

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE:

3/26/46

TO : JKE

FROM : HOB

SUBJECT: Despatch #176 from Tokyo

I just discovered the attached
among some of Turner's papers.
Do you think Map's comments
are worth writing a tel on?

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Noted: file with Tokyo Dispatch #176 MB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NA - Mr. Borton

FROM : Max W. Bishop

SUBJECT: Communism in Japan

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 7-30-47

Reference is made to our discussion the other day in which I stated that the results in the recent Japanese elections could not be considered an accurate gauge of Communist power or influence in Japan. The following quotation may be of interest:

".....Many Americans, understanding nothing of totalitarian politics, dismiss the Communists as 'a negligible force in American life,' because the Communist Party gets few votes in elections. For Communists, elections - particularly the vote one gets in elections - are among the most minor of political exertions. It might be recalled that in 1917, at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, the Russian Bolshevik faction, which became the Communist Party, numbered only about 25,000 members. In general it is a law of politics that a small minority, tightly organized and disciplined, knowing in advance what it wants and planning consciously how to get it, has far greater weight than loose, amorphous majorities...."

by: James Burnham, The Struggle for The World, p. 105

In this connection it may be worthwhile to recall Mr. Emerson's remarks on my apprehension (expressed in a memorandum forwarded with Tokyo's despatch no. 176, January 7, 1946) regarding the potential danger of Communism in Japan. Mr. Emerson in commenting on the seven factors which I listed as among those which "enhance the possibility of important growth of Communistic influence in Japan" stated that "only time can pass on the validity of these factors". I submit that leaving the matter to "time" is like leaving the barn unlocked because we cannot know that the horse thief will steal the horse until the horse has been stolen. I had hoped to raise with the Department basic problems rather than merely the immediate amount of power then held by the Communists in Japan.

It is to be noted that SCAP from the beginning, and Ambassador Atcheson, since late April, 1946, as USPOLAD and as Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan have taken every possible measure to combat Communist influence in Japan and to avoid dangers listed in my memorandum of December, 1945, under reference.

MWB
MWBishop:sg

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
UNCLASSIFIED	
FORM DS-507 3-5-47	REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING
DEPARTMENT OF STATE	

SECTION A			
TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION FE	EXTENSION 2951	BUILDING NS	ROOM NO. 3153
2. REQUESTER'S NAME Wilson C. Flake	DIVISION FE	EXTENSION 4834	BUILDING NS
3. DIVISION OF RECORD: DC/R, REF, PD, etc. DC/R		ROOM NO. 3181	

SECTION B	
ATTACHED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
TYPE OF DOCUMENT Despatch No.176 from Office of the U.S.Political Adviser, Tokyo	
TO: The Secretary of State	DATE Jan 7, '46
FROM: George Acheson, Jr.	
SUBJECT: Enclosing memorandum of Views of Mr. Max W. Bishop on Certain Aspects of Situation in, & of American Policy Toward Japan" & 3 memoranda: 1) dated /April 6, 1946 of J.K. Emerson; 2) dated 7-30-47 of Max Bishop; 3) dated 3-26-46 to JKE from HB.	
PRESENT CLASSIFICATION SECRET	740.00119 /

SECTION C	
THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.	
RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/>	CHANGE TO: <input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET* <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED <small>*(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).</small>
BY AUTHORITY OF: <i>Alexis Johnson</i>	DATE: 3-18-52 OFFICE: of Asst. Secy. for Far Eastern Affairs

SECTION D	
<p>INSTRUCTIONS— (1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate.</p> <p>(2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable.</p> <p>(3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy.</p> <p>(4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request.</p> <p>(5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA).</p> <p>(6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.</p>	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
UNCLASSIFIED	



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



SWN-3708
7 January 1946

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority 750131
By DR/SH NARS, Date 3-7-75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Reform of the Japanese Governmental System.

References: a. SWNCC 228.
b. SWNCC 228/1.

copy 45 of SWNCC 228 sent to Tokyo via Benninghoff 12-4-45 and SWNCC 228/1 sent to Tokyo instruction 44, 12-28-45.
Office of Eastern Affairs
JAN 11 1946
Department of State

At its 32nd meeting the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, after amending, approved SWNCC 228 in light of the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference b.

Copies number 60 and 65 of the revised approved paper (SWNCC 228) and SWNCC 228/1 are forwarded for information.

Copies of these papers have been forwarded to the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information.

It is requested that the Department of State transmit the enclosed copies number 60 of SWNCC 228 and SWNCC 228/1 to the American Representative on the Far Eastern Commission for his guidance in negotiations with the other members of the Commission on the formulation of an Allied policy on the reform of the Japanese Government.

It is further requested that the Department of State advise the American Representative that no parts of these papers are to be released to the press at present.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

DCR NE Unit
To: _____
Re: _____
Cat: _____
Dist: _____

H. Freeman Matthews
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Acting Chairman

Enclosures:
Cy. Nos. 60 and 65, SWNCC 228
Cy. Nos. 60 and 65, SWNCC 228/1

JAN 15 1946

Confidential File
140,00119 Control
(Japan) *FILED*

DCIR
740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-746

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Memo for SecState
Re: SWNCC 228

For Signature: Mr. Matthews

740.00115 Central (Japan) / 11-746

lap

DDR

JRP

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRETTOP SECRETCOPY NO. 657 January 1946STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEDECISION AMENDING SWNCC 228REFORM OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM*Copy 45 to
Tokyo
9-I-46.*Note by the Secretaries

1. At its 32nd meeting, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 228, after amending.
2. Holders of SWNCC 228 are requested to destroy page 3 by burning, renumber pages 4 through 13 to read 5 through 14 and insert the revised pages 3 and 4.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRETTOP SECRETCOPY NO. 65SWNCC 22827 November 1945Pages 1 - 13, incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEREFORM OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMReference: a. SWNCC 209/D.Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. A copy of this report has been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comment from a military point of view. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be circulated to the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

SWNCC 228**TOP SECRET**

*Copy 45x
Tokyo via
Mr. Benninghoff
4-XII-45*

TOP SECRETE N C L O S U R EREFORM OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the constitutional reforms which the occupation authorities should insist be carried out in Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. The Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese authorities that the Japanese governmental system should be reformed to accomplish the following general objectives:

(1) A government responsible to an electorate based upon wide representative suffrage;

(2) An executive branch of government deriving its authority from and responsible to the electorate or to a fully representative legislative body;

(3) A legislative body, fully representative of the electorate, with full power to reduce, increase or reject any items in the budget or to suggest new items;

(4) No budget shall become effective without the express approval of the legislative body;

(5) Guarantee of fundamental civil rights to Japanese subjects and to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction;

(6) The popular election or local appointment of as many of the prefectural officials as practicable;

740.00119 Confidential (papers) / 1-446

TOP SECRET

(7) The drafting and adoption of constitutional amendments or of a constitution in a manner which will express the free will of the Japanese people.

b. Though the ultimate form of government in Japan is to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, the retention of the Emperor institution in its present form is not considered consistent with the foregoing general objectives.

c. If the Japanese people decide that the Emperor Institution is not to be retained, constitutional safeguards against the institution will obviously not be required but the Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese that the constitution should be amended to conform to the objectives listed in a above and to include specific provisions:

(1) That any other bodies shall possess only a temporary veto power over legislative measures, including constitutional amendments approved by the representative legislative body, and that such body shall have sole authority over financial measures;

(2) That the Ministers of State or the members of a Cabinet should in all cases be civilians;

(3) That the legislative body may meet at will.

d. The Japanese should be encouraged to abolish the Emperor Institution or to reform it along more democratic lines. If the Japanese decide to retain the Institution of the Emperor, however, the Supreme Commander should also indicate to the Japanese authorities that the following safeguards in addition to those enumerated in a and c above would be necessary:

(1) That the Ministers of State, chosen with the advice and consent of the representative legislative body, shall form a Cabinet collectively responsible to the legislative body;

(2) That when a Cabinet loses the confidence of the representative legislative body, it must either resign

TOP SECRET

or appeal to the electorate;

(3) The Emperor shall act in all important matters only on the advice of the Cabinet;

(4) The Emperor shall be deprived of all military authority such as that provided in Articles XI, XII, XIII, and XIV of Chapter I of the Constitution;

(5) The Cabinet shall advise and assist the Emperor;

(6) The entire income of the Imperial Household shall be turned into the public treasury and the expenses of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by the legislature in the annual budget.

5. Only as a last resort should the Supreme Commander order the Japanese Government to effect the above listed reforms, as the knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future.

6. The effectiveness of governmental reforms in preventing the resurgence of military control in Japan will depend in a large measure upon the acceptance by the Japanese people of the entire program. In the implementation of allied policy on the reform of the Japanese Government, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers must take into account the problems of sequence and timing, as well as measures which might be adopted to prepare the Japanese people to accept the changes, in order to insure that the reforms are lasting in strengthening representative government in Japan.

7. This paper should not be released for publication. The eventual release of a statement of allied policy on the reform of the Japanese Government should be coordinated with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in order not to impede the accomplishment of such reforms in Japan itself.

TOP SECRETRECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Upon approval by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee of the Conclusions in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 above:

(1) The report, as amended, be forwarded to the State, War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for information; and

(2) The report, as amended, be forwarded to the American Representative on the Far Eastern Commission for his guidance in negotiations with other members of the Commission on the formulation of an Allied policy on the reform of the Japanese Government.

b. No part of this report be released to the press at present.

TOP SECRET17
53APPENDIX "A"FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Potsdam Declaration provides that:

"The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives [as set forth in the Potsdam Declaration] have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government."

2. The Allied note of August 11 to the Japanese Government stated that:

"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."

3. One of the ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan is stated in SWNCC 150/4/A, "United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan", to be:

"To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people."

TOP SECRET

54

APPENDIX "B"DISCUSSION

1. The Potsdam Declaration stipulates that the occupying forces shall not be withdrawn from Japan until a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" has been established. Past declarations of the United Nations, and the clear intention of the Allies permanently to eliminate Japanese practices and institutions which have made that country a danger to other nations, clearly indicate that that stipulation refers not merely to the particular Japanese Government which the Allies recognize prior to withdrawal, but also to the nature of Japan's governmental institutions. Although "the ultimate form of government of Japan" is to be determined by the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people", the Allies, in accordance with the above provision and as a part of their over-all program for the demilitarization of Japan, are fully empowered to insist that Japanese basic law be so altered as to provide that in practice the government is responsible to the people, and that the civil is supreme over the military branch of the government.

2. The existing Japanese governmental system, resting on the Consitution, the Imperial House Law, basic statutes and Imperial Ordinances supplementary to the Constitution, and customs and practices observed virtually as law, has shown itself unsuited to the development of peaceful practices and policies primarily by reason of the defects described in the following paragraphs.

3. The Absence of an Effective System of Responsibility of the Government to the People.

a. There are of course several ways in which this responsibility may be effected. In the United States the executive government is directly responsible to the President, who is himself elected by the people and is limited by the judicially enforced Constitution from encroaching

TOP SECRET

55

upon the rights of the judiciary and the Congress. In Great Britain the executive government is nominally responsible to an hereditary monarch, but actually it is responsible to the House of Commons, which is elected by the people. While in theory the power of the Parliament is absolute, in practice it recognizes the independence of the courts and certain rights of the executive.

b. The present Japanese Constitution was drawn up with the dual purpose of, on the one hand, stilling popular clamor for representative institutions, and on the other, of fortifying and perpetuating the centralized and autocratic governmental structure which its framers, the Meiji leaders, believed necessary for Japan's continued existence and development in the modern world. Consistent with this latter purpose, power was retained in the hands of a small group of personal advisors around the Throne, and the people's elected representatives in the Diet were given only limited supervisory powers over legislation. When a Cabinet falls the new Prime Minister, who selects his own Cabinet, is appointed by the Emperor not automatically from the leadership of the majority party in the Lower House but on the recommendation of these advisors, originally the Genro and more recently a council of former prime ministers. The nature and composition of a new government, consequently, was determined by the balance of forces around the Throne rather than by the majority view in the Lower House.

c. This lack of responsibility of the Cabinet to the Lower House was also the result of the Diet's limited powers over the budget. The Constitution provides (Article 71) that if a budget is rejected by the Diet, the budget of the preceding year automatically goes into effect. Consequently, even though the Prime Minister failed to win a vote of confidence in the Lower House he knew that he was assured of a budget equal at least to that of the current year.

TOP SECRET

d. Although the passing of general laws pertaining to the internal affairs of the nation are within its province, in practice most bills are introduced by members of the Cabinet, in whose selection the Diet has no part. The power to declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties are Imperial prerogatives over which the Parliament can exert only the most indirect influence because of its inability to control the Cabinet and the Privy Council which, together with the Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Minister of the Imperial Household and others close to the Throne, advise the Emperor on these matters. The Diet has no power over dynastic affairs, it cannot initiate amendments to the Constitution, it cannot convene of its own accord, and it may be prorogued for a period up to fifteen days any number of times during a session by the Emperor on the advice of the Prime Minister.

e. Although the Diet possesses indirect means of impressing its views upon the government which have proven more effective in practice than the direct controls, budgetary or otherwise, at its disposal, even these indirect methods have been of limited value. Its power to address the Throne or make representations to the government has little practical significance, because neither is bound to respond to its representations. Its power to establish committees of inquiry on any matters of state is limited by its inability to compel the attendance of witnesses. Interpellations and questions from the floor can embarrass a Cabinet, and have been among the Diet's most effective weapons, but ministers are free to make evasive replies or to refuse to answer at all on the ground of "military security" or "diplomatic security" or as "contrary to public interest". Although both Houses are empowered by custom to pass resolutions on matters within their jurisdiction, and resolutions of no confidence by the Lower House prior to 1931 frequently

TOP SECRET

led to the resignation of a cabinet or of the ministers thus censured, such resolutions have also frequently led to the dissolution of the House and a new election which, although it supported the House against the government, was not followed by the latter's resignation. Nevertheless, during the past fifteen years, criticism of the government from the floor or in address or representation resolutions have been virtually the only means by which members could hope to influence policy.

4. The Dual Nature of Japanese Government which Permits the Military to Act Independently of the Civil Government and of the Parliament.

a. The supreme command of the army and navy, and the power to determine their peacetime standing, are stated in the Constitution to be among the Emperor's prerogatives. This has been interpreted by the military services to mean that they are responsible solely to the Emperor and may act independently of the Cabinet and the Diet in matters of military concern. Only in matters of major importance have they felt obliged to seek the Emperor's approval, frequently interpreting and expanding that approval to suit their own ends. The right of direct access to the Emperor possessed by the Chiefs of Staff and the Ministers of the Army and Navy, a privilege enjoyed by the Prime Minister but by no other member of the Cabinet, has been an indispensable condition of the services' independence of action.

b. The ability of the military to affect government policy both within and without the area of their assigned responsibilities is further enhanced by the provision, based on an Imperial Ordinance of 1898, that the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy must be a general or a lieutenant-general or an admiral or vice-admiral respectively on the active list. This provision has been repeatedly used by the military services to overthrow an existing cabinet by requiring the resignation of the Minister of War

TOP SECRET

or the Minister of the Navy or to prevent the formation of a new Cabinet by the refusal to permit eligible officers to fill these posts. Divided responsibility between the military and civil authorities in the Japanese Government, beside giving the services undue weight in the determination of policy, has on numerous occasions prevented the civil government, which of its own accord might have acted in good faith, from fulfilling its international commitments.

5. The Excessive Power of the House of Peers and the Privy Council.

a. Except for the fact that financial bills must be initiated in the Lower House, and that the Lower House may be dissolved by the Emperor at any time whereas the Upper House can only be prorogued, the legislative powers of both Houses are the same. Inasmuch as the House of Peers is composed approximately one-half of the nobility, one-fourth of persons elected by and from the highest taxpayers, and one-fourth of Imperial appointees, its equal powers with the popularly elected Lower House gives representatives of the propertied and conservative classes in Japan an undue influence on legislation.

b. The Privy Council, composed of a president, a vice-president, twenty-four councilors appointed by the Emperor for life, and the members of the cabinet ex officio, serves as the supreme advisory body to the Emperor. The ordinance defining its powers, promulgated in 1890, stipulated that generally speaking its advice was to be solicited by the Emperor only on constitutional questions, international treaties and agreements, and prior to the issuance of emergency Imperial ordinances. Gradually, however, the Council has extended its activities and increased its power until in recent decades it has come to resemble a "third chamber", with broad supervisory powers over the executive in both foreign and domestic matters. It has frequently

TOP SECRET

opposed the Cabinet on policy questions, and on several occasions has forced the downfall of Cabinets possessing the confidence of the Diet. Owing no political responsibility to the Diet or to the people for its activities, and yet exerting important influence over the entire affairs of the state, the Privy Council as presently constituted has proved an important barrier to the development of a sound parliamentary system.

6. Inadequate Provision for the Protection of Civil Rights.

a. The Japanese people have been deprived in practice, particularly during the past fifteen years, of many of the civil rights guaranteed them in the Constitution. Qualification of the constitutional guarantees by the phrase "except in the cases provided by law" or "unless according to law" has permitted the enactment of statutes involving wholesale infringement of these rights. At the same time Japanese courts have shown themselves subservient to social, even if not to direct governmental, pressures, and have failed signally to administer impartial justice.

b. To rectify this situation, General MacArthur, on October 4, 1945, ordered the Japanese Government to abolish all measures which restricted freedom of speech, of thought and of religion and to report to him by October 15, 1945, on all steps which had been taken to assure civil rights to the people.

c. In one other respect the Japanese Constitution falls short of other constitutions in its guarantee of fundamental rights. Instead of granting those rights to all persons it stipulates that they shall apply only to Japanese subjects, leaving other persons in Japan without their protection.

7. To have lasting value and hence to be most effective, the constitutional and administrative reforms necessary to correct the defects in Japan's governmental system should be initiated

TOP SECRET

and carried into effect by the Japanese Government out of a desire to eliminate elements of the national structure which have brought Japan to its present pass and to comply with the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. Failing such spontaneous action by the Japanese, the Supreme Commander should indicate the reforms which this Government considers necessary before it can consider a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" to have been established in Japan, a condition of the occupation forces' withdrawal. Only as a last resort should a formal instruction be issued to the Japanese Government specifying in detail the reforms to be effected.

8. The combination of new provisions in the Constitution that (1) the government shall be responsible to an electorate based upon wide representative suffrage, (2) that the executive branch of government shall derive its authority from and be responsible to the electorate or to a fully representative legislative body and (3) when a Cabinet loses the confidence of the representative legislative body it must resign or appeal to the electorate would ensure the development of a truly representative government responsible to the people. This direct responsibility of the government to the people would be further strengthened by conferring full budgetary powers on the representative legislative body. If the government lost the confidence of the representative legislative body, it would be forced to resign at the end of the fiscal year because of the lack of funds.

9. Explicit provision in the Constitution for the guarantee of fundamental civil rights both to Japanese subjects and to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction would create a healthy condition for the development of democratic ideas and would provide foreigners in Japan with a degree of protection which they have not heretofore enjoyed. The position of a representative legislative body would be further strengthened by granting

TOP SECRET

to the Diet the right to meet at will and allowing any other organ of the government only a temporary veto over legislative measures approved by the legislative body, including amendments to the constitution. The popular election or local appointment of as many of the prefectural officials as practicable would lessen the political power formerly possessed by the Home Minister as a result of his appointment of governors of prefectures. At the same time it would further encourage the development of genuinely representative local government.

10. Although the authority and influence of the military in Japan's governmental structure will presumably disappear with the abolition of the Japanese armed forces, formal action permanently subordinating the military services to the civil government by requiring that the ministers of state or the members of a Cabinet must, in all cases, be civilians would be advisable.

11. While this Government is anxious to encourage the Japanese either to abolish the Imperial Institution or to reform it along more democratic lines, the question of the retention of the Imperial Institution will have to be left to the Japanese to decide for themselves. If the Imperial Institution is retained, many of the changes recommended above, such as the provisions for the direct responsibility of the government to the people through granting full budgetary powers to the representative legislative body and the requirement that only civilians serve as ministers of state or the members of a Cabinet in all cases, will go far towards reducing the power and influence of the Imperial Institution. Further safeguards must be established to prevent the resurgence of "dual government" in Japan and the use of the Emperor by nationalistic and militaristic groups to threaten the future peace in the Pacific. Those safeguards should include provisions that (1) the Emperor act in all important matters only on the advice of the Cabinet,

TOP SECRET

62

(2) the Emperor be deprived of all military authority such as that provided in Articles XI, XII, XIII and XIV of Chapter I of the Constitution, (3) the Cabinet shall advise and assist the Emperor, (4) the entire income of the Imperial Household shall be turned into the public treasury and the expense of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by the legislature in the annual budget. The position of the Imperial Institution in the Japanese political structure is to be treated more fully in a subsequent paper, pursuant to directive contained in SWNCC 209/D.

12. There are a number of desirable reforms in the Japanese governmental system which have not been specified in the conclusions, such as strengthening of the prefectural and municipal assemblies, and revision of the election laws to eliminate dishonest election practices. It is further believed that measures to strengthen the local assemblies and effect a thoroughgoing reform of the election system can be safely left, and would be better left, to be initiated by a genuinely representative national government at Tokyo, whose establishment the reforms specified in this paper should ensure. Elections during the occupation period will, presumably, be adequately supervised by the occupation forces.

TOP SECRET

63

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 65

SWNCC 228/1

19 December 1945

Pages 14 - 15, incl.

*Copy 45 to
Tokyo -
instruction
44,
28-XII-45*

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

REFORM OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

Reference: a. SWNCC 228

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum on the above subject from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated to the Committee for consideration in connection with reference a.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

740-00119 Central (Japan) 1-746

SWNCC 228/1

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TOP SECRETE N C L O S U R ETHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.SM-4499
18 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Reform of the Japanese Governmental System.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East (SWNCC 228), on the subject of reform of the Japanese governmental system, in which it is recommended that certain policies for reform be indicated, or as a last resort, be imposed by the Allies upon the Japanese authorities.

They assume that in formulating these policies, due consideration was given to the statement in the Three Power Proclamation issued from Berlin to the Japanese people on 26 July 1945, to the effect that there is to be established in Japan "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government."

From the long-range military point of view, the major concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the government of Japan is that no nationalistic or military clique or combination should again be able to dominate that country and lead it into a war of aggression. The effectiveness of governmental reforms in preventing the resurgence of military control in Japan will depend in a large measure upon the acceptance by the Japanese people of the entire program. The principal short-term military interest is in the possibility that the implementation of the proposed reforms may foment unrest in Japan to such a degree as to require increases in occupational forces or lengthening of the tenure of occupation by such forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it appropriate to point out that the effectiveness of the United States Army and

946.00119 Central (Japan) / 1-746

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TOP SECRET

65

Navy has already been reduced incident to demobilization, and that continuance of demobilization under current plans will, in the course of the next twelve months, further reduce the fighting strength of the United States armed forces to a point where it will be difficult to deal with any serious unrest in Japan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff further consider that, as a matter of planning in connection with the successful attainment of these ends, additional studies should be made by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on the details of the sequence and timing of the proposed reforms, together with measures which should be adopted to prepare the Japanese people to accept the changes in order to minimize unrest and disorder and to insure that the reforms are lasting in strengthening representative government in Japan.

Subject to the foregoing remarks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection from the military point of view to the objectives set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, USA,
Secretary.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 8, 1946.

DC/K

NO. 179

SUBJECT: New York Herald Tribune Editorial, December 20, 1945,
Alleging Lack of Cooperation Between this Mission and
SCAP.

*NJA
FE/R
OYD
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RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1946 JAN 17 PM 2 01

RECORDS BRANCH

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 23 1946
DIRECTOR
Department of State

*HB
1/16/46
T*

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose copy of my self-explanatory memo-
randum of identic date to the Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff
in regard to an editorial appearing in the New York Herald Tribune
under date of December 20, 1945, in which it is erroneously stated,
among other things, that this office does not provide General Mac-
Arthur with copies of its reports.

Respectfully yours,

George Acheson, Jr.
George Acheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *at JW*

Copy of Memorandum dated January 7,
1946.

Original and hectograph to Department.

102.2
GatchesonJr:anl

740.00119 CONTROL (J. SN) / 1-040

JAN 24 1946

FILED

*740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 1-846
CS/D*

DCR - NE Unit	
Anal	<i>MS</i>
Rev.	
Dat.	<i>CE</i>
Dist.	

PHOTO SENT TO FA

Enclosure to Despatch No. 179 of January 8, 1946 from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "New York Herald Tribune Editorial, December 20, 1945, Alleging Lack of Cooperation Between this Mission and SCAP."

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 7, 1946.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff.

I attach an editorial from the New York Herald Tribune of December 20, 1945, which was received from the Department of State in a routine way together with other newspaper clippings relating to Japan.

I do not think there is any misunderstanding in this Headquarters in regard to the reports which this Mission makes to Washington. Most of our mail reports consist of despatches enclosing copies of memoranda addressed to the Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff, which are forwarded to the Department in order that the Department may be kept informed in regard to our activities. Other mail reports or despatches to the Department on political or other subjects of interest are copied to General Headquarters, usually under cover of a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, in order that the Supreme Commander and interested staff officers may be fully advised in regard to our reports, recommendations and comment to the Department of State. Our other reports are by telegram, all of which, we understand, go over the desk of the Chief of Staff before despatch.

As I say, I do not think there is any misunderstanding in the official family here in regard to this matter and I submit this memorandum chiefly with the view, always desirable, of keeping the record clear.

George Atcheson, Jr.
Minister
U. S. Political Adviser

Enclosure:

Clipping, New York Herald Tribune

Copy to Department of State.

1-846

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

December 20, 1945.

TOKYO NIGHTMARE

The devices used to carry out American foreign policy might be likened to a crazy quilt made by an eccentric seamstress. Some areas of the quilt, of course, excel others in oddity. Of these the most curious is the Japanese section. In dealing with Japan, Americans have done some excellent work despite expectations that the task would be one of the most perplexing faced by the Allies. But they have accomplished their results with strange cumbersome political machinery.

The relations of the State Department and General MacArthur probably provide the best example. In Tokyo the Department has a group of experts under George Atcheson, of whom several are reputed to be men of exceptional ability. These diplomats collect information, mull it over and draw up reports on their findings. Do they then hand the reports to General MacArthur? By no means. The reports are sent to Washington, where they are read and revised in the State Department. They are then dispatched to the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also in Washington, where they are again read and revised. Finally, they are sent to General MacArthur's personal staff of experts in Tokyo. Eventually, it is presumed, the reports reach the general in some form or other and, if he is so inclined—he is a brilliant commander but not one who yearns for advice—he acts upon them.

This confusion in American administration will not be alleviated by the current meeting in Moscow of the foreign ministers of the Big Three. The foreign ministers may, indeed, add to the problem. One of the reported purposes of their conference is to set up conditions under which Russia will participate in the government of Japan. Anything done along this line is likely to make administration more complex rather than more simple. This fact should not be used to oppose Russian participation, of course, for no stable settlement in Asia can be reached without Russian co-operation.

But the necessity of international action ought to provide enough in the way of complexity in the future without the present American tangle of red tape. Is it not time to redesign American administration in Japan? Could not the experts under Mr. Atcheson in Tokyo, for example, pass on their words of wisdom to General MacArthur's staff in the same city without sending them over thousands of miles of radio and telegraph circuits and routing them past innumerable desk men in Washington?

DC/R

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NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA
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 CONSEIL PROTESTANT DU CONGO
 DANSK MISSIONSRAAD
 DEUTSCHER EVANGELISCHER MISSIONSTAG
 SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS EVANGÉLIQUES DE PARIS
 CONFERENCE OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF INDIA, BURMA AND CEYLON
 NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF JAPAN
 COMMITTEE ON COÖPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA
 CONCILIO NACIONAL EVANGÉLICO DE MÉXICO
 NEAR EAST CHRISTIAN COUNCIL
 NEDERLANDSCHE ZENDINGSRaad
 NETHERLANDS INDIA
 NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND
 NORSK MISJONSRAAD


FOREIGN MISSIONS CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA (UNITED STATES AND CANADA)
 PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF EVANGELICAL CHURCHES
 CONFEDERACIÓN DE IGLESIAS EVANGÉLICAS DEL RIO DE LA PLATA
 CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA
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 NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF SWITZERLAND
 NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF THAILAND

CABLEGRAMS:
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 MISSIONS CODE
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Honorary Chairman: JOHN R. MOTT, New York
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 Assistants: LELAND S. ALBRIGHT, New York
 Miss BETTY D. GIBSON, London
 Miss DORIS H. STANDLEY, London

156 FIFTH AVENUE
 NEW YORK 10, N. Y.

January 7, 1946



Mr. William T. Turner
 Chief, Division of
 Japanese Affairs
 Department of State
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Turner:

Thank you for your letter of January 5 in reply to our request that the Reverend Michio Kozaki of Japan might attend the meeting in February at Geneva of the International Missionary Council. I appreciate very much indeed the trouble which you and other officers of the State Department took in following up this request. While we are of course disappointed at the negative answer nevertheless we were not entirely unprepared for it and understand the reasons which dictated it.

LR
594.404

We join with you in hoping that it may not be long until conditions will change so as to make possible meetings between Christian leaders in Japan and those of other countries.

Again thanking you for your efforts on our behalf I am

Yours very sincerely

J. W. Decker
 J. W. Decker

JWD:emh

Signed in Dr. Decker's absence

JAN 14 1946

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 Japan/1-746
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 1-1-746

DCR NE Unit

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J.W. Decker
JWD

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE:

January 8, 1945


TO : U - Mr. Acheson

FROM : FE - Mr. Vincent

SUBJECT :

Attached is a telegram to George Acheson giving him the text of the proposed agreement with regard to relationship of civilian agencies in Tokyo to SCAP. The telegram from War to SCAP did not get out until yesterday afternoon. Jim Davis seems to have had a weekend of trouble with OPD but he finally got it passed without substantial change. In case we wish to refer to it, its designation is WARX 9180, 7 January.

I am sorry you are not feeling well.



FE:JCVincent:ead

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

A-R



December 21, 1945

U
Mr. Acheson:

In connection with the attached proposed telegram to General MacArthur:

I feel that paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 could well be omitted from the proposed cable. I am not certain that some of the statements set forth therein correctly set forth the position of the Department. I would also suggest that (b) and (d) of paragraph 7 be amended, and that (e) be added, as follows:

(b) In respect of military and related matters, the official channel of communications will be between SCAP in the theatre and the Joint Chiefs of Staff or, where appropriate, the War Department as the executive agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Washington. In respect of political and policy matters of non-military character, the official channel of communications shall be between SCAP and the War Department, as the executive agency for the Department of State.

(d) In the event the policy-making civilian agencies of the Government desire the particular views or recommendations of their personnel, who are assigned to your staff, the request for such views or recommendations will be transmitted to you by the War Department, as the executive agency of the Department of State, and the replies of such representatives will be transmitted to the Department of State by you through the War Department with such comment or recommendation as may be appropriate.

(e) Provision should be made for continued performance of non-military US Government activities such as routine consular functions understood now to be centralized in "Yokohama Office of Political Adviser."

DR
Donald Russell

File
9-19-46

SEP 19 1946

FILED

OK

For 744,00119 Control (Gopland/1-846)

CINCAFFAC, Adv Tokyo signed
WARCOS

1. Will appreciate your comments and suggestions regarding solution of inter-departmental problem of United States Government currently of great concern to War and State Departments.

2. Although the JCS, War Department and United States Army are charged in the administration of occupied territory with administering applicable governmental or inter-governmental policy, the development and formulation of government policy in the framework of the United States Government rests primarily with the civilian agencies of the government, in particular the State Department. The view of the civilian departments of the Government has been that in order to properly formulate policy with respect to the government of occupied countries they should be free to nominate representatives to act in an advisory capacity to the military authorities in occupied countries with the right to have direct communication for the transmission of information and instructions between such representatives and the departments nominating them. This position has been held especially by the State Department in the overall field of foreign policy and the Treasury Department with respect to financial problems.

3. The problem is illustrated by the view which has been held in the State Department

A

that a State Department representative designated as your political adviser should have his own staff and should act not only as your political adviser but as a representative of the State Department with right of direct communication to the State Department with respect to problems arising within your responsibility as SCAP. Treasury Department desires a similar arrangement with Treasury representatives who may be provided to you as advisers or otherwise attached to your staff. Position of these departments is based on their view that within the responsibility of the United States Government for the administration of occupied territory, the Secretaries of State and Treasury have definite responsibilities for policy consideration and determination which can be discharged only if they have the right of communication with and to some extent control over their personnel who may be serving in occupied countries. This view of the civilian departments is also reflected in the many requests which are received for the dispatch of specialized missions to investigate and report to the appropriate civilian departments on special matters of concern in the government of occupied areas, such as textile production and the Zaibatsu problem.

4. War Department efforts to recruit personnel for your staff have been seriously hampered by this position of civilian agencies of the government. By far the most productive field for recruitment of working staff is in the departments of the Government most concerned with the particular problem to be considered. This is true not only because of the specialized type of personnel available from these sources but also because the fact of the termination of the war inevitably makes general civilian recruitment for service overseas increasingly difficult.

5. War Department recognizes that the primary responsibility within the United States Government for the formulation of government policy with respect to the administration of occupied areas must rest with the civilian departments of the Government. It also recognizes the fact that the desire of the civilian departments of the government to obtain advice and information upon which policy must be formulated from their own

experts in the various fields under investigation is a natural one. However, War Department takes the position that to permit direct communication between civilian agencies of the government and the employees who may be detailed to your staff is inconsistent with your supreme responsibility as SCAP and is bound to create disorder and confusion in the administration of your responsibility.

6. Problem has been the subject of several discussions between the Secretaries of the State, War, and Navy Departments without final solution. In the present situation recruitment of personnel for your staff is delayed and with respect to certain types of personnel prevented completely. Moreover, with particular reference to your political adviser, it appears here that you are not receiving the maximum of benefit from his presence in Japan, and State Department is dissatisfied with its inability to receive what to it seems appropriate information and reporting from him.

7. At conference this week between the Acting Secretary of State and members of War Department staff, it was suggested following solution of the problem with respect to which your comments are desired:

a. Your political adviser will be assigned, with such assistants as he may have, to your staff and, as a member of your staff, will be subject to your authority and control. All other government personnel, including missions or groups to examine special questions, will also be assigned to your staff and will be subject to your authority and control.

b. There will be no official channels of communication between the United States Government or its agencies and SCAP or his staff except between SCAP in the theater and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, where appropriate, the War Department as the executive agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Washington. The position, views, or recommendations of SCAP on any question will be for your decision and advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or, where appropriate, the War Department, as executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

g. The normal flow of inquiries regarding information as to operation of government or other factual information will be between SCAP and the War Department.

d. In the event the policy-making civilian agencies of the Government desire the particular views or recommendations on a special subject of their personnel, who are assigned to your staff, because of such personnel's technical experience or particular relationship with the department involved, request for such views or recommendations will be transmitted to you by the War Department as executive agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the replies of the representatives of the civilian agencies of the Government will be transmitted through you to the War Department with such comment or recommendation as you may deem appropriate.

8. It is recognized that the foregoing suggested arrangement retains some objectional features. It will increase the burden on your staff to answer inquiries and is to some extent violative of military channels of communication. However, it represents substantial concessions by the civilian agencies of the Government, particularly the State Department, with respect to their obligations and responsibilities regarding which they hold very strong views. It is believed that its acceptance will facilitate the provision of personnel to your staff and the functioning of the inter-departmental government machinery in Washington in the handling of problems arising with regard to the government of Japan. Your comments are requested before negotiations proceed further.

PROPERTY GENERAL
RESTRICTED

A - 27

Nov. 15, 1945

The Acting United States Political Adviser
to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,

Care of American Embassy Building,

Tokyo, Japan.

According to information received from Gorge through the Swiss Foreign Office, the archives of the Colombian, Panamanian, Peruvian, Venezuelan, Chilean, and Cuban Governments as well as the effects belonging to Colombia, Chile, and Egypt were stored in the premises of the American Embassy building at Tokyo by the Swiss. On September 4, the Department authorized the Swiss to keep the aforementioned property temporarily in the Embassy building.

You are requested to endeavor to ascertain the present status of the property in question and to inform the Department in the premises so that the governments concerned may be appropriately notified.

Bygones

705.0054/9-1145

SPD:JECostello:PAE

10/30/45

NWC

AF

RESTRICTED

A - 488
American Embassy,

Santiago.

Chilean Interests - Japan

Nov. 15, 1945

The Department was informed on August 24 that certain official property and archives at Tokyo belonging to various countries whose interests were under Swiss protection were stored in the American Embassy premises at Tokyo. On September 4 the Department authorized the Swiss to keep the property in question temporarily in the Embassy premises. The Department was subsequently informed that the archives and effects of the Chilean Government were stored in the Embassy premises under the aforementioned circumstances. In view of the fact that the Embassy has recently been occupied by the American military group, the Acting Political Adviser at Tokyo is being requested to inform the Department regarding the present status of Chilean archives and effects there.

You are requested to communicate the sense of the foregoing to the Foreign Office, and to state that it will be informed further when a reply is received from Tokyo.

By Jones

706.0054/9-1145

SPD:JECostello:FAH

10/4-30/45

NAC

JAN 24 1946

In reply refer
to FE

My dear Mr. Cole:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
January 8, 1946 concerning your desire to obtain
information with regard to Civil Service positions
with the military government in Japan.

I am referring your letter to the Overseas
Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, War Department,
Washington, D.C. with the request that any available
information relating to your inquiry be sent to you.

Sincerely yours,

William T. Turner
Chief
Division of Japanese Affairs

DCR - NE Unit	
Anal.	<i>md</i>
Rev.	
Cat.	<i>J</i>
Dist.	

Mr. Roger F. Cole,
25 Cambridge Boulevard,
Pleasant Ridge, Michigan.

JAN 24 1946 P.M. *CR*

FE:RBacon:mho
1-17-46

FE
RB

A true copy of
the original
is

740.00119 CONTROL
(JAPAN) / 1-846

CS/17

*740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 1-846*

Handwritten initials

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

Collect

Charge Department:

Charge to

**NO PARAPHRASE
NECESSARY**

Department of State

Washington

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,

TOKYO.

FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER.

1517

68

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

SECRET

JAN - 8 1946

Handwritten initials

As a result of considerable discussion and of mutual accommodation of viewpoints, the State and War Departments have agreed upon the following solution of the problem of relationship of civilian representation in Tokyo to SCAP and War Department has sent explanatory telegram requesting General MacArthur's comments:

QUOTE a. Your political adviser will be assigned, with such assistants as he may have, to your staff and, as a member of your staff, will be subject to your authority and control. All other government personnel, including missions or groups to examine special questions, will also be assigned to your staff and will be subject to your authority and control.

b. There will be no official channels of communication between the United States Government or its agencies and SCAP or his staff except between SCAP in the theater and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, where appropriate, the War Department as the executive agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in

All recognize that Washington. / the position, views, or recommendations ~~of~~ of SCAP on any question will be for your decision and advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or, where appropriate, the War

Department

Scv

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-348

740.00119 Confidential File

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

Collect

Department of State

63

Charge Department:

Washington

SECRET

Charge to

-2-

Department as ~~the~~ executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. The normal flow of inquiries regarding information as to operation of government or other factual information will be between SCAP and the War Department.

d. In the event the policy-making civilian agencies of the Government desire the particular views or recommendations on a special subject of their personnel, who are assigned to your staff, because of such personnel's technical experience or particular relationship with the department involved, request for such views or recommendations will be transmitted to you by the War Department as executive agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the replies of the representatives of the civilian agencies of the Government will be transmitted through you to the War Department with such comment or recommendation as you may deem appropriate. UNQUOTE.
plans to order

JcV The Department ~~is to be expected to~~ you home on consultation in the near future.

Johnson
Acting

FE:JCVincent:ALM
1-4-46

CR SSW
JAN 7 1946 P.M. 5:10



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **UNCLASSIFIED** Tokyo, Japan, January 8, 1946

No. 181

UNCLASSIFIED



Subject: Political Parties in Japan: Developments During the Week Ending January 5, 1946.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



*NJA
1 FE/R
1 OR
1 FEC*

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/ 1-846

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 152, January 2, 1946 and previous despatches transmitting weekly reports made to the Supreme Commander on the development of political parties in Japan, and to transmit hereunder this Mission's latest report, dated January 7, 1946, on the same subject entitled: Political Parties in Japan--Developments During the Week Ending January 5, 1946.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att m*

- 1. Memorandum: Political Parties in Japan--Developments During Week Ending January 5, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department.

800
JSService:jwb

Mr. Tolson	<i>mgs</i>
Mr. E.A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

JAN 22 1946

UNCLASSIFIED

740.00119 Control (Japan)
CS/D
1-846

HECTO SENT TO MR
DELETED

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 181 dated January 8, 1946 from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Political Parties in Japan: Developments During the Week Ending January 5, 1946."

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 7, 1946.

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE
WEEK ENDING JANUARY 5, 1946

The New Year holidays and uncertainty over the date of the general elections brought political activity practically to a standstill. However, the issuance by SCAP on January 4 of the two directives abolishing certain organizations and disqualifying individuals from public office threw the political parties into sudden confused activity.

The Progressive Party finds itself deprived of its president and most of its leading officials. Probably the only outstanding members unaffected by the directives are SAITO Takao, KAWASAKI Katsu and YOSHIOKA Yayoi.

The consensus is that the Progressives cannot continue to exist as a party. Certain of the Liberal Party leaders will also have to retire from public life, including ANDO Masazumi, although the blow is far less severe than that suffered by the Progressives. The Cooperative Party finds one of its leaders, SENGOKU Kotaro, Minister of Agriculture in the HIGASHI-KUNI Cabinet, disqualified because of his position as director in the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association. The Social Democrats gain considerably in power and prestige, although a few of their members, such as KONO Mitsu and KAWAKAMI Jotaro, will be affected. The Communists are of course delighted with the directive and announce that they will seek to put additional candidates into the field.

The burning question at the moment is the future of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet. Although there is no certainty at this moment that the Cabinet will fall, the press and numbers of informed Japanese believed that the Cabinet cannot long survive the impact of this most recent blow, much more far-reaching in its effect than the directive of October 4 which caused the downfall of the HIGASHI-KUNI Cabinet. The Social Democrats and Cooperatives are anxious to establish a coalition party Cabinet and state they would be able to work together and with the Liberal Party in the interim period prior to elections. Among those proposed for Prime Minister are Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika (who may possibly be affected by the directive because of a position he held in Malaya during the war), KAGAWA Toyohiko, who it is said would attract support from Socialists and Cooperatives, and HATOYAMA Ichiro, president of the Liberal Party.

Observers point out that SHIDEHARA has lost the confidence of the people, that the recent directives will remove several members from his Cabinet, and that a patchwork job would achieve little more than temporary relief and might aggravate the increasingly serious economic situation. They believe that new leadership is needed in Japan, leadership which will rally the farmers of the nation to the effective execution of a plan to relieve the food shortage.

The opinion

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The opinion seems to increase among intelligent Japanese that SCAP will inevitably be forced to take more direct part in the administration of Japan. The lack of experience in democratic practices and the limp, negative state of political leadership increases the dependence upon the occupying power. Tokyo Shimbun on January 5 editorialized on a theme which has appeared more and more frequently in the Japanese press, namely, that while the reconstruction of Japan must in the final analysis depend on the efforts of the Japanese themselves, they have so far failed signally to take any initiative action toward the establishment of democracy.

In the present situation, it would therefore seem to be the wisest course to direct power into the hands of those who will have some incentive to accomplish constructive results. The political parties are on trial; if there is hope in democratic government for Japan, then political parties under leadership untainted by war responsibility, should be given the opportunity to prove themselves.

John K. Emmerson
Foreign Service Officer

UNCLASSIFIED

Copy for Mr. Emerson

Ms. 13

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 7, 1946.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE
WEEK ENDING JANUARY 5, 1946

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The opinion

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

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John K. Emmerson
Foreign Service Officer

UNCLASSIFIED

		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		EF 120 4-1-52 HCB	
FORM DS-507 3-5-47		REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING			DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECTION A					
TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION FE		EXTENSION 2951	BUILDING NS	ROOM NO. 3151	
2. REQUESTER'S NAME Wilson C. Flake		DIVISION FE	EXTENSION 4834	BUILDING NS	ROOM NO. 3181
3. DIVISION OF RECORD: DC/R, REF, PD, etc. DC/R					
SECTION B					
ATTACHED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION					
TYPE OF DOCUMENT Despatch No. 181					
TO: The Secretary of State					DATE 1-8-46
FROM: George Atcheson, Jr. USPOLAD TOKYO					
SUBJECT: Political Parties in Japan: Developments during the week ending 1-5-46 <i>FILE No. 740.00119 CONTROL (Japan)/1-846</i>					
PRESENT CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL					
SECTION C					
THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.					
RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/>		CHANGE TO: <input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET* <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED <i>*(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).</i>			
BY AUTHORITY OF: U. Alexis Johnson		<i>U. Alexis Johnson</i>		DATE 2/1/52	OFFICE OF ASS'T SECY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SECTION D					
<p>INSTRUCTIONS—(1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate.</p> <p>(2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable.</p> <p>(3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy.</p> <p>(4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request.</p> <p>(5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA).</p> <p>(6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.</p>					
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		UNCLASSIFIED	
FORM DS-507 3-5-47	REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
SECTION A			
TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION	EXTENSION	BUILDING	ROOM NO.
FE	2951	NS	3151
2. REQUESTER'S NAME	DIVISION	EXTENSION	BUILDING
Wilson C. Flake	FE	4834	NS
3. DIVISION OF RECORD: DC/R, REF, PD, etc. DC/R			
SECTION B			
ATTACHED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
TYPE OF DOCUMENT Despatch No. 181			
TO: The Secretary of State			DATE 1-8-46
FROM: George Atcheson, Jr. USPOLAD TOKYO			
SUBJECT: Political Parties in Japan: Developments during the week ending 1-5-46			
PRESENT CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL			
SECTION C			
THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.			
RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/>	CHANGE TO: <input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET* <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED <small>*(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).</small>		
BY AUTHORITY OF: U. Alexis Johnson	DATE: 2/1/52	OFFICE OF ASS'T SECY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS	
SECTION D			
INSTRUCTIONS—(1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate. (2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable. (3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy. (4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request. (5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA). (6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		UNCLASSIFIED	

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY *JA*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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JAN 16 1946

4542
PLAIN
Tokyo via War
Dated January 8, 1946
Rec'd 6:50 p

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
JAN 14 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington

14, January 8

Tokyo vernacular press not only gave unprecedented news coverage to January 4 directives but departed from usual practice of waiting day or two by making immediate editorial comment on January 5. Tone ranged from favorable to enthusiastic.

Sent to Department; repeated to Chungking as our 93 and to Moscow as 3.

Points of general agreement: revolutionary changes required are necessary for democratization in Japan; failure of Government to take step voluntarily clear indication its weakness and lack of understanding of democracy; balance of power and political leadership now rests with Social Democrats and Communists; Cabinet seriously affected will probably

PLAIN

JAN 15 1946

FILED

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-846

71

PLAIN

-2- #14, January 8, from Tokyo via War

will probably fall; Home Ministry practically wiped out.

ASAHI. Directives issued because Government, to its shame, neglected its duty. SCAP has advanced democratization Japan. Future leadership must be found in the individuals but in democratic social organizations of the people, such as labor and farmers' unions. Importance next elections increased.

MAIWOCHI. Directives welcomed by great majority people. Old parties dependent on militarists had merely repainted signs. We do not have a new starting point for Japan. Parties must retain their policies and people exercise their franchise with care.

YOMIURI. Downfall of Cabinet inevitable. Now is time for people to erect new government with their own hands. New directives now complete. Prosecution of those responsible for war and infringement human rights must be carried on by people. Emperor cannot avoid responsibility. Directives are a warning, we must rush on road to democracy.

ATCHESON

WFD

NOTE: Delay due to non-receipt

PLAIN

66

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 8, 1946



JK
ITP
~~BC~~
JA
DC/R
file

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. F.C. Everson, Second Secretary of British Embassy
Mr. Turner, JA

COPIES TO: JK
ITP
BC

OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY

JAN 15 1946

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1-1403

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-846

740.00119 A

Mr. Everson laid on my desk this morning the Departmental press release in regard to the State-War Department group of experts headed by Mr. Corwin D. Edwards of the State Department which will proceed to Tokyo to "procure data and make studies for use in connection with the implementation of Allied economic control policy in Japan". Mr. Everson said that this notice to the press was the first intimation received by the British of any such project on behalf of the Allies. He said that while he was not instructed to make any representations in the matter, he felt that the time had come when the major Allied powers should be kept informed at least, if not consulted in advance, of any steps being taken in connection with important control policies. He said that thus far the British Government had been content to let things take their course, in view of the efficient way in which General MacArthur has handled the situation in Japan, but that hereafter with the setting up of the Far Eastern Commission and with more active participation by other of the Allied governments in control policies toward Japan, the British Government would wish to be afforded an opportunity to express its views in such matters.

I informed Mr. Everson that I would bring his views to the attention of the authorities concerned.

JA:WTTurner:mls

JAN 23 1946

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 1-846

67

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JANUARY 3, 1946
No. 5

A State-War Department group of experts is scheduled to leave Hamilton Field today for Tokyo to join General MacArthur's staff. The group, headed by Corwin D. Edwards of the State Department, will procure data and make studies for use in connection with the implementation of Allied economic control policy in Japan. Other members of the group include James M. Henderson, William C. Dixon and Samuel E. Neel, Justice Department; Robert M. Hunter, Professor of Law, Ohio State University; Robert B. Dawkins, Federal Trade Commission; Benjamin B. Wallace, Tariff Commission; and Raymond Vernon, Securities and Exchange Commission. The group is expected to submit its report in three months.

* * *

*FW 740.00119 Control (Japan) / 1-846
JA - Turner - memo*



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 9, 1946.

NO. 187

SUBJECT: Views of Liberal Party Leader, HATOYAMA Ichiro.

[Handwritten initials]

DCK

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 30 1946
Department of State

Division of Japanese Affairs
JAN 24 1946
Department of State
[Handwritten initials]

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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1946 JAN 27

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward memorandum of conversation, participated in by a member of the staff of this Mission, in which Mr. HATOYAMA Ichiro, leader of the Japan Liberal Party, explained his party's platform and expressed views on current political issues in Japan.

XR 894.00

Mr. HATOYAMA, who claims to be not affected by the SCAP directives of January 4, is occasionally mentioned as a possible Prime Minister if the SHIDEHARA Cabinet should fall or if the Liberal Party should win the largest number of Diet seats in the forthcoming election, a possibility recently made more likely by the recent disqualification of many of the Progressive Party candidates.

Respectfully yours,

[Handwritten signature]
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att m*

Memorandum of Conversation,
November 25, 1945.

Original and hectograph to Department.

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HECTO SENT TO
GRATED

OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
JAN 31 1946
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 6 1946

PTJMD

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-946

740.00119 Control

Enclosure to Despatch No. 187 of January 9, 1946 from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Views of Liberal Party Leader, HATOYAMA Ichiro."

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 25, 1945.

Present: HATOYAMA Ichiro, leader of Liberal Party
ANDOMasazumi, Chairman, Political Research
Committee of Liberal Party
YAMAMOTO Katsuichi, Specialist on Economic
Problems, Liberal Party
MATSUMOTO (Interpreter for Mr. HATOYAMA)

Major ROEST, Government Section
Mr. COLE, Civil Intelligence Section
Lt. TSUKAHARA, Civil Information and Education Section
Mr. Service, Office of the U.S. Political Adviser.

Mr. HATOYAMA called by appointment, with the other Japanese named, at the Government Section to explain the principles and program of the Liberal Party.

An informal discussion, chiefly in the form of interrogation, lasted for about an hour and forty-five minutes. It was intended to be an introductory and exploratory talk to be followed at a later date by further detailed discussion of the Party's platform. Progress was slow because of the need of interpreting and Mr. HATOYAMA's apparent inability to formulate brief, concise answers.

The following is a summarization of Mr. HATOYAMA's remarks on points of significant interest (with sequence logically rearranged and unimportant or already published material omitted).

The Constitution should be revised so as to leave the position of the Emperor "about like that of the King of England". (But repeatedly throughout the discussion Mr. HATOYAMA made clear his strong belief in the necessity of retaining the Imperial institution as a central, stabilizing force—obviously higher than that of the King of England.)

Sovereignty should be shared by the Emperor and the people.

Basic individual freedoms must be guaranteed.

Asked to compromise this principle with his public advocacy of the denial of propaganda freedom to the Communists, Mr. HATOYAMA took the line that the Japanese Communists were "not like the American or British Communists" but were an un-Japanese Party acting as the agents of a foreign power and receiving funds from that power. Pressed on this point, Mr. HATOYAMA's reply (as translated) was: "These fellows have been in jail for years and just got out. They are immediately running around actively campaigning. They have bought a printing press for ¥500,000. Where did they get the money! It must have come from the Soviet Union."

The Privy

- 2 -

The Privy Council should be abolished. (It was explained that this was Mr. HATOYAMA's private opinion and had not yet been formally adopted by the Liberal Party.)

The House of Representatives should have "the dominant voice in government".

The "Upper House" should be reformed so as to represent the "best brains and the historical experience of the country", act as a "stabilizing force", and "protect the freedom of the minority".

There was considerable discussion of this point, the gist of Mr. HATOYAMA's remarks being that the Japanese are excitable, unstable and erratic by nature. If they go in one direction, they are apt to go too far. There is now danger that they will swing too suddenly and too radically to the Left. It is also part of Japanese nature that those in power tend to oppress and deny the rights of those not in power. It is therefore essential that there be a safeguard against "dictatorship of the majority". Since this "dictatorship" will be effected through the popularly elected House of Representatives, the "Upper House" should be utilized as a check to prevent it from becoming "too radical". It should be composed of representatives of responsible groups (such as government officials) and "stable professions" (such as the law). For instance, the "Upper House" would have in it representatives of the Home Ministry who would be elected by the personnel of that Ministry.

Mr. HATOYAMA avoided a definite answer on the relative powers of the two Houses and whether the "Upper" would have veto power. He repeated that the Lower House should be more favored, that the Upper should guard against "majority dictatorship" by the Lower, and tentatively suggested that the Lower House might be able to over-ride the veto of the Upper House by two-thirds vote.

Local Administration should have a greater degree of autonomy: prefectural governors should be popularly elected.

Education should be aimed at the development of individual personality, not as in the past at the standardized production of soldiers.

Mr. HATOYAMA evaded efforts to pin him down on the content of this education. He agreed that the student should be able to study and choose among different theories and interpretations of economics and history, including (obviously without enthusiasm) a "scientific interpretation of Japanese history and the Imperial institution". He insisted, however, that while the student had a right to study or believe whatever he pleased, the teacher had no right to "propagandize". Mr. HATOYAMA denied that, in speaking of the freedom of the student to study what he pleased, he was referring only to advanced students but

did not

- 3 -

did not elucidate how younger students were in practise to have such "freedom" or their teachers avoid the crime of "propagandizing".

(The opportunity presenting itself, Mr. HATOYAMA was asked about the Kyoto Imperial University incident which took place during his regime as Minister of Education. His detailed justification of his position in that affair is the subject of a separate memorandum.)

Elements of militarism still remain in positions of influence and must be eradicated. Some of these are local government officials. Because these are more numerous, they should be treated with "human sympathy" (translator had difficulty in finding exact phrase). If they are properly supervised so that they do not intimidate the people or influence the elections, it will not be necessary summarily to deprive all of them of their livelihood. But important collaborators and supporters of the militarists remain and are active in politics. Leaders—but not all members—of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association are of this category. The Liberal Party in the forthcoming session of the Diet will introduce a bill concerning the war responsibility of these leaders.

The primary need for economic recovery is revival of production. This can only be accomplished by restoration of free competition and removal of still existing controls, particularly the "Adjustment Law". The Japanese now have lost their industriousness and instead of working and producing are engaging in speculation and black-market trading. This can be checked by the incentive of free enterprise. Staple industries and foods, however, will still need to be under some control. When free competition develops "evil tendencies" (apparently toward monopoly, though unstated), "something will have to be done".

In the next Diet (to be elected in January) the Liberals hope to seat 150 Representatives. The Social Democrats will probably have between 50 and 100. Communist success in winning representation will be "negligible". (Mr. HATOYAMA's certainty on this point was interesting in view of his public exploitation of the Communist "bogey".) There will be a number of independents and representatives of minor parties. Most of the remainder (apparently about 200) will go to the Progressive Party but this party will probably split into three factions. One of these will be led by MACHIDA, supported with funds by NAKAJIMA, who will retire into the background because of war-guilt criticism. A second will be the UGAKI group, of which TSURUMI is a member. The leadership of the third is still uncertain. The KUHARA group is not active.

Mr. HATOYAMA is not impressive as a person of great conviction, forcefulness or leadership. Although pleasant in personality, he seemed more of a "politician" than a "statesman". Inclined to be verbose and indefinite, he often consulted ANDO who appeared to have a more incisive mind. YAMAMOTO took little part in the discussion.

John S. Service
Foreign Service Officer

JAN 9 1946

TOP SECRET

No. 52

To the
Acting United States Political Adviser to
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
American Embassy Building,
Tokyo.

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the
information of the Acting Political Adviser copies of
SWNCC papers as listed below.

Enclosures:

- 1. Decision amending SWNCC
228, 7 January, copy no.
45.
- 2. SWNCC 236/4, copy no. 45.
- 3. SFE 116/6, copy no. 23.

JAN 9 1946
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Confidential File

TOP SECRET

JAN 9 1946

TOP SECRET

No. 51

To the
Acting United States Political Adviser to
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
American Embassy Building,
Tokyo.

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the
information of the Acting Political Adviser copies of
SWNCC papers as listed below.

Enclosures:

- 1. SWNCC 70/13, copy no. 45.
- 2. Decision amending SWNCC 70/13, 3 January 1946, copy no. 45.
- 3. Minutes of SFE meeting, 27 December 1945, copy no. 23.
- 4. Status of papers, SFE, 2 January 1946.

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Date

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FE:JKPenfield:hst
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A true copy of the original is attached.

JAN 8 1946 P.M.

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PREPARING OFFICE WILL
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This telegram must be
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being communicated
to anyone.
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FONOFF should instruct its ranking diplomatic

secretary to report with his credentials to general

MacArthur's headquarters (urtel 25, Jan. 6) and

request that he be accredited as diplomatic agent

of Spanish Govt [~~near Supreme Commander~~] in accordance

with procedure prescribed by Supreme Commander for Allied

Powers.

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
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72
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 10, 1946.

NO. 189

SUBJECT: Views of Mr. NARAHASHI Wataru, Cabinet Legislative Bureau Chief, on Present Political Crisis.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose copy of a memorandum of conversation dated January 8, 1946, reporting a conversation which took place on that date between Mr. NARAHASHI Wataru, Chief of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, and a member of the staff of this Mission.

Summary of Mr. NARAHASHI's remarks. Following the issuance of the January "purge" directives, the Cabinet divided as to the course of action it should take, one group favoring resignation en bloc without further participation in government, another proposing a reshuffling of five or six cabinet posts, and the last suggesting resignation en bloc to be followed by formation of new cabinet under SHIDEHARA, bringing in new members, some from the political parties. Mr. NARAHASHI favors the last course. Cabinet members TSUGITA, HORIKIRI, MATSUMURA, TANAKA, MIYOSHI, MAEDA and MATSUMOTO, eighty percent of the Home Ministry, one hundred fifty Peers, and one hundred members of the House of Representatives may be affected by directives. Only a government headed by SHIDEHARA, who is politically neutral, can assure a "fair" election. An "investigative court" should be established to determine which officials should be removed under the directives in order to avoid injustices liable to arise through blanket application. End of Summary.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att m*

Memorandum of Conversation.

Original and hecto to Department.

Copy to: General Headquarters.

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 189 dated January 10, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, on the subject "Views of NARAHASHI Wataru, Cabinet Legislative Bureau Chief, on Present Political Crisis".

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

January 8, 1946

Participants: Mr. NARAHASHI Wataru, Chief,
Cabinet Legislative Bureau;
Mr. Bishop.

Subject : Present Political Crisis

At his request, Mr. NARAHASHI called on Mr. Bishop this afternoon by appointment. The following is a resume of the remarks which Mr. NARAHASHI made:

Upon his return to Tokyo on January 4, he found the Cabinet in a "furor" of political activity. There are three views among Cabinet members of the action which the Cabinet should take in the present crisis--(1) that the Cabinet should resign en bloc with no thought of further participation in a future government; (2) that the Cabinet should be re-shuffled with the five or six members who may be affected by the January 4 directives for "purification" of Japanese officials resigning and being replaced by new members; and (3) that the Cabinet should resign en bloc and a new Cabinet be formed under SHIDEHARA, bringing in new members, some of them from the political parties. Mr. NARAHASHI favors the last view. He asserted that there is no one in Japan other than SHIDEHARA who can assure that the coming election will be impartially and honestly conducted. The Social Democrats or any other political party which might have the government entrusted to it would, inevitably, take steps favoring the political fortunes of its own members. SHIDEHARA, however, and his Foreign Minister, Mr. YOSHIDA, are entirely neutral politically and would assure an election based squarely upon the principles of fair play.

Members in the present Cabinet who may be affected by the recent directives include TSUGITA, Chief Secretary; HORIKIRI, Home Minister; MATSUMURA, Agriculture Minister; TANAKA, Minister of Railways; MIYOSHI, Vice-Chief Secretary; MAEDA, Education Minister; and MATSUMOTO, Minister without Portfolio. It is estimated that eighty percent of the important officials of the Minister of Home Affairs are affected. Practically all prefectural governors come under the prohibited classification. Some 150 members of the House of Peers will presumably have to resign. Perhaps as few as 100 members of the Lower House of the Diet will be affected. These figures are of course rough estimates.

Because of the large number of officials affected, especially officials in important positions throughout Japan, important governmental administrative work has practically ceased and the collection of rice has almost stopped.

Feeling

740.00119 Central (Japan) / 14046

-2-

Feeling among the people was that because SHIDEHARA's original cabinet list had been approved by General MacArthur's Headquarters and because a large number of Cabinet members were affected by the recent order, General MacArthur must have lost confidence in the SHIDEHARA government. Therefore they felt no compunction to comply with governmental orders, such as those concerning collection of rice. Similarly, the people felt that the SHIDEHARA government having lost SCAP's confidence was now completely impotent.

Mr. NARAHASHI described an "investigative court" which he felt the Japanese Government should establish to determine whether individuals should be denied positions on the basis of the January 4 directives or should be allowed to continue. He said that while on the whole he felt the directive was a great benefit to Japan, it was possible under the broad terms of the directive that some injustices might be committed. It would be the purpose of his proposed "court" to determine justice and injustice in each case. He went on to describe several laws which he is drafting for early promulgation in compliance with the January 4 directives. He said that this drafting was especially difficult for the reason that there was no precedent that he could follow. He said that he felt that it was necessary that the laws be put into effect at the earliest possible moment in order that present governmental and political activity which have now virtually come to a stop could be started again. He said that until there was some definite clarification as to who was and who was not affected by the directives normal activities could not be resumed.

For the future Mr. NARAHASHI listed the following as the most important problems: (1) inflation (2) crime wave (3) impartial election (4) constitutional reform (5) revision of the House of Peers law (6) revision of the regulations and laws for the Privy Council (7) question of food and (8) a plan to assure that only those Japanese who would work would be able to eat.

M.W.B.

MWBishop:jwb

10/R-76

February 4, 1946

Dear General Hilldring:

In a letter of 10 January you requested the assignment to SCAP of Dr. C. Burton Fahs, Mr. Stanley Nehmer, Captain Tom Blakemore, Dr. E. A. Kracke, Jr., Mr. Howard Linton and Dr. Chitoshi Yanaga, all of whom have been employed by the Office of Research and Intelligence of this Department and formerly were with the Research & Analysis Branch, OSS.

Your letter came when I was out of town, and it was referred to the Office of Research and Intelligence. For that reason it has come to my attention only today, and I apologize to you for the delay in acknowledging or answering it. Mr. Nehmer and Mr. Blakemore have already been made available to General MacArthur, through his political adviser, and are en route to Japan.

Dr. Yanaga has resigned from the State Department to take a position at Yale, and I understand that your people are now discussing with him the possibility of his going temporarily to Japan. Dr. Kracke and Mr. Linton, for personal reasons, are unwilling to take assignments in Japan at this time.

That leaves only Dr. Fahs, who is Chief of the Division of Far East Intelligence of this Department, and as such is carrying a considerable responsibility. While I do not foreclose the possibility that Dr. Fahs might be made available on a temporary basis, it would be necessary to balance the importance of the job in Japan against the one here before coming to a decision as to whether he should be released.

As you know, 4 or 5 other members of the Division of Far East Intelligence have been released for service in Japan during the last few months. The present staff of the Division is not any larger than necessary to deal with pressing problems.

Sincerely yours,

Alfred McCormack
Special Assistant
to the Secretary

Maj. Gen. J. H. Hilldring
Director, Civil Affairs Division
War Department
Washington, D.C.

SA-Mc:AMC:ejg

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
11-1046
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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 10, 1946

~~RESTRICTED~~

No. 188

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 30 1946
DIRECTOR
Department of State

DCR

Subject: Memorandum on Suspension of SAITO Takao from the House of Representatives in March 1940.

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RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
JAN 24 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

I have the honor to forward copy of a memorandum dated November 22, 1945, prepared by the Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence, General Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, on the SAITO Takao affair of 1940.

It will be recalled that SAITO, who was a leading member of the Minseito Party, was suspended from the Diet because of critical questions made from the floor of the House of Representatives regarding the Government's China policy. The memorandum, though primarily historical, is of interest at the present time because of SAITO's prominence as a possible leader of the Progressive Party and because many of the other persons involved in the incident, either as supporters or opponents of SAITO, are important in present party politics in Japan. The stand which these men took on this controversy may be taken as some index of the strength of their liberal parliamentary convictions.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att m*

Memorandum dated
November 22, 1945.

Original and hectograph to Department.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 188 of January 10, 1946 from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Memorandum on Suspension of SAITO Takao from the House of Representatives in March 1940."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence

22 November 1945.

SUBJECT: The Takao Saito Affair of 1940

TO : Lt. PONTIUS, Research and Analysis Section

FROM : Tec 3 Saffell and Tec 5 Scott

1. The Affair Itself.

Takao Saito, Minseito, 10 times member of the Diet from Hyogo-ken, and elderly champion of constitutional government, set off a political explosion in the spring of 1940 by the character of the questions which he put to the Government on its China policy. Though the part of the speech deemed most objectionable was stricken from the House record, enough of it filtered out that some idea of its nature reached the press. Saito asked, for instance: "... what I wish to hear now is what will be the future of the China Affair, how long is it going to last and what are the Government's plans for its settlement."

The fiery Diet member even went so far as to declare that though he did not mean "to voice objection" he could not help but "have some suspicions over the Konoye statement" regarding Japan's war aims. As a matter of fact, he directly challenged the truth of Konoye's declared China policy.

Whatever the rest of the speech may have contained, the result of the episode was a demand for the member's suspension from the Diet. Saito's age and standing, however, together with the infrequency of such suspensions in Japanese constitutional practice, made this objective difficult of achievement. Saito had many supporters in his own party, in the Kuhara faction of the Seiyukai, and in the Social Mass Party. The Nakajima Faction of the Seiyukai, the Jikyoku Doshikai, and the First Lobby Group, on the other hand, took a strong stand in demanding that Saito be expelled from the Diet. After more than a month of involved party maneuverings and of Government and Army pressure on the Diet, Saito was suspended on 7 March 1940.

2. The Saito Affair as an Index of Political Complexion.

The line-up of Diet members on the question of Saito's exclusion is of significance because the affair involved their attitudes toward such basic issues as (1) the militaristic policy toward China (2) freedom of speech and the rights of Diet members (3) the independence of the Diet itself.

It is not meant to be implied that any one piece of evidence is sufficient to give the proper political label to an individual. Attitude toward Saito's exclusion, however, represents one significant political commitment. Used in connection with other facts, it should serve as corroborative evidence.

This material was taken from the Japan Times and Mail, hereafter

- 2 -

after cited as JT&M, and from Trans-Pacific, cited as T-P. Unless otherwise indicated, all of the following men were members of the lower House of the Diet in the spring of 1940, that is, of the 75th session. Political designations thus refer to that period unless indicated otherwise.

3. Viewpoints of individual Diet members on the question of expelling Takao Saito from the Diet:

ABE, ISOO, Pres. of Social Mass Party in spring of 1940; formerly a leader in the Social Public Party; was strongly opposed to Saito's expulsion and broke with his party on this issue; did not attend 7 March Diet session at which Saito was expelled (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Statement upon resigning from the Social Mass Party: ".....my political doctrine was diagonally opposed to that of the others. I followed my ideal instead of my sentiment" (JT&M, 22 March 1940). Later pushed formation of new labor party (JT&M, 30 March 1940).

ABE, SHIGEO, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party; had come to it from the old Japan Laborer's Party (totalitarian), but before that had belonged to the Social Public Party. Went with the group that favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

AKAMATSU, KATSUMARO, in 1940 leader of movement to form new political party in which influence of the Army and of those who had voted for Saito's expulsion would be dominant (JT&M, 24 March 1940).

AKITA, KIYOSHI, member of First Lobby Club in 1940; prominent in movement to form new political party in which influence of the Army and of those who had voted for Saito's expulsion would be dominant (JT&M, 24 March 1940).

ANDO, MASAZUMI, orthodox Seiyukai in 1940; at party meeting "strongly opposed" Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 7 March 1940).

ASANUMA, INEJIRO, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party (totalitarian). This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

ASHIDA, HITOSHI, orthodox Seiyukai, "strongly opposed" Saito's expulsion at party meet (JT&M, 7 March 1940). "Chairman of the political affairs investigation committee of the party and former president of the Japan Times & Mail" voted against Saito's expulsion in spite of his party's stand; resignation from party demanded by president (JT&M, 8 March 1940). Refused to accept president's proposal that he resign (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Party president determined to expel him (JT&M, 10 March 1940). Decided to leave party voluntarily (JT&M, 12 March 1940). Returned to party as result of compromise (JT&M, 13 March 1940).

ASO, HISASHI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideologies which favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Was a member of that "triumvirate" in the Social Mass Party which forced withdrawal from the party of the 10 pro-Saito men (T-P, 4 April 1940).

HATOYAMA, ICHIRO,

- 3 -

HATOYAMA, ICHIRO, orthodox Seiyukai in 1940, former Education Minister; at party meet strongly opposed Saito's exclusion from the Diet (JT&M, 7 March 1940). Was absent from the session which voted for Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 8 March 1940). Resignation likely as Seiyukai president took strong anti-Saito stand (JT&M, 10 March 1940). "Adviser of the Kuhara faction (Seiyukai) who sympathized with Mr. Saito's cause..." Resigned from party but was reinstated as result of compromise agreement (T-P, 4 April 1940).

HIDA, TAKUJI, in 1940 member of the Kuhara faction of the Seiyukai, decided to support President Kuhara to the end in his decision to oust pro-Saito men from the party (JT&M, 10 March 1940). Resigned from party because Kuhara had "bent the knee" before liberalists" in the Saito affair (JT&M, 25 March 1940).

HONDA, YEISAKU, in 1940 member of the Kuhara faction of the Seiyukai. Resigned from party because party president had "bent the knee before liberalists" in the Saito affair (JT&M, 25 March 1940).

HOSHIJIMA, JIRO, member of the Kuhara faction of Seiyukai, who in 1940 decided to support the party president "to the end" in his decision to oust from the party pro-Saito men (JT&M, 10 March 40).

IKUTA, WAHEI, in 1940 member of the Kuhara faction of Seiyukai. Supported Party president Kuhara in his decision to oust pro-Saito men (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

INOUE, RYOJI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party; he had come to it from the old Japan Laborers' Party (totalitarian), but before that had been a member of the Social Public Party. Went with the element that favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

KAAI, GIICHI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party (totalitarian). Went with the element that favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

KAMEI, KANICHIRO, Social Mass Party in 1940. Prominent in movement to form a new political party in which influence of the Army and of those who had voted for Saito's expulsion would be dominant (JT&M, 24 March 1940).

KATAYAMA, TETSU, one of the ten members of the Social Mass Party who was opposed to Saito's expulsion. Did not attend 7 March Diet meet at which actual expulsion took place (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Forced out of Social Mass Party (JT&M, 11 March 1940). Active with Iseo Abe in formation of new party (JT&M, 30 March 1940).

KATO, HYOZO, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideology. This section of the party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

KAWAKAMI, JOTARO, a member of the 'triumvirate' in the Social Mass Party which forced withdrawal from the party of the ten pro-Saito men. He succeeded to Tetsu Katayama's job as executive committeeman in charge of the Social Mass Party's floor tactics (T-P, 4 April 1940).

KAWAMATA, SEION,

- 4 -

KAWAMATA, SEION, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totaliterian ideology. This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

KAWASAKI, KATSU, with "other close friends of the condemned politician (Saito)," he asked for leave of absence from the Diet for the three days during which time Saito's fate was to be decided (JT&M, 5 March 1940).

KIKUCHI, YONOSUKE, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totaliterian ideology. This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

KONO, MITSU, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totaliterian ideology. This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

KOYAMA, RYO, in 1940 a member of Jikyoku Doshikai and prominent in movement to form a new political party in which influence of the Army and of those who voted for Saito's exclusion would be dominant (JT&M, 24 March 1940).

KOYAMA, KURANOSUKE, in 1940 a Minseito. At party meet he recommended no punishment for Saito (JT&M, 6 March 1940).

KOYAMA, SHOJU, Minseito and in 1940 Speaker of the House. Went with the party on decision to exclude Saito.

KUDO, TETSUO, in 1940 a Minseito Diet member who at party meet championed Saito's cause (JT&M, 4 Feb 1940). At later Minseito meeting recommended no punishment for Saito (JT&M, 6 March 1940).

KUHARA, FUSANOSUKE, in 1940 President of a Seiyukai faction and determined on exclusion from his party of those who supported Saito (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

KUNIHAKARI, GORI, in 1940 a member of the Kuhara faction of the Seiyukai. Supported President Kuhara in his decision to oust from the party pro-Saito men (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

MACHIDA, CHUJI, in 1940 President of Minseito. "..... has expressed himself in terms which to all intents and purposes should be taken as in support of the Government." (Ed., JT&M, 20 Feb 1940).

MAKINO, RYOZO, in 1940 "chairman of the parliamentary members' association of the party (orthodox Seiyukai) and noted attorney" voted against Saito's expulsion in spite of his party's stand. His resignation from the party therefore demanded (JT&M, 8 March 1940). Refused to leave party (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Party president determined to expel him (JT&M, 10 March 1940). Decided to leave party voluntarily (JT&M, 12 March 1940). Resigned and then returned to party as result of compromise. (JT&M, 13 March 1940).

MARUYAMA, BENZABURO, in 1940 an orthodox Seiyukai member who voted against Saito's expulsion. His own resignation from the party

was consequently

- 5 -

was consequently demanded (JT&M, 8 March 1940). Refused to leave party (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Party president determined to expel him (JT&M, 10 March 1940). Decided to leave party voluntarily (JT&M, 12 March 1940). Resigned and then returned to party as result of compromise (JT&M, 13 March 1940).

MATSUDA, TAKECHITO, in 1940 a Minseito member who at party meeting urged that a punishment lighter than exclusion be imposed upon Saito (JT&M, 6 March 1940).

MATSUMOTO, JIICHIRO, one of the ten Social Mass Party members who was opposed to Saito's expulsion. Did not attend the 7 March 1940 Diet meet at which actual exclusion was effected (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Expelled from Social Mass Party (JT&M, 11 March 1940).

MATSUNAGA, YOSHIO, one of the ten Social Mass Party members who was opposed to Saito's exclusion. Did not attend the 7 March 1940 Diet meet at which actual exclusion was effected (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Expelled from Social Mass Party (JT&M, 11 March 1940).

MATSUNO, TSURUHEI, in 1940 Railway Minister and a director of the Kuhara faction of Seiyukai. Determined to expel from the party pro-Saito men (JT&M, 11 March 1940).

MATSUOKA, KOMAKICHI, elected in the spring of 1940 to the central committee of Isao Abe's new liberal party after withdrawal from the Social Mass Party as a consequence of his pro-Saito attitude (JT&M, 1 April 1940).

MAYEKAWA, SHOICHI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Laborers' and Farmers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideology. This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's exclusion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

MITSUCHI, CHUZO, orthodox Seiyukai, in 1940 Chairman of the House Budget Committee, "sternly opposed" Saito's expulsion at party meet (JT&M, 7 March 1940). Absent from Diet session which expelled Saito (JT&M, 8 March 1940). Opposed party president's attempt to expel pro-Saito members (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

MIWA, JUSO, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideologies. This section of the party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

MIYAKE, SHOICHI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideologies. This section of the party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

MIYAWAKI, CHOKICHI, in 1940 a member of the orthodox faction of Seiyukai; "retired wing-colonel and brother of Chuzo Mitsuchi (sic), noted Seiyukai leader who four times held various cabinet posts;" voted against Saito's expulsion regardless of his party's position. Because of this failure to follow the party line, Miyawaki's resignation from the party was demanded (JT&M, 8 March 1940). Refused to leave the party (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Party president determined to

expel

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expel him (JT&M, 10 March 1940). Again refused to resign (JT&M, 12 March 1940). Resigned but was reinstated in party as result of compromise (JT&M, 13 March 1940).

MIZUTANI, CHOZABURO, in 1940 one of the ten members of the Social Mass Party who was opposed to Saito's expulsion. Did not attend the Diet session which expelled Saito (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Forced out of Social Mass Party as result of stand on the Saito affair (JT&M, 11 March 1940).

MORITA, JUJIRO, in 1940 at a meeting of Minseito Diet members he "is reported to have recommended that since what is considered improper in the sensational speech of Mr. Saito is his philosophy of war—and other parts of his speech are considered not to deserve any punishment, suspension of Mr. Saito's attendance to the Diet session for a certain period would be appropriate punishment" (JT&M, 6 March 1940).

MURAYASU, SHINKURO, close friend of Saito. Asked Speaker of House for leave of absence during the first days of March so that he would not be present at the session which expelled Saito (JT&M, 5 March 1940).

NAGAWA, KANICHI, lawyer, in spring of 1940 a member of orthodox Seiyukai, voted against Saito's expulsion in spite of his party's stand. His own resignation from the party therefore demanded (JT&M, 8 March 1940). Refused to leave party (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Resigned from party but was immediately reinstated as result of compromise (JT&M, 13 March 1940).

NAGAYE, KAZUO, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideology. This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

NAKAI, KAZUO, in 1940 chairman of the Diet Disciplinary Committee (JT&M, 3 March 1940). Member of the orthodox Seiyukai. Supported party president "to the end" in his decision to expel pro-Saito men from the party (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

NAKAJIMA, CHIKUHEI, in 1940 leader of the Nakajima or reformist faction of the Seiyukai. This faction favored Saito's expulsion (T-P, 14 March 1940).

NAKAMURA, KOICHI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Laborers' and Farmers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideologies. This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

NAKANO, JISUKE, in 1940 a member of the orthodox Seiyukai. Resigned from the party because he felt that the party president by a somewhat conciliatory move had "bent the knee" before liberalists" in the Saito affair (JT&M, 25 March 1940).

NISHIKAWA, TEIICHI, in 1940 a member of orthodox Seiyukai. Supported party president in his decision to cull pro-Saito men (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

NISHIMURA, SHIGEO,

- 7 -

NISHIMURA, SHIGEO, in 1940 a member of orthodox Seiyukai. Supported party president in his decision to oust pro-Saito men (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

NISHIO, SUYEHURO, one of the ten members of the Social Mass Party who was actively opposed to Saito's expulsion. Did not attend 7 March Diet meet at which actual expulsion took place (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Expelled from Social Mass Party (JT&M, 11 March 1940).

NISHIOKA, TAKEJIRO, former Parliamentary Vice-Minister; in 1940 member of orthodox Seiyukai faction. Resigned from party because party president had "bent the knee before liberalists" by arranging a compromise over the Saito affair (JT&M, 25 March 1940).

NOMIZU, MASARU, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideology. This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's exclusion from the Diet (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

OKADA, TADAHIKO, in 1940 Chief Secretary of the orthodox faction of Seiyukai (JT&M, 2 March 1940). Determined to push expulsion from party of the five pro-Saito men (JT&M, 11 March 1940).

OKAZAKI, KEN, one of the ten members of the Social Mass Party who was opposed to Saito's exclusion. Did not attend 7 March Diet meet at which exclusion was effected (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Expelled from Social Mass Party (JT&M, 11 March 1940).

OKAZAKI, KYUJIRO, "Minseito M.P. (1940), stated at the meeting of the Minseito that he would vote in opposition to expulsion of Mr. Saito in the plenary session and at the same time expressed his intention of leaving the party. Despite efforts by President Machida and his colleagues to induce him to stay in the party, Mr. Okazaki did not change his mind and tendered his resignation....(JT&M, 8 March 1940).

OTANI, SETSUO, in 1940 member of the orthodox faction of the Seiyukai. Decided to support party president "to the end" in his decision to oust pro-Saito men from the party (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

SAKAI, SHIGEI, in 1940 member of the orthodox faction of the Seiyukai. Decided to support party president "to the end" in his decision to oust pro-Saito men from the party (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

SUGIYAMA, GENJIRO, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideologies. This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Was a member of the "triumvirate" of the Social Mass Party which forced withdrawal of the ten pro-Saito men (T-P, 4 April 1940).

SUNADA, SHIGEMASA, in 1940 a member of the orthodox section of the Seiyukai. Regarded as a conspicuous absentee from the session which voted for Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 8 March 1940).

SUNAGA, YOSHI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, and of the wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideologies. This section of the Social

Mass

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Mass Party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

SUZUKI, BUNJI, in 1940 one of the ten members of the Social Mass Party who was strongly opposed to Saito's expulsion. Did not attend 7 March Diet meet at which actual exclusion took place (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Expelled from Social Mass Party (JT&M, 11 March 1940).

TADA, MITSUNAGA, Minseito, who at party meet favored a punishment for Saito lighter than complete expulsion (JT&M, 6 March 1940).

TAHARA, HARUJI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Japan Laborers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideology. This section of the Social Mass Party favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

TAKABATAKE, KAMETARO, in 1940 a member of the orthodox faction of Seiyukai. Decided to support party president "to the end" in the decision to oust pro-Saito men (JT&M, 10 March 1940).

TAMAN, KIYOOMI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party; he had come to it from the old Japan Laborers' Party and before that had been a member of the Social Public Party. Went with the group that favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

TAMANO, TOMOYOSHI, in 1940 a member of the orthodox faction of the Seiyukai; decided to back the party president "to the end" in his decision to oust pro-Saito men (JT&M, 10 March 1940). Resigned from party because he believed that President Kuhara had "bent the knee before liberalists" in the Saito affair. (JT&M, 25 March 1940).

TAMURA, HIDEO, in 1940 a Minseito Diet member who with others pointed to the "distinguished service that Mr. Saito had rendered the political world in the past 30 years and declared that any penalty imposed on him on the Speaker's authority could not be countenanced by his comrades" (JT&M, 4 February 1940).

TAWARA, MAGOICHI, one of the elders of the Minseito. Favored Saito's original intention to resign rather than to force the expulsion issue. Said Tawara: "We are grateful for many years of unremitting toil that Mr. Saito has put into the cause of the party but with the situation such as it is we have no choice but to accept his proposal to withdraw from the party" (JT&M, 4 February 1940). Reported to have decided to resign from post as floor manager of Minseito as means of "taking responsibility for the Saito case" (JT&M, 8 March 1940).

TAZAWA, YOSHISUKE, member of House of Peers in 1940. "Declaring that the reported high-handed attitude of the Government in dealing with the disposal of the Saito case in the House of Representatives is liable to cause unnecessary suspicion among the people, Yoshisuke Tazawa, independent member and former Deputy Mayor of Tokyo, demanded the Government to clarify its stand on the matter at the plenary session of the House of Peers this morning.

"The Government," the interpellator said, "appears as if it has been trying to interfere with settlement of the Saito case which should be decided upon solely by the House of Representatives. At least, the people have been given such a misconception.

"According

- 9 -

"According to reports by the vernaculars this morning, the Government is said to have been considering the suspension of the Imperial Diet session if the situation makes a turn for the worse."

"Mr. Tazawa went on to say that if these reports are true, the Government is actually threatening the House of Representatives and at least the people would have such an impression" (JT&M, 27 February 1940).

TEJIOROGI, RYUKICHI, in 1940 a Minseito member who at party meet recommended no punishment for Saito (JT&M, 6 March 1940).

TOMIYOSHI, YEIJI, a member of the Social Mass Party, and of that wing which had come from the old Laborers' and Farmers' Party, a group with totalitarian ideology. This section of the party in general favored Saito's expulsion. In spite of these antecedents, however, Tomiyoshi was one of the ten members of the Social Mass Party who was opposed to Saito's expulsion. Did not attend 7 March Diet meet at which actual exclusion was effected (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Expelled from Social Mass Party (JT&M, 11 March 1940). Active in formation of Abe's new liberal group (JT&M, 1 April 1940).

TSUCHIYA, SEIZABURO, in 1940 a Minseito member who at party meet "strongly demanded Mr. Saito's expulsion, saying his address was unquestionably improper at the present stage of the China Affair" (JT&M, 6 March 1940).

WAKAMIYA, SADA0, in 1940 a member of orthodox Seiyukai who at party meet strongly opposed Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 7 March 1940).

YAMAJI, JOICHI, with other close friends of Saito requested a leave of absence so that he need not attend that session of the Diet which expelled Saito (JT&M, 5 March 1940).

YAMAZAKI, JINJI, in 1940 a member of the Social Mass Party, but of that wing which had come from the old Laborers' and Farmers' Party, a group with a totalitarian ideology. This section of the Social Mass favored Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 9 March 1940).

YONEKUBO, MANRYO, one of the ten members of the Social Mass Party who was strongly opposed to Saito's expulsion. Did not attend 7 March Diet session which expelled Saito (JT&M, 9 March 1940). Forced to leave Social Mass Party (JT&M, 11 March 1940). Active in formation of Isao Abe's new party (JT&M, 1 April 1940).

YORIMITSU, YOSHIKAKI, in 1940 a member of the orthodox Seiyukai. Decided to support party president "to the end" in his decision to oust pro-Saito men (JT&M, 1940).

YOSHIZAWA, KENKICHI, in 1940 a member of the orthodox Seiyukai, former Foreign Minister, who at party meeting strongly opposed Saito's expulsion (JT&M, 7 March 1940).

JAN 10 1946

SECRET

No. 55

To the
Acting United States Political Adviser to
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
American Embassy Building,
Tokyo.

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Acting Political Adviser copies of FEC papers as listed below:

- FEC 2/4, 18 December 1945
- FEC 2/5, 18 December 1945
- FEC 2/6, 20 December 1945
- FEC 2/7, 20 December 1945, Copy 73
- FEC 15, 10 December 1945, Copy 23
- MI-4, 10 December 1945
- MI-5, 10 December 1945
- MI-6, 10 December 1945
- MI-6/2, 19 December 1945
- MI-6/3, 19 December 1945
- MI-6/4, 20 December 1945
- MI-10, 26 December 1945
- WC5-3, 27 December 1945
- Status of Papers, 15 December 1945, Copy 66
- Agenda, 10th Meeting, December 21, 1945
- Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, December 14, 1945

Enclosures:
As stated.

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Tokyo via War

Dated January 11, 1946

Rec'd 5:25 p.m. 14th


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SA/M
SEC/X Secretary of State

DC/L
ITP Washington

FC
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OPD
DC/R 22, January 11



Sent to Department, repeated to Chungking as our number 5 and to Moscow as our number 4.

Political summary January 6 through 9.
Political crisis. As result of January 4 directive for denazification of bureaucracy, Cabinet reported of 3 schools of opinion:

1. Resign in favor entirely new government.
2. Reshuffle Cabinet replacing 5 or 6 members believed affected by January 4 directives.
3. Resign en bloc followed by appointment second Shidehara Cabinet.

In all cases representatives principal parties would be included. Foreign Minister and majority of Cabinet thought to favor two, arguing Cabinet has responsibility to ensure free and impartial election. Supporters of three believe Cabinet will require expression of renewed SCAP confidence involved in reappointment Shidehara to maintain authority and even present degree of effectiveness. Premier expected leave sick bed shortly to seek SCAP wishes in final decision. Press, except YOMIURI, which proposed Liberal-Socialist-Communist coalition government, and Japanese of liberal view deplored continuance in office of Shidehara Cabinet but regretfully agreed newer elements not yet capable of assuming full responsibilities of government.

Approximately 150 upper and 110 recent Lower House Members, Ministers Horikiri, Matsumura, Maeda, Tanaka, and Matsumoto, Household Minister Ishiwata, Privy Council President Suzuki,

JA
JAN 16 1946
Cabinet Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 11 1946
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-2- 22, January 11 from Tokyo via War

Cabinet Secretary Tsugita, Central Liaison Director Kodama, 4/5 leading Home Ministry Officials and practically all Prefectural Governors among those reported affected by directives.

Some concerned disqualified officials and politicians may remain active behind scenes employing influence and financial resources in support reactionary candidates and policies.

SCAP, requested group of leading American educators be sent to Japan to advise on long-range education reform. Lt. Yuri sentenced to hang after admitting ordering execution American prisoner. SCAP stated Government monthly coal production quotas below realizable amounts. Estimated industry could produce 1.2, 1.5, and 2 million tons in January, February and March instead of Government quotas of .9, 1, and 1.2 million tons. Press reported increased production last decade of December raised months output to 854,000 tons.

SCAP refuted press stories disease increase since surrender, stating period had shown overall decline. Established regulations to control unauthorized reprinting of foreign newspaper and magazine articles. Government ordered to assemble Ryukyans desiring repatriation at Kagoshima and Oruga.

Government. Cabinet approved draft 1946-47 ordinary budget. Commerce and Industry Vice-Minister announced price and distribution controls for daily necessities would be maintained and advised manufacturers not to delay production in belief free market will be restored. Press had previously reported only about 10% scheduled production kitchen utensils, shoes, bulbs, and similar goods realized during November and December due coal and material shortages and management reluctance to utilize raw materials stocks to manufacture for sale at official prices. Story indicated Government contemplating compulsory disposal idle materials stocks.

Agriculture Vice-Minister stated food imports expected next summer but could not be relied upon, urged maximum use of substitute foods. Tokyo SHIMBUN deplored Tokyo population increase of roughly 200,000 monthly since surrender to present level of 4,000,000 as complicating food problem. Preliminary Government estimate Japanese overseas investments reported one hundred billion yen. Agriculture Ministry lower officials and employees demanded establishment Personnel Affairs Committee with employee representation and freedom to form union. ASAHII reported heads of Supreme Court, Appellate and District Courts and connected Procurator's

Offices

SECRET

SECRET

-3- 22, January 11 from Tokyo via War

Offices tendered resignations to permit renovation judicial personnel. Justice Minister disclaimed knowledge resignations stating meeting of Ministry officials to consider judicial reform scheduled January 11 and 12. 750 officials Tokyo District Court and local criminal and civil courts petitioned Minister institute measures for democratization court management and procedures, announced plans to form union in accordance new union law, urged similar action by court officials elsewhere. Education Minister instructed public and private school heads to consider new year rescript basis education policies. Government reported concerned regarding future employment 12 Imperial princes ineligible for public office under January 4 directives. Metropolitan police arrested 250 vegetable vendors and warned 173 fishmongers for violation anti-profiteering regulations.

Parties. Social Democrats demanded Cabinet resign en bloc reported planning to sponsor 500 candidates with hopes of obtaining 230 seats. Standing Committee decided to hold first meeting 108 - Member Central Committee January 15 to consider election of Party President, attitude on cooperation with other parties and Emperor question and election plans. Showdown left and right elements expected but with open split considered improbable, or at most likely to involve only small number of extremists.

Secretary General Katayama Tetsu, Matsuoka Komakichi, Nishio Suehiro, and Oyama Ikuo, now ill in US, mentioned as presidential prospects. Cooperatives are reportedly proposing coalition with Social Democrats. Hatoyama has expressed desire cooperate with Social Democrats but latter appear lukewarm to serving under his leadership. Pressures on right and left wings of Social Democrats may increase danger of defection in party ranks. Communists demanded overthrow Shidehara Cabinet and strict execution January 4 directives, reiterated Emperor should be called to account for war responsibility. Published land reform program involving transfer absentee Imperial and state land holdings to farmers without compensation and establishment farmers committees in each village to determine utilization land, pasture and forest resources.

Nosaka Sanji

SECRET

SECRET

-4- 22, January 11 from Tokyo via War

Nosaka Sanji follower recently returned from Yenan declared Japan Communists pushing Emperor issue too far, stated Nosaka believed issue should be settled by plebiscite. All parties except Communists, unlikely to be invited, appeared willing to join coalition Cabinet if present Cabinet resigns.

ATCHESON

JT

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JAN 17 1946

In reply refer to
JA

My dear Senator Myers:

I have received your communication of January 11, 1946, enclosing a letter addressed to you on December 28, 1945, by Mrs. F. N. Zimmerman in regard to the control of Japan.

I think that the following extracts from a radio address delivered by the Secretary of State on December 30, 1945, are responsive to the questions raised in Mrs. Zimmerman's letter. A copy of the full text of the address is enclosed for your further reference.

"The proposals we offered regarding Japan make it clear that we intend to cooperate with our Allies and we expect them to cooperate with us. But at the same time our agreement safeguards the efficient administration which has been set up in Japan under the Supreme Allied Commander.

"It assures that the authority of General MacArthur will not be obstructed by the inability of the Far Eastern Commission to agree on policies or by the inability of the Allied Council to agree upon the methods of carrying them out.

"We were determined to assure that the outstanding and efficient administration set up and executed by General MacArthur should not be obstructed."

Mrs. Zimmerman's

	The Honorable
	DCR - NE Unit
Anal <i>W</i>	Francis Myers,
Rev.	United States Senate.
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-2-

Mrs. Zimmerman's letter is herewith returned in response to your request, a copy of it having been retained for the Department's files.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

Acting Secretary

Enclosures ✓

Letter from Mrs. Zimmerman, returned.
Radio Bulletin No. 308, Dec. 30, 1945.

[Handwritten initials]

CR *[initials]*
JAN 16 1946 P.M.

[Handwritten initials]
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FE *[Handwritten initials]*

Routine
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File
D/R

United States Senate

January 11, 1946

Respectfully referred to

Department of State

with thanks for such favorable consideration as the communication herewith submitted warrants, and for a report thereon, to accompany return of inclosure.

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By direction of

Francis B. Saypol
U. S. S.

card: Zimmerman, 7.7.1. (Mrs.)

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1946



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Embassy, Rome, Italy,
January 11, 1946.

No. 2931

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Transmitting text of Italian Notes regarding
Italian assets which were carried away by the
Germans.

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my telegram no. 142 of January 11,
noon, 1946, I have the honor to enclose the Italian text
and English translation of the Italian Government's Notes
Verbales of April 21, 1945 and January 4, 1946 dealing
with Italian assets carried away by the Germans and the
desire of the Italian Government that Italian representa-
tives be permitted to go to occupied Axis territory to
identify such assets.

Respectfully yours,

A. Kirk

Alexander Kirk.

Enclosures: *atf*

1. Italian Note Verbale of April 21, 1945.
2. Translation of Note of April 21, 1945.
3. Italian Note Verbale of January 4, 1946.
4. Translation of Note of January 4, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department

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WAR AREAS
ECONOMIC DIVISION
FEB 15 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 2931, of January 11, 1946, entitled "Transmitting text of Italian Notes regarding Italian assets which were carried away by the Germans", from the American Embassy, Rome, Italy.

MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

42/65600

Dir.Gen. A.E. - Uff. 2

NOTA VERBALE.

Il R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, in previsione della prossima cessazione delle ostilità con la Germania e della conseguente occupazione dei territori tedeschi, ha l'onore di richiamare la cortese attenzione dell'Ambasciata degli Stati Uniti d'America, pregandola di volersene rendere interprete presso il Suo Governo, su quanto è qui appresso esposto:

1) L'economia italiana ha subito, in diretta dipendenza dello stato di guerra con la Germania, un complesso imponente di danni che possono comprendersi in questi grandi gruppi:

- distruzioni dell'attrezzatura di diretta pertinenza dello Stato (operate sulle reti stradali, sui porti, sulla rete ed impianti ferroviari, sugli edifici pubblici, sugli impianti dei servizi pubblici ecc.);

- distruzioni totali o parziali degli impianti produttivi privati (centrali elettriche, impianti industriali, scorte di materie prime, coltura agricole, patrimonio zootecnico);

- danni indiretti subiti dall'economia italiana (gravami germanici per spese di occupazione; paralisi produttiva di molte attività in conseguenza dell'occupazione militare; vasti decentramenti di industrie operati dalle autorità germaniche ai fini bellici tedeschi, ecc.).

Di tutto questo immenso complesso di danni, la cui dipendenza dallo stato giuridico di guerra non può essere contestata, non può non affermarsi che lo Stato e la Nazione italiana abbiano diritto di ottenere un congruo risarcimento, in conto riparazioni, allo stesso titolo di ogni altro belligerante.

2) E' poi da considerare che le autorità militari germaniche hanno asportato dall'Italia con violenza ingenti quantitativi di beni strumentali (macchinari, impianti, materiale ferroviario, materie prime ecc.), che in grande parte sono stati impiegati ed inclusi in impianti fissi, in territorio germanico. Inoltre, nell'estate 1944, il Governo tedesco dispose che le autorità militari germaniche occupanti costringessero privati ed Enti privati ad addivenire a convenzioni particolari, allo scopo di trasportare in Germania molti macchinari per completare

e rafforzare

- 2 -

e rafforzare impianti cola esistenti, in base alle quali convenzioni, la proprietà dei macchinari doveva rimanere alle industrie italiane cedenti essendone contemplata la restituzione alla fine della guerra.

Di tutto questo materiale e di tutti i beni sopraindicati, la ove ne sia possibile la individuazione, il R. Governo ritiene di essere in diritto di richiedere il recupero e la restituzione, al fine di poterne curare la riconsegna agli aventi diritto. Quando non sia possibile il recupero, il R. Governo ritiene che debba essere iscritto l'ammontare in conto danni di guerra da essere risarcito a carico della Germania.

3) Il R. Governo pertanto, nel mentre si riserva di fornire ogni possibile dato atto a comprovare l'estensione dei danni subiti dall'economia italiana imputabili al Governo germanico, e a dimostrare la fondatezza dei singoli reclami, e mentre riafferma le sue richieste per la restituzione dell'oro della Banca d'Italia e delle opere d'arte, oggetto di precedenti separate comunicazioni, ritiene suo dovere elevare fin da ora la piu ampia riserva del diritto di privati e degli Enti danneggiati, e chiede che gli venga dai Governi Alleati riconosciuta:

- a) la facoltà a far valere i suoi diritti a congruo risarcimento in conto riparazioni;
- b) la restituzione dei beni asportati come sopra e detto;
- c) in mancanza di essa, il diritto a concorrere in una proporzionata eventuale ripartizione dell'attrezzatura produttiva tedesca;
- d) l'ammissione diretta di Commissioni tecniche italiane negli organismi alleati che seguiranno le forze di occupazione in Germania, al fine di poter procedere al riconoscimento e conseguente recupero di tutti i macchinari e materiali e patrimoni di qualsiasi natura asportati;
- e) l'ammissione diretta di rappresentanti italiani nella Commissione per le riparazioni, la quale secondo la Conferenza di Yalta, dovrà prossimamente riunirsi a Mosca.

Il R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, nel raccomandare alla migliore considerazione dell'Ambasciata degli Stati Uniti d'America l'insieme delle richieste sopra elencate, esprime la speranza che, rendendosi interprete della fondatezza di esse, l'Ambasciata stessa vorrà appoggiarle presso il proprio Governo; e rests in attesa di conoscerne il pensiero al riguardo.

R o m a, 21 aprile 1945

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 2931, of January 11, 1946, entitled "Transmitting text of Italian Notes regarding Italian assets which were carried away by the Germans", from the American Embassy, Rome, Italy.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

42/65600

NOTE VERBALE.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in anticipation of the early cessation of hostilities with Germany and of the consequent occupation of the German territories, has the honor to invite the attention of the Embassy of the United States of America, asking it kindly to inform its Government of the considerations set forth below:-

1. Italian economy has undergone, in direct consequence of the state of war with Germany, an imposing mass of damage which can be included in the following large groups:

destruction of equipment directly owned by the State inflicted on highways, ports, railway lines and installations, public buildings, public service installations, etc.);

total or partial destruction of private productive installations (electric plants, industrial installations, supplies of raw materials, agricultural cultivations, zoo-technical holdings);

indirect damage undergone by Italian economy (German exactions for occupation expenses; paralysis in production of many activities due to the military occupation; great decentralization of industries operated by the German authorities for the German war effort etc.).

It cannot be denied that the State and the Italian nation, with the same right as any other belligerent, is entitled to obtain appropriate indemnity in the reparations account, for all this immense mass of damage which is indisputably due to the juridical state of war.

2. It is also to be considered that the German military authorities have violently taken from Italy huge quantities of productive (strumentali) assets (machines, plants, railway materials, raw materials, etc.), which in large part have been used and installed in stationary plants in German territory. Furthermore, in the summer of 1944, the German government ordered that the German military occupation authorities should oblige private citizens and private concerns to come to individual agreements for the purpose of transporting to Germany a large quantity of machinery for the completion and the strengthening of installations there existing; according to which agreements the ownership of the machinery was to remain with the granting Italian industries,

it being

- 2 -

it being contemplated that such machinery would be returned to them at the end of the war.

The Royal Government claims the right to request the recovery and the return of all this material and of all the afore-mentioned property, whenever identification of it may be possible, for the purpose of providing for its return to the rightful owners. When recovery is not possible, the Royal Government holds that the amount should be included in the war damages account to be indemnified at Germany's expense.

3: Therefore, the Royal Government, reserving the right to furnish all possible data for proving the extent of the damage undergone by Italian economy and attributable to the German Government, and to prove the well-foundedness of individual claims, and re-affirming its request for the restitution of the gold of the Bank of Italy and of the works of art, subject of previous separate communications, considers it to be its duty immediately to make the broadest reservations with regard to the rights of the private citizens and the concerns which have been injured, and requests that the Allied Governments recognize:

- a) the authority to enforce its rights to just indemnity in the reparations account;
- b) the restitution of the property carried away, as explained above;
- c) in default thereof, the right to participate in an eventual proportional division of German productive equipment;
- d) the direct admission of Italian technical commissions to the Allied organizations which will follow the occupation forces in Germany, for the purpose of recognizing and consequently recovering all the machinery and materials and property of any kind which have been carried away;
- e) the direct admission of Italian representatives to the reparations commission, which, according to the Yalta conference, is shortly to meet at Moscow.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recommending to the best consideration of the Embassy of the United States of America the entirety of the above-listed requests, expresses the hope that, by attesting to their well-foundedness, the Embassy will kindly lend them support with its Government, whose opinion on the subject it now awaits.

R o m e, April 21, 1945.

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 2931, of January 11, 1946, entitled "Transmitting text of Italian Notes regarding Italian assets which were carried away by the Germans", from the American Embassy, Rome, Italy.

MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

D.G.A.E. Uff. IV

44/00241/

NOTA VERBALE.

Il R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri ha l'onore di rivolgersi alla cortesia abituale dell'Ambasciata degli Stati Uniti d'America e riferendosi alla propria Nota Verbale No. 42/65600/C del 21 aprile c.a. con la quale sono stati fatti presenti gli ingenti danni sofferti dall'industria italiana a causa della guerra e per le asportazioni fatte dalle Autorita germaniche di occupazione, ha l'onore di segnalare quanto appresso:

1) Il Governo italiano ha ragione di ritenere che la questione della restituzione ai legittimi proprietari dei beni manomessi dalle Autorita tedesche nei Paesi da essi occupati sia in principio ammessa dalle Potenze Alleate, ma finora non sembra siano state ancora fissate le norme pratiche della restituzione di tali materiali.

2) Il R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, in attesa delle decisioni che dovranno essere prese per permettere il riconoscimento dei macchinari asportati dalle autorita germaniche, si era rivolto in data 20 settembre 1945 al Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, ammiraglio E. Stone (copia di tale lettera e stata inviata all'Ambasciatore degli Stati Uniti d'America con foglio 19925/128 del 20 settembre scorso), affinche fossero impartite alle autorita di occupazione in Germania ed in Austria disposizioni atte a far si che il materiale industriale italiano ivi rinvenuto fosse elencato e custodito. Il capo della Commissione Alleata ha pero fatto presente in data 30 settembre che la segnalazione del materiale doveva essere fatta all'Ambasciata della Potenza occupante il territorio ove gli impianti si trovavano.

3) Il R. Ministero Affari Esteri non ha mancato di fare di volta in volta quelle segnalazioni che gli sono pervenute, ma non ha fin'ora potuto ottenere che l'assicurazione generica che la questione era stata segnalata al Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America.

4)

All'Ambasciata degli Stati Uniti d'America,
R o m a.

- 2 -

4) L'Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale che, come è noto, raccoglie nel suo seno alcune importantissime aziende, ha ora segnalato le ingenti asportazioni fatte negli stabilimenti delle Società che esso controlla, in particolare nelle industrie meccaniche e siderurgiche. La lista completa delle asportazioni con tutte le indicazioni relative sarà comunicata ulteriormente, appena il notevole lavoro avrà potuto essere condotto a termine, tuttavia per molto materiale non è stato possibile ottenere indicazioni circa la sua destinazione al momento dell'asportazione e d'altra parte non si può escludere che la destinazione originaria sia stata successivamente cambiata.

5) Ciò permesso si renderebbe necessario ottenere che i rappresentanti delle principali Società interessate fossero autorizzati a recarsi in Germania ed in Austria allo scopo di riconoscere il materiale di proprietà delle ditte italiane asportato dai tedeschi e, con l'assistenza di personale alleato, potessero bloccare tale materiale in attesa delle disposizioni di carattere generale che le superiori Autorità Alleate prenderanno a suo tempo.

6) Il R. Ministero Affari Esteri è informato che il Sig. Edouardo Adler, incaricato dall'Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale per il recupero del materiale asportato dagli stabilimenti delle Società di tale gruppo, ha potuto esporre il proprio piano per un tale viaggio in Germania, al Sig. Ainsworth, segretario dell'Ambasciata degli Stati Uniti d'America a Roma. Per sua parte il Ministero degli Affari Esteri prega vivamente l'Ambasciata degli Stati Uniti d'America di voler esaminare con ogni possibile benevolenza la richiesta del Sig. Adler, raccomandandola alle competenti Autorità per un sollecito e possibilmente favorevole accoglimento. Infatti il recupero del materiale in questione allevierebbe in modo sensibile la grave situazione finanziaria attuale dell'Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale e per conseguenza dello Stato italiano. Inoltre tali impianti sono anche indispensabili per la ricostruzione economica del Paese e per dare lavoro alle maestranze, che rimarrebbero altrimenti disoccupate.

Il R. Ministero Affari Esteri non dubita che l'Ambasciata degli Stati Uniti d'America vorrà dare a quanto sopra esposto la sua migliore considerazione, esprime la speranza che l'Ambasciata stessa vorrà appoggiare le richieste italiane presso il proprio governo, e resta in attesa di conoscerne il pensiero al riguardo.

R o m a, li 4 gennaio 1946.

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. 2931, of January 11, 1946, entitled
"Transmitting text of Italian Notes regarding Italian assets
which were carried away by the Germans," from the American
Embassy, Rome, Italy.
Translation.

ROYAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

44/00241/

NOTE VERBALE.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to call upon the usual courtesy of the Embassy of the United States of America and, with reference to its Note Verbale 42/65600/C of April 21, in which were set forth the immense damages suffered by the Italian industry as a result of the war and of the removals effected by the German occupation authorities, has the honor to point out the following:-

1) The Italian Government has reason to believe that the question of the restitution to the legitimate owners of the assets appropriated by the German authorities in the countries occupied by them is accepted in principle by the Allied Powers, but up to the present it does not appear that the practical regulations for the restitution of such materials have been yet established.

2) The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, awaiting the decisions which will have to be taken for permitting the recognition of the machinery carried away by the German authorities, had addressed itself under date of September 20, 1945 to the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, Admiral E. Stone (copy of the letter in question was sent to the Ambassador of the United States of America with communication 19925/128 of September 20) so that there might be communicated to the occupation authorities in Germany and Austria suitable dispositions to provide that the Italian industrial material there found be listed and guarded. Under date of September 30, however, the Chief of the Allied Commission explained that the reporting of the material must be done to the Embassy of the Power occupying the territory where the plants were found.

3) The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not failed to make from time to time those indications which have come to it, but it has not been able yet to obtain more than the generic assurance that

question

To the Embassy of the United States of America,
R o m e.

- 2 -

question had been presented to the Government of the United States of America.

4) The Institute for Industrial Reconstruction which, as is known, embraces several very important companies, has now indicated the immense removals effected in the establishments of the societies which it controls, particularly in the mechanical and siderurgical industries. The complete list of the removals, with all of the relative information, will be communicated subsequently, as soon as it is possible to complete the considerable labor involved; however for much material it has not been possible to obtain information with regard to its destination at the moment of removal and, on the other hand, it cannot be excluded that the original destination may have been subsequently changed.

5) This being premised, it would be rendered necessary to obtain that representatives of the principal interested companies be authorized to go to Germany and Austria for the purpose of recognizing the material owned by Italian firms and carried away by the Germans and, with the assistance of Allied personnel, that they might block such material while awaiting the dispositions of general character which the superior Allied authorities will take in due time.

6) The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs is informed that Mr. Edoardo Adler, appointed by the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction for the recovery of material carried away from the establishments of the companies of that group, has been able to explain the plan for such a journey to Germany to Mr. Ainsworth, Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America at Rome. For its part, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly begs the Embassy of the United States of America to be good enough to examine with all possible benevolence the request of Mr. Adler, recommending it to the competent authorities for a prompt and possibly favorable reception. In fact, the recovery of the material in question would in a substantial manner alleviate the present grave financial situation of the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction and, as a consequence, that of the Italian State. Besides, the plants in question are also indispensable for the economic reconstruction of the country and for providing employment for the workmen, who would otherwise remain unemployed.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not doubt that the Embassy of the United States will give its best consideration to the foregoing; expresses the hope that the Embassy will support the Italian requests before its Government; and awaits being informed of the (latter's) views in the matter.

R o m e, January 4, 1946.

JAN 11 1946

SECRET

No. 59

To the
Acting United States Political Adviser to
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
American Embassy Building,
Tokyo.

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the
information of the Acting Political Adviser copies
of FEC papers as listed below:

- MI-11/4, 9 January 1946
- MI-11/5, 10 January 1946
- MI-13, 9 January 1946
- MI-14, 10 January 1946

Enclosures:
As stated.

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Confidential File

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-11-46 Japan / 1-11-46
740.00119 Control

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

Collect

Department of State

RESTRICTED

Charge Department:

JAN 17 1946

Charge to

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AMEMBASSY

Washington
This telegram
must be paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone other than a
Government Agency.
RESTRICTED

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

72

Approved SWNCC paper 205 on displaced persons in Japan states para 3 a QUOTE persons of non-Japanese nationality, including Formosan-Chinese and Koreans, should be repatriated if they so desire as early as possible except such persons as are held as war criminals or are held for security reasons UNQUOTE and para 4 g 2 QUOTE arrangements for the repatriation of Formosan-Chinese should be made with the Chinese Govt by the US Govt UNQUOTE.

LR

800.4016 D.P.

War Dept understands SCAP has made arrangements with Chinese Govt through COMGEN China for clearance and procedures regarding repatriation Formosan-Chinese. Consult with theater HQ and, assuming these arrangements are agreeable to all concerned, take appropriate action to ratify or confirm them with Chinese Govt.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/ 1-11-46
CS/IE
740 00119 Control
Japan / 1-11-46

TO	DCR NE Unit
FROM	<i>[Signature]</i>
SUBJECT	<i>SCM</i>
DATE	<i>1/16/46</i>
DIST.	

Acheson
Acting

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL RECORDS
JAN 11 1946

FE:JKPenfield:hst
1-10-46

[Signature]

JA *[Signature]*

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

JA

ACTION: *FE*
INFO: *AMN -S*

- S
- U
- C
- A-B
- A-D
- A-R
- SA
- SA/GN
- SA/M
- SPA
- EUR
- DC/L-C
- ITP
- ESP
- SPD
- FC
- OIC
- OPI
- PL
- DC/R

Action	<i>JA</i>
Information	
FE	<i>1</i>
CA	<i>1</i>
JA	<i>1</i>
SEA	
PI	<i>1</i>

4160
PLAIN
London

Dated January 12, 1946

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington
422, Twelfth.

WMS
1/14/46
nodrat



copy by ams into key

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-1246

JAP 3. No significant comment on occupation of Japan appeared this week until yesterday when TIME's published letter from James Callaghan Labor MP replying to Craigie's earlier letter advocating retention of Emperor. Callaghan states Emperor's crime is that he condoned aggressive policy of militarism and took no effective steps to restrain them; that his tremendous moral authority was used for the sole end of preserving dynasty, and that he could be counted upon in future to perform any necessary political acrobatics to preserve it. Callaghan also expresses belief that Japanese Communism would be pacifist and might be desirable influence in Japan.

TIME's leading editorial today comments on Callaghan's letter

PLAIN

JAN 15 1946

PLAIN

-2- #422, Twelfth, from London.

letter stating opinion is gaining ground in US and UK that retention of Emperor in present position of authority is obstacle to emergence of governmental system which will enable Japanese people to participate wholeheartedly in international security plans. It holds professional diplomats of other countries have been divided but have tended to share Craigie's views from fear of breakdown in Japanese system and believe that Japanese monarchy can be constitutionalized and used to democratize Japan. This school strengthened by Emperor's recent denial of divinity.

Editorial continues that Allies were justified in utilizing imperial authority to maximum to secure effective execution of surrender terms but that once surrender had been accomplished Emperor's position required reconsideration. It recalls that Imperial office in present form was creation deliberately built up during last half century "as a screen to protect manipulations of governing class from popular scrutiny and criticism" and that opposition to militarists by so-called Liberals and tycoons was merely difference of opinion on timing of bid for world supremacy it holds

real rulers

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-3- #422, Twelfth, from London.

real rulers of Japan have always been the baronial families and their adherents who have controlled directly or indirectly the armed services court politics commerce and industry finance and all main activities of national life. It had been very convenient for them to possess a "divine" Emperor as mainstay of social system which preserved their power as divinity is now out of fashion human Emperor would serve their purpose almost equally well provided he continued to remain revered focus of national loyalty and inspiration of patriotic endeavor.

TIMES doubts practicability of changing present Japanese governmental system as long as imperial mainstay remains firm "so long as source of political authority is pleasure of Emperor rather than sovereignty of people position of governing class will remain as strong as ever and they will continue to thwart any aspirations towards direct popular governing *** since they control economic as well as political power temporary discrediting of their militarist ambitions will not radically effect issue they will merely consolidate their hold upon the people through association of

Emperor

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-4- #422, Twelfth, from London.

Emperor with some other means of mobilizing popular enthusiasm for example national reconstruction".

Editorial concludes that too little attention has been paid to Chinese opinion on Japanese Imperial institution that Chinese view it calmly and impartially and fear American and British policy will preserve if in slightly different form monopoly of power in hands of governing class and that Russian opinion is undoubtedly similar.

WINANT

EDA

PLAIN



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 12, 1946

No. 193



file
DCR

SUBJECT: Digests of Japanese Ministry of Education Orders and
Actions from August 25 through December 26, 1945.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 23 AM 9 56

RECORD BRANCH

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



Sir:

I have the honor to transmit copies of a series of digests prepared under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel D. R. Nugent, USMC, officer in charge of the Education Division of Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP.

These digests give a calendar summary of official orders and actions of the Japanese Ministry of Education during the period of Allied occupation through December 26, 1945. The sequence of the orders, especially when they are related to Supreme Commander's directives, has significance, particularly to American educational authorities.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosures: *att on*

Copies of Digests

Original and hectograph to Department.

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KCLeebrick:jwb

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-1246

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HECTO SENT TO YR
ORABTD

MAY 6 1946

Received by Education Div.
19 Oct 45

DIGEST

DATE : 25 Oct 45

FROM : Ministry of Education (Bur. of Students' Mobilization)

TO : Presidents of universities and colleges, governmental, prefectural, communal, and private.
Local Governor-Generals and local Governors.

DOCUMENT: Order No. 20, Bureau of Students' Mobilization.

SUBJECT : Action concerning orders on students military training and anti-aircraft measures in schools.

1. The following are abolished and measures will be taken accordingly:

27 Nov 41	Order 30	Ministry of Ed	(Sch. Mil. training)
27 Nov 41	Order 59	Vice Min of Ed	(Sch. Mil. training)
29 Jan 44	Order	Vice Min of Ed	(Naval Instr.)
8 Feb 44	Order 28	Vice Min of Ed	(Sch. mil. training)
4 Apr 45	Order 37	Bu. Phys. Ed.	(Phys. training)
20 Apr 45	Order 42	Bu. Phys. Ed.	(Stud. mil. training)
30 Apr 45	Order 41	Bu. Phys. Ed.	(Stud. spec. abilities)
1 May 45	Order 47	Bu. Phys. Ed.	(Stud. aviation tr.)
1 May 45	Order 47	Bu. Phys. Ed.	(Glider tr. for teachers)
6 May 45	Order	Ministry of Ed	(Repairing gliders)
10 Jun 45	Order 51	Bu. Phys. Ed.	(course for Stud. Corps)
13 Jul 45	Order 48	Bu. Phys. Ed.	(Mil. off. in schools)

All orders concerning anti-aircraft measures in schools.
All orders concerning Students' Corps.

2. The Army and Navy have agreed to abolish the following:

13 Apr 24	Imperial order 135	(Mil. officers in schools)
13 Apr 24	Order 1	Min. of War & Ed. (Reg. on above)
27 Apr 25	Order 19	Ministry of War (Insp. sch. mil. tr.)
30 Nov 34	Order 22	Ministry of War (Inspe sch. mil. tr.)
9 Aug 43	Imperial Order 411	(Mil. officers in schools)
13 Nov 43	Imperial Order 862	(Naval instr.)
13 Nov. 43	Order 1	Min. of Navy & Ed. (Naval instr.)

Received by Education Div.
20 Oct 45

DIGEST

DATE : 28 Aug 45
FROM : Ministry of Education (Vice Minister)
TO : Local Governors and Governor-Generals, Presidents of Universities and Colleges, governmental, prefectural, communal, and private, Heads of Teachers' Training Schools.

DOCUMENT: Order 118, Bureau of Higher Class Schools.

SUBJECT : School education under the changing circumstances.

1. Directions already sent by wire will be fully carried out with consideration given to the following:

- a. With exceptions in cases of necessity, usual instruction to be restored in all schools (incl. girls' schools) and any students sent home are to be recalled by 15 Sept.
- b. Efforts to reopen schools damaged by air-raids to be made. Refer students to other schools if necessary, or give them temporarily work in food production.
- c. Be sure to follow the Imperial Rescript of 14 Aug 45 in dealing with textbooks.

Received by Education Div.
20 Oct 45

DIGEST

DATE : 3 Sept 45
FROM : Ministry of Education (Bureau of Lower Class Schools)
TO : Local Governors and Governor-Generals.
DOCUMENT: Order 178, Bureau of Lower Class Schools.
SUBJECT : One-year supplementary course in middle schools.

1. Abolishes as of 30 Sept 45 the one-year supplementary course in middle schools and makes the following provisions for the students:

- a. Those present in the course on 15 Aug 45 are eligible for certificate of completion.
- b. Those who want to leave course to work may do so immediately.
- c. Those who desire to enter upper-grade schools should continue until 30 Sept 45 as their record will be considered in their admission in 1946.

Received by Education Div.
Date ?

DIGEST

DATE : 5 Sept 45

FROM : Ministry of Education (Vice Minister for
Educ. Affairs)

TO : Heads of Governmental, Prefectural, Communal
and Private Universities, Colleges and Teachers'
Training Schools.

DOCUMENT: Order 120, Bureau of Higher Class Schools.

SUBJECT : Admission and transfer of ex-military and naval
students to universities, high schools, prepara-
tory schools, colleges, and teachers' training
schools.

1. Ex-military and naval students may enter Department of Education-controlled universities in April 1946 and high schools, preparatory schools, colleges, and teachers' training schools on 15 November 1945 on the basis of an application, personal interview, and physical examination (no mental examination required).

a. If turned down by the university or school of the applicant's first choice, applications should be sent to the head of the academic area who will arrange for its transfer to the universities or schools of second, third, etc. choice (all choices should be near residence of applicant).

b. Late applicants will be given another chance at the beginning of the school year.

2. A list of standards, showing what grades or classes various students may enter, is given. Department of Education will temporarily qualify applicants who lack the proper qualifications.

3. The legal limit of enrollees in any university or school may be disregarded and additional students accommodated by using more classes and the two-shift system.

Received by Education Div.
Date ?

DIGEST

DATE : 5 Sept 45
FROM : Ministry of Education (Vice Min. For Educ. Affairs)
TO : Prefectural Governors.
DOCUMENT: Order 120, Bureau of Higher Class Schools.
SUBJECT : Admission and transfer of ex-military and naval students to secondary schools.

1. Ex-military and naval students may enter Department of Education-controlled secondary schools on 1 Nov 45 on the basis of an application, personal interview, and physical examination (no mental examination required).

- a. If turned down by the school of the applicant's first choice, applications should be sent to the Prefectural office, which will arrange for their transfer to schools of second, third, etc., choice (all schools chosen by applicant should be near his home).
- b. Late applicants will be given another chance at the beginning of the school year.

2. Those returning to their original schools will go to their original classes. A list of standards, showing what grades various students may enter, is given.

3. The legal limit of enrollees in any school may be disregarded and additional students accommodated by using more classes and the two-shift system.