

df 6

1 referred to in question 26?

2 28. If your answer to the preceding question is in the
3 negative, what, if any, action did you take to cause the
4 character of alert in the Hawaiian Department to conform to
5 the type of alert you considered to be required by the message
6 of November 27, 1941, to General Short from the War Department?

7 29. Did you discuss General Short's reply to the War
8 Department message from General Marshall described in question
9 26 with any officer in the War Department during the period
10 from November 28, 1941, to and including December 7, 1941.

11 30. After November 27, 1941, up to and including December
12 7, 1941, did the President address any inquiry to you as to the
13 condition of alert maintained in the various overseas depart-
14 ments of the Army, and, specifically, as to whether in the
15 Philippines and Hawaii, the Army was prepared to meet any
16 type of Japanese attack?

17 31. If your answer to question 30 is in the affirmative,
18 what was the nature of the inquiry made to you by the President,
19 and your response thereto?

20 (Please state in complete detail, as you now recall,
21 what was said by the President and by you in any such
22 conversation)

23 32. I am informed that you suggested to the President,
24 and he approved the idea, that a final alert should be sent
25 to General MacArthur. Will you give us the details of your

if 7

1 conversation with the President on this matter?

2 33. I call to your attention a message sent by General
3 Miles to the Commanding General at Panama dated December 5:
4 "U.S.-Jap relations strained Stop Will inform you if and when
5 severance of diplomatic relations imminent - sgd Miles," and
6 ask you if you ever knew that that was sent.

7 34.a. If you knew of this message referred to in the
8 last question, will you explain when it was drawn up and sent
9 to the Commander in Panama?

10 b. Why was it sent?

11 c. Why was the same message not sent to Gen. Short at
12 Pearl Harbor?

13 35. Were you familiar with the reply that the Commander
14 in Panama made to the order of the 27th of November?

15 36. You have spoken in your testimony before the Pearl
16 Harbor Board that the President had made a momentous decision
17 on the 26th or near that date. It appears to be in connection
18 with sending the final alert as indicated in your diary. Will
19 you state what that decision was and all the conversations you
20 had with the President in relation to it?

21 37. In that message the following language was used:
22 "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all prac-
23 tical purposes with only the barest possibility that the
24 Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.
25 Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible

df 8

1 at any moment." Is this your language and, if so, did you
2 discuss it with anyone before the message of Nov. 27 was sent?

3 38.a. If the language used in the previous message is
4 not your language, will you tell whose it was and what dis-
5 cussions you had in relation to it?

6 b. Did you discuss this language with the President?
7 If so, will you give us the details of the conversation?

8 39. Isn't it true that the Japanese did come back for
9 discussions and that the newspapers carried accounts of further
10 discussions on December 1, 2, and 5?

11 40. Would not the reports in the newspapers that negotia-
12 tions had been resumed tend to make Gen. Short feel that the
13 situation was less critical, especially when he had been given
14 no further information by the War Department?

15 41. You used the following language in the message:

16 "If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the
17 United States desires that Japan commit the first overt
18 act."

19 Whose language is this?

20 41½. You having directed the preparation of the message
21 of Nov. 27 to Gen. Short in Gen. Marshall's absence, if that
22 message was subject to more than one interpretation was it not
23 your responsibility to check up on the reply to it under
24 "report action taken"?

25 42. Tell us as to the discussions you had concerning

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1 whether it should be put in the message to Gen. Short?

2 43. Did you ever discuss this first overt act as used
3 in the Marshall message to Short on Nov. 27 with the President?
4 Tell us what was said and when you had the conversation.

5 44.a. Did you ever discuss this first overt act language
6 with Sec. of State Hull? Tell us what was said and when you
7 had the conversation.

8 b. You knew that the message from Marshall to Short
9 required Short to report measures taken?

10 45. Do you know whether any follow-up was made by the
11 War Department on the report of measures taken made by Short
12 to this message?

13 46. For the purpose of this question let us assume that
14 Gen. Short misinterpreted the Marshall message. If the answer
15 is "no" to the previous question, is the fault that Short mis-
16 interpreted the message or that Washington failed to follow
17 up his reply and see he misinterpreted your message? Was the
18 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor caused by Short's misinter-
19 preting the Marshall message of Nov. 27th or Washington failing
20 to see that he had misinterpreted your alert and not sending a
21 new alert calling this error to his attention.

22 47. On the morning of November 28, you went to see the
23 President, as you describe it "before the President got up."
24 You had with you a November 28 G-2 report, or some other report
25 from G-2. Will you tell us the conversation you had with

df 10

1 the President -- what was said by each of you.

2 48.a. If this was important to discuss with the Commander-
3 in-Chief, the President, why did you not think it was also
4 important to discuss it with General Short or to give him
5 notice of it?

6 b. Did you discuss the same thing with General Marshall
7 or General Gerow?

8 c. Did you discuss it with anyone else -- if so,
9 give names and conversation.

10 49. You have described the decision as "momentous." If
11 this is true, should it not have been transmitted to General
12 Short?

13 50. Where did you expect the Japanese to strike on
14 December 7, 1941?

15 51. Did the President say or intimate that he did not
16 desire Short or Kimmel to fire the first shot or commit the
17 first overt act?

18 52. Did you concur without question in that attitude --
19 that the first overt act should not be committed by Adm.
20 Kimmel or Gen. Short?

21 53. If so, will you give us the reasons for such con-
22 currence?

23 54. Had not the military movements of the Japanese
24 clearly indicated that Japan was not coming back and not going
25 to offer to continue the conferences?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

55. Did you ever see the message of November 26, 1941, sent by Secretary Hull to the Japanese?

56. If your answer to the last question is "yes", did you know the contents of that message at the time it was sent or shortly thereafter? Will you explain as to whether or not you believed it broke off relations with Japan?

57. Will you state the full conversation you had with Secretary Hull in relation to the fact that he was through and that it was then up to the Army and Navy?

58. Did Mr. Hull explain why he was sending that message?

59. Are you conversant with an official document of the State Department of the United States wherein it is to be found these two sentences: "He (the Secretary of State) said that our proposed agreement (that is, the agreement proposed by Hull on the same day, the 26th) would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this might give rise to some misunderstanding. (He(that is Mr. Hull) also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador (that is, Nomura) of the ambition that had been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition."

60. Do you understand that these are Secretary Hull's own words, contained in a memorandum, transcribed for him by Assistant Secretary Ballantine who was present at the meeting?

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Do you understand that this is what Secretary Hull says he said to the Jap Government in the person of its ambassadors?

61 Do they represent what is known as an unnamed consideration in the event of the American note of the 26th being accepted by the Japanese?

show up the hands. (of Public Relations, Vol. 1, p. 766) and that Mr. Kawan said that he felt that our response to 1941 proposal would be interpreted as tantamount to saying the same. (of Pub. Relations, Vol. 1, Page 766).

62. Your diary shows that Secretary Hull stated at the meeting on December 7 at the meeting between you, Secretary Back, and Secretary Hull that the Japanese are planning some delivery and that he wondered where the blow would strike. Did you discuss Hawaii, or any other American possession at that time?

64. If so, will you state what was said and by whom?

65. Did anyone at that meeting bring up the question of 1 P.M. Washington time being down or morning in Pearl Harbor? Did you three Secretaries on December 7, 1941 discuss the 1 P.M. time of delivery and what was said by each of you?

66. Did anyone suggest or bring up the fact that there might or could be an attack upon Hawaii or Pearl Harbor?

67. If so, give the details of that discussion.

Give us the detailed conversation that took place in the Secretary of State's office on Sunday 12th, Dec. 7, 1941.

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1 62. Were you acquainted, when you reviewed the Army Board's
2 definition of the nature of the note of the 26th, with the fact
3 that having read the note and having heard the Secretary's supple-
4 mentary propositions, Ambassador Kurusu said "that when they
5 reported our answer to their Government it would be likely to
6 throw up its hands." (of Public Relations, Vol. 2, p. 765) and
7 that "Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their
8 proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the
9 end....." (of For. Relations, Vol. 2, Page 766).

10 63. Your diary shows that Secretary Hull stated at the
11 meeting on December 7 at the meeting between you, Secretary Knox,
12 and Secretary Hull that the Japanese are planning some deviltry
13 and that he wondered where the blow would strike. Did you
14 discuss Hawaii, or any other American possession at that time?

15 64. If so, will you state what was said and by whom?

16 65. a. Did anyone at that meeting bring up the question
17 of 1 P.M. Washington time being dawn or morning in Pearl Harbor?

18 b. Did you three Secretaries on December 7, 1941
19 discuss the 1 P.M. time of delivery and what was said by each
20 of you?

21 66. Did anyone suggest or bring up the fact that this
22 might or could mean an attack upon Hawaii or Pearl Harbor?

23 67. If so, give us the details of that discussion.

24 Give us the detailed conversation that took place in
25 the Secretary of State's office on Sunday A.M., Dec. 7, 1941.

R-2

1 68. On December 6, 1941, was an appointment arranged for
2 a meeting between you, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary
3 of the Navy, to be held at the State Department on December 7,
4 1941 at or about 10 o'clock a.m.?

5 69. a. Who arranged the meeting referred to in the pre-
6 ceding question and at what time? What was to be the purpose
7 of the meeting?

8 b. Why was not Gen. Marshall and/or Adm. Stark invited
9 or in attendance?

10 c. If the meeting was to consider Japan's reply to
11 the Secretary of State's note of Nov. 26, why was the President
12 not also conferred with?

13 70. What was the occasion for arranging the meeting
14 referred to in question 68?

15 71. a. Who attended the meeting at the State Department
16 on December 7, 1941, at or about 10 o'clock a.m.?

17 b. What intercepted Japanese messages were before
18 you at that meeting?

19 72. What discussion, or discussions, took place at the
20 meeting held at the State Department on the morning of Decem-
21 ber 7, 1941, which you attended in company with the Secretary
22 of State, Mr. Hull, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox?

23 (Please state in complete detail what was said by
24 you and by the other participants in the discussions
25 at the meeting referred to).

R-3

1 73. What action did you take, or direct to be taken, on
2 the morning of December 7, 1941, (a) when you learned of the
3 existence and tenor of the 14th part of the Japanese reply
4 to the American Note of November 26, 1941, which appears on
5 page 245 of Exhibit 1; and (b) when you learned that the Japan-
6 ese Ambassador in Washington was directed to present the Japan-
7 ese reply to the American Note of November 26 at 1 PM, Washing-
8 ton time?

9 74. Was there any discussion between you and any indivi-
10 dual on December 7, 1941, prior to the time of the attack on
11 Pearl Harbor, as to the significance of the Japanese message
12 directing the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present the
13 Japanese reply to the American Note of November 26, 1941, at
14 1 PM, Washington time?

15 75. If your answer to the preceding question is in the
16 affirmative, what was said by you and any other individual in
17 connection with the subject matter of the significance of the
18 hour fixed for the delivery of the Japanese note to the United
19 States on December 7, 1941?

20 76. After you learned of the existence of the 14th part
21 of the Japanese message and the additional message fixing the
22 time of delivery as 1 o'clock pm, Washington time, did you
23 discuss either of these messages with the President, with
24 General Marshall, or with Admiral Stark or any officer of the
25 State Department, the Navy Department, the War Department?

R-4

1 77. If your answer to the preceding question is in the
2 affirmative, what was said by you and what was said by the
3 person or persons with whom you had any discussion or conversa-
4 tion referred to in the preceding question?

5 78. Did you talk with the President personally or by
6 phone or contact him through a messenger on Saturday, December
7 6 or 7th from 4 PM to the time of the attack?

8 79. If you did communicate in any way with the President,
9 personally or otherwise, give the details of that conversation.

10 80. Did you at any time on December 6, 1941, receive the
11 first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the American Note of
12 November 26, which appears on pages 239, 240, 242, 243, and
13 244 of Exhibit 1 in this Investigation?

14 81. If your answer to the preceding question is in the
15 affirmative, at what time and from what individual, did you
16 receive the message referred to?

17 82. When on December 6, 1941, did you learn that the
18 first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the American Note of
19 November 26 had been intercepted and translated by the Army
20 and Navy?

21 83. From whom did you receive the information referred
22 to in the preceding question?

23 (Please state in complete detail, as you now recall,
24 what was said by any person or persons informing you
25 of the receipt of the 13-part message, and your

R-5

1 response thereto)

2 84. Exhibit 58 of this Investigation (Item 2) contains
3 a list of "telephone calls made from outside through White
4 House switchboard on December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941,
5 as compiled from operators' notes available." The following
6 calls appear among others with the following notations as to
7 time on December 6:

8 1258 p. Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull - - - lwc - OK 1259 p.

9 830 p. Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson - - - OK

10 845 p. Secy Knox cld Secy Hull - - - OK

11 847 p. Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson - - - OK

12 (a) What was said by you and by Secretary Hull in the
13 course of your telephone conversation at 1258 p.m.
14 on December 6, 1941?

15 (b) What was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course
16 of your telephone conversation at 8:30 p.m. on
17 December 6, 1941?

18 (c) What was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course
19 of your telephone conversation at 8:47 p.m. on
20 December 6, 1941?

21 85. Did you have any conversation or conversations with
22 Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox on 6 December 1941, other than
23 those referred to in the preceding question?

24 86. If your answer to the preceding question is in the
25 affirmative, what were the time or times of any such conversation

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1 or conversations, and what was said by you and the other party
2 to each such conversation?

3 87. This question not used.

4 88. This question not used.

5 89. This question not used.

6 90. At any time on December 6, 1941, did you discuss
7 the "Pilot Message," so-called or the 13-part message referred
8 to in question 80 with any of the following individuals:

9 (a) The President

10 (b) Secretary of State Hull

11 (c) Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox

12 (d) Mr. Sumner Welles

13 (e) Gen. George C. Marshall

14 (f) Adm. H. R. Stark

15 (g) General Miles - G-2

16 (h) General Cerow

17 (i) Col. Rufus Bratton

18 (Please specify in your answer to this question the
19 name of the individual or individuals referred to,
20 with whom you had such discussion or conversation,
21 and the time or times of such discussions or conver-
22 sations.)

23 (See question 94 for description of the Pilot Message)

24 91. What was said by you and by any of the individuals
25 referred to in question 90 in the course of any conversations

~~SECRET~~

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 or discussions on December 6, 1941, with reference to:

2 (a) the meaning of the so-called "Pilot Message" (See
3 question 94)

4 (b) any action to be taken by the War and Navy Depart-
5 ments, or the State Department, in connection
6 with the so-called "Pilot Message";

7 (c) the meaning of the 13-part message referred to in
8 question 80;

9 (d) any action to be taken by the War and Navy Depart-
10 ment or the State Department with respect to
11 the 13-part message:

12 92. Where were you on December 6, 1941, from 4 PM to
13 12 Midnight?

14 93. Did you learn of the contents of the 13th part of the
15 14-part message before you saw it? If so, relate the circum-
16 stances.

17 94. Your attention is directed to pages 238 and 239 of
18 Exhibit 1 of this Investigation, and specifically to the
19 message appearing on such pages from Tokyo to Washington,
20 Number 901, on December 6, 1941. This message has been de-
21 scribed in the course of this Investigation as the "Pilot
22 Message" because it informs the Japanese representatives in
23 Washington that Japan has prepared a memorandum in reply to
24 the American note of November 26 to be sent in 14 parts, and
25 that the time of its presentation was to be specifically fixed

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1 in a later message. Col. Rufus Bratton has testified before
 2 this Committee (Record, page 12050) that he disseminated this
 3 so-called "Pilot Message" around 3 o'clock of the afternoon
 4 of 6 December, 1941, to "Secretary of State, Secretary of War,
 5 Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans Division, G-2 and my
 6 own section."

7 What action did you take upon receipt of this message?

8 95. With whom did you discuss the so-called "Pilot Message"
 9 referred to in the preceding question?

10 96. What was the nature of your discussion of the so-
 11 called "Pilot Message" with any person or persons on the 6th
 12 of December 1941?

13 (Please state in complete detail what you said in any
 14 such discussion, and what was said by the person or
 15 persons with whom you discussed the "Pilot Message"?)

16 97. When did you see the pilot message which is number
 17 901, page 238 of Exhibit 1?

18 Had the contents of the pilot message been called to
 19 your attention before you saw it? If so, relate the circum-
 20 stances.

21 98. When did you first see or obtain information as to
 22 the contents of the following messages in Exhibit 1:

23 #904 Page 245

24 #907 Page 248

25 #908 Page 248

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#909 Page 240

#910 Page 249

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3 99. If you made plans at this meeting on the 7th between
4 the three Secretaries as to what was to be said or done, (the
5 words said and done were used by you in your testimony before
6 the Army Board) did you discuss with anyone that this informa-
7 tion should be sent to the field, particularly to Short?

8 Give us the conversations on what was to be said.

9 Give us the conversations on what was to be done.

10 100. At what time did you first get the 14th part of the
11 14th part message? Give hour if possible.

12 101. Did you see General Marshall on December 6? If so,
13 give us detailed conversations between you.

14 Did you see Gen. Marshall on December 7th prior to
15 the Japanese attack? If so, give us detailed conversation.

16 Did you see Gen. Gerow on Dec. 6 or 7 up to the Jap
17 attack? If so, give us detailed conversations between you.

18 102. Did you talk with any Army officer after 4 PM on
19 Dec. 6, 1941, up to the time of the attack on the 7th of Decem-
20 ber? If so, give us the conversations.

21 103. I quote from Exhibit 16 dated November 5, 1941
22 Memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff
23 to the President:

24 "The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are
25 in accord in the following conclusions:

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- a. The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.
- b. War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance, Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:
- (1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;
 - (2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of the 100° East or south 10° North; or into Portugese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

R-10

- 1 c. If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should
2 follow the strategic lines of existing war
3 plans, i.e., military operations should be
4 primarily defensive, with the objective of
5 holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic
6 position.
- 7 d. Considering world strategy, a Japanese Advance
8 against Kunming, into Thailand except as pre-
9 viously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would
10 not justify intervention by the United States
11 against Japan.
- 12 e. All possible aid short of actual war against
13 Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central
14 Government.
- 15 f. In case it is decided to undertake war against
16 Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplo-
17 matic, economic, and military fields should be
18 undertaken in common by the United States, the
19 British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East
20 Indies.

21 "The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend
22 that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the
23 above conclusions.

24 Specifically, they recommend:

25 That the dispatch of United States armed forces for

intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

R-11

1 That material aid to China be accelerated consonant
2 with the need of Russia, Great Britain, and our own
3 forces.

4 That aid to the American Volunteer Group be con-
5 tinued and accelerated to the maximum practicable
6 extent.

7 That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

8 104. Did you discuss the above (Question 103) with first,
9 the President? If so, give us the details of the conversation;
10 secondly, the Secretary of State? If so, give us details of
11 the conversation; third, with General Marshall? If so, give
12 us details of the conversation.

13 105. Following is the 14th part of the 14-part message:

14 "From: Tokyo

15 To: Washington

16 7 December 1941

17 #902 Part 14 of 14

18 (Note - In the forwarding instructions to the radio sta-
19 tion handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase
20 "VERY IMPORTANT")

21 7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Govern-
22 ment to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to
23 obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace
24 through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially
25 to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping

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1 Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed
 2 clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus,
 3 the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-
 4 American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of
 5 the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government
 6 has finally been lost.

7 The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby
 8 the American Government that in view of the attitude of the
 9 American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible
 10 to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

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106. How do you account for the delay from 5 o'clock A.M., the date of the receipt of the 14th part of the 14-part message, until you did receive it?

107. If any of the delay was caused by delay in decoding and translation, it seems clear it was translated by 8 A.M. or 8:15 A.M. on the morning of the 7th of December 1941. How do you account for the delay from 8 A.M. until you did see it?

108. Did you at any time prior to the attack discuss with the President the contents of any part of the 14-part message?

109. If so, what was the discussion?

110. Did you discuss with Gen. Marshall any of the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941 - and set forth in our Exhibit 1? If so, state the time; give the number of the message and page of Exhibit 1, also the details of what was said by each of you.

111. If you discussed with the Secretary of State any of the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941, and set forth in our Exhibit 1 at any time other than at the meeting in his office at 10 or 10:30 A.M. on Sunday, December 7. State the times and give the number of the message, page of Exhibit 1, and also the details of what was said by you and Mr. Hull.

112. Did you discuss with anyone in the Army and Navy any of the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7 and set forth in our Exhibit 1? Give the names of

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1 persons, time of discussion or conversations and conversation
2 by you and the other party or parties.

3 113. At the meeting of the three Secretaries on Sunday,
4 December 7, 1941, at 10 or 10:30 A.M. You, Mr. Stimson, were
5 familiar with the message sent to General Short on Nov. 27.
6 Did you not consider with the information you had received
7 here in Washington from that date until your meeting time on
8 December 7 that a new alert was necessary to Gen. Short?

9 114. You had seen on Nov. 28, 1941, the reply from Gen.
10 Short to the message of 27 Nov. which was as follows:

11 "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage.

12 Liaison with Navy REURAD Four Seven Two Twenty Seventh."
13 having in mind that reply showing his interpretation of the
14 message of 27 Nov. that a new alert was necessary.

15 Your findings as to Gen. Short indicate you believed he
16 was subject to criticism for his interpretation of the message
17 from Gen. Marshall to him on Nov. 27; is not the same thing
18 true of the failure to properly evaluate his reply to that
19 message.

20 115. When did you first learn that Gen. Marshall and Gen.
21 Gerow had failed to note what Gen. Short had replied to their
22 note of Nov. 27?

23 116. Did not the failure of the responsible Army officers
24 in Washington to properly evaluate Gen. Short's reply to Gen.
25 Marshall's message of Nov. 27 contribute to the Pearl Harbor

3

1 disaster?

2 117. Did you know what messages were sent from Washington
3 to Gen. Short between Nov. 27 and the 8th of December, 1941?

4 State the message you knew had been sent between Nov. 27
5 and Dec. 8, 1941.

6 Did you believe that Gen. Short was getting all decoded
7 Japanese diplomatic messages?

8 118. Did you believe that Pearl Harbor had the means to
9 intercept, decipher, and translate Japanese diplomatic messages?

10 119. Did you know that Gen. MacArthur had access to the
11 intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages through the Navy in the
12 Philippines?

13 120. Did you discuss with the President the 1 o'clock
14 message, Ex. 1, No. 907, Page 248?

15 121. If so, give time and what was said by you and by the
16 President.

17 122. Why did our Government adopt the policy of leaning
18 over backwards to keep from advising Japan that we were ready
19 for any attack that they might make?

20 123. If such was the plan, or our policy, who was respon-
21 sible for its adoption?

22 124. With whom did you discuss it and give us the con-
23 tents of the discussion.

24 125. Do you know why Gen. Marshall did not use the tele-
25 phone to advise Gen. Short of an anticipated attack or give

4

1 him an alert?

2 How could the fact that we were alerted to air attack
3 (if known by the Japs) been detrimental to the United States?

4 126. You have made a statement that there was a prelimi-
5 nary alert given prior to the 27th and a full alert given on
6 the 27th. As time went on, and the deadline date of the 29th
7 passed, new developments arose as to the destruction of the
8 codes, and other information came to our Government here in
9 Washington. Did you discuss with anyone the sending of a new
10 message to keep parties alerted and, if not, why not?

11 127. The fact that General Marshall did send a message
12 at 12:18 on the 7th of December, 1941, to Gen. Short would
13 indicate, would it not, that Gen. Marshall did not consider
14 the message of the 27th as sufficient considering the further
15 information that was obtained as to Japan's intentions?

16 128. This being true, can you tell us why, if a new alert
17 was to be given at all, it was not given earlier than 12:18
18 Dec. 7?

19 129. Was your Secretary of War's office alerted to war on
20 the 5th or on the 6th or on the 7th of December, 1941?

21 130. If not, can you explain why not?

22 131. If it was, will you explain just how it was alerted
23 and who was on duty in the office?

24 132. When, in your opinion, did war between Japan and
25 America become imminent?

5

1 133. Did you make any effort to contact General Marshall
2 on the afternoon or night of December 6, or on the morning
3 of December 7, 1941?

4 134. If your answer to the preceding question is in the
5 affirmative, were you successful?

6 135. If your answer to question 133 is in the affirmative,
7 what was said by you and by General Marshall?

8 136. Did you during the time, the 6th of December, contact
9 Adm. Stark?

10 137. If so, give us the conversations and what was dis-
11 cussed.

12 138. This question was not used.

13 139. This question not used.

14 140. Did you contact the Secretary of State, or did he
15 contact you, or were you in communication with him either per-
16 sonally or by message on the 6th?

17 141. If so, give us the details of the conversation and
18 the time of contact.

19 142. When did you receive notice or information concern-
20 ing a message from Ambassador Winant purporting to come from
21 Churchill to the President, received in the State Dept. at
22 10:40 on December 6?

23 143. If you had a conference with the Secretary of the
24 Navy about a meeting the next day, and were familiar with the
25 fact that a 13-part message was in, and one part had not been

6

1 received, can you explain why the meeting was held as late as
2 10 or 10:30?

3 144. When did you learn that the President was preparing
4 a message to the Emperor?

5 145. When did you first know or hear that that message was
6 sent?

7 146. If you had any conversations with the President about
8 that message to the Emperor will you give us the conversations?

9 147. Did you have a conversation at any time in Nov. or
10 Dec., 1941, with the President about a message to Congress con-
11 cerning the Far Eastern Situation? If so, give us details of
12 that conversation.

13 148. Were you aware that the President, in informing the
14 press on December 2, that he was asking Japan about the Indo-
15 China concentrations, was asked by a reporter if any time
16 limit had been set for a reply and that the President had said
17 that the question was silly, had answered in the negative, and
18 said that those tactics were used in the last century not in
19 this, and had said that the United States was at peace with
20 Japan and that the two nations were perfectly friendly?

21 149. Were you aware of the Jap Ambassador telling Under-
22 Secretary Welles, on delivery of the Dec. 2 note, that it was
23 apparent that both sides were preparing? (See Foreign Rela-
24 tions, Page 780)

25 150. Were you aware on December 4 that the Japanese

7

1 movements in Indo-China alone as represented in the President's
2 note of December 2, constituted actions which the Pres. in
3 his note of Aug. 17 had formally pledged the United States to
4 resist?

5 151. Do you have any evidence that that commitment on
6 Aug. 17 had been made known to the American people or to the
7 American Congress before Dec. 7, 1941?

8 152. Will you state your conversation with Gen. Marshall,
9 or any other military authority, in relation to the fact that
10 negotiations were ended so far as the Secretary of State was
11 concerned and that it was up to the Army and Navy?

12 153. When the President returned from the Atlantic Con-
13 ference, did you discuss with him his conversations or nego-
14 tiations with Prime Minister Churchill in relation to the Far
15 East?

16 154. I refer you to Foreign Relations, Vol. 2, Page 556, at
17 the bottom of the page, the last paragraph, which continues on
18 Page 557. Did you know that that message was given by the
19 Pres. to the Japanese and did you discuss with him the message,
20 or the contents thereof, and will you state your discussions,
21 what he said and what you said?

22 155. Did you know what our Government policy was in
23 giving armed aid or support to Britain or the Dutch if there
24 was an attack made by the Japanese upon the Malay Peninsula or
25 any other British or Dutch possession and no direct attack

8

1 against American possessions?

2 156. Why were you concerned with the movement south of
3 the Japanese to Thailand or the Malay Peninsula if we had no
4 policy as to what we intended to do in case of an attack on
5 the British and/or the Dutch?

6 157. Did you ever discuss with the President and/or Sec.
7 of State Hull the question of our policy in case of an attack
8 upon the British and/or Dutch and no attack by the Japanese
9 upon America or American possessions?

10 158. If you had such a discussion, give us the dates and
11 details.

12 159. At the meeting on December 7, 1941, with Secretary
13 Hull and Secretary Knox, during that meeting or from the time
14 of that meeting up until the attack, did you or anyone to your
15 knowledge present at that meeting, or in that conference, com-
16 municate with the President and, if so, what were the contents
17 of the conversation?

18 160. At the meeting between you and the other Secretaries
19 and Cabinet Members, you have stated that you stayed in confer-
20 ence until lunch time going over the plans for what should be
21 said and done. Will you give us the details of that conversa-
22 tion or, if you do not remember the exact words, then the sub-
23 stance of the conference, particularly what you meant by "plans
24 for what should be said" and what is meant by that. Also in
25 regard to "as to what should be done," will you tell us what

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1 was said by each on "as to what should be done."

2 161. I refer you to a memorandum, Exhibit 40, and ask you
3 if there was any discussion with you or anyone else to your
4 knowledge on this subject of armed support.

5 Who assured the British of American armed support as men-
6 tioned in their instructions to Singapore as shown in the
7 message of our Naval Observer at Singapore to Adm. Hart?

8 162. As Sec. of War on December 5, 1941, had you prepared
9 or acted in any way to implement the declaration of the Pre-
10 sident to Japan on August 17 that the United States immediately
11 would resist a Japanese threat or move into the southwest
12 Pacific?

13 163. You were certain, if only from the President's note
14 of December 8, were you not, that Japanese concentration in
15 southern Indo-China, constituted a threat within the meaning
16 and letter of the declaration of August 17, 1941?

17 164. As Secretary of War, on December 5, had you antici-
18 pated that American resistance to a Jap attack against some
19 other nation would follow the pattern of American resistance to
20 Germany's attacks on Great Britain in the Atlantic Ocean?

21 165. Was it ever called to your attention that the Sec.
22 of Interior was holding up the installation of the permanent
23 radar sets? If so, what was done to expedite these installa-
24 tions?

25 166. What evidence was before you when Gen. Short was

10

1 relieved of his Command?

2 Whose decision was it to relieve Gen. Short of his com-
3 mand?

4 167. It is true, is it not, that in late November and
5 early December 1941 you and General Marshall shared with General
6 Short the belief that Japan would not attack Pearl Harbor?
7 (See par. 19, Stimson Statement 29 Aug. 1945).

8 168. It is true, is it not, that the American General
9 Staff "completely underestimated the Japanese military capabi-
10 lities and particularly the advance which they had made in
11 the use of aircraft?"

12 169. Do you still think that "It is probably true that the
13 emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the
14 Department's caution against alarming the civilian population,
15 coupled with the failure to comment on Short's report of No-
16 vember 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen
17 the correct form of alert and might disregard all others, "as
18 you stated in your Official Report Regarding the Pearl Harbor
19 Disaster, released to the press on 29 August 1945?"

20 170. If there was, in the opinion of the War Department
21 General Staff, any "threat from without," in an overseas
22 command, and the reports from that area showed only an alert
23 against sabotage, who, if anyone, had the duty or authority in
24 the War Department to transmit a message to correct the situ-
25 ation?

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171. In your public report of 29 August you stated that G-2 "had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information * * * to the theater commanders"; it is true, is it not, that neither G-2 nor the War Department sent any information to General Short between 28 November 1941 and 7 December 1941?

172. In your opinion, was the War Department on a sufficient alert on 6 December 1941 so that the Chief of Staff could reasonably assume that information such as was received indicating a breach of diplomatic relations would get to him before the next morning, or do you regard the delay in getting this information to General Marshall as an unusual circumstance which he could not have reasonably foreseen?

173. Do you believe that in early December 1941 the War Department had an efficient functioning system to get important intelligence promptly to the Chief of Staff?

174. It is true, is it not, that neither you nor Colonel Clausen, your investigator even asked Gen. Short about his knowledge of the "winds" code, but that, nevertheless, you made a finding in your official report that "this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941?"

175. Were you consulted and did you have anything to do with the appointment of the Roberts Commission?

176. Did you see the Roberts Finding of Facts prior to its

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1 signing and submission to the President?

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3 Mr. Lane: As just previously referred to, subsequently

4 the committee submitted certain interrogatories to Mr. Stimson.

5 His reply has been received and we request that the interroga-

6 tories, the answers thereto, and the letter of transmittal

7 dated April 23, 1946 be spread on the record at this point.

8 The Chairman: It is so ordered.

9 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 Washington, D. C.

11 My dear Senator Barkley:

12 I have received your kind letter of April 11th enclosing the

13 two sets of interrogatories which Senator Ferguson has sub-

14 mitted.

15 I confess to disappointment that my previous efforts to give

16 your Committee a fair and full statement of what I could recall

17 had in regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, based upon such

18 effort and investigation as my health would allow, should not be

19 followed by no less than 237 interrogatories submitted by

20 Senator Ferguson. In preparing my statement I went to the

21 very margin of the rules imposed upon me by my physicians.

22 The interrogatories which you now send me are divided into

23 two lists. The first dated March 6th past have been prepared

24 before my statement sent to the Committee on March 13th could have

25 been received by them. While I have not been able to explain

Pearl Harbor Comm.

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is carefully, is in Law Offices of

WINTHROP, STIMSON, PUTNAM & ROBERTS

Mutual Life Building No. 32 Liberty Street

NEW YORK 5, N. Y.

Whitehall 3-0700 HENRY L. STIMSON

COUNSEL

April 23, 1946.

Hon. Alben W. Barkley,

United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator Barkley:

I have received your kind letter of April 4th enclosing the two sets of interrogatories which Senator Ferguson has submitted.

I confess to disappointment that my previous effort to give your Committee a fair and full statement of what I could recollect in regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, based upon such effort and investigation as my health would allow, should now be followed by no less than 237 interrogatories submitted by Senator Ferguson. In preparing my statement I went to the very margin of the rules imposed upon me by my physicians.

The interrogatories which you now send me are divided into two lists. The first dated March 6th must have been prepared before my statement sent to the Committee on March 13th could have been received by them. While I have not been able to examine

1 it carefully, it must have been in large part answered by that
2 statement of mine.

3 Senator Ferguson's second list by its title is related to my
4 statement and is in substance a cross-examination of that state-
5 ment. This second list I have now tried to answer to the best
6 of my recollection and belief.

7 I assume that the Committee will be satisfied with my origi-
8 nal statement as an answer to the first list and, if there are
9 any questions in that list directed to matters not in the state-
10 ment, it will assume that my recollection does not extend to
11 that question. I really cannot in my present condition of
12 health undertake the very heavy burden which would inure to
13 another reexamination of all papers, documents, and evidence
14 heretofore submitted. I did the best I could in that respect
15 in my first statement. I hope you will find my answers to
16 Senator Ferguson's supplemental questions satisfactory. I
17 enclose them herewith.

18 With many thanks for your courtesy and personal good wishes,
19 I am

20 Very sincerely yours,

21 (signed) HENRY L. STIMSON
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ANSWERS OF HENRY L. STIMSON TO SUPPLEMENTAL

QUESTIONS PROPOSED BY SENATOR FERGUSON

- 1
2
3 1. Mr. Secretary, you state in your statement to the Pearl
4 Harbor Committee that our military advisers had given the
5 President their formal advice that if Japan moved beyond
6 certain lines we would have to fight for the sake of our
7 own security. Are you referring to the memoranda to the
8 President, dated November 5 and November 27, 1941, and
9 signed by Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

10 Assuming this statement is addressed to the sentence
11 on page 4 of my statement, my answer is "Yes."

- 12 2. Was this advice on the request of the President?

13 I have no recollection as to this.

- 14 3. Was that advice accepted and did it become our Government
15 policy prior to the Pearl Harbor attack?

16 It has always been the fixed and permanent policy
17 of the United States Government to defend itself and its pos-
18 sessions. The Congress itself reaffirmed and endorsed this
19 policy on numerous occasions as the dangers to this country from
20 the war which was starting across the world became more acute.
21 It reaffirmed it when the regular size of our ordinary military
22 appropriations were enormously increased by the Congress in May
23 and June, 1940 at the time of the fall of France, Belgium and
24 the Netherlands. It reaffirmed it in September, 1940 when it
25 passed the draft law, and by the joint resolution in August,

1 1940 which authorized the total mobilization of the National
2 Guard for large scale maneuvers or training. It reaffirmed
3 it by its passage of the lend-lease legislation to assist in
4 arming the nations who were fighting in the front line against
5 aggression by the Axis and in opening our ports for the repairs
6 of their warships. Each of these extraordinary Congressional
7 enactments indicated beyond peradventure a policy to prepare
8 the United States against an immediate impending attack by the
9 Axis nations.

10 It is the President of the United States who is
11 charged with the execution of that policy, both as Chief Execu-
12 tive and as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. It was his
13 duty to make the decisions as to how this policy of defense
14 should be best carried out. The adoption of plans for defense
15 are ultimately for his decision and if the adoption of a par-
16 ticular strategy is to be terminated policy at all, it is execu-
17 tive policy the decision of which is entirely a matter for the
18 President. In making this decision, the President receives
19 the advice of numerous advisers, including his military advisers
20 and the members of his Cabinet. Their views and recommenda-
21 tions, however, are purely advisory, and the final policy and
22 strategy is for the decision of the President and it is his
23 alone.

24 As I have already pointed out in my statement, and as
25 my contemporaneous notes indicate, it was the consensus of

1 opinion of the President's advisers that if the Japanese in
2 the latter part of November should advance beyond a certain
3 point the security of this country demanded that we would have
4 to fight. It was also the consensus of opinion that a fur-
5 ther warning by us to Japan should be given. The President
6 was in fact during the early part of December engaged in prepar-
7 ing an address to the Congress which would incorporate such a
8 warning, and was also considering a special telegram to the
9 Emperor of Japan. Before the address to the Congress was
10 delivered, however, the Japanese struck on December 7th. I do
11 not recollect that the President prior to December 7th formally
12 announced any decision on his part to fight if the Japanese
13 passed the point in question, but he was undoubtedly consider-
14 ing such a decision most seriously, because it was the advice
15 of his best qualified advisers.

16 4. If so, what plans were promulgated to carry out that advice?

17 See answer to Question 3.

18 5. Did you have information from the President that we would
19 fight for the sake of our security upon the happening of
20 that event mentioned in Question #1?

21 See answer to Question 3.

22 6. If so, did you convey that information to General Marshall?

23 See answer to Question 3.

24 7. Will you state if the Secretary of the Navy had such advice
25 and if he conveyed it, or caused it to be conveyed, to

1 Admiral Stark?

2 I have no information as to this.

3 8. On Page 9 of your mimeographed statement to the Committee,
4 you have set forth four salient features of the situation
5 as they appeared to you in November of 1941. Were any or
6 all of these discussed with any other person?

7 All of these points were discussed many times and
8 with numerous persons. I have already indicated in my state-
9 ment the discussions that took place with the President, at
10 Cabinet meetings and at meetings with the Secretary of State
11 and Secretary of the Navy and with the Chiefs of Staff, all of
12 whom shared my views, to the best of my information and belief.

13 9. If so will you state with whom they were discussed and if
14 anyone else shared your views on these features? Will you
15 give their names?

16 I have nothing to add beyond what I have already said
17 in my statement of March, 1946, and in my last answer.

18 10. On page 12 of the mimeographed statement you speak of the
19 vote of the Cabinet as to whether or not it was thought
20 that the American people would back you up if it became
21 necessary to strike Japan in case she attacked England in
22 Malay or the Dutch East Indies, does this mean that it
23 became the policy of this government at that time to take
24 such steps?

25 See answer to Question 3.

1 11. If so, to whom was this policy communicated?

2 See answer to Question 3.

3 12. Did you advise General Marshall and was he to advise
4 others in the field of this policy?

5 See answer to Question 3.

6 13. Did you, Mr. Secretary, keep in close touch with the pro-
7 gram of installing permanent radar in the Hawaiian
8 Islands?

9 I took a very active interest in insisting that
10 proper installations of radar, both mobile and permanent, be
11 installed in Hawaii as promptly as possible, but I, of course,
12 left the details as to how and where the permanent apparatus
13 should be installed to the military members of the staff and
14 the local military commander. I have no recollection at this
15 time as to how much detail I knew with regard to the permanent
16 installations at Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941. I do re-
17 member distinctly the very favorable report of the test of the
18 mobile apparatus that was made shortly before the Pearl Harbor
19 attack, and that that report indicated that the mobile appara-
20 tus was in operation and was capable of detecting the approach
21 of enemy planes at a distance of at least eighty miles.

22 14. Will you state specifically what was done to expedite
23 the installation of permanent radar in Hawaii?

24 I have no recollection at the present time.

25 15. Was it not called to your attention that there were many

1 delays in the installing of radar equipment in the Hawaiian
2 Islands?

3 I have no recollection at the present time.

4 16. On pages 14 and 15, you tell of a conversation between the
5 War Cabinet -- the President, Secretary of War, Secretary
6 of Navy, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and the Secre-
7 tary of State -- on Page 15 you state that certain things
8 were discussed at the meeting. Was there any policy formu-
9 lated by virtue of that discussion?

10 See answer to Question 3.

11 17. If so, will you state what the policy was and how it was
12 to be carried out? On Page 15, you state that you re-
13 minded the President of his warning of August 19, I ask
14 you if the correct date of that is not Sunday, August 17,
15 when the President returned from the Atlantic Conference
16 with Mr. Churchill?

17 See answer to Question 3. I believe the correct date
18 of the warning which I described as of August 19 should be
19 August 17, 1941.

20 18. I also ask you what the President replied to you when you
21 made the statement to him as stated by you on Page 15 as
22 to the warning that he had given Japan?

23 I do not recollect.

24 19. Will you state what the President said about this warning
25 and your suggestion?

1 I do not recollect, except that I do remember that
2 the final view was that an additional warning to Japan should
3 be given.

4 20. When did you first become familiar with the warning that
5 the President gave to Japan on August 17, 1941, as related
6 in the White Paper (Vol. 2, For. Rel. of the U. S. Pages
7 556-557)?

8 I do not recollect. See answer to Question 52 below.

9 21. Did England ever give a parallel warning? If so, when?

10 I do not recollect. See answer to Question 52 below.

11 22. Was it not important that you, as Secretary of War, be
12 advised as to our policies in the Far East and that you
13 advise General Marshall of that policy and that he, in
14 turn, advise General Short and other officers in the field?

15 I think it was important that the Secretary of War
16 and the Chief of Staff should be advised as to our policies in
17 the Far East. As to what extent and in what detail the Com-
18 mander of the individual theatre should be so advised depends on
19 the circumstances of the particular situation.

20 23. Was it not important that if our Government had a policy
21 that if England or the Netherlands were attacked that we
22 would consider it as an unfriendly act and an attack upon
23 us, that our military authorities be fully advised as to
24 that?

25 See answer to Questions 3 and 22.

1 24. Was it not important that if Japan was to make an attack
2 upon the British and/or the Dutch and our policy was that
3 we were to treat that as an attack or unfriendly act upon
4 us that the commanding officer at Hawaii be fully informed
5 as to this in order that he might guard against an attack
6 upon our fleet and possessions which were on the flank of
7 the Japanese?

8 See answer to Questions 3 and 22.

9 The commanding officers of the individual Pacific
10 theatres were advised on November 27th that hostile action was
11 possible "at any moment".

12 25. On Page 17 of your statement, you speak of the conversation
13 with Mr. Hull and state that he had washed his hands of it
14 and that it was in the hands of the army and the navy, and
15 that you had called the President who gave you a different
16 view, do I understand that the President did not agree
17 with Mr. Hull?

18 I think my statement and my notes of November 27th
19 adequately cover the answer to this question.

20 26. Will you give us the entire conversation you had with the
21 President in relation to this?

22 I have nothing to add to what I have already said in
23 my statement.

24 27. Did you discuss with the President on or about November 27,
25 1941 the sending of a message to General MacArthur?

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I did.

28. Will you give us this conversation?

I have nothing to add to what I have already said in my statement, page 19, and to what is contained in my notes of Thursday, November 27, 1941.

29. At that time, or on the 27th, did you discuss with the

President the sending of a message to General Short?

I do not recollect. The sequence shows that such a message was sent to Short as well as the two other Pacific outposts, viz. Panama and the Pacific Coast including Alaska.

30. Will you give us the conversation with the President about

sending General Short a message?

See answer to Question 29.

31. When did it first come to your attention that the Japanese

were treating our note of the 26th of November, 1941, as

an ultimatum?

I do not recollect. I do not know that it ever came to my knowledge until after December 7th.

32. Was it not important that we understand the way the

Japanese were treating it -- as to what their acts would

be rather than what our intentions were?

I have nothing to say as to this. See answer to previous question.

33. On Pages 24 and 25 of your mimeographed statement you

make the statement that the President had made a momentous

1 decision that day, that is, to send what you called a
2 final alert. I wish you would explain why you refer to
3 this as a momentous decision.

4 The word "momentous" is perhaps not strictly accurate.
5 It is a fair sample of the rough and hasty character of my daily
6 notes as described in my original statement to your committee.
7 The thought I intended to convey was that the President had him-
8 self directed that a final warning should be sent out and that
9 as this decision had emanated from the Commander-in-Chief it
10 was very important that it should be done.

11 34. Why was it a momentous decision to advise our armed forces
12 to be on the alert for an attack by the Japs?

13 See answer to Question 33.

14 35. Did you consider this a declaration of war with Japan
15 and for this reason it was a momentous decision?

16 I did not consider this a declaration of war with
17 Japan.

18 36. State what was said between you and the President on this
19 occasion so we may be advised as to why this was a momen-
20 tous decision.

21 I have already answered this in my statement of
22 March, 1946, at page 26.

23 37. On Page 26 of your mimeographed statement you say that
24 our government had decided not to attack without a fur-
25 ther warning, and that the President suggested a special

1 telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. Was it
2 decided as a policy of our Government that we would
3 attack after sending of that message if the Japanese
4 continued their aggression further to the south?

5 See answer to Question 3.

6 38. On the same page you state that a special message would be
7 delivered to Congress. Will you state if you ever knew
8 why that message was not delivered to Congress?

9 It was not delivered to Congress because the Japanese
10 struck first.

11 39. Why was Congress allowed to adjourn from December 4th to
12 December 8th at a time when our Government knew of the
13 movement of the Japanese to the south?

14 I have no recollection as to this.

15 40. On page 28 of your statement you use the following language:
16 "On the other hand, we also decided that we could not at-
17 tack without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed
18 what form that warning should take. The President sug-
19 gested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of
20 Japan. After some discussion it was decided that he
21 would send such a letter to the Emperor, which would not
22 be made public, and that at the same time he would deliver
23 a special message to Congress reporting on the danger and
24 reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened."
25 Will you please explain as to whether this proposal

1 involved coming to Congress in advance or whether the pro-
2 posal was to strike Japan first and then report to Congress
3 what had been done?

4 The proposal was to go to Congress in advance, and
5 through the address to Congress to give the Japanese a final
6 warning.

7 41. Was it the intention of our Government, through the Presi-
8 dent, to notify Congress that certain things had happened
9 which caused us to strike Japan, and that the report to
10 Congress was to obtain Congress' ratification and approval?

11 No. See answer to Question 40.

12 42. Will you state why no action was actually taken upon this
13 proposal?

14 See answer to Question 40.

15 The fact that information coming in around the first
16 of December indicated that the Japanese expedition was landing
17 in Indo-China in the neighborhood of Saigon rather than going
18 on into the Peninsula and up into the Gulf of Siam may have
19 prompted the President to think that perhaps the Japanese were
20 not going to invade Thailand at once or attack the Malay
21 Peninsula and may have delayed his address to Congress.

22 43. On Pages 29 and 30 of your message to the Committee you
23 go from Tuesday, the 2nd of December to Sunday, the 7th,
24 why is there this gap when we consider the crisis that
25 was then pending?

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1 The gap in my statement occurs primarily because of
2 the fact that my notes of those days do not contain memoranda
3 relevant to this inquiry. I remember that we were very busy
4 on Wednesday, December 3rd. I participated in a large staff
5 conference in which we discussed at length maneuvers that had
6 recently been held and the lessons to be learned from them.
7 I left in the late afternoon to go to New York to keep a dentist
8 appointment on Thursday morning, December 4th. I returned to
9 Washington on Thursday afternoon. When I arrived there I was
10 greeted by the news of the publication by the CHICAGO TRIBUNE
11 on December 4th of our most secret war plans, which had caused
12 great concern to the members of my staff. On Friday, December
13 5th, my time was largely occupied in discussion of this matter
14 and in determining what action should be taken. On Saturday,
15 December 6th, I was in frequent conference with General Mar-
16 shall, and also with General Miles of G-2 and General Gerow of
17 the War Plans Division, which concerned chiefly the supplies
18 which were on the way to the Philippines and the additional
19 big bombers which we were trying to fly over there.

20 44. Will you state what took place during these five days of
21 the crisis with Japan?

22 See answer to previous question.

23 45. Did you leave Washington on December 5 and go to New York.

24 No; I was in Washington all that day and until long
25 after December 7th.

1 46. If so, had you fully advised General Marshall of the situ-
2 ation, or had you advised your under-Secretary, so that
3 they could proceed in an emergency?

4 See answer to previous question.

5 47. On Page 30 of your mimeographed statement you use the
6 words "and we were all wondering where the blow would
7 strike", will you explain to the Committee who you
8 include in "we"?

9 By "we" I referred to Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox and myself.

10 48. On page 35 of your mimeographed statement, will you state
11 as to whether or not you made inquiry from any military
12 personnel as to what was meant by an alert against sabotage,
13 or being alerted to prevent sabotage?

14 I made no such inquiry.

15 49. Were you at any time acquainted with various alerts of
16 the army?

17 I was not acquainted with the various alerts, the
18 details of the strategic and tactical plans for the defense of
19 the various theatres, nor was it my duty to be familiar with
20 them.

21 50. If not, was it not your responsibility, you having sent the
22 message of November 27, under General Marshall's name, to
23 acquaint yourself with the meaning of the reply?

24 There is nothing to add to what I have already fully
25 covered in my original statement to your committee. See pages

1 35 and 36.

2 51. Did the Marshall message of the 27th of November not call
3 for General Short to reply to the measures taken?

4 It did.

5 52. On Page 47 you use the language "I pointed out to the
6 President that he had already taken the first step toward
7 an ultimatum", are you there referring to the message of
8 August 17, 1941, delivered to the Japanese Sunday morning,
9 August 17, 1941, and was not that message an ultimatum if
10 the United States desired to use it as such?

11 I believe I am referring to the message of August 17,
12 1941. I have not before me the text of that message, nor have
13 I any recollection of having ever seen that text. I had heard
14 such a warning discussed, but I do not even recollect with
15 whom such discussion or discussions took place. They were
16 nearly five years ago.

17 53. Is it not true that that message having been delivered
18 that the Japanese had violated it in their movements south?

19 See answer to previous question.

20 54. Is it not true that the Japanese had violated the terms
21 of the President's message of August 17, 1941, on
22 Saturday, December 6, 1941, Washington time?

23 See answers to the previous two questions.

24 55. On page 56 of your memorandum to the Committee, under date
25 of November 28, you state that the final decision at that

1 time was to send a speech to Congress and that the Presi-
2 dent asked Mr. Hull, Secretary Knox, and you to try to
3 draft such papers. Did you aid him in the drafting of
4 these papers, and, if so, will you tell us where we might
5 get copies, or can you furnish us with copies?

6 I worked on the drafting of some paragraphs, but I
7 have no copies in my possession, nor do I know whether any
8 such copies still exist. Such drafts as I made were not used.

9 56. With the situation gradually growing worse from November
10 28 to and including the 6th, what happened that the mes-
11 sage was not given to Congress and the message to the
12 Emperor of Japan was not sent until after we had received
13 the 13 parts of the 14 part message indicating a rejection
14 by the Japanese of our proposals of the 26th of November?

15 See answer to Questions 38 and 42.

16 57. Referring to Page 60 of your memorandum, you state the
17 British were very much excited about it -- will you state
18 as to whether or not you had any contacts with the British
19 on the 6th or 7th of December, 1941?

20 I do not recollect that I personally had contacts
21 with the British on either the 6th or the 7th of December, 1941.

22 58. If so, state what information you received, or what infor-
23 mation you gave to the British.

24 See answer to Question 57.

25 59. On Page 67 of your memorandum, being Part 5 of Secretary

1 Knox's suggestion, I call your attention to the statement
2 "we should therefore be ready jointly to act together and
3 if such understanding has not already been reached, it
4 should be reached immediately". Do you know whether or
5 not any understanding had been reached?

6 I know of no such understanding. The fact that Mr.
7 Knox in his paper proposed the making of such an understanding
8 confirms me in the belief that none existed.

9 60. State whether such an understanding was attempted and, if
10 so, what was done toward arriving at such an understanding.

11 See answer to Question 59.

12 61. Was such an understanding ever reached and, if so, when?

13 To answer such a question would require an examina-
14 tion of the minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff throughout
15 the War. It was not my duty to follow such minutes and I have
16 with me no other basis for refreshing my recollection. The
17 long and harmonious cooperation throughout the war by our staff
18 and the British staff would indicate that such an understanding
19 was reached soon after we entered the war.

20 - - -

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STATE OF NEW YORK)
)
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

ss:

HENRY L. STIMSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I have prepared the foregoing answers to interroga-
tories. The same are true and correct to the best of my know-
ledge, information, and belief.

(signed) HENRY L STIMSON

Sworn to before me this

23rd day of April, 1946.

(signed) THOMAS DE ROSA

(SEAL)

THOMAS DE ROSA

Attorney & Counsellor at Law

Office Address: 32 Liberty St., N.Y.C.

Residing in Bronx County

Bronx Co. Clks. No. 3, Reg. No.A183D7

N. Y. Co. Clks. No. 9, Reg. No.439D7

Commission expires Mar. 30, 1947

Fols.
Stimson
interrog.

(4)

1 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether
2 or not all we are going to do this morning is to put these
3 things in the record? If so, there will be no necessity
4 of my staying, and I have another committee meeting.

5 The Chairman: That is my understanding.

6 Senator Ferguson: I have another hearing.

7 I do want the record to show how I feel, that the record
8 should not be closed until we have had time to fill in the
9 gaps, so as to make a complete record.

10 The Chairman: All right. Your statements on that subject
11 will be a part of the record.

12 Go ahead, Mr. Lane.

13 Mr. Lane: Mr. Chairman, we have a draft of a proposed
14 message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which
15 contains suggestions made in a memorandum by Secretary Stimson
16 and Secretary Knox, as shown in Exhibit No. 161.

17 We ask that this draft be marked Exhibit No. 161-A and
18 spread in the exhibits of the committee record.

19 The Chairman: So received.

20 (The document was marked as
21 Exhibit No. 161-A.)

22 Mr. Lane: The log of the Watch Officer, Office of Chief
23 of Naval Operations, on the night of December 6, 1941, as
24 shown in Exhibit No. 162, contains references by serial
25 numbers to certain Naval communications. Copies of these

1 messages have been obtained from the Navy Department and
2 we ask that they be received and marked Exhibit 162-A.

3 The Chairman: So ordered.

4 (The documents were marked as
5 Exhibit No. 162-A.)

6 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt
7 again, because of my inability to be two places at once, I
8 will ask to be excused.

9 The Chairman: Do you intimate that you prefer the other
10 place to this one? (Laughter)

11 Senator Ferguson: No, Mr. Chairman. I have done all I
12 can do on this committee but I still have a great interest
13 in it. It is only because the hearing is for the purpose of
14 putting in records that I ask to be excused.

15 The Chairman: Yes.

16 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I did write a letter on
17 May 20, after our last meeting, in relation to certain facts
18 that I thought we should get from the official records in the
19 War Department. I wrote the letter to Mr. Richardson on May
20 20th. He has the letter now and if we might consider that
21 letter at the present time I would appreciate it.

22 The Chairman: What is it you want Mr. Richardson to
23 produce?

(5) 24 Mr. Richardson: You will recall, Mr. Chairman, at our
25 last meeting a question arose with reference to the possible

1 interrogation of General Knerr with reference to matters
2 alleged to have taken place subsequent to 1937 in connection
3 with the preparation of long distance bombers known as B-17's.

4 This letter is the communication we received the 21st, I
5 think, the day following the day it was written, requesting
6 that this information be secured and put in the record.

7 The facts that are involved in the question are:

8 (1) A request for the report on the bombing of the
9 UTAH.

10 (2) The program referred to which was prepared by General
11 Andrews and General Knerr.

12 (3) Copy of the Budget which asked for 21 million
13 dollars for training.

14 (4) The evidence why the War Department refused to submit
15 the item covering these long distance bombers to Congress.

16 (5) The Knerr letters to the Senate recommending the
17 B-17 program and

18 (6) The War Department statement disapproving the B-17
19 program.

20 I am inclined to think that five of these six requests
21 are documentary and probably could be furnished by a request
22 appropriately submitted to the War Department. The fourth
23 one, evidence of why the War Department refused to submit
24 the item to Congress, would be directly controversial, of
25 course, and would require the calling of witnesses.

1 Senator Ferguson: I didn't mean to call witnesses on
2 that; if there was anything in the files.

3 Mr. Murphy: Wasn't the UTAH incident in 1938?

4 Senator Ferguson: 1937.

5 Mr. Richardson: 1937 is the recital here.

6 Mr. Murphy: Where was it bombed in 1937, in Pearl Harbor?

7 Senator Ferguson: It was a test bombing on this whole
8 B-17 idea.

9 Mr. Richardson: The point of this request is, as stated
10 before, the question of how far the committee wants to go
11 into the question of why the military services were short of
12 B-17 bombers, and it would be expected that this evidence, if
13 it was developed and put in the record, would disclose that,
14 who was responsible for opposing the building of those bombers,
15 and thereby would have the responsibility for failure to have
16 them in our Air Force during 1941 when the situation with Japan
17 grew more tense.

18 That is the question involved in this picture.

19 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I think that, in all fairness,
20 if that were to go into the record that it would be necessary
21 to go into a study of the defense strategy of the United States
22 from 1937 on. We have a statement from General Marshall as
23 to how much we actually had in the way of large bombers in
24 the Service at December 7, 1941.

25 This letter purports to be based upon a book which was

1 written by William Bradford Huie. Mr. Huie makes certain
2 statements in this book that are open to challenge. I noticed
3 a number of them that I think could be very easily refuted.

4 But at any rate, questions arise out of a reading of
5 this particular book, which is one placed on the market in
6 1946.

7 He says, at page 162:

8 "I suppose an objective discussion of the Marines is
9 about as difficult to achieve as is an objective discussion
10 of religion or Roosevelt."

11 That is the kind of a book it is.

12 The Chairman: What is the name of it?

13 Mr. Murphy: "The Case Against the Admirals".

(6) 14 The Chairman: The committee discussed this book at its
15 last meeting in executive session in connection with the
16 suggestion that certain people mentioned in the book be called
17 as witnesses which, the committee felt, I think, in view of
18 its action, would involve the committee going into a controversy
19 that was raging in 1937 as to whether these B-17's should be
20 ordered and an appropriation made for them.

21 The action of the committee in ordering the record and
22 the hearings closed today seems to preclude the calling of
23 these witnesses and, obviously, if the theory in this book
24 is to be exploited, or explored, everybody mentioned in the
25 book would have to be called here as a witness, or at least

1 a certain number of them. Those against whom the book is
2 written, being "The Case Against the Admirals", would certainly
3 have a right to be heard in defense of their own theory, and
4 it is my feeling, and I think it was the feeling of the committee,
5 by their action, that that not be gone into.

6 I don't think the committee can take any action based
7 upon what is in that book.

8 I stated at the time that the writer of the book was not
9 under oath, as was everybody else who testified here, and if
10 any statements, or any things mentioned in it, are to be
11 brought in as evidence, certainly those making the statements
12 would have to be sworn, like everybody else, and that would
13 make impossible, and be utterly inconsistent with the order
14 of the committee that the record should be closed today.
15 That is what I am going by.

16 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, it wasn't my desire to
17 make this book a part of the record. I never even suggested
18 that it be made a part of the record.

19 The Chairman: No, no, I appreciate that.

20 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I did read the book and
21 I found some facts in it, which I checked with officials in
22 the War Department, and I found one particular fact, that
23 the War Department could not approve the program for developing
24 the B-17's, and instead of B-17's, were ordered to build a
25 light, responsive, less expensive type of bombardment plane,

1 with a range not to exceed 300 miles.

2 Now, it is my contention that on this record as it now
3 stands that when our fleet was moved to Pearl Harbor, someone,
4 somewhere, have developed a defense for that fleet. If it
5 had been properly developed and if it had been properly taken
6 care of, then Pearl Harbor could not have happened. I take
7 that as being one of the things that we were to look into.

8 Now, I did find in this book certain information which
9 I thought should be brought to the attention of the committee
10 to fill in certain gaps. We had a lot of testimony, it is
11 no new subject, about taking the fleet to Pearl Harbor, and
12 whether or not it was defended at Pearl Harbor. There was
13 a lot in the record about who was to fly bombers out --
14 whether they were to be flown out. The record shows that
15 the reconnaissance was to be had. There is some doubt in the
16 record as to who was to carry on that reconnaissance. Was
17 it the fault of the Navy, was it the fault of the Army, or
18 who in the Navy or who in the Army, or who somewhere else.

19 I merely want to get information for the record officially.
20 I am not taking Huie's language. I don't want to put his
21 language in. I want official files in the record so that
22 the committee when it gets up its report may give to the
23 American people all of the facts.

24 The Chairman: What is it you are asking to be done now?

(7)

25 Senator Ferguson: I am asking that the War Department

1 furnish these particular things which Mr. Richardson read.
2 I understand that the committee has ruled against me, that
3 they are closing the record, but I did write this before
4 the hearing came on, so that we could get these official
5 records and put them in the record. That is all.

6 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Masten just suggested
7 to me, it would be possible, if the committee approves, to
8 get whatever official records are involved in these inquiries
9 presented to us, put them in shape, and that could be intro-
10 duced in the record before the record was finally closed,
11 without the necessity of additional testimony, or taking any
12 particular time, except that at some time the committee would
13 have to go in session, and do what they are doing this morning
14 with reference to the exhibits. That could be done and it
15 would only involve official records, apparently, from this
16 request.

17 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, couldn't you close the record
18 today with permission to insert those at a later date?

19 Mr. Richardson: Whatever the Chairman thinks advisable.

20 The Chairman: The committee ordered the record closed
21 today. I have to be governed by that action. If the record
22 can be closed as of today I personally have no objection to
23 these official documents being put in, as a part of today's
24 record; but if they are to be brought in before another
25 session of the committee and then be the basis for further

1 requests, that is something else. We couldn't close the
2 record on that basis.

3 The definite action of the committee last Thursday,
4 or Wednesday, whenever it was that we met, was that today
5 would close the record and it would come to an end.

6 Mr. Richardson: I would like to ask the Chairman whether
7 he and the members of the committee would think it would be
8 proper to close the record today as including these documents
9 with the right to physically present the documents and put
10 them in the record at some future date?

11 Senator Ferguson: That would solve the problem.

12 The Chairman: Not some future date; that they be put in
13 the record as of today.

14 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

15 The Chairman: Because if we ever get to the point where
16 we can meet to consider a report we have got to have the record
17 completed. And we have got to ask for another extension of
18 time, up to July 1st, I am not going to ask it beyond that,
19 to make this report.

20 But that would not, I suppose, violate the order of
21 the committee. Any objection to it?

22 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not
23 counsel is going to offer in evidence the letters of Colonel
24 Stimson and the letters of Mr. Roosevelt in regard to the
25 bomber program and the planes at Hawaii?

1 The Chairman: I don't know.

2 Mr. Richardson: I have no anticipation of offering
3 them.

4 Mr. Murphy: I ask that they be introduced, Mr. Chairman.
5 We have had them for six months.

6 Mr. Masten: Senator Ferguson has requested that all the
7 papers in the President's file that have not heretofore been
8 put in the record be included.

9 The Chairman: Without objection that will be ordered.

10 Senator Ferguson: The letters would be part of that.

11 The Chairman: Go ahead.

12 Mr. Lane: Exhibit No. 21 contains two dispatches dated
13 December 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to the
14 State Department. The dispatch dated at 3:05 p.m. that day
15 refers to State Department Dispatch No. 5682, dated December
16 5, 1941, to the American Embassy, London. Copy of dispatch
17 No. 5682 has been obtained from the State Department and
18 we ask that it be marked Exhibit 166.

19 The Chairman: It is so ordered.

20 (The document was marked as
21 Exhibit No. 166.)

22 Mr. Lane: The State Department file copy of the document
(8) 23 handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
24 on November 26, 1941; statement to the press on that date,
25 by the State Department office, relating to delivery of the

1 document; the State Department press release No. 585, dated
2 December 7, 1941, concerning delivery and text of the document;
3 and a memorandum dated December 2, 1941, concerning the President's
4 remarks at the press conference on that date relating to de-
5 livery of the document, have been compiled and we ask they be
6 marked and received as Exhibit 167.

7 The Chairman: So ordered.

8 (The documents were marked as
9 Exhibit No. 167.)

10 Mr. Lane: A compilation of documents from State Depart-
11 ment files which are dated in November and December 1941,
12 concerning a proposed modus vivendi, which documents supple-
13 ment those introduced as Exhibit No. 18, has been prepared
14 and marked Exhibit 168.

15 The Chairman: So ordered.

16 (The documents were marked as
17 Exhibit No. 168.)

18 Mr. Lane: A compilation of documents relating to conver-
19 sation between State Department officials and representatives
20 of the Thailand Government, between August 6 and December 8,
21 1941, has been prepared and we ask that they be received and
22 marked as Exhibit No. 169.

23 The Chairman: So ordered.

24 (The documents were marked as
25 Exhibit No. 169.)

1 Mr. Lane: Exhibit No. 140 contains certain documents
2 introduced in connection with testimony relating to the
3 retirement of Major General Walter C. Short. At the request
4 of the committee at page 8594 of the transcript, a comprehensive
5 review of the War Department file has been made and a compila-
6 tion of documents concerning the retirement of General Short,
7 and related matters, has been made, and we ask that this
8 material be received and marked as Exhibit No. 170.

9 The Chairman: So ordered.

10 (The documents were marked as
11 Exhibit No. 170.)

12 Mr. Lane: Pursuant to committee request at page 8649
13 of the transcript, the Navy Department has furnished a compila-
14 tion of documents from departmental records concerning the
15 retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters.
16 We ask that this compilation be received and marked as Exhibit
17 171.

18 The Vice Chairman: So received.

19 (The documents were marked as
20 Exhibit No. 171.)

21 Mr. Lane: At page 12,991 of the transcript, reference
22 was made to material handled under Lend-Lease to foreign
23 countries. Additional compilations have been made by the War
24 and Navy Departments on request of counsel, concerning planes
25 and guns produced and their distribution from February 1 to

1 November 30, 1941. We ask that this compilation be received
2 and marked Exhibit 172.

3 The Vice Chairman: So received.

4 (The documents were marked as
5 Exhibit No. 172.)

6 Mr. Lane: The War Department has furnished a translation
7 of the memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of
8 Japan. These documents are reported to have been turned over
9 to a representative of the U.S. Army in Japan by Prince Konoye,
10 subsequent to the Japanese surrender. We ask that this trans-
11 lation be received and marked Exhibit No. 173.

12 The Vice Chairman: So received.

13 (The document was marked as
14 Exhibit No. 173.)

15 Mr. Lane: From numerous documents submitted by the
16 State Department and examined by some members of the committee,
17 a number of miscellaneous documents were requested for inclusion
18 in the record. A compilation of these documents has been made,
19 they are somewhat voluminous, and we ask that the compilation
20 be received and marked Exhibit 174.

21 The Vice Chairman: So received.

22 (The documents were marked as
23 Exhibit No. 174.)

24 Mr. Lane: The Secretary of Navy by memorandum dated
25 December 5, 1941 and the Secretary of War by letter dated

1 December 6, 1941, submitted estimates concerning Japanese
2 forces in Indo-China and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of
3 State, for delivery to the President. We ask that this compila-
4 tion be received and marked Exhibit No. 175.

5 The Vice Chairman: So received.

6 (The documents were marked as
7 Exhibit No. 175.)

(9)

8 Mr. Lane: At pages 13,953 and 13,956 of the transcript,
9 request was made for the compilation of data reported to have
10 been requested of the Navy Department by the Secretary of War
11 to be delivered to the Secretary of War on the morning of
12 December 7, 1941. This data reportedly concerned the location
13 of U.S. Naval Forces in the Atlantic, Pacific and the Far East.
14 The War Department Liaison Office has obtained a copy of
15 such compilation dated as of 7 December 1941 which is apparently
16 the document in question.

17 We ask that this document be received and marked Exhibit
18 No. 176.

19 The Vice Chairman: So received.

20 (The document was marked as
21 Exhibit No. 176.)

22 Mr. Lane: Senator Ferguson has requested that a compilation
23 of documents obtained from the State Department dated in 1939
24 concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister
25 Baron Hiranuma for U.S.-Japanese understanding, be made a

1 part of the record. This compilation has been made and we
2 ask that it be received and marked Exhibit 177.

3 The Vice Chairman: So ordered.

4 (The documents were marked as
5 Exhibit No. 177.)

6 Mr. Lane: A compilation of documents from Ambassador
7 Grew to the State Department and the President and attached
8 memorandum has been made and we ask that it be marked and
9 received as Exhibit No. 178.

10 The Vice Chairman: It will be so received.

11 (The documents were marked as
12 Exhibit 178.)

13 Mr. Lane: A selection of documents from the files of
14 the late President Roosevelt, which were forwarded to the
15 committee by Miss Grace Tully last November, in response to
16 committee request for all material in the late President's
17 files relating to Japan and the Far East, in 1941, has been
18 obtained.

19 At the request of Senator Ferguson, we ask that these
20 documents be received and marked Exhibit 179. It should be
21 noted that in addition to these documents there are some
22 500 pages of other documents from the President's files already
23 in the record. With the introduction of this material, every-
24 thing furnished by Miss Tulley will be in the committee
25 record. We ask that this material be marked Exhibit 179.

1 The Vice Chairman: So received.

2 (The documents were marked as
3 Exhibit No. 179.)

4 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record
5 show that the committee is aware of the fact that about three-
6 fifths of this material has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor
7 but is only being introduced because it was a part of the sum
8 total of material furnished by Miss Tully. It has to do with
9 elections in the Philippines, about differences with the
10 Commissioner, Mr. Queson, and about some matters in connection
11 with General MacArthur, and about who is going to be named
12 Governor in Hawaii, none of which data has any pertinence
13 to this inquiry, and the only reason I do not object is that
14 they are part of the files furnished by the White House.

15 The Vice Chairman: Counsel may proceed.

16 Mr. Lane: The Army and the Navy have presented to the
17 committee Organization Charts of the Army and Navy at Washington
18 and Hawaii. They are large charts and we ask that they be
19 received and marked Exhibit No. 180.

20 The Vice Chairman: So received.

21 (The charts were marked as
22 Exhibit No. 180.)

(10) 23 Mr. Lane: With reference to Exhibits Nos. 117 and 117-A,
24 which have been introduced, we wish that a letter dated
25 February 4, 1941, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,

1 to various officers under his command, be spread upon the
2 record at this point.

3 The Vice Chairman: Be so ordered.

4 (The letter above referred to, dated February 4, 1941,
5 is as follows.)

- 6 Commander Battle Force
- 7 Commander Escorting Force
- 8 Commandant Fourteenth Naval District
- 9 Commander Aircraft Escort Force
- 10 Commander Patrol Wing Two

11 Subject: Aircraft in Arabian Area, Maximum Readiness of

12 1. Many matters of great material importance are sus-
13 ceptible of improvement. I hereby advise all Fleet and
14 future, to obtain approval of and accomplish expedient action
15 on these things. Meanwhile, the Fleet must be prepared at any
16 given time to employ, with maximum effectiveness, all resources
17 as they actually exist.

18 2. There is a definite line of demarcation between this
19 objective and longer range planning. The latter has the proper
20 sphere and must be continued as an essential basis for deter-
21 mining and executing improved readiness requirements. This
22 planning will naturally include the more effective spheres of
23 employment that improved readiness, when attained, will permit.

24 3. Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on
25 any recommendation for, or negotiation of, improved conditions

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Insert
10-A

1 A4-1/VZ

2 A4-3/VZ/(0195)

3 Pearl Harbor, T. H.

4 Feb. 4, 1941

4 CONFIDENTIAL

5 From: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

6 To: Commander Battle Force.

7 Commander Scouting Force.

8 Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

9 Commander Aircraft Battle Force.

10 Commander Patrol Wing TWO

11 Subject: Aircraft in Hawaiian Area, Maximum readiness of.

12 1. Many matters of Fleet material readiness are sus-
 13 ceptible of improvement. I heartily endorse all effort, past and
 14 future, to obtain approval of and accomplish expeditious action
 15 on these things. Meanwhile, the Fleet must be prepared at any
 16 given time to employ, with maximum effectiveness, all components
 17 as they actually exist.

18 2. There is a definite line of demarkation between this
 19 objective and longer range planning. The latter has its proper
 20 sphere and must be continued as an essential basis for deter-
 21 mining and stressing improved readiness requirements. This
 22 planning will naturally include the more effective schemes of
 23 employment that improved readiness, when attained, will permit.

24 3. Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on
 25 any recommendation for, or expectation of, improved conditions

2

1 or facilities. Such plans must be based only on hard fact.
2 They must be so developed as to provide for immediate action,
3 based on facilities and materials that are now available.

4 4. A subject emphatically calling for attention in
5 line with the foregoing is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian
6 area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all available
7 aviation components. As is well known, much remains to be
8 done for adequate future effectiveness in this respect. Much,
9 however, can now be done with means now available, to make ar-
10 rangements for local employment of aviation more effective than
11 they now are.

12 5. I propose, as a first step in direct action on this
13 subject, to call a conference at an early date with the addressees
14 of this letter. I desire that appropriate preliminary studies
15 be initiated at once; discussion may be had with Army authori-
16 ties subject to the understanding that preliminary agreements
17 must be confirmed by the senior officers of the respective ser-
18 vices in this area. As a guide in such studies, intended in no
19 way to exclude consideration of any other proposals that may occur
20 to those concerned, a brief outline is appended. I consider
21 these features to be the most obvious steps toward making
22 the best use of everything that is now available for the pur-
23 pose:

24 (a) Joint Air Exercises. Desirability of in-
25 tensified attention to this subject. Frequency and

3 1 scope. Degree of coordination. Improvement along
2 practical lines.

3 (b) Communications. Fully satisfactory communi-
4 cations between all Army and Navy air activities, both
5 in the air and on the ground. Direct and instantaneous
6 communications, in particular, between all Army and Navy
7 air fields. Continuation of and renewed stress upon
8 joint communication exercises.

9 (c) Air Command. Determination of responsibility
10 and degree under various conditions. Arrangements between
11 the two services for such direct exercise of air control
12 as may be necessary.

13 (d) Landing Fields, Mutual Use. "Scattering" plans,
14 including dispersion of patrol planes. Familiarization
15 of Navy and Army aircraft personnel with one another's
16 landing fields and facilities, including actual practice
17 in mutual use and servicing.

18 (e) Aircraft Recognition and Familiarization.
19 Recognition signals between air and ground. Familiariza-
20 tion of all personnel - air, ground and ship - with all
21 local Navy and Army types.

22 (f) Alert Watches. Determination of suitable alert
23 watch conditions. Requirements for all naval aircraft
24 types. Size and composition of watches. Watches with
25 and without ship-based planes present. Conservation of

4 1 personnel and material.

2 (g) Armament and Re-armament. Plans for adequate
3 accomplishment with means now available. Ready storage.
4 Speed. Replenishment.

5 (h) Alarm and Detection. Effective and instant-
6 aneous air alarm arrangements. Detection by RADAR (and
7 otherwise) and tracking of enemy planes. Possible re-
8 striction of own planes to specific operating areas for
9 this purpose. Similarly, control of air traffic ap-
10 proaches.

11 H. E. KIMMEL.

12 P. C. CROSLY,
13 Flag Secretary.

14
15 Mr. Lane: We have four documents from the files of the State
16 Department which we desire to add to the record. They consist of:
17 A memorandum of conversations dated December 5, 1941 between
18 Secretary of State and the British Ambassador concerning coopera-
19 tion with the Dutch East Indies against the Japanese;

20 A dispatch dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to
21 the State Department;

22 A dispatch dated December 6, 1941 from the State Department
23 to the American Ambassador to Chungking; and

24 A dispatch dated December 7, 1941 from the State Department
25 to Ambassador Grew.

The Vice Chairman: So received.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Date: DECEMBER 5, 1941

SUBJECT: COOPERATION WITH DUTCH EAST INDIES
AGAINST JAPAN

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH
AMBASSADOR, LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The British Ambassador called at my apartment by his request.

He said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign Office, setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of course relates to the matter of defense against Japan.

I expressed my appreciation.

C.H.

S CH:MA

COPY

MA

Tokyo

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before

Dated December 8, 1941
Rec'd. 6:58 a.m., 10th

2 1 being communicated to

2 anyone. (br)

3 Secretary of State,

4 Washington.

5 TRIPLE PRIORITY.

6 1906, December 8, 1 a.m.

7 CONFIDENTIAL.

8 Department's 818, December 6, 9 p.m., was received and
 9 decoded late this evening and I was able to see the Foreign
 10 Minister immediately thereafter at 12:15 a.m., when I re-
 11 quested an audience with the Emperor at the earliest possible
 12 moment in order to communicate the President's message directly.
 13 The Minister said that he would present my request to the
 14 throne and would communicate with me thereafter. I read to
 15 him and left with him a copy of the message.

16 GREW

17 HTM

18 - - - - -

19 TELEGRAM SENT

20 Department of State

21 Washington,

22 December 6, 1941.

23 9 p m

24 AMEMBASSY,

25 CHUNGKING (CHINA).

286

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

Confidential.

Please communicate, in person if feasible, at the earliest possible moment to Chiang Kai-shek for his confidential information a copy of a message which the President is sending to the Emperor of Japan, reading as follows:

QUOTE (Telegraph Section: Insert here the text of the attached message from the President to the Emperor of Japan beginning with the words SUBQUOTE Almost a century ago END SUBQUOTE to the end of page five including the President's name) UNQUOTE.

In communicating ^{copy of} this message to Chiang Kai-shek, please state orally as from the President that the quoted message has already been sent by the President to the Emperor; that this message, as the situation now stands, would seem to represent very nearly the last diplomatic move that this Government can make toward causing Japan to desist from its present course; that if the slender chance of acceptance by Japan should materialize, a very effective measure would have been taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it is very much hoped that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in Chinese Government circles adverse comment.

/s/ Hull

SKH

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

GRAY

Washington

December 7, 1941.

Midnite

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

TRIPLE PRIORITY. 823

The Department has been informed by the War Department that at 8:00 a.m. today (Honolulu time) fifty or more Japanese dive-bombing planes, presumably from an aircraft carrier, dropped bombs in and around Honolulu. According to unconfirmed radio reports, the Japanese Government has declared war against the United States and Great Britain.

At 1:00 p.m. on December 7 the Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment with the Secretary of State. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu were received at 2:20 p.m. The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that he was sorry that he had been delayed as his instructions were to deliver the paper which he then handed the Secretary at 1:00 p.m., but that owing to inability to decode the message he had been delayed. After reading two or three pages of the paper the Secretary asked the Ambassador whether it was presented under instructions of the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Secretary thereupon read the remainder of the paper after

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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1 which he made to the Ambassador a brief statement emphatically
2 critical of the contents of the document.

3 The Japanese representatives then took their leave without
4 comment.

/s/ Hull

SKH

7 FE; MWS/RLS; HES

FE

AL 28

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

8
9 Mr. Lane: In the testimony of Captain Zacharias at
10 page 8734, a question arose as to certain purported orders
11 to Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey. The Navy has advised
12 us in response to our request by a memorandum dated May 3,
13 1946 and we ask that the Navy reply be spread upon the record.

14 The Chairman: So ordered.

15 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)

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(The matter referred to is as follows:)

14,520

1083A
R#145

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary

Washington

3 May 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson, referred to and forwarded in your memorandum of 31 January 1946, that there be obtained a copy of the orders purporting to delay the return to Pearl Harbor in December 1941 of Task Force Eight under Admiral Halsey, as mentioned in the testimony of Captain Zacharias (Record of Proceedings Page 8734), careful and thorough searches for the period 28 November to 7 December 1941 have been made of the files of the Navy Department and of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Task Force Eight was required by order to be off Wake on 3 December 1941, but there were no orders to it to reduce speed nor any other directive to it to delay its return to Pearl Harbor.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
John Ford Baecher
Commander, USNR

January 31, 1946

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL COLCLOUGH

In the course of his testimony at page 8734 of the Committee transcript, Captain Zacharias refers to the fact that

1A

1 Halsey's Task Force was originally scheduled to arrive back
 2 in Pearl Harbor on the fifth of December, 1941, but was delayed
 3 by fueling and weather and "now I know because of certain orders
 4 which did not speed us up."

5 At the request of Senator Ferguson, it would be very much
 6 appreciated if you would secure the orders to which Captain
 7 Zacharias refers to above.

8 S. W. Richardson,
 9 Counsel

10 SWR:MBB

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

11
 12 Mr. Lane: In response to a request of counsel of the
 13 Navy Department concerning a memorandum prepared regarding
 14 the dissemination of magic material and the submission of
 15 raw material to the President, the Navy Department under
 16 memorandum dated May 23, 1946 has replied to counsel's
 17 request and we ask that the reply be spread upon the record.

18 The Chairman: So ordered.

19 (The matter referred to is as follows:)

20 copy to Captain Spaxer for his possible future reference and
 21 not an official document of the Navy or of concerning the
 22 work of conclusions referred to herein.

23 /s/ John Ford Bacher
 24 John Ford Bacher
 25

R-12-a

1070/JFB:ms

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

R. #185

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

23 May 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of the first and second paragraph of your memorandum of 17 May 1946, a search has been made of the pertinent official files of the Navy without success to find the memorandum dated 12 November 1941, prepared by Captain A. D. Kramer, U.S.N., entitled "Dissemination to White House", which you state was referred to by Captain L. S. Safford in his testimony or digest in the so-called Clarke Investigation conducted by the Army of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A copy of the paper obtained from Captain Safford is forwarded herewith, though because of the failure to find the original, it has not been possible to check its accuracy.

The memorandum in question was a rough handwritten paper by Captain Kramer for his possible future reference and not an official document of the Navy of or concerning the events or conclusions referred to therein.

/s/ John Ford Baecher

John Ford Baecher,

Commander, USNR.

R-13

C O N F I D E N T I A LDissemination to White House

7 Nov. '41 Gen. Sherman Miles (G-2) at 1600 called Capt. Wilkinson (DNI). I was called in on the subject question. In reply to Miles' inquiries I explained as follows:

G-2 ONI

JAN FEB

MAR APR

MAY JUNE

JULY AUG

SEPT OCT

NOV

A. Through spring of '41 (G-2) (Bratton) and ONI had followed the signed agreement of Jan. '41.

B. A combination of the following factors led to G-2 not sending anything to the White House after May '41:

1. Loss of Memo #9 by State in March.
2. German report to Japs of leakage in April and the resulting clampdown on security.
3. G-2 lack of confidence in Gen. Watson's ideas of security, particularly due to the absolute necessity thereof after 1 and 2 above, and because of the fact that earlier in the spring one Memo to the White House was found by Col. Bratton in Gen. Watson's wastebasket.
4. The feeling of G-2 that almost with-

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON D C

out exception the subject of the Memos and traffic was State business anyway, and the matters should therefore be properly taken up with the White House by State, rather than being sent directly.

- C. During June, when the new Naval Aide to the President (Beardall) came, he had taken the O. N. I. memos over as per agreement. In July I continued to show things to him in original form to keep him informed and also because he specifically requested this, since the President at times was asking him about points appearing in this material.
- D. Toward the end of September (G-2 having sent nothing to the White House) Beardall stated the President wanted to see the material I was showing him (Beardall). I informed DNI, explaining that G-2 permission must be obtained in accordance with the agreement. With DNI's permission I contacted Col. Bratton and got his O.K.
- E. During October (ONI dissemination duty), only the "memos" went.

R-15

1 F. Several times between 1 Nov. and 7 Nov.
2 (today) Capt. Beardall was shown original
3 material. On Friday noon, 7 Nov., he
4 asked to have a number of them to take.
5 I reminded him that November was Army's
6 month for dissemination. He acknowledged
7 this and stated he had so informed Mr.
8 Roosevelt, but Roosevelt had directed him
9 to bring it anyway. I told him I would
10 get DNI and G-2 permission.

11
12

General Miles then said G-2 was begin-
13 ning again to disseminate to the White House.
14 I indicated that my concern was to comply
15 with the agreement, and particularly to
16 avoid duplicating via the Naval Aide any-
17 thing which G-2 might send. This could
18 be done by keeping in daily touch with
19 Col. Bratton on what he was sending to
20 the White House. In fact, the Naval Aides
21 could be entirely eliminated during G-2's
22 months and adhere strictly to the agree-
23 ment, by having ONI request G-2 to send
24 anything Capt. Beardall felt should go.
25 Gen. Miles agreed and stated that he

R-16

would confer with Gen. Watson on the matter.

7 Nov. 1630 I saw Capt. Beardall, to show him today's material, and explain what had developed in the above talk. He elucidated further by saying that when he had informed the President, in reply to a request for material, that it was Army's month for dissemination, the President said he understood that, and was in fact either seeing or being told about the material through Hull. However, he desired to see the material via Beardall anyway. Beardall expressed the opinion to me that President grasps things more rapidly visually than orally, and therefore, wanted to see the material in addition to getting it from Hull.

7 Nov. 1700 I informed Capt. Wilkinson of the above. He indicated he was going to pass it on to Miles.

10 Nov. 1230 I saw Beardall with today's material. He informed me that a conference between him, Miles, Watson (and another?) had agreed to Beardall alone handling

R-17

dissemination to the White House.

10 Nov. 1630

Saw DNI with today's material. He had already been informed of the above and directed that I comply therewith.

12 Nov. 1615

Started routine of giving Beardall the day's material for transmission to the President, in compliance with the above outlined modification to the signed agreement of Jan. '41 between G-2 and ONI.

A. D. Kramer

12 Nov. 1941

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

AL 30

Mr. Lane: By memorandum dated May 23, 1946, the Navy Department has furnished a reply to the inquiry appearing at pages 271-273 of the transcript and at page 6144 of the transcript regarding orders issued to Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson as noted in the October 10, 1942 issue of The Saturday Evening Post. We ask that that reply be spread upon the record.

The Chairman: So ordered.

(The matter above referred to is as follows:)

11-B

CB-1

1 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 2 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
 3 WASHINGTON

4 1070/JFB:ms

5 R. #102

6 23 May 1946

7 MEMORANDUM

8 To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

9 In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart (Record
 10 of Proceedings, pages 271-273, and 6144), referred to in item
 11 2 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, in respect of statements
 12 made by Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson in the 10 October
 13 1942 issue of The Saturday Evening Post, concerning orders
 14 under which he flew an airplane from the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE
 15 while it was engaged in the mission of Task Force 8 from Pearl
 16 Harbor to Wake Island and return, 28 November - 7 December
 17 1941, it has been ascertained that on 28 November 1941, the
 18 date the Task Force departed Pearl Harbor, then Vice Admiral
 19 William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander, Task Force 8, sent to his
 20 command the following signal:

21 "CURRENT OPERATIONS INVOLVE NECESSITY READINESS FOR
 22 INSTANT ACTION."

23 This signal was received by the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE,
 24 which was the flagship of Task Force 8. It would be usual Navy
 25 practice, and may be assumed, that the substance of the signal

GB-2

1 was communicated to all of the pilots who flew planes from the
2 ENTERPRISE during the mission.

3 /s/ O.S. Cololough

4 Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

AL-31

5
6 Mr. Lane: Under date of May 22, 1946 the Navy Department
7 has furnished a reply in response to the request of Senator
8 Ferguson at pages 12,792 and 12,793 of the transcript concern-
9 ing the so-called "History" written in 1942 of the activity
10 of the Communications Unit of the Navy, which was testified
11 about by Admiral Hart in connection with conversations between
12 Captain Safford and himself.

13 We ask that this reply be spread upon the record.

14 The Chairman: So ordered.

15 (The matter above referred to is as follows:)
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

11-C

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

1070/JFB:ms

R. #179

22 May 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 12792-12793, 12862 and 12875), referred to in Item 18 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there is enclosed a copy of all of the references to and of all messages quoted concerning the Winds Code in the compilation or so-called "history" written in 1942 of the activity of the Communications Unit, which Admiral Hart testified was seen by him in connection with the incidents involving or conversation between Captain Safford and himself in respect of the Winds Code or any execute thereof.

The references in the commentary or explanatory paragraphs in the enclosure to Japanese messages are to only those intercepts which are also quoted therein, viz: JD-1: 6875, JD-1: 6850, JD-1: 6985 and JD-1: 7148.

The statement in the last commentary or explanatory paragraph, which is that preceding the quotation of JD-1: 7148, that there were "other references to the United States in

CB-2

1 texts not available now," is an obvious confusion of the
 2 Winds Code and the Hidden Word Code. It was made in connec-
 3 tion with the "Hidden Word" Japanese message of 7 December
 4 1941 (Tokyo Circular No. 2494) JD-1: 7148, in the first
 5 translation of which there was omitted the reference to the
 6 United States conveyed by the Japanese code word "Minami".
 7 A thorough search of the files of the cognizant activity of
 8 the Navy has failed to reveal any other message received prior
 9 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor containing any refer-
 10 ence to the United States in the Winds Code or the Hidden Word
 11 Code.

12 All of the messages referred to and quoted in the enclosure
 13 appear in Exhibit 1 of the Congressional Investigation, at
 14 pages as follows:

15 Tokyo Circular #2353 (JD-1: 6875) Page 154
 16 Tokyo Circular #2354 (JD-1: 6850) Page 155
 17 Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD-1: 6985) Pages 186-188
 18 Tokyo Circular #2494 (JD-1: 7148) Page 251

19 /s/ John Ford Baecher

20 John Ford Baecher

21 Commander, USNR.

22 Encl (1).
 23
 24
 25

CB-3

*****"instructions for secret broadcast signals to indicate critical relations with the United States, Russia, and Britain, were sent out from Tokyo."

*****"A plain Japanese weather broadcast on December 7 indicated that Japanese relations with England and the United States would be broken off."

*****"Secret codes for emergency messages in the regular short wave broadcasts from Tokyo were now issued by the Japanese. All of them dealt with the rupture of relations between Japan and other countries."

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2353 Nov. 19, 1941

To: Washington J19

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In the case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the curring off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger -
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East wind rain).

(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI-

(North wind cloudy.)

(3) Japan-British relations: HISHI NO KAZE HARE -

(West wind clear.)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

JD-1: 6875

Navy Translation

11-28-41

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2354 Nov. 19, 1941

To: Washington J19

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U.S. relations, "HIGASHI."
- (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA."
- (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) - "NISHI."

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

JD-1: 6850

Navy Translation

11-26-41"

*****"An interesting dispatch, which contained much valuable

CB-5

1 information for the decryption purposes of U. S. Navy Radio
 2 Intelligence was the subsequent one. Note the tone of finality
 3 in all the special messages.

4 FROM: Tokyo Circular #2409 Nov. 27, 1941

5 TO: Washington J19 (in 4 parts-complete)

6 (Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular
 7 #324)

8 (Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City,
 9 Bogata, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and
 10 New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

11 (Part I)

12 Handle as Chief of Office Routing.

13 With international relations becoming more
 14 strained, the following Ingo Denpo (hidden words,
 15 or misleading language telegrams) is placed in
 16 effect. Please study this carefully.

17 Make up a table with the left column con-
 18 taining the code words and the right the corres-
 19 ponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that
 20 there is no mistake in transcribing this.

21 Example. A message meaning:

22 "Japan and USSR military have clashed",
 23 will read "HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, Clerks, have been
 24 both ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell)
 25 STOP (end spell.)"

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word STOP will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used.)

(Part 2)

<u>Code Word</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
ARIMURA	Code communications prohibited.
ASAI	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
ASUMA	Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTY	Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?)	Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or Consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA	Relations between Japan and _____ have been severed.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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HATTORI Relations between Japan and _____
 are not in accordance with
 expectations.

(Part 3)

HIZIKATA Japan's and _____'s military forces
 have clashed.

HOZINO Japan and _____ are entering a full
 fledged general war.

IBARAGI) Communicate to us probable date of
 breaking off of relations between
 Japan and the country to which
 you are accredited.

INAGAKI Have you _____ the _____ matter?

ISHIKAWA I have _____ the _____ matter.

KASHIWAGI We are commencing military action?
 against _____.

KOBAYAKAWA Stop issuing all entrance and
 transient visas to Japan, to per-
 sons of _____ nationality.

KODAMA Japan

KOMIYAMA China

KOYANAGI England

KUBOTA U.S.S.R.

KURIBARA France ?

KUSONOKI Germany

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1	MATUTANI	Italy
2	MIWATA	Canada
3	MINAMI	U.S.A.
4	MIYAZAKI	Mexico
5	MOROKOSI	Brazil
6	MOTIZUKI	Panama
7	NAGAMINE	Argentina
8	MAKAZATO	Thailand
9	NANGO	French Indo-China
10	NEGI (?)	Netherlands East Indies
11	OGAWA	Burma
12	OKAMOTO	Malaya
13	OKUMURA	Australia
14	ONIZOKA	Union of <u>South Africa</u> (?)
15	ONODERA	Enemy country
16	OTANI	? (Possibly: friendly or allied country ?)
17	ONISI	Year
18	SIMANAKA	Day (?)
19	SAKAKIBARA	(Tsuki) Month
20	SIGENO I	(Ke) Paragraph
21	SANZYO	(Toki) time
22	ITIRO	1
23	NISAKU	2
24	SANTARO	3
25	YORI	4

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GORO 5
MASAROKU 6
SIMETARO 7
YASOKITI 8
HISAMATU 9
ATUMI 0

JD-1: 6985 Navy Translation
12-2-41

*****The first one (Dispatch on 7 December) was in plain Japanese, but used the weather code, which signified the breaking off of diplomatic relationships. Though this refers to England, other references were made to the United States in texts not available now.

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2494 Dec. 7, 1941
TO: (Circular telegram)
Plain Japanese language using code names)
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

JD-1: 7148 Navy Translation
12-7-41"

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C

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Mr. Lane: By memorandum dated May 16, 1946 the Navy Department in compliance with the request of Congressman Cooper at page 10,738 of the Record of Proceedings has furnished a smoot copy of a study made by Captain Kramer of certain translations of Japanese intercepts.

We ask that this be spread on the record at this point.

The Chairman: So ordered.

(The matter above referred to is as follows:)

Insert
11-D

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

/s/ John Ford Rauscher
JOHN FORD RAUSCHER,
Commander, USMC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary
Washington

1083A(HLB)

16 May 1946

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

In compliance with the request of Vice Chairman Cooper at page 10738 of the Record of Proceedings, referred to in item 14 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, Captain Kramer has prepared, and there is forwarded herewith, a smooth copy of the study made by him of the times of delivery to the White House of certain translations of Japanese intercepts.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Commander, USNR.

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JD #	Origin	Date	Tran.	Page in Ex. 1	Transcript	Subject & Army Number	Delivered by
7137	B-T #1421	12/ 5	12/ 6 N	11215		Gave Germans dope on U.S. negotiation. Think we should tell them re - Konoye note.	Navy
7138	B-T #1408	12/ 3	12/ 6 N	11217		(Re 7132) Re-Rostov and Rommel.	
39	W-T #1261	12/ 5	12/ 6 N	235		Hull-Kurusu-Nom talk on 5th	
40	T-W # 896	12/ 5	12/ 6 N	234		(Re 7051) Have Terasaki etc. leave in next few days. My footnote re Teraski.	
41	W-T #1262	12/ 5	12/ 6 N	11225		(Re 7140) Want to keep Teraski for present	Eve
42	T-W # 897	12/ 6	12/ 6 A	237		Re code machines, keep one I meant	6 December
43	T-W # 902	12/ 6	12/ 6 N	239		Jap Note parts 1-13	
43	T-W # 902	12/ 7	12/ 7 N	245		Jap Note part 14	0815-1000
44	T-W # 904	12/ 6	12/ 6 A	245		Re Typist	
45	T-W # 907	12/ 7	12/ 7 A	248		1 P.M. msg	
46	T-W # 908	12/ 7	12/ 7 A	248		Thanks to 2 Amb.	
47	T-W # 910	12/ 7	12/ 7 A	249		Destroy all codes and papers	
7148	T-Circ #2494	12/ 7	12/ 7 N	251		Rel. Bet. Jap & Eng. (Hidden Word Code)	1030-1100
49	T-W # 901	12/ 6	12/ 6 A	238		Pilot Msg	
50	T-W # 905	12/ 6	12/ 7 A	10745		AP-UP reports re FDR msg to Emperor	
51	T-W # 909	12/ 7	12/ 7 A	248		Thanks to Emb staff	
7152	R10-T#460	11/15	12/ 7 N			Re planes to Africa	PM 7 December

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