

Dec File

Box #

7104

---

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050

894.5018/1-145 -- 12-3146 - 47-48 - 49

894.5018/2-945

## CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

## NOTE

## SUBJECT

Request of Department of Agriculture for  
current information on agricultural  
production and the food situation in  
Japan and Japanese-occupied areas.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See ..... #61 .....  
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated ..... Feb 9, 1945 ..... From } ..... vladivostok .....  
To }

File No. .... 894.61/2-945 .....

894.5018/2-945

No. 867

AIR MAIL

UNRESTRICTED

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
MAR 16 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SR WAR SUPPLY  
RESOURCES DIVISION  
MAR 23 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Calcutta, India, March 2, 1945.

DIVISION OF  
MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 15 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

3 Agri  
reply lock  
ECL  
3/14

DATE  
A/E  
M  
E  
E  
DC/R

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
MAR 14 1945  
DC/L  
LIAISON OFFICE

SUBJECT:

Request from Department of Agriculture  
for Current Information on Agricultural  
Production and the Food Situation in  
Japan and Japanese Occupied Areas.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's  
instruction dated December 22, 1944, with which was  
forwarded a letter from the Department of Agriculture  
dated December 19, 1944, asking for current information  
on agricultural production and the food situation in  
Japan and Japanese occupied areas.

After considerable investigation it is now evident  
that very little primary information of the type desired  
by the Department of Agriculture in this connection can  
be expected to become available in Calcutta in the  
immediate future. The only subject mentioned in this  
request which has prime interest for commercial circles  
here is the rice situation in Burma, Thailand and Indo-  
China, particularly with respect to possible exports  
as soon as Japanese occupation of these territories may  
be ended. However, the firms here formerly engaged  
in the rice trade for these territories do not expect  
to have any tangible or accurate information until the  
military situation develops so as to permit their own  
representatives to return to Burma and the other areas  
concerned.

With regard to official sources of information  
there is also a dearth of primary information in Calcutta  
on this subject. It has been suggested by the Foreign  
Economic Administration to the American Mission in  
New Delhi that reference should be made to the Far  
East Enemy Division of FEA, which has been gathering  
information available on this subject. The General  
Representative of the Office of War Information in India

DIVISION OF COMMERCIAL POLICY  
APR 2 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ESC

DGB - 302 070  
Dist. RB.

WAR AREAS  
ECONOMIC DIVISION  
MAR 20 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
has file

For Distribution  
D. W. J. Henderson  
DIVISION OF MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS  
MAR 17 1945  
OFFICE FOR  
MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

894.5018/3-245

CS/D 894.5018/3-245

AIR MAIL


-2-

has informed the American Mission at New Delhi that much material has been forwarded by that organization to Washington which has a bearing upon the food situation in Burma. All such data should be obtainable from the office of Dr. Clarence Hendershot, (Room 3040), Social Security Building, Washington.

Information collected by both the British and American military authorities on this subject is being forwarded to Washington continuously and no doubt the Department of Agriculture can arrange for access to that portion of this information, which is not considered secret for military reasons.

Under the circumstances prevailing here it appears to be very doubtful whether much of any primary information of the nature requested by the Department of Agriculture in the instruction under reference will become available in Calcutta, but the Consulate General will continue to be watchful for anything that might develop here in this connection and promptly report information of interest.

Respectfully yours,



M. S. Myers  
American Consul General

850/869.1  
CEB/1h

Original and copy (carbon back) to Department  
Copy to American Mission, New Delhi.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 9, 1946

No. 185

*file FR*  
*JA*  
*PEAR*  
*WJH*  
*JK*

*WJH*  
*18*

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES DIVISION

enc 2 Copies Rept. 10  
JAN 21 1946 att.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

one copy detailed to JN

*DCR*

Subject: Report on Food Position of Japan Proper in 1946

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1946 JAN 17 PM 1 45

RECORDS BRANCH

DIVISION OF COMMERCIAL POLICY  
MAR 27 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward to the Department copies in duplicate of a preliminary report dated December 27, 1945, prepared by the Natural Resources Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on the Food Position of Japan Proper in 1946.

General Headquarters has been requested to furnish copies of all such reports and in the future they will be transmitted to the Department without covering despatch addressed to the Division of Japanese Affairs.

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN  
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enclosure: *att WJH*

APR 9 1946

Duplicate copies of Report  
on Food Position of Japan  
Proper in 1946.

In triplicate to the Department.

869.1  
JSService: jwb

894.5018/1-946

OS/D 894.5018/1-946

DCR - ITP Unit  
Adm  
E v  
Ext  
Dist

APR 1 1946

*WJH*

*Rept.*R E S T R I C T E D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Natural Resources Section

AFPO 500  
27 December 1945

REPORT NUMBER 10

FOOD POSITION OF JAPAN PROPER IN 1946

(A Preliminary Report)

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Natural Resources Section

FOOD POSITION OF JAPAN PROPER IN 1946  
(A Preliminary Report)

## SUMMARY

1. The normal inability of Japan Proper to satisfy its food requirements from domestic production will be seriously aggravated in 1946 according to the latest estimates of the Imperial Japanese Government. The present forecast, as of 9 November 1945, by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is for a total of 27,633,000 metric tons of foodstuffs available from domestic production for consumption in 1946.

2. This is almost 2,000,000 metric tons lower than the total production of foodstuffs for 1945. It will provide the average person with only 1325 calories and 40.8 grams of protein per day as compared with 1782 calories and 58.4 grams of protein from the 1945 food supply, according to Japanese officials.

3. Damage from typhoons and floods during September and October and unusually cold and wet weather during the latter part of the rice growing season, are blamed for the disappointing yields from current crops. Rice yields are almost 20 percent below earlier expectations; sizeable losses are also estimated in other grains and in the sweet potato crop.

4. Inequitable food distribution between the rural and urban population, and the diversion of foodstuffs into black market channels are expected to reduce even more the daily diet for large sections of the population. Japanese officials report a widespread reluctance among farmers to sell foodstuffs to the government. Serious difficulties are, therefore, anticipated in the collection of foodstuff quotas.

5. Imports will be necessary to bring the Japanese diet to minimum subsistence levels in 1946. An over-all average daily per capita diet of 1800 calories would require almost 4,000,000 metric tons of food imports according to Japanese officials. The Japanese Government has officially requested 3,679,400 metric tons of foodstuffs which, when added to the present estimate of food production, would provide an average diet per person per day of approximately 1760 calories.

6. At present, urban residents are receiving far less than these proposed average daily diet levels. The current basic ration is approximately 1000 calories per person per day. This may be supplemented by non-rationed foodstuffs in varying amounts depending on their availability. Recent investigations indicate that in Tokyo the average daily per capita diet, including both rationed and non-rationed foods, is now approximately 1270 calories and 32 grams of protein.

- 1 -

R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E DGENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Natural Resources SectionFOOD POSITION OF JAPAN PROPER IN 1946  
(A Preliminary Report)

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
A. Introduction. . . . .	1
B. Estimated Food Position of Japan Proper in 1946 . . . . .	1
C. Food Requirements of the Japanese People. . . . .	3
D. Problems of Food Distribution in Japan in 1946. . . . .	4
E. Import Requirements in 1946 . . . . .	6
F. Discussion and Conclusions. . . . .	7
G. Appendix. . . . .	8
Table 1 Estimated Food for Consumption in Japan Proper in 1946, as of 9 November 1945. . . . .	9
Table 2 Average Caloric and Protein Value of Food Consumed per Person per Day in One District of Tokyo During October 1945 . . . . .	11
Table 3 Estimated Food Imports Required at Various Diet Levels for 1945. . . . .	12
Table 4 Imports of Foodstuffs During 1946 Requested by the Imperial Japanese Government . . . . .	13
List of NRS Reports and Distribution of Report No. 10 . . . . .	14

R E S T R I C T E D

GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Natural Resources Section

FOOD POSITION OF JAPAN PROPER IN 1946  
(A Preliminary Report)

A. Introduction.

1. The combination of disappointing food harvests, an increasing population, inflation, and the prospect of serious maldistribution threaten Japan with a critical food shortage in 1946. The present forecast, as of 9 November 1945, by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is that the total indigenous food production in 1946 will be almost 2,000,000 metric tons lower than the production of foodstuffs available for consumption in 1945.\*

2. Under ideal conditions of distribution, the indigenous production of food will provide an average daily per capita diet in 1946 of only 1325 calories and 40.8 grams of protein according to Japanese officials. Present indications are that the daily food intake per person in urban areas is already below this figure.

3. The seriousness of the threat of starvation in Japan in 1946 appears to be dependent upon the volume of food imports which may be exported and the ability of the Japanese Government to solve the problem of maldistribution.

B. Estimated Food Position of Japan Proper in 1946.

1. The estimate of Japanese domestic food production available for consumption in 1946 has declined consistently since the first forecast submitted by the Japanese Government as of 31 August 1945. The three estimates submitted to date are as follows: 31 August 1945, a total of 30,077,800 metric tons; 20 September 1945, a total of 28,319,500 metric

\* "Foodstuff production in 1946" refers to the rice crop year from 1 November 1945 to 31 October 1946. The foodstuffs produced during this period will be available for consumption in 1946.

R E S T R I C T E D

tons; and 9 November 1945, a total of 27,633,000 metric tons. \*

2. This deterioration in the outlook for next year's food supply is attributed by Japanese officials to damage from the typhoons which swept across Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku on 17 and 18 September 1945; from the floods in Southern and Eastern Honshu on 7 and 8 October 1945; and from a prolonged period of cold wet weather the latter part of the rice growing season.

3. The rice crop suffered most from this damage. The total yield from the present rice harvest is now estimated at 6,445,000 metric tons which is almost 20 percent less than the crop anticipated earlier in the year. \*\* Serious losses were also reported in the sweet potato crop and in grains other than rice.

4. Of the total foodstuff production available for consumption in 1946, estimated as of 9 November, 24,613,100 metric tons, representing 11,418,200 metric tons in rice equivalents, will remain for food after deductions for non-food uses. The actual food intake, after further deductions for losses and waste, will be 20,466,500 metric tons according to official estimates. (Appendix Table 1).

\* When originally submitted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the 1946 production estimate as of 31 August 1945 was 29,369,100 metric tons. This would have provided an average daily per capita diet of 1551 calories and 44.5 grams of protein. The Ministry estimate as of 20 September 1945 was originally submitted as 27,619,000 metric tons which would have provided an average daily per capita diet of 1375 calories and 41.1 grams of protein. These figures were cited in Natural Resources Section Report Number 2, Food Position of Japan Proper for 1945 and 1946, 7 November 1945. When these figures were checked with the estimate submitted as of 9 November 1945, an arithmetical error was discovered in the previous Japanese estimates. The corrected figures follow: (a) Total production and average daily per capita diet in calories and protein for 1946, estimated as of 31 August; 30,077,800 metric tons, 1560 calories, and 45.2 grams of protein; (b) estimated as of 20 September: 28,319,500 metric tons, 1385 calories, and 41.8 grams of protein.

\*\* Natural Resources Section, Report No. 7, Rice Crop Losses from Adverse Weather Conditions in 1945. 11 December 1945.

R E S T R I C T E D

5. Food supplies in 1945 were considerably greater than those now expected in 1946.\* The current rice harvest is now estimated at 2,338,700 metric tons less than the 1944-1945 crop. This reduction will be partially offset by an estimated increase in 1946 of approximately 600,000 metric tons in potatoes and 250,000 metric tons in fish as compared with the 1945 production. A further addition to the 1946 food supply will be 150,000 metric tons (110,800 metric tons in rice equivalents) of "food substitutes", according to Japanese officials. These include such products as sweet potatoes, vines, mulberry leaves, fruit and potato waste, acorn flour, and weeds. However, the production of foodstuffs for consumption in 1946 as now estimated will be 1,181,000 metric tons lower on an overall basis than that of 1945.

6. At the same time, Japanese officials expect an increase in the home island population from 74,252,000 at the end of June 1945 to 77,133,000 by the end of June 1946. This combination of a decreased food supply and an increased population will reduce the Japanese diet from indigenous foodstuffs to 1325 calories and 40.8 grams of protein per person per day according to calculations of the Japanese Government.

C. Food Requirements of the Japanese People.

1. An average daily per capita diet of 1325 calories is far below the war or pre-war diet of the Japanese people. Data supplied by officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry indicate that the 5-year average consumption per capita per day in Japan was 2131 calories for the period 1911 - 1915, 2377 calories for 1921 - 1925, and 2265 calories for 1931 - 1935.

2. During 1940 - 1941, the Japanese people received an average of 2082 calories and in 1942, 1872 calories. \*\* Figures for 1943 and 1944 are unavailable. Investigations in several Japanese cities in June 1945

\* For a complete breakdown by types of foodstuffs of the estimated food supplies in Japan Proper in 1945, cf. Natural Resources Section, Report Number 2, Food Position of Japan Proper for 1945 and 1946. 7 November 1945. Appendix Table 1.

\*\* Ibid, p5.

R E S T R I C T E D

revealed a range of diet from 1677 to 2026 calories per person per day.\* At the present time, however, the basic ration has fallen to approximately 1000 calories per day. This basic diet is supplemented by non-rationed foodstuffs in varying amounts depending on their availability. Investigations by the Public Health and Welfare Section of this Headquarters indicates that the average food intake in one part of Tokyo during October 1945 was approximately 1270 calories per person per day. (Appendix Table 2.)

D. Problems of Food Distribution in Japan in 1946.

1. The estimated figure of 1325 calories per person per day from domestic production of foodstuffs in 1946 is an over-all average for the entire Japanese population. The present food purchase program of the Japanese Government would leave sufficient food for the agrarian population to provide an average daily per capita consumption of 1815 calories; this leaves only 1035 calories for the non-agrarian population.

a. Indications are, at present, that Japanese Government will have difficulty in bringing sufficient foodstuffs into the cities to meet even this diet level. Collections of rice from the current harvest on 20 November 1945 were only approximately 300,000 metric tons as compared with the average collection from 1942 to 1945 on 20 November of approximately 1,030,000 metric tons.

2. Officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and independent Japanese agricultural experts attribute the current shortage of collections to several causes. The 1945 rice crop is now estimated at less than 75 percent of the harvest of last year. Unfavorable weather has delayed the present rice harvest from two weeks to a month. Because of this delay, the rice harvest has extended into the season for planting wheat. Farmers are said to have insufficient time at present to deliver their rice as rapidly as possible. All observers agree, however, that farmers are reluctant to deliver their assigned food quotas to the government and that this constitutes the major obstacle in achieving the maximum possible distribution of foodstuffs available from domestic sources in 1946.

3. The prospect of serious difficulties in the collection of rice and other foodstuff quotas from farmers is attributed to causes which are both economic and psychological.

a. Because of the poor rice crop, farmers have been authorized to retain only 80 percent as much rice this year as last year.

\*Ibid. Appendix Table 10.

R E S T R I C T E D

This is despite the fact that the government has reduced the proportion of the crop it will purchase from 66 percent in 1945 to 62 percent in 1946. The present quota program would leave only sufficient foodstuffs for the farmers to provide an average daily diet per farm person of 1815 calories. For many farmers, this would mean a reduction in their own food supply to less than minimum requirements. Japanese officials admit that it will be difficult to induce farmers to curtail their consumption below an average of 2200 calories per farm person per day. If this is true, only about 800 calories will remain as the daily share of the average non-agrarian person.

b. The black market is a constant and difficult competitor of the government in the purchase of foodstuffs. This is particularly true when farmers see an opportunity to barter their crops for necessary physical commodities. Agricultural observers and officials believe, however, that this is not a serious drain on domestic food supplies except in the environs of the large cities. They point out that transportation facilities are unavailable for illegal shipments in large quantities over a distance. The proportion of the rice crop which will go into the black market is difficult to estimate. Officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry predict it will be less than five percent. Dr. Shiroshi Nasu, Professor of Agricultural Economics at Tokyo Imperial University, believes that black market sales, in the usual sense, will be much less than 10 percent of the commercial rice supply. He feels, however, that an important motive of the farmers in withholding rice from the market is their intention to pay many of their future operating and living expenses in foodstuffs rather than in money. Because of inflation, such "barter" payments are now encouraged by those who sell goods and services to the farmers according to Dr. Nasu. The recent increase in the purchase price of rice from 92.50 yen to 150 yen is reportedly considered inadequate by a large portion of farmers. In general, however, it is agreed that the ability to obtain farm supplies and consumer goods is a more important consideration to the farmer than the money price he receives for his crops.

c. A general attitude of resentment and hostility toward the government and governmental control is reported to exist among the rural population. This is attributed to (1) a reaction from the rigid control maintained over agriculture during the war, (2) disillusionment when the war ended in defeat instead of promised victory from which the farmers were encouraged to expect great benefits in exchange for their wartime sacrifices, and (3) past empty promises by the government to supply farmers with fertilizer, other farm supplies, and consumer goods, and to allow farmers to re-buy foodstuffs at a later date in cases where quotas were met at the expense of the grower's own minimum food requirements.

d. Dissatisfaction is reported among farmers with the policies and leaderships of the rural agricultural associations (Nogyokai)

R E S T R I C T E D

which now act as the staple food collection agencies. In many cases under present leadership, these associations are said to be regarded as organs for the maintenance of strict governmental control rather than as bodies representative of farmers and farm interests. Under present law, approval of leaders by the Prefectural Governor is required and in a great many cases this has been tantamount to appointment by the Governor.\* Present leaders received such "appointment" during the war because of their ability to expedite the government war program rather than because they had the support and cooperation of the farmers. Often they represent landlord rather than grower interests, and arouse the same resentments from the farmers as other agents of centralized control.

E. Import Requirements in 1946.

1. As previously noted, even the best possible distribution of foodstuffs produced domestically in 1946, will leave Japan far short of its minimum food requirements.

2. On the basis of the estimated food position as of 9 November 1945, imports which would be required to provide various average daily per capita diet levels, according to Japanese officials, are as follows: 2160 calories, 7,004,000 metric tons; 2000 calories, 5,481,000 metric tons; 1800 calories, 3,921,000 metric tons; and 1600 calories, 2,286,000 metric tons (Appendix Table 3).

3. The figures of 2160 calories per person per day are the minimum nutritional requirements according to the Japanese National Nutrition Laboratory. As shown in Natural Resources Section Report No. 3, Food Position of Japan Proper for 1945 and 1946, such a diet level was not received during the war, and cannot be expected under the emergency conditions anticipated in 1946.

4. The total of imports of foodstuffs officially requested by the Japanese Government on 14 November 1945 was 3,679,400 metric tons. This amount in rice equivalents would be approximately 3,796,000 metric tons and, when added to the present estimated domestic food production, would provide an average daily per capita diet of approximately 1760 calories, (Appendix Table 4).

\* A bill for repeal of this requirement is scheduled for presentation at the current session of the Japanese Diet.

R E S T R I C T E DF. Discussion and Conclusions.

1. The combination of poor harvests, an increase in population, and a prospect of serious maldistribution, threaten Japan Proper with a serious food shortage during the coming year. Physical food shortages within the country, are not expected by Japanese officials until about April 1946, with April, May, and June as the most critical months.

2. Maldistribution, however, may leave large sectors of the population without adequate food long before this time. Because of declining stocks of foodstuffs, the average daily per capita diet in urban centers has already fallen below adequate nutritional requirements. This present shortage of food supplies in various cities may be attributed to the delay in the rice harvest, and may be expected to improve as rice deliveries increase.

3. The duration and extent of this improvement, however, is dependent on the collection of established rice quotas from farmers. Japanese officials admit that full collection of these assigned quotas presents serious difficulties because of farmer resistance and because of diversion of foods into black markets. Recently, members of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, personally appealed to farmers in various rural areas to cooperate in the rice collection program. It is believed, however, that additional measures by the government will be necessary if Japan is to utilize its available food supply to achieve the maximum distribution possible.

4. The conclusion that with completely equitable distribution, the domestic production of foodstuffs will provide only 1325 calories per person per day, is based on an estimated population by June 1946 of 77,133,000 persons. This represents an increase of almost 2,000,000 persons over the 1945 population. Whether the actual increase will be this large is subject to question. A population of less than the Japanese estimate for 1946 will, of course, increase the average daily amount of food available per person.

5. Finally it must be noted that all figures on foodstuffs production are estimates made by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Physical harvests of individual crops have in no case been completed. Furthermore, it has not been possible to confirm the crop reports on which the estimates of the Japanese Government are based; nor has there been an independent audit of the data presented by the Japanese Government.



R E S T R I C T E D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Natural Resources Section

FOOD POSITION OF JAPAN PROPER IN 1946  
(A Preliminary Report)

G. APPENDIX

- 8 -

R E S T R I C T E D

TABLE 1

## ESTIMATED FOOD FOR CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN PROPER IN 1946 AS OF 9 November 1945\*

	Production	Total amount used for food		Total amount of food intake**	Food intake per capita		
		Food Wt. (1,000 M.T.)	Rice Equiv. (1,000 M.T.)		Weight (grams)	Fuel Value (Cal.)	(pct.)
<b>Cereals:</b>							
Rice***	6,445.1	6,354.5	6,354.5	5,017.3	210.2	738	55.7
Barley (covered)	578.2	381.6	304.6	281.3	10.0	35	2.6
Barley (naked)	724.4	579.6	531.1	494.8	17.6	62	4.7
Wheat	1,028.2	967.7	879.2	805.3	28.6	102	7.7
Others	141.8	7.1	5.8	4.6	0.2	1	0.1
TOTAL	8,917.7	8,299.5	8,075.2	7,503.3	266.6	938	70.8
Corn, Millet and similar small cereals	279.4	224.1	165.6	151.4	5.4	19	1.4
<b>Alimentary legumes:</b>							
Soybeans	339.3	273.1	341.9	264.9	9.4	40	3.0
Others	163.4	151.3	150.6	146.8	5.2	17	1.3
TOTAL	502.7	424.4	492.5	411.7	14.6	57	4.3
<b>Potatoes:</b>							
Sweet potatoes	5,468.4	4,095.8	1,256.2	3,429.3	121.6	146	11.0
Potatoes	2,437.5	1,695.0	329.7	1,382.1	49.1	38	2.9
TOTAL	7,905.9	5,790.8	1,585.9	4,805.4	170.7	184	13.9

RESTRICTED

TABLE 1

ESTIMATED FOOD FOR CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN PROPER IN 1946 AS OF 9 November 1945\*

	<u>Production</u>	Total amount used for food		Total amount of food intake**	Food intake per capita per day				
		<u>Food Wt.</u> (1,000 M.T.)	<u>Rice Equiv.</u> (1,000 M.T.)		<u>Weight</u> (grams)	<u>Fuel Value</u> (Cal.)	<u>(pct.)</u>	<u>Protein</u> (grams)	<u>(pct)</u>
	6,445.1	6,354.5	6,354.5	5,017.3	210.2	738	55.7	15.8	38.7
(covered)	578.2	381.6	304.6	281.3	10.0	35	2.6	0.8	2.0
(naked)	724.4	579.6	531.1	494.8	17.6	62	4.7	2.0	4.9
	1,028.2	967.7	879.2	805.3	28.6	102	7.7	3.5	8.6
	141.8	7.1	5.8	4.6	0.2	1	0.1	0	
	8,917.7	8,299.5	8,075.2	7,503.3	266.6	938	70.8	22.1	54.2
Wheat and small cereals	279.4	224.1	165.6	151.4	5.4	19	1.4	0.5	1.2
Dry legumes:									
Beans	339.3	273.1	341.9	264.9	9.4	40	3.0	3.8	9.3
	163.4	151.3	150.6	146.8	5.2	17	1.3	1.1	2.7
	502.7	424.4	492.5	411.7	14.6	57	4.3	4.9	12.0
Potatoes	5,468.4	4,095.8	1,256.2	3,429.3	121.6	146	11.0	1.3	3.2
Others	2,437.5	1,695.0	329.7	1,382.1	49.1	38	2.9	1.0	2.4
	7,905.9	5,790.8	1,585.9	4,805.4	170.7	184	13.9	2.3	5.6

TABLE 1 (Contd)

## ESTIMATED FOOD FOR CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN PROPER IN 1946 AS OF 9 NOVEMBER 1945\*

	Production	Total amount used for food		Total amount of food intake***	Food intake per capita per			
		Food Wt. (1,000 M.T.)	Rice Equiv. (1,000 M.T.)		Weight (grams)	Fuel value (Cal.)	(pct.)	(gram)
Vegetables	5,957.0	5,957.0	382.6	5,112.3	181.6	44	3.3	1.
Fruits	502.7	502.7	73.5	382.9	13.6	9	0.7	0.
Sugar	27.0	27.0	27.7	24.3	0.9	3	0.2	
Oils	21.7	15.0	38.4	13.5	0.5	4	0.3	
Food Substitutes****	150.0	150.0	110.8	145.5	5.2	13	1.0	0.
Plant Food Total	24,264.1	21,300.5	10,952.2	18,550.3	659.1	1,271	95.9	32.
Milk & Milk products	75.0	50.6	8.1	45.5	1.6	1	0.1	
Meat and Eggs	68.9	68.9	26.7	57.4	2.0	3	0.2	0.
TOTAL	143.9	119.5	34.8	102.9	3.6	4	0.3	0.
Fish & shells	2,437.5	2,315.6	344.5	1,104.5	39.2	40	3.0	7.
Sea weeds	787.5	787.5	86.7	708.8	25.2	10	0.8	0.
Total Marine products	3,255.0	3,103.1	431.2	1,813.3	64.4	50	3.8	7.
Animal food total	3,368.9	3,222.6	466.0	1,916.2	68.0	54	4.1	8.
GRAND TOTAL	27,633.0	24,613.1	11,418.2	20,466.5	727.1	1,325	100.0	40.

\*Data of the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

\*\*The figure for "Food Intake" shows the amount of foodstuffs actually consumed by the people after deducting the estimated losses incidental to polishing, milling, waste in cooking, deterioration and loss in weight during storage and transportation etc., from the quantities "Used for Food."

\*\*\*In calculation on food values of rice 96% rate of polish used.

\*\*\*\*Include food values to be derived from such things as potato stems, ground acorns and other substitutes which may be added to food supply.

TABLE 1 (Contd)

ESTIMATED FOOD FOR CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN PROPER IN 1946 AS OF 9 NOVEMBER 1945\*

Production	Total amount used for food		Total amount of food intake***	Food intake per capita per day				
	Food Wt. (1,000 M.T.)	Rice Equiv. (1,000 M.T.)		Weight (grams)	Fuel value (Cal.)	(pct.)	Protein (grams)	(pct.)
5,957.0	5,957.0	382.6	5,112.3	181.6	44	3.3	1.9	4.7
502.7	502.7	73.5	382.9	13.6	9	0.7	0.1	0.2
27.0	27.0	27.7	24.3	0.9	3	0.2		
21.7	15.0	38.4	13.5	0.5	4	0.3		
150.0	150.0	110.8	145.5	5.2	13	1.0	0.8	2.0
24,264.1	21,300.5	10,952.2	18,550.3	659.1	1,271	95.9	32.6	79.9
75.0	50.6	8.1	45.5	1.6	1	0.1	0	0
68.9	68.9	26.7	57.4	2.0	3	0.2	0.3	0.7
143.9	119.5	34.8	102.9	3.6	4	0.3	0.3	0.7
2,437.5	2,315.6	344.5	1,104.5	39.2	40	3.0	7.1	17.4
787.5	787.5	86.7	708.8	25.2	10	0.8	0.8	2.0
3,255.0	3,103.1	431.2	1,813.3	64.4	50	3.8	7.9	19.4
3,368.9	3,222.6	466.0	1,916.2	68.0	54	4.1	8.2	20.1
27,633.0	24,613.1	11,418.2	20,466.5	727.1	1,325	100.0	40.8	100.0

\*The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.  
 \*\*The figure for "Food Intake" shows the amount of foodstuffs actually consumed by the people after  
 deducting the estimated losses incidental to polishing, milling, waste in cooking, deterioration  
 in weight during storage and transportation etc., from the quantities "Used for Food."  
 \*\*\*The figures for fuel value and protein are based on food values of rice 96% rate of polish used.  
 \*\*\*\*The figures for fuel value and protein are based on food values to be derived from such things as potato stems, ground acorns and other  
 products which may be added to food supply.

R E S T R I C T E D

TABLE 2

Average Caloric And Protein Value Of Food Consumed Per Person Per Day  
In One District Of Tokyo During October 1945\*

<u>Food</u>	<u>Calories per person per day (No.)</u>	<u>Protein</u>
Rice	1112.0	24.00
Bread	45.0	1.60
Oil	19.0	---
Noodles	39.0	.30
Fish	11.3	1.00
Radishes, Greens	7.0	0.35
Sweet Potatoes	1.0	---
Miso	32.5	3.43
Soy Sauce	5.0	0.28
<u>Total</u>	<u>1271.8 Calories</u>	<u>31.56</u>

\* Based on a survey by Public Health and Welfare Section, GHQ, SCAP.

TABLE 3

ESTIMATED FOOD IMPORTS REQUIRED AT VARIOUS DIET LEVELS FOR 1946\*

Products to be imported	2,160 Cal			Diet Levels 2,000 Cal.			1,800 Cal.			1,600
	Total 1,000 Metric tons	Percent of total food req.	Rice Equivalent 1,000 metric tons	Total 1,000 Metric tons	Percent of total food req.	Rice Equivalent 1,000 metric tons	Total 1,000 Metric tons	Percent of total food req.	Rice Equivalent 1,000 metric tons	Total 1,000 Metric tons
Rice	1,350	17.5	1,350	1,350	17.5	1,350	1,350	17.5	1,350	1,350
Wheat	3,304	77.3	2,971	1,835	65.4	1,650	1,331	57.0	1,197	436
Soy Beans	1,000	78.5	1,251	1,000	78.5	1,251	700	71.0	876	500
Sugar	1,000	97.3	1,028	946	97.3	972	400	93.7	411	
Palm Oil	50	76.9	128	50	76.9	128	40	72.7	102	
Copra	300	100	461	300	100	461	100	100	154	
TOTAL	7,004	22.1	7,189	5,481	18.2	5,812	3,921	10.2	4,000	2,286

\*Data of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

TABLE 3

ESTIMATED FOOD IMPORTS REQUIRED AT VARIOUS DIET LEVELS FOR 1946\*

Cal	Percent of total food req.	Diet Levels		Rice Equivalent 1,000 metric tons	1,800 Cal.		Rice Equivalent 1,000 metric tons	1,600 Cal.		Rice Equivalent 1,000 metric tons
		2,000 Cal. Total 1,000 Metric tons	Percent of total food req.		Total 1,000 Metric tons	Percent of total food req.		Total 1,000 Metric tons	Percent of total food req.	
17.5	1,350	1,350	17.5	1,350	1,350	17.5	1,350	1,350	17.5	1,350
77.3	2,971	1,835	65.4	1,650	1,331	57.0	1,197	436	31.0	392
78.5	1,251	1,000	78.5	1,251	700	71.0	876	500	64.6	626
97.3	1,028	946	97.3	972	400	93.7	411			
76.9	128	50	76.9	128	40	72.7	102			
100	461	300	100	461	100	100	154			
22.1	7,189	5,481	18.2	5,812	3,921	10.2	4,000	2,286	8.5	2,368

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.



TABLE 4

## IMPORTS OF FOODSTUFFS DURING 1946 REQUESTED BY THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Foodstuffs	Import From	Quantity (1,000 Metric Tons)				Totals
		Jan-Mar	Apr-Jun	Jul-Sep	Oct-Dec	
Cereals	Korea (rice)	400.0	400.0		50.0	850.0
	Formosa (rice)	200.0			50.0	250.0
	Indo-China (rice)	100.0	150.0		100.0	350.0
	Siam (rice)		100.0			100.0
	U. S. A. and Canada (wheat & Flour)		600.0	550.0	96.0	1,246.0
	TOTAL	700.0	1,250.0	550.0	296.0	2,796.0
Soybeans	Manchuria	300.0	200.0		100.0	600.0
Sugar	Formosa			100.0	100.0	200.0
Oleaginous Seeds	Philippines			21.7	21.7	43.4
Oils & Fats	Malay and Sumatra	10.0	15.0	15.0		40.0
GRAND TOTAL		1,010.0	1,465.0	686.7	517.7	3,679.4

TABLE 4

IMPORTS OF FOODSTUFFS DURING 1946 REQUESTED BY THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Imports	Import From	Quantity (1,000 Metric Tons)				Totals
		Jan-Mar	Apr-Jun	Jul-Sep	Oct-Dec	
	Korea (rice)	400.0	400.0		50.0	850.0
	Formosa (rice)	200.0			50.0	250.0
	Indo-China (rice)	100.0	150.0		100.0	350.0
	Siam (rice)		100.0			100.0
	U. S. A. and Canada (wheat & Flour)		600.0	550.0	96.0	1,246.0
	TOTAL	700.0	1,250.0	550.0	296.0	2,796.0
	Manchuria	300.0	200.0			500.0
	Formosa			100.0	100.0	200.0
	Philippines			21.7	21.7	43.4
	Malay and Sumatra	10.0	15.0	15.0		40.0
	TOTAL	1,010.0	1,465.0	686.7	517.7	3,679.4

RESTRICTED

LIST OF NATURAL RESOURCES REPORTS

Report No. 1.	Possibility of Reparation From Japan's Natural Resources	31 Oct 45
Report No. 2.	Food Position of Japan for 1945 and 1946	13 Nov 45
Report No. 3.	Basic Problems of the Coal Mining Industry in Japan	14 Nov 45
Report No. 4.	Culture and Utilization of "Kozo" and "Mitsumata" for the Manufacture of High-Grade Paper in Japan	24 Nov 45
Report No. 5.	Ownership and Administration of Japan's Forest	27 Nov 45
Report No. 6.	Administration of the Japanese Mining Industry	1 Dec 45
Report No. 7.	Rice Crop Losses from Adverse Weather Conditions in Japan Proper in 1945	11 Dec 45
Report No. 8.	Stockpiles of Logs and Lumber in Japan	11 Dec 45
Report No. 9.	Unusual Materials as Foodstuffs in Japan	17 Dec 45
Report No. 10.	Food Position of Japan Proper in 1946	20 Dec 45

DISTRIBUTION:

War Department . . . . .	31
6th Army, Attn: Mil. Govt. Sec. . . . .	10
8th Army, Attn: Mil. Govt. Sec. . . . .	60
XXIV Corps, Attn: Mil. Govt. Sec. . . . .	12
ASCOM-C . . . . .	5
G-2 WDIT. . . . .	2
G-4 . . . . .	2
Office of the Chief Engineer . . . . .	2
CI & E. . . . .	2
Government Section. . . . .	2
Statistics and Reports Section. . . . .	5
Economic and Scientific Section . . . . .	4
General Procurement Agent . . . . .	3
Political Advisor . . . . .	1
Natural Resources Section:	
Each Division (lea) . . . . .	7
Library . . . . .	2
Historian . . . . .	1
File. . . . .	36

96  
1/20

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

### TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL  
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE  
CLASSIFICATION OF THE  
MESSAGE:

Collect

Charge Department: X

Charge to

**Department of State**  
**Washington**  
**NO PARAPHRASE  
NECESSARY**  
*Secret*

**SECRET**

NOV 28 1945

3p

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

TOKYO.

For Atcheson, Acting Political Adviser,

For Willoughby from Martin.

894.5019

FCC radio intercepts indicate considerable relaxation in food rationing regulations and in official efforts to collect food from farmers, particularly rice. Have reference especially to abandonment of price and rationing controls on fresh vegetables and fish and elimination of potatoes, soy beans and other beans from "staple food rationing" while retaining "staple food rationing" for present at existing calory level. Do these steps represent relaxation in fact with possible increased pressure for food imports as a result? Are such relaxations required by conditions in Japan?

894.5018/11-2845

SENT

Confidential File

OS/LE

894.5018/11-2845

Byrnes  
(per [signature])

Doc	11-28-45
Rec	jk
Dist	fl

NOV 28 1945

JK:EMMartin:lmc 11-21-45

JA

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

# TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

**SECRET**

Collect

Charge Department: **X**

Charge to

## Department of State

Washington

*secret*

3 1945

3 p

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,

TOKYO.

For Atcheson, Acting Political Adviser.

Appreciate views REURTEL 129/ <sup>740,00119 Central Japan/11-1445</sup> on Japanese food requirements. Looks doubtful if more than 1500 to 1700 is feasible in view of world food shortage, unsettled conditions in normal sources of supply in Far East and strong pressure from members of FEAC to limit Japanese standard of living to level of countries invaded by Japan.

*740,00119 FEAC*

*Bynes (per [unclear])*

**SENT**

894.5018/11-2845

OS/LE

DCR	ITP Unit
App. <i>mc</i>	<i>SEM</i>
Rev.	<i>jk</i>
Cat.	<i>OR 412</i>
Dis.	<i>NOV 28 1945</i>

RELEASE ROOM

NOV 28 PM 2 55

RECEIVED  
CONFIDENTIAL FILE  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES

*894.5018/11-2845*

JK:EMM Martin:lmc

*WJ*  
*LA* *JA*

FA-21  
SECRET

Copy No. 252

*File*

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION  
Enemy Branch  
Food and Agriculture Division

894.5018/11-2945

WARTIME FOOD POSITION OF JAPAN PROPER  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 1945

OS 1894.5018/11-2945

Condensed File  
FILED

FEB 25 1946

DCR - ITP Unit	
Anal.	<i>jk</i>
Rev.	<i>jk</i>
Cat.	<i>ms</i>
Dist.	

November 14, 1945

**SECRET**

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
I. Foreward .....	1
II. Summary .....	2
III. Wartime Food Position of Japan Proper .....	5
Rice - Supply .....	7
Rice - Demand .....	9
Wheat, Barley and Naked Barley .....	13
Other Grains .....	16
Legumes .....	17
Tuber and Root Crops .....	19
Vegetables .....	20
Sugar .....	21
Fruit .....	21
Kelps .....	21
Animal Foods .....	21
IV. Tables	
Table 1 - Estimated Food Supply of Japan, 1945 .....	23
Table 2 - Estimated Food Consumption in Japan, 1945 .....	24
Table 3 - Estimated Per Capita Consumption of Food in Japan, 1945 .....	26
Table 4 - Estimated Food Consumption in Japan Proper 1945 from Domestic Production .....	27
Appendix - Japan's Grain Position - War Department Cable .....	29

**SECRET**

FOREWORD

This report is intended to present a comprehensive picture of the wartime food position of Japan Proper, which may throw some light on the extent of the food deficiency and may be of guidance in formulating policies on rationing and on future food production in Japan.



FOREWORD

This report is intended to present a comprehensive picture of the wartime food position of Japan Proper, which may throw some light on the extent of the food deficiency and may be of guidance in formulating policies on rationing and on future food production in Japan.

-2-

SUMMARY

Up to 1943 there was no noticeable food shortage in Japan Proper, but by the end of that year the food supply situation became serious due to lowered domestic production and decreased imports, and declined still further in 1944 and 1945. Despite strenuous efforts by the Japanese government in restricting consumption, the carry-over stock of rice which is the most important staple food reserve, was practically exhausted by the end of 1943 and never recovered. Supply of wheat, barley and naked barley also decreased by 20 percent in 1945 as compared with 1941.

Present indications are that the Japanese average daily per capita food consumption for 1945 \* was about 1,809 calories. Compared with the prewar (1936) daily intake of 2,162 calories, the 1945 level is 16 percent lower. This average is estimated primarily on information supplied by Japanese official sources and on an estimated resident population of 72,000,000 for 1945. Of this daily consumption, 1,622 calories or about 90 percent were derived from domestic production. Since it will be some time before the prewar average can again be assured, it seems wise to plan 1946 food provisions by adjustments from the 1945 standard.

The total food consumed in Japan in 1945 is estimated at 21,702,000 m.t. of which 20,411,000 m.t. were from domestic sources.

---

\* The rice year, starting November 1, of the previous year to October 31, of the year, is used throughout this report for discussions of consumption, not the calendar year.

**SECRET**

-3-

The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has estimated the 1946 food available from domestic production for consumption at 23,000,000 m.t. or 1,573 calories daily per capita with a population of 77,133,000. Since there is no breakdown of this estimate by food items, it is impossible to evaluate this claim. The population in 1946 may be increased by the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians overseas, but the increase seems high compared with the generally accepted 1945 resident population estimate of 72,000,000. The population factor is so fundamental in this consideration that verification of the estimate is essential.

In 1945, the total rice supply in Japan was 9,342,000 m.t., of which 8,585,000 m.t. or 92 percent was produced at home. Imports declined from 1,633,000 m.t. in 1941 and 2,439,000 m.t. in 1942 to 365,000 m.t. in 1945. The supply of other grains has not increased to meet this deficit, but instead, total production of wheat, barley and naked barley decreased from 2,925,000 m.t. in 1941 to 2,352,000 m.t. in 1945. Japanese domestic production of soybeans is estimated to have remained constant at 355,000 m.t. during the period 1941-45, but imports, principally from Manchuria, were increased from 525,000 m.t. in 1941 to 787,000 m.t. in 1945. Consumption is estimated to have about equalled supply in this period. The supply of other beans and peas is estimated to have remained constant during the period.

However, the Japanese government had encouraged an increased production of both sweet and white potatoes not only for food but also for industrial purposes. The sweet potato crop for 1945 is estimated at 4,688,000 m.t., as compared with the 1930-36 average of 3,454,000 m.t.

-4-

White potato production increased from an annual average of 1,219,000 m.t. for the 1930-36 period to an estimated 2,175,000 m.t. in 1945. Production of other vegetables such as daikon, cabbage, onion, carrot, etc., dropped substantially during the war period.

Domestic production of sugar in Japan Proper averaged 122,000 m.t. during the period 1930-36. This may have been raised to 155,000 m.t. in 1945. The average apparent consumption was 1,028,000 m.t. during 1930-36. Due to a sharp drop in imports to 500,000 m.t. or less, the total consumption of sugar in 1945 is estimated to be no more than 650,000 m.t.

The supply of fish during the war period had decreased to less than half of the prewar average of 3,352,000 m.t. for 1931-37. Other animal protein foods had also dropped in quantity.

In addition to the general food shortage throughout Japan, the position of the urban population is relatively more serious than that of the rural population which normally receives more food per capita and which will continue to do so. Experience in war torn areas indicate that rural populations do not suffer the same decline in food availability as urban people. Dislocation of transportation, difficulties in food collection and distribution, black market operations and possible price inflation all tend to widen the gap in the amount of food between urban and rural people.

The problem of food imports, therefore, centers upon the supply of the urban population. The major items that feature in essential imports are rice, soybeans and sugar.

-5-

## WARTIME FOOD POSITION OF JAPAN PROPER

WITH

## SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 1945

The average per capita available for consumption of food in Japan for 1945 is estimated to have been 1,809 calories per day, as shown in Table 3. Compared with 1936, when the Japanese average daily consumption was 2,162 calories <sup>1/</sup>, the 1945 level is 16 percent lower. This lower caloric intake however, does not wholly reflect the inadequacy of the present Japanese food situation. In addition to shortages, the situation is aggravated, especially in the urban areas, by distribution disturbances due to dislocation of transportation and difficulties in food procurement from the farmers.

In a cablegram <sup>2/</sup> of September 28, 1945 from the Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces of the Pacific, data were furnished on staple grains for the years 1940 to 1945. In light of these data, an attempt is made to analyze the changes in the food situation of Japan Proper during the war years and to determine the present situation. Foodstuffs other than staple grains, such as fish, vegetables, meat, poultry and dairy products, are estimated on the basis of previous intelligence.

Table 1 presents the relation of domestic production and imports of feed to the total available supply in Japan in 1945. Only 4 percent of the rice was imported, 92 percent was domestic production and remaining

---

<sup>1/</sup> "Japan's Food Position" prepared by MIS, August 28, 1945.  
<sup>2/</sup> Paraphrased copy of cablegram attached to this report.

-6-

4 percent was the carry-over from the previous year. The total quantity of kaoliang is estimated to be imported from Manchuria. Japan produced 31 percent of her soybean supply while the rest was imported primarily from Manchuria. The bulk of sugar supply was imported from Formosa, amounting to 77 percent of the total sugar supply.

Tables 2 and 3 show the food available for consumption in 1945. Of the total of 47,514,663 million calories, 42,617,583 million calories are estimated to be domestic production, representing 90 percent of the total food consumed in 1945. The amount available from domestic sources is presented in Table 4.

According to a recent Japanese government estimate <sup>1/</sup>, a total of 22,000,000 m.t. of food production will be available for consumption in 1946. Compared with 1945 estimates of 20,411,000 m.t. (Table 4), from domestic sources, the 1946 estimate may be high. Total rice available for consumption may be over-estimated. Since the production of this year's crop is not expected to exceed 7.3 million m.t. as compared with 8.6 million m.t. in preceding year, the addition of a small carry-over of 346,000 m.t. from 1945 would amount to only a total of 7,646,000 m.t. which, however, does not take into consideration any imports or deduction for seed, waste, and non-food uses. On the other hand, a good harvest of wheat, barley, naked barley, and sweet potato crops, and possibly a better fish catch may be available for 1946 consumption, and consumption in industrial uses and wastes may have been lowered.

---

<sup>1/</sup> CA 53667 to WARTAG from SCAP, October 22, 1945.

-7-

The calculation used by the Japanese government is based on a population estimate of 77,133,000. This, however, needs further scrutiny as to its validity. If we take the total food available for consumption in 1945, 47,514,663 million calories and divide by the 1946 estimated population, the average available for consumption per capita per day would be 1,688 calories as compared with 1,809 calories in 1945. Furthermore, the 1945 domestic production would only give 1,514 calories per capita per day, calculated on the basis of 1946 population estimate.

Since it will be some time before the Japanese food can again be assured at a prewar level of 2,162 in 1936, it is better to examine the effect of 1945 level, 1,809 calories per capita per day on the health and efficiency of the Japanese populace, and make the appropriate adjustments necessary.

As background, leading up to the present position, there follows an analysis by commodities of the supply situation during the war years 1941-45.

#### RICE

##### I. Supply

Domestic Production - In prewar years, the peak production of rice 1/ was attained in 1939, a total of 68,964,468 koku 2/ (10,085,000 m.t.). During the war period, despite efforts of the Japanese government to increase production of rice, results were negative because production

---

1/ All rice figures in this report are in terms of brown rice except as otherwise specified. The conversion for brown rice in koku to metric tons is made at the rate of 6.838 koku to 1 m.t. or 1 koku equals 146.25 kg.

2/ Yomiuri Shimbun, April 7, 1943.

-8-

factors such as labor, fertilizers, and implements were limited by the requirements of war. Furthermore, with the exception of 1942, the rice crops were adversely affected by weather conditions. The purchasing quota system as well as price policy implemented by the Japanese government had also hindered the program of production increase.

Imports - Imports of rice in Japan depended heavily on the production in Korea and Formosa. From the Southern Areas, French Indochina, Burma and Siam, the Japanese shipping capacity was the determining factor. Substantial imports of rice were made in 1941 and 1942, but from 1943 on, imports declined drastically year by year. Only insignificant amounts were imported in 1945 before the surrender.

Carry-overs from previous year - The average carry-over for the ten-year period 1931-40, was 8,721,000 koku (1,275,000 m.t.) of rice. This average is roughly about 10 percent of the total rice supply in Japan for the same period. In 1941-45, the average carry-over was only 3,837,000 koku (561,000 m.t.) or 44 percent of prewar average stock. This amounts only to about 5 percent of the total supply in corresponding years. It is to be noted, however, that according to certain articles published in Japan <sup>1/</sup>, the 1944 rice deficit was partly made up by means of early crops. This would indicate that there was practically no carry-over from 1944 to 1945. But on the other hand, the meager amount of carry-over from 1944 to 1945 as indicated in the present cablegram, is in

---

<sup>1/</sup> Keizai Mainichi, Tokyo, December 15, 1944.



-9-

fact insignificant especially in view of transportation difficulties that existed in Japan. In other words, for all practical purposes, the Japanese government had exhausted its rice stock every year since 1943.

## II. Demand

It has been estimated that an annual export of about 500,000 koku was necessary to meet the demand in Karafuto and possibly some military outposts outside of Japan. After deducting exports and carry-over at the end of each rice year (Oct. 31) from the total supply, the remaining quantity is the disappearance. It is believed that the Japanese government had made strenuous efforts to cut down the waste in polishing and other non-food uses in order to provide the maximum quantity for human consumption and seed purposes. The prewar average (1930-1939) per capita disappearance of rice in Japan thus calculated was 1.081 koku (158 kg.). Assuming that the resident population in Japan Proper from 1941 to 1945 remained at 72,000,000 persons <sup>1/</sup> without any substantial change, the per capita disappearance of rice would amount to 0.981 koku, as the average of the five-year period 1941-45. It is to be noted that in 1944 and 1945, the average per capita disappearance dropped to 0.947 and 0.847 koku respectively. Comparing the 1945 figure with the prewar average of 1.081 koku, there is a decrease of about 22 percent.

---

<sup>1/</sup> Daily Operations Report from G.H.Q. SCAP to War Dept. CA 53041, 10/9/45. Population estimates - 75,000,000.

-10-

The following table shows the supply and demand for rice in Japan Proper in the five rice years, November 1, 1940 to October 31, 1945:

Rice Table AEstimated Supply and Demand of Rice in Japan Annually,1941 - 1945

(in thousand metric tons) 1/

<u>Rice Year</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
<u>Supply</u>					
Carry-over from previous year	1,350 a/	654 d/	1,061 d/	353 c/	392 d/
Production previous year	8,902 y/	8,056 g/	9,765 g/	9,197 h/	8,585 i/
Imports	<u>1,633 c/</u>	<u>2,439 c/</u>	<u>1,198 c/</u>	<u>888 c/</u>	<u>365 c/</u>
Total Supply	<u>11,886 d/</u>	<u>11,149 d/</u>	<u>12,024 d/</u>	<u>10,438 d/</u>	<u>9,342 d/</u>
<u>Demand</u>					
Exports	73 e/	73 e/	73 e/	73 e/	73 e/
Disappearance	11,159 f/	10,015 f/	11,598 f/	9,973 f/	8,823 f/
Carry-over to next year	<u>654 d/</u>	<u>1,061 d/</u>	<u>353 d/</u>	<u>392 d/</u>	<u>346 d/</u>
Total Demand	<u>11,886</u>	<u>11,149</u>	<u>12,024</u>	<u>10,438</u>	<u>9,342</u>

1/ For convenience, this table is repeated on the following page in koka.

-11-

Rice Table B  
Estimated Supply and Demand of Rice in Japan Annually,  
1941 - 1945

(in thousand koku of brown rice)

<u>Rice Year</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
<u>Supply</u>					
Carry-over from previous year	9,234 <u>a/</u>	4,472 <u>d/</u>	7,255 <u>d/</u>	2,414 <u>d/</u>	2,680 <u>d/</u>
Production previous year	60,874 <u>b/</u>	55,088 <u>g/</u>	66,775 <u>g/</u>	62,887 <u>h/</u>	58,707 <u>i/</u>
Imports	11,168 <u>c/</u>	16,677 <u>c/</u>	8,190 <u>c/</u>	6,074 <u>c/</u>	2,494 <u>c/</u>
Total Supply	<u>81,276</u> <u>d/</u>	<u>76,237</u> <u>d/</u>	<u>82,220</u> <u>d/</u>	<u>71,375</u> <u>d/</u>	<u>63,881</u> <u>d/</u>
Exports	500 <u>e/</u>	500 <u>e/</u>	500 <u>e/</u>	500 <u>e/</u>	500 <u>e/</u>
Disappearance	76,304 <u>f/</u>	68,482 <u>f/</u>	79,306 <u>f/</u>	68,195 <u>f/</u>	61,015 <u>f/</u>
Carry-over to next year	4,472 <u>d/</u>	7,255 <u>d/</u>	2,414 <u>d/</u>	2,680 <u>d/</u>	2,366 <u>d/</u>
Total Demand	<u>81,276</u>	<u>76,237</u>	<u>82,220</u>	<u>71,375</u>	<u>63,881</u>

a/ Estimated on the following basis: Japanese Official figures for carry-over from 1939 to 1940 and production in 1939 for 1940 consumption are 4,061,000 koku and 68,963,000 koku respectively. Imports for 1940 were estimated at 15,600,000 koku by Donald Lamm, formerly American Agricultural Attache in Japan. This gives a total supply of 88,624,000 koku of rice for Japan Proper in 1940. From this total supply, 500,000 koku is estimated to be exports, and 78,890,000 koku as disappearance (as given by Katayanagi, Shinkichi, in his publication entitled "Nippon Senji Shokuryo Seisaku" Tokyo, June 20, 1942, p.20) leaving a carry-over of 9,234,000 koku for 1941.

b/ Toyo Keizai Shimpo Keizai Nenkan (The Oriental Economist Yearbook) 1943, p.129.

c/ Derived by subtracting carry-over and production from the total supply.

d/ All figures were supplied by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and converted into koku from metric ton at the rate of 6.838 koku to one metric ton.

-12-

- e/ Minimum exports estimated by Donald Lamm, believed to be necessary to meet the minimum demands in Karafuto and Japanese military outposts.
- f/ Derived by subtracting exports from the "consumption" figures as given by the same source as d/.
- g/ Yomiri Shimbun, April 7, 1943.
- h/ Radio Report on the Far East No. 42, March 30, 1944, p. a-16.
- i/ Radio Report on the Far East, June 1, 1945. The rice production in 1944 was 4,180,000 koku, less than that of 1943. This would indicate that the 1944 production was 58,707,000 koku.

-13-

WHEAT, BARLEY AND NAKED BARLEY

Wheat - In prewar years 1/ taking the seven year period of 1930-36, Japan produced an annual average wheat crop of 7,821,000 koku (1,090,000 m.t.) 2/. The average disappearance of wheat after adding imports and subtracting exports for years 1930-36, was 8,990,000 koku (1,252,000 m.t.), or an average per capita disappearance of 0.133 koku. There has been substantial increase in wheat production since 1936, reaching a crop of 13,094,000 koku, in 1940 (the highest on record). It is assumed that in the years 1941-45, Japan depended entirely on her domestic production of wheat without any imports or exports. Therefore, the supply figures as given in the cablegram 3/ are viewed as the same as the production of the previous year as well as disappearance, of the subsequent year, since no carry-over was indicated. The following table is taken from the cablegram:

Wheat Supply in Japan, 1941-45  
(in thousand metric tons)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Supply</u>
1941	1,290
1942	1,284
1943	1,036
1944	1,380
1945	1,045

- 
- 1/ Wheat year in Japan starts July 1, of the year and ends on June 30 of the next year.  
2/ Wheat measurement is converted from koku to metric ton at the rate of 7.178 koku to a metric ton.  
3/ Copy attached.

-14-

Barley - Production of barley for years 1930-36 1/ averaged 7,057,000 koku (787,000 m.t.) 2/ and disappearance averaged 6,858,000 koku (764,000 m.t.) or 0.100 koku on a per capita basis. In the years between 1937-1940, the production of barley was maintained at practically the same level as the prewar average. It is believed that there were no imports or exports of barley in the period of 1941-45. The supply situation of barley is as follows:

Barley Supply in Japan 3/  
(in 1000 m.t.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Supply</u>
1941	706
1942	730
1943	572
1944	777
1945	623

Naked Barley - In prewar Japanese statistics, no imports or exports were shown for naked barley. In other words, what is produced is consumed. The average production of naked barley for 1930-36 4/ is 6,160,000 koku (858,000 m.t.) 5/ or an average disappearance of 0.091 koku per capita per year. However, in the years 1938-40, there were small amounts of naked barley exported to Korea. The export of naked barley is not accounted for in this report. The following table is the supply of naked barley in

- 
- 1/ Barley year is the same as the wheat year.  
2/ Converted at 8.972 koku of barley to 1 metric ton.  
3/ Cablegram 9/28/45 - copy attached.  
4/ Naked barley year is the same as the wheat year.  
5/ Converted at 7.178 koku to 1 metric ton.

-15-

1941-1945:

Naked Barley Supply in Japan 1/  
(in 1000 m.t.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Supply</u>
1941	929
1942	908
1943	733
1944	913
1945	684

---

1/ Cablegram 9/28/45 - copy attached.

-16-

OTHER GRAINS

Maize - Average annual production of maize in Japan for 1930-36 was 506,000 koku (66,000 m.t.) 1/. In the years 1931-37, Japan imported an average of 947,000 koku (123,000 m.t.) annually 2/ with the greatest imports in 1936, a total of 2,384,000 koku. Imports in 1931-37 were mostly from the Netherlands Indies and Argentina. Imports in 1938 amounted to 1,984,000 koku and 60 percent of which were from Manchuria. It has been reported that the Japanese did get some maize from French Indo-China in the early years of the war period 1941-45, but the bulk of imports is believed to be from Manchuria. It is generally accepted that maize is used in Japan primarily for industrial purposes and some for animal feed. Therefore it is not treated as human food in this report. The production of maize in Japan for 1941-45 follows:

Maize Production in Japan 3/  
(in 1000 m.t.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Production</u>
1941	60
1942	73
1943	70
1944	77
1945	72

Millet - The average production of barnyard millet in the seven year average of 1930-36, was 460,000 koku; foxtail millet, 890,000 koku; and

1/ Converted at 7.691 koku to 1 metric ton.

2/ U. S. Tariff Commission, Japanese Trade Studies, Annotated Tabular Survey.

3/ From cablegram - copy attached.



-17-

prose millet 209,000 koku, a total of 1,559,000 koku (181,000 m.t.).<sup>1/</sup>  
 It is estimated that no major change took place during the war years of 1941-45, and a substantial portion of this crop was used for animal feed and other non-food purposes.

Kaoliang - It is interesting to note that the Japanese during the war period repeatedly claimed imports of "grains" from Manchuria. The item of "Import grain sorghum" as shown in the cablegram would probably refer to kaoliang from Manchuria. The amount imported is as follows:

Imports of Grain Sorghum to Japan<sup>2/</sup>  
 (in 1000 m.t.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports</u>
1941	362
1942	203
1943	156
1944	271
1945	268

LEGUMES

Soybeans - Japan depends primarily on Manchuria for her soybean supplies. In the years 1930-36, soybeans were produced in Japan at an average of 2,546,000 koku (355,000 m.t.)<sup>3/</sup> and an average disappearance of 7,833,000 koku (1,091,000 m.t.) or 0.117 koku per capita. The average net imports for the same period are 736,000 m.t. The production in Japan is believed to have been maintained

- 
- <sup>1/</sup> Converted at a rough conversion rate of 8.613 koku to one metric ton.  
<sup>2/</sup> From cablegram, copy attached.  
<sup>3/</sup> Converted at the rate of 7.178 koku to one metric ton of soybeans.

-18-

during the war years on the same basis as that of the pre-war period. Increase of supply and consumption in 1945 over the pre-war average is probably the result of increased imports due to the drastic shortage of protein food -- the lack of fish.

Soybean Supply in Japan  
(in 1000 m.t.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated</u>		<u>Total Supply</u> <sup>1/</sup>
	<u>Domestic Production</u>	<u>Imports</u>	
1941	355	525	880
1942	355	485	840
1943	355	568	923
1944	355	633	988
1945	355	787	1,142

There are slight discrepancies between the consumption and the supply of soybeans in Japan. This may be interpreted as small amounts of carryover to the following year, but the differences are insignificant.

Consumption of Soybeans in Japan<sup>1/</sup>  
(in 1000 m.t.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Consumption</u>
1941	880
1942	830
1943	917
1944	928
1945	1,112

Other Beans and Peas - This group includes kidney beans, broad

<sup>1/</sup> From cablegram, copy attached.

beans or horse beans, Asuki beans (*Phaseolus radiatis*, var. aurea) and peas. Taking the average of all these crops together for 1932-37, a total of 287,000 m.t. was produced. It is believed that there were no major changes in the production of these crops during the war period 1941-45. Therefore, it is estimated that the same amount was available for consumption in 1941-45.

TUBER AND ROOT CROPS

Sweet Potatoes - The average production of sweet potatoes for 1930-36 was 921 million kan (3,454,000 m.t.).<sup>1/</sup> There were relatively small imports and negligible amounts of exports. Based on various information, the production of sweet potatoes in Japan for 1941-45 was as follows:

Estimated Production of Sweet Potatoes in Japan

<u>Year</u>	<u>Production</u>	
	<u>1,000 kan</u>	<u>1,000 m.t.</u>
1941	1,129,159 <sup>a/</sup>	4,234
1942	1,005,618 <sup>b/</sup>	3,771
1943	1,173,000 <sup>c/</sup>	4,400
1944	1,250,000 <sup>d/</sup>	4,688
1945	1,250,000 <sup>e/</sup>	4,688

- a/ Domei Jiji Nenkan, 1943, p. 223.
- b/ Toyo Keizai Shimpo, November 27, 1943.
- c/ Estimated, EP-60.1.
- d/ Tokyo Domei Broadcast, September 17, 1944.
- e/ Production goal set by the Japanese Government for 1945, was to be 2,700,000,000 kan (10,125,000 m.t.), but due to the loss of Okinawa, shortage of seedlings and poor weather conditions in the planting season, the total output may be no larger than in 1944.

<sup>1/</sup> 1 kan equals 3.75 kg.

-20-

White Potatoes - The average 1930-36 production of white potatoes in Japan was 325 million kan (1,219,000 m.t.) with a small amount of exports. The war time production is estimated as follows:

Estimated Production of White Potatoes in Japan

Year	Production	
	1,000 kan	1,000 m.t.
1941	514,377 <sup>a/</sup>	1,929
1942	524,565 <sup>a/</sup>	1,967
1943	540,000 <sup>b/</sup>	2,025
1944	580,000 <sup>c/</sup>	2,175
1945	580,000 <sup>d/</sup>	2,175

a/ Toyo Keizai Shimpo, November 27, 1943.

b/ Cable from Bern, June 20, 1944.

c/ Domei Press, June 15, 1944.

d/ Estimated.

Daikon - Daikon or giant radish is produced and used extensively in Japan. It is usually consumed in pickled form. In 1930-36, an average of 650 million kan was produced (2,438,000 m.t.). As the production of other vegetables dropped in wartime, it is estimated that the 1945 production was about 2,000,000 m.t.

Other Tuber and Root Crops - This group includes Taro, Konnyakuimo (Cuckoo pint), carrots, turnips, burdocks and renkon (root of Indian lotus). The total average production for 1930-36 was 1,217,000 m.t. The production for 1945 is estimated at 1,000,000 m.t.

VEGETABLES

Cabbages, cucumbers, egg-plants, musk-melons, squash cucumbers, tomatoes, turnips, radishes, watermelons, welsh onions, onions and

-21-

pumpkins are treated here as a whole under the vegetables group. In 1930-36, an annual average of 2,952,000 m.t. was produced. For 1945 it is estimated 2,500,000 m.t. were produced.

#### SUGAR

The average production of sugar (including cane and beet sugar) in Japan for 1930-36 was 122,000 m.t., while the imports during 1931-37 averaged 906,000 m.t. This gives an average apparent consumption of 1,028,000 m.t. annually. It is estimated that about 150,000 m.t. of sugar was produced in Japan in 1945, and no more than 500,000 m.t. was imported, giving a total of 650,000 m.t. as maximum supply available for consumption.

#### FRUITS

It is estimated that there are about 800,000 m.t. of fruits of all kinds available for consumption in Japan in 1945 as compared with the 1936 figure of 1,300,000 m.t. and represents a decrease of approximately 40 percent.

#### KELPS

The production in 1945 of kelps or edible seaweeds is estimated at approximately 400,000 m.t. The average for 1931-37 was 539,000 m.t. a year. Hence the 1945 estimate indicates a decline of about 25 percent.

#### ANIMAL FOODS

Fish - Fish is primarily the most important source of animal

-22-

protein in the Japanese diet. The average annual catch in Japan including coastal and pelagic catches for 1931-37 was 3,352,000 m.t. In the war period the lack of craft, fuel, and manpower had definitely curtailed the annual catch to a great extent. It estimated that the 1945 catch was in the neighborhood of 1,500,000 m.t. or a decline of about 55 percent.

Aquaculture - In this group are included carp, eel, oyster, asari (*Tapes philippinarium*) and amanori (*porphyra*). The average output for 1931-37 was 129,000 m.t. By active encouragement on the part of the Japanese government, such as fuller utilization of ponds, paddy fields, reservoirs, etc., during the wartime, it is estimated that in 1945 about a total of 150,000 m.t. was produced.

Meat and Poultry, Eggs, Milk and Dairy Products - Due to the lack of wartime information on these foodstuffs, the following rough estimates have been made for 1945: 100,000 m.t. of meat and poultry products, 150,000 m.t. of eggs and about 100,000 m.t. of milk and dairy products available for consumption in Japan.

-23-

Table I  
Estimated Food Supply of Japan, 1945  
 (in thousand metric tons)

<u>Foodstuffs</u>	<u>Total Available Supply</u>	<u>Domestic Production</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Rice <sup>a/</sup>	9,342	8,585	92		
Wheat	1,045	1,045	100	365	4
Barley	623	623	100		
Naked Barley	684	684	100		
Maize	72 <sup>b/</sup>	72			
Millet	181	181	100		
Kaoliang	268				
Soybeans	1,142	355	31	268	100
Other Beans and Peas	287	287	100	787	69
Sweet Potatoes	4,688	4,688	100		
White Potatoes	2,175	2,175	100		
Daikon	2,000	2,000	100		
Other Tuber and Root Crops	1,000	1,000	100		
Vegetables	2,500	2,500	100		
Sugar	650	150	23		
Fruits	800	800	100	500	77
Kelps	400	400	100		
<b>Animal Foods</b>					
Fish					
Aquiculture	1,500	1,500	100		
Meat and Poultry	150	150	100		
Eggs	100	100	100		
Milk and Dairy Products	150	150	100		
	100	100	100		

<sup>a/</sup> Carry-over 4 percent.

<sup>b/</sup> Believed to be larger, but due to lack of information, no estimates of imports are made.

Source: From foregoing data by commodities.

Table 2  
Estimated Food Consumption in Japan, 1945

Foodstuffs	Total Disappearance (000) m.t.	Seed (000) m.t.	Non-food Uses (000) m.t.	Waste % (000) mt.	Available For Consumption (000) m.t.	Calories Per Kg.	Gross Calories Per Year (000,000)
Rice	8,923 1/	122 2/	450 3/	6	500	7,851	3,560
Wheat	1,045	55 4/	158 5/	25	208	624	3,550
Barley	623	22 6/	156 7/	20	89	356	3,570
Naked Barley	684	34 8/	137 9/	10	51	462	3,570
Maise	72 10/		72 11/			100	3,400
Millet	181	10 12/	71			214	3,500
Kaoliang	268 13/		54 14/			354	3,500
Soybeans	1,142	25 15/	700 16/	15	63	230	3,000
Other beans and peas	287	20 15/		14	37	230	3,000
Sweet potatoes	4,688	188 17/	1,672 18/	10	283	2,545	1,080
White potatoes	2,175	196 19/		10	198	1,781	850
Daikon	2,000			4	80	1,920	200
Other tuber and root crops	1,000			20	200	800	1,000
Other vegetables	2,500			30	750	1,750	300
Sugar	650					650	3,980
Fruits	800			20	160	640	500
Kelps, edible	400					400	100
Animal Foods:							
Fish	1,500		400 20/	40	440	660	1,300
Aquiculture	150			60	90	60	900
Meat and Poultry	100			30	30	70	2,000
Eggs	150			10	15	135	1,580
Milk and Dairy Products	100					100	690
Total							
Miscellaneous 21/							
Grand Total	<u>29,438</u>	<u>672</u>	<u>3,870</u>		<u>3,194</u>	<u>21,702</u>	<u>46,355,770</u> <u>1,158,893</u> <u>47,514,663</u>



Footnotes to Table II

- 1/ Total disappearance as shown in Table I.
- 2/ Calculated on the basis of 0.26 koku of seeds per cho, (or about 35 lbs. per acre), the total acreage being estimated at 3,200,000 cho (or about 7,840,000 acres).
- 3/ Rice for non-food uses is estimated on the following allocation: 165,000 m.t. for Sake, 150,000 m.t. for Mochi, 75,000 m.t. for Soysauce, 10,000 m.t. for Paste and 50,000 m.t. for Confectionery and other uses.
- 4/ Calculated on the basis of 50 lbs. per acre, the total acreage being estimated at 2,420,000 acres or a 10 percent increase over the 1942 acreage.
- 5/ Wheat for non-food uses is estimated at 15 percent of production based on following allocation: 12 percent for Soysauce, 1 percent for condiment, 1.5 percent for animal fodder, and 0.5 percent for other uses. The respective official figures for 1931 were 17.3 percent, 1.1 percent, 3.1 percent and 1 percent of that year's disappearance. (See Hom-po No-gyo Yo-ran, 1938, p. 243).
- 6/ Calculated on the basis of 50 lbs. per acre, the total acreage being 980,000 acres (1942 acreage).
- 7/ Estimated at 25 percent of production, based on following allocation: 20 percent animal fodder, 2.5 percent beer and 2.5 percent for condiment.
- 8/ Calculated on the basis of 50 lbs. per acre, the total acreage being estimated at 1,493,000 acres or an increase of 15 percent over 1942 acreage.
- 9/ Estimated at 20 percent of production, based on the following allocation: 15 percent for feed, 2 percent for soysauce, 2.5 percent for condiment and 0.5 percent for other uses.
- 10/ Domestic production only, while imports are not accounted for.
- 11/ Including livestock feed and seed.
- 12/ Including seed and waste.
- 13/ Imports only, primarily from Manchuria.
- 14/ Estimated at 20 percent of total supply.
- 15/ Calculated on the basis of 7 percent of domestic production.
- 16/ Estimated 600,000 m.t. for oil manufacturing and 100,000 m.t. for soysauce and other industrial uses.
- 17/ Estimated at 4 percent of production for seedlings.
- 18/ Estimated 25 percent of production for alcohol and 500,000 m.t. for feed.
- 19/ Calculated on estimates of 9 percent of production for seeds.
- 20/ Estimated 400,000 m.t. of fish for oil manufacturing.
- 21/ Estimated at 2.5 percent of gross caloric content to cover oil, alcohol liquor and other processed foods.

-26-

Table III

Estimated Per Capita Consumption of Food in Japan, 1945

<u>Foodstuffs</u>	<u>Total Consumption</u> (1,000 m.t.)	<u>Total Calories</u>		<u>Per Capita Per Day</u> <sup>1/</sup>	
		<u>Calories</u> (1,000,000)	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Grams</u>	<u>Calories</u>
Rice	7,851	27,949,560	58.8	299	1,064
Wheat	624	2,215,200	4.7	24	84
Barley	356	1,270,920	2.7	14	48
Naked Barley	462	1,649,340	3.5	18	63
Millet	100	340,000	0.7	4	13
Kaoliang	214	749,000	1.6	8	29
Soybeans	354	1,239,000	2.6	13	47
Other Beans and Peas	230	690,000	1.5	9	26
Sweet Potatoes	2,545	2,748,600	5.8	97	105
White Potatoes	1,781	1,513,850	3.2	68	58
Daikon	1,920	384,000	0.8	73	15
Other Tuber and Root Crops	800	800,000	1.7	30	30
Other Vegetables	1,750	525,000	1.1	67	20
Sugar	650	2,587,000	5.4	25	98
Fruits	640	320,000	0.7	24	12
Kelps, edible	400	40,000	0.1	15	2
Fish	660	858,000	1.8	25	33
Aquiculture	60	54,000	0.1	2	2
Meat and Poultry	70	140,000	0.3	3	5
Eggs	135	213,300	0.4	5	8
Milk and Dairy Products	100	69,000	0.1	4	3
Miscellaneous <sup>2/</sup>	-	1,158,893	2.4	-	44
<b>Total</b>	<b>21,702</b>	<b>47,514,663</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>827</b>	<b>1,809<sup>1/</sup></b>

<sup>1/</sup> Calculated on the basis of 72,000,000 as the resident population in Japan. If a population figure of 75,000,000 is used, the average daily per capita intake would be 1,736 calories.

<sup>2/</sup> See footnote 21 of Table II.

Table 4

Estimated Food Consumption in Japan Proper, 1945 from Domestic Production

Foodstuffs	Total <sup>1/</sup> Production 1,000 m.t.	Seed <sup>2/</sup> 1,000 m.t.	Non-food <sup>3/</sup> Uses 1,000 m.t.	Waste <sup>4/</sup> 1,000 m.t.	Available for Consumption 1,000 m.t.	Calories per kg.	Gross Calories per year 1,000,000	Per Capita <sup>5/</sup> per day		Calorie Consumption	
								Grams	Calories	Domestic Supply	Total Consumption <sup>6/</sup>
Rice	8,585	122	460	6	421						
Wheat	1,015	95	158	25	208	3,560	26,813,920	267	1,020		96
Barley	623	22	156	20	69	3,550	2,215,200	24	84		100
Malted Barley	681	34	137	10	51	3,570	1,270,920	14	48		100
Milne	72		72			3,570	1,649,340	18	63		100
Millet	181	10	71								
Buckwheat	-	-	-			100	340,000	4	13		100
Soybeans	335	25	217	15	17	3,500	336,000	4	13		27
Other Beans and Peas	287	20		14	37	230	690,000	9	26		100
Sweet Potatoes	4,688	188	1,672	10	283	1,080	2,748,600	97	105		100
White Potatoes	2,175	136		10	198	1,781	1,513,850	68	58		100
Daikon	2,000			4	80	1,920	384,000	73	15		100
Other Tuber & Root Crops	1,000			20	200	900	800,000	30	30		100
Other Vegetables	2,500			30	750	1,750	525,000	67	20		100
Sugar	150			20	160	3,980	597,000	6	23		23
Fruits	800					500	320,000	24	12		100
Vegetables, edible	400					100	40,000	15	2		100
Animal Foods:											
Fish	1,900										
Aquaculture	150		400	40	440	660	858,000	25	33		100
Meat and Poultry	100			60	90	900	54,000	2	2		100
Eggs	150			30	30	70	140,000	3	5		100
Milk and Dairy Products	100			10	15	135	213,300	5	8		100
Total					100	690	69,000	4	3		100
Miscellaneous (2.5% of Total)							41,578,130				
Grand Total	27,515	672	3,333	3,129	20,411		1,039,453	-	40		91
							42,617,583	779	1,622		90

-28-

Footnotes to Table 4

- 1/ See Table 1.
- 2/ See Table 2.
- 3/ See Table 2. Same deduction for Non-food uses is applied, except Soybeans is deducted in proportion to total disappearance.
- 4/ Same percentages as being used in Table 2.
- 5/ On the assumption that the resident population in Japan is 72,000,000.
- 6/ Total consumption, see Table 3.

-29-

APPENDIX

Restricted

Paraphrase

Extracts from War Department cable from Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, 28 September 1945.

The following figures were supplied by Ministry of Agriculture with no independent audit.

JAPAN'S GRAIN POSITION  
(All figures in thousand metric tons)

Rice crop, years October to October, 1940 to 1945:

Supply	11,886	11,149	12,024	10,438	9,342
Consumption	11,232	10,088	11,671	10,046	8,996
Carry-overs	654	1,061	353	392	346

Wheat crop, years June to June (no carry-overs):

Supply	1,290	1,284	1,036	1,380	1,045
--------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

Barley crop, years June to June (no carry-overs):

Supply	706	730	572	777	623
--------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Naked Barley, for crop years June to June (no carry-overs):

Supply	929	908	733	913	684
--------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Soybeans, crop years Sept. to Sept:

Supply	880	840	923	988	1,142
Consumption	880	830	917	928	1,112

Corn, crop years Sept. to Sept. (no carry-overs):

Production	60	73	70	77	72
------------	----	----	----	----	----

Import grain sorghum:

	362	203	156	271	268
--	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Locations of present stocks will be forwarded later.

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*JA*  
ACTION COPY  
*JK*

CTC -P INCOMING TELEGRAMS  
No paraphrase necessary.

Tokyo via War

Dated December 17, 1945

Rec'd 4:19 p.m., 18th

SECRET

ACTION:FE  
INFO:  
A- C  
DC/L-C  
ITP  
ESP  
DC/R-1

Secretary of State  
Washington

Action	JA
Information	
FE	I
CA	
JA	I
SEA	
PI	I

*n.c.*  
209, December 17, (?)

No: CA 56110

SCAP states there has been no relaxation  
rationing regulations (your 157, November 28).

Potatoes, beans, still included staple ration  
and will not be removed from rationing control.  
Farmers reluctance sell at official prices has  
made maintenance collection controls difficult.

To remedy this:

(A) Official price of rice was raised and  
farmers will be required to meet set quotas.

(B) Price ceilings were removed on perishable  
foods with SCAP concurrence to insure the dis-  
tribution controls over these foods. Perishable  
foods are sold through official channels at  
purchase price from agricultural and fishing  
associations plus fixed transportation, handling  
and service charges.

ATCHESON

894.5018/12-1745

DCR ITP Unit

*JK AF*

Ans.	P. v.	Cat.	Dist.

EEC

SECRET

*Search Copy*

CONFIDENTIAL  
CS/VJ  
Confidential File

894.5018/12-1745

DIVISION OF JAPAN  
DEC 19 1945  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 25 1946

In reply refer to  
JK

Confidential

Dear Colonel Gross:

I enclose in triplicate a draft radiogram on the world food situation in relation to the Japanese situation which I should appreciate your dispatching to SCAP.

When this message has been dispatched, would it be possible for a copy of the War Department radiogram to be sent directly to me with one of the attached draft copies so that our file on the subject may be completed?

Sincerely yours,

Edwin M. Martin, Chief  
Division of Japanese and  
Korean Economic Affairs

Enclosure: "Japanese Food Imports"

Lt. Colonel Ernest Gross,

Civil Affairs Division,

3-B-859 Pentagon,

War Department,

Washington, D. C.

JAN 25 1946 P.M.

DCR - ITP Unit			
Anal.	R. V.	Dist.	

JK:EMMartin:lmc 1-18-46

IR

JA

894.5018/1-2546

OS/LE

894.5018/1-2546

Confidential

JAPANESE FOOD IMPORTS

Rate of rice collection (ref CA56297, 23 Dec and CA56674, 6 Jan) matter of serious concern here, especially in view of world food shortage which will limit Japanese imports (see para 4, WARX 89765). Even if imports were adequate to bring average caloric intake to 1550 per day, a low rate of collection and high farm consumption might result in starvation in cities.

Would greater appreciation of world food situation by Japanese Government and/or Japanese people assist Japanese administration of domestic food controls? While knowledge of world food shortage might encourage hoarding, it might also increase government efforts to distribute Japanese supplies equitably. Suggest every effort be made to indicate to people that Japanese Government and not (repeat not) Allies responsible for urban feeding.

Supplementing paragraph 4, WARX 89765, for your information and such use with Japanese as you deem desirable, following are additional details on world situation:

Wheat, which was previously plentiful, is now in short supply. Crop yields are low in devastated countries and some other normal suppliers (such as Australia) have short crops this year. In Canada and United States, where wheat crops were good, rail systems and port facilities already working at capacity in handling enormous volume shipments. This may be eased slightly after St. Lawrence thaws. Import requirements exclusive of Japan, are estimated by Combined Food Board at 17.5 million tons and exportable supplies at 12.6 million tons.

Confidential



Confidential

Rice supplies equally short. Combined Food Board now forecasting export surplus first quarter: Burma, 90,000 tons; Indo-China, 0; Siam, 180,000. For calendar year 1946: Burma, 100,000; Siam, 1,200,000; Indo-China, 100,000. U. S. view Indo-China figure too low but believe Siam surplus only 800,000 rather than 1.2 million. Formosa reported attempting to procure rice from China mainland. Total minimum 1946 import requirements for China, Philippines, NEI, India, and other SEA regions estimated 3.0 million. Total U.S. 1946 supply estimated 853,000 tons, of which only 336,000 contemplated to be allocated for U. S. civilians. No rice exports to Europe contemplated from any source. Balancing world requirements and export supplies, exclusive of Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa, yields world deficit in rice of 1.2 million tons.

Average 1934-38 sugar consumption of countries now covered by Combined Food Board allocations amounted to 14.3 million short tons. Estimated supplies available in 1946 approximately 10.8 million short tons. Sugar will undoubtedly continue to be rationed in USA at little above present rate throughout 1946.

Combined Food Board preliminary estimates show supplies pulses 425,000 metric tons to meet requirements 759,000 metric tons. Requirements include 78,517 metric tons military civilian feeding. Supplies beans included above 308,643 to meet requirements 420,876 metric tons.

This situation will make it impossible to meet all needs of liberated and occupied territories.

Plans under way for shipment of cotton to make use of all Japanese capacity. Request your views on extent to which farm retention of food could be lowered by making cotton textiles available to farmers. Would

Confidential

Confidential

effectiveness of this measure be increased if cotton goods distributed in rural areas were handled directly by government rationing authorities and made subject to simultaneous surrendering of food?


Confidential

JA

ALBERT HAYNES MACKENZIE  
ATTORNEY AT LAW  
PRESCOTT, ARIZONA

January 26, 1946.

Mr. George Carter Vincent, Chief  
Far East Division  
Department of State  
Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.



Dear Mr. Vincent:

My resignation as an Intelligence Officer with the Foreign Economic Administration, latterly absorbed by the State Department, took effect on December 25.

Inasmuch as there are still certain subjects and incidents arising in connection with my Central China, North China, and Japan missions still unreported I expect to forward them to you as fast as they can be formulated.

Enclosed is a self-explanatory report which, in part, covers my stop-over in Japan from December 9 to December 19.

Immediately after the trip by jeep from Kyoto to Omi Hachiman, Major Lardner W. Moore, C.O., 162nd Language Detach., G-2, 6th Army, Kyoto, and I reported our findings and conclusions to Colonel F. W. Hein, G-2, 6th Army, Kyoto.

Later, from my notes, I went over the whole subject matter again with Captain W. S. Egekvist, Chief of Rationing and Price Control, Division, of Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, Tokyo, and with Mr. Richard A. May, Chief of Imports and Exports Division, of the same Section, and as well with Colonel Munson, G-2, HQ, Tokyo. Therefore, there has been no actual delay in making a statement of the case to the authorities prepared and equipped to act.

From Shanghai I was given a letter of introduction by Colonel Karl T. Gould, A/CS, G-2, CT, to Colonel Archibald Stewart, G-2, HQ, Tokyo, and there reported to him some of the background as well as the sources of information they could use on one Kodama, who is on the war criminal list. Kodama functioned with Man Wa and Mizuta as purchasing agents for the Japanese navy. His record in Central China, and particularly in Shanghai, was not savory;

This intelligence being so predominantly of interest to G-2 and not to State, I made no formal report to your office on the matter.

894.5018/1-2646

894.5018/1-2646

RECORDED

CS/WJ



FEB 9 1946

In reply refer to  
JA

My dear Mr. Mackenzie:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 26, 1946, in which you ask permission to publish a reworded version of an official report that you prepared for the Department, entitled Report on Japanese Food Problem--With Solutions, a copy of which you enclosed with your letter.

The Department perceives no objection to having this report published in rewritten form, on the understanding that it will give no indication that it was originally prepared for the Department.

The copy of the report that you enclosed with your letter is returned herewith.

Sincerely yours,

William T. Turner  
Chief  
Division of Japanese Affairs

Enclosure:

Copy of report  
(returned).

FEB 9 1946  
CR  
Mr. Albert H. Mackenzie,  
Attorney at Law,  
Prescott, Arizona.

JA:HLory:mls  
2-6-46

RP  
QMS

894.5018/1-2646

CS/VJ

894.5018/1-2646

FEB 13 1946

In reply refer to  
JK

Dear Colonel Gross:

I enclose in triplicate a draft radiogram on the nutritional survey conducted in Tokyo which I should appreciate your dispatching to SCAP.

When this message has been dispatched, would it be possible for a copy of the War Department radiogram to be sent directly to me with one of the attached draft copies so that our file on the subject may be completed?

Sincerely yours,

Edwin M. Martin, Chief  
Division of Japanese and  
Korean Economic Affairs

Enclosure:

Draft radiogram to SCAP.

Lt. Colonel Ernest Gross,

Civil Affairs Division,

3 B 859 Pentagon,

War Department,

Washington, D. C.

JK:RHWhitman:aw

1-29-46

DCR - WFP Unit

LDH  
80

CR  
FEB 12 1946 P.M.  
FEB 13 1946

RECEIVED

IR  
72

ORI  
CDD

WMT  
JA

894.5018/2-1346

OS/D

894.5018/2-1346

(e) was survey conducted by Jap Govt or private agency or by Preliminary figures transmitted (URAD 56884, 14 January) of nutritional survey conducted in Tokyo during December and January are of particular interest here. While preliminary nature of figures is recognized, the following questions are immediately raised:

- (a) Average food intake of civilians quote from all strata unquote in Tokyo of 1971 calories per capita per day exceeds by 500-600 the diet level which can be supported by domestic food stocks as reported in previous messages from your HQ.
- (b) This discrepancy suggests either that Jap Govt has badly underestimated rice crop, that stocks are being consumed at an insupportable rate, or that the sample of 33,000 is not representative of quote all strata unquote.
- (c) Previous estimates here and in Tokyo (URAD 55293, 27 Nov) have indicated food consumption on farms in vicinity of 2200-2300 calories day. Since there is normally a sizeable differential between farm and non-farm food intake, an urban consumption of nearly 2000 calories, if correct, would suggest that farm retention may be substantially above current estimates.
- (d) In any case, proportion of food intake coming from black market sources indicates, if true, ineffectiveness of distribution controls in regulating consumption of scarce stocks.

(e) was

-2-

(e) Was survey conducted by Jap Govt or private agency or by your HQ?

Since it is difficult to reconcile the diet levels indicated in the nutritional survey with Jap representations of a need for food imports, request your views as to how situation as revealed in these preliminary figures can be explained.



February 23, 1946

MR. CLAYTON:

Colonel Gay, of the Civil Affairs Division, dictated the following to me over the 'phone. He asks if his office could know this afternoon. (War Dept. 86 - Ext. 4361).

The War Department has received an urgent cable from General MacArthur stating that if his food requirements can not be met, he anticipates widespread starvation in the urban areas of Japan after May 1st. His cable requests that immediate action be taken to obtain the necessary supplies to carry out his directives, or, that this problem be presented to the President personally to clearly define the share of responsibility in the event that a failure occurs.

This has come to the attention of the Secretary of War who intends to take this matter up immediately with the President if this matter cannot be decided by Monday night.

A meeting has, therefore, been arranged with Mr. Snyder or his representative, Mr. Peterson and General Hill-dring of the War Department and Dr. Fitzgerald of Agriculture to discuss this matter and determine the intent of the Government in supporting the requests made by General MacArthur for food stuffs, for civilian feeding in Japan.

This meeting is tentatively set up to be held in the Conference Room of the East Wing of the White House at 4:30 on Monday afternoon and your presence is desired at this meeting.

Mr. Stein, representing Mr. Snyder, has suggested that the conferees call his office prior to leaving for the conference to determine whether the Conference Room will be available for this meeting or whether the meeting will be held at some other place.

HY

894.5018/2-23-46

FEB 26 1946

In reply refer to  
IR

My dear Mr. FitzGerald:

Data relating to Japanese food requirements in general and the State Department's analysis of these data have been examined by representatives of the Departments of State, War, and Agriculture. There is general agreement that the food situation in Japan will be extremely serious in the spring and summer. More specifically, there is agreement that the State Department's estimate of 800 calories per day from indigenous resources for non-farm population during the crop year 1945-1946 is not unreasonable. The range of error, however, might be plus or minus 200 calories, which is somewhat greater than the error in estimates for western European countries. There is less certainty about the estimates of the rate of current consumption on the basis of which the State Department estimates, and the Army agrees that sometime in April indigenous supplies for non-farm population will be largely exhausted. However, there is complete agreement that the daily indigenous availability for urban consumers will dwindle during the coming months.

The Department of Agriculture believes that the exact date on which a drastic cut in rations will be necessary cannot be established sufficiently clearly from available data for final allocation purposes. All participants agreed that we can and should get more exact information. Conditions in the theatre, however, may postpone the receipt of such information for three weeks. Representatives of the Department of Agriculture feel that a better estimate can be made of the date of exhaustion of indigenous stocks available for rationing, and of the absolute minimum needs if the theatre furnishes up to date estimates on stocks, probably four months collections of indigenous supplies

and

Mr. D. A. FitzGerald, Director,  
Office of Requirements  
and Allocations,  
Department of Agriculture,

894.5018/2-2646

CS/LF

894.5018/2-2646

15

and quantities required to maintain ration levels. The State, and War Departments have agreed to expedite such a request. In the meantime, the Cabinet must consider the consequences indicated for the occupied areas if the present programming continues unchanged.

The Department of State, on the basis of its review of the data and its discussions with the Departments of War and Agriculture, feels that its analyses are sufficiently reliable to portray the seriousness of the situation and to serve as a basis for general policy determination. It recommends that of whatever amount the Cabinet tentatively decides can go to Japan in the next four months (a total which will be unavoidably small and well below the most conservatively estimated requirements), a proportionate share be scheduled for shipment in March. This would be without prejudice to adjustments agreed to on the basis of more complete data.

Sincerely yours,

*DK*  
Donald D. Kennedy  
Chief, International  
Resources Division

DIR. ITR Unit			
Ans.	Rw	Cat.	Dist.
<i>AB</i>	<i>AB</i>		

*CR NIA ✓*  
FEB 25 1946 P.M.

*Fl. eff*  
IR:CJShohab:bch  
2-21-46

4 out copy of the report sent.

*JKWB*  
*RHW*

*A-C*  
*[Signature]*

EVERGREEN 7-7124

THE ENERGY FOOD CO.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**MARSHAK**  
U.S. PAT. OFF.  
PRODUCTS

1946

233 SO. 1ST ST., BROOKLYN 11, N. Y.

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
APR 12 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 12, 1946

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES DIVISION  
MAR 18 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Referred to Lt Brown - JK  
for reply  
KDR  
3/17/46

4/4/46  
wms

State Dept.  
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

On January 24th, 1946, we sent you a letter advising you that we are interested in securing Japanese Agar Agar. At this writing we have not received a reply and we would appreciate your advising us to what department we must apply in order to obtain this information.

Very truly yours

THE ENERGY FOOD CO.

*S. A. Marshak*

S. A. Marshak

SAM:ek

894.5018/3-1246

DCR - ITP Unit	
Ans.	LDK
By	<i>[Signature]</i>
Cs	
Dist	

APR 16 1946

FILED

CS/VJ

894.5018/3-1246

APR 10 1946

In reply refer to  
JK 894.5018/3-1246.

My dear Mr. Marshak:

I refer to your letter of March 12, 1946, concerning the possibility of purchasing Agar Agar from Japan. I am sorry that your letter of January 24 has gone unanswered, but we are unable to find any record of its being received in the Department of State.

Small quantities of agar agar will be available for export during the current year. All shipments to the United States of this item, as well as of other Japanese products, will be handled by the U.S. Commercial Company. May I suggest that you communicate with the office of USCC in Washington stating the amounts and other details of your requirements for this product.

Sincerely yours,

Edwin H. Martin, Chief,  
Division of Japanese and  
Korean Economic Affairs.

Mr. S.A. Marshak,  
The Energy Food Company,  
233 So. 1st St.,  
Brooklyn 11, N.Y.

Anal. *[Handwritten initials]*  
Rev. *[Handwritten initials]*  
Dist. *[Handwritten initials]*

APR 5 1946 P.M.  
APR 10 1946

JK:MMBrown:me

4/4/46

894.5018/3-1246

CS/VJ 894.5018/3-1246

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

ACTION: DC/L

INFO:

A-C  
FE  
ITP  
ESP  
OFD  
FC  
DC/R

PEM K-M  
No paraphrase necessary.

6395

Tokyo via War

SECRET

Undated

SECSTATE

Rec'd March 16, 1946  
6 p.m.

MAR 19 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MJF/jb  
3-18-46  
3-18-46  
A9 R1

Unnumbered, Undated

FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ANDERSON, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, AND CLAYTON ASST SECRETARY OF STATE, FROM HARRISON

"Have investigated carefully basis for computation of food requirements for feeding Japanese civilians as reported in radios C 58445 and CA 58100. Particular investigations has been made of the following points: (A) Reduction in ration level. (B) Use of foodstuffs for non-food purposes. (C) Food stocks on hand. (D) Procedure for gathering in rural areas. (E) Control of black marketing and hoarding. (F) Action taken to increase indigenous production, especially fish and early maturing crops. (G) Action taken to obtain food from other areas in orient. (H) Show extent to which Army and Navy Surpluses, Pacific area, are being utilized. (I) Spoilage and wastage of foodstuffs. (J) Accuracy of crop estimates, past and present. (K) Percentage of extraction in milling processes.

As a result of these investigations we are convinced that stated requirements reflect conservatism, are realistic, and have been arrived at after maximum allowances for all available resources, economics and production increases. Long range plans relating to all points listed above have been well developed and are being vigorously executed.

Fully

SECRET

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
File  
APR 16 1946

ASSISTANT SECRETARY W. L. CLAYTON

MAR 18 1946

A-C DEPARTMENT OF STATE

894.5018/3-1646

Confidential File

PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

SECRET

-2- Unnumbered, Undated, from Tokyo via War.

Fully recognizing the worldwide food shortage and desiring to cooperate to the maximum extent possible in its alleviation, SCAP has agreed to reduce the basic ration to the Japanese, which is already 20% below recognized subsistence level, to the lowest possible level. It is believed that even this level cannot be maintained unless cereals are shipped in the amount of 200,000 tons for the months of March, April and May, with any shortfall in any month carried over to the succeeding months, making a total shipment for the next 75 days of not less than 600,000 tons. To the extent that they are available, oats and dried white potatoes of equal caloric value may be substituted for cereals. It must be recognized that the lowered basic ration necessitated by these reduced shipments will have an adverse effect on reconversion and production in all vital industries, especially textiles, mining and fishing. It must also be recognized that if this reduction proves to have been too great, subsequent shipments of foodstuffs will have to be increased to reestablish basic ration at a higher level. SCAP estimates this quantity of grain will only provide a total caloric intake of approximately 800 to 900 calories per day for non-self ~~adjustments~~ during most critical suppliers period. Your attention is invited to the following facts,

(A) 1946 food shipments to Japan from USA exclusive of those for direct relief, through first half of March have total only 24,600 tons.

(B) Food shipments of 200,000 tons per month for March, April and May as requested, represent a decrease from previous requests for these months of approximately 162,000 tons per month or a reduction of 44%.

Documented written report will be airmailed for action on this request cannot be delayed pending its receipt. Request that this quantity of grain or suitable substitutes be given highest shipping priority and no efforts spared to get it aboard ship

at the

SECRET

18

SECRET

-3- Unnumbered, Undated, from Tokyo via War.

at the earliest possible moment. Also request that you radio immediately if you concur in the quantities requested and will make them available per above schedule. Firm commitment on quantities and shipping schedule absolutely imperative for ration planning and publicity campaign at a later date. Absolutely no publicity or information on allocations should be released at Washington at this time. To do so will have adverse affect here on anti-hoarding campaign.

Further investigation will cover requirements for balance of year. This investigation will include visits to rural and urban areas now reported in deficit status. Upon completion, radio recommendations will be submitted and written report airmailed. It is anticipated that this investigation and preparation of final report will require approximately two weeks.

MESSAGE DESTROYED

CAD

SECRET



18

SECRET

-3- Unnumbered, Undated, from Tokyo via War.

at the earliest possible moment. Also request that you radio immediately if you concur in the quantities requested and will make them available per above schedule. Firm commitment on quantities and shipping schedule absolutely imperative for ration planning and publicity campaign at a later date. Absolutely no publicity or information on allocations should be released at Washington at this time. To do so will have adverse affect here on anti-hoarding campaign.

Further investigation will cover requirements for balance of year. This investigation will include visits to rural and urban areas now reported in deficit status. Upon completion, radio recommendations will be submitted and written report airmailed. It is anticipated that this investigation and preparation of final report will require approximately two weeks.

MESSAGE DESTROYED

CAD

SECRET

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM  
CORRECTION

13

*AC*  
*JK*  
*DC/R*

NLS-K-M  
No paraphrase necessary.

6395

Tokyo via War

Undated

Rec'd March 16, 1946  
6 p.m.

ACTION-DC/L  
INFO:  
A-C  
FE  
ITP  
ESP  
OFD  
FC  
DS

SECRET

SECSTATE

Unnumbered, Undated

FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ANDERSON, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, AND CLAYTON ASST SECRETARY OF STATE, FROM HARRISON

Page two, line twenty four, delete "non-self injurious" and insert "non-self supplies" now reading "per day for non-self supplies during most critical period."

3/20/46  
880  
6-09  
MAR 20 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

*F.W. 894.5018/3-16-46 copy.*

TELEGRAPH SECTION

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

JP

SECRET

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Returned to DC/L*  
MAR 21 1946

ASSISTANT SECRETARY W. L. CLAYTON

MAR 20 1946

A-C DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Reply drafted*  
MAR 26 1946  
*by Dept. Agri (208-5-40-46)*

*Confidential*

PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

ER  
HA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, March 28, 1946.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 337

SUBJECT: Food Crisis in Japan.

HB  
DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
APR 10 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DCR

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
3

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1946 APR 8 14  
RECORDS BRANCH

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a brief, informal memorandum prepared by Mr. Charles J. Shohan, Department of State member of the special food mission from Washington, on the basis of his studies of the food situation throughout Japan. His formal report to the Department will, of course, be far more detailed and will be submitted perhaps before this despatch is received. It is believed pertinent, however, to emphasize the serious political implications of the food crisis in Japan. In full cognizance of the world-wide shortage of food and of the inappropriateness of an attempt by an officer with restricted knowledge in the field to assess relative merit of food needs, no recommendations are offered.

A famine in Japan of two or more months duration would in all probability result in widespread civil disturbance; would seriously retard achievement of the purposes of the occupation; would accelerate and expand movements to destroy capitalism and to embrace communism as a nostrum to solve political, economic, and social difficulties; and, with probable failure of Government, might do irreparable harm to the prestige of a democratic form as contrasted with totalitarian forms of control of society. Famine or threat of famine has been the one condition in Japan which has inevitably brought about disorder and flagrant disregard of authority.

In assessing the significance of the food crisis in Japan, due consideration should be given to these political factors.

Respectfully yours,

*Max W. Bishop*  
Max W. Bishop  
Foreign Service Officer

Enclosure: *att H*  
Memorandum, March 27, 1946.  
Original and hectograph to Department.  
Copy to: General Headquarters.

848  
MWBishop:vs

JA  
FE/R  
FEC(ER)  
OCC  
CP  
JR  
Navy  
JK  
D

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
APR 10 1946  
RECORDS BRANCH

594.5018/3-2846

OS/A 894.5018/3-28

AUG 23 1946

FILED

Enclosure to despatch no. 337 of March 28, 1946, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, on the subject "Food Crisis in Japan".

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BISHOP

The food supply of the urban Japanese population and the small farmers (those with one-fourth acre or less) is expected to become critical during the first part of May and the crisis will probably last until at least the middle of July. By July the harvests of wheat and barley should permit material improvement in distribution from indigenous supplies, but if the position has deteriorated badly it is doubtful whether the Government will be able to achieve its goals for the collection and controlled distribution of these grains.

To date, there has been no exceptional malnutrition and no major difficulty in maintaining the ration of staple grains (except in Hokkaido). The staple ration, which provides 1043 calories daily for the normal consumer out of a total intake of 1087 calories from the standard ration, has been supplemented to a minor extent by special rations and has been widely supplemented by other purchases of unrationed food and from the black market. Overall, it is estimated that the average Japanese non-self-supplier has received about 1700 calories daily during the last six months, with considerable variation over time and inequitable and inefficient variation among income classes.

Japanese farmers cultivating more than one-fourth acre are assumed to be self-sufficient and are not provided for in the ration plan. Smaller farmers go on the ration when their supplies are exhausted. The self-suppliers are estimated to consume at about 2200-2300 calories per day, and all experience suggests that it is not possible to depress farmers' consumption far below an accustomed level.

Upon these assumptions, founded on fact and confirmed by experienced judgment, it is estimated by SCAP that there will be available indigenously for non-self-suppliers only 471 calories daily for the period (roughly) May-September. This would not be evenly distributed in time, May and June being the low months, July-September having increasing supplies. It is possible to assume statistically greater supplies for July-September than estimated by SCAP. It is also possible by assuming a lower average population for both halves of the year, and by assuming a 10% larger rice crop last fall than officially estimated (all reasonable assumptions) to calculate that about 1100 calories of all foods may be statistically "available" for consumption by the rationed population during the late spring and summer. For comparison, it is submitted that the average Japanese adult requires 1420 calories daily for subsistence without any activity.

The operating problem, however, is one of mobilizing supplies for controlled distribution to almost 60 million persons soon to be on the ration. Unless all Japanese statistics are to be rejected out of hand, present controlled stocks will last on the average about 60 days at the present rate of ration. (Imports now scheduled would add about one week's supply.) Future rice collections from farmers

are not

- 2 -

are not expected to be material. Farmers will eat, they have little faith in either the Government or the yen, and for these reasons as well as the known insufficiency of fertilizer for next year's crop it is probable that significant quantities of the "available" rice will not be eaten even by farmers this year but will be hoarded straight through next year's harvest.

The sixty or seventy day controlled stock is, of course, not evenly distributed. The Government states that it has already encountered resistance to movements of stocks from areas of relative surplus and predicts the use of outright force to prevent movements in the future. Its reassurances to the local authorities are valueless and would not be believed even if well-founded. Hence widespread difficulty in managing the ration may be expected in another month. The problems may then be expected to cumulate in intensity and to have serious consequences for the Government's future grain collection program.

Under these circumstances, the wealthy and the tougher poor will survive. Farmers will engage in some sharing with city relatives. Even the small remainder of the supply, that controlled by the Government, cannot be expected to be evenly shared. It will probably be found desirable and necessary to feed the children and also the workers in those industries or services that are vital to the occupying forces. Regardless of average statistical availability, those not falling in one of the above classes will have little or no food for two months or more in the absence of substantial imports.

It has been suggested that in spite of the pressing world shortage of grain it would be valuable though expensive insurance protection not only against immediate grave problems but against the prolongation and complication of many of the problems of the occupation.

Charles J. Shohan

March 27, 1946.

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

JA

*Wmsd*  
*4-24-46*  
*Ag*  
*Com*  
*JK*

Action	
Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FE	
CA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SEA	
PI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Office of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
APR 24 1946  
2:00 PM  
Department of State

8367

PLAIN

Moscow via War

Dated April 24, 1946

Rec'd 9:47 a.m., 24th

- ERA- W
- JA
- ACTION: ~~FE~~
- INFO:
- S
- U
- A C
- A-B
- A-H
- SPA
- SA/M
- EUR
- DC/L
- ITP
- ESP
- SPD
- FC
- OIC
- OPI
- PL
- OOD
- CY
- DC/R

SECSTATE

DEPARTMENT OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
*HB*  
*Tru.*  
APR 24 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1310, Twenty-fourth

Soviet press April 23 carries following Tass items on Japan.

One. 3 inch Washington despatch on statement by New Zealand representative on Far Eastern Commission objecting to US intention to deliver 500,000 tons of food to Japan during first half of 1946.

Two. 1 inch Tokyo despatch "violation of electoral rights of Japanese population" on press reports that 150,000 voters who had right to vote could not do so as their names were not on electoral lists.

Three. 2 inch Tokyo despatch reporting precious metals found in Tokyo Bay have not yet been brought to surface but that one officer estimates their value at thirty billion yen.

Sent Dept 1310: repeated Tokyo for ACTPOLAD 27, and Frankfurt.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

MJF

PLAIN

APR 29 1946

894.5018/4-2446

~~FE~~  
ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

JS -P

ACTION: EUR  
INFO:

- S
- U
- FE
- DC/L
- ITP
- ESP
- A-B
- A-C
- A-H
- SA/M
- SPA
- OCD
- FC
- CY
- OIC
- OPI
- PI
- DC/R

Office of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
JUN 18 1946  
DIRECTOR  
Department of State

5547

PLAIN

Moscow

Undated

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DISTRIBUTION OFFICE  
JUN 17 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd June 17, 1946  
5:30 a.m.

SECSTATE

JA	
FE	✓
DC/L	
ITP	
ESP	
A-B	
A-C	✓
A-H	
SA/M	
SPA	
OCD	
FC	
CY	
OIC	
OPI	
PI	✓
DC/R	

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
File in  
JUN 18 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1896, Undated.

Criticizing Emperor and Yosida Govt for adopting food policy which evades urgent necessity land reform in favor, US assistance on behalf Jap landowners, IZVESTIYA June 15 major article, "Food Policy Mr. Yosida", further attacks as contrary to intent Far Eastern Commission April 25 communique, actions US occupation authorities in encouraging US food imports into Japan rather than in putting end to rice speculation, removing rice from landowners and establishing strict control over food distribution. It concludes that not a few American statesmen and military leaders are trying to further policy encouragement Jap militarists who are daily becoming more dangerous.

SMITH

JMS

PLAIN

Handwritten notes and stamps:  
6-12-46  
1946  
FR  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUN 28 1946  
FILED

894.5018/6-1746 RECD

LRC

PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

*File*

July 30, 1946

*FE/NA  
#241  
Vol#2*

Mr. Gross

Mr. Easton

Statement on Japanese Food.

1. The attached memorandum from Mr. Whitman, received in A-H on July 25th, was not received in the Directorate until noon, July 29th.
2. Inquiry of Mr. Baldwin, Chief, Supply Section, Civil Affairs Division, discloses that Mr. Whitman telephoned the War Department on this matter himself on Friday, July 26th, and again on Monday morning, July 29th.
3. It is understood that the War Department has no strong objection to the proposed U.K. amendments but feels that the proposed addition to paragraph three is too operational for inclusion in a policy paper.
4. It is recommended that Mr. Whitman be advised that A-H is in agreement with the views of the War Department, viz:
  - (a) Suggested addition to paragraph three of C2-016 appears to be too operational for inclusion in a policy paper, and if included should be redrafted.
  - (b) The change in the first sentence of paragraph four is acceptable if the U.K. representative desires to make it.

894 5018 / 7-2446

A-H:ROEaston:eg

*OK  
EAG*



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum **UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : A-H - Mr. Heneman  
 FROM : JK - Mr. Whitman  
 SUBJECT: Statement on Japanese Food



DATE: July 24, 1946

At a meeting of the Economic Committee on July 24 the United Kingdom representative proposed the following amendment to C2-016, the FEC document on civilian supply of food and civilian relief:

"Add the following at the end of paragraph 3: '(c) The Japanese Government should be pressed to improve the collection of rice by every possible means, including the "link" system of releasing consumption goods against rice deliveries. The Japanese Government should also be instructed to take steps to limit the degree of rice-polishing to a minimum, with a view to increasing both the quantity of food available and its nutritional value.'

"Change the first sentence of paragraph 4 to read as follows:- 'The Japanese Government should be required to make known to the Japanese people the magnitude of the present food crisis in the rest of the world and widespread publicity should from time to time be given to the general policy that:'".

Would you please obtain the War Department position on this amendment so that instructions will be available for the United States representative for the next meeting of the Economic Committee on July 30?

I would like to note that the War Department has already approved the balance of C2-016 with the exception of the phrases "with the advice of the Allied Council". I am only raising, therefore, the question of the United Kingdom proposal.

*R. J. Whitman*

JK:RHW:il

*O.K.  
 EOB*

*link system - from 1/1/46  
 has approved  
 by letter to  
 General*

*10/1/46*

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT me

TO : Mr. Gross  
FROM : Mr. Easton  
SUBJECT: Statement on Japanese Food.

DATE: July 30, 1946

1. The attached memorandum from Mr. Whitman, received in A-H on July 25th, was not received in the Directorate until noon, July 29th.
2. Inquiry of Mr. Baldwin, Chief, Supply Section, Civil Affairs Division, discloses that Mr. Whitman telephoned the War Department on this matter himself on Friday, July 26th, and again on Monday morning, July 29th.
3. It is understood that the War Department has no strong objection to the proposed U.K. amendments but feels that the proposed addition to paragraph three is too operational for inclusion in a policy paper. *Mr. Whitman accepts this position.*
4. It is recommended that Mr. Whitman be advised <sup>by telephone</sup> that A-H is in agreement with the views of the War Department, viz:
  - (a) Suggested addition to paragraph three of C2-016 appears to be too operational for inclusion in a policy paper, and if included should be redrafted.
  - (b) The change in the first sentence of paragraph four is acceptable if the U.K. representative desires to make it.

JK  
Eog

~~432/872~~ 894. 5-018/7-3046

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Hilldring

DATE: Sept. 20, 1946

FROM : Mr. Claxton, A-H

SUBJECT: Paper on Food Policy for Japan to be Introduced in FEC.

You have formerly approved the attached paper in a longer form, with the suggestion that it be shortened. The longer paper was shortened by the deletion of a number of sentences in the second paragraph, leaving the statement of the basic principles unimpaired.

Mr. Whitman has submitted the paper to Mr. Fahey, as CAD representative at FEC, in order to be sure, in view of the War Department's objections to the last draft, that the present draft is now acceptable to the War Department. CAD has suggested the following two changes, which are approved by Mr. Martin:

- (a) The deletion from paragraph 1b of the first sentence.
- (b) The addition to the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the following language: "Except as internal conditions within a member nation may preclude the distribution of foodstuff allocated to that nation."

The first suggested change deletes language which though appropriate in the context from which it is taken is thought by CAD to be subject to misunderstanding when set out as in this paper. I believe that if Mr. Martin feels the omission of this sentence will not impair his ability to obtain acceptance of the paper in FEC, it may be omitted.

The second suggested change merely makes explicit a thought which was certainly intended implicitly. I therefore recommend your concurrence in both the suggested changes. A memorandum stating such concurrence, addressed to Mr. Martin, is attached.

Att:-1

334 J.P.C.  
010.1

P.H. 433/870

894. 5018/9-2046

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: Sept. 20, '46

TO : Mr. Martin, JK  
FROM : General Hilldring  
SUBJECT: Paper on Food Policy for Japan to be  
Introduced in FEC.

The following changes in the above  
paper, requested by CAD, are approved:

(a) Deletion of the first sentence of  
paragraph 1b.

(b) Addition to the first sentence of  
paragraph 3 of the following language: "Ex-  
cept as internal conditions within a member  
nation may preclude the distribution of food-  
stuff allocated to that nation."

Ben Miller  
The Boardman

URGENT

Baldwin disagrees with Ford Policy paper  
on these two points. Martin agrees  
Grom does.

1a - SNWA 107 para. 7?

# 16. You will not assume  
any responsibility for the ec. rehab.  
of Japan or the <sup>negotiating</sup> ~~structure~~  
of the Japanese economy.

Baldwin wants to strike this  
sentence & leave rest of 16.

SNWA 107 ~~para. 7~~ → 52 para. 13

last para.

wants to add:

at end "except as internal conditions  
within a member nation may  
preclude the distribution of  
foodstuffs allocated to that  
nation."

CIVILIAN SUPPLY OF FOOD AND CIVILIAN RELIEF IN JAPAN

1. The Far Eastern Commission hereby confirms general policies with respect to the civilian supply of food and civilian relief in Japan adopted by the U.S. Government in the fall of 1945 and transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be in effect so long as the present acute world food shortage exists. The substance of these policies is as follows:

a. The objectives of the relief policy of the United States are to prevent such starvation and widespread disease and civil unrest as would (1) clearly endanger the occupying forces, and (2) permanently obstruct the ultimate objectives of the occupation. (SWNCC 107, par. 4a)

b. You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy. You will make it clear to the Japanese people that:

a. You assume no obligations to maintain, or to have maintained, any particular standard of living in Japan, and

b. That the standard of living will depend upon the thoroughness with which Japan rids itself of all militaristic ambitions, redirects the use of its human and natural resources wholly and solely for purposes of peaceful living, administers adequate economic and financial controls, and cooperates with the occupying forces and the governments they represent. (SWNCC 52, par. 13)

c. The Japanese authorities will be expected to develop and effectively carry out programs of working activity that will enable them out of their own resources and labor to accomplish the following:

a. To avoid acute economic distress.

b. To assume just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

In order to achieve these aims, the Japanese authorities will have to make the utmost effort to maximize production of agricultural and fishery products, coal, charcoal, housing repair materials, clothing and other essentials. In the event that they fail to do so, you will direct them to take such measures as in your judgment are necessary. (SWNCC 52, par. 19)

- 2 -

d. You will assure that all practicable economic and police measures are taken to achieve the maximum utilization of essential Japanese resources in order that imports into Japan may be strictly limited. Such measures will include production and price controls, rationing, control of black markets, fiscal and financial controls and other measures directed toward full employment of resources, facilities and means available in Japan. (SWNCC 52, par. 29a)

e. You will be responsible for providing imported supplies only to supplement local resources and only to the extent supplementation is needed to prevent such widespread disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. Such imports will be confined to minimum quantities of foods, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies and other essential items, including those which will enable local production of such supplies which you would otherwise have to import. (SWNCC 52, par. 29b)

f. Production of food crops should be maximized. (SWNCC 98, par. 4b) Supplies of fertilizers should be made available. (SWNCC 98, par. 4c) The production of farm tools and implements in short supply should be encouraged. (SWNCC 98, par. 4d) Special attention should be given to encourage production and sale of incentive goods to induce farmers and other food producers to move their produce to market. (SWNCC 107, par. 4h) The existing dispersion of persons from food deficit areas to food surplus areas should be prolonged, exceptions being made for people of needed special skills. (SWNCC 107, par 4g)

2. The Far East Commission recommends to its member governments that as a matter of policy they take no step which would have the effect of providing imports of food to the Japanese which would represent priority or preferential treatment for the Japanese over the requirements of the peoples of any Allied power or liberated area, except to the extent that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has determined that imports into Japan are essential immediately for the safety of the occupation forces. This policy shall remain in effect during any period of acute world food shortage.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A-H - Mr. Gross  
FROM : JK - Mr. Martin  
SUBJECT: Food Policy Paper

DATE: September 13, 1946

1. Twenty-nine days ago today, General Hilldring, with considerable difficulty and embarrassment, persuaded the FEC to refer back to Committee No. 2 the question of a food and civilian relief policy for Japan. It was understood by the Commission that this step, representing the last in a long series of embarrassing incidents in the handling of this subject by the U.S., was designed to permit the U.S. to submit promptly a new statement which it could fully support clear through to final FEC action.
2. Twenty-eight days ago today, JK submitted to General Hilldring a proposed new statement to which he gave his general approval, subject only to a request that it be shortened.
3. As of today the U.S. Delegation on the FEC has not received any instructions with respect to the item of food and civilian relief policy which is on the Committee No. 2 agenda at the request of General Hilldring.

JK:EMMartin:jph



CIVILIAN SUPPLY OF FOOD AND CIVILIAN RELIEF IN JAPAN

1. The Far Eastern Commission hereby confirms general policies with respect to the civilian supply of food and civilian relief in Japan adopted by the U.S. Government in the fall of 1945 and transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be in effect so long as the present acute world food shortage exists. The substance of these policies is as follows:

a. The objectives of the relief policy of the United States are to prevent such starvation and widespread disease and civil unrest as would (1) clearly endanger the occupying forces, and (2) permanently obstruct the ultimate objectives of the occupation. (SWNCC 107, par. 4a)

b. You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy. You will make it clear to the Japanese people that:

a. You assume no obligations to maintain, or to have maintained, any particular standard of living in Japan, and

b. That the standard of living will depend upon the thoroughness with which Japan rids itself of all militaristic ambitions, redirects the use of its human and natural resources wholly and solely for purposes of peaceful living, administers adequate economic and financial controls, and cooperates with the occupying forces and the governments they represent. (SWNCC 52, par. 13)

c. The Japanese authorities will be expected to develop and effectively carry out programs of working activity that will enable them out of their own resources and labor to accomplish the following:

a. To avoid acute economic distress.

b. To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

In order to achieve these aims, the Japanese authorities will have to make the utmost effort to maximize production of agricultural and fishery products, coal, charcoal, housing repair materials, clothing and other essentials. In the event that they fail to do so, you will direct them to take such measures as in your judgment are necessary. (SWNCC 52, par. 19)

-2-

d. You will assure that all practicable economic and police measures are taken to achieve the maximum utilization of essential Japanese resources in order that imports into Japan may be strictly limited. Such measures will include production and price controls, rationing, control of black markets, fiscal and financial controls and other measures directed toward full employment of resources, facilities and means available in Japan. (SWNCC 52, par. 29a)

e. You will be responsible for providing imported supplies only to supplement local resources and only to the extent supplementation is needed to prevent such widespread disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. Such imports will be confined to minimum quantities of food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies and other essential items, including those which will enable local production of such supplies which you would otherwise have to import. (SWNCC 52, par. 29b)

f. Production of food crops should be maximized. (SWNCC 98, par. 4b) Supplies of fertilizers should be made available. (SWNCC 98, par. 4c) The production of farm tools and implements in short supply should be encouraged. (SWNCC 98, par. 4d) Special attention should be given to encourage production and sale of incentive goods to induce farmers and other food producers to move their produce to market. (SWNCC 107, par. 4h) The existing dispersion of persons from food deficit areas to food surplus areas should be prolonged, exceptions being made for people of needed special skills. (SWNCC 107, par 4g)

2. The Far East Commission recommends to its member governments that as a matter of policy they take no step which would have the effect of providing imports of food to the Japanese which would represent priority or preferential treatment for the Japanese over the requirements of the peoples of any Allied power or liberated area, except to the extent that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has determined that imports into Japan are essential immediately for the safety of the occupation forces. This policy shall remain in effect during any period of acute world food shortage.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Mr Claxton:

Will you try your  
hand at shortening  
and talk with me  
about it?

Sag

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Col. Gross

was had but  
too long. Clear  
with W.D.

V H H

Col. Gross: This is the  
paper submitted by Martin.