



Mr. Tateki Horiuchi, ex-Minister attached to the Japanese Embassy in China, at the time of the Japanese surrender, who worked as the 1st Secretary of the Japanese Legation, under Mr. Shigemitsu from September 1929 to July 1932, and as the Minister attached to the Embassy from January 1942 to March 1943, made the following statement: -

1. The Back Ground of Mr. Shigemitsu's Effort for the Betterment of the Relations of the two Countries.

In April 1929 I was transferred from the Embassy in London to Shanghai Consulate General (where Mr. Shigemitsu was working as the Consul-General and concurrently as Councillor of the Legation) as Consul and concurrently as the 2nd Secretary of the Legation.

In September of the same year, late Minister Sadao Saburi presented his Credentials and thereby the Japanese Government recognized the National Government in Nanking and Mr. Shigemitsu and myself worked under Mr. Saburi. After making free and private exchange of views with influential Chinese people, Minister Saburi succeeded in completing his plan for the gradual abolition of the extra-territoriality in China. This was done by the special order of the Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara. The plan was approved by Baron Shidehara in the evening of November 23,

1929, and was to be approved by the Cabinet Meeting. In the following evening Mr. Saburi committed suicide in Hakone. Late Mr. T. Obata was to be appointed as the successor. It was not, however, realized owing to the objection by the National Government of China and Mr. Shigemitsu, as the Chargé d'Affaires, was ordered to do his best for improving the relations with China. During his tenure of office Mr. Shigemitsu always exerted himself and with the very helpful corporation of Dr. T. V. Soong, Finance Minister of the National Government, he succeeded in solving many outstanding questions and contributed very much to the betterment of the relations.

2. Reciprocal Tariff Agreement between Japan and China in 1930. (so-called Shigemitsu T. V. Soong Tariff Agreement).

The very unsatisfactory relations between Japan and China caused by the Twenty-one Demand and the Shantung Question was very much improved by the orientation of the so-called Shidehara diplomacy. The first stroke of which was seen in the Special Tariff Conference in Peking of 1925, when Japan took the initiative in recognising in principle Chinese Tariff Autonomy, and the Chinese Delegation went so far as to make an informal commitment to the

Japanese Delegation that after the autonomy was recognized China was ready to conclude a reciprocal Tariff Agreement with Japan for the purpose of preserving the vital trade relation between the two countries. It is to be noted, in this connection, that Mr. Shigemitsu worked as the next to the General Secretary of the Japanese Delegation, Mr. Saburi, and myself assisted them.

The calm air of friendly relations of the two countries which was created by the first stroke of the Shidehara diplomacy and lasted for about two years was by and by darkened by the repurcation of the Seiyukai diplomacy. Its first program could be seen in the so-called Tō-hō Kaigi (The Far Eastern Conference) next step was dispatching army to Shantung Province with the result of Chi-nan Incident in 1927. When Mr. Shigemitsu began his work it was thought natural that the second stroke of the Shidehara diplomacy should be to materialize the Chinese commitment regarding the reciprocal Tariff Agreement, as Japan had already recognized China's Tariff Autonomy by the Yada, T. V. Soong temporary Commercial Agreement in 1928/97.

In the preliminary talk with Dr. T. V. Soong, Mr. Shigemitsu could understand that the higher Chinese Authorities were willing to improve the relations with Japan and were ready to conclude the Tariff Agreement but that they fear that any agreement of long term and covering

long list of Japanese imports could not obtain national sanction. Therefore Mr. Shigemitsu had to surmount many difficulties before persuading his Government and the business groups interested in China trade to accept the agreement of short term covering only a reasonable small portion of Japanese articles of imported into China. Thus the Agreement signed between Mr. Shigemitsu and Dr. T. V. Soong in May 1930 had the short term of three years and covered a portion of Japanese cotton goods and sea products as well as a small portion of sundries.

3. Consolidation of the Outstanding Chinese Debts to Japan.

This was one of the thorny questions between the two countries. Most part of the outstanding debts China owed to Japan were thought in China as political loan, which were supplied by the Japanese Government headed by Count Terauchi to the Yuan-hsi-kai Government for the purpose of providing the latter with the money necessary for suppressing Kuomintang (National Party) influence. Now that the National Government were established upon the ground of the Kuomintang even the higher authorities of the Government thought it very difficult to consolidate such kind of debts. While on the part of Japan, as a part of these loans were borne by the Government Banks (a portion

of the loan was defrayed through such bank from the Government Postal Savings which came from the people at large) and the rest by the influential civilian banks the Government had first to effectuate any consolidation scheme of such debts before they could go on with their program of any friendly policy toward China.

After the conclusion of the Tariff Agreement Mr. Shigemitsu took up this thorny question with Dr. T. V. Soong and they had arrived at a tentative principle of consolidation to somewhat the effect that the debts should be consolidated in long term amortisation say fifteen to twenty five years that the rate of interest should be lower than the current rate, that the amortisation scheme might be made workable within the paying capacity of the surplus Revenues of the Chinese Maritime Customs and that a portion of the proceeds from the amortisation might be reinvested in China. They tried their best to persuade their respective Government and after several months of painstaking effort they succeeded in working out the common scheme of consolidation, based upon the above principles, which scheme was approved by their respective Government.

In June or July, 1931, National Government invited to Nanking diplomatic representatives stationed in China of the creditor countries and informally disclosed before them the draft scheme of consolidation of all Chinese outstand-

ing foreign debts and intimated to them that the National Government was ready to consolidate all its outstanding foreign debts according to that plan. The creditor-countries were to study the scheme and there was even the prospect of the scheme being adopted by the countries concerned. Owing to the Manchurian Incident immediately happening the chance of consolidation was lost forever.

4. Manchurian Question.

It was true that owing to the ever multiplied efforts on the part of the two Governments, the relations between the two countries had gradually been much improved. In the spring of 1931 the High Authorities of the National Government even went so far as to invite some fifty Japanese junior class officers and men as the technical military advisors and entrusted them to train the efficient Chinese model armies of smaller unit in many technical departments of the modern army. While in Manchuria a dark cloud began to appear as the Chinese local authorities who were nationalized by the Kuomintang influence, tried to recover so-called lost sovereignty by resorting to some arbitrary measures. There some troubles or others occurred month by month in the shape of illegal taxation against the Japanese residents, trespassing on the land lease enjoyed by the Japanese as well as the starting of

the construction of railways by the local authorities in defiance of the Japanese treaty rights. After some serious talk with Dr. T. V. Soong Mr. Shigemitsu prepared a tentative memorandum on the activities of the Chinese local authorities in Manchuria against the Japanese treaty rights and interests and submitted it to Dr. T. V. Soong. It was about the beginning of September when Dr. T. V. Soong informed Mr. Shigemitsu of his intention to go to Manchuria to study the matter on the spot for the purpose of finding out some measures for the adjustment of the Manchurian Question. Dr. T. V. Soong wished to see Count Uchida, then President of the South Manchuria Railway and other Japanese authorities in Manchuria and the arrangement for the interviews with them were made beforehand. He was to leave Shanghai on September 18 on board a Japanese steamer of D. K. K. line but the sudden incident in Lin-Tiao-Kow checked his journey.

On the following day Dr. T. V. Soong proposed to Mr. Shigemitsu a plan of establishing a Sino-Japanese Commission of small numbers and trust it to make local settlement of the incident. Mr. Shigemitsu perceived the grave consequences of the incident ~~might give~~ and believed in the urgent necessity of the local settlement thereof and conveyed the proposal to Baron Shidehara and advised him strongly to accept the proposal. After a few days of deliberation, the pro-



posal was accepted by the Japanese Government and Dr. T. V. Soong was informed of the acceptance but in view of the Japanese military activities spreading throughout Manchuria he notified Mr. Shigemitsu of the withdrawal of his original proposal.

5. Truce Agreement Concluded After the First Shanghai Incident 1932.

Toward the end of 1931 Japanese residents in China were very much annoyed by the ever aggravating anti-Japanese movement throughout China actuated by the Manchurian Incidents. Some diehards elements of the Japanese community in Shanghai were so much insensed as to dare to take some strong attitude toward the Chinese boycottors. Some of them openly criticised Mr. Shigemitsu's weak attitude toward the boycott. Mr. Shigemitsu saw very dangerous atmosphere prevailing and said that he believed it necessary for him to get his pacific policy reconfirmed by the Foreign Minister Mr. K. Yoshizawa ( at the beginning of the year Baron Shidehara resigned and Mr. K. Yoshizawa succeeded him as the Foreign Minister in connection with the Cabinet change) so that he could take adequate precautionary measures to forestall any untoward happenings on the spot. He left Shanghai about the middle of January 1932 myself accompanying him. After finishing his talk with the Foreign

Minister and other high authorities in Tokyo, he was to leave Kobe on January 28 on board a Japanese steamer of N. Y. K. line, when he saw the news of the Shanghai Incident. Two divisions of the army were dispatched for the purpose of protecting Japanese residents in Shanghai.

After fighting against the 19th Route Army for about a month the Japanese Army had succeeded in repulsing the Chinese army out of twenty kilometers of Shanghai. Mr. Shigemitsu strongly persuaded, with the help of the late Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka who was in Shanghai as the personal representative of the Foreign Minister to assist Mr. Shigemitsu, Commander late General Shirakawa to issue stop-fighting order to his army so that the army should not deviate from the original objective of protecting the residents in Shanghai. The order was issued on March 4, and negotiations for the Truce Agreement were began between Mr. Shigemitsu and Lieut.-General late K. Uyeda on the Japanese side and Mr. Kuo Tai-chi and General Huang Chiang on the Chinese side. Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister and Mr. N. Johnson, American Minister and others assisted, as the informal mediators, the conclusion of the Agreement.

After one month and a half of very hard work of the negotiators and mediators, all the difficult questions were solved except giving finishing touch to one of the very thorny one of temporary stationing of a certain small

unit of the Japanese army in the suburbs of Shanghai and there was ample prospect of the Truce being signed in a week or so.

On April, 29, Mr. Shigemitsu and several other Japanese top-high civil and military personages on the spot fell victim to a bomb thrown by a Korean mankiller on the occasion of celebrating the Emperor's Birth Day held in Hongkew Park. He was seriously wounded and felt his life was in danger. In the evening of ~~the~~ of the bombing he invited myself and two others of his staff to his bedside and dictated a telegram to the Foreign Minister to the effect that in view of the ultimate objective of Japan for keeping everlasting friendly relations with China, the Truce Agreement should be signed at any cost and therefore that the original attitude toward the Truce Agreement should in no way be changed even though the present bomb incident had had some connections with the Chinese Policy toward Japan.

On May 5, the Truce Agreement was signed by the representatives of Japan and China. When Mr. Shigemitsu signed the documents on his bed his condition was still serious. After finishing his signature he said to late Mr. Samuel Chang, who was present on the occasion as the Chinese Secretary representing the Chinese Delegate, that the two nations, China and Japan were destined to be

friends and that he hoped that the Truce Agreement would help such friendship and asked Mr. Chang to convey these words to Mr. Kuo Tai-chi. I was at his bedside when he signed the Agreement and when he spoke to Mr. Chang. His leg was <sup>a</sup> amputated about an hour or two later.

6. Abolition of the Japanese Extraterritoriality in China in 1943.

Mr. Shigemitsu came to Nanking as the Japanese Ambassador to Nanking in January 1942. I was, then, in Shanghai as the Consul-General and concurrently as the Minister attached to the Embassy in Nanking. In November 1, of the same year I was transferred to Nanking as the Minister attached to the Embassy and worked under Mr. Shigemitsu until he went back to Tokyo and became the Foreign Minister in April 1943. Mr. M. Tani succeeded Mr. Shigemitsu and came to Nanking in the following month and I remained in the same position until the Japanese surrender in August 1945.

In January 1943 Japan concluded a Treaty of Alliance with the Nanking Government, signed by late Mr. Wang Ching-wei and Mr. Shigemitsu, and made a Declaration of the Japanese policy toward China including early abolition of the Extraterritoriality in China. In accordance with the above commitment Ambassador Shigemitsu and afterward Am-

bassador Tani negotiated with the Foreign Minister of the Nanking Government and after several months of negotiation two treaties were signed between them in March and in June or July, 1943, in March, 1943, one for the rendition of five Japanese concessions in Tientsin, Hankow, Soochow, Hangchow and Amoy as well as of the International Settlement in Shanghai and the Legation Quarter in Peking, and the other for the Recognition of the Chinese Taxation, on a gradual basis, upon the Japanese residents in China as a step toward the total abolition of the Japanese Extraterritoriality in China.

September 16th, 1947.  
Shanghai, China.

*T. Hornum*



極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

對

荒木 貞夫 其他

宣誓供述書

供述書

堀内 干城

自分儀中華民國上海ニ居住シ法的年齡ニ達シ居ル  
モノデアリマシテ我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ宣誓ヲ為シ  
タル上別添ノ通り供述致シマス

堀内干城ハ日本降伏當時在中華民國日本大使館附公使デ  
 アリ、一九二九年九月ヨリ一九三二年七月迄日本公使館一等書記官ト  
 シテ、一九四二年一月ヨリ一九四三年三月迄大使館附公使トシテ、重光  
 氏ノ下ニ勤務シタモ、デアリマシテ、左ノ通り陳述致シマス。

一、兩國關係改善ニ関スル重光氏ノ努力ノ背景

一九二九年四月私ハ在倫敦大使館カラ在上海總領事館ニ領事兼  
 公使館二等書記官トシテ轉任トナリマシタ。(重光氏ハ總領事兼公  
 使館參事官トシテ同地ニ在勤シテ居マシタ)。

同年九月故佐分利貞男カ公使カ信任狀ヲ捧呈シ之ニヨリ日

本政府ハ南京ニアル國民政府ヲ承認シマシタガ、重光氏及ビ私ハ佐分  
 利氏ノ下ニ勤務シマシタ。佐分利公使ハ中國ノ要人ト自由ニ且ツ私的ニ  
 意見交換ヲ行ツタ後、中國ニ於ケル治外法權ノ漸進的撤廢計  
 画ヲ作り上げマシタ。之ハ外務大臣幣原男爵ノ特別ノ命令ニヨルモ  
 ノデアリマシタ。此ノ計畫ハ一九二九年十一月二十三日夜、幣原男爵ヨリ承  
 認セラレ、閣議ノ承認ヲ受ケル筈デアリマシタ。其ノ翌日夜、佐分利氏ハ  
 箱根デ自殺シ、故小幡氏が後任ニ任命セル筈デアリマシタ。然レシ  
 民國國民政府ノ反対ニヨリ實現セズ、重光氏が代理公使トシテ民國  
 トノ關係改善ニ最善ヲ盡スヤリ命セラレマシタ。重光氏ハ任期中



努力シテ國民政府財政部長 宋子文博士ノ大ニ有益ナ努力ヨリ  
多クノ懸案ヲ解決シ關係ノ改善ニ多大ノ貢獻ヲナシマシタ。

二、一九三〇年日華互惠関税協定（所謂 重光 宋子文  
関税協定）

二一箇條ノ要求及ビ山東問題ニヨル日華間ノ甚ダ面白クイ關係  
ハ所謂 幣原外交ノ方針ニヨリ大ニ改善シマシタ。其ノ第一着ハ  
一九二五年ノ北京特別関税會議ニ見ラレ、日本ハ自發的ニ中國  
ノ関税自主ノ原則ヲ承認シ、中國代表ハ日本代表ニ對シ自主  
承認後ハ中國ハ兩國間ノ重要ナ通商關係ヲ維持スル目的ヲ

以テ日本ト互恵関税協定ヲ締結スル用意ガアル旨非公式ニ約  
束スル迄ニ行ツタノデアリマス。此ノ点ニ関シ注意スベキハ重光氏ガ日本  
代表團ノ事務總長佐分利氏ノ次ニ居ツタエトテ、又私、兩氏ヲ  
手傳ツタノデアリマス。

幣原外交ノ第一発デ醸成サレ約二年間續イタ兩國友交關係  
ノ靜穩ト空氣ハ政友會外交ノ復活ニヨリ漸次曇ツテ來マシタ。  
其ノ一着ハ所謂東方會議ニ見ラレ、ソノ次ハ山東省ヘ、派兵テ  
其ノ結果ハ一九二七年ノ濟南事件デアリマシタ。重光氏<sup>在</sup>勤務ノ

始々頃ニハ幣原外交ノ第二癸ハ當然互惠關係協定ニ関スル中國側ノ約束ヲ實現スルニアルト考ヘラレテ居マシタ。ソレハ日本ガ既ニ一九一八年矢田宋子文暫定通商協定ニヨリ中國ノ関稅自主ヲ承認シタノデアルカラデアリマス。

重光氏ハ宋子文博士<sup>博</sup>トノ予備的會談ニ於テ、中國最高首腦部ハ日本トノ關係ノ改善ヲ欲シ且ツ関稅協定締結ノ用意ハアルガ、長期ノ協定デ日本ノ輸入品ヲ多クナラセタモノハ國民ノ贊同ヲ得ラナシラシイコトガワカワタノデアリマス。ヨツテ重光氏ハ短期協定デ合理的

十一部ノ日本ノ対中國輸入品ダケニ限ルモノヲ受諾サセル為、政府及ビ中國貿易ニ関心ヲ有スル実業家ヲ説得スルニ多大ノ困難ニ打克ツ必要ガアリマシタ。斯クテ一九三〇年五月重光氏ト宋子文博士ト間ニ署名セラレタ協定ハ三年ノ短期デ日本ノ一部綿製品、海産物及ビ若干ノ雜貨ヲ含ンデ居マシタ。

三、中國對日借款<sup>款</sup>ノ整理

之ハ兩國間ノ厄介ナ問題デアリマシタ。中國ノ對日借款<sup>款</sup>ハ中國ガハ政治借款デアラテ、寺内伯ヲ首班トスル日本政府ガ國民黨ノ勢力ヲ抑

圧スルニ必要ナ金ヲ袁世凱政府ニ供給シタモデアルト考ヘテ居マシタ。  
 國民政府ハ國民黨ヲ基礎トシテ樹立セラレタ爲、政府首脳部デモ此  
 種借款<sup>款</sup>ヲ整理スルニトハ大ニ困難デアルト考ヘテ居マシタ。然ルニ日本側  
 ニ於テハ此等借款<sup>款</sup>ノ一部ハ政府系銀行ガシヨイ込<sup>込</sup>ンデ居リ(借款<sup>款</sup>  
 ノ一部ハ右銀行ヲ通ジ、一般民衆郵便貯金ニヨリ支出サレタモノデアラフ)、  
 残余ハ有カテ民間銀行ガ出シテ居<sup>居</sup>ンデ、政府ハ中國ニ対スル外交政策  
 ノ計画実行ニ先ツテ此ノ種借款<sup>款</sup>ノ整理案ヲ先ヅ実施スル要ガアツ  
 タノデアリマス。

肉稅協定締結後重光氏ハ宋子文博士トノ間ニ此ノ厄介ナ問題  
 ヲ採リ上げ、一ノ試案タル整理原則ヲ見出シマシタ、ソノ要矣ハ例ハ  
 十五年乃至二十五年ノ長期デ銷却シ、利率ハ現行利率ヨリ低クシ  
 銷却計畫ハ中國海關收入余剰金ニヨル支拂能力以内デ行ハレルコト  
 トシ且ツ銷却ニヨル收入ノ一部ハ中國ニ再投資スルト云フデアリマ  
 シタ。兩氏ハ各々本國政府ノ説得ニ努力ス、數ヶ月骨ヲ折リ後  
 右原則ニ基ク共通ノ整理案ヲ作成シ、此ノ案ハソレゾレ政府ノ承認  
 ヲ得マシタ。

一九三一年六月カ七月ニ國民政府ハ債權國ノ駐華外交代表ヲ

南京ニ招キ、非公式ニ中國外國借款全部ノ整理計畫案ヲ提  
示シ、政府ハ此案ヨリ外國借款全部整理ノ用意アルコトヲ反シ  
マシタ。債權國ハ同案ヲ研究スルコトナリ、關係國ガ之ヲ採擇ス  
ル見透シモアリマシタ。其ノ直後起リタ滿洲事變ノ為整理機  
會ハ永久ニ失ヘタリデアリマス。

#### 四、滿洲問題

兩國政府ノ多大ノ努力ヨリ兩國ノ關係ガ漸次改善セラタノ事  
實デアリマス。一九三一年春國民政府首腦部ハ日本ノ若イ

將校、下士約五十名ヲ軍事技術顧問トシテ招聘シ、近代  
軍隊ノ各種技術部門ニ於ケル中國軍ノ能率的ナ模範小  
部隊ノ訓練ヲ之ニ委任スル所マデ行キマシメ。然ルニ滿洲ニ於テ  
ハ國民黨ノ勢力カヨリ合作スルニトナフタ中國ノ地方官憲ガ独  
断的ナ手段ニヨツテ所謂主權ノ喪失ヲ回復シヤウト試ミタ爲、  
暗雲ガ現レテ来マシメ。同方面ニ於テハ日本ノ在留民ニ対スル非合  
法的ナ課税、日本人ノ商租權侵害又ハ日本條約上ノ權利ヲ侵  
害シテ地方官憲ガ鉄道ヲ建設スル等ノ形デ種々ノ事件ガ



月々起リマシタ。重光氏ハ宋子文博士ト重要ナ會談ヲ行ツタ後、日本條約上ノ權益ニ対スル滿洲ニ於ケル中國地方官憲ノ行動範圍スル覺書試案ヲ作成シ之ヲ宋子文博士ニ提出シマシタ。九月初デアリマシタガ、宋子文博士ハ滿洲問題解決ノ方法ヲ発見スル目的ガ現地ニ於テ事態ヲ研究スル為滿洲ニ赴ク意向ヲ重光氏ニ傳ヘマシタ。宋子文博士ハ當時ノ滿鉄總裁内田伯其他在滿日本當局ト會フ希望ヲ予メ會見ノ手筈モ行ハレマシタ。氏ハ九月八日大連汽船會社ノ日本船デ上海ヲ出發スル筈デアリマシタガ、柳條

溝ノ突発事件ガ氏ノ旅行ヲトメテシマヒマシタ。

翌日宋子文博士ハ重光氏ニ対シ少数ノ中日混合委員會ヲ設  
置シ之ニ事件ノ局地的解決ヲ委ヌ計畫ヲ提案シマシタ。重光氏  
ハ事件ノ重大ナ結果ヲ予想シ、之ガ緊急ナル地方的解決ノ必要ヲ  
確信シ、此ノ提案ヲ幣原男ニ傳達シ受諾スルヤラ強ク進言シマシタ。  
一、兩日考慮ノ後右提案ハ日本政府ノ容レル所トナリ、宋子文博  
士ハ受諾ノ旨通報サレマシタ。然シ日本側ノ軍事行動ガ滿洲ニ  
拡大シテ来タラズ、氏ハ原提案ノ撤回ヲ重光氏ニ傳ヘテ来マシタ。

五、一九三二年、第一次上海事変停戦協定ノ締結

一九三二年末、中國ノ日本在留民ハ、滿洲事変ヲ動機トスル中國全土  
排日運動ノ激化ヨリ大ニ惱マサレマシタ。上海ノ日本人團ノ強硬分子  
ハ大イニ怒リ、中國ノ排日運動者ニ対シ何等カノ強硬態度ヲ取  
ラウトシマシタ。中ニハ公然排日ニ対スル重光氏ノ弱腰ヲ非難スルモ  
ノモアリマシタ。重光氏ハ極メテ險悪ナ空氣ガ拡ガルヲ看取シ、氏ノ  
平和的政策ヲ芳澤外務大臣（同年始、幣原男爵辭職セラレ、芳澤  
氏が内閣更迭ニヨリ、外相トシテ後ヲ龍衣ハレタ）ニ再確認シテ

モラフ必要ガアリ、本委員等之ニヨツテ現地ヲ面白クナイ事件ノ發生ヲ防  
止スル手段ヲ採リタイモノデアルト思フト述ベマシタ。氏ハ一九三二年一月中  
旬上海ヲ出發シ、私ハ氏ニ同行シマシタ。外務大臣其ノ他東京ノ首  
腦部ト會談ヲ終ヘタ後、氏ハ一月二十日日本郵船會社ノ日本船ニ  
乘ツテ神戸ヲ立タウトシタ時上海事件ノ報道ヲ見タノデアリマス。  
上海ノ日本在留民保護爲陸軍ニ箇師團ガ派遣セラレマシタ。  
約一ケ月間、第十九路軍ト闘ヒ日本軍ハ中國ノ軍隊ヲ上海カラ二十  
料ノ外ニ撃退シマシタ。重光氏ハ手傳ノ爲外務大臣ノ個人的

代表者トシテ上海ニ來テ居タ 故松岡洋右氏ノ助力モアリ、司令部  
故白川大將ニ停戰命令ヲ軍ニ出シ、軍ガ最初ノ目的モ上海在  
留民保護カラソレナイヤウニスルヤウ大イニ説得ニ努メマシタ。此ノ命令ハ  
三月四日ニ出サレ、停戰協定ノ交渉ハ日本側ハ重光氏及ビ故植田  
中將、中國側ハ郭泰祺及ビ黃強將軍ノ間ニ開始サレマシタ。英國  
公使「サー、マイルズ、ランパスン」氏、米國公使「エス、ジョンソン」氏等  
モ非公式ノ調停役トシテ協定ノ締結ヲ援助シマシタ。

交渉當時者及ビ調停役ガ一ヶ月半大イニ努力シタ後困難尙  
題ハ一切解決サレ、唯上海ノ郊外ニ日本軍小部隊ヲ當分駐

此サセルトイフ極メテムツカシイ問題ノ仕上ゲラスルカヤトナリ一週同  
位デ停戦ガ締結サレルトスフ見透シガ十分ソキマシタ。

四月二十九日重光氏及ビ現地ノ日本側ノ最モ重立ワタ文官武官

等ガ虹<sup>ホシ</sup>公園<sup>モリ</sup>ガ行ハレタ天長節祝賀ノ際鮮人刺客ノ投ゲタ

爆弾ノ犠牲トナリマシタ。氏ハ重傷ヲ負ヒ生命ハ危険ニ陥ワタ

感ジマシタ。爆弾事件ノ夜氏ハ私ト他ノ同僚ニ人ヲ病床ノ傍ニ呼

寄せ、外務大臣ニ対シ、日本ガ中國ト永久ノ友交關係ヲ維持スルト

云フ究極ノ目的ニ鑑ミ、停戦協定ハ何トシテモ署名セラルベキデア

リ、從ツテ停戦協定ニ対スル從來ノ態度ハ假令今回ノ爆弾事

件が中國ノ対日政策ニ何等カノ關係がアツタニシテモ、全然変更ス  
マキデハナイトノ趣旨ノ電報ヲ口授シマシタ。

五月五日停戦協定ハ日本及ビ中國ノ代表者ヨリ署名セラレマシタ。

重光氏が病床デ文書ニ署名シタ時、氏ハ依然居合セタ中國代表  
重光氏が病床デ文書ニ署名シタ時、氏ハ依然居合セタ中國代表

側ノ故「サミエール」張氏ニ日華兩國ハ友邦ニアル運命ニアリ、停戦

協定ガカル友好關係ヲ助長スルコトヲ希望スルト述べ、之ヲ郭

泰祺氏ニ傳言スル称求メマシタ。私ハ氏が協定ニ署名シタ時張

氏ニ物ヲ言ツタ時、病床ノ傍ニ居リマシタ。氏ノ脚ハソノハニ時間後

ニ切断サレタノデアリマス。

六、一九四三年中国ニ於ケル治外法權ノ撤廃

重光氏ハ一九四二年一月日本ノ大使トシテ南京ヘ来マシタ。當時私ハ  
總領事兼南京大使館附公使トシテ上海ニ居マシタ。同年十月  
一日私ハ大使館附公使トシテ南京ニ轉ジ、重光氏が東京ニ帰  
リ一九四三年四月外務大臣トナル迄、下デ勤務シマシタ。翌月谷  
公之氏が重光氏ノ後任トシテ南京ニ来ラレマシタガ、私ハ一九四五年  
八月日本ノ降伏迄同ジ地位ニ留マリマシタ。

一九四三年一月日本ハ南京政府ト同盟條約ヲ締結シ、故汪精



衛氏及び重光氏が署名シ、中国ニ於ケル治外法權ノ早期撤廢  
 等中国ニ対スル日本ノ政策ノ宣言ヲ行ヒマシタ。右ノ約束ニ從ヒ  
 重光大使、次デ谷大使ハ南京政府外交部長ト交渉シ、數個月  
 ノ交渉後一九四三年三月及ビ七月（六月カ又ハ）ニ兩者ノ間ニシテ條約ガ署名  
 セラレマシタ。ソノ一ク天津、漢口、蘇州、杭州及厦門ノ五ツノ日本  
 租界並ビニ上海ノ共同租界ノ返還ノ為ノモノデアリ、他ハ中国ニ於  
 ケル日本ノ治外法權ノ全廢ニ至ル一歩トシテ在華日本人  
 留民ニ対スル中国側課税ノ漸進的承認ノ為ノモノデアリマシタ。

一九四七年九月十六日

中華民國上海二六二

堀内干城(署名)