

34. Did you and Gen. UGAKI discuss any other matters at that time pertaining to the overthrow of the Cabinet, besides OKAWA's plan.
35. Did Gen. UGAKI make a decision at that time as to the consistency or practicability of the plan.
36. What did Gen. UGAKI conclude as to the OKAWA plan to bomb the Diet.
37. Why was further attention paid to the plan if Gen. UGAKI considered the plan reckless (or disapproved OKAWA's plan).
38. Did you or Gen. UGAKI believe that the plan might be adaptable if it could be made consistent.
39. After your visit with Gen. UGAKI did you permit Col. NAGATA to continue work on the plan so as to give it consistency.
40. Why did you desire Col. NAGATA to give the OKAWA plan consistency if you did not consider the plan adaptable.
41. Is the purport of your testimony that if the OKAWA plan to bomb the Diet been consistent and adaptable you would have favored its execution.
42. In connection with the bombs which OKAWA received, you say that these were in possession of SHIMIZU, Gyonosuke.
43. Did you arrange to have OKAWA or SHIMIZU return them.
44. Did you ask OKAWA to return the bombs.
45. Was OKAWA a civilian.
46. What did you tell OKAWA to do regarding the return of the bombs.
47. Did you act in a private or military capacity when you requested OKAWA to return the bombs.
48. Was there any military authority on which the bombs could have been recaptured.
49. Why did you not use military authority to recapture the bombs.
50. Did you intervene with Marquis TOKUGAWA to secure the return of the bombs.
51. Why was intervention with Marquis TOKUGAWA necessary in order to recapture property belonging to the War Department.
52. As to KOISO's connection with the March and October incidents, the Prosecution refers the Tribunal to prosecution evidence in the record, pages 1402; 1406; 1417; 1418; 1441; 1445; 1553; 1558; 16051 1627; 1926; 15560; 15674.

II

The point I desire to make in the questioning regarding TATEKAWA's trip to Mukden, is that KOISO had a hand in the selection of TATEKAWA, and that this hand-picked representative, who was to prevent an outbreak, arranged matters so that his mission failed completely, thus permitting the Manchurian incident to occur.

53. In reference to the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, you say that you knew that a critical situation had developed and you were anxious to do something about it. Did you speak with Prince HIGASHIKUNI at the Palace on 8 August 1931 on the Manchurian-Mongolian areas and the preparedness of the Army in connection with discharging its duties in that region (Saionji Diary, Vol. 1, p. 22).
54. You knew, did you not, that the matter of disposing of Manchuria and Mongolia, and the question of how to rule them was undergoing studies prior to July 1931, by appropriate Japanese organs.
55. You knew, did you not, that complete occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia was also under study during the same period.
56. You knew, did you not, that in July 1931, MINE, Yukimatsu, the Commander of the Kempetai in Manchuria submitted to the War Ministry an estimate of his requirements in connection with the occupation of Manchuria-Mongolia of 5000 Military Police and 20,000 assistant Military Police.
57. Did SHIMANUKI, an officer in the Military Affairs Bureau, pass on the request of MINE and refer such request to the Personnel Section of the War Ministry for action.
58. You had knowledge, did you not, of these plans for the furnishing of large numbers of Kempetai in Manchuria and Mongolia in connection with the disposition of the problem of taking over control.
59. May the witness be shown Def Dec. 2295.
60. State whether the document in question was received by the Military Affairs Bureau while you were its chief, *and do you admit the truth of the contents of the document?*
61. I offer excerpt _____ of Def Dec. as a Prosecution exhibit. *(R 31506)*
62. Prosecution desires to read from ~~IPS Doc. 2295~~, Exh. _____ commencing with the heading "Study Concerning Organization of Military Power of Kempetai (Military Police) in Manchuria" and also par. 4 under the heading "Study Concerning rule of Occupied Territories in Manchuria and Mongolia".
63. Did you discuss the possibility of a Manchurian Incident with Gen. MINAI early in September 1931 (IPS Doc. 2965).
64. What suggestions did Gen. MINAMI make as to action to be taken.
65. Was Gen. MINAMI required to secure approval of the General Staff to issue an order to the Kwantung Army to desist from aggressive action or did he have power to act on his own initiative.

66. Did you mention the name of Gen. TATEKAWA to Gen. MINAMI in discussing this matter with him.
67. If so, what did you say concerning TATEKAWA.
68. Did Gen. MINAMI authorize you to discuss the matter with the General Staff Office.
69. Did you have such conference.
70. How long before September 18, 1931, did you confer at the General Staff Office in reference to a possible Manchurian Incident.
71. With whom did you discuss the matter at the General Staff.
72. Did you recommend Maj. Gen. TATEKAWA as the person to go to Mukden to prevent the outbreak of an incident; or did you mention him as a candidate for this assignment.
73. You knew at that time, did you not, that Gen. TATEKAWA had been accused of, or at least was under suspicion of, having planned the March 15th incident.
74. You knew, did you not, that TATEKAWA was responsible for releasing bombs to OKAWA in order to effectuate a plan to blow up the Diet in March 1931.
75. Why was TATEKAWA rather than some one else selected to go to Mukden.
76. How long before the Manchurian incident did TATEKAWA leave for Manchuria on his mission to prevent the outbreak of the incident.
77. Did you confer with him before he left, and if so, did you discuss his mission with him. If so, what was said.
78. From your long experience in military affairs, would you say that a mission such as Gen. TATEKAWA had, would require him to pass many days in headquarters discussing the same after his arrival in Port Arthur or in Mukden.
79. Were TATEKAWA's instructions such that he could have delivered them immediately on his arrival at Mukden.
80. Was there telegraph communication between Tokyo and Port Arthur at that time; and between Port Arthur and Mukden.
81. If TATEKAWA's instructions were to deliver the General Staff's order to prevent the outbreak of an incident, do you know why such instructions could not have been dispatched by telegram.

82. Why was it necessary to send a personal emissary to deliver instructions to the Kwantung Army to prevent an outbreak of an incident.
83. If the situation was considered so urgent as to call for a joint War Department and General Staff decision, why was an uncertain and slow method of communicating the decision adopted.
84. Did TATEKAWA fail to report to Tokyo for a considerable period of time after his departure, preceding the outbreak of the incident.
85. If you were so concerned about a possible outbreak of an incident in Manchuria, and the General Staff was also so concerned about the same matter, did you or they take any steps to find out why TATEKAWA failed to carry out his instructions diligently, and why he failed to report to Tokyo after his departure.
86. Is not the truth of the matter, that TATEKAWA failed to act expeditiously and failed to deliver the orders received by him upon his departure because you and he had a pre-arranged plan to permit the matter to be handled that way so that the Manchurian Incident would occur. (Saionji Diary, Vol. II, 1, p. 75)

III

Questioning of KOISO on his work as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army develops that KOISO, while advocating the independence of Manchukuo, in reality was implicated in the operation of a system of advisors and instructors to the Manchukuoan Army which vested control of the local and general governments in the Japanese; also that KOISO recommended control of the customs of Manchukuo, also the control of virtually all agencies of industry and commerce; and the passing of rescripts, ordinances and enactments; also that he was concerned in the aggressive warfare in Jehol and the North China provinces.

87. What were the functions of the Kwantung Army in relation to the government of Manchukuo.
88. Did such functions include the control of the local and central organs of government of Manchukuo.
89. Was it your aim as Chief of Staff to assure independence to the Manchukuoan Government.
90. Did the Kwantung Army exert itself to help Manchukuo achieve such independence.
91. Is it not true that the establishment of Manchukuo was brought about through guidance and active interference by the Kwantung Army.
92. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 3204, being a report dated 5 December 1931, from the Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, to the Vice Minister of War, pertaining to the temporary system being carried out until the establishment of the New Regime.
93. Did this document pass through your office while you were Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, *and do you admit the truth of the contents of this document* (R 3156)
94. IPS Doc. 3204 is offered in evidence.
95. Prosecution desires to read from IPS Doc. 3204, Exhibit _____ only that portion commencing with the heading "Explanation of the Temporary Expedient System", in the lower third of page 2 of the English translation.
96. Is it not perfectly clear from the document just read that the Kwantung Army was taking a very active part in the preliminary arrangements for establishing the new regime of Manchukuo.
97. And is it not a fact that MIYAKE, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army desired to keep secret the guiding of the independence movement by the Kwantung Army, so that Japan could secure such rights and interests it desired.
98. And did he not therefore desire a small autocratic organ for the giving of orders to the Chinese regimes which were to be used in setting up a new regime.
99. Was there a staff section in the Kwantung Army known as the Counselling Section.
100. What were its functions.
101. Who supervised its activities.

102. Did you devise the work to be performed by the Counselling Section.
103. Was Gen. TADA advisor to the Department of the Military Government of Manchukuo while you were Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
104. Was Gen. TADA the Chief of the Counselling Section.
105. Were you familiar with the policies pursued by Gen. TADA in guiding the Military Government of Manchukuo.
106. Did you know what Gen. TADA had accomplished by means of a system of advisors and instructors to the Manchukuoan Army, which had been established by the Kwantung Army.
107. You knew, did you not, that the Manchukuoan Army coordinated matters relating to its personnel, finance and munitions with the advisors and instructors of the Kwantung Army.
108. You knew, did you not, that Kwantung Army advisors and instructors were posted at each Manchukuoan detachment, government office and school and that this system put the Manchukuoan Army under the direct control of the Japanese.
109. You knew, did you not, that this system of advisors was extensively used in the conquest of Jehol.
110. Was not this system of advisors a subterfuge or pretense that the Kwantung Army was furnishing advisors to the Manchukuoans whereas such advisors and military instructors in reality were used to control the life pulse of the Manchukuoan Army.
111. Were not the advisors and instructors, ^{of} the Kwantung Army the practical rulers of both the local and central government of Manchukuo.
112. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 612.
113. Having examined Gen. TADA's report, which is an official document of the Japanese Government dated 1 August 1934, being a report by Gen. TADA, Shun, as advisor to the Department of the Military Government of Manchukuo, to the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, entitled "Direction of Manchurian Military Administration", will you say ~~that~~ Gen. TADA's report contained in IPS Doc. 612 is a fair resume of the work accomplished by the system of advisors and instructors in Manchukuo, and that the procedures outlined therein pertained during the time you served as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, *and do you admit the truth of the contents of said document*
114. Prosecution Doc. 612 is offered in evidence.
115. Read foregoing Exhibit in full.

116. Prior to the time you became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and while you were Vice Minister of War, do you recall receiving ¥20,000 from the War Minister in connection with the Manchurian Incident. (R. 15809)
117. State the precise reason for the payment of this money to you.
118. Do you admit receiving ¥18,500 (R. 15810) while you were Vice Minister of War, for your participation in the Manchurian incident.
119. State the things you did to justify the payment of this sum of money to you.
120. After you became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, did you receive, as Chief of Staff, ¥1,970,000 for secret expenditures. (R. 15811)
121. What was done with the money so received by you.
122. Was any accounting made of the expenditure of this money.
123. To whom in the Kwantung Army were funds, in ordinary military transactions, transmitted by the War Ministry.
124. In view of the ordinary procedure, was the transaction in question, the ¥1,970,000 payment to you, an extraordinary transaction.
125. What was the reason for handling this item out of the regular channels.
126. Do you recall receiving, during your incumbency as Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, an item of ¥3,000,000 from the War Ministry, for the Kwantung Army Service Fund.
127. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 989.
128. Does IPS Doc. 989 show the allotment to you of ¥3,000,000 by the War Ministry.
129. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 989 in evidence.
130. *with permission of the Tribunal, the Prosecution will*
Read Exhibit _____.
131. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, receive the funds mentioned in Exh. _____.
132. Who was the real beneficiary of this money, and how was the money used.
133. Were not these funds used in carrying out the conquest of Jehol.
134. Prior to becoming Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army were you Vice Minister of War of the Japanese War Ministry.

135. Which was the more important position, Vice Minister of War or Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
136. Did you become Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army at your own request.
137. Was not the real reason you were relieved as Vice War Minister and made Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army so that you could carry out the conquest of Jehol.
138. Did the Kwantung Army have plans for the conquest of Jehol.
139. Before the conquest of Jehol took place, did you not prepare a document entitled "Essentials of Propoganda in connection with the Occupation of Jehol" (Doc. 620-L).
140. And did you in that document recommend that emphasis should be laid on Jehol so as to aid military strategical and political measures.
141. Did you not plan matters so that the Kwantung Army would have political and military control of Jehol.
142. Were you the Executive of the Special Service Department as well as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
143. What were your duties as Executive of the Special Service Department.
144. Was Gen. DOIHARA connected with the Special Service Department during the time you were Chief of Staff.
145. Was the Special Service Department in charge of opium traffic in Manchukuo.
146. Do you agree with the statement made by Gen. MINAMI during his cross-examination (R. 19976) that one of the reasons for abolishing the Special Service Department may have been that it was running the opium traffic for its own benefit instead of for the Government of Manchukuo.
147. Can you explain what was meant by the expression "running the opium traffic for its own benefit" (referring to the Special Service Department).
148. Were you as Chief of Staff desirous of assuring the independence of Manchukuo.
149. Were Japanese-Manchurian economic relations an important item in connection with Manchukuoan independence.
150. Would the control of its commerce by Manchukuo be one of the evidences of Manchukuoan independence.

151. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, have the view that the international commerce of Manchukuo should be subjected to outside control.
152. Did you, while Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, recommend to Tokyo a customs policy for Manchukuo.
153. Did you recommend in respect to customs and tariffs that no other country except Japan should be permitted to participate unconditionally in Japanese-Manchukuoan conventional tariffs.
154. Did you recommend special tariff concessions for Japan pertaining to goods needed for defense by Japan.
155. What country did you have in mind as a possible aggressor against Japan on 12 December 1932, the date you made your recommendations on such customs and tariff policy.
156. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 1302.
157. Does IPS Doc. 1302 state your recommendations concerning Manchukuoan tariffs and customs.
158. Prosecution offers in evidence IPS Doc. 1302.
159. *With permission of the Tribunal, the Prosecution will*
Read Exhibit _____.
160. Was it your desire that Manchukuo be self-governing.
161. Did you recommend among other things to the Vice Army War Minister in connection with the proposed terms of the Manchukuoan constitution that power be divided between the Premier and the several department heads.
162. What was your motive in suggesting such a change.
163. What was the Vice Army War Minister's answer.
164. Was your recommendation to provide divided control carried out.
165. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 624.
166. Does IPS Doc 624 contain recommendations you made in reference to the Manchukuoan constitution.
167. Prosecution offers in evidence IPS Doc. 624.
168. Prosecution desires to read Exhibit _____.

169. How do you reconcile the assertion that the establishment of Manchukuo was spontaneous and with which the Kwantung Army had nothing to do, in view of the actions taken by the Kwantung Army and the War Ministry in dictating terms of the fundamental law of Manchukuo and the methods of administration under that law.
170. Was not your real interest in participating in these measures relating to Manchukuo the disintegration of that part of China in disregard of the Nine Power Pact.
171. As Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, were you not charged with all matters relating to international treaties and agreements. (Art. 11, Par. 8 of Def. Dec. 2562)

172. The points I was asking in this part of the cross-examination are:

1. That KURIKI was in favor of the Tripartite Pact.
2. That KURIKI favored military action in the South Pacific, in violation of Japan's agreement to respect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands Indies possessions.
3. That KURIKI favored extending Japan's domination all over the world.

IV

The points I am making in this part of the cross-examination are:

1. That KOISO was in favor of the Tripartite Pact.
2. That KOISO favored military action in the South Pacific, in violation of Japan's agreement to respect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands insular possessions.
3. That KOISO favored extending Japan's domination all over the world.

172. As Overseas Minister, were you familiar with the decisions of the China Affairs Board.
173. Were you familiar with a decision made at the meeting of the China Affairs Board on 7 April 1939 that Japan was to secure economic superiority in North China, and that Third Powers were to be permitted economic activity in Central China as long as such activity did not interfere with Japan's vital economic demands (IPS Doc. 2178-D).
174. Were you in accord with that decision.
175. Was not the decision of the China Affairs Board referred to, inconsistent with the Open Door policy in China.
176. And were you familiar with the decision of the China Affairs Board in 1939, that North China and Mengkiang (Mongolian Border) to supply Japan's national defense and economic demands.
177. And did you know that in order to secure a firm grasp on the labor and materials in North China and Mengkiang, it was decided by the China Affairs Board that substantial directions by Japan would be applied to aviation and railways in North China, to important marine transportation and water transportation on the Yangtze River, and communications in North China and the lower basin of the Yangtze River.
178. While you were a Cabinet member as Overseas Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, did you know that HIRANUMA as Prime Minister had determined to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact.
179. Did you know that during that same period HIRANUMA desired closer cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy.
180. Did you know that on 4 May 1939 HIRANUMA gave a statement that Japan was firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy.
181. Did you know that HIRANUMA praised Hitler's "lofty wisdom" his "iron will" and considered Hitler's work a "noble task" of reconstruction. (R. 6104-5)
182. As a member of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, did you subscribe to HIRANUMA's views as indicated in the foregoing questions.
183. Did you ever in your official capacity as a Cabinet member oppose such views.
184. Did you not complain to Baron HARADA, on or about 24 April 1939, that lack of unity in the Army was a hindrance to the successful conclusion of the Tripartite Pact (Saionji Diary, Vol. XIX, p. 2503).

185. Did you not visit the Navy Minister in early May 1939 in connection with a possible overthrow of the Cabinet due to Navy opposition to the rightists in their German-Italian attitude (Saionji Diary, Vol. XIX, p. 2508).
186. Do you recall that you and ITAGAKI took part in a radio interview on Domei Radio in May 1939, and that you spoke on the Tri-Lateral Anti Pact and took the view that the negotiations for the Pact would be successful if Germany and Italy understood Japan's point of view and power in the East, and that it was suitable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of Japan's policies (R. 15817).
187. What did you mean by the expression "execution of Japan's policies".
188. Did such policies include a southward movement.
189. Did you not also discuss with Baron HARADA, on or about 9 May 1940, the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance.
190. Did you not state to Baron HARADA that such an alliance was necessary in order to conclude the China war and that such an alliance would alleviate the feelings of the men at the front (Saionji, Vol. XIX, p. 2517-8).
191. While you were Overseas Minister in 1940, did you request Ott, the German Ambassador, to find out what Germany's attitude would be to military activity by Japan in Indo-China and parts of the Netherlands Indies (R. 11699).
192. And did you promise to pursue the idea of tying the United States down in the Pacific in return for German non-intervention in French Indo-China (R. 6175).
193. Did you know that the Foreign Office of Japan at the same time was announcing its view that the status quo of the Netherlands would be preserved (R. 11671-3; 11685-6).
194. Is it not true that the economic demands made on the Netherlands, if accepted by the Netherlands, would have disturbed the status quo in that region of the Pacific, and would have seriously interfered with the sovereignty of the Netherlands.
195. You knew, did you not, that under a declaration dated 14 February 1922, following the Four-Power Treaty of 13 December 1921, Japan agreed to respect the rights of the Netherlands in its insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean (R. 11635; 11674).
196. Did you as Minister of Overseas Affairs learn of the decision on 12 and 16 July 1940, of the Army, Navy and Foreign Office authorities, to have Japan dominate the southern areas (R. 11699).
197. If so, what did you understand domination of the southern regions to mean.

198. Did domination by Japan also include political domination or control.
199. Your personal views were that Japan had a destiny to advance in all directions; north, south, east and west, were they not (IPS Doc. 3030-N).
200. You also believed that Japan should have a two-fold policy embracing the south and the north as the ^{primary} objective, did you not (R. 15819).
201. Did you also have the view that the religious beliefs of Buddhists, Confucianists and Christians would have to conform to the spirit and culture of Japan (IPS Doc. 3030-N).
202. Did you not also urge the spread throughout the world of the spirit and culture represented by Imperial Japan (IPS Doc. 3030-N).
203. Were you not of the opinion that as the spirit, culture and economic interests of Japan extended to new territories, such territories would be administered by Japan.
204. How did you expect to convert to the Imperial Way those who were unwilling to be converted.
205. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 3030-N.
206. I show you IPS Doc. 3030-N and ask whether this document is a speech you made before the Budget Committee of the Diet on 17 February 1940.
207. Prosecution offers in evidence IPS Doc. 3030-N.
208. ^{with permission of the Tribunal} I will read Exhibit _____.

The questions directed to KOISO's activities as Prime Minister bring out his real intentions toward Indo-China and the Netherlands; also his fundamental conception of the Pacific war as a means of driving the United States and Britain from the Pacific.

209. When you accepted the office of Prime Minister in July 1944, had you come to a conclusion as to the reason why Japan was at war with the United States, Great Britain and other countries.
210. State what you believed was the reason Japan entered the war against the United States and Britain.
211. If he says that the war was for self-defense, asks: Was not the real intention of Japan in engaging in the war her desire to expel Anglo-American influence from China and the Asiatic Pacific regions, and to reconstruct a Greater East Asia.
212. Were you in accord with such views (R. 3704, Exh. 277).
213. Did you act as a member of the Committee for the establishment of Greater East Asia in April 1942 (R. 735, Exh. 114).
214. Was it ^{not} Japan's intention to close the door of the Asiatic countries to others except on her own terms.
215. In connection with the Dutch East Indies, did you in a speech before the 85th session of the Diet 7 September 1944, promise future independence to the Netherlands insular possessions (R. 11666).
216. Were you familiar with the announcement of the Chief of Staff of the Osamu Army Corp made in the same month you made the promise of Dutch independence, that "there shall be no great alterations in the operation and the business structure of the Military Government" (R. 12217).
217. If you knew of this, state whether such statement had your concurrence.
218. At the time the promise of independence to the Dutch East Indies was made, were ^{not} the agricultural enterprises, the sugar industries, the public utilities, the private railways, the gas and power companies and the newspaper plants under Japanese control. (R. 12216-17).
219. Was it your intention to return the enterprises mentioned to the Dutch owners.
220. Was not the real reason you failed to grant independence to the Netherlands East Indies during your Premiership, that had it been granted, Japan would have lost control and real power in that region.
221. As Prime Minister, did you know of the decision of the Supreme War Leadership Council, on 1 February 1945, to place all military and armed police forces of French Indo-China under the joint command of the Japanese Army, subject however to the orders of the Japanese Army in matters of organization, allotment and movement (R. 7165).

222. Specifically what matters would have remained for the joint Indo-China Japanese command to act upon; if exclusive authority over the military forces as to organization, allotment and movement was vested in the Japanese Army.
223. As Prime Minister, did you know of the decision of the Supreme War Leadership Council on 1 February 1945, to place all railways, shipping and communications in French Indo-China under the control of the Japanese Army.
224. Were you familiar with the 6-hour ultimatum given by the Japanese to the Governor-General of Indo-China to bring about the surrender of the agencies mentioned in my previous questions.
225. Was such action substantial evidence of what members of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere might expect, as proof of Japan's real intention in spreading the Imperial way and the spirit and culture of Japan to the four corners of the world.

29 September 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David N. Sutton
FROM : Col. Rowland W. Fixel ✓
SUBJECT : Documents not introduced in KOISO presentation by
Prosecution, but which may be used on cross-examination
or in rebuttal.

1. IPS Doc. 1402 is an article by TANAKA, Kiyoshi, in the March, 1946, publication: "The Civilization of the World," in which TANAKA explains that the Sakura Kai had a leading part in the reconstruction of Japan, by force if necessary, and that KOISO had a leading part in this activity. (This document has been typed and certified.)
2. IPS Doc. 1107 is an article entitled: "Outline of the October Incident," by IWABUCHI, Tatsuo, in the March number of "Chuo-Koron," in which the connection between the March, September 18 and October incidents is shown, and that the October incident was arranged by TATEKAWA, KOISO, WAGATA, Maj. TANAKA and Maj. IKEDA, the plotters of the March incident. He also said that on 4 August, HASHIMOTO told Maj. TANAKA that about the middle of September, a plot was expected to be laid by the Kwantung Army which would afford an opportunity of solving the Manchurian-Mongolian problem.
3. IPS Doc. 2965 is KOISO's "Materials for Future References," written by him in longhand while in Sugamo. It contains a chronological explanation of his actions while in military life and his justification therefor. I have used his statement (p. 8 of brief) to show its naivety. The document need not be certificated. It has been translated and can be used on cross-examination.
4. IPS Doc. 989 is Vol. 24 (3) Manchurian Daily Confidential Reports dated November 14, 1933, showing ¥3,000,000 allotted to KOISO, Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, by the War Ministry. (This document is typed and certificated.)
5. IPS Doc 1302 (Vol 13 (13)) "The Great Military Secret Diary of Manchuria" outlines recommendations to the Vice War Minister by KOISO, while Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, on 12 December 1932, for a customs policy for Manchukuo. In this proposal he urges that Japan and Manchukuo become one economic unit; that Manchukuo avoid as far as possible tariff negotiations with other countries; not permit other countries participate unconditionally in Japanese-Manchukuoan conventional tariffs; prevent the economical advancement of third countries especially China and the Soviet in Manchukuo by revision of the present tariff; and treat goods needed in Japan-Manchukuoan defense specially. (This document is typed and certificated.)

Memo For: Mr. David N. Sutton
From : Col. Rowland W. Fixel
Subject : Documents not introduced in KOISO
presentation by Prosecution, but
which may be used on cross-examina-
tion or in rebuttal.

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6. IPS Doc. 612 is a report by Gen. TADA, Shun, dated August 1, 1934, as head of the Counselling Section to the Manchukuoan Military Administration, entitled "Director of Manchurian Military Administration". It was made after KOISO was Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, but reported conditions existing during KOISO's incumbency. In this report, he shows how a powerful net of leaders secured control of Manchurian-Mongolian officials through the subterfuge of pretending that the Kwantung Army was only furnishing advisors whereas such advisors together with military instructors were in close coordination with Japanese officials and personnel posted at each Manchukuoan detachment, government office and school, and this gave the Japanese control of the "life pulse" of the Manchukuoan Army and put them under the Government's direct control. Such control extended to accounting, personnel affairs and munitions. The advisors in effect ruled the local officials because the officials not only received advice from the advisors but also had to look to them for promotions or continuance in their positions. The advisor system was extensively used in the conquest of Jehol. (This document has been typed and certificated.)

7. IPS Doc. 1867 relates to an interrogation of Ba Maw in which Ba Maw says he informed KOISO of the conditions on the Burma-Thailand Ry., where 30,000 died from maltreatment.

8. IPS Doc. 2607 is an article by KOISO published in November 1944, in "Dai Tao Shimbun Kai" in which he extols the Greater East Asia; refers to the war as a "war of justice"; the sole purpose of which is "liberating the entire sphere of Greater East Asia from the aggression and invasion of the United States and Britain and of constructing Asia for the Asiatics"; and advocates crushing "Anglo-American aggression". (This document is typed and certificated.)

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9. IPS Doc. 3030-N is a speech by KOISO while Overseas Minister, 17 February 1940 before the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives at the 75th Session of Imperial Diet. In this speech he explains that the national policy of Japan is to spread its "natural glory throughout the four corners of the world"; that Japan has a destiny to advance in all directions, north, south, east and west; that Japan is a "divine race", which has the quality to assimilate any culture. At the moment, he felt that Japan should proceed "bravely" toward economic development in the south "where resources are thought to be in abundance". Therefore, while Japan should follow an increased tendency toward the continent and the north, it should extend its "economic rights and interests towards the south with all our might".

Memo For: Mr. David N. Sutton
From : Col. Rowland W. Fixel
Subject : Documents not introduced in KOISO
presentation by Prosecution, but
which may be used on cross-examina-
tion or in rebuttal.

He then states that the Emperor is the nucleus of the nation, and if the spirit which he represents is "carried forth, it will spread throughout the world and some day might naturally become the main current of thought in all parts of the world". He says that Confucianism, Buddhism or Christianity are all inferior, and must be fostered in the Imperial Way, and the spirit and culture of Japan. (Typed and certificated.)

10. IPS Doc. 624, Item 7; telegram from C/S Kwantung Army KOISO to Vice War Minister, 24 January 1934, in connection with the Constitution of Manchukuo. In par III, he says that if the Premier is a stubborn man and will not cater to the opinion of the Army Commander, there will be danger of delay and standstill of all sorts of political affairs. However if the Chief of each Department is responsible for assistance in matters in his charge the Army Commander will be able to carry through his opinion by controlling one man or the other. Therefore he says it is appropriate to divide part of the responsibility for assistance among the Chiefs of Departments. (This document is typed, certificated and mimeographed.)

11. IPS Doc. 2194-X

The following telegrams passed between HAYASHI, Consul General at Mukden, and SHIDEHARA:

Telegram #562, dated 5 September 1931 from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA, consisting of three parts, namely 15-1; 15-4; and 15-5 relate to efforts made by the Japanese to secure testimony from a Chinese individual by the name of Wang, in the NAKAMURA matter. These messages indicate that HAYASHI recommended paying the witness 50,000 yuan for testifying.

Telegram 564, dated 9 September 1931 from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA states that decision has been made to suspend efforts to bribe Wang because he was of little value as a witness and because it required too much money to buy him, and it has been decided to bribe another Chinese named Huo. This decision was made after discussion with DOIHARA and Consul SHIMUZU.

Telegram 575, dated 9 September 1931 from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA states that the situation does not show the existence of any deliberate deceit on the part of the Chinese in the investigation of the NAKAMURA matter, "or prolongation in the political sense."

Telegram 576, dated 9 September 1931 from HAYASHI to Mukden in which he suggests that although the consent be given to the Army request that Capt. NAKAMURA's imprisonment be set for June 27th and his execution July 1st; this be not made public for sometime in view of the negotiations pending.

Memo For: Mr. David N. Sutton
From : Col. Rowland W. Fixel
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tion or in rebuttal

Telegram 577-1, dated 10 September 1931 from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA states that one Ho Fuyuan proposed one Kuo Chen-Yung as a witness. He, himself did not care to testify as "he entertained hopes for the future and did not wish to become a social outcast", but Kuo was "a bachelor with no relatives", and formerly "a mounted bandit". It was decided that Ho would go to Mongolia and bring Kuo back within a week.


Telegram 621, dated 19 September (no year mentioned) from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA, in which HAYASHI relates that on 14 September the Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Fushun Coal Co. reported to the Consulate that the Commander of the Fushun garrison requested the assembly of an extraordinary guard meeting to arrange the guarding of the coal company while he would attack Chinese airplanes at Niusiangtun, as one of the military actions to back up the NAKAMURA negotiations. However, the plan which was to have been carried out about 11:30 - 11:40 PM on 18 September, was postponed on 17 September due to "certain reasons of the negotiations". In the meantime the incident broke out on 18 September.

Telegram 635, dated 19 September from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA in which he said "although there is much room for doubt in the Army's report on the cause of the recent incident we are at present giving answers in accordance with the Army's explanation. However since the Army had previously been agitating for a positive policy, it is very doubtful whether we can expect full understanding."

Telegram 640, dated September 19, 1931, from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA is unimportant.

Telegram 664, dated 20 September 1931 from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA deals with damage done by the explosion at Mukden on 18 September. There was evidence of demolition on the down track of about 70 c.m. and the up track about 10 c.m. "It is said that the repair could have been made easily because only two sleepers were damaged and the total length of both damaged tracks was less than 1 metre."

(These telegrams have been processed and certificated.)


ROWLAND W. FIXEL
Colonel, JAGD

RESTRICTED

Reference to

Koiso, Kuniaki

in the "Brocade Banner"

Prepared by Colonel Fixel

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Reference to
Koiso, Kuniaki
in the "Brocade Banner"

1. The "Brocade Banner" (in Document Room) lists Koiso's connections with the following Japanese Societies.

- (a) He was Komon (Advisor) of Dai Nippon Koa.Domie in 1941-1942 and until May 1943.
- (b) He was Komon (Advisor) of Dai Nippon Yokusan Son-eudan from January 1942 to April 1943.
- (c) He was a member of the Preparatory Committee of Youkasu Seiji Kai, February 1942.
- (d) He was a member of Siusen Kohasha Senko Toku-betsu, February 1942.
- (e) He was a member of Yokusan Seiji Ryoki Kessen, May 1942.
- (f) He was a member of Tokubetsu IIN Kai.
- (g) He was a member of Sakura Kai (Cherry Blossom Society).

The foregoing appears on page 15.

2. The Sakurai Kai was formed about 1927, and was the secret organization which constituted the main force of the plot to seize Manchuria (p. 19)

3. The November 15, 1929 issue of Nihon Oyobi Nihon-jon was devoted entirely to the subject of the next war. One of the articles in that issue was "National Mobilization, Basis for the New National Defense" by Koiso.

4. "On 13 January 1931, according to Tanaka, Kiyoshi, War Minister Ugaki discussed with Sugiyama, General Yamawki Masao, Ninomiya Harushige, Koiso Kuniaki, Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, Hashimoto Kingoro and Nemeto Hiroshu, ways and means of seizing political power ----- Okawa Shumei collaborated with Hashimoto to mobilize a band of civilian confederates. The plan among other things included the following: A Major General who remains anonymous would enter the Diet with Lt. Gen. Koiso and Lt. Gen. Tatekawa and declare Gen. Ugaki Premier and demand the resignation of the Cabinet (p. 28-9).

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5. Officers of the Russian and Chinese Section of the General Staff together with members of the Sakura Kai and Kozakura Kai plotted to carry out an attempt on a larger scale than Ugaki's March and May attempts. Hashimoto told Tanaka "You must draw up plans for the army to seize political power before the beginning of September." (p. 33)

6. Okawa who wrote manuscripts on "The Kwantung Army Control and Operations Bureau"; "The Manchurian Incident and the Imperial Rescript"; "A Plan for the Construction of a New Japan"; "The Political Party Problem"; "The Manchurian and Mongolian Problem and a quick realization of the Showa Restoration"; and "Outline of the Showa Restoration and Measures for National Mobilization"--also had correspondence with Koiso (p. 38).

7. Koiso maintained that a war condition outside Japan was necessary for the accomplishment of internal reform. This was after the establishment of Manchukuo. (p. 66)

8. Koiso, Minami and Tatekawa were all considered Toseiha leaders and were called arch traitors and Ugaki also was out of favor. They were to be arrested in the February 1936 plot as violators of the Supreme Command, namely attempting to turn the Imperial Army into a private militia. See p. 75 (p. 75-79)

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE

OF

KOISO, Kuniaki

*Defendant
File*

Col. Rowland W. Fixel

ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE
OF
KOISO, KUNIAKI

Prepared by:

Col. Rowland W. Fixel

KOISO, KUNIAKI

1. The Indictment

Group One, Wars of Aggression

Koiso is charged under some but not all of the counts in Group One of the indictment. Specifically, he is charged with conspiring to conduct wars of aggression; dominate the world; violate International Law, treaties and agreements as to China; the U. S. A.; Great Britain; Australia; New Zealand; Canada; India; Philippines; Netherlands; France; Thailand; and the U. S. S. R. He also is charged in Group One with initiating a war of aggression against China, specifically against the Mongolian Peoples Republic, in 1931, in the area of the Khalhin-Gol River; and with waging wars of aggression against China between 1931 and 1945; against the Mongolian Republic and U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1936; and the Philippines; the U. S. A.; Britain; Netherlands and Thailand.

2. Motion to Dismiss Counts Under Group One

Apart from the technical grounds asserted, namely, that the crimes charged are not such as may be considered under 5A of the Charter of the Tribunal, the principal grounds of the motion to dismiss may be classified as follows: (a) that Koiso was a just, moderate and moral character, inactive in political groups or factions, and not intimately known by other accused or members of the Government, and that he did not participate

in the March and October incidents; (b) that his duties as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and as Vice Minister of War, were limited; as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he merely executed orders of his Commander-in-Chief, and that while in that position he believed that his duties were to subdue bandits, maintain and restore peace and order; and protect Japanese and Korean residents and property; that at the time of the Manchurian Incident he was not in any Government position of authority or responsibility; that the same applies as to the move for autonomy of the five North China provinces and the incident of the Marco Polo Bridge; that while Minister of Overseas Affairs in the Hiranuma Cabinet in 1939; in the Yonai Cabinet in 1940 and as Prime Minister from July 22, 1944 to April 7, 1945 he did not participate in or have responsibility for military actions as the Cabinet had no authority in such matters.

He claims he opposed Ribbentrop's approach to Japan; took no part in the conclusion of the Japanese-German alliance and in fact opposed the Tri-Partite Pact during his tenure of office as Minister of Overseas Affairs in 1940 while in the Yonai Cabinet. He claims he never attended any Imperial or Liaison conferences or cabinet meetings listed in App. B of the indictment. In general, he says that as Prime Minister he only followed the Imperial Rescript proclaiming that the war was in self-defense and he had no knowledge that the war was illegal. He merely endeavored to save the country, and what he said in the Imperial Diet was what would be expected of any war time Premier.

3. Indictment

Group Two, Murder

Koiso is named as having unlawfully caused or permitted unlawful attacks on Changsha on or about 18 June 1944; Henyang August 1944; Kweilin November 1944; and Mongolia and U. S. S. R. in the summer of 1939 in violation of treaties mentioned in count 2 and resulting in the death of large numbers of civilians and disarmed soldiers or members of armed forces; and he is also charged with participating as a leader, organizer, instigator and accomplice in a conspiracy or plan to procure or permit murder of prisoners of war, members of armed forces and civilians.

4. Indictment

Group Three, Crimes Against Humanity

Koiso is charged with breaches of laws and customs of War re. labor units for civilian internees and prisoners and that he disregarded his duty to such persons and failed to take adequate steps to secure observance and prevent breaches of laws of war, all between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945.

5. Motion to Dismiss All Counts in Group Two and Three

Koiso claims he had no responsibility or connection with the charges in Groups Two and Three as prisoners of war outside Japan are the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the field; that not even a Prime Minister has authority to intervene in those matters; that protests as to treatment of prisoners were transferred by the Foreign Office to Administration Offices of the War Department and that such matters were referred

to the respective field commanders, and none of this information was forwarded to the Prime Minister. He furthermore contended that he never was a Minister of War, Chief of the General Staff, or Commander-in-Chief of any front line army, and was not in the army since July 29, 1938.

6. Summation of Koiso's Defense

Briefly, Koiso takes the position that if any offenses were committed, he should be exonerated because he did not participate in the formulation of the plans for the violations; that he had no authority to carry out such violations; and that whatever he did was to carry out the orders of those in authority, in the belief that such orders were legal and emanated from higher authority.

- (a) The facts contradict the assertions of Koiso that he had no active part in the Manchurian and Chinese Incidents.

One has but to examine the record of important military and civil offices held by Koiso from August 1930 to April 1945, excepting the brief interval between 22 July 1940 and 29 May 1942, when he claims he engaged in agriculture in a private capacity, to become assured that Koiso was not the unimportant person he now seeks to portray himself to have been. In August 1930, he was already a Major General in the Army and prior to his assignment early in 1932 as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he was in the War Ministry as Vice War Minister and Chief Secretary of the Supreme War Council. During this time he was promoted to Lt. General, and from 29 February 1932 to 8 August 1932 served as Vice War Minister. While Vice War Minister, he was extremely

active in the handling of Manchurian military matters on the highest level.

(1) Participation in the March and October Incidents, 1931

Koiso was involved in Army politics and schemes of exploiting the Army as an aggressive instrument, as is demonstrated by the March incident of 1931. The March incident was a plan for the masses to express their disapproval of the Diet then in session by means of a mass demonstration and a bombing in the vicinity of the Diet. To do this, as many people as possible were expected to mobilize and to clash with the police. From that point on, it was anticipated that the affair would increase to such an extent that metropolitan Tokyo would be thrown into a turmoil and the Army would step in and declare Martial law (Okawa's testimony, R. p. 15,586, Pros. Ex. 2177A). Okawa, who was the civilian brains of the scheme, had been told by Colonel Shegeto, head of the Chinese Section, and Lt. Colonel Hashimoto of the Russian Affairs Section, of the General Staff, that the "upper class of the Army was burning with indignation at the Diet and that such a Diet should be crushed." He was requested to see General Ugaki, who was then War Minister, who stated that Japan could never develop "her fate" and "overseas development with such a Diet." (P. 18, Okawa's testimony, *ibid.*) At first, it was planned to agitate a mass demonstration and to have the Army take positive action when martial law was declared. (P. 20 Okawa's testimony *ibid.*) The same evening of the day Okawa had been to see Gen. Ugaki, Koiso, Minomiya and Sugiyawa saw

Ugaki and after that meeting Koiso took charge of everything and told Okawa that "since there would be the danger of being discovered if too many fussed about it," they should "pretend to have suspended it on the surface" and that Okawa "should represent the civilians" and Koiso would "represent the Army." (P. 20 Okawa's testimony, *ibid.*) It was Gen. Ugaki's intention to dissolve the Diet, set-up a new political power and form a Cabinet centering around the Army; have an influential army man as the leader of the Cabinet and adopt a bold policy. (P. 20 Okawa's testimony, *ibid.*)

Confirming Okawa's statement and amplifying it in some respects is an article by Tanaka in the March 1946 volume "The Civilization of the World" (Pros. Doc. 1402 not in evidence), in which Tanaka says that the Sakura-Kai (Cherry Society), which was organized in September 1930 by high ranking army officers, with the purpose of reconstructing Japan by force if necessary, had a leading part in the incident, through Hashimoto, Koiso, and others; and that had the incident taken place Koiso or Tatekawa, together with a certain unnamed Lt. Gen. were to enter the Assembly Hall and proclaim Ugaki Prime Minister and request Shidehara and others to resign.

The sum and substance of the participation of Koiso in the March Incident is that he represented the Army in the treasonous plot to overthrow the Cabinet by means of attempted murder. It is also crystal clear that Koiso represented Ugaki, the War Minister, and that the purpose of the overthrow of the Diet and Cabinet was to put the military in the saddle in the first


move for overseas expansion. Although the proposed plot was later suspended, it is indicative of the desire of Koiso for positive action by a strong Government by the Army in Manchuria. The motive for the March incident was the renovation of the Ministry in Japan so that the Army could have a free hand in Manchuria. (R. 15,578). This eventually was accomplished in September of the same year, when the Manchurian incident occurred, which in turn created the opportunity for the October 1931 incident, which was likewise a plot for the overthrow of the Diet and Cabinet. Iawbuchi, Tatsuo, in an article entitled "Outline of the October Incident", in the March 1946 number of "Chuo-Koron" directly implicates Koiso as well as other member of the Sakura Kai in the October incident. He said that

the March, September 18th and October incidents were connected. This conclusion is inescapable when it is considered that many of the same army officers appear to be tied into both the March and October incidents. (Pros. Doc. 1107, not yet in evidence). Koiso was involved in both the March and October incidents (R. p. 15,560-1, 15,677). The strength of Koiso is demonstrated not only by his retention in the service, after he sought the overthrow of the Cabinet and Diet by force, but by his subsequent promotions and assignments, in which he eventually gained for himself the position of Prime Minister.

Koiso's naive recital in his handwritten "Materials for Future References", of the part he played in the March and October incidents, (Pros. Doc. 2965 not yet introduced pp 3 - 8) would make it appear that he was an "Alice in Wonderland", instead of a Vice War Minister of the third most powerful nation in the world at that time.

In this recital, he admits that Okawa came to him to arrange an audience with Ugaki, the War Minister, to confirm a plan for the forcible overthrow of the Government. Koiso was told that Okawa wanted to talk over the matter "more concretely" with Ugaki (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 4) and that the plan contemplated "hurling bombs" at the Imperial Diet; seizing power "by military force"; creating a necessity for "martial law" and having Ugaki "organize the next Cabinet." (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 4)

Koiso claims that he thought the plan was "very reckless and childish" (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 5) but, nevertheless, he



Substitute the following for the last sentence on page 9 of
brief entitled - "Analysis of Defense of Koiso, Kuniaki."

Koiso "strongly advised" the Vice Chief of the General Staff
to "take back the bombs immediately". Various measures to
get them back were in vain until Koiso personally visited
Marquis Tokugawa and requested him to persuade Doctor Okawa
to return them. The Marquis consented to do this and it was
also reported that the Marquis "gave the Doctor the sum of
¥50,000 out of his pocket for the expense of dispersing the
gang" of ruffians from various parts of Tokyo assembled by Okawa
to participate in the affair. (Fros. Doc. 2965 p. 7)

admits he told Okawa to outline the plan in writing, after which Koiso says he showed it to Colonel Nagata, Tetsuzan, Chief of the Military Affairs Section, who, in turn wrote out a plan of his own which gave "some consistency" to Okawa's plan. (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 6)

Koiso was interested enough in Okawa's idea to overthrow the government by force that he went to Ugaki's official residence with a memorandum of the plan and this memorandum was considered by Ugaki for several days, before he concluded that it was an "absurd plan" (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 6)

However, high officials in the General Staff were interested because as Koiso was informed that there "were evidences" that through "the medium" of Tatekawa, Yoshitsugu, Chief of the Second Section of the Army General Staff office, a "gross indiscretion" had been committed in that the Army General Staff office had given Okawa some "imitation bombs", (shells for artillery firing practice). Koiso "strongly advised" the Vice Chief of the General Staff to "take back the bombs immediately", but various measures to get them back were "in vain", until Marquis Tokugawa, after a personal visit by Koiso, who "requested him to persuade Dr. Okawa to return them", which the "Marquis readily consented to do", and in addition it was reported the Marquis "gave the Doctor a sum of fifty thousand yen out of his pocket for the expense of dispersing the gang" of ruffians from various parts of Tokyo, assembled by Okawa to participate in the affair. (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 7)

If the facts related by Koiso in this extraordinary explanation are true, he brands himself as an inordinately incompetent, puerile, and childish person, because his actions as alleged would be more fitting in an 8th grade student, unfamiliar with the realities of life than those of a Vice Minister of War, in charge of many complicated agencies of a great world power.

If he was no part of the plot, why did he vacillate; why did he carry the plan to his Chief, Ugaki; why did Ugaki ponder on it three days; why did Colonel Nagata try to improve it; and finally why was not positive punitive action taken against those important War Department officials who passed the bombs over to Okawa?

His explanation of the October 1931 and May 15, 1932 incidents also lacks credulity, because, he, as a top ranking official in the War Department in the former case was satisfied to have the active participants merely "admonished", after a "prolonged argument", and in the latter affair in which Premier Inukai was murdered, he said the Army decided to pay "more attention to superintendence and discipline in the future." (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 8)

The real answer to the superficial explanation given by Koiso of these three, very serious outbreaks, is that Koiso was tied hand and foot by the persons involved, through his championship of expansionism, renovation of the government, and positive action by the Army. These policies were the keystones of the Sakura-Kai in which he has an active leadership for many years. (Pros. Doc. 1107, not yet in evidence).

(2) Participation in top military and government councils.

Another fact which nullifies Koiso's contention that he was but a subordinate figure in the plans of the War Ministry in 1931 was his participation in the conference called by General Minami on the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. Koiso was then (September 1931) Director of the Military Affairs Bureau and unless he had authority to participate in and act upon military matters he would not have been called to the breakfast conference of Minami, which was attended only by the War Minister, the Vice War Minister, Koiso and the War Minister's Private Secretary. (Def. Ex. 2435, R. p. 19,780) At that breakfast conference, the War Minister selected Koiso as the man to represent the Ministry of War as Liaison with the General Staff on the Manchurian Incident. It is inconceivable that a person of no consequence and without authority would be participating as he did in affairs considered at that time so important as to call for a meeting of the General Staff and subsequently a report to the Emperor. (Minami's affidavit, Def. Ex. 2435, R. p. 19,780).

His influence and strength in government circles is also shown by the mention of his views as to who the new Premier should be, following a Cabinet crisis in May, 1932. Kido records the transaction in his diary as of May 17, 1932 (R. p. 16,215) as follows:

"At noon today I met and had lunch with Prince Konoye, Marquis Inouya, and Lt. Col. Suzuki at Baron Haroda's residence.

We talked about matters concerning measures to cope with the present incident as well as the succeeding Cabinet. Lt. Colonel Suzuki said that if a new Cabinet were organized under the leadership of political parties, a second or third incident would occur.....It was suggested that a national coalition Cabinet might be a solution. Vice Minister Koiso seems to be in favor of a Hiranuma Cabinet."

It is apparent from the foregoing, that Koiso, far from being "unknown" by members of the Government, as was stated by his counsel in the motion to dismiss counts under Group One, was in reality a powerful figure in government circles; so powerful in fact that his opinion as to who should be Premier was openly discussed and considered by the top policy making members of the highest government circles.

The suggestion by Koiso that Hiranuma be the next Premier at that time, is interesting in that Hiranuma was President of the "Black Dragon Society", later called "Production Party", and officially known as Kokohon-Sha, of which Koiso was a director and in which Tojo was an advisor, and the avowed purposes of which were, "to foster the spirit of nationalism" and "to exalt the national spirit". (Pros. Ex. 164, R. p. 1636).

Thus did Koiso seek to gain for the Army group of aggressors as early as 1932, the key position in the government, where the tenets of the "Black Dragon" and "Sakura-Kai" could be put to practical use.

(3) Receipt of secret funds.

It appears that on July 4, 1932, Koiso, as Vice War Minister, approved for payment to himself, the sum of ¥20,000 from a secret fund in connection with the Manchurian Incident (Pros. Ex. 2210; R.p. 15,809). In the same exhibit, it clearly appears that other Army men were awarded sums of money out of this secret fund for their participation in the Manchurian Incident. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army received ¥85,000, the largest amount; Koiso the next largest; the Vice Chief of the General Staff ¥10,000; the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Garrison ¥5,000; the Chief of Staff of the Chosen Army ¥5,000; the M. P. Commandant ¥1,500; and the Chief of Staff of the Formosan Army ¥100. Koiso also received ¥18,500 from the same fund (R. p. 15,810; Pros. Ex. 2211), and the following year, when Koiso was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he received as Chief of Staff ¥1,970,000 from Manchurian Incident Funds, on account of Secret Expenditures. (Pros. Ex. 2213; R. P. 15,812). Again, on 25 January 1933, he received ¥3,000,000 as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, as money allotted to the Kwantung Army Secret Service Fund by the War Ministry (Pros. Doc. 989 not yet introduced, Vol. 24 (3) 11 February, 1933 of Manchurian Daily Confidential Reports).

It is to be noted that the first item of ¥20,000, when considered in connection with the other items, some trivial in amount, must have been a gift in token of some special services performed, whereas the item of ¥1,970,000 which Koiso received while Chief of Staff was specified to be for

requirements for his Army to the end of the current year. (Ex. 2213; R. P. 15,812).

The importance of Koiso in this transaction is apparent when it is considered that the ¥1,970,000 and the ¥3,000,000 were transmitted to him as Chief of Staff, and not forwarded to the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army or to the Finance Officer, as would ordinarily be done. No doubt the transaction earmarks Koiso as occupying a special position engaged in special secret work for the highest military authority in the War Department, apart from his regular military duties as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. It is, especially to be noted that this large sum was transmitted to him for requirements of his army in the one case and for a Secret Service fund in the other. Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire whether he was in command of any secret organization which in reality was an army, distinct from the Kwantung Army, which was commanded by General Muto, when Koiso was Chief of Staff.

(4) Participation in Expansion of Japanese control over Manchuria.

Koiso claims that he recommended non-expansion of the Manchurian incident and such action became a General Staff decision. However, it is quite apparent from subsequent events, that the military authorities, including Koiso, only gave lip service to the plan to control the incident, whereas by their real actions they sanctioned unlimited expansion of the initial outbreak to such an extent that in a very few months all of Manchuria was in Japanese hands. Okawa (Pros. Ex. 1908, r. p. 15,556) revealed that Koiso was one of the conspirators to renovate Japan by setting up a military dictatorship to carry a strong policy in Manchuria. How strong this policy had become less than two months after the Manchurian Incident is exemplified by a telegram dated November 7, 1931 from Consul General Ohashi to Shidehara (Pros. Ex. 700, R. p. 7,505) in which he said: "In order to execute the Government's North Manchuria policy, we must let the Army have its own way...attack Tsithar, destroy Chinese Army there and put up puppet on the post."

Again in a telegram dated November 30, 1931 from Morishima at Mukden to Shidehara, it was said (Pros. Ex. 700; R. p. 7,505): "The policy of the military in Manchuria is to establish a new regime in the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia and to establish an independent country which will be under our influences. The next step in our mind is to overthrow the Chinchow regime which is an obstacle in their way. The Japanese Government must establish its fundamental policies in connection with the Army's movement."

To now assert that the authorities in Tokyo, including Keise, favored non-expansion of the Manchurian Incident is to fly in the face of the actual facts. For instance, although the Chief of the General Staff notified the Commander of the Korean Army not to cross the Yalu River, a unanimous decision was made, only a short time after the Mukden Incident, to approve expenditures for the dispatch of the Korean Army to Manchuria (R. p. 1564). Keise was Director of the Military Affairs Bureau at that time under the Minister of War. The Military Affairs Bureau was concerned with political affairs and was not a part of the General Staff, which had control of operational matters (R. 1588). However, it is fatuous to assert that the Minister of War and the Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs had nothing to say about operational matters, when it affirmatively appears that in the Manchurian Incident the matter of extension or non-extension of the incident was settled by the General Staff after meeting with Keise, the Liaison Officer for the War Ministry, as above set forth. Joint action would be especially necessary in the case of any military operations in foreign territory. Not only the Minister of War but the Prime Minister also would have to be consulted in such matters as was done.

10

When Koiso was interrogated by Maj. Hummel on March 22, 1946, (Case file #62, serial #51), he stated that when Inukai became Prime Minister (in 1931), the policy in Manchuria had been decided, and such policy was to extend to the entire Manchuria, and that Koiso was assigned as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, in August 1932, to support three basic policies, namely: (1) the reorganization of peace in Manchuria; (2) development of its transportation and communication; (3) development of its industry, mining and agriculture. That the purposes stated by him were only half truths is shown by the following:

Okada testified: (R. p. 1825)

"After the occupation of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army was the real government there, although a so-called independent government was set up in Manchuria in the early part of 1932, whose independence was supposedly recognized by Japan in September of that year. This government was completely dominated and controlled by the Kwantung Army."

It stands to reason that Koiso knew the real purposes of his assignment to Manchuria, and he knew that the purported reasons were only those for public consumption. Occupying the position as he did of Chief Secretary of the Supreme War Council from 21 August 1930 to 29 February 1932, on which date he became Vice War Minister (r. 1927), he was sitting with the top hierarchy of military chiefs in Japan, and was obliged to be familiar with all of their discussions and decisions, and to know what the real policies of the Manchurian occupation were. He must have known,

as it was common knowledge among the inner circles, that the army was becoming more unyielding than ever early in the summer of 1931 and wanted to occupy Manchuria (R. p. 3016). Harada reported this to Kido at a lunch at which Harada, Tagaki, Sakai and Okabe were present, and the War Minister was to take the matter up with the Emperor on July 14 or 15 (R. 1927). Koiso's assertion of ignorance of the real purpose of Japanese action in Manchuria, is evasive and unbelievable.

Koiso was also present and representing the Army along with Minami, Kanaya, Sugiyama, Ito, Minomiya, Tate-Kawa and Oki at a meeting ^{in June 1931} to which the War Ministry had invited officials of the South Manchuria Railway to discuss Manchurian-Mongolian problems (R. p. 15,753). At that meeting Minami stated that the Army had long recognized the necessity of increasing its divisions in Korea and he hoped that the day would come when more divisions would be sent (R. p. 15,752, Ex. 2202).

Considering this situation in connection with the March incident and the October incident, in both of which Koiso was involved (R. p. 2187, 15,560, 15,561, 15,677), it is ridiculous for Koiso to assert that he had no facilities or means of his own to inquire into affairs of State and was dependent upon announcements of the Japanese Government (R. 16,428). If ever a man had the means of knowing what was going on it was Koiso, as he was officially occupied in the very occurrences of which he now claims to know so little. He knew that the General Staff had aggression as its bible, and even publicly sanctioned his participation while its Chief Secretary, in a movement to further military aggression, as is

shown by his retention as Chief Secretary after the notorious March incident.

(5) Koiso, as Chief of Staff Kwantung Army, consolidated Japan's control of Manchuria.

When Koiso became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he forwarded an outline for guiding Manchoukuo to the Vice Minister of War (Pros. Ex. 230, R. P. 2903, et seq.). In brief, Manchoukuo was to be supported and developed as an independent state, adapting herself to Japan's national policy and realizing co-prosperity and harmony between the two countries. The administration was to be backed by the inner leadership of the Kwantung Army and carried out by the Japanese officials of this leader. However, (and here is the plan Japan established for her subsequent conquests), it must be provided, the Vice War Minister said, ^{in reply} that Manchoukuoan officials shall outwardly assume charge of the administration as much as possible while Japanese officials must satisfy themselves by controlling the substance. Then comes the most important part of the instructions. The Japanese should occupy the key positions. The important words ^{Koiso} he used were as follows:

"The policy of Manchukuo in the future shall nominally be a constitutional empire, but substantially it shall be autocratic - - - The Administration shall be backed for the time being by inner leadership of the Commander of the Japanese Kwantung Army and shall be carried out with officials of Japanese lineage as its leaders. However, it must be provided that the officials of Manchukuoan lineage shall outwardly assume charge of the administration as much as possible, while officials of Japanese lineage must satisfy

themselves by controlling its substance. . . . (R. p. 2904) . . . Armament shall be only limited to a degree deemed necessary the essence of a centralized command shall be realized. . . . Diplomatically she shall adopt an anti-Chinese principle according to the circumstance . . . (R. p. 2907) . . . For the time being, she shall advocate the Open Door Policy 2907 . . . For some time political parties and political bodies shall not be permitted to exist and we do not welcome the rise of political ideas among the people, but rather that we lead the general situation skillfully according to the principle of "Let the people follow blindly". . . (R. p. 2909) . . . Japanese should occupy the key positions in the administration (R. p. 2909) . . . We must lead the trend in political affairs through control of the office of State Councillor by the Japanese officials (R. p. 2910) . . . We shall utilize the inspection system To keep watch occasionally over local tendencies (R. p. 2910) . . . we must never hesitate to wield military power in case of necessity (R. p. 2910) . . . When an organ of administration by civilians is to be established by Imperial Ordinance, with aims of accomplishing the national policy of the Japanese Empire towards Manchukuo, it shall be provided that the Commander of the Kwantung Army shall hold concurrently the position of the Chief of the Organ." (R. p. 2905)

To further show Koiso's hand in planning the tightest sort of control over Manchukuo's affairs, it appears that on 24 January 1934,

when the Constitution of Manchukuo was under consideration, he telegraphed the Vice War Minister of Japan in a top secret communication, that the Premier of Manchukuo should have only an advisory capacity and that the various ministers should act in their respective duties, because in this way the Commander of the Army (Kwantung) can enforce his will through influencing the ministers or the Premier, whereas if the Premier had sole authority, the Japanese may run into a "sturdy, uncompromising character". *(Pres Doc 674 item 7, not yet introduced)*

So, while Koiso was purportedly sent to Manchuria to reorganize the peace of Manchuria and develop its transportation, communication, mining, agriculture and other industries, his mission in reality was to develop these industries and agencies for the use, the benefit, and under the control of the Japanese, and also to retain political control under the guise of co-operation and co-prosperity.

This is substantiated by the minutes of a Cabinet Conference in Japan (Pros. Ex. 223, R. p. 282⁻⁷) which show the real interest of Japan in the reorganization and development of Manchuria. The minutes of that meeting of 11 April 1932 follow:

"We should not make it appear that important government posts of the new State are exclusively filled by Japanese.... the new State shall employ authoritative advisers from our country and make them the highest advisers in connection with financial, economic and general political problems . . . The new State shall appoint competent Japanese Nationals to the leading posts in the Privy Council, the Central Bank, and other organs of the new

State . . . As regards the railroads and . . .
of transportation of the new State, we shall hold real power
of management thereof in view of the National defense and
economic requirements of the empire and the new State."
(R. 2826) (Underscoring ours.)

Koiso was an important figure in the consummation of the
Army's scheme to extend the sphere of Japan by "Positive action".
One phase of Koiso's plans for the exertion of control by Japan
over Manchuria, to the exclusion of other countries, is set forth
in a document sent by him to Tokyo for implementation (Pros.
Doc. 1302 not in evidence, being Vol. 13, (13) 1936: "The Great
Military Secret Diary of Manchuria") in which he made the follow-
ing among other recommendations:

1. "It is the final aim to decide the custom policy to
comply with the purport to make the two countries of Japan
and Manchukuo so as to be one economic unit, but it is to
adopt the following line of policy for the present."
2. "The general principle of Manchukuo custom duties to
follow the statutory tariff, but the tariff for the special
articles is to be fixed by negotiation between Manchukuo
and our country and the tariff negotiations with countries
other than our country should be avoided as can be possible."

"Further as to our conventional tariff, it is not to
let other foreign countries participate in its interest
unconditionally so far as Manchukuo is concerned."

"In the revision of the present tariff, legal consideration should be directed to prevent the economical advancement of third countries in Manchuria, especially China and Soviet who are making economical relations between Japan and Manchukuo disadvantageous."

"The custom duties of special goods that are necessary for the enforcement of Japan-Manchukuo's national defense in common should be treated specially." (Underscoring ours).
The position he takes in his hand-written "Materials for Future References" (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 13) that the Japanese Government as well as the Army "took an absolutely hands-off policy, leaving the affairs to the natural development of themselves and to the support given through the good wishes of the Kwantung Army" and the position he takes in his motion to dismiss the counts under Group One of the Indictment are untenable. He was doing more than subduing bandits, maintaining peace and order, and protecting Japanese and Korean residents and property. He actually was vitalizing the policy which had been decided upon, namely, the extension of Japan's control over the entire Manchuria. (Case file #62, Serial #51) Had his efforts been merely directed to "restoration of public order within Manchuria" and to "sweep aside the turbulent elements in order to restore the public peace" (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 14) as he now claims, there would have been no necessity for Japan to seize control of the substance of Manchuria (R. p. 2903) and to seize the real power of both local and central govern-

ments through domination of the Manchukuoan Army. (Pros. Doc. 612 p. 40, Excerpt p. 7)

On the 29th of April 1934, Koiso was decorated by the Emperor for his services in the Manchurian Incident. Palpably, such decoration could not have been awarded for the only service he claims to have rendered, namely to vote to limit the expansion of the incident. It must have been awarded for the ground work and underground work he did prior to the incident, to bring the incident about. Any other conclusion would rebel against reason itself, because in 1934 awards were not given to those who opposed intervention, extension, and conquest of Manchuria.

(6) Koiso's Participation in conquest of North China Provinces.

The real extent of Koiso's contribution to the full conquest not only of Manchuria, but of Jehol and North China, came after his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, from August 1932 to May 1934. It was in this period that Jehol fell; the battle of Shanahaikwan was begun and key points along the Great Wall fell into Japanese hands. (R. 2269) It was also while he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army that Japan attempted to bring Hopei and Chahar and other parts of North China under its domination. Tanaka testified that there were persistent conspiracies to oust the political power of the Chinese National Government and Japanese militarists and diplomats openly declared that the political structure of

North China did not satisfy their wishes, and local authorities were instigated to proclaim autonomy. (R. p. 2701)

The Kwantung Army retained control of Jehol by establishing a powerful net of leaders who secured a firm hold on Manchukuoan troops, numbering 40,000 Manchurian-Mongolian men (Pros. Doc. 612, Excerpt p. 3). A net of leaders was established through the subterfuge of pretending that the Kwantung Army was only furnishing "advisors", whereas such "advisors" together with "military instructors" were in close coordination with Japanese officers and personnel, posted at each Manchukuo detachment, government office and school. (Pros. Doc. 612, p. 2)

In describing the success of this plan Tada, Shun, the head of the Counselling Section, Manchukuoan Military Administration, in a communication entitled "Direction of Manchurian Military Administration" summarized the action taken as follows:

"as the first provisional measure, it was necessary to strive for "Grasping control of them by force" as well as "putting the soldiers' minds at rest", so we dispatched advisors and military instructors (all of them were renamed advisors afterwards) who were very few in number at that time, to various key points in the whole of Manchukuo to make them assume the responsibilities of gripping the Manchukuoan Army with the influence of the Imperial Army for a background, at the same time perceiving that we must include in our grasp, 'money', 'people' and 'munitions'

to control the life pulse of the Manchukuoan Army and put them under the Government's direct control, we exercised, first of all, general control over the fundamental principles regarding accounting, personnel affairs and munitions, and after that we strove for the gradual centralization of matters relating to the above" (Pros. Doc. 612, excerpt pp 1 and 2, The Guidance of the Military Government of Manchukuo).

In the same report, General Tada showed that the Japanese Advisors came to exercise real power in the Manchukuoan Army and became the "practical rulers of both local and central governments", (Pros. Doc. 612 p. 40 excerpt p. 7) He said:

"The Manchukuoan leaders who are picked out by the Advisors to take posts in the Department of the Military Government established by the Advisors were naturally under the Advisors' perfect control; and besides, as they had never been in service in this kind of government office, they could not do anything without the Advisors' guidance. Such being the situation, the Department of the Military Government naturally held perfect control of the Advisors.

"In provinces, Chiefs of the Military Intelligence Bureaus being generally appointed as Advisors, past circumstances naturally caused

them to come in power.

"At the front line, they (the Manchukuoan leaders) realized that they could obtain facilities in connection with the Imperial Army through the Advisors, and the Advisors' footing was raised as they (the Manchukuoan leaders) thought it wise to rely upon them in matters concerning negotiations with the Department of the Military Government; they began to revere and rely upon the Advisors after they had known the Advisors' ability in matters concerning subjugation; and they also realized that a word from an Advisor to the Central Government Authorities would concern their position and merit, and this, naturally induced them to be ruled by the Advisors".

(Pros. Doc. 612 excerpt p. 7)

This plan to control the substance of the government in Jehol and other North China provinces through the Manchukuoan Army as a blind, is exactly what was done by the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.

While this plan of controlling the substance, was effectuated, Koiso was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, the Agency used to accomplish the ensuing aggressive acts in Jehol, and in other North China provinces. As Chief of Staff, Koiso is charged with knowledge of these schemes, and without his

active approval and participation, the action could not have been taken.

His statement in Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 3 (not yet introduced) entitled "Materials for Future References", that he exerted himself to "realize the establishment of an independent state in Manchuria and that the sweep into Jehol "can never be taken as done with aggressive intention on our part" and that the Japanese operations in Jehol were "nothing but military actions with the object of restoring peaceful order in Manchukuo" (Pros. Doc. 2965, p. 10) comes into violent collision with the affirmative actions taken by the Kwantung Army to become the "practical rulers of both local and central governments" in the Chinese Conquests (Pros. Doc. 612, p. 40 excerpt p. 7). And since the Kwantung Army was an agency of Japan, in which the Commanding General was responsible to the Emperor, the Premier and the War and Foreign Ministries, the hand of the Kwantung Army was the hand of Japan and the control exercised by the "advisors" of the Kwantung Army was control by Japan.

(7) Koiso's relation to Control of China and the South Pacific as Minister of Overseas Affairs 7 April 1939 - 30 August 1939 and 16 January 1940 - 22 July 1940.

The function of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, in which Koiso was appointed as Chief on 7 April 1939 (R. p. 733), was the administration of the territories of the Mandated Islands (i. e. the Carolines, Marshalls and Marianas), the Kwantung Leased Territory; the occupied areas in China and the South Pacific (R. p. 633).

How this administration was implemented to secure the practical rule over both local and central governments through a system of "advisors" was shown in par. (a)(6) above. The same policy was carried out in connection with China as appears in Pros. Doc. 2178 (D), entitled "Decision at the Meeting of the China Affairs Board on April 7, 1939"

This decision, it should be noted was made the same day that Koiso became Minister of Overseas Affairs.

The principal objectives of the decision as to China, were the establishment of an advisor system "as soon as possible (Pros. Doc. 2178 (D) p. 3), the "bringing about of a pro-Japanese-Manchukuo atmosphere" (p. 3, supra); and the establishment of public peace and stabilization (p. 3, supra).

It was determined that Japan should have a dominant position in economic matters in North China although Third Powers economic activity would be admitted in Central China under certain conditions. The exact terms of this determination read as follows:

"Regarding the activities and right of Third Powers, economic superiority on our part (Japan) shall be secured in North China according to the new Sino-Japanese relation adjustment policy (attached Doc. No. 2 of the 'Principles') while in Central China the free third Powers' activity shall be admitted as long as it does not interfere with our vital economic demands," (P. 5 supra).

Germany and Italy were to be induced to promote the economic development of North China, and efforts would "be made to cleverly utilize the capital of Britain, U. S. A., and others "in Central China, under the principle of respecting interests of third Powers" (p. 6, supra) (underscoring ours).

These policies and actions were contrary to the Open Door policy which had been affirmed time and again, in the Four Power Treaty; the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, and in communications from the State Department of the United States and by Japan as a contracting party in the Nine Power Treaty in which she agreed not to seek or support any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China, or a monopoly or preference that would deprive any other power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China.

Thus, while Koiso (Pros. Doc. 2965 p. 10) says that "the Japanese operations in Jehol were nothing but military actions with the object of restoring peaceful order in Manchukuo, and that the penetration of the Japanese Army into the North China district was the counter attack taken by the Japanese against the challenge on the part of the Chinese troops" and that the Jehol incident was not an aggressive action, the eventual disposition of the occupied territory was in violation of the Open Door policy and Treaties pursuant thereto, and inured to or was intended to inure for the paramount benefit of Japan.

Thus, it may be said that, even if credence is given to all of the talk about non-aggression in the initial stages of the military phases of the action in North China, such idealistic ideology was abandoned in the subsequent aggressive control exercised by the military leaders of Japan, once its military conquest was an assured fact.

In its ultimate result, the military "pacification" and "defense" actions taken by the Army, were used to achieve the "national policy" toward China, namely economic and political domination. This policy was worded by the China Affairs Board as follows:

"The incident has now entered the phase of long-term construction". (Pros. Doc. 2178 D p 1).

Whether worded as "long term construction" or otherwise, the policy foisted on China was in violation of long standing Treaty rights of Third Powers, and brought to fruition a threat made by Ishii in 1923, at the time when the Lansing-Ishii agreement granting special interests in China to Japan was cancelled. At that time he said, that Japan's special interests in China were "realities deriving from nature and geography and not benefits conferred on Japan by the United States". He further said that "The Lansing-Ishii Agreement may have been cancelled but Japan's special interests in China continue to live in all their vigor....they are not something which can be abolished".

The circle of time, sixteen years later, appeared to give the Military aggressionists of Japan, an opportunity

to vitalize Ishii's statement, and Koiso as Minister of Overseas Affairs was the man who, with others, in high authority attempted to restore Japan's special interests in contravention of outstanding Treaties as aforesaid. Prosecution Document 2178 (D), the decision of the China Affairs Board is a typical evidence of lack of candor and good faith in connection with the occupation of China. It follows a definite pattern of the use of military forces allegedly in self-defense, and to establish peaceful conditions, whereas the real purpose of such action was to obtain control of subjugated governments and the seizure of economic power.

In this way Hitler falsely explained his invasion of one European country after another. Japan followed Hitler's example in justifying its activities in Manchuria, China, Indo-China, Netherlands, and other places where control was sought.

(b) Refutation of Koiso's claim that he had no part in the Tri-Partite Pact.

The record indicates that Koiso was the ideological leader in the sphere of racial discrimination and religious persecution. (Pros. Ex. 668). He urgently requested the Japanese Minister of Education to inculcate in Japanese children, hatred towards Russians, Americans, and English (Pros. Ex. 668, R. p. 7319). While Overseas Minister, he initiated the publication by Pu-Yi of a manifesto in 1940 requiring the entire population of Manchuria, regardless of religious convictions, to worship the Japanese

goddess Amatorase (Pros. Ex. 668, R. p. 7319). When he became Minister of Overseas, he supported the anti-Soviet activities of the "Russian Fascist Union" (Pros. Ex. 730. R. p. 7603). Konstantin Rodzaevsky in an affidavit (Pros. Ex. 730, R. p. 7603) explains this important activity of Koiso's as follows:

"I met Koiso twice during my visits to Tokyo. When I first met him in the Ministry of Colonies in March 1939, Koiso promised me his support of the Anti-Soviet activities of the "Russian Fascist Union". (P. 3 of affidavit) I met him for the second time in October 1939 when I came to Tokyo on an excursion organized by the Kharbin Military Mission. Koiso received me in his flat and in our conversation concerning the relations of Japan with the USSR said that Japan strove to drive Soviet Russia from the Pacific Ocean. (p. 4 of affidavit)....The "R. F. S." (Russian Fascist Union) was also supported by the Japanese organization "The Black Dragon" headed by Mitsuru Tooyama. In 1935, the Japanese Tonnita, Tooyama's representative, came to Kharbin and brought me a samurai sword as a present from the "Black Dragon" Society. He said that Tooyama . . . wished us success in the struggle against the USSR."

Koiso became a member of the Cabinet (April 7, 1939) shortly after Ambassador Otto reported to Berlin that the Japanese Cabinet is "supposed to have finally decided upon

an intensification of the Pact" (Anti-Comintern) (Pros. Ex. 500, R. p. 6093), and he was a Cabinet Member on 6 May 1939 when Ott reported to the Germany State Secretary that, "The War Vice Minister ^(Koiso) declared that the treaty bound Japan definitely to the Axis powers." (Pros. Ex. 504. See R. p. 15,816, 15,817). At the same time, the Japanese Prime Minister was extolling Hitler for his "lofty wisdom," his "iron will" and his efforts in the "noble task" of the reconstruction of his country.

In an interview on the Domei radio, in which Koiso, as Minister of Colonies, was presented, he declared that Japan was convinced of the "necessity of further strengthening of the Anti-Pact "in order to be able to face the international situation from Japan's own standpoint (Pros. Ex. 2214, R. p. 15, 815).

Thereafter, in line with the general pattern woven eventually by the Tri-Partite agreement, Koiso as a Cabinet officer, speaking before a Joint Conference of the Committee of Accounts of the House of Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet on March 17, 1940, agreed with Fukuda, who recommended a "two-fold policy" of having both South and North as the objective of Japan and especially stated that a movement to the south was desirable, because the Southern Pacific was a "Treasure House" where there was 200 times as much coal, gold, silver, iron, and petroleum as in all of China, and if Japan had these resources, she would have adequate means of carrying on a war. Koiso, in answer to this bland suggestion, said: "Please note,

nevertheless, that as regards the idea of having both North and South as our objective, I am in full accord with Mr. Fukuda's opinion." (Pros. Ex. 2215, R. p. 15,819). A north and south policy had but one meaning, namely, aggression against the USSR and aggression in the South Pacific. This policy was one of the keystones of the Tri-Partite agreement, for that agreement contemplated a division of the world between Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Other overt acts and statements by Koiso in implementation of the negotiations for the Tri-Partite Pact are as follows: (1) while Koiso was Minister of Overseas Affairs, the Foreign Office announced on 1 August, 1940 that Japan had determined to fulfill her idea and mission of establishing a Great Asian chain of common prosperity (Ex. 1297; R. p. 11,714); Koiso promised to pursue the idea of tying down the United States in the Pacific in return for non-German intervention in French Indo-China as he felt that an agreement with U. S. S. R.; realization of Japan's colonial wishes in French Indo-China, and the Netherlands East Indies would make Japan independent of America (Pros. Ex. 523, R. p. 6175. Telegram of Ott of 24 June 1940).

Thus, while there is no evidence that he was a negotiator of the Tri-Partite Pact, he was a behind-the-scenes manipulator and schemer for the eventual execution of such a Pact, which had as its secret objective, aggressive action by the participants to finally accomplish subjection of all nations

to the yoke of Germany, Italy and Japan. Koiso in his official position laid some of the groundwork which channeled official opinion to the ultimate conclusion of the Pact. He is in no position to say now that he opposed Ribbentrop's approach to Japan and took no part in the conclusion of the Pact. If he opposed Ribbentrop's "approach", his conduct and words refute such contention. His technical position that he took no part in the conclusion of the Pact may have some force, if by conclusion of the Pact he meant the actual consummation. A broad view of the words "in the conclusion of the Pact" would mean every step taken by all persons in authority, to bring about the Pact, as well as the final consummation thereof. In that sense, and in that view, Koiso did participate in the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact, by his words and acts, indicating that he not only favored such an agreement, but aggressively aided in its final consummation. (Case file 62, Serial 4).

(c) Refutation of Koiso's claim that as Overseas Minister he had no responsibility for military actions.

The record points to important measures by Koiso in overseas military policies and matters during his incumbency as Overseas Minister in the War Ministry. One of the outstanding matters definitely aggressive in character was the undeclared war against the U. S. S. R. and the Mongolian Peoples' Republic Nomonghan Area from May to September 1939.

A change in the Cabinet in July 1940 removed Koiso from office as Overseas Minister and he, apparently became a

gentlemen farmer until 29 May 1942, when he again returned to power in the important position of Governor-General of Korea. However, after he had retired as Overseas Minister, he was still in the limelight as he was considered for the position of Chief Delegate by the Liaison Conference held July 27, 1940, in connection with the execution of plans for aggression on the Netherlands East Indies, but was rejected on the ground that he had given an interview to the Press in which he stated in violent terms that the Netherlands regime had always been most oppressive toward the indigenous population of the Indies and therefore, it was concluded that he would not be acceptable as a delegate without at least a public retraction or denial of the statement (R. p. 11,796). In this connection, it must be concluded that he would not be acceptable as a delegate without at least a public retraction or denial of the statement (R. p. 11,796). In this connection, it must

be considered that the Overseas Ministry had already, with other interested Japanese high level agencies, determined to "strengthen the diplomatic policy toward the East Indies in order to obtain important materials (R. p. 11,795) and had advised the Netherlands that an economic delegation would be sent." (R. p. 11796). Following this preliminary maneuvering, the Dutch Indies were given an ultimatum to "cut off relations with Europe and should quickly take a position as a member of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." (R. p. 11811, draft of demands dated Aug. 1940). And on 25 October 1940 the cat was let out of the bag when Delegate Saito telegraphed Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister (R. p. 11835) as follows: "Have a great number of planes and plain clothes troops enter these areas thereby establishing it to become some sort of strategical base from the point of view of military operations against the Dutch." (R. p. 11836). Thus in sum and substance the plan was to establish strategical bases in the Netherlands, to infiltrate fifth columnists, and then take the country over. Koiso's hand is seen in this aggressive undertaking, and he would have participated in the one-sided negotiations about to be undertaken had he not already publicly committed himself in such a manner as to make himself unacceptable to the Dutch. He was a willing agent for the propagation, promulgation and completion of the aggression against the Netherlands, despite his retirement as a gentleman farmer for the time being.

(d) Koiso's tenure as Governor General of Korea was part of a plan to wage an aggressive war on the U. S. S. R.

Koiso acted as Governor General of Korea from 29 May 1942 to 22 July 1944. While this position was clearly a civilian position, it was involved in politics and in military matters as well (R. p. 1632). Korea had become a rear supply base for the Kwantung Army (R. p. 7591-2, Ex. 728), and the Kwantung Army on January 1, 1942 had reached a strength of one million; the number of tanks had doubled and the number of airplanes had tripled in comparison to those of 1937 (Ex. 706). Ott reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Germany on July 25, 1941 that a new Army group was being formed in Korea (R. p. 8073). It is noteworthy in this connection to record that Koiso, prior to becoming Governor General of Korea, had been Commander of the Korean Army from 2 December 1935 to 15 July 1938, so he was no novice in that territory. In fact, while he was Military Commander, the Japanese established a military base on Korea for an attack on the U.S.S.R., in violation of the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, which recognized Manchuria as an integral part of China (R. p. 20039-40), and the Peking Treaty of 1925. Korea became very important as the supply center for Manchuria for the aggressive movement against the U. S. S. R. The extent of such preparations is seen by the increase of airfields in Korea from 8 in 1931 to 53 in 1941 (R. p. 7589); the increase of pieces of ordnance from 300 in 1931 to 800 in 1941 and the increase of military dumps for divisions from 10 to 15 divisions in 1931 to 50 divisions in 1941. (Ex. 728, R. p. 7592). Thus, both in his military capacity as Commander of the Korean Army for almost three years (1935-1938) and as Military Governor of

Korea (1942-1944), Koiso was at top level in the aggressive actions of Japan whereby her military forces in Manchuria increased from an admitted scant 15,000 in 1931 to approximately 1,000,000 by January 1, 1942 (Ex. 706, R. p. 7531). The supply of these forces was the task of those in command at Korea (Ex. 728, R. p. 7,592), and the reason for the presence of such a vast military force in Manchuria was because the North (U.S.S.R.) as well as the South (the Indies and Java and other countries) were the objectives of the policy of Koiso and the top controlling forces in Japan (Ex. 2215, R. p. 15,830).

(e) Koiso cannot relieve himself of his duties in reference to prisoners of war.

During the period Koiso was Premier, from 22 July 1944 to 7 April 1945, he had responsibility in reference to the treatment of prisoners of war. It was his responsibility to supervise matters of that kind, to determine whether the procedures and policies of the Commander in Chief of the Armies, the Minister of War and the Prisoner of War Administration Division, and the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, were adequate and in conformity to international undertakings and in accordance with the common dictates of humanity. The impression sought to be created that the Commander in the field was vested with sole responsibility is not accurate. His powers are not unlimited, but on the contrary are subject to directions by higher authority. In the case of Japan, the Commander in Chief of the forces in the field was subject to directions by the Chief of Staff of the General Staff, and the Chief of Staff himself was not entirely independent of all controls. The Chief of

Staff would especially be amenable to the powers granted him and to a conscientious compliance with the law. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff being the top policy making individual for the Army, had to be guided by his subordinates' views on matters including those of the War Minister. The latter though, was obliged to know what was going on in connection with the treatment of prisoners of war and if he failed in this duty or neglected to advise the Chief of Staff as to the facts, the Chief of Staff would be within his rights to compel him to secure the information.

As to Koiso's knowledge of atrocities committed on War prisoners, internees and impressed laborers, while he was Premier, he is charged with actual notice.

Koiso assumed the office of Premier shortly after Wakamatsu, Tadakazu, had made a comprehensive report concerning an inspection he made of the Burma-Siam area in the fall of 1943, in which he observed that the condition of the prisoners-of-war working on the railroad, was poor, and the "death rate was very high." He "saw many cases of dysentery and beriberi amongst them". He also found that the feeding of the prisoners was not satisfactory as the quantity and quality was "below the required standard". He reported that "many deaths of prisoners-of-war resulted from the building of this road". When bridge wash-outs occurred and the truckroad could not be used, the prisoners had a "very difficult time as a result". In other words, the prisoners were made beasts of burden, having to

haul the heavy loads themselves instead of by trucks. (R. p. 14,634 - 6).

Tojo while Premier had knowledge of these atrocities, and of violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions (R. p. 14,563). He said that complaints first came to the Foreign Ministry and would then be routed to the War Office (R. p. 14,563). He knew of the mistreatment of prisoners of war during the building of the Burma-Thai Railway" (R. p. 14,566). Koiso, who became Premier, July 22, 1944, several months after Tojo already had this knowledge, must be held to have acquired such knowledge from his predecessor in office.

That Koiso, ^{also} had direct knowledge of the cruel and inhuman treatment accorded impression civilian labor, as well as others, is shown by Pros. Doc. 1867(not yet introduced by the Prosecution). This document relates to an interrogation of Ba Maw (former Burmese Premier) in which BaMaw alleges that he informed Koiso of conditions in Burma, and how, under Terauchi, Burmese labor was impressed for work on the Burma-Thailand Railway, and was so ill-fed and maltreated that some 30,000 of such workmen died.

He also knew that white prisoners of war were being degraded and mistreated in March 1942, while he was Governor of Korea. In fact, he gave his consent to have such white prisoners transported to Korea so that the Koreans would have a visual demonstration of the superiority of the oriental over the white race, by publicly degrading such prisoners(R. p. 14,514-15-16-17-22-24-25-26-28).

He knew or should have known that such procedure was contrary to the Prisoner of War Convention (R. p. 14,296-7).

Koiso's assertion that he had no authority to intervene in such matters as protests of that kind were transferred to the War Department, do not take into consideration that he, as Premier, the very top Cabinet Officer, had a duty to the Emperor to know what was going on in all departments of the Government and especially in the War Department in 1944-45, when the Nation was entirely occupied with a world war.

Under the Constitution of Japan ^{then in effect} the Prime Minister ^{was required to} gives direct advice to the Throne, co-ordinates the work of the ministries; and ^{could} may issue orders for the suspension of any administrative operation or of any order made by a Minister of State (R. p. 534).

The obligation of the Prime Minister in connection with treatment of war prisoners was recognized by Tojo (R. p. 14,290); and Tojo conceded that the Prisoners of War Information Bureau was under the supervision of the Prime Minister, as an outside Bureau of the Cabinet (R. p. 14,882). Thus, while there ^{may} appears to be a division of authority between the Prisoner of War Information Bureau and the Prisoner of War Administration Division, both agencies were under the Minister of War, who, in turn, was subject to having his work co-ordinated by the Premier.

Under these facts, the claim that matters relating to prisoners of war was for the Commander of the forces in the field is completely refuted, and the ultimate responsibility for policies, actions, in-actions, and violations of treaties in this respect became a matter

for the Premier. Japan recognized this in its dealings with the Swiss Government, where it agreed to strictly observe the Prisoner of War Convention and also in its agreements relating to civilian internees. (R. p. 12,856, 12,857, 12,859). Koiso must bear his share of responsibility for failing to know what was going on, or if he knew, for failing to take appropriate action to prevent atrocities and violations of the laws of humanity, which were committed ^{during his tenure as Premier} on such a wholesale scale, that it was notorious within Government circles in Japan and eventually caused a Japanese government investigation. (Pg 5675-15)

(f) Koiso as Prime Minister was not the rubber stamp he now claims to have been.

When Tojo and his Cabinet resigned on 18 July 1944, a Senior Statesmen's Conference was called to consider who should be Tojo's successor (R. p. 11378), and thereafter the Emperor decided to appoint Gen. Koiso (R. p. 11379), who was then serving as Governor-General of Korea. When Koiso arrived from Korea and organized the Cabinet, he received instructions from the Emperor "to observe the text of the Constitution" and "to handle the affairs so as not to irritate the Soviet in order that the East Asia War might be accomplished" (R. p. 11384). In this direction there is a subtle suggestion that Japan wanted to dispose of its antagonists one at a time, and a mandate that Japan's program for domination of East Asia, politically, culturally, and economically must be completed.

One of the first moves of the new Cabinet, under pressure from local Army authorities, was to revise Japanese policy regarding

Netherlands Indies. Koiso, in a speech before the 85th Session of the Diet on 7 September 1944, promised "future" independence to the Netherlands. But no further details were given as to when, or to what extent, such independence would be granted, but it became perfectly clear that this false promise was given to induce the Netherlands people to assist to the utmost in the Japanese effort, by stimulating their Nationalistic feelings. (R. p. 11666).

The real plan in connection with the Southern regions had been promulgated as early as October 4, 1940; the Straits Settlement was to be placed under the direct rule of Japan (R.p. 11725); after independence of the Netherlands East Indies, a "protective" treaty under the name of military alliance would be accomplished, under which she would be made to appoint Japanese economic and military advisors in powerful positions. (R. p. 11727); she would be compelled to lease to Japan important places from a military standpoint (R. p. 11727). And, finally, it was planned as follows: "After we have grasped real power in the Dutch East Indies, we must take proper measures to get hold of real power in other British Territories" (R. p. 11728). That this plan of aggression was effectuated is evidenced by subsequent communications and actions by the Japanese Government officials. For instance, on April 16, 1941, the Army and Navy Imperial Headquarters established a policy that it intended "to occupy bases in the southern part of French Indo-China, needed for a military advance into the Netherlands Indies." (R.p. 11753); and in a telegram from the Japanese Secretary of the Embassy at Bangkok to Tokyo on July 4, 1941, he said: "Failure of Japan's economic negotiations with the Netherlands Indies would oblige

her to take over the oil resources there by force, since her fleet would otherwise be incapable of action. Prior to this there is to be a Japanese military occupation of Indo-China in order to procure a concentration area and jumping off ports against Netherlands East Indies" (R.p. 11755).

Also while Koiso was Prime Minister, the Japanese Government, by reason of a "change in the war situation and the attitude of French Indo-China" Japan decided to take independent action to place all of the military and police forces of French Indo-China under the joint command of the Japanese Army, and also all railway, shipping, and communications. A six hour ultimatum was given and it was said that unless the Governor General accept the terms he ^{would} ~~will~~ be considered "lacking in sincerity as regards 'joint' defense and resort will be had to necessary measures." This is how Japan, through Koiso as Prime Minister, consummated the fraudulent entry it forced on French Indo-China through pressure brought by Germany on Vichy France, and carried out its determination to secure domination in East Asia. (Ex. 661, R.p. 7165).

Japan's real purpose in Indo-China was disclosed in Feb. 1945, when Koiso was Prime Minister, when the aggression of 1941 eventuated in divesting all semblance of French Indo-China sovereignty. (Pros. Ex. 661, R.p. 7165).

Instead of independence for the Netherlands East Indies and Java, they were advised in September 1944 by the Chief of Staff of the Osamu Army Corps that ~~in regard to the Proclamation of Independence,~~ "there shall be no great alterations in the operation and the business structure of the Military Government." (R.p. 12217).

It is significant that if independence had been granted to the Netherlands and Java, such in fact would have been a mockery and a hollow grant, because all agricultural enterprises of any account had been brought under control of the Japanese; the Western owned sugar industries had been allotted to large Japanese sugar companies; public utilities had been seized by the Military Administration and operated without compensation and in some cases allotted outright to Japanese companies; a large part of equipment of private railway companies had been shipped to the Burma-Siam Railway; private or semi-government gas and power companies had been taken over by the Military Government or by Japanese companies and Press monopolies had been divided among the large Japanese newspaper concerns. (R. p. 12216, 12217, et seq.). In this state of affairs, the Netherlands would have received in effect nothing by a hypothetical return of independence, as such independence would have been in name only, and not in fact, inasmuch as all of the valuable assets of the country had been syphoned off by the Japanese.

But under these facts Koiso did not even carry out his promise, and return the hollow shell to the people of the Netherlands. As late as July 17, 1945, after Koiso resigned as Prime Minister, the Supreme War Council of Japan announced that the Independence of the East Indies would be recognized "as soon as possible." (Ex. 1350, R.p. 12121-2).

Koiso's union of thought with other Japanese military aggressionists is exemplified by a speech he made as Premier, before the 85th Diet Session in 1944, in which he extolled the Greater East Asia

Co-Prosperity Sphere and in an inflammatory manner advocated the destruction of the United States and Great Britain (Pres. Ex. 277, R.p. 3113). He said:

"Their Anglo-Americans greedy ambition to control the world has been disclosed to the Sun. In the district of their occupation they already are quarreling on the share of their big game. On the contrary the countries in East Asia are, under the joint ideal of reconstructing East Asia, exerting their utmost to protect it and to fight it out with their total powers. The ideal of co-existence and co-prosperity in the joint declaration of the Greater East Asia could not be compared with their suming object of the aggressive war."

To further show how thoroughly he imitated his German preceptors in falsifying facts, one has but to read his article in the magazine "Dai Tao Shimbinkai", Vol I, p. 54, Greater East Press Federation, (Pres. Dec. 2607 not in evidence) where he said in reference to propaganda warfare:

"Needless to say, the current war is a war of justice for it is being waged for the sole aim of liberating the entire sphere of Greater East Asia from the aggression and invasion of the United States and Britain and of constructing Asia for the Asiatics. The ignominious history of the political and economic aggression and encroachment of Greater East Asia by the United States, Britain and Holland cannot be recalled without a sense of resentment and indignation, for these

imperialistic countries have hypnotized in the name of civilization the Asiatic peoples into believing that they are a constellation of subject nations; deprived them of the happiness and welfare which rightfully belong to them; trampled under their hobnailed boots the true position of the Asiatic peoples and prevented them from collaboration with each other. The war of Greater East Asia has, however, awakened every one of the Asiatic peoples to the truth that Asia is one and further led them to rise to their feet jointly to crush Anglo-American aggression as well as to build up a new order in Greater East Asia. . . . It is, therefore, the common duties of all the newspaper men of Greater East Asia to knit more closely together these bonds among all the nations of Greater East Asia".

Keiso is thus shown to be a Japanese government official who, for a time, directed and encouraged programs of the enslavement of otherwise peaceful people, the economic oppression and plunder of industries in occupied territories, and the continuation of a war for announced aggressive designs.

To have him now say that he merely acted under an Imperial Rescript, in the belief that everything done was legal, does not hold water, because he knew or was familiar with and participated in the general scheme underlying Japan's conquest of Asia and the South and also her illegal actions against the United States and Britain. The assertion by Keiso of his belief in the legality of everything that was done, also evidences lack of candor and in any event cannot be considered in view of the shocking crimes

that were committed in the name of "co-prosperity" and "peace".
that The resignation of Koiso as Prime Minister of Japan on
4 April 1945 again illustrates that he could not even tell the
truth when he finally stepped out of the Premiership. In his
own words (Pros. Ex. 1281, R.p. 11384), the ^{purported} reasons for Koiso's
resignation are found (R. p. 11387) as follows:

"Since we are convinced that at this moment when
the situation of the Empire is getting more and more urgent,
with changes on both political and war fronts east and west,
and when there should exist no discrimination between the
battlefront and the home front or between the Supreme Command
and the Civil Government, a fundamental change should be
made in the organization and character of the Cabinet so
that they may cope with the present situation and so that
the Cabinet, together with the whole Nation, with renewed
resolution may be powerful enough to go straight forward
for the accomplishment of the great task of assisting the
Throne. To this end, we have decided to ask permission
of the Emperor to tender our resignation and carry out a
resignation en bloc."

In a conversation with Kido on April 4, 1945, (Pros. Ex. 1281,
R. p. 11384) Koiso stated, off the record, the real reasons for
his resignation ^{These} ~~were stated~~ to be, that the present organization and
character of the Government was not good; that his opinion concern-
ing the direction of the war was not availed of; that Japan needed
an Imperial Hq. Cabinet or Cabinet which would direct the war;
also, in view of the situation in Okinawa, he had been thinking of

deciding on this action at about the end of the month (R. 11384-5).

In viewing the military and political career of Keiso, it conclusively appears that he was an integral part of the military and political machine, in the highest circles of Japan, which fostered, planned, aided and carried out the Army's plan to dominate the world. He is almost always in the picture in important positions in Japan; in Manchuria; in Korea, and finally in the top government position of all, Premier of Japan. His leaving the Premiership as he did, for reasons not expressed in the formal document of resignation, indicates his desire to wash his hands of an unsavory situation, brought about in part by himself. His participation in the aggressive acts of the inner Army circles, for years; his knowledge of the real purposes of the war; and his participation in the crimes against peace and humanity are in the record of his acts. He was not an unimportant person who only carried out the orders of higher authority, as he seeks now to make out, but he himself gave orders and made certain of the recommendations on which the structure of Japanese aggression was built and sought to be imposed on the world.



KOJID

Suggested + given

I part is it correct

eliminate pp 1-18 incl

20-34 put the fact to the

witness - what was decided tell him
 out if it is not correct

eliminate 36

38 make it into a question on elimination

56-58 eliminate 54

59-65 put them what happened

67-70 some have the evidence of what happened

What?

omit 73, 76

II March 1944 Incident

omit 1 as a fact of fact 3 eliminate 7

15 divide into 2 sections eliminate 18, 19

change 20 to when did he leave

eliminate 21 combine 22, 23

eliminate 24-27

" 36-37

III eliminate or combine 1-5

a part - put the facts there

eliminate last part of 21

34 tell him what it is. shorten 34 + after
 admission tell what is in the document

15-20 ~~omit~~ I will

The point I desire to make is that KOISO at the time of the March incident, by reason of his high ground, experience, and official position, knew he should have known that CHANA's plan to bomb the Diet in March 1931 was not a proper matter to be brought before him in his KOISO capacity and was likewise not a proper matter to be examined by any of KOISO's subordinates, or by the Minister of War, and KOISO's action in connection with CHANA's plan indicated a close connection between KOISO and the conspirators.

I

The point I desire to make is that KOISO at the time of the March incident, by reason of his background, experience, and official position, knew or should have known that OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet in March 1931 was not a proper matter to be brought before him in his official capacity and was likewise not a proper matter to be examined by any of KOISO's subordinates, or by the Minister of War, and KOISO's action in connection with OKAWA's plan indicates a close connection between KOISO and the conspirators.

1. Col. Fixel for the Prosecution desires to cross-examine the defendant KOISO.
2. Did you in the early part of January 1931, consult with Gen. UGAKI, Gen. SUGIYAMA, Gen. YAMAWAKI, Gen. NINOMYA, Col. HASHIMOTO and Lt. Col. NEMOTO, ways and means concerning measures for reforming Japan.
3. You knew, did you not, that Gen. UGAKI, in January 1931, had made a decision to launch into the political world and organize a Cabinet.
4. You knew, did you not, that a decision had been made by the supporters of Gen. UGAKI, including yourself, that military forces might be used in connection with the appearance of Gen. UGAKI.
5. You knew, did you not, that senior officers were to draw programs and policies for the future state and that lesser grade officers were to make plans to seize the reins of the government.
6. You knew, did you not, that the headquarters of the Seiyu and Minsei parties and the official residence of the Prime Minister were to be bombed and that Dr. OKAWA would mobilize 10,000 persons in a demonstration towards the Parliament, after which troops were to encircle the Parliament by making an emergency call on the pretext of protecting the Diet, after which you or Gen. TATEKAWA and another general were to enter the House and declare that the nation did not confide in the present Cabinet, but only confided in a Cabinet with Gen. UGAKI as its Premier (IPS Doc. 1402-A) (Vol. I Saionji P. 25-26).
7. Did OKAWA present a plan to you early in March 1931, contemplating the overthrow of the Cabinet by bombing the Diet.
8. Did you examine OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet.
9. Did you raise objections to OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet.
10. What did you consider objectionable in his plan.
11. Did you not tell OKAWA that the execution of an improper plan always requires a good many unnecessary victims.
12. Did you believe that OKAWA's plan lacked consistency.
13. Did you show OKAWA's plan to Col. NAGATA, Tetsuzn, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau.
14. Did you direct Col. NAGATA to examine OKAWA's plan for its consistency.
15. Did you consider OKAWA's plan adoptable.

16. If you did not approve the adoptability or the execution of OKAWA's plan, why did you desire to have the consistency of the plan determined by Col. NAGATA.
17. Was a plan to bomb the Diet a proper matter of business to be presented by you to the War Minister.
18. Was such a plan a proper matter to be considered for consistency or adoptability by subordinates in your Bureau.
19. Was OKAWA's plan to create an incident in March 1931 within the scope of work assigned to you as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.
20. Prior to receiving Col. NAGATA's opinion on OKAWA's plan, did you go to the residence of the War Minister to discuss the OKAWA plan with Gen. UGAKI.
21. Did you take along with you your original pencil notations outlining the plan.
22. Did you deliver these pencil notations to Gen. UGAKI.
23. Did you tell Gen. UGAKI that you had directed Col. NAGATA to examine the consistency of the OKAWA plan and that you had not yet received Col. NAGATA's answer.
24. Did you and Gen. UGAKI discuss any other matters at that time pertaining to the overthrow of the Cabinet, besides OKAWA's plan.
25. Did Gen. UGAKI make a decision at that time as to the consistency or practicability of the plan.
26. What did Gen. UGAKI conclude as to the OKAWA plan to bomb the Diet.
27. Why was further attention paid to the plan if Gen. UGAKI considered the plan reckless (or disapproved OKAWA's plan).
28. Did you or Gen. UGAKI feel that if the plan could be made consistent that it might be adaptable.
29. After your visit with Gen. UGAKI did Col. NAGATA continue work on the plan so as to give it consistency.
30. Why did you desire Col. NAGATA to give the OKAWA plan consistency if you considered the plan not adaptable.
31. Is the purport of your testimony that had the OKAWA plan to bomb the Diet been consistent and adaptable you would have favored its execution.
32. In connection with the bombs which OKAWA received, you say that these were in possession of SHIMIZU, Gyonosuke.

33. Did you arrange to have OKAWA or SHIMIZU return them.
34. Did you ask OKAWA to return the bombs.
35. Was OKAWA a civilian.
36. What did you tell OKAWA to do regarding the return of the bombs.
37. Did you act in a private or military capacity when you requested OKAWA to return the bombs.
38. Was there any military authority on which the bombs could have been recaptured.
39. Why did you not use military authority to recapture the bombs.
40. Did you finally intervene with Marquis TOKUGAWA to secure the return of the bombs.
41. Why was intervention with Marquis TOKUGAWA necessary in order to recapture property belonging to the War Department.
42. As to KOISO's connection with the March and October incidents, the Prosecution refers the Tribunal to prosecution evidence in the record, pages 1402; 1406; 1417; 1418; 1441; 1445; 1553; 1558; 1605; 1627; 1926; 15560; 15674.

II

The point I desire to make in the questioning regarding TATEKAWA's trip to Mukden, is that KOISO had a hand in the selection of TATEKAWA, and that this hand-picked representative, who was to prevent an outbreak, arranged matters so that his mission failed completely, thus permitting the Manchurian incident to occur.

43. In reference to the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, you say that you knew that a critical situation had developed and you were anxious to do something about it. Did you not go to the Palace on 8 August 1931 and speak with Prince HIGASHIKUNI at length on the Manchurian-Mongolian areas and the preparedness of the Army in connection with discharging its duties in that region (Saionji Diary Vol. I, p. 22).
44. Did you also discuss the possibility of a Manchurian Incident with Gen. MINAMI early in September (IPS Doc. 2965).
45. What suggestions did Gen. MINAMI make as to action to be taken.
46. Was Gen. MINAMI required to secure approval of the General Staff to issue an order to the Kwantung Army to desist from aggressive action, or could he have acted on his own initiative.
47. Did you mention the name of Gen. TATEKAWA to Gen. MINAMI, in discussing this matter with him.
48. If so, what did you say concerning TATEKAWA.
49. Did Gen. MINAMI delegate you to discuss the matter with the General Staff Office.
50. Did you have such conference.
51. How long before September 18, 1931, did you confer at the General Staff Office in reference to a possible Manchurian Incident.
52. With whom did you discuss the matter at the General Staff.
53. Did you recommend Maj. Gen. TATEKAWA as the person to go to Mukden to prevent the outbreak of an incident; or did you mention him as a candidate for this assignment.
54. You knew at that time, did you not, that Gen. TATEKAWA had been accused of, or at least was under suspicion of, having planned the March 15th incident.
55. You knew, did you not, that TATEKAWA was responsible for giving OKAWA the bombs in March in order to effectuate a plan to blow up the Diet.
56. Why in particular was TATEKAWA selected to go to Mukden.
57. How long before the Manchurian incident did TATEKAWA leave for Manchuria on his mission to prevent the outbreak of the incident.
58. Did you confer with him before he left, and if so, did you discuss his mission with him. If so, what was said.

59. From your long experience in military affairs, would you say that a mission such as Gen. TATEKAWA had, would require him to pass many days in headquarters discussing the same after his arrival in Port Arthur or in Mukden.
60. Were not TATEKAWA's instructions such that they could have been immediately conveyed by TATEKAWA on his arrival at Mukden.
61. Was there telegraph communication between Tokyo and Port Arthur at that time; and between Port Arthur and Mukden.
62. If TATEKAWA's instructions were to communicate the General Staff's order to prevent the outbreak of an incident, do you know why such instructions could not have been dispatched by telegram.
63. Why was it necessary to send a personal emissary to deliver instructions to the Kwantung Army to prevent an outbreak of an incident.
64. If the situation was considered so urgent as to call for a joint War Department and General Staff decision, why was an uncertain and slow method of communicating the decision adopted.
65. Did TATEKAWA fail to report to Tokyo for a considerable period of time after his departure, preceding the outbreak of the incident.
66. If you were so concerned about a possible outbreak of an incident in Manchuria, and the General Staff was also so concerned about the same matter, did you or they take any steps to find out why TATEKAWA failed to carry out his instructions diligently, and why he failed to report to Tokyo after his departure.
67. Was TATEKAWA's failure to act expeditiously and his failure to deliver the orders received upon his departure, a part of a pre-arranged plan between yourself and TATEKAWA (Saionji Diary, Vol. II, 1, P. 75).

68. As Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, were you familiar with the staff sections planned or taken by the Kwantung Army.

69. Was there a staff section in the Kwantung Army known as the Counselling Section.

70. What were its functions.

71. Who supervised its activities. **III**

72. Did you devise the work to be performed by the Counselling Section.

73. Was Gen. TADA Chief of Staff of the Military Government of Manchuria.

74. **Questioning of KOISO on his work as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army develops that KOISO, while advocating the independence of Manchukuo, in reality was implicated in the operation of a system of advisors and instructors to the Manchukuoan Army which vested control of the local and general governments in the Japanese; also that KOISO recommended control of the customs of Manchukuo, also the control of virtually all agencies of industry and commerce; and the passing of rescripts, ordinances and enactments; also that he was concerned in the aggressive warfare in Jehol and the North China provinces.**

75. You know, did you not, that the Manchukuoan Army coordinated matters relating to its personnel, finance and munitions with the advisors and instructors of the Kwantung Army.

76. You know, did you not, that Kwantung Army advisors and instructors were posted at each Manchukuoan detachment, government office and school and that this system put the Manchukuoan Army under the direct control of the Japanese.

77. You know, did you not, that this system of advisors was extensively used in the conquest of Jehol.

78. You know, did you not, that this system of advisors was a subterfuge or pretense that the Kwantung Army was only furnishing advisors to the Manchukuoans whereas such advisors and military instructors were used to control the life pulse of the Manchukuoan Army.

79. You know, did you not, that by means of the advisors and instructors, the Kwantung Army became the practical rulers of both the local and central government of Manchukuo.

80. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 31E.

81. Having examined Gen. TADA's report, state whether the procedures outlined therein contained portions during the period of your service as Chief of Staff, which is an official document of the

68. As Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, were you familiar with all staff actions planned or taken by the Kwantung Army.
69. Was there a staff section in the Kwantung Army known as the Counselling Section.
70. What were its functions.
71. Who supervised its activities.
72. Did you devise the work to be performed by the Counselling Section.
73. Was Gen. TADA advisor to the Department of the Military Government of Manchukuo while you were Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
74. Was Gen. TADA the Chief of the Counselling Section.
75. Were you familiar with the policies pursued by Gen. TADA in guiding the Military Government of Manchukuo.
76. You knew, did you not, the results Gen. TADA had accomplished by means of a system of advisors and instructors to the Manchukuoan Army, which had been established by the Kwantung Army.
77. You knew, did you not, that the Manchukuoan Army coordinated matters relating to its personnel, finance and munitions with the advisors and instructors of the Kwantung Army.
78. You knew, did you not, that Kwantung Army advisors and instructors were posted at each Manchukuoan detachment, government office and school and that this system put the Manchukuoan Army under the direct control of the Japanese.
79. You knew, did you not, that this system of advisors was extensively used in the conquest of Jehol.
80. You knew, did you not, that this system of advisors was a subterfuge or pretense that the Kwantung Army was only furnishing advisors to the Manchukuoans whereas such advisors and military instructors were used to control the life pulse of the Manchukuoan Army.
81. You knew, did you not, that by means of the advisors and instructors, the Kwantung Army became the practical rulers of both the local and central government of Manchukuo.
82. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 612.
83. Having examined Gen. TADA's report, ~~state whether the procedures outlined therein contained pertained during the period of your service as Chief of Staff,~~ which is an official document of the

Japanese Government dated 1 August 1934, being a report by Gen. TADA, Shun, as advisor to the Department of the Military Government of Manchukuo, to the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, entitled "Direction of Manchurian Military Administration".

84. Would you say that Gen. TADA's report contained in IPS Doc. 612 accurately states the work accomplished by the system of advisors and instructors in Manchukuo, *and that the proceedings outlined therein pertained during the time you served as Chief of Staff*
85. Prosecution Exh. _____ is offered in evidence.
86. Read foregoing Exhibit in full.
87. Prior to the time you became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and while you were Vice Minister of War, do you recall receiving ¥20,000 from the War Minister in connection with the Manchurian Incident (R 15809).
88. State the precise reason for the payment of this money to you.
89. Do you admit receiving ¥18,500 (R 15810) while you were Vice Minister of War, for your participation in the Manchurian incident.
90. State the things you did to justify the payment of this sum of money to you.
91. After you became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, did you receive, as Chief of Staff, ¥1,970,000 for secret expenditures (R 15811).
92. What was done with the money so received by you.
93. Was any accounting made of the expenditure of this money.
94. To whom in the Kwantung Army were funds, in ordinary military transactions, transmitted by the War Ministry.
95. In view of the ordinary procedure, was the transaction in question, the ¥1,970,000 payment to you, an extraordinary transaction.
96. What was the reason for handling this item out of the regular channels.
97. Do you recall receiving, during your incumbency as Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, an item of ¥3,000,000 from the War Ministry, for the Kwantung Army Service Fund.
98. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 989.
99. Does IPS Doc. 989 show the allotment to you of ¥3,000,000 by the War Ministry.

100. Prosecution offers IPS Doc. 989 in evidence.
101. Read Exh. _____.
102. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, receive the funds mentioned in Exh. _____.
103. Who was the real beneficiary of this money, and how was the money used.
104. Were not these funds used in carrying out the conquest of Jehol.
105. Were you the Executive of the Special Service Department as well as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
106. What were your duties as Executive of the Special Service Department.
107. Was Gen. DOIHARA connected with the Special Service Department during the time you were Chief of Staff.
108. Was the Special Service Department in charge of opium traffic in Manchukuo.
109. Did you hear Gen. MINAMI testify and do you agree with Gen. MINAMI's statement (R 19976) that one of the reasons for abolishing the Special Service Department may have been that it was running the opium traffic for its own benefit instead of for the Government of Manchukuo.
110. What would you say was the meaning of the expression "running the opium traffic for its own benefit".
111. When you became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, what were the functions of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.
112. Were you also desirous of maintaining the independence of Manchukuo.
113. Were Japanese-Manchurian economic relations an important item ~~for consideration~~ in connection with Manchukuoan independence.
114. And is it not true that control of commerce by ~~accounting~~ ^{a country} is one of the basic elements of its independence.
115. Is it not true that you, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, had the view that outside control in international commerce should be imposed on Manchukuo.
116. Did you not, while Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, recommend to Tokyo a customs policy for Manchukuo.
117. Did you recommend in respect to customs and tariffs that no other country except Japan be permitted to participate unconditionally in Japanese-Manchukuoan conventional tariffs.

118. Did you recommend special treatment for Japan especially as to goods needed for defense.
119. What country did you have in mind as a possible aggressor against Japan on 12 December 1932, the date you made your recommendations on such customs and tariff policy.
120. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 1302.
121. ~~I show you~~ ^{Doc} IPS Doc. 1302 ~~and ask you if this document states~~ your recommendations concerning Manchukuoan tariffs and customs.
122. Prosecution offers in evidence IPS Doc. 1302.
123. Read Exh. _____.
124. Was it your desire that Manchukuo be self-governing.
125. Is it not true that you made recommendations to the Vice War Minister in connection with the proposed terms of the Manchukuoan constitution.
126. Is it not true that you recommended that it should be provided that power be divided between the Premier and the several department heads.
127. What was your purpose in making such recommendation.
128. Was your recommendation to provide divided control carried out.
129. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 624.
130. ~~I show you~~ ^{Doc} IPS Doc. 624 ~~and ask whether this document contains~~ recommendations you made in reference to the Manchukuoan constitution.
131. Prosecution offers in evidence IPS Doc. 624.
132. Prosecution desires to read only par. III of the document.
133. Now will you state whether it was your opinion that self-government and independence could be achieved by Manchukuo if the Kwantung Army controlled Manchukuoan officials.

135. As Overseas Minister, were you familiar with the decisions of the China Affairs Board.

136. Is it not true that a decision was made at the meeting of the China Affairs Board on 7 April 1939, whereby it was determined that Japan was to secure economic superiority in North China, and that their interests were to be permitted economic activity in Central China as long as such activity did not interfere with Japan's vital economic demands (R 1177-0).

IV

137. Were you in accord with that decision.

138. The points I am making in this part of the cross-examination are:

1. That KOISO was in favor of the Tripartite Pact.

2. That KOISO favored military action in the South Pacific, in violation of Japan's agreement to respect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands insular possessions.

3. That KOISO favored extending Japan's domination all over the world.

Is it not true that you and HAYASHI took part in a radio interview on Dutch Radio in May 1939 and that you spoke on the Tripartite Alliance and took the view that the negotiations for the pact would be successful if Germany and Italy understood Japan's point of view and power in the East, and that it was desirable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of Japan's policies.

That is you mean by the expression "execution of Japan's policies".

Did such policies include a southward movement.

Did you not also discuss with Baron HIRADA, on or about 9 May 1940, the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance.

Did you not state to Baron HIRADA that such an alliance was necessary in order to conclude the China war and that such an alliance would alleviate the feelings of the sea at the front.

Is it not true that in 1940, while Overseas Minister, you requested the German Ambassador, to find out what Germany's attitude would be to military activity by Japan in Indo-China and parts of the Netherlands Indies (R 11599).

134. As Overseas Minister, were you familiar with the decisions of the China Affairs Board.
135. Is it not true that a decision was made at the meeting of the China Affairs Board on 7 April 1939, whereby it was determined that Japan was to secure economic superiority in North China, and that Third Powers were to be permitted economic activity in Central China as long as such activity did not interfere with Japan's vital economic demands (IPS Doc. 2178-D).
136. Were you in accord with that decision.
137. Was not said decision of the China Affairs Board irreconcilable to and inconsistent with the Open Door policy in China.
138. Did you attend a meeting of the Cabinet at which a decision made to intensify the Anti-Comintern Pact (R 6093).
139. Did you oppose such action.
140. Did you complain to Baron HARADA, on or about 24 April 1939 that lack of unity in the Army was a hindrance to the successful conclusion of the Tripartite Pact (Saionji Diary, Vol. XIX, p. 2503).
141. Did you not visit the Navy Minister in early May 1939 in connection with a possible overthrow of the Cabinet due to Navy opposition to the rightists in their German-Italian attitude (Saionji Diary, Vol. XIX, p. 2508).
142. It is true, is it not, that you and ITAGAKI took part in a radio interview on Domei Radio in May 1939 and that you spoke on the Tri-Lateral Anti Pact and took the view that the negotiations for the Pact would be successful if Germany and Italy understood Japan's point of view and power in the East, and that it was suitable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of Japan's policies (R 15817).
143. What did you mean by the expression "execution of Japan's policies".
144. Did such policies include a southward movement.
145. Did you not also discuss with Baron HARADA, on or about 9 May 1940, the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance.
146. Did you not state to Baron HARADA that such an alliance was necessary in order to conclude the China war and that such an alliance would alleviate the feelings of the men at the front.
147. Is it not true that in 1940, while Overseas Minister, you requested Ott, the German Ambassador, to find out what Germany's attitude would be to military activity by Japan in Indo-China and parts of the Netherlands Indies (R 11699).

148. And is it not true that you promised to pursue the idea of tying the United States down in the Pacific in return for German non-intervention in French Indo-China (R 6175).
149. Is it not a fact that the Foreign Office of Japan ^{at the same time} was announcing its view that the status quo of the Netherlands would be preserved (R 11671-3; 11685-6).
150. Is it not a fact that the economic demands made on the Netherlands if accepted by the Netherlands would have disturbed the status quo in that region of the Pacific, and would have seriously interfered with the sovereignty of the Netherlands.
151. You knew, did you not, that under a declaration dated 14 February 1922, following the Four-Power Treaty of 13 December 1921, Japan agreed to respect the rights of the Netherlands in its insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean (R 11635; 11674).
152. Did you as Minister of Overseas Affairs learn of the decision on 12 and 16 July 1940, of the Army, Navy and Foreign Office authorities, to have Japan dominate the southern areas (R 11599).
153. If so, what did you understand domination of the southern regions to mean.
154. Did this include political domination or control.
155. You made a speech, did you not, before the Budget Committee in February 1940, in which you said that Japan had a destiny to advance in all directions; north, south, east and west. (DPJ Doc 3030N)
156. You made a speech, did you not, before the Committee of Accounts in March 1940, in which you recommended a two-fold policy by Japan, embracing the south and the north as the objective (R 15819).
157. Did you not also state that the religious beliefs of Buddhists, Confucianists and Christians would have to conform to the spirit and culture of Japan. (DPJ Doc 3030N)
158. Did you not also urge the spread throughout the world of the spirit and culture represented by Imperial Japan. (DPJ Doc 3030N)
159. Were you not of the opinion that as the spirit, culture and economic interests of Japan extended to new territories, that such territory would be administered by Japan.
160. How did you expect to convert those who were unwilling to the Imperial Way.

161. May the witness be shown IPS Doc. 3030-N.
162. I show you IPS Doc. 3030-N and ask whether this document is a speech you made before the Budget Committee of the Diet on 17 February 1940.
163. Prosecution offers in evidence IPS Doc. 3030-N. *del*
164. I will read Exh. _____.

V

The questions directed to KOISO's activities as Prime Minister bring out his real intentions toward Indo-China and the Netherlands; also his fundamental conception of the Pacific war as a means of driving the United States and Britain from the Pacific.

165. When you accepted the office of Prime Minister in July 1944, had you come to a conclusion as to the reason why Japan was at war with the United States, Great Britain and other countries.
166. State what you believed was the reason.
167. If he says that the war was for self-defense, ask: Is it not true that the real intention of Japan in engaging in the war was her desire to expel Anglo-American influence from China.
168. Was it not also the real intention of Japan to expel Anglo-American influence from the Asiatic Pacific regions.
169. And was not Japan's chief intention in engaging in the Pacific war to reconstruct a Greater East Asia.
170. Were you in accord with such views (R 3704, Ex. 277).
171. You acted as a member of the Committee, did you not, for the establishment of Greater East Asia in April 1942 (R 735, Ex. 114).
172. Was it not the intention of Japan to close the door of the Asiatic countries to others except on her own terms.
173. In connection with the Dutch East Indies, did you, in a speech before the 85th session of the Diet 7 September 1944, promise future independence to the Netherlands insular possessions (R 11666).
174. Were you familiar with the announcement of the Chief of Staff of the Osamu Army Corp made in the same month you made the promise of Dutch independence, that "there shall be no great alterations in the operation and the business structure of the Military Government" (R 12217).
175. If you knew of this, state whether such statement had your concurrence.
176. At the time the promise of independence to the Dutch East Indies was made, were the agricultural enterprises, the sugar industries, the public utilities, the private railways, the gas and power companies and the newspaper plants under Japanese control (R 12216-17).
177. Was it your intention to return the enterprises mentioned to the Dutch owners.
178. Was not the real reason you failed to grant independence to the Netherlands East Indies during your Premiership, that had it been granted, Japan would have lost control and real power in that region.
179. As Prime Minister, you knew of the decision of the Supreme War Leadership Council, on 1 February 1945, to place all military and armed police forces of French Indo-China under the joint command of the Japanese Army, subject however to the orders of the Japanese Army in matters of organization, allotment and movement (R 7165).