Doc. 3105 (4)

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(13)

IPS Doc. No. 3105 (4)

Exh. No. _____

REPORTED UNOFFICIALLY TO THE EMPEROR ON 14 Nov. 1941.

Outline of the Latest Developments of Japanese-American Negotiations

1. Instruction sent to Ambassador NOMURA.

2. Progress of negotiations in Washington

   a. Nov. 7 NOMURA-HULL Conversation

   b. Nov. 10 NOMURA-ROOSEVELT Conversation

3. Developments in Tokyo

   a. Nov. 10 Talk between Foreign Minister TOGO and the U.S. Ambassador

   b. Nov. 11 Talk between Foreign Minister TOGO and the British Ambassador

1. Instruction sent to Ambassador NOMURA:

Japan's counter-proposal on Japanese-American negotiations, on which an Imperial decision was received in the presence of the Emperor on November 5th, was dispatched on the same day to Ambassador NOMURA by telegram. In view of the negotiations, which had already lasted half a year since its commencement, Japan has been making concession after concession, bearing the unbearable, in order to reach a compromise quickly. In spite of this, America has not only shown no friendly reaction but held firmly to her original opinion. It is because of our sincerest desire to maintain peace that we have thus made difficult concessions, displaying our sincerity to the utmost. However, there is a limit to our patience. If our existence and prestige are at stake, we must defend them if necessary regardless of the sacrifice. Should the U.S. still take an attitude to disregard our position, we shall have to consider that there is no ground left for further negotiation. With the negotiation approaching its final stage, we have instructed him to notify the U.S. that she should take proper measures by reconsidering the situation from a broader viewpoint upon the present situation that does not permit of even a day's delay.

2. Negotiations in Washington.

   a. Meeting between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull (Nov. 7.)

Ambassador NOMURA, accompanied by Minister WAKASUGI, called on Secretary of State Hull and explained carefully Japan's position

and determination. He was also under instruction to reach a compromise at the earliest date possible on the three chief pending questions. Among the three main pending questions, i.e., non-preferential treatment of commerce, Tripartite Pact and withdrawal of troops, the first two could roughly be brought to a compromise by our present proposal. Regarding the stationing of the troops, we earnestly wish that in view of a maximum concession made by Japan, in spite of great hardships, U.S. would take a far-sighted view of the prevailing situations from a broader standpoint.

To this, Secretary of State Hull, after reading our counter-proposal, is reported to have answered to the following effect:

The question of non-preferential treatment is acceptable. As to the stationing of the troops, he simply asked in what proportions the withdrawal and the stationing will be made. Regarding the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Pact he stated that they would give an answer in due course after studying the question.

Further, on this occasion, the Secretary of State asked, as his personal question, what Japan would think, if the highest authorities of China should pledge her friendship and confidence to the Japanese Government as well as to its nation and wish for the restoration of friendly relationship between Japan and China. He wished it to be conveyed to the Japanese Government to inquire about its intention.

This proposal may be interpreted as hinting at the U.S.'s intention of leaving the question of the withdrawal of troops in China to a direct negotiation between Japan and China, since this has been the most difficult point in the negotiation. If so, we may be able to get a chance, as has been Japan's wish from the beginning, of solving the China Incident through direct negotiations between Japan and China without any intervention by a third power. We, therefore, instructed Ambassador NOMURA on November 9 that he should take necessary steps to enable us to avail ourselves of this proposal, on condition that the U.S. would delay the execution of items of agreement on questions other than the China question until the making of peace between Japan and China, and that she would, during this period, refrain from actions of assisting CHIANG.

b. Meeting between President Roosevelt and Ambassador NOMURA (Nov. 10)

Ambassador NOMURA met President Roosevelt and explained as follows: Six months have already elapsed since the commencement of Japanese-American negotiations, and during this time, Japan has endured the unbearable and made many concessions. In spite of this, the U. S. Government has strongly adhered to its original

proposal without making any concessions. There are people in our country who entertain doubts as regards the real intentions of the U.S. Therefore, from the viewpoint of earnestly desiring peace, the Japanese Government has made the maximum concession in the three questions which were the most difficult points heretofore in the negotiations.

However, the President did not immediately express agreement or denial. He stated the following only in an abstract manner: At the present time the whole world is in a critical condition because of disturbances caused by acts of aggressions. Our good sense hopes fervently that the world would soon return to the proper course of peace. The object of the U.S. Government lies in exerting its best efforts to bring about peace in the Pacific Ocean areas through the spirit of fair play. I hope that these preliminary conversations will favorably result in becoming the basis of the negotiations. The U.S. expects to check the expansion of war, and establish a permanent peace.

He added in connection with the principle of non-discrimination that the world generally hopes that it would be carried out.

When Ambassador NOMURA stated that the U.S. economic pressure against Japan is exciting the Japanese people, the President said that the people sometimes require a so-called "modus vivendi" in order to live, and that this should be translated "mode of living."

In reference to the above, it is to our surprise and regret that the U.S. Government in this negotiation still continues adhering to the attitude of not emerging from the bounds of preliminary conversations. We keenly felt that this is most unbecoming at the present pressing situation which requires the speedy conclusion of the negotiation. Therefore, on the 11th, instructions were again sent to Ambassador NOMURA ordering him to take steps to try to urge the U.S. Government to deeply reconsider this point. Also, on the 12th, close attention of the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo was also called to this point.

3. Negotiations in Tokyo.

a. Conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo (Nov. 10)

A general exchange of opinions was already carried out with the U.S. Ambassador on the 30th of October, but I met him again on the 10th and stated as follows:

After studying the past progress, what I feel keenly is the insufficient understanding of facts on the part of the U.S. The Japanese-American negotiations have been postponed time and again. In the meantime, we have made as much concessions as possible to the U.S. contentions, regardless of which the U.S. has firmly adhered to her first contentions without yielding a step. In some points she has even reversed her attitude. Consequently,

there are people on our side who even doubt the sincerity of the U. S. Government, and public feeling will not tolerate any further delay.

I referred to the approaching Diet session and explained the urgency of the situation. I strongly requested that the U.S. Government solve the problem at a single stroke from a wide point of view, and explained point by point our last (T.N. Saigo-an) proposal. I also emphasized the following effect: In some cases, economic pressure can result in offering a deeper threat than that by force of arms. Also, in regard to the China problem, for Japan, it is tantamount to suicide to tamely accept terms which ignore the results of four and a half years' of sacrifice. Since public opinion would never allow this, I fervently hope that the U.S. would consider this point fully.

I requested him to transmit the above to his Government. The U.S. Ambassador replied that he would cable the above to his Government immediately as he, too, has the desire to exert all his efforts for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations.

b. Conversation with the British Ambassador in Tokyo (Nov 11.

On both the 29th and 30th of October, I also explained in detail to the British Ambassador, Craigie, the necessity of an immediate satisfactory conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation. I heard that the Ambassador reported the above to his Government. When I met the Ambassador on November 11, he referred to it, so I stated the following effect:

Negotiations have already entered the main phase, and now by submitting (T. N. Asigo-Teki) Japan's counter-proposal of a final nature, it has now entered the final phase. It would be proper for Britain to cooperate so as to guide the negotiations to success. If the U.S. accepts our proposal, the signing is possible within a week to ten days. And, if unfortunately, the U.S. rejects this, there is no possibility of continuing the negotiation. Besides, our domestic situation is such that it will not allow further delay in this negotiation. Since there should be methods for a speedy and satisfactory conclusion, depending upon the attitudes of the U.S. and Britain, I hope that the British Government would also give the above matter her fullest consideration and exert efforts for the speedy conclusion of this negotiation.

The ambassador seemed to have had the impression that this negotiation was still in the preliminary stage, and through my explanation, he seemed to have become aware for the first time of the urgency of the situation. He left after replying that he wishes to exert his best efforts in cooperating for a break in the deadlock.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of (11) pages, dated 14 November, 19 41, and described as follows: OUTLINE OF THE RECENT PROGRESS ON U.S.-JAPANESE NEGOTIATION. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe

Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ Henry Shimojima
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. G. Lambert

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Exhibit No.

I.P.S. Doc. No. 3105(4)

内奏文ハ課長ノ手許ニアリ（鉛筆書き）
十一月二十日（木）内奏（ペン書き）

昭和十六年十一月十四日内奏

日米交渉最近ノ経過概要

外機密

一、野村大使宛訓令発出

二、華府ニ於ケル交渉経過

甲　十一月七日　野村、「ハル」会談

乙　同十日　野村、「ローズベルト」会談

三、東京ニ於ケル経過

甲　十一月十日　東郷大臣、米国大使会談

乙　同十一日　東郷大臣、英国大使会談

一、野村大使宛訓令発出

十一月五日御前ニ於テ御決定ヲ仰キタル日米交渉帝国政府対案ハ即日野村大使ニ電報シ交渉開始以来既ニ半歳ニ及ベル処帝国政府ハ之カ急速妥結ヲ計ル為難キヲ忍ビテ譲歩ヲ重ネ来レルニ拘ラス米側ハ之ニ対応スル誠意ヲ示サス始メ初ノ立張ヲ固執シ居ル処我方カ飽迄誠意ヲ披瀝シテ更ニ困難ナル譲歩ヲ敢テセル所以ハ一三年和維持ヲ願フニアツテ一モ帝国ノ隠忍ニモ自ラ限度アリ其ノ存ミト雖威ト共ニ依リテハ獲得ノ如何ヲ問ハス擁護セントスル米国ノ此ノ上帝国ノ立場ヲ無視スル態度ニ出ツルニ依テハ交渉ノ餘地絶無ト云フノ他ナシ交渉最後ノ段階ニ臨ミ米側ニ於テ大局的見地ヨリ翻然猛省シ事態ノ悪化ヲ一日モ遅ラスル為ノ許サル状況ニ鑑ミ善処センコトヲ要望セラル旨申入方訓令

ヨタデ御座イマス。

二、華府ニ於ケル交渉

(甲) 野村大使ハ若干公使ヲ帯同ツレシ長官会見(十一月七日)

野村大使ハ若干公使ヲ帯同ツレシ長官ヲ訪問大使ヨリ帝國ノ決意ト立場トヲ説明シ立ち交渉妥結ヲ計ルベキヨシノ命ヲ受ケ居リシトノ訓令ニ基キ直面無差別待遇、三國條約及駐兵撤兵ノ三主要懸案中ト最初ノ二点ハ人ヲ以提案ニ依リ大体妥結ニ達シ得ベク駐兵ニ関シテハ日本ハ多大ノ国難ヲ排シ最大限ノ譲歩ヲ為セルモノニ依リ米國ハ大局的見地ヨリ現実ノ情勢ヲ達観シ速ニ妥結ニ到ラシムルヲ切望スト趣旨ノ申入レマシタニ対シ長官ハ我方対案ヲ読ミタル上無差別待遇問題ニハテハ首肯シ駐兵ニハ単ニ撤兵ト駐兵ノ如ノミ別合ニ当ルベキヤ、貴国ノ又三國條約ニ関シ自衛権問題ニハ少ハ研究上回答スベキ旨ヲ答ヘタル由デアリマス。

尚其際同長官ハ自分一個ノ思ハトシテ若シ又那ノ最高権威者ガ日本政府及國民ニ対シ又那ノ真摯ナル友誼ト信任トヲ確言シ日支間ノ友好関係ノ回復ヲ希望スルニ於テハ日本ハ如何ニ考フベキ

ト貴国ニ右ヲ日本政府ニ伝達シ其ノ意嚮ヲ問合サレタシト述ヘマシタ。

右提言ハ米國側ニ於テ従来支那ニ於ケル撤兵問題カ交渉ノ最大難関タリシニ鑑ミ之ヲ日支間直接商議ニ委ネントスル意嚮ヲ反カセルモノカと解セラレ若シ然ラハ帝國ト初ヨリノ主張ノ通リ支那事変ヲ第三國ノ仲介等ヲ日支間直接交渉ニヨリ解決スル機会ヲ得ルモノト認メラレマシタノテ十一月九日野村大使ニ対シ米側カ日支和平成立ヲ見ル迄支那問題以外ノ諸懸案事項ノ実施ヲ遅ラサルコト及此間接蔣政権ヲ利用スル様急速措置方訓令致シマシタ。

(二)「ローズベルト」大統領野村大使會談（十一月十日）

野村大使ハ「ローズベルト」大統領ト會見シ日米交渉ハ開始以来既ニ六ヶ月ヲ經過シ此ノ間帝國ハ難キヲ忍ンデ幾多ノ讓歩ヲナシタルニ拘ラス米國政府ハ原案ヲ固執シテ讓ラス我國ニ於テハ米國ノ眞意如何カト疑フ者モアル處帝國政府ハ平和ヲ願フスルノ見地ヨリ從来交渉ニ於ケル主要難点タリシ三問題ニ関シ最大限ノ讓歩ヲ行ヘルモノナル次第ヲ説明シタイテ御座イマスカ大統領ハ直ニハ之ニ賛否ヲ示サス唯抽象的ニ現在全世界ハ侵略ノ力ニ依リ生ル搖乱ノ為危殆ノ状態ニ陥シリ吾人ノ常識ハ世界ト平和ノ常道ニ速ニ復歸セントヲ欲求ス米國政府ノ目的ハ「フェア・プレー」ノ精神ニヨリ太平洋地域ニ平和ヲ齎ス様最善ヲ盡スニ在リ本件豫備的会談ハ交渉ノ基礎トナルヘキ良好ノ結果ヲ興ヘンコトヲ希望ス米國ノ所期スル所ハ戰爭ノ擴大ヲ防止シ恒久的平和ノ確立ニアリト述ヘ無差別原則ニ関シテハ世界一般ニ右カ行ハルルコトヲ希望スル旨附言シ又野村大使ハ米國ノ対日經濟圧迫カ我國民ヲ激昂セシメツツアリト申述ヘタルニ関聯シ同大統領ハ國民ノ生キル為ニ所謂「モータス・ヴイヴェンディ」ヲ要スルコトアリ右ハ生キル方法ト譯スヘキナリト云ヒタリシタル趣ニテアリシス

右ニ対シマシテハ米國政府カ今次交渉ニ臨ムニ当リ今猶豫備的會談ノ成ル迄ハ態度ヲ持シ居ルコトハ当方ノ頗ル意外且遺憾トスル所ニシテ交渉多端迅速妥結

ノ他要スル現下ノ緊迫セル事態ニ即セサルコト甚シキモノアルヲ痛感致シ居タノテ十一日更ニ野村大使ニ訓令シテ此ノ點ニ付米國政府ノ盛者ヲ使ハシ格措置オヲ命スルト共ニ十二日在京米國大使ニ対シテモ此ノ點ニ付切実ナル注意ヲ喚起シテ置キマシタ

三、東京ニ於ケル交渉

(甲)在京米國大使トノ會談(十一月十日)

米國大使トハ十月三十日既ニ一ト通リノ意見交換ヲ遂ケテ置キマシタカ十日同大使ト再度會見致シマシテ從来ノ經緯ヲ説明シ痛感スルコトハ米側ノ事実ニ対スル認識不充分ナル點ナル旨ヲ述ヘ遺憾ノ意ヲ表シ居リ其間我方ハ出来得ル限リ米側主張ニ歩ミ寄レル点ヲ拡ケ米側ハ当初ノ主張ヲ固執シ一歩モ譲ラス或実ニ関シテハ却テ逆轉シ居リ從テ我方ニ於テハ米國政府ノ誠意ノ程度ヲ疑フモノアル有様ニテ此ノ上ハ遺憾ナ國民感情ヲ之ヲ許サストテノ議會ノ召集ノ近キニ及ヒ事態ノ切迫セルコトヲ説明シテ米國政府カ大局的見地ヨリ問題ヲ速ニ一擧ニ解決センコトヲ張ノ要望シ我最後案ヲ遂ニ一説明スルト共ニ經濟圧迫ハ或場合ハ武力ヲ以テスルヨリモ猶お実刻ナル脅威ヲ與フル結果ヲ来ス得ヘキヲ又那間題ニ付テハ四年半ニ亘リ敢テセル犠牲ノ成果ヲ無視セラルルカ如キ條件ノ甘受ハ日本トシテハ自殺ニ等シキヲ以テ輿論ハ到底之ヲ許容セサルヘキヲ以テ米國側ニ於テモ充分此ノ點ヲ考慮セラレンコトヲ熱望スル旨強調シ右ヲ米國政府ニ傳達ス要請致シマシタカ米國大使ハ自分トシテモ日米間國交調整ニ全力ヲ傾注シタキ熱意ヲ有

スルモノナルヤヲ右ノ次第ヲ早速本国政府ニ電報スベシト答ヘタリ。

(二) 在京英国大使トノ会談（十一月十一日）

「クレーギー」英国大使ニ対シマシテモ十月二十九日及三十日ノ両度本大臣ヨリ日米交渉ノ急速妥結ヲ要スル次第オ話ト説明致シ同大使ハ右ヲ本国政府ニ報告シタ趣デアリマシテ十一月十一日会見ノ際同大使ヨリ之ニ言及致シマシタノデ本大臣ヨリ交渉ハ既ニ本格的交渉トナリ居リ今ヤ帝国政府ノ最后的対案提示ニ依リ最終段階ニ入リタル次第ナリニシテ英国トシテハ右交渉ノ成功ニ道ク都合セラルルコトヲ望ムナルヘシ米側カ我提案ヲ受諾スレハ一週間乃至十日以内ニモ調印可能ナルヘシ又若シ万一米側カ之ヲ拒否ハ交渉継続ノ可能性ナキ次第ニテ他方我国内情勢ハ本交渉此ノ上ノ遷延ヲ絶対ニ許ササル情勢ニアリ英米ノ態度如何ヨリテハ迅速妥結ノ方法アリ得ヘキ行方ニ於テモ右事情ヲ充分考量シ本交渉ノ急速成立ノ為尽力オ願ヒタル旨ヲ述ヘマシタルニ対シ同大使ハ本交渉カ今猶豫備的段階ニ在ルモノナリトノ印象ヲ有シ居タル模様ニテ右ノ説明ニ依リ事態ノ緊迫セルコトヲ全ク始ノ如ク肩感セル様子ニテ最善ヲ尽シテ局面打開ニ協力致シタシト答ヘ辞去致シマシタ。

證明書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 号
國際檢察部 第三一〇五号(四)

典據及ビ公正ニ關スル證明

余、林馨ハ、余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、茲ニ該官吏トシテノ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、十二頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年(昭和十六年)十一月十四日附、下記題名ノ日米交渉最近ノ經過概要ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記錄及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番号又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

外務省文書課

千九百四十八年(昭和二十三年)一月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 林馨(K. HAYASHI)(署名捺印)
文書課長

右ノ者ノ公的資格

浦部勝馬(K. URABE)(署名捺印)

證

人

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ヘンリー・シモジマハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十八年(昭和二十三年)一月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄 ヘンリー・シモジマ(Henry SHIMOJIMA)(署名)
國際檢察部調査官

右ノ者ノ公的資格

ゲイ、ジー、ランバート(J. G. LAMBERT)(署名)

證人

CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. ______

I.P.S. No. 3105 (4)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, **HAYASHI, Kaoru,** hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: **Chief, Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE** and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of **(11)** pages, dated **14, Novvember**, 19**41**, and described as follows: **OUTLINE OF THE RECENT PROGRESS on U.S.-JAPANESE NEGOTIATION.**

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): **Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE**

Signed at **Tokyo** on this

26th day of **January**, 1948.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: K. Uraba

Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

Henry Shimojima
NAME

Witness: J. G. Lambert

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Doc 3105 (5)

Folder 9

(5)

IPS Doc. No. 3105(5) Exhibit No. _____

INFORMAL REPORT TO EMPEROR OF Nov. 20, 1941

The other day I reported to you the summary of the details of the negotiations conducted at Washington and Tokyo subsequent to the despatch of the Imperial (T.N. Japanese) Government's instructions (5th). Today, however, I shall report to you the subsequent developments.

Talks were held four times, viz. on the 12th, 15th, 17th and 18th, but as it just so happened that Ambassador KURUSU arrived at Washington on the 15th, the said Ambassador participated also in the negotiations on both the 17th and 18th, together with Ambassador NOMURA.

(1) Parley between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull of the 12th.

Notwithstanding the fact that the 11th fell on Armistice Day, the U.S. State Department deliberated the whole day on the proposal submitted by our side (T.N. Japan), and on the 12th Secretary of State Hull handed the following two notes to Ambassador NOMURA (accompanied by Minister WAKASUGI) who visited him on the 12th, viz. (A) A note expressing the desire of having our (T.N. Japanese) new Cabinet also confirm the opinion manifested to the U.S. Government by the KONOE Cabinet on August 28 in regard to the Pacific policy entertained by it, as well as (B) A note confirming Secretary of State Hull's personal suggestion made to Ambassador NOMURA on the 7th in regard to the China Problem, viz. the proposal of having both Japan and China mutually exchange oaths for the sake of establishing truly amicable and cooperative relations. On that occasion he (Hull) appears to have orally hinted his intention of acting as a mediator between Japan and China. Furthermore, in regard to the stationing of troops in China, the Secretary of State expressed his opposition to the permanent or indefinite stationing of troops, and he is said to have repeatedly criticized Hitlerism by stating that, as for the Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Pact, it was inconsistent for Japan to stand in alliance with Germany on one hand while advocating a Pacific policy on the other, and that there would no longer be any need for Japan to remain in the Tripartite Pact in the event of a Pacific Ocean Peace Agreement being conducted.

With regard to the foregoing, the Government made Ambassador NOMURA reply that, as for (A), the items regarding which the U.S. desires confirmation are all embodied in our Proposal and that the present Government also has no objection in confirming same in the spirit thereof; however, the satisfactory conclusion of the present negotiations should be made the preamble, so that it would be obvious that not our side only (T.N. Japan) should suffer any restraint in the event of the negotiations ending, by any chance, in a rupture. As for (B) the said Ambassador was instructed to be on his strict guard not to bring about a delay in the negotiations by complicating the situation thereby as same was accepted (T.N. for consideration) by our side from the standpoint of bringing about a break in the deadlock.

(2) Parley between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull of the 15th.

Secretary of State Hull presented two notes relative to the question of Commerce. Of these, (A) expatiates on the point that, whereas our Final Proposal (T.N. Saigo-an) (Proposal A) stated "In the event of the Principle of Non-Discrimination being applied throughout the entire world, the enforcement of this principle in the entire Pacific area, also including China, is approved," it is desired that, by taking into consideration the U.S. policy of endeavoring to remove trade barriers, Japan also withdraws the stipulation regarding "Application throughout the Entire World, etc." as the United States cannot hold itself responsible for countries outside of its own jurisdiction.

Proposal "B" is styled the "Proposal re Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration regarding Economic Policy" and is made up of the three parts of (1) General Policy, (2) Japan-U.S. Relations, and (3) Policy for the Pacific Area. (1) states that both Japan and the U.S. should cooperate in restoring the freedom of commerce throughout the world, (2) stipulates the restoration of normal relations between the two nations in regard to commerce, finance and economy, and the concluding of a commercial treaty, whereas (3) specifies that full control rights should be returned to China in regard to economy, finance and currency; preferential or monopolistic rights shall not be acquired in China; and that the joint economic exploitation of China shall be engaged in through the cooperation of the Powers. After receiving the foregoing, Ambassador NOMURA promised to transmit same to his Government, at the same time drawing the attention of the U.S. side to the fact that it was improper to consider the present negotiations as being still in the stage of Preliminary Talks inasmuch as same had already entered into the main stage. Against this the Secretary of State is said to have strongly persisted in his stand that they were still Preliminary Talks and that it would be more proper to enter upon Japan-U.S. negotiations after first of all discovering the basis for negotiations through the preliminary talks between Japan and America and consulting with interested nations like Britain, Netherlands and China, etc.

On that occasion, Ambassador NOMURA is said to have done his utmost in explaining that a Japan-U.S. Agreement and the Tripartite Pact would not be conflicting as the Secretary of State repeated his suspicions regarding Japan's peaceful intentions and went on to dwell on the Tripartite Pact by repeatedly expressing his strong desire to have the said Pact made extinct or a dead letter as there should be no need for Japan to preserve it in the event of a Japan-U.S. Agreement becoming concluded. In brief, the United States assumed the attitude that the views of the U.S. regarding the other pending questions, viz. the Tripartite Pact and the problems of stationing troops would be presented after receiving our reply to the aforementioned two notes.

With regard to the aforesaid two notes, Ambassador NOMURA was instructed to reply to the U.S. that, as regards "Application throughout the Entire

World, etc. ...," inasmuch as it is our desire to have the said principle applicable uniformly throughout the entire world, we have made it our condition to agree to the enforcement of the said principle also in China in sympathy with the realization of the said desire, so that, by taking into account the fact that this principle is being practically ignored at the present day, we cannot agree to same being made applicable at first only to China. As for Proposal (B), by utilizing the fact that this is styled a tentative plan also by the U.S., we have instructed Ambassador NOMURA to have the U.S. withdraw same completely and to arrange with the U.S. authorities to expedite the negotiations on the basis of our Final Proposal (T.N. Saigo-an), especially on the ground that the various clauses dealing with the Pacific Area ignore the actual conditions in China, and especially as Clause 3 (the proposal regarding Joint Exploitation of China) is liable to become the first step toward International Control of China.

(3) Parley between Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull of the 17th.

Accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, Ambassador NOMURA first of all visited Secretary of State Hull, and after a meeting of about 30 minutes, all of them had an interview with President Roosevelt.

It is reported that on Ambassador KURUSU explaining that a clash between Japan and the U.S. would not be beneficial to anyone, the President concorded with this view and stated that the situation could be saved by formulating a general understanding. On the said Ambassador furthermore emphasizing Japan's peaceful intentions and explaining her (T.N. Japan's) position as regards the Tripartite Pact, as well as the difficulties centering around the question of stationing of troops, to this, the President is said to have replied that he had heard about the difficulties regarding the China problem and that the U.S. has no intention of interfering or assisting in the matter but is merely desirous of becoming only an introducer. During the meeting, which lasted as long as an hour and a quarter , the President is said to have displayed a friendly attitude, but materially no special compromise was seen.

(4) Parley between Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU and Secretary of State Hull of the 18th.

Secretary of State Hull emphasized the menace of Hitlerism, adding that the peace policy of the U.S. was incompatible with same and that, inasmuch as it would be most difficult to adjust the U.S.-Japan relations as long as Japan joins hands with Germany, it was impossible to make any progress in the parleys between Japan and the U.S. without first of all eliminating this basic obstacle. Both Ambassadors gave their replies as deemed fit to the occasion and as there would be no limit to discussions on such a basic problem at a time when conditions had become so tense, both Ambassadors proposed on their own, with a view to planning to alleviate the situation in the Southwest Pacific, to have conditions restored as they were prior to the enforcement of the Freezing Act, by Japan withdrawing her troops from French Indo-China and by the U.S. rescinding the Freezing Act.

After being prevailed on in turn by both Ambassadors, the Secretary of State is said to have replied that, in the event of it being made clear that the heads of the Japanese Government are truly earnest in pursuing a pacific policy, he did not mind seizing this opportunity to persuade Britain and the Netherlands, etc. to restore conditions to the days prior to the enforcement of the Freezing Act. He (T.N. Secretary of State Hull) remarked that it was necessary, however, for the political conditions in Japan to proceed toward an increasingly peaceful trend.

Against the foregoing, both Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU expressed the opinion that, at this time, when the United States was about to venture on the Atlantic War by revising the Neutrality Act, it would be most advantageous for Japan to evade a rupture in the Japan-U.S. relations and prepare herself for future activities by pulling herself out of the present crisis by standing aloof from the theater of war. However, by concluding that the various circumstances made the Tentative Plan of both Ambassadors insufficient to ensure the safety of Japan's position, the Government instructed both Ambassadors at midnight of the 19th to immediately present to the U.S. authorities the Proposal "B" that was decided on at the meeting held in the Imperial presence the other day.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of (11) pages, dated 20 November, 19 41, and described as follows: OUTLINE OF THE RECENT PROGRESS ON U.S.-JAPANESE NEGOTIATION. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Signed at Tokyo on this

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/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

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Witness: /s/ K. Urabe

Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

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/s/ Henry Shimojima
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