

Doc. 2124 Evid.

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

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ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Carbon copied Documents about the "October Incident", "Notebook of Major X".

Date: Jan 1932 Original  Copy  Language:  
Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes  No   
Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HASHIMOTO; UGAKI; OKAWA; ARAKI; TOGO  
and others

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Planning "October Incident" and "March Incident"

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

In October 1931, the reconstruction of the Empire was planned by some officers of the Imperial Guard Divisions and Guard Staff Office. This "October Incident" was very much related to the SAKURAKAI ("Cherry Society Circle") organization and the ensuing "March Incident" in that the same persons were involved in both incidents and were members of the SAKURAKAI.

In September, 1931, the SAKURAKAI was founded by HASHIMOTO, SAKATA and HIGUCHI. It numbered about twenty other members.

(Note: Authenticity and origin of this document not clear).

Analyst: 2d Lt Goldstein

Doc. No. 2124

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THE SAKURA-KAI

Notes on the "October Incident"

The Notes of Major X

January, 1932.

In October, 1931, some of the officers of the General Army Staff HQ and of the Imperial Guard Division held a consultation with a view to carrying out national reconstruction by armed force. This incident ended in failure, it received wide if secret publicity as the "October Incident." Some criticised the Incident, others praised it, the one becoming the focus of the other's discussion and false reports have often been given by those who attempted to interpret it to their own advantage by twisting the facts.

From every point of view, the incident must be considered one of great importance, which will furnish valuable information for any third, or fourth or more attempts that may occur sooner or later in the natural course of events.

I will now describe the "October Incident" as far as is within the limits of my knowledge.

The relation between the "October Incident" and myself will be clear from the following narrative. In a word, it will be very obvious that I was intimately connected with this incident. There are two things that have a very close connection with the "October Incident: namely, (1) 'Sakura Kai' /The Cherry Club/ and (2) the "March Incident."

'Sakura Kai'

Outline of the Sakura Kai.

This club was organized for the reconstruction of the state with young officers of the War Ministry and General Staff HQ as its nucleus. (The name "Sakura Kai" was only given to this club as a matter of convenience long after its organization.)

The date of organization:

The end of September in the autumn of 1930.

Promoters:

More than twenty members, headed by:

Artillery Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO  
(A 23rd graduate of the Military Academy) of  
the General Staff HQ.

Infantry Lt. Col. SAKATA  
(A 21st graduate of the Military Academy) of  
the War Ministry.

Infantry Lt. Col. HIGUCHI  
(A 21st graduate of the Military Academy) of  
the Security Headquarters.

Being charged to draw up the general plan, the manifesto, etc., of this club, I had a close relationship with the club from the beginning.

Objects:

The ultimate aim of this club shall be the reconstruction of the state and, it will not be averse to the employment of armed force if necessary for this aim.

Membership:

The members shall be confined to officers who are in active service with ranks under Lt. Colonel and have interest in the reconstruction of the state without any selfish motive.

Preparatory activities for the fulfillment of the objects:

- (1) The infusion of an idea that the reconstruction of the state is necessary, leaving no means untried.
- (2) The increase and consolidation of the members. (The number of the members in May, 1931, amounted to 150 or so.)
- (3) The making of a concrete plan for the reconstruction of the state.

Meanwhile, considering its intrinsic nature, the Sakura Kai had in itself very much of a tendency to be dissolved from the time of organization; namely:

- (1) The destructive elements who thought destruction before construction, considering that the latter should follow the former in the course of nature. (Comment: What they said being high-sounding, not a few responded to the idea.)
- (2) The element who thought construction should claim first consideration and wished to bring destruction to the irreducible minimum, confining it to its necessary bounds which their prepared logic and predetermined definite plan should necessitate. (Comment: What they advocated was theoretical but rather modest; besides, they had no concrete plan at that time; therefore only a few agreed with this opinion.)
- (3) The neutral elements who took the mean between the above two, i.e. opportunists. (Comment: Many of the members belonged to this, but were always unsettled in their opinions.)

Thus, the members had differed in their opinions from the very beginning and resulted in taking a triangular position. The movements of the elements who insisted mainly upon destruction were always active and overwhelming and there was a strong probability to drive the whole Sakura Kai to take a direct action.

Soon after I was transferred to the War Ministry in August, 1928, I was advised to enter a certain investigating society (the objects of this society were not clear; it might be understood to be an investigating society for national reconstruction.) under the leadership of Infantry Major SUZUKI (who would be later involved), a member of the Operation Section of the General Army Staff at that time, and decided to enter it. The members sometimes gathered at the "Kaikō Sha" /Officers' Club/, and opened a meeting for investigation. This society, however, was dissolved because of a wide difference of views among the members. (Major SUZUKI was making an official tour in Europe and America at this time.) Therefore, I still continued a profound study with Captain WATANABE (a 29th graduate of the Military Academy), Captain IWAKURO (a 30th graduate), and Captain YAMAOKA (a 30th graduate).

When the Sakura Kai was formed, we four persons entered it. Nevertheless, the circumstances in the Sakura Kai being such as mentioned above, we four persons made haste to complete our reform plan as fast as possible; at the same time, we had been endeavouring to prevent the Sakura Kai from taking violent actions till the end of 1930. The authorities at that time in general had an unpleasant feeling toward the Sakura Kai.

Advance of the Sakura Kai

The General Army Staff held a meeting of the Second Section to study the situation of the world following its custom. The judgment of the situation of the world in 1930 was worth special mention. The judgment hitherto had been made only to furnish materials for operation; in other words, only enemy countries had been taken into account. In the judgment made that year, however, the opinion that in order to solve Manchurian and Mongolian problems positively, we should naturally accomplish the reform of the state before everything, and that we should carry out resolutely the reform, had the best of it and this important item was included in the judgment. The change of times might have led the Second Section of the General Army Staff to give an unprecedented judgment, but it chiefly depended on the facts that there were many members of the Sakura Kai among the group-leaders of the 2nd Section, and that influential men such as Artillery Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO (the Russian group) and Infantry Lt. Colonel NEMOTO (Chinese group) played an active part in it.

It seems that part of the Sakura Kai's views was carried through at the meeting on one hand, and that the Vice-Chief of the General Army Staff was induced to make up his mind to utilize the Sakura Kai for the so-called 'March Incident.'

The Sakura Kai's advance outside of the Army

The radical members of the Sakura Kai tried to get fellow-thinkers outside of the Army and many a time they met some of the leaders of the Shakai-Minshū Party /the Socialist Party/ and the Taishū Party /the People's Party/ to exchange their views. And as a result of this these proletarian parties could ascertain the intentions of young officers of the Army in general and this proved helpful for them to recognize that the Army was never an agent of the capitalists. However, the proletarian classes took advantage of these intentions of the Army for expanding the strength of their own parties. To cite an outstanding example of this, the Shakai-Minshū Party assumed such an attitude as explained in the following at the Hiroshima Branch at the end (?) of January, 1931.

A leader of the Shakai-Minshū Party who met in person some of the radicals of the Sakura Kai in Tokyo said at the meeting of the Hiroshima Branch: "The present Army is favourably disposed toward our party. From generals down to company officers, the whole Army are our sympathizers,

if not our supporters, especially among the young officers of the military authorities a secret society has been formed for the overthrow of the existing political parties,....."

With the object of establishing a close connection with navy officers, the Sakura Kai organized the Seiyō Kai (a society of army and navy staff-officers with ranks under Lt. Colonel and Commander) and had frequent talks with them. These activities were all done by the radicals in the Sakura Kai.

#### Rumours about the Sakura Kai

O Pros and cons in the Army toward the Sakura Kai were many and conflicting; moreover, many of their arguments were not based on the real nature of the Sakura Kai, so it will not be necessary to describe them here.

O At the end of 1930 (?) or in January, 1931 (?), a certain chief of a section in the Metropolitan Police Board visited one of the chiefs of the Kempei /M.F./ Headquarters and questioned, "There is a rumour that a party named Kinki /the Imperial Standard of gold brocade/ Communist Party has been formed especially among the officers of the military authorities in the Army and it is said that it is to undertake a reform with the Emperor as its head. I want to know the real situation." It could be said that he meant the Sakura Kai.

O In January, 1931, Home Minister ADACHI asked the then War Minister UGAKI at the first cabinet meeting, "They say that many of the officers in active service are talking of politics recently; they are said to have organized an association, too. How is about the real fact?" This also might have pointed the Sakura Kai and the Seiyō Kai.

Thus the Sakura Kai had gradually ~~moved~~ traced its course towards practical actions. Nevertheless, the radicals were also conscious through many experiences that they would not be able to accomplish their objectives if they were not theoretically right and that the movements might prove to be mere ill-considered attempts if they were lacking in concrete plans for reconstruction. Therefore, they decided to set about establishing a plan for reconstruction from the beginning of January, 1931. For this purpose, the following men were elected as the committee thereof:

Lt. Colonel SAKATA (a 21st graduate)  
 Lt. Colonel NEMOTO (a 23rd graduate)  
 Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO (a 23rd graduate)  
 Captain CHŪ (a 28th graduate)  
 Captain Y. TANAKA (a 24th graduate)  
 and myself--i.e. six members all together.

(Captain YAMAOKA, who was a fellow investigator of mine in the past, declined to be a committee as he was expected to be transferred to Russia shortly; Captain WATANABE did the same as he was to go to China; and Captain IWAAZE also followed the same because he thought it advantageous to scrutinize the reconstruction plan made by the Sakura Kai as an outsider. The committee being occupied mostly by the radicals, it was not unexpected that a satisfactory plan might not be brought about after all. I, with four of my old fellow-thinkers, recognizing the necessity of a second and third plans, followed the way, mentioned above.)

Although I did not think that anything could be achieved by these members, it was my intention to make this a tool for checking the radicals and making them recognize how important would be a theory and a concrete plan, and how difficult would it be to put things into practice. In this way the Sakura Kai had finally come to make its course clear, it not satisfactory one, when the so-called March Incident broke out.

#### So-called March Incident

On the 9th of January, General UGAKI made up his mind to enter upon a political career so as to organize a cabinet. On the 13th of January, General UGAKI had a talk about means and ways for national reform with Vice Minister SUGIYAMA, Vice Chief NINOMIYA, Chief of Military Affairs KOISO, Chief of Dept. TATEKAWA, Chief of (Operation) Section YAMAWAKI (Lt. Colonel Shinichi SUZUKI acted for him the day), Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, and Lt. Colonel NEMOTO. (Definite report)

In the beginning of January, 1931, Lt. General NINOMIYA, Vice Chief of General Army Staff, told Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO to the following effect:

General UGAKI is expected to enter upon a political world; so necessary plans for reconstruction shall be made and submitted.



Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, believing in these words, instantly took Lt. Colonel SAKATA and me to a branch office of the Investigation Group of the War Ministry and asked us to make schemes for starting our active movements in accordance with the words of Vice-Chief. Lt. Colonel SAKATA and I, however, thought it unwise and dangerous to believe the words rashly judging by the personality of both General UGAKI and Lt. General NINOMIYA and by the reputation of the Sakura Kai. And so we decided to make sure of Vice-Chief's real intention and draw up two kinds of plans (one was to be the real reform plan based on the final object of the Sakura Kai and the other plan was to be a camouflaged one which might prevent the Sakura Kai from being treated as a dangerous organization: in other words, it was to be modest enough to show that the Sakura Kai was an organization applying moderate thoughts. And we were to decide to take one or the other according to the real intention of Vice-Chief.)

Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO met Vice-Chief in person to find out Vice-Chief's real intention. The information he got from him was as follows:

1. The military leaders who have agreed to General UGAKI's premiership are as follows: Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, Major-General TATEKAWA; Chief of Military Affairs Bureau KOISO; Chief of Military Section NAGATA; Chief of Appointment Section OKAMURA; Chief of Chinese Section SHIGETO; and Chief of 2nd Section YAMAWAKI.

Vice-War Minister has not clarified his attitude.

2. We are ready to meet General UGAKI by force of arms if necessary.
3. This plan has also been approved by the military.
4. As the program and policy for the future society to be established will be prepared by the superior officers, we shall work out a plan to seize the political power.

Thus we have decided to work out the plan.

Therefore, according to instructions by the high-ranking officers, "those below the rank of captain shall not be permitted to participate in this incident for it may end in failure and everyone will have to take the blame. In this case, the livelihood of the bereaved cannot be guaranteed, so the participants shall be confined to those above the rank of major." Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO and Lt. Col. SAKATA were greatly shocked by this

instruction. That is, the two Lt. Colonels had, in the past asked the higher officers to permit my participation as a special case because it was difficult for them to work out a complete plan without me for the purpose of investigation. Anyway, through the efforts of the Chief of the Chinese Section I was permitted to participate.

However, as it is quite obvious, it is most outrageous to draw an establishment plan and a destruction plan separately. An inch ahead in the plan to seize the political power was as dark as midnight and it could never have been accomplished. Moreover, it became evident that the superior officers too had not been planning anything like a programme or a policy. And yet the time could not be delayed. It was decided to draw up a plan for destruction and a plan to seize the regime separately. Following are the various matters I was able to learn at that time from the necessity of drawing up this plan.

1. The military leaders had keen intentions to participate.
2. Preparations for dispatching of troops had been made secretly.
3. Necessary funds were to be paid from the secret service fund for a time being.
4. Dr. OKAWA Shūmei had decided to participate by mobilizing about 10,000 proletarians (mainly members of the Peoples' Party) and recruiting a death band.
5. The date of execution was to be the day on which a labour bill was to be laid.
6. Liaison business with the superiors was to be in charge of Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO.

(I had cross-questioned in detail about the above matters but to no avail. Note: Later confirmations proved that of these Paragraphs, 1 and 2 were very doubtful; as to Paragraph 3, part of the payment was actually made; and Paragraph 4 was true.)

In a word, this attempt was nothing more than a mere "coup d'état." We decided to draw up a plan within the extremely limited sphere for the realization of a coup d'état utilizing troops--with the hope that the superior officers would eagerly work out the other plan for the construction. Yet the time was

pressing, and we were lacking in materials for the plan. Moreover, everybody was having his own way without any control. Especially Colonel SHIGETO had been making thoughtless connections with the proletarian party in conspiracy with Dr. OKAWA, and according to what I understand, he was making plans for destruction. About 3:00 p.m. on Feb. 7, Lieutenant-Colonels SAKATA and NEMOTO and I met at SHIGETO's home in Shinagawa.

Col. SHIGETO said to me, "I guess you have already learned from Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO, but it has been decided not to allow those below the rank of captain to participate in the revolution. But, you are an exception; and even if the scheme should end in failure, you need not worry about the livelihood of your family. Proper measures will be taken for them so there is nothing to worry, etc."

SHIGETO and we deliberated and agreed upon a plan for destruction.

Its outline was as follows:

1. Three proletarian parties shall jointly hold a grand-scale speech meeting to denounce the cabinet at Hibiya in the near future and instill the spirit to break down the cabinet. And then we shall carry out a demonstration to the Diet as a reconnoitre in preparation for the actual operation. (Although the details of this plan have been worked out, they are omitted here.)
2. A destruction plan to seize the political power will be carried out on the day on which a labour bill will be presented.
3. The headquarters of the SEIYU KAI and the MINSETO Parties and the Premier's official residence shall be bombed on this day. However, ineffective bombs with terrific explosion shall be used. The bomb-throwers shall be decided according to Dr. OKAWA's plan. Ten thousand people will proceed in a demonstration to the Diet from all directions. Well-informed leaders will be placed at the head of each column to keep control. A band with drawn swords will be attached to each column and will exclude interruption expected to be made by the police.
4. Troops will come to an emergency assemble and surround the Diet Building under the pretext of giving protection and cut off all communications with the outside. Officers (mainly members of the "Sakura Kai") shall be placed in each street and the leaders of each column will carry it out.

5. Under this situation a certain lieutenant-general (his name is still kept secret and is unknown. Some say it was Lieutenant-General MAZAKI.) will enter the Diet Building with either Maj.-Gen. KOISO or Maj.-Gen. TATEKAWA and some officers and force the Cabinet to resign by declaring, "The people no longer have any more confidence in the present Cabinet. They will only have faith in a Cabinet under the premiership of General UGAKI. The Nation is now confronted with a grave situation. We request that proper measures be taken."
6. The acting Premier SHIDEHARA and the other ministers will be forced to tender their resignations.
7. We shall scheme beforehand so that the Emperor will order General UGAKI to form the new Cabinet. (Messengers to H.I.H. Prince KANIN and Prince SAIONJI shall be decided.)

(1-7 above is nothing but an outline of the plan. The details, being tedious, are omitted here, though they have been worked out.)

At midnight that day the plan was drawn up. Just before breaking up our meeting Colonel SHIGETO tried to distribute among ourselves the secret service money for campaign and motor-car expenses. (Note: This secret service money later gave rise to controversy.) Lieutenant-Colonel SAKATA and I strongly opposed the idea and we finally refused to take the money. This is attributable to the noble character, far-sightedness and good leadership of SAKATA. Colonel SHIGETO and Lieutenant-Colonel HASHIMOTO were wildly excited with joy as if it had already been accomplished. But, I, for one, could not but discern that the plan had vital defects in its general perspective. That is, they were attempting to collaborate with non-military men, especially with a man like Dr. OKAWA, and besides there was no significance about the time and especially the plan had no connection with a construction plan. At 9:00, Feb. 8, Colonel SHIGETO and the others met at TATEKAWA's home to deliberate and decide upon a destruction plan for seizing the political power and they were to submit it to General UGAKI. (Note: Although the first and second drafts were made for this plan, they both were of the same outline as mentioned above with a single fundamental principle.)

Thus there was nothing left but to wait for the designated day.

However, since then all the informations I received made me feel uneasy. The Chief of Military Affairs Bureau who was at first very eager to carry out the plan, was said to have softened his attitude; Colonels NAGATA and OKAMURA both began to take positive attitude against the plan; the Vice-War Minister had generally turned against it; and especially the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff had changed his attitude extremely against the reformation; that is, he had been dreaming of becoming the War Minister in the UGAKI Cabinet. Each had his own way without any control and did not give even a single information. I always took the initiative in seeking connections. The mobilization of 10,000 people which was of great significance and planned by Dr. OKAWA was <sup>extremely</sup> doubtful. Moreover, Dr. OKAWA and Colonel SHIGETO were indulging in extravagant pleasures every night at Araki-cho, Yotsuya and there they most imprudently told the geisha girls that their lives hung by a thread. Among other things, I was greatly disappointed that they had not made the least investigation about the principle, program and policy of the construction plan. (Note: This total absence of investigation is proved by HASHIMOTO's remarks, especially by the fact that Colonel YAMAWAKI of the Army General Staff who had been eager about the plan had asked me to lend him the materials for the program and policy if I had any and told me that the Chief of the Military Section, though he seemed to have some kind of a plan, was troubled himself.)

Thus the planned reform did not spring up from a pure sincerity of reorganizing our country, but from the contemptible ambition to satisfy selfish desire by aggravating the movements of party men for political power and by monopolizing the Emperor's Army. This was true of General UGAKI and also of the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff.

I could not but firmly set myself against such a reformation and now was the time to check the reckless attempt. Fortunately, Colonels NAGATA and OKAMURA started an active movement against the plan. Especially Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI in opposition to the plan acted in close concert with Lieutenant-Colonel SAKATA. Yet time lapsed away and at last as prearranged the speech meeting was held to impeach the Cabinet by the three joint proletarian parties. It was merely astonishing that the scale was so small and the spirit was so low. Besides, when I had an interview with AZABU Hisashi, President of the Peoples' Party and, then the leader of the proletarian faction, I found he had very little connection with Dr. OKAWA and consequently

that such a plan as mobilizing 10,000 men was nothing but a mere fantasy. Now, from any point of view it seemed to be a wise policy to give up the plan once and for all, so I made up my mind to dissuade Colonels SHIGETO and HASHIMOTO who were the most radical elements from carrying out the plan. But, they did not want to listen to me and rather pushed forward blindly, no matter how hard I had explained of the unfavourable circumstances. Finally, HASHIMOTO gave 300 bombs (like those above-mentioned) to Dr. OKAWA's men. (Note: These bombs often invited harms.) This caused HASHIMOTO and OKAWA to have a mutually inseparable relation.

However blindly SHIGETO and HASHIMOTO might have pushed forward, it was impossible to stem the tide of circumstances. General UGAKI was reported to have finally invited Dr. OKAWA and ordered him to give up the attempt because the time was not appropriate. Dr. OKAWA agreed and thus the so-called March Incident was not realized. This, however, rather served as a preparation for the next "October Incident" by stimulating the radical elements like HASHIMOTO and others, and by revealing that some high-ranking officers of the headquarters had participated in the attempted reformation and thus forcing them to have the idea that they will have to consent to the next reform attempt.

The remarkable points on the "March Incident" are as follows:

1. Difference in the reformations between the rule of right and the rule of might.
2. Careful plans, especially the construction plan--the construction plan and the destruction plan.
3. The time for the reformation.
4. Every day preparations and the establishment of leadership and guiding principle.
5. Control, consolidation and liaison.
6. Problem of liaison with non-military men.
7. Problem of appropriation of the secret service money.

Soon after the "March Incident" ended in failure, HASHIMOTO exerted to magnify and strengthen the "Sakura Kai" actively aggravating its activities. Its leading members became violent in words and action. Along with this, bitter complaints were made against the extravagant pleasures by some of the leaders

of the "Sakura Kai." They had often indulged in continuous extravagant pleasures under the pretext of making investigations and establishing measures to lead the "Sakura Kai." Those who were aware of it, blamed that they had the impudence to pocket the secret service money at the time of the "March Incident" by taking advantage of the Sakura Kai. A certain leader, when I asked him, said that this blame might be directed against the extravagant pleasures by SHIGETO and OKAWA at the time of the "March Incident." I wonder which is true.

Anyway the "Sakura Kai" thus aggravated the growing contradictions within and revealed evident symptoms of its break-up. We understood that the above stated points might have caused the "Sakura Kai" to sink into the depth of ruin. For the relief and healthy development of the "Sakura Kai," we made a proposal at a regular meeting in the middle of June, 1931 warning the members to prevent heedless rioting without establishing a theoretical construction plan and winning the hearts of the masses, to evade taking advantage of the "Sakura Kai" for personal ambitions, and to allow the "Sakura Kai" to accomplish its very purposes in time of emergency by trying to prevent it from dissolution. For instance, "With a view to establishing the leadership and function program of the "Sakura Kai" itself, the members, at least the leaders, should have the knowledge of matters necessary for the reorganization of a State like philosophy, sociology, ethics, economics and politics. For this purpose, it is advisable to invite respectable scholars with whom we can have informal talks by which their characters and knowledge could be seen through and thereby to form an organization of suitable persons for future good," was the outline of the proposal.

Fortunately, our proposal was approved by the leaders and was to be put in immediate practice. I consulted about it with transport officer Captain SUZUKI, a special student of the Imperial University who had special connections with many professors and let him make successful negotiations with them. Late in July, this attempt was realized by Prof. YOSHIDA Seichi and others. But the leaders of the "Sakura Kai" immediately gave up the attempt on the ground that scholars generally have no conclusion and judgment, nor executive talent. Early in July I made a trip during my vacation to the Kwansai districts. During this trip a question arose centering around the "Sakura Kai." The leaders of the "Sakura Kai," hoping to appeal to the whole nation as a means for a rapid increase in the membership, sent to officers below the rank of major (from the 28th term onward) throughout the country a manifesto drawn up at the meetings held by classmates and seniors below the 28th term residing in Tokyo.

Though there was a divergence of criticism on this Incident, the "Sakura Kai" itself was understood to have realized the above-anticipated result and the leaders seemed much exulted. Such was the impression I got when I returned to Tokyo on Aug. 4, and met HASHIMOTO and an officer of the Russian division of the Army General Staff. This was how the "October Incident" was brought about.

The incident was understood to have realized the above-anticipated result and the leaders seemed much exulted. Such was the impression I got when I returned to Tokyo on Aug. 4, and met HASHIMOTO and an officer of the Russian division of the Army General Staff. This was how the "October Incident" was brought about.

I promised to form a propaganda plan to investigate the people by denouncing the decay and corruption of the political parties, thereby spontaneously inviting their downfall. The Lieutenant-Colonel agreed with me.

On August 10 I made a trip to Hokkaido again. During my absence the SAIBU-KAI held its regular meeting for August at the KAI 10041. At this meeting the SAIBU-KAI made a 180 degree turn in its course and agreed to form a training organization and to take over the training of the military problem. This is a very important problem. Forming into a training organization was merely a bluff. It meant a change of scheme, and the SAIBU-KAI was entering a new phase. The SAIBU-KAI was later revealed as a direct consequence of the radical elements.

Interview of the Lieutenant-Colonel

That morning I called on Lt. Col. SAIBU of the War Ministry at the SAIBU-KAI at the Army General Staff Office and got the story of the incident and at the same time I was told by Lt. Col. SAIBU that "We have decided not to carry out the October Incident. We have decided to carry out the training of the military problem." He said that he had no regrets that he executed and I believed his words. I thought that were to proceed only with the setting of the Happonai-Drayton quarters of the SAIBU-KAI executing any internal affairs.

Then I received an express delivery (a sealed letter) from Lt. Col. SAIBU on the evening of October 3 (the day) which read,



The So-Called October Incident

When I met Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO on August 4 he said to me, "In the middle of September this year, \*\*\*\*\*; at this chance we must carry out a fundamental reformation \*\*\*, etc., and the problem of national reconstruction has been fully recognized by the leaders of the Army General Staff." (Note: to what extent it was recognized is not clear; whether it was a definite understanding or it was pointed at matters included in the judgment of the circumstances). Furthermore, the Lieutenant-Colonel continued, "Such being the case, the political power should come into the hands of the military. In other words, a plan shall be drawn by the first half of September to seize the regime under the leadership of the military. The political programme and the policy will be discussed and drafted after the political power is seized."

I promised to form a propaganda plan to instigate the people by denouncing the decay and corruption of the political parties, thereby spontaneously inviting their downfall. The Lieutenant-Colonel agreed with me.

On August 10 I made a trip to Hokkaido again. During my absence the SAKURA-KAI held its regular meeting for August at the KAI KOSHA. At this meeting the SAKURA KAI made a 180° change in its course and agreed to become a training organization and decided to have nothing to do with the situation problem. This is a very important problem. Turning into a training organization was merely a bluff. It meant nothing but a scheme by radical elements centering around the Russian and Chinese sections who were attempting internal reformation. This scheme was later revealed in direct conversations with the radical elements. ~~Outbreak of the Manchurian-Mongolian Problem~~

Outbreak of the Manchurian-Mongolian Problem on Sept. 18

That morning I visited Lt. Col. SAKATA at the War Ministry and Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO at the Army General Staff Office and got the truth behind the incident and at the same time I was told by Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO, "We have decided not to carry out an internal reformation this time, so I am returning the propaganda plan and I hope you will make further investigations." He made it clear to me that no reformation will be executed and I believed his words. I thought they were to proceed only with the settling of the Manchurian-Mongolian question without executing any internal reformation.

Then I received an express delivery (a sealed letter) from Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO on the evening of October 3 (Saturday), which read,

"I have something to discuss with you tomorrow 4th, please come to the MANKIN in MORIGASAKI. I shall wait for you there. Yours truly."  
(Original text) (Post-marked SHINTOMI-CHO, KYOBASHI). Judging from the place where we were to assemble and from where the letter had been sent, I went to the designated place on October 4th with the feeling that something was bound to happen.

On arriving at the MANKIN and telling the master that I had come to see Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO, I was admitted only after he had asked me of my position, name, etc. and informed some one upstairs of my arrival. There were three persons in the room: Major CHO, who had recently left for his new post as a Military Attache in China; Captain Wataru TANAKA of the Russian Section, Army General Staff, and Captain OHARA. They told me the internal reformation is now being executed. The War Ministry, Army General Staff, and the 1st Imperial Guard Division are all in preparation for the reformation. So is the Navy. First, the Military will seize the regime, establish a dictatorship and carry out a political reformation." The SAKURA-KAI is in action playing the leading role. Thus they requested my participation. (Note: These were the tactics they employed everywhere to induce people, especially regimental officers.)

Furthermore they said: They further told me that they had endeavoured day in and day out for a change ever since the outbreak of the Manchurian-Mongolian Incident and that they had returned to their homes but two or three times. They requested that I participate and help them in their plan. It came as a surprise to me, but I could not help doubting. Let us observe the point I had in doubt by stating here a part of my discussion with them.

(I questioned and they answered).

Question: If the military leaders are to participate in the internal reformation, there must be some kind of a doctrine, programme, policy, etc. for the future construction of society. What are the contents?

Answer: We can't tell you. It is a secret. We too are not well informed about it.

Question: What is the plan you have been scheming day and night since the outbreak of the incident?

Answer: It is a plan for destruction.

Question: The destruction plan must be formed after the completion of and within the limits of the construction plan. In other words, aren't they both supposed to follow a uniform ideology? Isn't the destruction plan unreasonable unless the construction plan is made clear?

Answer: The construction plan is being drawn up by others.

Question: Who do you mean by others?

Answer: A group under the leadership of Dr. Shumei OKAWA.

Question: Mainly, what kind of destruction do you intend to carry out?

Answer: Menace by navy bombing corps, murder of all ministers during the cabinet conference at the Premier's official residence, sudden attack and capture of the Metropolitan Police Board.

Question: Why is it necessary for all these destructions?

Answer: To do away with the leaders.

Question: Will an internal reconstruction be possible by such destructions?

Answer: A reformation is possible by destroying the political leaders.

Question: For example, how do you account for a reform in the economic field? Or has this been considered?

Answer: (Silence).

Question: As far as I know, Dr. OKAWA is not a constructor. The March Incident has proved that. Have the Army leaders become so senile as to entrust the most important construction plan to such an "idea"?

Answer: To tell the truth, we are not yet in connection with the military leaders, but we are having Dr. OKAWA draw up a construction plan in order to let them agree just before the decisive action.

Question: This will be the beginning of the downfall of the Imperial Army. I believe the military leaders should not move and should not be moved in this way. What do you think about that?

Answer: It is a difference of opinion.

Question: To my opinion, a national reformation and reconstruction is necessary. But, for this purpose a precise investigation is required in regard to time, limits, method, etc. A thorough construction plan is especially necessary. It would be highly outrageous to hastily attempt reconstruction through such a step as destroying the military without any construction plan. I'll advise you to give it up.

Answer: Logically, you're right. However, now that we have, ever since the outbreak of the Manchurian-Mongolian Incident, forced officers of the 2nd Lt.-1st Lt. Class residing in Tokyo to join and we are in close relation with outsiders, (Note: not military personnel), it is inevitable (too late to withdraw). As the time was too short a construction plan could not be completed. We request your participation and aid.

Question: I agree with you only in the principle of internal reform but I can't agree with you in its method at all.

After such a dispute it became evident that it was nothing but their thoughtless undertaking and that the participation of the military leaders was merely a fabrication. As a result of the dispute they seemed to have reflected a little.

After lunch, we exchanged our opinions in a form of a table-talk.

They asked me: "We hear you are usually much interested in reformation and are studying this subject. What kind of future society are you contemplating? Can you tell us briefly?" I replied, "We must have a moral society of live-and-let-live centering around the Emperor. To attain this, all the exploiting organs which exist between the Emperor and the common people should be excluded for the improvement and development of national life -- development and progress of the Japanese race. Therefore, everything must be planned on this basis." (Note: They say they had mainly taken my opinion in their plan). Thus I left them at 6 p.m.

The situation I had been able to grasp as a result of this meeting is as follows:

1. The radical elements among the old SAKURA-KAI are scheming a coup d'etat.
2. Their claim that the leading figures of the army have approved of this plan is only a pretext. It is very doubtful, nay, it may be admitted they are not concerned with the plot although a certain division chief of the Army General Staff seems to be involved.
3. There are not a few naval officers who personally agree with it.
4. About 100 army officers who belong to regiments and schools seem to be involved.
5. The coup d'etat is scheduled to be carried out around 21st of October.
6. It seems quite likely that the Kwantung Army is connected with the plot.
7. In the execution of the coup d'etat, those who have made speeches and acted against the SAKURA KAI in the past, especially those who usually have many characteristic defects are to be accounted for. There are not a few who harbour ill-feelings personally. (It is said that these officers are to be arrested and beheaded in the course of the coup d'etat), etc.

That is, no matter how you look at it, their scheme will never have any consequences. Moreover, I cannot but condemn it to be against the fundamental spirit of establishing the army, and will destroy the military circle which is supposed to be the sole powerful element for national reconstruction. This will bring about a great loss. I decided to make them stop their scheme by every means, and in so doing I hope to enlighten them so as to make them fully understand. Next day I was asked by some one to accompany him to Major CHO at his hiding-place, for the sake of the country and the army. I readily consented to take this opportunity to grasp the situation clearly and to dissuade him. It was nominal to call it a hiding-place. I found it to be a restaurant (I forgot its name) in Kyobashi-ku. I tried to explain to Major CHO, Captain TANAKA (Ya), and Captain OHARA that the activities they were planning would greatly destroy the army, bring about disadvantage to our country, and have a bad effect upon our international relations as well as on our industries, finance and economics, and that it would be almost hopeless of success. I tried to dissuade them to give it up, but I could not fully attain my objects except that I was able to call for their reflection. As a result of this interview, I learned the following points.

1. They have been living in assignation-houses (machiai) every day and night except for two or three days since Sept. 19th.
2. The machiais, which had been their headquarters, were situated in Akasaka, Shinbashi, Yotsuya, Omori and Kyobashi.
3. Sometimes (about once in several days) they called together few of the participant officers of the rank of 2nd Lt. and 1st Lt., and held dinner parties for the purpose of raising their morale.
4. Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO has been meeting people of various classes, and sometimes called at the MACHIAI, their headquarters, and so forth.

What I am greatly doubtful about is: firstly, where could they have obtained the funds for so many of them to indulge in extravagant pleasures day after day; and, secondly, whether they had contemplated this scheme with the true spirit of patriotism. As for the former, some say that Major CHO had brought it from the Kwantung Army, while others say that they got it from the Seiyu-kei. (It has not been brought to light to date). Thus, one week had elapsed. In the meantime, I notified Major IKEDA, a fellow-researcher of ours, the details of the plan for a coup d'etat by the HASHIMOTO faction and also my opinion toward it, and asked him to inform his intimate friend Colonel Hitoshi IMAMURA (head of the second section) of the situation, and cooperate to tide over the difficulties. The major sympathized with my opinion and immediately informed Colonel IMAMURA. The colonel was startled and promised to do his best. I, however, clearly made their activities and position known to him and called his attention to the fact that he should not resort to any oppressive attitude as yet,

in order to leave an opportunity for them to reconsider.

Colonel IMAMURA said to Major General TATEKAWA, "There is a rumor nowadays that Dr. OKAWA and his faction are plotting something, what is the truth behind it?" The Major General replied, "Yes; I have recently summoned OKAWA and demanded him to give up his scheme and he readily complied." From this information, I could only suspect that Major General TATEKAWA had had some kind of an understanding in this incident.

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On October 12, I met Captain (Ya) TANAKA on the street. He said that he "was making an on-the-spot reconnaissance of the Premier's official residence" and Captain KOHARA was also doing the same. He asked me to meet at the MATSUASA /Restaurant/ in OMORI at 6 P.M., and I consented. I went to the appointed place at 6 P.M. Among the persons who gathered there were Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Major CHO, Captain UMANAGI and two other persons (forgot the names) and I. That night, Captain (Ya) TANAKA presented to us as strictly secret a detailed plan to be executed at the occasion of the "coup d'etat." The contents of the gist was as follows: -- but there were many things which he had concealed to me--:

The time of decisive execution is on Oct. 21. However, whether it will be executed in the day time or at dawn will depend solely upon the circumstances.

The participating officers: About 120 persons living in the City.

The participating troop strength: 10 infantry companies and 1 mg company from each Imperial guard infantry regiment, and about one company from the First and the Second Infantry Regiments respectively, but in case of the execution being executed at night, almost all members of the 3GI will participate.

Among the participating troops there will be a whole company commanded by a company commander influenced by OKAWA, and the whole company commanded by officers who had pledged by blood with Zei NISHIDA.

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Outsiders involved:

Dr. OKAWA and his pupils

A Party of Zei NISHIDA and Ikki KITA

About ten members of the party-of-drawn swords /BATTO-TAI/  
consisting of navy officers (from YOKOSUKA).

13 naval bombers from KASUMIGAUR /flying corps/

3 or 4 air planes from SHIMO-SHIZU.

The operation:

1. Surprise attack the cabinet meeting at the Premier's Official Residence and massacre the Premier and the others -- under command of Major CHO.

2. Surprise attack and capture of the Metropolitan Police Board --under the command of 1st Lieutenant KOHARA.

3. Lay siege on the War Ministry and the Army General Staff Headquarters and cut off all connections with the outside. High ranking officers shall be forced to consent and if any one should refuse he shall be arrested. Order shall be given for military operations.

4. Fleet Admiral TOGO shall proceed to the Imperial Palace simultaneously. He shall request the Emperor to issue an Imperial command to the newly rising elements. (Note: They called themselves newly rising elements).

Express messengers shall be sent to Prince KAN-IN and to Prince SAIONJI.

(P. 33) The names of the new Cabinet members:

Premier and War Minister: Lt. General ARAKI

Home Minister: Lt. Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Foreign Minister: Yoshitsugu TATEKAWA

Finance Minister: Dr. Shumei OKAWA

The Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board: Major CHO

Navy Minister: Vice Admiral KOBAYASHI /Promoted/ Vice Admiral / (Note: He was then commander of the Air Corps at KASUMIGAURA)

And sanction is to be taken towards bad officers, bad personnel whom they would thought as such. (Omitted).

The fund amounting to ¥200,000 had been prepared for use at any time. (Note: This plan was drawn up in detail respectively).

I opposed it definitely once and for all this day. My opinion is to first draw up a construction plan.

I think that any desperate plan not connected with the present Japanese social condition is not suitable and that the time is entirely bad.

Destruction of the Military

From the standpoint of Japan's industry, economics, finance, and the relations with foreign countries, I had /T.N. a verb is omitted/ them as long as two hours that their plan was entirely imperfect.

They have, however, repeated to me their previous remarks that they would take charge of the destruction while the construction should be done on my part. There, I said, "All right. Then, I am now planning and studying a construction plan, a plan for national reconstruction, so why don't you wait until its completion and carry out the destruction plan within the limits of this construction plan? Why not put it off till then?" Then they asked me when I shall complete it and I answered that it is not definite. At the moment they repeatedly insisted that they could not possibly postpone it. Moreover, one of them said, "A man who studies only the theory is apt to always neglect its execution. At the present moment, there is no room for discussion and we shall proceed for the execution."

Realizing that I could never change their mind, I was about to quit and leave. I was intending to come back home. Just at this time, Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO opened the sliding door saying that we had better to stop our discussion now and hold a banquet for the various meanings, and I was surprised by seeing over a dozen Geisha girls were lined up. What an imprudence! Merely outrageous! I scolded them indignantly for their state of mind and told Captain TANAKA (Yayoi) on leaving, "I am absolutely against the execution of this plan. Even if I should give in and decide to carry it out, it won't do to co-operate with persons other than Military." He said, "We cannot do anything so lacking in love and duty like breaking ties with them at this stage. I said, "I cannot agree with you to be concerned about petty personal love and duty when carrying out important matters of a nation. I hope you will reconsider this matter."

I returned home at 11 P.M.

After observing them I came to the following conclusion:

1. Looking from all circumstances, Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO seemed to have already had the idea to withdraw.
2. Major CHO and his man tried to carry it out by all means.

Thus it seems there arose two opposing groups in the party. Moreover, the situation finally came to a point where possibility was good to give rise to a grave incident. So measures became necessary to suppress this.

For this purpose I had the idea to:

1. Demand it stopped by having the superior officers reason with them.
2. Carry out protective arrests by the KEMPEI TAI in case they do not obey.



However, to put unreasonable oppression upon the officers will not only make them lose but depress their spirits, so the utmost care was necessary. I informed Colonel IMAMURA after consulting Major IKEDA; and fortunately the Colonel was of the same opinion. Rumours were rampant at that time that the Army, especially the officers of the Army General Staff, had been taking the lead in some kind of a scheme; and there were reports that the anti-HASHIMOTO sentiment was growing stronger within their group. However, preparations were said to have been in progress for the execution. There had been considerable amount of rumours about activities of members of HASHIMOTO's faction like Lt. NOMURA of 3GI demanding the ordnance committee to secretly deliver pistols and ammunitions, etc. Their daily activities; especially their extravagant pleasures at their so-called headquarters, seemed to have drawn the attention of the Metropolitan Police Board. There is practically no room for doubt that Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO had been shadowed by the police. On October 15 I received a report that the day was imminent for HASHIMOTO's faction to cause disturbances, so I informed Lt. Col. SAKATA about it in the hope that he will persuade Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO. Lt. Col. SAKATA, realizing the graveness of the matter, immediately tried to meet Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO but failed in this attempt the whole day. Lt. Col. HIGUCHI of the Garrison General Staff tried personally to persuade Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO because of his connection with him at the SAKURA KAI and finally ended in a heated argument. On the night of 16th October, Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO persistently demanded Vice-War Minister Gen. SUGIYAMA to agree as they were about to start disturbances, and it is reported that the Vice-Minister turned pale with astonishment. (Note:- It is generally reported that the Vice-Minister was persuaded on the night of Oct. 16th, but judging from the circumstances thereabout I am of the opinion that it was at midnight of the 15th).

The Vice-Minister immediately summoned Chief of Military Affairs Bureau KOISO and Chief of Military Section NAGATA and informed them of the seriousness of the matter. This seemed like a complete surprise to both officers.

On Oct. 16th the high officials of the Household Department called Chief of the Mobilization Section Colonel Marquis INOUE, Saburo and asked him whether he knew about the HASHIMOTO Incident but the Colonel too was only amazed. The Colonel left and told this to the Bureau Chief Maj.-Gen. HAYASHI, Katsura and the Maj.-Gen. was astonished too. Thus the leaders of the War Ministry were only astonished at this incident. On the 16th the leading persons among the section chiefs of the Army General Staff communicated with the Headquarters of the Imperial Guards and the 1st Division and took remedial measures. This was probably because many regimental officers were involved. On that day Lt.-Gen. ARAKI (then Chief of General Affairs Department of the Inspectorate General of Military Training) accompanied by Assistant Chief of Section OKAMURA visited Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO at the restaurant KITEI in KYOBASHI and advised him to give up his idea but they were flatly refused. Then the Military

leaders decided to arrest them with the purpose of protecting them and at dawn on the 17th about 10 ringleaders of their faction were detained at the Military Police Headquarters. It was at this time, that is, when the Military police arrived at the ringleaders residence, that Captain TANAKA (Yayo) sent me a pencil written post card from KYOBASHI to the following effect:

"I hasten to inform you that our party are headed for the Military Police Headquarters. Please take proper measures."

4:00 P.M., 17th (exactly as the original)

I received this post card at 7:00 P.M. on the 18th. A little prior to this, Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO sent letters of summons to comrades in various districts. Lt. Col. OBAMA, Daizen had prepared rooms at the TOKYO Hotel for officers coming to the capital. For the sake of such battalion commanders from the HIROSAKI Regiment, I informed the Military Police on Oct. 18th, through Military Police Captain SHIKATA my research comrade, that this treatment of officers involved in the incident was inevitable from the spirit of the "Code of the Warrior." Therefore, the TOKYO Military Police Commander is already treating the detained officers according to the spirit of the "Code of the Warrior." This should be attributable to the character of Military Police Commander NANBA's personality.

The memorandum goes back to the 17th:

As soon as Chief of the Military Police Lt. Gen. SOTOYAMA heard of the incident on the 17th, he informed the matter to the Metropolitan Police Board. In reply, the Metropolitan Police Board said, "All matters in connection with this incident should be left to the management of the military. So please take such measures as you think best." It should be unnecessary and malignant for the Commander of the Military Police to inform the event to the Metropolitan Police. This is the result of a lack of foresight and definite faith in the incident on the part of the Military Police commander, and this is something very unpleasant. This was the impression of most officers. It is said that the Metropolitan Police had detected the existence of some serious plot in connection with the HASHIMOTO Incident but was finally unable to do anything and had given it up when they learned that this faction was under the leadership of Prince CHICHIBU and Prince KAYO. I wonder if this is true?

As soon as the plot was uncovered and the separate detention in various districts of the officers involved was completed, War Minister General MINAMI reported this incident to the Diet, but the publication of newspaper articles was suspended indefinitely. The outline of the War Minister's report to the Diet included the following points:

"Lately, a certain plot was attempted by some officers on the active list. However, this was due to their strong spirit of patriotism and there has been no other intention. Only, if this is left alone, it might be utilized by outsiders for some plot and is liable to be an act infringing the military discipline, so they have been detained for the sake of safety, etc."

There were much criticisms about the officers in custody. They were intent on amusements by calling GEISHA girls from TOKYO or there were dissolute and indiscreet manners about them. Thus they were detained for about 20 days and were gradually released. Among the officers connected with this event Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO was sentenced to 20 day's severe confinement, Major CHO and Captain TANAKA (Yayoi) both to 10 days' severe confinement, and no other person was punished. However, officers having any relation with this incident, without regard to whether they belonged to the Central Headquarters or to the troops, had to change their posts without exception; and the personnel affairs were completely renovated.

Motives Leading to the Disclosure  
of the October Incident

Elements observed as being the cause and motive for the discovery of the so-called October Incident are as follows:

1. Indiscretion of behaviour. Members of the party had dreamed of patriots during the MEIJI Restoration and took to extravagant pleasures. This is the most important cause for the failure. As the result of which, the Metropolitan Police had become aware of them, as has been mentioned above.

Lt.

2./ Col. Hashimoto's pressure on the Vice-War Minister to make him join their party on the night of 15 (16) October resulted in the complete exposure of the incident.

They had constantly declared their intention of forcing their high-ranking officers to join them just before the actual execution. But on what date had they planned for the execution? It may be harsh, but from this action by Lt. Col. Hashimoto, it might be concluded that it was his intention to check the general plan through the influence of his superiors as he had fallen into a dilemma and had no intention to carry out the plan. Lt. Col. Hashimoto had made frequent visits to Col. IMAMURA and used to tell him, "I am in a terrible position." Judging from this fact, my above opinion may be regarded not unreasonable. After all, Col. IMAMURA is an influential section chief of the Army General Staff Office. And yet, for Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO to have suddenly taken such actions as mentioned above on about the 10th of October, although he had never spoken to the Colonel before, must be the consequence of some dilemma.

No matter what Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO's true intention had been, his hasty urging of the Vice Minister to join them was the cause for the disclosure of the incident.

3. Dr. Shumei Okawa is said to have squealed this scheme to a certain high official of the Department of Imperial Household. On this point, however, there are some different views as follows:

a. That a spy of the Department of Imperial Household whom Dr. Okawa had trusted was privately informed of this scheme and the spy reported it to Sekiya, Vice-Minister of Household Department.

b. That Dr. Okawa himself squealed it.

c. That it was attributable to TAO TAKUNO of the DAI-ICHI SHIMBUN, who attempted to threaten a high official of the

Dept. of Imperial Household for money by taking advantage of this scheme.

Tao TAKUNO's character, however, was widely criticized. I have written above my knowledge of the October Incident; and in conclusion, I would like to make clear some misunderstandings on this incident.

1. The October Incident is certainly an influence of the anti-UGAKI ideology. Of course, many of the participants in the October Incident had been involved in the so-called March Incident. The March Incident was General UGAKI's sinister design but the October Incident aimed to account for the great blunders in personnel matters of the War Ministry caused by the General. It is often said that General UGAKI was to be blamed for the October Incident but this is not true.

2. It is evident that this scheme aimed to do away with all the existing political parties but this was not the only aim. It certainly was an attempt to check the blind movement of the officials of the Department of Imperial Household to separate the Emperor from the Army--especially to purge the vicious characters surrounding the Emperor who had sided with the political parties.

3. The relation between this Incident and the SAKURA-KAI.

They say that this Incident was attempted by the SAKURA-KAI but it was not. As stated above, it was an arbitrary scheme by some radical members of the SAKURA-KAI. They actually say that the SAKURA-KAI is so conservative that it can't be relied upon. Even if the leading policy of the SAKURA-KAI is said to be an advancement toward dictatorship, it must be concluded that their faction is directly connected with the SAKURA-KAI. This is probably because it is not only the SAKURA-KAI that is contemplating advancement toward dictatorship--the rule of the Emperor.

There are many points to be studied in the October Incident. For instance:

The necessity of a theoretical plan for the reformation.

Reformists (executors) and their reason.

Reformists and their desires.

Planning through consistent foresight.

Actions of the Army and the order of the supreme command.

The problem of connection and coalition with persons outside of the Army.

The problem of extravagant pleasures.

" " " funds

3

The problem of secrets.

" " " inducement, etc.

The problem of future reference in regard to the so-called October Incident.

1. Investigation of the fundamental problem of what made them attempt a political reformation by even resorting to emergency measures.

2. The fundamental issue of whether it is right or wrong for the Army to attempt a reconstruction of our nation.

3. The fear of successive occurrence of the same kind of incident in the future.

4. How shall we deal with it if it should occur in succession.

5. Will simple suppression and restraint be denied? How shall we lead the thought of national reform being deeply impressed in the minds of young officers?

6. National reform is inevitable. Should the reformation be made by the natural transition of the nation itself, or by some kind of revolutionary activities? If we shall resort to revolutionary activities, by whom will it be done? In order to reduce the disaster thereof as much as possible, should it not be inevitable that the reformation be made by force of the army?

7. So far as the above statement is concerned, activities of the army cannot but be extremely prudent. Such careless activities as in the March Incident and the October Incident should absolutely be stopped. In regard to the idea for reformation which is now prevalent among the young officers, we shall advise them not to act heedlessly and blindly by showing them some definite measures to rely upon.

8. It is one of the urgent necessities to form a draft for the reconstruction of our country.

I. Among the troops which tried to join the BASHIMOTO group, there were:

- (1) One company which was under the influence of  
Dr. OKADA OSUMI.
- (2) Four companies under the influence of HISHIDA OKIKAZU  
and NITA KAZUTARU.

However, regarding the troops above stated, all of the company commanders were not necessarily going to lead all of their men, but the officers attached to the companies were to do so in place of the commanders. (The number of the regiment to which the troops belonged, and the names of the officers were kept secret.)

II. The 3rd Infantry Regiment, although the plotters have not disclosed anything about it, seems to have had some connection. Their faction has revealed that the regimental commander had said, "In case all of my men will participate, I will go, too." From these words, the situation can easily be conjectured.

A P P E N D I X

III. All the participating troops were to openly leave the gate under the pretext of a maneuver and take the assigned positions.

IV. Regarding the so-called October Incident, Prince HISASHIKUNI had no relation with it. (This is clear from the statement by their faction.)

V. Regarding Princes CHICHIBU and KAYO, it is as already stated.

VI. Regarding TATEKAWA, Chief of Department, there is something which makes us believe that they had his least understanding on the so-called October Incident. The reasons are:

(1) When the staffs of the commander of the Korean Army and the Reserving Army came to Tokyo, there was something regarding the reformation among the preliminary matters.

(2) The reply to the request of advice of Colonel MATSUDA.

## APPENDIX

I. Among the troops which tried to join the HASHIMOTO group, there were:

- (1) One company which was under the influence of Dr. OKAWA SHUMEI
- (2) Four companies under the influence of NISHIDA CHIKARA and KITA KAZUTERU.

However, regarding the troops above stated, all of the company commanders were not necessarily going to lead all of their men, but the officers attached to the companies were to do so in place of the commanders. (The number of the regiment to which the troops belonged, and the names of the officers were kept secret.)

II. The 3rd Infantry Regiment, although the plotters have not disclosed anything about it, seems to have had some connection. Their faction has revealed that the regimental commander had said, "In case all of my men will participate, I will go, too." From these words, the situation can easily be conjectured.

III. All the participating troops were to openly leave the gate under the pretext of a maneuver and take the assigned positions.

IV. Regarding the so-called October Incident, Prince HIGASHIKUNI had no relation with it. (This is clear from the statement by their faction.)

V. Regarding Princes CHICHIBU and KAYO, it is as already stated.

VI. Regarding TATEKAWA, Chief of Department, there is something which makes us believe that they had his tacit understanding on the so-called October Incident. The reasons are:

- (1) When the staffs of the commander of the Korean Army and the Kwantung Army came to Tokyo, there was something regarding the reformation among the preliminary matters.

- (2) The reply to the words of advice of Colonel IMAMURA.



(Regarding the speech of Dr. OKAWA)

VII. The plan which the group had for the October Incident was quite simple. It consisted of three sheets of section-paper, and its contents were:

- (1) One sheet was in regard to the attack on the Metropolitan Police Board and the Premier's Official Residence, and going to the Imperial Palace.
- (2) One sheet was in regard to personnel affairs:
  - (a) Red column: names of the participants.
  - (b) Pink column: names of those who were regarded as having favorable opinions.
  - (c) White column: names of those who were regarded to remain neutral.
  - (d) Light green column: names of those who should be regarded with vigilance.
  - (e) Blue column: names of those who were to be accounted for (killed) at the execution of the coup d'eta (mainly those who oppressed the "Sakura-Kai". For example, Major General KATSUKI KIYO SHI of the Military Staff College and Colonel NAKANO NAOZO of the Military Officers' School, etc.), and there were names of scholars and politicians with strong nationalistic ideas).
- (3) On the last sheet were written the addresses of those mentioned above, and methods to contact with them, and to keep watch against them.

VIII. Regarding the October Incident, ADACHI, Ex-Home Minister, could be judged as having quite a distinct knowledge.

- (1) From the fact that the Metropolitan Police Board had already detected this incident; and NAKANO SEIGO was quite intimate with the young military officers, he seems to have reported to Adachi.
- (2) ADACHI, Ex-Home Minister, was extremely worried about the dissatisfaction among the young officers, a so-called coalition cabinet was what ADACHI had planned. He tried to grasp the power of administration by recommending UGAKI as premier, and by unifying most of the government officials and civilians, and by repressing the discontent of the army. But NAKANO

Seigo insisted on Lt.-Gen. ARAKI as War Minister, for UGAKI was distrusted by the army while ARAKI was strongly supported. He contrived to carry out his plan. Later, NAKANO began to think that it made no difference whether ARAKI would agree to be the War Minister or not, for he thought that there would be reasons in either case.

IX. Regarding the so-called March Incident, it is clear that UGAKI had a strong intention for the reformation.

- (1) When Dr. OKAWA showed him his plan (general outline) and demanded his participation, he said, "I shall rise and join you if you will bring it to that point."
- (2) When Vice War Minister NINOMIYA, Chief of Bureau KOISO and Chief of Department TATEKAWA explained to him the situation and demanded him to rise he said, "The time has come when the army will have to rise." But they did not judge whether UGAKI had heartily affirmed that the army would siege the Diet with troops, and force the resignation (of the cabinet).

X. Regarding the management of personnel in the March Incident and the October Incident:

- (1) In the March Incident, there was no person disposed nor transferred (although 300 bombs were handed to the civilians).
- (2) Regarding the October Incident, it has already been stated. Regarding these two points, the officers in general seemed to have concluded as follows, although they may have differed in some points:
  - (a) Higher officers are not punished even if they do wrong.
  - (b) The victims of the October Incident are after all the victims of the March Incident.
  - (c) As long as a slight punishment is fixed for those who destroy the national army and spread the spirit of the "subordinate contending against the superior," such incidents are bound to break out successively in the future.

THIS MONTH							NEXT MONTH						
APRIL							MAY						
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TUESDAY  
**2**  
APRIL

1946

Mr. Dandy,  
 This was <sup>sent in to</sup> ~~given~~ me by Capt. Robinson just before he left for Washington. I wish to turn it over for your usual processing. It deals with the October Incident.

DB  
at length.

Please have scanned <sup>at length</sup> and analyze. histo. etc. to be merely summarized.

92

Tuesday, April 2<sup>summarized</sup>  
 of pertinent <sup>Extensive translation</sup> parts in plan + control. 273

11/2/24

Document about the October Incident -1-

In October of Showa (1931) the reconstruction of the Empire was planned <sup>to complete by military power,</sup> by some officers of the Guard Staff Office and the Imperial Guard Divisions. But it was not fulfilled at last.

This Incident had much relation to Sakurakai (Cherry circle) and the March Incident.

(1) Sakurakai. - This circle <sup>was</sup> composed of <sup>radical</sup> young officers of the War Ministry and the Guard Staff Office with the object of reconstructing the Empire by themselves.

The time of the selection of this circle

: September of Showa 5th.

- Projectors : Hashimoto Artillery Lieutenant colonel
- : Sakata Infantry Lieutenant colonel
- : Higuichi Infantry Lieutenant colonel

Numbers of the circle about 20.

(2) The March Incident.

General Ugaki determined to enter the political world, and <sup>secretly</sup> planned to organize the cabinet <sup>himself</sup>.

(A) Chief members who supported this plan.

Tachikawa, vice-director of the Guard Staff Office

- Nagata, Okamura, Shigetō, Yamawaki, chiefs of sections
- (b) Means adopted to organize the cabinet: military power may be used, if necessary.
  - (c) This plan <sup>had been</sup> approved by the army.
  - (d) Promoters of this plan besides the officers  
Shūmei Ōkawa

This plan was much opposed by Nagata and Okamura Colonels of the Guard Staff Office before it was fulfilled.

As this circle was not oppressed and promoters of the March Incident was not punished, such incident as the October Incident was occurred next.

### The October Incident.

Some radical members of Sakurakai and some of the promoters of the March Incident began to plan holding the reins of powers by corps d'état again during the summer of that year.

Details of the plan:

Date of the enforcement of the comp d'état:

21st, October.

Number of the officers who <sup>planned to</sup> participate this plan:

about 120.

Strength of force <sup>which planned to</sup> participate this plan.

Each 10 companies from the regiments of the Imperial Guard divisions.

Each a company from the First and Second infantry regiments.

Participators besides the army.

Shumei Okawa and his followers.

Chikara Nishida and his party.

Naval officers about 10

Naval bomber 13.

Airplanes from Shimoshizu 3 or 4.

Order of the enforcement:

(1) They make a sudden attack on members under the cabinet conference.

(2) Sudden attack and occupation of the Metropolitan

### Police Guard.

(3) Surrounding the War Ministry and the Guard Staff Office and the isolation of them from the outside.

And they let the superiors approve this plan, and let them necessary orders issue.

(4) Admiral Tōgō proceeds to the Imperial Palace and hopes the Emperor's issue of an Imperial Command to form a new ministry to a new-born power.

(5) Members of the new cabinet planned.

Prime minister and War minister, Araki

Home minister Hashimoto.

Foreign minister Tachikawa

Minister of Finance Ōkawa.

Naval minister Kobayashi

Chief of the Metropolitan Police Guard, Chō.

On 16th, October, Hashimoto, a lieutenant-colonel, reported this plan to Sugiyama, vice-minister of the War Ministry and hoped to be approved this plan. He was much surprised and called Koiso and Nagata all of sudden and consulted to let them this plan with both men.

On that day, Lieutenant-general Araki urged Hashimoto

to stop this plan. But he rejected, so the leading members of the army brought about 10 of them into the gendarmerie. <sup>As a result of this,</sup> Lieutenant colonel Washimoto was put on good behaviour of twenty days, and Major Chō and Captain Tanaka also ten days. Others were not punished and all these members were transferred to other places and posts.

Some notes about this Incident :

- (1) This Incident was one of the expression of anti-Ugaki movements. Some of these members of this Incident had connections with the March Incident, but the March Incident was a expression of Ugaki's desire and this Incident was planned to wipe away many mistakes on personnel affairs <sup>that</sup> Ugaki had made.
- (2) This Incident was planned <sup>in order</sup> to drive away all bad officials and political parties who wanted to isolate the Emperor from the army.
- (3) Relation between this Incident and Sakurakai. It was often said that this Incident was planned by Sakurakai. But it seemed that Sakurakai had no



direct connection with this Incident. Some radical members of Sakurakai and other radical people planned this Incident.

(4) Prince Chichibu and Kaya were said to be <sup>in</sup> connection with this Incident. But it was only false rumour.

(5) Promoters of this Incident were not punished so severely that holding the rein of political power and the reconstruction of the Empire by military power or coup d'état have come to be planned next by next in the army.

憲兵司令部

憲少佐 三浦三郎

憲大尉 美座時成

憲大尉 横山憲三

× 憲大尉 河村愛三

憲少佐 植木鎮夫

憲大尉 赤藤庄次

憲大尉 四方諒二

總町憲兵分隊

憲少佐 大木繁

麻布聯隊區司令部

步中佐 古恩了

科學研究所

步中尉 生田目常雄

陸軍大學校

總中佐 坂又幸

總中佐 畑勇三郎

騎少佐 片岡重

× 總少佐 佐野忠義

騎少佐 大内教

步大尉 永井八津次

步大尉 福山寬郎

步中尉 辻政信

步大尉 大野武城

騎大尉 坂井芳雄

步大尉 三島美貞

× 步大尉 青木一伎

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT NUMBER 2124

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"Notebook of Major X".

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(None) (Part) of this document had been extracted for court use.

F. MATTISON  
Files Unit  
Document Division

2/12

昭和七年一月

〇〇少佐手記

所謂十月事件ニ關スル手記

Document  
delivered  
to Robinson  
by Japanese  
via Kawanishi  
To Government  
Div. for  
C.A.T.M.

昭和六年十月參謀本部及近衛師團等各一部ノ將校ニヨリ國家改造ヲ武力ニ訴ヘテ決行セントスル謀議行ハレタリ本事件ハ未遂ニ移リシト雖モ世ニ所謂十月事件トシテ陰ニ喧傳セラレアリ或ハ非難シ或ハ贊シ互ニ論議セラレツツ而カモ或ハ事實ヲ曲歪シテ論議者自體ニ有利ノ如カラシメ往々真相ヲ誤傳セラル

本事件ハ何レノ方面ヨリ見ルモ重要視スヘキ内容ヲ含ミ將來必然的ニ起ルヘキ第三第四等々ノ舉ニ貴重ナル參考ヲ呈ス

以下吾ノ知見セル範圍ニ於テ所謂十月事件ヲ記述スヘシ

吾ト所謂十月事件トノ關係ハ以下記述スル所ニヨリ明白ナリ要ハ吾ハ本事件ニ密接ナル關係ニアリシハ極メテ明瞭ナリ所謂十月事件ニ對シ極メテ密接ナル關係ヲ有ツモノニアリ曰ク(1)櫻會(2)所謂三月事件

櫻會

櫻會ハ概觀

本會ハ陸軍省、參謀本部ノ少壯將校カ中心トナリ國家改造ヲ目論ミ建設セラレタルモノナリ(但シ櫻會ナル名稱ハ便宜上建設久シテ後ニ於

テ附セラレタルモノナリ

建設日時

昭和五年秋九月下旬

發起者

參謀本部

橋本砲兵中佐 (23) 期

陸軍省

坂田歩兵中佐 (21) 期

警備司令部

樋口歩兵中佐 (21) 期

等ヲ始メ約二十數名

吾ハ本會ノ綱領宣言等ノ起草ヲ托セラレ最初ヨリ本會ニ關係深シ

目的 本會ハ國家改造ヲ以テ終局ノ目的トシ之カ爲メ要スレ

ハ武力ヲ行使スルモ辭セス

會 現役陸軍將校中ニテ階級ハ中佐以下國家改造ニ關心ヲ

有シ私心ナキモノニ限ル

目的 達成ノ爲メ準備行動

(1) 一切ノ手段ヲ盡シテ國軍將校ニ國家改造ノ必要ナル意識ヲ注入

(2) 會員ノ擴大強化 (昭和六年五月頃ニハ約百五〇名ノ會員アリ)

(3) 國家改造ノタメ具體案ノ作爲  
然ルニ機會ナルモノ、本質ヲ考察スレハ建設當時ヨリ既ニ分裂スヘキ性質ヲ多分ニ内包セリ即チ

(1) 破壊ヲ第一義トシ建設ノ如キハ破壊ノ上ニ自然的ニ發生スルトナ  
ス一派（註言カ壯ナルタメ少ナカテサル人員共鳴ス）

(2) 建設ヲ主トシ一切ノ準備ヲ準備シ具體案ヲ作成シ得タル後破壊ヲ  
其範圍内ニ止メ必要ノ最少限度ニ止メントスル一派（註主張ハ理  
論的ナルモ地味ニシテ且當時具體案未完成ナリシタメ多クノ共鳴  
者ナシ）

(3) 前二者ノ中間ニ立ツ一派（日和見主義的ノモノ）（註多數ニシテ常  
ニ浮動ス）  
斯クテ會内ハ最初ヨリ論争絶ヘス三派鼎立ノ状態ニ於テ破壊ヲ主トス  
ル一派ノ行動ハ常ニ積極的壓倒的ニシテ動トモスレハ機會全般ヲシテ  
直接行動ニ出テントシツアリ  
吾ハ義ニ昭和三年八月陸軍省ニ轉スルヤ間モナク當時參謀本部作戰課

ノ鈴木歩兵少佐（後ニ關係アル人）ヲ主腦トスル或ル研究会（其目的ハ明瞭ナラザリシモ國家改造ノタメ研究会トモ見ラル）ニ加入スヘキヲ求メラレ吾ハ意ヲ決シテ加入シ會員ハ時々借行社ニ集合シ研究会ヲ開キアリタル然ルニ該研究会ハ會員中ニ重大ナル意見ノ相違發生シ分裂解消セリ（鈴木少佐ハ歐米ニ出張中）吾ハ乃チ渡邊大尉（29期）岩畔大尉（30期）山岡大尉（30期）ト共ニ依然深刻ナル研究ヲ繼續シアリタリ

櫻會ノ成立スルトキ吾等四名ハ其ノ儘櫻會ニ入レリ然ルニ會内ノ事情前述セル如キヲ以テ吾等四名ハ極力改革案ノ完成ヲ急キ一方ニ會ヲシテ暴力化セシメサルコトニ努力シツ、昭和五年暮ニ到レリ當時上司ハ櫻會ニ對シ概シテ不快ノ念ヲ抱キアリタリ

參謀本部ニ於テハ恒例ニヨリ第二部ノ情勢判断行ハル昭和五年ノ情勢判断ハ特記セラルヘキ性質ヲ有ス即チ從來ノ第二部ノ情勢判断ハ單ニ作戰ニ資スルタメノ判断ノミニシテ更言スレハ敵國ヲノミ眼中ニ置キ



タルモノナリシカ當年ノモノハ積極的ニ滿蒙問題ヲ解決セントセハ必然的ニ國家ノ改造ヲ先行條件トセサルヲ得ス之カ爲メ先ツ國家ノ改造ヲ決行スヘシトノ主張勝ヲ制シ情勢判斷中ニハ此ノ重大ナル一項加ハリタリ參謀本部第二部カ從來ノ恒例ヲ破リタル判決ヲ下スニ至リシハ時勢ノ變化ニモヨルヘシト雖モ第二部ノ部員部長中ニ多數ノ櫻會員ヲ有シ橋本砲兵中佐（憲兵）根本歩兵中佐（支那班）ノ如キ有力者存シテ活動セシニヨル

此ノ情勢判斷ニ際シテ櫻會ナルモノハ主張一部貫徹サルト共ニ參謀次長ヲシテ所謂三月事件ニ櫻會ヲ利用セントセルニ至リシモノト認メラル

櫻會ノ軍部外ヘノ進出

櫻會ノ急進派ハ軍部外ニ同志ヲ求メントシ社會民衆黨大衆黨ノ幹部ト屢々會合シ意見ヲ交換セリ此ノ結果彼ノ無産黨ハ軍部ノ少壯將校ノ一般意識ヲ明ニシ軍部カ決シテ資本家ノ手先ニ非ラサルコトヲ認識スルノ一助トモナレリ然ルニ無産階級ハ軍部ノ此ノ意識ヲ以テ自己ノ黨勢

擴張ノ爲ニ逆用セリ其ノ顯者ナル一例ト見ルヘキハ昭和六年一月下旬

?ニ於ケル社會民衆黨ノ廣島支部ニ於ケル態度ナリ

社民黨ノ幹部東京ニテ直接接會ノ急進派ト會見セル廣島支部大

會ニ於テ云フ「現在ノ車部ハ著シク我カ黨ニ好意ヲ有ス將官級ヨリ

尉官級ヲ一貫シテ我黨ノ支持者ニ非スレハ共鳴者ナリ特ニ中央部ノ

少壯將校中ニハ既成政黨打倒ノ爲メ秘密會組織セラレアリ云々」ト

櫻會ハ海軍將校ト連繫ヲ密ニセントシ星洋會(陸海軍幕僚將校中佐以

下ノ會)ヲ作り屢々會見セリ是等ハ凡テ櫻會ノ急進派ノ策謀スル所

櫻會ニ對スル風評

○車部内ノ贊否ハ混淆シ特ニ櫻會ノ本質ヲ認識セスシテノ論議多キヲ

以テ特ニ記述スルノ要ナシ

○昭和五年暮(昭和六年一月)ニ於テ警視廳ノ某課長憲兵司

令部ノ一課長ヲ訪レ「近時軍隊内ニ特ニ中央部將校中ニ錦旗共產黨

ナルモノノ組織セラレ天皇ヲ奉シテ變革ヲ企圖セントスル在リト

ノ

風評アリ真相如何ト問ヘルカ如キハ明ニ櫻會ヲ指シタルモノト認

山ムヘシ

○又昭和六年一月第一回ノ閣議ノ席上ニ於テ安達内相ハ當時ノ宇垣陸  
一相ニ對シ「近時現役將校中ニ政治ヲ云々スルモノ多ク之カ爲メニ結  
社サヘ結成セラレアリト云フ真相如何」ト問ヘルアリ是亦櫻會及星

ニ洋會ヲ指示セルナラン

斯クテ櫻會ニハ一歩一歩實踐的行爲ノ方ヘト轉步シ行ケリ然シナカラ  
急進派モ幾多ノ經驗ヲ經テ理論無クテハ到底其目的ヲ達成スヘカラス  
特ニ改造ノ具體案ヲ缺キテハ單ナル盲動ニ過ル可キヲ徹力乍ラ意識セ  
ル爲メ昭和六年一月勿々ヨリ改造案ヲ作成スルニ着手センコトヲ決議  
セリ而シテ之カタメ委員トシテ選ハレタル者左ノ如シ

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手カ從來ヨリノ研究ノ同行者タリシ山岡大尉ハソ聯ニ不日轉任スヘ

キコト渡邊大尉又支那ニ至ルヘキヲ以テ自ラ辭シ岩畔大尉ハ局外者トシテ櫻會ノ改革案ヲ見ルヲ以テ有利ナリトシテ委員ヲ辭セリ蓋シ委員ハ急進派ヲ以テ大配分ヲ占メ到底満足ノモノ出來サルヘキハ豫想シ得タル所ニシテ吾ハ從來ノ同志四名ト共ニ第二第三段構ヘノ必要アルヲ認メ此ノ如クセル也

吾ハ到底此ノ委員ヲ以テシテハ何モノモ出來サルヘシト思惟シ乍ラモ之ニ依リテ急進派ヲ抑ヘ且彼等ヲシテ如何ニ理論及具體案ノ必要且作爲ノ難事ナルヤヲ意識セシムルノ具ニ供セントセリ斯クテ漸ク櫻會カ不満足ナカラ其進ムヘキ道ヲ自ラ明ニセントスルニ至リシ矢先キ所謂三月事件ハ爆發セリ

### 所謂 三月 事件

一月九日宇垣大將ハ政界ニ乗り出シ内閣ヲ組織スヘキ決心ヲ固メタリ  
一月十三日宇垣大將ハ杉山次官、二宮次長、小磯軍務局長、建川副長、山脇（作戰）課長（但シ當日ハ代理鈴木眞一中佐）橋本中佐、根本中佐ト共ニ國內改造ノ爲メ方法手段ヲ協議ス（確實ナル情報）

昭和六年一月初旬參謀次長二宮中將ハ橋本中佐ニ對シテ左ノ要旨ノコトヲ示ス曰ク

愈々宇垣大將ハ乗り出スニツキ變革ノ爲ニ必要ナル計畫ヲ作成シテ出スヘキコト

橋本中佐ハ此ノ言ヲ信シ直ニ坂田中佐及吾ヲ陸軍省調査所ノ支室ニ伴ヒ次長ノ言ニ從ヒ愈々活動スルタメ計畫ヲ作ルヘキコトヲ求ム然ルニ坂田中佐ハ吾ハ宇垣大將二宮中將ノ人物櫻會ニ對スル世評等ヨリシテ遽ニ此ノ言ヲ信スルノ不可ニシテ危險ナルヲ思ヒ一應次長ノ本心ヲ確ムヘキコト計畫ハ二案ヲ作ルヘキコト一一案ハ真相ノ變革案ニシテ櫻會終局ノ目的ヨリ割り出スモノ他ノ一案ハカモフラージュ的ノモノニシテ之ニヨリ櫻會ナルモノカ危險視サル、要ナキ更言スレハ櫻會ハ極メテ濫健ナルモノナルコトヲ明示スルニ足ルモノ、二案ニシテ次長ノ眞意ノ如何ニ懸シテ其何レヲ採ルヘキカタ決定セントストセリ

橋本中佐ハ直接次長ニ就キ其眞意ヲ確ム之ニ依リテ得タル情報左ノ如シ

1、宇垣大將乗出シニ賛成シアル軍部ノ主腦者參謀次長建川少將、小磯軍務局長、水田軍事課長、岡村補任課長、重藤支那課長、山脇第二課長

陸軍次官ハ其ノ態度明カナラス

2、宇垣大將乗出シニ就キ要スレハ兵力ヲ使用スルヲ辭セス

3、軍隊方面ニモ充分ナル諒解アリ

4、建設スヘキ未來社會政綱政策等ハ上級者ニ於テ作爲スヘキヲ以テ政權奪取ノ方法ヲ立案スヘキコト

等吾人等ハ其計畫ヲ作ルコト、ナレリ

然ルニ上級將校ノ指示ニヨリ「大尉級以下ハ本件ニハ參加セシメス蓋シ事不成功ニ終ランカ凡テ非ニ服スヘク然ル時ニハ遺族ノ生計ノ保證出來サルヲ以テ少ナクモ少佐級以上ニ限ルヘシ」ト此ノ指示ハ橋本中佐、坂田中佐等ヲ痛ク動かシタリ乃チ二中佐ハ從來ノ研究ノ都合上予ヲ除外視シテハ成案ヲ得難キヲ以テ特例トシテ吾ノ參加ヲ上司ニ乞ヘリ支那課長ノ運動ニヨリ兎モ角吾ハ參加スルコト、ナレリ

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然シ乍ラ極メテ明瞭ナル如ク建設計畫ト破壊計畫トヲ分離立案セント  
 スルカ如キハ暴モ甚タシ忽チニシテ破壊政權奪取ノ計畫ハ一寸先ハ暗  
 夜ノ如クナリテ到底出來サルニ至レリ而カモ政綱政策ナルモノハ上級  
 者ニ於テモ立案シアラサルコトハ明白トナレリ而カモ時日ノ遷延ハ許  
 サレス切り離シテ破壊計畫政權奪取計畫ヲ作ルコト、ナレリ當時此ノ  
 計畫策定上ニ於テ必要ナル諸件トシテ知り得タル所ノモノ左ノ如シ

- 1、軍首腦部乗出サントスル氣勢甚タ銳シ
- 2、軍隊ノ出動準備ハ暗々裡ニ出來アリ
- 3、必要ナル資金ハ機密費ヲ以テ取敢ス支出ス
- 4、大川周明博士ハ無産階級（主トシテ大衆黨）約一萬人ヲ動員シ決  
 死隊ヲ募集シテ参加スルコトニ決定
- 5、決行ノ時期ハ労働法系上程ノ日トス
- 6、上司トノ連絡ハ橋本中佐トス

（吾ハ以上ノ諸件細部ニ就キ反問スルモ得ル所ナシ茲後日備ムル  
 所ニヨレハ此ノ情報中トスハ疑問ノ大ナルモノアリハ實際的



ニハ一駐支出ハハ事實一  
之ヲ要スルニ車即今四ノ舉ハ純然タル一ノ「クイヂター」ニ過キス吾  
ハ極メテ限ラレタル範圍ニ於テ兵力行使「クイヂター」實現ノ計畫ヲ  
作ルコトハナリタリ一上級者ハ熱心ニ他ノ建設案ヲ作ルモノト思ヒ乍  
ラ一而カモ時日ハ切迫シ立案ノ思料ニ乏シク殊ニ何等ノ統制ナク各自  
勝手ナル行動ヲ採リアリ殊ニ重藤大佐ハ大川博士ト手ヲ握リ無軌的ニ  
無産黨ト連絡シ仄聞スル所ニヨレハ破壊計畫ヲ立案シツ、アリト云フ  
二月七日午後三時過品川ニ在ル重藤大佐宅ニ集合ス 會スルモノ坂田  
中佐、根本中佐及吾也  
重藤大佐ハ吾ニ云フ「既ニ橋本中佐ヨリ承知シアランモ今四ノ變革ニ  
際シテハ大尉級以下ヲ參加セシメサルコトトナシアルモ君丈ケハ特別  
トス然シ萬一不成功ノ場合ニ於テモ決シテ遺族ノ生活ニ關シテハ顧慮  
スルノ要ナシ然ルヘキ處ニ於テ善處スルコト、セラレアルヲ以テ安ン  
スヘシ云々」ト  
重藤以下協議ノ結果破壊計畫ヲ策定ス

其大要左ノ如シハ

1 近々大規模ニ無産三派連合ノ内閣糾弾ノ大演説會ヲ日比谷ニ於テ開  
ニ備シ御前ノ氣勢ヲ昂揚ス且議會ニ向ヒ「デモストレーション」ヲ行  
ニ本格的ニ決行スル場合ノ偵察的準備ヲ行フニ本件ニ就キテハ詳細  
ニ計畫セルモ略ス

2 労働法案上程ノ日破壊政權奪取ヲ決行ス

此ノ日政友民政兩黨ノ本部首相官邸ヲ爆撃ス但シ爆彈ハ爆聲大ナル  
モ殺傷效力少ナキモノヲ使用ス投爆者ハ大川博士ノ計畫ニヨル一萬  
人動員ヲ行ヒ八方ヨリ議會ニ對シ「デモ」ヲ行フ、各縦隊ノ先頭ニ  
ハ諒解アル幹部ヲ配シ統制ヲ取ル又各縦隊ニハ抜刀隊ヲ置キ必然的  
ニ豫期セラルヘキ警官ノ阻止ヲ排除ス

4 軍隊ハ非常集合ヲ行ヒ議會ヲ保護スルトシテ之ヲ包圍シ内外一切ノ  
交通ヲ遮斷ス豫メ將校ハ主トシテ樓會ノ者「ヲ各道路ニ配シ縦隊ニ  
配シアル幹部ハ之ヲ實行ス

5 此情勢ニ於テ某中將（此ノ氏名ハ最後迄秘匿セラレ今日ニ至ルモ明

カナラス一説ニハ眞崎中將ト云ヒアリハ小磯建川少將ヲ何レカ一名以下數名ノ將校ヲ率ヒ議場ニ入り各大臣ニ對シ「國民ハ今ヤ現内閣ヲ信任セス宇垣大將ヲ首相トスル内閣ヲフマ信頼ス今ヤ國家ハ重大ノ時機ニ會ス宜シク善處セラルヘシト宣言シ總辭職ヲ決行セシム

6. 幣原代理以下辭表ヲ提出セシムルハ其時重藤大佐ハ各各自ニ運動費自  
7. 大命ハ宇垣大將ニ降下スル如ク豫メ準備セル所ニ從ヒ策動ス大隈院  
宮殿下及西園寺公ヘノ使者ヲ決定スハ大隈院  
（1）ハ計畫ノ大綱ノミ各々ニ就テハ細部ノ計畫ヲ立案セルモ繁  
雜ニ亘ルヲ以テ略ス

此人日夜半計畫案ハ成ル解散セントスル時重藤大佐ハ各自ニ運動費自  
助車代トシテ機密費ヲ分配セントセリ註此ノ機密費ニツキテハ後日  
ニ問題トナレリ坂田中佐ト吾ハ斷乎トシテ反對シ遂ニ受ケス是レ坂  
田中佐ノ人ト爲リ先見ノ明、平時ヨリ指導ノ適切ナリシニ歸ス重藤  
大佐、橋本中佐ハ既ニ事成リシカ如ク狂喜セリ然カシ吾ハ其ノ計畫ハ

全般ノ見透シニ於テ重大ナル缺陥アルヲ認メサルヲ得ヌ軍部外ノモノ  
特ニ大川博士ノ如キ人物ト共同セントセル點時機トシテ見ルヘキ何モ  
ノモ無キ所特ニ建設計畫トノ連繋皆無ナル等々是也二月八日午前九時  
前日ノ重藤大佐以下建川少將モニ會シ破壞政權奪取計畫ヲ計議シ確定  
シ之ヲ宇垣大將ニ呈スルコトセリ（註本計畫ハ第一第二ノ兩案ヲ作  
爲セルモノナルモ其ノ根本主義ハ同一ニシテ前掲ノ如キ大綱ヲ有テリ）  
今ヤ其ノ決行ノ日ヲ待ツノミナレリ一々其ノ決行ノ日ヲ待ツノミナレリ  
然ルニ其後吾ソ得ル所ノ情報ハ甚タ疑問多キモノノミナリ即チ變ニ決  
行ニ極メテ熱心ナリト稱セラル、軍務局長ノ態度軟化セリト水田岡村  
大佐ハ積極的ニ反對ヲ開始セルカ如ク陸軍次官ハ其ノ態度大體ニ於テ  
反對ニ傾キタリト殊ニ參謀次長ノ變革ニ對スル心意ハ概メテ陋劣ナル  
モノアリ日ヲ宇垣内閣ノ下ニ於テ陸相ヲ夢ミツハアリト  
各自ハ無統制ニシテ理ニ行動シーノ情報ヲヌラ與ヘス一吾ハ悉ク進シ  
テ連絡ヲ求メ中ニ重大ナル意義ヲ與ヘラレタル大川博士ノ一萬人動員  
ハ頗ル怪シク而カモ大川博士重藤大佐ハ四谷荒木町ニ於テ連夜豪遊ヲ

極メ不謹慎千萬ニモ明日ヲモ知ラヌ命也云々ト藝妓ノ前ニテ口外スル  
カ如キ等々就中吾ヲ失望セシメタルハ建設計畫主義綱領政策等ニ  
就キテノ研究カ皆無ナリシコトナリ一茲此ノ點ハ橋本中佐ヨリノ言特  
ニ當時變革ニ熱心ナリシ參謀本部ノ山脇大佐カ未來社會建設ノタメノ  
綱領政策ノ研究セルモノアラハ借用シタシト吾ニ求メタル點並ニ  
同大佐ノ言ヘル軍事課長モ多少ハ案カアルラシイカ實ハ困ツテキル  
トノ點ヨリ判斷シ實證セラルル一  
斯クテ企圖スル變革ハ眞個ノ國家ノ改造純眞ナル精神ヲ發セルニ非ス  
シテ俗惡ナル政權者流ノ政權奪取行動ヲ一層惡化シ陛下ノ陸軍ヲ私シ  
自己ノ汚レタル慾望ヲ滿サントスル卑シムヘキ心情ヲ基礎トシテ成レ  
ル暴力行爲ノミ宇垣大將然リ參謀次長然リトス  
吾人ハ此ノ如キ性質ノ變革ニハ斷乎トシテ反對セサルヲ得ス今ヤ此ノ  
暴舉ヲ阻止スヘキ必要ヲ見ル幸ニシテ永田岡村兩大佐ノ積極的反對運  
動アリ鈴木中佐ノ反對アリ特ニ鈴木中佐ハ坂田中佐ニ極メテ密接ナル  
連繫ヲ保テリ一而カモ時日ハ速カニ經過シ遂ニ豫定計畫ノ如クニ無産

三派聯合ノ内閣攻撃ノ演說會ハ開カレタリ然レ共其規模ノ小氣勢ノ不振等ハ驚クバカリナリ又當時ノ無産派中堅タリシ大衆黨々首麻生久ト會見セル時大川博士トノ間ニ連絡極メテ薄ク一萬人動員ノ如キハ全く架空的夢想ニ過キサルト明ニセリ最早何レノ點ヨリ見ルモ斷然中止スルヲ賢明ノ策ナリトシ意ヲ決シ最急進分子タル重藤大佐橋本中佐ヲ説得セントセリ然レ共如何ニ情勢ヲ説述シテモ耳ヲ傾ケス却テ益々小兒病的トナリ盲進セントシテ總カス逐ニ橋本中佐ハ爆彈(前橋ノ如キモノ)三百個ヲ大川博士ノ部下ニ交付セリ(註此爆彈ハ屢々購セリ)此ノ結果橋本中佐ト大川博士トノ間ニハ切ル可カラサル縁カ結ハル、ニ至レルナリ

重藤大佐、橋本中佐カ如何ニ盲進スルニセヨ大勢ハ如何トモスヘカラス宇垣大將ハ遂ニ大川博士ヲ招致シテ今回ハ時期適當ナラサルヲ以テ中止スヘキ旨ヲ傳ヘタリト云フ大川博士ハ之ヲ諾シ茲ニ所謂三月事件ハ未遂ニ終レリト雖モ却ツテ橋本中佐等ノ急進分子ヲ刺戟シ且中央部ノ高級將校中變革ニ加擔セル者アルヲ明カニシ行キ懣り上次同ノ變革

ニハ不同意ナル能ハサル可シトノ觀念ヲ固ク抱カシメ所謂十月事件ヲ

準備セルノ形トナレリ

所謂三月事件ニ關シテ注意スヘキ件

1. 弱道ノ變革ト王道ノ變革ノ差

2. 周到ナル計畫ト建設計畫ト破壞計畫

3. 變革ノ時機

4. 平素ヨリノ準備指導精神及指導原理ノ確立

5. 統制ノ統一

6. 軍部外ノ者トノ連繫問題

7. 機密費使用ノ問題

三月事件不成功ニ移ルヤ橋本鮑兵中佐、說意櫻會ヲ擴大強化シ其ノ行

動ヲ活潑化セシメ同會幹部級ノ言動激越トナレリ之ト同時ニ同會

幹部中ノ一部者ノ豪遊ニ對シ激シキ非難ノ起ルアリ即チ櫻會幹部中

ノ或ル若干ノ者ハ名ヲ研究同會指導ノ方策樹立ノ爲ト稱シ屢々豪遊ヲ

繼續シ之ヲ知ル者ハ彼等カ櫻會ヲ好餌トシ三月事件ニ當リ機密費ヲ私

シツ、アリ等々ト非難ス吾ガ某幹部級者ニ就キ糺シタル結果此ノ非難  
ハ恐ラク三月事件ニ關シテノ重藤大佐、大川博士等ノ遊興ヲ指スナラ  
ント果シテ何レカ眞ナルヤ  
サアレ櫻會ハ斯クテ内部矛盾ヲ擴大シ分裂ノ兆歴然タルモノアリ吾々  
前記セル諸問題ノ結果ハ櫻會ヲシテ恐ルベキ淵ニ陥落セシムルナラン  
ト判斷シ之カ救済並ニ櫻會ヲシテ正常ノ發達ヲナサシムルタメ即チ理  
論建設計畫大衆心理ノ把握等無クシテ輕舉暴動セシムルコトヲ抑制シ  
櫻會ヲ以テ自己野望ヲ遂ケケシムルタメノ具ニ供スルコトヲ避ケシメ其  
分離解體ヲ避ケケシムル以テ有時ノ日櫻會本來ノ企圖セル所ヲ遂行スル上  
ニ缺クル所無カラシムル爲メ昭和六年六月中旬ノ例會ノ席上一ノ提案  
ヲ爲セリ即チ「櫻會自體ノ指導精神及行動綱領ヲ樹立スルタメ少クモ  
幹部級ハ哲學、社會學、倫理學、經濟學、政治學等々ノ中ヨリ國家改  
造ノ爲ニ必要ナル諸件ヲ地理學、經濟學、政治學等々ノ中ヨリ國家改  
的ニ其ノ目的ヲ達成スル爲メ先ツ可然學者ヲ招シ懇談  
見ヲ看破シ適當ナル者ヲ以テ一ツノ團體ヲ結成シ後日ノ役ニ立テシ



ムルヲ適當トスルトノ妥旨ノ論是レナリ  
幸ニシテ吾カ提案ハ幹部ノ谷ルハ所トナリ直ニ之ヲ實行スルコトセ  
リ乃チ吾ハ之ヲ帝大總講生ニシテ特殊ノ關係ヲ多クノ教授ニ有ツ鈴木  
輻重兵大尉ニ計リ交渉ヲ行ハシメ成功セリ此ノ舉ハ六月下旬吉田靜致  
教授ヲ先頭トシテ實行セラハ然ルニ櫻會幹部ハ一般ニ學者ナル者ハ結  
論ト判斷トヲ有セス且ツ實行力ナキトノ理由ヲ以テ忽チニシテ此ノ舉  
ヲ廢止シ終レリ吾ハ七月勿々ヨリ休暇ヲ利用シテ先ツ關西地方ニ旅行  
ス此ノ旅行中櫻會ヲ中心トセル一ノ問題惹起セリ即チ櫻會幹部ハ急速  
ニ會員ヲ獲得スルノ一助トシテ全國的ニ勸キカケントシ在京ノ第二十  
八期生以下ノ尉官ノ縦横ニ方面ニ亘ル會合ヲ備シ一ノ文ヲ作爲シ全  
國ノ尉官一28キ以降一ニ發送セリ  
本件ニ對スル論評ハ編々ナルモ櫻會ノミヨリスレバ豫期以上ニ其ノ成  
果ヲ獲得セルモノ、如ク判斷セラル會ノ幹部ハ眞ニ意氣揚々タル觀ア  
リ是レ吾カ八月四日歸京シテ橋本中佐並ニ參謀本部藤野ノ將校ニ會  
ヘル時ノ印象ナリ斯クシテ所謂十月事件ハ捲キ起サレルモノナリ

時局問題ニ關係セサルコトナレリトナラシムルハ  
吾カ不在中候會ハ八月例會ヲ借行社ニ於テ催ス此ノ會合ニ於テ同會  
吾ハ八月十日再ヒ旅行シ北海道ニ至ル  
壞ヲ招來セシムルタメ宣傳案ヲ慣起ス中佐ハ之ニ同意ス  
吾ハ政黨ノ腐敗墮落ヲ攻撃シ國民大衆ヲ憤起セシメ自然的ニ政黨ノ崩  
構成セラレタシ政綱策ハトナリテ攻究立案自然的ニ政黨ノ崩  
キ更言スレハ軍部中心トナリテ奪取ニ於テ計畫案ヲ答云々ト  
項ヲ指示セルヤ一更同中佐ハ云フ此ノ如キヲ以テ軍部ニ政權ノ來ルヘ  
ノモトナルヤ不明ナリ或ハ具體的ノ諒解カトナリテ何レノ程度  
題ハ參謀本部主腦部ニハ十分諒解アリキナリ云々ト  
契機トシテ根本的變革ヲ取行セラルヘキナリ云々ト  
又○四トシテ○テ○根○的○變○革○ヲ○取○行○セ○ラ○ル○ヘ○キ○ナ○リ○云○々○ト  
○八○月○四○日○吾○カ○橋○本○中○佐○二○會○セ○ル○時○同○人○日○ハ○吾○ニ○云○フ○一○本○年○九○月○中○旬○

所謂十月事件

是レ甚タ大ナル問題ナリ一ノ修養團體化ハ單ナル表面的紛争ニ過キス  
國內變革ヲ企圖セル露塔支那班ヲ中心トセル急進分子ノ策謀ニシテ何  
等他意ナキヲ示サントスルニ過キス（此ノ事件ハ後日急進分子ヨリノ  
直話ニヨリ明トナレリ）

九月十八日滿蒙問題突發  
吾ハ此ノ朝陸軍省ニ坂田中佐ヲ參謀本配ニ橋本中佐ヲ訪レ事件ノ真相  
ヲ明カニスルト共ニ橋本中佐ヨリ「今同ハ國內變革ヲ行ハサルコトニ

セラレタルニヨリ宜得來ハ一總返却スルニ就キ更ニ研究シ置カレタシ  
ト申渡サレ變革ノ不實施ヲ明ニセリ吾ハ橋本中佐ノ言ヲ信シ國內變革

ハ行フコトナク唯滿蒙問題解決ニ邁進スルナラント思ヘリ  
然ルニ十月三日夜（土曜日）橋本中佐ヨリ速達一封書アリ文ニ云フ

「明四日打ち合有之候間森ヶ崎ノ萬金ニ御出ヲ被下待入申候勿々（原  
文ノ儘）（消印ハ京橋新高町）ト吾ハ其集合地ト言ヒ發送地點ト言ヒ

共ニ何事カアラシト豫感シツツ十月四日所示ノ地點ニ至ル  
萬金ニ到リ橋本中佐ヲ訪レタル旨主人ニ傳ヘタルニ吾カ身分氏名等ヲ

萬金ニ到リ橋本中佐ヲ訪レタル旨主人ニ傳ヘタルニ吾カ身分氏名等ヲ

聞ヒ之ヲ階上ニ傳ヘ始メテ吾ヲ案内セリ在室スルモノハ最近支那駐在  
武官トシテ赴任セル長少佐參謀本部露野ノ田中彌大尉小原大尉ノ三名  
ナリ

彼等ハ云フ

今ヤ國內變革決行セラレ

陸軍省參謀本部ヲ始メ近衛第一師團等凡テ國內變革ニ向テ準備中海軍

亦然リ

先ツ「ク」ニ依リ政權ヲ軍部ニ奪取シテ獨裁制ヲ布キ先ツ政

治變革ヲ行フ

機會ハ中心トナリ活動中一註是等ノコトハ彼等カ人ヲ勸誘スル爲到ル

處特ニ隊附將校ニ對シテ採レル所ノモノナリ一等ノ件ヲ以テ吾ニ參加

ヲ要求セリ尙彼等ハ加ヘテ云フ

滿蒙事件勃發以來連日連夜變更ノ爲メ努力シ歸宅セルコト僅ニ二三回

ノミ參加シテ計畫ニ助力セラレ度ト吾ハ事以外ナルニ驚ケリ然レ共吾

ニ疑問ナキ能ハス以下吾ト彼等トノ論點ノ一部ヲ掲クルコトニヨリ吾

ノ疑問トセル所ヲ疑ハシ

(問ハ吾答ハ彼等)

問 國內變革ニ軍部ノ中樞力參加スルトセハ恐ラク其企圖スル未來社

會建設ノタメノ主義綱領政策等ハ存在セン如何ナル内容ナリヤ

答 秘密ニシテ示シ得ス、吾等亦之ヲ精シク知ラス

問 君等事件發生以來日夜畫策スル所ノモノハ何ノ計畫ナリヤ

答 破壊計畫ナリ

問 破壊計畫ハ建設計畫出來上リ其ノ範圍内ニ於テ作ルヘキモノ即チ

兩者ハ一貫セル思想ニ從フヘキモノニ非スヤ

建設計畫ヲ明ニセスシテ破壊計畫ハ不合理ナラスヤ

答 建設計畫ハ他ニ於テ立案中

問 他トハ

答 大川周明博士ヲ主體トセル一派

問 大體ニ於テ如何ナル破壊ヲ行フヤ

答 海軍ノ爆撃隊ニヨル威嚇、首相官邸ニ於ケル閣議ノ席上ニ於テ大

2124

中  
臣全部ノ斬殺、監視ノ急務奪取

問  
何ノ爲メニ是等ノ破壊ヲ必要トスルヤ

答  
元凶ノ一掃ノタメニ必要ナリ

問  
此ノ如キ破壊ニヨリテ國內改造ハ可能ナリヤ

答  
政治ノ中樞ヲ破壊スルコトニヨリ變革ハ出來得

問  
例ヘハ經濟方面ノ變革ハ如何ニスルヤ又之ヲ考慮シテルヤ

答  
默ス

問  
吾ノ知レル範圍ニ於テハ大川博士ハ建設者ニ非ス三月事件ニ於テ

試驗濟ノモノナリ此ノ如キ考ヘニ最重要ナル建設計畫ヲ托スル程

陸軍中央部ハ老死セルヤ

答  
實ハ未タ軍ノ中樞部首腦部ニハ連絡ナキモ決行ノ直前ニ於テハ同

意セシムヘク之カ爲ニハ大川博士ヲシテ建設案ヲ立テシメツツア

ルナリ

問  
是レ國軍ヲ破壊スルノ根本ナルモノ之ニヨリテ軍ノ首腦部ハ動ク

答  
ヘカラヌ又動カスヘキモノニモ非ス如何

問 答

見解ノ相違ナリ  
吾ノ見解ニ從ハル國  
家ノ變革改造ハ必要ナリ然レトモ之レカ爲ニ  
ハ其時國方法等ニ就キ正確ナル檢討ヲ要ス特ニ充分ナル建設

計畫ヲ要ス建設計畫ナクシテ且軍部ヲ破壊スルカ如キ方法ニヨリ

急據改造ニ着手セントスルカ如キハ暴モ甚タシ宜シク中止スヘシ

答

繼屈ハ正ニ然リ然レ共今ヤ滿蒙事件ノ發生以來在京ノ中小尉大尉

級ヲ加盟セシメ且ツ外配一駐軍人外ノ一トノ連絡密ナリシ關係上

如何トモスヘカラス一退クニ退カレヌ一且時日短少ナリシタメ建

設計畫ハ出來ヌ宜シク加盟シテ助力ヲ得タシ

問

唯々國內改造テウ主義丈ケニハ贊成スルモ其方法ニハ全然贊成シ

得ス

此ノ如キ問答カ行ハレ結局彼等ノ一ノ盲動セシニシテ軍中權限ノ參加

ノ如キハ全然慮リナルコト明白トナレリ問答ノ結果彼等ハ稍反省セル

カ如シ

中食後座談的ニ意見ノ交換ヲ行フ事

彼等ハ吾ニ對シテ「平時ヨリ變革ニ付キ多大ノ關心ヲ抱キ研究シツ、  
軍アリト聞ク如何ナル未來社會ヲ企圖シツツアリヤ、約言スレバ如何ト吾  
リ云フ

「天皇中心ノ人格的共存共榮ノ社會ヲ要ス、之カタメ天皇ト庶民トノ中  
間ニ介在スル一切ノ搾取機關ヲ排除シ、國民生活ノ擴充發展ヲ圖ルヘ  
シヤシ」日本民族ノ發展飛躍從ツテ一切ノコトハ此ノ點ニ立脚シテ策定  
セラルルヲ要スト（註彼等ハ彼等ノ計畫中ニ、吾ノ言ヘル所ヲ主トシ  
テ入レタリト云フ）

斯クテ吾ハ午後六時許シテ歸ル

此ノ會見ノ結果吾ノ知り得タル事情左ノ如シ

- 1 從來ノ櫻會中ノ急進分子ハ「グーデター」ヲ企圖ス
- 2 軍中樞部カ之ニ贊シアリト言フハ「一ノ手段ニ過キス、事實疑ハシキコ  
ト大ナリ、否關係ナキモノト認ムヘシ、但シ參謀本部ハ一部長ハ之ニ關  
係シアルカ如シト推斷セラル」
- 3 海軍將校中ニハ個人的ニ贊同シアルモノ少ナカラス



4 陸軍將校中ニ於テハ聯隊學校等ニアル者約百名加盟シアルカ如シ

5 「クローヂター」ノ實施ハ十月二十一日前後

6 本國ノ舉ハ關東軍ニ連絡アルモノト思ハルル節多シ

7 「クローヂター」ノ實施ニ當リテハ從來機會ニ反對ノ言動ヲ表セル者

ノ中特ニ平時ヨリ其ノ人格上ニ缺陷ヲ多ク有ツ者ノ清算ヲ行フ個人

的反感ヲ抱ク者少カラス（實施ト共ニソレ等ノ將校ヲ補縛シ斬罪ニ

處スト云フ）

等々

即チ何レノ方面ヨリ見ルモ彼等ノ企圖ハ何等ノ成果ヲ收ムル能ハス而

已ナラス此ノ如キハ建軍ノ本旨ニ反シ國家改造ノ唯一ノ力強キ源體タ

ルヘキ軍部ヲ破壞スルヤ大ニシテ其損失甚ダ大ナリト云ハサルヲ得ス

吾ハ如何ナル手段ニ訴フルトモ之ヲ中止セシムヘク而カモ其中止ニ當

リテハ彼等ヲシテ充分納得出來得ル如ク啓蒙セント期ス國家ノタメ國

軍ノタメニ翌日吾ハ長少佐ノ隨家ニ同行スヘク誘ハル吾ハ情況ヲ明カ

ニスルト共ニ彼等ヲ説得スルノ機ヲ捉ヘントシ快諾ス、隨家トハ名ノ

ミ實ハ京橋ノ料理屋（屋號失念ス）ナリ、吾ハ長少佐、田中（彌）大尉  
小原大尉ニ對シ彼等ノ企圖シツツアル行爲ノ著シク我ガ國家ニ不利益  
ヲ來スコト國軍ヲ破壞スル大、國際關係上ノ不利益、我產業財政經濟  
等ニ及ホス惡結果等ヨリ殆ンド成功ノ絶望ナルコト等ヲ説キ思ヒ止マ  
ルヘク説ケルモ、遂ニ十分其ノ目的ヲ果シ得ス唯彼等ニ反省ヲ促シ得タ  
ルニ止マル、此ノ會見ノ結果吾ハ次ノ諸件ヲ明カニセリ

1 彼等ハ九月十九日以來二三日ヲ除キ連日連夜待合ニ起居シアリ

2 彼等ノ本據トモ稱スヘキ待合ハ赤坂、新橋、四谷、大森、京橋等ノ

各地ニ設ケラル

3 時々一數日ニ一回位ノ副ニテ（加盟セル中小尉大尉級ヲ若干名宛集

メ士氣ヲ鼓舞スル目的ヲ以テ宴會ヲ開ク

4 橋本中佐ハ各方面ノ人物ト連日會見シツツアリ時々本據タル待合ニ

來ル

等々

吾ハ甚ダシク疑問ヲ投ケサルヘカヲサルモノハ彼等ノ多人數ニヨル連

日ノ蒙遊人タメノ資金ノ出所如何ト云フ點カ第一也彼等カ眞ニ愛國慨  
世ノ精神ヨリ今回ノ舉ヲ企テタルヤ否ヤト云フ點カ第二也前者ニ就テ  
ハ或ハ關東軍ヨリ長少佐カ持チ來レリト云フモ或ハ政友會ヨリ得タリ  
ト云フ（吾ハ今日ニ至ル迄之ヲ明ニセス）斯クテ一週間ハ經過セリ吾  
ハ此ノ間吾等カ研究ノ同志タル池田少佐ニ橋本一派ノ「クーデター」  
計畫ノ内容ト之ニ對スル吾ノ考トヲ述ヘ、少佐ガ親交アル今村均大佐（第  
二課長）ニ通シ善處スル所アラシコトヲ要求ス、少佐ハ吾ノ考ニ共鳴シ  
速ニ之ヲ今村大佐ニ通ス大佐ハ大ニ驚愕シ最善ヲ盡サント約ス、但シ  
吾ハ飽ク迄彼等ノ行動ト情勢トヲ明ニシ、改悟スルノ機ヲ捉フルタメ、上  
司ハ未ダ強壓的態度ニ出スヘカラサルコトノ注意ヲ喚起シ置ケリ  
今村大佐ハ建川少將ニ對シテ「近來大川博士一派カ何事カ策謀シツツ  
アリトノ風評ヲ聞ク真相如何」ト、少將之ニ答ヘテ「然リ最近大川ヲ招  
致シ策動ヲ中止スヘク要求セル所彼ハ快ヨク諾シタリ」ト吾ハ此情報  
ヲ得テ建川少將カ本事件ニ對シ何等カ諒解アリタルニ非スヤト臆測セ  
サルヲ得サルニ至ル

十月十二日吾ハ街路ニ於テ田中(彌)大尉ニ會ス彼ハ首相官邸ニ對スル現地偵察中ナリ小原大尉亦然リト且吾ニ對シ本日午後六時大森ノ松淺ニ集會スヘキヲ求メタリ吾語ス午後六時所定ノ地ニ至ル會スル者橋本中佐、長少佐、馬奈木大尉他ニ二名(失念)ト吾ナリ此ノ夜田中(彌)大尉ハ「クイデター」實施ノ際ニ於ケル詳細ナル計畫ヲ極秘トシテ示シタリ其内容ノ大要ハ左ノ如シト但シ吾等ニ對シテハ秘匿シアルモノ少ナカラス

決行ノ時機

十月二十一日

但シ日中決行スルヤ拂曉トス可キヤハ一ニ情況ニヨル參加將校

加盟セル將校 在京者ノミニテ約百二〇名

參加兵力 近衛各步兵聯隊ヨリ步兵十中隊一<sup>mg</sup> 中隊歩一、歩三ヨ

リ約一中隊

但シ夜間決行ノ場合ハ<sup>mg</sup>ハ殆ト全員

參加兵力中大川ニ私淑セル中隊長ハ一中隊全部ヲ以テ又西田税ニ血盟セル將校ハ殆ト所屬中隊全員ヲ以テス又外部ヨリ參加者

大川博士及其門下

西田税、北一輝ノ一派

海軍將校ノ拔刀隊、横須賀ヨリ約十名

霞ヶ浦ノ海軍爆撃機十三機

下志津ヨリ飛行機三十四機

實施 1. 首相官邸ノ閣議ノ席ヲ急襲シ首相以下ノ斬撃、長少佐ヲ指

揮官トス

2. 警視廳ノ急襲占領、小原大尉指揮官トス

3. 陸軍省、参謀本部ノ包圍一切外配トノ連絡ノ遮斷並上司ニ

強要シテ同意セシメ背セサル者ハ捕縛ス、軍行動ニ對スル

命令ヲ下ス

4. 同時ニ官中ニハ東郷元帥参内、(大急)ニ

新興勢力ハ駐彼等ハ自ラヲ新興勢力ト稱セリ、大命降下ヲ

奏上ス

閣院官殿下、西園寺公ニハ急使ヲ派ス

十月十一日

新内閣ノ氏名

首相兼陸相

荒木中將

内務大臣

橋本欣五郎中佐

外務大臣

建川美次

大蔵大臣

大川周明博士

警視總監

長少佐

海軍大臣

小林少將

(中將トシテ) (註十霞ヶ浦ニ在ル航空隊司令)

其他彼等ノ見テ不良將校、不良人物ニ對スル制裁(略ス)ハ實

本金二十萬圓ハ隨時使用シ得ル如ク準備シアリ

一註是等ノ計畫ハ夫々細部ニ亘リ立案セラレアリキ

吾ハ今日ヲ最後トシテ斷乎トシテ反對ス

建設計畫ヲ作ルコトヲ第一義トス

日本社會ノ現状ト没交渉ナル無謀ナル計畫ハ不可時價極メテ

不可

軍ノ破壊

日本産業、經濟、金融トウノ關係上ヨリシテ、外國トノ關係ヨリシテ等々ニ亘リテ約二時間ニ亘リテ彼等ノ計畫ノ仕掛ナルヲス彼等ハ前言ヲ繰返シ破壊ハ我等擔任スヘク建設ハ君ニ於テ行ハレタシト云フ茲ニ於テ吾ハ「可ナリ、然ラハ吾ハ目下建設案、國家ノ改造案ヲ立案攻究中ナルヲ以テ其完成ヲ待チ破壊計畫ハ其ノ出來上リシ建設計畫ノ範圍ニ於テ吾カ立案スルニ就テ實施ハ其ノ時迄延期シテハ如何」ト彼等ハ云フ何ノ時ニ完成スルヤト吾ハ未定ナリト茲ニ於テ彼等ハ到底延期ス可カラサルヲ樓説ス而カモ或ル一人ノ如キハ曰ク「鬼角理論ヲ研究セルモノハ實行ヲ輕ンヌ最早今日ニ至リテハ議論ノ餘地ナシ唯々實行ヘト邁進スルノミ」トサヘ斷言ス

吾ハ到底彼等ヲ改悟セシムル能ハサルヲ知り辭シテ歸ラントス此ノ時橋本中佐「議論ハ中止シテ種々ノ意味ニ於ケル酒宴ヲ催スヘシトテ僕ヲ排セハ藝妓十數名並ヒアルニ吾ハ一驚セリ

何タル不謹慎ソヤ醜態ノミ

吾ハ憤然トシテ彼等ノ心情ヲ叱シ歸ルニ臨ミ吾ハ田中(通マ大尉ニ云  
フ)「貴等一黨ニ對シテ日ノ取極ムルニ至ルハ國體ヲ損ニテ吾ハ其志ヲ  
ノミテ決行スルハ最後迄反對ス」此限令百歩ヲ讓リテ決行スルトシテ軍部  
ノ外ノ者ト提携スルハ不可中絶ノ部中ハ其結果ニ誰レモ幸甚ト見  
彼云フ「マアテリイハ爾時テリ後ハ心算ヲ以テテ行ハルハ其  
今日ニ及ビ彼等ト手ヲ切ル如キ情義ニ缺クルコトハナシ能ハス  
吾ハ云フ「爾等ノ軍部中ニ其結果ニ對シテ主對イテテテ取極ムル  
田中家ノ大事ヲ決行セントスル際片々個人ノ情義ニ提ハルル方如  
キハ同意シ得サルモナリ再考ヲ望ムトシハナリイハ吾ハ其志ヲ  
午後十一時歸宅スルニ至リテハ其對ノ意解セテ前夜ヨミルハ其  
吾ハ彼等一派ヲ觀察シテ次ノ如ク判斷セリ其行ス  
一、橋本中佐ハ既ニ四圍ノ情況ヲ察シテ退却シタキ考ヘテ有ルカ如キモ  
其志ナリ  
二、長少佐以下ハ是非ニテモ決行セントス  
斯クシテ一派中ニ對立スルニツクハ「タル」生シアルガ如ク而カモ



騎虎ノ勢ハ遂ニ重大事件ヲ惹起スルノ可能性十分ナリ。仍テ之ヲ抑制スルノ手段ヲ必要トスルニ至レリ。吾ハ之ガ爲メ

ト上司ヨリ兩端ヲ撤シ中止ヲ要求ス。且肯セザル時ハ憲兵ノ手ニヨリ保護檢束ヲ決行ス

但シ無理ナル彈壓ヲ加フルコトハ將校ノ意氣ヲ消失セシムルト共ニ沈滞スルニ至ルヲ以テ十分ナル注意ヲ要スルモノナリトノ考ヘテ有テ池田少佐ト計リ今村大佐ニ進ヌ同大佐亦同様ノ考ヘテ有テ幸ナルカナ當時何事カ軍部就中參謀本隊將校カ主体トナリテ策動シツツアリトノ風評切リニ至ルコト並ニ彼等一派中ニ橋本中佐ニ對スル反感強烈トナリツツアリトノ情報アリ然カシ乍ラ決行ノタメ着々準備ハ進メラレツツアリト云フ。SGIノ野村中尉ノ如キハ兵器委員ニ對シテ拳銃及彈藥ノ秘密交付ヲ要求シテ等々橋本一派ノ者ノ行動ニ關スル風評相當ニ多シ彼等一派カ連日ノ策動ハ殊ニ各ノ所謂本據ニ於ケル豪遊ハ警視廳ノ注目スル所トナリタルカ如ク橋本中佐ニ對シテ尾行ヲ附シタルコト

殆小疑フノ餘地ナシ十月十五日吾ハ橋本一派ガ事ヲ舉クルノ日甚接近  
 セリ大報ヲ得坂田中佐ニ此旨ヲ通シ橋本中佐ヲ説得セラレシコト  
 ハ希望ス中佐ハ事ノ容易ナザルヲ認メ直チニ橋本中佐ニ會ヒシト  
 シモ終日目的ヲ果サス備參謀口申佐ハ櫻會ニ於ケル關係ヲ個人  
 的ニ橋本中佐ヲ説得セシム逐ニ激論ヲ交ヘ終レリ於ケル關係ヲ個人  
 十月十六日夜橋本中佐ハ陸軍次官杉山元中將ニ對シ事ヲ舉クルニ就キ  
 同意セラレハキ旨強要ス次官ハ驚愕色ヲ失ヘリト傳ヘラル  
 駐十月十六日夜次官ヲ説得セリト一般ニ傳ヘラルモ吾ハ前後ノ事  
 情ヨリシテ十五日夜半ナラント判断シアリト申シ重ナリト傳フ  
 次官ハ直チニ小磯軍務局長水田軍謀課長ヲ招致シ事ノ重大ナルヲ傳フ  
 爾官ハ全ク履耳ニ水ノ如シト對面スル目途ヲ求メスハニ橋本  
 十月十六日宮内省ノ高等官ハ勲員課長侯爵井上三郎大佐ヲ招致シ橋本  
 事件ヲ知レリト問ヒシモ大佐亦以テ驚愕スルノミナリ大佐ハ飯リテ  
 之ヲ局長林桂少將ニ傳フ少將亦愕然ナリ此ノ如ク陸軍省首腦部ハ本件  
 ニ就キ愕然タルモノアルノミ十六日陸軍省參謀本部ノ課長中主ナルモ

ノハ近衛及第一師團司令部ニ連絡ヲトリ前後處置ヲ講シアリ蓋シ隊附  
將校ノ多數參加シアルヲ以テナリ  
此ノ日荒木中將(當時教育總監部本部長)岡村補佐課長同道シテ京橋  
ノ旗亭ニ橋本中佐ヲ訪レ思ヒ止マルヘキヲ説示セルモ斷乎トシテ之ヲ  
退ケ乃チ陸軍首腦部ハ彼等ヲ保護スルノ目的ヲ以テ檢束スルニ決シ十  
七日拂曉彼等一派ノ首謀者タル約十名ヲ憲兵隊ニ收容セリ此ノ收容時  
即憲兵カ各首謀者ノ居所ニ至リシ時ノコトナリ田中(補)大尉ハ京橋  
ヨリ次ノ内容ヲ有ツ葉書ヲ鉛筆書ニシテ記載シ吾ニ送レリ曰ク  
前略一黨今ヨリ憲兵司令部ニ至ル善處ヲ請フ  
十七日午前四時(原文ノ儘)  
吾ハ此ノ葉書ヲ十八日午前七時受領セリ  
是ヨリ稍養橋本中佐ハ各地ニアル同志ニ召集狀ヲ發セリ小濱代善中佐  
ハ上京スル將校ノタメ東京ホテルニ配宿ヲ準備ス弘前ノ隊ヨリ馳ケ  
タル大隊長等ノ如キ者ノ爲ニ十月十八日吾ハ研究上ノ同志タル四方憲  
兵大尉ヲ通シ事件關係ノ將校ノ取扱ヒハ武士道ノ精神ニヨルノ必要ヲ

憲兵隊ニ通ス然ルニ既ニ東京憲兵隊長ハ收容將校ヲ武士道精神ニヨリ  
取扱ヒテ是レ難波東京憲兵隊長ノ人格ノ功績ニ歸スベキナリニ  
手記ハ十七日ニ吳ル海ノ客々中出陣時ノ志士トシテ  
十七日憲兵司令官外山中將事件ヲ耳ニスルヤ直チニ之ヲ警視廳ニ通報  
セリ是ニ對シ警視廳ハ「本件ニ關シテハ一切ノ軍部處置ニ委スベキヲ  
以テ同然取計ハレ度」ト憲兵司令官ガ本件ヲ警視廳ニ通シタルカ如キ  
ハ無用有害ノコトナルヘシ且ツ憲兵司令官トシテ事件ノ見透シ並ニ確  
固タル信念ヲ缺ケル結果ニシテ甚タ不快ナリ是一般將校ノ感想ナリ  
警視廳ハ橋本事件ニツキ容易ナラサル策動ノ存スルヲ偵知シアリシモ  
彼等一派ハ秩父宮ヲ賞賜官兩殿下ヲ奉シアリトノ旨ヲ知り遂ニ如何ト  
モ爲スヘカラサルモソレ謂フ果シテ眞乎  
本件カ發見シ關係將校ノ各地ニ分散收容ヲ終リ先ツ一般落ヲ告ケルヤ  
陸相兩大臣ハ本件ニ關シ閣議ニ報告シ新聞記事ハ永久差止メトナレリ  
陸相カ閣議ニ報告セル所ハ左ノ如キ要旨ヲ含ム曰ク  
「今同現役將校中一配ニ於テ或種ノ策謀ヲ企テタリ然レトモ是レ愛國

概世ノ熱情ヨリ出テタルモノニシテ他意存スルニ非ス唯々之レヲ放置  
スル時ハ外程ノ者ノ策動ニ利用セラレ又軍規ヲ破壊スルノ行爲トナリ  
易キヲ以テ保護ノ目的ヲ以テ收容セリ云々ト一ハカクハ  
被收容將校ニ就キテノ非難少ナカラス彼等ハ東京ヨリ藝伎ヲ招キテ遊  
興ヲ專ラニスルカ如キ或ハ放縱不謹慎ナル態度アル等是レ彼等ハ約二  
旬ノ間收容セラレ逐次解放セラレル本事件ニ關係セル將校申橋本中佐  
ハ重越慎二十日長少佐、田中、彌、大尉ハ各十日ノ重越慎ニ處セラレ  
其他微罰者ヲ出サス 諸君ニハ一ハカクハ  
但シ苟モ本件ニ多少ナリトモ關係ヲ有スル將校ハ中央駐タルト軍隊多  
ルヲ問ハス一切之責任セシメ人的關係ヲ一掃セリ  
○十月事件發見ノ動機ニハ一ハカクハ  
所謂十月事件カ發覺セル原因動機ト見ルヘキモノ左ノ如シ  
ト行動ノ不謹慎ト一派ノ者カ明治維新當時ノ志士ヲ夢ミ豪遊ヲ極メツ  
ツアリシハ其ノ最大原因ナリ此ノ結果ハ既述セル如ク警視廳ニ着目  
セララルルニ至リシモノナリ

十月十五日（十六日）夜橋本中佐カ陸軍次官ニ加盟ヲ強要セルコト  
ハ事件ヲ白日ノ下ニ晒ス結果ヲ來セリ

彼等ハ決行ノ直前ニ於テ上級者ヲ強要シテ加盟セシムト常ニ號シアリ  
シカ彼等ハ何レノ日ニ決行セント計畫セシヤ吾ハ橋本中佐ノ此ノ行爲  
ヲ目シテ或ハ苛酷ナランモ中佐自ラ進退谷マリ決行ノ意志ナク上司ノ  
力ニヨリテ一般ヲ抑壓セントセシモノニ非スマヤト見解ス橋本中佐ハ屢

々今村大佐ヲ訪レ

「吾ハ今ヤノツビキナラヌ所ニ殆レリ」ト稱シアリシ事實ニ照シ吾ノ  
右ノ見解カ失當ナラサルモノト認メラル蓋シ今村大佐ハ參謀本部ノ有  
力課長ナリ而カモ橋本中佐ハ未タ嘗テ大佐ニ話シ掛ケタルコトナキニ  
拘ラス十月十日前後突如トシテ右ノ如ク行動セルハ何等カノ煩悶アリ  
シ結果ナラン

橋本中佐ノ本心ハ如何アルニセヨ過早ニ次官ニ加盟ヲ強要セルハ明カ  
ニ事件ヲ發覺セシメタルモノナリ  
大川周明博士ハ之ヲ宮内省高官ニ賣レリト云フ  
但シ此ノ點ニ就キテハ左ノ如キ異説アリ

イ、宮内省ノスパイカ大川博士ノ信任ヲ得アリ今回ノ舉ヲ内示セル所  
ス。スパイハ之ヲ關屋次官ニ報告セリト

ロ、大川博士自ラ賣レリト

ハ、第一新門社ノ毛野 出夫ハ本件ヲ逆用シ宮内省高官ヲ脅迫シ金錢ヲ

得ントセルニ基因スト

但シ毛野 出夫ナル者ハ其人ト爲リ上幾多ノ非難ヲ有シアリナキニ

以上吾ハ十月事件ニ關シ吾ノ見聞スル所ノ大要ヲ手記セリ終リニ臨ミ

本事件ニ關シ若干ノ誤解アル處ヲ解カントス

十月事件ハ實ニ反宇垣思想ノ流レナリ成程十月事件ニ關係セル者ノ

中ニハ所謂三月事件ニ關係セル者少ナカラス三月事件ハ宇垣大將ノ

野望ナリシモ十月事件ハ宇垣大將ノ陸軍ニ胎セル大ナル人事上ノ過

失ヲモ清算セントスルニ在リシ也

往々宇垣大將懸流トスレトモ當ラズ

本件ハ一切ノ既成政黨ヲ清算セントスル所ナルハ明ナルモソレノミ

ナラス

實ニ宮内省ノ 吏カ天皇陛下ト車部トヲ遠離セントスル盲動ヲ抑制セ  
ントセル所ノモノナリ特ニ政黨 セル君側ノ奸臣ヲ清算セントセルナ

3 本件ト櫻會トノ關係

往々ニシテ本件ヲ櫻會ノ企テタル所ナリト見ラレアルモ否ラス前述  
セル如ク櫻會中ノ一部急進分子ノ獨斷的ノ策動ナリ現ニ彼等ハ云フ  
櫻會ハ激進的ニシテ頼ムヘカラスト櫻會ノ指導精神カ假令獨裁ヘノ  
躍進ニ在リト雖モソレハ彼等一派ト櫻會トノ直接關係アリト云フ斷  
定ヲ斷サス蓋シ獨裁ノ親裁ヘノ躍進ヲ考フル者ハ單ニ櫻會ノミニ非  
サレハナリ

十月事件ニ就テ研究スヘキ點少ナカラス

變革ノ理論的構想ノ必要

變革者（實行者）トノ埋性

變革者ト慾望

一貫セル見透シニヨル計畫ノ立案



軍ノ行動ト統帥命令

軍部外ノ者トノ連絡提携問題

豪遊問題

資金問題

秘密問題

誘惑問題等々

所謂十月事件ニ關シテ將來ノ參考問題

1 何カ故ニ非常手段ニ訴ヘテ迄改革ヲ企圖スル者生シタルヤ其ノ根本

問題ノ研究

2 軍部カ國家ノ改造ニ乘リ出スカ是カ非カノ根本問題

3 將來第二第三等々ノ事件續出セサルヤ不安

4 續出スルトセバ如何ニ處理スルヤ

5 單純ナル壓迫抑制カ肯定セラルルヤ否ヤ青年將校ノ腦裏ニ深リ印セ

ラレツツアル國家改造思想ヲ如何ニ導クヘキヤ

6 國家改造ハ必然ナリ

ソノ改造カ國家自體ノ自然的推移ニヨルヘキヤ一種ノ革命行動ニヨ

ルヘキヤ革命行動ニヨルトセバ誰人ノ手ニヨルヘキヤ慘害ヲ極度ニ輕減セン

トセハ勢ヒ軍部ノ威力ニヨラサルヲ得サルニ非サルヤ

7. 然ル限リニ於テ軍部行動ハ極メテ慎重ナラサルヲ得ス

三月事件十月事件等ノ如ク不用意ノ行動ハ絶對ニ廢セサルヲ得ス

而シテ目下澎湃トシテ尙ク青年將校ノ改造思想ニ對シテ適確ナル願

ム所アラシメ以テ輕舉盲動ヲ慎マシサルヲ得サル可シ

8. 國家改造方案作成ハ目下ノ急務ニ非サルヤ

一、橋本一派ニ參加セントセシ兵

1. 大川周明博士ニ對スル信仰上ヨリセルモノ一中隊

2. 西田税、北一輝ニ對スル信仰的關係ヨリセルモノ四中隊

但シ以上ノ兵力ハ必スシモ中隊長カ部下全員ヲ率キルニ非スシテ中

隊附將校カ中隊長ニ代リテ率キントセルモノナリ一此ノ兵力ヲ聯隊

號ト將校ノ氏名ハ秘セラレタリ

ニ步兵第三聯隊ニ就テハ計畫者之ヲ示ササリシモ恐ラク關係ヲ有セシ  
ナラン彼等一派ハ聯隊長カ「部下全部カ參加スルナラハ聯隊長モ行  
クサ云々」ト云ヘリト辨シアリシヲ見テモ推察シ得  
三、參加兵力ハ凡テ演習ト辨シ室々出門シ所定位置ニ至ルコトトセラレ  
アリ  
四、所謂十月事件ニ就キテハ東久根ハ全然關係ナシ（彼等一派ノ  
明言セル所ニヨリテ證セラル）  
五、秩父宮賀陽宮兩殿下ニ就キテハ如シ  
六、建川部長ハ所謂十月事件ニ就キテハ暗黙ノ間ニ諒解ヲ有シアリシヲ  
疑シムルニ足ルソノ理由  
一、昭和六年夏關東軍朝鮮軍司令官幕僚ノ上京セル時打ち合セ事項中  
ニ變革ノ件ニ及ヒシモノアリ  
二、今村大佐ヨリノ警告的言辭ニ對スル返事  
（大川博士ノ言ニ就キ）  
七、十月事件ニ於ケル一派ノ有チシ計畫ハ極メテ簡單ナリ方眼紙三枚ノ

其ノ内容

1 一枚ハ警視廳首相官邸等襲撃宮中へノ参内等ノ件

2 一枚ハ人事關係

イ、赤色欄 加盟者氏名

ロ、桃色欄 好意ヲ有ツモノト判断セラルル者氏名

ハ、白色欄 中立ヲ守ルヘシト見ラルル者ノ氏名

ホ、濃青色欄 警戒ヲ要スヘシト見ラルル者ノ氏名

ニ於テ櫻會ニ對シ壓迫ヲ加ヘタル者例

月清司少將陸士中野直三大佐等一及國家

者政治家ノ氏名アリ

連環之ニ對ス警戒等系統表

他ノ一枚ハ上記人物ノ所在並ニ之トノ連環之ニ對ス警戒等系統表

八十月事件ニ就テハ安達前内相ハ相當精シク之ヲ知リアリト判断セラ

ル即チ

本件カ既ニ警視廳ニ於テ偵知シアリシ點中野正剛ト青年將校トノ

間ニ交際相當深キヲ以テ彼ハ之ヲ知り安達ニ報告シアリト見ラル  
安達前内相カ極度ニ青年將校ノ不滿ヲ憂苦セル點（所謂協力内閣  
ハ安達カ目論見タルモノニシテ宇垣ヲ首相トスルコトヨリ政民ノ  
大部ヲ合シ且軍部ノ不平不滿ヲ抑壓シ實權ハ彼カ握ラントセルモ  
ノ但シ中野正剛ハ對シテハ宇垣カ不信任ナルコト荒木中將  
カ甚強キ信望ヲ有シトヨリ同中將ヲ陸相タラシメント主張  
畫策シアリタリ中將カ入閣ヲ承知スルモセサルモ可ナリ  
何レモ理屈ハアリタリ

九 所謂三月事件ニ於テ宇垣ハ變革ノ意志强キコトハ明白ナリ

一 大川博士カ計畫一大体ノ筋書ヲ示シ「阪進ヲ促シタル時「君等ソ  
コマデモツテ來テ呉レルナラハ起ツ」ト言明セシ點  
二 宮次長小磯局長尾川部長等カ情況ヲ示シ陸軍ノ阪起ヲ促セル時  
「陸軍カ起タネバナラヌ時カ來タ」ト云ヘル點  
但シ軍部カ兵力ヲ以テ積極的ニ議會ヲ包圍總辭職強要（内閣）ノ  
如キコトヲ衷心ヨリ肯定セルヤ否ヤ判断セス

十、三月事件ハ十月

人事處分問題ニツキ

一、三月事件ニ於

ノ處分モ人事異動モナシ

(爆彈三百個

手ニ渡シタルニモ拘ラズ)

二、十月事件ニツキ既述ノ如シ

此ノ二事實ニ於テ一般將校ノ見ル所ハ彼此異ルモ

イ、上級者ハ惡ヲナシテモ咎ナシ

ロ、十月事件ノ犠牲者畢竟スルニ三月事件犠牲者ナリ

ハ、國軍ヲ破壊シ下剋上ノ精神ヲ擴大セル者カ僅カノ微弱處分ト相

場カ決マリシ以上此ノ如キコトハ將來續出セン

題 意 書

一、熟々帝國ノ現状ヲ見ルニ萬象ノ悉ク消極ニ墮シ新進ノ銳氣ハ地ヲ拂  
フテ空シク明治維新以來隆々トシテ發展シ來リシ國勢ハ今ヤ衰頽ニ  
向ハントシ吾人ヲシテ痛嘆憂愁措ク能ハサラシムルモノアリ若シソ  
レ斯クノ如キ狀態ヲ以テ進マンカ吾人大和民族ハ到底現在ニ於ケル  
世界的地位ト名譽トヲ保持シ得サルハ勿論勢ノ趨ク所史上ニ一朝ノ  
盛觀ヲ止メテ遂ニ希微、和蘭ノ墟ニ墮シ恨ヲ千載ニ殘スヘキハ昭々  
乎トシテ明ラカナル所ナリ  
而シテ我國ノ斯ノ如キ狀態ニ至リシ所以ノモノハ其ノ基由スル所多  
々アルヘント雖モ吾人ハ先ツ其ノ核心タルヘキ爲政者ノ重大ナル責  
任ヲ指摘セサルヲ得ス試ミニ眼ヲ擧ケテ彼等ノ行動ヲ見ヨ國民ノ師  
表トシテ國政ヲ變理シ上陸下ニ對シ奉リ重責ヲ擔フヘキニ拘ラス其  
ノ大本ヲ復却シテ國是ノ遂行ニ勇ナク大和民族興隆ノ原素タル精神  
的方面ハ怙トシテ之ヲ顧ミス唯徒ラニ政權、物資ノ私慾ニノミ没頭  
シ上ハ聖明ヲ蔽ヒテハ國民ヲ欺キ滔々タル政局ノ腐敗ハ今ヤソノ極  
點ニ達セリ

國民モ亦舉ケテ此ノ弊風ヲ感知シアルモ意氣消衰セル現社會ノ<sup>要カ</sup>國  
氣ニ同化セラレ既ニ何等ノ彈力ナク政界ノ暗雲ヲ一掃シテ邦家ノ備  
根ヲ剪除スヘキ勇氣ト決斷トハ到底之ヲ求ムルニ田ナク國民ハ舉ケ  
テ自ラ墓穴ヲ深ウシツツアルモノヲ獨り左傾團體ニノミ見出ササル  
ヘカラサルノ奇現象ハ果シテ吾人ニ何モノヲ教示スルカ而シテ今ヤ  
此ノ頌廢シ喝セル政黨者流ノ毒刃カ軍部ニ向ヒ指向セラレツツアル  
ハ之レヲ「ロンドン」條約問題ニ就テ觀ルモ明カナル事實ナリ然ル  
ニ混濁ノ世相ニ麻痺セラレタル軍部ハ此ノ腐敗政派ニ對シテスラ奮  
起スルノ勇氣ト決斷トヲ缺キ辛ウシテ老耄既ニ過去ノ人物ニ屬スヘキ  
者ニ依リテ構成セラレアル樞密院ニ依リテ自己ノ主張セサルヘカラ  
サル處ヲ代辯セラレタルカ如キ不甲斐ナキ現象ヲ呈セリ  
軍部カ斯クノ如キ狀態ニ陥リシ所以ノモノハ其ノ原因一ニシテ足ラ  
スト雖モ泰平ノ久シキ士風漸ク衰ヘ一般將校ニ一定ノ主義方針ト武  
士道ノ名ニ於ケル熱烈ナル團結トヲ缺除シアラテ第一義的原因  
トナス過般海軍ニ指向セラレシ政黨者流ノ毒刃カ近ク陸軍々縮問題



トシテ現ハレ來ルヘキハ明カナリ故ニ吾人軍部ノ中堅ヲナス者ハ充  
分ナル結束ト固メ日常其ノ心ヲ以ツテ邁進シ再ヒ海軍問題ノ如キ失  
態ナカラシムルハ勿論進ンテハ強硬ナル愛國ノ熱情ヲ以ツテ腐敗シ

喝セル爲政者ノ腹ヲ洗フノ概アラサルヘカラス

三現今ノ社會層ヲ觀ルニ高級爲政者ノ倖往行爲政黨ノ腐敗、大衆ニ無  
理解ナル資本家華族國家ノ將來ヲ思ハス國民思想ノ頹廢ヲ誘導スル  
言論機關農村ノ荒廢、失業、不景氣各種思想團體ノ進出、靡爛文化  
ノ躍進的抬頭、學生ノ愛國心ノ闕如、官公吏ノ自己保存主義等々邦  
家ノ爲是ニ寒心ニ堪ヘサル學界ノ推積ナリ然ルニ之レヲ正道ニ導ク  
ヘキ重責ヲ負フ政權ニ何等之ヲ解決スヘキ政策ノ見ルヘキモノナク  
又一片誠意ノ認ムヘキモノナシ徒ニ政權ノ威信ハ益々地ニ墜チ經濟  
思想政治上國民ハ實ニ不安ナル狀態ニ置カレ國民精神ハ逐次弛緩シ  
明治維新以來ノ元氣ハ消磨シ去ラントシテ國勢ハ日ニ下降ノ道程ニ  
アリ更ラニ之レモ外勢方面ニ觀ルニ爲政者ハ國家百年ノ長計ヲ忘却  
シ外國ノ鼻息ヲ窺フコトニノミ之ヲ汲々トシテ何等對外發展ノ熱ヲ  
有セス維新以來積極進取ノ氣魄ハ全ク消磨シ去リ爲メニ人口食糧ノ

解決ノ困迷ハ刻々トシテ國民ヲ脅威シツツアリ此ノ情勢ハ帝國ノ前途ニ一大暗礁ヲ横フルモノニシテ之カ排除ニ向ヒ絶叫スル吾人ノ主張カ爲政者ニヨリ笑殺シ去ラレツツアル現状ハ邦家ノ前途ヲ想ヒ憲ニ痛憤ニ堪ヘサル處ナリ

以上内治外交ノ政策上ノ行詰リハ政黨者派カ私利慾ノ外一片奉公ノ大計ナキニ由來スルモノニシテ國民ハ吾人ト共ニ眞實大衆ニ根幹ヲ置キ眞ニ天皇ヲ中心トスル活氣アリ明ラカナルヘキ國政ノ現出ヲ渴望シツツアリ吾人因ヨリ軍人ニシテ直接國政ニ參劃スヘキ性質ニ非スト雖一較々タル報公ノ至誠ハ折ニ胸レ時ニ臨ミテ其ノ精神ヲ現ハシ爲政者ノ華正ノ國勢ノ伸長ニ資スルヲ得ヘシ吾人茲ニ相會シテ國勢ノ衰運ヲ慨シ自ラ顧ミテ武人ノ操守ヲ戒ムル所以モ亦此ノ埒外ヲ出ルモノニ非サル也

此ノ情勢ハ帝國ノ前途ニ一大暗礁ヲ横フルモノニシテ之カ排除ニ向ヒ絶叫スル吾人ノ主張カ爲政者ニヨリ笑殺シ去ラレツツアル現状ハ邦家ノ前途ヲ想ヒ憲ニ痛憤ニ堪ヘサル處ナリ

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砲少佐 歩大尉 砲大尉 歩中尉 歩大尉 砲中佐 砲大尉 砲大尉 歩少佐 歩大尉 航大尉 砲少佐 歩大尉 歩中佐 參謀本部

遠藤 松村 松村 天野 小原 橋本 濱田 秋田 野田 寺田 阿邊 二見 牟田口  
 藤村 村野 原本 草 謙 濟 虎 秋 廉  
 三知 秀 重 欣 俊 五 一 郎 郎 也  
 郎 勝 逸 勇 孝 郎 大 俊 五 一 郎 郎 也

歩中佐 歩少佐 歩大尉 歩中尉 歩少佐 砲大尉 歩大尉 歩少佐 歩大尉 歩少佐 歩大尉 砲大尉 航大尉  
 安和 長中 課 唐武 田 藤 中 平 井 森  
 達知 野田 山 川 中 塚 山 田 原 本  
 二鷹 英 春 安 藤 中 止 才 事 正 須 次 郎 車  
 十三 三 勇 光 樹 夫 章 彌 夫 人 劉 郎 藏

樓 會 人 名 錄 (X印幹事)

