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Plato.

London : G. Bell, 1887.

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THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

BOOKS I. AND II.

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Οὐ γὰρ ἀόριστον τὸ εἰκαίον.

ÆSCHINES.

Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον.

THEOGNIS.

THE REPUBLIC

OF

PLATO

BOOKS I. AND II.

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND THE
ARGUMENT OF THE DIALOGUE

BY

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THIRD EDITION

LONDON: GEORGE BELL AND SONS

YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN

1887

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THE present text is that of C. F. HERMANN, with
the exception of STALLBAUM's conjecture, *ἐμποίησας* for
ἐμποιῆσαι, p. 333 E.

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. 'The finest of human intellects, exercising boundless control over the finest of human language.' If these words, in which Plato's genius has been described, are to be taken, not as the language of misguided enthusiasm, but as the verdict of competent criticism, we may well pause, in approaching the *Republic*, in order to attempt to grasp the situation, philosophical and political, that produced the masterpiece of Greek literary effort which lies before us.

After the storm comes the calm. The Peloponnesian War was over; Athens had passed through the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred, and through the tyranny of the Thirty; Socrates and Plato, amongst their fellow-citizens of Athens, had looked upon the destruction of their city's walls, the walls which had made Athens what she was; public irritation and private resentment had cut short Socrates' few remaining years of life—he was more than seventy years of age at the time of his impeachment—when Plato relinquished that promiscuous intercourse with all classes of citizens, which he had practised as Socrates' companion, for the private study of philosophy. He made the *Academeia*, a gymnasium lying on the north-east side of Athens, his

B

home; whence, without passing through the city,¹ he could reach the Lyceum, another gymnasium on the north-west, which had been Socrates' favourite haunt (*τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ διατριβάς, Euthyphro, init.*); and in the Academeia he delivered the results of his philosophical inquiries to all those who came to hear him.

In the intervals of his systematic studies, his mind continually reverting to the friend and master whom he had made the companion of his life, he poured forth a continuous series of biographical sketches, in which he treated all those ethical questions which engaged attention at the time, in relation to Socrates' life and Socrates' opinions with regard to them. It was a labour of love, demanding systematic work and careful elaboration, and could never have been carried out without an absorbing interest in the character of the man who is the hero of these Dialogues.

In the *Republic* of Plato, the completest and most elaborate of all his Dialogues, we find ourselves at a new point of departure in Greek philosophical thought.

The first philosophers were the Ionian physicists, such as Thales and Anaximenes, with whose systems Socrates had little or no sympathy. Next came Pythagoras, who thought that number was the essence of all things, a belief which must have swayed Plato's dictum in *Republic*, Book VI., page 546 C, viz. that disregard of a certain 'perfect number' (*ἀριθμὸς τέλειος*) is fatal to the existence of a good city. Reference to Pythagoras' teaching is also found on pages 600 B and 530 D.

But although this philosopher exerted no small influence over Plato's fancies, we must pass to the Eleatic

¹ See *Lysis, init.* ἐπορεύομην μὲν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας εὐθὺς Λυκείου τὴν ἔξω τείχους ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος.

school to trace the origin both of Socrates' method and of Plato's philosophical system.

Socrates' method was that of the Eleatic Zeno, who is styled by Aristotle the father and founder of dialectic; it was principally a negative method, *i.e.* it tended towards the destruction of error and the testing of facts. This method Socrates shared with the Sophists, a number of men professing to teach ethic, some of whom had applied this Eleatic method of criticism to all relations of life with a corrupting and subversive effect that had roused the indignation of orthodox and constitutional Athenians.

Passing on from the method to the system, we find that the Eleatic school held the belief that the world of sense, that is, tangible objects, did not really exist. This is in direct agreement with the system of philosophy which Plato constructs in Books VI. and VII. of the *Republic*¹; where objects of sight and touch (*φαινόμενα*) are stated to be three times removed from their Real Originals, of which they are emanations.

Independently of this negative, or Eleatic belief, Plato's philosophy also had its positive side; it recognised as the origin of all being certain forms (*εἶδη*) cognisable only by pure reason (*Νοῦς*). *Λόγος τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη*, page 511 C. In this belief we see the influence of Anaxagoras, a philosopher who was driven from Athens, B.C. 432, who spoke of *νοῦς*, or Intelligence, as the designing and arranging principle of the universe.² Since the expulsion of Anaxagoras, positive philosophy had held no place in Athens. As a substitute for it the lectures of Sophists had engaged public attention and

¹ See abstract of the Dialogue, *libb. citt.*

² See Aristotle, *Metaph.* i. 3.

had fostered private inquiry. The Sophists' lectures, like their method, were rather critical than positive; the Sophists did not contribute to general knowledge; they proved the fallacy of this question or that, and those of them who were inclined to rhetoric, taught the art of persuasion. But Plato, following upon hints dropped by Socrates, and not merely reproducing, the words of his teacher, struck out again into the path of constructive philosophy. Whilst he shows us in his Dialogues that no one appreciated the Socratic and Sophistic method, or *ἔλεγχος*, better than himself, it is in the *Republic*, beyond the other Dialogues, that he demands, under the characters of the sons of Ariston, a positive and coherent account of Justice, of Being, and of God. Whilst therefore sharing in the general tendency of Eleatic thought, Plato must be regarded as having developed and elaborated the main tenet of Anaxagoras' philosophy.

With this brief account of the conditions which furnished the occasion and the speculative direction of the *Republic*, we proceed to inquire into what divisions the Dialogue naturally falls.

§ 2. Setting aside the division into books, at once arbitrary, and, as in the case of Books II. and III., incorrect, we find that, speaking very generally, there are three main divisions of the Dialogue.

I. There is the preface, or, as Socrates calls it (page 357 C), the *προοίμιον*, which lasts from the beginning of the work to the end of the first book, and is carried on to page 367 E, that is, rather less than half Book II. This first part is occupied with a refutation of popular and Sophistical definitions of, and opinions concerning, justice, and with an elaborate statement of

the advantages of injustice, given as a challenge to Socrates by the two sons of Ariston.

II. In the second division of the Dialogue we have a defence of Justice given at length by Socrates, who finds it necessary to put the growth of an imaginary city before the minds of his hearers (*εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ*, page 369 A), in order to discover the growth of Justice in that city, and to transfer it analogically to the mind of individual man. The description of the origin, the life, the requirements of this State, and the education of its members, together with sundry *ἀπορίαι*, *i.e.* difficulties, put forward and discussed, occupy the remainder of Book II. and the whole of Books III.—V. inclusive. But in Book V. the Dialogue is beginning to assume a more analytical and esoteric phase. Socrates has already thrown out a hint of this: he has already admitted that his State and his Justice hitherto described are accommodated to popular comprehension: *καὶ εὖ γ' ἴσθι, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων, οἷαις νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μὴ ποτε λάβωμεν· ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδὸς ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα*: page 435 D.

III. Now, however, as the last *ἀπορία*, *viz.* 'The ruler of the State must be a philosopher,' is proposed, and to some extent settled, Socrates suggests that the thorough and complete solution of the whole of this point would be quite sufficient to set the main inquiry at rest, without entering upon other points connected with it: *ἔμοι γ' οὖν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι, εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου* (Book VI. *init.*). And this, on the whole, is the purport of the rest of the Dialogue, *i.e.* Book VI. to X. *fin.* This part starts with a study of the philosophic nature, gives the education

necessary for its development, propounds and accommodates to the philosophic nature the theory of Ἰδέαι, and with a digression upon the various degenerated forms of the perfect State, comes to an end in an account of the rewards that follow upon a life lived according to philosophy and justice.

To sum up, then, there are three parts into which the *Republic* may be divided. First, the prelude; secondly, the discovery of Justice through the creation of an Ideal State; thirdly, the elaboration and idealization of this State through a carefully worked out system of philosophy.

This division has been called a rough one; we proceed to give a more detailed view of the structure of the work.

I. The first part, or preface, may conveniently be kept, viz. Book I. *init.*—Book II. page 367 E.

II. Next we have the creation of a State, and the nature of Justice as found in it, pages 367 E—435 A.

III. Transference of Political Justice to man by analogy, pages 435 A—449 B.

IV. Three ἀπορίαι, or τρικυμῖαι, arising out of the question, 'How is the State to be managed?' pages 449 B—505 A.

V. Philosophical system of Ἰδέαι, or Real Existence, pages 505 A—541 B.

VI. Different forms of degeneration from the Ideal State, and the types of man corresponding to them, pages 543 B—579 C.

VII. Comparison between the just and unjust man; and their respective rewards, 579 C—*fin.*

§ 3. Following upon the first division of the Dialogue, the question demands attention—How far is the *Republic* a constructive dialogue? With a few exceptions, such as the *Apology*, and perhaps the *Cratylus*, which Professor Jowett looks upon as of a neutral stamp, Plato's Dialogues may be divided into two kinds: positive and constructive, and negative and destructive; i.e. those which try to prove, and those which try to disprove, some position or positions. Of the former the *Phaedo*, *Crito*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedrus* may be taken as examples; of the latter the *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, and *Meno*. The Dialogue before us is compound, i.e. it partakes of both kinds. In the first division of the book, viz. *init.*—367 E, Socrates is avowedly trying to disprove, and not to prove. He first destroys that definition of justice which is attributed to Simonides or Homer, or some other wise man; see 335 E, Μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, κοινῇ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ (sc. this definition of justice) φῆ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν εἰρηκέαι. He next combats at length a definition given by the inferior Sophist of the day, and shows that it is incorrect, see 352, *seqq.*; and, when he has twice shown the falsity of existing opinions on the question, 'What is Justice?' he openly confesses that he himself knows nothing at all of its true nature; see 354 B: *πρὶν δ' τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὐρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφήμενος ἐκείνου ὀρμηῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ . . . ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναί.*

So far in the Dialogue we have nothing of constructive import, with the exception of a few points by means of which Socrates overcomes Thrasymachus' position, which will be noticed in the text. And in the beginning of

Book II. we merely encounter a re-statement of Thrasymachus' position and an elaboration of his arguments; with which re-statement the first part of the *Republic* is held to conclude.

The earnest challenge of the sons of Ariston, *πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέσαι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμεινόν ἐστι δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον* (Book II. *init.*), has roused Socrates to an unusual effort, which he veils, as always, under the pretence of incapacity. He begins, not to tell them what Justice is, but to ask them to try with him if they cannot find a larger organism than the human soul wherein Justice dwells, and so to overcome the difficulty. 'Let us,' he says, 'construct a State, and find where Justice dwells in the State' (page 369 A). The word *γιγνομένην* here shows that we now have something to look for from Socrates himself,—that he has for the time renounced the destruction of error, and is entering upon the construction of a truth.

This constructive character the Dialogue maintains to its end. For the construction of a State is found to involve the construction of a complete system of education for all classes, and out of this system, again, there arises the necessity for constructing another and a more esoteric system of education for the upper class, and this involves the complete elaboration of a philosophical system. And besides these two systems of education and this system of philosophy which are contained in the *Republic*, we have a great deal of information and suggestion upon various other subjects conveyed to us by the way; for the Dialogue, although it has its unity, is far-reaching and discursive.

It must therefore be apparent to any one at all

familiar with the negative character of Platonic writing, what a valuable link in the chain of Greek thought lies before us in the *Republic*. Two complete systems of education and one of philosophy, a treatise upon the interdependence of classes in a State, trade, medicine, poetry, political economy, religion, the position of woman, death, slavery, the relation between mind and body, music, courage, temperance, science, immortality, all different systems of government, love, war, the stage, revolution, such, and many more questions of minor interest, do we find treated, in many cases with great care and elaboration, in this unique and universal Dialogue.

§ 4. We next come to inquire if it is possible from internal evidence to discover the motives that induced Plato to compose this Dialogue?

There can be little doubt that, amongst other motives, Plato approached the composition of the *Republic* with the intention of vindicating Socrates' life and opinions. It is an *Apologia pro vita ejus*. It may be replied to this that nearly all Plato's Dialogues partake, more or less, of this intention; and the reply would be true. Plato, we can see, had an unbounded veneration for the protagonist of his Dialogues as a man, as a philosopher, and as a dialectician. He must have experienced the bitterest grief at Socrates' death, and must have devoted a great part of his life to storing up, in these vivid dialectical portraits, reminiscences of his guide, philosopher, and friend. Now the Dialogue before us is at once the longest, with the exception of the *Laws*, and by far the most wide-reaching in the subjects of which it treats. (These subjects have been briefly summarized above.) It is, in fact, Plato's greatest effort. We expect, then, in

Plato's greatest effort to find the completest and the best account of Socrates' life and opinions. Those who look in Plato for anecdotes about Socrates will be disappointed, and must turn to the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. Plato does not deal in anecdotes. He never fell into what the author of *Vivian Grey* would call his anecdotage. He is too much of an artist to endeavour to depict a man solely by what he did; he gives us the true account of his character by showing what he would have said and done under certain circumstances.

If we view Plato and Xenophon in their respective ways of treating the character of Socrates, we find that Plato's manner is romantic or poetic, whilst Xenophon's is matter-of-fact; that there is, in fact, the same distinction between them which Aristotle draws between poetry and history. He says, 'There is this difference between the historian and the poet: the former tells us what has happened, the latter what would happen. For poetry is concerned with the general, and history with the particular.'¹ Plato has clearly laid down for us the general lines of Socrates' character, as well as Xenophon; but he has done so by means of giving us a broad and a coherent account of the principles which formed his character.

Plato himself would have been loth to hear himself termed a poet; he condemns most poets and their poetry, and drives them from his Ideal State²; he even depreciates Homer,³ although his endless quotations show

¹ See *Poetic*, ix. 1451 ὁ, τούτω διαφέρει τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διδὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποιήσις ἱστορίας ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποιήσις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.

² See p. 398.

³ See Book X. *in it.* 602, C.

how he read and admired him; but he was a poet in this, the real, sense, of which Aristotle speaks. He tells us what were and also what would have been Socrates' opinions.

Plato, then, was a poet in this respect; but it does not follow, as a writer supposes in his preface to Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (Oxford Ed.), that Plato's portrait of Socrates given us in the Dialogues is an idealization. To us the otherwise marvellous consistency of the character renders this an impossibility, especially in regard of Socrates' religious professions, his method of dialectic, his humour, and, a point difficult of illustration, but of the greatest weight, his manner.

To place before his readers a complete account of Socrates, his beliefs, his method, and his character, is one of the objects of Plato's *Republic*. But there is another object which Plato had in view, bearing no direct reference to Socrates, viz. the presentation of an Ideal State; and this object is to be explained by the absorbing interest felt by every Greek in the politics of a free city, the love of a Republic and the hatred of a Despotism. Each citizen of a Greek city had his political opinions, and no doubt each citizen had his political hobby. Putting together this philo-political feeling, and a further one, viz., the love of one's own creations, upon which Plato himself insists,¹ we may feel certain that the work grew under his hands, and that the gratification of watching his city's growth urged the maker of the city to further efforts than he at first intended.

¹ οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτὰ. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι...
p. 330, C.

Again: Plato's *Republic* is evidently a work of art, the work of a mind bent on a complete and beautiful creation. The definition of such a work is laid down by Aristotle in his *Poetic* (1450 *fin.*) in these terms, τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν. And he also states that the magnitude of the work must be in proportion to its importance: μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν. If we allow that these principles of artistic construction are correct, and if we grant that Plato considered justice to be a subject demanding the most lengthy and detailed treatment, and the most elaborate development from popular to scientific definition, we may at the same time gather that he looked upon it as a theme specially susceptible of artistic treatment, from various points of beauty which distinguish the Dialogue. We do not here speak of such points of beauty as the simplicity of the style and the lucidity of the argument: they are natural to the writer, and inseparable from his style.¹ We speak rather of conscious and exceptional efforts to adorn his work. Such an effort results in the elaborate sketching of character which presents to us the admirable portraits, among others, of the violent Thrasymachus and the sincere yet sceptical Glaucon. Another such effort relieves the monotony of constructive dialogue, whilst it illustrates the text of the speaker, by the introduction of short romances, fables, and allegories. Such are the story of Gyges and his ring in Book II., the allegories of the cave in Book VII.,

¹ To the simplicity and lucidity of Plato's writing John Sterling bears witness. See Carlyle's *Life of John Sterling*, Library Edition, p. 139, 1870: 'For philosophic inquiry and truths of awful preciousness, I would select as my personages and interlocutors beings with whose language and "whereabouts" my readers would be familiar. Thus did Plato in his Dialogues.

and of the ship's captain in Book VI., and the narrative of Er concerning the after life in Book X.

Theognis wrote—

Κάλλιστον τὸ δίκαιότατον, λῶστον δ' ὑγαίνειν,
Ἕδιστον δὲ τυχεῖν ὧν τις ἕκαστος ἐρά,

where it is noticeable that Justice (the theme of the *Republic*) is placed first amongst human blessings, and described as 'the fairest'; and Plato in his Dialogue concerning Justice felt with Theognis that it was a subject which called for the decoration of the artist as well as the research of the philosopher.

Another and a more special motive makes itself apparent here and there in the Dialogue, viz., the desire to rebut specific charges against Socrates, and especially to answer those brought against him in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes¹ and the indictment of Anytus. We know that the latter was expressed in the words: *Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕρα δὲ καὶ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρον· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.*

To take the latter charge first: we find a distinct statement as to the corruption of young men, in Book VI. 492 A. *ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγά, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, διαφθειρομένους τινας εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους εἶναι σοφιστάς;* Here he denies that corruption of a class can be effected by individuals, and asserts that society and its depraved

¹ In *Rep.* p. 583, B, we meet this expression, after two proofs have been given of the superiority of justice to injustice, *δὲς γε νικηκὸς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον.* This expression cannot fail to recall at once the episode of the word-battle between the *δίκαιος* and *ἄδικος λόγος* in the *Clouds*; and if we add the other points of coincidence between the two works, we shall not fail to conclude that Plato wrote with distinct reference to that comedy of Aristophanes.

taste is the real corrupter. Thus he answers the latter count of Anytus' indictment and the whole plot of Aristophanes' play. Of the charge of impiety we must speak more in detail, because we have to gather, not from a single passage, but from many scattered up and down in the Dialogue, Plato's opinion as to this charge against Socrates. In the *Clouds* Socrates is represented as repudiating the existence of the gods—

Ποῖος Ζεὺς ; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις· οὐδ' ἔστι Ζεὺς.

l. 367—

just as he is charged in Anytus' indictment ; and he is also represented, *καιὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων* (in Anytus' words), by Aristophanes in the same play.

ΣΤ. ὁ δ' ἀναγκάζων ἐστὶ τίς αὐτὰς οὐχ ὁ Ζεὺς, ὥστε φέρεσθαι ;

ΣΩ. ἦκιστ' ἀλλ' αἰθέριος Δῖνος. ll. 379, 80.

How does Plato answer these charges? In the first place he represents the Socrates of the *Republic* as eminently orthodox in religious belief and religious observance. When Socrates comes to these subjects in the course of founding his city, he remarks that to Apollo of Delphi must be left the greatest, the best, and the first legislation, *τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ πρῶτα τῶν νομοθετημάτων . . . ἱερῶν τε ἰδρύσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων θεραπείαι*, p. 427 B. This is the teacher who was accused of disregarding the gods of his country ! For, be it noted, it is to Apollo,¹ *Θεὸς πατρῶος* of Attica, and not to Zeus, that Socrates refers questions of religion, a course that should satisfy the most fasti-

¹ v. *Euthydemus*, 302, C fin. Ἀπόλλων πατρῶος διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἴωνος γένεσιν.

dious of Athenian ritualists. And this is not a solitary instance of his orthodoxy.¹ We find on page 461 E, that the family regulations of the State are to depend upon a system of lots subject to the consent of the Pythia, *ἐὰν ὁ κλήρος ταύτη ξυμπίπτῃ καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναυρῇ*.²

In the next place Socrates in the *Republic* is represented as removing from the gods all those charges of cruelty and lust which legend had attached to them³; thus on page 377 E *seqq.* *ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἃ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὃ τε αὐτὸν Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν. τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέος, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ, ὦμην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι.* And in the same passage he states his disbelief in quarrels between the gods, the stories of Hera being bound by her son,⁴ of Hephæstus being thrown out of heaven by his father, and so forth.⁵

¹ Xenophon bears strong and direct testimony to the falsity of the charge of heresy against Socrates in *Mem.* 1, 2, *fin.* *Πῶς οὖν ἔνοχος ἂν εἴη τῇ γραφῇ; ὃς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν τοὺς θεοὺς, ὡς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ γέγραπτο, φανερός ἦν θεραπεύων τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.* And *v.* also on this point, chap. iii. 1-4, and iv. *ad fin.*

² Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 3, *in it.* *τὰ μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φανερός ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων, ἥπερ ἡ Πυθία ὑποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπείας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων; ἢ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμφ πόλεως ἀναγεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποιεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρῆνει.*

³ The rejection of popular legend about the gods caused the cry to be raised that Socrates did not believe in the gods themselves.

⁴ A confirmation of this hypothesis, that Plato is writing with the express purpose of vindicating Socrates' teaching from accusations brought against it, is afforded by Xenophon in his *Memorabilia*, 1, 2, 49; where he expressly mentions that Socrates was accused of inciting youths to 'bind,' *i.e.* imprison their fathers, an accusation which this present passage of the *Republic* would answer: *'Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης, ἔφη ὁ κατηγορὸς, τοὺς πάτερας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε ... φάσκων κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανομίας ἐλόντι καὶ τὸν πάτερα δῆσαι.*

⁵ For an explanation of this inconsistency, *viz.* the belief in

Thirdly, Socrates lays down in plain language the terms of his religious belief, his creed. The God in whom he believes is one, and eternal, and true¹; and knows the just from the unjust.²

God cannot harm any being, because he is good himself, and therefore cannot make anything bad: on the contrary, he is the author of all good to mankind, page 379 D. *τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἅπτα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἷτια, ἕλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. All his works are for the best, page 530, A. νομιεῖν μὲν, ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα τὲ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω ξυνεστάναι τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. And one more point in support of Socrates' orthodoxy may be added: that the occasion itself of this Dialogue arises on the return of Socrates from a religious observance, προσευξόμενος τῷ θεῷ, whither he had been, like any other good citizen.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that Socrates was an irreligious man or an atheist. On the contrary, and in accordance with what has been said above, Xenophon bears witness that Socrates' belief in divine supervision of earthly life amounted almost to superstition. His words are (*Mem.* 1, 3, 4), 'And if Socrates thought that he had any intimation from the gods, he would have been less likely to disobey it than to take a blind guide in a journey instead of one who could see. And he used to speak in severe terms of those who prefer the blind counsel of men

good and beneficent gods existing side by side with a number of immoral and revolting tales concerning them, see Sir G. W. Cox, *Aryan Mythology*, Book I. chap. vi. ed. 1870; also chap. iv. p. 66.

¹ 382, E.

² 612, E. θεός γε οὐ λανθάνει ἐκότερος αὐτῶν οἶός ἐστιν.

to warnings from the gods.¹ With this religious feeling is associated the *δαιμόνιον*, or actual supernatural check, which, so he devoutly believed, prevented him from entering upon a wrong course of action. *ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει, πρότρέπει δὲ οὔποτε.*² And this belief no doubt partly accounted for that clause in the indictment of Anytus, *καὶνὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων.*³ But we cannot help asking, if Socrates' religious teaching was as pure as it is represented by Plato, and it is hard to believe otherwise, how are we to account for the charge, *οὗς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων*, in the face of such testimony as we possess to Socrates' regular observance of religious forms? We can only say that the original worship of Zeus, the mighty king who dispenses justice to gods and men, had become totally corrupted, that legend had come to be regarded as the essence instead of the accidents or accretions of religion, and that belief in legend was jealously demanded by ultra-orthodox Athenians from any one who practised as a teacher.

At the same time it must be remembered that the anti-Socratic agitation took its rise in political animosity; the indictment, like the scorpion, bore the sting in its tail: *διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους.* Alcibiades and Critias were no doubt the *νέοι*, who had attracted the special attention of the accuser: they were more or less responsible for their country's ruin, and in their excesses we see the more immediate cause of Socrates' indictment. The first count, viz. that of heresy, arose from an

¹ See also Socrates' remonstrances with Aristodemus the Little, a man who habitually disregarded sacrifice, consultation with oracles, and other religious duties.—*Mem.* 1, 4.

² See however Xen. *Mem.* 4, 3, 12, where it is hinted that the *δαιμόνιον* initiated action. *εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτῶμενοι (sc. θεοὶ) ἐπὶ σου προσημαίνουσί σοι ἄ τε χρῆ ποιεῖν ἄ τε μή.*

³ For the *δαιμόνιον*, v. *Euthydemus*, 272 E.

ignorance of facts, the second from a confusion of causes.

§ 5. Another interesting question meets us as we follow Socrates' creation of his State, viz. How far Plato thought it possible to realize such a State and such a life? That this question had engaged Plato's own attention we can be sure. Not once nor twice do the hearers interpose with the question, 'But, Socrates, is such a state of things possible?' See page 471 C. Ἄλλα γάρ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέποτε μνηθῆσεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρωσάμενος πάντα ταῦτα εἶρηκας, τὸ ὡς δυνατὴ αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία γενέσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατὴ· *et infra E*, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἦδη πειρώμεθα ἡμῶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν, ὡς δυνατὸν καὶ ἢ δυνατόν. Socrates' reply to this challenge is characteristic. 'You swoop down upon me and my argument just as I was coming to the most difficult part of it. Now we are inquiring what Justice and the just man are: very good: we are, in other words, trying to find the model, or pattern, or canon, to which we can apply individual cases, judge of their merits, and so build up our own definition of Justice. We never started with the idea of proving that such things can be. No! a painter may be able to paint a most beautiful figure, and yet it will not follow that such a figure has ever existed, or does, or will exist. But such a figure is none the less beautiful, it is none the less useful; for it serves as an ideal towards which painters may direct their efforts.' In this answer Socrates parries the question: he has not sufficiently unfolded his scheme, nor sufficiently prepared the minds of his hearers to approach such a question.

But in the third *τρικυμία* (473 D), that is, the statement that evil and trouble will never cease till kings

are philosophers and philosophers kings, Socrates has delivered his mind, and he adds, 'Until this is so, our State will never come to be a possibility (*φύη εἰς τὸ δυνατόν*) and see the light of the sun.' The further question at once arises, 'What does Socrates mean by kings being philosophers, and philosophers kings?' The answer to it is found in the conclusion of Book V. and in Book VI. Briefly, he means by philosophers those men who are gifted with a strong will, that can master the desires of the body (*λογιστικοί*), and a clear head that can discriminate real from false (*φιλοσοφίας ἐρωτικοί*).¹ Even in this place he does not distinctly commit himself to the statement that such a city is actually to be realized; he only mentions here a necessary condition for its realization, which he repeats in slightly different terms in 499 B., *οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μή ποτε γένηται τέλος πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλλῃ πόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῇ πόλει κατήκοι γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων υἱέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπινοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρος ἐμπέσῃ.* 'Until philosophers are compelled to govern the State, or kings receive, through some divine afflatus, a real love of real philosophy, our city can never exist.' And he adds, as before, 'And whether either or both of these conditions can be realized, I maintain is a question wide of the mark.' But let us see what follows;—'Now if in some bygone age, or at the present time in some foreign country far from our ken, or in the future, it happens that men of a truly philosophic nature be

¹ A succinct definition of 'philosopher' is given in 484, B. *φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι.*

found managing the State, I am ready to maintain in argument that the city we speak of has been, or is, or will be realized. We confess the difficulty of the thing, but we deny that it is an impossibility. Χαλεπὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ καλά.' Here then we have at least Plato's, and probably Socrates' opinion, clearly laid down, that the State he speaks of is not merely Utopian. By the side of this passage such a remark as 'I forgot that we were not in earnest' (page 536 C, ἐπελαθόμεν ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν¹) may be dismissed as not affecting the question, as being a *façon de parler* on the part of Socrates. And if further confirmation be needed, we may turn to the end of Book VI., where Socrates appeals to Glaucon to allow that his State is not all cloudland, μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, that it is difficult to realize, but not impossible. Glaucon however is not convinced; on the contrary, he expresses farther on in the Dialogue (Book IX. *fin.* 592 B) his opinion that the State only exists in the Dialogue, and not in the world, πόλει τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. To which Socrates repeats his original answer, 'Whether such a city exist or not, it matters little; but we have it in heaven as an ideal towards which we can strive.'

Such is the internal evidence of the *Republic* with regard to Plato's belief in the possibility of his State. This evidence we leave to the reader, first adding a few remarks upon the different conditions of political existence at the time this Dialogue was written, conditions which materially affect the question as to the possibility of the existence of such a State. These conditions may be gathered into two heads:—

First, the great pliability at that period of a mass

¹ It is perfectly true that Socrates 'was in jest,' but he was also in earnest. "Ἐπαίξεν ἄμα σπουδάσων, *v. infr.*

of people or material from which the State was organized.

Secondly, the small extent of the material.

The second point may be dismissed in a few words. Aristotle in his *Ethics* (9, 10, 3) lays down that the limits of a State must be more than ten citizens and less than 100,000: οὔτε ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων. Plato, it is true, mentions four or five as the least possible number that could compose a State, but he is speaking only of its origin, not of its complete form: see page 369 E. Εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν. According to Ctesicles, at a census of the population of Attica taken under Demetrius Phalareus, the number of free burghers was 20,000, 10,000 μέτοικοι, and 400,000 slaves. And the frequency with which whole communities migrated or were transplanted in Greek history will serve to show that Aristotle's 100,000 is an extreme limit towards which the average πόλις did not nearly approach. To take a few examples of this fact, and omitting mention of the numerous parties of κληροῦχοι or colonists continually leaving Hellas, as being rather off-shoots than transplantations, we may call to mind the several movements of the Thereans under Battus, of which Herodotus speaks (see Book IV. 155, *seqq.*); or the exodus *en masse* of the Phocaeans, who are said to have sunk a stone in their harbour as a pledge of eternal exile; or the sudden transplantation of citizens from forty districts to the newly-founded town of Megalopolis in Arcadia by Epaminondas.¹ And this ease of manipulation could only be afforded by comparatively small numbers.

¹ Similar instances in ancient history are afforded by the removal of the Jewish nation to Babylon, and the deportation of the Cilician pirates to Soli by Pompey.

With regard to the former point, viz., the great pliability of these bodies of men, it must be remembered that the range of human thought at the period of the Athenian empire was much less extensive than at the present day, and that the general tone of a State was depreciated, in the case of democracies, by the admission of the mass of the lower classes to a share in the management of public business. Hence the whole πόλις was easily influenced by a powerful, or ambitious, or unscrupulous mind. At Athens, Peisistratus, Pericles,¹ and Cleon, men of very different stamp, all exercised at different times an undisputed empire over the Athenian mind; and, in the case of the two latter, the people followed their leader obediently, and ratified with constitutional voting whatever measures that leader might put forward. Even in matters requiring the gravest and the longest deliberation, a burst of rhetoric would carry a majority on the side of the speaker; as in the case of the condemnation of the Mytilenæans, where the audacity of Cleon was sufficient to blind the whole Athenian assembly to the atrocious nature of his proposal. ‘The most violent man in the whole city, and at the same time the most influential.’ (ὦν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαίωτατος τῶν πολιτῶν, τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, Thuc. III. 36.) Such is Thucydides’ description of Cleon, and although it is evidently pointed by oligarchical feeling, it is generally borne out by the story of Cleon’s career. And if the most violent man in a city is also the most influential, we can see that the mental and moral standard of the whole city must be low, and the city itself easily swayed. Cleon’s history is an example of the power

¹ In Xen. *Mem.* 2, 6, 13, Pericles is said to have *charmed* the city into following him. ἐπάδων τῇ πόλει ἐποιεῖ αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὐτόν.

wielded by a violent or unscrupulous mind. When Pericles' influence was in the ascendant, the city followed his guidance to the bitter end, even to enduring the worst hardships of a siege and a blockade; thereby illustrating the truth of Plato's belief, that the people are usually traduced, and only need proper guidance to bring them up to better things. (See 499, E.) But Cleon's case is the reverse of Pericles', and his influence depreciated the public tone, whilst it also shows how blindly the average citizen was led by the man whom he believed, rightly or wrongly, to be working for his interest. Now, as such a man could lead the populace when champion (*προστάτης*, see 565 D, and also C, *ὅταν περ φύγῃται τύραννος ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίψεως καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν*), so he could impress them when he had constituted himself permanent despot, as Peisistratus (*τύραννος*); or when he availed himself of his influence only for a time, as Lycurgus and Solon and Pericles are said to have done (*νομοθετής*). Such men, in fact, stamped their individuality on the peoples with whom they had to deal.

Let us see how Plato himself bears out this fact. In page 502 B, Socrates states that one single man, supposing that he have the city in obedience to his will, can bring everything to pass that seems to his hearers so difficult of accomplishment. 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην, πάντ' ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα. The constitution of the Spartan community is a striking instance of a whole people voluntarily submitting themselves to an irksome military *régime* (said to have been inaugurated by one man), lasting far on into middle life, against which they are known to have secretly, and in some cases openly,¹

¹ *E.g.* in the case of Pausanias and Lysander.

rebelled. To this opinion of Socrates, that a single man could impress himself upon an entire community, we must add one of his reasons already mentioned, viz., his above-mentioned belief that the common people were usually traduced, and really merited a much better reputation for capacity of improvement. See 499 E. *ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγορεῖ ἄλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἕξουσιν . . . κ.τ.λ.*

Such are the considerations which help to explain Plato's belief in the possibility of his State—a possibility, however, not to be realised, as he thought, till the existing generation with their traditions and prejudices had given place to the next, on which the legislator might work. See page 415 D. *ὅπως μὲντ' ἂν οἱ τούτων υἱεῖς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὕστερον.*

§ 6. The first step towards the constitution of a defending and protecting body in the State is education (Book II. page 376 E). And the first part of education is music, *i.e.* all learning which demands a direct effort of the mind, and is opposed to gymnastic. Again, the earliest step in musical education is fiction (*ψευδεῖς λόγοι*). But to the usual tales of fiction which relate to gods and heroes, Socrates takes great exception, because of their lightness, their impiety, and their immorality. A great deal is said in this Second Book, and a great deal more in Book III. upon the same subject, a subject which has been formulated in the expression, 'the conflict between religion and mythology.'

It is well known to all what cruel and immoral deeds are attributed to the members of the Greek theogony. Socrates mentions several of them in this Second Book

of the *Republic*, e.g. the binding of Hera by her son Ares, the mutilation of Ouranos by Kronos, how Ouranos devoured his own offspring, and so forth. But it is not equally well known that by the side of this variety of legends there existed a clear and well-defined belief in the existence of one Supreme Power, almighty and just, from the earliest time of which we have records in Greek writing. The object of this belief was not well defined, nor can we expect it to have been so; there was no attempt to define in strict terms the nature of God.

But the co-existence of this belief and this mythology challenged criticism in the mind of the people, conscious or unconscious. Sometimes the criticism broke out in the writings of the poets in the form of a declaration of faith in the Supreme Being and his purity; sometimes it appeared as a direct protest against the wickedness of the celestials or the impiety of attributing wickedness to them. At another time both declarations of faith and protests were combined with an attempt to grasp with the mind that which must be by its nature transcendent.

The necessity under which the human mind lies of believing in God is put forward in the *Odyssey* in simple and beautiful language,

πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσ' ἄνθρωποι.—*Od.* iii. 48.

'All men yearn after gods'; and the recurrence of the expression *θεουδής* in that poem points to a God who is to be feared by those who violate the laws of hospitality (see *Od.* vi. 121, where the expression is joined with *φιλόξενος*), and who upholds justice (*Od.* xix. 109, in connection with *εὐδικίας*). Justice is also said by Hesiod to originate in its purest form from Zeus, *ἰθείησι δίκαις*,

αἶ τ' ἐκ Διός εἰσιν ἄρισται: and the same poet bears witness to the omniscience of Zeus,

οὕτως οὔτε πη ἐστὶ Διὸς νόον ἐξαλέασθαι,

and speaks of the race of heroes who succeeded to the gold, silver, and bronze ages, as juster and nobler than their predecessors—

δικαιότερον καὶ ἄρειον,

ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος.

Where it is noticeable that they seem to be termed *θεῖον* or godlike, inasmuch as they are just and noble. In the same way, and in the same poem, men who fail to honour parents in old age are described as οὐδὲ θεῶν ὅπιν εἰδότες: and Αἰδώς (Reverence) and Νέμεσις (Just Anger) leave the earth and return to Olympus in the iron age of cruelty and strife. And the reward of prosperity is said distinctly to follow upon righteous dealing—

οἱ δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμουσι διδοῦσιν
 ἰθείας καὶ μή τι παρεκβαίνουσι δίκαιοι,
 τοῖσι τέθλη πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἀνθεῦσιν ἐν αὐτῇ,
 εἰρήνη δ' ἀνὰ γῆν κουροτρόφος, οὐδὲ ποτ' αὐτοῖς
 ἀργαλέον πόλεμον τεκμαίρεται εὐρύσπα Ζεὺς.

From these passages it will be seen that Hesiod believed the relation of God to man to be one of justice and active supervision:—

πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας,

are his words later on in the same poem; and although he speaks of Zeus' hatred of particular individuals and the harsh punishment which mortals incur at his hands, his general and his final conception of the Deity is of a pure and monotheistic character.

Pindar's religious belief finds its expression in a

strong protest against the credibility of mythological tales; thus in *Olymp.* 1, 82,

ἔμοι δ' ἄπορα γαστρίμαρ-
γον μακάρων τιν', εἴπειν ἀφίσταμαι.

And another of the early lyrists claims Virtue as the peculiar gift of Heaven—

οὔτις ἄνευ θεῶν ἀρέτην λάβειν
οὐ πόλις οὐ βροτός· Θεὸς δὲ παμμῆτις.

Whilst another says the same of what is noble—

ὅτι καλὸν φίλον ἐστί· τὸ δ' οὐ καλὸν οὐ φίλον ἐστί·
τοῦτ' ἔπος ἀθανάτων ἦλθε διὰ στομάτων;

and Sotades speaks of Temperance as their especial gift:—

ἂν δὲ σωφρονῆς, τοῦτο θεῶν δῶρον ὑπάρχει.

Empedocles (*Fr.* 437-9) expressly states that the same law of right (*θέμις*) is invariable for all—

οὐ πέλεται τοῖς μὲν θεμιτὸν τόδε τοῖς δ' ἀθέμιστον·
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νομίμων διὰ τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.

Here the language is vague, and the principle of justice is not referred to one Being as its originator, but the principle itself is none the less distinctly laid down. And a similar thought occurs in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, line 863—

εἴ μοι ξυνείη φέροντι
μοῖρα τὰν εὖσεπτον ἀγνείαν λόγων
ἔργων τε πάντων, ὧν νόμοι προκείνται
ὑψίποδες, οὐρανίαν
δι' αἰθέρα τεκνωθέντες, ὧν Ὀλυμπος

πατήρ μόνος, οὐδέ νιν
 θνατὰ φύσις ἀνέρων
 ἔτικτεν, οὐδὲ μάν ποτε λάθα κατακοιμάσει.

Here, as Professor Campbell says, we have Olympus used to express 'a sort of unseen heaven,' a holy place. And all words and deeds are said to be fixed and defined by heavenly laws as pure or the reverse. A vagueness of expression pervades the poet's words, but there is no vagueness in the principle; just as in the same play (line 903 *infra.*), we have an invocation to Zeus, qualified by the condition 'if so thou art rightly called'—

ἀλλ' ὃ κρατύνων, εἶπερ ὄρθ' ἀκούεις,
 Ζεῦ, πάντ' ἀνάσσων,

a sentiment to be closely paralleled by a similar expression in the *Agamemnon* of Æschylus, line 162, 'Zeus, who'er he be,'

Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰ τόδ' αὖ—
 τῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ,
 τοῦτό νιν προσενέπω.

Here the use of the indicative *ἐστί* shows that there is no doubt in the mind of the supplicant as to Zeus' existence, which the context confirms; but there is the same confession of ignorance as to the form of his manifestation. And so in *Choëphoroe* 951, when speaking of Justice, the poet first speaks of her as Διὸς κόρα, adding that her name among mortals is called by a happy chance Δίκα, implying that her divinity and her being are alike derived from Zeus:—

Διὸς κόρα· Δίκαν δέ νιν
 προσαγορεύομεν
 βροτοὶ, τυχόντες καλῶς.

These passages show that in the minds of the best thinkers there was no doubt as to the existence and the preeminence, and the justice and purity of Zeus and the gods. They may have believed to a small extent in mythological tales; they cannot have accepted them entirely; in Pindar's opinion, in fact, they are to be unconditionally rejected—ἀφίσταμαι. And no doubt, all those poets and thinkers who approached to Pindar's intellectual standpoint thought with Pindar and with Socrates that tales of the sort should have no place in a man's serious belief.¹

§ 7. We have now seen what the *Republic* is, how it is divided, why it was written, what kind of information or addition to philosophy it contains, and how far Plato believed in the possibility of his State. We have also seen that in the first two books of the Dialogue we must only expect critical and negative results with the beginning of the creation of a State. It remains to say a few words upon the light in which Socrates is brought before us in the first two books of the *Republic*, which form the proem or prosodus of the dialectical drama.

We have spoken above of Socrates' religion, his belief in God, and the terms of that belief; we have

¹ In this apparent inconsistency, viz. the coexistence of a pure morality with a debased mythology, some have seen the traces of an old cult of personified natural forces, the growth of which cult is thus described by Buckle: 'The aspects of nature when very threatening stimulate the imagination. . . . Among an ignorant people there is a direct tendency to ascribe all serious dangers to supernatural intervention; and a strong religious sentiment being thus aroused, it constantly happens not only that the danger is submitted to, but that it is actually worshipped.'—*History of Civilization*, vol. i. page 113, 2nd Edition.

seen that, so far from being an atheist, Socrates was a man of lively belief in the gods of his country. We cannot speak here of his moral earnestness, his deep conviction of the seriousness of life, and the tenacity with which he applied himself to the preaching of that conviction. That, in spite of a superficial lightness and a gay humour, he was earnest and serious, the perusal of a single Dialogue of Plato will satisfy us. We have to speak rather of this gaiety and humour, characteristics which stand out in the brightest light in this prelude to the more serious business of the Dialogue.

*Ἐπαιζεν ἄμα σπουδάζων, 'he used to jest in earnest.' This epigram of Xenophon's expresses in the happiest terms Socrates' power of mingling the grave with the gay, the lively with the severe; it shows how he could joke and quibble apparently in the lightest strain, and yet bring out of his jokes and quibbles the solid grain of truth. And who shall quarrel with Socrates for this habit? The first principle of teaching, of preaching, of imparting knowledge of any kind, is not to instruct, but to interest. *Μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει* are the words of Aristotle¹; and induction, the marshalling of facts in detail, must precede deduction, if we are to interest our hearers. This is Socrates' manner of argument. He presents in their humblest guise the humblest facts, garnishes them with his humour, and links them effectively but not obtrusively into a more or less perfect chain of argument; until the hearer is struck with amazement and conviction to find what power and what knowledge the barest facts can yield if they are manipulated with a skilful hand.

Let us, then, see how this humour is employed with

¹ *Post. Analyt.* 1, 18, p. 81, a 40.

effect in the scenes of dialectic which the first two books of the *Republic* present. Socrates is quietly walking home from Piræus; in reply to the jocular threat of forcible detention he suggests the possibility of gaining his release by persuasion; he falls with pleasure into a conversation with Cephalus, who is approaching the evening of life, and begins an apparently short discussion with Cephalus' son and heir Polemarchus. Thus far Socrates has shown only in his quiet and speculative mood; but, as the discussion with Polemarchus advances, he begins to apply his *ἐλεγχος* or critical method with such effect that it rouses the envy of Thrasymachus, a Sophist present among the audience, described by Socrates in the *Phaedrus*¹ as the mighty Chalcedonian, who trusts, as the sequel will show, rather to his lungs than his logic for dialectical success. It is to Socrates' treatment of this braggart and to Socrates' bearing under the infliction of his declamations that we invite attention; for by his treatment of others the best insight is gained into a man's character.

The first result of the dialectical collision between the mighty Chalcedonian and Socrates is that the former is made ridiculous (see page 338 C); the next that he becomes furious; and this again is naturally followed by his discomfiture in the argument. But all these results are attained by Socrates without the slightest violation of those rules of good feeling and good breeding to which Thrasymachus is an entire stranger. In his account of the discussion Socrates compares Thrasymachus to a wild beast and a bath-man, and very well are the similes deserved; but in the actual

¹ 267 D.

conversation his politeness stands out in marked contrast to Thrasymachus' overbearing conduct. We know that there is nothing so provocative of anger to a violent person as a calm and cool demeanour under his attacks. Of this demeanour Socrates was a perfect example. His humour led him also to take a positive relish in exasperating men who showed any violent intentions—we see traces of this in his treatment of Thrasymachus, and we have another case of it in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, which deserves, for the illustration it affords of Socrates' manner in this respect, to be quoted *in extenso*.

'Critias and Charicles (two of the Thirty) called Socrates and showed him the law which forbade him to converse with the young Then he said, "I desire to obey the law; but I wish to know if you think dialectic is on the side of that which is spoken rightly, or against it, that you bid me discontinue it. For if it belongs to the former class, it is the same thing as if you ordered me not to speak rightly, and if it belong to the latter, it is evident that we should try to learn to speak rightly." At this Charicles was angry, and said, "As you cannot understand us, Socrates, we tell you clearly not to converse with the young at all." Socrates replied, "To prevent any misunderstanding, will you define what you mean by the young?" And Charicles answered, "All those below thirty years of age." "But supposing that I am making a purchase," said Socrates, "and the seller is under thirty years of age, may I not ask him what he charges?" "Of course," replied Charicles; "but you are always asking questions with a purpose: these questions you must not ask." "Nor answer, I suppose," replied Socrates, "if

a youth were to ask me, for instance, 'Where does Charicles live?' or, 'Where is Critias?'" "Such questions as those you might answer," said Charicles. And Critias said, "But your cobblers, and your carpenters and your coppersmiths, those illustrations that you are always dinning into our ears and working to death, you must have done with." "Then," said Socrates, "I must also have done with all my inductions from those illustrations, about justice and piety and the rest?" "By Zeus, you must!" said Charicles.¹

In this interesting and characteristic scene, we have Socrates treating in his humorous way a command that must have been of the greatest seriousness to him. *ἐπαιζειν ἄμα σπουδάζων*. He is trying to show his enemies the mistake into which they are falling, by exhibiting their command in a ridiculous light. But Critias and his companions were not men who could be influenced by words; and it is only when Socrates has fair play accorded to him that his *reductio ad absurdum* is of avail. Then, however, it is of the highest efficiency; and nowhere is it employed with greater effect than in the First Book of the *Republic*. And if it be asked, 'Why is it that Socrates was so given up to his humour that we find it glancing on every page of these biographical sketches?' we must answer that its very value and force lay in the fact that it was spontaneous, redeeming Socrates' teaching from the charge of dullness, and investing it with an interest for all. So far was Socrates even from lying under the imputation of flippancy that the Athenians who condemned him must have felt that in him they had to deal with one who

¹ Xen. *Mem.* 1, 2, 33, *seqq.*

exerted a real power and a real influence over the citizens. Earnest he was in every action, inasmuch as he did nothing without a definite object; and so far was he from wasting his energies in mere logomachy that his teaching may be fairly summed up in Plato's noble words, 'Ἀθληταὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος, 'Men are athletes in the greatest of all contests—the arena of life.'

THE
ARGUMENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

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THE
ARGUMENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK I.

I WENT down to Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, Ariston's son, to see the festival of Artemis; and, as we were coming back, Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, overtook us, with Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, and others with them. And Polemarchus constrained us to go home with him; where we found amongst others Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, and the old man Cephalus, just finishing a sacrificial rite. He gently upbraided me for not coming oftener to see him, adding that at his time of life the pleasure of conversation with friends was very great. I replied that nothing gave me also greater pleasure than communing with those who have gone before on the road of life; for they could describe whether it were hard or easy, rough or smooth. 'Why,' he said, 'many of my friends, Socrates, when they come to see me, are always lamenting their old age and longing after the pleasures of youth; whilst I tell them that to be quit of the desires of youth is to be freed not from one but from a host of hard and savage masters.' 'Yes,' I said, 'but you must recollect your easy circumstances, Cephalus.' 'No doubt,' he

replied, 'my circumstances make life easier; but though I might be discontented if I were poor, I am sure some of those friends of mine would never be contented, even if they were rich; as Themistocles said to the Seriphian. And I have worked hard to repair my grandfather's fortune, which my father left me in a dilapidated state. But when you come to my age, Socrates, you begin to think over your past life, of the good you have done, and then you are comforted: and of the evil, and the more it be, the unhappier a man is.' 'And what is this "doing good" or justice?' I said. 'Oh!' he said, 'I must bequeath the disquisition to Polemarchus.' 'Who is your heir?' I said. At this he smiled, and then left us. 'Come now, Polemarchus,' I said, 'with your legacy of argument, what is that definition of justice "Tell the truth and pay your debts," given by Simonides, which you support? You don't say that you ought to give back to a friend everything that you have borrowed? You might, at that rate, have to give a sword to a madman.' 'I suppose Simonides meant,' he said, 'that we ought to give that which befits each to each.' 'In other words,' I said, 'to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies; as a good steersman is capable of carrying his friends safely and drowning his foes. But in what circumstances is justice useful to our friends?' 'To help our friends,' he answered, 'when they need help, and give back money when they lend it us.' 'So that,' I said, 'if they have no attacks made upon them and never lend money, there is no place for this justice of ours. And on the principle that a good keeper makes a good poacher, our just man will be good at thieving, if he is good at keeping. So that Simonides' and Homer's definition of justice has assumed a strange aspect. And

again, often those who are apparently our enemies are really our friends; so that from our definition it would in some cases, turn out that doing harm to friends is justice—the very reverse of Simonides' meaning.' 'Let us change the definition then,' he said, 'and substitute "our real friends" for "our friends."' 'But,' I said, 'the function of justice is to make men just and good, as the function of each art and trade is to make the objects of their work better in respect of that art or trade. How then can it be the function of justice to harm any one, that is, to depreciate his powers? For all harm is depreciation. We must therefore remove that part of the definition.' 'We must,' he said.

Now Thrasymachus before this had tried to interrupt the conversation a good many times, but the rest prevented him; so that when we stopped he gathered himself together like a wild beast and hurled himself upon us. 'You fools!' he said, 'why, if you really want to know what justice is, do you exhibit all these pretty tricks of dialectic? Now answer me in a straightforward manner, what you really think it to be. And don't say that it is the beneficial or the advantageous or the profitable or that which is to a man's interest.' 'Nay! pity us, Thrasymachus,' I said, 'and give us your help, for we do not profess to know what it is.' 'Ah!' said he, 'Socrates' usual self-depreciation¹!' 'By no means,' said I; 'but if you ask a man to define twelve, and say, you must not answer twice six, or three times four, or four times three, what is he to say?' 'Nonsense!' he said; 'but supposing I tell you what justice is, what will you say?' 'I shall receive the information and be thankful for it,' I said

¹ εἰρωεῖα.

'Well, pay your money,' he said. 'I have none,' I replied. 'We will all contribute for Socrates,' said Glaucon. So Thrasymachus, after beating about the bush for a time, and pretending that he was not anxious to be the speaker himself, defined justice as the Interest of the Stronger. 'Do you mean,' said I, 'that if it is to the interest of Polydamas, who is stronger than we, to eat beef, that we ought to eat beef too, and that that would be justice?' 'You are a brute, Socrates,' he said. 'You know that, in every city, whether the government be tyranny, oligarchy, or democracy, the laws are always made by those in power in their own interest; and justice is acting according to law, therefore justice is the Interest of the Stronger, or the Governing Portion.' 'But stay, Thrasymachus,' I said, 'you told me not to use *interest* in my definition, and you have done so yourself. But, passing over that objection, I ask you if the Governing Portion does not sometimes make laws which turn out badly for themselves; and if so, whether justice, *i.e.* acting according to law, may not therefore sometimes turn out in the exactly opposite way, *viz.* against the Interest of the Stronger?'

'I did not mean that at all,' said Thrasymachus, 'I do not call the man who makes a mistake in legislation the Stronger, *when* he makes his mistake. For a man is not a scribe, a doctor, or a calculator, when he makes a mistake in transcribing, doctoring, or calculating.' 'Well, that may be,' I said; 'but all the arts have some definite object, *as arts* (I do not mean as remunerative, because in that respect they are all phases of the art of money-making); and these arts need no external assistance as long as they are correctly and wholly practised, but are free from defect and mistake,

as arts. ~~And these arts are superior to and command those subjects on whom they practise. And their object is merely and solely the interest of the subject, which is inferior to and weaker than themselves; and in the case of the arts, therefore, the interest of the weaker is their object and not the interest of the stronger.~~ And in a ship the steersman governs the ship, and directs all his efforts to the safety of the crew, who are his inferiors in steering. And in every kind of government, in short, you will find that it is the interest of the weaker that is sought after by the stronger, and not that of himself.'

At this point Thrasymachus suddenly asked me: 'Have you a nurse, Socrates?' 'Why do you ask foolish questions,' I said, 'instead of going on with the argument?' 'Because you drivel,' he said, 'and don't understand the difference between sheep and shepherd. For the shepherd takes care of the sheep, just as your steersman or captain takes care of his crew, but it is for his own ultimate profit and interest. You can prove it by what you know of public office. When a strong, unscrupulous man takes a public position, he farms it, he uses it to help his friends and spite his foes, he comes out of it with full hands, even if he went in with empty ones; but a just and upright man lets his own household go to rack and ruin, whilst he is transacting the public business of such a post, and offends his friends, and spends much of his private fortune, and comes out of his position much poorer than he was when he accepted it. And in a contract between a bad man and a good one, which do you suppose will come off the better? And I do not speak of thieves, and sacrilegious persons, kidnappers, and so forth, but of those specious rogues who compass the

ideal of injustice, and are highly respectable members of the State.'

After this burst of rhetoric Thrasymachus would have made off, but the others detained him, and compelled him to stay and defend his words. 'Well,' said I, 'in plain words, I do not believe all that. For you will not keep to your strict definition with which you began, when you said that the ruler, or the Stronger, never erred as a ruler; but now when you say that the shepherd takes care of the sheep only for his own ultimate interest, I answer that, respecting his own ultimate interest, he is a money-maker and not a shepherd. Therefore, as shepherd he has regard for the interest of the weaker.¹ And this is proved, Thrasymachus, by the attachment of salaries and honours to official posts, to induce men to come forward, or even fines, if they will not offer themselves; because it is not for their own interest that men hold office, but for the interest of those whom they govern. And therefore in a perfectly fair and prosperous community there would be exactly the same struggle to avoid office as there is now to enjoy it. On these grounds, among others, I repudiate Thrasymachus' definition of justice. But I consider that a much graver position which he upholds, viz. that an unjust life is better and more profitable than a just one. Come, Thrasymachus, let us enter on this question. You call injustice profitable, so I suppose you call justice vice.'

¹ This refutation of Thrasymachus is substantially a reply to Adeimantus also, in Book IV. *init.*, when he maintains that Socrates has not made the rulers of the State, the *φύλακες*, comfortable; for the answer there is, although not distinctly expressed, the same as this, viz. that the rulers are for the people and not the people for the rulers, and that this principle is evident, consistent, and universal, at any rate in a free State.

'No,' he said, 'but great folly.' 'You grant,' I said, 'that the just man does not try to overreach the just, but the unjust?' 'He might try,' he said, 'but he would not succeed.' 'Whilst the unjust,' I continued, 'tries to overreach both.' 'Yes,' he said, 'and the ideally unjust man succeeds completely.' 'But,' I continued, 'in any art whatsoever, it is the unskilful and ignorant man who tries to take advantage both of the ignorant and the skilful; whilst the skilful man would take advantage not of the skilful, but of the unskilful only. So that according to the analogy of all the arts, if we call the skilful man wise and good, and the ignorant useless and bad, your unjust man resembles the latter, and your just man the former.'

Thrasymachus was obliged to confess the justice of my proof, but he fought hard against it, and got very hot (for it was a summer day) and actually blushed, for the first time, I should say, in his life. 'Well,' I said, 'with this conclusion, that other position of yours is turned, viz. that injustice is strong and justice weak. For which city is more likely to hold her own amongst other cities, the skilful or the unskilful, i.e. the just or the unjust? You must remember that, where there is injustice, there is sedition, and the house divided against itself. So that the more injustice there is in a State the less efficient it will be. And your unjust man will incur Heaven's hatred, for he is opposed to the just, and I suppose you call the gods just; whilst the just man will be the friend of the gods. And hence we may conclude that, when we see an unjust man prospering, or a number of unjust men carrying out a project to a successful issue, that, in so far as they succeed, they are not entirely unjust, but have a certain consistency and

coherence, by virtue of which they succeed, whereas¹ if they were perfectly unjust they would fail altogether. And if you grant that we live in virtue of our souls, and that the soul has a function, or mode of action, as the eyes' function is seeing, and the ears' function is hearing; and if you further grant that these functions have an excellence proper to each, viz. their highest state of efficiency; we must conclude that the excellence of the soul is justice; for by it the soul best performs its part of originating right action. And so the just man will live a good life, and the unjust man a bad one. It is by your consideration, Thrasymachus, that we have arrived at this happy conclusion: since you began to take a calm view of the question. But for all this I know no more of what justice really is than when we began; for we have been considering whether it is wisdom or folly, virtue or vice, profitable or unprofitable, before we have even obtained its definition.'

¹ κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι.

BOOK II.

WHEN we had gone so far in our discourse I thought that there was an end of it, but as it turned out, this was merely the preface. For Glaucon would not accept the conclusion, but said, 'Are you content to suppose that you have set the question at rest in our minds by this mode of arriving at a conclusion, or will you thoroughly prove the truth of the position that justice is better than injustice? Is justice one of those things that we pursue for its own sake, or for the sake of its results, or for the sake of both?' 'Of both,' I answered. 'Well,' he said, 'I should like to have it satisfactorily proved. Thrasymachus gave up long before he ought to have done (for I will revive his argument), and did not bring half the objections against the just life which he might have brought. And all the apologists of justice, whom I have ever heard speak, confine themselves to the advantages which follow from a virtuous life, and do not support justice for its own intrinsic worth. So I am going to bring various counts against justice with all my powers. First, then, in its origin justice is described as a compromise, effected by the weaker, who find themselves habitually ill-treated, and make an arrangement that there shall be no ill-doing by themselves or against themselves. It is a compromise between the height of success, viz., doing evil with

impunity, and the depth of misfortune, which is being ill-treated without hope of redress.

There is no principle in doing good and being just. If a just man had a ring like that of Gyges the Lydian he would be as bad as the unjust. For Gyges' ring had the power of making its wearer invisible, and he committed adultery with the king's wife, and by her help slew the king, and reigned in his stead. Now strip off from the unjust man all things that make him unlovely to the world's eyes, and let him stand forth completely and efficiently equipped with his injustice. If he ever fail, imagine him as one capable of restoring his fortunes ; let him be considered a just man ; let him be master of persuasion, and, if need be, of force. On the other side place the perfectly just man, and, to complete the antithesis, subtract from him even his appearance of justice, for otherwise he will be rewarded according to his appearance, and let him go on unaltered until he die, so that he may be consistently and continuously just. How then will these two fare ? The good man will be scourged, fined, tortured, imprisoned, and deserted by every one, will end his days in solitude and misery ; whilst the unjust man will be called to rule over his fellow citizens, receive crowns and rewards, will attain to the summit of earthly prosperity, and will have all the means of helping on his poorer friends and of paying duteous sacrifice to the gods. This is the completest indictment against the just life that I know.'

I was about to begin a reply to Glaucon, when his brother Adeimantus chimed in : ' He has not said half enough, Socrates. The apologists of justice tell us that in the after life the good enjoy different sensual pleasures, *e.g.* a never-ending intoxication, and that the evil are sentenced to pour water for ever through a sieve ; such

are the rewards and punishments by which the minds of the young are incited to virtue. The poets again are hopelessly at sea on the question of justice and morality, for they sing of the beauty of holiness, but they tell us that spells and sacrifices and prayers of all kinds can easily sway the judgments of heaven. And when young men see how injustice prevails, and learn from professors of rhetoric and persuasion how to move the hearts of men, what wonder is it if they turn altogether away from justice, saying to themselves that they can always get rid of their sins by a few sacrifices, when they are coming towards their end. And all this is due to that custom of praising justice for its rewards, and dissuading people from injustice because of its penalties. In your apology, then, for justice, remove the reputation and the accessories that attach to each. Bring both bare before us, and prove to those who will hear you with eager ears that justice is right and good, and injustice wicked and bad.'

I had always felt a regard for Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on this occasion I was especially struck with them, so cleverly had they stated their case, and so earnest were they in their desire to have the question settled. I replied that I feared I was unable to make such a defence of justice as would satisfy them, but I was ready to try. To discover justice in the human soul, let us see if we cannot find justice first in some larger organism, just as if we were unable to read something written in small letters, and were to seek for the same thing written large in another place. Justice perhaps may be 'writ large' in a State, and could then be transferred by analogical argument to the Soul of man. Let us then picture to ourselves the actual birth and growth of a State.

‘Now the origin of a State lies, I take it, in the insufficiency of a man’s resources. For man needs much, but cannot always satisfy his needs by himself. Therefore this man joins that man to himself in a society to profit by his powers, and an interchange of benefits is made between them. What, then, is man’s first need? Food. And the next is that of lodging, and the third that of clothing. We shall require for our city, then, a tiller of the soil, a house-builder, and a weaver, and perhaps, too, a cobbler. Hence four or five at least is the original number of our citizens. The next question is this: Is the husbandman to produce enough corn for himself and no more, or is he to supply the others with corn on the condition that they supply him with the produce of their labour? Is he to make his own clothes and build his own house, besides raising food enough for his consumption? No; we must lay down this principle at once, that each man must share the results of his toil amongst all the citizens, because every man has one art and only one, generally speaking, in which he excels; therefore let him confine himself to this art, and not waste his time and his art by attempting other arts. So there must be a smith to make the husbandman his plough, and a carpenter, and various other mechanicians. And we cannot help feeling the necessity of importing commodities from other places; for each place, like each man, is not self-sufficient, but needs supplementing from the resources of other places. And so we shall have merchants in our State. And, seeing that a seller cannot sit down and waste his time till a buyer may happen to come by who wants his commodity, we must have middle-men, *i.e.* tradesmen, to form a convenient link between the producer and the consumer. Those of our citizens whose body is more efficient

than their mind will become hired servants, and so the different inhabitants of our city will grow and multiply.

‘This is our city. Now comes the question, What manner of life will they live? They will till the ground, build them houses, make them garments; in summer working lightly clad, in winter well protected; they will make them fine loaves and cakes of the wheat and barley which they grow; they will lie on leaf-couches and will live pleasantly, drinking their wine and praising their gods, training their children carefully to avoid poverty and contention. And, if you please, we will give them a relish, olives, cheese, figs, and nuts. And living moderately they will spend a long life, and bequeath the same happy existence to their children.’

‘’Tis a city of swine, Socrates, and nothing more nor less,’ said Glaucon. ‘You must give them the usual amenities of life, tables and chairs, and a few delicacies.’

‘Ah!’ I said, ‘you want me to create a luxurious city, with all its accompaniment of cooks, sweetmeats, sauces, dancing girls, and doctors. And to keep all this mob of accessory populace we shall want to cut off a little piece of our neighbours’ land, and they will feel the same necessity regarding ours, so that at once war is generated, with its horses, and soldiers, and weapons. And if war is an art or trade (and I do not see how it can fail to be so) we must confine our soldiers to their trade of war, and keep a standing army. Nay, of all other trades in the city, it will be the most important, because the duty of the warriors will be to keep intact the whole Body Politic. Hence the most time and the greatest care must be spent on our warriors or guardians as we may call them. They must be keen, quick, strong, courageous, and withal gentle; so that their great

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strength and spirit may not be turned against their own fellow citizens; like dogs of a noble nature—very savage when they see a stranger, who may have done them no harm, but gentle to any one whom they know, although he may never have done them any kindness. In other words they must be philosophic, *i.e.* quick to apprehend what is to the interest of their fellow countrymen and what is against it. How then are we to produce such a type of man?

‘Education is divided into music and gymnastics. In the music¹ the first step is fiction.’ ‘I do not understand you,’ he said. ‘I mean,’ said I, ‘that as we teach our children by telling them stories, so we must begin the education of our guardians, but with this difference: the tales that our children hear, told by Homer and Hesiod, contain a great deal of noxious fiction, which must be expunged with the greatest care from our system of education. The foul and ridiculous stories about many of the gods are not true, to begin with, and, if they were true, I would not have children’s ears defiled with them. What, then, are we to use in their place? you say. And I reply that we are no poets; but in our city there will be poets, and we shall instruct them as to the poetry they are to write, we shall lay down the lines on which they are to work, and if they transgress them, we shall punish the irregularity. God is good, and he must always be represented so: he cannot be the author of evil to any living being; he cannot lie or deceive; he cannot even change, for if he were to change it would be for the better or for the worse. Now he cannot change for the better, because he is the Best; and he would not desire to change for

¹ *i.e.* every subject which has an intellectual element, *e.g.* music, poetry, ethics.

the worse. Therefore he is true and unchangeable. We will, then, strive with all our might and main against those writers who attempt to traduce the nature of God, and drive them from our city. And we shall have great fault to find with Homer and Æschylus, and many other poets who have failed to give a consistent account of the goodness of the gods.'

BOOK III.

‘Our poets must be careful when they speak of the after life, not to malign it; and when they are singing of gods and heroes they must not attribute anything unseemly to them, either in grief or in joy, for example, excessive laughter. And the rulers of the State are to be the only persons who have control over the songs and myths of the State.

‘Again, sobriety and temperance are necessary for our young men; and therefore all things intemperate, either in word or in action, must be struck out of our poetry, especially in mentioning gods and heroes. The matter of our poetry having been considered, and rules for its guidance having been laid down, we come next to speak of its manner, or style.¹

‘All poetry is either imitative, or narrative, or compounded of both. For instance, the poet of the *Iliad* begins with invoking the Muse: and then he narrates to us how Chryses came, and besought all the Greeks to give him back his daughter; and then the poet speaks as if he were Chryses himself. And in this latter mode of speaking I call a poet imitative. For he might have gone on with his narrative style, and told us about Chryses’ invocation himself, instead of making Chryses speak, as he does. The epic then is of the

¹ λέξις.

compound order; whilst tragedy leaves out, "and he replied," or "so the goddess spoke," and gives the dialogue as it actually comes from the speakers. This kind is purely imitative. Whilst in dithyrambs it is the poet speaking all the time; and in them we have the narrative pure.

'Now one man is seldom or never a good imitator in more than one subject. A writer of tragedy does not succeed in comedy, nor *vice versa*. Man's nature is of so small a capacity that, as in craftsmanship, so in art, we must be specialists if we wish to succeed. And the manner of imitation must correspond to the matter.

We shall not allow our artists to give us presentations of anything foul or dishonourable. For as a good man will never lose control over his actions, so he should never imitate in word or action those who have lost control of themselves. As he will not imitate everything he sees indiscriminately, but only those things which are worthy of imitation, so he will not even read such imitations from the poets, or allow them to give such imitations. In fact, our citizens must be men of single, not double or multiple¹ mind; and in their words, actions, and writings, they will follow the ideal of the upright and single-hearted man.

'Next, the music of the poetry. This must be adapted as far as possible to the poetry itself; and if we observe this rule we shall not go wrong. Remove at once then those melodies of a pitiful and wailing character like the mixolydian and syntonolydian; the soft, effeminate,

¹ In the *Laelius* of Cicero, the single-minded man is held up for our admiration as a friend. 'Simplicem præterea et communem et consentientem, qui rebus iisdem moveatur, eligi par est; quæ omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem. Neque enim fidum potest esse *multiplex ingenium* et tortuosum.'—Ch. xviii. sec. 65.

and revelling strains.' 'At this rate,' he said, 'you will leave none but the Dorian and Phrygian.' 'I dare say not,' said I, 'for the first-named have many strings and many chords, and are altogether of too complex a nature for our simple and unaffected songs. And then the rhythm, or flow of the verses, must be fixed; for instance, dactylic, epic, iambic, or trochaic. But we will consult Damon on this point; for it is a difficult one. Only we may be sure of this, that, if we have a good style to begin with, our metre and rhythm will more easily flow well with it; and the whole composition will ultimately depend for its style and music and rhythm on the character of the composer. If we take pains with our teaching of temperance, courage, and magnanimity, we shall find our music and poetry falling naturally into a good groove; and thus we shall avoid all intemperance and vulgarity. ✓

'Now we come to the gymnastic training of our youths. And let me remind you that men are athletes in the greatest arena, that of life.¹ Their bodily training must be of the highest efficiency; excluding Syracusan luxuries, Sicilian cookery, Attic sweetmeats, Corinthian courtezans; for by the presence of luxury in the State the door is opened to intemperance and a whole horde of diseases, which will come trooping in; and our city will be full of doctors, cooperating up wrecked constitutions. Nay, our men will have no leisure to be ill; but if a man is unsound we will have none of him, for it is neither to his own interest nor to that of his fellow citizens that he live in our State or anywhere else.' 'But,' said Glaucon, 'the best doctor is he who has had most experience of bad constitutions and bad illnesses, even perhaps in his own body.' 'That may be,' I said,

¹ ἀθληταὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος.

‘but you might as well say that the best judge, and the most honourable man, is he who has had most-experience of crime. Whereas, on the contrary, the fact is that the fresher the mind and the purer, which approaches the administration of justice, the better able is it to discern between good and evil. For a wicked man would be always suspecting others to be as bad as himself, and would attribute the worst motives to every man. And no doubt the good man, on the contrary, would now and then lay himself open to the charge of too great a simplicity. But it is a fault on the right side.’¹

‘And we must take care in gymnastic that we do not forget its real object; which is, not to bring the body to its highest development, but to increase the efficiency of the mind.’² In this way. Men who spend all their time in gymnastic become subject to roughness and harshness of manner, whilst those who neglect it entirely grow too soft, and milder than is fitting. But a due admixture of the gymnastic element will strengthen the mind for its intellectual labour, and is of the same importance as music, because without it we cannot attain to that intermediate condition between the excess of roughness and the excess of mildness which is the proper frame of mind for our citizens to possess.’

‘And who are to be the guardians and rulers?’ ‘The

¹ Socrates does not really answer Glaucon's objection by this analogy. It is quite true, as Glaucon maintains, that in such a State a physician would not have the opportunity or the experience to perfect himself in his art. The true answer would be that in Socrates' state there is no requirement and no place for a skilled physician; but Socrates does not state this clearly, he leaves it to be inferred, and breaks away into the moral sphere with an illustration which is not sufficiently parallel to be to the point.

² See Book vi. 498 B. τῶν τε σωμάτων ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδρούται, εὖ μάλᾳ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτώμενους.

elder of course, and the best of the elders. And the best of the elders I should define as those who can best withstand the temptation and the bewitchment of pleasure and fear, who can keep their mental and moral balance and live a harmonious and consistent life.

‘To keep our youth firmly imbued with their responsibility and their duty, I would invent a fiction of this sort; that all those citizens who are found worthy to rule are golden in their nature, and the defenders are silver, and the common people iron: and that there is a prophecy that, when a silver or an iron nature shall be found at the head of the state, then it shall fall and come to nought.’ ‘Well,’ said he, ‘you might imbue a second generation with this fable perhaps, but not the present.’

‘And so our community will live, well governed by its guardians, and well defended by its protectors, who will not turn against the sheep they defend like wolves; and all will live in common, not calling this mine and that yours,¹ but, like a great army will be happy and powerful in the loyalty of each individual to the colours. Gold and silver, except the gold and silver of their own natures, they will never touch; for it is avarice that breeds disunion in a city, and it is disunion which is political ruin.

¹ Sir Thomas More following this principle of Plato in his *Utopia*, finds one result of proprietorship and inequality of possessions in the great number of laws required to regulate conflicting rights. Thus: ‘. . . where euerye man calleth that he hathe gotten his owne private and proper goodes, where so many newe lawes daylye made be not sufficiente for euerye man to enjoye, defende, and knowe from another man’s that whych he calleth his owne.’ A few pages further on we have his description of the Utopian life in common: ‘Whoso will may go in (to the houses), for there is nothing within the houses that is priuate or anye man’s owne.’—Pp. 67 and 73, ed. Arber, London, 1869.

BOOK IV.

'BUT supposing some one objected to all this, Socrates,' said Adeimantus, 'that you have made your State and appointed your guardians, and that they turn out to be by no means the happiest and most comfortable people in it, what would you say?' 'I should answer,' I said, 'that the people are not for the guardians, but the guardians for the people, or rather "each man for himself and God for us all." In other words, we do not make the happiness of a particular class our object, but the general welfare. It would be absurd, would it not, to dress up our farmers and potters and shoemakers in fine clothes, and tell them to do as much work as they pleased, and how they pleased? Every man then must do his quantum of due labour, and thus we shall avoid the two extremes of riches and poverty, which are the mainsprings of discontent and sedition.'

'But are we to have no resources, no wealth, Socrates?' 'Certainly not; for if we have no wealth we shall have no enemy coming to despoil us, and like a trained athlete, who can encounter any number of rich fat burghers, provided that he take them one or two at a time, so shall we be. For our soldiers and guardians will be able to fight twice their number of opponents; and other nations will prefer to fight with us, the strong and hard-bitten dogs, against the fat and helpless sheep. And us they will leave alone.'

‘Each of us then having our proper duty and performing it, we shall allow our State to grow and extend so far as is consistent with its unity. And our guardians will attend to many points of detail, such as of preserving the orthodox rules of music and gymnastic, of enforcing proper respect towards elders; but many more must be left to the good sense of our people, and the correct development of our principles of education. And our religious observances of all kinds will of course be settled by the word of the Delphian God.

‘Our city is now grown, and furnished with all its appliances, and is a living organism. Where, now, are we to look for justice? Let us approach the problem as a mathematical equation in which there are one or more unknown quantities. Every city that is rightly and justly managed, in other words, a good city, must be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. In our equation then, these four are the unknown quantities; and if we can ascertain the first three and eliminate them, the remaining one, justice, will be clear.

‘First then our city must be wise. And wherein? In the smallest and yet the most important section of itself, viz. in the body of guardians. For if these be truly wise, seeing that on them depends the weal or woe of the State, the rest of the people will be wise also, in so far as they can attain to wisdom. Again, what part of the State must without fail be brave?’ ‘The part which defends the rest,’ he said. ‘So,’ said I, ‘it is of the greatest importance that our guardians and defenders be the bravest men in the State.

‘Shall we take temperance next,’ I said, ‘or do you prefer to leave it out, and go straight on to find justice?’ ‘We had better keep to your method,’ he said, ‘and go on to consider temperance.’ ‘Well,’

said I, 'when all the citizens are in agreement as to who should be the rulers, and when they all live in harmony, then I should call them temperate. Just as in the soul of a man there is a better impulse and a worse, and sometimes the better has complete control of the worse; so that concord throughout the State is the temperance of the State.¹ And now, Glaucon, for justice. Follow close behind me, and breathe a prayer for success, and peep warily through this dark and tangled thicket. But courage! we must go forward.' 'We must,' said he. And I,—'Holloa, holloa, Glaucon, what fools we are! Here is the very thing we have been gaping about for, tumbling at our feet.' 'Why, what do you mean?' he said. 'I mean that when we said every man was to do his own business in the State, and not to be a busybody or a Jack-of-all-trades, that was justice; and that is the unknown quantity, as I was calling it, which we have been speaking of all along. And to meddle with other people's business is injustice.

'Now let us transfer this to the individual. In the mind of man there is a three-fold division which corresponds to the division above, of the three virtues necessary to a good guardian. There is the faculty of acquiring knowledge, of feeling spirited with the second, and of feeling sensual desire with the third. And let

¹ It will be seen that in the application of the justice of the State to the human soul, this description of *σωφροσύνη* is very nearly identical with that of *δικαιοσύνη* there. Only the different parts of the human soul, here described as *βέλτιον* and *χείρον* (431 B.), are there further elaborated into three, viz. *λογιστικόν*, *θυμοειδές*, and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. Aristotle's division in the *Politics*, Book i. chap. v. *ad neal.* is similar to the present one,—*ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ (sc. ψυχῇ) ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον, τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον· ὧν ἐτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετὴν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου.*

me premise that a thing can neither do nor be the contrary of itself, in the same part of it, and with regard to the same thing. We have thirst and we have thirst of a particular kind, but we have also sometimes, and together with the thirst, another feeling which holds us back from satisfying that thirst. This other feeling is the contrary of the first and cannot therefore be a manifestation of the same faculty. The faculty which often opposes itself to the sensual desire is the rational or intellectual; and we shall find upon inspection that the spirited or third kind of faculty either ranges itself upon the side of the intellectual or is quenched by the sensual. Then if our individual is to be just, the intellectual faculty must always predominate and govern the other two inferior faculties. For the sensual occupies the greatest extent of the soul and is of an insatiable nature; and the three must be in accord and harmony. It was then a shadow of the real justice which made us lay it down that a mechanic should work at that art with the whole and the best of his powers, and at that art alone for which he is fitted. So a man, generally, must see that each of his three faculties are working according to their proper nature and to their proper end, and if he adjust them harmoniously and combine them into one efficient whole, he will be a just man, and will be practising justice.

‘We have now to fix what is injustice—not a difficult task. It is the predominance of the wrong faculty in man’s soul, which cannot fail to bring with it disturbance and sedition and trouble. And it follows naturally upon this that justice is profitable and injustice unprofitable.’

BOOK V.

I WAS then going on to speak of the degenerate forms of the Body Politic, when Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted me. They refused to allow me to go on until I had set their minds at rest on the troublesome question of the wives and the children of our guardians. 'Well, then,' I said, 'I cannot help believing that we ought to go on the same principle with respect to our women as we did in the case of our men, in other words, that the women should undergo exactly the same training mental and physical, however much you may laugh at the idea of the wrinkled old women in the gymnasia. And I maintain this because there is in my opinion¹ no intrinsic difference between the two natures; only one is weaker than the other, implying a difference of quantity, not of kind. So we must select, as before, those with a prudent mind for our guardian-women, and their chastity² will be a protection for those who have to

¹ Aristotle's opinion was less liberal than Plato's upon this point. He thought, with the general mind of Greece, that the woman and the slave were naturally and originally inferior to man, and did not contemplate the possibility of their having been gradually deteriorated. See *Pol.* 1, 2. *ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρβρον πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρείττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον. Εἰ ἴνφρα, οὗτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δούλοι.* And again of women, chap. v. *ἰνί.* *τὸ τε γὰρ ἄρβρον φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον.*

² *ἔπειπερ ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἰματίων ἀμφιέσσονται.* Tennyson has the same thought in his *Lady Godiva*, 'Then she rode forth, clothed on with chastity.'

mingle with the men in daily life. This is the first of those great difficulties which stand in the way of my theory, and made me hesitate to expound it. And the next is a more serious one, viz., that all the wives and all the children should be common, and none should say, "This is my wife," "These are my children." My reason is one which should appeal to you, Glaucon, who are a bird fancier, and take great pains in the selection of your brood-birds and their pairing: you choose, of course, the staunchest and best-conditioned in your yard. Ought not therefore man, who is the noblest animal, to have the greatest care taken of his sexual relations? And the manner in which I should wish it to be managed would be as follows. At certain periods of the year solemn rites and sacrifices should be performed, and marriages should be effected then and there between the finest and strongest men and women. The festival should be looked upon as most holy, and any one disobeying the injunctions of the directing priest should be subject to the severest penalties. And for the ages between which marriages should be effected I place twenty to forty for the women, and thirty to fifty-five for the men. And no illegitimate offspring, or children born at a wrong time, should be brought up, so that all irregularity may be avoided in the matter. These children must be considered as the children of all the fathers, they must call all men who were married before they were born, father, and in the same manner they will speak of all the women as mother, and the children as brother and sister. And I wish to see this community of relationship, because, in such a state of things, each individual will feel, and enjoy or resent, everything that affects the state for good or for ill; just as in a man's body, which is healthy and sound, there is a perfect

sympathy and harmony of all feelings. Minor disputes, too, will be prevented by the fear and regard which relationship inspires in a well educated mind. Such a view of relationship dissipates, I think, your former objections about the hard life we were giving our guardians. For this view shows that a man's proper part in life is to be first well regulated, and afterwards comfortable; and the latter will follow upon the former.

'Now these children, so born, and brought up in large State nurseries, will be trained to war from their youth, besides their other studies, and ought by all analogy to go to view battles at an early age, mounted upon swift and docile horses to bring them out of possible harm. And in the battles the warrior who acquits himself best shall receive all the usual rewards of a victor, and shall receive the best wife, whomsoever he chooses, so that he may beget others like himself.

'In war our soldiers must recollect that they are not barbarians nor brutes; and in fighting against a Greek city they should treat their opponents as belonging to the same family as themselves, and not destroy houses nor burn fruit-trees, but only ravage the crop of the year; whilst against barbarians they will proceed as Greeks now, unhappily, treat Greeks.'

'You are avoiding all this time, Socrates,' said Glaucon, 'the real pith of the matter, viz., the question, Can such a condition of relationship exist in reality?' 'Well,' I said, 'I was avoiding it, I confess, and I answer, since you press me to a conclusion, Does the unattainability of anything make the representation of it any the worse, if it is the best representation that human skill can effect?' 'No,' he said, 'certainly not.' 'Well, then,' I replied, 'I do not say that such a thing has, or can, or will be brought about, but I do say that if we'

can, as we have done, picture it to ourselves, we may place it before the eyes of our mind, and work up towards our ideal in hope and faith.

‘A third difficulty I have to put before you, and the greatest of all. Until kings are philosophers, and philosophers kings, there is no end to the troubles of a state.¹ Stand by me, Glaucon, or I shall never weather this storm-wave.’ ‘That will I,’ he answered. ‘Do you know, then,’ said I, ‘what it is to be devoted to one subject, such as wine, when a man has a word to say about, and in favour of, all kinds of wine? Or to be very emulous, e.g. when a man will be sub-lieutenant if he cannot be general, rather than not be a commander of some sort; the opposite of the character ‘aut Cæsar, aut nullus.’ I mean, then, by philosopher, the man who is devoted to the acquisition of knowledge, real knowledge, and not merely inquisitive. The more our citizens approach this temperament, the better the state will be. True knowledge in its perfection and entirety, man cannot attain. But he can attain to a kind of knowledge of realities, if he has any knowledge at all, because he cannot know nonentities. Hence his knowledge is half way between real knowledge and ignorance, and we must call it opinion.² When, then, his opinion about a thing is correct; as far as it goes he is a philosopher and a useful and valuable member of our State.

¹ Sir Thomas More proposes a middle course which he judges would be of more value. ‘For where as your Plato judgeth that weale publiques shall by thys meanes atteyne perfect felicitie, eyther if philosophers be kynges, or elles yf kynges geue themselues to the studie of Philosophie, how farre I praye you shall commen wealthes then be frome thys felicitie, yf Philosophers wyll vouchesaufe to enstruct kinges with their good counsell?’

² Compare the definition of courage in Book IV. 429 B. : *δύναμις τραιήτη, ἥ διὰ πάντος σώσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν.*

BOOK VI.

‘WE must next spend some time, not as much as I should wish, upon a study of the philosophic nature. I call a philosopher one who can grasp the continuity and coherent existence of things.¹ So in our selection and education of philosophic natures, we must first be sure that they desire to know things which have a real and continuous existence, not those which are subject to flux and decay. Next, their nature must be truth-loving, lie-aborring. Again, they would be devoted to the pleasures of the mind, and have little taste for sensual pleasures ; from which it follows that they will not be ardent seekers of money : for they will despise the pleasures which money buys. They must also be magnanimous, with a disregard of death, gentle and just, fond of learning, with good memories.’

‘I can say nothing against the method of your conclusion, Socrates,’ said Adeimantus ; ‘but like a good chess-player you lead your man away little by little until these little diversions mount up to an overwhelming total. In this game of words I cannot beat you ; but what I have to say is this, that those men whom we see round us studying philosophy continuously, so far from being the best citizens, turn out the most

¹ ‘The eternal and unchangeable.’—JOWETT.

inferior, I will not say the worst. How then can these things be which you maintain?'

'I will try and explain myself in a parable, Adeimantus,' I said. 'Picture to yourself a ship, steered by a helmsman, who in size and strength is vastly superior to the rest of the crew, but short-sighted and deaf and not well acquainted with navigation. And suppose that his crew are always struggling and fighting amongst themselves, and trying to get the helm of the ship into their own hands, either by force or fraud. And that they try to drug the helmsman, and gauge the characters of their fellow-sailors entirely by the consideration, whether they are quick at getting the helm out of the helmsman's hands, or not. Such a position I imagine does the philosopher occupy in an ordinary state as the helmsman in such a ship as I describe. And the persons you describe as utterly worthless, who nevertheless affect philosophy, are like those sailors who without any knowledge or practice of navigation try to gain possession of the helm.

'You recollect the different excellences requisite for a nature which is to become truly philosophic: these requisites are very rarely combined in the same person. And we must further inquire into the depreciation and degeneration of these natures. For the principle, *corruptio optimi pessima*, is unfortunately too true, and the more abilities a man has the worse he will be without training and principle.¹

'It is not individual sophists who first corrupt noble

¹ We find the same sentiment insisted upon in the *Euthydemus*, page 281, D, through a number of instances:—'Ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ', φησὶν, ὃ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα, ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι . . . ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγήται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅσῳ δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι.

natures, but the applause and the noise and the struggling of the world. In fact, if any young mind were to resist all these influences by its own strength we should be inclined to call it a miracle. For these paid professors are like men who might study the passions and desires of some great brute and know how to humour him, and were to call this study wisdom; having no regard for real wisdom and virtue, but judging everything by the likes and dislikes of the monster. In the same way do these sophists study the tastes and opinions of the vulgar and the many, who from their nature, are incapable of ever knowing realities and unities. So that a young man is sorely let and hindered if he have any tastes for philosophy by the tyrannical action of the world and the sophists; seeing that even if he persist in his natural bent, they will be up in arms against him, straining every nerve to keep out the truth. The result is that those of a noble and philosophic nature are prevented from studying philosophy, whilst inferior and vulgar minds leave their workshops and their trades and go philosophizing; just as if a little baldheaded journeyman were to come into a fortune, get washed and dressed up in fine clothes, and marry his master's daughter. What kind of offspring could be expected from such a union but bastards? and what sort of philosophy can be expected from those vulgar minds we speak of but inferior sophistry and false systems? So those men who would be philosophers, if they could stand against the overwhelming attacks of the world, give up the contest, and content themselves with looking calmly at the worry and bustle, taking care to do their own duty, like a man who stoops down under a wall to let a storm of dust and hail pass over him.

‘Now in what sort of a state can a philosopher

F 2

have fair play? Not in any that we know of. But we must have a training and an atmosphere for our youths the very reverse of that at present existing. Boys approach philosophy in its most difficult aspect in the intervals of other studies, and soon throw it aside for the rest of their lives; with the exception of a few who continue it quite by the way,¹ and think a good deal of themselves for continuing it at all. But we should have the rudiments of philosophy taught at an earlier age, and we should amplify the training of the mind whilst it is approaching its greatest development. And when bodily strength begins to fail, our citizens should devote all their mental activity to philosophy, treating everything else as of secondary importance. And whether our plan succeed or not, is not the question, as long as we are persuaded that our principle is good; in fact, I do not look for very great opposition from the majority, who, I believe, are usually traduced, and after all are only misled by ranters and pseudo-philosophers. This then is the way towards realising our perfect state; and we must try to make it clear to the majority that men must be philosophic, and the philosophers must rule in the State. Nor will it be impossible for even a single man to bring a whole city into a condition of obedience to this maxim.

'Now we said that the philosopher must be fond of learning and of a keen nature withal, that he must be physically as well as intellectually able; two requisites hard to find united in the same person. What then is he to make his study and his object? The Ideal Good; which is above and greater than even Justice itself. Most men are ignorant as to what is really good: they pursue that which appears to them to be

¹ ἀδερργον.

good. Let us try to seek out the nature of this Ideal Good. The sense of seeing requires a medium through which the object of sight is seen, I mean light. And light is generated from the sun. The sight is not the sun, nor is the sun sight, but the one exists by means of the other, and beholds it. Conceive then the Ideal Good as standing in the same relation to the mind and the objects of thought, as the sun stands to the sight and the objects of sight. And as the shining of the sun enables our eyes to see things clearly before us, so that which brings truth and reality illumines the mind and gives rise to actual thought, and perception of the Truth and Reality themselves. They are not the Ideal Good, but partake of its form and its nature.¹ And as the sun is the author of life and growth, although not itself life and growth, so the Ideal Good is the author of real knowledge and real existence, yet superior even to existence itself.

‘And to make quite clear the relation between the different grades of knowledge and reality, imagine a line divided into two parts, and again another line divided into two parts, in the same ratio as the other. Let the first line represent the mental sphere, and the second line the sensual. The first section of the first line represents pure thought and its objects, viz. real existences²; and the second part represents thought which does not contemplate real existences, but copies of them as nearly as possible like the originals. Take, for instance, those squares and circles and triangles about which mathematicians reason, which are not


¹ Cf. ‘He was not that light, but was sent to bear witness of that light.’—St. John i., where this same illustration of light is carried out at length.

² *ἰδέαι.*

really exact squares and circles, but copies of the real, and useful for practical purposes. The whole line thus divided represents the sphere of thought and knowledge. The first division of the second line, that is of the visible and sensual sphere, is occupied by that faculty which apprehends objects as presented to us in this world of ours. And that faculty is belief.¹ The second represents the sphere of the unreal, the class of copies of the real, like shadows, reflections on the water and so forth. And these are the four grades, in descending order from the really existent.'²

¹ πίστις.

² Plato's geometrical arrangement may be given thus:—



$AB = \text{Ἐπιστήμη}$, and its objects, $\nu\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}$.

which includes $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} AC = \text{Νοῦς}, \quad \text{,,} \quad \text{,,} \quad \text{real existences (ιδέαι).} \\ CB = \text{Διανοία} \quad \text{,,} \quad \text{,,} \quad \text{conceptions (εἰδη).} \end{array} \right.$

$DE = \text{Δόξα}$, and its objects, things perceptible ($\alphaἰσθητ\acute{\alpha}$).

which includes $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} DF = \text{Πίστις}, \quad \text{,,} \quad \text{,,} \quad \text{natural objects.} \\ FE = \text{Εἰκασία}, \quad \text{,,} \quad \text{,,} \quad \text{copies and shadows.} \end{array} \right.$

BOOK VII.

‘Now picture to yourself,’ I said, ‘an underground cavern with a long exit to the upper air; and imagine that you see a number of people who ever since they were born have been chained neck and foot, so that they have always sat in the same position with their faces towards the inner wall of the cavern. Behind them, a long way off and above, a large bright fire is kindled, and between the fire and the prisoners runs a road, along which pass continually men carrying different objects; and between the road and the prisoners is a low wall, over which the fire casts their shadows on to the wall of the cavern facing which the prisoners sit. Will not these prisoners, if they can talk to each other, give names to the objects they see in the reflection on the wall? And will they not attribute the voices, if the men speak, to the different shadows?’ ‘Certainly,’ he said. ‘So that,’ I continued, ‘these shadows and echoes of the realities will be taken by the prisoners for realities themselves.

‘Next suppose that one of these prisoners is released from his chains and dragged up to the light of day by a rough and difficult path. Surely he will find everything hard to perceive, and will believe the shadows, with which he is better acquainted, to be the realities, and will be blinded by the light, and will hate the man

who dragged him up into it; and, if he is gradually educated and taught to understand and behold realities, he will first and most easily behold images in the water, reflections, and other things not far removed in their nature from his shadows: he will see better by night than by day.

‘If he ever become completely enlightened he will think himself fortunate in having escaped his dungeon, and he will pity his former fellow-prisoners, and will despise any good things he may have enjoyed there as worth nothing in comparison with what he now enjoys. Again, were he to revisit the cave, he would find his eyes unaccustomed to its darkness, and would be looked upon as good for nothing, even if, before, he had been the quickest and the cleverest at perceiving the various shadows. Nay, if he tried to persuade the captives to come up and be enlightened, they would ill-treat him and perhaps kill him.

‘Transferring all this image to the actual world, I liken men who have gone into the upper air and contemplated the realities, of which the captives only see the shadows, I liken them to men who have made an approach to the Ideal Good. Thus, following out the parable, when such men are called back to the world from that contemplation, it is small wonder if they fail, and are jeered, and worsted, in the pettifogging affairs of ordinary life. A wise man, then, will recollect that there are two ways of making a mistake; as we might say according to our parable, either from having too much light in the eye or too little. And, in accordance with this view of thought and life, I do not agree with those who talk about “putting” knowledge into people; as if it were not there already, and only needed a proper training and a

proper atmosphere to draw it out. Other powers of the soul may have been acquired and may seem to have their nature akin to the bodily powers, but the power of comprehension seems to have something of a divine and original nature which it never loses, however much it may be dulled.

'Therefore our education must make our chosen citizens move towards the contemplation of the Ideal Good and the Really Existing; and,¹ remembering that they are for the people and not the people for them, they must be content to go amongst them and lead them towards that light and knowledge which they themselves have acquired.

'And for this education, or drawing round of the mind towards light and knowledge, our former methods of gymnastic and music will not suffice. Let us take some general science, such as arithmetic or calculation, and see if they must be experts in it. First let me premise that all objects of perception and thought are either excitative or non-excitative, *i.e.* either they suggest something else, or they do not. For instance, finger. That does not suggest any other fact. But first finger, or long finger, suggest respectively second finger, short finger, and so on. The perception therefore of length, or priority, is the same as that of shortness, or duality; and is, as we might say, a double sense. But the actual vision only sees one object, and may therefore be called a single sense. Now the science of number is essentially excitative: we are continually seeing objects which the sight takes in as one and the same, whilst the mind teaches us to look upon them as one and

¹ *v. s.* Book IV. *init.* οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἐν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁ τι μάλιστα δλη ἡ πόλις.

as many at the same time. Therefore the science of number, being excitative of thought, appears to be necessary for our further developed education. And they will not treat the science in a trafficking way, but will investigate the properties of pure number.

‘Our citizens will find this science of great use also in warfare; geometry too will be good for the same purpose, which they must study, if we find that it also conduces to the knowledge of the Ideal Good and real existence. Now the objection that geometry is only useful when applied practically is absurd; for then it is knowledge applied to things that come and go, that are made and perish. Whilst our study of geometry will be primarily directed to the knowledge of that which is eternal and not perishable. Therefore let us teach our citizens geometry. After geometry shall we take astronomy, *i.e.* solids in motion? Or ought we not rather to pass to solids first, *i.e.* bodies of cubic content? The fact is that the science of three dimensions is so little understood and practised that we must say we will have it taught if our city will; and so we pass on to astronomy. By astronomy I do not mean lying on your back and staring upwards to the heavens, or lying on your face and staring downwards. I understand that science which teaches us about real existence in the study of the heavenly bodies, and draws the intelligence upwards in an intellectual, not a physical, sense. The student of philosophy will study the motions of stars, sun, and moon, the flight of seasons and years, as they point to a unity and a coherent design of a perfect Creator.

‘Should we not seek for some science which stands to our hearing in the same relation as astronomy to seeing? I mean the science of harmony; not the practice of

worrying and torturing musical instruments, twisting the head on one side, dragging unwilling notes from more unwilling strings, and disputing about demi-semi-tones. But that there is a science of harmony worth studying for our citizens I am sure.

‘All these sciences form but the preface and prelude to the business of life for our citizens. And this is a law, viz. that they shall be able to comprehend an account, and give an account of all that they ought to know. And Dialectic is the master science which effects this, and gives the mind the power to free itself from everything sensual, and move straight on through argument to the actual nature of things and to the Ideal Good. All the other studies and arts we have mentioned before merely correspond to the process of accustoming the released prisoner’s eyes to the sight of shadows and reflections. Even those sciences we have just now mentioned as indispensable to the education of our citizens have been treated in an inadequate manner, and not so as to conduce towards the knowledge of real existence. For men have been unable to give a rational account of them and have ignored their first principles. Dialectic, on the contrary, moves upwards towards first principles of science, directing the eye of the soul to the source of true knowledge; and uses these arts, which we have called sciences in deference to custom, as props and helps in its progress. It is in fact the coping stone and perfection of all studies.

‘Now we must be very careful in the choice of those who are to enter upon this highest course of study. We must be sure that they have a congenial nature and will take pains and pleasure in the subject. For intellectual labour which is found only compulsory, and brings no pleasure to the student, is worth nothing.

They must begin from boyhood to study arithmetic and geometry, but compulsion must be avoided; rather let each mind develop itself in its congenial channel; for in this way we can best judge in what direction we are to employ them. And the quickest in work of all kinds and on critical occasions are to be selected for the higher education; when the gymnastic period, of two or three years, is over. And then we shall distinguish these above their fellows, and begin to teach them the general connection between the different lines of study, and their general bearing upon real knowledge and real existence. At thirty years of age we shall again make a selection from these students, and advance the best to further honours. But we must beware of the free-thinking which dialectic brings with it, and try to prevent the former landmarks from being swept away. Put the case in a parable thus: A child is brought up from his infancy with parents whom he is taught to love and respect, as being his own, when they are not really so; and he is also surrounded with flatterers. If he discover his true relationship, or rather non-relationship, he will lose his respect and love for his supposed parents and pay more attention to his flatterers. So are we brought up to believe this and that honourable and just, until the age of scepticism, *i.e.* inquiry, comes and asks "What is the just?" "What is honourable?" And then, with the exception of strong and noble minds, men fall back upon the pleasures which have played the part of the flatterer, and fail in their allegiance to justice and honour. To prevent this from being the case in our city, the study of dialectic and the inquiry into the real nature of things will be consummated only late in life; in fact the youths will not be allowed to approach it at all,

except by the study of the preliminary sciences. Let us therefore place five years, or about twice the number of those given up to gymnastic, as the proper time to be allotted for the study of dialectic. After this period they must return to the cave and take their place as instructors in war and other business for, say, fifteen years.

‘And when they have earned their discharge from the duty of assisting their fellow-citizens in the routine of life, they may at last be admitted to the end and aim of their training, the contemplation of absolute existence, and the pure study of actual knowledge; allowing a short time, turn by turn, for the performance of political duties. And when they die they will go to the islands of the Blest, and will leave an honourable memory of their life and services in the city. All this is not impossible, but it is hard to compass; and our means of facing the difficulty will be to ignore the present generation, and apply ourselves to those who are young enough to receive new ethical impressions.

BOOK VIII.

'WE have now composed our State, and its different grades of citizens have been discussed, and we have agreed that everything in it which relates to men applies equally to women. But we have been diverging from the original question in these last discussions.' 'Yes,' said Glaucon, 'you were going to speak of the different modes in which the actual city of the present day is a degeneration from our ideal city. And you said that there were four kinds. What are these?' 'First,' I said, 'there is the Cretan or Laconian, which has the highest reputation, then oligarchy, a state full of evils, next democracy, and lastly that fine *régime* they call a despotism.¹ Let us then, with these five kinds of States before us, investigate the characters which severally correspond to them.

'We can omit the just and noble man, who corresponds to our Ideal State, for he has been fully discussed already. Next to him comes the ambitious and emulous man, corresponding to the Cretan State. And then we might pass in review the other characters, corresponding to the other three States, so that when we have studied injustice in its fullest development we may compare it with justice, and make up our minds whether to believe Thrasymachus or not. And following our former method

¹ τυραννίς.

we had better first study the several States which correspond to these men, so gaining a clearer understanding of the men themselves.

‘Change in a State arises from dissension in the governing part: where the governing part is unanimous no disturbance is possible.¹ But the origin of the disturbance will lie in a disregard of the proper season of reproduction. This season should properly depend upon a fixed number calculated to an exact result; and if this number be calculated wrongly there will be irregularity in the birth of our children. And this irregularity will show itself as the children grow up and are appointed by selection to posts of difficulty and danger. For they will fail to retain the proper opinion about musical study, about crises, and about moderation, and, according to our fiction, the gold will have become alloyed with silver, bronze, and iron. The inferior part will draw their minds to base gain, while the superior continues to draw them upward towards the proper object of life. Hence they will begin to strive with each other, to appropriate land and houses to their private use, and to enslave those whom they ought to protect against slavery. And such a State lies midway between aristocracy and oligarchy. But there will still be respect for government, the defending portion will

¹ Aristotle, *Pol.* v. 10, objects to this statement, on the ground that time changes all things. He also objects that this disregard of proper seasons is not peculiar to the dissolution of the *Ἀριστή πολιτεία*. And thirdly, he states that the progress of degeneration does not pass regularly through these five stages, but that often a monarchy will change at once to a democracy, or an oligarchy to a despotism. And another objection is that Plato does not tell us what happens after the despotism. And lastly, that although the forms of oligarchy and democracy are diverse, Socrates treats them as one.

still abstain from other business, and there will be meals in common. Yet there will be a reluctance to appoint the cleverest to govern, because the clever will now have become unprincipled, and men will lean towards the spirited and pugnacious to be their leaders. Greed of gain and of private fortune will spring up, concealment, and eluding of the law, and greater honour will be paid to gymnastic than to music. Next, the man who corresponds to such a state as this.' 'He will be something like Glaucon,' said Adeimantus, 'if he is emulous.' 'Perhaps he will,' I said; 'he will also sink a little below the intellectual standard, but will be fond of study, obedient, no orator, rough to slaves, gentle to his peers, and very fond of rule, of praise, of gymnastic, and of hunting; and as he grew up a love of money would develop in him. Such is our timocratic youth. And such men as he is arise in the following way: when a man, nobly born, retires into private life disgusted with the bad state of politics, and pays no attention to the pomps and vanities of the world. Then his wife, finding that she is nobody, as her husband holds no public office, and pays little attention to her for good or for ill, grows discontented. And the servants say to the sons of the family, "When you grow up you can pay off this man, or you can do all that your father neglects to do." Such a youth, and one born of such a father, will find himself dragged in different directions by the two inclinations—the philosophical, inherited from his father, prompting him to peace and retirement, and the concupiscent, on the other hand, and the spirited, leading him into politics and a life of action; from which conflicting motives he will finally become ambitious, emulous, and high-minded.

'Next after the timocratic or ambitious city will come

the oligarchy. The cause of degeneration here is the "auri sacra fames" in the citizens and their wives. For riches and virtue are like the opposite pans of a balance: as one goes up the other goes down. So our citizens, instead of being praise-loving or virtue-loving, will become money-loving. The rich will monopolise all government and honours, of whatever character they themselves may be, poor men will be ill-treated, and there will be two cities in one, a sure sign of dissolution. In war, for instance, this disunion will appear in the reluctance of the rich to put arms in the hands of the poor, for fear the poor should turn upon them. And tradesmen and farmers will sell their plant, which others will acquire who have no business with it, and thus a useless rabble will be turned loose upon the city, with nothing to do except raise sedition. If you see drones in a hive, you know that there are some bees with stings as well as those without; and in the same way in a city where you see beggars, there are sure to be thieves and cut-purses, sacrilegious and abandoned people. Now in an oligarchical city the beggars are numberless, and by analogy we should expect to find thieves and robbers there also. Next, to speak of the man corresponding to this State. His father has met with the worst misfortune of all kinds in public life; he has been general in a war, has failed, been impeached, fined, imprisoned, banished, or what not. And these misfortunes have quite driven all love of honour and all spirit out of the son's head, who applies himself sedulously to scrape money together. In his soul the concupiscent and covetous element is the honoured and unquestioned lord. He will satisfy those desires which we call necessary, but will not spend his money on the others, for them he will keep in subjection. He has no

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culture, and therefore all those drone-like vices are incipient in him, even if repressed; he would defraud a ward, for instance, and take any other opportunity of doing evil with impunity. He would have two natures, therefore, within him, and on the whole the better powers would be masters of the inferior, although not through any virtuous principle, but merely because such a man shuns indulgence as expensive.

‘After this comes Democracy. And the change from Oligarchy arises through an excess of present advantage, I mean the accumulation of wealth in a few hands. For we have those stinged creatures, the men⁷burdened with debts, and smarting under disgrace and political disabilities, ready to fall upon the rich class, and anxious for revolution. And the rich money-making, money-lending class increase the liabilities of their victims, stinging with their usury and filling the city with drones, *i.e.* beggars. There is no check on this malady, no law to prevent a man from converting his goods and his means into ready money; whilst the rulers make all they can out of the ruled, and bring up their own families in luxury. When these two classes meet, on the road, in war, at public games, on board ship, the poor man learns that it is not an unmixed advantage after all to be rich; he sees the rich man fat and unwieldy, whilst he himself is wiry and agile; and he consequently despises him as good for nothing. And a very slight occasion will serve to bring these two opposing elements into actual war. Then the poor conquer, and make a re-distribution of property, and a democracy is formed. How, then, will such a State fare? First there will be free license for every man to acquire what he likes and to live as he likes; and the State will be a wonderfully variegated production, such as some

people, women and children, for instance, especially admire. It is the city of all men, for every one can suit his own taste if he come here; a man can do just what he pleases. If you wish to go to war, your neighbour is not bound to agree with you; if you are prevented from this or that by law, you can set the law aside. Democracy, in fact, means anarchy.

‘The democratic man is the son of the oligarchic man, whom we have already described as money-making. The son will follow his father in keeping down those desires which are not imperative. By imperative or necessary desires I mean those of which we cannot be rid, which benefit us by being satisfied, such as the desire of eating, whilst those which do us no good and can be repressed by means of training I call unnecessary, of which we may mention a fondness of delicate food for an example. The change from the oligarchic to the democratic nature is as follows: the son was brought up in a frugal manner on the honey which the father accumulated, and afterwards makes the acquaintance of¹ gay and brilliant sparks who have carried the science of pleasure to a wonderful perfection. Then there arises in him a sedition, between the careful oligarchic temper and the pleasure-seeking and prodigal; and sometimes the former is in the ascendant, sometimes the latter. And if certain desires are driven out their place is soon filled up by others, perhaps worse, because in such a man there is nothing, such as intellectual tastes, to fill the void. So the citadel of his soul is won by base pleasures and wrong opinions. These base pursuits drive away honour, and temperance, and propriety, and flaunt anarchy, incontinency, and pride, in their stead. And the man who has thus lost the right opinion treats

¹ ἀΐθωσι θηροὶ καὶ δεινούς, carrying on the metaphor.

all pleasures alike, and indulges them indiscriminately. First he spends his time in drinking and playing, then he veers round and drinks nothing but water; sometimes he practises gymnastics and next does nothing at all; again he becomes a politician and jumps up to say the first thing that comes into his head; he is

‘Everything by starts, and nothing long.’

If he sees another engaged in making money, he will make money; if another is going to the war, he will go too. In short his life and his tastes are universal.

The finest State of all and the finest man now remain, I mean the despotism and the despot. As excess of wealth turned oligarchy into democracy, so excess of liberty turns democracy into despotism. For men, such as we have described in a democratic city, intimidate the rulers and make them do as they wish, and not follow the law strictly: they uphold servile rulers and decry just ones. All relations are disturbed and reversed, sons usurp their father's prerogatives, and fathers are afraid of their sons.¹ Strangers usurp the place of the citizens, masters fawn upon their pupils, and pupils have no regard for their masters. Elders throw aside their grave and serious bearing, and ape the lightness and flippancy of youth, and slaves are as free as their purchasers: whilst the very animals are imbued with this spirit of ultra-freedom and strut about pushing people off the pathways. So free must every one be that they disregard all law, and will call no one master. On the principle, then, of reaction, this ultra-freedom

¹ Cf. Ar. *Nub.* 1331, 1332:—

ΣΤ. τὸν πατέρα τύπτεις;

ΦΕ. κάκοφανῶ γε νῆ Δία

ὡς ἐν δίκῃ σ' ἔτυπον.

will result in an ultra-slavery, somewhat in the same way that we establish the principle *corruptio optimi pessima*; although it must be remembered that this surfeit of freedom is not "the best," for it is possible to have too much of a good thing.¹ The change will begin in the persons of those men whom we likened to the drones of the hives, some of them having stings and others stingless, in the oligarchic State; but in the democratic this class will be much stronger. So the strongest of these drones will do all the speaking and working in politics, and the inferior drones will buzz about the tribune and prevent any one from being heard in opposition, except a very few. Then there are the rich on which the drones subsist, and a third class, viz. the mechanics and journeymen, who are always ready to combine if they see an opportunity of plunder. And if the rich try to defend themselves they are called bad citizens and oligarchical, a false accusation which makes them really become so. And the people set up a champion in opposition to them, who is the germ of the despot. And such a man is like to him who once tastes human blood, as in the story of Zeus Lycæus in Arcadia, and must become a wolf. For if he once become involved in prosecutions and judicial murder, he will go on from bad to worse, banishing, killing, proclaiming abolition of debt and redistribution of land. Then he is perhaps expelled and re-installed by force, and his hand is against all who helped to drive him out. The next step is that he is obliged to ask the people to give him a body-guard, and when he has obtained this,

¹ Cf. *Euthydemus*, xxv. where the sophist is trying to make Ctesippus advance the contrary proposition; *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὁμολόγεις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάρμακον, ὅταν δέῃ, πίνειν ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλο τι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς πλείστον δεῖ πίνειν, εἰ seqq.*

the despotism stands forth complete. And the people do not say of their champion, "How are the mighty fallen!" but the champion is now a full-blown despot.

'At first he is mild and gentle, and his measures are all in the direction of lightening the people's burdens, but as he goes on he finds it necessary to stir up war so that he may keep up his character of champion, and impoverish the people by war-taxes to prevent their rising against him. And if any of his friends speak out his mind against these practices he will have to remove him, and so he will become the enemy of any magnanimous, prudent, or wealthy man. And as physicians remove all the evils of the body and encourage the development of what is good, the tyrant will remove all the good and leave the evil. He will defend himself with foreign mercenaries and with freed men. Hence we may see the mistake of Euripides and of poets in general who commend despotisms and democracies, and encourage people towards them, although they naturally are well rewarded for their encomiums by those whom they panegyrised. The despot will plunder sacred treasure, confiscate the property of those whom he has exiled, and spend his own inheritance in riotous living with male and female companions. And the people that has begotten the despot will have to keep him, and it will be of no use to them to say that it is not right for a child when he grows up to be a burden to his father, and that they did not help him forward as their champion that he might collect a pack of idle knaves about him, who devour the citizen's substance. Nay, he will strike his father and treat him as a son should not; and the people trying to escape out of the frying-pan of slavery will fall into the fire

of despotism, which is after all the worst kind of slavery. This, then, is the change from democracy to tyranny.¹

*¹ With this simile of the son illtreating the father, may be compared a considerable part of the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, v. ll. 1321, *seqq.* In Xenophon, *Mem.* 1, 2, 49, the charge is noticed against Socrates, as in the passage referred to in the *Clouds*, that he encouraged the very vices which he condemns here and in Book II. page 378 B.

BOOK IX.

‘WE now come to speak of the despot himself and how he arises. But first I should wish to define more exactly the differences of pleasure. Some of those pleasures which I called unnecessary appear to be distinctly criminal: the desire of them arises very frequently in sleep, when the rational faculty is dormant, and we imagine ourselves doing the worst actions without compunction. Now the more temperate a man’s actions are when waking, the more rational will be his dreams. The democratic man, if you remember, was he who had deserted the parsimony of his oligarchic father, and on making acquaintance with dissipated men, and lived a life midway between luxury and miserliness. The son of this democratic man will be brought up between two opposing forces; viz. the advice of his father and of a part of the household, to live a moderate life, and the incitements of others of the household who draw him on to all kinds of pleasures and expenses. If these triumph in the city of his soul, they are like the drone’s sting, they kill any honourable and temperate inclinations that may yet survive, and they fill the soul with madness and license. Thence come feastings, revellings, and dissipations of all sorts, which drain his income; and to supply funds for their continuance there

must be loans and embezzlement, and defrauding of his family, perhaps with violence, and his old and dear parents will perhaps be thrown aside and ill treated and disregarded, in the interest of some acquaintance of an hour. And from such crimes it is but a short step to robbery and sacrilege. If there are but a few of such men in a city, they commit crimes of various gravity, and perhaps they become informers, and take and give bribes; but they are a mere trifle compared with the *régime* of a despot. For he is generated by an excessive number of such men in a city; who put forward the most despotically-minded of them all, and he grinds down his father-city, or, as the Cretan phrase goes, his mother-city under, and by means of his young companions. Such a man is never on terms of friendship and equality with any one, he either flatters and fawns, or else he bullies: he has no honour or magnanimity, he is full of injustice, he is unreliable, and the longer he lives the worse he becomes. So the despot will become a most unhappy man, and will be exactly opposed to the monarch, and the monarchical state will be the best. Therefore let us glance also at the rest of the despotical State, to gain a clear and true notion of the whole growth of a despotism, and specially at the inner and unvarnished life of the despot himself.

To speak of the State first: all that is best in it will lie in the most abject slavery, and similarly in the man's soul, his noblest nature will be in slavery to his worst. And as the despot is a spendthrift and a lustful man, the soul of the despotical man will be continually poverty-stricken and continually craving. Is he not then the most wretched of all men? No. It is the despot himself, the despotical man who comes forward

and lives a public life, who is the most wretched.¹ Let us consider the life of those private individuals who have the greatest external resemblance to the tyrant, viz. those who possess many slaves. Now of these slaves they have no fear, why? Because the whole city is full of free men like themselves, and the union of them all is strength. But imagine a single free man with his whole family and household suddenly transported to a desert place,—where would his safety be? Would he not be obliged to fawn upon his slaves, to free them, to give them all they asked for? Or put a case of this sort. Imagine a man surrounded on all sides by neighbours who would not brook the slightest injury to any of their number, but would inflict the greatest penalties on him if he attempted to harm them. Such a life does the despotical man lead, and in such intimidation does he live, fearing even to show himself outside his house, and living more like a woman than a free man. But his worst lot is to come forward in public, for then he is like a man with an unsound body which is compelled to fight and strive with other bodies, although most unfit for the task. The despot will be of all men most hateful, wicked, odious, friendless, impious, and will make others as bad as himself. And the different kinds of men will follow in this order of descent, beginning from the monarchical; the timocratic, oligarchic, the democratic and despotical.

‘Let us try and gain the same result by a different method; and let us recollect the triple division of the

¹ Socrates is careful to insist upon the difference between the despot and the despotical man. Glaucon is deceived by Socrates' proposal in 557 B. *κελεύοιμεν εξαγγέλλειν, πῶς ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὁ τύραννος*. But, to discover the condition of the *τύραννος*, Socrates will pass first through a description of the condition of the *τυραννικός ιδιώτης*.

soul, into rational, spirited and concupiscent. The last may be renamed and called the money-loving element, because money is the means by which the sensual pleasures are gratified, and the second we may call the praise-loving or strife-loving element, and the first the knowledge-loving. Now each man in whom one of these elements predominates will praise the pleasures proper to that element, and despise those of the other two. Which then are we to believe? Surely the man who has the most experience, good sense, and logic. And the knowledge-loving man will have more experience than the other two, for he has, or may have, tried the pleasures which they commend, and found them wanting, before he went on to the pleasure of studying truth and real existence. He will also be a more sensible man, and have greater command of logic, for logic is the science of gaining knowledge. On all points, then, the knowledge-loving man is the best judge of what pleasure really is: next, he who loves praise, and lastly he who loves money.

'The just man has thus thrown the unjust man twice.¹ Let us try a third method. You know that people when they are in pain look back upon their past condition of painlessness with a feeling that it was pleasure compared with their present condition of pain. And when, after pleasure, there comes a cessation from pleasure, people imagine the absence of pleasure to be pain.² In fact there is a middle state, neither pleasure nor pain, and the pleasure or pain of this middle state is only apparent,

¹ See again, Ar. *Clouds*, ll. 889, *seqq.* where the Just and Unjust cause contend, the latter being victorious.

² Imitated by Sir Thomas More, *Utopia*, p. 114, ed. Arber. 'For thys (viz. the quiete and upryghte state of the body), yf it be not letted nor assaulted with no greif, is delectable of itself, thoughte it be moued with no externall or outwarde pleasure.'

not real. But there are real pleasures, which arise out of no cessation from pain, *e.g.* the pleasures of smell, which leave no feeling of pain upon their removal. Real pleasure and real pain are not the absence of pain and pleasure respectively, which form most of those states called bodily pleasures, pleasures of anticipation, and so forth. We may parallel this fact by picturing to ourselves something below and something above a fixed point midway between the two. The mid-point seems to be the upper point to the lowest, and the lower point to the upper: whereas it is really midway. And if you put gray beside white it looks black, or if you put it beside black it looks white. Now hunger, thirst, and feelings of this sort, are a sort of emptiness of the body, which their satisfaction fills up; and if you grant that the satisfaction of a void in knowledge and right opinion is more true and real than the satisfaction of a void in man's stomach (inasmuch as knowledge and right opinion partake more of the nature of real existence than the life of the body) it will follow that the pleasure experienced in the satisfaction or filling up of ignorance with knowledge will be a more real thing than that experienced in gratifying bodily desires and emptinesses. Those men, therefore, who know neither virtue nor good sense, wander all their lives about this middle or colourless region, experiencing no true pleasure, and they live the life of brutes, in endless gorging, indulgence, and strife. And their loves, and hates, and wars will all be concerned with shadows, as Stesichorus sings of the image of Helen, about which the Greeks fought at Troy.

‘Passing on to analyse the praise-loving or ambitious nature can we not account for it on the same principle? Is there not a void in the soul which is filled and

satisfied, according to the man's nature, by honours and victory and the exercise of spirit? Now in so far as any of the money-loving or praise-loving desires follow science and reason, they obtain true pleasure: what then shall we say of the knowledge-loving part, which makes science and reason its only pursuits? Therefore in man's soul, as long as each part pursues its own pleasures, and as long as the proper relation is preserved between the three parts, and we do not have one interfering with another, the man's life will be harmonious and happy. So the despot, since the worst and most unreal form of pleasure is master within his soul, will live most unhappily, and the kingly man, who gives the pursuit of true pleasure the first place, will live the happiest life possible. Let us try to estimate the gulf between them. The despot is three times removed from the oligarchical man, and the oligarchic man also three times from the kingly man. Hence the despot is thrice three times removed from the kingly or aristocratic man, and from true pleasure and happiness. So, to put it arithmetically, and taking six powers of three, we find that the kingly man is seven hundred and twenty-nine times as happy as the despot.

'Let me ask you now to exercise your imagination once more, thus: A being is composed of three parts, the first, of a sort of hydra, having the heads of all kinds of beasts, wild and tame; the second, a lion; the third, a man. All these different parts are grown together, so that they make one creature. But around them all and including them all there is the external appearance of a man. Now suppose that this man allows the brutal and bestial natures within him to have the upper hand of the human nature, and to quarrel, and to do exactly as the passing mood bids them, whilst the

human part is starved and reduced. Surely one who praises injustice would say that such would be the proper life for this creature to lead: whilst a man who loves justice would advise that the tame parts of the hydra be developed and the wild ones suppressed; that the leonine nature be won over to ally itself with the human, and harmony be attained in the whole body of the creature. In such an image as this we might express the history of man's composite nature. When a man commits a crime for the sake of money or does any evil act voluntarily, he is letting loose the bestial nature within him, and when he is cruel and desperate he gives the leonine part of his soul undue prominence. Or again, when he turns fawner and flatterer, he is trying to turn the noble lion within him to an ape. Therefore rule is salutary—the rule of the better; for the better rules for the good of the whole polity. That is the reason of our governing children, and not permitting them to think for themselves, till they by careful training come to years of discretion, because they do not when young understand the superiority of the rational or the inferiority of the sensual. He then that forgets not to keep his inferior nature in subordination to his superior, will gain temperance and justice and sense: he will give honour to study as the means of acquiring this temperament, he will not even make good health and strength his object, if it be incompatible with temperance; nor honours, unless he think that he will be the better for them.' 'Tis an ideal,' said Glaucon. 'Ah!' I said, 'it is an ideal, but one to which he would be always looking.'¹

¹ v. s. 472 and 473, e. g. ἐὰν οἱοί τε γινώμεθα εὐδοεῖν ὡς ἐν ἐγγ' ἄτατα τῶν εἰρημένων πόλις οἰκήσειεν, φάναι ἡμᾶς ἐξευρηκέναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γενέσθαι, ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις.

BOOK X.

'I SHOULD wish to say a few more words on the subject of poetry and imitation,—in short, to reject that poetry which partakes of the imitative. When a man makes a bed, or a table, he makes it with regard to a pattern or example.¹ He does not make the pattern, he uses the pattern to guide him. And any man can, in a sense, make everything; for instance if you reflect anything in a mirror, you make it, so to speak, and a painter, when he paints, makes objects in another sense. Now in the case of a bed the pattern is really the original and most really existent bed; for that which the carpenter makes is only this bed or that, and not the universal bed. Hence there are three beds; first, the pattern and original of all, second, the physical specimen, made by the craftsman, thirdly, the copy of this latter, made by the painter. And notice that God, who is the maker of the original, has made it one and universal, whilst the others are indefinite in number.

It is just so with poetry and poetry writers; they are imitators three times removed from the original maker. And consider the question thus also. When you look at a bed from different points, it seems different, but it is really the same. Now painting, and imitative art generally, represent things as they appear, not as they

¹ ἰδέα.

are. Now the question arises, are we justified in giving Homer the reputation he enjoys at present in our State, the reputation of knowing all those things about which he sings? for if he and the other poets do not, they are deceivers of those whom they instruct. Surely, if they were well acquainted with those works and objects about which they sing, they would apply their energies to those works themselves and to those objects themselves, in order to leave behind them a substantial and enduring record of their labours.¹ So when the poet speaks about medicine we shall inquire if he ever healed any sick persons, or else ask what right he has to speak on the subject. Has he made any laws, as Lycurgus, given any city a constitution, as Solon, invented anything, as Thales and Anacharsis? No! Then perhaps he was useful during his lifetime in private life; laid down ethical rules, as Pythagoras did, which have formed the law of a sect. Not even this! Both Homer and Hesiod then could hardly have been able to teach men how to be virtuous, or they would never have been allowed to travel about singing their songs with a scanty remuneration. They would have been treated, on the contrary, like Protagoras of Abdera² and Prodicus of Ceos, who gained such a hold over those whom they taught, that their pupils never thought of doing the smallest thing without consulting them. Homer therefore, and all the poets, are the imitators not of virtue but of the shadows of virtue. And the painters are the same; for they do

¹ It is curious that Plato should have been so carried away by the favourite antithesis of $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\iota$ and $\xi\rho\gamma\alpha$, as not to recognise in writings a more enduring work than the results of physical labour; especially with the writings of Homer and their influence before his eyes.

² For these two sophists v. the dialogue which bears Protagoras' name, 310 A.—316.

not consult with the maker of the things which they imitate, as they ought to do, if they wish to gain a good idea of it, before putting it on the canvas. Now it is granted that this sort of imitation is concerned with things three times removed from reality: things like shadows and reflections which seem different from what they really are, and are perceived by the most superficial of the senses; whilst the rational faculty discovers the true nature of things. Imitation then in painting is far removed from truth and reason, and consequently can be the originator of nothing sound and useful in us.

‘Next the imitation of poetry. Poetry represents action, intentional or unintentional, and the consequences of action: it represents men under the influence of complex and distracting thought. Now we know that when a man gives way to violent excitement, he does so under the influence of his sensual nature;¹ when he resists it, he is moved by the law of reason.² And the more a man resists the effects of excitement the more temperate and the better he becomes. What good and temperate man then will care to imitate, especially in the publicity of a theatre, the abandonment of self-restraint, as expressed in the writings of the poets? Will not any wise man think that it is hard enough to keep a check upon his own passions without imitating other people’s passions as well, and thereby bringing the mind into a relaxed and excitable condition?³

¹ Πάθος.

² Λόγος καὶ νόμος.

³ With this view of theatrical and poetical works should be compared Aristotle’s view in *Poetic* 5, 20. He justifies the exciting properties of tragedy as being a purgative: δι’ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαινουσα τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

Notably in the case of pity and fear the wise man will refrain from exciting himself by studying or representing the excitement of others. And he will shun excessive indulgence in laughter for fear of becoming flippant; and generally avoid the fiercer lusts of the flesh. Homer then as a hymn-writer and panegyrist shall be welcome in our State, but otherwise we will have nothing to say to him, although we may allow him to be the best poet and the first tragedian. And before any poet can be admitted he must make a defence of poetry in prose, to prove that it is salutary.'

'After all we have not yet spoken of all the rewards of virtue. It would be an endless task,' he said. 'And why should not our task be endless,' I said, 'in the case of an immortal being?' 'What do you mean?' he said. 'I mean,' said I, 'that our soul is immortal, and I will try to prove it. Every existing thing is liable to corruption, the body has its sicknesses and diseases, plants have their blight, metals rust, and all things go from better to worse. It is some evil which destroys, not a good, nor even a neutral; whilst the good preserves each thing of which it is a good. Injustice, ignorance, intemperance are the corrupters of the soul, just as disease corrupts the body. Bad food and poison do not directly destroy the body; but they produce in it a corruption, which corruption directly destroys it. According to this analogy, then, unless the corruption of the body implant a corruption of soul in the soul, we can never imagine that the soul is destroyed by a foreign evil without any evil of its own. But it does not appear that a bad condition of body can exert any influence of the sort upon the soul. A man is not the more wicked because he dies of a malignant fever. Nor does a life of wickedness make a man mentally

incapable; but rather sharpens his wits. Hence the soul is not destroyed by its own corruption, as the body is; neither is it, of course, destroyed by the corruption of other existences. Therefore it exists for ever, or is immortal. Neither can it grow less if nothing of it is destroyed; nor greater, for that would imply the addition of something mortal. To look at the soul as it exists in the world and human life, is to look at it with all its accretions and disfigurements, like the representations of the sea-god Glaucos, beaten, and bruised, and broken by the waves, with shells, and seaweed, and stones, sticking to his body; and more like a beast than a god. Such is the soul, beset with its thousand ills. We should, on the contrary, try to look to the philosophical history of the soul, its real, its immortal, and its divine nature, raising it out of this sea of troubles and removing all the accretions of the world, and the forms and feelings of human life which cloud and dim its clearness.

‘We have not yet spoken of the advantages and rewards of justice. I beg you to give me back the loan you received from me on that point, I mean, my admission, for the sake of the better stating of your case,¹ that a just man may be, and often is, considered to be unjust, and *vice versa*. Now I think it has been shown that in the first place the gods have no doubt about the just and the unjust. And if so, the gods must give him good fortune whom they know to be just, however much it may appear to be the reverse at the moment. And, in regard of his fellow-man, although the unjust may for the time appear to be carrying everything before him, like those who in a race rush off with the lead, yet, as those runners often run them-

¹ *v. s.* Book II. *init.*—367 E.

selves out and come in far behind at the end, so the unjust will be found wanting at the end of his career, and the truth of the proverb 'Honesty is the best policy,' will be established. One point yet remains to be settled. What are the rewards of justice and injustice after death? I will try and tell you briefly; no long story of Alcinous, but of a man named Er, a Pamphylian. This man died on the field of battle, and was taken up on the twelfth day to be burnt on the pyre, when he suddenly revived, and told how he had gone in company with many other souls, to a strange place, where there were two rifts in the earth, close together, and other two over against them in the heaven. Between these sat judges, who bade the just take the right-hand path upwards, and the unjust the left-hand and downward path. But him they told to observe carefully; for he was to return to earth, and tell men what things he had seen done there. So he saw the souls departing as I have said through these two rifts, one in earth and the other in heaven; and he saw them rising from the other rift in the earth covered with dirt and dust, and coming down from the rift in the heaven pure and clean. Here in a meadow there was a great meeting;—those from the earthly rift told how they had been wandering for a thousand years in pain, whilst those from the heavenly rift spoke of the transcendent pleasure they had enjoyed. In short, for each offence the penalty was tenfold, and for each good work a tenfold reward likewise. And greater penalties even than these for impiety and murder, and greater rewards in proportion for piety. He heard a question asked about Ardæus, despot of a Pamphylian city, who had committed foul crimes during his rule. And a soul answered that when Ardæus, together with other despots and certain private men,

who had committed great crimes, arrived at the entrance of the upper rift, after their thousand years' suffering, there was a bellowing noise from the entrance, signifying that they were still too guilty to be received, and certain savage-looking, fiery-hot figures advanced, seized and bound them, flayed them, and carded them with thorns, proclaiming to all the crimes which had merited such punishment. But those for whom the entrance had no noise, went on in peace and joy, and, after staying for seven days in the meadow, on the eighth they went on their way; and on the fourth day after this they came to a pillar of light, stretching straight along earth and heaven, like a rainbow, very bright and very clear. This they reached after a day's journey; and there they saw the ends of it lashed with cords, forming as it were an undergirder to the circuit of the heaven. At these ends was the spindle of Necessity, the centre of all revolutions, whose shafts and hook are of adamant, and its whorl of composite construction. For it was as if hollow and of great size, with a smaller and similar one fitting in it, and another within this, making eight in all. Their rims are of different breadths, and their lights of different intensity and colour, and their revolutions of different speed. On each of them sits a siren singing in monotone, and the eight sounds produce a harmony. And the three daughters of Necessity sit singing to the music of the sirens; Lachesis sings what has been, Clotho what is, and Atropos what is to come. And they turn the spindle one after the other. Now these souls were obliged to proceed towards Lachesis; and a certain one took different lives and lots from Lachesis' lap and stood up and proclaimed aloud, "Thus says Lachesis, daughter of Necessity—choose ye what life ye will; ye are responsible; God is free." Then he

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threw all the lots down and they chose, with the exception of Er, who was not allowed to choose. And there were lives of all kinds of men and animals. This then was the crisis, this was the difficult moment; and herein was the man fortunate who had studied the philosophy of life, and knew how to refuse the evil and choose the good; avoiding excess in both directions. And all, even the last, if he chose with discretion, might secure a happy and a peaceful life. Now the very first who chose, through his own folly and greed, selected the life of a great despot; and when he discovered what sort of a life he had chosen, he beat his breast, and bewailed not his own folly but the cruelty of fortune and of fate; whereas if he had gone about his choice in a quiet and philosophic spirit, he might not only have lived his earthly life in happiness, but afterwards have gone through the heavenly journey with comfort and pleasure. It was pitiful and sometimes ludicrous to see how the different choices were made, generally in some regard to the former life of each chooser. Orpheus, for instance, would be a swan, not wishing to be born of woman; Thamyris, a nightingale; Telamonian Ajax, a lion; Agamemnon an eagle; Epeios, son of Panopeus, a workwoman; Thersites, a monkey. And last of all there came the soul of Odysseus; and he, for his toils and wanderings that he had undergone, chose rather to live the life of an obscure and humble man than any other. Many souls of animals, too, passed into men, and interchanged with each other. Then they were all led before Lachesis, and a spirit took each of them, and led them to drink of the water of Lethe, after Clotho had assigned their future to each, and Atropos had rendered it inevitable. And the wise drank less than the foolish, who forgot everything. Then they lay down to rest

and at midnight there were thunderings and an earthquake, and they were all shot up different ways to their birth, like shooting stars. But Er was prevented from drinking, and remembered nothing more, till he revived.

'Such, Glaucon, is the story, which if we believe we shall do well, practise justice, believing the soul to be immortal, and at last arrive at that happy road which leads up to heaven, and spend our thousand years of wandering in happiness.'

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΓΛΑΤΚΩΝ, ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ,
ΘΡΑΣΤΜΑΧΟΣ, ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ.

CAP. I.

Κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ 327
Αρίστωνος, προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅμα τὴν

CH. I.—*Socrates, walking home from Piræus, is induced to tarry at Polemarchus' house.*

τῇ θεῷ, sc. the Thracian Artemis, known as Bendis. So we have this festival termed τὰ Βενδίδεια: v. *infra* 354 A. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰστίδασθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδίδείοις. The temple of this goddess stood on the promontory Munychia. See Xen. Hell. 2, 4, 11, where Thrasybulus is described as posting himself on Munychia. From this passage it appears that there were two temples, one of the Munychian Artemis and one of Bendis. *ἔπειτα ἐχώρου κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἅμα τὸν ἀναφέρουσαν. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Φυλῆς... συνεσπειράθησαν ἐπὶ τῇ Μουνυ-*

χίαν. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἔστεως εἰς τὴν Ἴπποδάμειον ἀγορὰν ἐλθόντες πρῶτον μὲν συνετάξαντο, ὥστε ἐμπλήσαι τὴν ὁδὸν ἣ φέρει πρὸς τε τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Μουνυχίας Ἀρτεμίδος καὶ τὸ Βενδίδειον. The question suggests itself, Why do we find a Thracian goddess located in the heart of Athens' seaport? Traces of a connexion between Athens and Thrace appear in an alliance with Sitalces, king of the Odrisian Thracians, made in the time of Pericles, B.C. 431; the strength of which may be gauged by the fact that a Lacedæmonian embassy who tried to separate Sitalces from Athens were delivered up to the Athenians by him. Sitalces' son Sadocus also became at that time an Athenian

έορτήν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσου-
 σιν, ἄτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. καλή μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ
 ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπή ἐδοξεν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ἦττον
 ἐφαίνεταιο πρέπειν ἢν οἱ Θυράκες ἔπεμπον. προσευξά-
 Β μνοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπήμην πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ,
 κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὠρμημένους
 Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν

citizen. Thuc. 2, 29. Thucydides gives as the reason for this alliance the desire of the Athenians to gain a post in Thrace from which they could support their efforts in Chalcedonia and conquer Perdiccas; and although he is careful to point out that Teres, father of Sitalces, had nothing to do with Tereus of the legend, who was a Thracian and married an Athenian wife, it is probable that this myth was made use of by the Athenians in consummating their alliance with Sitalces.

τὴν έορτήν..., τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν. The object of the dependent sentence is here drawn back from its proper grammatical position, because it is the most prominent thought in the mind of the speaker. So Ar. Nub. 1148—

καὶ μοι τὸν υἱὸν, εἰ μεμάθηκε
 τὸν λόγον
 ἐκεῖνον εἰφ', ὃν ἀρτίως εἰσή-
 γαγες.

et *infra ibid.* 1186—

οὐ γὰρ, οἴμαι, τὸν νόμον

Ἰσασιν ὀρθῶς, ὃ τι νοεῖ,
 where the subject of the dependent sentence is treated similarly. The idiom is a very frequent one. See below, *δρᾶς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ὅσοι ἐσμέν*; and Chap. X. *εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ τι ἐστίν*. For the sudden transition from

the past narrative tense to the simple future we may compare Herod. 2, 121, 9, ὡς, ἐκείνων προορέων, δίκως βίον ἀφθονον ἔχωσι, τεχνάσατο... Also see Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 2, ἐκ τούτου δὲ Φαρνάβασος φοβούμενος τὸ στρατεύμα μὴ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴν στρατεύηται, ... ἐδείτο— where the primary tense στρατεύηται accompanies the narrative tense ἐδείτο. This example, it may be noticed, also illustrates the use of the subject drawn back from the dependent sentence. Again, Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 4, ἔφη οὖν ταῦτα ποιήσειν, εἰ ἡνέρα 33, ἔς τε δ' ἂν μὸλωσιν, εἰς ἀφθονίαν παρέξειν ἔφη καὶ σῖτα καὶ ποτά.

πομπή, the technical term for a religious ceremony involving a procession. See Ar. Acharnians 247.

καὶ μὴν καλὸν γ' ἐστ', ὃ
 Διόνυσσε δέσποτα,
 κεχαρισμένως σοι τήνδε τὴν
 πομπὴν ἐμὲ.

πέμψαντα καὶ θύσαντα...

where the verb πέμπω is joined as here with πομπή.

ἀπήμην πρὸς, 'we were going towards'... so below, οἴκαδε, homewards. It is to be noticed here that Socrates goes through the religious service and festival like any other orthodox citizen, v. *Introd.*

παῖδα περιμείναι ἔ κελεύσαι. καὶ μου ὄπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμείναι. καὶ ἐγὼ μετεστράφην τε καὶ ἠρόμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶη. Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὄπισθεν προσέρχεται ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. Ἄλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων. καὶ ὀλίγω ὕστερον ὃ τε Πολέμαρχος ἦκε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς καὶ Νικήρατος ὁ Νικίου καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς. ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ μοι πρὸς ἄστν ὠρμήσθαι ὡς ἀπίοντες. Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ὅρας οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἡ τοῖνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ' αὐτοῦ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν

μου...λαβ...ίμ., 'taking hold of me by the robe from behind' —*ἱματίου* is added afterwards, defining more exactly the word *μου*. Verbs, such as *λαμβάνομαι*, *ἄπτομαι*, *ἄρπάζω*, *ἔχομαι*, *ψάω*, take genitive of the thing caught hold of, or of the part of the thing. Thus Eur. Cycl. 322—

τένοντος ἀρπάσας ἀκροῦ ποδός,
εἰ 390, *inf.*—

κὲγὼ λαβοίμην τοῦ τυφλοῦντος ὄμματα

δαλοῦ,
and Herod. 2, 121, 11, *ἔργου* ἔχουσαι. So *ἀντιλαμβάνομαι*, *inf.* Ch. X. *ἰνί.*, *Θρασύμαχος* .. ὄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνουσαι τοῦ λόγου.

μετεστράφην .. ἠρόμην, distinguish these tenses.

Πολέμαρχος, said by Muretus to have been brother of Lysias the orator. *v. inf.* Ch. II. *ἰνί.*

Νικήρατος. Muretus states that this Niceratus was a general in the Peloponnesian war; but Thucydides, to whom he refers, is silent upon the question.

ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς, in the same way above *ἄτε νῦν πρῶτον ἔγοντες*. These particles, joined with a participle, introduce a circumstance which defines more fully, or explains, the principal statement. See below 329 A, *ἀγανακτοῦσιν, ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι*. It must be distinguished from *ὡς* in the next sentence, which introduces a supposition, not a fact.

οὐ γὰρ... Fully expressed, the answer would be, 'You guess rightly, *for* (γὰρ) we are going homewards.' See Soph. O. T. 432—

ΤΕ. οὐδ' ἰκθμην ἔγωγ' ἂν, εἰ σὺ μὴ κάλεις.

ΟΙ. οὐ γὰρ τί σ' ᾔδη μῶρα φωνήσαντ'.

i.e. 'It was not my fault that I called you, *for* I knew not,' &c.

οὐκοῦν, &c. Socrates is ready at once with a characteristic reply to Polemarchus' dilemma. 'There is another alternative yet, if we can persuade you to let us go.' Polemarchus' threat

δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐλλείπεται τὸ ἦν πεισωμεν ὑμᾶς, ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι ; Ἡ καὶ δύναισθ' ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς, πείσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων. Ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομέγων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαν-
328 τος, Ἄρά γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἴστε ὅτι λαμπὰς ἔσται πρὸς ἑσπέραν ἀφ' ἵππων τῇ θεῷ ; Ἀφ' ἵππων ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καινόν γε τοῦτο. λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἀμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις ; ἢ πῶς λέγεις ; Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος· καὶ πρὸς γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἦν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι. ἐξανασησύμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα

is of force, Socrates suggests persuasion.

μὴ ἀκ., 'if we refused to listen.' The participle here, as often, is equivalent to a conditional sentence. See *infra*. Ch. V. *ἰνί.* δ ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων, *i.e.* 'if I were to mention it.' Also Ch. VI. *med.* τὸ τινας παρακαταθεμένου τι δόφουν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι, *i.e.* 'if he were to ask for it when he was out of his mind.'

οὐδ' ἴστε. οὐδέ indicates surprise. 'Then you do not really (ἀρα) know?' This particle ἀρα, although differently accentuated and used at the beginning of the sentence, contains the same implication as ἀρα, 'after all,' or 'then'; for which see Eur. *Med.* 1029—

ἄλλως ἄρ' ὑμᾶς, ὦ τέκν', ἐξεθρεψάμεν,

et ibid. 1262—

μάταν ἀρα γένος φίλιον ἔτεκες.

λαμπὰς, *i.g.* λαμπαδηφορία, a contest in which two or more sets of competitors handed on a torch from man to man, the object being to bring the torch first to the goal alight. See Aesch.

Ag. 281 *seqq.*; where the beacon-signals that brought the news of the capture of Troy are compared in an elaborate simile to the λαμπὰς, ll. 312-4—

τοιόδε τοί μοι λαμπαδηφόρων νόμοι,

ἄλλος παρ' ἄλλου διαδοχαῖς πληρούμενοι'

νικᾷ δ' ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών.

The simpler form of the game was for individuals to run the whole course with the torch. Muretus tells us that Prometheus, Hephæstus, and Pallas were the first recipients of this sacred celebration; and suggests that it was paid to Artemis under her character of Selene, quoting the epithet 'noctiluca' from Horace, *Od.* 4, 6, 38, and accounting for the introduction of horses by a reference to Ovid's line, 'Altaque rorantes Luna regebat equos.' He also refers most aptly to Plato's own use of this custom in simile. *Laws* 776 B. ἐκτρέφοντας παῖδας, καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων. πρὸς ἑσπέραν, sub noctem, towards night-fall.

θεασόμεθα καὶ ξυνεσόμεθά τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων αὐτόθι καὶ διαλεξόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως Β ποιείτε. καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων, Ἔοικεν, ἔφη, μενετέον εἶναι. Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρῆ ποιεῖν.

CAP. II.

Ἦμιεν οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμαρχου, καὶ Λυσιαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφούς, καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον του

πολλοῖς τῶν νέων... Added by Polemarchus as an inducement to Socrates, whose conversations with the young were so notorious that he was distinctly forbidden to engage in them. Xen. Mem. I, 2, 33, τοῖς νέοις ἀπειπέτην μὴ διαλέγεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ μένετε. ἀλλὰ is the favourite particle employed with an urgent imperative, and may be seen from the following passages to have the force, as it were, of anticipating a possible refusal. See above, 32δ, ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. Ar. Acharn. 40δ. ΔΙ. ἀλλ' ἐκκυκλήθητ'. ΕΥ. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον. ΔΙ. ἀλλ' ὅμως. Eur. Med. 942—

σὺ δ' ἀλλὰ σὴν κέλευσον αἰτεῖσθαι πατρός
γυναῖκα παῖδας τῆνδε μὴ φεύγειν χθόνα.

CH. II.—Where they find Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, with whom Socrates engages in conversation.

καὶ δὴ καί, *i. q.* et denique: this collocation of particles marks the final and principal point in a series, the particular case to which the others have

been the prelude. See Euthyphro *fin.* καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητρον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι..., καὶ οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάζω, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ἔμεινον βιωσοίμην. See also Rep. Book II. *in it.* Γλαῦκων ἀεὶ ἀνδρείοτατος ὢν τυγχάνει, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε, *i. e.* 'always hitherto, but especially on that occasion': an exact illustration of this force. See also Ch. III. B. καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ. Other cases of the phrase, with slightly varied meaning, will be noticed below, 343 B, 361 E. δὴ itself is usually final or conclusive: see Soph. Antigone, 895, where Antigone, after enumerating the others of her family who have perished by violent deaths, speaks thus of herself—

ὦν λισσθία ἴγῳ καὶ κάκιστα δὴ μακρῷ κάτειμι.

See also Rep. Ch. XII. *fin.* and Ch. XIV. τοιοῦτον οὖν δὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, the concluding statement and summing up of Thrasymachus' case.

Θρασύμαχον. The character of this person the Dialogue will unfold. He is mentioned as a rhetor in Phædrus 261 C, 269

Χαλκηδόνιον καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιανιέα καὶ Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου ἦν δ' ἔνδον καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου Κέφαλος. καὶ μάλα πρεσβύτης μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι· διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἑωράκη αὐτόν. καθῆστο δὲ ἑστεφανωμένος ἐπὶ τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου· τεθυκῶς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ. ἑκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν· ἔκειντο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλῳ. εὐθύς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ θαμίξεις ἡμῖν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ· χρῆν

E, and especially 271 A, whilst in 267 D he is termed 'the mighty Chalcedonian,' and specially commended for his able treatment of a pathetic theme; but we are tempted to think that Socrates is imposing upon Phædrus in this latter point, from what we learn of Thrasymachus in the Republic.

διὰ χρόνου, see Herod. vi. 118. ἀλλὰ μὲν δι' ἐτέων εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐκομίσαντο.

καθῆστο δὲ ἑστεφανωμένος.

In the same way the Socrates of the Clouds of Aristophanes causes the neophyte Strepsiades to sit down and wear a crown in approaching the Cloud-deities. ll. 255, 6—

ΣΤ. ἰδοὺ κάθημαι.

ΣΩ. τούτουλ' τοίνυν λαβὲ τὸν στέφανον.

προσκεφαλαίου καὶ δίφρου. So Cicero, Ep. Fam. 9, 18, *sin.* 'Sella tibi erit in ludo: eam pulvinus sequetur.'

παρ' αὐτόν. We find a verb with the meaning of sitting used with accusative in Euthydemus 273 B, ὁ μὲν παρὰ τὸ μεῖράκιον ἐκαθέζετο, and 271 B, ὁ δὲ παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος; and in Hom. Od. 4, 51—

ἐς ῥα θρόνους ἔζοιτο παρ' Ἀτρεΐδην Μενέλαον.

The accusative implies that they 'went towards him and sat down.' So Herod. 3, 64, ὡς Σμέρδης ἰζόμενος εἰς τὸν βασιλῆιον θρόνον ψάσειε τῇ κεφαλῇ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

ἔκειντο γάρ... These seats were for those who shared in the sacrificial rites, and afterwards partook of the sacrificial banquet from small tables placed in front of them. The practice of combining a banquet with a sacrifice was most frequent; thus the one is spoken of as the usual accompaniment of the other in Xen. Mem. 2, 3, 11. εἴ τινα τῶν γνωρίμων βούλοιο κατεργάσασθαι, ὅποτε θύοι, καλεῖν σε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, τί ἂν ποιήσῃς; also see Od. 1, 144,

οἱ μὲν ἔπειτα ἐξείης ἔζοντο κατὰ κλισμοὺς τε θρόνους τε.

And so in 3, 389.

θαμίξεις, the general term expressing frequency combined with a participle which specializes the action; whilst φοίταω (πυκνῶς ἰέναι), used below to express the same meaning as θαμίξεις καταβαίνων, has the further meaning of 'going'

μέντοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἦν τοῦ ῥαδίδως πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν ἄν σε ἔδει δεῦρο ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἂν παρὰ σὲ ἦμεν· νῦν δέ σε χρὴ πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι· ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε, ὅσον Δ αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὖξονται αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς νεανίαις ζῦνισθι καὶ δεῦρο παρ' ἡμᾶς φοίτα ὡς παρὰ φίλους

besides that of frequency. Hence it is the regular term for going to school. Euthyd. 272 C. ἄλλους πέπεικα συμμαθητὰς μοι φοιτᾶν πρεσβύτας. Rep. 563 A, διδάσκαλός τε ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται. Hom. Od. 2, 182, uses it of the flitting of birds.

ὄρνιθες δέ τε πολλοὶ ὑπ' αὐγὰς ἡελίοιο φοιτῶσι.

χρῆν μέντοι, 'but you should.'

It is always advisable to look for an adversative meaning in μέντοι; and this is its force in the great majority of cases: see Ch. I. *ἰνί.* οὐ μέντοι ἦττον... But in others it is more emphatic than adversative: *E.g.* 331 D, καὶ μέντοι καὶ παραδίδωμι τὸν λόγον. 375 C, ἀλλὰ μέντοι τούτων ὀποτέρου ἂν στέρηται... See note *ad* Cap. XIII. *ἰνί.*

εἰ μὲν... νῦν δέ. So in Od. 2, 76 and 79—

εἴ χ' ὑμεῖς γε φάγοιτε, τάχ' ἂν ποτε καὶ τίσις εἴη, νῦν δέ μοι ἀπρήκτους ὀδύνας ἐμβάλλετε θυμῷ.

Where *εἴ κε*, 'in that case,' is balanced by νῦν δέ, 'but as matters stand'; as here.

εἰ μὲν γάρ... If this statement represents an actual reminiscence, we must look upon it as of the greatest

importance, bearing witness as it does to the goodwill and confidence of an old man in Socrates. Notice that Cephalus uses ἡμεῖς, and τοῖσδε τοῖς νεανίαις below, his family as well as himself.

κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναί... Aristotle states the fact which is here implied, Eth. 7, II, 4, ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί. Plato is careful to show (*infra* Book III.) that a good mind must exert a good influence over the body, and that the body must not be left to itself to work out its own efficiency. See 408 E, οὐ γὰρ σώματι σῶμα θεραπεύουσιν, — ἀλλὰ ψυχῇ σῶμα. and *supr.* 403 D, ψυχῇ ἀγαθῇ τῇ αὐτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὡς οἴον τε βέλτιστον. And so also Xenophon in the Memorabilia represents Socrates as asserting that bodily efficiency can only be attained by making the body subservient to the mind. Book II. 1, 28. εἰ δέ καὶ σώματι βούλει δυνατός εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἰδρώτι. Conversely, Tennyson in the Princess—

'Since to look on noble forms

Makes noble through the sensuous organism

That which is higher.'

τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους. Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κεφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις· δοκεῖ Ἐγάρ μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων, ἦν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστι, τραχεία καὶ χαλεπή, ἢ ῥαδία καὶ εὐπορος· καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην, ὃ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας, ὃ δὴ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ φασὶν εἶναι οἱ

καὶ μὴν. μὴν is like μέντοι, and generally implies opposition. But like μέντοι it sometimes has no adversative force. e.g. *infra* Ch. VII. καὶ μὴν δταν γε πλοῖον, ὃ ναυπηγός. Here καὶ μὴν simply introduces another case similar to that mentioned immediately before, and is accumulative, not adversative. We see this accumulative force again in Book II. 362 D, ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; εἶπον, 'Why what next?' or 'What besides?' For Adeimantus is going to supplement, and not oppose, his brother's case with a further statement. As a rule its function is to adduce an answer to an objection, or to state a further objection or a further instance that must be taken into account. See Book II. 370 E, καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἦν ὁ διάκονος... κενὸς ἄπεισιν, and in Book VI. 485 E, καὶ μὴν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, and in Soph. Ant. 1053, 4—

KP. οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάντιν ἀντεπικεῖν κακῶς.

TE. καὶ μὴν λέγεις, ψευδῆ με θεσπίσειν λέγων.

i.e. 'Ah! but you do insult me.' Also *ibid.* *συρρα*, 221, καὶ μὴν ὁ χρησμός γ' οὗτος, 'Well, if they do that at any rate is the penalty.'

χαίρω γε. Γε is here apolo-

getic or explanatory. 'I really do take pleasure.'

καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ, 'so that I would gladly hear in your case,' lit. 'learn from you.' Here σοῦ is distinguished by καὶ δὴ καὶ from other cases in general as the special instance which engages the speaker's interest. See above, Ch. II. *ἰπί.* and Herod. 3, 20, νόμοισι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοισι χρῆσθαι, καὶ δὴ κατὰ τὴν βασιλητῆν.

ἐνταῦθα τῆς ἡλικίας εἰ, 'you are so far advanced upon the road of life.' For this genitive of distance see Euthyphro 4 B. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἶναι ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος. Again Lysides 204 D, πόρρω ἤδη εἰ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος. Euthydemus 294 E, οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας ἔκει. And Xen. Anab. 7, 8, 20, ὅπως δτι μακροτάτην ἔλθοι τῆς Λυδίας.

ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ. II. 22, 60, Od. 15, 348, and Herod. 3, 14, 12, ἐς πτωχητῆν ἀπίκται ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ. The first of a long series of quotations from Homeric poems with which Plato has adorned his work, which make us ill-prepared for a condemnation of poets in general (Book II. 377 D, *seqq.*) and of Homer in particular. (Book X. *ἰπί.*)

ποιηταί, πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

CAP. III.

Ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, νῆ τόν Δία ἐρῶ, ὃ Σώκρατες, οἷόν γέ μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες ³²⁹ εἰς ταῦτὸ παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασώζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν. οἱ οὖν πλείστοι ἡμῶν ὀλοφύρονται ξυνιόντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι περὶ τε τὰ φροδίσια καὶ περὶ πότους καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ' ἄτκα ἃ τῶν

δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι, seqq. Cicero has translated thus in his *Cato Major de Senectute*: 'Volumus sane, nisi molestum est, Cato, tanquam longam aliquam viam confeceris, quam nobis quoque ingrediendum sit, istuc quo pervenisti, videre, quale sit.' Ch. II. *fin.* In the next chapter Cicero translates from Plato almost literally this account of the old men who deplore their old age. He then states, in the mouth of Lælius, Socrates' suggestion that perhaps Cephalus' circumstances may be the reason of his happiness which we find in 329 D, together with the tale of Themistocles and the Seriphian. Hesiod uses the metaphor of the road in his description of the good and bad life. *Op. et Dies*, 285—

τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδὸς μάλα δ'
ἐγγύθι ναίει.

τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προ-
παροίθεν ἔθηκαν
ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὕρθιος
ὁ μὸς ἐς αὐτὴν,
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν
δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἰκηται

ῥηϊδίῳ δὲ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ
περ' εὐσθα.

τοῦ βίου, dependent on τοῦτα, 'this part of your life': *v. infra*. 367 D. τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης ἢ αὐτῆ δι' αὐτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίγησι. *Euthyd.* 304 A. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος. *And infra*, here, 329 C *fin.* τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται. *And* somewhat similar is Virgil's expression, *Æn.* I.—

'Tu mihi quodcumque hoc regni... Concilias.'

From these examples it is clear that we should gain a better idea of the idiom by translating 'your life at this time'; and 'justice in this respect,' 'the affair in this aspect,' in the examples respectively: τοῦτο being closely constructed with the substantive. Fortified by these instances, the above explanation may stand against Stallbaum's condemnation of it as 'valde contorta.'

CH. III.—*Cephalus' Apologia Senectutis.*

ἃ τῶν τοι. ἔχεται, 'which are connected with such things.'

τοιούτων ἔχεται, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων
 τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ
Β οὐδὲ ζῶντες· ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλα-
 κίσεις τοῦ γήρως ὀδύρονται, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ
 γήρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὄσων κακῶν σφίσιν αἴτιον. ἐμοὶ δὲ
 δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκράτες, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιᾶσθαι.
 εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτ' αἴτιον, κἂν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπε-
 πόνθη ἕνεκά γε γήρως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ἐν-
 ταῦθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας. νῦν δ' ἔγωγε ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα
 οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ
 ποτὲ τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγεγόμενῃ ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπὸ τινος
Γ Πῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς τὰ φροδίσια; ἔτι
 οἴος τε εἰ γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι; καὶ ὅς, Εὐφήμει,

Lit. 'hang on to,' or 'depend upon'; so, in a physical sense, *κισσὸς δρυὸς ἔχεται*.

τοῦ γήρως, 'about old age.' We find *ὀδύρομαι* constructed with genitive alone in *Od.* 4, 104—

τῶν πάντων οὐ τόσσον ὀδύρομαι.

So *Od.* 2 *inil.*—

τοῦ δ' γε δακρυχέων ἀγορήσατο.

ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ, 'it is on this very point,' or 'for this very reason'; viz. *οἰκείων προπ.* δὴ here is more emphatic than conclusive—its usual force; and refers to what precedes. So in *Book II.* 368 B, Socrates, after congratulating the sons of Ariston on their able defence of injustice, remarks, *δοκεῖτε δὴ μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπίσθαι*. 'You certainly appear to have lacked real conviction.' So in 370 B, *ἐκ δὴ τούτων*.

ἐπεπόνθη, 'the very same thing would have happened to me.' *πάσχω*, thus used of something happening to a man,

by force of circumstances apart from his control, is common. See 368 B, *loc. supr. cit.* πάνν γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, 'some divine afflatus has come to you.' *Aristoph.* *Clouds*, 816, τί χρῆμα πάσχεις, ὦ πάτερ; 'what has come to you?' See *infr.* *Ch.* XI. τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν; 'What do you think should be done to you?' The idiom lies in the use of the subjective word instead of a neutral or objective one.

νῦν δέ, 'whereas the fact is...' *v. supra not.* *Ch.* II.

καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ, 'Sophocles especially besides other.' For the idiom *καὶ ἄλλ.* *καὶ*, see *Theat. inil.* *εθαύμασα Σωκράτους ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τούτου*. For *καὶ δὴ καὶ v.s. not.* *Ch.* II. Sophocles was born B.C. 495, and died B.C. 405. Recollecting that Socrates' death took place 399 B.C. at the age of about seventy, we see that the philosopher must have had many opportunities of intercourse with the poet.

ἔφη, ὃ ἄνθρωπε· ἀσμεναίτητα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὡσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγῶν. εὖ οὖν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκείνος εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἦττον. παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρα πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίνεταί καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐπειδὴν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσσονται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίνεταί· δεσποτῶν D πάνυ πολλῶν ἔστι καὶ μαινομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι.

μέντοι, 'nay, on the other hand.'

ὡσπερ λυττῶντα, &c. See what was said above, Ch. II. D, of the opposition between sensual and intellectual enjoyment; and the passage quoted from Aristotle. Plato mentions this below, Book III. 403 A, as being most opposed of all to the intellectual exercises. Μείζω δέ τινα καὶ δευτέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, &c., as Aristotle in the Ethics.

κατατείνουσαι. The physical notion of stretching (τείνω) begets a large family of transferred yet kindred expressions, when the verb is compounded with different prepositions, e.g. διατεταμένους, Book VI. 501 C, 'with might and main,' (Jowett); ξυντεταμένως, 'in earnest,' 499 A; ἐντεινάμενος, 'laying great stress upon,' 'seriously,' 536 C; and again πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείνωνας, 'concentrating himself entirely upon this point,' 591 B; and τείνω simple: ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τείνοντας πάντας, 'all striving towards the same object,' 464 D.

μαινομένων. So in 403 A, *loc. cit.* οὐδέ γε μανικωτέραν. (ἡδονὴν sc.)

ἀπηλλάχθαι. In Eur. Med. 967, the simple verb ἀλλάσσομαι means to 'get one thing in exchange for another':

τῶν δ' ἐμῶν παιδῶν φυγὰς
ψυχῆς ἂν ἀλλαξαίμεθα'

whilst the active verb, ἀλλάσσω, is used simply as 'to take instead of.' Thus Theognis,

οὐδέ τις ἀλλάξει κάκιον, τοῦ
'σθλοῦ παρεόντος,—

ἀπαλλάσσω means 'to rid'; thus Eur. Cycl. 371—

κόμου μὲν αὐτὸν τοῦδ' ἀπαλλάξαι.

But it has also an intransitive meaning 'to turn out,' or 'come out from'; Rep. 491 D: τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν...κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης. Similarly παραλλάττειν, 'to change,' 530 B, γίγνεσθαι τὲ ταῦτα αἰεὶ ὡσάυτως καὶ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν. Hence we can understand the meaning of ἀπαλλάσσομαι, 'to get rid of,' or 'to free one's self from,' as here; it is found again in Book III. 406 D, τομῇ χρησάμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι (sc. νοσήματος) and 390 E, μὴ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τῆς μήνιος. Also 465 D, πάντων τε δὴ τούτων ἀπαλλάσσονται. But καταλλάσσομαι, 'to make it up with,' τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῆ, 566 E; and διαλλάσσομαι, in the same sense, 471 A, καὶ ὡς διαλλαγῆσόμενοι ἄρα διοίονται;

ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους
μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γῆρας, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλλ'
ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἂν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ
εὐκόλοι ᾧσι, καὶ τὸ γῆρας μετρίως ἐστὶν ἐπίπονον·
εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ γῆρας, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ
τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ξυμβαίνει.

CAP. IV.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βουλό-
μενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον ὦ Κέφαλε,

'Then they will dispute on the understanding that they are going to make it up again some day!' The sense of change is apparent throughout.

μετρίως, 'not very.' The word implies an absence of excess: see 372 C, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες; 396 C, μέτριος ἀνήρ; and 399 C, σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως πράττοντα. The idea which it conveys is the keynote of a great part of Greek thought: How to avoid excess and steer a middle course. So Theognis—

Μηδὲν ἄγαν ἄσχαλλε ταρασσο-
μένων πολιητέων

Κύρνε, μέσην δ' ἔρχου τῆν
ὁδὸν ὥσπερ ἐγώ.

So in Xenophon's Memorabilia, 2, I, 11, Aristippus defends his life of self-indulgence by terming it a mean between command and slavery. εἶναί τις μὲν δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδῶν, ἣν πειρώμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς, οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλευθερίας. For another example see Antigone 67—

τὸ γὰρ
περιστὰ πράσσειν οὐκ ἔχει
νοῦν οὐδένα.

It is interesting to trace how large a part the idea of excess and moderation plays in Greek legend and drama: prosperity in excess is a direct challenge to Nemesis; Polycrates must throw his ring away, but even that cannot save him; Œdipus is dashed from the height of success to a bitterness worse than that of death; and Agamemnon, flushed with victory, falls a victim to the jealousy which Heaven ever bears towards the over-fortunate.

καὶ γῆρας καὶ νεότης... See Cic. de Sen., Ch. II. 'Quibus enim nihil est in ipsis opis ad bene beateque vivendum, iis omnis ætas gravis est.'

CH. IV.—*Cephalus' Opinions about Age and Money.*

ἐκινούν. In this word we have an epitome of Socrates' method in its objective aspect. He tells us in another place that he does not agree with those who talk about putting knowledge into people, as though it were not there before. See

οίμαι σου τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃς, οὐκ εἰ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἠγεῖσθαι σε βραδίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτηῖσθαι· τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμύθια φασιν εἶναι." Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τί, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους εὖ ἔχει, ὃς τῷ Σεριφίῳ λοιδορουμένῳ καὶ λέγοντι, ὅτι οὐ δι' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοί, ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι οὐτ' **330**

Book VII. 518 C, φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέσθαι. He believed that knowledge, or at least the capacity for knowledge, was in all men, and only needed *κίνησις*, or *μαύεσις*, to use his own metaphor, to bring it out. We shall see below, Ch. V. C, how Socrates tries to draw Cephalus into a discussion about justice by means of propounding a dilemma; how again in Chaps. VI. and VII. he encourages Polemarchus to try and solve the difficulties in Simonides' definition of justice by placing them before him; how he is careful to say, after the detection of the flaw in the definition, 'We, then, shall dispute it,' *μαχοῦμεθα ἄρα κοινῇ, ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ...*; and, in fact, to impress the person with whom he is conversing that it is his duty to do all he can to help in the discussion. Therefore Xenophon's word for Socrates' teaching of virtue in the *Memorabilia* is *προτρέπειν*, not *διδάσκειν*. See I, 7, *ἰπύ.* ἐπισκευῶμεθα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἀλαστονείας ἀποτρέπων τοὺς ζῆνοντας ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προέτρεπεν. and again Book II. *ἰπύ.* ἐδοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέ-

πειν τοὺς ζῆνοντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν. That is, to incite men to *teach themselves* how to practise virtue. Also see Book II. Ch. V. *ἰπύ.*

ἠγεῖσθαι σε βραδίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν... Cicero's rendering: 'Tibi propter opes et copias et dignitatem tuam tolerabiliorem senectutem videri.'

λέγουσι μὲν τί, 'there is something in what they say.' We have another meaning of λέγω, *ἰπύ.* Ch. XII. ζῆμαθον δ λέγεις, 'I understood what you mean,' and XIII. *ἰπύ.* τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ζυμφῆρον ἔλεγεν δ ἦγοιτο ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ ζυμφῆρειν. For the sense here, see *Euthyd.* 305 E. Δοκοῦσί σοί τι, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν; Aristotle, *Eth.* 7, 13, 3, οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἦ ἀγαθὸς, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. *Xen. Mem.* 2, 1, 12, εἰ μέντοι μηδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως ἂν τι λέγοις.

τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους, *v.s.* 329 C, τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται. Herodotus tells the tale of a man named Timodemus of Aphidna, and places his birthplace in Belbina, a little island north-west of Seriphus.—8, 12, 5.

ἂν αὐτὸς Σερίφιος ὦν ὀνομαστὸς ἐγένετο οὐτ' ἐκεῖνος Ἀθηναῖος. | καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέρουσιν, εὖ ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπιεικῆς πάνυ τι ῥαδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι, οὐθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικῆς πλουτήσας εὐκόλος ποτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ γένοιτο. "Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, ὦν κέ-
Β κτησαι γὰρ πλέω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω;" Ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις γέγονα χρηματιστῆς τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος ἐμοὶ σχεδὸν τι ὄσην ἐγὼ νῦν οὐσίαν κέκτημαι παραλαβὼν πολλάκις τοσαύτην ἐποίησε, Λυσανίας δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἔτι ἐλάττω αὐτὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νῦν οὐσης· ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ, εἰ μὴ ἐλάττω καταλίπω τουτοισί, ἀλλὰ βραχεῖ γέ τι

οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιεικῆς πάνυ τι... In the same manner Aristotle claims for the good man a portion of the world's goods if he is to be really happy; Eth. 1, 5, 6, ἐνδέχεσθαι ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν...κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν: and in 7, 13, 3 quoted above; and again προσδέεται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀγαθῶν.

ἐπεκτήσω, notice force of ἐπί. ποῖ' ἐπεκτ...., 'Acquired! do you ask?' The usual way of expressing surprise or contempt, viz. to join the pronominal ποῖος to a word used by the last speaker. So Aristoph. Ach. 61, 2—

KHP. οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρὰ βασιλέως.

ΔΙ. ποίου βασιλέως;

i. q. 'King indeed!'

et infr. 109. Also see Euthydemus 291 A. ΣΩ. μὴ δὲ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ τοιαῦτ' εἰπών; ΚΡ. Ποῖος Κτήσιππος;

πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος. The usual practice was for grandfather and grandson to bear the same name. Thus we hear of a young Sophocles, B.C. 401, a tragic poet, who was son of Iophon, and grandson of Sophocles. Sometimes, however, this nomenclature missed a generation: thus we have in Alcibiades' family—

Clinias

| Alcibiades

| Axiochus

| Clinias.

ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ, not 'I love,' but 'I am content.' So in 435 D, οὐκοῦν ἀγαπητόν; ἔφη. 'Can we not rest content with these instances?' and again, 472 B, ἢ ἀγαπήσομεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ἦ; 'Or shall we be satisfied if it be the nearest possible?' We find ἀμο used similarly in Jun. 7, 9,

πλείω ἢ παρέλαβον." Οὐ τοι ἔνεκα ἠρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν[ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτή-
C
σωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταύτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάξουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, ἤπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι εἰσίν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον." Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

'At si Pieria quadrans tibi nullus in arca

Ostendetur, ames nomen victumque Machærae,'

'You would have to content yourself with...' The expression is an optimistic one, as though anything that has to be acquiesced in became not merely tolerable, but pleasant.

οἱ δὲ κτησ. διπλῆ... Sir Thomas More in his *Utopia* expresses this fact thus, 'And verily it is naturally given to all men to esteem their own inventions best.' Aristotle, *Eth.* 4, 1, 20, πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. Again 9, 7, 7, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων. Also *sec.* 4 gives the psychological reason for it, according to Aristotle's system. 'Ενεργεῖα δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως· στέργει δὲ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. This passage seems to be a reproduction of Plato's words. Lord Beaconsfield, in his psychological romance of Contarini Fleming, states the

same fact with regard to the acquisition of knowledge:— 'The idea that is gained with an effort affords far greater satisfaction than that which is acquired with dangerous facility. We dwell with more fondness on the perfume of the flower which we ourselves have tended, than on the odour of that which we cull with carelessness and cast away without remorse.' *Pt. II. Ch. I.*

καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, 'as well as in regard of its use.' See above, καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ, 329 B, 'Sophocles in particular, as well as others.' Aristotle, in speaking of friendship, remarks that the friendships of the old are dictated by what is advantageous, which so entirely absorbs their attention that they are sometimes unpleasant. See *Eth.* 8, 3, 4, οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺν οἱ τηλικούτοι διψκοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀφέλιμον... ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς' as here χαλεποί. And again *Eth.* 8, 6, 1, ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικαῖς ἤττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσῃ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἤττον τοῖς ὀμιλίαις χαίρουσιν.

CAP. V.

D Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλά μοι ἔτι τοσόνδε εἰπέ· τί μέγιστον οἶει ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι τοῦ πολλῆν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι; ¹Ὁ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. εὐ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ἦ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσῃ, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντίς περὶ ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσήει. οἳ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελῶμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ

CH. V. — *Wealth is a good thing, but a good conscience is better.*

λέγων, *v.s. not.* ἀδ μὴ ἀκούον-
τας. Ch. I.

τελευτήσῃ, this word is at once elliptical (τελευτῶν βίον) and euphemistic. 'To finish life' avoids the use of an unlucky word, and is inspired by the same feeling which prompts the use of οἱ κάτω, or plures, to express the dead; see Antigone 75—

ἐπει πλείων χρόνος
ὄν δεῖ· μ' ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω
τῶν ἐνθάδε,

and, again, substitutes ἐκεῖ (see below) for Hades. Thus in B, ἐπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι: and so in Book VI. 498 C, τῆν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν. In Book III. we find a remarkable acknowledgment of the use of euphemism, in the case of the word εὐήθεια. 400 E, εὐήθεια, οὐχ ἦν ἀνοίαν οὐσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν, ἀλλά... A similar use of εὐδαιμών is found in 422 E, εὐδαιμών εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἶει... 'You are much to be envied,

if you suppose...'; cf. χρηστός, 531 B, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πρόγματα παρέχον-
τας, 'those fine people.' In this last instance, as also in Plato's use of χαρίεις, κομψός, γενναῖος, euphemism becomes sarcasm.

καταγελῶμενοι τέως μῦθοι. We shall have more to say about the μῦθοι farther on: at present let it be remarked that Cephalus takes it for granted that national legend and belief incur ridicule amongst all but the old. Reference should also be made to Book III. *ipit.* where Socrates asks the question—'Can we expect a man to be brave and despise death who is afraid of Hades as of a place full of horrors?' τῶν Ἄιδου ἠγούμενον εἶναι τε καὶ δεῖν εἶναι οἶει τινὰ θανάτου ἀδεῆ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἰρήσεσθαι πρὸ ἡττης τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον; Socrates' answer to the difficulty is, to compel all who speak or write of the after life to sing the praises of Hades as of a place full of enjoyment and reunion with friends.

στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὧσι· καὶ ἔ
 αὐτὸς ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρωσ ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὡσπερ
 ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾶ αὐτά.
 ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται καὶ
 ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἴ τινά τι ἠδίκηκεν. ὁ
 μὲν οὖν εὐρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα
 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπνῶν, ὡσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος
 δειμαίνει καὶ ζῆ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος· τῷ δὲ μηδὲν 331
 ἑαυτῷ ἀδικὸν ξυνειδότι ἠδεῖα ἐλπίς ἀεὶ πάρεστι καὶ
 ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος, ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος λέγει. χαριέν-
 τως γάρ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐκείνος εἶπεν, ὅτι ὁς
 ἂν δικαίως καὶ ὀσίως τὸν βίον διαγάγη,

γλυκεῖα οἱ καρδίαν ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος
 συναορεῖ
 ἐλπίς, ἃ μάλιστα θνατῶν
 πολύστροφον γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ.

εὐ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτ'
 ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πλείστου

Πίνδαρος. Socrates quotes Pindar in Book II. 365 B, and refers to him in Book III. 408 C. Plato, as it has been mentioned, conceived, at any rate in Socrates' person, a violent antipathy for poets; but their words are continually on his lips. In this dialogue alone he quotes Homer in more than twenty places, Hesiod in seven, Æschylus in six, Pindar in three, besides Orpheus, Musæus, Archilochus, Euripides, Sophocles, Phocylides, and Simonides. And this antipathy is rather a result of rigidly working out the principles of specialization than an expression of Plato's own feeling upon the subject. But poets are accused by him of traducing the

gods and the after life; in the philosophical system of the later books they are found to be imitators, and are therefore condemned, as being removed from treating of realities; and in Book X. Plato works himself up to such a pitch of indignation against their presuming to write about any subjects of which they have not a technical knowledge that he arraigns Homer and Hesiod at his dialectical bar, and bids them answer for themselves if they wish to be barely tolerated.

γλυκεῖα οἱ... Fr. 233.

πολύστροφον, 'full of expedients.' The mind of man is ever ready through hope to make fresh endeavours. This word is

Β ἀξίαν εἶναι, οὐ τι παντὶ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ. τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατήσῃαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, μηδ' αὐτὸ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρείας πολλὰς· ἀλλὰ γε ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἀν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὃ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

35 C Παγκάλως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι, ἅν τις τι παρὰ του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε

in effect the same with that which is applied to Odysseus :

Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολ-
ύτροπον.

ἔπειτα, inserted between participle and infinitive, shows that the action expressed by the infinitive must be preceded by that expressed by the participle : that they express, in fact, a compound but indivisible thought. Thus, 'For money contributes to a large extent in helping a man to depart to Hades without owing anything to heaven or his fellow-man.' See Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 4. ὁ δὲ Ἀναξίβιος ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν ξυνδιαβάνα ἔπειτα οὕτως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. (Where notice what precedes—'Xenophon told Anaxibius that he wished to depart.') 'But Anaxibius commanded him *not* to go away until he had crossed over,' or 'without crossing over.'

θαυμαστῶς ὡς. Similarly *ἰνῆρα* 350 C, μετὰ ἰδρωτός θαυμαστοῦ ὄσου. The participle *δεδιότα* here is loosely constructed, and added rather as an afterthought. It should properly be qualified

with a negative, and would fall thus into the sentence : 'Money makes it possible for a man to depart to Hades without fear, as not owing,' &c. In Greek it is very frequent to find that when once the sentence has taken a negative phase, as in the present case (*μηδὲ ἐξαπατήσῃαι*), very little care is taken to separate strictly the rest of it into its affirmative and negative parts. In this sentence the second *μηδέ* belongs solely to the participle *ὀφείλοντα*, and has nothing to do with the main verb *ἀπιέναι*, whereas *μηδέ* in the former clause qualifies *ἐξαπατήσῃαι*, the principal verb.

τὴν δικαιοσύνην. Cephalus has said that a life lived well and justly is the best passport to the other world. Socrates insists upon this point, viz. the difficulty of living a life justly, and, as is usual with him, demands a definition.

ἀποδιδόναι τι. This may seem too special a case to be included in a wide definition such as that of justice; but it is to be

μὲν δικαίως, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν ; οἶον τοιόνδε λέγω· πᾶς ἂν που εἴποι, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονούντος ὄπλα, εἰ μανείς ἀπαιτοῖ, ὅτι

remembered that deposits on trust with friends were of the most frequent occurrence and of the greatest necessity in ancient times, from the absence of public funds, scarcity of reliable banks (τραπέζαι), and the few opportunities of safe investment ; and, in the case of Greece, from the precarious status of many commonwealths. We have many references in Greek and Roman literature to this practice. In Herodotus 6, 86, we have the tale of Glaucus of Sparta, which turns upon the religious obligation of good faith in deposits : τὰ ἡμίσεα πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ἐξαργυρώσαντα θέσθαι παρὰ σε, εἰ ἐξέπισταμένῳ ὡς μοι κείμενα ἔσται παρὰ σοι σόα, &c. And the moral of the tale is thus expressed : οὕτω ἀγαθόν, μηδὲ διανοέσθαι περὶ παραθήκης ἄλλο γε, ἢ ἀπαιτεόντων ἀποδιδόναι. See also Juv. xiii. 174—

‘Nullane perjuri capitis, fraudisque nefandæ

Pœna erit?...’

Spartano cuidam respondit
Pythia vates ;

Haud impunitum quondam
fore, quod dubitaret

Depositum retinere.’

Thus Pompey is made the custodian of one of the copies of Ptolemy's will when the treasury could not find room for them : ‘Quum propter publicas occupationes (in ærario) poni non potuissent, apud Pompeium sunt depositæ.’ Cæs. B. C. 3, 10, 8. In Quintilian, Instit. Or. an accused man, it is suggested, may explain the presence of an

article seized in his house by asserting that it is ‘deposita res’ ; 5, 13, 49 : ‘Cum res furtiva in domo deprehensa sit, dicat necesse est reus, aut se ignorantem illatam, aut depositam apud se...’ And again *ibid.* 7, 2, 50, the distinction is drawn between ‘credita’ and ‘deposita,’ from which the latter appear to have been the more important. ‘Crediti et depositi duæ sunt quæstiones, sed nonnunquam junctæ.’ In Thuc. 2, 72, Archidamus the Spartan uses the word παρακαταθήκην to describe the way in which the Plateans' city and property should be treated under the Spartans' care. ἐπειδὴ δὲ (πόλεμος) παρελθῆ, ἀποδώσομεν ὑμῖν ἃ ἂν παραλάβωμεν, μεχρὶ δὲ τοῦδε ἔξομεν παρακαταθήκην. And in Xen. Hellen. 6, 1, 2, we read of Polydamas, a Thessalian, whose reputation for probity was so great that he was entrusted with the acropolis and the revenue of the Pharsalians in time of a political struggle. οὕτως ἔδοκεῖ καλὸς τε κἀγαθὸς εἶναι ὥστε καὶ στασιδισάντες οἱ Φαρσάλιοι παρακατέθεντο αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπέτρεψαν. See also the use of δυσξύμβολος in Xenophon, Mem. 2, 6, 3 ; and note αἰ ξυμβόλαια, *infra* Ch. VII.

εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς ... Cicero has translated this passage in De Officiis 3, 25, 95. ‘Depositæ non semper reddenda ; si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit...’

οὔτε χρή τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα Δέβελων τάληθῆ λέγειν. Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκ ἄρα οὗτος ὄρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἂ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἴπερ γέ τι χρή Σιμωνίδῃ πειθεσθαι. Καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον· δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν

οὔτε χρή is balanced by οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη, whilst οὐδ' αὖ, &c. is supplementary to ὁ ἀποδιδούς; 'nor again one who made a point of (ἐβέλων) telling him everything.'

καὶ μέντοι. See above note ad Cap. I. In this place there does not appear to be any adversative sense in μέντοι. Rather some phrase such as 'and now' or 'and really,' would express the bearing of Cephalus' remark. If we look below, 339 C, we find the question οὐ καὶ πειθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι; 'Do you not maintain justice to be, in fact, obedience to governors?' In this passage the whole point of the question bears upon the obedience, which Thrasymachus calls justice; because the obedience of the ruled is found sometimes to be against the interest of the rulers. Hence the word πειθεσθαι is emphasized by καί (καί is often purely emphatic), and the whole sentence by μέντοι: and the latter is adversative only in so far as it qualifies the opening sentence of an argument. The word is also found subjoined to ἀλλά, which fact confirms this supposition, that it is not always purely adversative: v. *infr.* 614 B, ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

Ἄλκιου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ. And below here, Ch. vi. *in it.* ἀλλά μέντοι. For καί emphatic see Hom. Od. II. 107, 8—

ἀλλ' ὅτε τέτρατον ἦλθεν ἔτος
καὶ ἐπήλυθον ὦραι,
καὶ τότε δὴ τις ἔειπε γυναικῶν,
ἦ σάφα ἦδη.

et infr. 244-5—

ἀργαλέον δὲ
ἀνδράσι καὶ πλεόνεσσι μαχή-
σασθαι περὶ δαιτί.

And see below here, Ch. X.—
καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν
καὶ διαλεγόμενων ἡμῶν ... and
note.

With Cephalus' departure the first phase of the Dialogue comes to an end, which we may call the descriptive and uncritical. The lines of an argument have been indeed laid down, but Cephalus has declined to have anything to do with the argument: he is the representative of old Athens, orthodox in his religion and undisturbed by scepticism. He has to contemplate his own approaching dissolution, not a dissolution and reconstruction of social systems; and he leaves it to the younger men to justify beliefs by argument, while declining to enter upon the task himself.

ιερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς γελάσας· καὶ ἅμα ἦει πρὸς τὰ ιερά.

CAP. VI.

Λέγε δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, τί εἴπης τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης; "Οτι, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι· τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέγειν. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδη γε οὐ

CH. VI.—*Simonides' definition means that we ought to give every man his deserts.*

τί φησ τὸν Σιμ. The principal verb here is really λέγοντα. 'What do you maintain that Simonides said, when you say that he gave a true account of justice?' But through a desire to give a more lengthened and connected form to the sentence, the sense is, as it were, suspended in the participle λέγοντα, and only brought to a conclusion at λέγειν; whereas it should have stopped at λέγοντα, and ὀρθῶς λέγειν should have been cast into a fresh dependent clause. See Ch. VI. *init.* A similar construction, subordinating the principal verb into a participle, is found in 462 A. τί ποτε τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἔχομεν, οὐ δεῖ στοχαζόμενον τὸν νομοθέτην τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους; where the sense is, 'What is the best object at which our lawgiver ought to aim when he makes his laws?' But the aiming, although the important word, is subordinated grammatically to the conclusive, yet really

weaker word, τιθέναι, already implied in νομοθέτην. See also Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 34. Πότερον τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην σὺν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λεγομένοις εἶναι νομίζοντες, ἢ σὺν τοῖς μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύετε αὐτῆς; *i.e.* 'Do you think dialectic is on the side of that which is rightly, or wrongly spoken, that you bid me renounce it?' Again, Xen. Anab. 7, 7, 8. καὶ οὐχ ὅπως δῶρα δοὺς καὶ εἰ ποίησας ἑνθ' ὧν εἰς ἐπαθες ἀξιοῖς ἡμᾶς ἀποπέμψασθαι, ἀλλ', &c. 'And so far from having the grace to make us presents and repay us for benefits received, when you send us away...' Plat. Euthyd. 289 C. ἀρὰ ἐστὶν αὐτῆ, ἣν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι; 'Was this the art which we ought to have learnt, if we wanted to be happy?' Eur. Cycl. 123, 4—

ὡς ἐκπιεῖν ἂν κύλικα βουλοίμην μίαν,
πάντων Κυκλώπων ἀντιδοὺς
βοσκήματα.

i.e. 'I would give all the Cyclops' flocks, if I could drain a single cup.' And similarly *ibid.* ll. 431, 453, and Rep.

ῥάδιον ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ· τοῦτο μέντοι ὃ τί ποτε λέγει, σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τό τινας παρακαταθεμέ-
332 νου τι ὁφροῦν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναί· καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενόν πού ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ παρακατέθετο· ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Ἐποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν τότε, ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ; Ἀληθῆ, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλο δὴ τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναί. Ἄλλο μέντοι νῆ Δί, ἔφη· τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις

471 C. δοκεῖς οὐδέποτε μνηθῆ-
 σεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρω-
 σόμενος πάντα ταῦτα εἴρηκας.
 In the present passage Polemar-
 chus' answer shows what is the
 real sense of the question, for
 he tells us what Simonides
 said.

σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος. So Hero-
 dotus calls Solon a σοφιστής,
 I, 29. Solon, like Simonides,
 embodied his wise saying in
 verse: Stallb. quotes Cicero de
 Nat. Deor. I, 22. 'Simonides
 non solum poeta suavis, sed
 etiam cetero quin doctus sapiens-
 que traditur.' θεῖος, 'partaking
 of the divine nature.' The soul
 of man was regarded by Plato
 as being in some degree divine.
 See Book III. *fn.* (416 E),
 εἰπεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θεῖον παρὰ θεῶν
 αἰὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι; as Cicero
 says in De Offic. iii. 2, 44:
 'Mentem suam, qua nihil homini
 dedit deus ipse divinius.' Plato
 again, in speaking of the tempta-
 tions of youth, attributes all
 good resolutions and resistance
 of evil to the same element;
 see Book VI. 492 E. οὔτε γὰρ
 γίγνεται . . . ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς
 ἀρετὴν παρὰ τῆν τούτων παιδείαν

πεκαυδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὃ
 ἔταυρε· θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν
 παροιμίαν ἐξαιρώμεν λόγου· εὖ
 γὰρ χρῆ εἶδέναι, ὃ τι περ ἂν σωθῆ
 . . . θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σώσαι
 λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς. See also
 500 D. θεῖφ δὴ καὶ κοσμίφ ὃ
 γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιος τε
 καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δύνατον ἀνθρώπῳ
 γίγνεται. In legend we have a
 gradually descending scale of
 divinity from Zeus, through the
 Olympian deities, the inferior
 gods of heaven such as the
 Hours, Hebe, Ganymede; then
 gods of the earth, Dryads,
 Naiads, and of the sea, Nereids;
 and so on to demi-gods as
 Heracles, and Sarpedon; whilst
 finally such personages as Ἄεσ-
 cularius, though mortal, obtain a
 partial divinity from their asso-
 ciation with gods. Such a system
 Plato would explain by the pre-
 sence to a greater or a less degree
 of that which he calls τὸ θεῖον.
 For this question see also 518
 E, 546 B, 589 D, 590 D, ἔχοντας
 ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, where it
 is equivalent to that part of the
 soul called λογιστικόν.

δίκαιον εἶναι, 'that justice
 consists in...'

οἶεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι δρᾶν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν. Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν, ὃς ἂν τῷ χρυσίον ἀποδῶ παρακαταθεμένῳ, εἴνπερ ἢ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἢ λήψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ὥσιν ὃ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ ἀποδιδούς· οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον, ὃ τι ἂν τύχη ὀφειλόμενον; Πανταπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς· ὀφείλεται δέ γε, οἶμαι, παρά γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ, ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακὸν τι.

CAP. VII.

Ἠνίξατο ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἶη. διανοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς

τὰ ὀφειλόμενα. At present the difficulty of justifying this definition lies in the double meaning of ὀφείλω. ὀφειλόμενον means 'that which is owed.' Anything therefore which is 'owed' ought to be given back. But the word has also a moral signification, viz. 'that which is due' to any one. Hence in the present sentence τὰ ὀφειλόμενα is elevated to the meaning 'that which is due to a man,' not merely 'that which is owed him.'

τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. Notice here Socrates' adroitness. By an apparently unimportant suggestion he starts the wide question, 'How should we act towards enemies?' Upon this slight suggestion hangs the greater part of the rest of this book. And Polemarchus is drawn into the discussion irresistibly; thinking, as he does, that he

has an answer ready for the difficulty.

CH. VII.—*We find that justice is doing good to friends and harm to foes. But apparently there are but few occasions on which justice can be employed.*

In this chapter Socrates draws on Polemarchus to give a certain definition of justice, and a further description of it; and then proceeds to demolish the definition and stultify the description by cases which are drawn from physical facts, *i. e.* by analogy. These proofs are in themselves insufficient and unsatisfactory; it is not fair to condemn an ethical system because it does not fall in analogically with the system of doctoring, of cooking, and of cobbling. But Socrates' friends are too ignorant of the use of

φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη δίκαιον, τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον. Ἄλλὰ τί οἶει; ἔφη. Ὡς πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὧς Σιμωνίδη, ἢ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἶει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι; Δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἢ σώμασι φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. Ἡ δὲ τίσι τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖται; Ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα. **D** Εἶεν ἢ οὖν δὴ τίσι τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο; Εἰ μὲν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὧς Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἢ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελείας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδούσα.

words to doubt his proofs or impugn his method. And Socrates, in his conclusion, viz. that the definition of justice is unsound, is correct, although he arrives at the conclusion unfairly.

τίσιν οὖν τί... 'What then does the art of healing give which is due and right, and to whom, that it is called the art of healing?' Here, as above, Ch. VI. *ini.*, we have the principal verb in the participle, and the unimportant word 'called' thrown into its place. The question is not 'What is the art of healing called?' but, 'What does it give, and to whom, to deserve the name?'

τί ἂν οἶει. ἄν stands at the beginning of the sentence to intimate at once that it is hypothetical; as in *Antigone*, 466—

ἀλλ' ἂν, εἰ τὸν ἐξ ἐμῆς
μητρὸς θανόντ' ἄθαρτον ἦν-
σχόμην νέκυν,
κεῖνοις ἂν ἤλγου.

and so in *Book II.* 378 A. τὰ

δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη, ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέος, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ, ὤμην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι; and similarly in the expression οὐκ οἶδ' ἂν εἰ πεύσαιμι.

εἰ μὲν τι, δεῖ ἀκ... These words betray a consciousness that analogy may not be a sufficient guide to true inference. As τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις stands here, we have in other places λόγος almost personified, as the chain of argument, which must be followed out implicitly unless bringing the reasoner to a palpable absurdity. See *Book II.* 365 C. ἀλλ' ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν ταύτη ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρεται. *Book III.* 388 E, ὡς ἄρτι ὁ λόγος ἐσήμαινεν· ὃ πειστεῖν, ἕως ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἄλλω καλλίονι πέσει. *ihst.* 394 D, ὅτη ἂν ὁ λόγος ὡσπερ πνεῦμα φέρη ταύτη ἰτέον. 399 D, ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει. 503 B, παρεξίοντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.

Τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει ; Δοκεῖ μοι. Τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν ; Ἱατρός. Τίς δὲ πλείοντας πρὸς Ἐ τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον ; Κυβερνήτης. Τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος ; ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατώτατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν ; Ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ξυμμαχεῖν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Εἶεν μὴ κάμνουσί γε μήν, ὦ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἱατρός ἄχρηστος. Ἀληθῆ. Καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης. Ναί. Ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος ; Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο. Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη ; Χρήσιμον. Καὶ γὰρ γεωργία 333

τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα... The first definition, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι, having been found insufficient, a second is stated in these words.

τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος ; The fallacy is involved here of confusing a contract with an ethical question. The physician and pilot are men of business, and perform certain duties to the best of their abilities for money ; whilst a just man is one whose actions, as being just, are at once an object and end in themselves. The objective benefit of just conduct lies more in the example and encouragement it affords to others.

ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν... Polemarchus falls into the trap prepared for him, and tries to find some 'business' which a just man practises, some profession of which he makes a study ; thereby getting involved in the difficulty explained above.

ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν... This inference is perfectly lo-

gical if a just man be described in the terms of Polemarchus' definition. For if we state that a just man is one who benefits his friends, and then limit the benefits to acting as a champion and ally (προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν) ; it follows that if there are no disputes going on, the just man's province or profession does not enter into consideration at all.

χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ... Polemarchus, by agreeing to this, repudiates his former reading of his definition, ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν. He is thus forced to find some 'produce' of justice, because Socrates continues to insist upon the analogy of the arts and manufactures, whose function is to produce some thing or some condition of things. Socrates, or Plato, was well aware of what we call the relation of things. In Book IV. 438 B we find the words ὅσα γε ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι του, 'All those things of such a

κ

ἡ οὐ; *Ναί.* Προς γε καρποῦ κτήσιν. *Ναί.* Καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική; *Ναί.* Πρὸς γε ὑποδημάτων ἄν, οἶμαι, φαίης κτήσιν. Πάνυ γε. Τί δὲ δῆ; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρεῖαν ἢ κτήσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, ὧς Σώκρατες. Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἢ τι ἄλλο; Κοινωνήματα δῆτα. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεττευτικός; Ὁ πεττευτικός. Ἄλλ' εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων

nature as to have a relation to some thing.' These words are the introduction to a disquisition upon quality and relation. Now Socrates knew that justice is concerned not with things but with the relations between things; and from the passage in Book IV. it appears that he is using this form of *ἔλεγχος* or disproof here only because it suits the mind of his hearer and gets rid of the bad definition.

ξυμβόλαια. Here Polemarchus is nearer to the function of justice—the model and rule for covenants and transactions. For the word compare 486 C, *ὁ κόσμιος... ἐσθ' ὅπῃ ἐν δυσξέμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο*, where *δυσξ...* is 'covenant-breaker'; and 424 D, *ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει;* and 554 C, *Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τούτω δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος... κατέχει ἐπιθυμίας;* So in Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 3, *δυσξέμβολός ἐστι, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν ἡδεται, ἀποδιδόνα δὲ οὐ βούλεται; ἐλ ἡψρ. 5, εὐορκὸς τε καὶ εὐξέμβολος ὧν τυγχάνει.*

πεττῶν. 'Πεσσοὶ σive πεττῶν non sunt tali, sed calculi; ἀστράγαλοι tali sunt; at πεσσοὶ ψῆφοί

times, ut constat ex Polluce libr. ix. Ludi sunt valde inter se dissimiles. Male itaque Marsilius, "in diferendis talis"; tali non diferuntur sed jaciuntur. At πεσσοὶ disponuntur in lineis, deinde moventur.'—MURETUS. The game is mentioned again in Book C, 487 B: *ὡσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς ἀποκλείεσθαι ὑπὸ πεττείας αὐ ταύτης τινὸς ἐτέρας οὐκ ἐν ψῆφοις ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις, i.e. the skilful dialectician 'checkmates' his opponent. The game is mentioned also in Euripides, Medea 68. Here again Polemarchus is taken through a number of special pursuits, each aiming at a direct result; and is naturally unable to discover any limited class of objects upon which justice exercises its functions. Generally speaking we might summarize the fallacy here by saying that justice regards the mode in which a thing is done, or, as above, the relation of those concerned in it, rather than the action itself and its results.*

κοινωνος τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ ; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ' εἰς τινα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὡσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων ; Εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Πλήν γ' ἴσως, ὡ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέῃ ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἵππον· τότε C δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἵππικός· ἢ γάρ ; Φαίνεται. Καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης. Ἔοικεν. Ὅταν οὖν τί δέῃ ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων ; Ὅταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σὼν εἶναι, ὡ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις, ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κείσθαι ; Πάνυ γε. Ὅταν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ἢ ἀργύριον, τότε

εἰς ἀργυρίου. Polemarchus thus driven into a corner falls back upon that case, mentioned above (see note *ad* Cap. V. ἀποδιδόναι τι) where the services of another are required to guard a deposit, a case of very frequent occurrence, but entirely inadequate for purposes of definition.

καὶ μὴν. *v. s.* note *ad* Cap. II. τί δεῖ...χρῆσθαι. This verb takes accusative of the purpose or object, and dative of the means employed. See Ar. Acharnians 935, τί χρήσεται ποτ' αὐτῷ ; and Nubes 22, τί ἐχρήσαμην ; Equit. 1183, καὶ τί τοῦτοις χρῆσομαι τοῖς ἐντέροις ; Plat. Euthyd. 287 C, οὐκ ἔχω δὲ τι χρήσομαι τοῖς λόγοις ; Xen. Anab. 7, 2, 31, Ξενοφῶν ἐπήρετο Ξεύθην δὲ τι δέοιτο χρῆσθαι τῇ στρατιᾷ. And so here ἵπφρα, ὅταν μηδὲν δεῖ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι.

ἀλλὰ κείσθαι. Notice the instantaneous change of ἀργύριον here from object to subject. See Homer, Il. 1, 218—

ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπειθεται, μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ.

Here the subject, ὅς, never reaches its verb, but is changed into an object, αὐτοῦ, before its own construction is complete. Such abruptness is characteristic of the Greek language, and seldom finds a place in Latin ; for where it does occur we shall probably be right in attributing it to the influence of Greek literature ; *e.g.* Virg. Æn. 5, 773—

'Tres Eryci vitulos, et Tempestatibus agnam
Cædere deinde jubet, solvique
ex ordine funem.'

Again *ibid.* iii. 60—

'Omnibus idem animus, scelestata excedere terra,
Linqui pollutum hospitium,
et dare classibus Austros.'

And vii. 468—

'Jubet arma parari
Tutari Italiam, detrudere finibus hostem.'

But in these passages the change of subject lessens the abruptness of the change of construction.

κινδυνεύει. **Χρήσιμος** ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἢ δικαιοσύνη; **Κινδυνεύει**. Καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέη φυλάττειν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρησιμος καὶ κοιῆ καὶ ἰδία; ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἢ ἀμπελοργική; Φαίνεται. Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέη φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὀπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν; Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα δὴ πάντα ἢ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστία χρήσιμος; Κινδυνεύει.

CAP. VIII.

Ε Οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἴη ἢ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὄν τυγχάνει. τόδε δὲ σκεψώμεθα. ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τιῶν καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον

περὶ τᾶλλα δὴ πάντα. ^ἢ *is here conclusive, as it is in combination with καὶ δὴ καὶ, see above Ch. II. *in it.* but with καὶ alone, καὶ δὴ τεθνήσκει, 'Well then they are dead?' i.e. suppose them dead, Eur. Med. 386, καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι, Soph. Ant. 245, δὴ assents. See 361 E, note.*

CH. VIII.—*But we may make a mistake between friend and foe. Therefore justice would be better defined as benefiting our real friends and harming our real enemies.*

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον, &c. The original reading here of most of the MSS. is φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, οὗτος δεινότατος καὶ ἐμποιῆσαι. Muretus was for removing καὶ λαθεῖν altogether, as

'absurdum planeque obscurum, although the latter epithet hardly implies a reason for removing the words. Bekker, from a MS., substituted καὶ μὴ παθεῖν, in which he was followed by Stallbaum; a substitution which cuts the knot rather than unties it. Faesi's defence of the common reading is accepted by Boeckh, Wiegand, and apparently at one time by C. F. Hermann, from whose recension the text is taken; it is as follows, 'cavere sibi a morbo morbumque fallere (aut devitare, aut latere ne te capiat).' Stallbaum, from whose note the above facts are taken, points out with justice that the notion of λαθεῖν, secrecy, is required in the latter part of the sentence, for 'we have below the good

ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν στρατοπέδου 334 γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός, ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολέμων κλέψαι καὶ βουλευματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις. Πάνυ γε. Ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φῶρ δεινός. Ἔοικεν. Εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλεπτειν δεινός. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. Κλέπτῃς ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀναπεφανται· καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὀμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσ-

custodian of the camp represented as δεινὸς κλέψαι, and again in the conclusion of the whole matter the just man, *i.e.* the good custodian, turns out to be a good thief. λαθεῖν then must be transferred to the latter part of the sentence. And the best codices remove καὶ altogether from between δεινότατος and ἐμποιῆσαι. Thus far for destructive criticism. But it is evident that the construction of the words καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιῆσαι conveys no meaning at all. And the fault in the sentence is also evident; viz. the want of a participle to combine with λαθεῖν. If we are right in our destruction of the common reading, there can be no doubt about the meaning which this latter clause should convey; viz. ('The man who is clever at protecting himself from disease) is the very man who is cleverest at secretly inflicting it upon others.' Stallbaum whilst acknowledging this requirement of the text, retains the reading which involves this want of construction; although he has satisfied himself, 'sine ullâ dubitatione,' that we should write

ἐμποιήσας for ἐμποιῆσαι. The conjecture is very happy, involves the smallest possible alteration of the text, and may very fitly stand until challenged by a better.

ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, *v. s.* note ad Cap. VII. εἴ τι δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος... See Od. 19, 395. (Αὐτόλυκον)—

Μῆτρὸς ἐῆς πάτερ' ἐσθλὸν· ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο

Κλεπτοσύνη θ' ὄρκω τε.

It is but fair to the poet to quote the lines which follow—

θεὸς δέ οἱ αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν

Ἑρμείας τῷ γὰρ κεχαρισμένα
μήτρια καῖεν

Ἄρνῶν ἤδ' ἐρίφων.

In this conclusion of Socrates we have an expression of that hostility which Plato felt towards poets who represented the gods as immoral. We cannot palliate the fact that fraud and deception commanded admiration in the Homeric age, provided success followed their employment. But we must couple with this fact another, viz. that this deception was directed against foes, and that a semi-barbarous age compelled recourse

Βσεως πρὸς μητρὸς πάππον Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾶ τε καὶ φῆσιν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνη θ' ὄρω τε. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σέ καὶ καθ' "Ὀμηρον καὶ κατὰ Σιμωνίδην κλεπτικὴ τις εἶναι, ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ μεντοὶ τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὃ τι ἔλεγον· τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς. Φίλους δὲ **Ο**λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἐκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως; Εἰκὸς μὲν, ἔφη, οὓς ἂν τις ἡγήται χρηστοὺς, φιλεῖν, οὓς δ' ἂν πονηροὺς, μισεῖν. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἀμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε

to many shameful acts, the prime object of which was self-preservation on the part of the perpetrator.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί' ἔφη, &c. Socrates' method, here exhibited at length, is described lower down by Thrasymachus thus: 'He will take care not to answer himself, but make the other person answer, then seize his words, and so confute them.' 337 E. This charge is true, for Socrates' method as above described was eliminative, viz. to discover the true by getting rid of the false or the vague. In this part of the Dialogue he is destroying popular ideas of justice, which are vague and insufficient: hence he draws Polemarchus on to give his ideas full expression and convince him of their insufficiency. In 348 B Socrates gives a reason for his method. He says, 'It is no use for us to make orations and each sum up the points in

his favour, because, in such a case, we shall need a jury to decide; whereas if we pursue the system of question and answer, we shall be barristers and jurymen at one and the same time.' In Book VI. Adeimantus, as it has been mentioned above, compares Socrates' method to that of a good chess-player, whose opponent does not understand the gist of his moves, but suddenly finds himself, at the end of the game, in a predicament.

πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας... The same distinction is drawn lower down, Ch. XIII., in the argument with Thrasymachus, between that which is, and that which is thought to be, to the advantage of the stronger. So Madame de Sévigné calls attention to this distinction, beginning one of her letters 'Comment-vous portez-vous? Comment croyez-vous vous porter?' &c.

οὐχ ἀμαρτάνουσιν... See Ch.

δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τούναντίον; Ἀμαρτάνουσιν. Τούτοις ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι; Πάνυ γε. Ἄλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις, τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν. Φαίνεται. D Ἄλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοι τε καὶ οἰοὶ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. Ἀληθῆ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικούντας δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν. Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος. Τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὠφελεῖν. Οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται. Πολλοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ξυμβήσεται, ὅσοι διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάπτειν; πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς E ὠφελεῖν; ἀγαθοὶ γάρ; καὶ οὕτως ἐρούμεν αὐτὸ τούναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω ξυμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα; κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι. Πῶς θέμενοι, ὦ Πολέμαρχε; Τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστὸν, τούτον φίλον εἶναι. Νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα; Τὸν δοκοῦντά τε, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν

XIII. Πίτερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἔρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἷσι τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν;

τότε, 'in that case,' as we had above, Ch. III., νῦν δέ, 'whilst as facts are'; and in Ch. II. εἰ μὲν...νῦν δέ.

πνηρὸς...ὁ λόγος, v. s. note ad εἰ μὲν τι δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν... Ch. VII. The use of πνηρὸς implies a sort of maliciousness or perversity in the argument, just as Euthyphro complains to Socrates that the words will keep coming round again to the same point from which they started. Euthyphro, 11 B. Ἄλλ',

ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι εἴπω ἢ νοῶ; περιέρχεται γὰρ πως ἡμῖν δεῖ δ' ἂν προθώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἰδρυσώμεθα αὐτό.

ὅσοι διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Stallb. compares Phædr. 257 D, τοῦ ἑταίρου συχρὸν διημαρτάνεις, which sets any doubt about this passage at rest. Heindorf, on the Phædrus, had already compared this passage of the Republic.

τὸν δοκοῦντα τε, &c. 'By distinguishing the apparently and the really good friend.'

335 φίλον· τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ μὴ, δοκεῖν ἄλλα μὴ εἶναι φίλον· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ θεσις. Φίλος μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρὸς. **Ναί.** Κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἐχθρὸν κακῶς· νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν, ὅτι ἔστι δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, **Β** οὕτως ἂν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

CAP. IX.

Εστιν ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτει καὶ ὄντινούν ἀνθρώπων; Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη, τοὺς γε πονηροὺς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν. Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίγνονται; Χείρους. Ἄρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων; Εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γίγνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς

Φίλος μὲν δὴ... κελεύεις δὴ...
'You conclude then that the good man,' &c., and 'Finally you would have us add...'

προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ... A curious ellipse. We must supply πλέον, not ἄλλο, for at first the statement was unqualified. The notion of comparison, or greater extent, is implied in the preposition πρὸς. So μᾶλλον is omitted, II. I, 117—

βούλομαι

εγὼ λαθὼν σόον ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι.

Lysias 171, 5, ζητοῦσι κερδαίνειν ἢ ἡμᾶς πείθειν.

νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν...
Xenophon, Mem. 2, 3, 14, 80

far depreciates the character of Socrates as to make him lay down this rule of retaliation himself. καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, ὅς ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν, showing thereby how far below Plato's was his knowledge of Socrates.

CH. IX.—But good men do no harm to any one.

ἄρα εἰς τὴν... This qualification restricts the injury to the proper nature of the sufferer; and shows that it is the most telling and delsterious possible.

τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετὴν ; Ἀνάγκη. Ἀνθρώπους δέ, C
ὧ ἐταίρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν, βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν
ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χείρους γίγνεσθαι ; Πάνυ μὲν
οὖν. Ἄλλ' ἢ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετὴ ;
Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη. Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὧ
φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι.
Ἔοικεν. Ἄρ' οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ ἀμούσους

ἀνθρώπους δέ... In the time of the cruelties of the Thirty, Socrates spoke out against ill-treatment of our fellow man thus : *ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον* (sc. than the herdsman ill-treating his flock with impunity) *εἴ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως, καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους καὶ χείρους, μὴ αἰσχύνεται.*

ἀλλ' ἢ δικαιοσύνη. It must be noticed above that the question is not 'Is it right that any one should harm another?' but 'Is it right that a just man should harm any one?' Then *δικαιοσύνη* is adroitly introduced as that human *ἀρετή* upon which any harm done will take effect ; thus bringing about the telling conclusion that for a just man to harm another is an unnatural action, and, in fact, a moral impossibility. Looking back upon this piece of reasoning, it must be impugned, upon logical grounds, as again merely resting on analogy. But to consider the argument broadly : first let us grant that Socrates by *βλάπτω* means the physical equivalent of *ἀδικῶ*. Then we must translate *βλάπτω* by 'hurt wantonly,' not merely 'hurt'; because if we strike a horse or a dog it may be for his good, and instead of depreciating his 'powers' (*ἀρετή*) improve them. Then, if by *βλάπτω* he means 'to treat

wantonly,' we shall thoroughly agree with Socrates that all creatures treated thus have their powers diverted towards resentment and retaliation, instead of keeping them concentrated upon useful and healthy action. So we speak of 'vice' in horses (to carry out Socrates' illustration), which is often the result of wanton ill-treatment. And so in the moral sphere. If a person is wantonly injured (*ἀδικεῖσθαι*), the injury not only breeds in him a desire to be revenged upon the perpetrator, but lowers his general sense of justice, by making him think worse of his fellow-man.

ἀμούσους. This word means here 'unmusical' or 'uneducated,' devoid of *μουσική*. In Book III. 411 D, the result of practising gymnastic to the exclusion of music is said to render a man *μισόλογος καὶ ἄμουσος*, i.e. 'opposed to intellectual exercise,' and *ἄμουσος* is 'un-intellectual.' A third sense arises from this meaning, the positive sense of 'vulgar,' or 'wanting taste,' which appears in the word *ἀμουσία* ; v. *infr.* 403 C. *ψόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξονται*. So Ausonius ad Symmachum : 'Dein cogitans mecum non illud Catullianum, "Cui dono lepidum et novum libellum!" sed *ἀμουσώτερον*

δύνανται ποιεῖν ; Ἄδύνατον. Ἄλλὰ τῇ ἵππικῇ οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἀφίππους ; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἄλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους ; ἢ καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀρετῇ
Δ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὺς ; Ἄλλὰ ἀδύνατον. Οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος, οἶμαι, ἔργον ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Ναί. Οὐδὲ ξηρότητος ὑγραίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Πάνυ γε. Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὡς Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ
Ε ἀδίκου. Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι φησὶ τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῶ, τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ

et verius ; "Cui dono illepidum, rudem libellum?"

ἔργον, 'function,' or, more objectively, 'use.' We have three divisions of things possessing ἔργα in the Republic.

i. Abstractions, as in the present passage. 'The function or property of heat.'

ii. The arts, *v. infr.* 346 D. καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι (τέχναι) οὕτω τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὀφελεῖ ἐκείνο ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται...

iii. Individuals, *infr.* 352 E. καὶ μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον.

The definition of ἔργον is to be found in the context of the last passage quoted: Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἀν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὄτουσιν ἔργον, ὃ ἀν ἡ μόνω ἐκείνω ποιῆ τις ἢ ἄριστα ; This principle forms the groundwork of the State which is to be created ; thus Book V. 453 B. αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κατοικίσεως, ἣν ὀκίσετε πόλιν, ὠμολο-

γεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἓνα ἐν τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν. The expression κατὰ φύσιν must be noticed ; it covers the case of individuals ; because to do uncongenial work, however well, is not strictly an ἔργον. Aristotle describes the ἔργον of man as that, in the exercise of which lies a man's well-being physical and moral : αὐλητῆ καὶ ἀγαματοποιῶ καὶ πάντι τεχνίτη, καὶ ὄλωσ ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εἶδ. He then defines it more distinctly as, ζωὴ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, or finally, ψυχῆς ἐνεργεία κατὰ λόγον. — Nic. Eth. I, 7, 10—14. Ἔργον in short is exercise of faculties.

ὁ δὲ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός. 'And the just man I suppose comes under the head of "good" ?'

νοεῖ, 'means,' 'signifies,' see Euthydemus, 287 D, where an eristic quibble is set up on the expression νοεῖ τὸ ῥῆμα, 'the word means.'

δικαίον ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὠφέλειαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών· οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὃν βλάπτειν. Συγχωρῶ, ἢ δ' ὅς. Μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῆ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῆ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν εἰρηκέναι ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. Ἔγωγ' οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης. Ἄλλ' οἴσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μοι **336** δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; Τίνος; ἔφη. Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τίνος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἢ δικαιοσύνη ὃν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίη εἶναι;

οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ... δίκαιον... ὄν, predicate; οὐδένα, object. οὐδαμοῦ, 'in the case of no man.'

ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ. Perhaps the best example of this identification of his companion with himself in the discovery of truth is found in Book IV. 432, where Socrates has started with the discovery of temperance, wisdom and courage, and proceeds to find justice by eliminating the other three. 'Now, Glaucon, like hunters, we must surround the thicket, and beware lest the object of our search escape us. Be zealous then and look carefully, and tell me if you see it first,' &c. For this expression of uncompromising hostility against false morals, see his opinion, not less uncompromising, on religious beliefs, Book II. 380 B. κακῶν δὲ αἰτίων φάναι θεόν τινα γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα,

διαμαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινα λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, μήτε τινα ἀκούειν.

οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου... Plato's contempt for this maxim may be gauged by the fact that he attributes it to tyrants: for whom he had the liveliest detestation. See Argument of the Dialogue, Books IX., X. For Periander, tyrant of Corinth, see Herod. 3, 48, *seqq.*; and 8, 137, *seqq.* for Perdiccas, tyrant of Macedonia. For Ismenius of Thebes, see Xen. Hell. 3, 5, 1.

οὐδὲ... ἢ δικαιοσύνη... οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον. Similarly Plato distinguishes between ὁ τυραννικὸς and τύραννος in Book IX. See Argument, and note, p. 90. δικαιοσύνη is the General or Ἰδέα, under which τὸ δίκαιον, i.e. individual cases of justice, are included.

CAP. X.

B Και ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγόμενων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἤγην, ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἤκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς

CH. X.—*Thrasymachus interpreposes violently; and asks why they do not discuss the question seriously.*

καὶ διαλεγ. καὶ emphatic, 'even whilst we had been talking,' as in 582 B. μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ βῆδιον (γενέσθαι). 'On the contrary, it is a hard matter even for one who is zealous.' The particle is employed in a similar way above, Ch. III. καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ; but it is more emphatic here, the coordinate clause being introduced merely by δέ (ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα), much weaker than καὶ δὴ καὶ which introduces the second clause of the example above. See Ch. V. *not. ad καὶ μέντοι.*

ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. See *not. c. i. ad μου... λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου.* Ἀντί here, as in similar verbs, ἀντέχομαι, e.g. implies that the object caught hold of is entirely distinct and separate from the person who catches hold of it: and communicates the idea of aggression in the present passage. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 618, Obs. 1, 3rd ed. 'As a general rule the compounds of ἀντί take a dative, as conveying a notion of hostility.'

ἔπειτα, the middle point of the sequence, introduced by μέν and concluding with δέ.

διακοῦσαι. Note force of διδ, 'hear it out.'

θηρίον. We see here a reference to a hunt, from which Socrates draws many similes and metaphors; v. *infr.* Book IV. 432, quoted above: κυνηγέτας θάμνον περίστασθαι. Euthyphro 13A, *et passim.* Socrates arrives at the conclusion how to combine courage and gentleness in the warriors of his city, by a reference to the fact that those traits coexist in hounds. Book II. 375 C. For συστρέψας we may compare the metaphor ξυρεῖν τὸν λέοντα, *infr.* Ch. XV., where Thrasymachus is the lion. Another word involving a metaphor from the sphere of hunting is ἀγριαίνω, 'to behave like a wild beast.' See *infr.* ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι; and Book VI. 501 E. ἔτι οὖν ἀγριαίνουσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν... From this metaphor another is drawn, viz. the process of 'taming' a person, as in Book II. Ch. II. *in it.* Thrasymachus is said to have been 'tamed' by Socrates: this metaphor is of the most frequent occurrence, as will be noticed there.

διαρπασόμενος. καὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὁ Πολεμαρχος δει-
σαντες διεπτοήθημεν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος
Τίς, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες; C
καὶ τί εὐθηλίξεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατακλινό-
μενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλ' εἶπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βούλει
εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τι ἐστί, μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ
φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδὴν τίς τι ἀποκρίνηται,
ἐγνωκῶς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥᾶον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναί καὶ εἶπε, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ

εἰς μέσον φθεγξ. So Herod.
3, 62. προηγόρευε στὰς ἐς μέσον
τὰ ἐντεταλμένα. And v. s. not.
ad Cap. II. ἐκαθεζόμεθα... παῶ'
αὐτόν.

ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, reflexive for reci-
procal 'each other.' For see
below ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλή-
λοις. The word ὑποκατακλ.
means 'retiring in turn,' and
expresses the motions of a pair
of dancers, to whom Thrasyma-
chus derisively likens Socrates
and Polemarchus. Such dancers
were ordinarily employed to
amuse guests at a banquet from
Homeric times. See Hom. II.
18, 605; Od. 4, 15. In Od.
8, 378, we have the equivalent
of ὑποκατακλ.—

ἄρχείσθην δὴ ἔπειτα ποτὶ
χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ
ταρφέ' ἀμειβομένῳ

where ἀμειβομένῳ exactly ex-
presses the alternate advance
and retirement of the two per-
formers. Although Thrasyma-
chus compares Socrates to a
public juggler, it will be seen
in the course of his conversation
that he is very anxious to ex-
hibit his own rhetorical powers.
Thus *infra*. 338 A. ὁ Θρασύ-
μαχος φανερὸς ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν,
ἵν' εὐδοκιμήσειεν.

μηδὲ φιλο. ἐλεγχ. &c. 'And

do not be anxious to distinguish
yourself in disproving every-
thing that a person says.' ἐπειδὴν
&c. must be taken closely with
ἐλέγχων.

ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποκρ. This
is exactly what Socrates could
not be brought to do; he dis-
claimed all knowledge, which
relieved him from the onus of
construction, and persisted in
showing the incorrectness of po-
pular beliefs, theories, language,
and morality. In many cases
we may believe that he had
actually no settled account to
give at once of the large ques-
tions which he used to discuss,
and that he really derived in-
struction and assistance from
demolishing the mistaken no-
tions of other people. It has
been pointed out in the Intro-
duction that, as this Dialogue
proceeds, Socrates is induced to
launch out into construction;
but it is at the urgent request
of Glaucon and Adeimantus,
who in Book II. *init.* evince a
feeling of perplexity at the pro-
sperity of the wicked, and a sin-
cere desire to hear of a solution
to the troublesome paradox, that
the gods are good and the wicked
are prosperous. But Thrasyma-
chus asks, and asks in vain.

D δίκαιον· καὶ ὅπως μοι μὴ ἔρείς, ὅτι το δέον ἐστὶ μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ξυμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι, ἐὰν ὑθλους τοιούτους λέγῃς. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων αὐτὸν ἐφοβούμην, καὶ μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἐωράκη αὐτὸν ἢ ἐκείνος ἐμέ, ἄφρονος ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἠνίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου

E ἤρχετο ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος, ὥστε αὐτῷ οἶός τ' ἐγενόμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ εἶπον ὑποτρέμων ὦ Θρασύμαχε, μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι· εἰ γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγώ τε καὶ ὄδε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνομεν. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶου, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἡμᾶς

ὅπως μοι μὴ ἔρείς, omission of *δρα*, or a similar word. See Eur. Cycl. 487—

ἄγε νυν' ὅπως ἔψεσθε τοῦ δαλοῦ χεροῖν.

So 469, *surp.* ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀνήρ ἔσει. Meno. 77 A.: ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἶός τε ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. Aristoph. Nub. 489—

ἄγε νυν, ὅπως, ὅταν τι προβά-
λωμαι σοφὸν
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων εὐθέως
ὑφαρπάσει.

et *infra*. 882—

ὅπως δ' ἐκείνω τὰ λόγῳ μαθή-
σεται.

This sentence indicates Thrasymachus' temperament, condemning as he does five possible definitions as ὑθλοι τοιοῦτοι, nonsense of this sort.

εἰ μὴ πρότερος .. See Virg. Ecl. 9, 53—

'Vox quoque Mœrim
Jam fugit ipsa; lupi Mœrim
videre priores.'

So Pliny, Hist. Nat. 8, 34.

'Sed in Italia quoque creditus luporum visus esse noxius, vocemque homini, quem priores contemplantur, adimere ad præsens.'

ὑποτρέμων. Socrates here almost descends into the burlesque; and prepares the effect which is afterwards produced by the discomfiture of the overbearing Thrasymachus.

μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶου... 'For pray do not think that in a search for gold we should not have deferred to each other, but that in the search for justice we should do so.' This *à fortiori* reasoning from the physical to the moral sphere is employed very frequently by the Xenophonic Socrates; see Memorabilia, Book 1, 2, 32. θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκεῖν εἶναι, εἰ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομῆς, καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χεῖρους ποιῶν, μὴ ὁμολογήη κακὸς βοῦκόλος εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως, καὶ

έκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ ζητήσῃ καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὐρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ζητοῦντας, πρᾶγμα πολλῶν χρυσιῶν τιμιώτερον, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοήτως ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό. οἴου γε σύ, ἦ φίλε· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ δυνάμεθα· ἐλεεῖσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστί που ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἢ 337 χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους καὶ χείρους, μὴ αἰσχύνεται, μηδ' οἴεται κακὸς εἶναι προστάτης τῆς πίστεως. And *inf.* Ch. VII. *fin.* ἀπατεῶνα δ' ἐκάλει οὐ μικρὸν μὲν, εἴ τις ἀργύριον ἢ σκεῦος παρά του πειθοῦ λαβῶν ἀποστεροῖη, πολὺ δὲ μεγίστον, ὅστις μηδενὸς ἀξίος ὦν ἐξηπατῆκει, πείθων ὡς ἱκανὸς εἴη τῆς πόλεως ἠγχείσθαι. And again, Book 2, 4, 2, καὶ γὰρ οἰκίας καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ βοσκήματα καὶ σκεῦη κτωμένους τε ἐπιμελῶς ὄραν ἔφη, καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώζειν πειρωμένους· φίλον δὲ, ὃ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φασιν ὄραν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐτε ὕπως κτήσονται φροντίζοντας, οὐτε ὕπως οἱ θνητοὶ ἑαυτοῖς σώζονται.

ἔπειθ', 'in that case,' 'in such a case as that.' This particle generally emphasizes the connexion of one sentence with another in a *sequence*, see above this Ch. *init.* ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν... But, as here, it sometimes stands more as a powerful demonstrative, although still retaining the sequential force in part. This sequential force is logical rather than temporal,

as Conington points out when he compares the use of *præterea* with *ἔπειτα*. Virg. *Æn.* 1, 49—

'Et quisquam numen Junonis
adorat
Præterea?'

And cf. *Od.* 2, 275—

εἰ δ' οὐ κείνου γ' ἐσσι γόνος καὶ
Πηνελοπείης,
οὐ σέ γ' ἔπειτα ἔολπα τελευ-
τήσειν ἃ μενοινᾷς.

δεινῶν. *δεινός* by itself bears the secondary sense of 'clever,' which it gains through the notion that great cleverness strikes awe into those who witness it. Thus 'wonderfully clever' would more nearly express the exact meaning. In his description of a chariot race in the *Electra*, Sophocles, with the complacency of one who praises his audience, speaks thus:—

γνοῦς δ' οὐξ Ἀθηνῶν δεινὸς
ἠγνιστρόφος
ἔξω παρασπᾶ κἀνακωχέει...

CAP. XI.

Καὶ ὃς ἀκουσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὐτῆ κεινῆ ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τούτοις προῦλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλησους, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τις τι σε ἐρωτᾷ. Σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· εὐ οὖν ἤδησθα ὅτι, εἴ τινα ἔροιο ὅποσα **B** ἔστι τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῶ· ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς, ὅτι ἔστι τὰ δώδεκα δις ἕξ μηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου, ἐὰν τοιαῦτα

CH. XI.—*Thrasymachus knows what justice is, but wishes to be paid before he will share his knowledge.*

ἀνεκαγχ. σαρδάν. Cf. Virg. Eclogue 7, 41—

'Immo ego Sardoniis videar tibi amarior herbis,'

and Horace, A. P. 375; from which passages it is evident that Sardinia produced certain acrid herbs; but the connexion of the 'Sardonic smile' with the grimace produced by eating these herbs seems not to be warranted. For the construction of this adverbial accusative, see Eur. Alc. 773—

τί σεμνὸν οὕτω καὶ πεφροντικὸς βλέπεῖς;

And Aristoph. Vesp. 900—

ὡς δὲ καὶ κλέπτον βλέπει.

εἰρωνεία, 'pretending to know less than one does,' 'self-depreciation.' ὁ εἰρών in Aristotle is described as the converse of the braggart. Thus Nic. Eth.

4, 7, 2. δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ ἀλαζῶν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δ' εἰρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν. And so in 2, 7, 12. ἢ δὲ προσποίησις ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζῶν, ἢ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρων.

σόφος γὰρ εἶ, '(of course you knew this) for you are adroit,' &c. Socrates implies that Thrasymachus put his question in such a manner as to preclude an answer, so that he might charge Socrates with εἰρωνεία. For the expression *v. infr.* ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, Συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ.

ὅπως μοι, *v.s.* Thrasymachus' own words, which are repeated exactly, to point the ludicrous comparison.

ὡς οὐκ ἀποδ. *v.s.* Ch. IV. *in it.* ὦ Κέφαλε, οἶμαί σου τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι· *et infr.* Ch. XIII. *fin.* οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα.

φλυαρῆς· δῆλον, οἶμαι, σοὶ ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο τῷ οὕτω πυνθανομένῳ. ἀλλ' εἴ σοι εἶπεν ὧ Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν; πότερον, ὧ θαυμάσιε, μηδ' εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶπω τι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἶπες πρὸς ταῦτα; Εἶεν, C ἔφη· ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ. Οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὅμοιον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἡττόν τι αὐτὸν οἶει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ, ἔάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἔάν τε μῆ; Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω

δῆλον ἦν. We should expect *ἔν*, but Socrates perhaps wishes to put the case as if it had really passed through Thrasy-machus' mind.

μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι. 'Am I not to answer?' Deliberative subjunctive. See Eur. Ion. 758—*εἶπωμεν ἢ σιγῶμεν*; and Med. 1271—

οἶμοι τι δράσω; ποῖ φύγω
μῆτρος χέρας;

et infr. here οὕτω σε φῶμεν
λέγειν; Ch. XIV. *in it*

ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον. δὴ here is purely emphatic, as below 338 A.: σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναί. And similarly in Od. 2, 271.

εἰ δὴ τοι σοῦ πατρὸς ἐνέστακται
μένος ἡῦ.

'If you really have inherited your father's spirit.' See Book VIII. 544 C.: ἢ γενναῖα δὴ τυραννίς.

ἄλλο τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις; 'Are you positively going to do so?' A common colloquialism in which the particle *ἢ* is omitted. Constructed fully the phrase would stand ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ οὕτω, ὅτι...κ.τ.λ. We can see the first stage of the ellipse in such an expression as this:

τί τόνδ' ἂν εἶποις ἄλλο πλὴν
αὐτῷ πόνους

φῦσαι;

Soph. Ant. 646. Also see Euthydemus 276 A.: ἄλλο τι οὖν οὐπω ἠπίστασθε ταῦτα. *et infr.* here Ch. XV. 342 D. Thrasy-machus is evidently dismayed at Socrates refusing to bind himself to the restrictions laid upon him. This kind of sophist required that the conversation should be conducted not merely on certain lines, but even in certain terms, if he were to prove his points. See Euthydemus, Ch. XVI., where a sophist, bearing a certain resemblance to Thrasy-machus, although gifted with greater powers of argument, positively refuses to proceed unless Socrates answer precisely in the terms he wishes. Thrasy-machus here intends to produce an effect, when he prohibits the use of certain words in the definition, by forcing Socrates to confess that he cannot define justice without them: Socrates parries the assault by calmly hinting that the true definition would require one of them.

L

ποιήσεις ; ὧν ἐγὼ ἀπέειπον, τούτων τι ἀποκριεῖ ; Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ μοι σκεψαμένω οὕτω δόξειεν. Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξω ἐτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταυτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης βελτίω τούτων ; τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν ; Τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότη ; προσήκει δέ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδοτος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἀξιῶ παθεῖν. Ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότισον ἀργύριον. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδάν

τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν, 'how ought you to be treated?' i.e. 'what ought you to have done to you?' For this use of παθεῖν v.s. ποτ. ad Cap. III. ἐπεπόνθη.

ἦδὺς γὰρ εἶ, 'you are a cool fellow.' ἦδὺς in this relation means 'simple' or 'ingenuous,' and is thus euphemistic, and sarcastically used for its opposite e.g. δεινός or ὑβριστικός: i.e. 'it is a cool request to ask, without payment.' Somewhat similarly in Book VII. 527 D. 'Ἡδὺς εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔοικας δεδίοσι τοὺς πολλοὺς, μὴ δοκῆς ἀχρηστα μαθήματα προστάττειν. And so χαρίεις Book IX. 602 B. χαρίεις ἂν εἴη δ' ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικός. Where the opposite notion is intended, v.s. Ch. V. ποτ. ad τελευτήσειν.

ἀποτίσον ἀργύριον. With this practice of Thrasymachus compare Xenophon's testimony to Socrates' disinterested teaching. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμητάς καὶ ἀστοὺς καὶ ξένους λαβῶν οὐδένα πώποτε μισθὸν τῆς ξυνοουσίας ἐπράξατο, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀφθονῶς ἐπήρκει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. Mem. I, 2, 60, whilst *infra* he seems to describe Thrasymachus himself: τοῖς γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσι χρήματα διδόναι οὐκ ἤθελον διαλέγεσθαι. Plato's opinion of such sophists

may be gathered from Book VI. 493 A: ἕκαστος τῶν μισθαροῦντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσιν...κ.τ.λ. where the word μισθαροῦντων bears a bad sense. Other passages in the Memorabilia corroborating Socrates' refusal to take money for teaching are I, 6, II. οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνοουσίας ἀργύριον πράττη. And *supr.* § 3. καὶ μὴν χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβάνεις. Socrates speaks thus of those who took money for imparting knowledge: καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργύριον τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πύρρονος ἀποκαλοῦσιν. And he speaks of the advantage which he enjoys from his practice of taking none, viz. that he can choose whom he will to instruct, and is not at the beck and call of every one; § 5. ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντι οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι ᾧ ἂν μὴ βούλωμαι. In the Apology Socrates mentions that his accusers could not bring the charge of money-making against him; 31 C. οὐχ οἶοί τε ἀπαναιοχρῆνται ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξαίην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. And so 19 D: οὐκ ἐστίν...ὡς ἐγὼ χρήματα πράττομαι.

ἐπειδάν μοι γέννηται. In the Apology 23 B, Socrates explains his poverty thus: περιτῶν ζητῶ

μοι γένηται, εἶπον. Ἄλλ' ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· ἀλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε· παντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν. Πάνυ γε, οἶμαι, ἢ δ' ὅς, **E** ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται, αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνη λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὶς ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φασκων εἰδέναί, ἔπειτα, εἴ τι καὶ οἶεται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρη- μένον αὐτῷ εἶη; ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὧν ἠγεῖται, ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου; ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· **338** σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναί καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐμοί τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσης καὶ Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων, ἂν τινα οἴωμαι σόφον εἶναι· καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας... ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν. *v.s.* also the mention of his charity in the passage from Xen. Mem. I, 2, 60: πᾶσιν ἀφθονῶς ἐπήρκει; which would help to account for it.

ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου, 'as far as money is concerned.' Cf. Euthyphr. II D: ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ἔμενον ἂν ταῦτα οὕτως, *i.e.* 'for anything I did to the contrary.' And see Eur. Cycl. 512—
κελευσμάτων δ' ἕκατι τυφέσθω
Κύκλωψ.

And so Rep. 582 C. ἐμπειρίας μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἔνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρινεῖ οὗτος.

πάντες γὰρ Σωκράτει. Of this popularity which Socrates evidently enjoys, the Charmides supplies another instance; see *infra*. καί με ὡς εἶδον ἐσίοντα ἐξ ἀπροσδοκίτου, εὐθύ· πῶρρωθεν ἠσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν.

αὐτὸς μὲν, &c. A very fair description of Socrates' ordinary method. See *Introd.* p. 7.

ἀπειρημένον... εἶη. Stallbaum proposes to omit εἶη, a course which the run of the sentence recommends; for, as the text stands, εἰ must qualify both οἶεται and εἶη, which it cannot do without awkwardness. Then εἰρημένον will be a case of the neuter absolute participle in the accusative case. Sometimes the partic. is omitted: Book V. 449 C: ὡς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων πάντι δῆλον. Protag. 323 B: ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα μετέχειν αὐτῆς. Also Herod. I, 129: εἰ, παρεὼν αὐτῷ βασιλέα γενέσθαι... ἄλλω περιέθηκε τὸ κράτος.

ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου. *v.s.* σόφος γὰρ εἶ.

ἐμοί τε χαρ. So below, 351 C, where Thrasymachus repeats Socrates' words. Σοί γὰρ, ἔφη χαρίζομαι. *et ibid.* τότε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε. And in

CAP. XII.

Εἰπόντος δέ μου ταῦτα ὁ τε Γλαυκῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν· καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος φανερός μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰτεῖν, ἕν' εὐδοκίμησειεν, ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην· προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονεικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.

B τελευτῶν δὲ ξυνεχώρησε, κᾶπειτα Αὐτῆ δὴ, ἔφη, ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία, αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιμοντα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. "Ὅτι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· ὅτι δὲ οὗ με φῆς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδει. ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὄσσην δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα

Euthydemus 274 D. πάνν μὲν οὖν τοῦτοις χαρίσασθον καὶ... ἐπιδείξατον.

CH. XII.—*Thrasymachus' definition of Justice, the Interest of the Stronger.*

φανερός ἦν ... εὐδοκίμησειεν. These expressions prove Thrasymachus to have belonged rather to the rhetorical than the ethical division of sophists. See below, Ch. XVI., where Thrasymachus having stated his views at length wishes to make off without further argument. Protagoras of Abdera, the most famous of all the sophists, was not often in the habit of conversing; he, too, rather employed rhetoric than dialectic. See Prot. 335 A. where he refuses to go upon the principle of short questions and answers, which Socrates asks to be the only kind of discussion he can follow. It is true that

earlier in the dialogue Protagoras offers to discuss a question μῦθον λέγων, ἢ λόγῳ διελεσθῶν. But we can see from the later passage quoted that λόγος with Protagoras and Socrates meant different things. And Socrates believed in the case of Protagoras, as in that of Thrasymachus here, that he had a distinct desire to produce a rhetorical effect. *id.* 317 C. ὑπάπτευσά γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προδίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἰππία ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι (as εὐδοκίμησει, here).

ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία, *v.s.* above ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους. The article indicates that Socrates had a public reputation for wisdom.

χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω, *v.s. not ad. ἀποτίσον ἀργύριον*, Ch. XI. In Xen. Mem. 1, 6, 2, Antiphon asks how it is that philosophy only brings poverty: ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν ὄμην τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας

γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω. ὡς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, ἐάν τις μοι δοκῆ εὐ λέγειν, εὐ εἴσει αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν ἀποκρίνη· οἶμαι γὰρ σε εὐ ἐρεῖν. Ἄκουε δὴ, ἦ δ' ὄσ. φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττουτος ξυμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς ; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθειλήσεις. Ἐὰν μαθῶ γε πρῶτον, ἔφην, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὐπω οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττουτος

εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίνεσθαι, σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰνάντια τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολαυκέναι· ζῆς γοῦν οὕτως, ὡς σὺδ' ἂν εἰς δοῦλος ὑπὸ δισπότη διαιτῶμενος μείνειε. Aristotle in the Politics, 1, 4, shows that the philosopher can be wealthy, if he chooses, by the story of Thales in Miletus, who discovered from astronomical researches that the olive-yield would be excessive in the ensuing year, and, by a small deposit of earnest-money, secured a large profit upon it at the harvest : ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καιρὸς ἦκε πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἅμα, καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἐκμισθοῦντα ἄν τρόπον ἠβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα ξυλλέξαντος ἐπιδειξάι, ὅτι ῥάδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται.

ὡς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ. This adroit piece of flattery is evidently swallowed by Thrasymachus, for he proceeds without more ado to give his definition. Socrates' words exhibit a phrase of his εἰρωνεία, for he incites Thrasymachus to speak by an assumed admiration for the wisdom of what he is going to say. We must suppose that Socrates veils the sarcasm of his words beneath an appearance of innocence : otherwise Thrasymachus would hardly fail to see their true drift.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττουτος ξυμφέρον. We have now left behind popu-

lar, and have to treat with sophistic definition ; briefly the principle is, 'Might is Right.' Thrasymachus' line of argument is as follows. The stronger make regulations for their own benefit, and these regulations are dignified by the term 'laws,' and justice is obedience to them. Now the description of that form of government called τυραννίς in Aristotle's Politics, 3, 55, corresponds exactly to Thrasymachus' account of a state of justice here : ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ ξυμφέρον τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος. And Aristotle calls such a state a degenerated form or abnormal growth from a monarchy, which is described, in contrast to the τυραννίς, as having regard to the common interest, not to that of the ruler ; καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν ξυμφέρον βασιλείαν ; where it should be noticed that ἀποβλέπουσαν means having regard only, or chiefly, to the public weal. Here Thrasymachus puts forward the κρείττων, i.e. the man who is superior in bodily strength or force of will, but disregards the claims of the commonwealth upon him, as the ruler of the state. Socrates, on the contrary, gradually unfolds the principle that all arts and sciences, and therefore all governments, ought to be

φῆς ξυμφέρον δικαίον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασυ
μαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τό γε τοιούνδε
φῆς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατια-
στής καὶ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρεται τὰ βόεια κρέα πρὸς τὸ
D σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἡττοσιν
ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δικαίον. Βδελυρὸς γὰρ
εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτη ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἥ

directed, if they are true arts and governments, towards the amelioration of some objects less strong and less capable than themselves. And therefore he will be found to claim the right to govern for that man who is himself governed by his best nature, arguing from the analogy of such a man's own psychical polity. For when the θεῖον, λογιστικόν, or rational part of man's nature is in the ascendant, and keeps under the spirited and sensual, then such a man's body and mind as a whole will be most healthy and most efficient. See Book IX. 590 D. δούλον αὐτόν (sc. τὸν τυχόντα) φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλαβῇ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχειν αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ζῆτο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ἐν παντί ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχειν, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος. That Thrasymachus' position is not entirely out of date, the following passages from a modern writer will show. 'All fighting is the dusty conflict of Strengths, each thinking itself the strongest, or in other words the justest: of Might which do in the long run and for ever will in this just universe in the long run mean Rights.'

Carlyle, Past and Present, Book III. Ch. X; and again in his Life of John Sterling, Pt. III. Ch. I. 'Might and Right, the identity of these two, if a man will understand this God's-universe, and that only he who conforms to the law of it can in the long run have any "Might."'

Πουλυδάμας ἀπὸ σκοτούσης ἦν, πόλεως Θεσσαλίας, διασημότατος παγκρατιαστής, ὑπερμεγεθής, ὅς ἐν Πέρσαις παρ' Ὠφω γενόμενος τῷ βασιλεὶ λόντας ἀνείλε καὶ ἄπλισμένους γυμνὸς κατηγωνίστατο. Schol.

βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ. So above ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, σόφος γὰρ εἶ.

ταύτη ὑπολ. This answer it must be observed, is a confession that the definition is assailable, i.e. is imperfect. ὑπὸ implies stealth on Socrates' part, in an underhand way, as we say; so ὑποκάθημαι, to lie in ambush, ὑποστέλλομαι, to prevaricate. But the word is also used merely 'to interrupt,' without any further notion; see below, Ch. XIII. *ad med.* ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβόν. In the present passage we may translate ὑπ. ταύτ. 'twist into that sense,' with the additional notion of stealth. In Euthyd. 295 B, the word means simply 'to understand.' ὑπολαμβάνεις γὰρ δήπου τι ὃ λέγω;

ἀν κακουρησῆσαι μάλιστα τὸν λόγον. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἰπέ, τί λέγεις. Εἴτ' οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον; Πάνυ γε. Γίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἢ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτῇ ξυμφέρον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς, τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω θέμεναι

τῶν πολέων αἱ μὲν... Plato is fond of this triple division, which occurs again in his analysis of μέλος (λόγος, ἁρμονία, ῥυθμός); of justice itself (σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σοφία); of the city (χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρικόν, φυλαικικόν); of the soul (θυμοειδές, φιλομαθές, φιλοχρήματον); and of the main difficulties to be encountered in founding the ideal State, Book V.; and of things desirable, Book II. *ini.* But in Book VIII. (*conf.* Book IV. *fin.*) we have four varieties of the State, degenerations from the Ideal, viz. the Timocratic, Oligarchic, Democratic, and Despotic; the first of which Socrates limits to such constitutions as those of Crete and Sparta. In his accusation of Ctesiphon Æschines divides all states into three kinds. εἰ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τυραννὶς καὶ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ δημοκρατία. And he goes on to say that the former two are managed merely according to the fancies of the rulers, but the democracy by established law. διοικοῦνται δ' αἱ μὲν τυραννίδες καὶ ὀλιγαρχαὶ τοῖς τρόποις τῶν ἐφεστηκότων, αἱ δὲ πόλεις αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις. Æsch. in Ctes. *ad ini.*

τίθεται δέ γε... Thrasymachus is correct in this statement as long as the selfish and unjust have the reins of government. But in Book IX. 590 D (*v.s. not. ad τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον*) Socrates shows that the best men, *i.e.* those in whose souls the λογιστικόν or rational element is master, ought to be masters of all the rest; because as the λογιστικόν, by restraining the lusts and passions produces the best possible condition of the body, when it is master, so the good man will not indulge himself when he is master in the state, but will set himself to make the whole body politic as healthy and efficient as possible. Therefore it is that he says in Book V. 473 D, that, until kings are philosophers and philosophers kings, the best state cannot be; for by philosopher he means λογιστικός, *i.e.* one in whom the intellectual dominates the sensual, *v. Intro.* p. 19. In short, the good man or philosopher is unselfish, and has regard for the well-being of the whole state, rather than for his own. Such is Socrates' answer in effect to this position of Thrasymachus.

δὲ ἀπεφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι ξυμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομούντά τε καὶ ἀδικούντα. τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστίν, ὦ Βέλτιστε, ὃ λέγω ἐν ἀπάσαις
339 ταῖς πόλεσι ταῦτόν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς ξυμφέρον· αὕτη δὲ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε ξυμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. Νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λεγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ μή, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι· καίτοι ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην· πρόσσεστι δὲ
B δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. Σμικρά γε ἴσως, ἔφη,

τοῦτο δίκαιον εἶναι, &c. So Sir Thomas More in his Utopia, Book II. of the religions in Utopia. 'Besides this the riche men not only by private fraud but also by commen lawes, do every day pluck and snatche away from the poore some parte of their daily living. So where as it semed before unjüste to recompense with unkindnesse their paynes that have been beneficiall to the publique weale, now they have to this their wrong and unjuste dealinge given the name of justice, yea and that by force of a law.' See Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 41, where the question is asked, τί ἐστι νόμος; and the conclusion is: πάντα, ὅσα ἂν τὸ κράτον τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον ἂ χρῆ ποιεῖν γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται. And it is there shown that spoliation and oppression is often dignified by the term law. See also Arist. Pol. 3, 6. ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἄρχειν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἂν

οὖν κάκεινοι ταῦτὰ ποιῶσι, καὶ διαρπάξωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ δίκαιον;

πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. Socrates is really anxious to arrive at a refutation of Thrasymachus' account of justice; therefore he passes over, with a bare mention, the objection that Thrasymachus has employed a word in his definition which he had forbidden Socrates to use; *v.s.* 336, D. And he likewise passes over Thrasymachus' reply, that he added to this word the qualification τοῦ κρείττονος. His desire is expressed in 346 A in the words ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν, 'let us get to some conclusion or other'; and so below here he uses the imperative verbal, ὅτι τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον.

αὐτόθι, 'in this (latter) place,' 'in your later definition.'

σμικρά γε ἴσως, 'a slight qualification, I suppose.' ἴσως sarcastically.

προσθήκη. Οὐπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη ἀλλ' οὐκ
 μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον. ἐπειτα
 γὰρ ξυμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δὴ
 καιον, σὺ δὲ προστίθης καὶ αὐτὸ φῆς εἶναι τὸ
 κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέον δῆ. Σκόπει. 340
 ἔφη.γ

CAP. XIII.

Ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἶπέ· οὐ καὶ
 πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι ;
 Ἔγωγε. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες C
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἳοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν ;
 Πάντως που, ἔφη, οἳοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. Οὐκοῦν
 ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασι,
 τοὺς δὲ τινὰς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Τὸ δὲ

οὐπω δῆλον... 'It may be an important one for all I know.' οὐδέ, 'not even,' implying that it may very well be an important addition.

ξυμφέρον γέ τι... ὁμολογῶ. The first piece of positive statement which Socrates has admitted in this argument. He allows justice to be 'advantageous.' ξυμφέρον τι is not more than a quality of justice. It is no definition, but merely one of the aspects of justice.

σκεπτέον δῆ. We have had three statements to which this is the conclusion ; δῆ being the particle which marks the final stage of an argument. v.s. not. ad περὶ τάλλα, Ch. VII. and Ch. II. *in it.* καὶ δῆ καί.

CH. XIII.—But often, *Thrasymachus, the Stronger make laws, in their ignorance, to their own disadvantage; and is that Justice?*

οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι... 'Was it not this very obedience?...' καὶ emphatic as above, Ch. X. *in it.* μέντοι marks the opening of an objection ; as we might say, 'Now was it not this very obedience'; but its adversative sense is not concentrated here upon the particular sentence, and is therefore not so clearly marked as usual. v.s. not. ad Cap. V. καὶ μέντοι.

ἢ οἳοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. The latter alternative is generally that intended to be accepted. v. *in fr.* Ch. XV. 342 B. ἢ οὐτε αὐτῆς οὐτε ἄλλης, &c. And Ch. XXII. *fin.* πότερον ἢ κρείττων πείλις... τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔξει ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης ; τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα... 'And by rightly we are to understand enactments to their own advantage, are we not?' ἄρα, 'as it seems'; ἄρα, 'as it seems,' with the addition of an emphasized interrogation. v.s. note,

δὲ ὡς ἄρα τὸ τὰ ξυμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀξύμφορα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως. κί δ' ἂν θῶνται, ποιητέον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τοῦτό τι τὸ δίκαιον; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸναντίον τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον. Τί λέγεις σύ; ἔφη. Ἄ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ σκοπῶμεν δὲ βέλτιον. οὐχ ὠμολόγηται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προστάττουτας ποιεῖν ἅττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν τοῦ ἑαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἃ δ' ἂν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ποιεῖν; ταῦτ' οὐχ ὠμολόγηται; **Ε** Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀξύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὠμολογήσθαι σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ αὐτοῖς προστάττωσι, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῆς ταυτὰ ποιεῖν, ἃ ἐκείνοι προσέ-

page 108. It is noticeable how very careful Socrates is to define all his terms with strictness: the reason being that he has to deal with a sophist who would think nothing of obstructing the argument by a mere logomachy, whilst Socrates is anxious to get to a conclusion.

ἃ δ' ἂν θῶνται. The subjunctive is used to express the indefinite nature of the law-making, which depends merely upon the will and present feeling of the legislators; as *Æschines* expresses it, *τοῖς τρόποις τῶν ἐφεστηκότων*. *v.s. not. ad τῶν πολέων αἰ μὲν*.

τί λέγεις σύ; *Thrasymachus* is taken by surprise; he does not see to the end of Socrates' argument at present. This argument has been employed

before in *Polemarchus' case*. See *supr.* Ch. VIII. *ad med.* where Socrates points out that a person may injure a friend through believing him to be an enemy, just as here he is about to show that legislators may harm themselves through legislation intended for their own benefit.

τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῆς. If we punctuate as in the text it would seem better to read *φῆς*, and look upon this clause as not dependent upon *ὅταν* in the preceding one, but added as an after thought, repeating one of the premisses. *Stallb.* places only a comma at *προσέταξαν*, but the question *ἄρα τότε, &c.*, cannot follow in the same sentence as the imperative *οἴου*.

ταξαν' ἄρα τότε, ὦ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὕτως δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν, τούναντίον ἢ δὲ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀξύμφορον δήπου προστάττεται τοῖς ἥττοσι ποιεῖν. Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ 340 Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατά γε. Ἐὰν σὺ γ', ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσης, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβόν. Καὶ τί, ἔφη, δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάττειν, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχοντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὦ Κλειτοφῶν, ξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο. ταῦτα δὲ Β ἀμφότερα θέμενος ὡμολόγησεν αὐ ἐνίοτε τοὺς κρείττους τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀξύμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἥττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον. Ἄλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὁ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ ξυμφέρειν τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥττονι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο. Ἄλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Πολέμαρχος,

ὑπολαβόν. *v. s. pot. ad ταύτην ὑπολ. Cap. XII. med.* This is a piece of raillery on Cleitophon's part; Polemarchus chiming in as though there were an end of the discussion to which he himself has contributed nothing.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττ. ἔλεγεν... ἔλεγεν here is 'meant,' not 'said'; for if it were the latter, the sense would require εἶναι before ἔ. And Polemarchus is quite right in the point of fact, viz. that Thrasymachus did not say so.

And, thirdly, λέγειν is used in the same sense, XIV. *init.*; and in Ch. XV. *ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἀρχοντά τε, &c.* For another sense of λέγω see Ch. IV. note, with which compare Cicero, Cato Major, vi. 16. 'Nihil igitur afferunt, qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant,' *i. e.* 'they say nothing to the point. τοῦτο ποιητέον, &c.' 'This he meant was to be done by the inferior, and he meant to define (ἐτίθετο) justice thus.'

Σ ἐλέγετο. Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα.

CAP. XIV.

Καὶ μοι εἶπέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἦν δ' ἐβούλου λεγῆναι τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι, εἴαν τε ξυμφέρῃ εἴαν τε μῆ; οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν; "Ἡκιστὰ γ', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἶε καλεῖν τον ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ; "Ἐγωγε, εἶπον, ἄμην σε τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὠμολόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ **Δ** τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ

ἀποδεχόμεθα αὐτοῦ, *v.s. not.* ad Cap. XI. ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι σου. And see Parmenides, 128 E. ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι...καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. We can render here 'Let us take him so,' *i.e.* 'So let us understand him.' During this discussion Thrasymachus has been at a loss for an answer, and is elaborating a reply, when Cleitophon, who seems to lean rather to Thrasymachus' side, saves him from immediate confusion by the different reading of his definition.

CH. XIV.—*Thrasymachus shows that one who legislates against his advantage cannot be termed the Stronger when he does so.*

φῶμεν. For this subjunctive *v.s. not.* ad μῆ ἀποκρίνωμαι, 337 B.

κρείττω με οἶε... 'Do you think I call a man who makes

a mistake the Stronger when he makes a mistake?' This delicate distinction can be upheld in theory; but in practical legislation the result does not arise from the intention of the legislator, but from the actual legislation. It is to no purpose to uphold, as Thrasymachus does, that cases of bad legislation are to be left out of the question; because it is the sum total of all upon which the estimate of a man's powers is founded. It has been said, 'the best general is he who makes fewest mistakes'; as Thrasymachus would phrase it, 'who is oftenest a general'; but we can see in such a case that, regarding the total result, the office and the man are inseparable.

Συκοφάντης. Below, Ch. XV. *init.* we have Socrates' reading of this expression. οἶε με ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουρ-

Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρον καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει; ἢ λογιστικόν, ὃς ἂν ἐν λογισμῷ ἀμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἀμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής· τὸ δ', οἶμαι, ἕκαστος τούτων, καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ προσαγορεύομεν αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἀμαρτάνει· ὥστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀμαρτάνει. ἐπιλιπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός· ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ᾖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἤμαρτε καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἤμαρτε. τοιοῦτον οὖν δὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸν ἄρχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστί, μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν, μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντα δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ

γούνατ' σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἡρόμην; ἐξ ἐπιβούλης is the point wherein lies the *συκοφαντία*: 'making a false representation on purpose.' So Demosthenes accuses Æschines of *συκοφαντία*, in that Æschines accused him of receiving commendation from Ctesiphon when in office and for the mere discharge of the duties of his office, whilst, Demosthenes implies, Æschines knew very well that the commendation was elicited by the gift of certain moneys, separate and distinct from the official accounts. See Dem. de Cor. 264, Reiske. οὗτος *συκοφαντῶν*, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ θεωρικῷ τότε ὡν ἐπέδωκα τὰ χρήματα, ἐπήνεσεν αὐτόν, φησιν, *ὑπέυθυνον ὄντα*. Οὐ περὶ

τούτων γε οὐδενός, ὡν ὑπέυθυνος ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐπέδωκα, ὡ *συκοφάντα*.

αὐτίκα. 'Ne longe abeam ut statim exemplum afferam'; Stallb. 'Do you call a physician, now,...

λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι. Cf. Euthydemus, 304 E. οὕτως γὰρ πῶς καὶ εἶπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι. λέγω here is 'to say,' not 'to mean.' ῥήματι is added to make this clear; but should be omitted in translation, and λέγομεν emphasized. 'We say the physician has made a mistake, whereas he cannot make a mistake as a physician.' ἀλλὰ here may be translated as 'yet'; and so below, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι, 'yet it would be commonly said.'

τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ποιητέον. ὥστε, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, δίκαιον λέγω τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον.

CAP. XV.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· δοκῶ σοι συκοφαντεῖν ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οἶει γάρ με ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργουῦντά σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἠρόμην ; Εὐ μὲν οὖν οἶδα, ἔφη· καὶ οὐδὲν γέ σοι **Β** πλέον ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε μὴ λαθὼν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιο. Οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε. ἀλλ' ἴνα μὴ αὐθ' ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι, ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἀρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα, τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπέειν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὃν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὐ τὸ συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἥττονι ποιεῖν. Τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἔφη, λογφ

CH. XV.—*But, Thrasymachus, all the arts and sciences have regard to the interest of those to whom they minister, to the interest, that is, of the Weaker.*

SOCRATES shifts his line of confutation here: he does not prove the fallacy of Thrasymachus' point, that the legislator, as a legislator, cannot err. And he refrains for this reason. He is about to employ Thrasymachus' own words on this point to confute him farther on. See Ch. XVII. 345 C, where Thrasymachus is shown to have first demanded that the shepherd, or ruler, be considered only and entirely as a shepherd, or ruler; and afterwards to have employed the term shepherd, or ruler, as one who keeps sheep, or rules a people, for his own profit.

οὐδεν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται. 'It will be no advantage to you.' See Euthydemus, 288 E: οὐδὲν πλέον, οὐδ' εἰ ἄνευ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὀρύττειν τὴν γῆν τὸ πᾶς ἡμῖν χρυσίον γένοιτο. And see below here, Ch. XXI.; also in Ch. XVI we have the converse phrase: δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου παταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει.

οὔτε μὴ λαθῶν, &c. 'Nor, if you are detected [lit. fail to escape notice], will you be able to force me in the argument.' There is an alternative between the employment of fraud and force, as in Book II. 3. λέγειν τε ἱκανῶς ὄντι πρὸς τὸ κελθεῖν..., καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται.

ὄν. Keeping the same meaning of ἔλεγες as above in λέγεις, ὄν must refer to τόν, not to λόγφ.

ἄρχοντα ὄντα· πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει, εἴ τι δύνασαι· οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι· ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἴός τ' ἦς. Οἷει γὰρ ἂν με, εἶπον, οὕτω C
μανῆναι, ὥστε ξυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντεῖν Θρασύμαχον; Νῦν γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπεχειρήσας, οὐδέν ὦν καὶ ταῦτα. "Αδην, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι· ὁ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἰατρός, ὃν ἄρτι ἔλεγες, πότερον χρηματιστής ἐστίν ἢ τῶν καμνόντων θεραπευτής; καὶ λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἰατρὸν ὄντα. Τῶν καμνόντων, ἔφη, θεραπευτής. Τί δὲ κυβερνή-

οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι, 'I do not try to get anything conceded by you.' Prof. Campbell supplies two instances of this use from the Laws, 742 B, ἰδιώτη δὲ ἂν ἄρα ποτὲ ἀνάγκη τις γίγνηται ἀποδημεῖν, παρέμενος μὲν τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀποδημεῖτω. And below 951 A.

ὥστε ξυρεῖν... παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτῶν τι ἢ ἀδύνατα ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων λεγομένη. Schol.

νῦν γοῦν, &c. 'At any rate you made the attempt just now, and failed for all that.' We find the expression καὶ ταῦτα thrown in without regard to the construction, with this meaning of 'besides' or 'and yet'; e.g. Xen. Anab. 2, 4, 15. Μένωνα δὲ οὐκ ἐζήτει, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' Ἀριαίου ὦν τοῦ Μένωνος ξένου. See also Rep. Book IV. *in il.* Ναι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐπισίτωι. Also Euthydemus, 288 A. καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως θυμαστῆς οὐσης (τέχνης) εἰς ἀκριβείαν λόγων. *in fr.* 299 D. Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρυσίον ἀγαθόν; Πάνυ, καὶ ταῦτά γε πολὺν, ἔφη. Similarly καὶ τάδε; Soph. O. T. 819—

καὶ τὰδ' οὐτὶς ἄλλος ἦν

ἢ γὰρ 'π' ἐμαυτῷ τάσδ' ἄρας ὁ προστιθεῖς.

In this example τάδε has been explained as an accusativus pendens, in the others ταῦτα is rather an accusative of respect, or adverbial accusative.

πότερον χρηματιστής... At this point Socrates begins to introduce the consideration that a physician, as a physician, has no regard for money, i.e. for his own interests, and that, by analogy of the arts, a ruler must, as a ruler, have regard to the interests of the ruled. Hence the injunction, λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἰατρὸν ὄντα. His next point is that the arts, in so far as they require anything, require it in order to render them more efficient, that they may be perfect in themselves (τέλεια), and self-sufficient (αὐταρκεῖς); whereas both that with which, and that upon which, they are exercised, require their assistance, and perhaps the assistance of much else besides. Governing, therefore, being an art, looks to the benefit of the governed, and in itself should be self-sufficient, and should not require recompense from the governed.

της; ὁ ὀρθῶς κυβερνήτης ναυτῶν ἀρχων ἐστὶν ἡ
Δναύτης; Ναυτῶν ἀρχων. Οὐδέν, οἶμαι. τοῦτο ὑπο-
 λογιστέον, ὅτι πλεὶ ἐν τῇ νηϊ, οὐδ' ἐστὶ κλητέος
 ναύτης· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν κυβερνήτης καλεῖται,
 ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν.
 Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἐστι τι
 ξυμφέρον; Πάνυ γε. Οὐ καὶ ἡ τέχνη, ἣν δ' ἐγώ,
 ἐπὶ τούτῳ πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἐκάστῳ
 ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἐκπορίζειν; Ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἔφη. Ἄρ'
 οὐν καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν ἐστὶ τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο
Εἢ ὃ τι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι; Πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;
 Ὡσπερ, ἔφη ἐγώ, εἴ με ἔροιο, εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι
 εἶναι σώματι ἢ προσδεῖται τινος, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι

ὁ ὀρθῶς κυβ. ...ἀρχων. A short digression upon the meaning of κυβερνήτης. His duties as captain (ναυτῶν ἀρχων) and as the person responsible for the safe conduct of the ship (κυβερνήτης) form his real business; his duties as a sailor, and the fact of his sailing in the vessel are incidental. *v. infr. fin. ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἀρχων, ἀλλ' οὐ ναυτής.*

οὐκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτων... ἄρ' οὐν ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν. These two questions must be connected in the argument: they form an antithesis; and whilst the answer to the first is 'yes,' the answer to the second, if Thrasymachus understood the question, would be 'no.' See below, οὕτως φαίνεται, and the question answered in those words. Every person who exercises an art (ἐκάστῳ τούτων) receives a reward or payment (ξυμφέρον) in return, in order that he may be supported and kept in a state of efficiency to discharge the duties of his art.

But every art (ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν) is sufficient in itself, requires no external aid, and only aims at being as perfect as possible by enlarging its sphere of action.

πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς; 'What do you refer to?' or 'How am I to understand your question?' The question is worded in such a manner that it does not convey a definite meaning to Thrasymachus.

εἴ με ἔροιο... Socrates' fondness for the dialectical method causes him to cast even his illustration in the form of question and answer.

ἐξαρκεῖ. The corresponding adjective is ἀυταρκής, self-sufficient, that which has not to depend upon external resources and external aid. The origin of justice itself is said (Book II. 358 E) by Glaucon to lie in the fact that some men, being naturally unable to defend themselves, combine together to bring about an arrangement which shall insure their not being ill-

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὐρημένη, ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι πονηρὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι. τούτῳ οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ ξυμφέροντα, ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη. ἡ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκῶ, ἔφην, ἀν εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἢ οὐ; Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη. Τί δὲ δῆ; 342 αὐτὴ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐστὶ πονηρά, ἢ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἐστ' ὅτι προσδεῖται τινος ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὄψεως καὶ ὠτα ἀκοῆς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δεῖ τινὸς

treated. In other words they are not *αὐτάρκεις*, they require external assistance. Aristotle follows in Plato's steps thus: . . . πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ κοινῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν. Eth. Nic. 5, 6, 4. Again in Book II. the origin of the city itself is said to lie in men being not *αὐτάρκεις*, but requiring each other's assistance in daily life. Γίγνεται τοίνυν πόλις ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής. Aristotle places happiness in the same category that Plato places the arts here, because whilst all things else in human life have regard to happiness as their aim, happiness itself is *αὐταρκής*, or self-sufficient. See Nic. Eth. I, 7, 6: τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκές εἶναι δοκεῖ. Similarly in the Republic, Book III. 387 D, the noble man (*ἐπιεικῆς ἀνὴρ*) who has no fear of death is *αὐταρκής*: ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐταρκῆς πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἐτέρου προσδεῖται. But not entirely so; see Ch. IV. οὐτ' ἀν' ὁ ἐπιεικῆς πάντι βραδίως γῆρας μετὰ πένιας ἐνέγκοι. Similarly Aristotle in the passage quoted allows that even his

perfect human character stands in need of a few relations and friends, and therefore in Books IO, 7, 4, he speaks of perfect *αὐτάρκεια* as having rather a mental than a social and physical import. "Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστα" ἀν εἶη; τῶν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ σόφος καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται.

ἢ ὀρθῶς... εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων. v.s. Ch. VI. *ἐπιεικῆς*. τί φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης;

αὐτὴ ἡ ἰατρικὴ... Here the original question is repeated, ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν... Thrasymachus having been enlightened.

ἔσθ' ὅτι προσδεῖται. See *infra*. 346 D: ἔσθ' ὅτι ὠφελείται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; And Ch. XXIII. *ἴδοις*: ἔσθ' ὅτ' ἀν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Also the particle *ὅτι* combines very readily with such words as *ἐστὶ*, *οἶδα*, *δῆλον*, to emphasize either a statement or a question. So *ἔστιν ἴνα*, *ἔστιν οὐ*, *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως*, *οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως*.

ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, 'over and above them.' The force of *ἐπὶ* here must not be overlooked. The meaning is that on account of this dependence (*διὰ ταῦτα*)

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τεχνης τῆς τὸ ξυμφέρον εἰς ταῦτα σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριζούσης ; ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τέχνῃ ἐνι τις πονηρία, καὶ δεῖ ἐκάστη τέχνη ἄλλης τέχνης, ἣτις αὐτῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται, καὶ τῇ σκοπούμενῃ ἐτέρας αὐ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπέραντον ; ἢ Β αὐτῇ αὐτῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται ; ἢ οὔτε αὐτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης προσδεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς πονηρίαν τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἀμαρτία

there is a further consideration, viz. the art which attends to the eye and ear. αὐτοῖς then refers to the eye and ear ; whilst τῆς τὸ ξ. &c. below will mean 'an art which looks out and provides that which is to the advantage (of the eye and ear) for these purposes,' viz. sight and hearing (εἰς ταῦτα).

καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπέραντον, 'and does this go on for ever?' 'ad infinitum?'

ἢ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ... The latter alternative, as usual in these longer dilemmas, is intended to be accepted. v.s. Ch. XIII. *in it.* : πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἱότι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν. And see Meno. 72 B. ἄρα τούτῳ φῆς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι ; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλω δὲ τῷ ;

οὔτε αὐτῆς... 'Not only is the art independent of other arts, but it is also independent of assistance from itself.' This proposition is not true in its latter clause. An art, as practised upon its objects, does not gain assistance from other arts *directly* ; although indirectly many arts contribute to the improvement of one, e.g. microscopy to surgery. See Sir John Lubbock's address to the British

Association at York, 1881 : 'One very marked feature in modern discovery was the manner in which distinct branches of science had thrown, and were throwing, light on one another.' But an art does gain assistance from itself, i.e. it improves by experience, the continual treatment of new cases suggests improvements,—vires acquirit eundo. And, to transfer this to Plato's instance, an old doctor is, broadly speaking, better than a young one. This loose point, although of no account here, will be found to create a difficulty later on, in Book III., where Socrates is speaking of the physicians in his State. In that passage (409 *fin.*) he slurs over the fact that experience of disease makes the best physician, with the barbarous conclusion that where a person is of a bad constitution, ἀποθνήσκειν ἐάσουσιν.

οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία... i.e. in the principles of science there is nothing of evil effect. They are immutable and beneficial ; for by the knowledge of them we can work according, and not in opposition, to nature. But in the person who applies them, and in the recipient of their application, there is πονηρία, or fault. An art is the exercise of

οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾶ τέχνη πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσήκει
 τέχνη ἄλλῃ τὸ ξυμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη
 ἐστίν, αὐτῇ δὲ ἀβλαβῆς καὶ ἀκεραῖός ἐστιν ὀρθή
 οὔσα, ἕωςπερ ἂν ἡ ἐκάστη ἀκριβῆς ὄλη ἤπερ ἐστί ;
 καὶ σκόπει ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ· οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως
 ἔχει ; Οὕτως, ἔφη, φαίνεται. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 ἰατρικὴ ἰατρικῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σώματι.
 Naί, ἔφη. Οὐδὲ ἰππικὴ ἰππικῇ ἀλλ' ἵπποις· οὐδὲ C
 ἄλλη τέχνη οὐδεμία ἑαυτῇ, οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδεῖται,
 ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν· Φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.
 Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ

human faculty according to system, and whilst exercised thus (*ὀρθῇ οὔσα*) an art is beneficial. In this passage it must be borne in mind that Socrates is speaking 'strictly,' *i.e.* when speaking of an art he speaks of those principles which in their nature are unerring; and does not regard the art in the slightest degree as remunerative to him who practises it.

οὕτως ἔφη, φαίνεται. Thrasymachus is beginning to see the gist of Socrates' argument, and uses the qualitative word *φαίνεται*.

ἄρχουσί γε... 'are in command of, and are stronger than...' On this analogy, cleverly brought home to the ears of his audience by the use of *ἄρχω* and *κρατέω*, rests Socrates' conclusion, that justice is the interest of the weaker, and not of the stronger. The analogy may be borne out thus: the principles of medicine and the ruler of a State alike dictate to the people what they are to do and what they are not to do as subjects, respectively, of medicine and law. The principles of medicine and of law

are alike intrusted to experts whose duty it is to legislate, for prevention and cure, against illness and crime. A citizen who is a good member of the commonwealth, and a person who has need of medicine, must, as a condition of benefit, accept the constitution and the principles of medicine. But it is easy to see that the analogy cannot be borne out entirely. If we put the case that a person disobeys his doctor, who is the worse? The patient. Whereas if a citizen be guilty of treason he may throw the State into confusion and ruin the ruler. The particle *μὴν* is used to introduce a fresh link in the chain of argument, and also indicates the point at which this argument begins to show in marked opposition to Thrasymachus' words, that rulers rule for their own benefit; just as in XXI. *fin.* in a similar stage of an argument we have *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμολογοῦμεν, &c.* For Socrates here brings the arts under the category of rulers. 'And yet, Thrasymachus [*i.e.* for all that you said before], the arts are rulers.' *Γε* is to save

κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου, οὐπὲρ εἰσι τέχλαι. Συνεχωρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόγισ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἥττονός τε καὶ ἀρχομένου ὑπὸ ἐαυτῆς. Ξυνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠμολόγησεν, Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς οὐδεὶς, καθ' ὅσον ἰατρός, τὸ τῷ ἰατρῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ κάμνοντι; ὠμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς ἰατρὸς σωμαίων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής. ἢ οὐχ ὠμολόγηται; Ξυνέφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἄρχων ἔαλλ' οὐ ναύτης; ὠμολόγηται. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ γε τοιοῦτος κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων τὸ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται τε καὶ προστάξει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ναύτῃ τε καὶ ἀρχομένῳ. Ξυνέφησε μόγισ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστί, τὸ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ξυμφέρον καὶ πρέπον καὶ λέγει ἂ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἂ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.

CAP. XVI.

343 Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἤμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ πᾶσι καταφανὲς ἦν, ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τοῦναντίον

the directness of this attack upon Thrasymachus' position; it is apologetic.

turns government to his own benefit, and a just man finds it his ruin.

ἄλλο τι οὖν, v.s. Ch. XI. C.

ᾧ, 'in whose interest,' 'for whose benefit.'

ἐνταῦθα τοῦ λόγου, v.s. Ch. II. fin. ἐνταῦθα εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας.

ὁ τοῦ δικ. λόγος, 'the account' or 'the definition' of that which is just.

CH XVI.—That is all nonsense, replied Thrasymachus; any one can tell you that an unjust man

περιεστήκει, ὁ Θρᾷσύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίτθη σοι ἔστιν; Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρώτων; "Οτι τοί σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾷ και οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις. "Οτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. "Οτι οἶει τοὺς ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς βουκόλους

περιεστήκει. περιέρχουαι, used in Euthyphro, II, B, C, of an argument coming round to the same point, instead of to a conclusion, as here. περιέρχεται γὰρ πως ἡμῖν αἰὶ δ' ἂν προθώμεθα. And so περιέναι, *ibid.* Here, as noticed above in Ch. VII., the argument is invested with a quasi-personality.

τιτθῆ σοι ἔστιν; Thrasymachus is evidently enraged at his discomfiture. The scene is very similar to that in Euthydemus, 287 B, where Socrates has got the better of two sophists; whereupon the less discreet of the two remarks: εἴτ' ὃ Σώκρατες, οὕτως εἶ Κρόνος, ἔστε, &c. *i.e.* 'Are you such a dotard, &c.?' So below, ὃ εὐθέστατε Σώκρατες.

αὐτῇ, 'for her,' *i.e.* 'because she neglects to tell you.' An example of the pure 'Ethic Dative.' This Ethic Dative is merely an extreme case of the ordinary use of the dative: which is to express reference to a person or thing other than the subject, but affected indirectly by, or having some relation to, the action of the main verb. Examples of this general sense of the dative are:—

αὐτὰρ ὃ τοῖσιν ἀφείλετο νόστιμον ἦμαρ.—Hom. Od. I, 9.
'Oscula libavit natæ.'

Virg. *Æn.* I, 256.

κελσάσῃσι δὲ νησὶ καθείλουεν ἴστια πάντα.

Hom. Od. 9, 149.

'Multis ille bonis flebilis occidit.'

Hor. Od. I. 24, 9.

The above datives fall in grammars under different heads; but they all agree in this fundamental character, that they express some person or thing more or less directly connected with the main action. In these examples the connection is close: often we can render by 'of,' as though the case were a genitive. Subjoined are some examples of the Ethic Dative, where it will be noticed that the connection between the person or thing in the dative, and the subject, is more remote, is rather mental than physical, as in the above examples:—

'Non Berœe vobis! non hæc Rhœteia, matres,
Est Dorycli conjux.'

Virg. *Æn.* 5, 646.

οὐκ ἔρβεν' ὑμῖν ἔστιν;

Arist. Nub. 688.

κλιθητί νῦν μοι, πλεῦρα θεῖς ἐπὶ χθονός.

Eur. Cycl. 425.

ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ μυθολογοῦσι θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον.—Rep. Book II. 359 D.

μάλιστα, 'particularly,' 'in what special point?'

Β τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν ἀγαθὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν, ἄλλως πως ἡγεῖ διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ ὥσπερ ἂν τις πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθείη, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ νυκτὸς

Γ καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ τοῦτο ὅθεν αὐτοὶ ὠφελήσονται. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἶπερ τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικου τε καὶ ἀδικίας, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι,

καὶ δὴ καί, *v. s. not. ad Cap. II. ipit.* For other instances of this expression see Herod. 3, 61, κήρυκας τῆ τε ἄλλῃ διέπεμπε, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐς Αἴγυπτον. *Ἐξ ἰψfr.* 62, οἱ τε δὴ ὧν ἄλλοι κήρυκες προηγόρευον ταῦτα, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον ταχθεῖς, &c.

ἄλλως πως ἡγεῖ... Thrasy-machus here betrays his own debased notions of government, by giving no governor credit for a disinterested regard for the good of those whom he governs. Just as Socrates says in Book III. 409 A, a man who has been familiar with crime from his youth is no good judge; for he will attribute the worst motives to every person who comes before him. ἀπειρον αὐτὴν (ψυχὴν) δεῖ κακῶν ἡθῶν νέαν οὖσαν γεγονέναι, εἰ μέλλει καλὴ κάγαθῆ οὖσα κρίνειν ὑγιῶς τὰ δίκαια... δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν δικαστὴν... ὀψιμαθῆ γεγονότα τῆς ἀδικίας οἶόν ἐστιν. Thrasy-machus shifts his ground here, and, discarding the δίκαιος ἰατρὶς and ἀκριβὴς ποιμὴν (who is a shepherd and nothing but a shepherd), he advances the position that the Ruler, like the shepherd, has his own interest

always in view when taking all care of those committed to him.

οὕτω πόρρω εἶ. 'so far a-field,' 'so far off.' We find the expression used to convey an exactly opposite sense when the simple genitive is employed. οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας ἦκει, 'you are so far advanced upon the road of wisdom.'—Euthyd. 294 E.

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν. See Arist. Eth. Nic. 5, 6, 6, διὰ τοῦτο (τὸ μὴ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν ἀγαθοῦ) ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν τῆν δικαιοσύνην. And *ibid. sup.* Ch. I. 17. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ δικαιοσύνη μόνῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερον ἐστιν. 'The phrase means, 'the benefit of some one else.' Thrasy-machus here must be taken as meaning by δικαιοσύνη, 'justice as popularly understood'; otherwise ἀλλότριον has no meaning. But he is passing on now to consider the condition of the subjects, those who experience justice, *i. e.* the 'rule of the Stronger'; whilst, from the view of the rulers, justice is the 'advantage of the Stronger.' 'By justice,

τοῦ κρείττονος τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ξυμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἣ δὲ ἀδικία τούναντιον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ δ' ἄρχόμενοι ποιούσι τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἐκείνον ποιούσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν. σκοπεῖσθαι δέ, ὧ εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες, D οὕτωςι χρή, ὅτι δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους

he would say, 'in the mouths of the people, we must understand the profit of the rulers and the injury of the ruled.'

οἰκεία βλάβη. *v.s.* the passage quoted from Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* in Ch. XII. 338 E. The passage proceeds thus:— 'Therefore when I consider and way in my mind all these common welthes, which now a dayes any where do flourish, so God help me, I can perceave nothing but a certain conspiracy of riche men procuring their owne commodities under the name of the common wealth.'

ἣ δὲ ἀδικία τούναντιον, καὶ ἄρχει... Thrasymachus does not tell us who are the perpetrators of injustice; but, as injustice is stated to be the exercise of rule over the just (ἄρχει τῶν δικαίων), we are obliged to conclude that it is the rulers who are the ἀδικοὶ and exercise this ἀδικία. We are confirmed in this conclusion by a reference to Book III. 409, *loc. supr. cit.*, where the just man, it is allowed, is often the victim of the unjust; just as in the Gospel it is said that the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light. διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις (as εὐηθικῶν

here) νέοι ὄντες οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς φαίνονται καὶ εὐεξαπατητοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδίκων. Therefore Thrasymachus' position comes to this: Rulers manage the people for their own profit: the law-abiding people consider obedience to the rulers to be justice. Still it remains that the rule of the Rulers is, in all cases, an unjust one. It is evident from this that Thrasymachus allows in the background the existence of a very different justice from the justice of his definition; otherwise, why does he acknowledge that the Rulers rule unjustly? We shall see what use Socrates makes of this inconsistency in the sequel. Aristotle treats of a similar case in *Eth. Nic.* 5, 6, where, describing πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, he also defines injustice: τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. Διὸ οὐκ ἐῴμεν ἄνθρωπον ἀρχειν ἄλλα ἐν λόγον.

δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει, *v.s. pol. ad. οὐδέν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται*, Ch. XV. *in it.* In *Arist. Eth. Nic.* 5, 9, the just man is described as denying himself, as permitting or conniving at the advantage of others, ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικὸς ἐστίν. And above,

ξυμβολαιοις, ὅπου ἂν ο τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινω-
νήσῃ, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εὔροις ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινω-
νίας πλέον ἔχοντα τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλ' ἔλαττον
ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τέ τινες εἰσφοραὶ
ᾧσιν, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ
Ε δ' ἔλαττον, ὅταν τε λήψεις, ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ
κερδαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα ἄρχῃ ἐκάτερος,

πλέον ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει. For this position see Book II. Chaps. I.-IX., where it is drawn out at much greater length, and illustrated with much greater force by Glaucon and Adeimantus. See also Aristophanes, Clouds, where the Δίκαιος Λόγος and the Ἄδικος Λόγος measure swords, ll. 889-1104. And with regard to the special question, ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, of the just man and the unjust in office, see Socrates' conversation with Aristippus in Mem. Xenophontis, Book II. Ch. I. And also Antiphon's opinion of Socrates' refusal to take money for teaching; *ibid.* Book I. 6, 12. Δίκαιος μὲν οὐδ' ἂν εἴης, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, σόφος δὲ οὐκ ἂν, μηδενός γε ἄξια ἐπιστάμενος. Here σόφος οὐκ... is the equivalent of εὐθικῶν and εὐήθεις in the passages of the Republic. And see also the passage from Arist. Ethics quoted above, πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν.

ξυμβολαιοῖς. *v. s. nol. ad* Cap. VII.

εἰσφοραί, an extraordinary tax, raised upon property, to meet urgent occasions. Thus when Mytilene was besieged, B. C. 428, by Paches, an εἰσφορά was imposed. προσδεόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενέγοντες τότε πρῶτον εἰσφορὰν διακόσια,

ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, &c. The term for the imperial requisition was φόρος, and afterwards σύνταξις, see Dem. de Cor. 305, Reiske.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων, 'upon an equal assessment or amount of property.' ἀπό implies 'calculating from.'

λήψεις. An illustration of this practice, *i. e.* of gratis distribution to the citizens when any extraordinary revenue accrued, is found in Herod. VII. 144, where it is proposed that the produce of the Laurian silver should be applied thus: ἐμειλλον λάξεσθαι ὄρχηδόν ἕκαστος δέκα δραχμάς. Themistocles however diverted the money to the building of a fleet. Similarly in Roman history, when Attalus Philometor, king of Pergamus, bequeathed his property to Rome, Tiberius Gracchus proposed to apply it to the stocking of those farms which poor farmers had obtained through his agrarian laws, instead of merely distributing it to all the citizens.

ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα... For this third point compare Xen. Mem. II. 1, 8. καὶ γὰρ πάντοι μοι δοκεῖ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τὸ, μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὧν δέονται

τῷ μὲν δίκαιῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ζημία, τὰ γε οἰκεία δι' ἀμέλειαν μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὠφελείσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπέχθεσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλη αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον· τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τάναντία ὑπάρχει. λέγω γὰρ ὄνπερ νῦν δη ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλαν δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν. τούτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ **344** βούλει κρίνειν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει ἰδίᾳ αὐτῷ ἀδικὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥᾶστα μαθή-

πορίζειν. καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν πολλὰ ὦν βούλεται ἐλλείπειν τῆς δὲ πόλεως προστώτα, ἂν μὴ πάντα, ὅσα ἢ πόλις βούλεται καταπράττει, τούτου δίκην ἰπέχειν, τούτο πῶς οὐ πολλὰ ἀφροσύνη ἐστίν; So in Herod. I, 97, the just man Deioceas, who is always appointed arbiter of disputes, finds that his own affairs go to ruin whilst he is rectifying others'. οὐ γὰρ οἱ λυσιτελείειν, τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐξημεληκότα, τοῖσι πέλας δι' ἡμέρης δικάζειν. Aristotle (Eth. 5, 66) gives the reason for the just man's poverty in office, by stating the principle on which he acts: οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. And he agrees with Plato in his opinion of their different behaviour in office when he says, ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δεῖξει; 5, I, 16. Thrasymachus adds that it is the fault of the judge's εὐήθεια if he cannot make his livelihood and something to spare out of his dispensation of justice.

μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν. We should be inclined at first sight to make τὰ οἰκεία the subject of μοχθ. ἔχειν, but when we come to the balancing clauses, ἐκ δε...

ὠφελείσθαι, and πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπέχθεσθαι, we see that the sentence will be more perfect if 'the just man' be made the subject of μοχθ. ἔχειν as well as of ὠφελείσθαι. The use of μοχθηρῶς διακείσθαι in Gorgias, 504 E, may be noticed in support of this construction; and τὰ γε οἰκεία will then be accusativus respectus pendens. For the termination of μοχθ. Stallb. adduces a number of similar words, ἐνδεστέρας, ἀγριοτέρας, μαλακωτέρας, &c. And for this use of the absolute comparative, see Euthyphro *init.*, τί νεώτερον; Herod. VI. 46. τεῖχος ἰσχυρότερον περιβαλλόμενοι.

ἀπέχθεσθαι. Transl. 'to be an object of hatred to,' thus bringing out the force of the dative, the case of the person indirectly concerned; *v. s. not. ad αὐτῷ*, and see *infr.* Ch. XXIII. ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτε ἀπέχθωμαι. To render, 'by his relations and acquaintances,' is not accurate, although unavoidable in such a phrase as, ἐμὶ πέπρακται τοῦργον.

ἢ τὸ δίκαιον, *sc. εἶναι ξυμφέρει τῷ δίκαιῳ*, Stallb. The expression is awkward and more abrupt

σει, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς, ἢ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθεντας καὶ ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτέτους. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἢ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰλλότρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ ξυλλήβδην ὧν ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ, ζημιούται τε καὶ ὀνειδῆ ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρύχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικούντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων κἀλοῦνται· ἐπει-

than we should expect to find. Bremius conjectured τό before ἄδικον, which would improve the reading; but some of the MSS. omit τό altogether.

τὴν τελεωτ. ἀδικίαν. v. i. 348 D: οἷ γε τελέως οἰοί τε ἀδικεῖν. And *infr.* in this Ch. τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἡδικηκότα. 351 B: τελεώτατα οὕσα ἄδικος. 352 C: κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι. 360 E: τέλεον ἐκότερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν. Et *ibid.* *infr.* ἐσχάτη ἀδικία, τῷ τελέως ἀδικῶ. And so ἡμιμόχθηροι, 352 C, and οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικούντες, *infr.* here.

ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς. See Arist. Eth. 5, 6, 5. Διδὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεταί τυραννος. *Loc. supr. cit.*; et *infr.* § 7. Μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος... ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τυράννοι. For the genesis of the τυραννος, see Book VIII. *fin* IX. *init.* Thrasymachus' account of the despot here agrees substantially with that of Socrates in Book VIII.

ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια. ἱερὰ = Latin sacer; ὄσιον = fas. See Liddell

and Scott *ad* ὄσιος, 2. For ξυλλήβδην v.s. Ch. IX.: ἢ καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοῦς; (sc ποιούσι).

καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι, &c. Cf. the tale of Alexander and the robber, which has been related thus. 'A certain pirate who made great havoc among the shipping of the Mediterranean Sea was taken prisoner by the Macedonian soldiers and brought before Alexander, who asked by what right he committed his robberies. "I am a robber by the same right that you are a conqueror," was the reply; "the only difference between us is, that I have but a few men, and can do but little mischief, while you have a large army and can do a great deal."'

τῶν τοιούτων κακ. Causal genitive: it is used very frequently in Greek, and appears in many forms. *E.g.* with adjective alone, ὦ δυστάλαινα τῶν ἐμῶν παθημάτων Or with verbs of wondering, see *infr.* 426 D. τοὺς... προθυμουμένους οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας. Also with such verbs as εὐδαιμονίζω, μακαρίζω, ὀλβίζω.

δὰν δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσῃται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν **C** ἠδίκηκότα· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι ὄνειδίζουσιν οἱ ὄνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὕτως, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶν ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἕξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον.

CAP. XVII.

Ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι, **D** ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν κατὰ πτλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὠτων

ἀνδραπ. δουλ. ἀνδραποδίζομαι is the more odious word of the two, and expresses the act of depriving a man of his liberty; hence it means sometimes to kidnap; δουλώω, to hold in subjection. So in Book V. 469 B, we find the former used when the question is discussed—Shall Greeks enslave Greeks in war? Πρῶτον μὲν ἀνδραποδισμῷ πέρι, δοκεῖ δίκαιον Ἑλλήνας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι. Whilst farther on we find δοῦλος and δουλεία used to describe the state of slavery.

οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν. In his elaboration of Thrasymachus' case in Book II., Glaucon shows that what is called justice arises from this fact, that men give up wrong dealing, not from principle, but because they prefer to free themselves from the danger of being

ill-treated by others. ὥστ' ἐπειδὴν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύονται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυμβέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μὴτ' ἀδικεῖν μὴτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι.

φοβούμενοι, 'because they are afraid of.'

ἰσχυρότερον... ἀδικία. Thrasymachus here no longer conceals his true position, but clearly states that what is justice in the hands of the ruler; an inconsistency which cannot be supported by the terms of any definition.

CH. XVII.—Socrates entreats Thrasymachus to abide by his words.

ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς... Socrates, as it has been mentioned above, had the greatest objection to

ἀθροον και πολὺν τὸν λόγον. οὐ μὴν εἰασάν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ' ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναι τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον και δὴ ἐγῶγε και αὐτὸς πάννυ ἐδεόμην τε και εἶπον· ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε, οἶον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, πρὶν διδάξαι ἰκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἶτε οὕτως εἶτε ἄλλως ἔχει ;
Ε ἡ σμικρὸν οἶε ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ'

long speeches, and always stipulated for the method of question and answer in discussion. See Protag. 334 D. He justified this claim on the ground that he had a bad memory (a phase of the *εἰρωνεία*), thus: *loc. cit.* ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ἂν ἄνθρωπος. In Ch. XXII. *inip.* Thrasymachus, when defeated in argument, refuses to be convinced, and expresses his intention either of giving his opinion in a speech, or of saying 'yes' and 'no,' just as Socrates desires—in other words, of not attempting to argue the question. He there states that he knows Socrates will accuse him of making an harangue (*δημηγορεῖν*) if he deliver himself as he desires, and yet declines to argue point by point. For *καταντλέω*, see 536 B, *φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν*; where also the object is in the genitive.

πολὺν τὸν λόγον. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 272, 20, *πολλῶ ῥέοντι*, of an orator; and Hor. Sat. I, 7, 28—

'Salso multoque fluenti.'

The word *θρασυνομένω* preceding *πολλῶ ῥέοντι* in the passage quoted from Demosthenes, encourages us to believe that the name Thrasymachus was appropriated by Plato to intimate the character of this sophist.

οὐ μὴν εἰασάν γε, 'but the rest by no means permitted him to escape.' γε implies the complete refusal of the others to let Thrasymachus off, being attached to *εἰασαν*, in order to negative the bare idea of their doing so.

οἶον ἐμβαλὼν... ἔχεις. Here, as noticed above, page 128, the principal verb is cast into the participle, for purposes of grammatical construction; as we had above, *οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀδίκᾳ... φοβούμενοι ὀνειδίζουσιν*. 'They are not afraid of doing but of suffering harm, that they reproach,' &c. We may recal Virgil, *Æn.* I, 141—

'Clauso ventorum carcere regnet.'

i.e. 'Let him shut up his prison before he play the king.' For *ἐμβαλὼν v. inifr.* ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον;

ἡ σμικρὸν οἶε... ἀλλ' οὐ... For the sentiment, *v.s. not.* *ad εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν*, Ch. X. And *inifr.* 352 C, *οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ζῆν*. Similarly 358 E, *περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων και ἀκούων*; (*sc. δικαιοσύνης*). Again 367 D, *σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἂν* (*sc. bear to hear the ordinary talk about justice*) *εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, διότι πάντα τὸν*

οὐ βίου διαγωγὴν, ἢ ἂν διαγομενος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν
 λυσιτελεστώτην ζωὴν ζῶη; Ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ
 Θρασύμαχος, τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν; Ἔοικας, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ,
 ἦτοι ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι, οὐδέ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε
 χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα ἀγνοοῦντες ὃ σὺ φῆς
 εἶδέναι. ἀλλ', ὦ γαθέ, προθυμοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐνδείξα-
 σθαι· οὗτοι κακῶς σοι κείσεται, ὃ τι ἂν ἡμᾶς τοσοῦσδε 345

βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελέ-
 λυθας ἢ τοῦτο. In the same
 strain he insists in Book V.
 452 C, *seqq.* on the folly of
 those who only make a joke
 out of well-intentioned legisla-
 tion, adding the telling remark,
 μάταιος δὲ γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγείται
 ἢ τὸ κακόν. Again in Book VI.
 497 E he makes the just man
 disregard all else but living his
 life purely and uprightly; ἀγαπᾷ,
 εἴ πῃ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε
 καὶ ἀνοσιῶν ἔργων τὸν τε ἐνθάδε
 βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν
 αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἴλεως
 τε καὶ εὐμενῆς ἀπαλλάσσεται.
 These passages are very valuable,
 because they preserve the lead-
 ing point of Socrates' moral
 system—'Put everything after
 living your life uprightly,'—
 just as in Book X. *init.* he puts
 truth before persons, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ
 πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος
 ἀνὴρ, and they prove to us what
 we are liable to forget sometimes
 amid the raillery of the dialogue,
 that Socrates was always in
 earnest. See *Introd.* § 7. Ari-
 stotle speaks similarly in *Eth.*
Nic. 2, 21: Ἐπει οὖν ἡ παρούσα
 πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν
 (οὐ γὰρ ἦν εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ
 ἀρετὴ) σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀγαθὸν
 γενώμεθα, &c. The expression
 ἀλλ' οὐ is to be noticed, where
 in English we should say 'and
 not.' See Book II. 379 D:
 τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀλλ' ἅπτα δεῖ ζητεῖν

τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. So
 in Book VI. 500 A: ἐν ὀλίγοις
 τισὶν ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 πλήθει, χαλεπὴν οὕτω φύσιν γίγ-
 νεσθαι. Also *ibid.* 492 A: ἡ καὶ
 σὺ ἡγεῖ διαφθειρομένουσ τινὰς
 εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέουσ...ἀλλ'
 οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας
 μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστάς.
 And also Book VII. 532 C, and
infr. here, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν
 ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα, and Ch. XVIII.
 ὠφέλειαν ἰδίαν παρέχεται, ἀλλ'
 οὐ κοινήν.

εἴτε χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσ.
 v. Euthyphro *fin.* καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν
 ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἀμεινον βιωσοίμην.
 προθυμοῦ. A favourite term
 with Plato in a similar context.
 So Euthyphro 11 E, αὐτὸς σοι
 ξυμπροθυμῆσομαι δεῖξαι, where
 ξόν implies that the learner will
 assist the teacher by readiness
 to receive information; as in
 Xen. *Anab.* 7, 2, 24: δεόμενός
 μου ξυμπροθυμηθῆναι διαβῆναι τὸ
 στρατεύμα. See also Laches
 186 A: προθυμούμενοι αὐτῶν ὃ
 τι ἀρίστας γενέσθαι τὰς ψυχάς.
 And for the spirit in which the
 remark is proffered see *Meno.*
 71 D: εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσης, τί
 φῆς ἀρετὴν εἶναι;
 κείσεται. Something similar
 is Virgil's—
 'Haud illi stabunt Æneia parvo
 Hospitia.'
 (*Æn.* 10, 494); the difference
 being that stare is used of the
 expense, κείμαι of the gain.

ὄντας εὐεργετησης. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ σοι λεγῶ τὸ γ' ἑμόν
 ὅτι οὐ πειθῶμαι οὐδ' οἶμαι ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερ-
 δαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐὰν τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ
 διακωλύη πράττειν ἂ βούλεται· ἀλλ', ὡ γαθέ, ἔστω
 μὲν ἀδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λαμβάνειν ἢ τῷ
 διαμάχεσθαι, ὅμως ἐμέ γε οὐ πείθει ὡς ἔστι τῆς
 δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον. ταῦτ' οὖν καὶ ἕτερος
Βἴσως τις ἡμῶν πέπονθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ. πείσον οὖν,
 ὦ μακάριε, ἱκανῶς ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευόμεθα
 δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι. Καὶ
 πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον μὴ
 πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων
ἐνθῶ τον λόγον; Μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ σύ γε ἀλλὰ
 πρῶτον μὲν, ἂ ἂν εἶπης, ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἐὰν μετα-
 τιθῇ, φανερώς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἔξαπάτα.
Γνῦν δὲ ὄρας, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἔτι γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν
 ἐπισκεψώμεθα, ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον
 ὀριζόμενος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ᾧου δεῖν

For this sense of κείμαι, to be stored up, see Ch. VII. *ad fin.* μηδὲν αὐτῷ (sc. ἀργυρίῳ) χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κείσθαι.

τὸ γ' ἑμόν, *v.s.* τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους, Ch. III.

ἢ τῷ λαμβάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμ. *v. inf.* Book II. Ch. IV.: λέγειν τε ἱκανῶ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, εἰάν τι μηνύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται. The unjust man is described as fully provided against all emergencies, by fraud or force, as in this passage.

πέπονθεν, 'has occurred to some one else,' *v.s. not. ad page 114, ἐπεπόνθη.*

ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα, &c. See the beginning of Ch. XVI. where Thrasy-machus, in transferring his metaphor from a physician to a shepherd, forgot

or repudiated his former distinction between the physician speaking roughly, and the physician purely as a physician; and proceeded to assert that the shepherd has his own ultimate profit always in view rather than the good of the sheep. Socrates points out that if the shepherd is to be understood rigorously as a shepherd (*ἀκριβῶς*), he has regard only to the well-being of the sheep, and not of himself. See Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*, p. 61, ed. Arber, in imitation of this passage: 'Therefore the kynge ought to take more care for the wealth of his people, then for his owne wealth, euen as the office and dewtie of a shepheard is, in that he is a shepherde, to feede his shepe rather then himselfe.'

ὑστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν οἶει αὐτον
 τα πρόβατα, καθ' ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ
 τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ
 δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν
 εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδοῖσθαι, ὡσπερ χρημα-
 τιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπου **D**
 ἄλλου του μέλει ἢ, ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ
 βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ· ἐπεὶ τά γε αὐτῆς, ὡστ' εἶναι
 βελτίστη, ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπόρισται, ἕως γ' ἂν
 μηδὲν ἐνδέη τοῦ ποιμενικῆ εἶναι· οὔτῳ δὲ ᾧμην ἔγωγε
 νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν, πᾶσαν ἀρχήν,
 καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖ-
 σθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ,
 ἐν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ. σὺ δὲ τοὺς **E**
 ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας,
 ἐκόντας οἶει ἄρχειν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' εὐ
 οἶδα.

τῇ δὲ ποιμεν. οὐ δήπου ἄλλοι
 μέλει. We find this verb used
 personally in Hom. Od. 9,
 20—

εἰμ' Ὀδυσσεὺς Λαερτιάδης δε πᾶσι
 δόλοισιν

ὀνθρώποισι μέλω.

So δοκέω is found, and ἔοικα
 personally, as well as δοκεῖ and
 ἔοικεν. See Book II. 368 B:
 δοκῶ γὰρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι. And
 Meno. 72 A: πολλῇ γέ τιμι
 εὐτυχία ἔοικα κεκρησθαι.

ἕως γ' ἂν μηδέν... See above,
 Ch. XV., the question at which
 Thrasymachus stumbled: ἀρ'
 οὐκ καὶ ἐκάσῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐστι
 τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι μάλιστα
 τελέαν εἶναι;

οὔτῳ δὲ ᾧμην... νῦν δὴ, 'just
 now.' Socrates calls Thrasymachus' attention to the incon-
 sistency of making the ruler,

as a ruler, have regard to his
 own interest. He then puts a
 question involving the word
 ἄρχειν, which he and Thrasymachus understand in different
 ways, thus; 'Thrasymachus' idea
 of ἀρχή is the discharge of
 certain duties as a necessary
 condition of obtaining money,
 power, and opportunity to
 further one's influence by judi-
 cious distribution of places;
 whilst Socrates looks upon it
 as an arduous and responsible
 labour, in which self must be
 ignored, and all the powers of
 the mind strained to their
 utmost, in providing for the
 welfare of the public. On these
 different acceptations of the
 term ἀρχή turns the next part
 of the discussion.

CAP. XVIII.

Τί δέ ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχεῖν ἐκῶν, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφέλειαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχεῖν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ; ἐπεὶ 316 τοσόνδε εἶπέ· οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν ~~τούτῳ~~ ἑτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ; καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ πρὸς δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. Ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέρα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠφέλειαν ἐκάστη ἰδίαν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρέχεται, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερ-

(Ch. XVIII.—*To every art, if it be exercised not merely as an art, but as a means of livelihood, the art, so to speak, of making money is subsidiary.*

οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχεῖν ἐκῶν, &c. See Arist. Eth. 5, 6, 6 : ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασὶν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην· μισθὸς ἀρα τις δοτέος. And so Aristotle in the Politics, when speaking of those to whom the supervision of criminals was intrusted : Χαλεπή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ (ἀρχή) διὰ τὴν πολλήν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαν· ὥστε ὅπου μὴ μεγάλα ἐστὶ κερδαίνειν οὐτ' ἄρχεῖν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτήν... μέντοι, emphatic here, not adversative ; *v.s. not. ad* Cap. II. page 111.

τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι... *i.e.* 'What is it that makes one art different from another ; is it not the work it performs ?' And see Meno. 72 B. Ἄρα τούτῳ φησὶ (μελίττας)... εἶναι διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι.

παρὰ δόξαν, 'contrary to expectation' ; *i.e.* πρὸς σδοκίαν, 'a jesting answer.' We shall

understand Socrates' hint better if we refer back to Thrasymachus' question, Ch. XVI., τίτῃ σοι ἐστίν ; and below, Ch. XX. *ad med.* where Socrates says, 'I think you are now really speaking your mind, Thrasymachus, and not jesting.' ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖς σὺ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγειν ὥσπερ διανοεῖ. παρὰ δόξαν means contrary to the expectation of the listeners, and does not refer to the speaker, as in Ch. XXII. E. Μηδαμῶς παρὰ γε τὴν σωανοῦ δόξαν, 'against your own conviction.' Cf. also Æschines cont. Ctes. 18 (ed. Simcox) : διδάξω δ' ὑμᾶς πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῶν παραδόξων, *i.e.* 'in cases where you would least expect it.'

ἰδίαν.. ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν. Each art may afford a recompense to the exercisers of it, but it may be exercised gratuitously, *πρῶτα ἐργάζηται, infra* D ; therefore it is not essential to the nature of an art that it bear profit ; but each art has a special function and a special sphere, in which its true nature consists.

νητική δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθόν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις· ἡ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἡ ἑάνπερ βούλη ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὡσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἔάν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιῆς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρευν αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἔνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικὴν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Οὐδέ γ', οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, ἔάν ὑγιαίνῃ τις μισθαρῶν. Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαρνητικὴν, ἔάν ἰόμενός τις μισθαρῆ; Οὐκ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τὴν γε C ὠφέλειαν ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὠμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Ἦντινα ἄρα ὠφέλειαν κοινῇ ὠφελούνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι κοινῇ

ἡ ἑάνπερ βούλη ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν. The latter alternative gives the proposition to be accepted, v.s. Ch. XV. note. The art of navigation exists for and is directed solely towards, the safe conduct of people and goods over the sea. A physician may say to a man 'take a sea voyage to recruit yourself'; but if a sailor is the better for his seafaring life, it is an accident in his art, not a constituent element, for he may be required to voyage in unhealthy as well as healthy climates.

οὐ δῆτα, 'of course not.' Prof. Paley terms δῆτα an adverbial expansion of δή. Δῆ, as has been noticed above, is culminative or final, and also emphatic; and often thus combined with οὐ. So *infr.* Ch. XXIII. *in it.* δοκεῖς...πράξει ἂν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν; Οὐ δῆτα. See also Sophocles, *Œd. Tyr.* 754, 5—

ΟΙ. ἢ κἄν δόμοισι τυγχάνει
τανὺν παρών;

ΙΟ. Οὐ δῆτ'.

cf *infr.* 941, 2—

ΙΟ. τί δ'; οὐχ ὁ πρέσβυς
Πόλυβος ἐγκρατῆς ἔτι;

ΑΓ. οὐ δῆτ', ἐπεὶ νιν θάνατος
ἐν τάφοις ἔχει.

ὠφέλειαν ... ὠφελούνται. So above, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχεῖν; and *infr.* Book III. 405 C, πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι. ἄρα calls attention to a discrepancy or a difference, its prevailing sense in Attic Greek being 'alter all,' 'as it appears then,' and so is often used, as here, when a conclusion is reached conflicting with a former belief. See Book II. 302 A: τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου πολὺν ἦν ἄρα ορθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου; and note. And so in *Æschylus'* *Agamemnon*, when the chorus asks what *man* is to be the murderer, Cassandra replies, ἡ κάρτ' ἀρ' ἂν παρεσκόπεις χρησμῶν ἐμῶν. And so οὐκ ἄρα, *infr.* here; and see note page 108, οὐδ' ἴστε.

τινι τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρῶμενοι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὠφελούνται.
 Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Φαμέν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνημένους
 ὠφελείσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρήσθαι
 τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. Ξυνέφη
Δμόγις. Οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάστῳ αὐτῇ
 ἢ ὠφέλειά ἐστίν, ἢ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις, ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ
 ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἢ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἢ
 δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἢ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν,
 ἢ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῇ ἐπομένῃ μισθόν, καὶ α
 ἄλλαι πᾶσαι οὕτω τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται
 καὶ ὠφελεῖ ἐκείνο, ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. εἰ δὲ μὴ μισθὸς
 αὐτῇ προσγίγνηται, ἔσθ' ὅ τι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς
 ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; Οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐδ'
Ε ὠφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργάζεται; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
 Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμίᾳ
 τέχνῃ οὐδὲ ἀρχῇ τὸ αὐτῇ ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει,
 ἀλλ', ὅπερ πάσαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ
 παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου ζυμφέρειν

φαμέν δέ γε, &c. We have here a crude version of the fact that all human labour can be productive. The only way of justifying the use of the word τέχνη is to say that there is an art in knowing what article is demanded, in order that the labour may meet a want and be profitable to the labourer. But Socrates does not mean this, he is only arguing upon analogy; and he chooses to term the practice of getting paid for duties, professional or mechanical, an art, because it suits his disproof of Thrasymachus' statements.

εἰ δὲ μὴ μισθός... We must not overlook the importance of this clause, although stated conditionally. 'But what if a

man gets no pay for his labour — what then? Does he get any benefit from the art itself?' 'No,' Socrates would go on, 'it is to the person for whom he works that all benefit accrues from the art itself and not to the labourer; for he may spend his labour on that which is not wanted at once, and then he gets no return.' In contrast to this Socrates then puts the converse, 'Does he do no good, then, if he work without pay?' And Socrates' answer is that he must benefit some one by productive labour; although he may not be necessarily remunerated for it. In brief, it is impossible to work without doing good, but it is possible to work without gaining money.

ἤττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Θρυσύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλον καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδέ- 347 ποτε αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιταττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ ζῆμιαν. εἰ μὴ ἄρχῃ.

διὰ δὴ ταῦτα. δὴ marks the conclusion.

τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ... See Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 8: ἀφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τὸ, μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δεόντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἄρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις.

ὁ μέλλον... 'the man who is to do his duty in his art.' When μέλλω is used thus in the participle or with εἰ, the principal verb in the sentence expresses a necessary condition without which the action expressed by the verb following μέλλων cannot be realized. We should therefore gain a clearer rendering if we put the statement negatively, 'A man cannot do his duty in his art, unless he loses sight of his own interests,' or 'if a man is to do his duty in his art, he must lose sight of his interests.' μέλλω then has the force of a certain future, 'to be sure to'... So in 520 D the phrase οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρχειν is applied to men who are said

to be unwilling to take office, but who, nevertheless do take it; where it may be construed 'those who must take office.' And in this Book, Ch. XXI.; πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει... εἰοικέναι: 'How can he fail to be like...?' And here ἕντιν: τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, 'Those who are to be induced to take office.' And in Book II. Ch. I.: τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι. Also ἕλ. Ch. IV.: λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἀδικος εἶναι. This meaning is in curious contrast to another use 'to be going to do a thing (and never do it)'; 'to linger,' 'hesitate.' See Soph. O. C. 1627, 8—

ὦ οὗτος οὗτος, Οἰδίπους, τί μέλλομεν
χωρεῖν; πάλα δὴ τ' ἀπὸ σοῦ
βραδύνεται.

From which latter sense we have μελλητής (cunctator) in Ar. Eth. Nic. 4, 3, 27.

ζῆμιαν. See Ar. Eth. 5, 6, 6. loc. sup. cit.

CAP. XIX.

Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ; ἔφη ὁ Γλαυκῶν, τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γινώσκω· τὴν δὲ ζημίαν ἦντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἴρηκας, οὐ βξυνῆκα. Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἄρα μισθόν, ἔφη, οὐ ξυνιείς, δι' ὃν ἄρχουσιν οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλωσιν ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστιν ; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτε χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε τιμῆς· οὔτε γὰρ φανερώς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕνεκα μισθὸν

CH. XIX.—*Men who love money and fame are ready to take office: the best men only do so when pressed. But next I do not agree with Thrasymachus, that the just life is less profitable than the unjust.*

οὐ βξυνῆκα. Glaucon does not contemplate a repugnance to taking office; Socrates himself below confesses that the reverse is the case, ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν (περιμάχτην). Aristotle in Eth. Nic. draws out this character of a just man who is actuated by no self-interest, because he is in lack of nothing (οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται); he is βασιλεὺς, the true monarch, and stands in contrast to τύραννος.

τὸ φιλότ. καὶ τὸ φιλάργ. With this threefold division of the self-sufficient, the praise-loving, and the money-loving characters, compare Book IX. 581 A. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ... τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς... καλοῦντες φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδῆς ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν ;... Τί δέ ; τὸ θυμοειδές... εἰ φιλόνεικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγο-

ρεύομεν, ἢ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι ; Ἄλλὰ μὴν ᾧ γε μανθάνομεν... φιλομαθῆς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν ; We have therefore before us here already an intimation of that threefold division into which the human mind is to be parted in Plato's ethical system ; upon which he founds his political system as well. This statement, τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστιν, may have been true in so far as the latter (φιλάργυρον) was concerned, but not as regards τὸ φιλότιμον, in Athenian politics. Demosthenes acknowledges in a magnificent passage that Athens had spent more money and more lives ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας than the rest of Hellas had spent upon themselves ; and the statement would apply with equal truth to those epochs of Athenian history which witnessed the decorations of the Acropolis and the Sicilian expedition.

μισθωτοὶ βούλονται κεκλήσθαι, οὔτε λάθρα αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαμβάνοντες κλέπται· οὐδ' αὖ τιμῆς ἕνεκα οὐ γάρ εἰσι φιλότιμοι. δεῖ δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσ- C εἶναι καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν· ὅθεν κινδυνεύει τὸ ἐκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι. τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλη ἄρχειν· ἦν δεισαντές μοι φαίνονται ἄρχειν, ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, καὶ τότε ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθόν τι ἰόντες οὐδ' ὡς εὐπαθήσουτες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν βελτίοσιν ἐπιτρέψαι οὐδὲ ὁμοίοις. D ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει, πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμάχητον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἂν καταφανές γενέσθαι, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γιγνώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἔλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν

ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον, &c. At the completion of his system of education for the philosopher-kings (Book VII. 520), Plato shows how unwillingly they will take office, preferring much the life of calm speculation to that of political business. ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἰσι τὸ ἄρχειν, τούναντιον τῶν νῦν ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει ἀρχόντων.

περιμάχητον. See again *loc. cit.* οὐκ ἔναρ, ὡς νῦν αἱ πολλὰ ὑπὸ σκιαμαχοῦντων τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος.

ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν. In the passage quoted, 520 D Book VII., Plato adds that that city is the best where men are least anxious

to govern. ἐν πόλει ἣ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρξειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταύτην ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι.

ἐνταῦθα, 'there,' *i.e.* 'in that city.'

οὐ πέφυκε... σκοπεῖσθαι. So Soph. *Antigone* 79—

τὸ δὲ βία πολιτῶν δρᾶν ἔφυν ἀμήχανος.

And *infra*. here, Ch. XXIII; πάντα ποιήσει, ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι.

ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν. The fondness for a continuous participial construction is allowed here to interfere with the exactness of the antithesis, which would have required ὠφελεῖν.

Ἐ ἔγωγε οὐδαμῇ συγχωρῶ Θρασυμάχῳ, ὡς τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ κρείττους ξυμφέρων· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαυθίς σκεψόμεθα· πολὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖ μείζον εἶναι, ὃ νῦν λέγει Θρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω ἢ τὸν τοῦ δικαίου. σὺ οὖν πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, αἰρεῖ καὶ ποτέρως ἀληθεστέρας δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; Τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε, ἔφη, λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι. Ἡκουσας, 348 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα ἄρτι Θρασύμαχος ἀγαθὰ διήλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου; Ἡκουσα, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐ πείθομαι. Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθά πη ἐξευρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἦ δ' ὅς Ἄν μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγωμεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὐτὸ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαυθίς σκ. Thrasymachus is here reduced to silence, but not convinced.

τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε... Although Glaucon is ready to state his conviction to this effect, we find in Book II. that he is sorely troubled by the misfortunes of the just and the prosperity of the wicked. See Ch. V. 361 E: ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγῶσεται, στρεβλώσεται, &c. (τὸν δὲ ἄδικον) πρῶτον μὲν ἀρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔπειτα γαμεῖν ὀπόθεν ἂν βούληται, &c.

ἀληθεστέρας, v.s. μοχθηροτέρως, Ch. XVI. and *inf.* Book II. Ch. V. ἀγροικότερας.

ἦκουσα. In Book II. *ipit.* Glaucon confesses that he has doubts about the question, for the superiority of injustice has been so dinned into his ears by Thrasymachus and others. ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὅσα ἀκούων Θρασύμαχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων.

πείθειν, 'convince.' So Book

II. *ipit.*: πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι;

ἂν μὲν τοίνυν... v.s. *not. ad* Cap. XII. *ipit.* This arrangement is proposed by Socrates in the interest of his method. We know that he disliked long speeches, from the way in which he speaks of Thrasymachus' oration, *sup.* Ch. XVII., and from Protagoras 335; and, if he can induce Thrasymachus to argue the question, he is sure of the victory. For the word ἀντικατατ. Stallb. comp. Phædr. 257 C: εἰάν ἄρα καὶ ἐθελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἕλλον (λόγον) ἀντιπαρατεῖναι.

αὐτῷ, Θρασυμάχῳ. *

αὐ. This particle always has reference to a fresh case whether of like nature, or not, with that which precedes; v. *inf.* Ch. XXIV. *ad med.*: τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν; The statement then, of the advantages of justice is looked upon as a rejoinder to

δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὐθις οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἡμεῖς, ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει τὰγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν, ὅσα ἑκάτεροι ἐν ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν, καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν δια- **B** κρινούντων δεησόμεθα· ἂν δὲ ὡσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἅμα αὐτοὶ τε δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει ; Οὕτως, ἔφη.

CAP. XX.

*Ἴθι δη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασυμαχε, ἀπόκριναι ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τὴν τελείαν ἀδικίαν τελείας οὔσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῆς εἶναι ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἔφη, καὶ δι' ἃ, εἴρηκα. Φέρε δη τὸ τοιόνδε **C** περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις ; τὸ μὲν που ἀρετὴν αὐτοῖν

Thrasymachus' statement already made, that injustice is the better.

ἐκατέρῳ, sc. λόγῳ.
ἀνομολογούμενοι, 'allowing,'
or 'making concessions.'

CH. XX.—*Justice then with you, Thrasymachus, is wretched and evil, whilst injustice is noble and good. But your just man only tries to get the better of the unjust, whilst your unjust man tries to get the better of both unjust and just.*

τὴν τελείαν ἀδικίαν... v.s. 344
A : ἐπὶ τὴν τελειωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθης. 'The ideal of injustice,' in contrast to mere acts of felony, τοὺς τὰ βαλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας, *infra*. Hence the definite article is used.

φέρε δη τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις ; 'Come then, what

would you say to such a question as this about them?' The drift of this part of the argument is clear, if we look to the middle of the chapter, where Socrates says that he believes Thrasymachus to be in earnest. He is merely taking Thrasymachus categorically over the ground of his assertion—on which it rests ; he wishes to have Thrasymachus' position well defined before he proceeds to attack it. It is with this intent that he couches his questions in such a form as to draw from Thrasymachus downright and emphatic answers. Thus he says, when he has elicited the statement that one is ἀρετὴ and the other κακία, 'I suppose justice is ἀρετὴ and injustice κακία ;' on purpose to draw from Thrasymachus an indignant disclaimer.

καλείς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; Οὐκοῦν τὴν μεν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετήν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν ; Εἶκος γ' ἔφη, ὦ ἡδιστε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὐ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν ; Τοῦναντιον, ἢ δ' ὄς. Ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν ; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν. Τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄρα κακοῖ-
D θειαν καλείς ; Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἔφη. Ἡ καὶ φρόνιμοί σοι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι ; Οἷ γε τελεως, ἔφη, οἷοί τε ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυναμμενοὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι· σὺ δὲ οἶε με ἴσως τοὺς τὰ βαλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' ὄς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια
E λόγου, ἀλλ' ἂ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον. Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀγνωῶ ὃ τι βούλει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τίθης μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντιοῖς. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ οὕτω τίθημι. Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη στερεώτερον, ὦ ἐταῖρε,

ἡδιστε. Not merely colloquial, as Horace's 'quid agis, dulcissime rerum,' but with the sarcastic vein noticed on ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, Ch. XI. The words virtue and vice for ἀρετὴ and κακία are altogether inadequate; there is a further notion in ἀρετὴ of health and vigour.

τοῦναντίον... οὐκ, ἀλλὰ... It is evident that Thrasymachus is now talking very much at random; he states that his view is the converse (τοῦναντίον) of Socrates'; but has to qualify this statement considerably.

πάνυ γενν. εὐήθειαν, 'an admirable simplicity,' or 'most ingenuous folly.' So below, ἀστείος is coupled with εὐήθης.

κακοῖθειαν. A passing pun of Socrates'; εὐήθεια, goodness or mildness of disposition,

comes afterwards to mean foolishness euphemistically; see p. 120, note. Socrates pretends to conclude that, ἀδικία being the contrary of δικαιοσύνη, the former is κακοῖθεια. But εὐήθεια in its ordinary, that is, its derived sense of folly, is not the contrary or correlative of κακοῖθεια, which means viciousness. Hence Socrates is merely jesting for the moment.

ἐν ἀρετῆς ... μέρει, v.s. Ch. XIX.: ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἶρηκας.

ἀλλὰ πάνυ... v.s. Ch. I.: ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν.

τοῦτο στερεώτερον. This is said to beguile Thrasymachus. Socrates has no difficulty in refuting such a suicidal position as that taken up here. It is a much more difficult task, and one which he has to meet in

καὶ οὐκετι ῥάδιον ἔχειν ὃ τί τις εἴπη. εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὠμολόγεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἂν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες· νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα αὐτῷ πάντα προσθήσεις, ἃ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν 349 ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐτόλμησας θεῖναι. Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη, μαντεύει. Ἄλλ' οὐ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποκνητέον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν σκοπούμενον, ἕως ἂν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἄπερ διανοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖς σύ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν. Γί δέ σοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις; Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ B τόδε μοι πειρῶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον

Book II., to prove that 'honesty is the best policy,' against the facts marshalled by Glaucon and Adeimantus. It will be seen that Socrates does not attempt the solution of that difficulty there; he begins to form his state, and only in Book IX., does he come back to settle finally the thorny question, of which the present position of Thrasymachus is but a shadow or a caricature, see Book IX. 588: Εἰεν δὴ, εἶπον· ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῦθα λόγου γεγόναμεν, ἀναλάβωμεν τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα, δι' ἃ δεῦρο ἤκομεν. ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελῶς μὲν ἀδικῶ, δοξαζομένῳ δὲ δικαίῳ... Νῦν δὴ, ἔφην, αὐτῷ διαλεγόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἦν ἐκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν.

ἐν ἀρετῇ, ἰ.ε. ἐν ἀρετῆς μέ-

ρει. See above, Chap. XIX. *ἰπι.*

διανοεῖ. *διανοία* is Plato's word for the faculty by which human knowledge is obtained; distinguished on the one side from *νοῦς*, that which grasps real existence, and on the other from *δόξα*, opinion, and *πίστις*, belief. But this strict sense is not to be attached here to *διανοεῖ*; for in the next sentence we find τὰ δοκοῦντα used to express that which *διανοεῖ* expresses here—'what you really think,' 'your real opinion.' And in Book II. Ch. III. *ἰπι.* ποιεῖν *διανοία* is simply to imagine, picture to oneself in the thoughts.

πλέον ἔχειν. This phrase is employed rather with the intention of confuting Thrasymachus' position, than in order to convey

ἔχειν ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀστεῖος, ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ εὐήθης. Τί δέ ; τῆς δικαίας πράξεως ; Οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας, ἔφη. Τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου πότερον ἀξιοῖ

a consistent meaning in all the different cases where it is applied. We can understand the unjust man 'taking advantage' (compare οὐδέν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται, Ch. XV.) or 'getting the better of,' his own kind and the just also. But we do not understand Socrates' statement that the just man would try to take advantage of the unjust ; unless we admit that, for the sake of the present argument, Socrates sinks his own opinion about 'doing good to friends and harm to foes,' as Xenophon represents him in Mem. 2, 3, 14 : καὶ μὴν πλείστον γε δοκεῖ ὄνῃ ἐπαινοῦ ἄξιος εἶναι, ὃς ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν. Again, accepting this explanation, we come to a further difficulty ; viz. how to understand the phrase, when, in Ch. XXI., it is applied to the arts of music, doctoring, &c. It seems probable, as Messrs. Davies and Vaughan in their translation of the Republic suppose, that there is here a play upon words. πλέον ἔχειν means (as noticed above) 'to get or take advantage of' ; but, in its application to the arts, this sense of the phrase must be passed over for another—such as 'to know more about,' 'to be more at home with.' Now this sense also implies that the man who 'knows more about' music or physic 'has the advantage over' one who knows less ; and it is in this sense that we must understand Socrates, if we are to follow him in his disproof. The analogy of the

arts cannot conduct us here to a conclusion in ethics any more than in Ch. XV., where see note on ἀρχουσί γε. The whole train of argument is forced, and the disproof must be held to depend entirely upon this *equivocque* inherent in the expression πλέον ἔχειν. The translators above mentioned have been happy in their mode of conveying the sense of the Greek to English readers. Thus they render πλέον ἔχειν, 'to go beyond,' in most places where it occurs ; but reserve to themselves the privilege of substituting 'have the advantage of,' 'do or say more,' (πλείω αἰρεῖσθαι ... ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν) in other places which seem to gain in clearness as they lose in consistency of translation.

ἀστεῖος... καὶ εὐήθης. Hendiadys, conveying the same meaning as γενναία εὐήθεια. ἀστεῖος is used like ἡδὺς, χαρίεις, γενναῖος, χρηστός, sarcastically here. Its first meaning is 'fine,' comptus, or lautus ; it is found in Πράξ. τῶν Ἀποστ. Μωσῆς ἦν ἀστεῖος τῷ Θέῳ. E. V. 'exceeding fair.' See also Arist. Nub. where the explanation is being given that geometry measures out the whole earth, and Strep-siades, understanding it to mean allotments, replies—

ἀστεῖον λέγεις.

Τὸ γὰρ σόφισμα δημοτικὸν καὶ χρήσιμον.

We find it used again in this sarcastic sense in Book V. 452 C : ἐξῆν τοῖς τότε ἀστεῖοις πάντα ταῦτα κωμωδεῖν. 'The wits of the day had the opportunity

ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον ; 'Ηγοῖτ' ἂν', ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο. Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρωτῶ ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δίκαιου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου ; Ἄλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἀδίκος ; ἄρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δίκαιου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ; ἔφη, ὅς γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἀδίκος πλεονεκτῆσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλείστον αὐτὸς λάβη ; Ἔστι ταῦτα.

CAP. XXI.

᾽Ωδε δὴ λεγῶμεν, ἔφην ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἀδίκος τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου. Ἄριστα, ἔφη, εἶρηκας. Ἔστι δέ γε, ἔφην, φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἀδίκος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερος. Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, εἶ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ

of turning this into burlesque.' And sarcastically again Arist. Nub. 1064—

Μάχαιραν' ἀστειῶν γε κέρδος ἔλαβεν ὁ κακοδαίμων.

ἀμιλλήσεται. So διαμιλλᾶν in 516 E : τὰς δὲ δὴ σκίας ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ δεῖ αὐτὸν γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀεὶ δεσμώταις ἐκείνοις, &c. And again ἐνάμιλλον 433 D : Ἐνάμιλλον ἔρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις.

CH. XXI.—But no man who exercises an art well, tries to have the advantage of his fellow-

workman, but only of the unpractised. And such an artificer is good and wise ; therefore an unjust man is wicked and foolish.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἔοικε. This chain in the argument is inserted with a definite object. It has been mentioned above that the argument is one of analogy ; and the first conclusion comes out therefore in the establishment of a resemblance, — a resemblance between the just man and him who is wise and good ; see *infra* 350 B. Socrates, foreseeing the nature of his conclusion, provides against its indefinite

ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔοικεν ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὢν καὶ εἰκέναι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰκέναι ; Καλῶς. τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷσπερ ἔοικεν. Ἄλλὰ τί μέλλει ; ἔφη. Εἶεν, **Εὖ** ὦ Θρασύμαχε' μουσικὸν δέ τινα λέγεις, ἕτερον δὲ ἄμουσον. Ἐγώ γε. Πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα ; Τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δήπου φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον ἄφρονα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἂ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν ; Ναί. Τί δὲ ἰατρικόν ; οὐχ οὕτως ; Οὕτως. Δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν τίς σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ ἀρμοττόμενος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν ; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Τί δέ ; **350** ἀμούσου ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Τί δὲ ἰατρικός ; ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἂν τι ἰατρικοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ

character by gaining Thrasymachus' agreement to the proposition: 'A man is of the same kind as those whom he resembles'; a position in itself neither correct nor definite, but necessary for confounding Thrasymachus.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει... εἰκέναι, 'how can he help being like?' *v.s. not. ad ὁ μέλλων*, Ch. XVIII. μέλλω has here the sense of 'sure to be,' whilst in Thrasymachus' next remark we have an entirely different meaning, partaking of that sense of delay or hesitation which, it has been noticed, μέλλω also possesses. τί μέλλει, then, is like τί μὴν; 'what further stay is there,' or, colloquially, 'Well, what then?'

πότερον φρόνιμον... Here there is a double deception. First the fallacy of two questions; for, be it observed, Socrates asks *which is wise and which foolish,*

before he has asked if they *are* respectively wise and foolish. And secondly the word φρόνιμος is used in its broad sense, although there is no certainty that a man who is μουσικός is also φρόνιμος. This latter fallacy appears later on more than once, see 350 B: ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων σοφός ; ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός. But Thrasymachus, as it has been stated, is more of a declaimer than a dialectician, and has not the ability to find these flaws in Socrates' argument. In fact we can quite imagine that Socrates is caricaturing argument in the present passage. In his next suggestion Socrates seems to feel the necessity for qualifying these conclusions, and adds to the statement that 'the wise man is a good man' the limitation, 'in so far as he is wise'; but it is a solitary piece of accuracy in an otherwise loose argument.

ἀνδρὸς ἢ πράγματος ; Οὐ δῆτα. Μὴ ἰατρικοῦ δέ ;
 Ναί. Περὶ πάσης δὲ ὄρα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνε-
 πιστημοσύνης, εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὅστισούν
 πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἰρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅσα ἄλλος ἐπιστήμων
 ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταῦτὰ τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ
 εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πράξειν. Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη
 τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχειν. Τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων ; οὐχὶ
 ὁμοίως μὲν ἐπιστήμονος πλεονεκτῆσειεν ἂν, ὁμοίως **B**
 δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονος ; Ἴσως. Ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός ;
 Φημί. Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός ; Φημί. Ὁ ἄρα ἀγαθός
 τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐβελήσει πλεονεκ-
 τεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίου. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.
 Ὁ δὲ κακός τε καὶ ἀμαθὴς τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ
 ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, ὁ ἄδικος ἡμῖν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὁμοίου πλεο-
 νεκτεῖ ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες ; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Ὁ δέ
 γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτῆσει, τοῦ δὲ **C**
 ἀνομοίου ; Ναί. Ἔοικεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν
 δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ
 καὶ ἀμαθεῖ. Κινδυνεύει. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὠμολογοῦμεν,

πλείω αἰρεῖσθαι... ἢ πράττειν ἢ
 λέγειν, v. s. not. ad πλέον ἔχειν.
 These infinitives are appositive,
 not exexegetical.

τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ. τῷ ὁμ.
 depends upon ταῦτὰ, and ἑαυτῷ
 upon ὁμοίῳ ; 'the same things
 with the man who is like
 him.'

ἀλλ' ἴσως... τοῦτο γε. Signs
 of hesitation begin to appear in
 Thrasymachus. Thus we find
 the word ἴσως in his reply to
 the next question, when, to a
 similar question with the mere
 substitution of δίκαιος and ἄδικος
 for ἐπιστήμων and ἀνεπιστήμων,
 he had readily assented. Ch.
 XX. fin.

ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός ; ὁ δὲ
 σοφὸς ἀγαθός. These generaliza-
 tions are not accurate, as it has
 been remarked ; they require
 the qualification ἄπερ ἐπιστήμων
 and ἄπερ σοφός. In Euthy-
 demus a sophist tries this
 dialectical trick upon Socrates
 himself, but Socrates exposes
 the fallacy, and then gratifies
 the sophist by appearing to be
 defeated in the argument. *Plas*
 293 C : Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι μὴ ἐπίσ-
 τασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ. Ἐκείνου
 γε, i. e. 'In respect of that I
 am not wise.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν. For the same
 particles in a similar context, see
 Ch. XV. and note on ἄρχουσι γε.

ὦ γε ὅμοιος ἑκατερος εἶη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι. Ὁμολογοῦμεν γάρ· Ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὦν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός.

CAP. XXII.

Ο δὲ Θρασυμαχος ὠμολόγησε μεν πάντα ταῦτα, Δοῦχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ραδίως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐλκόμενος καὶ μόγῃς, μετὰ ἰδρῶτος θαυμαστοῦ ὄσου, ἄτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος· τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγὼ, προτερον δὲ οὔπω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὔτω κείσθω, ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε; Μέμνημαι, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐδὲ ἂ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. εἰ οὖν Ε λέγοιμι, εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἄν με φαίης· ἢ οὖν

ἄρα ἀναπέφανται. Ergo evasit. See Book V. 464 B: τοῦ μεγίστου ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡμῖν πέφανται ἢ κοινωνία τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν τε παιδῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

CH. XXII.—*There is yet another point, Thrasymachus; you said that the unjust was more efficient than the just. Shall we settle it? Just as you please, he said.*

θαυμαστοῦ ὄσου, v.s. Ch. V.: εὐ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα.

ἄτε καὶ θέρους. ἄτε it has been seen, Ch. I., introduces an accompanying fact; ἄτε νῦν

πρῶτον ἄγοντες, and ὡς in some cases, also *ibid.*: ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς. So οἶά τε, Od. 3, 73; οἶά τε ληϊστῆρες.

Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα. See Euthydemus 297 B, where Dionysodorus, the less adroit of the two word-fencers, is overcome in an argument and blushes. Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ἠρυθρίασεν.

ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ. See 348 E: νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι.

ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν, v.s. 347 D: οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν βελτίσιον ἐπιτρέψαι.

δημηγορεῖν, 'harangue,' v.s. *not. ad ὡσπερ βαλανεύς*, Ch. XVII.

ἔα με εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι, ἢ, εἰ βούλει ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις, εἶεν ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. Μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν. Ὡστε σοι, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἔα̃ς λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει; Οὐδὲν μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἶπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, ποίει· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐρωτήσω. Ἐρώτα δὴ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῆς διασκεψώμεθα τὸν λόγον, 351 ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὃν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη γὰρ που, ὅτι καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἶη ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην, εἶπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη, ῥαδίως, οἶμαι, φανήσεται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἢ ἀδικία. οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀγνοήσειεν. ἀλλ' οὔτι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῆδέ πη σκέψασθαι· πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἀδικὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι **B** ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλωθῆναι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη· καὶ τοῦτό γε ἡ ἀριστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἀδικός. Μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὅτι σὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ λόγος· ἀλλὰ τόδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ· πότερον ἢ

ἐρώτα δὴ, 'ask then,' v. i. Book II. 361 E: καὶ δὴ κἂν, and note.

σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετὴ, predicate.

ἔτι, sc. after the proof that justice is wise and good, and injustice foolish and bad.

οὔτι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, 'by no means in this sweeping manner.' ἀπλῶς means 'generally' or 'broadly.' τὸ ἀπλῶς καλόν, Arist. Eth. 5, 9, 9, is 'the absolute good.' So above here in Ch. VI. πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν δικαιοσύνην φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς;

i. e. 'without qualification.' Socrates does not wish here to employ the general conclusion that justice is good and wise and injustice wicked and foolish, in order to prove the strength of the former and the weakness of the latter; he is going back to prior considerations, expressed in the proverb, 'Union is Strength,' which he proceeds to develop.

τελεώτατα οὖσα ἀδικός, v. s. Ch. XVI. τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, and note.

κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; Εἰ μὲν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες ἔχει, ἢ δικαιοσύνη σοφία, μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας. Πάνυ ἀγαμαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνει πάνυ καλῶς. Σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι.

CAP. XXIII.

Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χίρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ ληστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινῇ ἐπὶ τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πρᾶξαι ἂν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῦεν ἀλλήλους; Οὐ δὴτα, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῦεν; οὐ μᾶλλον; Πάνυ γε. Στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἢ γε

ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ, v. s. not. Ch. XIII.: ἢ οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν; χαρίζομαι. So above, ὥστε σοι ἀρέσκειν, and also *infr.* καὶ τόδε μοι χίρισαι καὶ λέγε. And in Ch. XI. *fin.*: ἐμοὶ τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς.

CH. XXIII.—*In every relation of life injustice, by breeding hatred and discord, brings weakness; but justice, concord and strength. Again, the just man will be happier than the unjust.*

In this chapter Thrasymachus does not attempt to argue, but carries out his stated intention, κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι.

δοκεῖς. This use is not uncommon. We find also a construction intermediate between this and the ordinary impersonal sense. See Book II. 368 B, δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι.

οὐ δὴτα, v. *infr.* E: ἔσθ' ὅτε ἂν ἄλλω ἴσοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δὴτα. And *supr.* Ch. XVIII.

στάσεις. Stasis was the *bête noire* of Greek politicians; for the constitution was not often in such stable equilibrium that it could defy the attacks of a single determined and pertinacious citizen. The Republic, being a political dialogue (as well as an ethical), abounds in references to Stasis. Thus when describing the contest between the sensual and rational elements of the soul, we have the simile of a stasis: ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντων ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμόν, Book IV. 440 B; *et infr.* 442 B, of the sensual nature again, ἀρχεῖν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσήκον. Again 459 E, ἢ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅτι μάλιστα ἀστασιαστος ἔσται. It is especially con-

ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν· ἢ γάρ; Ἔστω,

demmed in Book V. 462 B: Ἔχομεν οὖν τι μείζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν αὐτὴν (πόλιν) διασπᾶ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; The community of wives and children, and property, will remove all occasions of στάσις from the guardians of the Ideal State, 464 E: ὅσα γε διὰ χρημάτων ἢ παιδῶν ἢ ξυγγειῶν κτήσιν ἄνθρωποι στασιαζουσιν. And if the guardians of the State are not subject to στάσις, the rest of the State will fall into στάσις neither with the guardians nor amongst themselves. τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ποτε ἢ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ. In 470 B, we have στάσις defined and distinguished from war. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔχθρᾳ στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος. Change in a State arises from στάσις in the governing body, Book VIII. 545 D: πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται. A city composed of very rich and very poor men is two cities, and must come to nought. Το μὴ μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἰεὶ ἐπιβουλευόντας ἀλλήλοις, 551 D. There is no στάσις in the philosopher's soul. Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἕρα ἐπομένης ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης; 586 E. This point has been illustrated at length, not only because the passages quoted will be found to bear upon the present chapter, but because in

this principle, that concord is inherent in justice and discord in injustice, we have the keynote of the whole Dialogue of the Republic. In agreement with this fact we find the definition of justice, as finally discovered in Book IV. 433 A: ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἢ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφικνῖα εἴη. 'Each unit of the State should concentrate himself upon that for which nature has best fitted him.' Or, in a brief definition, *ibidem*, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ, 'Justice is doing your own business and not meddling.' Therefore in the present passage, although Socrates does not pretend to arrive at definition (see the last words of this book, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἶδέναι), he is still preparing his own and his audience's thoughts for the line he afterwards takes; viz. that justice must be found in the due discharge of one's proper duties. We have noticed above a similar presage of a theory to come, in the case of the three-fold division of rulers into those who love money, praise, and duty; Ch. XIX. *inil.* And we shall perhaps view in their truest light these correspondences between the earlier and later books of the Republic, if we consider that Plato in the composition of his work first approached those questions only tentatively and incompletely which he afterwards bent his full powers to solve.

ἢ δ' ὅς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι. Ἄλλ' εὐ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἄρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῆ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐγγυγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει. **Ε** ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδύνατους εἶναι κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων πράττειν; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν ἐν δυοῖν ἐγγένηται, οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσουσι καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις; Ἔσονται, ἔφη. Ἐὰν δὲ δῆ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἐνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔξει; Μηδὲν ἦττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τιὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἶαν, ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατο-
352 πέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὄτρωον, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, ἔτι δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ δῆ, οἶμαι, ἐνοῦσα ταῦτα πάντα τοιήσει, ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ νύχ ὁμοιοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ

ἔργον ἀδικίας, *v.s.* Ch. IX. θερμότης ἔργον, *et infra*. Ch. XXIV. ὀφθαλμῶν ἔργον.

καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. This is added with a distinct purpose; see below 352 A, Δίκαιοι δὲ καὶ οἱ θεοί;

ἐν ἐνὶ, *v.s.* passage quoted from 586 E; note on *στάσεις*.

μὴ μὴ...ἔξει. The nom. to ἀπολεῖ is ἀδικία, and also to ἔξει. οὐδὲν ἦττον is adverbial.

οἶαν, ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται...ποιεῖν. οἶαν is attracted to the case of δύναμιν; we should expect οἷαν ἂν ποιοῖ. Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* 823, Obs. 2, οἶος is for οἶός τε or ὡστε. So *infra*. 415 E: τοιαύτας

(εὐνάς) οἶας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ἱκανὰς εἶναι.

μεθ' αὐτοῦ, 'with itself,' *i.e.* 'with harmony among its individuals'; for notice that the several examples are all collective—city, camp, nation; whilst in the next question we come to the individual, who is none the less susceptible of *στάσις*. καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ is again added with the intention of proving the schismatic to be θεοῖς ἐχθρός; see below.

ἐν ἐνὶ δῆ. δῆ final; the case of the individual being the important one, to which the other cases are introductory.

ἐαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δίκαιοις. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Δίκαιοι δέ γ' εἰσίν, ὧ φίλε, καὶ οἱ θεοί; Ἔστωσαν, ἔφη. Καὶ **B** θεοῖς ἄρα ἐχθρὸς ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὧ Θρασύμαχε, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος. Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἔφη, θαρρῶν οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσομαι, ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι. Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μοι τῆς ἐστιάσεως ἀποπλήρωσον ἀποκρινόμενος ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν μετ' ἀλλήλων οἰοί τε, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὖς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως πώποτε τι μετ' ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πράξαι ἀδίκους ὄντας, τοῦτο οὐ παντά- **C** πασι ἀληθές λέγομεν οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς

εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου. For this word *v.s.* Ch. III. *in il.*, περί τε τὰ φροῦδία καὶ περί πότους καὶ εὐωχίας. And Ch. XVII. C: ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἐστιάσασθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν. And see a similar expression of Thrasymachus' below Ch. XXIV.: Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, εἰστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδαίοις, 'Let this be your banquet.' So we may translate here 'Feast yourself upon the argument.' And finally we have immediately below, τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἐστιάσεως.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ, &c. This introduction of the sentence is taken up again after a long parenthesis (ἀλλὰ δὴ ... ἀδύνατοι), in the words: ταῦτα μὲν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.

οὖς φαμεν, &c. The construction here is entirely changed. We should expect at least οὗτοι οὐκ οὕτως ἔχουσι or περί τούτων οὐκ ἀληθεύομεν; but the personal pronoun is neglected altogether, and the whole clause dismissed

by a demonstrative, τοῦτο. Somewhat similar is Electra Sophoclis, 1364—

τοὺς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ λόγου
πολλὰ κυκλοῦνται νύκτες ἡ-
μέραι τ' ἴσαι
αἱ ταῦτά σοι δείξουσιν, Ἥλέκ-
τρα, σαφῆ.

Where the substitution of a neuter pronoun, to express the substance of that which has preceded, occurs; but the construction approaches nearer than the present to a regular one.

κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, opposed to ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες. For this expression and τελῶς ἄδικοι, *v.s. not. ad τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν*, Ch. XVI.

δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη. See Xen. Mem. 3, 9, 5: τὰ τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδύτας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθῃ, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ, εἰ ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν.

δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μήτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οὓς ἦσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, δι' ἣν ἐπραξαν ἂ ἐπραξαν, ὥρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀδिका ἀδικία ἡμιμόχ-
D θηροι ὄντες, ἐπεὶ οἷ γε παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἀδικοὶ τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πρᾶττειν ἀδύνατοι· ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, μαυθίνω, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προϋθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν ὁμως δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ζῆν. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη. Σκοπῶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καὶ μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; Ἐμοιγε. Ἄρ' **E** οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν

φαίνονται μὲν οὖν νῦν... ὁμως δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον. So above, Ch. XXII.: ἀλλ' οὕτι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῆδὲ πη σκέψασθαι.

οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος. ἐπιτυγχάνω, to light upon, or happen. ὁ ἐπιτυχών, 'a chance comer'; τὸ ἐπιτυχόν, 'anything that happens,' 'this or that.' So in Book II., Socrates will not permit the children in his State to hear any kind of fiction from any kind of person. Ἄρ' οὖν βραδῶς παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας; (Ch. XVII). See also Book VII. 539 D: καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχῶν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό. For the sentiment v.s. 344 E: ἡ μικρὸν οἷε ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ βίου διαγωγῆν... οὐδὲ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα; and note.

Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης, &c. 'Would you not then call the function of a horse, or of anything else, that which we do only with horses or best with horses?' In Book III. 406 E, it is implied that without the ἔργον it is no use for a man to live: ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον, ἢ εἰ μὴ πράττοι, οὐκ ἐλυσίτελεϊ ζῆν. And in Book V. 453 B, when the question has been asked, are not women different from men? and answered in the affirmative, the inference is that they should have a different ἔργον. οὐκοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἔργοι ἐκατέρφω προσήκει προστάττειν τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. ἔργον then, as meant by Plato, is action of some kind, the agent or instrument being that which is naturally fitted to perform it; v.s. Ch. IX.: θερμότητος ἔργον, and note. And for the rest of the doctrine of τὸ ἔργον see Ch. XXIV. and note.

ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἡ μονῶ ἐκείνῳ ποιῆ τις ἡ ἄριστα ; Οὐ
 μανθάνω, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ὦδε' ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις
 ἡ ὀφθαλμοῖς ; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἡ
 ὠσίν ; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων
 φამὲν ἔργα εἶναι ; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ ; μαχαίρα ἂν 353
 ἀμπέλου κλήμα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις
 πολλοῖς ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; Ἄλλ' οὐδενί γ' ἂν, οἶμαι,
 οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς δρεπάνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐργασθέντι.
 Ἄληθῆ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο τούτου ἔργον θήσομεν ;
 Θῆσομεν μὲν οὖν.

CAP. XXIV.

Νῦν δὴ, οἶμαι, ἄμεινον ἂν μάθοις ὃ ἄρτι ἠρώτων
 πυυθανόμενος, εἰ οὐ τοῦτο ἐκάστου εἴη ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἡ
 μόνον τι ἡ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται. Ἄλλ',
 ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἐκίστου πράγ-
 ματος ἔργον εἶναι. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ **B**

ἔσθ' ὅτῳ, v.s. Ch. XV. ἔσθ'
 ὃ τι προσδεῖται.

CH. XXIV.—*Finally, everything has a function which it is enabled to discharge by means of its own proper virtue. The virtue of the soul is justice; hence a just man lives the best, the most useful, and the happiest life.*

νῦν δὴ, 'by this time,' sc. 'after this explanation'; v. *inf.* ἔχε δὴ, ἴθι δὴ.

ὃ ἂν ἡ μόνον τι. τι, subject ;
 ὃ, object ; μόνον and κάλλιστα
 qualify ἀπεργ.

ἀρετὴ. The word here has
 the widest signification of which
 it is capable ; and, as noted

above, is not adequately translated by 'virtue'; 'excellence' expresses this general sense better. With Plato the physical aspect of ἀρετὴ is more pronounced ; it expresses first an efficiency of bodily organs which is rather congenital than acquired ; and, afterwards, moral excellence, which also Plato thought was inherent in man. It is true that according to the dialogue of the Meno, Plato thought that moral ἀρετὴ was a science (ἐπιστήμη), and admitted of being taught (διδασκῆ) ; but he also believed that the rudiments of it and the aptitude for it existed already in man. Similarly Socrates in Mem. Xen. 2, 6, 39, speaks of the

δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστω, ὥπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστε-
 τασθαι; ἴωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ὀφθαλμῶν,
 φασί, ἔστιν ἔργον; Ἔστιν. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ
 ὀφθαλμῶν ἔστιν; Καὶ ἀρετὴ. Τί δέ; ὧτων ἦν τι
 ἔργον; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ; Καὶ ἀρετὴ. Τί δὲ
 πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὕτω; Οὕτω. Ἐχε
 δὴ ἄρ' ἂν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπερ-
 C γάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ'
 ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν; Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἔφη· τυφλό-
 τητα γὰρ ἴσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὄψεως. Ἦτις, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἢ ἀρετῆ· οὐ γὰρ πω τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ'
 εἰ τῆ οἰκεία μὲν ἀρετῆ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται
 τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακία δὲ κακῶς. Ἀληθές, ἔφη;

moral excellences, not being formed, but *increased* by study and practice: ὅσαι δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταὶ λέγονται, σκοπούμενος εὐρήσεις πάσας μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτη αὐξανόμενας. And for Plato's belief in the existence of ἀρετὴ in man, see Rep. Book IV. 444 E: Ἄρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, ὑγιειά τε τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, (i.e. its normal and natural state) κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἰσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια. Aristotle (Eth. 2, 6, 2) follows partly in Plato's footsteps: πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὐ ἂν ἦ ἀρετὴ, αὐτὸ τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἢ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ; τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῆ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῆ εὖ ὀρώμεν. Ὅμοιος ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν... καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. The first part of this passage is taken directly from Plato; the latter part is

Aristotle's own. For he looks upon ἀρετῆ of man as something acquired by habit (ἕξις); see *ibid.* Ch. I. 2: ἐξ οὗ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται, 'No ethical excellence is congenital'; the contrary of Plato's belief quoted above from Rep. Book IV. ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτά, 'the same illustration.'

ἔχε δὴ, 'now mark.' δὴ emphatic; intimating an important step, and a new point of departure in the argument. So, ἴθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι.

τυφλότητα γὰρ, &c. Thrasymachus is too assenting here: in his willingness to agree to all that Socrates says, he says too much. Socrates is not concerned with the actual excellence or vice of this or that subject of illustration; he does not wish to stop over that, hence he disregards the suggestion and dismisses it with a mere acknowledgment.

τούτο γε λεγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧτα στερόμενα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται ; Πάνυ γε. Τίθεμεν δὺν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἴθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα **D** τὸδε σκέψαι· ψυχῆς ἔστι τι ἔργον, ὃ ἄλλω τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ πράξαις, οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε· τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλω ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαίμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι ; Οὐδενὶ ἄλλω. Τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν ; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι ; Μάλιστά γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι ; Φαμέν. Ἄρ' οὖν ποτέ, ὦ Θρασύ- **E** μαχε, ψυχὴ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα εὐ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον ; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὐ πρᾶττειν. Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴν γε ξυνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἀδικίαν ; Συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ. Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὐ βιώνεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἴδικος. Φαίνεται, ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν **354** σὸν λόγον. Ἄλλα μὴν ὃ γε εὐ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ

τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ... ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλω ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως, &c. See Xen. Mem. I, 2, 53 : τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελευθούσης ἐν ἧ μόνῃ γίνεται φρόνησις.

τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν. See Aristotle Eth. I, 7, 12 : ἀνθρώπου θεῖη τις ἂν ἔργον τι. τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς. Aristotle thus demands a fuller definition of the ψυχῆς ἔργον than ζῆν alone ; and he finds it in ζωῆ πρακτικῆ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.

οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν... Socrates refers to the conclusion (Ch. XXI. *fin.*) : ὁ

μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὢν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὃ δὲ ἴδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός. But there is in this question a fallacy. The word ἀρετῆ, on which the whole discussion turns, has not been definitely employed in the former conclusions. It has only been employed in the present chapter in the general sense of excellence of any particular person or thing. Now it is suddenly introduced, with the limited sense of human virtue, to clinch the argument that a virtuous life is the best.

εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τάναντία. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὁ δ' ἄδικος ἄθλιος. Ἔστωσαν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα δέ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐδέποτε ἄρα, ὦ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδείοις. Ἐπὸ σοῦ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδὴ μοι πρᾶος ἐγένεθ' καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω. **Β** οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίμαι δι' ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ αἰεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἀρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ὑπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶ-

Βενδιδείοις, v.s. Ch. I. *in*it. note.

πρᾶος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων *ξπ.* This word is suggested by the simile of the wild beast, in which Thrasymachus was introduced, Ch. X.: *συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὡσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρπασόμενος; et in*fr. *ibid.* ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἤρχετο ἀγριάνεσθαι. Xenophon employs the verb with regard to a person in Mem. 2, 3, 16; ἀλλ' ἐγχείρει τὸν ἄνδρα καταπραῖνειν. See also Book VI. 501 C for a similar expression, πολιτειῶν ζωγράφος, δι' ὃν ἐκεῖνοι ἐχαλεπαίνον ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ παρεδίδομεν, καὶ τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραῖνονται; And in Book IV. when speaking of the γενναῖος, Socrates says: οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἡ διαπρόξῃται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὡσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πραῖνῃθι; Similarly the word ἡμερος is applied to that part of the soul called the λογιστικόν, whilst the sensual is described as τὸ θηριώδές τε καὶ ἄγριον, Book IX.

*in*it. The former also is said to soothe the third element of the soul, τὸ θυμοειδὲς πραῖνας. In Book II. Ch. II., the simile is further elaborated, *q.v.*

δι' ἐμαυτόν... 'through my own fault, not through yours'; i.e. ὑπὸ σοῦ γε *συγγ.* Socrates hints that he has thoroughly enjoyed that part of the entertainment which Thrasymachus has supplied; that he has enjoyed a light meal and a quaint, not a hearty one.

τοῦ αἰεὶ παραφερομένου. *V.i.* Book II. Ch. III.: αὐτῷ αἰεὶ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν, 'from time to time.'

ἀρπάζοντες. See Arist. Nub. where Socrates tells the neophyte to 'catch up' any scrap of wisdom he may throw him.

ἔγε νῦν, ὅπως, ὅταν τι προβάλωμαι σοφόν

περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, εὐθέως ὑφαρπάσει.

πρὶν τοῦ προτ. μετρ. ἀπολαῦσαι, 'Before they have had a fair taste of the first.' For μετρίως v.s. p. 116.

τον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὐρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφόμενος ἐκείνου ὀρμῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέφασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμαθία εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπесόντος αὐ ὕστερον λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἢ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμεν τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι· ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὃ ἐστὶ, σχολῆ εἶσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὐσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.

τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, cf. *Æsch. Ag. 162*: Ζεὺς ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, implying ignorance of the real nature of Zeus, as here of justice.

σχολῆ εἶσομαι, 'it will be long before I know,' 'I shall

take a long time to find out'; v. i. *Book III. 394 E*: Σχολῆ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μμήσεται, 'He will be very far from,' &c.

BOOK II.

CAP. I.

357 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ

CH. I.—*I thought we had here come to a conclusion, but it was only the prologue after all. For Glaucon would have me attempt an account of justice.*

The first book, as Socrates says here, is a preface or prelude; it intimates, as we have noticed in one or two passages, what is to be the matter of the whole dialogue; it shows how far astray even those men who profess to have a coherent system of ethics, wander from the real facts. It smooths the way for a fresh and a more satisfactory system in two ways, viz. by removing error, and by suggesting possible solutions to different ethical difficulties; and this last confession of Socrates that he knows nothing about justice, separates the inquiry from all prejudice. And, finally, Socrates is thus placed in the position of director of the discussion, as the man who can remove fallacy and

point the way, if he decline to lead it, towards truth and justice. The first five chapters are devoted to Glaucon's statement of the case for injustice and the unjust life; the next four to a like statement, or an elaboration of the same, by Adeimantus. Then at last Socrates takes up his parable and speaks his mind. He proceeds to the construction of a State, in which, so he expects, the counterpart of justice in man may be found. For the State is made 'not of stone or wood, but of men, of living flesh and blood.' And the construction of the State, and the education required in it, occupy the rest of this second book.

λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι, *v.s.* note page 115.

ἄρα, note p. 108.

προοίμιον. Cf. πάντα ταῦτα προοίμιόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν. See 531 D.

Γλαύκων αεί τε ἀνδρειότατος ὦν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλ' ἔφη ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι, **B** ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστι δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον ; ὦς ἀληθῶς, εἶπον, ἔγωγ' ἂν ἐλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἶη. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς ὁ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι ἄρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι ; οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἰ

Γλαύκων. For other traits in this character see Book I. Ch. XI. where he generously offers on behalf of all to contribute for Socrates: ἀλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν. He is outspoken and confesses his ignorance with a laugh in Book III. 398 C: καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἐπιγέλασας, Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ὃ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύω ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι. In the same Book 402 E, we are almost surprised to find him advancing the enlightened suggestion, that bodily defects do not obscure the loveliness of a fair mind: εἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὑπομείναι ἂν ᾧστ' ἐθέλειν ἀσπάζεσθαι. In Book VIII. 348 E his brother Adeimantus calls him combative: οἶμαι μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος τουτουεῖ τείνειν ἔνεκά γε φιλονεικίας. He is ἐρωτικός, 474 D: ἄλλω, εἶπον, ἔπρεπεν, ὃ Γλαύκων, λέγειν ἢ λέγεις ἀνδρὶ δ' ἐρωτικῷ, &c. He is very earnest over the dialogue. Book V. 450 C: μέτρον δὲ γ', ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὄλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. Yet we are disappointed in Book VI. 508 B, to

find that he supposes ἡδονὴ to be the source of knowledge and truth: οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις.

αεί τε...καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε, v.s. Book I.: ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ, &c.; pp. 109 and 112.

ἀπεδέξατο. See Book I. Ch. IV. *in*it.: Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. And here *in*fr. 568 B: ἢ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ᾧμην ἀποφαίνειν, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου.

ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔγωγ' ἂν ἐλοίμην. This declaration follows with consistency upon his opinion, delivered in Book I. Ch. XXIII., about the importance of the question before them: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆσθην. εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἶη is spoken in Socrates' usual tone of self-depreciation, just as *in*fr. Ch. X. he says of himself, ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί. See Book I. Ch. XI. *in*it.: αὕτη ἐκέλευε ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεῖα Σωκράτους. So below here he says, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τις, ὡς εἴοικε, δυσμαθής. And in Meno 71 C: οὐ πάνυ εἰμι μνήμων, ὃ Μένων. Here also in 368 B: δοκῶ γὰρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι.

καὶ αἰ ἡδοναί, &c. The con-

ἡδοκαὶ ὄσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.
C Ἐμουγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Τί δέ ; ὃ αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνομένων ; οἷον αὐτὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὄραν καὶ τὸ ὑγαινεῖν· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που δι' ἀμφοτέρα ἀσπαζόμεθα. Ναί, εἶπον. Τρίτον δὲ ὄρας τι, ἔφη, εἶδος ἰαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰατρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός ; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαῖμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ
D αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἔνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν, ἔφην, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ; Ἐν ποίῳ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην
358 τίθης ; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὃ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι. Οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἶδους,

struction in the middle of this sentence passes easily from a relative to a demonstrative : instead of διὰ ταύτας where it stands, the continuation of the regular construction would require δι' ἄς after καί ; see p. 195.

χαίρειν ἔχοντα. Here the personal accusative is thrown in, as frequently ; see below, καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι. And Book I. Ch. V. : μηδ' αὐτὸ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῶν θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπων χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκέισε ἀπέναι δεδιότα.

τρίτον δὲ. For this continually recurring division into three heads, v.s. Book I. Ch. XII., note τῶν πολλῶν αἰ μὲν. And below here Ch. II. *ad init.*

ἐν ᾧ, 'under which fall' ; as in Book I. Ch. XX. : ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφίᾳ

ἐτόλμησας θεῖναι. The same meaning is expressed in Ch. XIX. *id.* by the phrase ἐν μέρει : ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει.

τί δὴ, 'what is your conclusion?' v. *infra*. Book I. Ch. XXIIV. Νῦν δὴ, ἔχε δὴ, ἴθι δὴ, which mark off the salient points, or points of conclusion ; and *not.* pp. 109, 114.

τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι, v.s. *not.* *ad* ὁ μέλλων, Book I. Ch. XVIII. ; and the examples of this expression there mentioned.

τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἶδους. This may be regarded either as a purely partitive genitive, or the speaker may have in his mind the expression ἐν μέρει, q.v. *supr.*

τοῖς πολλοῖς. Adeimantus further elaborates this statement of Glaucon's in Ch. IX. *infra.*

ὁ μισθῶν θ' ἔνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ δι' αὐτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὄν χαλεπόν.

CAP. II.

Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω, καὶ πάσαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄν ψέγεται· ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής. Ἴθι δὴ, ἔφη, ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, Β' εἰάν σοι ταῦτα δοκῇ. Θρασύμαχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρωιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφεις κληθῆναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐπω κατὰ νοῦν ἢ ἀπόδειξις γέγονε περὶ ἐκατέρου· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκούσαι, τί τ' ἔστιν ἐκότερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν εἶσαι χαίρειν. οὕτως οὖν ποιήσω, εἰάν και σοὶ δοκῇ· ἐπανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον,

where he says that no one has ever praised justice or blamed injustice for themselves, but only for the rewards and reputation that each brings. οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπήνεσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γινομένας.

CH. II.—*He would therefore first state a case in full for injustice, as it appears to thrive. Justice arises from a contract between the many weak and the few strong, that there be no ill-treatment at all.*

ὥσπερ ὄφεις κληθῆναι, *v. s. not.* ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω, Book I. Ch. XXIV. The word expresses the effect of the Sirens' song in Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 31: ἀλλὰ πᾶσι

πόρρωθεν ἐπῆδον, πάντας φασὶν ὑπομένειν, καὶ ἀκούοντας αὐτῶν κηλείσθαι. In Phædrus 267 C, Thrasymachus is represented as doing that which he here suffers himself: ὀργίσει τι αὐ πολλοὺς ἀμα δεινὸς ἀήρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὄργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν ὡς ἔφη. In Rep. X. 601 the word is used of the charm of poetry, which makes the poet seem to understand all the subjects on which he touches: οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχει. Compare the expression ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, Book VIII. 554 D. τί τ' ἔστιν ἐκότερον. Above, Book I. *fin.*, Socrates has confessed ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὃ ἔστι...

ἐπανανεώσομαι ... λόγον. So ἐγκωμιαζόμενον, *infra.*; expressions used as if the Λόγος were an actually existent being;

Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ὄθεν γεγενῆσθαι· δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἄλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν· τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐτι δοκεῖ οὕτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὄντα, ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ **Δ**τῆς δικαιοσύνης λογον, ὡς ἄμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι· βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκούσαι. μάλιστα δ' οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἀδικὸν βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαι σοι, ὃν τρόπον αὖ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἄλλ' ὄρα, εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἂ λέγω. Πάντων μάλιστα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ περὶ **Ε**γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλακίς τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; Κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὁ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί οἷόν τε καὶ ὄθεν γεγενεε δικαιοσύνη. πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασὶ τὸ

hence the expressions, *ἴχνη τοῦ λόγου, τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνη*, Book V. 462 A. See also *nott.* pp. 108, 132, 135.

ἐρῶ δικ. οἷον εἶναι φασιν, *v.s. not.* p. 106.

πρῶτον...δεύτερον...τρίτον, *v.s. Ch. I. not. ad τρίτον.*

διατεθρ. τὰ ὄντα, *v.s. Book I. Ch. XVII. ἰπι.*: ἡμῶν καταπλήσας τῶν ὄντων ἄθροον καὶ πολλὸν τὸν λόγον. And Book III. 411 A: ὅταν μὲν τις μουσικῆ παρέχη καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὄντων ὡς περὶ δὴ χώνης, κ.τ.λ.

ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου...καὶ λόγον...οὐδενὸς ἀκήκοα. Notice the accusative of the thing and genitive of the persons.

κατατείνας, *v.s. not.* p. 115.

αὖ, 'in return.'

εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ. ὡς ἔρα τὰ Τρωεσσὶν ἐελοδομένοισι φανήτην; II. 7, 7. ἐμοὶ δὲ κεν ἀσμένῳ εἶη; II. 15, 108. ποθοῦντι προῦφάνης; Soph. O. C. 1505. Uti militibus exaequatus cum imperatore labos volentibus esset; Sall. Jug. 4. Jelf, Gr. Gr. 599, 3.

περὶ γὰρ τίνος, &c., *v.s. not. ad* οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, Book I. Ch. XXIII.

τί οἷόν τε καὶ ὄθεν, 'what justice is, both in its nature and its source.'

πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασὶ, &c. 'They say that doing harm is naturally a good thing.'

μὲν ἄδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἄδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπειδὴν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύονται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοισι τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν 359 ξυυθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μῆτ' ἄδικεῖν μῆτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι.

πλέονι δὲ κακῷ, 'but that suffering harm is more of an evil than the doing it is a good.' The construction here is compound. By the omission of πλέονι...ἢ we should have the simple sense, 'but that suffering harm exceeds, as an evil, doing harm as a good.' Thus πλέονι is inserted pleonastically; and if it were to be kept, the comparative word ὑπερβάλλειν would have to be removed in favour of some neutral expression such as εἶναι:—πλέον δὲ κακὸν εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ξυυθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις, i.e. the origin of justice lies in a social contract. To this view, which Glaucon propounds, the view taken of justice by Hobbes, the English philosopher (1588-1679), has a certain resemblance. He considered that, naturally all men are equal, and all have an equal right to everything; but that, in virtue of their possessing reason, they recognise 'Laws of Nature' as he terms them. The first or fundamental Law of Nature according to Hobbes is this: 'That every man ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use, all helps and advantages of Warre.' The second 'Law of Nature' grows out of this one: 'That

a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre forth as for Peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.' 'Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.' This surrendering of right corresponds to the surrendering of the power of doing harm, which Glaucon speaks of here, and the object is the same, self-preservation and self-protection. Glaucon's justice is nothing more than this compromise; but Hobbes' justice is something more. This second Law of Nature makes it possible for the Contract to come into existence. 'Right is laid aside either by renouncing or transferring.' 'The mutual transferring of Right, is that which men call Contract.' And a contract extending over a period of time Hobbes calls a Covenant. 'Before the names of Just and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power to compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terror of some Punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant.' It will be seen that, in this description of the germs of justice, Hobbes' account agrees partly with Glaucon's.

καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δη ἄρξασθαι νομοὺς τιθεσθαι καὶ ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν, -καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιταγ-
μα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταυτην
γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὐσαν
τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῶ δίκην,

He agrees with him that men will violate their covenants if they can do so without suffering. But he does not agree with him precisely as to the restraining power. Plato makes Glaucon here affirm that it is the fear of being treated themselves unjustly at another time, which restrains men from acting unjustly, and thereby gives rise to Justice; which, in effect, is the belief of Hobbes also; but Hobbes continues thus to explain what he means by that 'terror of Punishment.' 'Such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth . . . And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is where there is no Commonwealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things. Therefore, where there is no Commonwealth, there is nothing Unjust. So that the nature of Justice consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants; but the validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them.' Hobbes therefore thought with Socrates (Ch. X.) that Justice must be sought for in the State. It is not, as Glaucon here is urging, a crude bargain between men in a savage state; but it is the result of an attempt to gain security, which can only

exist in a civil polity. And thus Hobbes enunciates a Third Law of Nature: 'That men performe their Covenants made.' 'And in this Law of Nature consisteth the Fountain and Originall of Justice.' 'And the definition of Injustice is no other than *the not Performance of Covenant.*' Therefore, taking a general view of Hobbes' scheme of justice, we see that it is arrived at by three steps, these three Laws of Nature:—

i. Man as a reasonable being makes peace his object.

ii. To ensure peace he surrenders certain of his natural rights.

iii. He must abide consistently by this surrender, *i.e.* by his Covenants.

Finally, to this description of the evolution of law from a state of barbarism may be added a similar account of the origin of chivalry; which is thus summarized: 'The exaltation of woman, and the extravagant homage paid to her sex, by the masters of the *gay saber*, were among the instinctive efforts of a semi-barbarous society to protect itself from its own ferocity.' See the Nineteenth Century, November 1881: A New Love Poet; by Lord Lytton.

ἀρίστου ὄντος ἐὰν ἀδικῶν...
In Book III. 405 C Socrates holds up such a person as the worst type of man possible in a state. Ἡ δοκεῖ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὄν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστία τοῦ Β ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ποτε ξυνθέσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι· μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἄν.

τούτου ἀσχιον εἶναι τοῦτο ὅταν τις... ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ τούτῳ πεισθῆ καλλωπίζεσθαι, ὡς δεῖνός ἂν περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἱκανός πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι, πάσας δὲ διεξόδους διεξελεθῶν ἀποστραφῆναι λυγιζόμενος ὥστε μὴ παρασχεῖν δίκην. Also in *Crito* (49), injustice is harmful to the doer. τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικούντι καὶ κακόν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὅν παντὶ τρόπῳ. So *Gorg.* 508 : καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὅτι οὖν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικούντι καὶ ἀσχιον καὶ κακίον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ. In *Aristophanes'* *Clouds* the ἀδικος λόγος sums up the advantages of Injustice, ll. 1071 seqq.; and, as in the case of the character referred to in *Rep.* Book III., it is said that to practise injustice with impunity requires a ready tongue. See *Arist. Nub.* 1073 : ἀπόλλωλας· ἀδύνατος γὰρ εἶ λέγειν. The use made of rhetorical education to elude the law, brought a bad name upon those who learnt and those who taught. The sophists, we know, lay under a social stigma, for evidence of which see *Protagoras*, 311 C-E (καὶ ὅς εἶπεν ἐρυθρίδας). And the teachers of rhetoric were included under the σοφισταί. See note on *πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι*, Ch. VIII.

τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ. For this favourite image of a virtue or anything desirable lying as

a mean between two points, see note p. 116. Aristotle has followed it out completely in his account of the different virtues. Thus courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice, liberality between extravagance and parsimony; see *Ethics* 2, 7. And of justice itself, *Book V.* 5, 17 : δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸ δὲ ἑλαττόν ἐστιν. But not in the same way as the others; for injustice is at once excess and defect, justice being the mean.

ἀγαπᾶσθαι, see p. 118, note; 'to put up with,' or 'accept.' That which is put up with is often introduced by the conditional εἰ. Thus *Demosthenes de Cor.* 301 (Reiske) : ἀλλ' ἀγαπητόν εἶναι, εἰ μὴδὲν παραλείπων τις ἂ δεῖ πράξειεν. And so here *Book VI.* 496 E. ἀγαπᾶ εἶ πῃ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται, κ.τ.λ. *Book V.* 471 B : ἡ ἀγαπήσομεν, ἐὰν ὅτι ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ᾖ; *Book IV.* 435 C : οὐκοῦν ἀγαπητόν; ἐφη. Similarly *στέργω* in *Dem.* de *Cor.* 249 : εἰ δέ φησιν οὗτος, δεῖξάτω, καὶ γὰρ στέργω καὶ σιωπήσομαι. *Aeschines cont. Ctes.* 20 (ed. Simcox) : ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαπῶσιν, ἐὰν τις παρ' αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀδικῇ.

ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὧ Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.

CAP. III.

Ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστα ἂν αισθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἑκατέρῳ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἴτ' ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι, ποῖ ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπ' αὐτοφῶρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμὴν. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἦν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἶαν ποτέ φασι δύναμιν τῷ [Γύγῃ] τοῦ Λυδοῦ

CH. III.—*If the just man had the power of doing evil without being detected, he would be as bad as the unjust, as in the tale of Gyges.*

αὐτό, sc. δικαιοσύνην.

εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν διανοίᾳ. Similarly εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, *infr.* Ch. X. And τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν, Ch. XI. *inil.*

ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν ... βούληται ... ἄξει, *v. s. not.* p. 106.

νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμὴν. See Aristotle *Eth.* 10, 9, 9 : *περὶ ταῦτα θεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων καὶ ὅλων δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. Εἰ *infr.* 12 : ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν. And the majority of mankind, so Aris-*

totle thinks, do not pursue what is good unless they are compelled ; see *supr.* § 4 : οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὐταὶ ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λυπὰς, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσι, ἀγευστοὶ ὄντες.

Γύγῃ. An older and a different version of the story is related in Herod. I. 8-15 ; whilst in Cicero *de Off.* we have a short summary of Plato's account, see 3, 9, 38 : *Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, &c.* The account here is thrown into the infinitive narration, as in the story of Er in Book X. p. 614, *seqq.*

προγόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα **D**
 θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ
 πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ραγῆναι τι τῆς γῆς
 καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἢ ἔνεμεν· ἰδόντα
 δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ
 μυθολογοῦσι θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν κοῖλον,
 θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ἃς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα
 νεκρὸν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι, μείζω ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτον
 δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν **E**
 δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. συλλόγου δὲ
 γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἴν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν
 κατὰ μῆνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποίμνια, ἀφικέ-
 σθαι καὶ ἐκείνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον. καθήμενοι
 οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην τοῦ
 δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἶσω τῆς
 χειρός· τούτου δὲ γενομένου ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι **360**
 τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχο-
 μένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψηλα-

ἄλλα τὲ δὴ...καὶ, *v.s.* note p.
 114: καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ,
 'Sophocles besides others.' For
 μυθολογοῦσι *v.s.* αὐτῇ, Book I.
 Ch. XVI. *in it.*

μείζω ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον. Cic.
loc. cit. 'corpus magnitudine
 inusitata.'

δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον.
 Rings play an important part
 in Eastern legend; many tales
 in the Arabian Nights turn
 upon rings and their talismanic
 properties. Compare the story
 of Polycrates and his ring,
 Herod. 3, 39, *seqq.*

ἐξαγγέλλοιεν. Hermann notes
 that the present tense retains
 its force in the other moods
 besides the indicative, referring
 to 'res diutius durans vel sæpius
 repetita.' Whilst Schneider

accounts for this present tense,
 by supposing that the word
 refers to the passing of accounts
 at the meeting.

τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην. Cicero
loc. cit.: Quem ut detraxit, ipse
 induit: tum in pastorum se
 concilium recepit: ibi quum
 palam ejus annuli ad palmam
 converterat, a nullo videbatur,
 ipse autem omnia videbat; idem
 rursus videbatur quum in locum
 anulum inverterat.

καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, 'and they
 began to converse about him
 as though he had gone away.'
 For the sudden change of subject
 see p. 131 note; and add to the
 examples quoted Virg. *Æn.* X.:

liceat dimittere ab armis
 Incolumem Ascanium, liceat
 superesse nepotem.

φῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέψαι ἔξω τὴν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερόν γενέσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐννοήσαντα ἀποπειρᾶσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου, εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν, στρέφοντι μὲν εἴσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἀδήλω γίνεσθαι, ἔξω δὲ δήλω. αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθύς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα· ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετ' ἐκείνης **B** ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίῳ γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν, καὶ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι, ἔξόν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὅ τι βούλοιο λαμβάνειν, καὶ **C** εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτῃ βούλοιο, καὶ ἀποκτινύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὔστινας βούλοιο, καὶ τᾶλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεον ὄντα. οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ

διαπράξασθαι, 'to manage.'

In Book IV. 440 C. the word means 'to carry out to the end.' οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξῃται ἢ τελευτήσῃ. In Xenophon Anab. 7, 3, 16, 'to effect': Παριανούς τινας, οἱ παῖσαν φιλιαν διαπραξόμενοι πρὸς Μήδοκον. In Od. ii. 213, 'to accomplish'—

οἳ κέ μοι ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διαπρήσσωσι κέλευθον.

And so in Herod. iii. 61, 4: ὡς οἱ αὐτὸς πάντα διαπρήξει.

ὡς δόξειεν. Ast inserted ἂν, but against MS. authority. Matthiæ held that the preceding ἂν qualifies this clause. For ἀδαμάντινος Stallb. compares Book X. 619 A: ἀδαμάντινος δὲ δεῖ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα

εἰς Ἄιδου ἰέναι.

τολμήσειεν, 'bring himself to abstain.' *τολμάω*, like *τλάω*, is 'to have the heart to...' See Medea Euripid. 1325—

ἦ τις τέκνοισι σοῖσιν ἐμβαλεῖν ξίφος

ἔτλης τεκοῦσα.

And so *infra. ibid.* 1339—

οὐκ ἔστιν ἦ τις τοῦτ' ἂν Ἑλληνὶς γυνὴ ἔτλη ποτέ.

For *τολμάω* see Book IX. 576 A: πάντα σχήματα *τολμώντες* ποιεῖν ὡς οἰκίοι.

ἔξόν αὐτῷ. For this absolute accusative *v.s.* note page 147; also Æschines cont. Ctes. 10, (ed. Simcox): εἰ φανήσεται ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ πόλει, τυχόν δε καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνιαυτῷ

ἑτέρου ποιοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῦτόν ἴοιεν ἀμφότεροι. καί-
 τοι μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις, ὅτι οὐδεὶς
 ἐκῶν δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ
 ἰδίᾳ ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου γ' ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἷός τε
 ἔσσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν. λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἴεται **D**
 πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἰδίᾳ τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιο-
 σύνης, ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος, ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου
 λόγου λέγων· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβό-
 μενος μηδὲν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικῆσαι μηδὲ ἄψαιτο τῶν
 ἄλλοτριῶν, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς
 αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, ἐπαινοῖεν δ' ἂν αὐτὸν
 ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτως.

CAP. IV.

Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου περὶ ᾧν λέγομεν, ἐὰν **E**
 διαστησώμεθα τὸν τε δικαιοτάτον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτα-

ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος. It is not clear if ἰδίᾳ is to be taken as equivalent to καθ' ἑαυτὴν; 'Justice is not a good in itself,' or 'with regard to the individual.' The latter seems preferable, if we take into account ἰδίᾳ in the following sentence.

ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος. This is spoken merely in the character of advocate for injustice which Glaucon has assumed. The question is this, 'Is injustice more profitable (λυσιτελεῖν)?' But Glaucon does not even believe that it is; v.s. Ch. II: πολλὸν γὰρ ἀμείνων ἔρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτι δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ἐπιλαβόμενος. For verbs of this kind v.s. note p. 107.

ἀνοητότατος, v.s. Book I. ἀστεῖος καὶ εὐήθης, Ch. XX. and note.

διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδ. φόβον. So Horace Sat. I, 3, 111—

Jura inventa metu injusti
 fateare necesse est,

Tempora si fastosque velis
 evolvere mundi.

CH. IV.—*Let us now place before us the unjust man, fully equipped with injustice, even appearing by his cleverness, to be just; and on the other side the just man who, on his part, fails to seem just.*

ἐὰν διαστ. τὸν τε δικ. καὶ τὸν ἀδ. See Arist. Nub. 889-1104. διαστ. means to discriminate, to set before oneself separately;

τον, οἷοι τ' ἔσομεθα κρῖναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἢ διάστασις; ἦδε μὴδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μητε τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ εἰντοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἄδικος ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιείτω· οἷον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἱατρὸς τά τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ
361 τὰ δυνατὰ διαῖσθάνεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἔα, ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἄρα πῆ σφαλῆ, ἱκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι· οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασι λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι· τὸν ἀλίσκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἠγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. δότεον οὖν τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον, ἀλλ' ἐάτεον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην
B δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακέσαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ εἰ ἄρα σφάλληται τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῶ εἶναι, λέγειν τε ἱκανῶ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, εἰ ἄν τι μὴνύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται,

this is necessary because, as Glaucon shows below, the just is often mistaken for the unjust, and *vice versa*.

μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδ. As a rule this verb takes an accusative of the thing, and dative of the person, or a double accusative; but the present construction is found again in Xen. Hell. iii. 1, 7: φρεατίαν τεμόμενος ὑπόνομον ἔρπτεν, ὡς ἀφαιρησόμενος τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτῶν.

τέλεον, *v. i.* τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ, and *συγγ.* τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, Ch. XVI. and note.

δεινοὶ δημ., 'adepts in their craft'; *v. i.* ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, Ch. X.

εἰ μέλλει, *v. s.* Book I. Ch. XVIII.: ὁ μέλλων, and note.

τὸν ἀλίσκόμενον. With this expression, and εἰ ἄρα πῆ σφαλῆ, compare *Ag. Nub. loc. cit.* 1079—

μοιχὸς γὰρ ἦν τύχης ἁλοῦς, τὰδ' ἀντιρεῖς πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἠδίκηκας.

λέγει τε ἱκανῶ ὄντι. This is the means employed by the Ἄδικος Λόγος of the Clouds to insure success in roguery; *v. loc. cit.* 1072—

ἡμαρτες, ἠράσθης, ἐμοίχευσάς τι, κατ' ἐλίφθης, ἀπόλωλας· ἀδύνατος γὰρ εἰ λέγειν' ἐμοὶ δ' ὀμιλῶν, &c.

βιάς, *v. s.* 341 B: οὐ·ε γὰρ ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε μὴ λαθῶν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναο. And 345 A, of the unjust man, as here: ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, *du.*

διά τε ἀνδρειαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων
καὶ οὐσίας. τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον
παρ' αὐτὸν ἰστώμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἀπλοῦν καὶ
γένναϊον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἄλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν
ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δόξει
δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι C
τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι· ἄδηλον οὖν, εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν
δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἔνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη. γυμνωτέος
δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως
διακεῖμενος τῷ προτερῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν

νάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λανθάνειν
ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι.

παρασκευὴν φίλων. See *Æschines contra Ctes.* I, 1: τὴν
μὲν παρασκευὴν δράτε, ὧ Ἀθη-
ναῖοι, καὶ τὴν παράταξιν, ὅσα
γεγένηται. And compare the
use of the word *παράκλησις*,
Dem. de Cor. 69 (Arnold):
οἱ μὲν ἐκ παρακλήσεως συγκλη-
μένοι.

ἀπλοῦν, in the first sense, *i. g.*
simplex, 'open' or 'single-
hearted.' In Book III. this
singleness of mind in the
guardian of the city precludes
him from imitation (*i. e.* descrip-
tion in art) of anything not
entirely in accord with his own
nature. See 395 C: τοὺς φύλα-
κας...δεῖν εἶναι δημιουργοὺς ἐλευ-
θερίας πάνυ ἀκριβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν
ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύειν ὅ τι μὴ εἰς
αὐτοὺς φέρει, οὐδὲν δὴ δέοι ἂν
αὐτοὺς ἄλλο πράττειν οὐδὲ
μιμῆσθαι, εἰδὲν δὲ μιμῶνται,
μιμῆσθαι τὰ τοῦτοις προσήκοντα
εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδῶν, ἀνδρείους, σώ-
φρονας, δόσιους, ἐλευθεροῦς. Simi-
larly Cicero speaks of the single
heart which must be a first
condition of friendship. 'Sim-
plicem præterea...eligī par est...
Neque enim fidum potest esse
multiplex ingenium et tortuo-

sum.'—*Lælius xviii.* 65. And
Juvenal Sat. iii. grounds his
antipathy against the Greeks on
the fact that they can assume
any character and play any rôle.
See ll. 74 *seqq.*—

Ede quid illum

Esse putes? quem vis hominem
secum attulit ad nos:
Grammaticus, rhetor, geome-
tres, pictor, aliptes,
Augur, schænobates, medicus,
magus: omnia novit.

...Natio comæda est. Rides:
majore cachinno
Concutitur; flet, si lacrimas
conspexit amici.
...Non sumus ergo pares:
melior, qui semper et omni
Nocte dieque potest alienum
sumere vultum.

κατ' Αἰσχυλί'. See *Sept. c.*
Theb. 592—

οὐ γὰρ δόκειν ἄριστος, ἀλλ'
εἶναι θέλει,
βαθείαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρ-
πύμενος,
ἀφ' ἧς τὰ κεδνά βλαστάνει
βουλεύματα.

And *v. infr.* Ch. V. *ad med.*
where the lines are quoted.

ἄδηλον οὖν, *sc. ἂν εἴη.*

έχετω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, ἵνα ἡ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας
Δ καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένων ἀλλ' ἴτω ἀμετάσπαστος μέχρι θανάτου, δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι ἀδικος διὰ βίου, ὧν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵν' ἀμφοτέροι εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐλληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνωνται ὀπότερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος.

CAP. V.

Βαβαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαῦκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἐκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις

βεβασανισμένος. 'Ut quasi ad Lydium lapidem exploratus sit illis erga justitiam amor, quod neque infamia molliatur atque inflectatur, neque iis quæ eam consequi solent.—Muretus.

εὐδαιμονέστερος. Aristotle speaks strongly against the theory that virtue made a man perfectly happy in spite of circumstances. Thus *Eth.* I, 5, 6: *δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν.* And 7, 13, 3: *οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαιμόνα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἢ ἀγαθὸς, ἢ ἔκοντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν.*

CH. V.—*The purely just man will be fined, imprisoned, tortured; the perfectly unjust will live prosperous and die honoured.*

ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα. A favourite simile with Athenian writers; who had the works of Myron,

Polycleitus, Phidias, and many others before their eyes. See Book IV. 420 C: *νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὡς οἴομεθα, τὴν εὐδαιμόνα (πόλιν) πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες, ὀλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιοῦτους τινας τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ὀλην' αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντας γράφοντας προσελθὼν τις ἔψεγε λέγων, κ.τ.λ.* See also Book VI. 500 D: **Ἄν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ δρᾶ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἔθη καὶ ἰδιὰ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθεῖναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, κ.τ.λ.,* where the metaphor of the painter accompanies it. Again, Book VII. 540 C: *Παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς, ἀπείργασαι.* We find a reference again to the art in *Xen. Mem* 2, 6, 6: *τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς, ἔφη, δοκιμάζομεν, οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαίρομενοι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἂν δρῶμεν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καλῶς εἰργασμένον τοῦτ' πιστεύομεν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς εὐ ποιῆσειν.* Again, Demosthenes accuses Æschines of demanding

τοῖν ἀνδρῶν. Ὡς μάλιστα, ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὄντοι δὲ τοιοῦτοι, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷος ἐκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει. λέκτέον οὖν Ε καὶ δὴ κὰν ἀγροικότερως λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινούντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν. ἐρούσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρέβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθῶν 362 ἀνασχινδουλεύθησεται, καὶ γινώσεται, ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου

an arbitrary definition of δημοτικὸς: ὡσπερ ἀνδριαντα ἐκδεδωκὸς κατὰ ξυγγραφὴν, εἴτ' οὐκ ἔχοντα ἃ προσήκεν ἐκ τῆς ξυγγραφῆς κομιζόμενος. — 268 Reiske. Again, in Ion. 533 A, Plato draws an instance from the art: τί δὲ; ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιῆται, ἤδη τίν' εἶδες, ὅστις... ἀνδριαντοποιῶν περὶ ἐνὸς δεινός ἐστιν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἃ εὖ πεποίηκεν; ἐπεξελθεῖν, 'to go through next.' ἐξ here has the force of διὰ in διελθεῖν, 'to go through,' or 'describe fully.' See Meno. 71 E: εἰ δε βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν. 'Eπὶ with the same force occurs again in ἐπανελεθεῖν, ἐπανιέναι; see Dem. de Cor. 260: βούλομαι τοῖνον ἐπανελεθεῖν ἐφ' ἃ τούτων ἐξῆς ἐπολιτεύομεν, 'I wish next to refer back to...' And so 246: ἀλλ' ἐκέισε ἐπανέρχομαι, 'But I am coming back to that point next.' See also Arist. Nub. 1058—

ἀνείμ' δὴτ' ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὴν γλώτταν,
'From this point I pass back to the question of talking.' And *infra*. 1408—

ἐκέισε δ' ὅθεν ἀπέσχισάς με τοῦ λόγου μέτειμι.

καὶ δὴ κὰν. καὶ δὴ καὶ here is not culminative as noticed pp. 109, 112. We have rather to emphasize καὶ δὴ: 'Well then, granted that it be spoken.' Καὶ δὴ is expressive of assent, either to a thought—

καὶ δὴ τεθναῖσι τίς με δέξεται πόλις.—Eur. Med.
or to a command—

ΚΡ. οὐκοῦν ἐρεῖς ποτ', εἴτ' ἀπαλαχθεῖς ἄπει;

ΦΥ. καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι.—Soph. Ant. 244.

So here καὶ δὴ is assentient to the thought which Glaucon takes for granted will be in Socrates' mind: 'And if you say that my words are rather unpolished,' &c. The assentient force of δὴ is very noticeable in δῆτα; see Book I. Ch. IX.: ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις τὰ κοινωήματα, ἢ τι ἄλλο; κοινωήματα δῆτα, i.e. 'Certainly covenants.' ἐκκαυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμῷ. See Dem. de Cor. 246: τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν καταεγότα, τὴν χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πετηρωμένον.

πολὺ ἦν ἄρα, for ἄρα in this sense *v.s.* 346 C, and note on ὠφέλειαν: also Book I. 335 E, where it has been found

πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἄδικον, ἅτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν,

B βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον,
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλευματα,

πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμῆν ὀπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται, ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλη, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν καὶ τοὺς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλῆπτειν, καὶ θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρε-

that a definition cannot be rightly ascribed to Simonides: μαχόμεθα ἔρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ... ἔάν τις φῆ, κ.τ.λ. For τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχ. see τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, Book I. 329 C; and τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, Book IV. 422 E. For the imperfect indicative we may recall Horace's—

'Ornare pulvinar d'orum
Tempus erat dapibus sodales.'

Od. I, 37, 2.

And Virg. Ecl. I, 80—

'Hic tamen hanc mecum poteras
requiescere noctem.'

where see Conington.

τῷ ὄντι γὰρ, i.e. the unjust man's conduct is consistently unjust, and, inasmuch as he realises good things from it, there is an element of consistency or reality in it.

ἐχόμενον, lit. 'attaching itself to'; v.s. note p. 107, and *infra*. here πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα, Ch. VI. *ad med.*

ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν, v.s. Book I. 333 A: ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα; And *infra*. Ch. XI. where money is described as νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἑνεκα.

τοὺς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθρ. βλῆπτειν, see Meno. 71 E, where the ἀρετὴ of a man includes this practice, when he is in office: πρῶτον μὲν εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν, ῥάδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.

ἀναθήματα. Any dedicated offering: see Herod. 5, 60, this inscription on a tripod, Σκαῖος πυγμαχέων με ἐκηβύλαφ Ἀπόλλωνι νίκησας ἀνέθηκε τέιν περικαλλῆς ἀγαλμα—in the temple of Ismenian Apollo at Thebes. Again, upon a chariot and four horses of bronze, on the left hand

πῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὓς ἂν βουληαί, ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον. οὕτω φασίν, ὧ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ.

CAP. VI.

Ταῦτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐν νῶ D εἶχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, Οὐ τί που οἶει, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἰκανῶς

as one entered by the propylæa into the Acropolis at Athens:

Ἔθνεα Βοιωγῶν καὶ Χαλκιδέων
δαμάσαντες

Παῖδες Ἀθηναίων ἐργασίην ἐν
πολέμῳ,

Δεσμῶν ἐν ἀχλύοεντι σιδηρέῳ
ἔσβεσαν ἔβριον,

Τῶν Ἰππους δεκάτην Παλλάδι
τάσδ' ἔθεσαν.

See also the epigraph of Pausanias upon the tripod dedicated by the Greeks at Delphi, after the Persian war—

Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγὸς ἐπεὶ στρατὸν
ᾤλεσε Μήδων

Πανσανίας Φοῖβῳ μνημ' ἀνέ-
θηκε τόδε.

θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς. Socrates at the end of the dialogue comes back to this question, and shows, in direct reference to this passage (ἀρ' οὐδ' ἀποδώσετέ μοι ἂ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, Book X. 612 C), that God knows well the character of each, *ibid.* E. οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἀποδώσετε, ὅτι θεοὺς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἶδός ἐστιν. It is worth noticing that Hesiod,

whose morality Adeimantus disparages, Ch. VI. *infra*. bears witness also to the omniscience of Heaven. See Op. et Dies. 247:

ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν
ἔδοντες

ἀθάνατοι φράζονται ὅσοι σκο-
λιῆσι δίκησιν

ἀλλήλους τρίβουσι θεῶν ὅπιν
οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.

τρὶς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ
πουλυβοτείρη

ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς φύλακες θνητῶν
ἀνθρώπων.

θεοφιλέστερον, in opposition to Socrates' position that the unjust is θεοῖς ἐχθρός. Book I Ch. XXIII. 352 B.

CH. VI.—*Herewith Adeimantus struck in: 'Neither should we leave out the case for justice: fathers commend justice to their children, not for its own sake, but for its rewards; and poets likewise.'*

ταῦτ' εἶπ. With these opening words compare Book I. Ch. XVII. *infra*. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ὁ Θερασύμαχος ἐν νῶ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι.

εἰρησθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου; Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν: εἶπον-
 Αυτό, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ εἰρηται ὁ μάλιστα ἔδει ρηθῆναι.
 Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ
 παρείη ὥστε καὶ σύ, εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμυνε.
 καίτοι ἐμέ γε ἱκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ρηθέντα κατα-
 παλαῖσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη.
Ε καὶ ὅς, Οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε·
 δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν
 ὅδε εἶπεν, οἱ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ
 ψέγουσιν, ἵν' ἦ σαφέστερον ὁ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι
 Γλαύκων, λέγουσι δὲ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέ-
363 ρες τε υἱέσι καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι, ὡς χρῆ
 δίκαιον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες.

τὸ λεγόμενον, 'as the proverb goes.' The phrase occurs again in Book VI. 492 C, ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἵνα οἷε καρδίαν ἴσχειν. So τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, "as they say in the game." ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλις εἰσι παμπολλαί, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων. Book IV. 422 E. Also Euthydemus *fin.* Θαρρῶν διώκε καὶ ἕσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ παιδιά, *id.* Ch. XIX. *fin.* ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ Διδὸς Κόρινθος γίγνεται; also Chaps. XX., XXIV. The expression stands in apposition to the proverb it recalls, and some verb such as γίγνεται is understood, as we had above, τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, Book I. Ch. III. οὐκοῦν, *i. e.* 'is it not as we should expect?' 'Naturally,' as in Book I. Ch. V. *fin.* where there is also a reference to relationship, οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρόνομος, 'Should we not expect it, Polemarchus being your heir?'

ἐμέ γέ, εἰρωνικῶς, 'poor me.' καταπαλαῖσαι, a favourite metaphor; more generally, in Book IX. 583 B, δις νενικηκῶς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτήρῳ τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Διὶ, κ.τ.λ. And below, *ibid.* with this metaphor, καίτοι τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτώματων. Similarly in the contest between the Λόγοι in Aristophanes' Clouds, the Ἄδικος says:—
 ἐπισχες. εὐθύς γὰρ σε μέσον
 ἔχω λαβῶν ἄφυκτον, l. 1045.
 οὐδέν λέγεις, Adeimantus means that he takes Socrates' denial as merely εἰρωνεία. For he proceeds to make the task of explanation harder than ever.
 οἱ sc. τούτων οἱ.
 βούλεσθαι, 'to mean.' Lat. *velle dicere.*
 πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδ. 'all kinds of guardians.'
 οὐκ αὐτὸ δικ. ἐπ., 'not praising the thing itself, justice.' Adeimantus is here taking up Glaucon's original point; viz. that some things are desirable

ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἵνα δοκοῦντι
δικαίῳ εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης ἀρχαί τε καὶ
γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διῆλθεν ἄρτι ἀπὸ τοῦ
εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ ἀδίκῳ. ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ οὗτοι τὰ
τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσι· τὰς γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις
ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθὰ, τοῖς
ὁσίοις ἃ φασὶ θεοὺς διδόναι, ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος
Ἡσιόδός τε καὶ Ὀμηρός φασιν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρῦς τοῖς Ἰ
δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν—

in themselves, others for their effects, and others for both. *Suipr.* Ch. I. Ἄρα σοὶ δοκεῖ τοιοῦδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι; cf. *Juv. Sat. X. 141.*

Quis enim virtutem amplectitur ipsam

Præsentia si tollas.

γίγνηται... ἀρχαί τε, &c. The schema Pindaricum; where the plural substantive is masculine or feminine; but the word ὅσαπερ here helps out the irregularity. See *Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 49,*

Στεῦται δ' ἱεροῦ Τμῶλου πελάται

Ζύγον ἀμφιβαλεῖν δούλιον Ἑλλάδι.

And see Book V. *infra.* 462 E *crit.* ἔστι μὲν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες τε καὶ δῆμος. *Jelf, Gr. Gr., 386,* notices that this schema amongst Attic writers is chiefly limited to the verb ἔστι, ἦν, at the beginning of a sentence.

ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ... 'And these people carry out this principle, the advantage of a good reputation, still further.' τὰ τῶν δοξῶν is something like τὸ τῶν παιζόντων quoted above. The expression is indefinite in both cases, because it is as short and

elliptical as possible. And it is shortened thus because there can be no doubt in the mind of the hearer as to the reference in both cases. τὸ τῶν παιζόντων means 'the (saying) of people who play a game.' τὰ τῶν δοξῶν means 'the (advantage) of (gaining) reputation.' τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους, 'the (case, or circumstances, of) Sophocles.' *Suipr.* Ch. III. The article, in short, is used thus indefinitely with the purpose of suggesting to the hearer some known fact about the substantive which depends on it as genitive. See Ch. II. Book I., *sup.* note τούτο..., τοῦ βίου.

ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσ. Spoken sarcastically: in the same spirit that *Thrasymachus* uses the expression γενναία εὐθθεια, Ch. XX. Book I. 'Ingenuous' is the sense meant to be conveyed. Translate, 'as our good Hesiod and Homer say.' For Hesiod's theology, *v. Introd. p. 25, 26;* and Ch. V. here, note on *θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου.* And, for another charge against Homer's morality, *p. 133.*

Τὰς δρῦς, &c., see Hesiod, *Op. et Dies*, 230. Τοῖσι φέρεται μὲν γαῖα πολλὴν βίον. οὐρεσι δὲ δρῦς Ἄκρη μὲν τε φέρεται βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ μελισσας· Εἰροπόκι δ' ἕτις μαλλοῖς καταβεβριθασί.

ἄκρας μὲν τε φέρειν βαλανους, μέσσας δὲ μελίσσας
 εἰροπόκι δ' ὄϊες, φησὶν, μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι,
 καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τουτων ἐχόμενα· παρα-
 πλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος· ὥστε τευ γάρ φησιν

ἡ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος, ὅστε θεουδῆς
 εὐδικίας ἀνεχησι, φέρησι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα'
 C πυρούς καὶ κριθάς, βριθησι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῶ,
 τίκτη δ' ἔμπεδα μήλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ ἰχθύς.

Μουσαῖος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τὰγαθὰ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς
 αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόασι τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς "Αἰδου

τούτων ἐχ., 'connected with,'
 'related to these,' and so 'like
 these' A similar sense is found
 in the case of εἶναι with genitive,
 Book IV. 438 B. ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ
 τοιαῦτα οἶα εἶναι του, 'All things
 that bear a relation to some-
 thing.' For ἔχομαι see above
 πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον. The
 subject and object of ἔχομαι used
 thus represent consecutive mem-
 bers of a sequence. See Xen.
 Anab. I, 8, 4. Κλέαρχος μὲν τὰ
 δεξία..., Πρόξενος δὲ ἐχόμενος, οἱ
 δὲ ἄλλοι μετὰ τούτων. Cf. ἐφεξῆς,
 ἐπισχέρω.

ἡ βασιλῆος, &c. Hom. Od.
 XIX. 109.

Μουσαῖος. According to
 Herodotus (VII. 6) he was a
 seer. ἔχοντες Ὀνομάκριτον,
 ἄνδρα Ἀθηναίων, χρησμολόγον τε
 καὶ διαθέτην χρησμῶν τῶν Μου-
 σαίου. His χρησμοὶ were of
 sufficient importance to make
 tampering with them criminal:
 ἰβιδ. ἐξηλάσθη γὰρ ὑπὸ Ἰππαρ-
 χου τοῦ Πεισιστράτου ὁ Ὀνομά-
 κριτος ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν, ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ
 ἀλοῦς ὑπὸ Δάσου τοῦ Ἑρμιονέος
 ἐμποιέων ἐς τὰ Μουσαίου χρησμῶν,
 ὡς αἱ ἐπὶ Δήμου ἐπικείμεναι νῆσοι
 ἀφανίζοιτο κατὰ τῆς θαλάσσης.

He is said to have foretold the
 particulars of the battle of
 Salamis; *id.* 8, 96. ὥστε
 ἀποπλήσαι τὸν χρησμὸν, τὸν τε
 ἄλλον πάντα τὸν περὶ τῆς ναυμα-
 χίης ταύτης εἰρημενόν Βακίδι καὶ
 Μουσαίῳ, κ.τ.λ. He is mentioned
 in the same capacity with Bacis
 again in 9, 43. ταῦτα μὲν καὶ
 παραπλήσια τούτοισι ἄλλα Μου-
 σαίῳ ἔχοντα οἶδα ἐς Πέρσας.
 Plato in the Ion 536, speaks of
 him as possessing with Homer
 and Orpheus poetic inspiration
 and occult influence upon other
 poets and rhapsodes. οἱ μὲν
 ἐξ Ὀρφέως, οἱ δὲ ἐκ Μουσαίου
 (ἡρητημένοι εἰσί), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
 ἐξ Ὀμήρου κατέχονται τε καὶ
 ἔχονται. Musæus, according to
 Plato's system of theology, see
 above p. 126, note on σοφὸς καὶ
 θεῖος, was one of those men in
 whom τὸ θεῖον was present to a
 great extent. See *id.* 533 D.
 ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ἐν
 παρά σοι περὶ Ὀμήρου εὐ λέγειν
 δ' οὐκ ἐν δὴ ἔλεγον, θεῖα δὲ δύναμις.
 Again 534 D. οὐκ ἀνθρώπινά ἐστι
 τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ποιήματα, οὐδὲ
 ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ θεῖα καὶ λέγειν.
 Compare also πᾶν γὰρ θεῖον
 πεπόνθατε in the Republic, II.

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γὰρ ἀγαγοντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατακλίναντες καὶ συμ-
πόσιον τῶν ὁσίων κατασκευάσαντες ἐστεφανωμένους D
ποιοῦσι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἤδη διάγειν μεθύοντας,
ἠγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον·
οἱ δ' ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσι μισθοὺς
παρὰ θεῶν· παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος
κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ εὐόρκου. ταῦτα
δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐγκωμιάζουσι δικαιοσύνην· τοὺς
δὲ ἀνοσίλους αὐ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύτ-

Ch. X. *ἰνί*. He is included by Protagoras among the first σοφισταί or 'Wise men', who veiled their true profession under that of poetry, or sooth-saying, or gymnastic, or music; Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, having the reputation of poets, Musæus and Orpheus of sooth-sayers. Prot. 316 D. φοβου-
μένους τὸ ἐπαχθῆς αὐτῆς (sc. τὸ σοφιστὰς καλεῖσθαι) πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι τοὺς μὲν ποιῆσιν, οἷον Ὀμηρὸν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς τε αὐτὴ τελεταὶ τε καὶ χρησμοφθίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον. His son Eumolpus, migrating from Thrace to Attica, founded the Eleusinian mysteries: hence the sacred family of Eumolpidæ. V. *ἰνφρ*. Ch. VIII. *ῖν*. βίβλων δὲ ἑμᾶδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως.

νεανικώτερα, v. *ἰνφρ*. Book IV. 425 C, καὶ τελευτῶν δὴ, οἶμαι, φαίμεν ἂν εἰς ἓν τι τέλειον καὶ νεανικὸν ἀποβαίνειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ τούναντίον, Æschylus (Ag. 75) speaks of the νεαρὸς μυελὸς στέρνων ἐντὸς ἀνάσσων.

τῷ λόγῳ, v. *ἰνφρ*. Ch. X. *αἰ* *ῖν*. εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασάμεθα λόγῳ.

κατακλίναντες... ὁσίων... ἐστεφαν. v.s. Book I. Ch. II.

καθῆστο δ' ἐστεφανωμένος, and note.

μέθην αἰώνιον. This view of the after life is evidently a survival from barbaric times. Μεθῆ is emphatically proscribed in the account of the régime under which the φύλακες are to live; see Book III. 403 E. A connection between old Greek and Scandinavian mythology is apparent here; for in Valhalla the Valkyries or attendant nymphs are said to serve warriors after their death with cups of mead and ale; and thus the promise used to be made to a warrior: 'You shall quaff beer out of the skulls of your enemies.'

μακροτέρους ἀποτ. A common phrase to express a lengthy speech. Eurip. Med. 1351—

μακρὰν ἂν ἐξέτεινα τοῖσδ' ἐναντία λόγοισιν.

Æsch. Ag. 916: μακρὰν γὰρ ἐξέτεινας.

τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίλους αὐ... To answer this travestie of the rewards of virtue and vice, Socrates at the end of the whole Dialogue tells a tale in which fearful punishments and great enjoyment are meted out to the bad and good respectively. This

τουσιν ἐν "Αιδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι
 Εφέρειν, ἔτι τε ζῶντας εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἅπερ
 Γλαύκων περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων
 διήλθε τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων λέγου-
 σιν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔπαινος καὶ ὁ
 ψόγος οὗτος ἐκατέρων.

CAP. VII.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκεψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὐ
 εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδία τε
 364 λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐνὸς
 στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν, ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἢ σωφροσύνη τε

tale of Er the Pamphylian (see Argument Book X.) did not represent Socrates' belief regarding a future existence; and is merely popular. His general audience, for whose sake the tale is told, could hardly understand, much less appreciate his ideal of existence, viz.: ἀνακλί-
 ναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς
 αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς
 παρέχον, sc. ἰδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ :
 'To lift the eye of the soul up
 to the contemplation of the Real
 Good.' Book VII. 540 A.

ἄγοντες, 'representing them
 as coming to an evil reputation.'
 Like κατορύττουσιν above, 'sub-
 merge them' i.e. 'represent
 them as submerged.' It is a
 brachylogy of expression, where
 the first and prominent subject
 of the sentence is constituted
 subject also to an action which
 does not really belong to it.
 In Soph. Œd. Tyr. 742, we
 have the expression used of an
 old man—

χρῶζων ἄρτι λευκανθὲς κᾶρα,
 an action where the person is

not properly an agent. And *id.*
 480—

τὰ μεσόμφαλα γῆς ἀπονοσφίζω
 μαντεῖα.

i.e. 'going away from,' but
 literally, 'separating.' In the
 same way Virg. Æn. 7, 173—

'Hic primos attollere fasces
 Regibus omen erat.'

Where the kings are said 'to
 raise,' when properly they
 should be said 'to have raised
 for them.' Other examples in
 Virgil are, 'dare classibus
 Austros,' 'seram dedit per
 membra quietem'; and see
 below here Ch. XVI. παιδεύωμεν
 τοὺς ἄνδρας.

ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν, i.e. 'they
 have none better to speak of.'

CH. VII.—*The poets too one and
 all describe virtue as toilsome,
 and vice as pleasant, whilst
 soothsayers offer to purge men
 from crime with a few prayers.*

ὑμνοῦσιν, 'harp on this';
 see Book VIII. 549 E: ἄλλα δὲ
 ὅσα καὶ οἷα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες

καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον ἀκο-
λασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετέες κτήσασθαι,
δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν. λυσιτελέστερα δὲ
τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγουσι, καὶ
πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας
εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσι δημοσίᾳ
τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἂν πη
ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὦσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς **B**
ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἐτέρων. τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ
περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιώτατοι λέ-
γονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυ-
χίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἔνειμαν, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίους
ἐναντίαν μοῖραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντιες ἐπὶ
πλουσιῶν θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ

περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν. And
supr. Book I. Ch. III.: τὸ
γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν, ὕσων κακῶν
σφίσι αἴτιον.

πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ...δυνά-
μεις ἔχ. Cf. Seneca, Herc. Fur.
2, 250—

‘Prosperum ac felix scelus
Virtus vocatur.’

τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμ. Juv. I, 74—

‘Probitas laudatur et alget:
Criminibus debent hortos,
prætoria, mensas,
Argentum vetus et stantem
extra pocula caprum.’

ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες. With
this passage the third satire of
Juvenal may be well compared;
e.g. ll. 20 seqq.—

‘artibus, inquit, honestis
Nullus in urbe locus.’

160 seqq.—

‘Quis gener huic placuit censu
minor atque puellæ
Sarcinulis impar? Quis pau-
per scribitur hæres?
Quando in consilio est Œdi-
libus? Agmine facto

Debuerant olim tenues mi-
grasse Quirites.’

And for the admiration and
influence which wealth brings
with it, Sat. VII. 124, seqq.

ὁμολογ. ‘although they allow
the just to be better.’

πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας.
At the end of this Book it is
argued that God cannot be the
author of evil to any one; 379
C: οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ
ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὐ ἐχόντων
αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον...
τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα δεῖ
ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια δὲ οὐ τὸν θεόν.
ἄρα, introducing the words or
thoughts of others, stigmatizes
them as incorrect or absurd;
see below: πείθοντες...ὡς ἄρα
λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημά-
των διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν
εἰσί. See also Æschines contr.
Ctes. 13 (ed. Simcox): Λέξουσι δὲ
...ὡς ἄρα, ὅσα τις αἰρετὸς ὢν πράτ-
τει κατὰ ψήφισμα, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα
ἀρχή. Where the orator is antici-
pating the case for the defence.

Q

σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ
 C ἐπιφαλαῖς, εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προ-
 γόνων, ἀκείσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐορτῶν, εἴαν τε
 τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλη, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν
 ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψειν, ἐπάγωγαις τισὶ καὶ
 καταδέσμοις τοὺς θεοὺς, ὡς φασι, πειθοντές σφισιν
 ὑπηρετεῖν. τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας
 ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται, οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας
 δίδόντες,

ὡς τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
 D ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·
 τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρουθεν ἔθηκαν

καὶ τινα ὁδὸν μακρὰν τε καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν
 θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὀμηρον μαρτύ-
 ρονται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκείνος εἶπε

λιστοὶ δέ [στρεπτοὶ] τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
 καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχολαῖς ἀγαναίσιν

ἐπιφαλαῖς. These were also used
 to keep off disease; Eurip.
 Hippol. 478—

εἰσὶν δ' ἐπιφαλα καὶ λόγοι
 θελκτήριοι
 φανήσεται δὲ τῆσδε φάρμακον
 νόσου.

ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, v.s. Book
 I. Ch. XXI. τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ.

ἐπάγωγαις τισὶ καὶ καταδ. In
 Aristoph. Nub. 749 we have
 a caricature of this witchcraft—
 γυναικα φαρμακίδ' εἰ περιέμενος
 Θετταλῆν,
 καθέλοιμι νύκτωρ τὴν σελή-
 νην...

As in Horace Epod. 17, 5—

Refixa cælo devocare sidera.

And again, Epod. 5, 45—

Quæ sidera excantata voce
 Thessala

Lunamque cælo deripit.

Virg. Ecl. 8, 69—

Carmina vel cælo possunt
 deducere Lunam.

And Plato in the Gorgias 513:
 τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας,
 τὰς Θετταλίδας.

ὡς τὴν μὲν, &c. Hesiod.
 Opp. et Dies. 285. See Xen.
 Mem. 2, 1, 22 in the choice
 of Hercules: ὃ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς
 χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς
 εὐφροσύνας ἢ γυνή σοι αὐτῆ
 διηγείται. *Et supr.* for ἰδρῶτα
 here: εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι βούλει
 δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρε-
 τεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμνασ-
 τεῖν σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἰδρῶτι.

λιστοὶ, &c. Hom. Il. ix.
 497.

λοιβῆ τε κνίση τε παρατρῶπῳσ' ἄνθρωποι
 λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῆ καὶ ἀμάρτη. E

βίβλων δὲ ὄμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρ-
 φέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὡς φασί,
 καθ' ἃς θηηπολοῦσι, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ
 καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικη-
 μάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μὲν ἔτι
 ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς κα- 365
 λούσιν, αἰ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ
 εὔσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.

CAP. VIII.

Ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ
 τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄν-
 θρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα
 ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ

τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν. See p. 120
 supr., and Ch. V. B, ἐκείσε
 ἀπιέναι, τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν.

CH. VIII.—*What wonder if
 young men, then, make this per-
 fect injustice their object? It is
 no easy task, but all things
 perfect are difficult to realize;
 and if we prosper in wickedness
 we can appease the gods with
 sacrifice.*

περὶ ταῦτα ἔχουσι τιμῆς, see
 Jelf Gr. Gr. 528. Thuc. 1. 22,
 ὡς ἐκατέρων τις εὐνοῖδς... ἡ μνήμης
 ἔχει. Ἐχειν in this sense usually
 refers to the condition not the
 action of the subject, e.g. ἔχειν
 τρόπον, εὐδαιμονίας, γνώμης,
 ἐμπειρίας, but here τιμῆς stands
 for τοῦ τιμᾶν.

τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων
 ψυχὰς. A similar case is put
 below, Book VI. 492, ὅταν, εἶπον,
 ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἀθροῖο οἱ πολλοὶ
 εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ
 θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα ἄλλον
 κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν
 πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι
 τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων,
 τὰ δὲ ἐπαιῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως
 ἐκάτερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κρο-
 τοῦντες, πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς αἰ τε
 πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν
 ἐπηχοῦντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον
 παρέχουσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου.
 ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ
 λεγόμενον, τίνα οἶει καρδίαν
 ἴσχειν; ἢ ποῖαν ἂν αὐτῷ παιδείαν
 ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατα-
 κλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου
 ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχῆσεσθαι
 φερομένην κατὰ ροῦν ἢ ἂν οὗτος

ικανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς περ ἐπιπτόμενοι
 συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν, ποίος τις ἂν ὦν καὶ πῆ
Β πόρευθῆεις τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι; λέγοι γὰρ
 ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον
 ἐκείνο τὸ

πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον
 ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις

ἀναβὰς καὶ ἑμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιώ; τὰ
 μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ
 δοκῶ, ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας
 φανεράς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρασκευασα-
Σ μένω θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται. οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ
 δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν

φερῆ, καὶ φήσει τε τὰ αὐτὰ τού-
 τοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι, καὶ
 ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ
 ἔσσεσθαι τοιοῦτον; In this pas-
 sage we see that 'flood' of
 words which Socrates has already
 complained of in Thrasymachus
 (Book I. Ch. καταντλήσας κατὰ
 τῶν ὠτῶν ἀθρόον καὶ πολὺν τὴν
 λόγον), and Glaucon has men-
 tioned in the beginning of his
 speech (διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὄτα,
 ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων
 ἄλλων). All such doctrines as
 are conveyed through these
 means, says Adeimantus are
 depraved; and, as might be ex-
 pected, the young believe them.
 Now it is the young to whom
 Socrates principally addresses
 himself: Cephalus, as has been
 noticed, p. 111, and Polemar-
 chus, p. 109, alike hold out the
 inducement of converse with
 the young to Socrates; and in
 the Euthydemus we find Socra-
 tes telling two Sophists what a
 strong interest he takes in a
 young man Clinias. Later on

in the Republic we find a partial
 explanation of this interest.
 Apart from other reasons,
 Socrates was interested in the
 young, because they were most
 susceptible to his teaching, and
 he hoped to imbue them rather
 than the older men with his
 beliefs; see Book III. 415 D:
 οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὅπως γ' ἂν αὐτὰ
 οὗτοι ὅπως μέντ' ἂν οἱ τούτων
 νιεῖς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι
 ἔνθρωποι οἱ ὕστερον.

ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λέγ. ὡς περ ἐπι-
 πτόμενοι, 'fitting as it were over
 the whole field of words.' Al-
 though the metaphor is different,
 the sense of the present passage
 reminds us of that in Book I. Ch.
 XXIV.: τοῦ δὲ παραφερομένου
 ἀπογεύονται ἀρπάζοντες, and see
 below Ch. XII. *ῥην.*: ἐπικίνον-
 τες.

τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι, v. s.
 Book I. 352 E: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ
 ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος ἀλλὰ περὶ
 τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ῥην, and
 Note.

τὰν ἀλάθειαν βί. Plato is

βιάται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὄλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλω περὶ ἔμαντον σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραφτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἐλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥάδιον αἰεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές, φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλ' ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτη ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε

quoting Simonides: hence the peculiarity of dialect.

σκιαγρ. ἀρετῆς, see Book VII. 523 B, where the word σκιαγραφέω refers to objects drawn in outline, not clearly and sharply presented to the sight: τὰ πρόρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δηλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα. And in Book X. 602 D, σκιαγραφία is described as deceptive: φ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει; and in Book IX. 583 B, the pleasure of the φρόνιμος is said to be the only true pleasure, that of others being shadowy: οὐδὲ παναληθῆς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονή πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις. σχῆμα means the figure or general outlines of an object; thus it denotes the movement of troops. Book VII. 326 D: ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐν αὐταῖς τε μάχαις καὶ πορείαις; and in Book VIII. 548 D, we find the word itself explained: αὕτη μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτω γεγρονυία καὶ τοιαύτη ἔν τις εἴη, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι, 'in outline, not in detail.'

τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφ. Fr. 89, τῷ

δ' ἄρ' ἀλώπηξ κερδαλέα συνήνητο.

“Ἀλώπηξ dicitur pro pelle vulpina, ut λέων pro pelle leonina, et ejusdem generis alia; de quibus Horatius de Arte Poetica, 437:—

Nunquam te fallent animi
sub vulpe latentēs.—

Ruhnken.

οὐδὲν εὐπετές τῶν μεγάλων. Socrates expresses this sentiment in Book VI 497 E in the words, χαλεπὰ τῷ δυντι τὰ καλά. εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, see note, Book I. Ch. XVIII.

ταύτη ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη, see notes, pp. 128, 132, 135, and *infra*. Book III. 401 C: τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους ἴχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, and Book VIII. *ἰπι.*: ἀναμνησθῶμεν, πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἴωμεν; and Book V.: ἄρα ἂ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνος ἡμῖν ἀρμόττει. And the final discovery of justice Plato compares to threading the way through a dark and tangled thicket, in pursuit of game. Book IV. 432 C: καὶ μὴν, εἶπον ἐγὼ, δύσβατός γέ τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκοις· ἐστὶ γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερευνητός, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅμως ἰτέον.

καὶ ἑταιρείας συναζόμεν, εἰσὶ τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικὴν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ δίδοναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. οὐκουν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν· εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθὲν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν· οἱ δὲ

πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι, i. q. σοφισταί, see Ch. II. note ἀρίστου δντος; and Protagoras 312 C: τί ἡγεῖ εἶναι σοφιστὴν; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἡδ' ὅς, ὥσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα... Ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστὶ... ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν. Gorgias was a sophist of this sort, see Philebus 58 A: Ἦκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις, ὡς ἢ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν. And for σοφίαν δημηγορικὴν see Sympos. 198 C, where Socrates bears witness to his powers of rhetoric: ἐφοβούμην μὴ μοι τελευτῶν ὃ Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφάλην δεινοῦ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πέμψας, &c. Also Aristophanes makes the ἄδικος λόγος the principal accomplishment of the Socratic School; Clouds 114 seqq.—

τούτῳ τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγοις,
τὸν ἤττονα

νικᾶν λέγοντά φασι ταδικώτερα.
And one of the first questions Socrates asks the Neophyte in the same play is—

ἔνεστι δῆτά σοι λέγειν ἐν τῇ
φύσει;

τὰ μὲν πείσομεν τὰ δὲ βιασ.,

v. s. Ch. IV. βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δεήται.

θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν. See 612 E, Book X.: θεοὺς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷός ἐστιν. And here above Ch. V. *fin.*: θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι; sc. τὸν ἄδικον. ἀλλὰ δὴ introduces an objection, 'But one might say the gods know who is unjust.' And the objection is answered on each of two suppositions: (i.) The gods do not exist; therefore we need not trouble ourselves. (ii.) We can appease them with sacrifice.

καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν. This is C F. Hermann's alteration of the old reading ... μέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν οὐ μελητέον. οὐ is not supported. Stallb. replaces *τί* καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον with certain MSS. All agree as to the sense; for it will be noticed that Hermann's text gives οὐκουν, whilst Stallb. οὐκοῦν. And so G. Baiter, while reading ἀμελητέον, keeps οὐκοῦν.

λόγων καὶ γενεαλογ. ποιητῶν. In his construction of a state, which begins at Ch. XI., Socrates soon comes to this point, viz. the popular theology, and treats it with the greatest strictness. See below Ch. XVII. seqq.

αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν, ὡς εἰσὶν οἰοὶ θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχολαῖς ἀγανῆσι καὶ ἀνάθημασι παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι· οἷς ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ἢ οὐδέτερω πειστέον· εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων. δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι ὑπὸ θεῶν 366 ἐσόμεθα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπώσόμεθα· ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανοῦμέν τε καὶ λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἄιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων. ἀλλ'

Θυσίαις, &c., v.s. Ch. VII. εἰσὶν οἰοί, sc. θεοί. Such priestcraft as this was not uncommon in Greece, and was practised by the ministers of Cybele, called *μητραγῦραι*. In the time of the Roman Empire the priests of Isis, besides those of Cybele, flocked to Italy to practise similar knaveries, and even Jews traded upon their religion. See Juvenal VI. 543,

Arcanam Judæa tremens mendicat in aurem

Interpres legum Solymarum.

We find mention of these priests of Cybele in *Juv.* II. 111; VI. 512; and we gain some idea of their quack religions from Demosthenes' reflections upon Æschines, when he is accusing him of having assisted his mother in inaugural rites or mysteries of initiation. *De Cor.* 312 (Reiske), ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος τῇ μητρὶ τελοῦσθαι τὰς βίβλους ἀνεγίνωσκας καὶ τὰλλα συνσκευωροῦ, τὴν μὲν νύκτα νεβρίζων καὶ κρατηρίζων καὶ καθαίρων τοὺς τελομένους καὶ ἀπομάττων τῷ πληθὶ καὶ τοῖς πτύροις καὶ ἀνιστάς ἀπὸ τοῦ καθαρμοῦ κελεύων λέγειν 'ἐφυγον κακὸν, εὗριν ἔμεινον,' &c. Arnold *ad loc.* states that Lobeck has proved these mysteries to

have been of an Orphico-Bacchic character, to which the word *νεβρίζων*, amongst others, points.

Θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικ. Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* 620, calls this a temporal genitive, 'where a point of time is marked by an action,' and compares Herod. VI. 129, γενέσθαι ἀπὸ δείπνου. It is a condensed expression, the notion of ἀπαλλάττειν (v. *infra*. ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν) being probably present to the writer's mind; thus, fully expressed, θυτέον ὥστε ἀπαλλάττειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων.

κερδανοῦμέν τε καὶ...ἀπαλλάξομεν, 'But if we do wrong we shall not only gain by it, but get off scot free, by making prayers when we transgress and using persuasion when we commit crimes.' For the various senses of ἀπαλλάσσω and its compounds v.s. note p. 115.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ..., reply of the objector: which is answered by a sentence introduced by ἀλλὰ repeated, as above, Book I. *ἰπιῖ*. ἀλλὰ περιμένετε· ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν, and p. 109. note. Also Ch. IX. Book I., Ἄλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοῦς; Ἄλλὰ ἀδύνατον.

ὠφελήσουσιν ἀγνιζομένους αἱ τελεταὶ καὶ οἱ λύσιοι
Β θεοί, ὡς αἱ μέγισταὶ πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν
 παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφήται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἷ
 ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει μνηύουσιν.

CAP. IX.

Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἂν πρὸ
 μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἰροίμεθ' ἂν; ἦν ἔαν μετ' εὐσχη-
 μοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ
 παρ' ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντές τε καὶ
 τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων
 λεγόμενος λόγος. ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τίς
 μηχανή, ᾧ Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ᾧ
Κ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος
 ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα;

αἱ τελεταί, v. Dem. de Cor.
loc. cit.

θεῶν παῖδες, i.e. Orpheus,
 Musæus, &c., v.s. *not. ad Μου-
 σαῖος*; and *not. ad σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ
 θεῖος*, p. 126. Ion 534 E, οἱ δὲ
 ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἐριμνεῖς τῶν
 θεῶν εἰσι, κατεχόμενοι ἐξ ὅτου ἂν
 ἕκαστος κατέχηται.

CH. IX.—*In fine, all who can
 commit injustice with impunity
 will continue to do so, until those
 who praise justice praise it for
 itself, not for its rewards. To
 you, Socrates, we look for a better
 recommendation of Justice.*

ἔτι, i.e. 'after this comparison
 of their respective values.'

πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν, join in
 translation.

τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων.
 There is a slight touch of sar-

casm discernible here in Adei-
 mantus' words. This expression
 is a Hendiadys:—'many of the
 most competent.'

δύναμις, so below, ἀδύνατον
 αὐτὸ δρᾶν. This is in agreement
 with Glaucon's original account
 of the nature of justice, v.s. Ch.
 II. τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν
 ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν, &c.,
 'Those who have no power';
 whilst those who have power, be
 it bodily or mental, direct or
 indirect, find injustice to be to
 their advantage rather than
 justice. Hence we are at present
 only listening to Thrasymachus'
 case elaborated,—that Justice is
 the Interest of the stronger; for
 Thrasymachus made it clear that
 the interest of the stronger was
 injustice towards the weaker.
 Ch. XVI. Book I.

ἀλλὰ μὴ. μὴ is used, the case

ὡς δὴ τοι εἴ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκα-
 μεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη,
 πολλήν που σύγγνωμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς
 ἀδίκους, ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θεία φύσει δυσχε-
 ραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται
 αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ **D**
 ἀνανδρίας ἢ γήρωσ ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει
 τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δέ, δῆλον· ὁ
 γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος
 ἀδικεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἶός τ' ἦ. καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὅθεν περ ἅπας ὁ λόγος
 οὗτος ὥρμησε καὶ τῷδε καὶ ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες,

being hypothetical. For ἀλλὰ
 with the negative, v. *infra*. 379
 D., ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

ἔχει... ἀποφῆναι v.s. pp. 181
 and 190; *ei infra*. Ch. XI. ἵνα
 οἱ οἰκοδόμοι (ἔχιοιεν) χρῆσθαι
 ὑποζυγίοις.

ἄριστον δικ., v. *infra*. Ch. IX.
 ἢ μὲν κακόν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθόν' ἐστι,
 'One is an evil, the other a
 good,' ἄριστον, 'the Best.'

ἱκανῶς ἔγνωκεν... πολλήν συγ-
 γνώμην, Tout comprendre c'est
 tout pardonner. The particles
 ὡς δὴ τοι, introduce a statement
 explaining or corroborating that
 preceding, 'At any rate the fact
 is...' ὡς here is like ἐπεὶ in
 Euthyphr. 9 B. Μανθάνω ὅτι
 σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέ-
 στερος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε
 ἐνδείξει, κ.τ.λ. And Arist. Nub.
 785,

Ἄλλ' εὐθὺς ἐπιλήθει σύ γ' ἄττ'
 ἂν καὶ μάθης·

ἐπεὶ τί νυνὶ πρῶτον ἐδιδάχθης;
 λέγε.

Both particles bring in a further
 consideration not to be lost sight
 of.

πλὴν εἴ τις θεία φύσις, v.s. *not*.
 ἀδ σοφὸς καὶ θεῖος, p. 126. εὐ

γὰρ χρῆ εἶδέναι ὅτι περ ἂν σωθῆ
 τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ
 καταστάσει πολιτεῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν
 αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς.
 Book VI. 492 E. These words
 are part of the description men-
 tioned above in Ch. VIII. (on
 the words τί οἰόμεθα ἀκούουσας);
 where it is shown that a young
 man who is exposed to the
 ordinary influences of life can-
 not fail to be depreciated by
 the noise and struggle. Adei-
 mantus here, and Socrates in
 the passage quoted, are speaking
 the same words: it is the same
 expression of Plato's belief that
 God works by means of and in
 man: see Ion 534, where it is
 shown that the best poetry is
 the direct inspiration of God.

ψέγει τὸ ἀδ., ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ
 δρᾶν, Ch. III. *in*il. ἀδυναμία τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖν ἄκουτες αὐτὸ (δικαιοσύνην)
 ἐπιτηθεύουσι.

πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, v.s. Ch. III.
 ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν
 τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταῦτόν
 ἴοντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν.

τῷδε, Glaucon, who insisted
 upon this point, Ch. II. *ad*
med.

εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ᾧ θαυμάσιε πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινέται
Ε φατέ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων
 ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγοι λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν
 ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπή-
 νεσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ
 δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δ' ἐκάτερον
 τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνὸν καὶ
 λαυθάνον θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὐτ'
 ἐν ποιήσει οὐτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπέξηλθεν ἰκανῶς τῷ
 λόγῳ, ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχῇ ἐν

ἡρώων, notably the choice of
 Heracles, given at length in
 Xen. Mem. II. 1, 21, seqq. e.g.
 28. εἶτε τοὺς θεοὺς ἴλεως εἶναι
 σοὶ βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς
 θεοὺς, εἶτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις
 ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετη-
 τέον, εἶτε ὑπὸ τινος πόλεως ἐπι-
 θυμῆι τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελη-
 τέον, εἶτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης
 ἀξίοις ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν
 Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὐ ποιεῖν.

οὐδεὶς πώποτ' ἐν ποιήσει. The-
 ognis, for instance, as it has
 been noticed in the Introduction,
 describes justice as κάλλιστον,
 the Fairest, i.e. he commends it
 rather for its external than its
 intrinsic value. This sentiment,
 the devotion to τὸ καλόν, is
 characteristic of the Greeks who
 were an emulous people, and to
 some extent of the Romans also.
 The Greeks possessed to an extra-
 ordinary degree the sense of the
 beautiful, and they lived very
 much in public: hence they
 were prone rather to judge of
 actions by their effects than by
 the motives which prompted
 them. τιμαί, δωρεαί, στέφανοι,
 the rewards of probity and great
 deeds, are set forth and insisted
 upon instead of probity itself.
 Thus Aristotle, in describing the

good man's patience under ad-
 versity, speaks of τὸ καλόν, the
 beauty of the endurance and the
 decency (εὐσχημόνως) of his con-
 duct. ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ
 καλόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρη τίς εὐκόλως
 πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας.
 Eth. Nic. I, 10, 12, et infr. 13.
 τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθόν καὶ
 ἔμφορα πάσας οἰδέματα τὰς τύχας
 εὐσχημόνως φέρειν. Similarly in
 8, XIII. 8, καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὐ ποιεῖν.
 It is the same feeling which
 prompts the use of the word
 'laus' in Virgil's poem for
 'noble deeds.' See Æn. VIII.
 273—

Tantarum in munere laudum
 Cingite fronde comas.

and IX. 252—

Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri,
 pro laudibus istis

Praemia posse rear solvi ?

Also I. 461—

Sunt hic etiam sua praemia
 laudi.

Adeimantus's complaint is that
 the good deed and its intrinsic
 value is lost sight of in the
 honour and glory of the reward.

ἰδίοις λόγοις, h.e. pedestri
 sermone Stallb. See Ch. VII.
 ad init. ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ
 ποιητῶν.

μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχῇ

αὐτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως 367
 ἐλεγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων
 ἡμᾶς ἐπέειθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ
 ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς
 μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ξύνοικος ᾗ. ταῦτα, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω Θρασύμα-
 χός τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
 ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἂν μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύνα-
 μιν, φάρτικῶς, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν γάρ Β
 σε δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούσαι
 τὰναντία, ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατεινας λέγω.
 μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη
 ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιούσα ἑκατέρα τὸν
 ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν ἢ μὲν κακόν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθόν
 ἐστὶ· τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὥσπερ Γλαύκων διεκε-
 λεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἑκατέρωθεν τὰς
 ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον
 φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀδικον
 εἶναι ψέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι C
 ἀδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ,
 ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, ξυμφέρον τοῦ
 κρεῖττονος, τὸ δὲ ἀδικον αὐτῷ μὲν ξυμφέρον καὶ

ἐν αὐτῇ. So in Book III. 491 C. Ἀχιλλεύς... ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσήματι δύο ἐναντίω ἀλλήλων, whilst in Book IV. 444 E. as already noticed, virtue is described in the same metaphor as ὑγίειά τις.

φορτικῶς, 'in a vulgar or unappreciative way' See VII. 528 E. ἐπέπληξας (μοι) περὶ ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι, and IX. 81 D. οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικῶν τινα ἡγεῖται;

κατατεινας, v.s. p. 115, note.

τί ποιούσα τὸν ἔχοντα, after the analogy of εἶδ, κακῶς, ποιεῖν

with accusative.

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφ., &c. 'If you do not remove their real characters and give them the credit of false ones,' &c. See above Ch. IV. *ad med.* οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον (ἀδικῶ) ἀλλ' ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικούντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην... ἀφαιρετέον δὲ τὸ δοκεῖν (δικαίῳ). εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαί, &c. The unjust man is to have the credit of justice, whilst from the just man is to be taken away even the reputation of the justice which he practises.

λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἤττονι ἀξύμφορον. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὠμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ἄξια κερτῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, οἶον ὄραν, **Δ** ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δῆ, καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ ἡούμα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἀλλ' οὐ δόξῃ ἐστὶ, τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης, ἧ αὐτῇ δι' αὐτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησι καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν. ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψευγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, διότι πάντα τὸν

ὠμολόγησας; *surp.* Ch. I. *fin.* ἐν ποίῳ τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην τιθῆς; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ἧ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον.

αὐτῶν. *sc.* ἔνεκα.

ὄραν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δῆ. It is pleasant to notice here the optimistic tone of Adeimantus' words—the sense of healthy enjoyment in mere existence. There is no question, 'Is life worth living?' Existence itself is a pleasure, as long as health is with us. Ἐγιαίνειν concludes the list of blessings, and emphasized as it is by δῆ, is marked out as the greatest blessing of all. In Book IX. 583 D, we have an analysis of such pleasurable states. Ἄρ' οὖν μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν; Ποίους; ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ γῆρας ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἤδιστον ὄν. See also Argument, p. 91.

τοῦτ' οὖν...δικ., *v.s.* p. 113, note. 'Make your commendation then of justice regarding its very nature, viz. that, &c.' τοῦτο δικαιοσύνης, 'this aspect of justice,' is here further defined and emphasized by αὐτο, which, if we have regard to the use of αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, and αὐτῇ δι' αὐτὴν, above, will be seen to mean more than 'itself' in the present passage: rather 'the essence' or 'nature.'

καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει, loosely constructed co-ordinately with αὐτῇ ὀνίνησι, because the two thoughts are co-ordinate in the speaker's mind. See above καὶ αἰ ἡδοῖαι, κ.τ.λ. Ch. I.

τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην... ἐπ. See Book VIII. 564 E. οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, and X. 613 C. Ἀνέξει ἄρα λέγοντος ἐμοῦ;

εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, the entire confidence which Socrates' character commanded is here strikingly exemplified. Adeimantus is convinced that to commend justice for its reward

βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελέλυθας ἢ τοῦτο. μὴ ἔ
 οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη
 ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιούσα ἐκατέρα τὸν
 ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὐτήν, εἴαν τε λαυθάνῃ εἴαν τε μὴ
 θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἢ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ κακόν
 ἐστίν.

CAP. X.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας αἰὲ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε
 Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμημην, ἀτὰρ οὖν
 καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἤσθην καὶ εἶπον· Οὐ κακῶς εἰς 368
 ὑμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν

is a mistake, but if Socrates choose to do so, he is ready to hear him, as believing that he would have something valuable to say.

πάντα τὸν βίον, v.s. Ch. II. περὶ γὰρ τίνας ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων. And in Book V. 450 C. μέτρον δέ γ' ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαῦκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὄλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. Such are Socrates' own expressions, which bear witness to the truth of Glaucon's words here. With this chapter the case for injustice comes to an end, and with it the first part of the Republic. It has been an elaborate criticism of popular beliefs and definitions. We have seen Cephalus decline to enter upon the question, 'What is justice'? We have had definition after definition of justice tried and found wanting, and lastly, we have seen the spectacle of two earnest minds, fully convinced that integrity is the best, but harassed and wearied with

the commendations of wickedness, demanding of their friend and teacher a solution of the paradox which distresses them. Besides this, the matter of the dialogue, there has also been no small preparation for a lengthy controversy. Side subjects, bearing on the main question, have been suggested for future settlement; methods of argument have been tested, and approved, or found wanting; accuracy in description and definition has been demanded, and all is ready for Socrates' task, the justification of justice.

CH. X.—*I said that their able words had filled me with admiration; I was however unequal to the task. Then they besought me again to try. So I said: Let us take a larger organism than man, the State, and try first if we can find justice there.*

καὶ τότε. καὶ emphatic; see above p. 140.

ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαῦκωνος ἔραστής, εὐδοκιμη-
σαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῦ μάχην, εἰπών·

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός.

τούτῳ μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὐδοκεῖ ἔχειν· πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον
πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμει-
νον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖτε
Βδὴ μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεῖσθαι. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ
τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετεροῦ τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε αὐτοὺς
τοὺς λόγους ἠπίσταν ἂν ὑμῖν· ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον πισ-
τεύω, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὅ τι χρήσωμαι· οὔτε
γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι·
σημεῖον δέ μοι, ὅτι ἂ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ὤμην
ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ
ἀπεδέξασθέ μου· οὐτ' αὖ ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω·
Γδέδοικα γάρ, μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιο-
σύνη κατηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν

θεῖον, *v.s. not. ad* Μουσαῖος
Ch. VI. *ad med.*, and *not.*
pp. 126, 150. 'You have
received a divine afflatus.' This
remark of Socrates must not be
taken too seriously; there is a
spice of raillery intended. But
he goes on to pay them a
compliment, which, coming from
him, is of the greatest value,
for their able statement of the
case for injustice. For *πεπόνθατε*
see note p. 114.

ἀπορῶ ὅ τι χρήσωμαι. Ellip-
tical. 'I don't know what to
do (with the situation).' For
this sense *v.s.* p. 131, note.
Here the usual dative is omitted,
the object of *χρήσωμαι* being
τούτοις, or *ταύτῃ τῇ πίστει*, to
be supplied from *πιστεύω*. This
omission occurs in Arist. *Nub.*
439—*Νῦν οὖν χρήσθων ὅ τι βού-
λινται.* Sc. *ἐμοί*.

ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω. We have
seen *ἔχω* used above in this
sense but with an infinitive;
see Ch. IX. *ἔχει... ἀποφῆναι*.

δοκῶ ἀδύνατος, v.s. δηλός. εἶ
ὅτι φήσεις, Book I. Ch. XX. ad
med.; and *ἐμοί γε δοκῶ* Book I.
339 D. So on p. 175 it has been
noticed above that *μέλω* and
ἔοικα are used.

ἀπεδέξασθε. See note p. 122.
οὐτ' αὖ... Socrates' devotion
to the defence of truth against
falsehood is here expressed with
words of grand simplicity. Simi-
larly Aristotle, when investi-
gating the nature of moral
action, and finding a difficulty
in providing for particular acts:
ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὕντος τοιούτου τοῦ
πάροντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.
—Eth. Nic. 2, 2, 5.

ἀπαγορεύειν, 'to refuse';
hence 'to give up,' or 'fail';

ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ. ὁ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τί τέ ἐστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς ὠφελείας αὐτοῖν τάληθές ποτέρως ἔχει. εἶπον οὖν ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλ' ὄξυ βλέποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἶανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὄξυ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη, οἶμαι, ἐκείνα πρῶτον

see Book VIII. 568 D: διαφ' δ' ἂν ἀνωτέρω ἴσως πρὸς τὸ ἅπαντες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μᾶλλον ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἡ τιμή.

διερευνήσασθαι. In the discovery of justice the spot where it lies hid is called *δυσδιερευνητός*; Book IV. 432 C. For the eagerness of all those present to hear Socrates and to follow the discussion, see Book I. Ch. XI.: πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσσομεν. *Ibid.* XII. *in it.*: ὁ τε Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. Ch. XVII.: οὐ μὴν εἰσάσιν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ' ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναι τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγων.

οὐ φαῦλον, *v.s.* Book I. Ch. XXIII.: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δυντα ἀτόκον χρῆν. *Et infr.* here Ch. XV. *in it.*: οὐκ ἔρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἠρόμεθα.

ὄξυ βλέποντος. So in the account of the cave, Book VII. 516 D: γέρα τῷ ὄξυτάτα καθ' ὄρωντι τὰ παρόντα.

ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί. Not necessarily *εἰρωνεία*; but with Socrates customary self-depreciation. When this self-depreciation is excessive, and has the direct intention of deceiving an opponent, it becomes *εἰρωνεία*; *v.s.* εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη, Ch. I. *in it.*

οἶανπερ ἂν εἰ... For this position of ἂν, repeated below (*ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη*), see p. 128 note. The construction is broken off at *οἶανπερ* and a fresh sentence begun.

ἐν μείζονι, *sc.* *χρήματι*, or *τόπῳ*, 'in a larger place,' or 'on a larger object.'

ἔρμαιον, 'a piece of good luck.' Hermes was the divinity from whom good fortune came; see II. 14, 491—

τόν ρα μάλιστα
'Ερμείας Τρώων ἐφίλει καὶ
κτῆσιν ὅπασσε.

For the word *ἔρμαιον* see Euthydemus 273 E: πόθεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔρμαιον εὐρέτην; *et id. infr.*: τί μείζον ἔρμαιον αὐτοῦ ἂν εὐροίμι ἐν πάντι τῷ βίῳ;

ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ἄδει-
Εμμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, ὦ Σώκратες, ἐν τῇ περι-
 τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσῃ καθορᾶς; Ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ.
 δικαιοσύνη, φασμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστι δέ
 που καὶ ὄλης πόλεως; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν
 μείζον πόλις ἑνός ἀνδρός; Μείζον, ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν
 πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι ἐνεῖη καὶ ῥάων
369 καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πό-
 λεσι ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τι ἔστιν ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπι-
 σκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος
 ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέα ἐπισκοποῦντες
 Ἄλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ'

οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν. οὕτως here is like ἔπειτα in Book I. Ch. V. *ad med.*: μηδ' αὐτὸ φείλοντα ἢ θεῶ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπων χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκέισε ἀπιέναι. See note *ad loc.*

ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὄλης πόλεως. The common possession of certain qualities, habits, and morals is attributed to men and states in Book VIII. 544 E: οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἷε ἐκ δρυὸς ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι; καὶ οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. Also Book VIII. *passim*, and Book IX.

πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι. With this system Aristotle agrees, Pol. i. 1, when he says, after describing the origin of the πόλις from the οἰκία and κωμή, that the πόλις is in its nature prior to the οἰκία, and κωμή as the whole is prior to its parts: καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἔστι

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. In Xen. Mem. i. 2, 17 the charge is brought against Socrates: χρῆν τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικά διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας ἢ σωφρονεῖν, a charge pointed by the fact that Critias and Alcibiades were his pupils. But it is there urged that these two men came to Socrates merely with the object of learning politics; and we know from the rest of Plato's dialogues that ethical rather than political enquiries commanded Socrates' attention when dealing with the young. Aristotle again puts political science above ethic in Nic. Eth. i. 2, 8: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν (sc. τὰνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν) ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μείζον γὰρ καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν. ἀγαπητόν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ μόνῃ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεϊότερον ἔχει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἦ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφέρεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα. In short, Ethic is a kind of Politic.

ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαιμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν; Τάχ' ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἐλπίς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὃ ζητοῦμεν; Πολύ γε Β Δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι ἐπιχειρῆσαι περᾶν; οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι σκοπεῖτε οὖν. Ἔσκεπται, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

CAP. XI.

Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγᾶμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν' οἶει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν

εἰ γιγνομένην πόλ. θε. λόγ., 'If we were to see in our argument how a city comes into being,' i.e. 'picture to ourselves.' See *infra*. Book V. 458 A: ὥσπερ οἱ ἀργοὶ τὴν διανοίαν εἰώθασιν ἐστιᾶσθαι ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν, i.e. 'feed their imagination.' And above here, Ch. III. *init.*: εἰ τόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, 'if we were to put this case before our minds.' Plato describes the city as a sketch, when accomplished; Book VIII. 548 D: ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα. περαινεν. ἵνα τι καὶ περαινῶμεν, Book I. Ch. XVIII. *init.*

CH. XI.—A city arises from man's necessities, which cause him to join with his fellow-man for mutual benefit. And one man must devote himself to one kind of production, not to many.

Γίγνεται τοίνυν, *et seqq.* With this account it will be well to compare Aristotle's history of the origin of a community. He

describes a city as a *κοινωνία*, or clubbing together, directed towards some good: *πᾶσαν πόλιν ὀρώμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν... πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται.* It is also that *κοινωνία* which includes and joins together all other *κοινωνίαι*: *ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας.* He then proceeds to analyse this *κοινωνία* by going back, as Plato does here, to the origin of the state: *Εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν.* Those who cannot exist without each other's help naturally come together: *ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδύεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι.* But Aristotle goes farther back than Plato; he finds the first *κοινωνία* in family relations, man and wife, and man and slave; not between man and man, as Plato does here; and this is the first germ of the state, viz. *οἰκία*. Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο *κοινωνιῶν οἰκία*

B

Coικίζειν; Οὐδεμίαν, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὕτω δὴ ἄρα παρα-
λαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου

πρώτη. For this he compares
Homer's expression—

θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος

Παιδῶν ἢ δ' ἀλόχων.

He then proceeds from the family to the κοινωνία πλειόνων οἰκιῶν, or κώμη; thence from the κώμη to the κοινωνία πλειόνων κωμῶν, or πόλις. Still Aristotle agrees on the whole with Plato in his account of the origin of a state, viz. that it lies in man's need (χρεία) of his fellow-man. For instance when speaking of the πόλις he says: γιγνομένη οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εἶ ζῆν, 'In its origin existence is the object, in its complete state, orderly existence.' And in speaking of the former of these two original relations, viz. that between master and servant, he says: πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἴπωμεν, ἵνα τὰ τε πρὸς ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν ἴδωμεν, &c. ἀναγκαία χρεία, 'necessities that must be satisfied.' And in agreement with this principle, a family is said to be more αὐτάρκης than an individual, and a city than a family; see Pol. 2, 1: οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστερον ἑνὸς, πόλις δ' οἰκίας. And, again, a man who wants nothing and shares nothing, but is self-sufficient, cannot, Aristotle says, be part of a city at all: ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν, οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως. For which see also Herodotus I, 32, 14: ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐν οὐδὲν αὐταρκές ἐστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἄλλου δὲ ἐνδεές ἐστι. Whilst upon this subject of the origin and growth of the state, it may be as well to give Aristotle's

definition of justice, which he draws from his description of the state, viz. 'Justice is the adjustment (τάξις) of common relations in the πόλις.' ἢ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν. For this, in effect, is Plato's view of justice also; see Rep. IV.: τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν; 433 A. 'To do one's own business and not meddle with other people's,' i.e. 'To act in those relations where you are called to act, and not in those where you are not.' Hobbes, also, points out, as Plato does here, that physical necessity is the cause of a commonwealth coming into being. 'The finale Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love liberty and Dominion over others), in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Commonwealths), is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall passions of men.' He then shows that covenants (see note on ξυνοθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις, Ch. II.), the outcome of the first and second Laws of Nature, are by themselves so liable to be broken, that a further step in the same direction is taken by a multitude of people, not by a few. This step is to centre the rights which they have renounced (see above *not. cit.*), in the hands of an individual or a representative body of

χρεία, πολλῶν δεόμενοι, πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἰκησιν ἀγείραντες κοινωνοὺς τε καὶ βοηθοὺς, ταύτη τῇ ξυνοικία ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα. ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλω, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει οἴομενος αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι. Πάνυ γε. Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν. ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἡμετέρα χρεία. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν **Δ** χρεῶν ἢ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν ἔνεκα. Παντάπασί γε. Δευτέρα δὴ οἰκίσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶς ἢ πόλις ἀρκέσει ἐπὶ τοσαύτην

persons, who will enforce their adjustment (τάξις, in Aristotle's words) by the strength of the whole people. 'The only way to erect such a Common Power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another ... is to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of Men, that they may reduce all their Wills by plurality of voices, unto one Will.' Hence the following definition of a Commonwealth. 'A Commonwealth is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multiude by Mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the Strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and cominon Defence.' 'This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.'

For αὐταρκής v.s. note, p. 118.

Μεταδίδωσι δὴ, Aristotle again shews that ἡ χρεία is the principle of commerce. Eth. Nic. 5, 5, 13, "Ὅτι δὲ ἡ χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἔν τι ὄν, δῆλον ὅτι δταν μὴ ἐν χρεία ᾖσιν ἀλλήλων, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται. And again Pol. 2, 1. Ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ (πόλιν) ἐν γενέσθαι εἶδει διαφέρει. Διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώσει τὰς πόλεις, ἰ.ε. 'the men composing a city must differ, but by reciprocity they will constitute one and a prosperous city.' And he speaks thus of the principle of exchange in Book I. iii., "Ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων ἀρεθιμότης τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλεῖω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἰκάνων ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

τῷ λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, v.s., εἰ τοιονδε ποιήσαιμεν διανοία, quoted above, Ch. III. *in it.*

τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν ἔνεκα, v.s. γιγνομένη τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκα, quoted above.

πῶς ἢ πόλις ἀρκέσει, 'How is the city to meet such a demand,' *ibid.* 'How will the city be sufficient in itself to make such preparation?' Πῶς, 'in what

παρασκευήν; ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἰς, ὁ δὲ οἰκο-
 δόμος, ἄλλος δέ τις ὑφάντης; ἢ καὶ σκυτοτόμον
 αὐτόσε προσθήσομεν ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
 θεραπευτήν; Πάνυ γε. Εἴη δ' ἂν ἢ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη
 Ἐ πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν. Φαίνεται· Τί
 δὴ οὖν; ἕνα ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον

way?' i.e. 'what must be its elements, or constituent parts, if such a result is to be obtained?'

ἄλλο τι, v.s. *not.* p. 145.

ἢ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις. For Aristotle's limits of the city, see *Introd.* p. 21. His words are οὕτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτο' ἂν πόλις, οὐτ' ἐκ δέκα κυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. 'Αναγκ. 'The least possible.' So when the Athenians were working at their wall (*Thuc.* I. 90), they raised it to the 'least height necessary' for defence before they informed the Lacedaemonians. ὥστε ἀπομάχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαιοτάτου ὕψους. Similarly, of words, to say the fewest necessary. *Demosth.* de *Cor.* 269, αὐτὰ τὸ ἀναγκαιοτάτα' εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ. And here *infra.* Book VI. 486 E, μή πη δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι ... 'Αναγκαιοτάτα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἕνα ἕκαστον τούτων. The principle of specialization, i.e. that each man should have but one employment and confine himself to it, runs through the whole of this Dialogue, and is employed to such an extent by Plato, that Aristotle complains of it as excessive. Thus in reviewing the Republic, he says, Ἐτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὃ φησι τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον'... λέγω δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν πάντων ὡς ἄριστον ὅτι μάλιστα. λαμβάνει γὰρ

ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης. Καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν, ὡς προϋόουσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται. πλῆθος γὰρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις'... Οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ κλεινῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. And so below, τὸ λίαν ἐνοῦν ζητεῖν τὴν πόλιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄμεινον. And again φανερόν, ὡς οὕτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν, ὡς λέγουσι, *Pol.* 2, 1. This criticism of Aristotle's arises in a discussion of the merits of Plato's suggestion that wives and children should be in common to the citizens of the state (see Book V.); the extreme point to which Plato's communistic tendencies lead him in the Republic; and if taken as a criticism of that point, we must accept it as just. But, if we see how Plato in certain other places works out the principle of specialism, and employs it in his discovery of justice, we shall be unable to agree with Aristotle's complaint. Thus in Republic IV. 423 B, we read οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλιστος ὁρὸς τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἔρχουσιν, ὅσην δεῖ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἡλικίη ὅσην ὅσην χώραν ἀφορισάμενους, τὴν ἄλλην χαίρειν εἶαν. τίς, ἔφη, ὁρὸς; οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὐ ἂν ἐθέλη ἀύξανόμενη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου ἀβξειν, πέρα δὲ μή. And

ἅπασιν κοινὸν κατατιθέναι, οἷον τὸν γεωργὸν ἕνα ὄντα παρασκευάζειν σιτία τέτταρσι καὶ τετραπλάσιον χρόνον τε καὶ πόνον ἀναλίσκειν ἐπὶ σίτου παρασκευῇ, καὶ ἄλλοις κοινῶν εἶναι; ἢ ἀμελήσαντα ἑαυτῷ μόνον τέταρτον μέρος ποιεῖν τούτου τοῦ σίτου ἐν

below, φυλάττειν παντὶ τρῶπι ὅπως μήτε σμικρὰ ἢ πόλις ἔσται μήτε μεγάλη δυκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τις ἰκανὴ καὶ μία. And below D, as here, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, πρὸς ὃ τις πέφυκε, πρὸς τοῦτο ἕνα πρὸς ἕνα ἕκαστον ἔργον δεῖ κομίζειν, ὥπως ἂν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύον ἕκαστος μὴ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ εἰς γίγνηται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ξύμπασα ἢ πῆλις μία φύηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλαί. See also the description of σωφροσύνη in 432 A, δι' ὅλης (πόλεως) ἀτεχνῶς τέταται διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη ξυνῶδοντας τοὺς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταῦτ' ἐν καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους. Again, the definition of justice itself is based upon this principle of harmony, or unity, see Book IV. 433 A. ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἢ φύσις ἐπιτηδαιοτάτη πεφυκῦα εἴη... Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολὺ πρᾶγμα εἶναι δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ. And in Book V. 462 A, Ἐχομεν οὖν τι μείζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκείνο ὃ ἂν αὐτὴν διασπᾶ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μίας; ἢ μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ὃ ἂν ξυνδῆ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν; (The principle involved in these remarks is unimpeachable. But it is rather upon the passage noticed above, which advocates the community of wives and children, that Aristotle founds his objections, and upon the further development of the principle of unity in the later books of the Republic, the system of Ἰδέαι, or

Single and Primary Forms, which are transcendent, and furnish life and reality to the objects of the world of sense.) Further, in 476 A, Plato strongly insists upon the unity that pervades Nature, the model of the unity which he would introduce into his state: καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλά φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον. Lastly he passes on from this unity of the world of sense (apparently diverse) to the 'Real Good,' or the 'Form of Good,' which supplies their truth to all things that are known, and the capacity of knowing them to the knower; and is, in a word, the Single Source of all that is Real and Good: see Book VI. 508 E. Τοῦτο τοῖνον τὸ τὴν ἀληθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γινγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιννώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας. Such in brief is the Platonic unity, which is carried on from the physical to the transcendent world. The remarks quoted from Book IV. respecting the unity of the city itself must commend themselves to our acceptance, whatever we may think of the system of ἰδέαι.

370 τετάρτῳ μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς οἰκίας παρασκευῇ διατρίβειν, τὸ δὲ ἰμάτιου, τὸ δὲ ὑπόδημάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δι' αὐτὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν ; καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ἔφη Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω ῥᾶον ἢ κείνως. Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὰ Δί' ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν

B φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ πᾶν ὁμοίος ἕκαστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πρᾶξι. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ; Ἐμοιγε. Τί δέ ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττει ἂν τις εἰς ὧν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, ἢ ὅταν μίαν εἰς ; Ὅταν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰς μίαν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, οἶμαι, καὶ τότε δῆλον, ὡς, ἐάν τις τινος παρῆ ἔργου καιρόν, διόλλυται. Δῆλον γάρ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸν πράττοντα τῷ πραττομένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργου μέρει.

C Ἀνάγκη. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίνονται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾶον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, ^{τοῦ λόγου} τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πρῆττη. Παντά-

ἄλλ. κοιν. πράγματα ἔχειν. See Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 9: ἐγὼ οὐν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν, &c.; where the sense is slightly different, 'to be busy'; here it is 'to give one's self trouble.'

φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ πᾶν ὁμοίος. So Aristotle, *loc. supr. cit.*: οὐ γὰρ γίνονται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. *v. s. not. ad μεταδίδωσι* δὴ, and the passage where Aristotle says that men *must* be different if they are to form a mutually beneficial community.

ἐν παρέργου μέρει. See Book I. *not.* p. 184. For *παρέργον v. Book VII.* 527 C: καὶ γὰρ τὰ πάρεργα αὐτοῦ (*sc.* γεωμετρίας)

οὐ σμικρά, *i. e.* the secondary uses of geometry, besides its value as leading to the acquisition of pure knowledge. And Book VI. 498 A: μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται, *παρέργον* οὐόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν, where the study of philosophy is said to be taken up off hand, as a leisure employment, by most men, if they take it up at all. See also Euthydemus 273 D: *παρέργοις αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.*

κατὰ φύσιν. See what has been said in Book I. of the *ἔργον* of man, p. 138; and the recurrence of this expression in the passage there quoted from Book V.: *δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἕνα ἐν τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.*

πασι μὲν οὖν. Πλειόνων δὴ, ὧ Ἀδείμαντε, δεῖ πολιτῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἐπὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ὧν ἐλέγομεν· ὁ γὰρ γεωργός, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ σμινύην οὐδὲ τάλλα ὄργανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν· οὐδ' αὖ ὁ οἰκοδόμος· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ δεῖ ὡσαύτως δ' ὁ ὑφάντης τε καὶ ὁ σκυτοτόμος. Ἀληθῆ. Τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες πολλοὶ δημιουργοί, κοινωνοὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ πολιχνίου γιγνόμενοι, συχνόν αὐτὸ ποιούσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι εἴη, *οὐδ'* εἰ αὐτοῖς βουκόλους τε καὶ ποιμένας τοὺς τε ἄλλους νομέας προσθεῖμεν, ἵνα οἳ τε γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄροτρον ἔχοιεν βοῦς, οἳ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρῆσθαι ὑπόζυγιοις, ὑφάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτοτόμοι δέρμασί τε καὶ ἐρίοις. Οὐδέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, σμικρὰ πόλις ἂν εἴη ἔχουσα πάντα ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον, οὗ ἐπέισαγωγίμων μὴ δεήσεται, σχεδόν τι ἀδύνατον. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ. Προσδεήσει ἄρα ἔτι καὶ ἄλλων, οἳ ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως αὐτῇ κομίσουσιν ὧν

εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, 'if it is to be a good one.' See *not.* Ch. XVIII.

ἐπὶ τὸ ἄροτρον ἔχοιεν βοῦς. Hesiod makes the ox an indispensable part of the most primitive household—

οἶκον μὲν πρόωστα, γυναῖκό τε, βοῦν τ' ἄροτῆρα.

οἳ τε οἰκοδόμοι. Supply ἔχοιεν *be.ore* χρῆσθαι.

μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν. To be joined closely with *πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς*. 'For their carrying-traffic with the farmers.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν, 'but again.' ἀλλὰ *orposes*, and μὴν shows that a

fresh instance is to be added.

προσδεήσει ἄρα ἔτι καὶ ἄλλων. So Aristotle in *Pol.* I, 3, shows that some nations support themselves from a single pursuit, *e.g.* νομαδικοὶ, ἀλιεντικοὶ, θηρευτικοί. But those, he adds, who combine them live pleasurably, filling up the life that lacks much; to which conclusion Plato is gradually coming here. οἳ δὲ καὶ μιγνύντες ἐκ τούτων, ἠδέως ζῶσιν, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον, ἢ τυγχάνει ἐλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκη εἶναι.

δεΐται. Δεήσει. Καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἴη ὁ διάκονος
 μηδὲν ἄγων ὧν ἐκείνοι δέονται, παρ' ὧν ἂν κομίζονται
 371 ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία, κενὸς ἄπεισιν. ἦ γάρ; Δοκεῖ
 μοι. Δεῖ δὴ τὰ οἴκοι μὴ μόνον ἑαυτοῖς ποιεῖν ἱκανά,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷα καὶ ὅσα ἐκείνοις ὧν ἂν δέονται. Δεῖ
 γάρ. Πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 δημιουργῶν δεῖ ἡμῖν τῆ πόλει. Πλειόνων γάρ. Καὶ
 δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων που τῶν τε εἰσαζόντων
 καὶ ἐξαζόντων ἕκαστα· οὔτοι δέ εἰσιν ἔμποροι ἦ
 γάρ; Ναί. Καὶ ἔμπόρων δὴ δεησόμεθα. Πάνυ γε.
 Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε κατὰ θάλατταν ἡ ἔμπορία γίνηται,
 Β συχῶν καὶ ἄλλων προσδεήσεται τῶν ἐπιστημό-
 νων τῆς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐργασίας. Συχνῶν
 μέντοι.

καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν... 'And again, if the carrier go empty, taking nothing with him of those things which the people want, from whomsoever they are importing their own requirements, he will have to go away empty.' ἐκείνοι is the people to whom the trader comes; whilst the subject of κομίζονται and αὐτοῖς, refer to the people who sends the trader. The principle is that the trader must come with some import to exchange for a nation's exports; and therefore production must not be limited by the bare requirements of the country itself, but there must be a surplus, with which to purchase the exports of other nations. See

the passage in Arist. Pol. 1, 3, quoted above, regarding this surplus: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ὀραζομένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. It will be noticed that Aristotle makes this surplus a natural result, in which he practically agrees with Plato. *Et infra*, regarding the πλήρωσις or 'filling up,' in which all exchange consists: εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἦν. εἰσαζόντων καὶ ἐξαζόντων. Arist. *loc. cit.*: τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι, καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόνασον. Exportation results from over production.

CAP. XII.

Τί δὲ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει ; πῶς ἀλλήλοις μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ἐργάζωνται ; ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι πόλιν ὠκίσσαμεν. Δῆλον δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὠνούμενοι. Ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄν οὖν C κομίσας ὁ γεωργὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν τι ὧν ποιεῖ ἢ τις ἄλλος τῶν δημιουργῶν μὴ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἦκη τοῖς δεομένοις τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀλλάξασθαι, ἀργήσῃ τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας καθήμενος ἐν ἀγορᾷ ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ τοῦτο ὁρῶντες ἑαυτοὺς

CH. XII.—*This barter must be made more convenient through a medium of exchange, money, and through middlemen, i.e. retail traders. How then will our citizens live ?*

ὧν, partitive genitive, from the sense of 'sharing' in μεταδώσουσιν. The second ὧν refers also to the results of labour, the several productions, which were to be mutually exchanged and shared.

νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλ. νόμισμα means that which is recognised, anything instituted. See Soph. Antig. 295—

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν οἶον ἄργυρος

κακὸν νόμισμ' ἔβλαστε.

And ξύμβολον has reference to interchange with agreement ; see note p. 130. νόμ. ξύμβ. then means, 'a recognised medium,' or 'a common token.' In Aristotle's Ethics 5, 5, 11, the reason for using money is thus given : δεῖ ἄρα ἐνὶ τιμῇ

πάντα μετρεῖσθαι...οἶον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ ξυνηκῆν. Where κατὰ ξ. represents ξύμβολον in Plato's definition. And again in Pol. I, 3, 16, the origin of the use of money is explained in accordance with the principle of the origin of society : Πορισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς, κ.τ.λ. Et supr.: ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρήσις· οἱ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων· Διδὸν πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς δίδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ἦν, εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἶον σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος, κ.τ.λ. et inf. 18 : τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχείον καὶ πέρασ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστίν.

εἰσὶν οἱ τοῦτο ὁρῶντες. With reference to the necessity and growth of middlemen or tradesmen, Aristotle (*loc. cit.*) shows that they are not found in the

ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάττουσι ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀχρεῖοί τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν. **Δ**αυτοῦ γὰρ δεῖ μένοντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ μὲν ἀντ' ἀργυρίου ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς τι δεομένοις ἀποδοῦσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὐτοῦ ἀργυρίου διαλλάττειν, ὅσοι τι δεόνται πρίασθαι. Αὕτη ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ χρεία καπήλων ἡμῖν γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἡ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονούντας ἰδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἔτι δὴ τινες, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκονοι, οἳ ἂν τὰ **Ε**μὲν τῆς διανοίας μὴ πάνυ ἀξιοκοινωνῆτοι ὦσι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺν ἰκανὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόρους ἔχωσιν· οἳ δὴ πωλοῦντες τὴν τῆς ἰσχύος χρείαν, τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληνται, ὡς ἐγῶμαι,

primitive community where all exchange is barter, and that ἡ καπηλικὴ ἰσχύς ἐστὶν ἀπὸ φύσει. Ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωσίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερόν ἐστι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἔργον αὐτῆς (sc. καπηλικῆς) ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωσίας οὐσης.

ἀλλάξασθαι... διαλλάττειν, 'to take.. and give in exchange.' The difference of voice is noticeable.

οἳ ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς διαν. Aristotle also draws this distinction in Pol. i. 1. And the extreme case of those whom Plato is describing in the text is the δούλος, whom Aristotle in a like spirit calls ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, 'a live machine'; Eth. Nic. 8, 11, 6. It is characteristic of Plato's broader views, as compared with those of his age, that he makes no mention here of the δούλος, in other words he does not consider a slave

necessary to a community. Aristotle, on the other hand, considers that superiority of intellect constitutes the relation of slavery at once: Ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν, ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπύζον φύσει· τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δούλον. Here it will be noticed that he grounds his principle upon the same distinction as Plato, viz. that between mental and bodily efficiency; but where Plato concludes that some men must be μισθωτοί, Aristotle condemns them to slavery. He commends slavery again in 1, ii. thus: τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστί· καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε, τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν.

μισθωτοί ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεώς εἰσιν, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ μισθωτοί. Δοκεῖ μοι. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἤδη ἡμῖν ἠϋξήται ἡ πόλις, ὥστ' εἶναι τελέα; Ἴσως. Ποῦ οὖν ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία; καὶ τίνι ἅμα ἐγγενομένη ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ 372 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ που ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεία τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς λέγεις· καὶ σκεπτέον γε καὶ οὐκ ἀποκνητέον. πρῶτον οὖν σκεψώμεθα, τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται οἱ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι. ἄλλο τι ἢ σῖτόν τε ποιούντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, καὶ οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας, θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοὶ τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι ἐργάσονται, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἡμφιεσμένοι τε καὶ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἱκανῶς; θρέφονται δὲ ἐκ Β μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἄλφιστα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἄλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάξαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμόν τινα παραβαλλόμενοι ἢ φύλλα καθαρὰ, κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβύδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις,

χρεία τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Aristotle says in Pol. I, 2 ὁ δὲ βίος πράξις, οὐποίησις ἐστὶ, 'Life is action, not creation,' i.e. 'Our life lies more in our relations with others than in our own several acts themselves.' Adeimantus' suggestion here is prompted by a similar thought. Justice as noticed above (p. 129, note) has to do not so much with persons and things, but with the relations between persons and things, inasmuch as it has to do with the whole of life. And so Aristotle gives the following definition of justice as popularly accepted: 'Ὅρωμεν δὴ πάντα τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βου-

λομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ.

οὐκ ἀποκνητέον. See below 380 C: διαμαχετέον πάντι τρόπῳ: and above Ch. X.: δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὄσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κατηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν. So in Ch. XV. ἐπιβ.: ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδεικναιτέον, ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις παρεῖκη.

γυμνοί, 'without the upper garment.' See Hesiod Opp. et Di. 389—

γυμνὸν σπεῖρειν, γυμνὸν τε βοιωτεῖν,

Γυμνὸν δ' ἀμάειν.

Which Virgil imitates Geor. i. 299—

Nudus ara, sere nudus.

εὐωχῆσονται αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδιά, ἐπιπινοντες τοῦ οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς, ἡδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆ οὐσίαν **C**ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας, εὐλαβούμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον ;

CAP. XIII.

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ὑπολαβών, Ἄνευ ὄψου, ἔφη, ὡς εἰκας, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐστιωμένους. Ἄληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμεν ὅτι καὶ ὄψον ἔξουσιν ἄλας τε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τυρόν, καὶ βολβούς καὶ λάχανα, οἶα δὴ ἐν ἀγροῖς ἐψήματα, ἐψήσονται καὶ τραγήματά που παραθήσομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἐρεβίνθων καὶ κυάμων, καὶ μύρτα καὶ **D**φηγούς σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες καὶ οὕτω διάγοντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας,

Εὐωχῆσονται. For this word v.s. Ch. XXIII., note on εὐωχού.

ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, 'sipping their wine ;' opposed to ἐκπίνω, 'to drain.' The force of ἐπι here is similar to that in ἐπιπτόμενοι, 'skimming over,' in Ch. VIII. *ibid.*, i.e. 'superficially,' 'slightly'; cf. the words ἐπιπόλαιος, ἐπιπολάζω; and see Book X. 601 A, χρώματ' ἅττα ἐπιχρωματίζειν. οἴνου, partitive genitive, see Od. iii.

4—

Τοῦ (*sc.* οἴνου) ὁ γέρον κρητῆρα κεράσσατο.

The same sense is more definitely given below in the words μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες, Ch. XIII.

ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς, see Book I. Ch. II. *ibid.* where Cephalaus is making a sacrifice; καθῆστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος, and see note.

CH. XIII.—*Glaucon, interrupting, said that I ought to give them some slight amenities of life. Ah! said I, you mean that, instead of a simple, happy community, I am to form a luxurious and fevered city, full of doctors, cooks, dancing girls, and the rest.*

ὑπολαβών, v.s. note p. 150.

σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς σποδὸν ἤγουν εἰς ἀνθράκων ἐσβεσμένην ἐψήσουσιν. Schol.

ὑποπίνοντες. Other words in which ὑπὸ has this force are ὑποάμουςος; see Book VIII., 548 E, 'rather less intellectual'; ὑπογράφειν, 'to sketch slightly,' *ibid.* D, i.e. give in outline, v.s. note on σκιαγράφου, Ch. VIII.

ὡς εἰκός, γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες ἄλλον τοιοῦτον βίον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις παραδώσουσιν. καὶ ὅς, Εἰ δὲ ὑὼν πόλιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, κατεσκευάζεις, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες; Ἄλλὰ πῶς χρή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων; Ἄπερ νομίζεται, ἔφη· ἐπὶ τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι, οἶμαι, τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν καὶ ἔσφα ἄπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγήματα. Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω· οὐ πόλιν, ὡς εἴοικε, σκοποῦμεν μόνον ὅπως γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφῶσαν πόλιν.

παραδώσουσιν, 'bequeathe,' v.s. Ch. V. Book I. παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον... Οὐκοῦν Πολεμάρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος; ἄπερ νομίζεται, 'the proprieties of life.' Jowett.

τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλ., v.s. Book I. Ch. XVIII., and note. See also *not.* pp. 214, 229, 247.

τρυφῶσαν πόλιν, 'a city of indulgence.' See *infra*. Book III. 399 E, καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, εἶπον, λεληθασμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἦν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν. 'It seems that we are purging the city again which we said just now was becoming luxurious.' Again in Book IV. the two great enemies of a healthy constitution are said to be wealth and poverty, the one as causing luxury and idleness, and the other crime. 421 E, Extr. πλοῦτός τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πενία, ὡς τοῦ μὲν τρυφήν καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ποιοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ κακοεργίαν πρὸς τῷ νεωτερισμῷ. Again, in the investigation of democracy, the rulers are said to bring the young men and all that have to do with them into a luxurious and effeminate con-

dition. ...σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αἰτῶν ἄρ' οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους; 556 B. The exact meaning of the word may be gathered from an expression in the context of the last passage quoted:—μαλακοὺς καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λυπὰς καὶ ἀργούς. See Æschines *contr.* Ctes. 20 (Ed. Simcox), οὐκ ἔρα στεφανωθήσεται ἢ βουλή ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου; οὐδὲ γὰρ πάτριον αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. οὐκ ἔρα φιλοτιμοῦνται; Πάνυ γε, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαπῶσιν, εἴν τις παρ' αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀδικῆ, ἀλλ' εἴν τις ἐξαμαρτάνῃ κολαζοῦσιν' οἱ δὲ ὑμέτεροι ῥήτορες τρυφῶσι. 'Are not Arcopagites then able to receive crowns? No, it is not the custom. Have they then no ambition? Certainly, but it is to punish vigorously any crimes that come under their jurisdiction. But the orators who come before you have no principle,' *i.e.* they are weak and liable to urge considerations of indulgence and pity; in Plato's words, μὴ καρτερεῖν. For which sense compare Euthyphro, 11 E, μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, used of one who is not energetic.

ἴσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχει σκοποῦντες γὰρ και τοιαύτην τάχ' ἂν κατίδοιμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην και ἀδικίαν ὅπη ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγιῆς τις· εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε και φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τισιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει, οὐδ' 373 αὕτη ἡ δίαίτα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναί τε προσέσονται και τράπεζαι και τᾶλλα σκεύη, και ὄψα δὴ και μύρα και θυμιάματα και ἐταῖραι και πέμματα, ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά· και δὴ και ἅ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα θετέον, οἰκίας τε και ἱμάτια και ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τήν τε ζωγραφίαν κινήτεον και χρυσὸν και ἐλέφαντα και πάντα τὰ Β τοιαῦτα κτητεον. ἡ γάρ; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὖ τήν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν; ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ὑγιεινὴ

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθ. Stallb. makes ὥσπερ ὑγιῆς τις the predicate of εἶναι: but it is open to us to take ἀληθινὴ; thus 'the city which we have described seems to be the true one, being as it were healthy.' 'Healthy,' or 'sound,' is a favourite metaphorical expression with Plato. It occurs again in conjunction with ἀληθῆς in Book X. 603 B, where Plato is speaking of the painter's art, of which he says, *προσομιλεῖ τε και ἐταῖρα και φίλη ἔστιν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδ' ἀληθεῖ*. And in speaking of the middle state, which, compared with pain and pleasure respectively, seems to be pleasure or pain, he says, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἔρα τούτο ἀλλὰ φαίνεται παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἠδὺ και παρὰ τὸ ἠδὺ ἀλγεινόν τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, και οὐδὲν ὑγιᾶς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἠδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις.*

οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκ. θετ. 'And we must no longer lay down as the only requirements those that we mentioned at first.' For ἀναγκαῖα, 'the least necessary,' v.s. Ch. XI. ἀναγκαιοτάη πόλις.

ζωγραφ. κιν. 'we shall have to start painting.' κινέω is 'to set in motion.' See Book I. Ch. IV. *ἰπιλ. βουλόμενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκινουν*. It is used of a top in Book IV. 436 D, which is stationary (ἔστηκε) and in motion (κινεῖται), simultaneously, viz. in respect of axis and circumference. 'Begin,' here would not convey the whole meaning; the art of painting is to be 'set going.'

χρυσὸν, κ.τ.λ. governed by κτητέον.

αὖ v.s. note p. 124; and above in this chapter, εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε.

οὐκέτι ἰκανή, ἀλλ' ἡ δὴ ὄγκου ἐμπληστέρα καὶ πλήθους, ἀ οὐκέτι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἶον οἳ τε θηρευταὶ πάντες, οἳ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικὴν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψωδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, σκευῶν τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν **C** περὶ τὸν γυναικεῖον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλείονων δεησόμεθα. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ δεήσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὐτῶν ὀψοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν προσδεησόμεθα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνῆν· ἔδει γὰρ οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτου προσδεήσει, δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκήματων παμπόλλων, εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται. ἡ γάρ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρείαις ἐσόμεθα **D**

οἳ τε θηρευταὶ κ.τ.λ. We should be surprised, if we were not aware of Plato's hostility to poets, to find them thus unceremoniously thrust in among the rabble of the Larger City, as if they were no more than Horace's

Ambubaiarum collegia, pharmacopolæ,

Mendici, mimæ, balatrones, hoc genus omne.

See pp. 121, 133, notes. We shall find below (Ch. XVII.) what is the moving cause of this hostility to poets in Plato's mind. For *σχήματα*, 'drawing,' *v.s.* note on *σκιαγραφ. ἀρετῆς*. Ch. VIII. In Book X. 601 A, it is explained that poets are nothing but 'word-painters,' and that *es* painters are nothing but copyists, poets are the same, and have no claim to originality or truth. Thus we can understand why Plato includes them

here among the vulgar herd. In the passage referred to we find these same words coupled together. *Ὅστω δὴ, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματ' ἅπτα ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν*. And for Plato's opinion of painting see 603 A, ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὄλως ἡ μιμητικὴ πόρρω μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ὄν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται.

κοσμὸν, the general word for a lady's toilette, *mundus muliebris*, including many different articles. One of these we know to have been rouge, which Professor Newton tells us has been found in a grave at Athens; it being usual to bury with the dead articles of all kinds which they had used in their lifetime.

ἰατρῶν. Plato's hatred of doctoring is so strong that, as has been noticed in the Argu-

πολὺ μᾶλλον οὕτω διαιτώμενοι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρότερον ;
Πολύ γε.

CAP. XIV.

Καὶ ἡ χώρα που ἡ τότε ἱκανῆ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε
σικμρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἱκανῆς ἔσται ἢ πῶς λέγομεν ; Οὕτως,

ment, p. 55, note, he allows it to blind his logic, in replying to Glaucon's suggestion that the best doctor is he who has had the largest and most varied experience of disease. His suggestion in another place (Book III. 410 A) that, where a man is of a weakly constitution, he had better take his leave of life as soon as possible, has been already noticed. For his general treatment of the question in brief see Argument, p. 54 ; and Book IV. *fin.*, where he draws an elaborate comparison between illness and wickedness ; illness, as he describes it, being a στάσις in the body. "Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίαιαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἕλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου. And again Book VIII. 556 E. σῶμα νοσῶδες μικρὰς ῥοπῆς ξέωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ξέω στασιάζει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ... Generally, Plato thought illness almost culpable, because he considered that most diseases arose from indulgence : in which opinion he was not far wrong. Hence his expression above here, φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις ; and in Book VIII. *loc. cit.* he shows what an advantage the poor, sunburnt, yet wiry (ισχυρὸς) citizen,

possesses in any contest over one who is rich but incapable, through having too much flesh and too little wind.

CH. XIV.—*We shall then want to take our neighbour's land, i.e. we shall go to war ; and the warriors must be carefully trained from their youth up.*

Aristotle agrees with Plato that war is, in its nature, a form of acquisition, drawing this fact from man's universal pursuit of wild, and acquisition of tame animals. See Pol. I. 3. διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πως ἔσται, et præcedd. But he considers that the immediate cause of war is the refusal of men who are φύσει δούλοι, to submit. ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἢ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον. Sir Thomas More does not follow Plato upon this point, but assigns as the chief cause of war the wantonness and pugnacity of princes. Thus, 'The most part of all princes have more delyte in warlike matters and feates of chivalrie than in the good feates of peace, and employe muche more study, how by right or by wrong to enlarge their dominions, than howe wel and peace-

ἔφθ. Οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτ-
μητεον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἰκανὴν ἔξειν νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν,
καὶ ἐκείνοις αὐτῆς ἡμετέρας, ἐὰν καὶ ἐκείνοι ἀφώσιν
αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες
τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρον; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ
Σώκρατες. Πολεμήσομεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαῦκων; **Ε**
ἢ πῶς ἔσται; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Καὶ μηδέν γέ πω λέγω-
μεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτ' εἴ τι κακὸν μήτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ
πόλεμος ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι πολε-
μου αὐτὸ γένεσιν εὐρήκαμεν, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς
πόλεσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ κακὰ γίνονται, ὅταν
γίνηται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἔτι δὴ, ὦ φίλε, μείζονος
τῆς πόλεως δεῖ οὔτι σμικρῶ, ἀλλ' ὄλω στρατοπέδω, **374**
ὃ ἐξελθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάσης καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν νῦν
δὴ ἐλέγομεν διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιούσιν. Τί δέ; ἦ
δ' ὅς· αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἰκανοί; Οὐκ, εἰ σύ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

able to rule and gouverne that they have alreadie.'

τῆς τῶν πλ. χώρας, with this genitive compare ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, Ch. XII. *fin.*

εἰ μέλλομεν ἰκ. ἔξειν, 'if we are to have enough'; see Book I. Ch. XVIII. note.

ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτ. ἄπειρον. Aristotle shows in Pol. 1, 3, that there are two kinds of wealth, ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν, which is not the possession of so much money, but abundance of those things necessary to a comfortable life: this he brings under the province of οἰκονομική; the other is ἡ χρηματιστική with which is closely allied καπηλική, money-making by trade. He then goes on to show that in οἰκονομική there is a πέρασ τέλους, or 'limitation of wealth, in its object'; whilst in χρηματιστική there is no πέρασ, the object of

money-making being to go on continually amassing more. Οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρασ· τέλος δὲ, ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις. Τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, οὐ χρηματιστικῆς, ἔστι πέρασ. And therefore, he adds, those fall into error who think that amassing money is the part of οἰκονομική,—αὔξειν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἄπειρον, agreeing with Plato in this, viz. that where there is unlimited covetousness (εἰς ἄπειρον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐσης, as here ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἄπειρον) it is the result of an abnormal state of a community, not of πλοῦτος κατὰ φύσιν.

αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἰκανοί; The necessity for a standing army is here shown, on the continually recurring principle of specialization. 'What we do, we must

καὶ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ὠμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἠνίκα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν· ὠμολογοῦμεν δέ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἓνα πολλὰς καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας. Ἄληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἢ Β περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ἦ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκωλύομεν μήτε γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἅμα μήτε ὑφάντην μήτε οἰκοδόμον, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς σκυτικῆς ἔργον καλῶς γίγνοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ ἑκάστῳ ὡσαύτως ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς δὲ πεφύκει. ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολῆν C ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεῖς τοὺς

do well. We cannot do our business well, unless we attend to it and to it alone: therefore each man must choose one profession and no more.' *V.s. Ch. XI.*

τεχνικῆ, 'an art in itself,' 'a special art'; for which word see *Ar. Pol. I. i. πόλιν ὀνόματα καὶ περὶ τούτων* (sc. ἐξ ὧν ἐνυγκεῖται) μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων. *i.e.* 'any characteristic,' or 'special distinction.' *V. infr. Ch. XV. init.* where the defence of the city, in regard of its great importance, is said to require the greatest elaboration and study (*τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον*).

τὸν μὲν σκυτ. διεκ. μήτε γεωργ. ἐπιχ. εἶναι. Upon this principle Socrates refuses in *Ch. XVIII.* to prescribe what the poetry of the State is to be, for he says, we are not poets but founders of a city: καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν

ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλὰ οἰκισταὶ πόλεως. On the same principle actors in tragedy do not succeed in comedy; see *Book III. 395 B*: ἀλλ' οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμωδοῖς τε καὶ τραγωδοῖς οἱ αὐτοί. Where Socrates adds that man's nature is so atomic, that it is impossible for him not only to do many things, but even to imitate many things, with success: καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, φαίνεται μοι εἰς μικρότερα κατακερματίσθαι ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς μιμῆσθαι ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν ὧν δὴ καὶ τὰ μιμήματα ἐστὶν ἀφομοιώματα. Cf. the Latin proverb, 'Ne sutor ultra crepidam.'

καὶ τῶν ἄλλ. ἐνὶ ἐκ. See *Ch. XI.*: Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾶον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολῆν τῶν ἄλλων ἔγων, πράττη.

αὐτὸ. This demonstrative thrown in to help a long relational construction, has al-

καιρούς καλῶς ἀπεργάζεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα; ἢ οὕτω ῥάδιον, ὥστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἅμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἠντιοῦν ἐργαζόμενος, πεττευτικός δὲ ἢ κυβευτικός ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων, ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος; καὶ ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν πολεμικῶν ὀπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημερὸν ὀπλιτικῆς ἢ τινος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργὸν οὐδὲ ἀθλητὴν ληφθὲν ποιήσει, οὐδ' ἔσται χρήσιμον τῷ μήτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου λαβόντι μήτε τὴν μελέτην ἱκανὴν παρασχομένῳ; Πολλοὺ γὰρ ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὰ ὄργανα ἦν ἄξια.

ready been noticed in Ch. I.: οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς κἂν μὴδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίνηται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.

ἐμελλε καλ. ἀπ. For this sense, expressing an indispensable condition, see above note Ch. XVIII. 'Which he cannot bring to perfection unless he concentrate himself thereupon,' or 'Which he will bring to perfection only if he give all his attention thereto.'

τὰ δὲ δὴ. δὴ recalls the hearer to the point on which this recapitulation bears; 'To come to the point, then, &c.'

ἔσται...ἂν γένοιτο. The former case, that a mechanic could at once become a soldier, is cast into the mood of facts, so that it may stand, in all its glaring absurdity, contrasted with the potentially stated

yet truer assertion, that for a man to become even a good chess-player the study of years is requisite. For πεττευτικός, v.s. p. 130 note.

παρέργῳ χρωμ., sc. τούτῳ; παρ. being predicate. So παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ; Book VII. 540 A. Philosophy, Socrates shows, is treated as a *πάρεργον* by most men; Book VI. 498 A: *πάρεργον* ὀλομενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν. In Book VII. the word bears a slightly different sense, 'the details, or minor aspects, of a study'; 527 C: καὶ γὰρ τὰ *πάρεργα* αὐτοῦ (γεωμετρίας) οὐ σμικρά. For the predicative sense see also Xen. Mem. i. 2, 56: ἔφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ πονηρότατα, καὶ τούτοις μαρτυροῖς χρώμενον, κ.τ.λ.

CAP. XV.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσω μεγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον, τοσοῦτω σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἶη καὶ αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον. Οἶμαι ἐγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτήδειας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἡμέτερον δὲ ἔργον ἂν εἶη, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ οἰοί τ' ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι, τίνες τε καὶ ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτήδειαι εἰς πολέως φυλακῆν. Ἡμέτερον μέντοι. Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἄρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἠράμεθα ὁμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδειλιάτεον, ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις

375 παρείκη. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Οἶει οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακῆν νεανίσκου εὐγενούς; Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; Οἶον ὀξύν τε που δεῖ αὐτοῖν ἐκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκάθειν, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὐτῶν, ἐὰν δέη ἐλόντα διαμάχεσθαι. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντων τούτων. Καὶ μὴν ἀνδρείον γε, εἴπερ

CH. XV.—*The defenders of our state must unite in themselves the two traits of courage and gentleness, lest they turn and illtreat those whom they defend.*

τέχνης, 'special work,' v.s. Ch. XIV. note on τεχνική. ἡμέτερον δὲ ἔργον... ἐκλέξασθαι. Arist. Nub. 1594—

ὄν ἔργον, ὃ δὲ, ἰέναι πολλὴν φλόγα.

ἡμέτερον μέντοι, v.s. note. pp. 111, 124. A salient instance of μέντοι without adversative import.

φαῦλον, v.s. Ch. X.: τὸ ζήτημα ἔπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ ὀξύ βλεπόντος.

ἀποδειλ., v.s. Ch. XII.: οὐκ ἀποκνητέον.

παρείκη, 'allow'; not 'fail' or 'submit,' as εἴκω unpounded.

σκύλακος, v.s. p. 140, note εἰς φ. i.e. πρὸς τὸ φυλάσσειν.

νεαν. εὐγ., i.e. τῆς φύσεως νεαν. εὐγ.

τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; as in Thrasy machus' reply, Book I. Ch. XV.: πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς; the sense is, 'in what respect do you mean?' 'what is the bearing of your question?' And again, πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, Ch. XIX. Book I. *in it.*

καὶ μὴν, v.s. p. 112, note.

εὖ μαχεῖται. Πῶς δ' οὖν; Ἀνδρείος δὲ εἶναι ἄρα ἐβελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδῆς εἴτε ἵππος εἴτε κύων ἢ Β ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ζῶον; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας, ὡς ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὐ παρόντος ψυχῇ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀηττητος; Ἐννενόηκα. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ σώματος οἶον δεῖ τὸν φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα. Ναί. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ. Καὶ τοῦτο. Πῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὄντες τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις; Μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐ ῥαδίως. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πρᾶους αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς C πολεμίους χαλεπούς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ φθῆσονται αὐτὸ

ἐβελήσει, v. *infra*. Book IV. 440 C; also in a psychological discussion: οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός; and Book VI. 504 B: Εὐμαθεῖς ... οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἄμα φέεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί. The certainty of a physical effect following upon its cause is emphasized by the use of the word, which properly belongs only to the mental sphere.

ἢ οὐκ, nonne. For the nature of θυμός v. Book IV. *loc. cit.* In the triple division there made of the human mind into λογιστικὸν, θυμοειδῆς, and ἐπιθυμητικὸν, the second kind is said to range itself most frequently upon the side of the first, and to unite with it, in case of a στάσις, or disagreement between reason and desire; and, again, it refuses to be aroused, in cases where it would be unworthy and unreasonable. τίθεσθαι τὰ ἄπλα πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ.

τὰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ. v. i. τοιοῦτοι γὰς φύσεις.

πῶς οὐκ ἄγριοι, v. i. Book III. 410 E, where a just admixture of music and gymnastic in education is said to produce this harmony of courage and gentleness; the defenders being neither allowed to sink into effeminacy (μαλακία) by a preponderance of intellectual study, nor into roughness and crudity by applying themselves wholly to gymnastic. Δεῖν δὲ γέ φαμεν τοὺς φύλακας ἀμφοτέρω εἶναι τοῦτω τῶ φύσει... Οὐκοῦν ἡρμόσθαι δεῖ αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας... καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡρμοσμένου σώφρων τι καὶ ἀνδρεία ἢ ψυχῆ... τοῦ δὲ ἀναρμόστου δειλὴ καὶ ἄγροικος; and see Argument p. 55. In the reply it is to be noticed that οὐ ῥαδίως refers to the efforts of the οἰκιστῆς, not to the φύλακες.

σφᾶς pro αὐτοὺς. Jelf notices the use, Gr. Gr. 654 i. δ. Thuc. I, 126: ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι ἄπως σφίσι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἶη. The prevailing sense of the plural is reflexive and

δράσαντες. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιήσομεν; πόθεν ἅμα πρᾶον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἦθος εὐρήσομεν; ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδεῖ πραεῖα φύσις. Φαίνεται. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι τούτων ὁποτέρου ἂν στέρηται, φύλαξ' ἀγαθὸς οὐ μὴ γένηται· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἔξυμβαίνει ἀγαθὸν **Δ** φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, Δικαίως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν· ἥς γὰρ προυθέμεθα εἰκόνοσ' ἀπελείφθημεν. Πῶς λέγεις; Οὐκ ἐνόησαμεν, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα φύσεις, οἷας ἡμεῖς, οὐκ ᾤθήθημεν, ἔχουσαι τὰναντία ταῦτα. Πού δή; Ἴδιοι μὲν ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζώοις, οὐ μεντ' ἂν **Ε** ἤκιστα ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἷόν τε πραοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας τούναντίον. Οἶδα μέντοι. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατόν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

in the present passage we may consider that the defenders are, as it were, identified with those whom by their conduct they might ruin, p. 261.

ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδ. See what is said of Socrates' opinions regarding the *θυμός* in Book III. note *ἢ οὐκ*, p. 261.

δικαίως γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀπ. See Book IV. 432 C, where the search for justice is brought to a crisis, as here the search

for the good defender: Ἦ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βλακικόν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος.

εἰκόνοσ' ἀπελ., 'we have stopped short in the illustration we employed,' 'we have not fully carried out our illustration.' Privative genitive.

ἄρα, 'as it seems,' 'as it turns out'; see note p. 108, and above here, Ch. V.

ἐν ᾧ, ἐν τούτῳ δ.

CAP. XVI.

Ἄρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι τοῦδε προσδεῖσθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἔτι προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν; Πῶς δὴ; ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. 376 Καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσὶ κατόψει, ὃ καὶ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τοῦ θηρίου. Τὸ ποῖον; Ὅν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνώτῳ, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδὲν δὲ κακὸν προπεπονθῶς· ὃν δ' ἂν γινώριμον, ἀσπάζεται, κἂν μηδὲν πώποτε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθη. ἢ οὐπω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, μέχρι τούτου προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν· ὅτι δέ που δρᾶ ταῦτα, δῆλον. Ἄλλὰ μὴν κομψον γε φαίνεται τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως καὶ

CH. XVI.—*This discrimination is philosophic: so that in addition to being spirited, swift, and courageous, our ideal defender must be also of a philosophic nature.*

ὁ φυλακ. ἐσόμενος. ἐσ. here is equal to ὁ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι.

δ... τοῦ θηρίου. v.s. note p. 113 and *supr.*, here Ch. IX.

κομψόν, like ἀστεῖος, 'fine' or 'splendid,' and very often, like ἀστεῖος, used sarcastically, or in a passage through which runs a vein of humour, as in the present case. For the first use see Book VI. 505 B. τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἠδονὴ δεκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψτέροις φρόνησις, i.e. 'finer natures.' And in Book VII. the study of number as directed to the acquisition of pure knowledge is contrasted with its use in trade (καπηλεύειν) as κομψόν, 525 D. καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ βῆθεντος τοῦ περὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς μαθηματος, ὡς κομψόν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῆ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν πρὸς

ὁ βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἐνεκά τις αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύῃ ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν. Whilst in the humorous description of the democracy (Book VIII. 558 A), in which even the draught animals are so replete with freedom that they push people out of their way in the streets (563), and condemned criminals are suffered to walk about in public unmolested, the demeanour of the latter is termed κομψή. Τί δὲ, ἢ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή, 'exquisite' (D. and V.), 'charming' (J.). The word means 'lautus,' or 'comptus,' 'neat,' 'smart,' and suggests the further notion 'with an eye to effect.' From this further notion it results that the word specially suits a sarcastic context; because to challenge admiration is also to challenge criticism. Compare note on πῶ ποτ' ἐν ποιήσει; and for ἀστεῖος, Book I. Ch. XX. Here the word gives a humorous, not a sarcastic tone to the passage.

Βῶς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον. Πῆ δὴ; *Ἡ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄψιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν διακρίνει, ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν καταμαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀγνοῆσαι καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἂν φιλομαθὲς εἶη, συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοία ὀριζόμενον τό τε οἰκείον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅπως οὐ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταυτόν; Ταυτόν γαρ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν θάρρουντες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ μέλλει πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρᾶός τις ἔσσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι; Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη. Φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδής

φιλόσοφον. For the first two requisites of the philosophic nature are said, in Book VI, to be memory (*μνήμων*) and aptitude for gaining knowledge (*εὐμαθής*). It is thus termed because there is discrimination (*διακρίνει*) and limitation (*ὀριζόμενον*), which are characteristic of a mind that gains knowledge, and partakes in an elementary degree of the nature of the philosopher, οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι. Book VI. *ἰνί.* For another definition of the philosophic mind see Book V. 475 C. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶνα, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάσης; εἰ ἰηγ. φιλομαθῆ καὶ φιλόσοφον, as synonymous.

φιλόσοφος δὴ. It should be noticed that this conclusion has been reached on analogical grounds, as usual: by an appeal to experience of common objects and common events Socrates encourages the listener to agree to his larger propositions. See the remarks upon his method, *Introd.* p. 30. In Book VI where the philosophic

nature is defined, as quoted above, it is also analysed, and like the φύλαξ here, the φιλόσοφος is characterised by several different traits; εἰ μὴ φύσει εἶη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπῆς εὐχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενής ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης; 487 A. The difficulty of combining all kinds of bodily and mental excellences is again insisted upon in the same Book: εὐμαθείς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχείνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὄσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαίωτος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπη ἂν τύχωσι καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. That is, the element of steadiness, which alone can ensure valuable results, is especially hard to find in brilliant natures. Hence the need of education: the mind must be as thoroughly disciplined as the body; οὐκ ἦττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ. And again (Book VII. 536 B) Δριμύτητα δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρκειν.

καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλ-
λων καλὸς καγαθὸς ἔσσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως ; Παντά-
πασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι
θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα
τρόπον ; καὶ ἄρά τι προὔργου ἡμῖν ἔστιν αὐτο σκο- **D**
πούσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν, οὐπερ ἔνεκά πάντα σκοποῦ-
μεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει
γίγνεται ; ἵνα μὴ ἐώ μὲν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ συχρὸν
διεξίωμεν. καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς Πάννυ
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ προὔργου εἶναι εἰς
τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν. Μὰ Δια, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ
φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀφετέον, οὐδ' εἰ μακρο-
τέρα τυγχάνει οὔσα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ
ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές τε καὶ σχολῆν ἄγοντες λόγῳ
παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας. Ἄλλὰ χρη. **E**

ἡμῖν, Ethic dative, *v.s.* note p. 165.

οὐκ ἄρα ἀφ. οὐδ' εἰ μακρ. For the sentiment *v.s.* οὐκ ἀποκητέον, Ch. XII. and the passages compared.

μακροτέρα, 'rather long.' For this absolute comparative, very frequent both in Greek and Latin, see Euthyphr. *inil.* τί νεώτερον ; Hom. Od. 3, 49—

ἀλλὰ νεώτερός ἐστιν, δημηκίη
δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ.

Et infr. 362—

Ὅλος γὰρ μετὰ τοῖσι γεραίτερος
εὐχομαι εἶναι.

Cic. Lælius 16, 59. Sæpe enim in quibusdam aut animus abjectior est, aut spes amplificandæ fortunæ fractior. *Et infr.* 60. Quis etiam si minus felices in

deligendo fuissemus, ferendum id potius. *Id.* Cato Major, *inil.* Et tamen te suspicor iisdem rebus, quibus meipsum, interdum gravius commoveri. See also Virg. *Æn.* i. 228—

Tristior et lacrimis oculos
suffusa nitentes

Alloquitur Venus.

παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας, *i.g.* 'let us represent them as receiving their education.' For this mode of expression, where a narrator is referred as subject to an action not properly his own, but which he is describing, see above Ch. VI. p. 224, note on ἄγοντες, and κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἄιδου, p. 223.

ἀλλὰ χρη. For ἀλλὰ in as sentient replies *v.s.* p. 107. ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν.

CAP. XVII.

Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία ; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐρημένης ; ἔστι δέ που ἡ

CH. XVII.—*Education is divided into music and gymnastic ; and narration is a part of music, and in narration we must begin with fiction, avoiding however those legends that attribute immorality to the gods.*

We here enter upon the first system of education, viz. that destined to train up a class of efficient soldiers whose military ardour is tempered with patriotic tenderness. The education comprises two branches, music, i.e. intellectual labour, and gymnastic, exercise of the body. In another place Socrates explains that it is necessary to employ these two exercises, because if a man give all his time to his body, he becomes *ἄμουσος*, vulgar, or incapable of appreciating things intellectual, whilst if he confine himself to mental work he becomes softer than is fit and unnerved in the presence of danger. The account of this first education continues from the present chapter to the end of Book III., after which the question is discussed, how the guardians will manage the city, and justice is discovered. But then the *ἀπορία* arises, Until kings are philosophers and philosophers kings, the city will never be governed aright ; and this results in the question, What is a philosopher ? To answer this question a second, esoteric, system of education is required,

much more elaborate, and much more searching than that before us, treating of all the sciences as they bear upon each other and upon their source, Real Knowledge, which is to human knowledge as the sun's light to the human eye.

Aristotle recognises the necessity for education, in order to curb individual peculiarities, and to make the welfare of the state an object of serious interest ; and thus he agrees with Plato in the principle that the general object of education is to steady the mind. *V.s.* note on φιλόσοφος δὴ, p. 264, and the words quoted μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν. Aristotle's words are, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει, πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν, καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίους. Again in the Ethics 10, 9, Aristotle speaks of education in letters not merely of education in letters for children when growing up, but also of a training in morals as soon as they are capable of understanding, a training which corresponds to the inculcation of principle through *μῦθοι* which Plato here advocates for the very young. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προὔπάρχειν πως οἰκείον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρὸν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις

μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἢ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.
 Ἔστι γάρ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ μουσικῆ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα
 παιδεύοντες ἢ γυμναστικῇ; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Μουσικῆς
 δ' εἰπὼν τίθης λόγους, ἢ οὐ; Ἐγώ γε. Λόγων δὲ
 διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ' ἕτερον; **Ναι.** 377
 Παιδευτέον δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς
 ψευδέσῃ; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μαν-
 θάνεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους
 λέγομεν; τοῦτο δὲ που ὡς τὸ ὄλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἐν
 δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδία
 ἢ γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τοῦτο δὲ
 ἔλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἀπτέον ἢ γυμναστικῆς.
 Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντός ἔργου **Β**
 μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέῳ καὶ ἀπαυλῷ ὄτρυν;
 μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος,
 ὃν ἂν τις βούληται ἐνσημῆσθαι ἐκάστω, Κομιδῆ

τραφέντα νόμοις... Διδ νόμοις δεῖ
 τετάχθαι τὴν τροφήν (i.e. their
 nurture) καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα·
 οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη
 γενόμενα. Οὐκ ἰκανὸν δ' ἴσως
 νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας
 τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ
 ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ
 καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
 δεοίμεθα ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὄλων δὴ
 περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον. And again,
 a direct reference to this passage,
 Διδ δεῖ ἤχθαι πῶς εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων,
 ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησιν, ὥστε χαιρεῖν
 καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ ἢ γὰρ ὀρθῆ
 παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. Eth. 2, 3, 2.

Μουσικῆς δ' εἰπὼν... 'and
 when you speak (of music) you
 include narration under music!'
 Stallb. reads εἶπον from Ast's
 emendation.

ὡς τὸ ὄλον εἰπεῖν, v. i. ὡς ἐπὶ
 τὸ πολὺ. ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰπεῖν.
 Euthydemus 279 E.

οὐκοῦν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχή. See

Aristotle Eth. i. vii. 23, where
 the necessity for strict definition
 follows upon this principle: σπου-
 δαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς·
 μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπήν πρὸς
 τὰ ἐπόμενα. Δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ
 ἡμισυ πάντος εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή. Cf.
 Hesiod's proverb, Opp. et Di. 40,
 νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ἕσφ πλέον
 ἡμισυ παντός.

ἐνσημῆσθαι, to stamp, to
 impress; cf. the words παρά-
 σσημος, ἐπίσημος. For the meta-
 phor, cf. Theat. 191 C, ὅς δὲ
 μοι λόγου ἔνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς
 ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κληρῶν ἐκμαγεῖον. Cf.
 also the word πλάττειν below
 here. And Aristotle speaks
 again of the importance of train-
 ing from the earliest age in
 Eth. 2, 1, 8, οὐ μικρὸν οὖν
 διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς
 ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ,
 μάλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν, see preceding
 note.

μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ραδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις, ἅς, ἐπειδὴν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς; Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν παρήσομεν. Πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν **Κ**καλὸν ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ' ἂν μὴ, ἀποκριτέον· τοὺς δ' ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν, ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον. Ποίους δὴ; ἔφη. Ἐν τοῖς μείζουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταῦτὸν δύνασθαι τοὺς τε μείζους καὶ **Δ**τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἦ οὐκ οἶει; Ἐγώ, ἔφη· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐννοῶ οὐδὲ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις. Οὗς Ἡσιόδός τε, εἶπον, καὶ Ὀμηρὸς ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι

τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας, *v.s.* Book I. Ch. XXIII. οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, and note. On the question of this inconsistency between mythology and religion, see Sir G. W. Cox, *Aryan Mythology*, Vol. i. Ch. vi. Book i.

ὃν μὲν ἂν, *sc.* μῦθον.

ἐν τοῖς μείζουσιν. *i.e.* 'if we settle the claims of the larger tales and compositions we shall thereby settle also the less.'

ταῦτὸν δύνασθαι, 'have the same import.' See Euthydemus, 286 C, τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος. Also see Dem. de Cor. 10 (ed. Arnold), τί δὲ τοῦτ' ἠδύνατο, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἐγὼ διδάξω. And in Aristoph. *Clouds* 674, the Socrates of the play explaining that *κάρδοπος* is, by virtue of

its termination, as much masculine as *Κλεώνυμος*, uses the same expression: ταῦτὸν δύναται σοὶ *κάρδοπος Κλεωνύμφ*.

Ἡσιόδός τε καὶ Ὀμηρὸς, *v.s.* pp. 133, 121, see also Book X. *in*it. 607; where the case for and against Homer is thus summed up: *Συγχωρεῖν Ὀμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ἔμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν, and compare Xenophanes' words ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. i. 289, ix. 193—*

Πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκ' Ὀμηρὸς
θ' Ἡσιόδός τε
ἴσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνειδέο
καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν.

* * *

ποιηται. οὔτοι γάρ που μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσιν. Ποίους δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις ; "Ὅπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρή καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδῃται. Τί τοῦτο ; E "Ὅταν εἰκάσῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἥρων οἰοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν εἰκότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῆ γράψαι. Καὶ γάρ,

ὡς πλεῖστ' ἐφθέγγαντο θεῶν
ἀθεμιστία ἔργα,
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ
ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

For the connection between the Eleatic Xenophanes and Plato's philosophy, see *infra*. Ch. XX. Xenophanes acutely presents the necessity, and, at the same time, the absurdity of anthropomorphism in religion thus—

'Ἄλλ' εἶτοι χεῖρας γ' εἶχον
βόες ἢ ἐλέντες
ἢ γράψαι χεῖρεςσι καὶ ἔργα
τελείν ἄπερ ἄνδρες
καὶ κε θεῶν ιδέας ἔγραφον καὶ
σώματ' ἐποίουν
τοιαῦθ' οἷόν περ καὶ τοὶ δέμας
εἶχον ὁμοῖον,
ἵπποι μὲν θ' ἵπποισι, βόες δὲ τε
βουσὶν ὁμοῖα

τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις. The objection to Homer and to poets in general, as it has been noticed above, is that they are imitators thrice removed from realities, that, instead of studying arts, they write about arts of which they practically know nothing, and that therefore what they have to say upon them is worth nothing. See Book X. 598 E, extr. δεῖ δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον μμηταῖς τούτοις οὔτοι ἐντυχόντες ἐξαπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν δρῶντες οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριτὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ῥάδια ποιεῖν μὴ

εἰδοῖτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. φαντάσματα γὰρ ἄλλ' οὐκ ὄντα ποιούσιν.

μη καλῶς ψεύδῃται, 'if any one of them write debased fiction.' *Ψεῦδος*, fiction, is of the highest value as a moral instrument. Aristotle considers poetry to be more philosophic than history, because it deals in fiction (οἷα ἂν γένοιτο) in contrast to fact (οἷα ἐγένετο). See Poet. IX. 1451b, quoted on p. 10. This *καλὸν ψεῦδος* is opposed to the *ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος* (*infra*. 382 A) or 'lie with intent to deceive,' or 'lie in the soul ;' the object of the *καλὸν ψεῦδος* being not to deceive but to instruct. Hence it is described also as the 'lie in words' (τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημα), and contrasted with the 'lie in the soul' (τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαι), 382 B. Compare also the Laws 663 E, where the legislator, it is suggested, may invent fictions, to point the moral for the young. *Νομοθέτης δὲ οὐ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν οὕτως ἔχον, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐτόλμησεν ἂν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους, ἔστιν ὅ τι τοῦτου ψεῦδος λυσιτελέστερον ἂν ἐψεύσατό ποτε ; ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν, κ.τ.λ.* This simile, introduced here merely as an illustration, is worked out at length in Book X.

ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὰ γε τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα ; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεύδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἅ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὃ τε αὐτὸν Κρόνος ὡς
378 ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν· τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέος, οὐδ' ἂν εἴ ἦν ἀληθῆ, ὥμην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, δι' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους, θυσα-

598 C, *seqq.* in order to prove the poet an imitator of an imitator. The painter, it is there maintained, is a deceiver because he represents not the nature, but the appearance of objects, *οἶον δὲ ζωγράφος, φαμὲν, ζωγραφῆσει ἡμῖν σκυτοτόμον, τέκτονα, τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς, περὶ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἐπαίων τῶν τεχνῶν. ἀλλ' ὁμῶς παιδᾶς τε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατῶ ἂν.* In that passage it is not false representation, as here, that is complained of; but representation, however accurate, of appearances, is disparaged: in the present passage, the painter is considered as drawing upon his imagination, not even upon appearances.

ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἶργ. Theogon. 154 and 179.

...τῶν μὲν (sc. παιδῶν)

ὅπως τις πρῶτα γένοιτο,

πάντας ἀποκρίπτεσκε, καὶ ἐς φῶς οὐκ ἀνίσκε

Γαίης ἐν κευθμῶνι, κακῶ δ' ἐτέρπετο ἔργῳ

Οὐρανός.

τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργ. καὶ παθ. See Euthyphr. 5 E, τοῦτον (sc. Δία) ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα δεῖσαι, ὅτι τοὺς υἱεῖς κατέπιεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ κάκεινόν γε αὐ

τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμῖν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, and similarly in Ar. Nub. 904—

πῶς δῆτα δίκης οὐσης ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν τὸν πατέρος αὐτοῦ

δίσας;

For the question of mythology see *Introđ.* p. 24.

ἄφρονας καὶ νέους, as in the passage quoted from Book X. παιδᾶς τε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατῶ ἂν.

μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ... 'to keep silence if possible, and failing that, &c.' For this expression see Book V. 461 C, μάλιστα μὲν μὴδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κῆμα, μὴδὲ γ' ἐν, ἐὰν γένηται, ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσσηται, οὕτω τιθέναι. 473 B, μάλιστα μὲν ἐνός, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δυοῖν. Also Book VIII. 564 C, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγένησθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, κ.τ.λ. Demosthenes de Cor. 317, μάλιστα μὲν μὴ ἔχειν ταῦτ' ἐν τῇ φύσει, εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ. Also in poetry, Soph. Antigone, 327—

Ἄλλ' εὐρεθείη μὲν μάλιστα· ἐὰν δέ τοι

ληφθῆ τε καὶ μὴ, κ.τ.λ.

δι' ἀπορρήτων, cf. 460 C, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσι.

μένους οὐ χοῖρον, ἀλλά τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὁ τι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκούσαι. Καὶ γάρ, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὗτοί γε οἱ λόγοι χαλεποί. Καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γ', ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει, οὐδὲ λεκτέον **B** νέφ' ἀκούοντι, ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀδικούντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρώη ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοί τε καὶ μέγιστοι. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὐδὲ αὐτῶ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτήδεια εἶναι λέγειν. Οὐδέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ παράπαν, ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ· εἴ γε δεῖ **C** ἡμῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας τὴν πόλιν φυλάξειν αἰσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ῥαδίως ἀλλήλοις ἀπεχθάνεσθαι· πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποιητέον, καὶ ἄλλας ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς

θυσασμένους οὐ χοῖρ. So in Book V. when the important and sacred marriage ceremonial takes place, sacrifices are made, οὐκοῦν δὴ ἑορταί τινες νομοθετηταί ἔσονται, ἐν αἷς ξυνάξομεν τὰς τε νυμφὰς καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους, καὶ θυσαί καὶ ἕμνοι ποιητέοι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ποιηταῖς πρέποντες τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις.

συνέβη. Stephanus notes that we should expect συμβαίη; Stallb. however supports the indicative on the ground that the protasis was indicative, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν.

ἀδικούντα πατέρα κολάζων, see Arist. Nub. where this very case is exhibited as a result of Socratic teaching. See ll. 1330, seqq.—

ΣΤ. τὸν πατέρα τύπτεις;

ΦΕ. κάποφᾶν γε νη Δία ὡς ἐν δίκῃ σ' ἔτυπτον.

ΣΤ. ὦ μιαιώτατε,

καὶ πῶς γένοιτ' ἂν πατέρα τύπτειν ἐν δίκῃ; κ.τ.λ.

The comedy of the Clouds was first acted B.C. 423, and for the second time B.C. 421; hence it is probable, as stated in the Introd. p. 13, that this, among other passages in Plato's works, has direct reference to that comedy which traduces Socrates so cruelly.

ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολ. Plato here is probably thinking of the disputes of the gods over the Trojan war. See Il. i. 531-568; iv. 422, seqq. and especially v. 846, seqq. where Pallas with Diomed attacks Ares and drives him wounded to Olympus.

Λάζετο δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ἡνία Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

Αὐτίκ' ἐπ' Ἀρηϊ πρώτῳ ἔχε μώνυχας ἵππους.

πολλοῦ δεῖ. Like οἶδ' ὅτι, δῆλον ὅτι, πῶς οἶει, πῶς δοκεῖς, and many others, this has passed into a merely adverbial expression.

θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν· ἀλλ' εἴ πως μέλλομεν πείσειν, ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἀπήχθητο οὐδ' ἔστι **Δ** τοῦτο ὄσιον, τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδιά εὐθύς καὶ γερούσι καὶ γραυσὶ καὶ πρεσβυτεροῖς γιγνομένοις, καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέου λογοποιεῖν.)¹ "Ἡρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις ὑπο πατρός, μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένη

ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἔτ. It is with the intention of arriving at this result that Plato proposes and works out his theory in Book V. that, in the model state, the wives and children should be in common to all the citizens. For, according to his scheme, all the younger people will look upon each other as brothers and sisters, and upon all the elders as fathers and mothers, that thus there will be ever present the sense of relationship, to prevent quarrels and injuries, and that the whole state, like one body, will respond either in pain or in pleasure to everything that affects a single individual in it. See 462 D: Καὶ ἦτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει, οἷον ὅταν πού ἡμῶν δάκτυλός του πληγῇ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωρία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν ζύνταξιν τῆν τοῦ ἀρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἡσθετό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα ζυνήλησε μέρους πονήσαντος ὄλη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἀνθρώπος τῶν δάκτυλον ἀλγεί. And for the statement that this result will be arrived at by a community of wives and children, see 464 B: Τοῦ μεγίστου ἔρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡμῖν πέφανται ἡ κεινωρία τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν τε παιδῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

γέρουσι, sc. μυθολογητέον, to be supplied from the preceding sentence. For the whole of this passage see Euthyphro 6 B: Καὶ πόλεμον ἔρα ἡγεῖ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐχθράς γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ οἷα λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τὰ τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποίκονται.

"Ἡρας δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος, κ.τ.λ. In Il. i. 588, Hephæstus recalls to his mother how he was thrown out of heaven by Zeus, when striving to help her, ἀλεξέμεναι μεμαῶτα. And for the actual binding of Hera by Zeus, see Il. xv. 18—

Ἦ οὐ μέμνη, ὅτε τ' ἐκρέμω ὑψόθεν, ἐκ δὲ ποδοῖν

Ἄκμοναι ἦκα δύο, περὶ χερσὶ δὲ δεσμὸν ἔηλα

Χρῦσεον, ἔβρηκτον.

Ast ingeniously clears up the expression here, δεσμ. ὑπ. υἱέος¹ by pointing out that Hephæstus made the chains to confine Hera at Zeus' bidding, although willing himself to connive at her escape.

Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις. Il. i. 590—

Ἦδη γάρ με καὶ ἄλλοτ' ἀλεξέμεναι μεμαῶτα

ῥίψε, ποδὸς τεταγῶν, ἀπο βηλοῦ θεσπεσίω.

Compare Euthyphro 6 B.

ἀμύνειν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὄσας Ὅμηρος πεποιηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὐτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἶος τε κρίνειν ὃ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, ἀλλ' ἂν τηλικούτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι. ὢν δὴ ἴσως ἔνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον, ἂν πρώτα ἀκούουσιν, ὃ τι κάλλιστα μεμβολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν.

ὑπονοίας, 'allegory.' This appears from Plutarch 2, 19 E: ταῖς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις, ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν λεγομέναις; Stallb. So Horace professes to regard the Homeric poems in Ep. i. 2—

Qui (Homerus) quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non, Planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dixit... Rursus quid virtus et quid sapientia possit Utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen. δυσέκνιπτα, cf. Hor. Od. 3, 5, 28—

Neque amissos colores Lana refert medicata fuco: Nec vera virtus, quum semel excidit, Curat reponi deterioribus. And a similar moral is expressed by a different metaphor in Ep. I, 2, 67—

Nunc adhibe puro Pectore verba puer; nunc te melioribus offer. Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem Testa diu. i.e. the young, as Plato demands here, must be subject to good influence from their first years.

In Book IV. 429 D this metaphor, as we have seen in other cases, is expanded and detailed. The legislator, it is there said, must imbue the defenders of the state with courage, as with a dye that cannot be washed out. Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅτι οἱ βαφεῖς, ἐπειδὴν βουληθῶσι βάψαι ἔρια ὥστ' εἶναι ἀλουργὰ, πρώτον μὲν... λευκῶν, ἔπειτα προσπαρασκευάζουσιν οὐκ ὀλίγη παρασκευῆ θεραπεύσαντες, ὅπως δέξεται ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ ἄνθος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ βάπτουσι. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν τοῦτω τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῆ, δευσοποιὸν γίγνεται τὸ βαφὴν, καὶ ἡ πλύσις οὐτ' ἄνευ ρυμμάτων οὔτε μετὰ ρυμμάτων δύναται αὐτῶν τὸ ἄνθος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἂ δ' ἂν μὴ, οἶσθα οἷα δὴ γίγνεται, ἐάν τις ἄλλα χρώματα βάπτῃ ἐάν τε καὶ ταῦτα μὴ προθεραπεύσας. Οἶδα, ἔφη, ὅτι ἔκπλυτα καὶ γελοῖα. Τοιοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὅτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ ἐπαιδευόμεν μουσικῆ καὶ γυμναστικῆ. Μηδὲν οἶον ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὅτι κάλλιστα τοὺς νόμους πεισθέντες δέξοιτο ὥσπερ βαφῆν, ἵνα δευσοποιὸς αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα γίγνοιτο, κ.τ.λ.

CAP. XVIII.

Ἐχει γὰρ, ἔφη, λόγον. ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρώτῃ ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἂν φαίμεν; καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον Ὁ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ
 379 ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως. οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἶδέναι, ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ' οὓς ἂν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτόν, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους. Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν; Τοιοῖδε πού τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ οἶος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὦν, αἰεὶ δῆπου ἀποδοτέον, ἂν τε τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσι ποιῇ, ἂν τε ἐν τραγωδίᾳ. Δεῖ γάρ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὁ γε
 Β θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτως; Τί μῆν; Ἀλλὰ

CH. XVIII.—*We are not poets ourselves, but legislators; we proceed therefore only to lay down the lines upon which the poets must compose.*

Plato's attitude towards poets in this Book is merely critical; he gives his opinion as to what they should say and what they should not say; and he disparages their general tone. But he reserves for Book X. his complete and most exhaustive indictment against them. He treats them here only as they stand in relation to theology, and as regards the effect of their writings upon the children in the State; *v.s.* note p. 121.

τύπους, cf. Book III. 403 D: καλὰ ἦθη ψυχῇ ἔνοντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογούντα ἐκείνοις, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου. And again in Book VI. 491 D it is

used as equivalent to τὸ καθ' ἑλίου, the general, as opposed to individual instances: ἔ εἰς γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὦν λέγω... Λαβοῦ τοίνυν ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, κ.τ.λ. And similarly to this present use in Book III. 414 A: ὡς ἐν τύπῳ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας.

οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας. For this question see *Introd.* pp. 13-15, 24-29. It has been already shown in Book I. Ch. IX. that good men do no harm (βλάπτειν) to any person, (see note p. 137, ἀλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη): Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἕλλον οὐδένα. And hence it would follow *à fortiori* that God does not harm anyone. But Socrates reviews rapidly the steps of the argument which proved in Book I. that it was unnatural for anything good to do anything bad.

μην οὐδεν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν. ἢ γὰρ; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Ἄρ' οὐν ὃ μὴ βλαβερόν, βλάπτει; Οὐδαμῶς. Ὁ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει, κακὸν τι ποιεῖ; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Ὁ δὲ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ἂν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἴτιον; Πῶς γάρ; Τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν; Ναί. Αἴτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας; Ναί. Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. Παντελῶς γ', ἔφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθος, C πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀλλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. Οὐκ

Αἴτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας. See Hom. Od. xv. 532—

Οὐ τοι ἄνευ θεοῦ ἔπτατο δέξιός ἄρνις.

τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχ. Xenophon, in the Memorabilia I, 3, 2, bears witness to this belief of Socrates: Καὶ εὐχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τὰγαθὰ δίδόναι, ὡς τὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστ' εἰδέναι ὅποια ἀγαθὰ ἐστί. For his belief in God's direct care of man, see Mem I, 4, 10, seqq.

πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰγαθὰ. Perhaps the most pessimistic statement that can be found in the Republic. We find a trace of the same feeling in Book IV. 442 A, where the lowest part of man's nature is said to be the most extensive and exacting: τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστω ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον. And see Book VI. 491 A and 495 B, where he complains of the scarcity of

natures susceptible of higher training. But these are isolated passages; through the whole of the Republic there breathes a hopeful spirit, if not of consummation, at any rate of amelioration; see Introd. p. 18 seqq., on the question whether Plato thought such a state could be realized, and his favourable opinion of the common mass of mankind, in Book VI. 499 E: Ὡ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγορεῖ, ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἔξουσι, κ.τ.λ. See also Ch. IX. note on ὄραν ἀκούειν.

τῶν δὲ κακῶν...οὐ τὸν θεόν, Hesiod gives utterance to the opposite opinion in 'Erg. 47—

ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε, χολωσάμενος φρεσὶν ἦσιν, ὅττι μιν ἐξαπάτησε Πρωμηθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης.

τοῦνεκ' ἄρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἐμήσατο κήδεα λυγρὰ.

For ἀλλ' οὐ, v. s. p. 173.

ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε Ὀμήρου οὔτ' ἄλλον
 ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
 ἀνοήτως ἀμαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος, ὡς δοιοὶ
 πίθοι

κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
 κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν
 καὶ ᾧ μὲν ἂν μίξας ὁ Ζεὺς δῶ ἀμφοτέρων,
 ἄλλοτε μὲν τε κακῶ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ'
 ἐσθλῶ,

ᾧ δ' ἂν μὴ, ἀλλ' ἄκρατα τὰ ἕτερα,

τὸν δὲ κακῆ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα διὸν ἐλαύνει·

εὐδ' ὡς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε
 τέτυκται.

CAP. XIX.

Τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄρκων καὶ σπονδῶν σύγχυσις, ἣν
 ὁ Πάνδαρος συνέχεεν, ἐάν τις φῆ δι' Ἀθηνᾶς τε
 καὶ Διὸς γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα· οὐδὲ θεῶν
 ἕριν τε καὶ κρίσιν διὰ Θέμιτός τε καὶ Διός·

ἀποδεκτέον Ὀμήρου, *supr.* pp.
 144, 156.

κατακείαται, *seqq.* II. xxiv.
 527. In Book X. (see Argument) a choice is allowed to the
 souls who are going to enter
 into life, and their career does
 not depend upon the will of
 Fate. But, as remarked above,
 the story of Er is only popular.
 ἀμφοτέρων, partitive genitive,
v.s. p. 249.

τὸν δὲ. II. *loc. cit.*
 οὐδ' ὡς, κ.τ.λ. these words
 depend upon λέγοντος.

CH. XIX.—*And we will refuse
 to hold God as the author of
 trouble and misfortune. Neither
 does God change.*

τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄρκ. II. *iv.* 55.
seqq.

Πάνδαρον ἀντίθεον διζημένη, εἴ
 που ἐφεύροι.

διὰ Θέμ. τε καὶ Διός, II. *xx.* 4,
 l. 88—

Ζεὺς δὲ Θέμιστα κέλευσε θεοῦς
 ἀγορήνδε καλέσσαι.

Pars illa Iliados vocatur a
 veteribus θεῶν μάχη. Pro Græcia

οὐδ' αὖ, ὡς Αἰσχύλος λέγει, ἐατέον ἀκούειν τοὺς 380
 νέους, ὅτι

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,
 ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλη.

ἀλλ' ἐάν τις ποιῇ, ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ἰαμβεῖα ἔνεστι,
 τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ
 ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ
 λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ἄν νῦν
 ἡμεῖς λόγον ζητοῦμεν, καὶ λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς Β
 δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζό-
 μενοι. ὡς δὲ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἦν δὲ δὴ
 ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεός, οὐκ ἐατέον λέγειν τὸν ποιητὴν
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως λέγοιεν, ὡς
 ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελούντο ὑπὸ

pugnant Juno Minerva, Nep-
 tunus, Vulcanus, Mercurius :
 pro Trojanis Venus, Apollo,
 Diana, Latona, Mars, Scaman-
 der. Muretus.

ὡς Αἰσχύλος λέγ. Cf. *Æsch.*

Ag. 1468—

δαῖμον, ὃς ἐμπίπτει δόμασι
 καὶ διφυλί-
 οισι Τανταλίδαισιν.

Et infr. 1481.

ἢ μέγαν οἴκοις τοῖσδε
 δαίμονα καὶ βαρυμῆνιν αἰνεῖς.

and again, 1532, *πίτνοντος οἴκου.*
 And in the *Choephoræ* the
 chorus pray that the house be
 not entirely ruined, l. 805.

γέρων φόνος μήκει' ἐν δόμοις
 τέκοι,

τῶδε καλῶς κτάμενον. *ᾄ*

μέγα ναῖων στόμιον, εὖ
 δὲσ ἀνιδεῖν δόμον ἀνδρός.

λόγον, 'some account,' 'ex-
 planation'; v.s. Ch. XVI. *in it.*
 ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος, the 'account
 of justice.'

οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολ. v. *infr.*

Book X. 613 A, τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ
 οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ
 θεῶν γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι
 ὡς οἶόν τε ἄριστα, εἰ μὴ τι
 ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προ-
 τέρας ἁμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν; Πάνυ
 μὲν οὖν. Οὕτως ἔρα ὑποληπτέον
 περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ' ἐν
 πενία γένηται, ἐάν τ' ἐν νόσοις, ἢ
 τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν,
 ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι
 τελευτήσῃ ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθαν-
 όντι. The Socrates of the *Clouds*
 is made to rest his disproof of
 the existence of Zeus upon the
 consideration that the thunder-
 bolt often falls not upon the
 guilty but upon inanimate
 objects. ll. 398, *seqq.* καὶ πῶς,
 ᾄ μῶρε σὺ καὶ κρονίον ὄζων καὶ
 βεκεσεῖληνε, εἴπερ βάλλει τοὺς
 ἐπιύρκους, δῆτ' οὐχὶ Σίμων' ἐνέ-
 πρησεν; Οὐδὲ Κλεώνυμον οὐδὲ
 Θέωρον; καίτοι σφόδρα γ' εἶσ'
 ἐπιόρκοι Ἄλλὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ γε νεῶν
 βάλλει καὶ Σούνιον ἄκρον Ἀθη-
 νέων Καὶ τὰς δρῦς τὰς μεγάλας.

τροῦ θεοῦ, ἐατέον· κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινα γίνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει **C** εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτ' ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθολογούντα, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε ξυμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνά αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. Σύμψηφός σοί εἰμι, ἔφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, καί μοι ἀρέσκει. Οὗτος μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἂν εἶη τῶν περὶ θεοὺς νόμων τε καὶ τυπων, ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τοὺς λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιούντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Καὶ **D** μάλ', ἔφη, ἀποχρη. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὄδε; ἀρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἶει εἶναι καὶ οἶον ἐξ ἐπιβουλήs φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ιδέαις, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν

διαμαχετέον. See Book I. Ch. XV. where Thrasymachus is obliged to assent to Socrates' proof but 'struggles' against agreeing to the several steps of the Argument, *Συνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι.* See also Book I. 335 E, *μαχόμεθα, ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐάν τις φῆ Σιμωνίδην, κ.τ.λ.* Also in Parmenides 127 E, *ἄρα τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι; οὐκ ἕλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστιν.*

μήτ' ἐν μέτρ. v.s. Ch. IX. *οὐδεὶς πώποτ' οὐτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὐτ' ἐν ἰδίῳ λόγῳ.*

σύμφωνα, 'inconsistent.' So the inconsistency of the belief that the Gods can dispute or be in any way divided is shown in Euthyphro 8 A, *ταῦτά ἄρα, ὡς εἶκε, μισεῖται τε ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλή ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη. καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἶη.*

σύμψηφος. See *Æsch. Ag. 1353—*

κἀγὼ τοιούτου γνώματος κοινῶνός ὦν

ψηφίζομαί τι δρᾶν.

ἐν ᾧ δεήσει, κ.τ.λ. See Book I. Ch. XV. where the ruler is proved to have regard only to the interest of the ruled in all his words and actions, *καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνο ξυμφέρον καὶ πρόπον καὶ λέγει ἃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.*

γόητα. In Book III. 413 A, men are said to lose their 'right opinions' not intentionally, but by force or 'bewitchment,' *οὐ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀκουσίως στέρεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους... κλαπέντες ἢ γοητευθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες; and ἡψτ. B,* all things that deceive are said to bewitch, *Ἔοικε γὰρ γοητεύειν πάντα ὅσα ἀπατᾷ.* See below here also Ch. XX. *ἐξαπύτωντες καὶ γοητεύοντες.*

γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη,

ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι. In this assertion of the Unity and simplicity of God, we trace the effect of Eleatic philosophy as interpreted by Xenophanes (c. 650): This philosopher attacked Homer and Hesiod in much the same way as Plato does here. See Diog. Laert. ix. 18, Γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ἐν ἔπεισι καὶ ἐλεγείας καὶ ἰάμβους κατ' Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ὀμήρου, ἐπικόπτων αὐτῶν τὰ περὶ θεῶν εἰρημένα, for which see also Ch. XVII. note on Ἡσιόδός τε καὶ Ὀμ. His words regarding the Unity and nature of God are as follows,

Εἰς θεὸς ἓν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
οὐ τι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοῖος
οὐδὲ νόημα.

This passage supplies us with further evidence of the connection between Xenophanes and Plato mentioned on p. 3. Compare also Ar. Eth. 7, 14, 8, who is speaking of human fondness for change: he there explains it by the fact that human nature is not ἀπλή: but, he adds, God inasmuch as He is perfect is unchangeable, οὐκ αἰεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλήν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν... Διὸ δὲ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν χαίρει ἡδονήν. This Unity of the divine nature is again touched upon in Book X. 397 C, where Socrates is explaining his theory of Ideas or Original Essences (see Argument, p. 95). He there supposes that all things upon the earth of the same kind have a single original or prototype in heaven, made or

emanating from God, and he implies that it is in accordance with God's single nature that the prototype should be single, ὁ μὲν δὲ θεός, εἶτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, εἶτε τις ἀνάγκη ἐπὶν μὴ πλεον ἢ μίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει ἀπεργάσασθαι αὐτὸν κλίην, οὕτως ἐποίησε μίαν μόνον αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ὃ ἐστὶ κλίην. And *infra*. ταῦτα δὲ εἰδὼς ὁ θεός (sc. that there must always be one simple original of any number of individual objects), βουλόμενος εἶναι ὄντως κλίης ποιητῆς ὄντως ὄσης, ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίης τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποῖος τις, μίαν φύσει αὐτὴν ἔφυσεν.

οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη. This challenge on behalf of monotheism comes upon Adeimantus with a startling effect. To a Greek, who saw a divinity in every stream and grove, and even in every tree, the monotheistic conception of God would be at once repugnant and hardly intelligible. Socrates' belief, as far as we can formulate it, beside the limitations in the present book, included the doctrine of τὸ θεῖον, or the communication of God's spirit to mankind. See notes, pp. 126, 150. Hence, although no polytheist, he believed in the present and pervading character of the Divine Nature throughout the universe. In advocating monotheism Plato follows strictly upon Xenophanes' belief concerning God, εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ἀπάντων κράτιστον, ἓνα φησὶν αὐτὸν προσήκειν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ δύο ἢ πλείοι εἴεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κράτιστον καὶ βέλτιστον αὐτὸν

νῦν γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν. Τί δὲ τόδε ; οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ
 τι ἐξίσταται τῆς αὐτοῦ ιδέας, ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ
 Ἐμείσασθαι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ
 μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἤκιστα ἀλλοιοῦνται τε
 καὶ κινεῖται ; οἶον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν
 καὶ πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἰλήσεών τε καὶ ἀνέ-
 381 μων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὐ τὸ ὑγιέστατον
 καὶ ἰσχυρότατον ἤκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται ; Πῶς δ' οὐ ;
 Ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην
 ἤκιστ' ἂν τι ἐξῶθεν πάθος ταραξείη τε καὶ ἀλλοιώ-
 σειεν ; Ναί. Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τά γε ξύνθετα πάντα
 σκευή τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τὰ
 εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων παθημάτων ἤκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται. Ἔστι δὴ
 Β ταῦτα. Πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ
 ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐν-
 δέχεται. Ἔοικεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεὸς γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ
 θεοῦ πάντῃ ἄριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δ' οὐ ; Ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ
 ἤκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἴσχοι ὁ θεός. Ἦκιστα
 δῆτα.

CAP. XX.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεταβάλλοι ἂν καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ ;
 Δῆλον, ἔφη ὅτι, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ

εἶναι πάντων. Arist. de Xen.
 Zen. et Gorg. 3.

παθημάτων...πάθος, the objec-
 tive use of these words is
 curious. As a rule the word
 πάσχω and its derivatives apply
 only to the subject, but here we
 have it, by the use of ὑπὸ,
 constituted an agent.

ἐνδέχεται, 'admits of.' This
 word in Attic writers is generally
 neuter, and equivalent to 'it is

possible.' See 501 C, Book VI.
 ἀνθρωπεία ἦθη, εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται,
 θεοφιλή ποιησίαν, but its use with
 accusative is not uncommon.

Ἦκιστα δῆτα, v.s. not. p. 177.

CH. XX.—*He cannot change for
 the better: he would not change
 for the worse.*

ἀλλ' ἄρα, 'but some one will
 say that' &c. For ἔσα and ἄρα

τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἰσχιον ἑαυτοῦ ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦνται· οὐ γάρ που ἐνδέεα γε C φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι. Ὁρθότατα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, λέγεις· καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἂν τίς σοι, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐκὼν αὐτὸν χεῖρω ποιεῖν ὀπηροῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ; Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφη, καὶ θεῶ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ. Ἄπασα, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Μηδεὶς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὦ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς

D

θεοὶ ξείνοισιν εἰκοτες ἀλλοδαποῖσι
παντοῖοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστροφῶσι πόληας·

μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θετιδος καταφενδέσθω μηδεῖς,
μηδ' ἐν τραγωδῖαις μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν

introducing another's words or opinions see above p. 225, and below here, ὡς ἄρα θεοὶ τινες περιέρχονται.

χεῖρον ἑαυτ. a mode of expression not at all unusual, see below Book VII. 526, C, ὅμως εἰς γε τὸ ὀξύτεροι αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιδιδόασιν. So the superlative is used: Xen. Mem. I, 2, 46. Εἶθε σοι, ὦ Περικλείς, τότε συνηγνόμην, ὅτε δεινότατος σαυτοῦ ταῦτα ἦσθα.

χεῖρω ποιεῖν. This is in accordance with Xenophanes' teaching of the nature of the gods. See Arist. Rhet. ii. 23: Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ποτε. And he also gives the reason for this belief among men—

ἀλλὰ βροτοὶ δοκεοῦσι θεοὺς
γεγενῆσθαι

τὴν σφετερὴν τ' αἰσθησιν ἔχειν
φωνῆν τε δέμας τε.

And the principle of the immutability of the divine nature is thus expressed by him: Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον δὴ ἔν, δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι. λέγει, οὔτε κινεῖσθαι οὔτε κινήτην εἶναι. ...οὔτε γὰρ ἂν εἰς αὐτὸ ἕτερον οὔτε ἐκείνο εἰς ἄλλο ἐλθεῖν. — Arist. de Xenoph., &c. 3.

μένει ἀεὶ ἀπλ. ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μορφ. Fancifully expressed by Xenophanes thus: Ἄϊδιον δ' ὄντα (τὸν θεόν) καὶ ἕνα καὶ σφαιροειδῆ.

θεοὶ ξείνοισιν, κ.τ.λ. Odys. xvii. 485.

Πρωτέως, see Euthyphro 15 D: οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ, ὥσπερ δὲ Πρωτέως, πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς. Euthydemus 288 B: τὸν Πρωτέα

εισαγετω Ηραν ἡλλοιωμενην ὡς ιερειαν ἀγείρουσαν

Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροισ'

Ἐκαὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ μὴ ἡμῖν ψευδέσθωσαν· μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδιά ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα θεοὶ τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργάζονται δειλοτέρους. Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοὶ εἰσιν οἱοὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν, ἡμῖν δὲ ποιούσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι, 382 ἔξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψευδεσθαι θεοὺς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὄς. Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι το γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἶόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν; Πῶς, ἔφη, λεγεις; Οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν ψεῦδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα

μειέσθον τοι Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς.

ὡς *ιερ. ἀγείρ.* Ruhnken points out that *ἀγείρω* here is 'mendicando colligere'; he supposes the poet to be Sophocles, and the verse to be taken from the *Inachus*, a satyric play. Stallb. thinks with Valeknaar that it more likely belongs to Euripides or Æschylus.

δειλοτέρους. sc. τοῦ δέοντος. For an absolute comparative *v.s.* *μακροτέρα*, Ch. XVI. and note.

Ἴσως. This reply is not to be wondered at, if we recollect the character attributed to Hermes; see the description of Autolycus in Book I. Ch. VIII. and note.

τὸ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, contrasted with the *ψεῦδος τὸ ἐν λόγοις*; *v.s.* *μὴ καλῶς ψεύδεται*, Ch. XVII. and note. Aristotle implies the existence of the 'good lie' in *Eth.* 4, 7, 6: *Καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, i.e.* there are cases in which it may be justifiable. And see also Book V. of the Republic 459 D: *πρὸς τόδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, συχρῶ τῷ ψεῦδει καὶ ἀπατῇ κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν δεήσειν χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀρχομένων.*

τῷ κυριωτάτῳ. See *Ar. Eth.* 9, 8, 6: *χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ.* And in Book x. 7, 8, he speaks of *νοῦς* as *τὸ θεῖον* and *κύριον* in man: *Εἰ δὴ θεῖον*

οὐδεις ἐκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ παντων μάλιστα φοβείται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι. Οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἢ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω. Οἶει γὰρ τί με, ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω, ὅτι **B** τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαι τε καὶ ἐψεύσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἤκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. Πολύ γε, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ' ἂν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἢ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀγνοια ἢ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἰδῶλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνυ μὲν **C** οὖν.

CAP. XXI.

Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τί δὲ δῆ;

ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον...εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρὸν ἐστὶ δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἕμεινον. *i.e.* the intelligence may be said to 'be' the man, as it is the strongest and finest part of him. In accordance with this principle, a poet who is only an imitator, is, in Book X. 605 C, debarred from the state because he gratifies the least intelligent part of it: ταῦτον τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνόητῳ αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον.

σεμνὸν, *v. infra*. Book III. 413 B: οὐ δὲ νῦν, ἔφη, μανθάνω. Τραγικῶς, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, κινδυνεύω λέγειν.

ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, *sc.* ψεῦδος.

ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἰδῶλον, an expression which points to the system of 'ἰδέαι or first essences, found in Book VI., see Argument p: 69; all things of the same kind derive what being they have from a common source. And if there be anything derived from them or representing them, it is one step farther removed from the Really Existing. Thus τὸ ἐν λόγοις is merely the shadow of the principle, τὸ ἐν ψυχῇ, and not the substance.

CH. XXI.—God then neither changes nor deceives man: this also must be laid down as a precept for the use of the poets.

τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεύδος πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς τε τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων οἱ ἂν διὰ μανίαν ἢ τινα **Δ** ἄνοιαν κακὸν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται; καὶ ἐν αἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, ὅπη τάληθές ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντές τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεύδος ὃ τι μάλιστα οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιούμεν; Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεύδος χρήσιμον; πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιωῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο; Γελοῖον μὲντ' ἂν εἴη, ἔφη. Ποιητῆς μὲν ἄρα ψευδῆς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς **Ε** ἔχθρους ψεύδοιτο; Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. Ἀλλὰ δι' οἰκείων

πότε καὶ τῷ, see Argument p. 56. And compare Book III. 389 B where, in recapitulation of these remarks, it is stated that falsehood must, like strong medicine, be used sparingly, and only by experts; and that the truth must be jealously guarded: 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον· εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, καὶ τῷ δντι θεοῖσι μὲν ἄχρηστον ψεύδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρμάκῳ εἶδει, δῆλον, ὅτι γε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἄπτεον. Therefore the rulers may speak falsely in behalf of the city, but for a citizen to speak falsely to the rulers, is a worse fault than if a patient lied concerning his bodily condition to a doctor, or a sailor about the steering to his captain.

τῶν καλ. φίλων, sc. πρὸς τούτους τῶν καλ. φιλ.; or the genitive may be merely described as partitive.

καὶ ἐν αἷς, κ.τ.λ. 'And in the case of those tales of mythology, which we were speaking of just now, because we cannot be sure of the exact truth in antiquity, we shall try to make fiction profitable by assimilating it as far as possible to truth,' i.e. 'In telling tales about gods and heroes (ψεύδος) we shall not lose sight of the principles of rectitude (ἀλήθεια).' So in Book III. *loc. cit.* where Socrates is trying to find a means of preserving the right adjustment of classes in the state, he says: τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν μηχανῆ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι γιγνομένων;

Γελοῖον μὲντ' ἂν. See Book III. 404 E: γελοῖον γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, τόν γε φύλακα φύλακος δεῖσθαι.

ποιητῆς μὲν ἔρα ψ. The speaker for the moment is regarding the divine nature as comprehending all others, the poet, philosopher, &c.

ἄνοιαν ἢ μανίαν ; Ἄλλ' οὐδείς, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ
 μαινομένων θεοφιλῆς. Οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὐ ἔνεκα ἂν
 θεὸς ψεύδοιτο. Οὐκ ἔστιν. Πάντη ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ
 δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
 Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ, καὶ
 οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἔξαπατᾷ, οὔτε
 κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ' ὕπαρ
 οὔτ' ὄναρ. Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται 383
 σοῦ λέγοντος. Συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἔφην, τοῦτον δεύτερον
 τύπον εἶναι, ἐν ᾧ δεῖ περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν,
 ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς
 μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι πᾶράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ ;
 Συγχωρῶ. Πολλὰ ἄρα Ὀμήρου ἐπαινούντες ἄλλα
 τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπῆν

ἀλλ' οὐδείς, κ.τ.λ. Cf. the
 proverb, 'Quem Deus vult per-
 dere prius demat.'

Κομιδῇ ἀπλ., *v.s.* Book I.
 Ch. XXIII., κομιδῇ ὄντες ἀδι-
 κοι.

οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ, 'a sign
 either when we are awake or
 when we are asleep.' In the
 later Books of the Dialogue
 these two words are again em-
 ployed together in contrast, but
 ὕπαρ there means 'a reality';
 see Book IX. 576 B: "Ἔστι δέ
 που (ὁ κάκιστος) οἶον ὄναρ διήλ-
 θομέν, ὅς ἂν ὕπαρ τοιούτος ᾖ.
 And in Book V. 476 C the two
 are defined: τὸ ὄνειρῦττειν (sc.
 τὸ ὄναρ) ἄρα οὐ τῶδε ἔστιν, ἐάν
 τε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάν τ' ἐγρηγορῶς
 τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ μὴ ὁμοῖον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ
 ἡγήται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν; Τί δὲ ὁ
 τάναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι
 αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν
 καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα
 ἡγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ αὐ καὶ
 οὗτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; Καὶ μάλα,
 ἔφη, ὕπαρ.

Πολλὰ Ὀμ. ἐπαιν. See Book
 X. 607 A, where Socrates allows
 that Homer is the first among
 tragic poets, before finally ex-
 cluding him from his state:
 Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ᾧ Γλαύκων, ὅταν
 Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχης, λέ-
 γουσι, ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαί-
 δευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητής... φιλεῖν
 μὲν χρῆ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι... καὶ
 συγχωρεῖν Ὀμηρον ποιητικώτατον
 εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγωδο-
 ποιῶν. Whilst in 612 A, the
 conclusion is reached by proof
 that Homer and Hesiod are
 wrong upon the whole in their
 views of justice: οὐκοῦν, ἦν
 δ' ἐγὼ, τά τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα
 ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς
 οὐδὲ τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπη-
 νέγκαμεν, ὥσπερ Ἡσιόδον τε καὶ
 Ὀμηρον ὑμεῖς ἔφατε, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ
 δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον
 εὔρομεν, καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ
 τὰ δίκαια, ἐάν τ' ἔχη τὸν Γύγου
 δακτύλιον, ἐάν τε μή.

τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπν. πομπ. For this
 dream was a deception; see II.

Β ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδὲ Αἰσχυλοῦ, ὅταν φῆ ἡ
Θέτις τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὐτῆς γάμοις ἄδοντα

ἐνδατεῖσθαι τὰς ἐὰς εὐπαιδίας,
νοσῶν τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραιώνας βίους.
ξύμπαντά τ' εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας
παιῶν' ἐπευφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ.
κάγῳ τὸ Φοῖβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα
ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρῦνον τέχνη.
ὁ δ', αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίγῃ παρων,
αὐτὸς τὰδ' εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ κτανῶν
τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν.

Ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε
καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν
ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ
φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον
ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλείστον οἶόν τε. Παντάπασιγ, ἔφη,
ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ καὶ ὡς νόμοις
ἂν χρώμην.

ii. 8: Βάσκ', ἴθι, οὐλε θνερε.

Et infr. 35—

ὡς ἄρα φωνήσας ἀπεβήσετο,
τὸν δ' ἔλιπ' αὐτοῦ
τὰ φρονέοντ' ἀνά θυμὸν ἅ ρ' οὐ
τελέεσθαι ἔμελλον,
φῆ γὰρ ὁ γ' αἰρήσειν Πριδμόν
πῶλιν ἡματι κείνῳ,
νῆπιος, οὐδὲ τὰ ἦδη ἅ ρα Ζεὺς
μῆδετο ἔργα.

ἐνδατεῖσθαι. Fr. 266. ἐνδατ.
quod proprie significat *dividere*,
nunc *per partes celebrare*, quo
sensu item positum videtur apud
Sophoclem, O. T. 205—

βέλεα θέλομ' ἂν ἀδέματ ἐνδα-
τεῖσθαι.—Stallb.

ἐὰς ... ἐμὰς. The passage
passes from an indirect to a

direct quotation. We should
have expected *αὐτῆς* instead of
ἐὰς, but *ἐὰς* is probably metri
gratia to preserve the run of the
line.

χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν. A poet
who desired to exhibit a play,
applied to the ἄρχων βασιλεὺς
if the play were to be repre-
sented at the Lenæa in the
month Gamelion, or to the
Ἄρχων, if at the Διονυσία ἐν
Ἄστει in Elaphebolion. If the
play were approved, a chorus
and actors were assigned to the
poet; whom he trained and
supervised for the performance.

εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν, 'if we
intend that our protectors,' &c.

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