

FERRATA SHEET

(MUTO)

5 Nov. 1947

Def. Doc. 2678, (additional correction), Affidavit of ~~NISHIURA~~, Susumu:
Page 2, Para. 1, Line 1, "the Press Section of" should read: "the Intelligence
Division of"

Page 2, Para. 1, Line 2, "with that of the" should read: "with the
Information Section of the"

Page 2, Para. 1, Line 3 and 4, "the Information Bureau of the Cabinet"
should read: "the Bureau of Intelligence of the Cabinet"

ERRATA SHEET

MUTO

4 Nov. 1947

Def. Doc. 2678, Affidavit of NISHIURA, Susumu;

Page 1, Para. 3, Line 4, "almost continuously from October, 1931,"
should read: "almost continuously (except for about 3 years) from October,
1931,"

Page 2, Line 1, "In 1936" should read "In 1937"

Page 2, Para. numbered II, Line 3, "The Was Minister" should read "The War
Minister"

signed - Gen Phose

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
et al

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

*most of this belonged to the Gen Phose
not particularly official
was testified to
B. 26, 949
R 27, 294*

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: NISHIURA, Susumu

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

I, Susumu NISHIURA by name, am now 47 years old and live at No. 560, Ome, Ome Town, Nishi-tama District, Tokyo.

I was a colonel at the termination of the war; I was graduated from the Military College in 1930, was in the service of the Military Administration Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry almost continuously from October, 1931, immediately after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, to December, 1944, shortly before the termination of the Pacific War and worked as the officer in charge of Estimate and Organization Affairs, Senior Section Adjutant and Chief of the Section. While I was in the service I was engaged in the study of revisions of the War Ministry organization. Thus I am one of those most conversant with the system and organization of the Army, and in the practical operational aspects of the War Ministry organization.

The duties and authorized limits of authority of the Military Affairs Bureau and its director will be described. During my tenure, no director ever deviated from the authorized limits of that position.

I. The duties and authority of the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. - - -

The main subdivisions of the Military Affairs Bureau were the Military Administration Section and the Military Affairs Section. In addition, there was the Press Section of the War Ministry. Originally there were six Bureaus in the War Ministry: Personnel Affairs, Military Affairs, Ordnance, Intendance, Medical Affairs, and Judicial Affairs. In 1926 the Equipment Bureau was established, and it took care of personnel and material mobilization.

In 1936 the Military Service Bureau was established and made a separate bureau. Only the business formerly handled by the Military Administration Section remained under the charge of the Military Affairs Bureau, and was divided into the Military Administration Section and the Military Affairs Section; the other matters were transferred to the Military Service Bureau. Such matters included morale and discipline, M. P. duties, anti-aircraft defense, counter-espionage, military drill, etc. These matters were entirely apart from the Military Affairs Bureau from that time on.

In 1936 also the Press Section of the War Ministry became one body with that of the Imperial Headquarters and was there after under the Supreme Command. Further, as the Information Bureau of the Cabinet was strengthened, it took over most of the remaining matters that had formerly been announced by the War Ministry; thus the information matters announced through the War Ministry became very few.

Through these changes the scope of activities of the Military Affairs Bureau became smaller and smaller. Prior to this time it had been customary to ask the opinion of the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau on some personnel matters, but after TOJO became War Minister this practice was discontinued, and personnel matters were conducted without participation of the Military Affairs Bureau Director.

Under the general rule of the Imperial Ordinance relating to general rules concerning the organization of the Ministries, Article 18, the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau was the same in authority as all other directors of bureaus. Such directors were not authorized generally to decide principal matters on their own opinion exclusively, but rather their duty was to administer under the direction of the Minister; and all were in equal conditions, with equal responsibility. It is completely wrong to say that the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau had any special authority as compared to other directors.

Next I shall make an explanation of the word "Rentai", a word especially used in the system of the Japanese Army. The verb "rentai-suru" or "to give rentai" means only approving a decision by a competent bureau by affixing one's seal on the understanding that one has no objection as far as matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau or section are concerned. It does not mean that one who gave "rentai" to a certain plan took so-called joint responsibility for all the contents of the plan in question beyond his authority as defined in the official organization.

The War Minister and Vice-Minister asked the opinion of each director on pertinent matters, and no more importance was attached to the opinion of the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau than to that of other directors. It was not at all rare that the opinion of that director was disregarded and the opinions of other directors adopted. It was a rule of the Japanese Army that, once a superior decided a matter, his subordinates must be absolutely obedient to his decision. As to this point, there was an insistence in this court that "One, though he may be a soldier can and should demand release from office, if he disagrees with the orders of his superior." But this was such a matter as could never be approved in the system and organization of the former Japanese Army.

II. Relation between the War Ministry, especially the Military Affairs Bureau and the Army General Staff Office. - - -

The War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and Inspector-General of Education took over portions of the central business upon themselves. Each bureau of the War Ministry took over a share of the matters which were under the supervision and control of the War Minister. Thus the matters under any one bureau were strictly limited, and in no case could extend beyond the authority of the War Minister. For example, although "organization" was mentioned as one of the functions of the Military Administration Section, it did not mean that army organization could be decided

by that section alone. In reality, the right to draft organization plans for the Army originally belonged to the General Staff, and the General Staff actually had an office which took care of that matter. As a matter of practice, the General Staff actually made plans regarding organization, and merely asked for the War Minister's counsel.

Most matters mentioned as the responsibility of the War Ministry arose from demands made by the Chief of the General Staff most of which naturally arose from considerations of national defense. During the course of the China Incident, and later during the Pacific War, these demands were varied and more numerous. They included requests from the General Staff on the War Minister, on current problems from the standpoint of home affairs or foreign relations.

Such requests were first received by the Military Affairs Bureau and transmitted to the proper bureau for consideration, and afterwards reply was made by order of the War Minister. There were some matters which did not go through the Military Affairs Bureau at all.

There were frequent disagreements between the War Minister and the General Staff, and often it was necessary to repeat the consultations and negotiations. Also, there were a large number of demands from the General Staff which concerned ministries other than the War Ministry; in these matters the War Ministry negotiated with the ministry concerned. For example, as for estimates, it negotiated with the Finance Ministry through the Intendance Bureau; for materials, with the Planning Board or the Munitions Ministry through the Equipment Bureau; as for foreign affairs, with the Foreign Ministry through the Military Affairs Bureau.

The War Minister had a sort of double character; as a minister of state he was compelled to an awareness of political and diplomatic activity, and as an official highly concerned with army matters he had also to be completely a soldier. But since the Chief of the General Staff had the highest responsibility as far as the Army was concerned, it was his highest duty to give consideration to winning victory in war time. Thus there was often sharp conflict between the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister. It was the duty of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to negotiate with the General Staff Office in such disputes and also to represent the General Staff in dealing with other agencies in some matters.

It was a fact that many officers in the War Ministry also held concurrent offices in connection with the Imperial General Headquarters; for example, the Directors of Ordnance, Intendance, and Medical Bureaus. It was also decided that the War Minister, with some of his subordinates, should participate in the conferences of the Imperial General Headquarters as occasion demanded. But in reality there was no change in the true relationship between these two units. The Directors of the Military Affairs Bureau and the Personnel Affairs Bureau, who did not hold concurrent posts with the Imperial General Headquarters, were simply ordered to be "attendants" of the War Minister at the conferences. Most officials confined themselves to the work in their own offices in the War Ministry, and attended conferences at Imperial General Headquarters only in urgent circumstances. Though the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, as well as the Vice-Minister and Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, were "attendants" of the War Minister, he did not participate in such conferences in any

degree, but merely made preliminary arrangements for the War Minister and attended to detail work after such conferences as the War Minister attended. With regard to operation attendants such as the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau were given only such information; by staff officers of Imperial General Headquarters, as applied to their own particular offices in the War Ministry.

III. Matters under the Military Affairs Bureau. - - -

Under the Military Administration Section were matters concerning the main lines of national defense. It had no power to decide main policies of national defense, but rather to harmonize and co-ordinate the matters handled by the various bureaus and sections. When consultation between the bureaus and sections involved resulted in disagreement, the Military Administration Section had no power to settle the dispute, but merely to arbitrate and give counsel. Matters of national defense and tactics were the exclusive concern of the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs; this was also true in other routine affairs. If plans involved appropriations and material, consultation was had with the War and Navy Ministers. In case of an agreed plan, each bureau went about its own particular business.

One of the matters placed under the charge of the Military Affairs Section was "matters concerning the national defense policy in general". This might be understood to mean that that bureau had authority to make a final decision on matters of national defense policy, but the exact contrary is the case. As previously stated, each bureau transacted its business in accordance with policies fixed by the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister. This business often involved matters which were originally under offices other than the War Ministry, such as mobilization of material and national health. If such matters were taken up independently with the various bureaus concerned, confusion would result, and it was thus necessary to have some one office to co-ordinate all activities. The abovementioned business of the Military Affairs Section meant this coordinating function.

The Military Administration Section had certain duties in connection with budget matters. It was the duty of the Paymaster's Section of the Intendance Bureau to collect data on the requirements of the various bureaus and sections in order to formulate an overall budget for the War Ministry, and thereafter to apportion such sums as had been allowed. The duty of the Military Administration Section in relation to the budget was this: to do its best to adjust the organization and application of budget business of other bureaus and sections to the requirements of national defense as set by the General Staff.

Failure to handle the appropriation properly within the War Ministry often resulted in failure to meet the demands of the General Staff. The Military Administration Section, however, could never intentionally interrupt a plan of the General Staff, which was thoroughly familiar with the amount of appropriations and the outline of their distribution. In such case, the decisive power was in the War Minister, needless to say never in the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. To my knowledge, this was strictly true.

IV. Regarding additional posts held by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. - - -

The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau automatically held other posts, ex officio. One such post was Chief Secretary of the Supreme War Council. His only duties were secretarial in nature: he notified the councillors of the date and place of meeting; distributed necessary papers before the meeting, and, since he had no voice in the discussions nor right to vote, his work was nothing more than keeping the minutes.

Another such concurrent duty was to act as secretary of the joint Imperial GHQ-Government Liaison Conferences. It was agreed that the Chiefs of the Military Affairs Bureau in the War and Navy Ministries and the Secretary to the Cabinet should act as secretaries. The only duty of the secretaries was to distribute the necessary papers before such a conference and to deal with documents acted upon; none of the three had any right to participate in any way in the discussions of the conference. The same situation existed in the case of conferences before the Throne.

The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau also held certain posts such as member of various committees of the Cabinet, or other ministries, but this was true of all Bureau Chiefs of all ministries and was done for the purpose of bringing all ministries into close co-ordination. Resolutions of such committees were not binding in any way on the ministry involved, and, as a matter of practice, those named to the committees were rarely present, being most often represented by a proxy.

With regard to the Privy Council, there was no direct connection with the Council and the Military Affairs Bureau. When the War Minister himself was required to attend, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau or one of his subordinates attended for the sole purpose of explaining, if called upon, specific and technical details of matters within the scope of his bureau.

With regard to attending some sessions of the Diet, there were usually representatives from all ministries concerned in matters to be discussed. Not only the Parliamentary Vice-Minister and Councillor, but also the Vice-Minister, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Chief of the Account and Supply Bureau and sometimes chiefs of other bureaus were appointed "commissioners" and charged with the duty of explaining or answering questions about the matters before the Diet. Such duties were in no way "policy-making."

On this 7th day of October, 1947.

At Tokyo, Japan.

DEPONENT: NISHIURA, Susumu (Seal)

I, ROGER F. COLE, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo, Japan.

WITNESS: /s/ ROGER F. COLE

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Susumu NISHIURA (seal)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3038

11 June 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Loose, Handwritten Sheets, Corrected Decoration Data on Certain Defense Witnesses, and Additional Decoration Data on KOSHI, Saburo

Date: 6 May 1947 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese, English

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL)

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:)

Board of Decorations, Japanese Govt.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: See below

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Data on following personalities:

KOGA, Kiyoshi
ARIYOSHI, Chuichi
GODO, Takuo
HANEDA, Toru
IKAWA, Tadao
ISHIMARU, Shitowa
MURAKAWA, Kengo
ONODERA, Naosuke
BABA, Tsunego
FURUMI, Tadayuki
IKEZAKI, Tadatake
HATTA, Shiroji
IWAI, Takeo
INAHARA, Hatsuji
IWATA, Ainosuke
KANAT, Shoji
KANEKO, Kiyoto
KAWABE, Masakaza

KOMURA, Sakahiko
KOTANI, Etsuo
KUSUMOTO, Masataka
MANAKI, Yoshinobu
MATSUDA, Reikichi
MISHIMA, Yasuo
MIZUNO, Shinko
MURAMATSU, Tsuneko
NAKAMURA, Benko
NAKAYAMA, Hajime
NAKAYAMA, Yasuro
MISHIMURA, Susumu
SAITO, Masatoshi
SHIMOMURA, Nobusada
SHIRAI, Seishin
SHIZEKI, Ihei
SHIRAI, Masatoki
SUETAKE, Kamezo

Doc. No. 3038

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NISHIURA, Susumu

Request by MUTO, Akira

a. Resident of Tokyo.

b. He was a senior member of a section in the Military Affairs Bureau when Muto was chief of said bureau and is an authority on Japanese Army system and organization. He will give relevant testimony as to the organization of the Army and the duties, responsibilities and powers of such offices as were held by Muto.

NISHIURA, Susumu

Request by MUTO, Akira

a. Resident of Tokyo.

b. He was a senior member of a section in the Military Affairs Bureau when Muto was chief of said bureau and is an authority on Japanese army system and organization. He will give relevant testimony as to the organization of the army and the duties, responsibilities and powers of such offices as were held by Muto.

NISHIURA, Susumu

Request by: Mito, Akira

Address: Resident of Tokyo

He was a senior member of a section in the military affairs bureau when Mito was chief of said bureau.

(1st sketch)

NISHIMURA, [?] Susumu

Request by: Mito, Akira.

Address: Resident of Tokyo.

He was a senior member of a section in the Military
Affairs Bureau when Mito was chief of said Bureau.

NISHIMURA, Susumu

Request by SATO, Kenryo

Witness is a resident of Tokyo. First Demobilization Bureau. Was Chief of the Military Affairs Section when SATO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. He can give relevant testimony concerning the organization of the Army and the duties, responsibilities and powers of the office held by SATO, as well as fact that treatment of War Prisoners was not dealt with by the Military Affairs Bureau.

Documents requested are all located in the Washington Document Center, Stuart Building, Washington, D.C. Shipping Advice # 15072 to be procured and lodged with the Registry of the Tribunal:

| Crate No. | Items No. | Description |
|----------------|-----------|---|
| 96 51 66 | 21 | File dealing with classified War Prisoners 1942 |
| 650 | 43 | File of non-classified correspondence and records dealing with China affairs 1942 (3 bundles). |
| 166 | 273 | Transcript of telegrams exchanged between the Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army and the Vice Minister of War on the question of executing U.S. Aviators captives while bombing Japan 25 April to 8 May 1942 (5 pages). |
| 11 | 375 | Mimeographed booklets "Military Regulations issued by the T.H. China Expeditionary Army for the punishment of enemy fliers", 13 Aug. 1942 (4 volumes). |
| ? | 379 | File of miscellaneous correspondence and records of War Ministry 1940-1942. (1 bundle) |

Order dated 4 December 1946.

1st Democ.

NISHIMURA, Susumu

Request by SATO, Kenryo

Witness a resident of Tokyo - 1st Democ. Bureau

was chief of the Military Affairs section when

SATO was chief of the Military Affairs Bureau

He can give relevant testimony concerning the organization of the army and the duties, responsibilities and powers of the office held by SATO, as well as fact that treatment of war prisoners was not dealt with by the military affairs Bureau.

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| <u>crate no.</u> | <u>Items no.</u> | <u>Description</u> |
|------------------|------------------|---|
| 96, 51 & 66 | 21 | File dealing with classified war prisoners 1942. |
| 650 | 43 | File of non-classified correspondence and records dealing with China affairs 1942 (3 bundles) |
| 166 | 273 | Transcript of telegrams exchanged between the chief of staff of the China Expeditionary Army and the Vice Minister of |

Crate No. Item No. Description

was on the question
of executing U.S. aviators,
captives while bombing
Japan 25 April to 8
May 1942 (5 pages)

11

375 Mimeographed booklets,
"Military Regulations Issued
by the Y.H. China Expeditionary
Army for the Punishment of
Enemy Flyers", 13 Aug. 1942
(4 Volumes)

7

379 File of miscellaneous
correspondence and records
of War Ministry 1940-1942
(1 bundle).

(order dated 4 Dec. 1946)

REPORT BY: RICHARD LARSH
30 Dec 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: NISHIMURA, Susumu

Address: A resident of Tokyo.

He was Chief of the Military Affairs Section when SATO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

A check of IPS files reveals no mention of Subject.

COPIES: 3 File
1 Mr. Prout

REPORT BY: RICHARD LARSH
27 Dec 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: NISHIURA, Susumu

Address: A resident of Tokyo.

Was a senior member of a section in the Military Affairs Bureau when MUTO was Chief of said Bureau.

Subject is mentioned briefly in TOJO's file (File 20) in Serials 10 and 12.

COPIES: 3 File No. _____
1 Mr. Prout

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: NISHIURA, Susumu

Date of Birth: Dec. 4, 1901

Domicile: No. 877, Sakaetani, Wakayama City

Present Address: No. 896, Kamiurajiku, Omemachi, Nishitama-gun, Tokyo
Metropolis.

| | |
|--------------|---|
| 30 Sep. 1931 | Assigned to Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry. |
| Mar. 1934 | Ordered to stay in China and in France. |
| Mar. 1937 | Assigned to Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry. |
| Mar. 1938 | Promoted to Lt. Colonel. |
| Aug. 1941 | Promoted to Colonel. |
| 17 Oct. 1941 | Appointed Secretary of War Minister. |
| 20 Apr. 1942 | Appointed chief of Military Affairs Section, Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry. |
| Dec. 1944 | Appointed Staff officer of Expeditionary Forces in China. |
| 27 July 1946 | Attached to First Demobilization Ministry. |

Curriculum Vitae

Name: NISHIURA, Susumu.

Date of Birth: Dec. 4, 1901.

Domicile: No.877, Sakaetani, Wakayama City.

Present Address: No.896, Kamiurajiku, Omemachi, Nishitama-gun,
Tokyo Metropolis.

- Sept. 30, 1931: Assigned to Bureau of Military Affairs, War
Ministry.
- March 1934: Ordered to stay in China and in France.
- March 1937: Assigned to Bureau of Military Affairs,
War Ministry.
- March 1938: Promoted to Lt. Colonel.
- Aug. 1941: Promoted to Colonel.
- Oct. 17, 1941: Appointed Secretary of War Minister.
- Apr. 20, 1942: Appointed chief of Military Affairs Section,
Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry.
- Dec. 1944: Appointed ~~member of~~ Staff ^{Officer} of Expeditionary
Forces in China.
- July 27, 1946: Attached to First ^{Dem} Mobilization ^{Ministry} Bureau.

REPORT BY: RICHARD LARSH
30 Dec 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: NISHIMURA, Susumu

Address: A resident of Tokyo.

He was Chief of the Military Affairs Section when SATO
was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

A check of IPS files reveals no mention of Subject.

COPIES: 3 File
1 Mr. Prout

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF NISHIURA, Susumu,
by Mr. Cole.

32944 * The witness identified and verified exhibit
32947 3439 as his affidavit. * The affidavit stated that the
witness, after his graduation from the Military College
in 1930, was in the Military Administration Section of
the Military Affairs Bureau, except for about three years
from October 1931, immediately after the outbreak of the
Manchurian Incident to December 1944, and was officer in
charge of estimate and organization affairs, Senior Section
Adjutant and chief of the section. While in service he
was engaged in the study of revisions of the War Ministry
Organization. During his tenure, no director of the MAB
ever deviated from the authorized limits of that position.

32948 The main provisions of the MAB * were the
Military Administration Section and the Military Affairs
Section, and in addition there was the Press Section.
Originally there were six bureaus in the War Ministry,
Personnel Affairs, Military Affairs, Ordinance, Intendance,
Medical Affairs, and Judicial Affairs, but in 1926 the
Equipment Bureau was established. In 1936 the Military
Service Bureau was established and made separate. Only
the business formerly handled by the Administration
Section remained under the MAB, and was divided into the
Military Administration Section and the Military Affairs
Section. Other matters were transferred to the Military
Service Bureau, such as Morale and Discipline, MP duties,
etc. These matters were entirely apart from the MAB from
that time on.

32949 In 1937 also the Intelligence Division was
united with the Information Section under the Supreme
Command. As the Bureau of Intelligence of the Cabinet was
strengthened, it took over most of the remaining matters
* that had formerly been announced by the Ministry; and
information matters announced through the latter became
very few.

Through these changes the activities of the MAB
became smaller. Prior, it had been customary to ask the
opinion of the Director of the MAB on personnel matters,
but after TOJO became War Minister the practice was dis-
continued. Under the general rule of the ordinance
relating to the organization of ministries, the director
of the MAB had the same authority as all other bureau
directors.

November 12, 1947
DEFENSE - MUTO
NISHIURA - Direct

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Directors were not authorized generally to decide principal matters on their own opinion, but their duty was to administer under the minister's direction, and all had equal responsibility. It was completely wrong to say that the director of the MAB had any special authority.

32950

* The verb "rentai-suru" or "to give rentai" meant only approving a decision by a competent bureau by affixing one's seal on the understanding that one had no objection so far as matters within his bureau or section's jurisdiction was concerned. It did not mean that one who gave "rentai" to a certain plan undertook joint responsibility for its contents beyond his authority as defined in the official organization.

The War Minister and Vice-Minister asked each director's opinion on pertinent matters, and no more importance was attached to the opinion of the director of the MAB than to others. It was not rare when the opinion of that director was disregarded and the opinions of others adopted. It was an army rule that once a superior decided a matter, subordinates must be absolutely obedient. The soldier's demanding release from office if he disagreed with his superior's orders could never be approved in the system and organization of the army.

32951

* The War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and Inspector-General took over portions of the central business upon themselves. Each bureau took over a share of matters under the control of the War Minister. Those matters under any one bureau were strictly limited and could not extend beyond the Minister's authority, although "organization" was mentioned as a function of the Military Administration Section, which did not mean that army organization could be decided by that section alone. In reality, the right to draft organization plans originally belonged to the General Staff, and as a practical matter the General Staff made plans regarding organization, merely asking for the Minister's counsel.

32952

Most matters mentioned as the War Ministry's responsibility arose from demands of the Chief of Staff. During the China Incident and during the Pacific War these * demands were varied and more numerous, including requests on current problems from the standpoint of home affairs or foreign relations. These requests were first received by the MAB and transmitted to the proper bureau for consideration, and afterwards reply was made by the War Minister's order. Some matters did not go through the MAB at all.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
November 12, 1947
DEFENSE - MUTO
NISHIURA - Direct

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There were frequent disagreements between the War Ministry and the General Staff, and often it was necessary to repeat consultations and negotiations. There were many demands from the General Staff which concerned ministries other than the War Ministry, and in such matters the ministry negotiated with the ministries concerned. For instance, it negotiated with the Finance Ministry through the Intendance Bureau; for materials, with the Planning Board or Munitions Ministry through the Equipment Bureau; and as for foreign affairs, with the Foreign Ministry through the MAB.

32953

As a minister of state, the War Minister was compelled to be aware of political and diplomatic activity * and as an official concerned with army matters he had also to be completely a soldier, but since the Chief of Staff had the highest responsibility concerning the army, it was his highest duty to give consideration to winning victory in war. Thus there was often sharp conflict between the Chief of Staff and the War Minister. It was the duty of the Chief of the MAB to negotiate with the General Staff in such disputes and represent the General Staff in dealing with other agencies in some matters.

32954

Many War Ministry officers also held concurrent offices in connection with Imperial Headquarters. It was decided also that the War Minister, with some of his subordinates, should participate in Imperial Headquarter's Conferences, as occasion demanded. However, in reality there was no change in their true relationship. Directors of the MAB and the Personnel Affairs Bureau who did not hold concurrent posts with Imperial Headquarters were simply ordered to be "attendants" of the War Minister at the conferences. Most officials confined themselves to * the work of their own offices in the Ministry, and attended Headquarters Conferences only in urgent circumstances. Though the Director of the MAB, as well as the Vice-Minister and Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau were attendants of the War Minister, he did not participate in such conferences in any degree, but merely made preliminary arrangements for the Minister and attended to detail work after such conferences as the War Minister attended. With regard to operations, attendants such as the Director of the MAB were given only such information by Headquarters Staff officers as applied to their particular offices.

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32955

* Under the Military Administration Section were matters concerning main lines of national defense. It had no power to decide main policies, but rather to harmonize and coordinate matters handled by various bureaus and sections. When consultation between the latter resulted in disagreement, the section had no power to settle the dispute, but merely to arbitrate and counsel. Matters of national defense tactics were the exclusive concern of the Chiefs of the General Staffs, and this was also true in other routine affairs. If plans involved appropriations and material, consultation was had with the War and Navy Ministers. In the case of an agreed plan, each bureau went about its own particular business.

32956

One matter under the charge of the Military Affairs Section was "matters concerning the national defense policy in general". This might be understood to mean that that bureau had authority to make final decision on matters of defense policy, but the contrary was true. Each bureau * transacted its business in accordance with the policies of the Chief of Staff and War Minister. This business often involved matters originally under offices other than the War Minister. If such matters were taken up independently with bureaus concerned, confusion would result and it was thus necessary to have some one office coordinate. This was the business of the Military Affairs Section.

32957

The Military Administration Section had duties in connection with budget matters. It was the duty of the Paymaster's Section of the Intendance Bureau to collect data on the requirements of bureaus and sections to formulate an over-all budget and apportion allowed sums. The duty of the Administration Section was to do its best to adjust the organization and application of budget business of other bureaus and sections to the requirements of national defense as set by the General Staff.

* Failure to handle the appropriation properly within the War Ministry often resulted in failure to meet General Staff demands. The section, however, could never intentionally interrupt a General Staff plan, for the latter was thoroughly familiar with the amount and distribution of appropriations. In such case, decisive power was in the Minister, and never in the Chief of the MAB.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
November 12, 1947
DEFENSE - MUTO
NISHIURA - Direct

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The Chief of the MAB automatically held other posts ex-officio, one such being Chief Secretary of the Supreme War Council. His duties were only secretarial in nature. He had no voice in discussions, nor the right to vote. He did nothing more than keeping minutes.

32958

Another concurrent duty was to act as secretary of Joint Headquarters Government Liaison Conferences. It was agreed that the Chiefs of the MAB in the War and Navy Ministries * and the Cabinet Secretary should act as secretaries. Their only duty was to distribute the necessary papers and deal with documents acted upon. They had no right to participate in discussions. The same situation existed in the case of conferences before the Throne.

The Chief of the MAB also held posts as a member of Cabinet Committees or in committees of other ministries, but this was true of all bureau chiefs and done to bring about close coordination. Resolutions of such committees were not binding on the ministry involved, and as a practical matter those named to the committees were rarely present, and usually represented by proxy.

There was no direct connection between the Privy Council and the MAB. When the War Minister was required to attend, the chief of the MAB or one of his subordinates attended, solely for explaining, if called upon, specific and technical details.

32959

* With regard to attending Diet sessions, usually representatives from all ministries concerned were there. Not only the Parliamentary Vice-Minister and Councillor, but also the Vice-Minister, Chief of the MAB, Chief of the Accounting and Supply Bureau, and sometimes other bureau chiefs were appointed "commissioners" and charged with explaining or answering questions about matters before the Diet. Such duties were not policy-making.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY Mr. Freeman,
Counsel for SATO.

32960

The witness acknowledged that he had stated in his affidavit he was in the Administrative Section of the MAB continuously with the exception of three years from October 1931 to December 1934. * The witness was reminded that the witness TANAKA, Ryukichi, testified, (T.14287), that protests received from Allied powers by the Foreign Office relative to the treatment of POWs were routed directly to the MAB. The witness stated that such matters were not handled in his section.

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The witness was told that TANAKA also testified that the MAB prepared all replies to such protests. The witness stated that neither he nor his section ever prepared a reply to such protests. The witness was told that TANAKA also testified (T.29051) that there were junior officers in the Military Administration Section of the MAB who held extreme views relative to the execution of the Doolittle fliers. The witness stated there were no members of his section who wished the execution of any or all of the fliers.

32961

* The witness was reminded that when asked by the prosecution to name subordinates within the ministry who favored execution, TANAKA named Colonel OTSUKI of the Administration Section, who, he said, came to him several times urging severe punishment. Asked if there was any such colonel by the name of OTSUKI in his section during 1942, he replied there was no officer by that name in the section during that year. An officer by the name of OTSUKI, Akira, at one time served in the Administration Section, but just prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War he was transferred outside Japan, and the witness did not think he served in any post in Japan during the course of the war. He thought OTSUKI was transferred to Saigon.

32962

The witness was reminded that in his affidavit he had stated that many officers in the ministry concurrently held offices in connection with Imperial Headquarters, and that directors of the MAB and the Personnel Affairs Bureau * attended Imperial Conferences only as attendants of the minister and did not participate in them, but only made preliminary arrangements for the minister. The witness stated that by this he meant to state that the attendants had no voice in decisions reached at Headquarters, and actually the two directors attended only in an advisory capacity to the minister.

32963

Policies and regulations relative to the treatment of POWs were drafted by the POW Administration Bureau.

* (The attention of the Tribunal was called to Transcript page 16966).

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. LOPEZ.

The witness stated that throughout his long connection with the MAB he never attended a meeting of the Supreme War Council. He did attend a meeting of the Chief Secretary of the Privy Council to explain matters on the agenda.

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32964

32965 * He was not able to attend any meeting of Imperial Headquarters. These meetings were held at times within the Palace, and at times at Headquarters. The Privy Council met within the Palace, as did the Supreme War Council. He had been in the room where the latter were held when the conference was not in session. He * had never attended liaison conferences, but knew they were held in a certain room in the Palace.

32966

* Exhibit 3440, an article in the "Japan Times and Mail" re speech made by MUTO at a session of the committee of accounts of the House of Representatives on 19 March, 1940, showed that in the speech MUTO stated he supported the opinion of committeeman HAMAJI. It was the attitude for the Japanese to take in surmounting the emergency. He was of the opinion that they must have the spirit of leadership commonly needed for attaining its purpose. * It was, as already stated by War Minister TERAUCHI in the Diet, essential to oust individualism and liberalism which would attach too much importance to personal interests. Looking over the present international situation, all nations were attaching importance to a national standard. They were carrying on economic transactions with one another with nations as the unit. This had progressed to a "bloc" economy. Each attached importance to the nation as a unit in competition rather than personal gains in an economic race.

32967

MUTO stated he was firmly convinced that it was impossible to unite and give full swing to Japan's strength to see her through the emergency so long as greater importance was attached to personal interests. Regarding totalitarianism, TERAUCHI once stated that they must depend thoroughly on totalitarianism, attaching importance to * patriotism. MUTO wondered if the principle of Japanese national policy would not be satisfactory for this.

32968

It was his firm conviction that if all would unite, based on the nation more than the individual, total strength would be unified and give full swing. Should political parties be neglectful of national affairs and cling to their own interests, this would not be allowable. If government officials should swing to self-complacency, they should reflect and reform. As for the armed forces, should there be any points that should be criticized, they should be amended.

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF NISHIURA, SUSUMU
BY MR. FREEMAN

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27694 The witness identified Exhibit 3098 as his affidavit and verified it. * The affidavit stated that the witness was Chief of the Army Affairs Section for the Military Affairs Bureau from April 20, 1942 to December 1944, and as such was in charge of the establishment and institution of the army. He had a thorough knowledge of how the business of training POWs was allotted in the army, both in principle and in practice.

27695 * After the capture of POWs, they were investigated and a POW roll and diary was prepared. The POWs were then delivered to the nearest office of transportation and communication.

An operational commander who wanted to send POWs to the rear reported to Imperial Headquarters the number to be sent and Headquarters informed the War Ministry. When the Ministry received such a report, they advised Headquarters as to the ports to which POWs should be sent, and Headquarters informed the Ministry of the date of their arrival at the place assigned.

In accordance with Headquarters' orders, the office of transportation and communication would escort POWs to the designated place and deliver them to a receiver designated by the Ministry. The commander of an operational force would establish a provisional camp to house and supervise them until delivery.

27696 * After delivery, POWs came under the War Ministry but before that time their treatment was in the hands of the operations troops. Any trouble occurring prior to delivery was out of the War Minister's hands. After the War Ministry received POWs they were put in a POW Camp established by the ministry which was supervised by an Army Commander or Defense Commander designated by him.

27697 Many POW camps were established at the front, in which case the field commander supervised the camps in his area under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry. Provisional camps were beyond the Minister's jurisdiction. * The chief supervisor (army or defense commander) in conformity with regulations supervised the camps and laid

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down regulations. Business under the War Minister was divided and assigned to the POW Administration Department. The POW Department was governed by the regulations concerning the treatment of POWs and by the Adjutant's Notification and that of each Bureau in the War Ministry indicated that the chief business connected with the treatment of POWs and allotted to the Bureau according to the official system.

27698

The Administration Department as a chief office in charge managed matters concerning general plans of treatment at the front; detention; supervision; exchange; release; employment and punishment. * Also matters concerning POW labor and communications of military internees.

27699

The Administration Department was established at the end of March 1942 in accordance with regulations. In past wars the treatment of POWs was allotted to bureaus in the War Ministry. At the beginning of the last war, it was thought this allotment was practicable but the greatness in number of POWs and the complicated business of treating them made it necessary to have an exclusive office managing such affairs. The Administration Department was established to meet such demand at the end of March 1942. * The Administration Department was the responsible office and was on the same level as other bureaus and not in a position to be controlled by the Military Affairs Bureau. During the witness' tenure as Chief of the Army Affairs Section, he at no time gave orders to this department for he believed business concerning POWs should be managed by it.

27700

* The main business of which the Bureau of Military Affairs took charge concerning POWs was to draw up ordinances and organization of POW camps and regulations concerning the establishment and organization of the Administration Department and to draft replies of the Vice-Minister concerning application of the Geneva Convention. There was also the POW Information Bureau managed by the War Minister which was an organization established under the Hague Convention and entirely separate from the War Ministry. It was different from the Administration Department and the Chief of the Information Bureau was not subject to the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs or other bureaus. According to the Information Bureau's regulations, it had a right to ask for information from operating forces.

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27701

* The so-called mistreatment of POWs in Malay and Bataan Peninsulas took place during or immediately after the fighting, and the POWs were not yet under the War Ministry. POWs engaged in the Tailand-Burma Railway construction were under the War Ministry. The construction was carried out by the Commander of the Southern Army by order of the Chief of Staff. The War Ministry was consulted about this construction order by the Chief of Staff and various bureaus were consulted according to the division of business in the Official System of Organization. The Military Affairs Bureau took charge of the construction budget; the Maintenance Bureau, communication, materials and labor; and the POW Administration Department, labor, etc. Each bureau and department was consulted according to the business in its charge and the Minister and Vice-Minister of War jointly responsible for the consequences.

27702

The Southern Area Army undertook to carry out * the construction work, and the General Staff took the lead in shortening or lengthening the term of construction, alleviating transportation facilities and increasing forces, etc. The Director of Transportation and Communication Bureau directed the construction work. As the POWs were under the jurisdiction of the War Minister, he dispatched HAMADA, Director of the POW Information Bureau and Chief of the POW.

27703

* CROSS-EXAMINATION BY COLONEL MORNANE

The witness stated that the Military Affairs Bureau was divided into a Military Affairs Section and an Army Affairs Section and in addition had an information unit. The principal duties of the Army Affairs Section were the organization of the army, control and supervision of the budget, and disposition of various army organizations.

27704

With respect to POWs the Army Affairs Section had charge of such matters as the drafting of regulations governing the camps. Regarding the building of camps, the policy was to use buildings existing before the war, and officials in charge of administration of POW Camps were to select from such buildings those suitable. * With regard to buildings accommodating POWs, such matters were handled by the Building and Construction Section of the Intendance Bureau. The Affairs Section was in charge of camp organizations and

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drafted regulations, but as to general plans, as to the location of the camps, these would be drawn up by the Administration Bureau within the limits of such plans.

27705

* Then the Affairs Section would draft regulations for the camps. It did nothing further toward organizing them. With regard to POWs, the Military Affairs Section had the closest connection with problems of international law and regulations concerning POWs and he didn't think the Military Affairs Section had anything else to do with POWs.

27707

* Up to the time POWs were sent to the rear and report made to Headquarters as to their number, the person in charge was the commander of operations who was responsible for them. The policy was to send them to the rear and dispatch them as soon as circumstances permitted. The manner in which they were treated was not a matter for the Administration Division.

27708

* The witness stated that he was familiar with regulations for the treatment of POWs issued March 31, 1942 which stated that the Administration Division shall be established for the conduct of all affairs relative to treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the theatre of war. The witness stated that he believed the original phrasing was "civilian internees in the theatre of war and prisoners of war" and was different from the present interpretation. The Administration Department handled only POWs under the Ministry of War. If POWs were not under the direct control of the War Minister, they would not be under the Administration Department.

27709

* The witness stated that he had not said the POW Information Bureau was not related to the War Ministry. He had said it was an entirely different organization. The Administration Department was one of the bureaus constituting the War Ministry, but the Information Bureau did not constitute such a department but was a separate entity. The witness stated that it was correct that the Information Bureau which was managed by the War Minister was established in accordance with the Hague Convention and entirely separate from the Ministry. * He meant it was entirely separate because the Administration Department was a bureau constituting the Ministry of War and he had compared the Information Bureau with that department's status. He stated

27710

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27711 that the Chief of the Information Bureau and the Chief of the Administration Department were the same man. At first, the Chief was Colonel HANADA and he was succeeded by Colonel NINOMIYA. They would be under the control of the accused SATO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Complaints as to breaches of international conventions and such from the Swiss or other protecting powers would go to the Military Affairs Bureau. *

27712 Some complaints came directly as reference to the Military Affairs Bureau from the Foreign Office, but he did not know which came directly as he had nothing to do with such matters. He thought that for the most part, protests were handled directly by the Information Bureau. He did not know when they would come through the Ministry of War from the Information Bureau. * He could not tell where requests by protecting powers to visit prisoner of war camps were addressed, nor who handled requests to be allowed to visit the camps as he was not concerned with such matters.

27713 * CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BROOKS

27714 The witness stated that the official organization of the War Ministry may have had minor revisions * in 1935 but there were major revisions in 1936. When handed Exhibit 74, which listed the Intendance Bureau as one of the seven bureaus of the War Ministry, the witness explained that this was the same as the Bureau of Accounts mentioned in his Affidavit. * Exhibit 74 did not refer to the War Ministry organization prior to 1936 * but the witness' testimony referred to the periods as the revision in 1935 and 1936. After that the Army Affairs Section had general control over budgetary matters. * The witness stated that he did not know whether all the employees of the Information Bureau and Administration Bureau were the same, but he did know that the principal staff members were the same. He was not familiar with the particulars or details of the expenditures of funds from the bureaus, but knew that employees and staff members were not having salaries duplicated. He thought the funds were the same.

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27721

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF NISHIURA, Susumu
BY MR. BLEWETT

26,949

The witness stated he lived in Tokyo. He identified Exhibit No. 3023 as his affidavit and verified it. The witness served in the Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, from October 1931 to August 1941, except for the period from April 1934 to February 1937. In * October of 1941 he became private secretary to the War Minister. He became Chief of the Military Affairs Section in April 1942 and served until December 1944.

26,950

26,951

Most of the armaments used in the Pacific war were supplied from provisions originally prepared for use in Manchuria against the Soviet or had been prepared for emergency during the China incident. It was not originally prepared for use in the Pacific war. The mobilization plans of March 1941 provided for a large Baggage Transportation Section in the rear against fighting in severely cold or barren regions. The brigade was so equipped as to be a mobile unit in Manchurian operations, but not to be used * in the southern islands. All horses in the Supply and Baggage Department were to be Manchurian except those for headquarters.

26,952

Immediately before using these units in the south, they had to change the organization completely, and it could not help but be unadjusted, inadequate and incomplete. One could guess the operation plan by the distribution of the supplies. For example, ammunition in the spring of 1941 was to be divided 20% for Manchuria, 30% in China, 50% in Japan and none for Formosa and FIC. Aviation gas was 16% for Manchuria, 4% for China, 80% for Japan, and none for Formosa and FIC. In the Kwantung Army special * maneuvers which aimed at strengthening the USSR Manchuria boundaries, they sent a considerable portion of supplies preserved in Japan to Manchuria during July and August. 27% of all ammunition and 14% of aviation gas was sent there.

26,953

On the basis of the decision of early September 1941, it was scheduled to prepare for war by the end of October, although they were working for success in diplomacy and to avoid a war with the U.S. and Britain. In the field of supplies, Japan was blocked entirely by the U.S. and Britain and there was no room for increase in output, and what is referred to as completion of military preparation was in reality a mere change of distribution of supplies already owned or the preparation of personnel and materials for developing resources in the south in case of an outbreak there. * From September 1941 to December, 10% of ammunition and 12% aviation gas was for the first time transferred to Formosa and FIC. Completing military preparation for ten years preceding the Pacific war, the Manchurian affair broke out in September 1931 and the Army at that time had seventeen divisions and twenty-six air

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26,954 squadrons. However, material was badly wanting and the allotted ammunition was insufficient. Though it was decided to produce these munitions by mobilizing all industrial power, it was only a paper plan and many parts could not be taken seriously. Having no remedy, they did nothing about it. Productive power of airplanes and storage of aviation gas were almost non-existent and the real substance of the Army, acknowledged to be the * strongest in East Asia, was only superficial armament without content. The Army only consumed 20,000 tons of steel a year and its total budget was 200,000,000 ¥. Despite anxiety of the authorities, Japan's preparations were inferior compared to those of other powers which after being in the first World War showed a marked advance in their armament.

26,955 Japan was also substantially getting poorer and poorer. Munitions were merely sufficient to supply peacetime consumption. With this condition, the Manchurian affair broke out. Japan had promised cooperative defense and she had to consider the defense of the part of Manchuria bordering on the Soviet. She was faced with the advancement of industries of the Soviet and the numerical increase in the eastern part of Siberia. All required Japan to increase her military power in Manchuria to feel secure in the north. The economic restriction * was still strict and military power in Manchuria increased only slightly annually.

As to aviation, the annual production was about 100,000,000 yen and the air unit was barely increased from 26 to 50 odd companies in 1936. The makeup of the companies was so poor that it was not possible to carry out offensive operation. The General Staff deemed that if an incident arose between Japan and the Soviet, the defense of Japan and Manchuria would be impossible unless Japan had two-thirds of the military strength which the Soviet might use in East Asia. Such strength could never be provided. No one ever thought of preparing for an all-out war with China. Up to the Marco Polo incident in 1937 there was never any request from the staff for filling up of armaments with a view to such an incident. The idea of completing armaments in those days was to be prepared for counter measures if and when the Soviet attacked.

26,956 It was planned that war materials lacking in Japan and Manchuria would be obtained from the U.S., Britain and China. Fighting with them was never contemplated. In the Spring of 1937, the Army was just beginning to realize the plan to complete armaments for defense against the Soviet. They were discussing the plan of expanding Japan and Manchurian productive power to develop industrial economy. When

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they checked military demand with this plan, self sufficiency of fuel in case of war with the Soviet was impossible even if the plan was carried out. In peacetime they had never considered stocking the quantity needed for war. The plan was carried out with the idea of keeping friendly with the U.S., Britain and China even if there was a war with the Soviet.

26,957 Suddenly the Marco Polo affair broke out in July 1937 and it spread despite the * policies to minimize it. Developments made it necessary to send to China a group which had not been expected. The budget was appropriated in three piecemeal amounts during the Summer and Fall of 1937. A considerable quantity of materials accumulated for use against Russia was consumed against China. The division which was to be used in Manchuria, was used in China and in many cases their organization and equipment were not suitable. While field guns were inconvenient and mountain guns more expedient in China, most Japanese divisions were field artillery and had been reorganized with old fashioned mountain guns. Battlefield consumption exceeded the amount that could be produced.

26,958 Large scale operations in China consumed a large amount of war materials and increased the danger in North Manchuria. * The Changkufeng incident in 1938 and the Manchurian affair in 1939 gave Japan a lesson and a chance to reconsider military preparation. The lack of munitions at Changkufeng made them realize that they could supply only seven and a half divisions if the affair spread. At Nomonhan the capacity to supply air and mechanized units was inferior when compared with the USSR. It made them realize that unless they put their entire efforts into preparation against the USSR they could not carry out the China affair confidently. It became clear that the China affair would be prolonged and to supply the China theater and increase security against the North, a plan was drafted in 1939 to strengthen Army war supply mobilization for three years beginning in 1941. The total budget for this was 100 billion yen, 40% for supplies in China and the rest for military preparation in Manchuria.

26,959 They tried to transfer the munitions industry * to Manchuria and it was decided to establish the South Manchuria Plant in Mukden and elsewhere. The completion of preparations was so urgent that ordnance manufacturing was considerably advanced. The cultivation of resources as a basis of manufacturing was much neglected. Liquid fuel, rubber, bauxite and special alloys had to be obtained more than ever from abroad due to expansion of wartime strength and consequently the

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26,960 need of materials. The aid from the U.S. and Britain considered absolutely necessary in war with the Soviet became much more vital. The Army went ahead to draft a three year plan. As the China affair progressed, it gradually brought about the anti-Japanese economic oppression of the U.S., Britain and others and the situation became critical after the Summer of 1940. However, if relations with the U.S. and Britain were broken, the Army * could not carry out the affair and it would upset completing military preparation for defending Manchuria in view of the frequent armed conflicts with the Soviet.

They had never thought of warring with the U.S. and Britain and they believed they would come through the crisis. They could not change their view and prepare for war against the U.S. and Britain, which would have been natural in view of public opinion. There was a set tradition of defense against the Soviet and no one who knew anything about the material situation in the event of war with the U.S. and Britain was aware of the difficulties that would confront Japan. This prevented making whole hearted preparation. The solving of the China affair and preparing for defense against the Soviet was more than the Japanese Army could handle.

26,961 Even if full preparation for war with the U.S. and Britain was ordered, they could not do so due to lack of materials and the budget. From the middle of 1941, the situation grew worse daily and the consensus of Army opinion was to hurry and reach an agreement diplomatically and avoid a dangerous situation.

There was no cross-examination.

MEMORANDUM

27 August 1947

TO : Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM : Joseph F. English
SUBJECT: ~~NISHIURA~~, Susumu - Affidavit

Regarding the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, according to the decision of which Japan was to make preparations for war by the end of October, the affiant says (page 2, paragraph 3) that "what was referred to as a completion of military preparations for war against America and England was in reality a mere changing of the distribution of the supplies which were already possessed by Japan, or preparation of personnel and materials for developing resources in the southern region in case of an outbreak of operations in the south." The affiant should be questioned as to the meaning of this statement in light of the statements of TOJO and OIKAWA contained in the next paragraph. It seems that Japan was then ready for a war with the United States if that war would not last beyond a year and a half. He admits that there was a preparation of personnel and materials for developing of resources in the southern region. For what purpose was this preparation made but to secure the necessary resources that Japan would need after a war which lasted over one year and a half. With the resources of the south in addition to the resources and the military preparations in 1940 and 1941, Japan could continue a long war.

Regarding the inability of Japan to engage in military preparations for war against America and England, NISHIURA's attention might be directed to statements made during a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council on 26 September 1940, which approved the Tripartite Pact. Councilor KAWAI asked about Japan's preparation to meet the situation "when the worst turns up," i.e. war with the United States and Great Britain. TOJO replied that as far as the Army was concerned, only a part of its strength would be employed in a war against the United States. (R 6353) TOJO also said that Japan had enough reserve for "quite a while" (R 6354) but that he had no confidence in that respect if the war should continue "three to four years further." (R 6365) Navy Minister OIKAWA said that preparations of Japan's ships for battle had already been completed and that she had enough war materials, crude oil in particular, to last "for quite a while" (R 6354) (on the basis of full scale fleet-to-fleet clashes Japan's 'stock will be exhausted in the course of half a year or one year.") (R 6365) Regarding the scarcity of oil, Navy Minister OIKAWA said that Japan could not expect much from the production of synthetic oil and thought that oil could be imported from the Dutch East Indies and Northern Saghalin through peaceful means.

(R 6366) Consequently, one of the arguments used by the Army and the Navy in support of Japan's joining the Axis was her readiness then in September 1940 for a war with the United States and Great Britain -- her readiness for a war that would last one and a half years and her preparations to secure the materials for an extension of this war. In fact, Japan, as the minutes of the Privy Council meeting of 26 September 1940 indicate, entered into the Tripartite Pact knowing that "if the worst should come," i.e. war with the United States, she was then prepared; otherwise, fearing the reaction of the United States she would not have joined the Axis had she not been prepared.

Early in 1941, in a conversation between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP, OSHIMA stated that "preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May. For safety's sake preparations must be made not only for war against England but also against America The occupation of Hongkong and the Philippines had been provided for in case of need." (R 6463)

Regarding the statement of the affiant on page 6, that the material situation in the event of war with America and England was full of difficulties that would confront Japan in the course of such war, and that these facts prevented them from making whole-hearted preparations, a report to RIBBENTROP by OTT dated 24 March 1941 concerning Japan's military preparations states that "according to inquiries with the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral KONDO, the Navy is vigorously preparing for an attack on Singapore. Preparations were expected to be concluded by the end of May"

"According to inquiries with the Chief of the General Staff, General SUGIYAMA, the Army also was making preparations for an attack. Conclusion presumably also end of May.


"Conditions for accomplishment of this is a free rear towards Russia"

"Summarizing: The will to attack is present in the Army and Navy, preparations for attack are in progress, accomplishment possible if the Army's and Navy's objection could be eliminated. Military prospects favorable The need for her rear to be left free by Russia, plays a decisive part in the Japanese considerations and was being striven for by a reconciliation with Russia. The possibility of creating this free rear by other means is to be suggested to MATSUOKA. . . ." (Ex 576 - R 6477-79).

The witness's attention may also be directed to the decision of the Imperial Council of 2 July 1941 which decided, inter alia, that "for the sake of her self-existence and self-defense Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the southern regions and will also promote other necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States. First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes

against French Indo-China and Thailand following the 'Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand,' and 'Matters concerning the Promotion of our Southern Policy,' thereby stabilizing our structure for the southern advance. In order to achieve the above mentioned purpose, Japan will not hesitate to have a war with Britian and the United States. (R 6568)

In a telegram to RIBBENTROP of 13 July 1941, OTT stated that "in the meanwhile there are symptoms preceptable here that Japan is seriously undertaking military mobilization measures." (Ex 867 - R 8813)


Joseph F. English

Def. Doc. #2203



Exh. No.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: NISHIURA, Susumu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, NISHIURA, Susumu, after having been first duly sworn according to the custom of my country make the following statement:

1. I was formerly in service as Colonel and occupied the post of Chief of Army Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, from 20 April 1942 to December 1944. In the Ministry I was in charge of the establishment and institution of the army, I have a thorough knowledge of how the business of treating Prisoners of War was allotted in the army both in principle and in practice. I hereby state as follows:
2. Prepared for the purpose of making my statement understandable are attached to this document.
3. The system of business in the army concerning the treatment of Prisoners of War was regulated and practised as shown in the attached papers.
After the capture of POW's by the Japanese Army, the following two steps were followed as to the treatment of POW's.

- (1) Treatment within the troops in operations.
 - (a) When a front force captured POW, after having made necessary investigation and having prepared a POW roll and POW diary, the prisoners were delivered to the nearest office of transportation and communication.
 - (b) The commander of an army in operation who wanted to send prisoners to the rear reported to Imperial Headquarters as to the number of the prisoners to be sent and further the War Ministry was informed by the Imperial Headquarters.
 - (c) When the War Ministry received a report about sending POW's to the rear, the Ministry advised the Imperial Headquarters as to the ports or other places where POW's should be sent, and the Imperial Headquarters informed the War Ministry of the date of arrival of POW's at the place assigned.
 - (d) In accordance with the orders of the Imperial Headquarters, the office of transportation and communication would escort POW's to the designated place and deliver them to the receiver who had been designated by the War Ministry.
 - (e) The commander of a force in operation would establish a provisional POW camp to house and supervise POW's until the time of delivery, (Exh. No. 1965, Regulations Concerning the Treatment of POW., Chapt II, Art XII, XIII, XV, XVI, XVII).

After this delivery to the receiver designated by the War Ministry, POW's came under the jurisdiction of the War Minister. Before that time, the treatment of POW's was in the hands of the troops in operations, so that any trouble occurring prior to the time of delivery to the receiver of the War Ministry was out of the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

- (2) Treatment within the Army Administrative system after coming under the jurisdiction of War Minister.

After the receiver designated by the War Ministry received POW's, they came under the jurisdiction of the War Minister and were put in a POW camp established by the War Minister. (Ordinance concerning POW camps, Art II, Exhibit No. 1965). The POW camp was supervised by the army commander or defense commander designated by the War Minister. (Ibid Art III). During the Pacific War there were established a lot of POW camps at the front. In that case the field commander in operation and

the like, supervised the POW camps in his area and his supervision was put under the jurisdiction of the War Minister. As to the provisional camps mentioned above, the supervision thereof was beyond the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

The chief supervisor (i.e. army commander or defense commander) in conformity with the relevant regulations, etc., commanded and supervised the POW camp and laid down the POW camp service regulations, thus taking charge of all the supervising business concerning the POW camp. (Ordinance concerning the POW camp, Art V, Regulations concerning the Treatment of POW, Art XXI)

The business under the jurisdiction of the War Minister was divided into several parts and assigned to the POW Administration Department and each Bureau in the War Ministry as shown in the attached Table.

As regards each allotted business also shown in the table, that of the POW Department was provided by the Regulations concerning the Treatment of POW and by the Adjutant's Notification (Defense Exhibit No. 1598), and that of each Bureau in the War Ministry indicates the chief business which had connection with the treatment of POW and allotted to the Bureau according to the regulated official system of the War Ministry.

The POW Administration Department as a chief office in charge of the business under the supervision of the War Minister concerning the treatment of POW managed the following business:

- (1) Matters concerning the general plans of treatment of POW and military internees at the front: detention, supervision, exchange, release, employment (labor, propaganda, etc.), punishment, treatment, etc.
- (2) Matters concerning the labor to be imposed upon POW.
- (3) Matters concerning the communication of POW.
- (4) Matters concerning the punishment of POW.
- (5) Matters concerning the labor and communication of military internees at the front.

The following are necessary explanations as to several important matters:

The POW Administration Department was established at the end of March, 1942, in accordance with the Regulations Concerning the Treatment of POW, mentioned above. I have

learned that in the past wars the business concerning the treatment of POW was allotted to the bureaus in the War Ministry. It was generally thought at the beginning of the last war that the above allotment of the business was practicable as in the past wars. The greatness in number of POW and the complicated and extensive business of treating POW made it necessary to have an office exclusively managing the business of the War Ministry concerning the treatment of POW. The POW Administration Department was arranged to be established in the Ministry to meet such demand, but was actually established as late as at the end of March, 1942, under such circumstances. As was already stated above, the business under the jurisdiction of the War Minister concerning the treatment of POW was conducted by the POW Administration Department as the responsible office. The POW Administration Department was on the same level with other bureaus of the War Ministry and was not in a position to be controlled or supervised by the Military Affairs Bureau or any other bureau in the War Ministry. In fact, during my tenure of office as Chief of the Military Affairs Section, I, at no time, gave orders to the said Department, for in my belief the business concerning POW should have been managed by the POW Administration Department.

B. The main business of which the Bureau of Military Affairs took charge concerning the POW, were as shown in the attached tables:

The main business conducted in accordance with the above were as follows:

- (1) To draw up the Ordinance for POW camps and the organization of POW camps.
- (2) To draw up the regulations concerning the establishment and organization of POW Administration Department.
- (3) To draft the reply of vice-minister concerning the application of the Geneva Convention.

C. Besides there was the so-called POW Information Bureau which was managed by War Minister. This was an organization specially established in accordance with the Hague Convention and was entirely separate from the War Ministry. This was altogether different from POW Administration Department established as one of the sections of War Ministry. Furthermore, Chief of the POW Information Bureau was not subject to the control or supervision of Chiefs of the

Bureau of Military Affairs or other bureaus of War Ministry. According to the regulation governing the POW Information Bureau, the same bureau, the same bureau had a right to ask for various information from the operating forces.

(4) Mistreatment of POWS:

The so-called mistreatment of POW's in Malay and Bataan Peninsulas were cases which took place during or immediately after the fighting and the POW's were not yet brought under the jurisdiction of the War Minister--namely, they were still under the supreme command system. Those prisoners engaged in the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway were, for the most part, under the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

The construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was carried out by the Commander-General of the Southern Army by order of the Chief of the General Staff.

The War Ministry was consulted by the Chief of the General Staff about this construction order. The various bureaus were consulted according to the division of business stipulated in the Official System of Organization. The Military Affairs Bureau took charge of the budget for construction; the Maintenance Bureau, communication, materials and labor; and the POW Administration Department, labor, etc. Each Bureau and Department was consulted according to the business in its charge, and the Minister and Vice-Minister of War jointly responsible for the consequences.

The Southern Area Army undertook to carry out the construction work, and the General Staff took the lead in shortening or lengthening the term of construction, alleviating transportation facilities and increasing the forces, etc. The Director of Transportation and Communication Bureau undertook to direct the construction work, as previously testified by Lieutenant-general WAKAMATSU, the then director of that bureau. (Court Record in Japanese, PP 14-15)

As the prisoners engaged in the construction work were under the jurisdiction of the War Minister, he dispatched HAMADA, Director of the POW Information Bureau and Chief of the POW.

On this 10 day of Aug, 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)

Def. Doc. #2203

I, KAZUMA, Isaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)

Organization Concerning P.O.W. Affairs in
the War Ministry (Diagram No. 2)

In addition, the personnels of POW Supervision Bureau and Dispensary Bureau were dispatched to inspect the actual circumstances, thereby taking all possible reform measures.

War Minister --- Vice-Minister of War

Secretariate --- Affairs concerning the handling of documents and other general business.

Personnel Affairs Bureau --- Affairs concerning appointments and dismissals and other personnel affairs.

Military Affairs Bureau --- Affairs concerning organization, control of budget, arrangement of units, various wartime regulations, and international covenants.

Military Service Bureau --- Affairs concerning gendarmerie, military discipline and morals, punishment, air defense, prevention of espionage, and military police.

Bureau of Equipments --- Affairs concerning munitions production, military labor, communication and transportation.

Bureau of Accountants --- Affairs concerning budgets, money, clothing, food, building, and various war-time regulations for the accountants' Department.

Bureau of Medical Affairs --- Affairs concerning sanitation, prevention of epidemics, hospitals, medical supplies, and various war-time regulations for the Medical Department.

Judicial Affairs Bureau --- Affairs concerning military administration of justice, amnesty, execution, and various war-time regulations for the Judicial Affairs Department.

Def. Doc. #2203

P.O.W. Administration Department --- Affairs concerning general plans of handling of P.O.W.s and military internees at the front such as accommodation supervision, exchange, release, utilization, punishment, and treatment; Communication and punishment for P.O.W.s and military internees at the front; and P.O.W.s labor.

Note:

1. The War Minister supervises the P.O.W.'s Camp and controls the P.O.W. Information Bureau.
2. The vice-Minister of War assists the War Minister and arranges departmental affairs and takes charge of affairs of Secretariate, each Bureau and the P.O.W. Administration Department.
3. The chief of each Bureau and the P.O.W. Administration Department supervises the business in his own bureau or department according to the order of the War Minister.
4. With regard to the affairs of each Bureau, we quote here only important items which have connection with the treatment of P.O.W.s.
5. The above are based on the Official Organization of the Cabinet (Exhibit #70), the Official Organization of the War Ministry (Exhibit #74), regulations for P.O.W.s and Riku-A-Mitsu (Army Asia Secret) No. 1108, the adjutants of War Minister's note in the War Ministry.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

26 August 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Frank S. Tavenner, Jr.
FROM : D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT: NISHIURA, Susumu
Def. Doc. No. 1690 (Revised)

I hand you herewith the suggestions of Col. Fixel as to objections which might be made to the above affidavit.

D. N. Sutton

Encl.

*I have discussed this with Brigadier Dullion
he sees nothing harmful
to the Pros.*

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

25 August 1947 RWF/lp

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. David N. Sutton
FROM : Colonel Rowland W. Fixel
SUBJECT : Defense Document No. 1690, Affidavit of NISHIURA, Susumu

Object to para. 8 starting on line 3 with the word "However," on the ground that it refers to the opinions of unspecified individuals, as for instance on page 5 it says, "we had never thought of waring against America and England" and "we believed we would somehow be able to come through this crisis," and "we were just unable to change our point of view." Also because the paragraph on page 6 is theoretical, speculative and abounds in conclusions, as for instance, "the solution of the China Affair and . . . defense against the USSR were more than they could handle," and "if full military preparation for war with America and England was ordered . . . they would not have been able to do so . . . due to lack of materials and the budget."

ROWLAND W. FIXEL
Col JAGD

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

MEMORANDUM

25 August 1947

TO : Col. Rowland W. Fixel
FROM : D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT: Defense Witnesses - Pacific Phase -
Military Subdivision

Will you please go over the following affidavits:

NISHIURA, Susumu Def. Doc. No. 1690
YOSHINAGA, Yoshitaka " " No. 2105

and prepare a brief report on each witness and on the substance of the affidavits, outlining suggested cross-examination, if any, and references in the record where our evidence, if any, on the same subject is found.

These witnesses appear about the middle of the order of proof on the Military Subdivision of the Pacific Phase and will probably be reached tomorrow afternoon or Wednesday. We would like to have your report in triplicate as soon as you can reasonably make it.

D. N. Sutton

cc: Mr. Tavenner

EX. 3023

Translated by
Defense Language Branch~~INTERNATIONAL~~ MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.



Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: NISHIURA, Susumu

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was serving in the business concerning the military preparations in the Military Affairs Section, the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry from October 1931 to August 1941, except the period from April 1934 to February 1937 during which I was residing abroad. From August 10, 1941 I was ill and in hospital over a month, and could not work in the office during the period of illness. Was transferred to the post of the Private Secretary to the War Minister in October of the same year, returned to the Military Service Bureau again in April 1942 as the Chief of the Military Affairs Section. Since then until December 1944, I was serving in the business of the same section.
2. First of all, I will speak about the fact that most of the armaments used in the Pacific war was spared or supplied from the military provisions either which had been originally prepared to be used in Manchuria for guarding Manchuria, against USSR or which had been prepared as an emergency in the process of the Sino-Japanese Incident. And it had not been originally prepared to be used in a Pacific war. In the Mobilization Plan of 1941 which had been planned by March of 1941, the organization of the units in operations was as follows:
 - (a) Having a large Baggage Transport-Section in the rear providing against the fighting in severely cold or barren regions.
 - (b) The whole organization of the brigade was equipped so as to be the Mobile Units in operations in Manchuria but under no consideration to be used in the Southern Islands.
 - (c) All the horses needed in the Supply and Baggage Departments were to be Manchurian horses except the horses for the Headquarters (which was one third of the whole horses).

Military Preparations

These points are worth notice. Consequently, immediately before using these units in the Southern Regions, we had to change the organization completely to make it suitable for the purpose. And even though the organization had been changed, yet it could not be but a very unadjusted, inadequate and incomplete one, when the unit was mobilized to the South. You can surmise the Operation Plan by the distribution of the Supplies for Operation. Noting, for example the distribution of ammunitions and aviation gasolines in the supplies for operations under the direct control of General Headquarters about the spring of 1941:

Ammunitions

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| In Manchuria | 20% |
| In China Republic | 30% |
| In Japan Proper | 50% |
| In Formosa and French India | 0% |

Aviation Gasolines

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| In Manchuria | 16% |
| In China Republic | 4% |
| In Japan Proper | 30% |
| In Formosa and French India | 0% |

Moreover, by the so-called "Seki Special Manoeuvres" which aimed at the strengthening of the guarding of the USSR Manchuria Boundaries, they began to send forth a considerable portion of the Supplies necessary for the operation which had been preserved within Japan to Manchuria from July or August 1941.

27% of the whole ammunitions and 14% of the whole amount of aviation gasolines were removed to Manchuria.

3. With the decision on National Policy early in September 1941, it was scheduled to make preparation for war by the end of October or thereabouts although we were working for a compromise with America through diplomatic negotiation and were decided not to resort to war with America and Britain except in unavoidable circumstances. But at least in the field of supplies Japan was already blocked entirely by America and England, and there was no room for an increase in output, and what was referred to as a completion of military preparation for the war against America and England was in reality a mere changing of the distribution of the supplies which were already possessed by Japan, or preparation of personnel and materials for developing resources in the Southern Region in case of an outbreak of operations in the South, and Japan was obliged to be content with this.

As for the supplies for operation mentioned above, for the first time, in the period from September 1941 to December, 10% of the ammunition and 12% of the aviation gasoline were transferred to Formosa and French India.

4. As a supplementary explanation, I will give the details of the completion of military preparation for about ten years preceding the Pacific War.

In September 1931, the Manchurian Affair broke out. The Japanese Army at that time basically consisted of over 17 Divisions and 26 Air Squadrons. (EX. 380) However, although the numerical strength of the Front seems to have been arranged, material to equip them was badly wanting, and even the ammunition allotted to each Brigade on its mobilization was hardly sufficient. Though it had been decided to produce these munitions by mobilizing all the industrial power of Japan evidently it was only a paper plan and there were many parts that could not be taken seriously. But as we had no concrete remedy for them, we did nothing about that. As for the productive power of aeroplanes and the storage of aviation gasolines they were almost none, and the real substance of the Imperial Army, which was commonly acknowledged to be the strongest army power in the East Asia, was a mere superficial armament that had no content. The amount of consumption of steel in one year by the army at that time was only 20 thousand tons, and the total budget was only about ¥ 200,000,000. Thus being under the restriction of state economy, in spite of the anxiety of the authorities concerned with the military preparations, not only were the preparations of the Japanese Army inferior when compared with those of the other powers, which after participating in the First World War showed a marked advance in their armaments, but they were also substantially getting poorer and poorer. Munitions and other materials produced were merely sufficient to supply the peace time consumption. In such a condition of the military preparation, the Manchurian Affair broke out. However, Japan had promised a cooperative defense with Manchukuo, while on the other hand had to consider the defense of that part of Manchuria which bordered with the great military power of USSR. In addition, she had to face the continued advancement of industries of the USSR, and her increase of the numerical strength in the Eastern Part of "Siberia". All of these necessitated Japan to increase her military power in Manchuria in order to feel secure in the northern region of Manchuria. But in reality, the economical restriction was as strict as ever and the military power in Manchuria was increased only slightly year by year. For instance, aviation which needed the most urgent progress, the annual amount of production was only about 100 million yen in reality, and the entire Army air unit, which consisted of 26 companies in 1931, was barely increased to 50 some odd companies in 1936. Moreover the make up of these companies was so poor that no one thought it possible to carry out offensive operations. In the General Staff Office, they considered that if something should arise between Japan and the USSR, the defense of Japan and Manchuria would be impossible unless Japan had at least as many as two thirds of the military strength anticipated to be used in East Asia by the USSR. However, in actuality such strength could never be provided.

So, it was a matter of course that no one had ever thought of preparing for an all out war with China, if such did ensue. Up to the happening of the Lukouchiao Incident in 1937, there had never been any request from the General Staff Office concerning the filling up of the armaments with a view to such an incident. The idea behind the desire to complete the armaments in those days was mainly to be prepared to take counter-measure if and when attacked by the USSR. It was planned with the idea that benzine and other necessary war materials, which were lacking in Japan and Manchuria, could be obtained from the United States and Britain and even from China. Fighting against China, Britain and the United States was never Contemplated.

5. In the spring of 1937 when I came back to Japan from European duty to serve in the Military Affairs Office, they were just beginning to realize the above plan to complete the armaments - the plan which was being made intently since 1936 in the way of defense against the USSR. On the other hand they were having much discussion about the plan to expand the productive power of Japanese and Manchurian with the objective of developing industrial economy of the two nations. When we checked the military demand with this plan, the self-sufficiency of fuels in the event of war with USSR, for instance, would be impossible in Japan and Manchuria even if the plan was carried out accordingly. Furthermore we had never in peace time considered stocking the quantity necessary for war time. So the plan was being carried out with the idea of keeping friendly relations with America, England and China etc., even if a war should break out against the USSR.
6. In such a situation as explained above, suddenly the Lukouchiao Affair broke out in July 1937. The affair spread more and more in spite of the Japanese policy and effort to minimize it. The development of the hostile situation gradually made it necessary to mobilize and send to China a Group, which had not been expected necessary. Even the budget for the expedition was barely appropriated in 3 piecemeal amounts during the summer and fall of 1937. And a considerable quantity of the materials which had been accumulated with a great deal of trouble in preparation to defend against the USSR was consumed against China. Moreover, the divisions which were expected to be used in Manchuria had been used in China, and in many cases their organizations and equipment were not suitable for the local situation and we suffered greatly. For instance, though the use of field guns was inconvenient and mountain guns were more expedient in China, most of the Japanese divisions were Field Artillery divisions. Therefore we had to reorganize them with old-fashioned mountain guns. Moreover the consumption on the battlefield far exceeded the amount that could be produced. The mobilization of war industries was not as effective as desired since it had just then begun. The unexpected large-scale operation in China consumed a large amount of war materials on the one hand, and increased the danger in the northern region of Manchuria.

7. Especially the occurrences of the Changkufeng affair in the summer of 1938 and of the Nomonhan affair in 1939 gave us a lesson and a chance to reconsider our military preparations. The lack of our munitions in the Changkufeng affair made us realize the fact that we were capable of supplying only seven and a half divisions in the event the affair spreads. In the Nomonhan affair our capacity of supplying air and mechanized units was inferior when compared with the efficiency of supply of the mighty air and mechanized units of the USSR. These facts made us feel that unless we put our entire efforts in military preparation against the USSR, it was not possible even to carry out the China Affair with confidence. On the other hand, as it became evident that the Sino-Japanese affair was going to be prolonged in spite of Japan's desire to settle the affair early, to supply the China theater of war and to increase the security against the North, the drafting of a plan was undertaken in 1939 and the idea conceived was to strengthen the army war supply mobilization for 3 years beginning in 1941. The total budget for the plan was about 100 billion yen, and 40% of it was to be appropriated for supplies in China and the rest was for military preparation in Manchuria. Also the transfer of a munitions industry to Manchuria was tried as much as possible in consideration of war against the Soviet, and it was decided to establish the South Manchuria Plant etc., in Mukden and in other places. The immediate completion of military preparations being so urgently demanded at that time that the ordnance manufacturing was considerably advanced but the cultivation of the resources which was the basis of the manufacturing industries was much neglected. Especially, liquid fuel, "rubber", bauxite, and alloys of special steel among the war materials of Japan had to be obtained more than ever from abroad, that is America and England due to the expansion of necessary wartime strength and the consequent need of these materials. That is, the material support by America and England, which had been considered to be absolutely necessary in case of war with the Soviet in future, became much more vital. The army of that time, bearing even this serious burden, went ahead to draft the Three Year Plan.
8. As the Sino-Japanese affair progressed, it gradually brought about the anti-Japanese economical oppression of America, England and other countries. The situation became critically worse after the summer of 1940. However, if the relations with America and England should be broken, the Japanese army would be frustrated in carrying out the Sino-Japanese affair as explained above, and besides, it would also mean the upsetting of the foundation of completing military preparations for the defense of Manchuria in view of the frequent armed conflicts actually occurring along the Soviet-Manchuria borders. Also as we had never thought of warring against America and England, we believed we would somehow be able to come through this crisis. We were just unable to change our point of view and engage in military preparations for war against America and England. In fact, the public opinion was anti-america and anti-English and it

would have been natural for the military authorities to prepare for an emergency because such is their duty. But they had a set traditional idea of defense against the USSR and anybody who knew anything about the material situation in the event of war with America and England were fully aware of the difficulties that would confront Japan in the course of such war. These facts prevented them from making whole hearted preparations. For the Japanese Army at that time the solution of the China Affair and the military preparation for the defense against the USSR were more than they could handle. Even if full military preparation for war with America and England was ordered by their superiors they would not have been able to do so concretely due to the lack of materials and the budget.

Since the middle of 1941, the situation grew worse day by day. In the Japanese Army, the consensus of opinion was to accelerate to reach an agreement through diplomatic negotiations and avoid the dangerous situation. And thus, the summer of 1941 came as mentioned above.

On this 28th day of May, 1947
At I.M.T.F.E.

Deponent /S/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ NISHIURA, Susumu (seal)

NISHIURA, Susumu

Request by MUTO, Akira

a. Resident of Tokyo.

b. He was a senior member of a section in the Military Affairs Bureau when Muto was chief of said bureau and is an authority on Japanese Army system and organization. He will give relevant testimony as to the organization of the Army and the duties, responsibilities and powers of such offices as were held by Muto.

DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: NISHIMURA, Susumu (MUTO)

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>Partially Completed</u> | <u>Fully Completed</u> |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division. | _____ | <u> X </u> |
| 2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony. | _____ | <u> X </u> |
| 3. Examination of case file, if any. | _____ | <u> X </u> |
| 4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division. | _____ | <u> X </u> |
| 5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division. | _____ | <u> X </u> |
| 6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony. | _____ | <u> X </u> |
| 7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness. | _____ | <u> X </u> |
| 8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses. | _____ | <u> X </u> |
| 9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you. | _____ | _____ |

Pedro Lopez
Capt. James J. Robinson
William E. Edwards

By



CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: NISHIURA, Susumu

Date of Birth: Dec. 4, 1901

Domicile: No. 877, Sakaetani, Wakayama City

Present Address: No. 896, Kamiurajiku, Omemachi, Nishitama-gun, Tokyo
Metropolis.

- 30 Sep. 1931 Assigned to Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry.
- Mar. 1934 Ordered to stay in China and in France.
- Mar. 1937 Assigned to Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry.
- Mar. 1938 Promoted to Lt. Colonel.
- Aug. 1941 Promoted to Colonel.
- 17 Oct. 1941 Appointed Secretary of War Minister.
- 20 Apr. 1942 Appointed chief of Military Affairs Section, Bureau of
Military Affairs, War Ministry.
- Dec. 1944 Appointed Staff officer of Expeditionary Forces in China.
- 27 July 1946 Attached to First Demobilization Ministry.

NISHIURA, Susumu

Request by MUTO, Akira

a. Resident of Tokyo.

b. He was a senior member of a section in the Military Affairs Bureau when Muto was chief of said bureau and is an authority on Japanese Army system and organization. He will give relevant testimony as to the organization of the Army and the duties, responsibilities and powers of such offices as were held by Muto.

CHARGE OUT SLIP
LEGAL SECTION
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL DIVISION

DATE 25 Feb 49

CASE FILE NO. Nishimura Susumu (col)

VOL. _____

Signature [Signature]

Room No. 823

Defense witness - testified

Nishimura, Susumu (col)