

Doc. #2030

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Vol. 30

Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee  
on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack  
S. Con. Res. 27

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December 21, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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Pages:.....5227 to 5460.....

NATIONAL {4266  
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(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)  
OFFICIAL REPORTERS  
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.  
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

TURNER, Admiral Richmond Kelly (Resumed)

5228

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Friday, December 21, 1945.

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Congress of the United States,  
 Joint Committee on the Investigation  
 of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
 Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
 10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
 Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster  
 and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
 Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
 Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
 of counsel, for the joint committee.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Now, in the testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry  
3 Admiral Noyes states that he knew that the particular codes  
4 that we were using for the decryption of the diplomatic mes-  
5 sages were not in the possession of either Admiral Hart or  
6 Admiral Kimmel and in his testimony he said that he could  
7 not understand how he could have given me any such informa-  
8 tion.

9 The only conclusion that I can arrive at is that I did  
10 not make my question to Admiral Noyes clear and that he mis-  
11 understood what I was trying to get at. It was true that  
12 Admiral Kimmel's organization and Admiral Hart's were doing  
13 the traffic analysis and that they had such codes and ciphers  
14 as were in the military's possession concerning Japanese  
15 naval codes. We were not doing that type of work here but  
16 only, as I understand it now, the diplomatic decryption. It  
17 is possible that Admiral Noyes thought I was referring to that  
18 type of decryption and not to the -- I mean to the tactical  
19 type of decryption and not the diplomatic.

20 However, as a result of those three conversations at  
21 three widely separated times during 1941 I believed and so in-  
22 formed Admiral Stark that those officers were receiving the  
23 same information on all decrypted messages, at least concern-  
24 ing the Pacific, that we had here in Washington. I now know  
25 that that belief is entirely in error as regards diplomatic

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 codes.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Noyes was in charge of what at  
4 that time?

5 Admiral Turner: He was in charge, - he was the Director  
6 of Naval Communications.

7 Mr. Mitchell: And if there was any one man in the Navy  
8 Department that knew what the set-up was about intercepting,  
9 decoding and translating these Jap intercepts, he would be  
10 the man, would he not?

11 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Mitchell: And, of course, he knew or must have  
13 known when you had any conversations with him just what the  
14 situation was?

15 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Mitchell: And he would not have any object, of  
17 course, in deceiving you about it?

18 Admiral Turner: Not the least. He gave me at all times  
19 all information that I requested.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Well, here is a situation where according  
21 to the set-up that you described and the responsibilities  
22 of the War Plans Division it was your duty to keep these  
23 fleet commanders fully advised and report to them any overall  
24 information that affected the possibilities of war and, of  
25 course, it was not possible to discharge that duty if you did

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 not know what means they had of obtaining information of their  
3 own. You could not do that unless you knew precisely just  
4 what they had and what they needed from you, isn't that so?

5 Admiral Turner: No, sir, that is not correct. It was  
6 not my duty to inform the Commanders-in-Chief as to intelli-  
7 gence, as to information. It was my duty to inform them as  
8 to the major aspects of the international situation that might  
9 lead to war with the United States or might affect war with  
10 the United States. Sending the intercepts or summaries of  
11 the intercepts or evaluating them as to authenticity or  
12 probability was not War Plans' province and we never under any  
13 circumstances sent such information out.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Well, these so-called diplomatic inter-  
15 cepts, this magic code stuff that you were getting here and  
16 seeing every day, did bear directly on the overall situation,  
17 did they not?

18 Admiral Turner: They affected very greatly our estimate  
19 as to the overall situation. I will modify that and say they  
20 affected them. They probably affected them in general terms  
21 about fifteen per cent, because we were gathering information  
22 from many other sources and we knew we were not intercepting  
23 all of the diplomatic dispatches.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Well, then, assuming the diplomatic inter-  
25 cepts only affected your estimates to the extent of fifteen

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 per cent, in judging what you ought to communicate to the  
3 fleet commander it was important for you to know whether they  
4 already had available that fifteen per cent through the  
5 intercepts and translating of the diplomatic purple code?

6  
7 Admiral Turner: Yes, that is true.

8  
9 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

10  
11 Admiral Turner: Because they would understand, - if they  
12 had at least the more important parts of those intercepts  
13 it would certainly influence their understanding of any gen-  
14 eral estimate that we sent out from the Department.

15  
16 Mr. Mitchell: Precisely. Now, the situation was, though,  
17 as a fact, whatever caused it, that War Plans Division as-  
18 sumed then or believed that at Honolulu the Navy had a system  
19 and equipment to decode all that stuff when in truth and in  
20 fact it had not; that was the actual situation, wasn't it?

21  
22 Admiral Turner: That was the actual situation and I  
23 thought and Admiral Stark thought that we had taken due pre-  
24 cautions to inform ourselves on exactly that point, but there  
25 was apparently a misunderstanding in the conversations. It  
26 was all done orally.

27  
28 Mr. Mitchell: Another question I want to ask you about  
29 is with reference to your statement that you submitted this  
30 warning message of the 27th and the previous one of November  
31 24th, submitted it or transmitted it to the President. Now,

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 did you do that personally?

3 Admiral Turner: No, sir. I left those messages with  
4 Admiral Stark with the understanding that he would clear them  
5 with the Secretary and if necessary with the President. I  
6 believe that he did in the case of both of those dispatches,  
7 but I have no knowledge except that Admiral Stark on one or  
8 both occasions informed me that either one or both dispatches,  
9 and my memory is not clear on that, had been approved by the  
10 President.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Before they were sent?

12 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Or after?

14 Admiral Turner: Before they were sent.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, one of the things that the  
16 President was very keen about here was having these warning  
17 messages tell the commanders not to commit the first overt  
18 act and he brought that to Marshall's attention and they were  
19 careful to weave that into the War Department warning. Here  
20 you have a dispatch of the same type sent to the naval command-  
21 ers and the President, if he saw it, apparently did not say  
22 a word about any overt act or anything of that kind.

23 Admiral Turner: I have no recollection that the Presi-  
24 dent told Admiral Stark or Secretary Knox anything at all  
25 concerning any overt act. The fact that the President ap-

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 proved one or both of those dispatches, and I know that he  
2 approved them in general terms even if --

3  
4 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you knew it because somebody told  
5 you so, isn't that about all the basis for your knowledge?

6 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. My relations were in these--

7 Mr. Mitchell: We are going to try to draw a distinction,  
8 Admiral, between things that you were told and things that  
9 you know from your own personal knowledge or activity.

10 Admiral Turner: I know from my own personal knowledge  
11 that I was never informed that any such warning dispatches  
12 should by direction of the President contain any prohibition  
13 against any overt act.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Senator Brewster: Did he ever talk to the President  
3 about it?

4 Mr. Mitchell: I am trying to get that clear.

5 You never did talk to the President, did you, about  
6 these messages, these warning messages?

7 Admiral Turner: No, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: You never took them personally to him?

9 Admiral Turner: No, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: All you did was to leave them with  
11 Admiral Stark, with the understanding, as you put it, that  
12 he would clear them with the Secretary of the Navy and,  
13 if necessary, with anybody else, including the President?

14 Admiral Turner: With the Secretary of the Navy and  
15 the President.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you said before, "If necessary,  
17 with the President."

18 Now, was it your definite understanding that these  
19 messages could not be sent until they had been submitted  
20 to President Roosevelt?

21 Admiral Turner: No, sir. The messages were sent when  
22 Admiral Stark relieved them, gave directions to Admiral  
23 Ingersoll to release them.

24 I know Admiral Stark believed, and I believed, that  
25 certainly the President and the Secretary ought to be in-

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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formed as to any definite war warning and as to any message similar to the one of November 24, because they extremely important.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, I was not asking you whether you had any instructions from the President about putting something in this message to warn our commanders not to commit the first overt act, my curiosity was aroused by the fact that the President had a good deal of emphasis laid on that, and he insisted that it be put into the War Department dispatch.

I was wondering how it could be that this warning message of the Navy of November 27 went over to the President before it was sent, and he examined it and approved it, and yet the message as drawn does not say one word about overt act. Would not you think yourself that if it actually got to the Commander in Chief in that way, and he had been so interested in the overt act business, he would then have made a similar suggestion to you or to the Navy?

Admiral Turner: Well, Mr. Counsel, that would be a pure surmise on my part. I know that I was never informed --

Mr. Mitchell: I think you were right about that.

Admiral Turner: -- that the President required such a phrase to be put in the Navy's messages, and so far as



Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 I am aware, no evidence that the President directed the  
3 Navy to put anything about overt acts, as has been intro-  
4 duced in this inquiry.

5 Mr. Mitchell: When did you first see the Army warning  
6 message that went to the Commander of Pearl Harbor?

7 Admiral Turner: It was when General Gerow brought it  
8 to Admiral Stark's office, I think on the afternoon of  
9 November 27.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that message had a provision in  
11 it about overt acts.

12 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: It is from the Chief of Naval Operations  
14 to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated  
15 November 28, and in it, the statement is made that you  
16 undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an  
17 overt act -- I am mistaken about that. I have missed where  
18 the quotation started. The message of November 28, from  
19 the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief  
20 PNACP, with information to the Commander in Chief of the  
21 Pacific Fleet, quotes the Army message which contains  
22 the statement that the United States desires that Japan  
23 commit the first overt act. Then after the quotation is  
24 ended, the Navy message goes on and states "WPL-52 is  
25 not applicable to Pacific area, and will not be placed in

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 effect in that area as now in force in Southeast Pacific  
3 sub area, and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake  
4 no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt  
5 act."

6  
7 That is not a copy of the Army message, that part.  
8 That is an order from the Commander in Chief, or the Chief  
9 of Naval Operations.

10 I suppose you had something to do with preparing  
11 that message. Have you found it? It is on page 38 of  
12 Exhibit 37.

13 Admiral Turner: That was sent to the Commander in  
14 Chief for information, so that he would know what orders  
15 had been given by the War Department to their subordinate  
16 commanders primarily on short, and so that the Commander  
17 in Chief would know what orders we were giving to those  
18 two officers of the Pacific Northern and Pacific Southern  
19 Naval Coastal Frontiers, as to what they should do, since  
20 those two officers, as soon as was eventuated, would come  
21 under the Commander in Chief for certain merits.

22 Now the overt acts that could be committed by those  
23 officers were possibly arrests --

24 Mr. Mitchell: Well, Admiral, excuse me, but I am  
25 afraid I have not made my question clear. I am trying to  
find out where you got any directions or instructions to

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 put into a Navy command order an explicit direction to  
3 undertake no offensive action against Japan until Japan  
4 had committed an overt act. It is not the Army dispatch  
5 I am quoting from, it is part of your dispatch of the 28th  
6 that follows after the quotation of the Army dispatch.

7 Who told you, or suggested that you give this caution  
8 against the first overt act?

9 Admiral Turner: The commanders of those two naval  
10 coastal frontiers --

11 Mr. Mitchell: That is not my question.

12 Admiral Turner: I will answer it, Mr. Counsel.

13 Mr. Mitchell: All right, sir.

14 Admiral Turner: The commanders of those two naval  
15 coastal frontiers were ashore in the United States. Along-  
16 side of them were Army commanders who had been given orders  
17 to commit no overt act, and it seemed entirely suitable  
18 in that case that the orders to the naval officers should  
19 be parallel to their associates in the Army.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Well, on that basis, why, then, in your  
21 November 27 warning message, in order to make it parallel  
22 with the Army order to Pearl Harbor, did you not notify  
23 your Commander in Chief in Hawaii not to commit the first  
24 overt act?

25 Admiral Turner: The Commander in Chief in Hawaii was

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h6

1  
2 in a very much more exposed position where hostilities were  
3 far more likely to ensue than were the commanders of the  
4 naval coastal frontiers.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Now, I will ask you again if you will  
6 state to us just who was it? Was it the President, or if  
7 not he, who was it that suggested or directed that this  
8 warning against committing the first overt act was put in  
9 the message from the Chief of Naval Operations on November  
10 28, which I have just read?

11 Admiral Turner: I drafted that dispatch and put those  
12 words in, so that the actions of the commanders of the naval  
13 coastal frontiers should be parallel with the actions of  
14 the Army commanders who were their associates.

15 Mr. Mitchell: But you did not want them parallel at  
16 Hawaii? Is that the way I understand it; you wanted  
17 different orders there? You wanted the Army to look out  
18 for the first overt act but the Navy not?

19 Admiral Turner: The Navy dispatch of the 27th of November  
20 was written first. It was cleared and we were agreed on it  
21 before any of us ever saw the Army dispatch. I consider  
22 that the dispatch to the Commanders in Chief of 27 November  
23 was couched in the proper terms to meet that particular  
24 situation, which was a very dangerous one, with which they  
25 were faced.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: When you saw the draft of the Army dispatch  
3 of the 27th and the words that cautioned against overt acts  
4 in it, did you inquire why that was there or who had suggested  
5 it?

6  
7 Admiral Turner: We discussed -- that is, Admiral Stark,  
8 General Gerow and I, discussed the Army dispatch for a few  
9 minutes. I do not recall the nature of the discussion. I do  
10 recall feeling, as I probably express it, that the Army dispatch  
11 was not as strong as the Navy's dispatch.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Now, Admiral, I think you had one or two  
13 proposed corrections of the transcript of your evidence that  
14 you wanted to mention. Will you please do that now?

15 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. On page 5130, the bottom of  
16 the page, I would like to clarify my answer as to the time,  
17 the hour of preparation of Admiral Stark's reply to Admiral  
18 Hart's dispatch report of 7 December concerning the report  
19 of the Hart-Phillips conversations.

20 From a study of the date and time books of the two  
21 dispatches and a knowledge as to times of decoding and coding,  
22 and the times of transmission, I believe that I received  
23 Admiral Hart's dispatch of his date December 7 about 11:30  
24 a.m. on the morning of our December 7, and that I prepared  
25 a reply to it late in the afternoon of the 7th, after knowing  
about the attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Page 5152, the first sentence, change to read "Maritime  
3 traffice between Hawaii and Japan ordinarily was much heavier  
4 than maritime traffic on the northern Great Circle routes."

5 On the same page, line 5, change the word "every" to  
6 the words "for a few".

7 Mr. Mitchell: Did you want to add something about the  
8 ship location information?

9 Adm'ral Turner: I have a little more.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Excuse me.

11 Admiral Turner: Page 5152, the next to the last line,  
12 in two places change the words "no patrol" to read "a patrol".

13 Page 5153, line 7, change "maritime ports" to read  
14 "maritime routes".

15 Page 5153; line 15, insert after the word "because" the  
16 words "of necessity", and insert a period after "necessity".

17 Page 5153, lines 16 and 17, change the word "production"  
18 to "troops".

19 That is all, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Now did you want to add anything to your  
21 testimony about the information available here as to the  
22 location of Japanese vessels?

23 Admiral Turner: It may be that I gave an incorrect  
(4) 24 impression as to my impressions concerning the Japanese vessels  
25 that had been lost sight of by our analysts during the first

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 part of December. I knew that we had not definitely located  
3 a considerable number of vessels of the Japanese Fleet. I  
4 did not identify them at all as forming any particular task  
5 force, but knew that a number of vessels of various classes  
6 had not been located.

7 I said yesterday, and was not too firm on it, that I  
8 believed I had seen dispatches or information here in Washington  
9 showing that these vessels had not been located, and that I  
10 did not agree with the deductions by the Office of Naval  
11 Intelligence that these vessels were necessarily in home ports.

12 A good deal of information was sent to the Navy Depart-  
13 ment by both the Commandant of the 14th and Commandant of the  
14 16th Naval Districts, giving analyses of their information as  
15 to the location of Japanese naval vessels and the organization  
16 of fleets.

17 I have here two dispatches, one from each of those  
18 officers, dated November 26, 1941, which go into considerable  
19 detail as to organization and locations. They are not signifi-  
20 cant of the information that I believe I saw about the first  
21 of December, but they are indicative of the types of report  
22 that were coming in every day or two or three days concerning  
23 the Japanese Fleet. I think that there were other dispatches  
24 than these about the 1st or 2nd of December which gave estimates  
25 that certain vessels of the Japanese Fleet had not been located

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

for several days.

Mr. Mitchell: That last phrase "for several days" answers the question I was just about to ask you on that. You say "had not been located". Now our understanding from the old records in prior inquiries on the situation at Oahu was that these carrier divisions had been previously located up to about maybe the 25th or so of November, and then had vanished into thin air, and they got no further trace of them, there was absolutely radio silence as to all of them from that time up to the 7th.

So that is a little bit different from the statement that they had not been located. They had been once, and then they had been lost track of for that period.

That is what you mean by saying they had not been located?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: I think that is all.

Larry follows

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Turner

questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: May I ask, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of  
3 information, was there a Lieutenant Commander, or Com-  
4 mander, Layton out at Hawaii, who was in charge of this  
5 matter of ship locations?

6 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

7 Mr. Keefe: He is the man that was sending those re-  
8 ports into Washington. Were you acquainted with him,  
9 Admiral?

10 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I know him very well. He  
11 is at the present time, or was, Admiral Nimitz's Intelli-  
12 gence Officer, and during the time that I was out there,  
13 why, he was the advisor for Admiral Nimitz.

14 Mr. Keefe: He was the Intelligence Officer for Admiral  
15 Kimmel, wasn't he, at the time?

16 Mr. Mitchell: The evidence will show later, Mr.  
17 Congressman, that it was Layton who had charge of this  
18 ship location business; it was he who reported to Admiral  
19 Kimmel, and it was he that noticed and called attention to  
20 the fact that the carriers had disappeared.

21 Mr. Keefe: I merely wanted to identify him in my mind  
22 at this time.

23 Admiral Turner: There is one small point about that,  
24 at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the actual mechanical  
25 work of decryption was under the Commandant of the 14th

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Keefe  
The Vice Chairman

h2

2 Naval District --

3 Mr. Keefe: That was Admiral Bloch?

4 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir; and not directly a part  
5 of the staff organization of the Commander in Chief?

6 Mr. Keefe: I see. All right.

7 The Chairman: The Chair at the moment has no questions  
8 to ask, because I have missed most of Admiral Turner's  
9 testimony. Therefore, he will waive his right.

10 Mr. Cooper.

11 The Vice Chairman: Admiral Turner, I desire to commend  
12 you very highly on the splendid record that you have made  
13 during the fighting in this recent war with Japan, as I  
14 understand it from the information you gave us. I under-  
15 stood you to indicate that you were engaged in some of  
16 the greatest battles in the Pacific area. Is that correct?

17 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir; the amphibious operations.

18 Thank you.

19 The Vice Chairman: I commend you very highly on that.  
20 Any questions I might ask you about the period of time during  
21 which you served as Chief of War Plans of the Navy would not  
22 in any way reflect on this distinguished record which you  
23 have made during the fighting period, but I do want to inquire  
24 briefly about some of these matters that have developed  
25 during your testimony in connection with the period of time

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h3

1  
2 during which you served as Chief of War Plans Division of  
3 the Navy. And I may say that my impression is that much  
4 of the information you have given us is somewhat in con-  
5 flict with other information we have received during the  
6 hearing.

7 Naturally, we want to try to reconcile all of these  
8 matters as much as we can.

9 Now, how long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?

10 Admiral Turner: I entered the Navy as a Midshipman  
11 of the Naval Academy in June of 1904; graduated in 1908.

12 The Vice Chairman: From what state did you enter  
13 the Academy?

14 Admiral Turner: California.

15 The Vice Chairman: Now, during what period of time  
16 was it that you served as Chief of War Plans Division of  
17 the Navy?

18 Admiral Turner: From October 24, 1940, to June 13,  
19 1941 -- 1942; I beg your pardon.

20 The Vice Chairman: From 1940 in June --

21 Admiral Turner: October, 1940.

22 The Vice Chairman: October 1940.

23 Admiral Turner: June 13, 1942.

24 The Vice Chairman: October 1940 to June 1942?

25 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h4

2 The Vice Chairman: What was your rank at that time?

3 Admiral Turner: I came to War Plans as a Captain.

4 In January I was appointed by the President as a Rear  
5 Admiral. That was for the purpose of giving me rank for  
6 the ABC conversations. That was not a rank that involved  
7 an increase of pay. It was what they call a spot promotion.

8 In October, I believe, of 1941, I was promoted to  
9 the temporary rank of rear admiral, with the advice and  
10 consent of the Senate, and in December of 1941 I was made,  
11 given the permanent rank of rear admiral.

12 The Vice Chairman: Well, during this period about  
13 which we are inquiring here, you held the rank of rear  
14 admiral either temporary or permanent?

15 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: Now, it was your duty and respon-  
17 sibility as Chief of the War Plans Division, to make plans  
18 for war in case this country became involved in war?

19 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

20 The Vice Chairman: And also to direct any operations  
21 that might become necessary in connection with those plans?

22 Admiral Turner: To give the orders for the initiation  
23 of operations and to give advice as to major changes or  
24 major aspects of the operations. Minor routine operations  
25 were taken care of by the Ship Movements Division.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: Well, most of my inquiries are  
3 for the purpose of securing information.

4 Now, would it be fair to assume that from the stand-  
5 point of the real effect of operations that the War Plans  
6 Division perhaps had the highest responsibility for the  
7 advice given to the Chief of Naval Operations?

(2)

8 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

9 The Vice Chairman: The Office of Naval Intelligence  
10 was largely charged with the responsibility of disseminating  
11 information?

12 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

13 The Vice Chairman: But your division, War Plans, was  
14 the responsible operations division?

15 Admiral Turner: So far as regards the major aspects  
16 of war.

17 The Vice Chairman: Now, you were kept fully advised  
18 and informed as to the development of all diplomatic rela-  
19 tions between this country and Japan and other foreign  
20 countries, were you?

21 Admiral Turner: I was kept advised and I think had  
22 fully adequate information. There were lots of details,  
23 of course, that I didn't know.

24 The Vice Chairman: Well, did you reach the conclusion  
25 that war with Japan was inevitable?

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: When did you reach that conclusion?

Admiral Turner: I thought that war with Japan was inevitable for a number of years, for quite a number of years before the war, at some time, that the nations would clash in war.

I became convinced that war was certain under the conditions that existed in 1941 during June and July of 1941, and that it was only a question of a few months at most before we would be in war with Japan.

The Vice Chairman: During June and July of 1941, you became convinced that war, and you were certain that war between the United States and Japan would occur?

Admiral Turner: Within the next few months.

The Vice Chairman: Within the next few months from June or July of 1941?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You at that time held the position of Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Did you express those views to other responsible and high ranking officers of the Navy Department?

Admiral Turner: I did, and also two officers of the

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 War Department.

3 The Vice Chairman: Did any of those other high ranking  
4 and responsible officers of the War and Navy Departments  
5 agree with you in that conclusion?

6 Admiral Turner: Yes, there were quite a number in the  
7 Navy Department that agreed. I am quite sure that Admiral  
8 Stark had a strong opinion in that direction. I am sure  
9 that Admiral Ingersoll did. And other officers with whom  
10 I talked. They felt that the situation was developing so  
11 that we would definitely be at war within a few months.

12 The Vice Chairman: Then you knew that Admiral Stark  
13 and Admiral Ingersoll, and perhaps other high ranking  
14 officers agreed with you in the conclusion and the conviction  
15 that you had that war was inevitable with Japan within  
16 a few months from June or July 1941?

17 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I believed that.

18 The Vice Chairman: Do you know whether or not Admiral  
19 Wilkinson agreed with those views?

20 Admiral Turner: I knew then that Admiral Wilkinson  
21 did not agree with them. On December 6 he, much to my  
22 surprise, because I had not fully realized his belief before  
23 that, he informed me that he felt that I was mistaken,  
24 and I asked him, "Mistaken in what," and he said, "Mistaken  
25 that Japan would attack the United States."

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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1  
2 The Vice Chairman: Well, did you have the conviction  
3 tion that Japan would attack the United States?

4 Admiral Turner: I did.

5 The Vice Chairman: And that was your conviction,  
6 that you have spoken of, that you reached that conclusion  
7 along about June or July of 1941, that it would be within  
8 a few months?

9 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: Did you ever think an attack would  
11 be made on Pearl Harbor?

12 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I did. I thought that  
13 that was a very important part, a fundamental part of a  
14 war that we would have with Japan. The Navy generally  
15 and the Army generally had thought so for a long time.

16 Under the circumstances that existed at the time of  
17 the outbreak of war, as I testified yesterday, I felt  
18 that there was at least a 50-50 chance that we would get  
19 a severe attack on, that is, a severe raid, not a landing  
20 attack -- I did not expect that, because they could not  
21 do important operations in the South China Sea and also  
22 conduct an amphibious operation against Hawaii simultane-  
23 ously.

24 The Vice Chairman: The type of raid of which you speak  
25 was what did occur on December 7, 1941, wasn't it?





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Witness Turner

Questions by: The vice chairman

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The Vice Chairman: You felt confident that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ready for war on December 7, 1941?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, and further that the District was ready for war within the limits of the material that we had been able to provide. We all had the utmost confidence in the command of the Fleet and the command ashore.

The Vice Chairman: Well, it is probably always true, isn't it, Admiral, that the commander in the field, whether it be the Navy or Army, always wants still more in the way of supplies and equipment and forces, doesn't he?

Admiral Turner: Mr. Congressman, you never have enough, you always want more and you want things to be better.

The Vice Chairman: I think General Marshall conveyed that very clear impression to us and also the impression that he wouldn't be worthy of his command and responsibility unless he did feel that way about it.

Admiral Turner: I agree with that, sir. I will say further, you were speaking of the Navy --

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Turner: Further, I felt from all indications, all my contacts with the Army, that the Army headquarters here and the Army in Hawaii had done everything that they could in the way of preparing for war. They were limited in a great

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1  
2 many things but that was due to other conditions.

3 The Vice Chairman: I remember General Marshall testified  
4 that he had stripped practically every other post in the United  
5 States of vital aircraft and many other things in order to  
6 give it to the Hawaiian Department and that, he gave us the  
7 impression that that was the best prepared post in the Army  
8 of the United States in December 1941.

9 Would that probably hold true also as to the Navy?

10 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. If I may say, they had also  
11 put a good deal of material, or were putting a good deal of  
12 material, in the Philippines and, of course, just by so much  
13 was the availability of formations, troops, reduced for Hawaii.

14 The Vice Chairman: As a Senior Officer of the United  
15 States Navy of long experience and the Chief of War Plans  
16 Division of the Navy on December 7, 1941, it was your con-  
17 viction that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was pre-  
18 pared for war?

19 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: Now, back for a moment to the question  
21 of your views or convictions as to the imminence of war, please,  
22 Admiral.

23 You stated that during June or July of 1941 it was your  
24 conviction that war with Japan was imminent within a few months.  
25 Then I asked you, did you ever think an attack would be made

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 on Pearl Harbor. I understood you to indicate that your con-  
3 viction on that point was not quite as definite and certain  
4 as that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable  
5 within a few months.

6  
7 Could you help me a little further on that point?

8 Admiral Turner: I am sorry, I think that is the wrong  
9 impression. I was concerned at this time with the over-all  
10 picture and not specifically concerned with parts of the  
11 picture. Inherent in war with Japan was an attack on Hawaii  
12 and all through the entire time I felt that that was a part  
13 of it.

14 The Vice Chairman: But in June or July, Admiral, you  
15 had the conviction that war with Japan was inevitable within  
16 a few months?

17 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: And that Japan would attack the  
19 United States?

20 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

21 The Vice Chairman: Where did you think that first  
22 attack would come?

23 Admiral Turner: Well, I thought the major effort, the  
24 major part of the attack, would certainly come, I mean, the  
25 permanent amphibious, the conquest part, would certainly  
come in the Philippines and would come either against the

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Malay Peninsula, Kra Isthmus, or against Borneo, thence Java  
3 and thence westward to Singapore. The Japanese were strong  
4 enough by that time to launch two major efforts. I believed  
5 that they were pretty well convinced, by June or July, that  
6 they could not detach the United States, although they con-  
7 tinued efforts to do so, from very definite military interest  
8 in the Far East.

9 For example, if they had attempted to go down to the  
10 China Sea and to have made a major effort against Malaysia  
11 without having a definite assurance from the United States  
12 that the United States would not intervene, they couldn't  
13 possibly have gone on down without the capture of the  
14 Philippines, because it would leave on their flank an extremely  
15 important position, which we could build up and later attack  
16 them and cut them off from the south.

17 So that I believe the whole diplomatic effort during  
18 that time, the summer and fall, was towards getting an arrange-  
19 ment with the United States for us to keep out of war while  
20 they went after the British and Dutch.

21 The Vice Chairman: Of course, as subsequently developments  
22 developed, they did make their main effort along the line that  
23 you have indicated; is that correct?

24 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

25 The Vice Chairman: Did you ever at any time think there

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1  
2 would be a raid on Hawaii?

(4) 3 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I thought there was always  
4 a strong possibility and even a probability that a raid in  
5 Hawaii would precede any declaration of war and would be  
6 simultaneous with other operations. I always thought that.

7 The Vice Chairman: And you thought then that probably  
8 the first thrust or the first raid that Japan made, and even  
9 before the declaration of war, would be at Hawaii?

10 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, unless we could build up  
11 their strength so great that the raid would almost certainly  
12 be disastrous in a large way for Japan. We were engaged in  
13 building that strength up.

14 The Vice Chairman: You had that conviction then in June  
15 or July of 1941, that such a raid or thrust at Hawaii would  
16 come within a few months?

17 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, unless we could be so superior  
18 in strength that they would be afraid to take a chance.

19 The Vice Chairman: You have stated that the Pacific  
20 Fleet based at Hawaii was prepared for war on December 7, 1941?

21 Admiral Turner: That was my conviction.

22 The Vice Chairman: And was it sufficient at that time  
23 to have defeated or greatly reduced the effect of the Japanese  
24 raid on Hawaii if it had been fully alerted?

25 Admiral Turner: I believe so.

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2           The Vice Chairman: And the raid made by Japan on Pearl  
3 Harbor December 7, 1941 could have been defeated or the effect  
4 of that raid greatly reduced if proper measures had been taken  
5 by the local Commander?

6           Admiral Turner: I believe so.

7           The Vice Chairman: Now, after seeing these various  
8 messages that were intercepted from Japan along during the  
9 period immediately preceding December 7, 1941, for a few  
10 weeks before that, did your conviction become firmer and  
11 stronger that war with Japan was inevitable?

12          Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, and it was daily approaching  
13 the point where it would occur.

14          The Vice Chairman: And that an attack on Pearl Harbor  
15 was imminent?

16          Admiral Turner: Probable.

17          The Vice Chairman: Now, you say you drafted the war  
18 warning message of November 27, 1941 to Admiral Kimmel?

19          Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

20          The Vice Chairman: Did you consider that that message  
21 was adequate and sufficient as a war warning to him?

22          Admiral Turner: I did, particularly with the addition  
23 of the information that was sent later concerning the Japanese  
24 destruction of codes.

25          The Vice Chairman: He was one of the highest ranking

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 officers of the United States Navy at that time, wasn't he?

3 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: He was a full Admiral, wasn't he?

5 Admiral Turner: He was.

6 The Vice Chairman: Of long experience?

7 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: And regarded as among the best of  
9 the Senior Naval Officers in the Navy?

10 Admiral Turner: Indeed so. I personally had the utmost  
11 confidence in him and respect for his ability and I believe  
12 that that was a generally shared opinion in the Navy.

13 The Vice Chairman: And it is your conviction if he had  
14 carried out the order drafted by you and sent to him on  
15 November 27, 1941 that the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor  
16 could have been defeated or the effects greatly reduced?

17 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: And that he had sufficient equipment,  
19 material and other things necessary at his disposal to have  
20 accomplished that result?

21 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, to have inflicted very serious  
22 damage on the Japanese Fleet.

23 The Vice Chairman: I believe you stated yesterday that  
24 in your opinion his Fleet should not have been concentrated in  
25 Pearl Harbor on that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.



Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Admiral Turner: I did not say that in those words. I said the business of the Fleet out there was to be so deployed as best to be able to carry out a defense of the region and to prepare to carry out the other tasks of the war plan. If Pearl Harbor was the best place for them to be to carry out those tasks, why, and it might be a question of judgment on that, then Pearl Harbor was the best place for those ships to be. If it was the best place, if the best place was at sea, why, then they should have been at sea.

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Personally, I would have had them at sea, except those under repair.

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The Vice Chairman: You thought then that the ships and naval forces there should have been at sea on that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

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Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

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The Vice Chairman: And you certainly do not think that they should have been tied up two and two in the harbor?

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Admiral Turner: Well, two and two was the only way that you could tie them up there, and, as a matter of fact, the anti-aircraft fire, development of fire, was nearly as good, not quite, when tied up in that manner and, of course, in addition to that, and this actually occurred on the attack, the inside ships got far less damaged than the outside ships did; that is, the ones toward the water were the ones worst

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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damaged.

The Vice Chairman: From a naval standpoint could the Fleet be prepared to protect itself or maneuver or move about so as to not catch the full force and effect of an air raid of that type tied up and standing still as if it had been out to sea?

Admiral Turner: They could not maneuver, naturally. They did have the advantage that the waters of the lochs in Pearl Harbor are very narrow. The torpedo runs were short and difficult. It was a difficult attack to make by torpedos.

They had, presumably, around them the anti-aircraft guns of the Army. And it was far easier to have a combat patrol of airplanes overhead in a defensive position, than it would have been if the ships had been several hundred miles away.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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In that case, you see, it would have been necessary to have given the fighter cover over the Fleet from the carriers, and thus take them away from any offensive missions which they might wish to undertake.

So that from many aspects the defense of the battleships primarily had advantages with them in Pearl Harbor over the conditions outside. On the other hand, being at sea offered other types of advantages.

The Vice Chairman: Well, you stated a moment ago that if you had been in command there, you would have had your fleet at sea.

Admiral Turner: I believe so.

The Vice Chairman: Now, then, considering all of these various elements to which you have referred, and considering it from a practical standpoint, it is your view that best over-all results could have been accomplished if the fleet had been at sea?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

Just one or two questions, if I may, with respect to this message.

Well, was it solely within the discretion and jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel, as to whether his ships were all in Pearl

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Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 Harbor, as they appeared on December 7, 1941, or were out  
2 at sea?

3  
4 Admiral Turner: It was within his province entirely.

5 The Vice Chairman: And he was the one that made that  
6 decision as to just what he did with his fleet and how he  
7 handled it, and used it rather than somebody here in Wash-  
8 ington?

9 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: Now, the message of November 27,  
11 1941, which was drafted by you, and sent by the Chief of  
12 Naval Operations, is addressed, and, as I understand, was  
13 sent to CINCAF. Is that the Commander of the Asiatic  
14 Fleet?

15 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: And CINPAC. Is that the Commander  
17 of the Pacific Fleet?

18 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: This message was sent to these  
20 two commanders who were at that time Admiral Hart in  
21 command of the Asiatic Fleet and Admiral Kimmel in command  
22 of the Pacific Fleet?

23 Admiral Turner: It was sent to them for action.

24 The Vice Chairman: Sent to them for action?

25 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: And the word "action" appears on  
3 the message?

4 Admiral Turner: It does.

5 The Vice Chairman: Now, then "INFO," does that mean  
6 "information"?

7 Admiral Turner: It does.

8 The Vice Chairman: To CINCLANT. Who was that?

9 Admiral Turner: Commander in Chief of the Atlantic  
10 Fleet, Admiral King.

11 The Vice Chairman: And SPENAVO. Who was that?

12 Admiral Turner: That is the Special Naval Observer  
13 in London, Admiral Ghormley, who was there acting as the  
14 head of our Naval Mission to the British Admiralty.

15 The Vice Chairman: Then this action message of  
16 November 27, 1941 was sent directly to Admiral Kimmel and  
17 Admiral Hart for action on their part, and was sent for  
18 information to the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral  
19 King, and the Naval Observer in London, Admiral Ghormley?

20 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir; and Admiral Ghormley was  
21 directed by the dispatch to inform the British Admiralty.

22 The Vice Chairman: But that was drawn by you and  
23 was sent by Admiral Stark as an action message to Admiral  
24 Hart and Admiral Kimmel?

25 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: Now, at my request, you have  
3 kindly indicated to us yesterday on the map the areas  
4 coming within the responsibility of Admiral Hart and Admiral  
5 Kimmel at the time this message was sent.

6 Now, in this message the following occurs about the  
7 middle of the message:

8 "The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the  
9 organization of Naval Task Forces indicates an amphibious  
10 expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra  
11 Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

12 All of those points were within the area coming under  
13 the responsibility of Admiral Hart, were they not?

14 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

15 The Vice Chairman: None of them were within the area  
16 coming under the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel?

17 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

18 The Vice Chairman: Then, Admiral, if you had the con-  
19 viction at the time this message was sent that at least a  
20 50-50 chance existed for a raid or a thrust at Pearl Harbor  
21 why did not, either in this message or in some subsequent  
22 message, you convey some more information to Admiral Kimmel  
23 on that point?

24 Admiral Turner: The message tells Admiral Kimmel to  
25 execute an appropriate defensive deployment. That is

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 perfectly specific and entirely clear and must be separated  
3 from the orders to Admiral Hart that the Pacific Fleet was  
4 to execute a defensive deployment. That is to take care  
5 of territory and take care of itself.

6  
7 The Vice Chairman: My purpose is to try to secure  
8 information, and I certainly haven't drafted as many naval  
9 orders as you have, and I wanted to get your views on that.

10 Then, if I understand it correctly, the part of this  
11 message conveying general information applied to both  
12 Admirals Hart and Kimmel?

13 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: And the part specifically pointing  
15 out these places within the area coming under the responsi-  
16 bility of Admiral Hart were primarily for his attention  
17 and only for information to Admiral Kimmel?

18 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: Now then, following the words I  
20 have read from the message, ending with the word "Borneo,"  
21 these words next appear:

22 "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment prepara-  
23 tory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WFL-46."

24 That part of the message applied with equal force and  
25 effect to both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: In your opinion, Admiral, did Admiral  
3 Kimmel comply with that part of this order?

4 Admiral Turner: He did not, in my opinion.

5 The Vice Chairman: If he had complied with that part  
6 of this order do you think the disastrous effects suffered  
7 by the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941  
8 would not have occurred or would have been materially reduced?

9 Admiral Turner: I think they would have been materially  
10 reduced and I believe there would have been a good chance of  
11 inflicting considerable damage on the Japanese fleet. We know  
12 from experience now that an offensive raid by carriers against  
13 positions and against ships is very difficult to stop and  
14 almost always can get in. With the ships in Pearl Harbor,  
15 why, no matter what had been done I believe a considerable  
16 portion of the attack might have gotten in but it would have  
17 been broken up and been of considerably less effect.

18 We had in land based in Oahu at that time a total of  
19 185 fighter aircraft. The total fighter aircraft that the  
20 Japanese had, according to my information, in their fleet  
21 was 112 and a portion of those and a portion of their re-  
22 connaissance planes were maintained over their carrier group  
23 for protection.

24 Now, if even a considerable portion of our fighters had  
25 been in the air and been able to intercept, - and that is not



Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 too easy, - why, I believe that the Japanese attack would  
3 have been very much less severe in its results and I believe  
4 then that we could have with our land based bombers done con-  
5 siderable damage to the Japanese carriers.

6 We know, however, from subsequent experience that high  
7 altitude bombers have little chance of doing much damage to  
8 maneuvering ships. Our principal possibility of damaging the  
9 carriers, as was shown in the Midway battle, is from the car-  
10 rier planes that we ourselves have.

11 The Vice Chairman: Did Admiral Kimmel ever reply to this  
12 message of November 27, 1941?

13 Admiral Turner: He made no reply so far as I know.

14 The Vice Chairman: Did he ever acknowledge receipt of it?

15 Admiral Turner: I do not know. That would not come to  
16 my attention. Probably he did. We know that it was receipted  
17 for by his communications organization. There is a difference  
18 between acknowledge and receipt. When an operator finishes  
19 sending a dispatch the operator at the other end receipts for  
20 the dispatch.

21 The Vice Chairman: I can understand that.

22 Admiral Turner: But "acknowledge" means that it has gone  
23 to the Commander-in-Chief and he has seen it.

24 The Vice Chairman: I can understand that, Admiral, but  
25 here was an important action order drawn by you and issued by

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1  
2 the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander of the Pacific  
3 Fleet. Now, did you ever receive any information that he got  
4 that message?

5 Admiral Turner: No, sir. The standing orders at that  
6 time were that whenever an operating dispatch went to an of-  
7 ficer he was required to acknowledge. Now, that part of it  
8 would have come under Communications people to check. I think  
9 there is no question but that he did receive it.

10 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield?

11 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

12 Senator Lucas: May I ask counsel on that point whether  
13 or not the record shows that the Admiral did reply?

14 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

15 Senator Lucas: That he did reply?

16 Mr. Mitchell: There is no question but what he got it.  
17 We have not put in evidence the receipt for it. He actually  
18 got it, there is no question about that.

19 The Vice Chairman: Do you have any record of any message  
20 from him making acknowledgment?

21 Mr. Gesell: No.

22 Mr. Mitchell: We haven't got any of that information.  
23 We can look at the communications record; but there isn't any  
24 doubt but what he received it.

25 The Vice Chairman: I have never understood that there

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 was any question about Admiral Kimmel receiving it.

3 Mr. Mitchell: No, there is not.

4 The Vice Chairman: But the point I had in mind in this  
5 question, Admiral, was to check you a little bit as well as  
6 Admiral Kimmel. If you drew an important action order to go  
7 to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I was just  
8 wondering why you did not have the interest or even the curi-  
9 osity to satisfy yourself as to whether he got that directive  
10 order or not.

11 Admiral Turner: Mr. Congressman, I will agree that the  
12 word "Acknowledge" should have been on the end of that mes-  
13 sage. It would have been a proper thing to do.

14 The Vice Chairman: You should have included that word  
15 "Acknowledge" at the end of this message you drafted?

16 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I believe so.

17 The Vice Chairman: But even not having included that  
18 word "Acknowledge" at the end of the message, didn't you have  
19 the interest or at least the curiosity to satisfy yourself  
20 as to whether Admiral Kimmel received it or not?

21 Admiral Turner: I knew that it had gotten into the com-  
22 munication organization of Admiral Kimmel because our radio  
23 people never quit until they get an "R" for it. Now, the  
24 chances of a dispatch like that being lost in the Communica-  
25 tions organization without getting to Admiral Kimmel may be

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 one in a million; I doubt if they are that much.

3 The Vice Chairman: Well, I can understand that but what  
4 I was trying to get at is whether you felt an interest in the  
5 matter sufficient to want to satisfy yourself that Admiral  
6 Kimmel received it?

7 Admiral Turner: Oh, I was satisfied he had it, per-  
8 fectly satisfied.

9 The Vice Chairman: Without ever inquiring or checking  
10 it or indicating any further interest on your part you were  
11 satisfied that he got it?

12 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: You did not have any information as  
14 to what he had done, if anything, after receiving it, did you?

15 Admiral Turner: None.

16 The Vice Chairman: Now, if he had complied with this  
17 message of November 27, 1941 would his command have been pro-  
18 perly alerted? In other words, was this message of November  
19 27th to him sufficient to require the proper alert of his  
20 command?

21 Admiral Turner: I believe it was.

22 The Vice Chairman: And if he had complied with this  
23 message his command would have been on the proper alert?

24 Admiral Turner: I believe so.

25 The Vice Chairman: Do you have any knowledge or any

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 information as to why Admiral Kimmel did not so alert his  
3 command?

4 Admiral Turner: No, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: You have not received any information  
6 since then that would indicate to you why he did not alert his  
7 command or comply with this order as you had written it and  
8 had intended it?

9 Admiral Turner: I have never seen a report on the sub-  
10 ject by Admiral Kimmel. I have not read any of the testimony  
11 given before the various courts of inquiry from officers of  
12 the fleet or in Hawaii. The only things that I have seen  
13 on it are matters that have appeared in the newspapers and  
14 reading the report of the Naval court of inquiry.

15 The Vice Chairman: Well, you continued as Chief of the  
16 War Plans Division of the Navy Department from December 7,  
17 1941 until June of 1942, didn't you?

18 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: If Admiral Kimmel had made any re-  
20 port or conveyed any information to the Navy Department as  
21 to the reasons for his action or lack of action on that it  
22 would have come to your attention, wouldn't it?

23 Admiral Turner: I believe so.

24 The Vice Chairman: And you never received any such in-  
25 formation?

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Admiral Turner: I have no recollection of receiving any  
3 explanation at all. We received further dispatches as to  
4 action being taken subsequently by Admiral Kimmel but I have  
5 no recollection of an explanation.

6 I read also, in addition to the other matters I men-  
7 tioned, I read the report of the Roberts' Board.

8 The Vice Chairman: Well, was it customary in the Navy  
9 Department when an exceedingly important order had been issued  
10 to a commander of an important part of the fleet, or in this  
11 case the Pacific Fleet itself, and that order was not com-  
12 plied with, was it the practice of the Navy Department to call  
13 on him for some explanation?

14 Admiral Turner: The matter was taken out of the Navy  
15 Department's hands as regards responsibility by the President's  
16 decision to appoint the Roberts Commission and also it was  
17 taken out of the Chief of Naval Operations hands by Mr.  
18 Knox' personal investigation at Hawaii.

19 The Vice Chairman: So that you do not consider that the  
20 Chief of Naval Operations, or you as one of the chief divi-  
21 sions under him, which was the Division of War Plans, had any  
22 further responsibility to inquire into the reasons or the  
23 causes for his failure to comply with your order?

24 Admiral Turner: No, sir. That was a matter -- let me  
25 change that. Admiral Kimmel was relieved from his command be-

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1  
2 fore he could possibly have submitted a formal report to the  
3 Department and once it had been put into the inquiry stage,  
4 naturally none of the naval officers would have expected him  
5 to make any statement to the Department, but only to the vari-  
6 ous courts.

7 The Vice Chairman: Well, almost immediately after the  
8 attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 the Secretary of  
9 the Navy, Mr. Knox, flew out in person, didn't he?

10 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

11 The Vice Chairman: And made an investigation?

12 Admiral Turner: He did.

13 The Vice Chairman: Now, if he found out anything about  
14 the reason for Admiral Kimmel's failure to comply with this  
15 order of November 27th did you secure any such information from  
16 him after his return, or anybody else coming from him?

17 Admiral Turner: Mr. Knox made a report to the President.  
18 I do not recall whether or not I ever saw that report, or not.  
19 Shortly after Mr. Knox returned he made a very short oral  
20 statement to several officers in his office. I was present  
21 amongst them.

22 The Vice Chairman: Well, did that short oral sta tement  
23 which was made in your presence convey to you any information  
24 as to why Admiral Kimmel had not carried out the order you  
25 had written which had been sent to him by Admiral Stark?

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Admiral Turner: No, sir, no reasons.

3 The Vice Chairman: Now, did you consider the Pacific  
4 Fleet as safe at Pearl Harbor as any other place that it could  
5 have been based?

6 Admiral Turner: If I may, Mr. Congressman, before mak-  
7 ing a specific answer to that, I would like to put some quali-  
8 fications ahead of it.

9 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could not  
10 stop the competition with the witness. I want to hear the  
11 witness. There is a terrific noise coming from the left; I  
12 do not mean at the table here.

13 The Chairman: Well, the committee will be in order  
14 and also the spectators.

15 Mr. Murphy: I do not mean the committee. I mean the  
16 spectators.

17 The Chairman: Well, all right, whoever is in disorder  
18 will now resume order.

19 The Vice Chairman: Well, Admiral, I am sorry to have  
20 detained you this long, but just as briefly and specifically  
21 as you can answer the question, why, that will be sufficient.

22 Admiral Turner: The reason for the fleet's being in  
23 Hawaii was not for its own safety or its own security. The  
24 reason was for the security of Hawaii and the security of the  
25 United States. Hawaii was, under war conditions, a dangerous



1 Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 place. Any place where fighting is going on is dangerous. The  
3 Fleet would have been more safe if it had been on the Pacific  
4 Coast or if it had been in the Atlantic, but it was out there  
5 for the purpose of engaging in a fight with the Japanese and  
6 winning the fight.

7 So far as regards its own immediate safety, that is,  
8 the battleships, which was of far less importance than of  
9 carrying out its tasks against the enemy, there is great  
10 disagreement. There are two opinions as to whether it was  
11 better in port or at sea. Since then we in the Navy have  
12 maintained our ships in port many times against very severe  
13 air attacks because we had things to do in port, at other  
14 times they have been at sea, and under the conditions which  
15 existed at that time I myself feel that local safety could  
16 have been obtained better if the fleet had been at sea but,  
17 certainly, that opinion is subject to challenge.

18 The Vice Chairman: Well, considering the world condition  
19 as it existed at that time did you think it was appropriate  
20 and best for the Fleet to be based at Pearl Harbor?

21 Admiral Turner: I did.

22 The Vice Chairman: I thank you.

23 The Chairman: Inasmuch as I am compelled to go to the  
24 floor I would like to ask one question, if it is agreeable,  
25 prompted by Congressman Cooper's interrogation.

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Chairman

1  
2 Admiral, you sent or Admiral Stark sent on the 27th of  
3 November this command message to Admiral Kimmel.

4 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

5 The Chairman: In which you thought you were sufficiently  
6 specific, in view of the possible danger, to notify him or any  
7 other officer in a similar position that it was essential  
8 that all proper steps be taken to protect not only the Navy,  
9 but protect whatever the Navy was out there to protect, is  
10 that right?

11 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman: And on the following day you wrote and  
13 Admiral Stark sent an additional message in which you speci-  
14 fied the Philippines and the Kra Peninsula, I believe Thai  
15 and possibly Formosa, as the more imminent objects of attack.

16 When you sent that message Admiral Hart had jurisdiction  
17 over all those places you mentioned in that message of the  
18 28th?

19 The Vice Chairman: The 27th.

20 The Chairman: I know the 27th, but I am talking now  
21 about the message of the 28th, the next day. You mentioned  
22 all those points over which Admiral Hart had jurisdiction and  
23 you did not mention points over which Admiral Kimmel had  
24 jurisdiction.

25 Did you give any thought, in view of the previous mes-

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Chairman

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sage of the 27th, did you give any thought to the possibilities that the emphasis that you placed upon the Philippines and Formosa and these other places would justify any relaxation on the part of the commander in the Hawaiian area whose area was not specifically mentioned in that telegram of the 28th?

Admiral Turner: No, sir, I did not. You see, that dispatch of the 28th, which transmitted the Army dispatch, was sent for action to the shore based Navy commanders on the West Coast and only for information to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet so that he would know of the several orders we were giving his subordinates.

The Chairman: In view of the command nature and the imperative nature of the message you sent on the 27th, regardless of the fact that you mentioned other points that might appear to you and to Admiral Stark as more imminently in danger, would that have justified a prudent officer in relaxing his effort in that area though it was not mentioned specifically?

Admiral Turner: We did not think so and reviewed that very subject, as I testified yesterday, on Friday afternoon.

The Chairman: Yes. Now, one other question. It is in evidence here that on the 6th day of December there was no reconnaissance of any kind, either Army or Navy, at Pearl Harbor; that the only reconnaissance within that region any-

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Chairman

where was from the airplane carrier Enterprise, which was some two hundred or more miles west of Oahu.

Would you say that you regarded the failure of any reconnaissance of any character on the 6th, the day before the attack, whatever may have happened between the 28th or the 27th and the 6th, that the failure to have any sort of reconnaissance at Pearl Harbor on the 6th of December was a compliance or a violation of the command order you had sent out on the 27th?

Admiral Turner: It was a violation of it.

The Chairman: That is all I want to ask.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire at this point.

Mr. Clark: Following up the question that was just touched upon by the chairman, I have no disposition to be super-critical about this message of the 27th. I call your attention to the fact that after referring to cessation of negotiations it says, "An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days."

I am struck by the fact that is limited to the singular and it continues: "The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against the" four places you mentioned, all of which were in Admiral Hart's district.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 In fairness to Admiral Kimmel, might he not have assumed  
3 reasonably from that that the authorities in Washington were  
4 expecting a movement only in the direction of the places in-  
5 dicated and not in his naval district at all?

6 Admiral Turner: An answer to that I believe would be  
7 surmise, but I invite attention to the fact that Admiral Kim-  
8 mel was directed to take an appropriate defensive deployment.

9 Mr. Clark: I am not speaking of that at all. The thought  
10 in my mind is whether he might have been justified in read-  
11 ing this message and giving the words a simple meaning, that  
12 it was the opinion of Admiral Stark who sent this message, or  
13 in whose name it was sent, that there would be an aggressive  
14 movement and in the direction of one of these four places  
15 mentioned in the message?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 Admiral Turner: An aggressive movement.

3 Mr. Clark: One?

4 Admiral Turner: One. An aggressive movement was in-  
5 tended to include the over-all effort, military effort exerted  
6 by Japan. It was that Japan as a whole was making a move.  
7 That was the intention there.

8 Now with regard to the singular, in the next sentence,  
9 the opinion was rather generally held here by officers that  
10 the amphibious movement, amphibious expedition by Japan, only  
11 one at a time could be undertaken in sufficient strength.  
12 I personally feel that the dispatch would be improved by saying  
13 "The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organiza-  
14 tion of naval task forces indicates one or more amphibious  
15 expeditions", but I think the singular in the first part  
16 there as indicating the whole picture is all right.

17 Mr. Clark: I am only interested in the impression this  
18 might reasonably have made upon Admiral Kimmel.

19 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Clark: You refer here to only one amphibious expe-  
21 dition.

22 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Clark: And you point out the direction that the  
24 circumstances indicate it would take. Might that not easily  
25 have lulled him into some sense of security as to his District.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 Insofar as the opinion of Washington was concerned?

3 Admiral Turner: I do not know, Mr. Congressman.

4 Mr. Clark: I believe you testified before this committee  
5 that if Hawaii, or our establishment on Hawaii, had not been  
6 considerably damaged, if our establishment there had not been  
7 quite severely damaged it would have constituted a serious  
8 threat to the Japanese flank as this large movement to the  
9 south unfolded. I think you said that in your testimony.

10 Admiral Turner: No, sir, I beg your pardon. That  
11 testimony was given by another witness. I have not made any  
12 such statement.

13 Mr. Clark: I did not want to repeat if you did. What  
14 do you say about that now?

15 Admiral Turner: The threat to the flank would not have  
16 been particularly serious for some months. It would, under  
17 no circumstances, have affected the Japanese action in the  
18 South China Sea and against Malaysia. We could not possibly  
19 move the Fleet, as it was then constituted or as it would  
20 ever be constituted, direct from Hawaii to the Philippines  
21 and establish a base and leave all of those Japanese Islands  
22 in between. We could not have supported the Fleet. The  
23 only threat to the Japanese flank would be operations against  
24 the Islands in the way of raids for some months, and that was  
25 about the only thing that would be done, the idea being that

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 we would try to contain the Japanese naval forces and air  
3 in the Mandates and take them off the backs of our forces  
4 in the Far East.

5 Mr. Clark: I understood you, Admiral, to say that the  
6 only kind of an attack that could be made on Hawaii would be  
7 by a surprise air attack.

8 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, and submarines.

9 Mr. Clark: And submarines, yes.

10 Admiral Turner: That is the only kind we anticipated.

11 Mr. Clark: Now you do agree that a surprise air attack  
12 of the character made by the Japanese was a right risky thing  
13 for them, was it not?

14 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Clark: Then why would they undertake that unless  
16 Hawaii was a serious threat to their flank?

17 Admiral Turner: For two reasons. Hawaii was a serious  
18 threat to their flank ultimately, not immediately. In other  
19 words, with the Fleet practically destroyed it meant that  
20 any action of ours against the Mandates with the idea of making  
21 an advance across the Pacific must be postponed possibly  
22 indefinitely, and that would give the Japanese time to get  
23 themselves set in a better defensive situation, and it might  
24 so discourage the United States -- I think that is the second  
25 point -- that we would be willing to let things go and leave



Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 them in possession of their spoils.

3 Mr. Clark: The only thing I am getting at, in my own  
4 thinking, is whether the presence of our establishment on  
5 the Hawaiian Islands along during the days from the 27th of  
6 November to the 7th of December constituted such a threat  
7 to what Japan had in mind doing that they would have been  
8 interested in taking a desperate chance on removing that threat.

9 Admiral Turner: By all means, Mr. Congressman, from a  
10 long-range point of view, not very much from within a few  
11 months, or something like that.

12 But that was very definitely an ultimate threat against  
13 their position, because it formed a base from which we could  
14 undertake later strong operations.

15 Mr. Clark: Then, as I understand you, while you expected  
16 or thought the chances of a raid on Hawaii were about fifty-  
17 fifty, you would not have expected it to come for some months?

18 Admiral Turner: No, no, I mean that was the time to  
19 do it right then. It was unquestionably the time to do it.  
20 I am sorry I cannot make myself plain. A raid on Hawaii,  
21 from the Japanese viewpoint, if successful might have such  
22 tremendous effects as to insure their success not only in  
23 conquering these positions but in holding them indefinitely.

24 Mr. Clark: Well, now, to my mind that seems inconsistent  
25 with your statement that Hawaii was not a serious threat to

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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their flank all the time.

Admiral Turner: It was not any particular immediate threat that would prevent their major operations from being successful within a few months. It was a definite threat against their ultimate success in the war and holding their conquests.

In other words, whatever happened there at Hawaii would have very little effect on the operations for the capture of the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies and Malaya.

However, from Hawaii, with an intact fleet built up, as they knew we could, we could, in the course of time, move across the Pacific, as we did, and then threaten their position and relieve them of their conquests.

For the immediate operations, unless we wanted to commit suicide, why, we could not possibly interfere with their success.

Mr. Clark: Would you say the strategic importance of Hawaii increased or diminished or remained static from the 27th of November to the 7th of December, having in mind the movement of the Japanese south?

Admiral Turner: Well, it remained the same. It was a fundamental of our position in the Pacific, for any future offensive it was fundamental that we should hold Hawaii. Probably I did not understand the question.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 Mr. Clark: I do not think I made myself clear, I am  
3 sorry. I really was thinking of the Japanese point of view  
4 when I asked that question. From their point of view, with  
5 this rather extensive movement unfolding to the south, did  
6 the strategic importance of the Hawaiian set-up to them in-  
7 crease?

8 Admiral Turner: Oh, no, it was the same, the same as it  
9 had always been and the same as it continued.

10 Mr. Clark: I want to ask you about the diversion of this  
11 traffic that you spoke of in your testimony.

12 Was that known to Admiral Kimmel?

13 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. All of those dispatches were  
14 sent to him.

15 Mr. Clark: Did that or not enhance the opportunity for  
16 the Japanese to make a successful surprise attack along the  
17 route they did take?

18 Admiral Turner: Not in my opinion. I think it made  
19 no difference one way or the other. They could have easily  
20 avoided any of that traffic. They could pass the trade routes  
21 at night darkened and they could send airplanes out to let  
22 them maneuver clear, and in fact the route through which they  
23 came was a normal operating area, they operated out there  
24 for maneuvers and drill a good deal of the time.

25 Mr. Clark: You don't think the likelihood of the discovery

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2 of that expedition would have been greater if traffic had  
3 still been moving along normal channels?

4 Admiral Turner: Not in the least.

5 Mr. Clark: Now may I ask you one more question about  
6 the message that was sent by General Short in response to the  
7 message from the Chief of Staff. I believe you said you saw  
8 that.

9 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Clark: It had in it I think the phrase "liaison with  
11 the Navy".

12 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

13 Mr. Clark: What did you make of that?

14 Admiral Turner: Well, I assumed that full arrangements  
15 were in effect for the exchange of information and for the  
16 issuing of orders by one service to the other in such situations  
17 as the one service worked for the other.

18 For example, we had some fighters on shore and the Army  
19 was charged with the fighter defense. I assumed that those  
20 communications were set up and functioning and that arrangements  
21 had been made for full exchange of information and for putting  
22 in or standing by to put into effect operating orders for  
23 both services with the knowledge of the other.

24 Mr. Clark: But the words in the preceding sentence of  
25 that message indicated that they had become alerted only as

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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to sabotage.

Admiral Turner: That is correct as regards that message.

Mr. Clark: Now applying that same rule, would not you have understood there was cooperation between the two forces as to sabotage only?

Admiral Turner: That conclusion is, I believe, entirely justified. It was not drawn at the time of the receipt of that message, although I distinctly remember the message and thought it was rather queer.

Mr. Clark: I would like to ask you, Admiral, with the greatest respect, what other conclusion could have been drawn from that message?

Admiral Turner: Well, another message had been sent by G-2 with respect to special measures against sabotage, and while I do not recall distinctly my thoughts about that dispatch, my thoughts at that time, I think that I assumed that additional reports would come in as regards the deployment of the troops.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Hook Follows

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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Mr. Clark: Yes, but that does not really get to my question.

Admiral Turner: Your question is what other conclusion could have been drawn?

Mr. Clark: That is right.

Admiral Turner: I am telling you what conclusion I drew at the time.

Mr. Clark: You concluded that other reports would come?

Admiral Turner: Might come, yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: But as to the meaning of the Short message when you read it -- I am not talking about other reports, I am talking about that particular message, as to its meaning -- what other meaning could you draw from it than that which I have just suggested?

Admiral Turner: I think I should have drawn the conclusion that sabotage was the only one that was concerned in it, but I certainly did not draw that conclusion, nor did any of the other officers that saw it draw such a conclusion.

Mr. Clark: Well, I am inclined to agree with you on that, but that still does not answer the question I am asking you.

Admiral Turner: I am not saying we were right.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 Mr. Clark: Did that not raise even a suspicion in  
3 your mind that your order of the 27th had not been complied  
4 with?

5 Admiral Turner: I remember the dispatch very well,  
6 and I read it over several times, and thought it was a  
7 rather peculiar dispatch. It certainly did not have any  
8 connotation, nor does it now, that the action taken by the  
9 Navy was confined to sabotage, not the least, and I cannot  
10 see how that conclusion can be drawn, because there were  
11 additional orders issued to General Short with regard to  
12 sabotage, and knowing the order about sabotage had been  
13 issued, I just drew the conclusion that that was the message  
14 that related to sabotage.

15 Mr. Clark: That is all I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

16 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois will  
17 inquire, Admiral.

18 Senator Lucas: Admiral Turner, I want to refer just  
19 briefly to this message that was prepared by you and sent  
20 out on November 27. The beginning of that message reads:

21 "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

22 Could there be any question about the interpretation  
23 of those words by anyone who was in command of a fleet any-  
24 where in the Pacific or otherwise?

25 Admiral Turner: I do not see now, and I did not see

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1  
2 then that there was any possibility of misinterpreting that  
3 sentence.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, our main fleet was located at  
5 that particular time in Hawaii, was it not?

6 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

7 Senator Lucas: You also state:

8 "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory  
9 to carrying out the tasks assigned in WFL-46X."

10 Admiral Turner: "X" is a period, Senator.

11 Senator Lucas: WFL-46, then. I presume counsel will  
12 probably ask you what WFL-46 is.

13 The Vice Chairman: He covered that.

14 Senator Lucas: You covered that thoroughly, so I  
15 will not go into that.

16 Admiral Turner: That was covered yesterday.

17 Senator Lucas: Presumably Admiral Kimmel also knew  
18 what that was, did he not?

19 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Now, in addition to that warning sent  
21 out on November 27, as a matter of precaution, I take it  
22 you also sent to Admiral Kimmel, on November 28, a copy  
23 of the message that was sent by General Marshall to General  
24 Short in Hawaii.

25 Admiral Turner: The primary reason for sending that



Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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dispatch was to inform the commanders of the Pacific Northern and Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontiers as to what orders had been given to the commander of the Western Defense Command.

Since those two officers, the commanders of those two naval coastal frontiers on the outbreak of war automatically came under Admiral Kimmel's command for certain purposes it was appropriate that we should inform Admiral Kimmel what orders the department had given to two of his future subordinates, and that is the sole purpose of that dispatch.

Senator Lucas: That may be the sole purpose of the dispatch, but certainly it also had a significant additional warning, it seems to me, to Admiral Kimmel, in view of the type and kind of message that was sent to General Short. He could not overlook the following day, it seems to me, a message which meant really action. Am I correct in that?

Admiral Turner: I do not believe that had any influence in drafting that dispatch, because we were satisfied, as was the case, that General Short would show to Admiral Kimmel the dispatch which he had received, and which was identical with that.

Senator Lucas: Assuming that he did do that, and I presume General Short did show the warning he received from

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1  
2 General Marshall to Admiral Kimmel, but nevertheless,  
3 here was an additional warning to Admiral Kimmel that was  
4 sent from the Chief of Naval Operations from Washington  
5 D. C. There cannot be any question about that even though  
6 it may have been as you have stated, insofar as the Northern  
7 and Southern spots were concerned.

8 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. I misunderstood you before.  
9 I agree with that.

10 Senator Lucas: Now, on December 3, the Chief of Naval  
11 Operations in Washington also sent to Admiral Kimmel this  
12 message:

13 "HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT  
14 CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO  
15 JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG, SINGA-  
16 PORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON, AND LONDON, TO DESTROY  
17 MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL  
18 OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS."

19 Did you prepare that message?

20 Admiral Turner: No, sir, that was prepared by a  
21 subordinate of Admiral Wilkinson's, but I knew about it,  
22 and we talked about it ahead of time, and we all considered  
23 that that was an exceedingly important piece of information  
24 to send to Admiral Kimmel and to Admiral Hart, because the  
25 destruction of codes in that manner and in those places

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1  
2 in my mind and experience is a definite and sure indication  
3 of war with the nations in whose capitals or other places  
4 those codes are destroyed.

5 Senator Lucas: Am I correct in my understanding that  
6 that is about the last thing a potential enemy does before  
7 war is started?

8 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. It indicates war within  
9 two or three days.

10 Senator Lucas: I am only a layman, but I believe I  
11 can understand that, and I could understand that if I were  
12 on the ground and knew something about the burning of codes.

13 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Lucas: And especially in view of the message  
15 sent on December 6, which is as follows:

(10) 16 "In view of the international situation and the exposed  
17 position of our outlying Pacific islands" - he is talking  
18 about Hawaii there as well as the Philippines, and others,  
19 is he not?

20 Admiral Turner: No, sir, not about Hawaii.

21 Senator Lucas: It went to the Commander of the Pacific  
22 Fleet did it not?

23 Admiral Turner: Yes, but the "outlying Pacific islands,"  
24 that was a phrase, while not appearing to be specific in  
25 this dispatch, that we used in correspondence and dispatches

h7

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 and indicated Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake,  
3 and Guam.

4 Senator Lucas: It further says:

5 "You may authorize the destruction by them of secret  
6 and confidential documents now or under later conditions  
7 of greater emergency. Means of communication to support  
8 our current operations and special intelligence should  
9 of course be maintained until the last moment."

10 Did you prepare that message in Exhibit 37, page 45?

11 Admiral Turner: No, sir. That was prepared by the  
12 Office of Naval Communications, but it was referred to  
13 me.

14 As I recall it, Admiral Noyes and I talked it over  
15 before it was sent. We held on as long as we could, and  
16 then it was decided that that was the last minute that was  
17 proper to send it. But we did not send that direct to  
18 those outlying islands, because it is bad practice to give  
19 orders to subordinates.

20 Senator Lucas: I understand. But this message did  
21 go direct to Admiral Kimmel, who was in charge of the  
22 Pacific Fleet?

23 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: Could I ask counsel whether or not the  
25 record shows that Admiral Kimmel received all these

h8

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 messages?

3 Mr. Mitchell: It may be presumed he received all in  
4 this book. There is no question about it, that I know of.  
5 We can get the Communications record, if you like. Every-  
6 body has assumed so, including his own counsel.

7 Senator Lucas: Then on that same day, on page 46  
8 of that same exhibit, you sent to the Commanding Officer  
9 of the 14th Naval District, a message as follows:

10 "Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system  
11 although presumably not included in your eighteen double  
12 five of third."

13 Will you explain to the committee just exactly what  
14 that means?

15 Admiral Turner: That, Senator, is from the Commander  
16 of the 14th Naval District to Operations, and gives us  
17 information. Now it does not show information to the Com-  
18 mander in Chief, but customarily since they go out through  
19 the same offices, why, as the dispatches are customarily  
20 delivered to the Commander in Chief, undoubtedly they knew  
21 it.

22 Senator Lucas: All right. In other words, on the 6th  
23 of December, this message came from Admiral Bloch, who  
24 was then commanding the 14th Naval District in Hawaii?

25 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: He advised you that the local consul -- he means Japan there, does he not?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: The local consul of Japan has destroyed all but one system, although presumably not "included in your eighteen double five of third."

Now, under the arrangement that was had there between the Army and Navy, the Commander of the 14th Naval District, Admiral Bloch, had the duty to inform General Short, as well as Admiral Kimmel with respect to this important piece of information?

Admiral Turner: It was.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: He advised you that the local consul -- he means Japan there, does he not?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: The local consul of Japan has destroyed all but one system, although presumably not "included in your eighteen double five of third."

Now, under the arrangement that was had there between the Army and Navy, the Commander of the 14th Naval District, Admiral Bloch, had the duty to inform General Short, as well as Admiral Kimmel with respect to this important piece of information?

Admiral Turner: It was.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: So the result of all these messages that  
3 were sent from November 27 up to December 6 and the message  
4 that was received from Admiral Bloch on December 6 by the  
5 authorities here in Washington indicated, from the 27th on,  
6 that a serious crisis was existing between this country and  
7 Japan, and that war was imminent, if not inevitable, between  
8 these two nations?

9 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

10 Senator Lucas: Now, after all of these messages had  
11 gone forward advising Admiral Kimmel of the situation between  
12 these two nations as the Chief of Naval Operations here saw  
13 them, what he did with the Fleet upon these instructions was  
14 his own responsibility under Navy orders?

15 Admiral Turner: That is correct.

16 Senator Lucas: I want to ask you, Admiral Turner, a  
17 questions which probably is not pertinent or material, but  
18 inasmuch a lot of questions of that kind have gone into the  
19 record I don't believe that I am going to be stopped by the  
20 Chairman if I ask this one question.

21 Assuming that Japan had not struck Hawaii, assuming  
22 they had struck the Philippines, as it seems most Navy  
23 Officers thought they would if they did attack the United  
24 States, what war plans did you have to aid the Philippines  
25 in the event that Japan struck them first and made a landing



Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 there?

3 Admiral Turner: It was the same war plan, Rainbow No. 5,  
4 WPL46. That was a global plan and included orders to the  
5 Asiatic Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, all of  
6 the naval coastal frontiers and the entire naval department  
7 and all of the services in the Navy Department.

8 Senator Lucas: Assuming that Japan had not destroyed  
9 our Fleet in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, would it have been  
10 possible, in the opinion of naval experts, to have given  
11 relief to General MacArthur and his men before they were  
12 captured at Bataan in the following spring?

13 Admiral Turner: No, sir; it would be completely impossible.

14 Senator Lucas: I gleaned that from your statement a  
15 moment ago with respect to the Fleet being a threat on the  
16 flank of Japan and I wanted to ask that question.

17 In other words, it has been stated many times -- it  
18 hasn't been stated but it has been questioned by many people  
19 as to why we did not give relief to MacArthur and his forces  
20 in the Philippines after the Japanese invaded in December 1941.

21 It is your studied opinion now that even though we had  
22 not been attacked in the Hawaiians by the Japanese we still  
23 would not have been able to deliver to our forces in the  
24 Philippines supplies and support before they were captured?

25 Admiral Turner: That is correct. It would have been

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 completely impossible. That is, from that direction. Now,  
3 we made an effort and got some supplies, small in amount,  
4 up from the south, but that had nothing to do with the Pacific  
5 Fleet. I believe we sent one or two submarines from the  
6 Pacific Fleet, but as far as any material effect on the  
7 situation is concerned, why, the Pacific Fleet could not have  
8 gone out and relieved the situation.

9 Senator Lucas: Well, it was my understanding that a  
10 certain amount of relief did reach them but it was only through  
11 submarines landing there at night.

12 Admiral Turner: And a few little small ships from the  
13 south.

14 Senator Lucas: But so far as taking out the Fleet to  
15 convoy a group of merchant ships with supplies and men, and  
16 so forth, it is your opinion that that could not have been  
17 done before we were captured there?

18 Admiral Turner: It could not. The only way that could  
19 be done was the approximate manner in which it was done.  
20 That is, step by step, and that took two years.

21 Senator Lucas: You stated in the examination of Congress-  
22 man Cooper that in your opinion war had been more or less  
23 inevitable with Japan for many years. Didn't you say years?

24 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: What factors did you take into considera-

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

tion when you reached that conclusion years ago?

Admiral Turner: The general national policy of Japan towards expansion in the Far East, starting with, actually with their war with China in 1893, and the continuation of that; the growth of the militaristic spirit, the increasing education of the Japanese people to be completely submissive to the military leaders; the increased military influence in the Government; their actions in China from the earliest time, toward trying to get advantages of all kinds; their attempt to hold on to Shantung after World War I; the Tanaka Memorial, so-called -- that may have been later. It may have been 1925, which, while he died, Mr. Tanaka was the epitome of Japanese aspirations toward military conquest and world conquest.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Their moving into China and refusal to make any arrangements and gradually thereon, the formation of those associations "to bring light and happiness" to the Asiatic people.

Senator Lucas: In other words, it was the aggressive nature of the Japanese to expand that caused you to believe that sooner or later this country would be engaged in war with Japan.

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, and a definite crossing of our national policy and the threat to the Philippines and our position in the Far East which such aggressive tendencies had.

Senator Lucas: Was there anything during that period, upon the part of any of the officials in the War, Navy or Executive Branches of the Government that caused you to reach that decision?

Was there any action or any opinions expressed either in the War, Navy or Executive Branches of the Government that influenced your opinion that sooner or later we might get into war with Japan?

Admiral Turner: Yes, and on the part of the American people. The demand generally of the American people that we put an embargo on Japan for some years, and the refusal of American officials to completely back down and let Japan

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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7  
2 have their own way.

3 Of course that is not a criticism of them, naturally,  
4 but our adherence to our policy right along in support  
5 of China, and in support of the British and our refusal  
6 to just let the field, leave the field open to Japan,  
7 let them do what they pleased.

8 Of course, that had a very definite influence.

9 Senator Lucas: In other words, we would have had to  
10 completely forget about our basic and fundamental policies  
11 that we had pursued over a long period of years in this  
12 country, so far as our foreign policy in the Pacific is  
13 concerned?

14 Admiral Turner: That is my opinion.

15 Senator Lucas: And we would have had to yield completely  
16 to Japan if we wanted to stay out of war with them?

17 Admiral Turner: I believe so.

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2       Senator Lucas: Now, do you know of anything in the last  
3 three or four months before December the 7th, 1941 in the  
4 Navy, the War, the diplomatic or any branch of the executive  
5 government that tricked Japan into this war?

6       Admiral Turner: No, sir; far from it. We wanted to  
7 hold them off as long as we could and there was -- I knew  
8 pretty well what people in all branches of the government were  
9 doing with respect to this matter and I think there was ab-  
10 solutely complete loyalty on their parts to the constitution  
11 and to our constitutional methods of prosecuting foreign af-  
12 fairs and prosecuting war. There was never the slightest  
13 tendency to do anything but what I believe was honest and  
14 sound.

15       Senator Lucas: That is all.

16       Mr. Clark: Mr. Murphy has some questions to ask at this  
17 time.

18       Mr. Murphy: Admiral Turner, as I understand it you were  
19 very close personally to Admiral Stark prior to December 7,  
20 1941.

21       Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

22       Mr. Murphy: I find at one point that before the Naval  
23 court of inquiry you stated that your duties included being  
24 a sort of professional adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations  
25 in matters pertaining to military operations and particularly

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 with regard to preparation for war to future operations and  
3 also in respect of relationships with the War and State De-  
4 partments. Would that be an accurate statement?

5 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir; not too much with the State  
6 Department. I had some direct relations. It was mostly as  
7 an adviser on questions that were of concern to the Chief of  
8 Naval Operations.

9 Mr. Murphy: Did you state before Admiral Hart that you  
10 considered yourself one of Admiral Stark's principal advisers  
11 and that you were close personal friends as well as closely  
12 associated officially?

13 Admiral Turner: I did.

14 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, as I understand it you felt that  
15 the possibility of an attack on Hawaii was a 50/50 proposition.

16 Admiral Turner: Approximately.

17 Mr. Murphy: And you also felt that that would be one  
18 of the starting points of the war?

19 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Murphy: Were you in close contact with Admiral Hart  
21 in the month of October 1941?

22 Admiral Turner: Admiral Hart?

23 Mr. Murphy: Admiral Stark. I beg your pardon.

24 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: Now, I direct your attention to the file of

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 letters between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel and par-  
2 ticularly to a letter dated October the 17th, 1941.

3 Will you make that available, please? The letter I am  
4 referring to is dated October the 17th, 1941 and at the top  
5 of the page it says, "Received 23 October."

6 Admiral Turner: I have it.

7 Mr. Murphy: Do you have that letter?

8 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Murphy: I direct your attention, Admiral, to the  
10 second paragraph, a letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral  
11 Kimmel. (Reading)

12 "Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to  
13 sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the  
14 'possibility.' In fact, I tempered the message handed  
15 to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not.  
16 In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House it  
17 was felt we should be on guard, at least until something  
18 indicates the trend."

19 Would you say that that was Admiral Stark reflecting a  
20 50/50 possibility of an attack on Hawaii and that war was  
21 certain on that date?

22 Admiral Turner: No, sir. I was very much astonished when  
23 I first saw that because I had not and did not later detect  
24 any opinion like that. Of course, with regards to the 50/50  
25



Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 possibility we referred to a time that was about seven weeks  
3 later.

4 Mr. Murphy: Except that you said that --

5 Admiral Turner: And I do not believe that Admiral Stark  
6 held that opinion around the latter part of November.

7 Mr. Murphy: Well, you said yesterday before us that you  
8 felt that war was certain in July.

9 Admiral Turner: Yes.

10 Mr. Murphy: And when do you think the 50/50 possibility  
11 arose? Was that before when war was certain?

12 Admiral Turner: War was certain, - I believed war was  
13 certain but in the event of war probably -- well, right  
14 about the time of Pearl Harbor I felt that there was at least  
15 a 50/50 chance that they would raid Hawaii.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now, what was there that occurred between  
17 July 26, 1941 and December 7, 1941 to change the situation so  
18 that it became a 50/50 proposition?

19 Admiral Turner: I am afraid I did not make myself  
20 clear. I was satisfied in July that we would be at war with  
21 Japan certainly within the next few months. I believed dur-  
22 ing the first part of December that the probability of a raid  
23 on Hawaii was 50/50. There was no change, Mr. Congressman.  
24 I do not know that I evaluated it in July as regards a raid.  
25 I was certain there was going to be war.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: I understood you to say that something hap-  
3 pened right before December 7th that made you come to the  
4 conclusion that a raid on Hawaii was a 50/50 possibility or  
5 probability.

6 Admiral Turner: Nothing occurred to change any relative  
7 probability there at all. I said that I felt that there were  
8 two methods, two strategic methods that the Japanese Fleet  
9 could pursue. One was to go down and base their fleet in  
10 the Mandates with the hope that our fleet would go after them  
11 and they would be in a good position. The other was to make  
12 a raid on Hawaii. There were two major methods and without  
13 evaluating it too much, too greatly, I thought it was about a  
14 50/50 chance of the raid on Hawaii.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, as I understand it in July you  
16 felt that it was certain that we would be at war with Japan  
17 in a few months and yet in the month of August you made a  
18 report and a forecast that they would attack Siberia, didn't  
19 you?

20 Admiral Turner: That was a possibility there and was a  
21 new development and I believe that they had taken it in mind.  
22 You remember the attack by Germany on Russia was, I think, the  
23 24th of June and by August Russia was in a -- had suffered  
24 some severe defeats and there were movements up to Manchuria  
25 of Japanese troops which started, I think, along in the first

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 part of August and continued on into October.

3 Mr. Murphy: Do we have here, Admiral --

4 Admiral Turner: Sir?

5 Mr. Murphy: Do we have here available your forecast of  
6 the Japanese attack on Siberia in August? Do we have that  
7 available?

8 Admiral Turner: Yes, I have that. I think it is the  
9 dispatch of the 3rd of July, Mr. Congressman.

10 Mr. Murphy: Well, that would be a message from the Chief  
11 of Naval Operations to the various outlying theaters, but  
12 wasn't there some forecast made by you to Admiral Stark at  
13 that time, a written report or something, upon which this mes-  
14 sage was based?

15 Mr. Clark: Mr. Murphy, it is 12:30 and I presume during  
16 the luncheon our maybe you can get that straightened out.

17 The committee will stand in recess until 2 P.M.

18 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock P.M., a recess was  
19 taken until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)  
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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

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## TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER

(resumed)

The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

Mr. Murphy will resume his examination.

Mr. Murphy: What was the status of the record at the time of adjournment, Mr. Reporter, please?

(Record read by the reporter as follows:

"Mr. Murphy: Do we have here available your forecast of the Japanese attack on Siberia in August? Do we have that available?

"Admiral Turner: Yes, I have it. I think it is the dispatch of July 3rd, Mr. Congressman.

"Mr. Murphy: Well, that would be a message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the various outlying theaters, but wasn't there some forecast made by you to Admiral Stark at that time, a written report or something, upon which this message was based?")

Mr. Murphy: Do you understand the question now before you, Admiral?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. I ask for a moment.

So far as I recall there was no memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations covering the subject matter of the dispatch of July 3, 1941 addressed for action to the Commander-

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of  
3 the Pacific Fleet and for information to a number of ad-  
4 dressees. I beg your pardon, I have the incorrect reference.  
5 The dispatch I referred to is No. 031939.

6 Mr. Murphy; It is the dispatch of July 3, 1941, con-  
7 tained on page 41, exhibit 37.

8 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. So far as I recall there was  
9 no memorandum on that subject. It was discussed with vari-  
10 ous officers, including War Department officers and officers  
11 in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

12 Mr. Murphy: I understood your testimony to be that on  
13 July 26th war with Japan was certain and that the probability  
14 of an attack on Hawaii was 50/50. Did you have that in mind  
15 at the time of the sending of this dispatch of July 3, 1941?

16 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, ultimately, within the next  
17 several months. Also at that time, on July 3rd, owing to  
18 troop movements of Japanese troops and through magic inter-  
19 cepts which showed the Germans were urging the Japanese to join  
20 in against the Russians, it looked like the first move might  
21 have been against Russia instead of to the south, but I felt  
22 that that would be succeeded if successful by war by the  
23 Japanese against the United States; that in any war by the  
24 Japanese against the United States, where they initiated it,  
25 that there was a very good probability, on the order of 50/50,

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 that the first move would be accompanied by a raid against  
3 Hawaii. That was --

4 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, can you point out to the committee  
5 anywhere, at any time, any single word in writing where you  
6 said that, anywhere, at any time, to anyone, where you made  
7 such a statement in writing?

8 Admiral Turner: That is the 50/50?

9 Mr. Murphy: Yes. I am talking now about before De-  
10 cember 7th. Incidentally, I have never seen a Monday quarter-  
11 back of a football game. What we want is what happened be-  
12 fore December 7, 1941. Now, is there anywhere, to any per-  
13 son, at any time where you said anything like that in writing  
14 or anyone in the Navy Department, any paper that will show it  
15 by anyone in the Department?

16 Admiral Turner: No, not anything on the 50.50, but I  
17 invite your attention to the consideration of the Secretary  
18 of the Navy's letter of January 24th, to the Bellinger-Martin  
19 agreement, to the estimates that were made by the Commander-  
20 in-Chief in his war plan and in his estimate, to letters  
21 between the War and Navy Departments as to the strong possi-  
22 bilities that war would be initiated with a raid, an air raid  
23 on Hawaii.

24 Mr. Murphy: That was in the --

25 Admiral Turner: On the 50/50, I was asked my opinion

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 as to what I thought the chances were and I said I thought  
3 about 50/50. I never put that in writing.

4 Mr. Murphy: The letter of the Secretary of War and the  
5 letter of the Secretary of the Navy spoke about what would  
6 happen if there was an attack on Hawaii, but where do you find  
7 in either of those letters anything that would indicate that  
8 the war would start by an attack on Hawaii?

9 Admiral Turner: I invite your attention to the wording  
10 in the first paragraph of the letter of the Secretary of the  
11 Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24th. The last  
12 sentence says:

13 "If war eventuates with Japan it is believed easily  
14 possible that hostilities would be initiated by a sur-  
15 prise attack upon the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl  
16 Harbor."

17 That is, if a war under any circumstances occurred it  
18 would be initiated by such an attack. That is the same thought  
19 that is in the Martin-Bellinger agreement, it is the same  
20 thought that many, many officers of the Navy Department and  
21 the War Department have had for many years, that the war would  
22 probably start and be fought generally in the Asiatic lands  
23 but it would be accompanied by an air raid and an attack on  
24 Pearl Harbor.

25 Mr. Murphy: Now, will you point out anything in your

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 estimate of the situation of July 3, 1941 that would point  
3 anything like that out or indicate anything like that? That  
4 was a current estimate of the situation, wasn't it, July 3rd?

5 Admiral Turner: That is correct. As I have mentioned  
6 before, this was the major, - it was speaking of the major  
7 principles and inherent in any eventual war with Japan was  
8 the belief in the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

9 Mr. Murphy: Well, is there anything like that in your  
10 dispatch of July 3, 1941?

11 Admiral Turner: That is not mentioned there.

12 Mr. Murphy: Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to  
13 page 108 of the Narrative Statement of Evidence in the Pearl  
14 Harbor Investigation, volume 1. Do you have a copy that the  
15 Admiral can use?

16 Mr. Gesell: No, we do not have a copy.

17 Mr. Murphy: Does anyone have a copy of volume 1 that  
18 he might let the Admiral use?

19 Admiral Turner: I have never seen that.

20 Mr. Hannaford: Here it is.

21 Mr. Murphy: I am referring, Admiral, to page 108, in  
22 which is set forth Section 1333 of WPL 46 and I will read  
23 Section 1333:

24 "To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that  
25 Japan's initial action will be toward



Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2           "(a) Capture of Guam;

3           "(b) Establishment of control over the South China  
4 Sea, Philippine waters and the waters between Borneo and  
5 New Guinea by the establishment of advanced bases and  
6 by the destruction of United States and Allied air and  
7 naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture  
8 of Luzon;

9           "(c) Capture of Northern Borneo;

10          "(d) Denial to the United States of the use of the  
11 Marshall-Carolines-Mariannas area, by the use of fixed  
12 defenses and by the operation of air forces and light  
13 naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States  
14 Fleet;

15          "(e) Reinforcement of the mandate islands by troops,  
16 aircraft and light naval forces;

17          "(f) Possibly register like stronger attacks on  
18 Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions."

19          Now, I am wondering where in there there is anything that  
20 would indicate that there was a 50/50 possibility of com-  
21 mencing the war by a raid on Hawaii? That is the alternate  
22 plan.

23 Shef--

24 Shack

25 fls

2:15

25

Shack (1) pm  
AL-1  
follows  
Shefner

5317

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Admiral Turner: I said that my estimate was fifty-  
3 fifty, and that that estimate was shared by other officers.  
4 In "f", which you last read, possibly raids on other outlying  
5 United States possessions.

6 Mr. Murphy: Is there anything in Rainbow 5, Section 1333  
7 that agrees with your estimate of the situation?

8 Admiral Turner: That does.

9 Mr. Murphy: Where?

10 Admiral Turner: Possibly raids.

11 Mr. Murphy: "Raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway,  
12 and other outlying possessions." You mean the fifty-fifty  
13 proposition would be covered in general terms in Section F  
14 in what Japan would have to accomplish in her initial action,  
15 that the fifty-fifty proposition would be covered in Section  
16 F, in general terms?

17 Admiral Turner: This is a Navy Department publication.  
18 The WPL46 is a Navy Department publication. While War Plans  
19 prepared it, those estimates also reflected the opinion of  
20 the War Department, and that is the official publication.  
21 I have not said at any time that either the War Department  
22 or the Navy Department thought there would be a fifty-fifty  
23 chance of a raid on Hawaii, because I do not believe they did.

24 Mr. Murphy: Your message, Admiral, of November 27 to  
25 Admiral Kimmel tells him "Execute an appropriate defensive

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Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned  
3 in WPL46", and when you go to WPL46, to Section 1333, I do  
4 not see the name of Hawaii mentioned.

5 Admiral Turner: Those are not the tasks. The tasks  
6 were read yesterday, and the defensive task read yesterday  
7 was the task requiring the defense of the territory of the  
8 Associated Powers. This is part of the estimate which is in  
9 the front part of WPL46.

10 Mr. Murphy: It does say, however, Admiral, "to accomplish  
11 the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will  
12 be as outlined in these paragraphs", doesn't it?

13 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. Those are not the tasks.

14 Mr. Murphy: Well, the tasks are in section 3212, are  
15 they not? The tasks are on page 103, and I find on page 103  
16 of Volume 1 of the Narrative Statement of Evidence in the  
17 Pearl Harbor Investigations paragraphs A, B, G, H and I of  
18 the Rainbow Plan, or WPL 46, reading as follows:

19 "The U.S. Pacific Fleet is assigned the following tasks  
20 Pacific areas", and then there is outlined A which pertains  
21 to the Malay Barrier. Let me read it exactly. .

22 "Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the  
23 Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay  
24 Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the  
25 Marshalls and through raids on enemy sea communications and

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 positions.

3 "B. Prepare to capture and establish control over the  
4 Caroline and Marshall Island area and to establish an advanced  
5 fleet base in Truk.

6 "G. Protect the sea communications of the Associated  
7 Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling as required by  
8 circumstances and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

9 "H. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in  
10 the Pacific area and prevent the extension of any military  
11 power in the Western Hemisphere by supporting land and air  
12 forces and denying the enemy the use of such positions in  
13 that hemisphere."

14 And

15 "I. Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier  
16 Forces."

17 That would cover Hawaii in H and I, would it not?

18 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. There are tasks omitted,  
19 of course.

20 Mr. Murphy: Yes. They are in the record as you read  
21 them yesterday.

22 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: Do you see anything in Section 3212 that  
24 would make Hawaii a fifty-fifty proposition for a starting  
25 point in case of war?