

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF HIRANUMA, Setsuko,
by Mr. Warren.

29319 * The witness identified and verified exhibit
29322 3231 as her affidavit. * The affidavit stated that the
accused HIRANUMA was her mother's uncle, and since he was
old and without anyone to care for him, he lived with her
family.

29323 On the night of August 14-15, 1945, there were
two air raid alarms, the second about 5.30 a. m. They
learned that on the second raid the planes were not
bombers, so they did not go into the shelter. * Suddenly,
the witness heard a terrific noise and loud shouting
outside the house. Looking through the window, she saw a
gang of men coming through the front gate, making for the
house. She had been warned by the police guards stationed
in the house that something unpleasant was likely to happen.

The day before, one of the guards told her he
didn't like the way Japanese army planes had been flying
low over the house, and that they had better be prepared
in the event they should drop bombs on them. She knew the
mob had come after HIRANUMA, because they had the fifteen
police guards lined up with their hands over their heads.
She heard the leader of the gang, whom she later learned was
an army captain named SASAKI, shouting. He was shouting,
"Don't you know what sort of a _____ HIRANUMA is? He is
a notorious leader of the pro-Anglo-American group and a
traitor." SASAKI asked if they didn't realize the country
was going to collapse and be destroyed. They should be
ashamed to guard an arch traitor.

29324 * The witness rushed to HIRANUMA's room. By
this time uniformed soldiers had entered and were throwing
gasoline all over the house and setting fire to the rooms.
She got about half way to HIRANUMA's room, but because of
smoke could not advance.

She heard one gangster say they could not find
HIRANUMA, and another had shouted that he would be burned
to death in a minute. When she heard this, she felt that
someone had managed to take HIRANUMA from his room in the
nick of time.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
September 25, 1947
DEFENSE - HIRANUMA
HIRANUMA, S. - Direct

Page 4595

Page

29325 She was worried about her children and their nurse, * and when she asked one of the soldiers where they were, he replied brusquely that they had gone out. She then went around the house toward a neighboring building which was the office and library of a cultural organization known as Mukyukai, the president of which was HIRANUMA. She thought he might be hiding there. She found the nurse and her children there. The gang had guarded the front and side gate with machine guns in the event HIRANUMA came out, but overlooked a third gate leading to the Mukyukai library.

In the library was a lone police guard, who made a sign to her indicating HIRANUMA was hiding in the building. Some of the gang appeared to have been students and one of them threatened the nurse and children with a drawn sword in an attempt to tell where HIRANUMA was.

29326 * The house was completely destroyed by fire, and the mob left in a truck. She estimated there were roughly forty men, mostly soldiers and a few students.

The attack occurred the same morning Premier SUZUKI's house was assaulted, but his house escaped with only small damage.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: HIRANUMA, Setsuko

I, HIRANUMA, Setsuko, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs of my country, depose and state as follows:

My name is HIRANUMA, Setsuko. I was born in Kamakura, Japan, in 1913, and now live at 1053 Yoyogi Oyamacho Shibuyaku, Tokyo. I have been asked if I know anything of the attack made on the home of the accused HIRANUMA on 15 August, 1945. I do know because I was there and because that was my home. Baron HIRANUMA is my mother's uncle, but we always called him "Ojiisan", Granddad, in our house. He was old and had no one to take care of him, therefore, my parents, my two children and I live with him. At that time my husband had been conscripted and was in the Navy. My mother was over sixty years of age, in delicate health, and I was managing the house.

During the night of August 14-15, 1945, there had been an air raid alarm and we were in a dug out air raid shelter which was in our yard. At about 3 a.m. on the morning of the 15th of August, the air

raid alarm was lifted and we came out and went to bed in the house. At about 5:30 a.m. there was another alarm. I awakened, dressed and was ready to go into the shelter again when I learned that this time the raiders were carrier borne planes and not bombers. I attempted to get my two children to go back to sleep, but they wanted to stay up with me. Had I not permitted them to do so, I probably should never have seen them alive again, for suddenly I heard a terrific noise and loud shouting outside our house. I looked through my window and saw a gang of men coming through the front gate, making for the house proper. I had been warned by the police guards stationed in my house that something very unpleasant was likely to happen and I guessed accurately what this disturbance might mean. Just the day before one of the guards, TANAKA, Hiroshi, told me he did not like the way Army planes; that is, Japanese Army planes, had been flying low over our house and that we had better be prepared in the event they should drop bombs on us.

I knew the mob entering our front gate had come up after Granddad HIRANUMA because they had the police guards, about fifteen in all, lined up in a single row, with their hands over their heads, and I heard the leader of the gang, whom I could see and whom I later learned was an Army captain by the name of SASAKI, shouting at the top of his voice. He was saying, "Don't you know what sort of a bastard HIRANUMA is? You don't know, eh? He is a notorious leader of the pro-Anglo-American group. He is a traitor! Don't you realize our country is going to collapse and be destroyed! Guarding an arch traitor! You should be ashamed of yourselves!"

The first thing which occurred to me was that I must get Granddad away from the house. I left my children, who were clinging to me, a girl of 8 and a boy of 6, with an old Amah (elderly housemaid), and rushed towards his room. By this time a number of soldiers in uniform had come into the house and were throwing gasoline all over the house and setting fire to all the rooms one after another. Paper doors, screens and mats caught fire. I was not afraid, because I did not have time to become frightened, and besides I was dressed in a kind of uniform we all used to wear in those days when there was an air raid. I was much too worried over Granddad to be afraid. I got about half way to his room but was choked by smoke, and found it impossible to advance forward. At this time I heard one of the gangsters shouting, "We can't find HIRANOMA", and another one shouted in reply, "He will be burned to death in a minute." When I heard this I felt that someone had managed to take Granddad away from his room just in the nick of time, and I returned immediately to the servants quarters and sought for my children and Amah, but they were nowhere to be seen. I was extremely worried and asked one of the soldiers in the house what he had done to them and where they were, but he stated he did not know. I passed the leader of the gang and his soldiers when I was going out through the side gate. He was just inside the front gate with his men. They were all holding big drawn swords and pistols, and covering the police guards with at least one machine gun. The Captain, whom I later learned, as I stated, was named Sasaki, glared at me but I asked one of the soldiers whether he had seen my children anyway. He replied in a very brusque manner that they had

gone out.

I then went around the house toward the yard of the neighboring building. This building happened to be an office and library of a cultural organization known as Mukyukai, and Granddad was its President. I thought he might be hiding there. Amah and my children were there. The gang had guarded the front gate and a side gate with machine guns in the event Granddad came out, but they had overlooked a third gate through which one could go directly into the Mukyukai library. In the library was a lone police guard, who made a sign to me indicating that Granddad was in the building hiding. Some of the gang who raided our home that morning, appeared to have been students and one of them threatened Amah and my children with a drawn sword, in an attempt to force them to tell him where the old man was. He looked extremely vicious holding his drawn sword over his head, and Amah thought sure he was going to kill her. However, he did not harm either her or the children.

By the time I had located the children and learned Granddad was in hiding, the house was in full blaze, and it was completely destroyed, except the garage, which was only half destroyed. The mob left in a truck and shortly afterward the firemen arrived with their pumps, but they were too late. According to my estimate and that of the guards, there were roughly forty men, mostly soldiers and a few students. This attack occurred the same morning Premier SUZUKI's house was assaulted, but his house escaped with only small damage.

at Tokyo, Japan, this _____ day of September, 1947.

On this 14 day of Sept., 1947

At the above address.

DEPONENT: HIRANUMA, Setsudo (seal)

I, USAMI, Rokuro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At same place.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

HIRANUMA, Setsuko (seal)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

3 August 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. F. S. Tavenner, Jr.
Acting Chief of Counsel

FROM: David Nelson Sutton

SUBJECT: Chronological Statements of Prosecution's Evidence

I hand you herewith a copy of the Chronological Statement
of the Prosecution's Evidence as to each of the seven following
defendants:

DOIHANA, Kenji
HATA, Shunroku
HIRANUMA
HIROTA, Koki
ITAGAKI, Seishiro
MUTO, Akira
TOGO, Shigenori

DAVID NELSON SUTTON

7/21/47

CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT
of
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE
against
HIRANUMA

CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT

of

PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE

against

HIRANUMA

- 20 Dec 1920 Kokuhonsha Society organized by HIRANUMA to foster the spirit of nationalism; to bolster the foundations of the State; and to exalt the national spirit.
Ex 164 - R 1636
- 12 Apr 1926 Appointed vice-president of Privy Council.
Ex 107 - R 704
- 28 Oct 1926 Created a baron for distinguished services.
Ex 107 - R 704
- 18 Aug -
26 Sept 1930 Attended as vice-president meetings of the Investigation Committee, Privy Council, on ratification of London Naval Treaty of 1930.
Ex 910-A - R 9161
- 1 Oct 1930 Attended as vice-minister meeting of Privy Council. No decision reached at this meeting. Discussed ratification of London Naval Treaty.
Ex 911-A - R 9169
- 9 Dec 1931 Attended as vice-chairman meeting of Privy Council which discussed the China Incident. MINAMI reported on the China Incident.
Ex 2205-A - R 15,765
- o/a 17 Dec 1931 Attended as vice-chairman meeting of the Privy Council which decided the policy of pacifying and occupying the four Provinces of Liaoning, Kirm, Heilungkiang and Jehol. Approved military budget for this purpose.
Ex 188-C - R2222
- 13 Sept 1932 Attended as vice-chairman meeting of Privy Council on the signing of the protocol between Japan and Manchukuo. HIRANUMA presented the report to the Council on the matter and made statements concerning setting up of the new state, the attitude of the League and the stationing of Japanese troops in the country.
Ex 241 - R 2972-73
- 19 Dec 1934 Ambassador GREW notified Mr. HULL that the Privy Council had unanimously approved the Government's decision to abrogate the Washington Naval Treaty, and that draft instructions to SAITO would be submitted to the Cabinet on Dec. 21 or 22. HIRANUMA was vice-chairman of the Privy Council at this time.
Ex 58 - R 9199

- 3 July 1935 HIRANUMA, as vice-chairman, attended meeting of Privy Council which unanimously approved Japan-Manchukuo Economic Agreement establishing joint economic committee. HIRANUMA did not speak.
Ex 850 - R 7888
- 26 Oct 1935 -
1 Apr 1936 HIRANUMA appointed member for Japan to Permanent Conciliation Commission which was formed under Article 12 of Japanese-Netherlands Treaty. This commission formally completed in Nov. 1935 was formed to settle by conciliatory means all disputes not settled by diplomatic means. The treaty was abrogated by Japan on 12 January 1940.
Ex 1307 - R 11,769
- 13 Mar 1936 HIRANUMA became president of Privy Council (Kokuhonsha dissolved).
Ex 107 - R 704
- 6 May 1936 Signed the report, as chairman of the Committee of Examinations, to himself, as chairman of the Privy Council, unanimously deciding that "it is actually essential that both the ministers and vice-ministers (of the War and the Navy Ministries) be officers on active service."
Ex 2367 - R 18,183-88
- 10 June 1936 When HIRANUMA was president of the Privy Council, a treaty between Japan and Manchukuo was concluded abolishing by progressive stages Japan's extraterritoriality in Manchukuo in return for which Japanese subjects were to be free to reside, travel and engage in business in Manchukuo the same as native Manchurians. However, there was a supplemental agreement and a secret understanding attached to the treaty which modified the formal treaty to provide that Japanese should receive reduced rates of taxation which should be one-fourth of the original rates in respect to certain taxes and one-third of the original rates with respect to other taxes. Certain taxes with reference to the South Manchurian Railway zone were to become effective only after consultation with Japanese authorities.
Ex 238 - R 2949-59
- 20 Nov 1936 Report of the Investigation Committee unanimously recommending the approval of the Japanese-German Pact against the Communist Internationale and the Secret Attached Pact against the Soviet Union addressed to HIRANUMA as president of the Privy Council.
Ex 484 - R 5958
- 25 Nov 1936 HIRANUMA, as chairman, attended the Privy Council meeting which unanimously approved the Anti-Comintern Pact and Fishery Treaty with Russia.
Ex 485 - R 5968
- 20 Jan 1937 Attended a meeting of the Privy Council which approved appointment of naval officers as administrators of the South Sea Islands.
Ex 909-A - R 9158-B

- 7 July 1937 When HIRANUMA was president of the Privy Council, China Incident occurred.
- 6 Nov 1937 Attended a meeting of the Privy Council which decided to allow Italy to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Ex 492 - R 6044
- 11 Jan 1938 Telegram from DIRKSEN to the Reichminister refers to Privy Council meeting at which decision was made that in event of Chinese refusal of Japanese conditions, declaration of war would be made, denial of Nanking Government, establishment of provisional government of Peiping and continued military operations. HIRANUMA was president of Privy Council.
Ex 486-D - R 5995
- 11 Jan 1938 HIRANUMA presumably attended, as chairman of Privy Council, an Imperial Conference which decided the basic policy of the disposition of the China Incident, reserving the right to negotiate with the old Nanking Regime on the basis of the peace terms drawn up separately in case it changes its mind and seeks peace; however, if it does not Japan will discontinue negotiations, create a new Chinese Regime, and crush the old Nanking Regime or merge it into the new Central Regime.
Ex 463-A - R 5302 and 3623
- 15 Sept 1938 HIRANUMA was awarded a silver cup for meritorious services as a member of the Legislation Investigation Committee.
- 2 Nov 1938 HIRANUMA, as chairman, attended a meeting of the Investigation Committee and the Privy Council which passed unanimously the bill to terminate cooperative relations between the Japanese Empire and the various organs of the League of Nations.
Ex 271 - R 3641
- 22 Nov 1938 HIRANUMA was chairman and attended a Privy Council meeting which passed a resolution for the conclusion of a cultural agreement with Germany.
Ex 589 - R 6573
- Dec 1938 The KO-A-IN with branch offices in Shanghai, Peiping Amoy and Kalgaw was established in 1938 with its head office in Tokyo. The Prime Minister was its president and the Ministers of war, Navy, Finance and Foreign Affairs were its vice-presidents. OIKAWA, vice-president and director of the Political Affairs Bureau of KO-A-IN from 1941 to 1942, testified that "When a decision was made by the Central Office of the KO-A-IN it was communicated to the branch offices, who in turn would take the matter up with the local Chinese Government. When an agreement had been reached in the manner of effecting the decisions made in Tokyo, the technical advisors on the staff of the KO-A-IN would then aid the local Chinese Government to carry out the decision.....The KO-A-IN studied the needs of opium in different parts of China and arranged for the distribution of the opium from Mongolia to North China, Central China and South China. This distribution was done through Chinese organizations."
Ex 389 - R 4761-64

26 Dec 1938

KIDO wrote that he met HIRANUMA who was insistent that KONOYE's 1st Cabinet should not resign. His reason was that Wang Chao-Ming had escaped from Chungking and that the plot to establish the Puppet Government of China (see 4 Aug 1939) was proceeding steadily.

Ex 2265 - R 16,231

1939

MORIOKA testified that "The Special Service Board was completely organized by the army, while its successor, KO-A-IN, had all the administrative departments of the Japanese Government pulled together, with the responsibility to transmit the order of the Japanese Government to the puppet governments in occupied areas with the purpose of effective control."

Ex 401 - R 4806

1939

During HIRANUMA's Premiership, the opium production in Chosen for 1939 was as follows: "With the increase of the acreage by 2,000 Chobu (4,900 acres), the cultivation of poppies in 1939 was extended to 7,060 Chobu (17,297 acres) from which 78,366 kilograms of raw opium was derived and disposed of as follows:

"Manchukuo	62,000 kilogr.
"Kwantung Leased Territory	13,000 "
"Taiwan (Formosa)	5,000 "
Total	<u>80,000</u> "

"Furthermore, in order to meet the increasing demand for opium in excess of its production in Chosen, Manchukuo, Kwantung Leased Territory, and Formosa, and in accordance with the Cabinet's decision of December 12, 1938, the Opium Management Board on November 9, 1939, passed a resolution approving an additional 5,000 Chobu (12,250 acres) increase of poppies cultivation in Chosen for 1940. This increase, plus the previous year's 7,060 Chobu raised the total acreage under cultivation to 12,060 Chobu (29,547 acres)."

Ex 382 - R 4711

1939

During 1939, the "Office Report for 1939 of the Third Section of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry" sets forth the Iranian opium purchases for 1939 (72 kilograms to a case at officially fixed price of 125 pounds). Mitsubishi Trading Co. handled 200 cases imported by the Kwantung Leased Territory and 2800 cases imported by Manchukuo. The Mitsui Bussan Kaisha handled 1150 cases imported by the Restoration Government of China. The Monopoly Bureau of Waiwan through Iwai & Co., Ltd. imported 35 cases of Iranian opium from Hamburg. The report contains an agreement on Iranian opium purchases between the Mitsubishi Trading Co. and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha concluded on March 14, 1938, through the good offices of the Foreign Ministry regarding the

places of importation and their respective shares of business. Paragraph C of the agreement provides that "the government offices of Japan, Manchuria and China concerned shall decide upon and inform the two companies the amount of purchases for 1940 after ascertaining the actual opium collections in Chosen and Manchukuo in September of this year" (1939). Later at the request of Asia Development Board (KO-A-IN) and in order to further promote the smooth operation of the agreement, the Foreign Ministry urged the conclusion of a compromisory agreement as a result of which an agreement for the establishment of the Iranian Opium Purchasing Association was concluded between the two firms. This agreement provided that "The amount of purchases shall be decided each year and notified to the association by the government officials of Japan, Manchuria and China concerned, after ascertaining the actual amount of opium collected in Chosen and Manchukuo and the demand and supply in China. HIRANUMA was Premier during 1939.

Ex 383 - R 4861-63

1939

During 1939 a report of the United States Treasury Attache states that "One shipment of 1,000 cases for the puppet government arrived on November 16th, and another shipment of 1,000 cases was supposed to arrive on November 27th or 28th, to complete the order for 1939. The latter, however, has been delayed due to a foreign tramp steamer (perhaps British) being afraid to proceed further than Columbo. The Japanese authorities in Shanghai have received a telegraphic message from their agents stating that the foreign tramp steamer is now somewhere near Columbo and will not proceed further for fear of German submarines around that area. The Japanese authorities have already despatched 2 destroyers to bring this valuable cargo to Shanghai, and expect it to be here some time around December 20th.....

"The sudden stop in the preparations for the proposed new central government by WANG CHING-WEI's followers a few days ago was because of the difference of opinion between the Japanese and WANG. One of the points of difference was in respect to the turning over of full control of the gambling houses and opium business by the Japanese to the WANG-CHING-WEI Government, since important revenues are collected from these sources, amounting to \$5,000,000. per month with the opium revenue the largest item. Eventually, however, the Japanese authorities agreed to waive control of these two businesses. In order not to be outdone in obtaining revenue for the maintenance of Japanese wounded soldiers and the Special Service Bureau, the Japanese authorities, while releasing the opium distribution, are still holding on to the business of opium supply. In furtherance of this plan of control, the Japanese authorities have instructed the Mitsui Company to make an arrangement with a Chinese Hong (appointed already by the Japanese military authority 'as a sign board') as Agent of Mitsui Co. This Chinese firm will sell all Persian opium to the Chinese Government Monopoly Bureau at a profit of 5 to \$6,000.00 per case, the Chinese Hong appearing a

a screen for the Japanese authority and receiving for its services 25% of the profit, up to a limit of \$1,000,000.00 on each 1,000 cases of opium sold to the Chinese Government Monopoly Bureau." HIRANUMA was Premier during this time.

Ex 427 - R 4896

1939

The statement of KUO YU-SAN, an operator of an opium den in Peiping, states that "I was the manager of the Sin-Yi-Tsan, Peiping, from May 1944 to January 1945. So far as I know, there were in Peiping, during the Japanese occupation, around 247 opium dens, 23,000 registered or licensed opium addicts, 80,000 unregistered opium addicts, and 100,000 people who casually came to smoke opium. Opium was not sold openly prior to the Marco-Polo Bridge Incident. Just a few months after Japanese occupation the sale of opium was legalized, during the period of so-called Local Maintenance Association. Those who entered into the business of establishing opium dens were required to get license, at the beginning from the Bureau of Taxation on tobacco and wine, and later from the Board of Opium Suppression. The said Board secured its stock from the Meng-Kiang Opium Corporation."

Ex 402 - R 4810

During 1939

A statement by the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. contains figures regarding the importation by it of Persian opium from 1937 to 1940.

See R 4860. This document was not submitted. Would be submitted as an affidavit.

During 1939

An extract from the Record of the High Court of Nanking states that "the opium business in China was the systematic policy of high ranking officials of the Japanese Government for two reasons. First, the Mongolian-Singkiang Autonomous Government, which was a puppet organization set up by the Japanese following their occupation of Inner Mongolia, sought to solve the financial deficit problems by purchasing opium in Inner Mongolia, where the people used to grow poppy and sell it at a profit. Second, Japan, in addition to scraping every possible gain in China, looked to opium as a possible way out of her own financial difficulties caused by the war. The money for Mongolian puppet government ear-marked for the purchase of opium had to be first remitted to the Finance Ministry in Tokyo, where part of the sums were retained." HIRANUMA was Premier during 1939.

Ex 429 - R 4912

During 1939

The Chief of the Drug Control Service of the Secretariat of the League of Nations stated that, regarding the required annual report to the League of Nations, "No annual report, as provided under Article 21 of the Convention of July 13th, 1931 has been received in regard to Japan, and/or her territories in respect of any year subsequent to the reports covering the year 1938." HIRANUMA was Premier in 1939.

Ex 432 - R 4924

Jan 1939

Outline of the plan for the expansion of productive power by the Board of Planning dated January 1939. The plan was to be realized in accordance with the real object of its planning, and with the entire nation's strength backed by perfect cooperation. Government was to promote industrial development, devise special measures in regard to the control and encouragement of enterprises, and the supply of technicians and laborers, accommodation of funds, etc. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.
Ex 842 - R 8389

5 Jan 1939

HIRANUMA became Prime Minister. KIDO's diary relates that HIRANUMA requested KIDO to take the position of Home Minister "on the ground that the nomination was a predetermined one and almost constituted a condition as a result of his talk with Prince KONOYE." (ITAGAKI and ARAKI were continued as War Minister and Education Minister, respectively and KOISO was appointed Greater East Asia Minister).
Ex 2267 - R 16,233

5 Jan 1939

HIRANUMA continued ARITA as Foreign Minister in his cabinet. ARITA was appointed by KONOYE as Foreign Minister in his 1st Cabinet in Nov 1938. Upon his appointment as Foreign Minister, a new policy in dealing with other countries was decided upon. In replying to a note from Ambassador GREW which admittedly possessed an important bearing on the Nine Power Pact, it was decided to avoid all phraseology that would affirm the principles of that pact, to make the United States understand that the existing rights and interests of third powers would be respected but not as a corollary of the Pact, and to make them understand that the standard laws governing the future economic activities by third powers in China were to be established in conformity with the new conditions (Ex 989 - R 9575). The Japanese reply of November 18, 1938, made no mention of the Nine Power Pact but pointed out that permanent peace could not be gained on ideas or principles in their original form as applied to the pre-incident conditions. In this answer for the first time Japan ceased to avow her ostensible allegiance to the Treaty System, although she continued to pay allegiance to its underlying principles (Ex 989 - R 9576). On November 19, 1938, Arita told DOOMAN that there had in fact been no change in policy. While his predecessors had assured the United States that Japan would respect the principle of the open door, the assurances were not intended to be unconditional since Japan could no longer unqualifiedly undertake to respect that policy. They had not acted in bad faith but were attempting to do the impossible, reconcile the open door with Japan's needs and objectives (Ex 987 - R 9566).

Again on November 21st When GREW met ARITA, the latter told him that it was impossible for Japan to recognize the unconditional application of equal opportunity and the open door when the state of affairs had changed in China. He went on to assert that "Japan's Open Door Policy" and "Principles of Equal Opportunity" might clash with the rights and interests of third powers and implied that measures necessary to foster a closer relationship between

Japan and China and to insure their existence, might necessitate at times eliminating the application of these principles to some extent (Ex 989 - R 9581).

On December 8, 1938, GREW was informed that the Far Eastern Treaties hampered peace and universal prosperity. No move however was made to openly repudiate the treaties. (Ex 989 - R 9583).

5 Jan -
Aug 1939

While HIRANUMA was Premier, Japanese forces began to violate systematically the state frontier of the Mongolia People's Republic.

Ex 766 - R 7845

5 Jan 1939

Witness SATOMI, Hajime, said that after the China Affairs Board, the KO-A-IN, was created it handled opium in China. (R 4883).

Spring 1939

HIRANUMA, as Prime Minister, was President of the Board which was established 16 December 1938. In the spring of 1939, the Amoy Liaison Office of the China Affairs Board, an agency for the creation of a new order in East Asia, was set up as a creature of the Japanese Navy as other offices have been set up under the control of the army elsewhere. Officers were transferred to it from active service. The use of opium was sanctioned by this office and it licensed dens so that the puppet government could get needed funds.

Ex 412 - R 4834-36

7 Jan 1939

Extract from diary of Count CIANO relates that HIRANUMA is openly in favor of Axis-Japanese Alliance. It also relates that "Ribbentrop sends CIANO the text of the Pact, as well as the text of the secret conversation for the use of the military commissions."

Ex 499-A - R 6092.

12 Jan 1939

A report of the United States Treasury Attache at Shanghai contains the following statement: "According to information secured from an important official of the Puppet Ministry of Interior, who is visiting Shanghai on private business, the Japanese authorities have decided to hand over the administration of opium trade to the Reformed Government, so as to avoid international criticism for their part in the narcotization of Chinese, as reported in a recent memorandum. A General Opium Suppression Bureau for the Three Provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei has been established under the control of the Executive Yuan, but actually it is to be supervised by the Ministry of Interior.

"The General Opium Suppression Bureau for the Three Provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei is to be established in Nanking as soon as a suitable commissioner is secured."

HIRANUMA was Premier at this time.

Ex 420 - R 4870

14 Jan 1939

The United States Treasury Attache at Shanghai reported that "The Japanese authorities are considering

another way to guard against further international criticism of Japan's narcotization policy in China, according to information secured from circles in close touch with local opium merchants. The whole opium trade in the Japanese occupied areas in this part of China is to be covered by a network of 'Charitable organizations' called the Hung Chi Shan Tang."

"The Chairman will be a Chinese, while a Japanese will be elected vice-chairman. The personnel of the society and its branches and sub-branches will be selected by Japanese authorities. Mr. WANG SHAO-TSENG, a well-known opium merchant here, has been prominently mentioned as possible chairman of its Shanghai branch. This society, when established, will function with the General Opium Suppression Bureau for Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei in the carrying out of an effective opium monopoly scheme in this part of China."

HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Ex 422 - R 4874-75

21 Jan 1939

Excerpt from address of Baron HIRANUMA, Prime Minister, from March '39 issue of Tokyo Gazette dealing with the feelings of HIRANUMA on the China Affair. He stated that the present Cabinet was committed to the same policy as the previous one and he was determined to carry it out in order to lay the foundation of prosperity and progress in East Asia thru cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China in political, cultural and economic spheres. There must be a new order to replace the old, he continued, and he hoped that the Chinese would understand this correctly, and cooperate with the Japanese. There was no alternative but to exterminate those who persisted in opposition against Japan.

Ex 2229-A - R 15,988

6 Feb 1939

GREW informed ARITA of the imposition by the Japanese Naval Authorities at Chefoo of various restrictions on the shipment of merchandise and to the unwarranted restrictions placed upon American persons and business enterprises in Tientsin.

Ex 992 - R 9598

10 Feb 1939

The Island of Hainan was taken by a surprise attack and occupied. HIRANUMA was Prime Minister.

Judicially noticed - R 6143

18 Feb 1939

Telegram from OTT to State Secretary reveals that the Japanese Cabinet under Premier HIRANUMA, "is supposed to have finally decided upon an intensification of the (Anti-Comintern) Pact in opposition to Anglophile ideas especially of the Court circle."

Ex 500 - R 6094

21 Feb 1939

The United States Treasury Attache at Shanghai reported that "According to information secured from circles in close touch with Japanese Special Service Organ, the Japanese military in enforcing the narcotization policy in China expects to raise a revenue of \$300,000,000 a year when it is carried out in full swing. The Japanese believe that through the port of Shanghai, they can control the opium supply of the whole southeastern area including Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei and parts of Kiangsi and Hupeh. They calculate that in this area they can easily distribute 100,000 taels of opium every day. That means 3,000,000 taels a month or 36,000,000 taels per annum. In addition to this, they can distribute 5,000 ounces of morphine, cocaine, heroin and other narcotic drugs every day making an annual total of approximately 1,800,000 ounces.

"As the source of supply of Chinese opium from Szechuen, Yunnan, Kweichow, Kansu and Shensi has been cut off, the only opium allowed by the Japanese authorities will be Jehol opium, Persian opium, Suiyuan opium and Manchurian opium.... Several factories have now been established by Japanese in Shanghai which make and refine these drugs locally. The lowest wholesale price for Jehol, Suiyuan and Manchurian opium as given by Japanese authorities to the opium merchants is between \$6.00 to \$7.00 per tael, while Persian opium is \$7.00 to \$8.00 per tael. To this must be added the tax and surtaxes, license fees, bribery, escort fees, etc. So it is safe to say that Japanese can make \$5.00 net profit on every tael of opium sold in Shanghai and the surrounding districts. If calculated on the basis of 100,000 taels a day, the Japanese could raise \$500,000 a day or \$15,000,000 a month and \$180,000,000 a year. With income from other narcotic drugs and taxes added, the Japanese will have a revenue of approximately \$300,000,000 from the narcotization policy,"

Ex 421 - R 4871-73

22 Feb 1939

HIRANUMA attended as Premier meeting of Privy Council which unanimously agreed to participation of Hungary and Manchuria in the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Ex 491 - R 6037

8 Mar 1939

CIANO's diary discloses the intention to regard the Tripartite Pact as exclusively Anti-Russian. HIRANUMA on this date was Prime Minister.

Ex 499 - R 7910

8 March 1939

Excerpt from Japan Year Book 1941-42 shows that the amendment of Military Service Law was promulgated on 8 March which amended regulations for military service, conscription of ex-servicemen, postponement of conscription for students, abrogation of the short term conscription system and recognition of the privilege of postponement of conscription for Japanese students in Manchukuo Government schools. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Ex 604 - R 8803

- 11 March 1939 Ambassador GREW called ARITA's attention to the restricting of American shipments of merchandise, and unwarranted restrictions on U. S. personnel and business interests in Tientsin. The control measures imposed by the Japanese sponsored regime in North China were considered most discriminating against the United States and others and favorable to Japan.
HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.
Ex 992 - R 9598
- 20 March 1939 A dispatch from the American Consulate General at Mukden covering the Manchukuo Budget for 1939 showed gross receipts from opium sales for 1939 to be ¥90,908,400 as against ¥71,045,200 for 1938. In 1938 raw opium purchased by the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration cost ¥32,653,000; in 1939 it cost ¥43,470,000. Net profits from the sale of opium in 1939 were expected to be over ¥56,000,000, after payment of nearly ¥15,000,000, to general accounts, reserve funds, and national loan funds. HIRANUMA was Premier from 5 Jan. to 30 Aug. 1939.
Ex 387 - R 4750
- 23 March 1939 OTT wired Berlin that he had been informed that a Five Minister Conference had decided to take up diplomatic negotiations with Germany for the purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia.
Ex 780 - R 7909
- 25 March 1939 Law No. 25 for safeguarding secrets of military material resources was promulgated. Article 1 of the law aims at the prevention of leakage of information on manpower and material resources to be employed for military purposes to foreign nations. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.
Witness: Liebert - R 8664
- 27 March 1939 Spain was admitted into the Anti-Comintern Pact. HIRANUMA was Premier.
Ex. 494 - R 6046
- 30 March 1939 During HIRANUMA's Premiership, the Spratley Islands, a French possession off the eastern coast of French Indo-China, were occupied by Japanese troops.
Ex 512 - R 6146; 6791
- 30 March 1939 GREW informed ARITA of the "ever lengthening list of instances in which, as a result of air raids by the Japanese forces, American properties, although clearly marked and the location thereof previously reported with accompanying maps to the Japanese authorities, have been damaged and in some cases destroyed (GREW then lists the numerous instances).
Ex 985 - R 9559
- 31 Mar 1939 KIDO's diary relates that HIRANUMA had conferred with KIDO on the problems of the Military Alliance between Germany and Japan and of the appointment of new Cabinet members, etc.
Ex 2268 - R 16,234

1 Apr 1939

In a report of the United States Treasury Attache at Shanghai, the following statement appears: "It has been ascertained from local opium merchants that the Japanese ship which carried Persian opium from Dairen to Shanghai and arrived at the Jukong Wharf near the Civic Center on February 26 was the Zinyu Maru No. 3. This ship brought 800 chests of opium, being part of the 3,700 chests previously reported. The other ship which arrived on February 28 was the Tangshan Maru." HIRANUMA was Premier at this time.

Ex 417 - R 4866

1 Apr 1939

On this date there was a further revision of the Military Service Law, facilitating registration of young men for military service outside of Japan and eliminating the difference between active and reserve officers, when active service was completed, they immediately enrolled in the reserve. HIRANUMA was Premier at this time.

Witness: Liebert - R 8804

1 Apr 1939

The Japan Electric Power Company was formed for the purpose of effecting a unity in the production and distribution of electric power in Japan proper. The Company was given monopolistic powers by law under governmental control. Capital came from private sources. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Witness: Liebert - R 8532

5 Apr 1939

The Motion Picture Law of 1939 passed which related to the control and censorship of motion pictures. A permit had to be obtained to produce or distribute motion pictures; no picture could be shown before being passed by necessary administrative office; punishments and fines were provided for violators, etc. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Ex 155 - R 1315

5 Apr 1939

The Shipbuilding Industry Law (No. 71) was promulgated to sanction and provide subsidy and loss indemnification to encourage shipbuilding. Basically it allowed the Imperial Government to make contracts with banking organizations that provided funds for shipbuilding or for buying ships and to indemnify the loss they might incur by accommodation of the funds. The same law authorized the Government to issue public loans to necessary limit or pay indemnity in bonds. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Witness: Liebert - R 8320

5 Apr 1939

The United States Treasury Attache in Shanghai reported that "One of the most important programs to be carried out by the Ministry of Interior of the puppet Reformed Government of China for 1939 is the enforcement of opium monopoly under the cover of opium amelioration work.....The real power of the bureau, however, is in the hands of the Japanese co-director, Mr. Hamata."

Ex 424 - R 4879

14 April 1939

In an aide-memoire from GREW to Japan, it stated that "In the parts of China now under Japanese military control, however, according to reports sub-

mitted by American officials, Japanese in authority are not taking effective measures to cooperate in the suppression of the abuse of narcotic drugs and illicit traffic therein." HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Ex 434 - R 4928

The Japanese Government did not acknowledge receipt of or make reply to the aide-memoire.

Ex 434 - R 4941

26 Apr 1939

Telegram from RIBBENTROP to OTT states "top secret discussions between Berlin, Rome and Tokyo, on the conclusion of a defensive alliance have been in progress for some time. They have for special reasons and in accordance with agreements made with the other partners been conducted outside usual diplomatic channels," and that drafts of two secret protocols which provided for immediate consultation on the execution of the obligation of assistance and special measures for mutual treatment of questions on propaganda and the press had been sent to Tokyo and considered by the Cabinet. HIRANUMA was Premier at this time.

Ex 502 - R 6098-99

28 Apr 1939

"The Temporary Government of North China has had discussions at Peiping on 28 April 1939 with the North China Liaison Section of the Asia Development Board on the drafts of both the Law for the Prohibition of Smoking and the Regulations for its enforcement in North China, with a view to a uniform system of opium control in North China. But they have not yet come into effect." HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Ex 382 - R 4777

May 1939

HIRANUMA, although Premier at the time, stated that he knew nothing until after the opening of hostilities of the Nomongan Incident and that the army acted independently of the government.

Ex 768 - R 7854

May 1939 to
Surrender of
Japan

An affidavit by Leo KANDEL, a dentist, who resided in Peiping, states that "during the period of my residence in Peiping up until the surrender of Japan opium was openly sold in Peiping with the consent of the Japanese controlled government. Heroin was also sold. The opium trade was open and catered to the Chinese. So far as the government could enforce the rule opium was not sold to Japanese. I am advised that even the hospitals gave morphine very freely to the Chinese patients -- a practice not applied to other patients.

"It was perfectly obvious that the open sale of opium in China was approved and sponsored by the Japanese Government for the purpose of weakening and undermining the strength of the Chinese people."

Ex 403 - R 4813

May 1939

A report from the American Consulate at Canton, China states "In May, 1939 a concern called Fuk Man Tong was organized for the distribution of opium. Although the local regime announced that this firm had been granted a monopoly for import, sale and distribution of opium, no form of control over the firm's activities was indicated until September when it was announced that the Fuk Man Tong would operate the monopoly under the control of the city government. The Fuk Man Tong is said to have been organized by Chan Shi-chai, a Formosan Chinese, in close cooperation with the Special Service Section of the Japanese Military Headquarters. It is said that Chan was granted the monopoly for two years for a reputed consideration of 200,000 yen (military notes)* -- *One military yen is now the equivalent of approximately US \$0.104 -- which supposedly remained with the Special Service Section. In addition to the initial price, a sum of ¥1,000 per month was payable to the Section by the Fuk Man Tong....."

".....While accurate information as to consumption is unavailable it is reported that about 129,000 taels of the drug were sold in the two month period of October and November, 1939. It will thus be seen that, exclusive of profits on the sale of the opium itself a monthly revenue of about ¥82,650 is obtained from its distribution in Canton City itself. Seven agencies of the monopoly are reported to have been set up in the populous nearby districts of Namhoi, (containing the large city of Fatshan), Punyu, Shuntak, Sunwui, Tsengshing, Tungkun and Samshui. No information as to the number of dealers, dens or amount of sales for these districts is available but it may be conservatively estimated that the consumption in all the districts mentioned would be at least double that of Canton City itself.

"The revenues described in the foregoing paragraph are understood so far to have gone exclusively to the Special Service Section of the Japanese Army and to have been put into a 'special fund'. It is understood, however, that at the present time consideration is being given to permitting the local 'puppet' government to collect the revenue under reference, presumably to retain at least a portion of it, the Special Service Section presumably to continue to receive the profits from the import and sale of the drug to the monopoly.

"Prices:

"The Special Service Section is said to be selling raw Persian opium at the present time to the monopoly at ¥18,000 per case of 160 lbs., which in turn sells it to raw opium dealers at ¥23,000 per case."

"Although it is not possible to state with accuracy how the local supply is obtained, an observer in Macao has reported that Japanese military officers

from Canton are frequently visitors at the Macao opium monopoly and it is believed that early supplies came mainly from that port. It is said that the first direct shipment from Persia was brought by the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha from Persia to Shanghai and there transhipped to Canton by military transport in January 1940. This shipment was said to consist of 200 - 160 lb. cases. It is reported that future supplies will probably be obtained in a similar manner."

"Unconfirmable but probably accurate information indicates that since the latter part of 1939 rather extensive cultivation of poppies has been started in the Tsungfa and Punyu districts. It is said that over 3,400 mow (roughly 550 acres) are nearly ready for harvesting in the latter district. A tax of ¥40 per mow is said to be imposed by the local regimes."

"It would appear from available information that the traffic is controlled and consumption encouraged by the Special Service Section of the Japanese Army."

"Although it is now said that at least part of the licensing revenues will be turned over to the puppet Chinese government, all indications are that the lion's share of the lucrative traffic goes to the somewhat mysterious Japanese 'special funds'. Licensing and taxing revenues in the city of Canton alone are about ¥90,000 per month, and sales in the city itself probably much more than ¥300,000 per month. It appears safe to conjecture from the well known Japanese attitude towards the drug traffic and the completely negative economic gains achieved in the occupied areas of Kwangtung that the traffic will be continued and stimulated as the best possible source of an easy continuous flow of funds into the military coffers."

HIRANUMA was Prime Minister during 1939.
Ex 413 - R 4838-44

1 May 1939

Regulations issued for the strengthening and expansion of the Mongolian Army. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Ex 274 - R 3689

4 May 1939

HIRANUMA's declaration is contained in a telegram from OTT to RIBBENTROP. The declaration was sent to HITLER after the negotiations on the Japan-Germany Alliance had come to a deadlock. HIRANUMA stated that "in this splendid hour it is a confirmed joy to me how effective the Anti-Comintern Agreement between our two countries proves itself in the execution of the tasks placed before them. And today if I have in view the conclusion of an agreement, to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and to make closer the cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy, this does not occur just out of consideration of the more expediency of it, but in the hope that in that way we may contribute to the consolidation of a world peace founded upon justice and morality in consciousness of our common tasks now." HIRANUMA also stated that Japan is firmly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy and to afford them political, economic

and military assistance. He further stated that Japan was at that time unable to extend in a practical manner any effective military aid but that she would, if it should become possible through a change in the circumstances.

Ex 503 - R 6103

4 May 1939

Telegrams from OTT to the German Foreign Minister concerned HIRANUMA's message to Italy and Germany concerning the negotiations for the Tri-Partite Pact and the Japanese Army's objections to certain provisions of the pact regarding obligatory military aid. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Ex 503 - R 6103

6 May 1939

Telegram from German Ambassador OTT to State Secretary concerning the fact that HIRANUMA has obtained a compromise in the conflict of the Five Ministers' Conferences between the War and Finance Ministers and the War and Navy Ministers. OTT reported that he reconciled the conflicting views of ITAGAKI and others and that treaty may, therefore, go through.

Ex 504 - R 6103-11

11 May 1939

GREW informed ARITA of the indiscriminate bombings of the civilian population of Chungking, Swatow, Ningpo and Foochow. GREW referred to the "repeated bombings of American property in China, of which approximately 140 separate instances have come to my Government's attention during the present hostilities in spite of the fact that these properties were clearly marked by American flags and their positions notified to the Japanese military authorities. Loss of American life, wounds and serious property damage were caused."

Ex 58 - R 9603

14 May 1939

Japanese violated the Mongolian People's Republic with a force of 300 men strong, according to a memo of the Red Army General Staff "on the provocative attack of the Japanese in the Mongolian area in 1939." HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Ex 766 - R 7846

15 May 1939

The United States in its reply to a League of Nations circular which reply is found in the minutes of the 25th Session of the League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, May, 1940, the following statement is made "The Government of the United States observes that the Japanese Government, after admitting the importation of large quantities of opium of high morphine content into areas of China under control of its military forces, endeavors to justify such importations as technically permissible under the International Drug Conventions, presumably as a basis for refraining from prosecuting or interfering with the Japanese who are concerned in thus building up this serious menace to the rest of the world. The Government of the United States holds that the Japanese Government shares with the American Government and with other governments the well-

recognized obligations under the International Drug Conventions to control the production and distribution of raw opium, to render effective the limitation of manufacture of narcotic drugs to the world's legitimate requirements for medical and scientific purposes, to use its efforts to control or to cause to be controlled all those who manufacture, import, sell, distribute and export narcotic drugs, and to cooperate in other ways provided for in those Conventions. The actions in reference to narcotic drugs of the regimes which have been established in those areas of China controlled by Japanese military forces cannot be regarded as limiting the manufacture or controlling the distribution of narcotic drugs." Ex 372 - R 4667-69.

The same exhibit contains the declaration of Dr. Hoo Chi-Tsai (China) as follows: "We have succeeded in obtaining a copy of a proclamation by the Japanese occupation authorities exhorting the population to grow the poppy plant. This proclamation, which I shall hand over to the Secretariat, comes from Shui Yeh district in the province of Honan. It reads in translation as follows: "'As it is now autumn, the season for sowing opium-poppy seed, villagers are hereby informed that they must sow the seed in good time. When the poppy is ripe it may, after payment of the statutory taxes, be sold at the current rate freely and without restrictions. It is important therefore to sow the seed immediately and not miss the season.

"'The Pacification Detachment of the Japanese Army at Shuiweh.'" (R 4865-66)

HIRANUMA was Premier during May 1939.
Ex 372 - R 4865

15 May 1939

Five Japanese bombers made an attack on the 7th outpost on the Mongolian People's Republic border. Damage and casualties were caused. Hiranuma was Premier at the time.
Ex 766 - R 7846

June 1939

Article of Tokyo Gazette of June entitled "Progress of Economic Construction in Manchukuo". In view of the natural richness of Manchukuo, it plays an important part in the comprehensive program surrounding Japan. The results which the 5-year plan obtained in the progress of development of coal, iron, steel, etc., are excellent. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.
Ex 449 - R 5103

5 June 1939

In a telegram from OTT to RIBBENTROP, during HIRANUMA's Premiership, it was stated that "participation in the war against England and France has been conceded, tho still with certain reservations by which Japan wishes to secure the right to choose a favorable time for entering the war." The Premier and the Foreign Minister have assented to the understanding.
Ex 614 - R 6793

15 June 1939

CRAIGIE wrote ARITA to the effect that military

restrictions were being imposed on communications with the British at Tientsin constituting a definite and grave anti-British discrimination. British subjects were held up and rigorously searched on entering and leaving a concession in the same manner as and together with all Chinese. Other foreigners were allowed to pass without examination. British subjects including military in uniform were refused exit.

Ex 1003 - R 9616

19 June 1939

A law was passed forming the Korea Magnesite Development Company for the purpose of developing magnesite mining and the control and sale thereof. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.

Witness: Liebert - R 8475

23 - 25 June 1939 While HIRANUMA was Prime Minister, certain Protestant and Roman Catholic Mission properties were bombed in China as well as the Union High School in Foochow on June 29.

Ex 998 - R 9609

25 June 1939

CRAIGIE wrote to ARITA of gross indignities inflicted by agents of the Japanese Army upon Mr. Cecil Davis, honorary New Zealand Government agent at Tientsin. He pointed out that he had previously referred to other cases leaving no doubt as to the deliberate nature of the provocation.

Ex 1003 - R 9618

6 July 1939

Two squadrons of Japanese planes raided Chungking, bombs falling at random on both banks of the Yangtze River and in the city one of which fell within 400 feet of the residence of the Counselor of the American Embassy and others landing about 300 yards from the residence of the American Embassy. The Lewis Memorial Institutional Church at Chungking, an American Institution, was badly damaged.

Ex 999 - R 9610

7 July 1939

Japanese planes raided Chungking and bombs fell within 50 yards of the quarters of the Counselor of the American Embassy causing about 30 Chinese civilian casualties. During raids of 6 and 7 July 1939, 5 bombs struck within 200 yards of the U.S.S. Tutuila.

20 July 1939

While HIRANUMA was Prime Minister, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued an order that "to meet a protracted war, this army should gradually create conditions which can be long maintained and should continuously crush and 'destroy the fighting power of the enemy from the air and on the ground.' At the same time, by resorting to active political resources and stratagems, weaken the foundation of the enemy's spiritual and material powers of resistance." The exhibit also states that "we will establish a new Central Government with WANG CHING-WEI as its head and give positive support to its development."

Ex 272 - R 3655

- 25 July 1939 The Japan Rice Company was formed for the purpose of effecting a monopoly in the purchase and sale of rice. Main method in control of price of food-stuffs, since rice constitutes major item of Jap diet. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.
Witness: Liebert - R 8532
- 26 July 1939 During HIRANUMA's Premiership the United States after numerous protests against commercial discrimination against citizens of the United States, notified Japan of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty of Commerce & Navigation which had been signed in Washington on February 21, 1911.
Ex 994 - R 9602
- 26 July 1939 There was promulgated the ordinance concerning the plan by the promoter of a business for general mobilization. This ordinance provided that the Ministers of War and Navy could call in the owners or promoters of selected businesses, named pursuant to ordinance under the National General Mobilization Law, and order such persons to make plans for production following a set national production schedule. HIRANUMA was Premier at this time.
Witness: Liebert - R 8402
- 1 August 1939 GREW notified NOMURA, Foreign Minister, that the property of the Lutheran Brethren Mission at Tungpeh, Honan had again been damaged as a result of an air raid by Japanese planes and GREW stated that the property had been bombed on two previous occasions resulting in the death of an American national and the wounding of two other American nationals.
Ex 1000 - R 9612
- 4 August 1939 KIDO's diary states that it would be extremely bad policy for the HIRANUMA Cabinet to resign prior to the establishment of the WANG Regime, after WANG had taken all the trouble to come to Tokyo to confer with the Cabinet members. He thought it best to have the political change after the WANG Regime was established.
Ex 2271 - R 16,237
- 16 August 1939 By decree of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, the Coal Sales Control Regulation was promulgated on 16 August. These regulations provided that Commerce and Industry Ministers had to sanction sales of coal producers or coal agents about 250 tons per month, or privileged government distributors. This indirectly made producers of certain industries manufacture products desired. HIRANUMA was Premier at this time.
Witness: Liebert - R 8298
- 25 August 1939 Protest of HIRANUMA set out in telegram from OTT regarding the conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact, saying it violated the secret agreement of the Anti-Comintern Pact and terminated the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact.
Ex 486-L - R 6122
- 26 August 1939 Chief Administrator De Taste informed Acting Consul General Urabe at Hanoi that at eleven

- o'clock on 26 August a Japanese seaplane dropped bombs, causing about thirty casualties in the vicinity of Tha Khe near the border of French Indo-China. HIRANUMA was Premier at the time.
Ex 616-A - R 6814
- 28 August 1939 KIDO's diary - Cabinet meeting held regarding the resignation of HIRANUMA's Cabinet. After HIRANUMA's explanations, all agreed and tendered their resignations.
Ex 2272 - R 16,240
- 10 Feb 1940 While HIRANUMA was Premier, the Hainan Islands were forcibly occupied by Japanese forces. Kiungchow and Haikow fell into the hands of the Japanese.
Ex 613-A - R 6733
- 5 July 1940 Extract from KIDO's diary disclosed arrests made of participants in attempts on the lives of members of the YONAI-ARITA Cabinet. This caused the downfall of the Cabinet. HIRANUMA suggested that, in view of present rumours of political change, there would be no better appointment than Prince KONOYE. KIDO stated that "The Army unanimously will support Prince KONOYE's candidacy" and as to the selection of a Foreign Minister "the Army would leave such a question entirely to Prince KONOYE."
Ex 532 - R 6242-43
- 17 July 1940 Excerpts from KIDO's diary which stated that HIRANUMA and other members of the Cabinet met with Lord Privy Seal on matter of choosing another Premier. HIRANUMA recommended KONOYE.
Ex 532 - R 6242
- 26 Sept 1940 By joining KONOYE whose appointment he had supported (see 5 July 1940), he adopted the Tripartite Pact which he had tried to negotiate himself.
Ex 532 - R 6242
- 6 Dec 1940 Appointed as Minister without Portfolio in 2d KONOYE Cabinet.
Ex 107 - R 704
- 21 Dec 1940 Appointed Home Minister in 2d KONOYE Cabinet.
Ex 107 - 704
- 10 Jan 1941 The orders of Restriction of Publication in newspapers and others, otherwise known as Imperial Ordinance Number 37 was enacted and prohibited publication of any news which might hinder conduct of foreign affairs or national policies, or conduct of financial and economic policies and that which must be kept secret from foreign countries. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.
Ex 154 - R 1315
- 13 Jan -
21 July 1941 Attended all Liaison Conferences except those of 13 Jan and 22 May. During this period he was Home Minister.
Ex 1103 - R 10,057

16 Jan 1941

When HIRANUMA was Home Minister a list of Japanese demands containing most of the points decided upon by the Cabinet on 25 Oct 1940 was presented to the Netherlands Indies authorities. The Cabinet decision of 25 Oct 1940 (Ex 1317 - R 11,832) determined the measures for the economic development of NEI.

Ex 1309-A - R 11,844

21 Jan 1941

HIRANUMA was a member of the Cabinet when MATSUOKA in a speech before the Imperial Diet for the first time declared publicly that the Netherlands Indies formed part of Japan's Co-prosperity Sphere (Ex 1300 - R 11,740) and sent out instructions that the fact that Netherlands Indies formed a part of this sphere should henceforth not be denied.

Ex 1302 - R 11,743

22 Jan 1941

Newspaper extract from Japan Times & Advertiser stating that fundamental principles of Japan's population policy were decided at cabinet meeting after HOSHINO and Ministers of Welfare, War & Education had expressed their opinions. Policy of increasing population was adopted and goal of 100 million for 1945 was set. HIRANUMA was Home Minister at the time.

Ex 1067 - R 9879

Ex 865 - R 8810

30 Jan 1941

Attended as Home Minister Liaison Conference of 30 Jan 1941 which decided policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand.

Ex 1303 - R 11,744

6 Feb 1941

Telegram from OTT to German Foreign Office regarding Japan's plans to obligate France and Thailand by secret agreement whereby they will conduct no military or political agreement with a Third Power. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 564 - R 6446

13 Feb 1941

GREW informed MATSUOKA that Japanese officials in Indo-China continued their interference in granting permits to United States firms. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 1042 - R 9797

7 Mar 1941

Presumably attended as Home Minister a Cabinet meeting which decided that the detailed regulations regarding the application of revised National Mobilization Law, which regulations had been approved in the 76th session of Diet, were to go into effect March 20.

Ex 1055 - R 9842

8 Mar 1941

New Peace Preservation Law was promulgated. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 98 - R 506

15 Mar 1941

The Imperial Oil Company Law (Law No. 73) established the Imperial Petroleum Company, a national policy company, to survey and develop oil fields and to control the purchase and sale of all petroleum and oil products. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Witness: Liebert - R 8290

19 Mar 1941

A report from the United States Treasury Attache at Shanghai states that "It is reported that the Japanese Consular Police give protection to Japanese and Koreans engaged in the heroin trade. Such dealers, if they violate regulations by selling the drug to Japanese or in any other way, may be arrested by the Consular Police without however, their business being interrupted. A fine usually gets them off." HIRANUMA was Home Minister.

Ex 400 - R 4804

28 Mar 1941

A report to the Secretary of State from the American Consulate at Tsinan, China, states that "Reports from reliable foreign sources indicate that the use of heroin by the renegade Chinese troops cooperating with the Japanese forces is widespread, particularly among those in northeastern Shantung. The sale of heroin adulterated with flour is being sponsored by and engaged in primarily for the profit of the Japanese Army. It is made available in 'doses' costing 'Federal Reserve Bank' \$3.00, and is consumed by addicts by burning and inhaling the fumes. A single addict is capable of consuming as much as FRB \$45.00 worth of this adulterated heroin in a single day, it is said." HIRANUMA was Home Minister.

Ex 397 - R 4796

1 Apr 1941

On 1 April the Chief of Cabinet Printing Bureau ordered the manufacture of "Ha" and "Ni" series of military currency immediately in Dutch and English, to be completed in early April. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 852 - R 8452

1 Apr 1941

Excerpt from Japan Year Book 1941-1942, giving details of further revised Military Service Law of 1 April with main points: (1) enrolment of new conscripts in overseas districts into garrisons nearest to their residences; (2) abrogation of 2nd reserve Service System; (3) prolongation of days of call for the education of supplementary reservists. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 864 - R 8803

14 April 1941

Telegram from BOLTZE of German Embassy in Tokyo regarding the signing of the Neutrality Pact between Japan and Russia. It would facilitate Japan's expansion policy in South Asia and attack on Singapore. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 584 - R 6553

2 May 1941

Presumably attended as Home Minister a Cabinet meeting which decided that the National Defense Security Law would be enforced on May 10, 1941.

Ex 1038 - R 9781

6 May 1941

Treaties of residence, navigation and customs system were concluded between Japan and French Indo-China, giving Japanese equal rights with nationals of that country. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 46 - R 7159

Ex 7140 - R 658

- 6 May 1941 In a telegram from OTT to RIBBENTROP regarding the American proposal, OTT stated that "on Saturday (3 May 1941) a solemn group consisting of the Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, HIRANUMA, and the Chief of the Army gave their consent to the interim reply which was communicated in the foregoing report; and gave a vote of confidence.
Ex 1068 - R 9886
- 9 May 1941 Peace agreement between France and Thailand was signed. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.
Ex 47 - R 6999
- 10 May 1941 The National Defense Security Law was enforced to safeguard the secrecy of high state secrets regarding diplomatic, financial and economic matters. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.
Ex 864 & 1038 - R 8805
- 12 May 1941 When HIRANUMA was Home Minister a draft proposal of a confidential memorandum agreed upon between Japan and the United States was submitted by NOMURA to HULL. Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was reiterated and the United States' attitude towards China and the economic and political problems between the two countries were reviewed.
Ex 1070 - R 9891
- 15 May 1941 Liaison Conference was held and was attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO, and OKA. There is no reference to its decision.
Ex 1103 - R 10,057
- 18 May 1941 In a cable from OTT to RIBBENTROP, OTT stated That HIRANUMA had to resign when the German-RUSSIAN Non-aggression Pact was concluded, being a champion of a German-Japanese Alliance against Russia.
Ex 1073 - R 9912
- 18 May 1941: In a telegram from OTT to RIBBENTROP he referred to a statement by MATSUOKA that "during a secret Cabinet session he (MATSUOKA) had called upon all members of the government clearly to acknowledge Japan's obligation under the Tripartite Pact on their part too, in all of their conversations. All members of the Cabinet had agreed unanimously." OTT further stated that MATSUOKA viewed most skeptically the chances for success of the Japanese-American negotiations and that as theretofore "he counts on America's entry into the war in the near future. His sole motive in the negotiations with the United States is, if possible, to postpone or prevent the entry of the United States into the war and furthermore to eliminate the increase of the present American assistance to England."
Ex 1073 - R 9911
- 6 June 1941 Attended as Home Minister Liaison Conference. No

decisions reported but KONOYE informed KIDO that OSHIMA had an interview with HITLER and "that Germany had at last decided to attack Russia." KONOYE also said that the Liaison Conference would discuss this matter and that he, KIDO, should report this fact to the throne.
Ex 1084 - R 9979

6 June 1941

When HIRANUMA was Home Minister, HULL handed NOMURA an informal statement which stated that HULL was disappointed in the vast difference between the proposal as it then stood with the revisions and the original document. Japan appeared to stress its alignment with the Axis, to avoid giving a clear indication of her intention to make peace with China on a basis which in the opinion of the United States would contribute to a lasting peace and thus to the future stability of the Far East, and to veer away from clear-cut commitment regarding policies of peace and non-discriminatory treatment which are the fundamentals of a sound peace in the Pacific area.

Ex 1085 - R 9982

10 June 1941

In a telegram from WOERMANN to the Reich Foreign Minister, it is shown how the execution of Japanese plans of aggressive action in southern areas had progressed by this date. The Japanese Army desired bases in south Indo-China for the purpose of strategic position with Singapore. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 586 - R 6560

16 June 1941

Investigation Committee of Privy Council unanimously ratified a treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation regarding French Indo-China and treaty between Japan and France regarding tariff system and trade and the method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China. HIRANUMA was Home Minister at the time.

Ex 660 - R 7155-56

20 June 1941

KIDO stated that KONOYE informed him, in view of strained international relations and the outbreak of war between Germany and USSR, that it was difficult to understand MATSUOKA's opinion. When KONOYE referred to Cabinet responsibility, KIDO promised they would discuss the matter with HIRANUMA, Home Minister, at the earliest opportunity.

Ex 1090 - R 9998

20 June 1941

KIDO refers to a discussion among KONOYE, HIRANUMA and himself in which KONOYE said that if war broke out between Germany and the USSR⁴ his Cabinet would have to take the responsibility and resign, as the HIRANUMA Cabinet had done in 1939 when Germany made a pact with the USSR while the Tripartite Pact was under negotiation. KIDO opposed this, saying that Germany signed the treaty with Russia, Japan's "hypothetical enemy, before the policy of HIRANUMA's Cabinet was decided.

Ex 781 - R 7911

21 June 1941

Telegram from Ambassador in Tokyo to German Foreign Minister concerning conversation with MATSUOKA plans for air bases in French Indo-China in preparation for attack on Netherlands East Indies. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 635 - R 7008

21 June 1941

When HIRANUMA was a member of the Cabinet, a telegram from OTT to RIBBENTROP reported that MATSUOKA had stated to OTT that the breaking off of the negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands was definite and that for proceeding against the Netherlands Indies air and naval bases must be set up in French Indo-China.

Ex 365 - R 7009

22 June 1941

An extract from KIDO's diary states that KIDO had an audience with the Emperor in order to present his opinion based upon a talk with KONOYE and HIRANUMA. KIDO stated that there had been a difference of opinion between KONOYE and MATSUOKA concerning the foreign policy of Japan to be followed in case war broke out between Germany and Russia. KIDO also stated that the Emperor informed him that MATSUOKA's policy would mean Japan's positive advance to both the northern and southern regions. KIDO then telephoned HIRANUMA to say that it was desirable to pay careful attention to the matter.

Ex 1093 - R 10,021

25 June 1941

HIRANUMA attended as Home Minister the Liaison Conference which decided to accelerate all preparatory measures in Thailand and French Indo-China such as stationing of troops in southern part of French Indo-China and the acquisition of air and naval bases. Diplomatic relations were to be opened to accomplish this; failing that, Japan would obtain her object by arms.

Ex 1306 - R 11,753

28 June 1941

In a telegram from OTT to RIBBENTROP regarding Japan's preparation for an attack against Russia, he stated that a majority of the cabinet decided not to weaken Japan's military position in China and to tighten her grip on Indo-China for which purpose three divisions were allegedly prepared.

Ex 1097 - R 10,034

2 July 1941

Presumably attended as Home Minister a Cabinet meeting referred to in a telegram from OTT to Berlin stating that MATSUOKA's successor TOYODA would continue Japan's attitude toward Germany and Italy as expressed by former Foreign Minister MATSUOKA based upon a Cabinet decision of 2 July 1941.

Ex 1118 - R 10,171

2 July 1941

HIRANUMA as Home Minister attended an Imperial Conference which adopted resolutions concerning the Japanese-American negotiations. It was decided that Japan would adhere to the principle of establishing a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere; that she would continue the disposition of the China Incident and would step up the southward advance; that the northern problems (Russia) would be dealt with according to the changes in the situation; and that Japan would remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing. Preparations for war against Great Britain and the United States were to be made and her schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand were to be executed. While Japan would not for a while in-

tervene in the German-Soviet war she would take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against Russia. In case America enters the war Japan would act according to the Tripartite Pact.

Ex 588 - R 6566-10,145

Ex 799 - R 7904

Ex 1107 - R 10,140

Ex 1110-A - R 10,152

3 July 1941

Telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo to German Foreign Minister concerning Japanese plans to secure "points" in French Indo-China to strengthen her pressure on Britain and America; that Japan has and will continue vigilance over the southwest Pacific against these two powers. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member. Ex 636 - R 7008

3 July 1941

HIRANUMA as Home Minister attended meeting of Privy Council which ratified the French-Japan Protocol on guaranty and political understanding and the Thai-Japanese Protocol on guaranty and political understanding.

Ex 637 - R 7011-14

10 July 1941

A telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo concerned the imminence of a Japanese move against French Indo-China. Utterances by MATSUOKA demonstrate that Japanese will first ask German Government to obtain Vichy consent to move. Excuse to be used will be the proposition of joint defense of French Indo-China by Japanese and French. The Anglo-Saxon countries are not expected to interfere and no serious French resistance is anticipated. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 639-B - R 7033

12 July 1941

In a telegram from OTT, German Ambassador in Japan, to Berlin he enumerated the Japanese preparations for war believed to have been taken. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 799 - R 7966

12 July 1941

Telegram to Ambassador KATO concerned the Government's decision to occupy military bases in French Indo-China and dispatch Japanese forces to Southern French Indo-China. KATO was requested to open negotiations at once with the French on the point and request an answer of Yes or No. In the event of "Yes" a peaceful advance will be effected, and if "No" a military occupation. Keep these plans secret from the British and American otherwise difficulties may arise. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 640 - R 7037

12 July 1941

Two telegrams addressed to Ambassador KATO in France show that the Japanese Government had decided to take possession of military bases and to dispatch Japanese troops to southern French Indo-China. The action was to be taken in spite of any hindrances by Britain and America and even if the French Government or the authority of French Indo-China opposed it. Force to be used in carrying this out. HIRANUMA was Home Minister at the time.

Ex 640 - R 7037

14 July 1941

A memo was sent by the Japanese to France demanding bases, etc., and requesting answer by 22 July 1941. HIRANUMA was a Cabinet member.

Ex 647 - R 7061

15 July 1941

Germany was informed through OTT that Japan had requested its ambassador to Vichy to obtain consent for stationing troops in French Indo-China and for setting up naval and air bases for a common defense with the French against the DeGaulle Movement. Germany was assured that Japan desired to reach her goal peacefully but was determined to succeed against any interference by England and the United States. Japan expected the negotiations to end successfully by July 20, and requested that if Vichy asked for German help against Japan's demands, that Germany influence Vichy toward a peaceful settlement.

Ex 114 - R 10,159

16 July 1941

Resignation en bloc of the 2d KONOYE Cabinet decided at special Cabinet meeting. HIRANUMA ceased to be Home Minister and became Minister without Portfolio in the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet formed on 18 July 1941.

Ex 1116 - R 10,164

17 July 1941

KIDO's diary refers to meeting of senior statesmen presumably attended by HIRANUMA to recommend new Premier. HIRANUMA was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet. Exhibit does not show that HIRANUMA was present.

Ex 1117 - R 10,166

19 July 1941

Telegram signed Rintelen to German Foreign Minister concerned negotiations with French Government for naval and air bases in French Indo-China. This plan is the first move in southern push and Japanese Government believes Germany and Italy will uphold Japanese demands since in pursuing this end Japan will create diversion for Anglo-United States forces and render valuable assistance to Germany, therefore any entreaty to Germany by France for intervention would be useless. Japan wishes billeting, foreign exchange facilities, etc., to be provided for her forces. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 642 - R 7046

20 July 1941

TOYODA succeeded MATSUOKA as Foreign Minister in KONOYE's 3rd Cabinet. HIRANUMA became Minister without Portfolio. TOYODA made a declaration which was sent to Berlin by OTT and which stated that the policy of the Japanese Empire would in no case undergo any change; that Japan's policy would rest on the basis of the spirit and aims of the Tripartite Pact; that no change whatever will take place in Japan's attitude towards Germany and Italy as clearly expressed by MATSUOKA based upon a cabinet decision of 2 July 1941.

Ex 1118 - R 10,171

20 July 1941

Telegram from German Ambassador to Tokyo of 20 July which deals with inquiry by Ambassador whether change in government might alter Japanese policy towards French Indo-China. Japanese denied this. Regarding Vichy answer to Japanese demands on French Indo-China, in event of refusal, Japan will resort to force. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 644 - R 7051

24 July 1941

OTT informed Berlin that an agreement had been reached between Vichy and Japan regarding the occupation of bases in French Indo-China on 20 July 1941. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.
Ex 1121 - R 10,178

25 July 1941

OTT sent telegram to Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs concurrently to High Command, (OKW) and Army General Staff (OKH) on 25 July. This telegram concerns itself with multiple Japanese mobilization preparations, quoting number of men under arms and due for call up, drafting of Russian speaking men and technicians, limitation of use of foreign languages in communication, restrictions on travel, and transportation of troops to Saishun, Bashin, and Shanghai. Impression from conversations is that besides Manchuria and Korea, parts of North China are to be used for action against the USSR. Goal not clear, but it does not appear it will be an attack limited to Vladivostok area, but will start simultaneously in direction of Lake Baikal. Time of start unknown, but possibly on the arrival of German troops at the Volga. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 830 - R 8071

29 July 1941

In the face of President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24, 1941, that French Indo-China become a neutralized country giving Japan the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring a source of food, supplies and other materials which Japan claimed she was seeking (R 10,762) and despite the fact that NOMURA feeling that diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States might be severed, wired for instructions pointing out that American public opinion toward Japan was changing rapidly and that the people considered the southern advance of Japan as only the first step to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies (R 10,760, Japan nevertheless concluded the agreement and protocol (Ex 1122 - R 10,180). Large Japanese forces were moved into southern French Indo-China (Ballantine - R 10,762). HIRANUMA was Minister without Portfolio in the Cabinet.

29 July 1941

Protocol between France and Japan concerning joint defense of French Indo-China and two letters from Vichy. Japanese demands for air and naval bases granted, quartering of troops and freedom of movement to be arranged and recognized. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 651 - R 7079

29 July 1941

An official statement of the Bureau of Information reported that Protocol between Japan and France had been ratified. The signing had been done on 29 July at Vichy -- it will be effective immediately. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 1122 - R 10,180

4 Aug 1941

HIRANUMA was Minister without Portfolio in 3rd KONOYE Cabinet when a Liaison Conference decided the "Principle of Negotiation with Soviet Union." The Imperial Conference of 5 Nov 1941

decided to "continue negotiations with the Soviet Union" upon the basis of this principle. (No further reference is made to the Liaison Conference decision.)

Ex 1169 - R 10,335

10 Aug 1941

A map dated 10 August showed that Japan had already at this time created extensive fortifications of Wotje. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Witness: Richardson - R 11,199

16 Aug 1941

NOMURA informed TOYODA that relations between the United States and Japan were critical and the next move by Japan might lead to a sudden change which both Japan and America fear might happen in case Japan advances into Thailand. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 1131 - R 10,203

22 Aug 1941

HIRANUMA, Minister without Portfolio in the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet, presumably attended Cabinet meeting which decided the National Commodity Mobilization Plan, the key points of which were the prompt expansion of armaments; the establishment of a system of autocracy for important resources in the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, especially in the maintenance of steel and coal production; the maintenance of the lowest limit for the nation's living necessities; and strict harmony between the commodity mobilization scheme and the marine transportation plan.

Ex 1132 - R 10,204

30 Aug 1941

Promulgation of key industries Control Ordinance based on provisions of Article 18 of National General Mobilization Law was to serve as foundation for the complete control by government of all major industries, using the existing cartel structure as guiding principle. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Witness: Liebert - R 8404

1 Sept 1941

The Imperial Petroleum Co., formed on 1 September, had purpose of surveying and developing oil fields in Japan and dominated territories and the control of purchase and sale of all petroleum and oil products. This company was effective government instrument for complete control of petroleum. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Witness: Liebert - R 8476

1 Sept 1941

Telegram from NEUMANN at Bangkok of 1 September states that occupation of French Indo-China shows signs of being for a long period, contemplated that 45,000 Japanese will be there within several weeks, all strategic points, large towns, etc. are occupied. Attack on Siam is envisaged in November when additional troops have arrived and rainy season ends. Seizure of raw materials and economic measures parallel to military occupation have been effected. The Japanese are attempting to buy rubber and rice plantations, to acquire real estate, etc. in French Indo-China. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 652 - R 7107

- 4 Sept 1941 Telegram from OTT to Berlin after MATSUOKA's dismissal as Foreign Minister, states the third KONOYE Cabinet still planned far-reaching mobilization. Japanese Army was reserved on the subject of attack on Russia due to being weakened in Chinese War and not expecting to be able to make decisive victory before winter sets in. Plan to take action when numerical force of Japanese Army is increased. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.
Ex 801-A - R 7971
- 5 Sept 1941 HIRANUMA was Minister without Portfolio in the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet which decided the Traffic Mobilization in order to put land and sea transportation on a wartime basis.
Ex 1133 - R 10,214
- 6 Sept 1941 HIRANUMA was Minister without Portfolio in the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet. While the exhibits do not show that he attended the Imperial Conference of this date he presumably, as a member of the Cabinet, ratified the action (Ex 588 - R 10,217). This Conference adopted resolutions concerning Japanese-American negotiations. According to TOJO the main question (R 10,221) at this conference was war or peace. It was decided to continue negotiations and, if a break did not come by the middle ten days of October, war would be undertaken against America. War preparations were to be pushed. (R 10,221)
- It must be pointed out that subsequent attempts of some members of the KONOYE Cabinet to recede from the position taken at this Conference were not a matter of principle but were purely of expediency owing to the doubts of OIKAWA, then the Navy Minister, as to the success of the war (See p 84 of A&B Phase of Summary of Proof. See also p 88 regarding KONOYE's letter of resignation showing that the conspirators had not split over accomplished objectives but over matters and methods of timing in carrying out the conspiracy).
- 12 Sept 1941 When HIRANUMA was Minister without Portfolio in the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet, a Cabinet meeting adopted the 1941 Workers Mobilization Plan which was a preparatory step for the establishment of the people's total labor service system jointly formulated by the Planning Board and the Welfare Office to insure a supply of sufficient labor for increased production for munitions.
Ex 1140 - R 10,228
- 13 Sept 1941 Secret communication contained request to make arrangements immediately for the manufacture of "Ho" series notes in denominations of pesos, and "Ni" military currency in denomination of dollars. Again requested preparation of notes in denomination of guilders. Manufacture of pesos to be completed by 20 October, dollars one half by 30 October and guilders by 20 November (one half). HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.
Ex 852 - R 8452

16 Sept 1941

Top secret communication concerned the manufacture of "Ho" and "Ni" series military currency, gives order to manufacture these notes and is technical communication regarding the printing of them. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 852 - R 8455

24 Sept 1941

From 24 September onwards, Japan ordered her consuls to make reports concerning vessels along certain routes embracing Pearl Harbour. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Witness: Richardson - R 11,207

4 Oct 1941

Excerpt from telegram, OTT to Berlin, states that from careful sounding of the Army leaders it has been concluded that the inherent aim of the Tripartite Pact is to overpower the British Empire, keep the United States at bay and eliminate USSR, thus bringing about new distribution of power in Europe and the Far East. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 788-A - R 7932

10 Oct 1941

It is shown in the document "Japan's Decision to Fight" that on 10 October, Colonel Ryuto, Commander of an anchorage group, wrote a report on conditions showing that the mobilization order had been issued on 12 September. They reached Palau on 10 October and established anchorage headquarters and prepared for leading operations to accompany war. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 809 - R 9012

11 Oct 1941

It is shown that on 11 October, in a diary of Pvt. KASHINO of an Infantry Regiment, his unit landed at Shanghai and prepared for the Malaya operation from 12-14 leaving for Thailand on 22 November and arriving there on 8 December. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 809 - R 9013

12 Oct 1941

When HIRANUMA was Minister without Portfolio in the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet, a meeting of the members of the Cabinet at KONOYE's home (Ogigaiso) decided, on the advice of TOJO, that demands regarding the stationing of troops in French Indo-China should not be altered, etc. The exhibit is an extract from KIDO's diary.

Ex 1147 - R 10,246

12 Oct 1941

In a diary of an unknown soldier of the 41st Infantry Regiment, it is revealed that his unit arrived at Shanghai on 12 October, was given jungle training and left on 2 December for Sama, and on 13 December was the first unit to enter Gubun Street. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 809 - R 9014

15 October 1941

Telegram from German Ambassador to Tokyo concerning Japanese occupation of French Indo-China which, according to reports was not without friction. Japanese intend to increase strength there to 40,000 and wrest concession from French colonial administration through local military authorities. He says open conflict will be avoided despite all this. The Japanese Foreign Ministry denied a Japanese-Siamese argument concerning the border zone. HIRANUMA was Cabinet member.

Ex 654-A - R 7113

17 Oct 1941

HIRANUMA attended meeting of Senior Statesmen which approved TOJO as Prime Minister. Exhibit states all ex premiers were present.
Ex 1154 - R 10,291

18 Oct 1941

HIRANUMA, as well as KONOYE, TOYODA, OIWAKA were dropped as Cabinet members as there was no place for them in TOJO's Cabinet as they wished to go forward with the conspiracy by negotiation. See entry of 6 Sept 1941.

29 or 30
Nov 1941

An excerpt from KIDO's diary shows that HIRANUMA attended meeting of Senior Statesmen which discussed the matter of war with the United States. At the meeting the Emperor asked the Senior Statesmen's opinion concerning the present political situation. "Baron HIRANUMA agreed with Mr. WAKASUKI's opinion as regards the spiritual strength of the Japanese nation, and urged further measures to awaken political sentiment." WAKASUKI stated that "We were equal to a prolonged war with the USA in spiritual power, but regarding material power we must make a careful study."

Ex: 1196 - R 10,452
Ex 1158-A - R 10,513

"At this meeting no one dared to openly express disagreement with the war policy. Only WAKASUKI was brave enough to say that if the war was to be fought for national defense and self-defense it should be fought to the end and even then there was no chance to win, but if it were being fought to realize ideals such as the Co-Prosperity Sphere, such a war was very dangerous. The most the others would do was to stress the need for a careful study of material power."

P 103 A&B Summary of Proof
P 104 " " " "

28 Aug 1942

HIRANUMA was ordered to China as the Special Envoy of good will.

Ex 107 - R 704

17 July 1944

KIDO's diary relates that HIRANUMA attended a Senior Statesmen's conference held at his home to discuss the possibility of reorganizing TOJO's Cabinet in view of the fact that the Cabinet seems to have lost the sympathy of the public. HIRANUMA said "It is not a question of whether the Cabinet is overthrown or not, or whether the next Cabinet will be a weak one or not. The point is that we are really concerned with our country and we must make up our minds to do something."

TOJO's Cabinet was to be replaced not to bring the war to an end but to "build a powerful national cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly."

Ex 1277 - R 11,372-73

18 July 1944

KIDO's diary states that HIRANUMA attended the Senior Statesmen's meeting to discuss a successor cabinet to TUJO's. HIROTA proposed the Imperial Prince but HIRANUMA objected and insisted on a military man as did KIDO. Conference recommended TERAUCHI, KOISO or HATA. HIRANUMA suggested Admiral SUZUKI, Kantaro.

Ex 1278 - R 11,378

19 July 1944

KIDO's diary states that HIRANUMA agreed with KONOYE's idea of a coalition government of KOISO and YONAI.

Ex 1279 - R 11,382

20 July 1944

Attended meeting of Senior Statesmen regarding a coalition cabinet. KOISO and YONAI were ordered by the Emperor to form a cabinet.

Ex 1280 - R 11,383

5 Apr 1945

Attended a meeting of Senior Statesmen which decided to recommend SUZUKI, Kantaro, President of the Privy Council, as successor to Premier KOISO. HIRANUMA stated that "there is no way out but to fight to the end." And he also pointed out that the KOISO Cabinet formation was a failure and that KOISO should have consulted the elder statesmen "a little more without being apprehended by theory." (P 6 of exhibit.)

HIRANUMA also stated that "there are two phases of opinion at home in regard to the conclusion of the war. At this time, we must have a person who will fight it out. We cannot recommend any peace advocator who favors cessation of hostilities. From this import, the choosing of a Premier has important bearings. Incidentally, I am unable to voice any opinion if it means that all we have to do is to appoint the Premier and the rest to be left to him. I am strongly opposed to any advocacy for peace and cessation of hostilities."

HIRANUMA further said that the "candidate should be a military man," and, therefore, "it is my wish to have Admiral SUZUKI accept the Premiership." (P 12 of Exhibit).

Ex 1282 - R 11,390

9 Apr -
15 Dec 1945

HIRANUMA became head of Privy Council.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

MEMORANDUM

2 July 1947

TO : Mr. Joseph F. English
FROM : D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT: HIRANUMA, Baron Kichiro

Mr. Monaghan recently located in his desk copies of a trial brief prepared on HIRANUMA. I enclose one copy herewith and have had a copy placed in the case file of this defendant.

It does not appear when or by whom this was prepared, but the information may be helpful to you.

D. N. Sutton,
Assistant Counsel.

Enc.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)
- AGAINST -)
ARAKI, SADA0, et al.)

T R I A L B R I E F

Trial Brief relating to the Defendant, Baron
Kichiro HIRANUMA.

The record of the above named defendant's public career is already in evidence, having been placed therein by Mr. Horwitz.

Evidence developed against defendant by interrogation:

In answer to questions propounded by the Interrogator the above named Defendant made the following statements:

That he was originally a Judge in the Procurer's Court. In 1907, Vice Minister of Justice and Minister of Justice in 1923. Member of the Privy Council from 1930 to 1936 and President of the Privy Council from 1936 to 1939. Premier from January 1939 until August 1939; Minister without Portfolio in 1940; and later Home Minister, Vice Premier and Minister without Portfolio in 1941. Was the founder and first president for many years of the Kokuhonsha Society. Was Vice President of the Privy Council during the Manchurian Incident in 1931. That the Privy Council recommended to the Emperor that Japan withdraw from the League of Nations and he, as a member of the same, thought it was advisable to do so. That he became Premier on January 5, 1939 and as Premier his policy was to settle the China Incident as quickly as possible; and in the attempt of the settlement of the same armed forces were used in China.

That on January 5, 1939 in his official statement upon taking the office of Premier he declared that the entire power of the state should be concentrated on achieving the goal in the China hostilities and that the policies pertaining to a Greater East Asia as established by a former Prince KONOYE Cabinet would be carried out. That in 1939 during the China Incident Japan was increasing her armaments. That on January 6, 1939 in a radio address to the nation he declared that the new Cabinet would place emphasis on intensement of national mobilization and national strength and that national mobilization would be intensified for the enforcement of domestic and foreign policies. That this statement was made not only in connection with the Army and Navy but was international, a general mobilization of the entire nation. That in an interview with the press on January 12, 1939 he asserted that the application of Japan's China policy would depend upon the stand of the "other party," explaining that the words "other party" referred to China.

That on January 23, 1939, Navy Minister YONAI, stating the policy of the Japanese Government, said that the Navy had worked out new plans that would give Japan such control of the seas that it would be in a position to enforce its national policy for construction of a new East Asia without interference, and that while this was a statement of policy of Admiral YONAI, who as Minister of the Navy in general acted independently with no power in the Cabinet to give him instructions, but nevertheless, as Premier he had a responsibility in connection with the statement made by Admiral YONAI.

That as Premier he followed the policy that the Japan-China Incident was a matter peculiar to Japan and

China without help or advice from other parties and on March 4, 1939, as Premier he made a radio speech stating as his policy the construction of a New Order in East Asia. That it was his idea that for the sake of world peace that government should be established based on morality and by mutual conferences; that he did not approve of the use of armed forces in China, but the Army was powerful and armed forces were used and that as Premier he had "gone along" with the Army in the use of armed forces. On January 5, 1939 the War and Navy Departments asked him as Premier to give special attention to the requirements of the national defense and as a result of such request the National General Mobilization Law was promulgated on April 1, 1939, becoming effective May 5, 1939, and that as Premier he approved such policy and that the General Mobilization Law for bigger armaments and bigger national defense was due to the Army and Navy's experiences in connection with the China Incident.

That as Premier he carried out the policy of the military in the continued use of armed forces in China. That the purpose of the General Mobilization Law was designed with the object of controlling and advancing generally the national economy and to advance industry in an effort to keep up with the requirements of the military, it being his idea that the two, to-wit: military preparations and the general mobilization of the country's resources, should go together. That as military expansion exceeded its requirements it did affect adversely the living conditions of the people and industry. That it was necessary for the military to expand in 1939 for the sake of peace in the Pacific and the defense of the Japanese part of the Pacific and that as Premier he supported the policy

of military expansion for the sake of the Pacific defense.

That the war in Europe broke afterwards and as Premier it was necessary that he look to the future. That as Premier he realized that the Japanese war with China might eventually lead to war with other powers and he wanted to settle the China Incident as soon as possible. That he realized that if the General Mobilization Bill had not been passed, plans for expansion of the military would have been impossible because of lack of backing of the national mobilization sources and that he, as Premier, supported the policy of general mobilization; in fact, that it came from him and his actions exceeded support.

That on January 31, 1939, a question was propounded to him before the Japanese House of Representatives in relation to the possibility of holding a conference between the United States, Japan and Great Britain in connection with an effort to settle the China questions to which he expressed opposition, as he wanted this question settled between China and Japan and opposed the intervention of a third country.

That in June, 1939, in connection with the action of Japanese forces in placing a blockade over the foreign settlements in Tientsin he was advised of this fact by Foreign Minister ARITA, War Minister ITAGAKI and Navy Minister YONAI, stating that if the military and the Navy considered it essential that the blockade be established he would not oppose the same as Premier.

That he was not a member of the Cabinet at the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States but as an elder statesman received information that war between the United States and Japan was imminent toward the end of November or early part of December 1941, receiving this

information from Premier TOJO, TOJO stating that the conferences between the United States and Japan were not successful and war was unavoidable. That on November 28 or 29 he attended a meeting of elder statesmen at which were present Premier TOJO, Admiral SHIMADA, Former Premiers OKADA, ABE, YONAI and himself, at which meeting they were advised of the impending war with the United States. That while he had never stated it publicly, his personal opinion was that further negotiations between the United States and Japan should be carried on and war not resorted to.

He further stated generally that the Manchurian Incident was carried on by the military with the agreement on the part of the government that as the various developments occurred in Manchuria they were approved or accepted by the government. The prerogatives of command with the Army and Navy were independent of the government and Cabinet and any actions under this prerogative of command could not be opposed or hindered by the government but the government, however, did approve such actions after they had occurred. That it was the desire of the government in the development of a Greater East Asia to bring Manchuria, China and other Far Eastern nations within the sphere of Japanese influence, however, collaboration between nations of the Far East was desired.

That in the development, however, in the program of Japan of a Greater East Asia the military and government of Japan worked hand in hand. That the policy of the Japanese government as prepared by Prince KONOYE relating to China, being national policy of Japan was not his personal policy, nevertheless he did nothing to oppose it. That while the military acted independently, beginning with 1931 in the Manchurian Incident and continuing down to and

including the China Incident, resulted in Japan accepting whatever advantages were obtained thereby, the government taking advantage of the results of all of those operations.

Further and additional evidence developed against the above named defendant:

International Prosecution Section's Document No. 957 "Proceedings of Privy Council - Questions and Answers on the Manchurian Incident" wherein it appears possibly on page 37 thereof the first recorded suggestion that Japan withdraw from the League of Nations when it was discussed by the Privy Council whether it would be correct to secede from the League of Nations by reason of the Manchurian affair. The Defendant, HIRANUMA, was present at this meeting.

International Prosecution Section's Evidentiary Document Number 947 "Proceedings of Privy Council for 13 Sep 1932" in which an agreement was entered into on general policy that Manchukuo would be considered as an independent state.

International Prosecution Section's Evidentiary Document Number 855 being further actions of the Privy Council on February 21, 1934, at which the defendant was present, relating to Japan's policy in connection with Manchukuo.

International Prosecution Section's Document Number 940, dated March 20, 1935, being further proceedings of the Privy Council, at which the Defendant was present, relating to an agreement in connection with the North Manchurian Railway for Japan; the same should be purchased by Manchukuo from Russia.

International Prosecution Section's Document Number 875, dated July 3, 1935, relating to Proceedings of

the Privy Council in connection with a committee to be set up for the economic control of Japanese-Manchurian trade and financial relations, also at which the Defendant was present.

International Prosecution Section's Document Number 808, dated May 1936, being the Proceedings of the Privy Council, at which the Defendant was present, in connection with a treaty between Japan and the Manchurian government regarding the residence of Japanese subjects in Manchuria and taxation problems.

Quotations of public statements of the above named defendant while Premier taken from a magazine "Temporary Japan:"

January 5, 1939, in his official statement upon taking office, Premier HIRANUMA declared that the entire power of the state should be concentrated on achieving the goal in the China hostilities and that the policies of the KONOYE Cabinet will be carried out.

January 5, 1939, the War and Navy Ministers requested Premier HIRANUMA to give special consideration to the needs of national defense and foreign relations.

January 6, 1939, in a radio address to the nation, Premier HIRANUMA declared that the new cabinet will place emphasis on enhancement of national strength. National mobilization will be intensified for the enforcement of domestic and foreign policies.

(Note: The above statement is important in view of the later facts as developed upon interrogation of the Defendant and as a result thereof the General Mobilization Law was placed in effect by the defendant as Premier.)

January 12, 1939, in an interview with newspapermen Premier HIRANUMA asserts that the application of

Japan's China policy will depend upon the stand of the "other party."

January 23, 1939, Navy Minister YONAI declared before the House of Representatives that the Navy has worked out new plans that will help to give Japan such control of the seas that it may enforce its national policies for constructing a new East Asia without interference.

(Note: In connection with this statement the defendant stated upon interrogation his responsibility as Premier for this statement of policy.)

January 31, 1939, in replying to an interpellation in the House of Representatives both Premier HIRANUMA and Foreign Minister ARITA express opposition to the proposal to hold a conference in Japan with the United States and Great Britain to discuss the New Order in East Asia.

March 4, 1939, Premier HIRANUMA broadcast over a nationwide hook-up and addressed on the movement for construction of a New Order in East Asia.

Additional evidence of public statements of the above named defendant as set forth in the public press as hereinafter stated and which newspapers will be made available at the request of the Prosecution for introduction into evidence:

In an article headed, "New East Asia First Objective Premier Says", which appears on Page 1 of the Japan Times and Mail for January 13, 1941, HIRANUMA in a press interview declared that Japan's policy toward foreign powers in connection with hostilities at that time should be carried out cautiously so as not to conflict with the objective of building up New East Asia -- that Japan so far as the China Incident is concerned needs to readjust

the relationship so as not to hinder the already fixed policy of creating the New Order in East Asia.

In the January 21, 1939 issue of the Japan Times and Mail there appears an article, the heading of which starts, "Premier declares Diet's Main Task." Premier HIRANUMA again stresses the construction of a New Order in East Asia, claiming that, "Without the establishment of this Order through the cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo, and China no lasting peace can be hoped for." He goes on to express hope that the Chinese will understand Japan's aims and adds, "As for those Chinese failing to understand to the end and persisting in their opposition against Japan there is no other alternative than to exterminate them." He advocates the renovation of the educational system, "so as to enhance the national spirit of rapid replenishment of all the powers of the nation, especially the defense power, the reinforcing of all systems of transportation and communications in accordance with the new conditions in East Asia, and the indication of other provisions in the national mobilization law toward fortifying Japan's position." He goes on in regard to the China Affair, and says, "Both the government and the people are concentrating their attention and there exists an immutable policy upon which imperial sanction was obtained, and the present Cabinet being, of course, committed to the same policy is determined to go forward at all costs for the achievement of the final purposes." The above speech was made at the 74th Session of the Diet. It is quite lengthy and covers points of foreign policy, aims, and opinions in addition to those set out above.

In answer to an interpolater who asks the opinion of the government on the murder of Chen Lu, Foreign Minister of the Nanking Government who was killed in the International Settlement at Shanghai on February 19, HIRANUMA states, "Notwithstanding the frequency of terroristic demonstrations in the international settlement, which hitherto was believed to be a safety zone begins to give the impression that it is nothing more than a base for terroristic activities of lowly elements", and promises that fundamental steps will be considered for the assurance of no recurrence of terroristic activities. He mentions that assassinations were aimed not only at pro-Japan Chinese residents but also Japanese residents and promises that there will be nothing to check invocation of the self defense plan of Japan so far as is necessary.

An article entitled, "China Policy Unchanged Says Premier" which appears on Page 1, Second Edition of the Japan Times for March 30, 1939, reports an interview with Premier HIRANUMA, in which he urges that material mobilization and a strengthening of the national defense structure of the country should go side by side with the primary object being self sufficiency. He says, "The government must refrain from purchasing goods from abroad as much as possible." He speaks of reforms in the country's internal administration which would bring about a "Human mobilization." He advocates enforcement of controlled economy and admits, "It is inevitable that some of the middle size and minor industrialists will lose their jobs as a result" and promises relief to these groups. HIRANUMA says that eventually a central government or central commission must come into being in China -- that the Provincial Government and the new Nanking Government are not

sufficiently strong to become a central government of China. He denies however that the Japanese Government is disregarding the two Chinese Regimes and continues, "Anybody who entertains a similar view with Japan in the establishment of a New Order in East Asia in opposition to the colonization of China and an anti-Comintern spirit and who suspends anti-Japanism, and who acts according to the intention of Japan is always welcome." He says that, "Japan is not at present considering the creation of an East Asia Ministry within the government as an organ for the unification of Japan, Manchukuo, and China. I think that, however, the relations between these two countries have connection with Japan's productive capacity development and national defense program." The Premier refused to make comment regarding fishing negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union, Japan German relations, or the readjustment of Japan's relationship with France, Great Britain, and the United States.

Of possible interest to the Prosecutor is an article appearing on Page 1 of the May 22, 1939 Japan Advertiser, wherein HIRANUMA repeats that, "Moral principles guide diplomacy." In this article HIRANUMA is reported quoted as follows: "Japan has a mission to induce moral diplomacy into world affairs, and the nation must believe that they (principles of Japan's Foreign Policy) are based on morality in accordance with the idea on which the Japanese Empire is founded." He continues, "A grasping policy might be pursued but a short period of ten or twenty years by retribution will come swiftly and surely." He says, "That the failure of the League of Nations was due to the reduction of the League to a theater wherein each member nation could dramatize its

own interests." By contrast and in the same article HIRANUMA says, "In order to make the world powers appreciate Japan's moral diplomacy we must check those countries attempting to disturb the peace of the world and join hands with those nations which share our task. To this end the status quo of the world must be modified to some extent. The immediate problem is the construction of a new East Asia." He says that Japan is capable of eradicating Communism within its own borders but it cannot set its mind at rest because it alone has no Communistic invasion. He says that China is secure in this respect because the majority of Chinese politicians are shortsighted and cannot understand the logic of the situation. He admits that Japan is secure from invasion of "ideas" and "thought" because it has its own Imperial Way. HIRANUMA says in effect that because the Chinese statesmen are incapable of coping with their own affairs and fail to understand Japan's logic that Japan must replenish its national power and fighting strength without which it cannot have a convincing voice in world affairs. In this connection he stresses the need for expansion of the nation's productive powers and the enforcement of economic control. He says, "The objective of Japan's guiding political principles is the realization of the justice of heaven and earth and the expression of the Divine Will." He assures his listeners that he is deaf to capricious public criticism for what one cannot achieve in a lifetime may be handed to the next generation.

An article headed, "HIRANUMA Defends Assistance Group", which appears in the Japan Times and Advertiser, Morning Edition for January 13, 1941, reads in part as follows: "The Imperial Rule Assistance Association which

is under fire in some quarters is defended by the Home Minister, Baron Kichiro HIRANUMA, in an interview in Kyoto Saturday night, according to Domei. He is quoted as assuring the nation that the association will guide the nation in the right direction." He says, "I should think that the government would be confronted with the necessity dealing with the House of Representatives in the same spirit in which it dealt with political parties before their disbandment to participate in the association." He continues, "My considered opinion is that the behavior of the association as a whole is above criticism, and I wish to see it driven home to the people in general that the association has no idea of pitting itself against the government although it desires to be strong politically."

Addressing a Session of the Budget Committee on February 17, 1941 HIRANUMA stated, "Individualism and liberalism are ideas originally developed in Europe. It is self evident a system based on these isms is not suitable for this country." He continues to say that, "It is also self evident that happiness and peace of individuals are guaranteed in this country." He says that, "The liberty of individuals should be recognized but that if individualism and liberalism were to become the basis of everything, it would be against the very spirit of the founding of the Empire." This session was reported on Page 1 of the Evening Edition of the Japan Times and Advertiser of February 17, 1941, and deals with proposed supervision of those who uphold the anti-national thought under the guise of totalitarianism, growing out of an unpublished speech of an unidentified person who "made a radical speech at a recent meeting."

In an article entitled, "KONOYE, HIRANUMA Talk on Reforms", which appears on Page 1 of the Evening Edition

of the Japan Times and Advertiser for March 15, 1941, it is reported that HIRANUMA, as Home Minister, allegedly advised the Premier to "Take steps to formulate concrete plans for reform of the association by the end of this month so that the association will be able to make a new departure." The paper continues, "He was entertained by the Home Minister in regard to the same problems or understood to be - (1) Amalgamation and abolition of bureaus and departments of the association should naturally be carried out in accordance with the government's fundamental policy for reform of the association. - (2) There is an impression that the Cabinet has been led by the association. This can be wiped out by reform of the association and strengthening power of the Cabinet. - (3) Political power of the Cabinet should be strengthened in order to carry out various war time measures smoothly and speedily, however, more importance should be attached to better operation of the current system than to reform of administrative mechanism in strengthening Cabinet power."

The policies of the government's domestic problems were explained by HIRANUMA in an address which he made on May 1, 1941, and which is recorded in an article headed, "HIRANUMA Outlines Domestic Program" and is located on Page 2 of the Morning Edition of the Japan Times and Advertiser for May 2, 1941. Among other things he directs the postponement for one year of the general elections which were to have been held in the spring of 1941. In this connection he says, "The government is determined to see that there is an end of any domestic strife. This move prompted the desire to postpone the elections to the House of Representatives and Prefectures Assemblies

for one year, thus the country will be free from the turmoil which usually accompanies a general election. This is not the time for people to get excited over things which have no close bearing on the supreme question of perfecting the domestic structure to permit the nation to proceed with a construction of the New Order in East Asia." The strengthening of the nation's war time structure was also a subject of HIRANUMA's discussion.

In discussing the Japanese Civil Service System in the regular session of the Cabinet on May 6, 1941, HIRANUMA is quoted as follows: "So-called red tape system of officialdom should be revised. Such a tenancy is in some part due to the system of examinations for the high officials. It was from such a point of view that the government previously established the system of free appointment of officials." The above quotation is taken from an article appearing on Page 1 of the Evening Edition of the Japan Times and Advertiser for May 7, 1941, headed, "HIRANUMA Clarifies Official Structure."

6 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. English; Mr. Sutton
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - HIRANUMA

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

HIRANUMA, Kiichiro

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

E P M

Incl
(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Baron Kiichiro HIRANUMA: President, Privy Council. Former Premier;
former Home Minister

1865 Sept Born Okayama prefec.; 2nd son of Shin Hiranuma; unmarried
1888 Graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, law
Entered Justice Ministry
* Judge, Tokyo, Chiba, Yokohama local courts
* Judge, Tokyo Court of Appeal
1906* Director, Civil and Criminal Affairs Bureau, Justice Ministry
1906 Toured Europe and America
1907 Received doctorate degree; Procurator General; President
Supreme Court
1907 or 1908 Vice Minister of Justice in Saionji Cabinet
1912 Vice President, Privy Council
* President, Juridical System Council
* Chairman, Religious System Investigation Committee
* Member, Shrine System Investigation Committee
1923 Minister of Justice in Yamamoto Cabinet
1924 Appointed to House of Peers by Emperor
1926 Created Baron
* President, Nihon University
* President, Kokuhonsha, rightist organization
* President, Shuyodan
1936-1939 President, Privy Council
1937 Jan -
Aug Premier
1940 Dec 7 Minister without Portfolio in second Konoye Cabinet
1940 Jul 18 Vice Premier and Minister without Portfolio in third
Oct 41 Konoye Cabinet
1945 Apr President Privy Council
1945 Jun 30 Named one of the leaders of the Home Defense League

Address: 429 Nishi Okubo, 1-chome, Yodobashi-ku, Tokyo

Hugh Byas in "Government by Assassination" characterizes Hiranuma as a sincere unbeliever in political parties. As founder and leader of nationalistic Kokuhonsha (disbanded after Tokyo military revolt of 26 Feb 1936) was supposed to have totalitarian leanings, but as Premier and later he pursued moderate course. (5,53,16). When Germany concluded a nonaggression pact with Russia on 23 August 1939, thus casting shadow on his Cabinet's pro-Axis policy, Hiranuma's strong sense of responsibility made him resign, even though his Cabinet had refused to conclude military alliance with Germany as desired by Japanese military extremists and Germany. Never an ardent pro-German collaborationist; rather had advocated rapprochement with democracies. (20, 55)

When Hiranuma joined second Konoye Cabinet 7 Dec 1940, he and the Premier were generally regarded as strongest possible combination obtainable of Japanese civilian political leadership. Believed to have been thoroughly in sympathy with Premier Konoye's policies. (56)

Kiichiro HIRANUMA: (Continued)

A bitter opponent of London Naval Treaty, he approved of Japan's withdrawal from League of Nations, abrogation of Washington Naval Treaty, and conclusion of Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in 1936 and later with Italy. Gave support, nevertheless, to those groups desiring peace and opposing closer alliance with Axis. While Premier dispatched secret mission to Axis capitals to hold in check Ambassador Oshima in Berlin and Ambassador Shiratori in Rome, both very pro-Axis. (5, 57)

Former Ambassador Grew in Ten Years in Japan speaks of Hiranuma as receptive to his ideas on improvement of Japanese-American relations and as endeavoring to restrain extremist hotheads, reportedly threatening to arrest prominent extremists in July 1941 but being obliged to desist by assassination warning. Other sources state he was wounded by an assassin a month later. (5)

As member of Jushin (senior statesmen) is called into consultation occasionally by the Government in power. Tokyo broadcast of 12 April 1945, quoting Asahi Shimbun, stated that he is one of four former Premiers who take the lead among the Jushin in nominating premiers, the others being Konoye, Okada, and Wakatsuki.

21
HIRANUMA

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

15 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Joseph F. English, Room 303

SUBJECT : Document 1209

1. In accordance with your request of 10 May, pamphlet "Stampede to Peace and Freedom" by witness BABA, Tsunego, has been re-scanned, for references to defendant HIRANUMA, Kiichiro and cabinet. A supplementary analysis is attached.

2. More detailed scanner's notes are also inclosed.

W. H. WAGNER
Scanning Unit

cc: Mr Sutton ✓
Files

SYNOPSIS

of the documents presented to the Court containing direct reference to the actions of the accused connecting him with the facts mentioned during prosecution's phase "Japanese Aggression Against the U.S.S.R."

DOCUMENTS.

1. Entry from Kido's diary dated July 21, 1941 showing Hiranuma's hostile attitude toward the USSR. (Prosecution's Doc. No. 1632-54, Exh. No. 781).
2. A telegram sent to Berlin by the German Ambassador to Japan dated March 23, 1939 informing State Secretary that the Japanese conference of five ministers presided over by the prime-minister Hiranuma decided "to take up diplomatic negotiations with Germany for the purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia." (Prosecution's Doc. No. 4043-E, Exh. No. 780)
3. A telegram dated May 4, 1939 sent to Berlin to the Reich Foreign Minister by Ott, German Ambassador to Tokyo informing the Minister that Prime Minister Hiranuma directed a statement to the Fuehrer. In that statement Hiranuma admitted that the Anti-Comintern Pact proved effective in the execution of the tasks placed before the participants of the Pact and said that the Tripartite Pact would make closer the cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy. (Prosecution's Doc. No. 4043-B, Exh. No. 503).

REFERENCE TO THE FOLLOWING FACTS

3. Aggressive intentions of the imperialistic clique of Japan in regard to the U.S.S.R. (1928-1945).
15. The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact finally shaping the conspiracy of aggressors against the democratic states, and the U.S.S.R. in particular.
14. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a military political alliance of aggressors directed against the democratic states and against the U.S.S.R. in particular. The results of its enforcement as regards the U.S.S.R. prior to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. (1936-1940)
15. The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact finally shaping the conspiracy of aggressors against the democratic states, and the U.S.S.R. in particular.

4. Protest of the Japanese Government lodged with Germany on account of Germany concluding the Non-aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. in August 1939 stating that the Pact violated the provisions of the secret agreement appended to the Anti-Comintern Pact. (A telegram of the German Ambassador to Japan sent to Berlin on August 25, 1939. Prosecution's Doc. No. 1381, Exh. No. #486-M).

5. A letter of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin to the Reich Foreign Minister dated August 26, 1939 stating the protest of the Japanese Government in regard to the conclusion by Germany of the Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. (Prosecution's Doc. No. 4050-B, Exh. No. 782).

6. A record of the Imperial Conference on July 2, 1941, with the participation of Hiranuma. The resolution adopted by the Conference shows that "the spirit of the Tripartite axis" obliged Japan to intervene in the Soviet-German war on Germany's side. (Prosecution's Doc. No. 1652, Exh. No. 779).

7. A record of the Imperial Conference on July 2, 1941 with the participation of Hiranuma. The resolution adopted by the Conference stated that Japan would secretly prepare arms against the Soviet Union awaiting opportune time to participate in the war on Germany's side. (Prosecution's Doc. No. 1652, Exh. No. 779).

14. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a military political alliance of aggressors directed against the democratic states and against the U.S.S.R. in particular. The results of its enforcement as regards the U.S.S.R. prior to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. (1936-1940)

14. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a military political alliance of aggressors directed against the democratic states and against the U.S.S.R. in particular. The results of its enforcement as regards the U.S.S.R. prior to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. (1936-1940)

15. The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact finally shaping the conspiracy of aggressors against the democratic states, and the U.S.S.R. in particular.

17. Active realization of the aims of conspiracy as regards the Soviet Union during the period of the aggressive war of Germany against the U.S.S.R. and gross violation of the Neutrality Pact.

8. Minutes of interrogation of Hiranuma Kiichiro containing his admission that he knew about the actions of the Japanese troops attacking the Mongolian People's Republic and the U.S.S.R., considered those actions wrong, but took no measures to stop the hostilities. (Prosecution's Doc. No. 4122, Exh. No. 768-A)

12. Undeclared aggressive war against the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic in the Nomonghan area. (May - September 1939).

~~Col Woodworth~~
Mr Higgin

HIRANUMA, Michiro

The following is a list of references made to the defendant
HIRANUMA in the Narrative Summary of the Record:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Reference</u>
	Biography: HIRANUMA was Vice-President of Privy Council, from 12 April 1926 - 13 March 1936.
	Biography: HIRANUMA was a member of government committee on Permanent Arbitration Committee between Japan and Holland - 26 Apr 1935 - 1 April 1936.
125	Exh. 164: Official record of the KOMUHONSHA society, organized in close touch with military circles on 20 Dec 1920 with idea of fostering spirit of nationalism and bolstering foundations of state. HIRANUMA was President of this society, and founded it.
128	GOTO stated in cross-examination that HIRANUMA made a statement to the Diet in either February or March 1941 on the nature of the I.R.A.A., witness could not recall exact text of speech.
131	GOTO stated in cross-examination that Hiranuma was not a member of the I.R.A.P.S. and expressed belief that HIRANUMA believed in parliamentary government.
366	Exh. 241: Proceedings of Privy Council meeting of 13 September 1932 concerning the signing of the protocol between Japan and Manchukuo. HIRANUMA attended meeting as Vice-Chairman and made statement concerning setting up of state, attitude of League and stationing of Japanese troops in country.
	Biography: HIRANUMA was Head of the Privy Council from 13 March 36 to 5 January 1939.
487	Exh. 271: Privy Council meeting of 2 November 1938 with HIRANUMA as President, held to discuss the matter of termination of cooperative relations between the Japanese Empire and the various organs of the League of Nations. The Privy Council passed the resolution unanimously.
857	In connection with Anti-Comintern Pact, attention directed to fact that HIRANUMA was head of Privy Council 13 March 36 - 5 Jan 39 and Prime Minister from 5 Jan 1939 to 29 August 1939.

Page 2

Reference

- 677 Exh. 412: Letter from the Secretary of State of Treasury and Report of American Consul at Amoy stating that Amoy Liaison Office was set up under China Affairs Board in Spring of '39 and sanctioned use of opium. HIRANUMA was President of China Affairs Board 5 January 1939 to 30 August 1939.
- 686 Witness SATOH's testimony placed responsibility for opium work on China Affairs Board - HIRANUMA was President (see above).
Biography: 4 January 1939 - HIRANUMA becomes Prime Minister, President China Affairs Board and Supreme War Councillor.
- 684 Exh. 485: HIRANUMA was President, and attended the Privy Council Meeting of 25 November 1936 to discuss approval of the Anti-Comintern Pact and fishing treaty with Russia. Draft was unanimously approved.
- 880 Exh. 492: HIRANUMA attended this Privy Council Meeting on the conclusion of the Protocol between Japan-Italy-Germany. The Privy Council approved the Protocol.
- 890 Exh. 499-A: Extract from Diary of Count Ciano for 7 January 1939 relates that HIRANUMA is in favor of Axis-Japanese Alliance.
- 891 Exh. 502: Telegram Ribbentrop to Ambassador to Tokyo of 26 April 1939 states that drafts of two secret protocols which provided for immediate consultation in the various cases and special measures for treatment of questions on propaganda and the press had been sent to Tokyo and considered by Cabinet. HIRANUMA was Premier at this time.

<u>Page</u>	<u>Reference</u>
892	Exh. 503: Telegram from German Ambassador to Reich Foreign Minister dated 4 March 1939 which contains HIRANUMA declaration. This declaration of HIRANUMA was sent to Hitler after the negotiations on the Anti-Comintern pact had come to a deadlock. HIRANUMA stated that although Japan was in sympathy with the Axis they could not promise military help in view of the present situation but Japan would stand with Germany and Italy and where possible extend assistance to them.
893	Exh 504: Telegram from German Ambassador to State Secretary 6 May 1939 concerning fact that HIRANUMA has obtained compromise with Axis on alliance in view of the present strife existing between the War and Finance Ministers and the War and Navy Ministers.
917	Exh 532: Excerpts from Kido Diary which state that HIRANUMA and other members of the Cabinet met with Lord Privy Seal on matter of choosing another Premier. HIRANUMA recommended KINOYE.
920	With formation of ABE Cabinet, HIRANUMA was first Minister without Portfolio and later Home Minister
979	<u>Exh. 539</u> : A Privy Council Meeting was held 22 November 1938, at which HIRANUMA was Chairman to discuss conclusion of a cultural agreement with Germany. (Japan concluded a cultural agreement with Italy 23 March 1939 - Exh. 38).
1146	Exh. 7 68: Interrogation of HIRANUMA in which he tells of variance of opinion between War Minister ITAGAKI and himself. HIRANUMA, although Premier at time, May 1939, stated he knew nothing of Nomonan Incident and the Army acted independently of government.
1147	Exh. 503: Statement of HIRANUMA when Prime Minister expressing joy at effectiveness of Anti-Comintern Pact on the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact.
1150	Exh. 486a: Protest of HIRANUMA re conclusion of Soviet-German Pact, saying it violated the secret agreement of the Anti-Comintern Pact.
1238	Exh. 875a ⁸⁵⁰ : Privy Council Meeting, HIRANUMA Vice Chairman re conclusion of Joint Economic Agreement between Japan and Manchukuo. Plan was agreed upon unanimously and agreement signed 15 July 1935.
1152	Exh. 781: Kido states in his diary that HIRANUMA could not help feeling responsible for Germany's treaty with U.S.S.R. since he had always advocated USSR to Emperor as hypothetical enemy. 21 September 1940 - HIRANUMA appointed Home Minister

HIRANUMA (contd.0

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<u>Page</u>	<u>reference</u>
	28 August 1942 - 14 October 1942 - HIRANUMA was special good will envoy to China.
	9 April 1945 - 15 December 1945 HIRANUMA was Head of Privy Council
	8 June 1945 Appointed councillor.
862	Exh. 484: Report of the Investigations Committee concerning the conclusion of Japanese - German Pact, made to HIRANUMA as President of Privy Council on 20 November 1936.
* 871	Exh. 486-D: Telegram Dirksen to the Reichminister, 11 Jan 1938 refers to Privy Council meeting at which decision was made that in event of Chinese refusal of Japanese conditions, declaration of war would be made, denial of Nanking government, establishment of provisional government of Peiping, and continued military operations. Hiranuma was President of the Privy Council at this time.
* 890	Exh. 500: Telegram from OTT dated 18 Feb 1939 to State Secretary reveals the Japanese cabinet (then under Premier Hiranuma) had decided upon an intensification of the Anti-Comintern Pact in opposition to Anglophile group.
860	Exh. 479: A report by the Investigation Committee on the conclusion of the Japan-German and Comintern Pact. Report made to HIRANUMA.

* Although the defendant held the position stated at the time of decision, it has not been established that he was actually present at the meeting.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY

HIRANUMA, Baron (Former Premier)

- 1.14.40 Ouster of Prince Konoye; new War Minister.
6.3.40* Cabinet change; European problems.
7.17.40** YONAI cabinet resignation; Prince KONOYE's candidacy.
12.9.40 Installment to State Minister.
3.1.41 Imperial Rule Assistance Association
6.21.41** Germany and Soviet War.
8.14.41 Attempts upon.
11.29.41*E Conference - war opinion.

"BRIEF"

Name: Baron HIRANUMA (Kichiro) File: 211
Age: 80
Interrogated: Yes

COUNTS OF INDICTMENT:

OUTLINE:

Founder and President of Kokuhensha (1926 - 1936)

Vice President of Privy Council when Incidents 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 occurred.

As member of Privy Council - recommended to Emperor that Japan withdraw from League of Nations.

President of Privy Council when Incidents 5A, 6, 6A, 7, and 8 occurred.

Premier (Jan. - Aug. 1939) when Incident 9 occurred. Declared entire power of nation should be concentrated on goal of China Incident and stated that policy pertaining to the Greater East Asia of the Komei Cabinet would be carried out. Approved General Mobilization law passed later. During tenure, Japanese forces landed at Hainan Island.

Minister (Home) in 2nd Komei when Incident 13 occurred.

Vice Premier in 3rd Komei and Minister w/o Portfolio when Incident 14 occurred.

Attended meeting of Elder Statesmen on 28 or 29 Nov. 1941 when advised of possibility of declaration of war against U. S.

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATION
1926		Founder and President of Kokuhonsha for many years (Dissolved in 1936)			15 Jan. p. 28
1930) 1932)	1,2,3,4,5	Vice President of Privy Council when Incidents 1,2,3,4,5 occurred.			11 Jan. p. 2
Mar 1933		Privy Council recommended to Emperor that Japan withdraw from League of Nations			11 Jan. p. 3
1936) 1939)		President of Privy Council			11 Jan. p. 1
1936) 1938)	5A,6,6A,7,8	(Incidents 5A,6,6A,7,8 occurred)			
5 Jan 1939) Aug 1939)		Premier			11 Jan. p. 1 11 Jan. p. 5
5 Jan 1939		In official statement on taking office, Hiranuma declared that the entire power of the State should be concentrated on achieving the goal in the China hostilities and that the policies pertaining to the Greater East Asia of the Kenryo Cabinet would be carried out. (Admits this)			11 Jan. p. 6
6 Jan 1939		In radio address, Hiranuma declared (as Premier) that the New Cabinet would place emphasis on enhancement of national strength and national mobilization and national mobilization would be intensified for the enforcement of domestic and foreign policies. This was to be a general mobili- zation of the entire nation.			11 Jan. p. 6
31 Jan 1939		Stated that he wanted to settle the China question without the intervention of a 3rd country.			15 Jan. p. 25

YEAR	INCIDENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATION
10 Feb 1939		Japanese forces landed on Hainan Island			14 Jan. p. 15
1939		Admits that as Premier he went along with the Military in the use of Armed Force in China			12 Jan. p. 1(?)
1939		Admits that increased forces sent to China			12 Jan. p. 11
1939		Admits that he supported the policy of Military expansion for "Pacific Defense."			14 Jan. p. 17
1939		Stated that Japan was increasing her armaments (during the China Incident)			11 Jan. p. 6
4 Mar 1939		As Premier made a radio speech stating as his policy the construction of a new order in East Asia.			12 Jan. p. 10
31 Mar 1939	9	Incident 9 occurred.			11 Jan. p. 1
1 Apr 1939		General Mobilization Law promulgated. (Hiranuma approved it.)			12 Jan. p. 11 14 Jan. p. 16
1939		Hiranuma stated that he had believed military preparations and general mobilization of Japan resources should go together			14 Jan. p. 16
Dec 1940) Jul 1941)		Minister without Portfolio Home Minister in 2nd Kono Cabinet.			11 Jan p. 1
1941	13	Incident 13 occurred.			
Jul 1941) Oct 1941)		Vice Premier and Minister without Portfolio in the 3rd Kono Cabinet			12 Jan. p. 13
29 Jul 1941	14	(Incident 14 occurred)			
28 or 29 Nov 1941		Attended meeting of Elder Statesmen at which received advice of possibility of declaration of war against the U.S.			15 Jan. p. 27
Apr 1945		President, Privy Council			
Jun 1945		Named leader of Home Defense League.			

REPORT OF VALENTINE C. HAMMACK

CASE NO. 211

15 March 1946

HIRANUMA, Baron (Kichiro)

Report of evidence relating
to Baron Kichiro Hiranuma

The case history of the above-named subject reflects that in the early days of his career he was judge of various courts, later Procurator to the Tokyo Court of Appeals, and later Minister of Justice in the Yamamoto Cabinet.

In 1923-1926 subject was the organizer and became the President of the Kokuhonsha Society, a strongly nationalistic organization believing in the principles of the imperial way. While there is no particular evidence to support this claim, it appears to be generally recognized that the Kokuhonsha Society exercised considerable influence in governmental military and naval affairs.

The subject became Vice-President of the Privy Council in 1930, continuing in this position until 1936, when he became President of the same. As a Member of the Privy Council, he recommended to the Emperor that Japan withdraw from the League of Nations as a result of the League's action in connection with the Manchurian affair.

The subject became Premier on January 5, 1939, remaining in such position until August 1939. During his term of office he supported the Japanese policy in connection with the China incident and approved the General Mobilization Law enacted in 1939, which law, by its terms, mobilized the resources of the Japanese Empire, a movement to more effectively place the Empire upon a war footing. During his term of office as Premier, he made several public statements to the effect that the entire power of the State would be concentrated on achieving the goal in the China incident and that the policies pertaining to Greater East Asia of the Konoye Cabinet would be carried out. After this, subject was Minister of the Portfolio in the Konoye Cabinet in 1940, Home Minister in 1941, and Vice Premier and Minister w/o Portfolio in the 3rd Konoye Cabinet. As an Elder Statesman, he was present at a meeting on November 28 or 29, 1941, at which time, as such, he was advised that war with the United States was imminent.

CONCLUSION

The subject is now 80 years of age or slightly over, and

Continuation of
Report of Valentine C. Hammack
Baron HIRANUMA

while apparently bright mentally appears to be feeble physically. By reason of his condition he was exempted from reporting to Sugama, being permitted to remain at his home where he was interrogated by myself. The evidence against Baron HIRANUMA consists in newspaper articles containing public utterances made by himself during his term as Premier, together with his own statements in connection with his activities as given to the interrogator. In my opinion, the history of the subject reflects that he has always been very conservative in his ideas, but nevertheless has drifted along with the tide of Japanese expansion and in so doing contributed materially to the Japanese Expansion Program.

Respectfully,

Valentine C. Hammack

THE PRESIDENT: At the close of the prosecution's case the Tribunal will be prepared to entertain any motion the defense may care to make to dismiss the case on some or all of the counts on the ground that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction.

Mr. Levin, do you want anything elucidated?

MR. LEVIN: No, your Honor, that is quite satisfactory.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether you want to submit on all the counts or some only, if there is not sufficient evidence. We will hear whatever motion you have to make in that regard.

I understand you want one general motion and a motion in respect of individual accused. Is that so?

MR. LEVIN: That is correct, Mr. President.

The motion would address itself, Mr. President, to the individual counts and also the individual defendants.

THE PRESIDENT: I am asked to stress the fact that the accused applied to me, that the accused by their counsel applied to me in Chambers for liberty to make that motion. I, of course, left it to the whole Bench.

I understand that you will reduce what you have to say to writing in each case so that we may have simultaneous translations. You might let the prosecution know beforehand so that they may do likewise, if they decide to oppose the motion, as they will, of course.

MR. LEVIN: I assume from the character of the motion, Mr. President, that it will be necessary for counsel to prepare their motions in writing in advance, and naturally they could have copies for translation purposes given to the interpreters. I presume that it would not be necessary for us to serve the prosecution with copies of our motions in advance.

THE PRESIDENT: We would like simultaneous translation of the prosecution's reply; that is why you would have to give them your argument, in advance.

MR. LEVIN: As this will be prepared, I am sure we can easily, readily comply with that request, Mr. President -- with that suggestion, rather

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any idea how long it will take?

MR. LEVIN: I haven't now, Mr. President, but I should imagine it would take at least a day.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. LEVIN: And with reference to the statement that you made to the effect that the defense called on you in Chambers with reference to making this motion, we, of course, appreciate that all proceedings in Chambers are a part of the record, and of course that, therefore, is a part of the record and is fully recorded.

MR. PRESIDENT: Well, that is arguable, but they are being kept as though they were.

M. Higgins

KAYA

The following is a further list of references in the Narrative Summary to the Record of the Defendant KAYA:

1552

Exhibit 588. The Exhibit is a document found at the Foreign Ministry giving information as to the national policies agreed on and the decision made at the Imperial Conference of 1941. Japan would adhere to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and would continue the move southward of the China Incident. Japan would continue negotiations with relevant nations for war with Britain and U. S.. First she would carry out her scheme against FIC and Thailand and secretly attack against the Soviet while continuing diplomatic negotiations with precaution.

Reference: KAYA attended Imperial Conference of November 5 and December 1, 1941.

in Higgins

HIRAHARA

The following is a further list of references in the Narrative Summary to the Record of the Defendant

HIRAHARA:

1549

1552

Exhibit 503: The Exhibit is a document found at the Foreign Ministry giving information as to the national policies agreed on and the decisions made at the Imperial Conference 1941. Japan would adhere to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and would continue the move southward of the China Incident. Japan would continue negotiations with relevant nations in the South and would prepare for war with Britain and United States. First she would carry out her scheme against French Indo China and Thailand and secretly arm against the Soviet while continuing diplomatic negotiations with precaution.

Reference: HIRAHARA attended Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941.

HIRANUMA

The following is a further list of references to the defendant
HIRANUMA in the Narrative Summary of the Record:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Reference</u>
1556	Exh. 1117 - KIDO's diary, July 17, 1941 HIRANUMA was appointed Minister of State in KONOYE Cabinet July 18, 1941.
1556	Exh. 643 and 644 - New Cabinet continued policy of the old with respect to French Indo-China.

Mr. Higgins

OHA

The following is a further list of references in the Narrative Summary to the Record of the Defendant OHA:

Page

1552

Exhibit 585: This exhibit is a document found at the Foreign Ministry giving information as to the national policies agreed on and the decision made at the Imperial Conference 1941. Japan would adhere to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere and would continue the move southward of the China Incident. Japan would continue negotiations with relevant nations for war with Britain and United States. First she would carry out her scheme against French Indo-China and Thailand and secretly arm against the Soviet while continuing diplomatic negotiations with precaution.

Reference: OHA attended Imperial Conference of July 21 and September 6th and November 5, December 1, 1941.

Ha Higgins
~~*Ed. [unclear]*~~

HIRANUMA

Page

The following are additional references to the Defendant HIRANUMA:

References

1375

Exhibit 910: Minutes of the Committee Meetings for the Year 1930 of the Privy Council. HIRANUMA was present as Vice President of the Privy Council. At the meeting, the relations between the Privy Council and the Cabinet regarding the London Treaty were discussed. The state of Japan's armament being based on the possibility of a crisis in the Orient with America or other Three Powers intervening in Sino-Japanese relations over rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia was also discussed, and it was pointed out that the ratio of strength provided in the treaty would become more unfavorable for Japan the closer they got to 1936.

1377

Exhibit 911-A: Conference of the Privy Council regarding Imperial Ratification of the London Naval Treaty of October 1, 1930. HIRANUMA was present in the capacity of Vice-President.

1384

Exhibit 58: On December 19, 1934, Ambassador Grew notified Mr. Hull that the Privy Council had unanimously approved the decision to abrogate the Washington Naval Treaty and draft instructing to SAITO would be submitted to the Cabinet, December 21 or 22. HIRANUMA was Vice-President of the Privy Council at this time.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET IPS/CWH/fh

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject: Translation Errors in the Record

Note
No.

From: Assistant Chief of Counsel To: Language Arbitration Board Date: 16 December 1946

1. Enclosed herewith is memorandum from Commander Maxon calling attention to what appears to be translation errors in the record.
2. Please examine the memorandum and report your findings to the Tribunal.

C.W.H.

CWH

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

WAR MINISTRY BUILDING
TOKYO, JAPAN

13 December 1946

MEMO FROM: Comdr. Maxon

TO: Mr. Higgins

SUBJECT: Translation Errors in the Record

1. The following errors in the Record, are, it is believed substantial enough to warrant official correction:

<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Should read</u>
Page 8,923, Lines 21-23	there is an advantage in taking the initiative in declaring war on A and B when they are still unprepared.	there is an advantage in taking the initiative in opening hostilities against A and B when they are still unprepared.

(IPS Document 1622, Lines 7-9 should be revised accordingly.)

Page 8,998 Line 18	the declaration of war	our initiation of hostilities
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Line 24	a declaration of war	the initiation of hostilities
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(English version of Prosecution Exhibit 878, line 9 and line 15 should be similarly corrected.)

Yale Maxon

Approved:

D.C.

Mr. Okazaki Katsuo

Subject: List of Officials Attending the Imperial Conference.

1. The following are the particulars in regard to the compilation of the personnel who attended the Imperial Conferences which were held on 2 July, 6 September, 5 November, and 1 December, 1941.
2. The records and documents of decisions reached at the Imperial Conferences held in connection with the Pacific War should have been kept in the custody of the Cabinet, but most of these documents were burned during the air raid on Tokyo on the night of 25, 26 May, 1945. Consequently it was not only impossible to obtain the original papers but also difficult to procure other documents since the majority of the officials who had either attended the conferences or those officials of the Foreign Ministry who had participated in this work were not available in Tokyo at that time. The necessity of compiling data of the conferences was foreseen, and it was ordered by the Foreign Minister that Mr. OKAZAKI Katsuo, director of General Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry, do it. This was sometime in the Spring of 1946. Consequently, Mr. OKAZAKI, with the aid of those officials of the various ministries concerned (Foreign Office included) who possessed knowledge of the matters pertaining to the Imperial Conferences, gathered as much as possible, the various facts on the Outbreak of the Pacific War which were recognized as important and weighty decisions. These facts were closely gone over before compiled. In

1107

connection with this work the names of those who attended the Imperial Conferences were listed. The following method of selection of data was believed to be the most accurate; by surveying through the unadjusted papers and memos on hand of the officials concerned, and then add the recalled memories of the officials and finally all these facts were closely scrutinized by all concerned and the final conclusion was reached if agreed by all. OKAZAKI Katsuo, Director of General Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry, ordered OHNO Katsumi, Chief of General Affairs Section, (presently Director of Reparations Division, CLO) to assume the charge of aforementioned work in line with his duties.

3. Soon after the work in question was finished, it was learned that General Headquarters had directed the Japanese Government that it furnish the International Prosecution Section with a list of the names of those officials who had attended the Imperial Conferences. CLO which had received the directive, then requested of Foreign Office that if it was in possession of any sort of materials which would be helpful in compiling the names, it should be handed over. Whereupon, the Director of General Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry submitted the document which had been compiled by the method explained under 2 together with an explanation as to its sources etc., to CLO. IGUCHI Sadao, Director of General Affairs Division, Central Liaison Office, signing the covering note, in turn submitted the list to the General Headquarters.

IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL LIAISON OFFICE

TO : GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.

FROM : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Personnel who Attended the GOZENKAIGI.

C.L.O. No. 2781(PP)

10 June 1946

1. Reference: Memorandum of Colonel C. S. Myers, dated 23 May 1946, subject as above.
2. Official records of the GOZENKAIGI consisted of the documents deciding to hold the Conference and bills to be put before the Conference. There were no records showing the details of the Conferences (the proceedings of the Conference, etc.)
3. The above-mentioned records of the GOZENKAIGI were held in custody of the Cabinet Secretariat, but they were destroyed by air-raided fire on the night of 25-26 May 1945.
4. Premier, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, Chief of Army General Staff and Chief of Naval General Staff were always included among those who attended the Conference. It was an established usage with President of the Privy Council to attend the Conference. In addition to the above, Finance Minister, President of the Planning Board and certain Minister attended the Conference continuously during a specified period, and other Cabinet Ministers were asked, from time to time, to attend the Conferences in case their presence was felt necessary. As secretaries of the Conference, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry and Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry attended the Conference for the purpose of giving explanations to the bills. In most cases Vice-Chief of Army General Staff and Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff were attendants of the Conference.

5. According to the investigation those persons whose names are listed in the enclosure attended the respective Conferences held on the following dates:

2 July 1941
6 Sep. 1941
5 Nov. 1941
1 Dec. 1941

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

/s/ S. Iguchi
S. IGUCHI
Director of General Affairs
Central Liaison Office

Enclosure: 3 copies of a report as indicated in Para. 5 above.

Attendants of the GOZENKAIGI

I	2 JULY 1941	
	KONOE	Prime Minister
	MATSUOKA	Foreign Minister
	TOJO	War Minister
	OIKAWA	Navy Minister
	KAWADA	Finance Minister
	SUZUKI	President of Planning Board
	HIRANUMA	Home Minister
	SUGIYAMA	Chief of Army General Staff

NAGANO	Chief of Naval General Staff
TOMITA	Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
OKA	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry
TSUKADA	Vice-Chief of Army General Staff
KONDO	Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff
HARA	President of the Privy Council

II 6 SEPTEMBER 1941

KONOE	Prime Minister
TOYODA	Foreign Minister
TOJO	War Minister
OIKAWA	Navy Minister
OGURA	Finance Minister
SUZUKI	President of Planning Board
TANABE	Home Minister
SUGIYAMA	Chief of Army General Staff
NAGANO	Chief of Naval General Staff
TOMITA	Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
MUTO	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry
OKA	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry

TSUKADA	Vice Chief of Army General Staff
ITO	Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff
HARA	President of the Privy Council

III 5 NOVEMBER 1941

TOJO	Prime Minister and War Minister Concurrently
TOGO	Foreign Minister
SHIMADA	Navy Minister
KAYA	Finance Minister
SUZUKI	President of Planning Board
SUGIYAMA	Chief of Army General Staff
NAGANO	Chief of Naval General Staff
HOSHINO	Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
MUTO	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry
OKA	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry
TSUKADA	Vice-Chief of Army General Staff
ITO	Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff
HARA	President of the Privy Council

IIII 1 DECEMBER 1941

TOJO	Prime Minister and War Minister Concurrently
TOGO	Foreign Minister
SHIMADA	Navy Minister
KAYA	Finance Minister
SUZUKI	President of Planning Board
IWAMURA	Justice Minister
HASHIDA	Education Minister
INO	Agriculture Minister
KISHI	Commerce Minister
TERASHIMA	Communication Minister
KOIZUMI	Welfare Minister
SUGIYAMA	Chief of Army General Staff
NAGANO	Chief of Naval General Staff
HOSHINO	Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
MUTO	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry
OKA	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry
TANABE	Vice-Chief of Army General Staff
ITO	Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff
HARA	President of Privy Council

Th. Haggard

KAYA

The following is a further list of references in the
Narrative Summary of the Record to the Defendant KAYA:

Index

1505

Exhibit 1167: Policy for guiding public opinion on
British and American Problems agreed by the Cabinet
meeting on November 4, 1941, provided that the
suppression of reports on the tenuousness of diplomatic
relations with Britain and the United States shall be
ceased and the people given hope for the future. News
and speeches enabling the enemy to see Japan's war
preparations are to be excluded as well as all activities
which might incite the public to take action against
residents of third powers.

Reference: KAYA was Finance Minister.

DATA

DATA

1535

Exhibit 1169: Attended the Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941, where "Measures towards Foreign Countries in Relation to the Principles of Execution of National Policy of the Empire" was decided.

EAXA

Page

1590 Exhibit 1176: General outline for hastening the conclusion of war against the United States, Britain, Netherlands and Chungking, dated November 12, 1941, provided in essence the plan to be adopted toward foreign powers as already set out in Exhibit 1169 pertaining to Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941.

KAYA

Page

1590

Exhibit 1173: Measures to be taken toward foreign countries decided at the Council in the presence of the Emperor on November 5th as considered in the Liaison Conference on November 19, 1941, the policy towards various nations is outlined. This is substantially the same as exhibit 1169 with some addition in respect to China.

Although names are not listed KAYA is cited as being a Member of the Cabinet.

1590

Exhibit 1175: Liaison Conference, November 11, 1941 gives the principal reasons alleged for the commencement of hostilities against United States and Britain. Although the names are not listed KAYA is included as being in the Cabinet.

Hi Haggard

HIRANUMA

The following is a further list of references in the
Narrative Summary of the Record to the Defendant

HIRANUMA:

Page

- 1611 Exhibit 1153-A: In TAJU's interrogation of March 11th, 1946, he states that the Conference of Senior Statesmen was convened by the Emperor on November 30th and December 1st and HIRANUMA's name is given as being present.

Col. Woodworth

Ph. Higgins

SEA

The following is a further list of references in the
Narrative Summary to the Record of the Defendant **SEA**:

SEA

1570

Exhibit 114B: This gives the facts pertaining to the resignation of the third **HEMME** Cabinet by **HEMME** and reviews the various stages of the Japanese-United States negotiations. There was disagreement between the Army and Navy and between **TOJO** and the Premier. **SEA** who was in the Naval Officers Bureau stated that with the exception of the Naval General Staff, the Navy did not want war. However, in view of the previous approval of the Navy to the decision of Imperial Headquarters, the Navy Minister would like to leave the decision to the Prime Minister.

SEA

1582

1585

Exhibit 1169: Attended the Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941, where 'Measures towards Foreign Countries in Relation to the Principle of Execution of National Policy of the Empire' was decided.

OIA

Page

1590

Exhibit 1176: General outline for hastening the conclusion of war against the United States, Britain, Netherlands and Chungking, dated November 12, 1941, provided in essence the plan to be adopted toward foreign powers as already set out in Exhibit 1169 pertaining to Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941.