

TOP SECRET

Serial: 00019

ANNEX "F"
TO
COMFIRSTCARTASKFORPAC
OpOrder No. 11-44

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

- References:
- (a) JICPOA Bulletin No. 69-44 of May 15, 1944.
 - (b) (1) Interim Report on FORMOSA, prepared by Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Washington, D. C., February 1944.
 - (2) CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 119-44 of August 1, 1944.
 - (3) Airfields and Seaplane Bases in FORMOSA, OPNAV-16-V #S87, June 1944.
 - (4) Air Objective Folders Nos. 91.3, 91.4, 91.5, 91.6 and 91.7, prepared by Intelligence Service, USAAF, December 1, 1942 and February 15, 1943.
 - (c) (1) CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 125-44 of August 15, 1944.
 - (2) JICPOA A.T.F. 108A of July 1, 1944.
 - (3) O.N.I. 93.
 - (4) Allied Geographical Section S.W.P.A. Special Report No. 60.
 - (5) Air Objective Folder Nos. 96.1, 96.2, published by Intelligence Service, U.S. Army Air Forces, August 15, 1943.
 - (6) USC & GS Chart No. 4235.
 - (7) USC & GS Chart No. 4236.

1. It is believed that carriers hold all references, with the possible exception of reference (b)(2), delivery of which to all carriers is expected prior to the operation.

2. Pilots must be briefed on all target areas for the Task Force as a whole since there is a definite possibility, especially in FORMOSA, that strikes from task groups will be shifted into areas other than those originally assigned.

3. Current friendly air search plans with radio calls are shown on Annex "H". Friendly submarine operating areas are in accordance with 18CL-44 as modified by effective CinCPac Submarine Area Notices and by SOP 1 which is expected to become effective about October 4. Effective Submarine Area

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Notices are No. 15 (CinCPac 042114 August, ALPAC 156); No. 16 (CinCPac 180844 August, ALPAC 177); No. 18 (CinCPac 180849 August, ALPAC 176); No. 19 (CinCPac 230525 August, ALPAC 182); No. 21 (CinCPac 280254 August, ALPAC 194); No. 22 (CinCPOA 310320 August, NPM How 6754); No. 24 (CinCPac 102329 September, NPM How 2062); No. 27 (CinCPOA 142316 September, NPM How 2968); No. 28 (CinCPac 190812 September, NPM How 4026); No. 29 (CinCPac 222021 September, NPM 4388); No. 30 (CinCPac 240743 September, NPM How 4771); No. 31 (CinCPac 262129 September, NPM How 5233); No. 32 (CinCPac 280919 September). Further notices are anticipated covering areas concerned in contemplated operations.

4. For reporting locations of ships damaged or sunk at sea, give latitude and longitude; for ships off the coast, give the nearest town or important point of land; for ships in major harbors other than MANILA, locate as well as possible by reference to docks, jetties, etc; for ships in the MANILA Bay Area, locate by grid position using the grid chart which is included with this annex.

5. An estimate of enemy air strength in FORMOSA and Southern NANSEI SHOTO including OKINAWA, and in the Empire (HONSHU, KYUSHU and Northern NANSEI SHOTO) is set forth below. No estimate of enemy air strength in LUZON and the VISAYAS is possible at this time, but there have been no indications of heavy reinforcements being flown in since the strikes by this force.

FORMOSA and Southern NANSEI SHOTO

EMPIRE

| | <u>Combat</u> | <u>Operational Training</u> | <u>Combat</u> | <u>Operational Training</u> |
|-----------|---------------|---------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|
| VF | 175 | 150 | 950 | 600 |
| VB | 95 | 90 | 410 | 300 |
| VB(L) | 40 | -- | 75 | -- |
| VB(M) | 50 | 30 | 200 | 200 |
| VP | 18 | -- | -- | 100 |
| VPF & VS0 | <u>35</u> | <u>--</u> | <u>30</u> | <u>275</u> |
| Total | 413 | 270 | 1665 | 1475 |

It is not possible to estimate enemy air strength at the various air bases in NANSEI SHOTO and FORMOSA, but Army fighter units are known to be based at NAHA on OKINAWA JIMA and

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at MATSUYAMA, KAGI and HEITO on FORMOSA, and Navy fighter units at SHINCHIKU, EINANSHO and OKAYAMA on FORMOSA. Army twin-engine light bombers are based on MIYAKO JIMA and Army single-engine bombers on TOKUNO JIMA. This information placing an operational airfield on TOKUNO JIMA, was received subsequent to the printing of Part 1 of Annex "D", map of NANSEI SHOTO Airfields and Target Areas and consequently no airfield is shown on TOKUNO JIMA on the map, which should be corrected accordingly.

6. Enemy naval strength available for combat and dispositions are estimated below, but information concerning the location of enemy naval units is unfortunately very poor at this time.

| | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Empire | 4 CV, 2 XCV, 4 CVL, 1 CA, 4 CL, 8 DD, 40 SS. |
| Formosa Area | 2 DD, 2 SS. |
| Philippines-Western Carolines | 4 DD, 6 SS. |
| Malaya-Borneo | 6 BB, 11 CA, 3 CL, 18 DD. |

Four CVE's and some destroyers are escorting.

Although almost all the enemy's carriers are listed as available for combat, actually probably only a few of them have air groups sufficiently trained for combat. It is most unlikely that he will risk any large portion of his fleet in combat until his carriers are fully prepared for action.

7. Merchant shipping: The Japanese are known to have been reinforcing NANSEI SHOTO very heavily during the past few months. Consequently a fair amount of merchant shipping, engaged in carrying supplies for the troops and materials for improving the defenses of the islands, should be found in this area. Much merchant shipping is to be expected at FORMOSA with the TAKAO Area the most important and KIIRUN and MAKO next in importance in that order. It is impossible to tell what the Japanese reaction to our recent heavy strikes on the VISAYAS and LUZON will be, but it is believed that in view of the size of the enemy's commitments in the PHILIPPINES, much merchant shipping will still be found in LUZON and the VISAYAS.

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NANSEI SHOTO

8. A. AIRFIELDS, ANCHORAGES AND TARGETS IN NANSEI SHOTO.
B. LOCATION OF PRINCIPAL ANCHORAGES AND AIRFIELDS AT
OKINAWA AND NEIGHBORING NANSEI SHOTO ISLANDS.
C. WATER DEPTHS FOR USE OF TORPEDOES IN ANCHORAGES
AT OKINAWA AND NEIGHBORING NANSEI SHOTO ISLANDS.
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(A) All information concerning airfields, anchorages, and targets in NANSEI SHOTO is contained in reference (a). It is believed that upon its retirement from the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the enemy fleet took refuge in NAKAGUSUKU WAN on the southeastern side of OKINAWA JIMA. NAHA Airfield on OKINAWA is an important staging point for aircraft flying from the EMPIRE to FORMOSA and enemy bases further south.

(B) Part 1 of Annex "D" is a chart showing the principal anchorages and the general location of the airfields in the portion of NANSEI SHOTO to be covered by this force on "A" minus 10 day.

(C) Water depth for use of torpedoes in anchorages at OKINAWA JIMA and neighboring NANSEI SHOTO Islands.

OKINAWA JIMA ANCHORAGES.

NAKAGUSUKU WAN: Depths in general permit using torpedoes, although there are some shallow spots. The waters of YONOBARU WAN, YONOBARU KO, BATEN KO and KATCHIN WAN can easily be reached by torpedoes. YONOBARU is reported most used by Japanese war vessels even though KATCHIN WAN gives most protection in the Northeast season from October through March.

NAHA KO: Suitable water for torpedoes can be found, although there are many shallow areas in which torpedoes could neither be dropped or run.

CHIMU WAN: Torpedoes could travel in practically all this water but approaches and dropping points must be selected.

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NAGO WAN: Torpedoes can be freely used.

SESOKO BYOCHI: Torpedoes may be freely dropped in the southern half of this anchorage.

TOGUCHI KO: Restricted deep water area and probably not suitable for torpedo attacks.

UNTEM KO: Approach and dropping point must be carefully selected in making torpedo attacks here.

KANTENA WAN: Torpedoes cannot be used in this anchorage.

KUME SHIMA ANCHORAGE (47 miles west of OKINAWA):

SHIMAJIRI WAN: Water suitable for torpedoes can be found but dropping point must be carefully selected.

KERAMA RETTO ANCHORAGES (18 miles west of OKINAWA):

AKA KAIKYO: Torpedoes may be used freely in this anchorage.

KERAMA KAIKYO: Torpedoes may be freely used if a few shoal spots near the entrance are avoided.

IRIOMOTE JIMA ANCHORAGE (118 miles east southeast of KIIRUN, FORMOSA):

FUNAUKE KO: The outer portion of the anchorage could easily be reached but a very skillful approach and drop would be required to reach the inner waters.

ISHIGAKI JIMA ANCHORAGE (142 miles east of KIIRUN, FORMOSA):

ISHIGAKI HAKUCHI: Torpedoes can be used freely in the outer harbor. The best torpedo run for ships in the inner harbor is from the Northwest.

MIYAKO JIMA ANCHORAGE (160 miles southwest of OKINAWA):

MIYAKO HAKUCHI: Only the outer parts of the anchorage are suitable for torpedoes.

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AMAMI O SHIMA ANCHORAGES (100 miles northeast of OKINAWA).

O SHIMA KAIYO: There is deep water here and in the inner anchorages of KUJI WAN and SATSUKAWA WAN, but only selected approaches are suitable.

NAZE KO and KASARI WAN: Deep water exists but only the seaward approach appears suitable.

FORMOSA

9. A. ENEMY AIRFIELDS AND SEAPLANE BASES.
B. ADDITIONAL NOTES ON ENEMY AIRFIELDS.
C. HARBORS AND ANCHORAGES.
D. WATER DEPTHS FOR USE OF TORPEDOES IN HARBORS AND ANCHORAGES.
E. SHIPPING ROUTES.
F. ALLIED POW CAMPS.
G. TARGETS.
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(A) Enemy airfields and seaplane bases are classified according to importance and plotted on Part 2 of Annex "D". For fuller information on these fields, consult references (b) (1), (b)(2) and (b)(3).

(B) Additional Notes on Enemy Airfields.

(1) KAGI Area:

According to a POW report, there is an Army Airfield at ROKURYO, South-Southeast of KAGI. It is described as being in a valley or plateau and it is possible that the field lies in one of several small valleys cutting the foothills just north of the UNSUI riverbed. It is also possible that this is the dummy airfield, consisting of 2 conspicuous runways East/West and Northwest/Southeast, located 5.2 miles Southeast of KAGI Airfield. This field is sometimes wrongly reported as CHOSU and KEISHU. The main KAGI Airfield is 4 miles West Southwest of the center of the town of KAGI.

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(2) KARENKO Area:

Although designated in Part 2 of Annex "D" as a field of secondary importance, it has been reported that an airbase of major proportions, a seaplane station, and an aircraft factory are in operation near KARENKO, probably north of the harbor.

(3) GARAMBI Field:

This is in all likelihood the field at KOSHUN and not a separate field.

(4) JITSUGETSUTAN Area:

A POW reports an airfield and AA defenses comprising several AA regiments in the immediate region. Existence of the airfield is questionable.

(5) TAITO Field:

The position of this field is uncertain. It has been reported as slightly Northwest of the town of TAITO, rather than as shown on Part 2 of Annex "D".

(6) BATAN (BASCO, MANANIOY) Field:

A small airfield has been reported on BATAN Island (20°24' N; 121°58' E), in LUZON Straits. Its dimensions are reported as 1056 feet by 316 feet.

(7) DALUPIRI:

An airfield is reported on the south part of DALUPIRI Island (19°03' N; 121°13' E) in LUZON Straits.

(8) CALAYAN:

An airfield is reported on CALAYAN Island (19°17' N; 121°27' E), in LUZON Straits.

(9) DUMMY AIRFIELDS - TAIHOKU AND TAINAN:

Reported locations are in the drill ground area, southwest of TAIHOKU and the drill ground area north of TAINAN.

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(C) HARBORS and ANCHORAGES.

(1) KIIRUN (KIRUN, KEELUNG) - 25°08' N; 121°43' E.

The principal harbor of northern FORMOSA and the primary port of entry for troops and supplies moving south.

Anchorage is available for vessels of from 3000 to 10,000 tons in the inner harbor with drydock for vessels up to 3000 tons. Larger vessels and most naval craft anchor in the outer harbor. On 10 September 1944 there were 120,700 tons of merchant shipping at KIIRUN.

An airfield, seaplane base, and submarine base have been reported in the KIIRUN Area, but their existence has not been verified, nor have locations been designated. The submarine base is possibly on the east shore of the harbor, i.e. on the south shore of SHARYO Island, on BASSHIKO WAN.

A POW reports that the harbor has been deepened considerably and that at present three or four vessels of 20,000 tons can moor in the outer harbor; docking facilities have been improved and the drydock is apparently capable of accomodating 10,000 ton ships.

A POW also states that there were usually 3 or 4 CA's or CL's and numerous DD's in KIIRUN HARBOR.

(2) TAKAO - 22°37' N; 120°15' E.

The primary industrial and military zone of FORMOSA and the largest convoy control point for ships leaving for the southern theatre.

Anchorage available for 20 vessels of 10,000 tons and 6 smaller vessels. Ships over 10,000 tons anchor in the outer harbor, just north of the breakwater. On 10 September there were present 103,000 tons including 3 large AO's; on 12 September there were 13 AO's and 33 AK's present.

Defenses consist of numerous AA and coastal defense guns, particularly on APE HILL, the KIGO Peninsula, and in the REIGARYO area.

A POW declares that the harbor has been deepened to the extent that ships of 20,000 tons can now go slightly past the railroad station and freight yards area.

(3) TOSHIEN - 22°38' N; 123°17' E.

Naval base under construction, nearing completion. Three 50 x 275 foot drydocks completed, one being lengthened. Although facilities are reputedly far from completed, on 9 September, there were 26,900 tons with 1 AO present, and on 10 September, 31,9000 tons, with 2 large AO's.

A POW reports that large scale construction has now been completed and that the harbor's importance as a naval base has increased to the extent that it is now considered in a class with MAKO (in the PESCADORES ISLANDS).

(4) MAKO (BAKO, HOKO) - PESCADORES ISLANDS -
23°33' N; 119°34' E.

L Large deep water anchorage in BAKO BAY, used intermittently for convoy fueling and assembly. The ANSAN naval base serves as a station for naval escort vessels.

Strongly fortified with AA and CD guns. POW reports that many warships of all types were usually seen at MAKO, and that in February 1944 he saw 1 CVL, 1 possible CVL or CV, 4 CA's or CL's and a number of DD's off the PESCADORES Islands.

(5) ANPING KO (TAINAN) - 23°00' N; 120°08' E.

Inner harbor suitable only for small craft and junks. Only anchorage for ocean-going ships is an open readstead one mile offshore in five to six fathoms.

(6) TOKO - 22°28' N; 120°25' E.

Port admits only vessels of less than 5 foot draft over the entrance bar. Vessels of deep draft can use outer anchorage about 1¼ miles offshore. It is reported that important convoys frequently form in the area off the coast between TOKO and BORYO, a few miles to the southeast.

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(7) KARENKO - 23°58' N; 121°37' E.

Artificial harbor just north of KARENKO Town. No outer harbor. Vessels must anchor within the limited area enclosed by the small breakwater. Three vessels of 3000 tons can berth alongside. Proposed enlargement to accommodate 12 vessels of 6000 tons and 3 of 3000 tons.

Port has relatively limited storage and loading facilities, and it is used primarily by ships serving the aluminum, nickel, and chemical plants in the KARENKO Area.

A major naval airbase and seaplane station is reported north of the harbor. An aircraft factory is reported near the field.

(8) SUO - 24°34' N; 121°47' E.

The only natural harbor on the east coast, but facilities, unless considerably expanded recently, are extremely limited. The anchorage in the outer part of the bay is in about 12 fathoms, protected from all but southeast gales. There is safe anchorage for vessels drawing nine feet or less inside the south arm of the bay. Its importance is chiefly as a fishing base.

It was reported in 1936 that the Japanese were considering the possibility of establishing a naval base at SUO, but there has been no confirmation of this report.

(D) WATER DEPTHS FOR USE OF TORPEDOES IN HARBORS AND ANCHORAGES.

Torpedoes cannot be used in the inner harbors of TAKAO, TOSHIEN, or KIIRUN, but the outer harbors at TAKAO and TOSHIEN can easily be reached by torpedoes if the few isolated shoals are carefully avoided. At KIIRUN the outer harbor is within the breakwaters and is a very restricted area. Although the water of a major portion of the outer harbor is of suitable depth, an extremely skillful approach and drop would have to be made for a successful torpedo attack. Outside the breakwater there are only minor shoal areas to consider.

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Along the west coast of FORMOSA off-shore water is deep and ships inshore could easily be reached by torpedoes dropped at the eight fathom line.

In the PESCADORES suitable dropping points within torpedo range of the usual anchorages are readily available, although there are many shoal spots and areas with less than 8 fathoms of water.

(E) SHIPPING ROUTES:

Except for the direct routes from Japan to MANILA, the routes from the Empire to the south are almost entirely west of the NANSEI SHOTO, arriving at the North end of FORMOSA and either stopping at KIIRUN temporarily or continuing down the west coast hugging the beach as much as possible. The TAKAO inner and outer harbors, the newly-developed TOSHIEN naval base, and the PESCADORES anchorages are the chief waters used by merchant shipping on the north-south route. At this time of year, offshore anchorages at TAKAO, TOSHIEN, and ANPING KO(TAINAN) are suitable for most types of vessels.

The shipping route from TAKAO to MANILA is most generally the island hopping route down the west coast of FORMOSA to NAN WAN, ITBAYAT and BATAN ISLAND, or possibly into BASCO on BATAN, and then via BABUYAN to the North coast of LUZON. A less used route is from FORMOSA out into the SOUTH CHINA SEA to MANILA.

Overnight anchorages enroute to MANILA are at NAN WAN (21°55' N; 120°45' E.), SABBANG CHANNEL, BASCO (20°27' N; 121°28' E.), FUGA ISLAND (18°54' N; 121°55' E.), SIBANG, on the south coast of CALAYAN ISLAND, and BANGUI (18°34' N; 120°44' E.).

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(F) ALLIED POW CAMPS:

TAIHOKU - POW reports camp for high-ranking allied staff officers located approximately 6/10 of a mile west of HOKUSAKU village, and five miles south of TAIHOKU city, in a tangerine grove that had formerly been a Formosan cemetery.

Another report places a camp about three miles north of TAIHOKU city. In February 1943, a POW saw approximately 200 allied prisoners of war working on road construction in the MARUYAMA area, north of TAIHOKU city center.

KINKASEKI (25°07' N; 121°51' E) - POW reports suggest that approximately 500 U.S. and British prisoners of war are located in a camp in the midst of the KINKASEKI gold and copper mine area. Their living quarters are enclosed by a fence, the stockade being located to the west of the other buildings in the immediate area.

TAICHU - Location unknown. (Possibly moved to HORI, near LAKE JITSUGETSUTAN, 23°58' N; 120°57' E). A camp has been reported near TAICHU, with unpainted wooden barracks in a compound surrounded by a wire fence (POW report).

TAMASATO (23°10' N; 121°10' E) - At about the center of the TAITO-KARENKO valley in Eastern FORMOSA. It has also been reported that 100 U.S. and British prisoners of war have been interned at KARENKO (POW report).

HEITO - Several POW's mention the existence of an allied prisoner of war camp in or near HEITO, though its position is not known and it has been reported abandoned by several similar sources.

(G) TARGETS:

Primary targets are aircraft, shipping, aircraft facilities, including assembly plants, and harbor facilities, including fuel storage, ship repair facilities, docks, and warehouses. Fuel storage, although a primary target, should not be attacked until late strikes to avoid obscuring the target areas.

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Principal aircraft assembly plants are located at:

- | | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. SHINCHIKU | 24° 50' N; 120° 58' E. | in Task Group 38.2 Area. |
| 2. OKAYAMA | 22° 48' N; 120° 16' E. | in Task Group 38.4 Area. |
| 3. HEITO | 22° 40' N; 120° 27' E. | in Task Group 38.1 Area. |
| 4. KARENKO (Reported) | 24° 02' N; 121° 37' E. | in Task Group 38.3 Area. |

Principal fuel storages are located at:

- | | | |
|---|------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Kyushi Zan Oil Storage | 25° 09' N; 121° 44' E. | In Task Group 38.2 Area. |
| 2. Rising Sun Petroleum Storage | 25° 10' N; 121° 27' E. | in Task Group 38.2 Area. |
| 3. Mitsubishi Oil Storage | 22° 37' N; 120° 17' E. | in Task Group 38.1 Area. |
| 4. Toshien Fuel & Munitions Depot | 22° 40' N; 120° 17' E. | in Task Group 38.4 Area. |
| 5. Parade Ground Oil Stores (PESCADORES ISLANDS) | 23° 33' N; 119° 35' E. | in Task Group 38.3 Area. |
| 6. Naval Base Oil Stores (PESCADORES ISLANDS) | 23° 33' N; 119° 34' E. | in Task Group 38.3 Area. |
| 7. Suo Oil Storage | 24° 36' N; 121° 53' E. | in Task Group 38.2 Area. |

Following the destruction of primary targets, industrial targets may be designated. A list of some of the more important industrial targets, with a suggested order of priorities in each area, follows:

Task Group 38.1 Area:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| Takao Transformer Station | 22° 39' N; 120° 17' E. |
| Nippon Aluminum Company | 22° 37' N; 120° 17' E. |
| Industrial Alcohol Plant (TAKAO) | 22° 37' N; 120° 17' E. |
| Reigaryo Sugar and Alcohol Plant | 22° 34' N; 120° 19' E. |
| Heito Sugar and Alcohol Plant | 22° 39' N; 120° 29' E. |
| Takao Railroad Shops and Yards | 22° 37' N; 120° 17' E. |
| Hozan Wireless Telegraph Station | 22° 38' N; 120° 22' E. |
| Hozan Chemical Warfare Depot | 22° 38' N; 120° 22' E. |

Task Group 38.2 Area:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Taihoku Transformer Station | 25° 01' N; 121° 32' E. |
| Byoritsu Refinery | 24° 34' N; 120° 49' E. |
| Matsuyama RR Shops and Iron Foundry | 25° 03' N; 121° 35' E. |
| Kinsui Casing Head Plant | 24° 37' N; 120° 53' E. |
| Maruyama Power Plant | 24° 39' N; 121° 40' E. |
| Carbon Black Plant | 24° 37' N; 120° 53' E. |
| Itahashi Wireless Telegraph Station | 25° 01' N; 121° 27' E. |

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Task Group 38.3 Area:

| | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| Japan Aluminum Company (KARENKO) | 24° 00' N; 121° 37' E. |
| Nickel Smelter (KARENKO) | 24° 00' N; 121° 37' E. |
| Taichu Alcohol Plant | 24° 08' N; 120° 42' E. |
| Kobi Sugar and Alcohol Plant | 23° 42' N; 120° 26' E. |
| Kagi Alcohol Plant | 23° 29' N; 120° 26' E. |
| Nansei Sugar and Alcohol Plant | 23° 24' N; 120° 16' E. |

LAKE JETSUGETSUTAN

*Power Plant number one (Monpaitan) 23° 51' N; 120° 52' E.
Power Plant number two (Suiriko) 23° 49' N; 120° 51' E.

*Power Plant number one is the more practicable target but should not be bombed unless photographic reconnaissance, to be made the first day, determines whether bombing is feasible.

Task Group 38.4 Area:

| | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| Kyoshito Sugar and Alcohol Plant | 22° 46' N; 120° 17' E. |
| Tainan Magnesium Plant | 23° 00' N; 120° 09' E. |
| Taito Sub-Station | 22° 45' N; 121° 09' E. |

Detailed descriptions and photographs of principal targets and target areas are contained in references (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(4).

Care must be exercised to place bombs in the designated target areas. The bulk of the Formosan population is Formosan - Chinese (approximately 5.5% of the total population is Japanese) and there is good reason to believe that these people are opposed to the Japanese yoke. Pilots should be thoroughly briefed on the precise locations of industrial targets when assigned, and indiscriminate bombing and strafing is to be avoided.

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LUZON

10. A. AIRFIELDS.
B. SHIPPING.
C. WATER DEPTHS FOR USE OF TORPEDOES.
D. TARGET DATA.
E. EVASION AND ESCAPE.
-

(A) Airfields:

(1) Appendix 1 to this Annex lists all known airfields in LUZON. Those airfields believed most important are marked with two asterisks, and the fields which are believed operational but of secondary importance are marked with a single asterisk. The fields not marked are believed non-operational. The numbers on the list appearing before the airfield names refer to the numbers on the map of LUZON Area Airfields, which was Appendix 2 to Annex "F" to Supplement No. 2 to ComFIRSTCarTaskForPac Operation Order No. 10-44. Copies of this map have been delivered separately to the carriers in Task Group 38.4 which were not on the distribution list for Supplement No. 2 to ComFIRSTCarTaskForPac Operation Order No. 10-44 so that now all carriers have copies of this map. The following corrections should be made on the map:

- (a) Remove POLILLO Airfield No. 35, marked as operational, from the map. POLILLO Island was thoroughly investigated and photographed by planes from this force and no airfield could be found.
- (b) Change MANDALUYONG, No. 74, from non-operational to operational. A few planes were found on this field.
- (c) Change MALVAR, No. 59, from non-operational to operational. Planes were also found on this field.
- (d) Change the Southern SAN MARCELINO field, No. 85, from under construction to operational. Several planes were found on this field and many fighters were shot down over it.

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- (e) Add BUGALLON as under construction and mark it No. 105. It is located on the highway, just south of LINGAYEN.
 - (f) Add MANKAYAN as under construction and mark it No. 106. It is located about 28 miles due east of LUNA, No. 25.
 - (g) Add IGUIG as under construction and mark it No. 107. It is located about 10 miles due north of TUGUEGARA0, No. 3.
- (2) Conflicting information has been received concerning the following airfields:
- (a) LINGAYEN, No. 18. One air group reported that the field was under water, but another reported it as a good grass strip with three planes present.
 - (b) PILI (NAGA), No. 42. It is reliably reported that the old airfield is being greatly expanded by the Japanese Army, but a reconnaissance flight failed to find even the old field.
 - (c) BULAN, No. 47. Reliable sources have repeatedly reported aircraft at this field, but pilots who have flown over BULAN state that the old field appears abandoned. However, a captured document shows the highway running in the direction of the prevailing wind as an excellent runway with taxiways constructed along the side of the road.
- (3) MANILA Airfields: Appendix 2, Airfield and Target Chart MANILA and Suburbs, shows the location of all the MANILA Airfields, except LAS PINAS. NEILSON and NICHOLS are major airfields with numerous installations, and many planes of all types were present on both fields during the previous strikes by this force. ZABLAN, the old PHILIPPINE Army Field, is fully operational and quite a few twin-engine planes were destroyed there. GRACE PARK, PASIG and MANDALUYONG are all operational strips, and a few planes were found on each field. However, there are practically no installations at these fields.

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One plane was found on MARIKINA, which is an operational strip without installations. QUEZON Field (No. M5 on Appendix 2) had no planes on it and showed no signs of use, but pilots state that both roads have been widened sufficiently to permit their use as runways. According to pilots MANDALUYONG East does not appear operational but might be available for emergency use. Pilots reported finding nothing at the supposed location of a strip just west of the site of the proposed University of the Philippines. No pilot reports were received concerning BALARA, a prewar field, which has been reported as enlarged by the enemy. A field known as LAS PINAS or NICHOLS No. 2 has been reported constructed by the Japanese eight and one-half miles south of MANILA and in use by training planes. During the previous operation pilots reported two possible fields in the area; one believed to have a single turf runway with about twelve barracks type buildings around the northeast end of the runway and possible AA along the sides and the second thought to have criss-cross runways under construction but no buildings or AA positions. There was no air activity in the area. No pilot reports were received concerning ALABANG field which has also been reported used by training planes. Since the reported position of the latter field is only a few miles southeast of that of LAS PINAS, it is likely that these are the two fields observed. No aircraft were found at the supposed strip on DEWEY BOULEVARD near the Polo Club, but pilots state that single-engine planes could probably be flown off that portion of the boulevard.

- (4) Other airfields in LUZON: NEW LIPA, No. 57, is a single concrete strip where about 25 planes mostly NICKS were found. Task Group 38.2 covered the CLARK Field Area during the previous strikes by this force, and Commander Task Group 38.2 has been requested to prepare a description of the airfields in this area which will be distributed to all carriers.

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(B) Shipping.

Considerable amounts of merchant shipping will probably still be in the LUZON area although the usual practice of dispersal of shipping destined for MANILA is being intensified. Probably only that shipping currently being handled will be present in MANILA Bay. Anchorages in which shipping has been dispersed are:

SUBIC Bay Area:

PORT OLONGAPO
PORT BINANGA
PORT SILANGUIN
TALISAIN BAY
CALAGUAGUIN BAY

MARIVELES at the South tip of BATAAN.

MASINLOC, 15°33' N, 119°57' E.

SANTA CRUZ, 15°46' N, 119°55' E.

BOLINAO, 16°25' N, 119°55' E.

SAN FERNANDO, 16°37' N, 120°19' E.

SOLVEC COVE, 17°26' N, 120°27' E.

VIGAN BAY, 17°30' N, 120°22' E.

LAPOG, 17°45' N, 120°35' E.

CURRIMAO, 18°00' N, 120°30' E.

BANGUI BAY, 18°32' N, 120°44' E.

PASELANG BAY, 18°34' N, 120°55' E.

APARRI, 18°22' N, 121°38' E.

BATANGAS and VERDE PASSAGE Area between
MINDORO and LUZON.

PUERTA GALERA, 13°30' N, 120°55' E.

CORON BAY Area, 12°02' N, 119°56' E.

LUBANG Island, 13°47' N, 120°10' E, especially
LOOC BAY.

(C) Water Depths for use of torpedoes.

MANILA BAY: There are no shoal spots to interfere with the dropping of torpedoes in MANILA Bay except where the water becomes shallow off the beach. However, since the gradient of the bottom toward the beach is gentle, the eight fathom line is located a considerable distance out from the shore. For convenience in planning torpedo attacks, the eight fathom curve is plotted on the grid chart of MANILA Bay, a copy of which is included with this annex.

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SUBIC BAY: The water is deep in SUBIC BAY and torpedoes may be freely dropped.

(D) Target Data.

(1) Aircraft assembly and repair facilities and other important airfield installations are located at NEILSON and NICHOLS Fields and between CLARK and CLARK North.

(2) Permissible bombing targets in LUZON after the destruction of aircraft, shipping and aircraft installations are:

MANILA AREA, in order of priority.

(Note: numbers are those shown on Appendix 2, Airfield and Target Chart MANILA and Suburbs).

- Target 1. Tank farm in the PANDACAN district on the south side of PASIG River.
- Target 2. Tank farm at SANGLEY POINT. Photos taken on the previous raid by this force show large fuel tanks intact.
- Target 3. Fuel tanks remaining in main wharf area.
- Target 4. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. - Both plants, one at north side of mouth of PASIG River and the other on south side of PASIG River near Spencer and Kellogg Co. These are extensive machine shops for fabrication of structural steel.
- Target 5. Earnshaw Docks and Honolulu Iron Works and the facilities on Engineers Island. Three submarines were at the Earnshaw slipways during the prior attack on MANILA.
- Target 6. The main dock and warehouse area as far east as Chicago Street.
- Target 7. The Marsban Building, containing engineering workshops, is located in this area just across from the Navy landing south of Pier 7.
- Target 8. The CAVITE shop and ship repair facilities.

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- Target 9. The OLONGAPO shipping and ship-building installations.
- Target 10. The Railroad Yards at CALOOCAN.
- Target 11. Barracks area at Camp Murphy.
- Target 12. Ammunition stores at Dilliman Estate and site of New University of the Philippines.

Note: Oil storage, although given a very high priority, should not be bombed until late strikes to avoid obscuring the target areas.

LUZON, north of MANILA, in order of priority:

- Target 1. Port facilities at PORO, 16°37' N; 120°18' E, including any remaining oil tanks near the pier and at nearby SAN FERNANDO.
- Target 2. Mill and smelter at the LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. at MANKAYAN, 16°52' N; 120°48' E.
- Target 3. Port facilities, MASINLOC, 15°33' N; 119°57' E, which handle output of nearby chrome mines which supply 20% of Japanese chrome needs.
- Target 4. Port facilities, BALURATE, 15°45' N; 119°53' E, just southwest of SANTA CRUZ, loading facilities for nearby chrome mines.
- Target 5. Central AZUCARRERA DE TARLAC at SAN MIGUEL, 15°26' N; 120°37' E, Sugar Mill.
- Target 6. Pampanga Sugar Mills, DEL CARMEN, 14°59' N; 120°32' E.
- Target 7. Pampanga Sugar Co., Inc., SAN FERNANDO, 15°02' N; 120°42' E.

Southeast LUZON:

- Target 1. Aviation gas stores at HONDAGUA, 13°57' N; 122°14' E.
- Target 2. Diesel oil storage tanks at PORT JOSE PANGANIBAN, 14°17' N; 122°42' E.
- Target 3. Oil tanks at PARACALE, 14°18' N; 122°47' E.
- Target 4. Pier and loading facilities CALAMBAYANCA Island, 14°19' N; 122°30' E.

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(3) All pilots must be carefully briefed not to engage in indiscriminate strafing and bombing and must attack only their assigned targets. This is essential to prevent injury to friendly Filipinos.

(4) Special caution must be exercised to avoid damage to known POW camps located at SANTO TOMAS University, FORT MCKINLEY near NEILSON Field, BILIBID PRISON, FORT SANTIAGO in INTRAMURAS, LAS PINAS and PASAY RIVER District in the MANILA Area and elsewhere at CABANATUAN, LIPA, BAGUIO, ANGELES and LOS BANOS at the south end of LAGUNA de BAY. The camps located in the metropolitan area are shown on Appendix 2, Airfield and Target Chart MANILA and Suburbs.

(E) EVASION and ESCAPE:

Separate maps showing areas of enemy concentrations and where friendly forces are operating on LUZON either have been or will be received by all carriers. It should be noted that these areas frequently overlap and it must be borne in mind that the so-called guerilla forces in the built up areas of LUZON are only an underground. Japanese occupy key centers and communication lines leaving other areas free. Therefore all major roads are to be avoided. The mountains are always the safest refuge especially the SIERRA MADRES and to a lesser extent the Southern ZAMBALES and the mountains in Southern CAVITE PROVINCE, but one should proceed with extreme caution in the mountains of BATAAN. A pilot forced down in the MANILA-CAVITE area is badly off but may possibly find help in the BARRIOS in the vicinity; however he should make every effort to get to the mountains avoiding all roads. Relatively safe areas are southern BONDOC Peninsula and POLILLO Island except for POLILLO Town. Excluding the coastal area and the DINGALAN-LAUR Road, the area from ANTIPOLLO* to MARCELINO POINT and as far north as a line from CABANATUAN to CAPE ENCANTO (but giving CABANATUAN a wide berth) is relatively safe.

* ANTIPOLLO is located at 14°35' N, 121°10' E.

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INFANTA, DINGALAN BAY, BALER and CASIGURAN Sound are especially to be avoided, but the northeast coastline above CASIGURAN Sound is relatively safe. The central plain from MANILA Bay to LINGAYEN Gulf and the entire CAGAYAN River Valley are to be avoided.

VISAYAS

11. A. AIRFIELDS.
 - B. SHIPPING.
 - C. TARGET DATA.
 - D. EVASION AND ESCAPE.
-

(A) Airfields:

(1) LEYTE: The only operational field is TACLOBAN. DULAG, MALABKA (BURI), SAN PABLO, BAYUG and VALENCIA are serviceable but non-operational. ORMOC is not serviceable. A sketch of the LEYTE fields is being prepared for distribution to all carriers in sufficient quantity for pilot use.

(2) CEBU: Operational fields are OPON on MACTAN Island and LAHUG just outside CEBU City. Float-planes have regularly been found at the CAUIT Island Seaplane base.

(3) NEGROS: The most important operational fields on NEGROS are FABRICA, SARAVIA, BACOLOD, and MANAPLA, and to a lesser degree DUMAGUETE. Other serviceable fields are TANZA, TALISAY and possibly SILAY. At LA CARLOTA and other grass strips in the vicinity, which were probably BINALBAGAN, HINIGARAN and VALLADOLID, many planes were found hidden and well camouflaged. The fields themselves are difficult to find and with the exception of LA CARLOTA and BINALBAGAN are not accurately located. There are probably planes remaining at these fields and at other grass fields in western and Southwestern NEGROS.

A map of Northern NEGROS showing the known locations of existing airfields and overlays of FABRICA, MANAPLA, SARAVIA, TANZA, SILAY, TALISAY, and BACOLOD are being distributed to all carriers in sufficient quantities for pilot use. The

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position shown for LA CARLOTA on the map is that of the prewar field which was not covered by photographs during the previous operation nor were any reports received from pilots concerning it. Recently received photographs show a new operational field with a single northeast-southwest runway one-half mile west of the town, north of the main east-west road, and one and one-half miles northwest of the prewar field. The map should be corrected accordingly. BINALBAGAN, which is south of the area covered by the map, has a single operational north-south strip located about one and one-quarter miles south of the town and between the river and the main road. There are many revetments under clumps of coconut trees.

(4) PANAY: There are only two strips known to be operational based on coverage by this force, namely MANDURRIO and SANTA BARBARA, but SAN JOSE DE BUENA VISTA is reliably reported an important field and LOCTUGAN in Northern PANAY is probably operational. Overlays of MANDURRIO and SANTA BARBARA are being prepared for distribution to all carriers.

(5) MASBATE: MASBATE Field is serviceable but probably non-operational. The other fields on the island appear overgrown.

(6) MINDORO: The SAN JOSE field on Southwest MINDORO has recently been reported in use.

(7) SAMAR and BOHOL: No fields are believed operational on either of these islands.

(B) SHIPPING:

The most used inter-island route from MANILA to PANAY, NEGROS, CEBU, and LEYTE is via VERDE, BURIAS and TICAO Passages, perhaps stopping at SANTA CRUZ on MARINDUQUE, and then on to the usual ports of ILOILO, CEBU, BACOLOD, ORMOC and TACLOBAN. The route via TABLAS Strait has been a secondary one but may assume greater importance because of its greater distance from ocean waters to the East.

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(C) TARGET DATA:

(1) Permissible bombing targets in the VISAYAS after the destruction of aircraft, shipping, and airfield installations are fuel storage, docks, warehouses and other shipping facilities in the major ports including BACOLOD.

(2) Motor torpedo boats are known to have been stationed in the TACLOBAN Area, although none have recently been seen or reported. They are thought to have been moved to hide outs along the east coast. Every opportunity must be taken to destroy these craft.

(3) Destruction of all known or discovered Japanese installations on LEYTE rates a high priority. It is reported that 1000 Jap Marines are located at BARRIO SAN JOSE South which is adjacent to TACLOBAN (CATAISAN) field and at which there are no friendly natives. New buildings occupied by the Japanese are reported 2½ miles Northwest of TACLOBAN. In BURAUEN Town there are several buildings used for aircraft parts storage and plane repair, but these buildings cannot be accurately located in photographs. However, at the North end of BURAUEN Town there is a clearing containing underground, revetted and loose stores and three AA positions which were empty as of 24 September. North of BURAUEN between the north-south road and the MALABKA (BURI) strip a barracks area is located. At the VALENCIA air strip, which is located one-half mile west of the town and serviceable, though under active construction, there is a tight group of barracks or warehouses directly east of the taxiway. Another loose group of barracks or warehouses is located three-quarters of a mile northwest of the taxiway on the east side of the main north-south road. There are large quantities of loose stores on both sides of the road between the first mentioned barracks or warehouse group and VALENCIA Town. Troop concentrations are reported

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in DULAG, BURAUEN, DAGAMI, JARO, ORMOC, VALENCIA, TACLOBAN, JARO, LAPAZ, DOLORES. Defenses along the East Coast are being rushed.

(4) As in the case of LUZON pilots must confine their attacks to their assigned targets and must not engage in indiscriminate strafing and bombing. Any power driven boats are enemy. Sailing craft are manned by friendly natives.

(D) ESCAPE and EVASION:

All carriers either now have or will receive from their respective Task Group Commanders separate maps showing the principal enemy concentrations and the areas where friendly guerilla forces are operating in the VISAYAS. It is believed these maps are still substantially correct except that the enemy has recently strengthened his hold on the eastern coastline of LEYTE. It should be noted that the areas of enemy concentrations and where friendly forces are operating frequently overlap. The general rule of avoid all roads and towns and make for the hills still applies. Ninety percent of the natives are pro-American and the majority speak English. American money is not necessary; use parachute material and items in back pack. Cigarettes are a most highly appreciated item and should be handed out one at a time. Sidearms should be carried exposed. Spanish priests should be avoided particularly on CEBU and NEGROS. All in all, conditions are most favorable for escape in the VISAYAS and several pilots have already been well received by the natives.