

EXHIBIT No. 3290

(11)

(Translation)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: ARITA, Hachiro.

Date of birth: September 21, 1884.

Domicile: 911 Yoyogi Nishigahara-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

(1) I was appointed as an eleve-consul on December 28, 1909, remaining in the service of the Foreign Office till I assumed the office of Foreign Minister in the HIROTA Cabinet on April 2, 1936, and resigning from the office on February 2, 1937. Later, I was Foreign Minister in the KONOYE and HIRANUMA Cabinets from October 1938 to August 1939, and Foreign Minister in the YONAI Cabinet from January 1940 to July of the same year.

(2) Mr. HIROTA was appointed State Councillor in the YONAI Cabinet. The system of the State Councillors had been established in the time of the First KONOYE Cabinet. The succeeding HIRANUMA Cabinet retained the system, with the State Councillors remaining in their office, but, when the YONAI Cabinet was formed, three or four of them whose opinions were apparently not in an agreement with the policy of the new Cabinet tendered their resignation. Mr. MATSUOKA, Yosuke, was among those who resigned. His appointment as State Councillor was considered to be due to the estimation of his knowledge and experiences in diplomacy, and Premier YONAI asked for my advice in choosing the man to succeed Mr. MATSUOKA in his office. I recommended Mr. HIROTA, who was considered to be of opinions contrary to those of Mr. MATSUOKA, and he

was appointed State Councillor in March, 1940. I recommended him because I was well aware of the fact that he was a man of sound diplomatic opinions and that he was against the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

(3) The YONAI Cabinet resigned en masse in July, 1940, and the Second KONOYE Cabinet was formed. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Tripartite Pact was concluded shortly after that.

I used to call on Mr. HIROTA to exchange views with reference to diplomatic problems. One day after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, I called on him as usual and had a talk on various subjects. On that occasion, Mr. HIROTA reiterated his opinion against the Tripartite Pact. He said he could not quite understand from what necessity the Pact in question had been concluded. The most important thing of the time should have been the termination of the China Affair. The said Pact would surely cause grave reaction on the part of the United States and Britain. China, of course, would not lose any chance to take advantage of this state of affairs, and the settlement of the China Affair would naturally become all the more difficult. He further pointed out that Japan had so far been able to keep its economy going through friendly intercourse with Britain and the United States, and that, in case Japan fell in strained relations with Britain and the United States, its future economic development could never be expected. He then turned to the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and pointed out the possibility of an undesirable change of the Soviet attitudes. He also expressed his deep anxiety about the disadvantageous effect which the conclusion of the Pact might have upon Japan's international standpoint.

On the same occasion Mr. HIROTA told me that when the Cabinet called a meeting of the senior statesmen who had once held the portfolio of Premier to make a report before them of the Tripartite Pact immediately after the signing of the said Pact, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, according to Mr. HIROTA, was the principal speaker and explained the Pact article by article,

together with circumstances in which the Pact was concluded, for about two hours. Mr. HIROTA told me that he put several questions to the above effect. Mr. MATSUOKA, however, only answered that it was a matter of opinions, and no convincing replies were obtained.

Of several meetings which I had with Mr. HIROTA, I remember one which took place on April 16, 1941, when he revealed his feelings that the course of the foreign policy of the Cabinet seemed very dangerous, and deplored the fact that he was really anxious about the future of Japan.

(4) As the Army gained in its political influence after the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, military men came to talk frequently about the so-called "general intention" of the Army. At the same time, a word "suishinryoku" (driving power) was used far and wide, frequently appearing in newspapers and magazines. And this "driving power", invisible and intangible, meddled in Japan's external and internal affairs, making various demands. The Government of the time was too weak to make headway against it. Such was the feeling common to those of the intellectual class who were more or less concerned in the affairs of state. In the meantime, some of the military men even came to act against the Government policy. It was not quite easy, however, for the Government to take proper and effectual measures to suppress them.

In consideration of such circumstances, the opinion gradually gained in influence that it would be more desirable to choose the Premier from among the generals on the active list, or on the retired list, who could exercise strong control over the Army. It was so hoped because they expected that the military might become the more prudent in their behaviours and the control over the reckless actions of some military officers might get the more effectual as a result of that. Mr. HIROTA also set forth the similar opinion in our frequent meetings.

On this 9th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo.

(Signed) ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned date and place.

(Signed) MORISHIMA, Goro (Seal)

Witness.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Signed) ARITA, Hachiro (Seal)