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Authority 818541
By JL NARA Date 2/4/10

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SECRET Security Information

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
G-2
FAR EAST COMMAND

FILE NO. 000.7

LINE NO. 1 TO 18

DATE JAN TO DEC '52

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LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.7 CLASSIFIED 1952

Sheet # 2

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
bed 13	G2	23 May	JA	C/S: Possible unfavorable publicity Yokohama Enginner Depot
kgg 14	G2	15 Nov	PIO	C/S: Undersirable Publicity Concerning 65th Infantry Regiment
kgg 15	G2	12 Nov	PIO	D/F: POW Command Press Release
af 15	G2	26 Nov	PIO	D/F: POW Command Press Release
kgg 16	OofCofS	25 Nov	Chiefs all Gen &Special Staff Sections	Memo: Undignigied Publicity Detrimental to the Army
af 17	G2	27 Nov	CofS	MEMO: RYCOM Publicity Guidance concerning Return of Amami Oshima
af 15	G2	15 Dec	PIO	D/F: POW Command Press Releas
af 18	ACofS, G2	18 Dec	ACofS, G2 KCZ	Ltr: Press Release by President Rhee

11794—FEC P&PC—4/51—30M

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LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.7

Sheet # 1 CLASSIFIED

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
cd 1	G2	3 Jan	G2 XVI Corps	X REF: Security of Classified Info with relation to the Press-Movement of 40th Division
cd 2	Gen Ennis	5 Jan	C of S	C/S: Japanese Reaction to Premier Stalin's New Year Message
rk 3	Int Div	7 Jan	Col Bratton	IMO: INS dispatch 6 Jan 52
rmk 1	PIO	11 Jan	G-3	C/B: 40th Infantry Division
rmk 4	G-2	17 FEB	PIO	C/S: Press release of a wave of hemorragicefever on the Western Front in Korea
cd 5	G2	20 Feb	Chf Scty Div	IOM: Japanese Actions and Reactions as expressed in informationa Media of all types
DEC 6	G2	26 Feb	G1	C/S: Press Coverage of POW Exchange
~~RMK7~~	~~G-2~~	~~27 Feb~~	~~G-3~~	~~C/R: Recommendations in XVI Command rprt Dec 51 Rel to public, news still classifie as security information~~
pmb 8	G2	17 Mar	CofS	MEMO: Japanese Press Reaction to Alleged Statement by Gen MARQUAT
pmb 9	G2		PIO	C/S: Pres Coverage on Operations under EUSAK Plans "SPRING-OUT" and "ROUND-UP"
rmk 8	SCAP Economic & Scientifie Sec	19 Mar	Lt Gen Doyle O. Hickey	Memo: Press statement By Maj Gen W. F. MARQUAT
pmb 10	RFE	20 Mar	SGS	MEMO: CinC's Comments re Nippon times 18 March 1952
rmk 11	G-2	7 Apr	PIO	C/S: Agence France Presse
DEC 12	G2	29 Apr	Sec of Gen Staff	C/S: Prior Publication of Movements of the CinC

18277—FEC P&PC—9/51—30M

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MGI

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

18 December 1952

SUBJECT: Press Release by President Rhee

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Korean Communications Zone
APO 234

Reference your message A 71655 CZGI dated 13 December 1952:

1. By this particular press release President Rhee has served warning upon all opposition that the Republic of South Korea is to have one major party - his, and one strong man - himself. This particular public statement shows no change in policy, attitudes, purposes, or intentions from those made known at the opening of and during his campaign for re-election. His statement is broad enough to cover all Korean and non-Korean political and civilian groups he may consider now or in the future, as opposition. This statement is broad enough to leave him free to use any or all legal, or otherwise, measures to dominate the Assembly, control Korea, and continue as its strong man.

2. President Rhee may be expected to become more and more critical of the UN military effort and to demand a greater part and stronger voice in military decisions. He may be expected to become more demanding for South Korean equality along those lines granted by US to Japan, France, England, Germany, and other nations in the matter of exports, imports, and control of foreign national personnel. He will "permit" minor political parties and sham opposition candidates for office, but none will ever be allowed to become strong enough to threaten his control. He will establish a police state and "private" army if he cannot use ROKA for political purposes.

3. He may be expected to invite us to mind our own business, should we become critical of his manner, means, and methods of handling anti-government (anti-Rhee) groups and individuals.

G2 FEC

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT Rreleasable TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SUBJECT: Press Release by President Rhee 18 December 1952

4. In particular at this time, it is believed that Rhee's reference to "strong movement among politicians" indirectly names:

CHONG Ui Chul - Member of "Higher Peoples Assembly" of the NK government. Allegedly came to South Korea under instructions to infiltrate and absorb the middle of the road political organizations.

HONG Wun Il
HONG Sang Hi - Brothers who were collaborators with CHONG Ui Chul. Former members of the SK Labor Party.

SUNOO Jong Wun - Secretary to CHANG Myun, who was the contact man of the HONG brothers, and who delivered instructions to them.

5. The "virulent propaganda and secret organizations" charge is directed at:

a. Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP).

b. Outside Liberal Party (OLP) elements.

c. All-Korea Guidance Committee for Revolutionizing the Korean Government.

d. Committee for Reformation of Government.

e. Korean Democratic Front (Koreans residing in Japan).

6. Reference to "money sent", and "bribed some assemblymen", in particular is directed at:

a. Russia.

b. Japan.

c. Assemblymen:

(1) Cleared and released (but still suspected): CHANG Hong Yum, LEE Suk Ki, PAK Jong Keun, and YANG Byung Il.

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SUBJECT: Press Release by President Rhee 18 December 1952

(2) Cleared only to attend Assembly sessions: CHUNG Hun Joo, IM Heung Soon, KIM Ui Joon, KNAK Sang Hoon, KWUN Joong Ton, YI Yong Sul, and SUH Pom Suk.

7. The "own man" probably is CHANG Myun, former ROK Prime Minister and leading presidential candidate prior to June 1952.

8. The JACK analysis follows:

a. The referenced statement is similar to several made by officials in President Rhee's camp recently. It is believed that these utterances are merely a prelude to a political purge of opposition elements within the ROK Government. The primary targets are the HUNG-SA-DAN, Democratic National Party (DNP), CHO Pong Am Group, dissident elements in the Outside Liberal Party, and elements in the National Assembly.

b. Indications of increasing preparations for the purge are:

(1) Establishment of the paper "MINCHON ILBO", which is backed by the People's Self-Determination Alliance. This Alliance was in the forefront of the past summer's political activities. The paper will be the organ of purge.

(2) Recent authorization of a case against CHO Pong Am by the Home Ministry.

(3) Reactivation of the WHITE BONE, STINGING BEE, RIGHTEOUS BLOOD and other similar societies active in the summer activities.

T. F. VAN NATTA
Colonel, General Staff
A C of S, G-2

Copies furnished:
JACK
G2 FEC

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK)
Office of the Adjutant General
APO 301

INCOMING MESSAGE

Secret security info

PRIORITY 13 Dec 52 /adb

FROM: CG KCOMZ

TO: EUSAK

CITE: A 71655 CZGI

ACTION: G2 (5)
Chief Opns.
INFO: G1 (1)
G3 (4)
G4 (3)
CA (5)
INFO (1)
C/S (2)

Fol is summary of recent press release by Rhee.

"When I came home from abroad there were many political factions but there were no political parties. Those factions were endangering our sovereignty. Recently I organized an exemplary political party to show the people how a political party shoud be organized.

Recently there was a strong movement among politicians who intended to overthrow the govt. They had been making virulent propaganda and secret organizations both at home and abroad. They brought about what is called political turmoil of this year. With money sent from a foreign country they bribed some assemblymen. They tried to elect their "own man" President. They wanted peaceful unification through negotiation with the North Korean Puppet Government. Investigation revealed these things. However, as the leader has fled, the trial has been suspended. Anti-Govt groups are still working for "destruction both at home and abroad. I sincerely declare that all individuals and organizations who are against the administration will be pointed out, their followers will be put to one side", and all men and women who support the administration will work together to keep the destructive elements from doing harm.

Request your analysis ASAP and that of JACK, on intentions behind this release.

ACTION NO: CT 12-1388 PRIORITY TOO: 130750 Z
TOR: 131830 I

Secret security info

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED Consult Cryptocenter before declassifying.
Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per AR 380-5.

Action

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20 DEC 1952
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27 Nov 52

Memo for: CofS

Subject: RYCOM Publicity Guidance concerning Return of Amami Oshima

1. Query has been received from CG RYCOM for instructions to counter press and public opinion action in Ryukyus relative to statements made by Eugene H Dooman, to effect that he would discuss the return of Amami OSHIMA to Japan with appropriate US officials. (Incl 1)

2. Matter has been discussed informally with Mr. Blake, Amembassy, who recommended press and public opinion be ignored. No policy exists regarding the status of Amami OSHIMA, and it is being taken up by the National Security Council. Statements of Mr. Dooman, a retired State Dept official, considered his own opinion and do not reflect current US policy.

3. Proposed reply incorporates above principles. Coordination has been effected with PIO and G5. (Incl 2)

4. Recommend approval.

2 Incl
1. RYCOM msg (AG 45438) #Y 4835, dtd 25 Nov 52
2. Proposed Reply

R.F.E.

G2 file JEVS/ac

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HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

GE/SetyDiv/ExOp/LMM/df

26 November 1952

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO: CG RYCOM OKINAWA . . . . . ROUTINE

For G2. DNMSG Y 4835.

Believe that issue of status of Amami OSHIMA is before National Security Council. Therefore recommend you neither deny existence of nor offer favorable consideration to such move advocated by press. Statement by DOOMAN should be explained as opinion of private US citizen. However best idea is to ignore issue and not to counter any local press reaction.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

C. V. BROMLEY
Colonel, General Staff
Deputy

Copies to:
G5
PIO
G2 (return)
G2 Sety Div (return)

Concurrences:
G5_____

PIO_____

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Abv ref rad rqstd instructions as to counter press & public opinion locally re the retn of Amami OSHIMA to Japan. Matter discussed w/Mr. Blake, US Emby. Mr. Blake's statements in brief on matter were: No policy exists on the future status of Amami OSHIMA. This problem is being taken up in the National Security Council. He recommended press & public opinion be ignored & that we neither deny the existence of such move nor offer favorable consideration to any move advocated by the press. Furthermore statements by Mr. DOOMAN, retired State Dept Officer are purely opinions of his own & in no way reflect current US policy. In his opinion to officially deny the existence of such a move at this time would give the press another item to exploit in addition to the current court jurisdiction fight. To offer sympathetic consideration to such move on our part would only add additional "fuel to the Fire".

Ref to problem before Nat'l Sety Council require SECRET clas. Abv msg self-explanatory.

L.M.M._____
26-8911

Reference Radio is Y 4835

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G2 File

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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G-2

HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Office of the Chief of Staff

25 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs, All General and Special Staff Sections,
Headquarters, FEC and UNC

SUBJECT Undignified Publicity Detrimental to the Army

1. The Department of the Army has expressed concern over the lack of judgment shown in certain publicity stunts which have reacted to the detriment of the Army. A case in point cited was that of the instance in which officers of this command served breakfast in bed to enlisted men as part of a fund raising stunt.

2. It is obvious that any exhibitions as this sort not only results in a lowering of the dignity and respect of the individual concerned, but have a very serious effect on the over-all prestige of the entire United States Army.

3. While the whole-hearted cooperation of all officers in service-sponsored fund raising projects is essential, it is desired that full consideration be given to the impact in the eyes of the public of any unusual activities before agreeing to participate in them.

Doyle O. Hickey

DOYLE O. HICKEY
Lieutenant General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

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G2 HQ FEC ROUTING SLIP
(Do Not Detach)

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NOV 25 1952

SUBJECT: UNDIGNIFIED PUBLICITY DETRIMENTAL TO THE ARMY.

ACofS, G2	( )	Adm Officer	( )	Intelligence Div	( )
Deputy	( )			Security Div	( )
Secretariat	( )	Mil Pers	( )		
Dep for Adm & Ex O	( )	Civ Pers	( )	441st CIC	( )
Asst Ex	( )	Pers Sgt Maj	( )	500 MI Svc Gp	( )
Planning Group	( )	Files	( )		
		T/S Control O	( )	FEC/LG	( )
Dep for Navy	( )	Message Center	( )		
Scty Div Gp	( )	Supply	( )	Doc Res	( )
Asst SIA	( )	.	( )	SSO	( )
		.	( )		
Sp Asst Radio	( )			Japanese Liaison	( )
Sp Asst 441 CIC	( )	.	( )		
Sp Asst Fiscal	( )				
Sp Asst Comd Rpt	( )				

Action	( )	Comment	( )	Signature	( )
Draft Reply	( )	Concurrence	( )	Initials	( )
Info for Reply	( )	Approval	( )	Dispatch	( )
Brief	( )	Info	( )	File	( )

(REMARKS)

~~DRS copy attached~~
1cy attached - G-2 file
1cy Int Div
1cy Sec Div
1cy FEC/LG
1cy MISG
1cy CIC
1cy Supply
1cy SIA
1cy JIL
1cy FML
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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12



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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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subj: POW Command Press Release

TO: PIO FROM: G2 DATE: 15 Dec 52 COMMENT NO. 8
Lt Col Vardas
265-259

G2 concurs in dispatch of redrafted message Inclosure 3.

3 Incls
n/c

G/C MM

-R.F.E.-

MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Instant action initiated by DF, G2 to PIO, requesting coordination, prior to release, of future PW Cmd press releases containing information of subversive activity.

2. G2 concurrence of redrafted outgoing message (Incl 3), CINCUNC to KCOMZ, implementing G2 request, concludes this action.

(15) 000.7

CV 265-259

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POW Command Press Release
PIO 10 Dec 52 6
Lt Col Bankson 265-258

PsyWar
G1
G2 (In Turn)

1. PIO concurs in the changes recommended by G1 in Comment No. 4 and by G2 in Comment No. 5.

2. Inclosure #2 has been redrafted, incorporating these changes. New draft is Inclosure #3.

3. Request concurrence on Inclosure #3 as redrafted and return to PIO for dispatch.

3 Incls
Added 1 incl
3. Redrafted radio

----------D.R.N.----------

TO: G1 FROM: PsyWar DATE: 12 Dec 52 COMMENT NR 7
G2 Col Goodwin/rms, 26-8053
PIO (In Turn)

PsyWar concurs in message as redrafted in Inclosure 3.

3 Incls
n/c

----------K. K. H.----------

G2

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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G-2 File

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Comment #1 fr G2 to PIO fwded radio referring to enemy activity within UNC PW camps. G2 rqstd that proper release of such info be delayed until coordinated with G2 FEC in order to make best possible use of info relative to UNC propaganda campaign. PsyWar and G1 made appropriate comments and inst msg fwds conclusions to PIO.

JFF 265-511

To: PIO From: G2 Date: 26 November 52 Comment #5
Colonel Whitney 265-510

1. G2 concurs in proposed draft message (incl 2) providing that paragraph 2 be revised as recommended by G1 in Comment No. 4 with one additional change.

2. G2 believes that the present wording of the second sentence of the proposed revision does not adequately delineate the type of information that should be withheld for co-ordination. Information having subversive implication is taken to include: references to captured documents or their contents, the Communists' organization and methods of control within the camps, and means of communication and contact with outside agencies. It is recommended, therefore, that the proposed revision of paragraph 2 be amplified accordingly.

2 Incls
n/c

R. F. B.

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G1
G2
PIO (In turn)

POW Command Press Release
PsyWar

20 Nov 52
Mr. Spaulding/ms
26-8939

3

1. PsyWar concurs in proposed radio (Inclosure 2).

2. Your attention is invited also to the recent exchange of radios between DA and CINCFE (DA 923559 and CX 58895) concerning public release of the documents taken from the two prisoners referred to in Inclosure 1. In briefing by the Chief, PsyWar Section, CINC expressed an opinion that release of these documents would not be useful because they would reflect unfavorably on UNC control over the prisoner enclosures. CINC directed that action to publicize communist instigation of camp disorders be deferred until more appropriate materials are available.

3. It is suggested that the study described in C/N 1 give particular attention to evidence indicating that disorders are planned and directed by communist agitators within the camps, as distinguished from indications that they are initiated from outside the camps. Evidence in the former category is more useful from a propaganda viewpoint because it does not raise the question of continued communist ability to communicate with and issue new orders to prisoners in UNC custody.

2 Incls
n/c

-K. K. H.-

G2

Lt Col Kogstad/chj 265-724
DATE 21 Nov 52 COMMENT NO. 4

TO PIO
THRU G2

FROM G1

1. This correspondence is returned to PIO through G2 in order that PsyWar's comments may be noted by G2 collection agencies.

2. The comments of G1 on proposed action follow:

a. Message (Incl 2) should be addressed to KCOMZ with info to UN POW Command. Suggest AFFE be added as info addressee.

b. While it is desirable to build a UNC case on Communist-inspired activity originating within POW camps, there appears to be equally good exploitation material in evidence indicating outside direction. By careful preparation of publicity and propaganda attacks, we could stress the difficulties being encountered in maintaining complete isolation of four island locations against strong and continuous effort

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Lt Col Kogstad/chj 265-724

POW Command Press Release

PIO
THRU G2

G1 21 Nov 52 4
(Cont'd)

by Communist intelligence to penetrate camps. By playing on the magnitude of the Communist effort to realize relatively minor results, we can pound on their desperation to do anything to upset the orderly and peaceful administration of our camps despite the costs in lives of their own people.

c. In order to avoid confusion in the minds of KCOMZ as to what their current press policy should be (relative to POW incidents) and to provide them with a basis for press inquiries on incidents which have intelligence value, recommend 2d para of draft message (Incl 2), be revised to read as follows:

> "In order to insure continuity in present policy of releasing prompt and factual coverage of POW incidents, it is desired that you continue to to make such releases as incidents occur. However, when circumstances indicate that a particular act of violence, attempted escape, etc, is linked to subversive activity which can be exploited to UNC advantage, request proposed release, together with such other pertinent background data as is available, be transmitted to this headquarters with at least a 48-hour delayed release time. This will permit this headquarters to coordinate action here and to transmit to you by either radio or telephone authority to make release as scheduled."

2 Incls
n/c

----------B. L. M.----------

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

TO: PsyWar
G-1
G-2 (In Turn)

FROM: PIO

DATE: 20 Nov 52 Comment No. 2
Lt Col Bankson 265-258

1. Draft of a proposed radio to CO POW Command is added as Inclosure #2.

2. PIO will appreciate an opportunity to take advantage of the information under the program outlined in Comment No. 1 above.

3. Request comment and/or concurrence on Inclosure #2.

2 Incls
Added 1 incl
2. Draft Radio

- D.R.N. -

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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Lt Col Vardas 265-528

POW Command Press Release

PIO G2 12 Nov 1952

1. Reference POW Command Radio, NR: PWCG 11-142, dated 8 Nov 52, copy attached.

2. Captured documents refered to in above cited radio are presently being evaluated and will be incorporated in a comprehensive study of enemy activity within UNC PW camps. It is anticipated that this study may provide the basis for an effective UNC propaganda program to show that the recent disorders in UNC camps were directed and controlled by Communist leaders. Piecemeal and untimely disclosures of this information can well deprive the UNC of a possible propaganda weapon as well as provide the enemy with material which could be used against us. It is recommended, therefore, that future releases of this nature not be made without prior coordination with G2, FEC. With respect to coordination, the cited radio, containing the proposed release, did not reach the G2 Radio Room until 0345 hours, 8 Nov, with the release scheduled for 0800 hours the same day. This does not allow sufficient advance notice for proper coordination and reply.

1 Incl
Radio # PWCG 11-142
dtd 8 Nov 52

- R. F. E. - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

G2 File Copy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Self explanatory.

JFF_____265-511

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CIA 7-8
13 NOV 1962

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By [illegible] NARA Date 3/4/13

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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8447

Mr. Bowden
26-6447

Undesirable Publicity Concerning
65th Infantry Regiment

G2 PIO 15 Nov 52

1. Attached letter from Headquarters, United States Army Forces Antilles, subject as above, is forwarded as a matter of primary interest to your section.

1 Incl
Ltr Hq US Army Forces,
Antilles, subj as abv
dtd 6 Oct 52, w/1 Ind
w/6 incls

C/S

----------R. F. E.----------

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Ltr Hq US Army Forces Antilles, subj as abv, dtd 6 Oct 52, inclosed clips of press dispatches printed by EL MUNDO and EL IMPARCIAL in Puerto Rico, and pointed out that the nature of the articles was undesirable fr the standpoint of both civilian and military morale in Puerto Rico, in that: (a) Announcements of heavy casualties were made before the affected families were notified; (b) The CO of the unit (Col. Cordero) was pictured as conducting operations in a manner to cause unnecessary and numerous casualties, to draw fire from the enemy, and to reveal the identity of the unit by front-line unit-flag-raising ceremonies; (c) Puerto Rican troops were depicted as being put in combat w/o sufficient training. Ltr was sent to G2, DA and fwdd to G2, FEC by 1st ind dtd 23 Oct 52. Since control of press dispatches is exercised by PIO's Press Advisory Division, G2 by abv C/S fwds matter to them for appropriate action. Abv C/S self-explanatory.

G2 - Major [illegible] File Copy
SctyDiv/SMI/CBB/df

C. B. B. 26-6447

OTR

Fole 13

G-2 FEC
12 NOV 1952
DOCUMENT

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Security Information

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Security Information
SECRET

DISPATCHED
15 NOV 1952
C-2 FEC

C* B* B*

MEMO FOR RECORD:

- - - -

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

CONFIDENTIAL

50124

Mr. Carusi
26-7197

Possible Unfavorable Publicity,
Yokohama Engineer Depot

G2 JA 23 May 1952
SctyDiv/P&P/JSC/bb

1 1. Disposition Form from 8th CIC District to CO, 441st CIC Detachment dated 6 May 1952, subject: "Possible Unfavorable Publicity, Yokohama Engineer Depot" is forwarded for your information and any action deemed appropriate by you.

2. A report of the action taken by you in the premises is requested.

1 Incl:
a/s

- R. F. E. - - - - - - - - - - - -

MEMO FOR RECORD:
See IOM, Cmt 2, dtd 23 May 52, subj as abv.

JSC 26-7197

G2 File Copy
JSC/bb

file

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F.O.O.J.

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O-2 FEC

RECAPP
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MEMO FOR RECORD:

See IOM, Chf S/S, dtd 23 May 52, subj: as above.

- - - -

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

Possible Unfavorable Publicity,
Yokohama Engineer Depot

From: SctyDiv To: G2 Phone: 26-7197 SctyDiv/P&P/JSC/bb
Name: Mr Carusi Date: 23 May 1952

1. The contents of D/F subject "Possible Unfavorable Publicity, Yokohama Engineer Depot" (Incl 1) while ambiguous seem to indicate the following: 2

a. The Nippon Motors Company operating Plant No. 8 at Fuchinobe changed its identity as such and became a new juridical entity.

b. Prior to the change in identity, YED's (Yokohama Engineer Depot) approval was sought inasmuch as it was contemplated that the existing contract would continue in full force.

c. YED's approval was apparently obtained since at the meeting held for the purpose, Lt Col Hatfield, Chief Maintenance Division, YED, ordered the discharge of three members of the Board of Directors of Plant No. 8.

d. By virtue of the change approved by YED, performance of the contract between Nippon Motors Company and YED would automatically be continued by the new organization.

e. YED without any apparent reason cancelled the existing contract

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

Possible Unfavorable
Publicity, Yokohama
Engineer Depot

23 May 1952

SctyDiv G2 26-7197
Mr Carusi

and awarded same to the Sagami Engineering Works. 2 (Cont'd)

f. The cancellation of the contract will affect some 1400 individuals who, no doubt, moved with their families in the vicinity of Plant No. 8 because of assurances and representations made to them prior to the transfer of Plant No. 8 from its original location in Yokohama to the present one in Fuchinobe.

g. The possibility of court action to determine the rights of the several individuals affected by the cancellation of the contract.

2. It is not clear whether Mr. Warren, formerly a DAC, now engaged in private practice in Japan, a lawyer with considerable experience in contract and labor cases, is going to represent the new organization at Plant No. 8 or the individual employees at stated plant, but irrespective of whom he represents, the intimation seems to be that he will base his case on bribery and attempt to prove that through bribery, YED officers were influenced to cancel the existing contract and award it to Sagami Engineering Works.

3. In addition to the possibility of a suit by the Plant No. 8 contingent, there is also the possibility of a suit by Sagami Engineering Works for breach of contract should YED decide to reinstate Plant No. 8 and its employees to their former position rather than face embarrassment.

4. The information disclosed by the D/F while of interest to G2, presents purely a legal problem, one which calls for the determination of contractual rights and obligations. As such it falls within the purview of the JA. Therefore, in view of the possibility of court litigation and the many legal aspects involved, Security Division suggests that the report be forwarded to the JA.

5. Recommend approval and dispatch of C/N 1 (Incl 2).

2 Incls:
1. n/c
ADDED: 1 Incl
2. C/S fr G2 to JA,
subj as abv, dtd
23 May 52

-E. C. E.-

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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44256

Lt Col F. M. Frey 26-6447

Prior Publication of Movements of the CinC

G2

Secretary of General Staff

29 April 1952
SctyDiv/P&P/FMF/mlm

1 1. Attached hereto is an article from the Stars and Stripes issue of 20th of April 1952.

2. Prior publication of movements of the Commander in Chief, including time and location of attendance at public affairs increases the difficulties of providing adequate security measures. The CIC Security measures in Tokyo and in other CIC districts are carefully planned to prevent leaks of information concerning the movements of the Commander in Chief.

3. It is recommended that information releases concerning details of time and specific locations of movements of the CinC be kept to a minimum.

1 Incl
a/s

- R. F. E. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

MEMO FOR RECORD: IOM fr CIC Det calls attn to article in the Stars & Stripes issue 20 Apr 52 "RIDGWAYS TO ATTEND JUTLANDIA DEPARTURE," listing in detail the time & location. CIC points out that although this publicity is mabe nec & desirable, it is hardly consistent w/the scty measures provided by CIC details in Tokyo & other CIC Districts who make careful plans to prevent leaks of the movemts of the CinC. C/N abv self-explanatory.

Lt Col Frey 26-6447

G2 file cy
SctyDiv/P&P/SMI/FMF/mlm

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

SECRET

Lt Kaiser 26-6513

383.3

Agence France Presse

G2 PIO 7 April 1952
Scty Div/P&P/WFK/an

1 1. The following information re Agence France Presse has been received by this Headquarters from the Military Attache, American Embassy, Paris, France, and is being forwarded for your information:

a. History:

The Agence France Presse has been government controlled since the French liberation. Prior to that it was the privately owned "Havas" news agency. At the time "Havas" was abolished it was heavily Communist infiltrated. Many of the pro-Communist correspondents remained with AFP. The degree of Communist influence has generally fluctuated with Communist influence in the government (1945-1947 being the period of heaviest influence). However, when Communist influence in the French Government diminished in 1947 the director of AFP was able to weed out pro-Communists holding influential posts.

b. Present status:

There are still Communist correspondents in the organization but none of them are considered to be in important positions. Suspected correspondents are generally sent to minor posts since it is difficult to get them out of the organization on the basis of Communist affiliations. The director of AFP since 1949, Mr. Maurice Negre, has been continually attempting to reduce Communist influence in the organization and has been considered quite successful in his efforts.

G2 File Copy

c. Director:

The position of director of Agence France Presse is filled by political appointment and has been held by Mr. Maurice Negre since 1949 except for a short period of time in the early part of 1952. Mr. Negre enjoys excellent relations with the United States Embassy officials in Paris who have complete confidence in his ability. Embassy officials state he is pro-American, anti-Communist and is trying to hold down Communist influence in AFP. Negre admits that it is impossible to eliminate such influence but he does feel that Communists have been cleared from directorship of important overseas posts and editorial positions.

d. Far East correspondents:

(1) Leon L. PROU has always had close and useful contacts with the Japanese, whose language he speaks. His wife is a Japanese national, and

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

F.O.O.A

(11)

DISPATCHED 6 APR 1952 6-2

a. Top Secret correspondence:

(1) Leon L. TROY and wife had close and recent contacts after
his return from Europe. His wife is a relative, according
to Embassy Paris.

b. Secret correspondence:

The location of Director of Agence France Presse is listed by
Who's Who as Paris. Monitored Reuter wire service July 1951 except
for a short period in the early part of 1952. Mr. Reuter subsequently
returned to the United States Embassy Office in Paris and was completely
confident in his ability. Embassy Office advised us it pro-American
Communist influence and generally friendly to U.S. Reuter might
be kept on hold down Communist influence in AFP. Reuter's wife
made statement that it is important to maintain contact with
Communist influence and that it was good for U.S. to keep
in this area as long as possible.

c. Director:

The location of Director of Agence France Presse is listed by
Who's Who as Paris. Monitored Reuter wire service July 1951 except
for a short period in the early part of 1952. Mr. Reuter subsequently returned to Paris and was completely confident in his ability. Embassy Office advised us it pro-American Communist influence and that it was good for U.S. to keep in this area as long as possible.

d. Present status:

Many of the pro-Communist correspondents left AFP and Communist influence in the Agence France Presse has been reduced to a small group of Communist sympathizers. Agence France Presse (1951-1952 period) is being reorganized and Communist influence in the Agence France Presse is expected to be reduced. However, when Reuter returns to Paris he will probably reinstate Communist influence in AFP as was done by pro-Communist Director of Agence France Presse.

e. History:

The Agence France Presse has been reorganized several times since the end of World War II. Prior to that it was a private French corporation. Reuter "NEWS" has been completely owned by Reuter "NEWS" since 1941 and is the largest British news agency. It has a branch office in Paris and has been in operation since 1851. Mr. Reuter is an excellent contact for a short period in the early part of 1952. Mr. Reuter subsequently returned to Paris and was completely confident in his ability. Embassy Office advised us it pro-American Communist influence and that it was good for U.S. to keep in this area as long as possible.

a. Personalities:

(1) Leon L. TROY and wife had close and recent contacts after his return from Europe. His wife is a relative, according to Embassy Paris.

b. Secret correspondence:

Communist influence and that it was good for U.S. to keep in this area as long as possible.

c. Director:

The location of Director of Agence France Presse is listed by Who's Who as Paris. Monitored Reuter wire service July 1951 except for a short period in the early part of 1952. Mr. Reuter subsequently returned to Paris and was completely confident in his ability. Embassy Office advised us it pro-American Communist influence and that it was good for U.S. to keep in this area as long as possible.

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I. The following information re Agence France Presse has been received by the Military Attache, American Embassy, Paris, France, and is being furnished for your information:

Agence France Presse

OIO

25

Paris 5

2252 Hist 7

Le Matsen 52-2525

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority 81951.1
By NARA Date 3/4/12

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

SECRET

Lt Kaiser 26-6513

Agence France Presse

G2 PIO 7 April 1952
Scty Div/P&P/WFK/au

1 (Cont'd) these conditions would make it probable that he is pro-Japanese. However, PROU is considered politically reliable and is not considered to have any Communist sympathies or affiliations.

(2) Maurice CHANTELOU is considered entirely reliable. He was taken prisoner in Seoul but was under instructions to stay there as late as possible.

2. The individual cited in paragraph 1d (2) above is believed to be identical with Maurice CHANTELOUPE concerning whom a US intelligence agency has expressed the opinion that CHANTELOUPE is possibly "Red" or at least "left of center" in his political ideologies.

3. Perhaps Leon L. PROU's intimate association with the Japanese people can, in part, explain the bitterness of his article toward the Occupation printed in the 27 May 1951 issue of the Yomiuri Shimbun in which he was highly critical of the practice of reserving certain facilities for Occupation use only; drawing a comparison between Occupationaires' associations with the Japanese and the relationship of the Brahmans of India to the "untouchable" Indian natives.

- R. F. E.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

M/R:

Inst c/n is to furnish PIO w/info supplied by Mil Attache, US Embassy, Paris, France re AFP & its corr, as shown above. Sources: 2d Ind fr Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, Paris, France, subj: Request for Information re: Agence France Presse and Its Correspondents in Far East Command, 15 Feb 52; 201 - CHANTELOUPE Maurice; FEC/LG IOM, subj: Maurice CHANTELOUPE, 4 Jul 50 - (opinion stated in para 2 above was derived from this IOM and is based upon his associates and actions prior to his capture by the North Koreans).

Lt Kaiser - 26-6513

file 2nd cy to Scty Div/P&P

2

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

SECRET

32119

20 March 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: SGS

SUBJECT: CinC's Comments Re Nippon Times 18 March

1. Reference CinC's note on the margin of the Nippon Times of 18 March 52 concerning article "Nippon Ships Victims of Mystery Attackers in Area off Chejudo."

a. Information obtained from PIO Navy (Lt Schoonmaker) indicates that the No. 25 DAITO MARU was discovered outside the MacArthur Line, with identifying markings covered, by a British plane from Task Group 962. The plane fired warning bursts, whereupon the ship identified itself and moved towards proper fishing area. See attached radio Cite 80648.

b. The following information has been obtained from the Chief of the Rescue and Operations Section of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency regarding the other ships mentioned in the cited news article:

(1) No. 2 NANSEI MARU was chased and gunned by an unidentified vessel said to have a resemblance to the AKASHI MARU type of Japanese fishing vessels on 16 March 52 at 1825 hours in the 303rd zone which is outside the MacArthur Line at a location about 60 miles west of Chejudo (or Ceju Do) an island off the southern tip of Korea. There were no casualties.

(2) No. 10 NISSHIN MARU was chased and gunned by an unidentified vessel on 16 March 52, 2020 hours in the 303rd zone. There were no casualties. The newspaper article which indicated that this latter vessel had been seized was erroneous.

RSB
R. F. B.

1 Incl
CTG 96.2 Rad to
COMNAVFE, 161753 Z,
dtd 17 Mar 52

G2 file cy
SctyDiv/ODB/mlm

Cys Socty
file
G2

H/C by Lt Ford
1645 20 Mar.

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Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

6097
28136

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col Bankson 26-6857

SUBJECT: Press Coverage on Operations Under EUSAK Plans "SPRING-OUT" and "ROUND-UP"

FROM: PIO TO: G-2 DATE: 11 March 1952

1 1. Request comment on the suggestions and recommendations concerning the problems presented in the attached letter from PIO, EUSAK.

2. In view of necessity for adequate planning, request early consideration and return of this correspondence.

1 Incl
Ltr from PIO EUSAK
dtd 8 Mar 52

/i/
- G.P.W. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

FROM: G2 TO: PIO Maj Wagner, 26-7864

2 1. From the G2 viewpoint there is no necessity for restricting interviews by news media representatives of Chinese and NK PsW released under Operation "SPRING-OUT." G2 interest in these PsW will terminate upon their release from the PW camps. There is no conceivable, practical means for imposing effective censorship restrictions on released enemy PsW, nor is it considered necessary since any control established would be relinquished at the exchange point when they pass into communist hands.

2. With reference to "ROUND-UP", all but a few of civilians, other than ROK personnel, in communist hands who might be recovered are members of religious orders or representatives of civilian organizations and as such are not subject to military control. They cannot, therefore, be required to sign a security certificate such as recovered UNC PsW will sign and consequently G2 will have no criteria for issuing individual clearances. While not a matter of direct G2 concern, it is desired to point out that three of the four factors necessitating restrictions on interviews with UN PsW also apply in the case of civilian exchangees, i.e., premature interview could result in one or more of the following:

a. Revelation of items of information which would serve the propaganda machine of the communists.

b. Making statements concerning persons or actions that might result in reprisals upon United Nations troops still held prisoner.

c. Revealing information which could cause grief and hardship to friends and relatives in the home country of the individual concerned.

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G2 File cy EHFS/DHM/bj

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Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

Maj Wagner, 26-7864

Press Coverage on Operations Under EUSAK Plans "SPRING-OUT" and "ROUND-UP"

FG2 PIO

2 (Cont'd) 3. It appears that the only means of counteracting the dangers inherent in this situation are to:

a. Brief all civilian returnees immediately upon recovery, pointing out the possible consequences of divulging this type of information and soliciting their cooperation.

b. Direct PAD censors to refuse release of information of this type.

4. Pars 2 and 3 above coordinated with G1 (Lt Col Sauls) who concurred.

1 Incl
n/c

RSB/5/

R. F. E.

MEMO FOR RECORD: 14 Mar 52

Operation "SPRING-OUT" is plan for releasing NK & CCF PsW held by UN forces. Operation "ROUND-UP" is plan for exchange of civilian internees. Operation "CATCHALL" is plan for receiving and processing UN & ROK PsW. Under plan "CATCHALL" returnees will be given a security lecture and be required to sign a certificate that they will not disclose unauthorized info. Majority of civilians interned by Communists are members of religious orders and as such cannot be directed to accomplish a similar certificate. G1 (Lt Col Sauls) stated that we could not prevent these civilians from talking if they so desired and could step in only if they interfered with our processing of recovered PsW.

DHW ✓ 26-7864 EHFS ✓ 26-7838

DHW

Cpy w/ msg to file

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Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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SECURITY INFORMATION

6097

HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK)
Information Section
APO 301

8 March 1952

SUBJECT: Press Coverage on Operations Under EUSAK Plans "SPRING-OUT" and "ROUND-UP".

TO: Public Information Office
GHQ FEC
APO 500
ATTN: Colonel Welch

1. Present censorship criteria as published by PAD GHQ, prevents news media representatives from conferring with, travelling with, or interviewing enemy POWs.

2. These restrictions, if enforced during operations to be conducted under EUSAK plan "SPRING-OUT", are expected to bring strong protests from news media representatives. Deliberate evasion of the restrictions can be anticipated.

3. Discussion of this problem with EUSAK G-2 reveals that little or no tactical security information is involved under plan "SPRING-OUT". Consequently, restricting activities of correspondents on that basis is considered un-necessary. Conversely, consideration should be given to possible adverse publicity stories of a general nature arising from embarassing incidents that might occur during the northward movement of enemy POWs. It should be pointed out, however, that it is doubtful if such stories could be prevented from "leaking", even if full restrictions were enforced.

4. In view of the above, it is recommended that PAD GHQ prepare a special memorandum for correspondents that would clearly define what activities will be permitted and what censorship criteria will be enforced during plan "SPRING-OUT". Absence of a special memorandum would be interpreted to mean that current criteria and restrictions would remain in effect. As such, it is the opinion here that serious problems would be precipitated with the news media representatives.

5. It is further recommended that special instructions be prepared to cover correspondents' activities and censorship criteria to be enforced during the civilian exchange program under EUSAK plan "ROUND-UP". As in

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Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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SECURITY INFORMATION

8 March 1952

SUBJECT: Press Coverage on Operations Under EUSAK Plans "SPRING-OUT" and "ROUND-UP".

the case of returned POWs under EUSAK plan "CATCHALL", it is believed that the only restriction to be enforced should be the prevention of interviews with civilians returned to friendly forces until authorized by G-2 GHQ.

6. These problems have been discussed with Lieutenant Colonel Stoppelli PAD GHQ (Adv) who is returning to Tokyo and will present the problems in person to your office.

7. Request your comment as soon as practicable.

/s/ KENNETH L. BOOTH
KENNETH L. BOOTH
Colonel, Artillery
Chief of Information

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DISPATCHED
15 MAR 1952
G-2 FEC

8 March 1952

SUBJECT: Press Coverage on Operations under EUSAK Frame "SPRING-OUT" and "ROUND-UP".

In case of reported ROK unit EUSAK Area "CATCHALL", it is believed that only restriction to be enforced should be that prevention of interviews with civilians returned to territory of friendly forces until authorized by G-2 GHQ.

Request prohibitions have been discussed with Lieutenant Colonel Stoppelli AFO GHQ (Yoka) who is returning to Tokyo and will present the problems in person at your office.

7. Request your comments as soon as practicable.

KENNETH L. BOOTH
Colonel, AGD
Chief of Information

(s) KENNETH L. BOOTH

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 81951.1
By ZL NARA Date 3/6/12

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Economic and Scientific Section

19 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieut. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Press Statement - BY MAJ GEN W. F. MARQUAT

1. The summary presented by G-2 reviews the situation correctly. You are aware of the fact, as you so clearly stated at the Monday briefing for General Ridgway, that the press distortion of the factual statements in the release is responsible for the political repercussions.

2. There are bound to be minor references to the statement in imminent political attacks on the Prime Minister but I believe that they will not seriously hurt him. It is significant that, instead of using the contents of my release to "bail himself out" of the consequences of previous rash and unfounded promises, Prime Minister Yoshida has chosen to continue to misrepresent the facts to the Japanese people. I do not see how the headquarters can support such a position and, of course, I assume that no effort will be made to do so.

3. I concur in your view that no "clarification" is required. Knowing Japanese press tendencies from long experience, I venture to suggest that reopening the issue will call for additional future "clarification" on practically every point discussed. As I mentioned Monday, the United States agencies desire that Japan be dissuaded from the belief that our country will dish out funds for political purposes to Japan since such public utterances will be reflected unfavorably in the efforts to obtain military-economic aid appropriations now being attacked by the Congress. Of course, political grants may be made in the future by the Congress but the U.S. taxpayer does not approve of this procedure as a matter of policy.

4. You will notice that the Prime Minister has modified his view by saying that the press did not present the complete substance of the views expressed. Press representatives have asked for interviews which I have avoided up till now.

5. Should developments indicate the need for a subsequent statement to assist the Prime Minister or to meet pressures from the press I shall prepare one for clearance by you. In the meantime I recommend, as do you, no further action.

NOTED
DCSS

W. F. MARQUAT
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief, Economic and Scientific Section

OK for file
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

CHIEF OF STAFF
FEC

Date 3/18 1951

MEMORANDUM For: Gen. Margetts, EUSA

Ch of Staff ROK ____	G-1 ____	G-4 ____
Sec. Gen. Staff ____	G-2 ____	ADC ____
	G-3 ____	AG ____

Information & your file ____
Note & return to ____
Appropriation circulation ____
Necessary action ____
Process action to C/S
by draft letter ____
by draft radio ____
by draft plan ____
by draft order ____
Comment to C/S
by memo ____
orally ____

This refers to ____
CofS file ____
Noted ____
Suspend to ____
Return with reference
dispatches ____
This slip is part of
permanent file ____
Destroy this slip ____

1. For your info.
2. Re para 8 — please give me your views.
3. In the interim, I strongly favor no further statement of any kind from us — let Yoshida & Jap Govt. make all statements.

3/17/51

DOYLE O. HICKEY
Lieutenant General, GSC

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

17 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Japanese Press Reaction to Alleged Statement by Gen MARQUAT

1. There have been unfavorable Japanese reactions to what appear to be misapprehensions of a policy statement, in the form of an interview with Gen MARQUAT, issued by the PIO in English at 1645, 11 Mar 52 (Tab A).

2. The "Asahi" in the morning editions of 13 Mar 52 (Tab B), editorially commented -- "Japan has to develop its power resources with its own funds now that hopes for foreign capital for such purposes have been shattered." Kyodo News Service (Tab C) said -- "The statement virtually has presented a new problem of what to do with the expansions of industrial facilities."

3. On 14 Mar 52, Kyodo quoted Prime Minister YOSHIDA as telling the Diet that Gen MARQUAT himself said he had nothing to do with the statement. An AP story (Tab D) written on this item quoted MARQUAT's office as saying he did not know of anything he said to Prime Minister YOSHIDA that alters or changes his remarks in the press release. UP (Tab E) made a bulletin out of this, leading with "Gen MARQUAT reaffirmed today that US financial circles do not plan to underwrite sovereign Japan's economic rehabilitation in the form of dollar loans for yen investments." There were many Japanese editorials (Tab F) pro and con on 13 and 14 Mar 52, with Economic Stabilization Board Director SUDO quoting Gen MARQUAT on various phases of the original statement.

4. In the Upper House Budget Committee 14 Mar 52, YOSHIDA is again quoted as discounting the MARQUAT statement, saying, according to "Tokyo Shimbun," that Gen MARQUAT knew nothing of the statement. Later in the day, "Asahi" (Tab G) quoted a Cabinet spokesman as saying that YOSHIDA did not mean that MARQUAT disowned all of the press release, but only that part saying that there can be no political loans.

5. This led to a general and to-be-expected attack on the YOSHIDA's Government policies, particularly its dependence on expected loans from the US.

6. On the 17th, "Asahi" (Tab H) stated that the Government was "extremely dissatisfied" with the statement. It claims that the Government expected, presumably because of remarks by Ambassador DULLES, that the US will extend economic aid to Japan after the peace. In the Upper House, the Opposition criticized YOSHIDA's efforts to discount the MARQUAT press release. They accused him of "trying to shift to GHQ the failure of the Government to bring in foreign capital," according to the "Asahi," (Tab H).

7. The net result of this interchange has been the weakening of Prime Minister YOSHIDA's political prestige at a time when he is under severe attack for a variety of other reasons.

8. It is recommended that a clarification of the controversial portions of this 11 Mar 52 press release be issued by this headquarters.

R. F. E.

8 Incls:
a/s

3/17/52

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

3620

Security Information
CONFIDENTIAL

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17 MAR 1952

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 81951
By NARA Date 3/10/12

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Public Information Office

1645
11 March 1952

Immediate Release:

GENERAL MARQUAT, BACK FROM U.S., DISCUSSES LOAN OUTLOOK FOR JAPAN

Individuals and agencies in the United States are sincerely interested in the continuation of mutual good will with Japan as a friendly sovereign nation and are anxious for full development of mutually beneficial economic relationships. There is a sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties facing Japan in the exercise of regained sovereignty, but Americans exhibit a profound confidence that Japan will face these obstacles with full courage and capacity to conquer them.

These are the impressions brought back to Japan by Maj. Gen. W. F. Marquat, Chief of SCAP's Economic and Scientific Section, after a month in Washington, D.C., on a special mission devoted to, among other issues, a reexamination of the prospects for favorable economic relationships between the U.S. and Japan after ratification of the peace treaty. His mission, he states, did not include the consummation of commercial deals or the extension of specific loans, as erroneously reported, but rather to determine the future bases upon which these matters might be resolved.

The mission, which included Brig. Gen. Leroy Watson, Lt. Col. James Landrum, Kenneth Morrow and Eugene Reed, laid the groundwork for some $150 million worth of business not previously negotiated and for the continuation of industrial cooperation activities at a satisfactory level.

General Marquat today made these observations on the subject of loans to Japan by United States Government and private sources:

1. The international credit rating of Japan will be established by Japan herself in terms of how she sets up her domestic fiscal and financial policy, economic stabilization procedures and debt servicing programs. Japan should be able to meet all requirements for necessary credit.

2. The extension of credit will be based entirely upon the economic justification which can be made for the amount requested and the general commercial benefits to be derived therefrom. Japan will enjoy full equity treatment with all other foreign nations with respect to requests of this nature.

3. American institutions will consider requests for individual loans after examination of full documentation of the requests on a loan by loan basis if they are within the credit policies of the institutions concerned. Full documentation should include, among other things, indications of total amount involved, contributions of domestic funds in terms of amounts and sources, participation by other foreign financial agencies or institutions, details of the project to include date of realizing returns, means and rates of liquidation, interest rates, collateral guarantees, distribution of profits and similar factors.

(more)
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4. U.S. firms and agencies frankly state that most previous requests from Japan have been in too general terms and have not been justified in specific economic terms. The case of the Export-Import Bank cotton loan is a notable exception.

5. U.S. financial agencies prefer direct requests from Japanese governmental bodies or concerns rather than through intermediaries from the U.S. or other countries.

General Marquat said that government loans are no different from private loans -- both must be fully justified to begin with and repayment prospects and earning rates are prime considerations. Japan should not hesitate to seek loans when they are actually required. She can be sure of full consideration but should be prepared for rejection of any request that cannot be fully supported.

He stated that his investigations have revealed that U.S. financial experts do not look favorably upon dollar loans to finance yen investment even if the foreign credit can be obtained at a lesser interest rate than a domestic loan. The predominant opinion in the U.S. is that if the project is of an economic value to justify a foreign loan to finance yen investment, indigenous financing should be furnished from government budget or private sources and domestic interest rates should be adjusted to make the loan attractive.

General Marquat said that the issue of foreign bonds would be another solution considered preferable to requests for bank credit, although the value of the bond would be affected by many of the same factors influencing the loan application.

Membership in the International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development may provide Japan with a source of funds more nearly approximating a general line of credit than any other type available at the moment. The amount of deposit by Japan in these agencies will establish a drawing fund available for special loans justified on the same basis as any other loan.

"How about political loans?" the General was asked.

"The United States has no such category," he replied. "If you are speaking of grants in aid, that is an entirely different consideration. Such aid must be justified on premises equally as stringent as bank loans and must be approved by the Congress. I do not think, however, that Japan is in a financial condition today to justify such type of assistance."

General Marquat claims that U.S. Government economic aid has been generously granted to Japan during the Occupation but was discontinued because it was no longer required. Current U.S. international aid in general is directly related to participation in regional defense programs in which Japan is not yet involved.

Questioned about specific U.S. loans to certain countries for economic development, the General explained that in these cases each separate project comprising the total loan was examined, analyzed and accepted precisely in the manner he described as being applicable to Japan.

"It is entirely a matter of the validity of the request for the loan and the actual provisions for its use," he said. "The right of the U.S. to withhold funds if standard required conditions are not met is right now preventing the use of credit already extended to some nations."

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General Marquat said that conditions in U.S. industry are considerably different than they were one year ago when he was in America. He said that steel and aluminun are not nearly so scarce as they were at that time. Cutbacks in some of the larger industrial areas and price indices are leveling off or dropping. Industrial capacity has rapidly expanded.

Offshore procurement is becoming an important problem. The fallacy that the United States can finance and is willing to buy anything anywhere and at any price is being rapidly exploded. The U.S. Congress justifiably is becoming gravely concerned over the mounting impact of the demand for U.S. funds to be used in global disbursements.

There is sincere interest in offshore procurement in Japan when the full value of the dollar expenditure is obtained and time or expediency factors are served. The extent to which Japan can participate in this business is limited only by funds available to the U.S. and Japan's ability to return value received. General Marquat believes Japan has the capability of meeting all requirements including the expansion of trade with Southeast Asia and the United States. His group discussed several new programs for Japan while in Washington. Its main purpose was to obtain recognition for Japan in the allocation of any offshore procurement funds that may become available in present or future U.S. budgets.

He said his SCAP section has advised the Japanese of the possibility of the changes now occurring and that active steps are being taken in Japan to improve production methods, develop new and more economic sources of supply and reduce prices.

The Chief of ESS admits that the cost of imported raw materials in Japan is high but adds that there are important compensating factors. He points out that approximately 60 percent of the cost of finished steel in Japan represents indigenous materials and labor as against 40 percent expended on imports. He favors expanded production to realize lower unit costs, rather than the use of control devices to maintain high selling prices.

He believes Japan should give special attention to power and shipping development programs and that these programs should not be delayed. He is of the conviction that sufficient domestic yen credit can be made available for essential industrial developments and for adequate commercial transactions, provided efforts are made to direct credit into proper channels and away from non-essential uses.

General Marquat said that U.S. authorities recognize Japan's merchant fleet shortage but granting of authority to Japan to charter ships from the U.S. "moth ball fleet" wouldrequire a change in existing U.S. legislation. He said the Japanese government's presentation of its shipping problem has convinced most Americans that Japan's purpose is to resolve the issue of high-priced imports to permit the adjustment of selling prices toward world levels, and not with the objective of creating unfair competition in world markets.

He praised the efforts of Mr. Takeuchi and his staff in handling the Washington Japanese office, Shigeru Matsumoto representing the Bank of Japan in the U.S., and others who are developing most amicable relationships with U.S. official and business leaders.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE GROUP/FAR EAST

SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS

NO: 2103 DATE: 13 Mar 52

Today's Tokyo Newspapers

-NEWS-

Foreign news and domestic speculation highlighted the coverage today. In the evening press the British budget drew the best play, topping two papers and breaking high in the others. The impending Senate action on the Japan peace treaty and the French Assembly approval of the Pinay Cabinet also made a good showing. In the later papers the emphasis shifted to the home front—mostly to speculative stories like MAINICHI's on security force buildup and YOMIURI's on US-Japan economic cooperation. Two topics--foreign relations and national defense—rated consistent frontpage treatment. In their foreign coverage the morning papers featured the New Hampshire primaries and Sino-Japanese treaty talks.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The Government has apparently decided to build up a security force of 300,000 within the next four years. Indications are that it will strengthen the force, which will grow out of the National Police Reserve this October, to 150,000 in 1952, to 200,000 in 1953, to 260,000 in 1954, and to 300,000 in 1955. (a)

State Minister OHASHI's security agency plan—explained to a ministerial roundtable Tuesday—is expected to come up for a cabinet decision next week. Designed for 1 July enforcement, the plan would put the security force and coast guard under unified cabinet command. (b)

At a central executive committee meeting yesterday, Socialist left-wingers drew up their final strategy for challenging the constitutionality of the NPR. They decided to attack the Government in four ways: 1) file suit with the Supreme Court on 15 March on the ground that the administrative order setting up the NPR violates the Constitution; 2) ask the local courts to outlaw the "defense" budget; 3) urge owners of NPR-requisitioned property to bring suit; and 4) prod NPR members into filing suit if restrictions are placed on quitting. (c)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

A former Tokyo University professor told the Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday that the nationality principle in the administrative agreement adds up to extraterritoriality. "Such a wide scope of extraterritoriality has never before been recognized in peace time," said KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu. "The humiliating consular jurisdiction of the past applied only to a small foreign settlement. But the nationality principle of the administrative agreement will apply both in and outside military bases. From the size of the US garrison in Japan, we must admit that the nationality principle means extraterritoriality on an unprecendented scale." He saw the administrative agreement as a victory of the US Defense Department over the States Department. "Japan is now like Viet Nam to France and the Philippines to the US," he said. "I cannot but conclude that the disregard of our independence is unfortunate both for Japan and the US." (d)

Other experts testifying before the committee were less critical. YANAI Tsuneo, former director of the Foreign Ministry's Treaties Bureau, differed sharply with Kamikawa on the nationality principle. He insisted that the nationality principle "has no tinge of extraterritoriality." (e)

Cabinet ministers, meanwhile, studied legislative measures for implementing the administrative agreement. (f) Under the guidance of Treaties Bureau Director NISHIMURA, the Foreign Ministry is working out a draft of a garrison agreement with the UN forces. (b) State Minister OKAZAKI, replying to an Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee question, pointed out that there is a "definite distinction" between US garrison forces and UN forces. "While the costs for US Occupation forces are covered by war-end expenses, UN forces pay their expenses in dollars. The US, therefore, will pay for those expenses of its UN component exceeding the amount fixed in the administrative agreement. (a)

(a) Mainichi Shimbun (AM) (c) Asahi Shimbun (AM) (e) Yukan Nihon Keizai
(b) Tokyo Shimbun (d) Mainichi Shimbun (PM) (f) Yomiuri Shimbun (AM)

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INTERNAL SECURITY

Two cabinet ministers yesterday defended the "vice-minister's memorandum"—an understanding between the Education Ministry and the Metropolitan Police Board guaranteeing university autonomy. Education Minister AMANO, objecting to any basic change in the memorandum, told the Upper House Judiciary Committee that police should get the permission of university officials before coming on the campus. He demanded an end to such police practices as "thought investigation" of professors. Attorney General KIMURA also wanted to let the memorandum stand. "We must fully respect the custom of self-government within university premises," he said. But he added that to preserve their autonomy the universities themselves should take steps to control radical students. (a)

At the Liberal executive board meeting MPB Superintendent TANAKA disclosed that Tokyo University reported 300 campus crimes last year--27 percent of the total committed in the Motofuji police district. He estimated that the university would account for 50 percent if unreported crimes are included. (b) The Liberals went on record against redrafting the internal security plan to include "the right of compulsory inspection." (c)

The Government has found a new chairman for the National Public Safety Commission. It has tentatively picked HANAI Tadashi, attorney and Chuo University professor, to succeed TSUJI Jiro, whose term expired Friday. (d)

NEWS BRIEFS

Election Cleanup Drive Projected: Planners of a national drive for cleaner elections will hold a preparatory meeting in Tokyo on Monday. The meeting will bring about 35 persons together--including former State Minister SHIMOMURA Kainan, Japan Education Society Chairman MAEDA Tamon, and former Agriculture-Forestry Minister ISHIGURO Tadaatsu. (a)

400-500 Japanese Said Hiding in PI: Former Lt Col JIMBO Nobuhiko, testifying before the Lower House Special Repatriation Committee yesterday, reported that 400 to 500 Japanese servicemen are still hiding out in the Philippines. (e)

(a) Asahi Shimbun (AM)
(b) Tokyo Shimbun
(c) Yomiuri Shimbun (PM)
(d) Asahi Shimbun (PM)
(e) Yomiuri Shimbun (AM)

-EDITORIALS-

Attention centered on Gen Marquat's announcement that Japan can expect no more US government loans. Economic discussion also included the problem of exports to the pound sterling area. Other comment covered a variety of topics--Prime Minister Yoshida's views on "war potential for self-defense," Japan's application for UN membership, labor law revision, and Communist China's campaign against "anti-revolutionary elements" within the country.

ECONOMY

ESS Chief MARQUAT's statement that Japan can expect no US "political" loans indicates that Prime Minister YOSHIDA has assumed too hastily that foreign loans were obtainable, according to ASAHI. It believed that the Government has counted too much on the induction of foreign capital as the best means for economic rehabilitation and that Japan should rely more on itself. "We cannot be too optimistic about the future of Japan's economy, but we believe the difficulties may be overcome if the people aspire to economic independence. If the Government depends upon foreign loans, the people will not try to raise and maintain their living standard by their own efforts."

It is now up to the Government, the paper said, to work out a program for power source development on its own and to set a clear goal toward which the people should work.

A TOKYO SHIMBUN columnist called the Marquat statement a "bolt from the blue" and a "slap in the face" to the Government. He severely criticized the Government for assuming that US loans would be forthcoming and added that since the surrender "we have relied upon the US too much."

YOMIURI, on the other hand, stated that foreign capital is absolutely necessary and that Japan must create conditions favorable for its induction. "Now that we know political loans and economic aid are virtually hopeless, we must drop our easy-going views of the past. We must work for early participation in the International Monetary Fund and the International Reconstruction and Development Bank and study

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the situation from all angles to entice as much foreign capital as possible. We must not expect a large amount of foreign capital at one time. We must not repeat the mistake of the Government, which erred completely in its expectations."

In view of Gen Marquat's statement that Japanese loan requests have lacked sufficient detail and justification, NIHON KEIZAI said this must be corrected in the future. On the subject of making applications directly to financial agencies rather than through the US Government, the paper conceded that "we have grown accustomed to carrying out negotiations under the protection of government influence."

"The US is unwilling to extend loans in dollars to cover the deficiency of yen funds," it continued. "This is a matter to which not only borrowers but also the Government and the Bank of Japan should give special consideration. Overproduction, in particular, is now a controversial issue. Nevertheless capital cannot be obtained from domestic banks due to the tight money policy. It would be most irrelevant to apply to US financial circles for funds to cover this gap."

JIJI SHIMPO turned to the question of how to deal with surplus pound holdings. To stimulate imports from the sterling area, one proposal is for the Government to buy high-priced raw materials from the sterling area and sell them cheaply to private firms, or to pay subsidies to firms to cover the difference between their prices and the international price level. Another proposal is to grant an export quota in proportion to the amount of imports.

"These formulas look excellent, but actually they are not," the editorial commented. "The first involves a financial burden and is contrary to international custom under which government should not give special protection to foreign trade. The second is more progressive, but would encounter many difficulties. The best alternative is to permit free trade in sterling so that its rate may fall to the point where imports are balanced with exports. Following Indonesia's revision of its exchange rate, Thailand reduced its sterling rate. Britain, we believe, has no reason to oppose Japan in following their examples."

UNITED NATIONS

MAINICHI noted that the Government, in preparation for independence, is taking steps to apply for United Nations membership. It hoped that Japan would be admitted to the world organization, even though some people argue that it would be undesirable for Japan "to join in the use of force for the sake of collective sanction, such as the action of UN troops in Korea." Japan will naturally assume a certain degree of obligation if it becomes a UN member. "So long as the purpose of the UN is to maintain peace and security, it will use its forces to punish acts of aggression. We should recall the old League of Nations. It lacked strength to punish aggressors, and this led to World War II."

"Despite our hopes and wishes, the prospects for Japan's admittance are dark," the paper concluded. "There is every reason to believe that the Soviet Union will exercise its veto power in the Security Council."

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The Diet debate on "war potential" is revolving around the same spot without reaching any conclusion, a YOMIURI columnist observed. He paid his respects to the Upper House for trying to clarify the issue, but he said the problem went deeper than interpretation of legal theories. "The fundamental question is whether Japan should have war potential. If we are required to have it at all costs, we should revise the Constitution. If we should not have war potential under any circumstances, we should adhere to the Constitution even at the sacrifice of our lives. We suggest that the Yoshida Cabinet decide on a plebescite to divest the issue of its misty nature."

MISCELLANEOUS

TOKYO SHIMBUN discussed the Labor Inquiry Committee's difficulties in trying to draft a report on labor law revision. The journal understood the views of labor, but said management has misgivings about revising the laws because it feared a labor "offensive" when the peace treaty takes effect. "In view of the times, we feel it proper that management firmly insist on placing restrictions on strikes by public service employees."

ASAHI's evening editorial dealt with the large-scale executions being carried out inside Communist China to eliminate all political opposition.

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Supplement to

SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS COMMUNIST TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES

KOREANS

Korean Roundup in Kobe; Mob Action Follows: Twenty-six Kobe district Korean communities and a Korean school were raided by police yesterday in an action designd to smoke out the ringleaders of the "violence" incidents that have been taking place lately. By 0800 hours police had arrested 27 Koreans and uncovered an arms and propaganda cache. The cache, containing 27 bamboo spears and antiwar propaganda, was located at the Korean school in Nawa Ohama Machi, Aioi Shi. Also at the school they found Korean ZEN Zaiko, wanted as the ringleader of the mob attacks on 26 February on the Korean Residents Association offices.

At 1000 hours the repercussions began. About 100 Koreans, including school children, swooped down on the Aioi Shi police station and demanded that the arrested persons be freed. They were still hanging on at the station last night. Meanwhile prisoner Zen was being questioned by police on some of the entries in his notebooks. Among them was a piece from a Chinese Communist instruction sheet called, "Organization and Strategy of Nucleus Self-Defense Corps." The piece gave a recipe for manufacturing gunpowder. (Yomiuri Shimbun, PM, 12 March)

Koreans Smash Police Patrol Phone in Osaka: Two Koreans smashed up a police patrol box telephone in Osaka yesterday. One of the Koreans was arrested. (Yomiuri Shimbun, AM, 13 March)

Koreans Demonstrate at Shiga Police Station: Sixty or more Koreans, including women, demonstrated on 8 March in front of the National Rural Police substation in Azuchi Mura, Shiga Ken. They milled around for an hour heckling and threatening the police. This was the third Korean demonstration at the station since the beginning of March. (Asahi Shimbun, PM, 9 March)

JCP STRUGGLE POLICY

JCP Said Stressing "Inside-Prison" Activities: The Japan Communist Party is bearing down on "inside-prison" activities lately. Extreme leftist prisoners are said to be working with JCP self-defense corps on the outside to incite all-prisoner rebellions. The accent is on "mass violence, mass resistance, mass sabotage, and seizure of prison officers' pistols." (Yomiuri Shimbun, Santama edition, 12 March)

JCP Steps Up Counterpolice Activity in Santama: JCP counterpolice activity in the Santama district has gotten "markedly" stronger lately. Tracing the undercover angles, police found out that an organizer from JCP headquarters arrived in Hishi Gun on 2 March for a "top-level" policy conference with the Santama district bureau. The conference decision was to strengthen counterpolice activities in the district with emphasis on "attacking police stations and wresting pistols away from policemen." The overall resolutions were: 1) to make sketches of all the police stations and substations in the district, 2) to investigate "in detail" police strength throughout the district and the activities of police officers, 3) to map out plans for attacking police, 4) to form three-man attack units. (Yomiuri Shimbun, Santama edition, 12 March)

JCP Launches Four-Pronged Offensive in Akita: The JCP has opened a four-pronged offensive in Akita Ken as follows: 1) activities to win over National Police Reserve members, 2) counterpolice activities, 3) activities to win over the second and third sons of farmers, 4) activities to win over day laborers.

Of the four No 1) and No 3) are being pushed the hardest. A special JCP operations team to penetrate the NPR was recently formed within a JCP district cell in Akita Shi. It is making headway fast, according to one report. Allegedly when the NPR main force stopped off at the city on 4 March, a JCP member took pictures of the leading staff members and the equipment, and, moreover, showed up at a civic function marking the occasion. In the play for farmers' younger sons, the JCP is spreading the word that they are getting a raw deal from the prefecture. Some time back prefectural authorities had considered setting up a relief project for these younger sons. They had to give up the idea, for the time at least, because of lack of funds. The JCP is agitating the boys "most effectively" on this issue. (Yomiuri Shimbun, Akita edition, 11 March)

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No. 4

MARQUAT STATEMENT
STIRS MISGIVINGS

(Morning Edition)

Kyodo

TOKYO, March 13 --- The statement issued by Maj.-Gen. William F. Marquat, chief of ESS, GHQ, Tuesday has stirred new misgivings in economic circles over the immediate future of the national economy.

Industrial circles said that prospects for new special procurement orders have brightened.

At the same time, they pointed out, the Marquat statement served to lessen hopes in industrial circles for exports of iron and steel to the United States.

More than that, the statement virtually has presented a new problem of what to do with the expansion of industrial facilities.

The statement noted that there is no immediate need for "political loans" for development of power resources.

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Marquat statement 2

Although it did not deny the possibility of private loans for such purposes, large loans could not be expected from the United States.

Since the statement stressed that power resources should be developed primarily by domestic funds, industrial circles continued, the United States apparently is critical of Japan's attempt to effect large-scale power developments.

The statement, on the other hand, sounded a warning to Japan's iron-steel industry to expand its facilities, these quarters opined.

They held that new orders amounting to $150 million (m) to Japan may be realized parallel with $1 billion U.S. aid to Asia and the Pacific.

They are likely to deal with repairs of munitions and production of munitions parts and materials. as well as development equipment.

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TOKYO, MARCH 14-(AP)-KYODO NEWS AGENCY TONIGHT QUOTED PRIME MINISTER SHIGERU YOSHIDA AS TELLINYHR JAPANESE DIET TODAY THAT MAJOR GENRAL WILLIAM F. MARQUAT, CHIEF OF SCAP'S ECONOMCI, SOCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC SECTION, DID NOT MAKE A FORMAL STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO HIMS MARCH 11.

ACCORDING TO KYODO, YOSHIDA TOLD THE DIET THAT HE HAD HEARD MARQUAT HIMSELF SAY HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE STATEMENT, WHICH WAS RELEASED BY PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. THE STATEMENT SAID IN PART THAT "ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION MUST PROVIDE THE BASE FOR ANY TYPE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT OR PRIVATE LOANS TO JAPAN." IT ADDED THAT MARQUAT, WHO RETURNED RECENTLY FROM WASHINGTON, SAID JAPANESE REQUESTS FOR LOANS HAVE BEEN IN TOO GENERAL TERMS AND HAVE NOT BEEN JUSTIFIED IN SPECIFIC ECONOMIC TERMS."

TONIGHT MARQUAT'S OFFICE QUOTED MARQUAT AS SAYING HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANYTHING HE SAID TO PRIME MINISTER YOSHIDA THAT ALTERS OR CHANGES HIS REMARKS IN THE PRESS RELEASE OF MARCH 11.

IN THE UPPER HOUSE INTERPELLATIONS ON THE 1952 JAPANESE BUDGET TODAY, KINACHIRO KIMURA, LABOR FARMER, ASKED YOSHIDA IF A SELF-SUPPORTING ECONOMY (JAPANESE) CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS. HE SAID THAT MARQUAT "SEEMS TO HAVE SAID" IN HIS STATEMENT THAT JAPAN CANNOT HAVE MUCH EXPECTATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.

ACCORDING TO KYODO, YOSHIDA REPLIED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED MARQUAT ABOUT THE PRESS REPORT ON HIS STATEMENT AND THAT MARQUAT HAD REPLIED HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE STATEMENT. YOSHIDA ADDED THAT HE HAD HEARD MARQUAT HIMSELF SAY THAT, KYODO STATED.

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BULLETIN

TOKYO, MARCH 14--(UP)--MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. MARQUAT REAFFIRMED TODAY A STATEMENT THAT U.S. FINANCIAL CIRCLES DO NOT PLAN TO UNDERWRITE SOVEREIGN JAPAN'S ECONOMIC REHABILITATION IN THE FORM OF DOLLAR LOANS FOR YEN INVESTMENTS.

THE STATEMENT BY THE SCAP FINANCIAL ADVISER ON HIS RETURN FROM A ONE-MONTH TRIP TO WASHINGTON WAS DENIED TODAY BY PRIME MINISTER SHIGERU YOSHIDA BEFORE THE UPPER HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE AND THREATENED TO DELAY A PPROVAL OF THE 1952 -53 BUDGET.

YOSHIDA TOLD LABOR-AGRICULTURE PARTY INTERPOLLATOR KIMA CHIRO KIMURA IN THE HEATED SESSION GENERA L MARQUAT HAD TOLD HIM HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF A STATEMENT A SCRIBED TO HIM THAT U.S. FINANCIAL CIRCLES "DO NOT LOOK FA VORABLY UPON DOLLAR LOANS TO FINANCE YEN XXXXXXXXX INVES TMENT."

THE STA TEMENT, RELASED TUESDAY BY THE GHQ PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE, SAID IT WAS FELT IN AMERICA THA T LOCAL PROJECTS SHOULD BE FINANCED WITH INDIGENOUS CREDIT FROM GOVERNMENT BUDGET OR PRIVATE SOURCES AND DOMESTIC INTEREST SHOULD BE ADJUSTED TO MAKE THE LOANS ATTRACTIVE.

GENERA L MARQUA T, WHEN CONTACTED TODAY, REAFFIRMED THE STATEMENT BUT REFUSED TO COMMENT ON YOSHIDA'S ANSWER TO KIMURA UNTIL HE WAS FULLY INFORMED OF ITS WORDING. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE DOES NOT REMEMBER HAVING DISCLA IMED THE STATEMENT ON DOLLAR INVESTMENTS IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE PREMIER THIS WEEK.

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ADD JAPANESE BRIDES,TOKYO X X X TAPE

The G.I. or officer must have all paper relating to his marriage in the hands of American consular authorities by the deadline.

If he doesn't, he either can get the U.S. Congress to pass a special law for him -- or he can sit tight and hope the deadline is extended again.

... sa 5.45 p.m.

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ADD MARQUAT, TOKYO, X X X WEEK.

KIMURA MMKMM IN HIS INTERPOLLATION CHALLENGED THE GOVERNMENT'S WHOLE ECONOMIC POLICY WAS ENDANGERED BY THE REVELATION OF AMERICAN RELUCTANCE TO INVEST IN MMXMM INDIGENOUS PROJECTS.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COMMITTEE SESSION THE ISSUE WAS TAKEN UP BY THE JOINT COUNCIL OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES MMM WHICH DEMANDED THAT THE BUDGET DISCUSSION, IN THE LIGHT OF MARQUAT'S STATEMENT, BE BROUGHT BACK TO THE FLOOR OF THE LOWER HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE.

LIBERAL CHAIRMAN JUICHIRO TSUKATA OMMXMXMXMMMMMMMM PROMISED TO TAKE UP THE REQUEST AT THE COMMITTEE'S EXECUTIVE MEETING MONDAY.

THE BUDGET WAS RAMMED THROUGH THE LOWER HOUSE FEBRUARY 27 ON THE STRENGTH OF THE WHOPPING LIBERAL MAJORITY AGAINST A SOLID FRONT BY THE OPPOSITION PARTIES.

IN HIS STATEMENT MARQUAT, MXMMM WHO HAS BEEN THE OCCUPATION'S FINANCIAL VICEROY, MMXMM EXPRESSED THE BELIEF SUFFICIENT DOMESTIC YEN CREDIT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE MMMM FOR EXPANSION OF ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIES "PROVIDED EFFORTS ARE MADE TO DIRECT CREDIT INTO PROPER CHANNELS AND AWAY FROM NONEESSENTIAL USES."

HE EMPHASIZED JAPAN MUST AWAKE TO THE FACT THAT NO MORE U. S. HANDOUTS WILL BE FORTHCOMING WITH JAPAN'S ACHIEVEMENT OF MMXMXMXMMMXM SOVEREIGNTY. HE POINTED OUT THAT SUCH FOREIGN LOANS WHICH JAPAN HOPES TO FLOAT WILL HAVE TO BASED ENTIRELY UPON THEIR ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION; THAT RECENT JAPANESE REQUESTS HAVE BEEN IN TOO GENERAL TERMS; THAT U. S. FINANCIAL AGENCIES PREFER DIRECT REQUESTS FROM JAPANESE GOVERNMENTAL BODIES RATHER THAN FOREIGN INTERMEDIARIES.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE GROUP/FAR EAST

SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS

NO: 2104 DATE: 14 Mar 52

Today's Tokyo Newspapers

-NEWS-

Results of the Tokyo 6th district Lower House by-election topped all evening papers but one and carried over into early morning editions. The evening exception was JIJI SHIMPO, which led with State Minister Ohashi's press conference on the National Police Reserve. Progress of the Preliminary Working Group was a consistent midpage item, but otherwise domestic news unrelated to the election did poorly. Morning leads went to speculative stories, such as MAINICHI's on sending a special envoy to the Chinese Nationalist Government and YOMIURI's on sharing of defense expenses and US-Japan cooperation. Wire news included Secretary Acheson's press conference on rearmament and status of the Taipei treaty negotiations.

POLITICS

KUMAMOTO Torazo, rightwing Socialist, and ARAI Kyota, Liberal, won the Tokyo 6th district Lower House by-election, with 61,675 and 58,391 votes respectively. SHIMAGAMI Zengoro, leftwing Socialist, was runner-up with 39,023. Thirteen candidates contested for the two seats. The voting turn-out was only 42 percent. (a)

The victory of Kumamoto was regarded as significant since this was the first election since the Socialist Party split into right and left factions. It was also the first election for the newly-organized Progressive Reform Party, whose candidate drew 30,236 votes. Among the defeated candidates were four depurgees. (a) The Communists, who won more than 50,000 votes in the previous district election, came out with about 10,000. (b)

In view of their victory at the polls, rightwing Socialists skirted the danger of wrangling arising from the recent statement by the party-affiliated League for Democratic Socialism that rearmament called for constitutional revision. The central executive committee decided to regard the League as entirely separate from the party, which will adhere to its policy of keeping self-defense within the Constitution. (c)

NATIONAL DEFENSE

The Upper House Budget Committee will resume interpellation of Prime Minister YOSHIDA today. It will also call in more witnesses for their views on the constitutionality of war potential for self-defense. (d)

State Minister OHASHI told a press conference that he wants to discontinue the retirement bonus of 60,000 yen to National Police Reserve personnel after their two-year term. The first group of recruits will get the allowance, but the Government is considering some other form of benefit to those who enlist from now on. "Military experts are now studying the formation and disposition of the expanded security force," Ohashi added. "Since its disposition is aimed at defense of the country instead of aggression on the continent, there is a great difference between the NPR and the old army." (e)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Prime Minister apparently would like to send KAWAGOE Shigeru, former ambassador to China, as his special envoy to the Nationalist Government. He has instructed the chief of the treaty mission in Taipei to sound out Nationalist views on the matter. (f)

Two experts on constitutional law who testified on the administrative agreement before the Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday agreed that the legal jurisdiction provision constituted extraterritoriality. "The stationing of a foreign army naturally involves extraterritoriality," one said. He believed, however, that the agreement was constitutional. (b)

(a) Yukan Nihon Keizai
(b) Mainichi Shimbun (PM)
(c) Asahi Shimbun (AM)
(d) Yomiuri Shimbun (AM)
(e) Jiji Shimpo
(f) Mainichi Shimbun (AM)

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ECONOMIC

Speculation has been aroused as to the nature of the 150,000,000-dollar business with Japan referred to earlier this week by ESS Chief MARQUAT. Sources close to the Economic Stabilization Board think the amount will cover purchases for the US garrison of commodities not previously bought in Japan, and military aid materials for Southeast Asia. These purchases, it is believed, will be in addition to 1952 special procurement which the ESB had already estimated at about 350,000,000 dollars. ESB Director SUDO talked with Gen Marquat yesterday and was told that the US is now working on a US-Japan economic cooperation plan. (a)

Chairman ISHIKAWA Ichiro of the Federation of Economic Organizations will probably remain in his post. His re-election is expected at the FEO general meeting on 27 March. (b)

INTERNAL SECURITY

Metropolitan Police Board and Education Ministry representatives are trying to adjust their interpretations of the "vice-minister's memorandum" to prevent future conflicts between police and university authorities similar to the Tokyo University case. (a) Meanwhile the MPB claimed that four political meetings took place on the Tokyo University campus in January that would have been banned had they been held outside. The MPB says that continuance of such meetings--of which the university authorities were apparently ignorant--amounts to a kind of extraterritoriality. (b)

NEWS BRIEFS

Cabinet to Get Amnesty Bill Today: Today's Cabinet meeting is expected to approve the bill providing large-scale amnesty and reduction in terms for war criminals when the peace treaty takes effect. (a)

Nemoto Wins UH Committee Approval: The Upper House Steering Committee approved the appointment of Liberal member NEMOTO Ryutaro as adviser to the ESB to permit his going to Burma as a Government envoy. (c)

(a) Asahi Shimbun (AM) (b) Tokyo Shimbun (c) Yomiuri Shimbun (AM)

-EDITORIALS-

Two writers today commented on the Lower House by-election in the Tokyo sixth electoral district. Discussion of internal security issues included the Government-proposed measures for public peace maintenance and the Tokyo University incident. Economic editorials pivoted on the effects of Britain's new financial policy on Japan and the development of electric power resources. Other topics included right-wing Socialist policy, fire prevention, and prostitution.

LOWER HOUSE BY-ELECTION

MAINICHI said the Lower House by-election in the Tokyo sixth electoral district revealed that 1) a right-wing Socialist received the largest number of votes followed by a Liberal; 2) the Communist Party received the smallest number of votes, while they received the most votes last time; and 3) former politicians, including depurgees, were completely defeated. "Since this by-election is a model case, we think it is suggestive to some extent of future political tendencies." Noting that the voting percentage was very low, the daily said: "If this by-election is held as a barometer of the people's concern in national politics, the matter becomes serious...If the people are cool toward politics, there will be danger that politics will fall into the hands of a few rightists or leftists. It is an indispensable condition for the sound development of Japanese politics that the people have great concern in national politics."

Although a right-wing Socialist won more votes than the Liberal candidate, a MAINICHI columnist said, the Liberal tactic of entering only one candidate in the by-election saved the Liberal Party from a complete defeat. "It may be that this tactic is attributed to the foresight of Chief Secretary MASUDA. Being more aware than any one else of the changing public opinion toward the Yoshida Cabinet, he did not have the courage to run two party candidates."

INTERNAL SECURITY

TOKYO SHIMBUN was concerned about the Government-proposed measures for public peace maintenance such as the special security bill and revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. "The idea that it is only necessary to enact laws wide in scope must be rejected whether it be to control violence or to search

Tab "J"

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G

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE GROUP/FAR EAST

SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS

NO: 2105 DATE: 15 Mar 52

Today's Tokyo Newspapers

-NEWS-

The GHQ note conditonally approving arms production in Japan took top play in all morning papers today. The typical headline read, "Ban on Arms Production Eased." In second place came Prime Minister Yoshida's attempt, before the Upper House Budget Committee, to write off the Marquat statement on US loan prospects. Late morning editions coupled the story with Maj Gen Marquat's confirmation of earlier press reports. In the evening press the main emphasis fell on foreign news. The two leading stories carried Washington datelines--the possibility that the Senate would ratify the Japanese peace treaty on 18 March and the transfer of command over the Formosa and Philippines areas from Gen Ridgway to Adm Radford.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Government received a GHQ memorandum yesterday easing the postwar ban on arms production. Subject to GHQ approval, Japan can now produce weapons, war ships, and aircraft. (a) In a few days Government officials will consult GHQ to get an idea of how much to ease the Potsdam ordinance banning arms production. With restrictions softened, Japanese factories will stand a good chance of getting an increasing volume of special procurement orders. (b)

The procurement method favored by US members of the Preliminary Working Group has stirred up some opposition. Japanese PWG members feel that the proposed direct-procurement method carries disadvantages for Japan. They want "indirect procurement" with the Government stepping in between the US garrison and Japanese dealers. (c)

At the Upper House Budget Committee meeting yesterday, Prime Minister YOSHIDA explained the Government's thinking on the US counterpart fund. "National sentiment will not permit us to accept it as relief just because it has served to relieve Japan and bolster its economy," he said. "I believe we should pay it back to the US." (d)

When questioned about the Marquat statement on the bleak prospects for dollar investments, Yoshida discounted the statement. He said Maj Gen MARQUAT himself knew nothing of the statement published as his. (a)

Later a cabinet source tried to backstop Yoshida. He said the Prime Minister did not mean that the ESS chief disowned all of the statement but only the part reading, "There can be no political loans." (a)

Executives of the Progressive Reform Party prepared to demand on explanation for the discrepancy between the Government promise of early dollar investments and the Marquat statement. (d)

In the Lower House Communist HAYASHI Hyakuro asked the Government when it would rule on the passport-to-Russia issue. He pointed out that a Soviet ship would dock today to pick up the Japanese delegates to the international economic conference in Moscow. To this State Minister OKAZAKI replied: "They can set the date of arrival at their own discretion. It is annoying for the Government to have the deadline for its decision fixed in terms of a ship-arrival date...We are now studying the issue." He added that in working up to a decision the Government is taking note of the fact that no one in the US or Italy is planning to attend the conference. (a)

NATIONAL DEFENSE

State Minister OHASHI told the Upper House Budget Committee yesterday that the National Police Reserve, even when it takes action in line with "joint US-Japan measures," will not deviate from its present function. "It will have no other duty than to secure the nation's internal peace and order," he said. (b)
Former Admiral NOMURA Kichisaburo declared on the eve of his depurge that Japan must rearm. "The size of the military force is not the question; the important things is to get down to rearming the nation." (d)

(a) Asahi Shimbun (AM)
(b) Mainichi Shimbun (AM)
(c) Yomiuri Shimbun (AM)
(d) Tokyo Shimbun

Tab "G"

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WAR CRIMINALS

The purge screening committee decided informally yesterday to reinstate about 100 war criminals (including former Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU Mamoru) who have served out their sentences. It also proposed to depurge all dead war criminals except those sentenced to capital punishment. If the plan works out, this would be the first release of war criminals since the purge system began. (a)

At the cabinet meeting yesterday a war criminal bill was approved for submission to the current Diet. The bill lays down the procedure for handling war criminals after the peace treaty comes into effect. Its provisions will apply to the 1,108 war criminals now in Sugamo Prison and to any others who may be repatriated to finish up their sentences. (a)

NEWS BRIEFS

MPB Reform to Strengthen Guard Function: The Metropolitan Police Board has drawn up plans for a structural reform by mid-April. The proposed reform will center on strengthening controls over subversive elements. To stop up efficiency it would merge the Criminal Affairs Division (arrest-investigation) and the Patrol Division (information on-guard) into a new police guard division. (b)

Okano Protests Amano's School Aid Bill: State Minister OKANO objected yesterday to the Education Ministry bill to grant state aid for compulsory education. Differing sharply with Education Minister AMANO's remarks at Thursday's session of the Upper House Local Administration Committee, he asserted that the bill would revive the old subsidy system and compromise the present system of equalization grants. He also charged that it would endanger local autonomy. (c)

Socialist Right Upholds Present Policy: Socialist right-wing leader ASANUMA emphasized that his faction has not changed its policy despite the recommendation by one of its subordinate bodies that the Constitution be amended. "Our party will firmly uphold the present Constitution," he said, "and attack the Yoshida Cabinet for its unconstitutional character." (d)

(a) Asahi Shimbun (AM)
(b) Mainichi Shimbun (PM)
(c) Yukan Nihon Keizai
(d) Mainichi Shimbun (AM)

-EDITORIALS-

Two editorials today dealt with the Education Ministry's plan to pay compulsory education expenses from national funds. Economic editorials discussed Japan's excess pound holdings and the system of power allotment to major consumers. The results of the Lower House by-election in the 6th Tokyo electoral district drew comment from two writers. The rest of the coverage went to the UN disarmament talks, the significance of the US presidential election to Japan, labor-management relations, and the Education Ministry's proposal for a "people's song."

EDUCATION

ASAHI commented on the controversy over the Education Ministry's bill to pay compulsory education expenses from national funds. "The Local Finance Commission objects to this bill because it would destroy the local finance system...Moreover, the LFC contends that it will lead to central Government interference in local autonomy because the state will practically control the budgets of local bodies." While observing that the Liberal Party has drawn up a compromise plan, the daily said: "We want to draw the greatest attention to the fact that education made compulsory by the Constitution should never be placed under centralized bureaucratic control as it was before the war."

MAINICHI felt that legislation for educational finance is "absolutely necessary" in view of the importance of compulsory education and the grave crisis facing local finance...."We favor the main line of the Education Ministry's plan. But even the ministry's plan has room for further study. We especially want the problem investigated from a broad viewpoint of education--free from politics, election considerations, and sectionalism among government offices."

ECONOMY

TOKYO SHIMBUN warned the nation against hasty measures to cope with excess pound holdings. "It is silly to voice strong opinions without having any adequate measures to back them up. Japan must take steps against excessive pound holdings after first negotiating with Britain. In negotiating with foreign countries, the most important thing is unity of opinion at home."

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The daily added: "The authorities must not overlook the fact that counter-measures are not those of a single ministry or bureau, but national measures that will have great influence on the people's livelihood." With the Anglo-Japanese payments adjustment conference just ahead, the authorities concerned were urged to consider the matter carefully.

JIJI SHIMPO commented on the system of power allotment under which major consumers enjoy considerably lower rates than general consumers. "Should this system to protect the so-called essential industries at the expense of the general consumers be maintained, as the ESB and Trade-Industry Ministry are trying to do, we are sure the public will offer firm opposition. Such a system is anachronistic--nothing more than a relic of controlled economy."

The journal continued: "If the Government wants to protect special industries, it should do so through reduced taxes and reduced interests on loans or by increasing the prices of their products. The Government should let power companies and major consumers make their own power arrangement without interference... We believe it is high time to shift to a free economy formula."

BY-ELECTION

ASAHI's evening editorial considered it "unreasonable" to appraise the nationwide political situation merely on the basis of returns from the 6th electoral district in Tokyo. "But does it not suggest that the Socialist Party, including both the right- and left-wing factions, is a match for the Liberal Party?"

A JIJI SHIMPO columnist said: "Had most of the qualified voters cast their ballots, the results would have differed greatly. The 6th electoral district is a business center of smaller merchants as well as an old industrial area. Inasmuch as it is the cradle of the Japan Federation of Trade Unions, abstainers among the working class were few. Therefore, the right-wing Socialists have not necessarily won a great victory. On the other hand, since this district has been a great stronghold of the Liberal Party...from which it saw three Liberal Diet members elected in the last election, this time it barely managed to save face. They can't knowingly talk about public sentiment on the basis of the results and not appear ridiculous."

MISCELLANEOUS

Noting that the UN Disarmament Committee met in New York for the first time, YOMIURI commented on the difficulty of the disarmament problem, "The issue lies in such concrete details as the time and method of disarmament...At present, with rapid progress in military science, experts view the strict execution of disarmament as next to impossible. Despite all this, disarmament is the strong desire of all mankind. Disarmament does not mean the prompt advent of peace. But beyond doubt, it will help ease the current world tension and avert a war."

"Since both domestic and diplomatic administration are entirely in the hands of the US president," a MAINICHI columnist said, "we must remember that the US presidential election has bearing on Japan's destiny."

NIHON KEIZAI observed that the Labor Legislation Deliberative Council could not come to any conclusion at its Tuesday session because of the difference of opinion between labor and management. "As long as both labor and management doggedly stick to their own grounds, there will be very little chance of their coming to an agreement." The paper felt that both parties must discard the fear that "an inch of concession will make it necessary to concede all the way." Whatever revisions are made, the daily said, they will not fix the labor laws into a permanent shape. "It would be democratic to correct such defects as the revised laws may reveal when enforced, so that better labor laws and labor-management relations can be established." The daily hoped that both labor and management will do nothing that they will regret, even if the council recommendation displeases them.

An ASAHI columnist criticized the Education Ministry for planning a "people's song." "The top officials of the Education Ministry, who have of late been trying to shift Japan's locomotive into reverse by means of various devices such as the moral code and revival of Chinese classics, appear to be trying to unite the people's thoughts and sentiments along old lines by means of a song...Let the people sing what they want to sing. And if a song is born that wins the response of all the people, then let it become the people's song."

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Supplement to

SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS
COMMUNIST TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES

15 MARCH ANNIVERSARY

Nation's Police Alerted for Anniversary: Communist-inspired meeting to celebrate the 15 March anniversary are slated in 50 places throughout the nation, according to the National Rural Police headquarters Friday. All prefectural NRP districts went on alert to curb the expected "illegal acts" directed against law-enforcement officers and their families. The National Council of Trade Unions is scheduled to assemble thousands of union members near the Diet building for a protest demonstration against suppressive legislation. (Yukan Nihon Keizai, 14 March)

Underground Communist leaders have mobilized picked party members throughout the nation and issued orders to resort to acts of violence against police stations and other government agencies in each district, according to information reaching authorities in charge of public peace. Also from anticonscription handbills recently distributed in the Keihin district, authorities anticipate youth meetings of an ideological nature in this area Saturday. They believe the Communists will follow the line set forth in its underground publication "How to Raise Flower Bulbs, No 36." They also note that Communists have recently gone in for acts of violence and arms stealing on a larger scale. (Tokyo Shimbun, 14 March)

RED PUBLICATIONS

New Tactics Seen in Handbill Distribution: Hakodate labor unions have adopted new tactics in distributing agitation leaflets. Since 11 March union members have been distributing inflammatory bills opposing security law legislation and the peace and security treaties to night high school students. They also distributed bills to children at a city housing area, saying to them: "Show this to your family." (Mainichi Shimbun, Hokkaido edition, 14 March)

JCP Directive on Making Gunpowder Found: Notes on manufacturing gunpowder, taken from the JCP document "Organization and Function of the Nucleus Self-Defense Corps," were found on Korean CHON Chae-hong when he was arrested at a Korean school in Aioi, Hyogo Ken. Police, believing he was in charge of powder making in this prefecture, are looking for his associates. During the search they found 27 bamboo spears in the Korean school. (Yukan Okayama, 13 March)

Anti-American Poster Found in Akita Shi: A JCP anti-American poster was found tacked on a wall in Akita Shi on 12 March. Signed by the Akita Communist committee, it played up the local police assault case of the 9th and carried anti-US remarks. (Yomiuri Shimbun, Akita edition, 13 March)

Directives Found in Secret Member's Home: A notebook found on secret JCP member ISAJI Nobu, when arrested for violence on 2 March, revealed him to be a distributor of secret JCP publications. Mitaka police searched his home and found a room filled with Communist books. In addition police found over 50 secret publications, including guidance books entitled "How to Raise Flower Bulbs," "Electric Welding," and "Tactics of the Communist Chinese 8th Army," hidden in a rusty oil can under the front porch. Police are changing the charge to violation of Government Ordinance No 325. They believe the canvas bag Isaji holds, even during his sleep, contains important information. He refuses to answer police questions. (Yomiuri Shimbun, Santama edition, 3 March)

MISCELLANEOUS

FEAMCOM Worker Arrested for Red Activity: FEAMCOM sheet metal worker HIGASHIWARA Eiichi, who is also editor of the Communist organ KAIHO, carried on Communist activities although claiming to have dropped party membership last March. Police raided his home in Higashi Murayama Mura on 12 March and found a notebook giving a detailed description of his movements since 1949 to February this year. Authorities have learned that he provided the party with information on conditions in FEAMCOM Base, and that the Communists have made plans to infiltrate the base. (Yomiuri Shimbun, Santama edition, 13 March)

Excrement Bomb Case Suspect Confesses: On 9 March someone threw an excrement bomb into the home a Fukuoka Korean Residents Association leader. Two days later police arrested LEE Pai-paik, leader of the Democratic Front Patriotic League's nucleus self-defense corps. Lee confessed, saying the bombing was arranged at a DFPL conference. (Yukan Fukunichi, 12 March)

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE GROUP/FAR EAST

SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS

NO2107 DATE: 17 Mar 52

Today's Tokyo Newspapers

-NEWS-

In the predominantly speculative coverage today, only a few straight news stories made much of a showing. The best of these were tied to out-of-town statements by Socialist right-wing leaders Asanuma and Mizutani. The activities of the Preliminary Working Group also rated good play in several papers. Otherwise, nearly all the frontpage space went to foreign news and domestic speculation. YOMIURI featured an analysis of the Marquat statement and its impact on the Japanese economy.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Marquat statement on bleak prospects for dollar aid has left the Government "extremely dissatisfied." Officials feel that the statement does not reflect "highest Washington policy." They believe, presumably on assurances given by Ambassador DULLES, that the US Government will extend economic aid to Japan "in some form or other" after the peace treaty takes effect. Since the Japanese Government expects the State Department to be the arbiter of economic aid after the Occupation, it has taken offense at the release "of what is understood to be the result of conferences between General MARQUAT and the Defense Department." (a)

In the Upper House the opposition parties criticized Prime Minister YOSHIDA's efforts to discount the Marquat statement. They accused him Saturday of "trying to shift to GHQ the failure of the Government to bring in foreign capital." (b)

Prime Minister Yoshida and his aides have come up with a basic policy on post-treaty relations with Russia. They will let the Allied powers decide where the enforcement of the San Francisco treaty will leave Russia. If the treaty comes into effect with no Allied decision on this problem, the Government will deny diplomatic privileges to the Soviet Union and treat its nationals in Japan as ordinary third nationals. In event of negotiations with Russia—either direct or indirect—Japan will insist first on the repatriations of Japanese internees and the return of Shikotan and Habomai. The Government stand on repatriation was relayed to the Soviet Mission last week by Foreign Vice-minister IGUCHI. (c)

Both Japanese and US members of the Preliminary Working Group will tour Tohoku and Hokkaido for three days this week inspecting areas and facilities. The tour will begin tomorrow. (d) The PWG, studying the future disposition of the US garrison forces, will later conduct similar on-the-spot surveys in other parts of the country. (e)

NATIONAL DEFENSE

A Socialist right-wing leader warned yesterday against "too clamorous" opposition to rearmament. Policy Council Chairman MIZUTANI feared that such opposition after the peace treaty comes into force would be construed as a request for indefinite garrisoning of US troops. "When the time comes for us to defend ourselves," he said, "the rearmament issue should be decided by the working class." (e)

The special defense study committee of the Progressive Reform Party has recommended the immediate formation of a defense force. The committee plan—soon to be submitted to a PRP caucus—calls for an army of 150,000 men and an air force and navy with a combined strength of 200,000. It stipulates voluntary enlistment and sets the ceiling on military expenses at 3.5 percent of the national income. (f)

(a) Asahi Shimbun (AM)
(b) Asahi Shimbun (PM)
(c) Tokyo Shimbun
(d) Sangyo Keizai Shimbun
(e) Mainichi Shimbun (AM)
(f) Yomiuri Shimbun (AM)

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Tab "N"

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INTERNAL SECURITY

The Government is working on a program to immobilize the Japan Communist Party after the Occupation. To strengthen controls it intends to send a bill to the current Diet that would set up an internal security agency. It proposes to give officials of the agency the right of "compulsory investigation." The Attorney General's Office is reportedly redrafting the bill so that this right will be included. (a)

Cabinet ministers especially want to deprive the JCP of any benefits when the purge system is abolished. The coming purge abolition would not help TOKUDA Kyuichi, NOZAKA Sanzo, and other Communist leaders who refused to report to the Special Investigation Bureau in July 1950, for they are being hunted for violating the Organizations Control Ordinance. But the Communists who reported to the SIB--including international faction leaders like SHIGA Yoshio and MIYAMOTO Kenji--would be free to resume political activities. The Government apparently intends to do everything in its power to prevent this. (a)

NEWS BRIEFS

Asanuma Outlines Party Expansion Policy: Secretary General ASANUMA of the Socialist right wing set forth an expansion policy at a press conference in Matsuyama yesterday. He said his faction will seek new members not only among labor and farm unions but among small businessmen and progressive scholars. "We will also encourage anti-Communist left-wingers to rejoin," he added. "Through this unification we will form a large Socialist Party capable of competing with the Liberals." (b)

Local Assembly Seats Scheduled for Cut: The Local Autonomy Board has drawn up a reform plan that would reduce the number of seats in prefectural assemblies by 400. Under the proposed revision to the Local Autonomy Law, municipal assemblies will take an average cut of 10 percent--a move that will reduce the total number of seats by 20,000. (a)

(a) Asahi Shimbun (AM) (b) Yomiuri Shimbun (PM)

-EDITORIALS-

Administrative reform was the only topic that drew more than one comment today. Expenditures for compulsory education, revision of the Labor Standards Law, the proposed bill against prostitution, and the selection of ambassadors and ministers rated single comment.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Commenting on the Liberal Party's administrative reform plan, MAINICHI considered it "meaningless" to reorganize the administrative structure merely by combining or separating ministries. "For example, if the Transportation, Postal, Administration, and Telecommunication ministries were combined into one, they would be divided again. Since the chief aim of politics lies in helping the weak and the poor, we can say that a reform is bad if only the offices dealing with the underprivileged are abolished. We want prompt steps taken to abolish ministerial sections and bureaus instead of ministries themselves in accordance with their importance."

The journal continued: "We also demand that cliquism or sectionalism within government offices...be crushed promptly. Last but not least, there is an anachronistic tendency in some government office to dream of reviving the former regime, perhaps in anticipation of the end of the Occupation. What is the opinion of political parties concerning this attempted revival of bureaucracy among senior officials of the government offices? Do they condone the frequent corruption cases among officials? It is of course necessary to save expenses by means of administrative readjustment, but it is more important to pursue those public employees who make money by taking advantage of their posts."

JIJI SHIMPO conceded the difficulty of drafting a plan to reform the administrative structure. "Therefore, the draft may be full of defects. But since no reform plan can be expected to be flawless, it is unavoidable, and perhaps desirable, that the proposed plan face various counterarguments before the best possible plan is agreed upon by the Cabinet and the Liberal Party. The only thing desired is that the Cabinet and the party unite their entire efforts in drafting a definite plan as quickly as possible and to materialize it...The

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MAR 19 1952

SUBJECT: Press Statement

FROM: G-2 Admin

TO: 7

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Deputy	( )	Operations	( )
Secretariat 4 Ialls	( )	PDM	( )
Deputy for Adm	( )	Fn Mil Ln	( )
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Planning Group	( )	Special Intell	( )
Asst Ex	( )	Geog Branch	( )
Asst Sec Div	( )	Targets Branch	( )
Asst SIA	( )	Tech Intell Branch	( )
Sp Asst 441st CIC	( )	SSO	( )
Sp Asst Fiscal	( )	Japan Section	( )
Sp Asst Radio	( )	Security Division	( )
Sp Asst FEC/LG	( )	Admin	( )
Sp Asst Comd Rpt	( )	Operations	( )
Sp Asst Library	( )	Plans & Policies	( )
Admin Officer	( )	441st CIC	( )
Pers (Mil) (Civ)	( )	PSB	( )
Pers Sgt Major	( )	MISG/FE	( )
Japanese Liaison	( )	FEC Intell School	( )
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Info	( )	Approval	( )	Signature	( )	Draft Reply	( )
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

17 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Japanese Press Reaction to Alleged Statement by Gen MARQUAT

1. There have been unfavorable Japanese reactions to what appear to be misapprehensions of a policy statement, in the form of an interview with Gen MARQUAT, issued by the PIO in English at 1645, 11 Mar 52 (Tab A).

2. The "Asahi" in the morning editions of 13 Mar 52 (Tab B), editorially commented -- "Japan has to develop its power resources with its own funds now that hopes for foreign capital for such purposes have been shattered." Kyodo News Service (Tab C) said -- "The statement virtually has presented a new problem of what to do with the expansions of industrial facilities."

3. On 14 Mar 52, Kyodo quoted Prime Minister YOSHIDA as telling the Diet that Gen MARQUAT himself said he had nothing to do with the statement. An AP story (Tab D) written on this item quoted MARQUAT's office as saying he did not know of anything he said to Prime Minister YOSHIDA that alters or changes his remarks in the press release. UP (Tab E) made a bulletin out of this, leading with "Gen MARQUAT reaffirmed today that US financial circles do not plan to underwrite sovereign Japan's economic rehabilitation in the form of dollar loans for yen investments." There were many Japanese editorials (Tab F) pro and con on 13 and 14 Mar 52, with Economic Stabilization Board Director SUDO quoting Gen MARQUAT on various phases of the original statement.

4. In the Upper House Budget Committee 14 Mar 52, YOSHIDA is again quoted as discounting the MARQUAT statement, saying, according to "Tokyo Shimbun," that Gen MARQUAT knew nothing of the statement. Later in the day, "Asahi" (Tab G) quoted a Cabinet spokesman as saying that YOSHIDA did not mean that MARQUAT disowned all of the press release, but only that part saying that there can be no political loans.

5. This led to a general and to-be-expected attack on the YOSHIDA's Government policies, particularly its dependence on expected loans from the US.

6. On the 17th, "Asahi" (Tab H) stated that the Government was "extremely dissatisfied" with the statement. It claims that the Government expected, presumably because of remarks by Ambassador DULLES, that the US will extend economic aid to Japan after the peace. In the Upper House, the Opposition criticized YOSHIDA's efforts to discount the MARQUAT press release. They accused him of "trying to shift to GHQ the failure of the Government to bring in foreign capital," according to the "Asahi," (Tab H).

7. The net result of this interchange has been the weakening of Prime Minister YOSHIDA's political prestige at a time when he is under severe attack for a variety of other reasons.

8. It is recommended that a clarification of the controversial portions of this 11 Mar 52 press release be issued by this headquarters.

G
R. F. E.

8 Incls:
a/s

G2 File

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2380

Press Coverage of POW Exchange

From: G2 To: G1 26 February 1952
Col Maykovich - 26-8838

1/4 Concur.

1 Incl: n/c

RSB

---R. F. E.---

filed By

SC LEB 1025

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Security Information
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DISPATCHED
26 FEB 1952
0-2 FEC

E° K° E°

FROM: CS TO: CI

SC Department [illegible] - SC-8838

SUBJECT: [illegible]

Press Coverage of VOM Exchange

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Authority 81951
By NARA Date 3/10/12

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Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM
(For use within G-2 only)

Col M[illegible]
Col M[illegible]
Col C[illegible]
Capt [illegible]

2.0086

File No:

Subject: Japanese Actions and Reactions as Expressed in Informational Media of all Types

Date: 20 Feb 52

From: G-2 To: Chief Soty Div Phone: Name: Comment Number

1. As it is obvious that Communist and other leftist propaganda agencies will capitalize on any unfavorable news stories which involve occupation or security forces, a prompt evaluation of the implications and possible usage by subversive elements of such incidents together with submission of a recommended course of action to CINCFE is a G-2 responsibility. This responsibility can best be discharged through watchfulness and prompt action on the part of the Security Division with the complete support of all other G-2 agencies.

2. Effective this date, therefore, the Chief, Security Division, is charged with the overall responsibility for such evaluations and recommendations on incidents which, in his judgment, tend to affect seriously:

a. The security of the Occupation or the Security Forces;
b. The prestige of the Occupation or the Security Forces, and;
c. The amicable relationship between the Japanese people and the American Forces.

In addition, the trend of thought of, and opinions expressed by, the Japanese in the Diet, press, radio, etc., vis-a-vis a, b, or c are an integral part of the overall evaluation.

3. The assistance of all G-2 agencies and divisions may be requested by Security Division with special emphasis on the translation and press summary activities of MISG/FE, the clipping and analysis of news media and analysis and evaluation of Diet and Governmental opinion by Japanese Liaison, and all existing liaison established by other G-2 agencies with the Attorney General's Office, Japanese Police, etc. Top priority will be given by all agencies and divisions of G-2 concerned to requests of Security Division, in order that this mission may be accomplished expeditiously on all such occasions.

for R. F. E.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Col Rasmussen
26-6025

Press Release

G2 PIO 17 Feb 52
THRU: Medical Section

1 1. Reference is made to a UP release dated 14 Feb on the subject of a "wave of hemorragic fever" on the Western Front in Korea. See Tab 1.

2. As a matter of principle, G2 regards this type of reporting as giving aid and comfort to the enemy whether or not the report is true. Irrespective of the technical details in this particular case, it is apparent that such reports could provide the enemy with immediate confirmation of his success in the event he ever decides to use or experiment with Biological Warfare. While there is no known indication of BW use at present, there is likely to be no advance warning if and when it becomes a reality.

3. It is recommended that any reports whatever regarding the health of UN troops be released by PIO only after clearance by the appropriate medical echelon. In any case of questionable cases possibly involving BW, request immediate notification of G2.

1 Incl:
Press release

R. F. E.

Memo for Record:
Self-explanatory.
KER 26-6025

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G-2 File KER/pc

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DISPATCHED 18 FEB 1952

C-S File KEB

Memo for Record:

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

ID/HVW/KER/cbs

File No: **Subject:** INS Dispatch 6 Jan 52 **Date:** 7 January 1952

FROM: Int Div **TO:** Col Bratton **PHONE:** 26-6025 **NAME:** Capt Kennahan

Comment Number 1

1. The Handleman article, which was reported to G2 as being written in a briefer form 5 Sep 51, is a timely news story with wide reader interest; particularly in view of the recent Stalin message to Japan. The same subject has been a lively newspaper topic for the past year or more, with variations of a "Japanese Army of Liberation" and an invasion of Japan published in the worldwide press. Time Magazine dated 19 Nov 51, carried a lengthy article on the same subject, in which a Major General Ryuji Sejima was mentioned as commander of an infantry division composed of former Japanese PW's. This unit reportedly was stationed in the Kurile Islands.

2. Scores of reports have indicated the presence of organized Japanese troop units in the Far East. To date these reports lack verification, but this does not preclude their possible validity as a limited potential does exist. Handleman's references to Soviet strength, military districts, and commanders in the Far East is reasonably correct. However, it is noted that the officers named often have been reported in the press, and that Soviet troop dispositions and military district breakdowns have been reasonably accurately reported in the press in the past.

3. In conclusion, it is believed that this article is a rewrite of previous information, released at this time because of current reader interest. Handleman's "sources" of information are unknown. However, it is believed that he has a "connection" with the Kyodo News Agency, which undoubtedly has access to much information of this type currently being reported in Japan by Japanese Intelligence experts.

4. This whole matter seems to be a prime example of dabbling in the intelligence field by newsmen under the guise of news collection. It will undoubtedly continue in view of Handleman's snide remark to the effect that G2 refused to comment. Possibly our Japanese sources should be checked for multiple outlets to newspaper men and Intelligence agencies.

5. The known military record of ex-Lt Col Sejima, Ryuzo is attached.

1 Incl:
Military Record
of ex-Lt Sejima

- H.V.W. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

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5 January 1952

TO : Colonel D.S. Tait

SUBJECT: Military Record of ex-Lt. Col. SEJIMA, Ryuzo

SEJIMA, Ryuzo ( )

Date of Birth: 9 December 1911 40 years of age

Permanent Domicile: #707, Washijima, Matsuzawa-mura, Nishi-Tonami-gun, Toyama-ken.

Military Record:

Jul. 1932:	Graduated from the Military Academy. (Class 44th)
Oct. 1932:	Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant (Infantry). Assigned to the 35th Infantry Regiment.
Oct. 1934:	Promoted to 1st Lieutenant.
Jan. 1935:	Entered the Army Infantry School.
Dec. 1935:	Assigned to the 9th Division Signal Unit.
Aug. 1936:	Assigned to the Cadet Unit of the Military Academy.
Dec. 1936:	Entered the War College. Assigned to the 35th Infantry Regiment.
Nov. 1937:	Promoted to Captain.
Nov. 1938:	Graduated from the War College.
Jan. 1939:	Appointed Staff Officer of the 4th Division.
May 1939:	Appointed Staff Officer of the 5th Army.
Nov. 1939:	Appointed Staff officer in the Army General Staff Headquarters, concurrently appointed Staff Officer in the Imperial General Headquarters. (Served in G-2 Section)
Oct. 1941:	Promoted to Major.
Mar. 1945:	Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.
Jul. 1945:	Appointed Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army GHQ.

- - - - -Cessation of hostilities- - - -

He had not yet been repatriated

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

DATE: 5 January 1952

FROM: Gen Ennis

TO : C of S

SUBJECT: Japanese Reaction to Premier Stalin's New Year Message

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER: 000.1

LINE NUMBER: 2

FILE NUMBER 000.7

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By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

S E C R E T

Security Information

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

DATE: 11 January 1952

FROM: PIO

TO : G3

SUBJECT: 40th Infantry Division

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER: 370

LINE NUMBER: 2

FILE NUMBER 000.7

-S-E-C-R-E-T-

Security Information

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Authority 813541
By [illegible] NARA Date 2/6/12

SECRET

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

DATE: 3 Jan 52

FROM: G2

TO : Asst CofS, G2, XVI Corps APO 14

SUBJECT: Security of Classifed Information with Relation to the Press-Movement of 40th Division

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER: 380.61

LINE NUMBER: 1

FILE NUMBER 000.7

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