BASIC: Ltr. Dept. of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S 014 Japan, (26 Jan 48)
CSCAD: subject: "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts",
dated 2 February 48.

Purge Statistics and Estimates - Contd.

Par. 10.	Political parties with members in Diet and branches and organizations affected by Imperial Ord. 101 of 1946.	200
11.	Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations.	
12.	Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations not listed in Par. 11.	450
		9,670

e. Estimate of numbers of persons in each category of undesirable persons who have been or will be excluded under provisional purge prescribed by Cabinet Ordinance No. 119, July 1, 1947:

Category A	0
B	129,315
C	3,356
D	822
E	0
F	44
G	83,480
	217,017

f. Total numbers of persons removed and excluded from public office to date:

	REMOVED	BARRED
1946 (Screened)	845	216
1947 (Screened)	5,471	1,328
(Purged thru provisional designation)		152,491
	6,316	154,035

23 April 1948

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

23 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: Results of Purge Directive of 4 January 1946 (SCAPIN 550)

I. POLITICAL PURGE

A. War criminals, members of military and naval high command, commissioned officers of the gendarmerie (Kempei) and all officers of the army and navy who have been active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression:

1.	War criminals	70	
2.	Career Army Officers	50,850	
3.	Career Navy Officers	21,764	
4.	Gendarmerie (Kempei)	39,555	
5.	Chiefs of ex-service men's associations, local branches	38,979	
6.	Officers of Tokumu Kikan and Tokumu Bu and other secret military and naval police agencies	891	
7.	Chokunin-rank officials in War and Navy Ministries	145	152,254

B. Persons who have been influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, the Political Society of Great Japan, and of ultranationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic societies, their affiliates and agencies:

1.	Imperial Rule Assistance Association	18,277	
2.	Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association	16,071	
3.	Council for Establishing Imperial Rule Assistance Political Societies	572	
4.	Political Society of Great Japan and affiliates and agencies of the above	138	
5.	Influential members of ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies	4,530	39,588

C. Other active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression in the political field:

1.	State Ministers other than war criminals		49
2.	Governors of occupied areas		56
3.	Policy-making officials in organizations whose paramount purpose was the financing of war production or the mobilization and exploitation of financial resources in colonial or Japanese-occupied territories		475
4.	Important special higher police, thought-control police and procurators and Tojo-recommended candidates in the 1942 Diet election and individual militarists	3,468	4,048
	Total undesirable personnel removed and excluded from government service (of whom 5,248 were removed from public office and 190,642 were excluded)		195,890

II. ECONOMIC PURGE (Pursuant to JCS 1380/15, Paragraphs 23 and 40)

A. Persons who held key positions of high responsibility and influence in commerce, industry, finance, and agriculture.

1.	Removed from such key positions	256	
2.	Resigned from such key positions in anticipation of removal	949	
3.	Barred from such key positions	268	1,473

III. PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA PURGE

A. Persons who held key positions of high responsibility and influence in newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, theatrical and other public information media (of whom 136 were removed from public information media and 523 were excluded)

659

TOTAL PERSONNEL REMOVED AND EXCLUDED FROM PUBLIC SERVICE UNDER SCAPIN 550: 198,022

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

24 April

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

FROM: SPECIAL PROJECTS DIVISION, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: Procedure for Appeal from the Purge

1. The Japanese Ordinance prescribing an "Appeals Procedure" and the Ordinance establishing "Regulations on Organization of Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board" were promulgated by the Japanese Government on 1 March 1947 as Imperial Ordinances No. 65 and No. 66 of 1947, respectively.

2. Under the Ordinances any person designated as a purgee might file an appeal for rescission of such designation within three months from the date of the designation or from the date of the Ordinances, whichever is later.

3. The Appeal Board has complete discretion to consider all facts and circumstances relevant to the determination of each individual case even though a particular individual may come within the purview of mandatory provisions of the purge directive and its implementing ordinances.

4. On 27 March 1948, with the purge program virtually completed, an ordinance was promulgated which established 15 April 1948 as the final date for the acceptance of appeals and 10 May 1948 as the date of dissolution of the Appeal Board. However, to avoid any gross injustice, appeals may still be submitted to the Prime Minister.

5. In addition to the above appeal procedure, all persons designated as purgees on the basis of documentary evidence (not as a result of having been screened by questionnaire for a specific position in the public service) as well as those purged under the public information media phase, were allowed a thirty-day period during which they could submit counter-evidence on the basis of which their cases were given individual consideration by the Qualifications Examination Committees. Rejection of such counter-evidence does not constitute a bar to a further appeal to the Appeal Board.

6. Attached is a copy of the ordinance pertaining to Appeals Procedure.

Roger W. Snow, Jr.
Roger W. Snow, Jr.
Maj FA
Deputy Chief, Special Projects Division

2 Incls
1 - Imp. Ord. #65 of 1947
2 - Appeal Statistics

BASIC: Ltr. GHQ, SCAP, AG 091.112, (16 June 48) GS, subject: "Purge Statistics, Final Report", dated 16 June 48.

PURGE STATISTICS
(As of 1 June 1948)

SERIES I

a. Number of Persons removed and excluded (barred) from principal categories of public office listed in Imperial Ord. of 27 February 1946:

	REMOVED	BARRED
(1) Government officials and candidates for position in Government.	661	264
(2) Officials of corporations, associations and other organizations under special control of the Government.	139	0
	800	264

b. Numbers of persons removed and excluded from public office under each of the 12 categories of public office listed in Appendix II of Imperial Ord. No. 1 of 1947:

		REMOVED	BARRED
Par. 1.	National Government entity.	2,224	215
2.	National Diet	31	2 11
3.	Commissioners or committees (of prefectural level or above), etc.	967	4
4.	To, Do, Fu or Ken (metropolis, territory or prefecture)		
5.	City, town or village or town and village association.	9[illegible]	2,147
6.	Special companies, banks, etc. in which the Government is the largest stockholder.	94	5
7.	Companies and organizations to be designated under Temporary Supply and Adjustment Law	41	0
8.	Organizations established under special legislation, subsidized organizations, other organizations serving for the public benefit.	55	5

BASIC: Ltr. GHQ, SCAP, AG 091.112, (16 June 48) GS, subject: "Purge Statistics, Final Report", dated 16 June 48.

Purge Statistics - Contd.		REMOVED	BARRED
Par. 9.	Information media organizations.	143	66
10.	Political parties and members in Diet and branches and organizations affected by Imperial Ord. 101 of 1946.	9	15
11.	Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations.	233	172
12.	Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations not listed in Par. 11.	21	0
		4,736	2,335

c. Numbers of persons removed and excluded from public office under each of the 7 categories and principal sub-categories listed in Appendix I of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance of Feb. 27, 1946 and Appendix I of Imperial Ord. No. 1 of 1947:		REMOVED	BARRED
(1) Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance of 27 Feb. 1946. (Including Cabinet Announcements of 10 Mar. 46 and 16 April 46).			
Category A		24	13
B		272	18
	Career army officers - 165		
	Career navy officers - 116		
	Chokunin rank officials in War or Navy Ministries. - 9		
C		3	1
D		101	31
E		60	2
F		11	0
G		283	190
	Economic - 41		
	Public Information Media. - 15		
	Special Higher Police, etc. - 417		
Compound		46	9
		800	264

BASIC: Ltr. GHQ, SCAP, AG 091.112, (16 June 48) GS, subject: "Purge Statistics, Final Report", dated 16 June 48.

Purge Statistics contd.

		REMOVED	BARRED
(2)	Appendix I, Imperial Ord. No. 1 of 1947 (including Amendments).		
	Category A	15	0
	B	2,782	464
	Approx: Career army officers - 2,056		
	Career navy officers, (includes Demobilization Bureaus, etc.) - 1,190		
	C	83	89
	D	559	1,085
	E	10	39
	F	1	2
	G	1,286	1,156
		4,736	2,835

d. Estimates of numbers of persons who have resigned from each category of public office to avoid possible removal:

Par. 1.	National Government entity.	1,300
2.	National Diet	470
3.	Commissioners or committees (of prefectural level or above) etc.	0
4.	To, Do, Fu or Ken (metropolis, territory or prefecture)	)
5.	City, town or village or "Town and Village Association".	) 5,000
6.	Special companies, banks, etc. in which the Government is the largest stockholder.	0
7.	Companies and organizations to be designated under Temporary Supply and Adjustment Law.	0
8.	Organizations established under special legislation, subsidized organizations, other organizations serving for the public benefit.	2,000
9.	Information media organizations.	250

BASIC: Ltr. GHQ, SCAP, AG 091.112, (16 June 48) GS, subject: "Purge Statistics, Final Report", dated 16 June 48.

Purge Statistics contd.

Par. 10.	Political parties with members in Diet and branches and organizations affected by Imperial Ord. 101 of 1946.	200
11.	Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations.	) :
12.	Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations not listed in Par. 11.	) 450
		9,670

e. Numbers of persons in each category of undesirable persons who have been excluded under provisional purge prescribed by Cabinet Ordinance No. 119, July 1, 1947:

Category A	0
B	113,337
C	3,066
D	33,573
E	391
F	43
G	42,770
	193,180

f. Total numbers of persons removed and excluded from public office to date:

	REMOVED	BARRED	TOTALS
1946 (Screened)	800	264	1,064
1947 (Screened)	4,736	2,835	7,571
(Purged thru provisional designation)		193,180	193,180
	5,536	196,279	201,815

CABINET ORDER 62 March 27, 1948

Cabinet Order Concerning Abolition of Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee and Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board.

10 May 48

Article 1. The Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee and the Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board shall be abolished after 10 May 1948, the designation of persons who fall under the provisions of the Memorandum in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (Imperial Ordinance Concerning Removal and Exclusion from Public Service of Undesirable Personnel) having been completed except for inadvertencies.

After the abolition of the two committees as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the affairs as related to the Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board shall be handled by the Prime Minister and the affairs as related to the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee shall be handled by the Prime Minister or Prefectural Governor in the Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, Article IV, paragraph 1.

Article II. The letter of appeal under the Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 (Imperial Ordinance Concerning Petition for Cancellation of Designation) shall be filed by 15 April 1948 and no letter of appeal arriving at the Prime Minister's Office thereafter shall be accepted.

Supplementary Provisions.

Article III. This Cabinet Order shall come into effect as from 15 April 1948.

Article IV. The Imperial Ordinance concerning Organization of Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee and the Imperial Ordinance concerning Organization of Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board shall be abolished after 10 May 1948.

Article V. The Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 concerning the petition for cancellation of the Designation shall be abolished after 10 May 1948 provided that the penal provisions shall be applied as heretofore to the offence committed prior to its abolition.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

31 May 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SERVICE

SUBJECT: Results of Purge Directive of 4 January 1946 (SCAPIN 550)

I. POLITICAL PURGE

A. War criminals, members of military and naval high command, commissioned officers of the gendarmerie (Kempei) and all officers of the Army and Navy who have been active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression:

1.	War criminals	75	
2.	Career Army Officers	50,186	
3.	Career Navy Officers	24,879	
4.	Gendarmerie (Kempei)	39,223	
5.	Chiefs of Ex-Servicemen's Associations, local branches	39,732	
6.	Officers of Tokumu Kikan and Tokumu Bu and other secret military and naval police agencies	902	
7.	Chokunin rank officials in War and Navy Ministries	151	155,148

B. Persons who have been influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, the Political Society of Great Japan, and of ultranationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic societies, their affiliates and agencies:

1.	Imperial Rule Assistance Association	18,410	
2.	Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association	16,163	
3.	Council for Establishing Imperial Rule Assistance Political Societies	563	
4.	Political Society of Great Japan and affiliates and agencies of the above	140	
5.	Influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies	4,286	39,562

C. Other active exponents of militaristic-nationalism and aggression in the political field:

1. State Ministers other than war criminals		
2. Governors of occupied areas	49	
3. Policy-making officials in organizations whose paramount purpose was the financing of war production or the mobilization and exploitation of financial resources in colonial or Japanese-occupied territories	56	
4. Important special higher police, thought-control police and procurators and Tojo recommended candidates in the 1942 Diet election and individual militarists	431	
	3,978	4,514
Total undesirable personnel removed and excluded from government service (of whom 4,982 were removed from public office and 194,242 were excluded)		199,224

II. ECONOMIC PURGE (Pursuant to JCS 1380/15, Paragraphs 23 and 40)

A. Persons who held key positions of high responsibility and influence in commerce, industry, finance, and agriculture.

1. Removed from such key positions	259	
2. Resigned from such key positions in anticipation of removal	909	
3. Barred from such key positions	367	
		1,535

III. PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA PURGE

A. Persons who held key positions of high responsibility and influence in newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, theatrical and other public information media (of whom 153 were removed from public information media and 902 were excluded) 1,056

TOTAL PERSONNEL REMOVED AND EXCLUDED FROM PUBLIC SERVICE UNDER SCAPIN 550: 201,815

Jack F Napier

JACK F NAPIER
Maj AGD
PUBLIC SERVICE QUALIFICATIONS DIVISION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

24 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

FROM: SPECIAL PROJECTS DIVISION, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: Procedure for Appeal from the Purge

1. The Japanese Ordinance prescribing an "Appeals Procedure" and the Ordinance establishing "Regulations on Organization of Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board" were promulgated by the Japanese Government on 1 March 1947 as Imperial Ordinances No. 65 and No. 66 of 1947, respectively.

2. Under the Ordinances any person designated as a purgee might file an appeal for rescission of such designation within three months from the date of the designation or from the date of the Ordinances, whichever is later.

3. The Appeal Board has complete discretion to consider all facts and circumstances relevant to the determination of each individual case even though a particular individual may come within the purview of mandatory provisions of the purge directive and its implementing ordinances.

4. On 27 March 1948, with the purge program virtually completed, an ordinance was promulgated which established 15 April 1948 as the final date for the acceptance of appeals and 10 May 1948 as the date of dissolution of the Appeal Board. However, to avoid any gross injustice, appeals may still be submitted to the Prime Minister.

5. In addition to the above appeal procedure, all persons designated as purgees on the basis of documentary evidence (not as a result of having been screened by questionnaire for a specific position in the public service) as well as those purged under the public information media phase, were allowed a thirty-day period during which they could submit counter-evidence on the basis of which their cases were given individual consideration by the Qualifications Examination Committees. Rejection of such counter-evidence does not constitute a bar to a further appeal to the Appeal Board.

6. Attached is a copy of the ordinance pertaining to Appeals Procedure.

2 Incls
1 - Imp. Ord. #65 of 1947
2 - Appeal Statistics

Roger W. Snow, Jr.
Roger W. Snow, Jr.
Maj FA
Deputy Chief, Special Projects Division

IMPERIAL ORDINANCE NO. 65 of 1947

Appeals Procedure

1 March 1947

Article I. Any person who has been designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 109 of 1946 or of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, may, in the event he feels that an error has been made in his case and that he can submit proof thereof, file an appeal for a rescission of designation to the Prime Minister.(1)

The Prime Minister, upon acceptance of the appeal prescribed in the preceding paragraph, may, on the basis of the findings and recommendations of the Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board, rescind the designation.

Article II. Any person who intends to appeal in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 1 of the preceding Article shall submit a letter of appeal to the Prime Minister, stating clearly reasons for justification of his case and together with relevant documents for evidence.

In case the appellant has been designated as falling under the Memorandum by the Prefectural Governor, the letter of appeal prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be submitted through the Prefectural Governor. In this case, upon acceptance of documents pertaining to the appeal, the Prefectural Governor concerned shall forward them immediately, together with statement of his opinion and the questionnaire of the appellant, to the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister, upon acceptance of documents pertaining to the appeal, shall forward them immediately together with a statement of his opinion concerning the case prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the statement of the Prefectural Governor) and the questionnaire of the appellant, to the Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board.

(1) Deletion of requirement that person be "removed or barred from appointment or election to a position in the public service" as a consequence of his designation before he shall file an appeal — by Cabinet Order #136, 15 July 1947.

Article III. The appeal prescribed in Article I, paragraph 1 above shall be filed within three months from the day of designation as falling under the Memorandum.

Validity of designation as falling under the Memorandum shall not be affected by filing of the appeal prescribed in Article I, paragraph 1 above.

Article IV. The rescission of designation as falling under the Memorandum shall be effected by notification of the Prime Minister to the appellant.

In case the designation be rescinded, the designation shall lose its validity from the day of its rescission. In this case, the provisions of Article V, paragraph 1 of the Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (including corresponding provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 109 of 1946 replaced by the former Imperial Ordinance) shall be deemed as not having been applied.

Article V. The Prime Minister, when he effects the rescission or takes other necessary actions on the basis of consequence of examination by the Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board, shall publish them immediately.

Article VI. Any person who has submitted the statement of reasons or documents prescribed in Article II above containing false entry or entry lacking full and complete disclosure shall be liable to the penal servitude of not more than three years or to a fine of not more than ¥ 15,000. Any person who has been requested to present materials or an explanation of facts who fails to do so or who submits materials containing false information or lacking full and complete disclosure of facts on relevant or material matters shall be likewise liable to the same punishment.

Supplementary Rule

The Present Imperial Ordinance shall come into force on the day of its promulgation.

The period prescribed in the Article II, paragraph 1 above shall with persons who have been designated as falling under the Memorandum prior to the issuance of this Imperial Ordinance, be three months from the date of its promulgation.

PURGE APPEALS BOARD STATISTICS

22 April 1948

Total number of appeals recommended approved by Appeals Board 66

Total number of appeals recommended disapproved by Appeals Board 335

Total number of appeals not yet submitted to GHQ 1,000

23 April 1948

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

23 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: Results of Purge Directive of 4 January 1946 (SCAPIN 550)

I. POLITICAL PURGE

A. War criminals, members of military and naval high command, commissioned officers of the gendarmerie (Kempei) and all officers of the army and navy who have been active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression:

1.	War criminals	70	
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3.	Career Navy Officers	21,764	
4.	Gendarmerie (Kempei)	39,555	
5.	Chiefs of ex-service men's associations, local branches	38,979	
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3.	Council for Establishing Imperial Rule Assistance Political Societies	572	
4.	Political Society of Great Japan and affiliates and agencies of the above	138	
5.	Influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies	4,530	39,588

C. Other active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression in the political field:

1.	State Ministers other than war criminals	49	
2.	Governors of occupied areas	56	
3.	Policy-making officials in organizations whose paramount purpose was the financing of war production or the mobilization and exploitation of financial resources in colonial or Japanese-occupied territories	475	
4.	Important special higher police, thought-control police and procurators and Tojo-recommended candidates in the 1942 Diet election and individual militarists	3,468	4,048
	Total undesirable personnel removed and excluded from government service (of whom 5,248 were removed from public office and 190,642 were excluded)		195,890

II. ECONOMIC PURGE (Pursuant to JCS 1380/15, Paragraphs 23 and 40)

A. Persons who held key positions of high responsibility and influence in commerce, industry, finance, and agriculture.

1.	Removed from such key positions	256	
2.	Resigned from such key positions in anticipation of removal	949	
3.	Barred from such key positions	268	1,473

III. PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA PURGE

A. Persons who held key positions of high responsibility and influence in newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, theatrical and other public information media (of whom 136 were removed from public information media and 523 were excluded)

659

TOTAL PERSONNEL REMOVED AND EXCLUDED FROM PUBLIC SERVICE UNDER SCAPIN 550: 198,022

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

APO 500
27 February 1948

AG 091 (27 Feb 48)GS

SUBJECT: Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts

TO: The Adjutant General, Dept. of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.
(Attn: Civil Affairs Division)

1. Reference: Ltr. Dept of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S 014 Japan, (26 Jan 48) CSCAD: subject, "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts," dated 2 Feb 1948.

2. Inclosed herewith are available purge statistics and forecasts as requested in Series I.

3. Since the information requested in Series II has never been required, purge statistics have never been compiled in accordance with subdivisions comparable to A,B,C and D of that Series. Generally, however, it may be said that every person found subject to the purge directive by virtue of the position held actively supported the policies leading to war and aggression and none were able to present satisfactory proof to the contrary, although all had full opportunity to do so.

4. Throughout the administration of the purge operation, it has been the concept here that the persons to be removed and excluded from important positions in government and business should be the policy-makers rather than the technicians. Accordingly, the detailed criteria included in the Japanese Government's implementing ordinances and the actual operation of the purge were such that none other than persons who had made or influenced policy in government or in business in the direction of war would be affected thereby. To this end, if any individual occupying a position classified under the criteria as policy-making was able to show that he was not in fact a policy-maker or that he opposed the policies leading to war and aggression, he was exempt from the provisions of the purge. Full opportunity to secure such exemption was afforded both in the initial screening and the appeal. In addition, with due regard to the critical economic condition of Japan, temporary exemptions or extensions were granted to individuals where a showing was made that the continued services of such individuals were essential to the efficient operation of enterprises important to national economic recovery.

5. At various stages of this operation the fear has been expressed in certain quarters that the removal of important individuals from the

economy would adversely affect the operating efficiency of business concerns, retard economic recovery, and increase the burden on the taxpayers of the United States. Statistics of production and trade during the last six months have failed to bear out this fear. In fact, evidence has come to the attention of this Headquarters that the removal of old leaders has, by permitting younger and more vigorous executives to assume more important positions, created a healthier and sounder base for the future Japanese economy.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Incl:
Purge Statistics and
Estimates, in quadruplicate.

A. J. REHE
Major AGD
Asst. Adj. Gen.

BASIC: Ltr. Dept. of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S 014 Japan, (26 Jan 48) OSCAD; subject, "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts", dated 2 February 48.

PURGE STATISTICS AND ESTIMATES
(As of 14 February 1948)

SERIES I

a. Numbers of Persons removed and excluded (barred) from principal categories of public office listed in Imperial Ord. of 27 February 1946:	REMOVED	BARRED
(1) Government officials and candidates for position in Government.	706	216
(2) Officials of corporations, associations and other organizations under special control of the government.	139	0
	845	216

b. Numbers of persons removed and excluded from public office under each of the 12 categories of public office listed in Appendix II of Imperial Ord. No. 1 of 1947:	REMOVED	BARRED
Par. 1. National Government entity.	2,550	0
2. National Diet	20	204
3. Commissioners or committees (of prefectural level or above) etc.	339	1
4. To, Do, Fu or Ken (metropolis, territory or prefecture) :		
5. City, town or village or "Town and Village Association.	779	997
6. Special companies, banks, etc. in which the Government is the largest stockholder.	33	0
7. Companies and organizations to be designated under Temporary Supply and Adjustment Law	5	0
8. Organizations established under special legislation, subsidized organizations, other organizations serving for the public benefit.	1,320	118

BASIC: Ltr. Dept. of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S 014 Japan, (26 Jan 48)
CSCAD: subject: "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts", dated 2 February 48.

Purge Statistics and Estimates - Contd.

		REMOVED	BARRED
Par. 9.	Information media organizations.	151	2
10.	Political parties and members in Diet and branches and organizations affected by Imperial Ord. 101 of 1946.	12	1
11.	Influential companies, finahcial institutions, and other economic organizations.	246	4
12.	Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations not listed in Par. 11.	16	1
		5,471	1,328

c. Numbers of persons removed and excluded from public office under each of the 7 categories and principal sub-categories listed in Appendix I of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance of Feb. 27, 1946 and Appendix I of Imperial Ord. No. 1 of 1947:

		REMOVED	BARRED
(1)	Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance of 27 Feb. 1946. (Including Cabinet Announcements of 10 Mar. 46 and 16 April 46).		
Category A		29	7
B		231	58
	Career army officers - 165		
	Career navy officers - 116		
	Chokunin rank officials in War or Navy Ministries. - 8		
C		4	9
D		106	26
E		49	12
F		9	2
G		273	100
	Economic - 41		
	Public Information Media. - 15		
	Special Higher Police, etc. - 331		
Compound		44	11
		845	216

BASIC: Ltr. Dept of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S 014 Japan, (26 Jan 48) CSCAD; subject: "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts", dated 2 February 48.

Purge Statistics and Estimates - Contd.

		REMOVED	BARRED
(2)	Appendix I, Imperial Ord. No. 1 of 1947 (including Amendments).		
Category	A	8	2
	B	2,652	663
	Approx: Career army officers. - 1,835		
	Career navy officers, (includes Demobilization Bureaus, etc.). - 980		
	C	131	32
	D	1,026	257
	E	38	9
	F	2	0
	G	1,511	340
Compound		103	25
		5,471	1,328

d. Estimates of numbers of persons who have resigned from each category of public office to avoid possible removal:

Par. 1.	National Government entity.	1,300
2.	National Diet	470
3.	Commissioners or committees (of prefectural level or above) etc.	0
4.	To, Do, Fu or Ken (metropolis, territory or prefecture)	)
5.	City, town or village or "Town and Village Association".	) 5,000
6.	Special companies, banks, etc. in which the Government is the largest stockholder.	0
7.	Companies and organizations to be designated under Temporary Supply and Adjustment Law.	0
8.	Organizations established under special legislation, subsidized organizations, other organizations serving for the public benefit.	2,000
9.	Information media organizations.	250

BASIC: Ltr. Dept. of Army, Wash., D.C. AGAO-S 014 Japan, (26 Jan 48)
CSCAD: subject: "Purge Statistics, Including Forecasts",
dated 2 February 48.

Purge Statistics and Estimates - Contd.

Par. 10.	Political parties with members in Diet and branches and organizations affected by Imperial Ord. 101 of 1946.	200
11.	Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations.	)
12.	Influential companies, financial institutions, and other economic organizations not listed in Par. 11.	) 450
		9,670

e. Estimate of numbers of persons in each category of undesirable persons who have been or will be excluded under provisional purge prescribed by Cabinet Ordinance No. 119, July 1, 1947:

Category A	0
B	129,315
C	3,356
D	822
E	0
F	44
G	83,480
	217,017

f. Total numbers of persons removed and excluded from public office to date:

	REMOVED	BARRED
1946 (Screened)	845	216
1947 (Screened)	5,471	1,328
(Purged thru provisional designation)		152,491
	6,316	154,035

APPENDIX II

THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression.

This directive, issued as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

BASIS FOR THE PURGE

Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society". . . . . who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation."

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultra-nationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicious evidence that these individuals had played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kinjuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed.

This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie, former intelligence agents, etc., had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter groups were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organizations. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved

in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Facist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or anti-militaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc., of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials

were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of the federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were placed within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened, and the following report was made by the Japanese Government:

Candidates	Filed	Passed	*Provisionally Passed	Barred
House of Representatives	3,426	3,230	59	137
House of Councillors	1,406	1,365	10	31
Prefectural Governors	451	428	3	20
Mayors of 5 Principal Cities	43	42	-	1

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet. Of cases held pending for further investigation and determination of exact interpretation of the Purge Ordinances, one governor and six additional members of the House of Councillors were barred.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies and associations had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public service. There remained at that time the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

This remaining task was largely completed by early October 1947, by which time a total of 3,488 such persons had been screened in almost 300 companies and associations, and the total number of persons removed and/or excluded increased to 360.

Public Information Media Purge.

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and anti-militarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of those provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15

motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified officeholders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

Early in October the Japanese Government reported that 134 information media companies had submitted counter-evidence, on which 95 have been acted, resulting in the request to SCAP for approval to remove 12 companies from the black list.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engaged in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees."

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been secured, listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. By early September 1947 lists had been compiled of the Governors of Occupied Territories (Category F) and of officials who held certain policy making positions in the Japanese Government between 1937 and 1941 (Category G); and by the end of that month the collection of documentary evidence listing the persons falling under the other various categories and provisions of the Purge Ordinances was rapidly approaching completion.

By early October approximately 1,405 persons, on whom documentary evidence was obtained, had been provisionally designated; this will result in the final designation of over 1,000 persons whose period for submitting protest has expired. Of those provisionally designated 130 individuals submitted letters of protest.

APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly

enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by October 1947 a total of 239 were listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 41 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 16 recommended for reinstatement, while 182 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but in August 1947 a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP. In 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 4 October 1947 the Japanese Government screened 611,411 cases. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 25,600 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in government, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct or approve reinstatement of 21 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of early October 1947 reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947). 1,067

2. Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - Oct. 1947) 1,941

3. Career officers, gendarmes, intelligence agents, etc, barred by original directive 183,000

4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation 20,000

5. Provisionally designated (2 July 47 - 9 Oct 47). . 1,405

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of

other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6,000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5,000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

30 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD.

SUBJECT: ISHIBASHI, Tanzan.
His Status Under SCAPIN 550.

1. Examination of the record of ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, Minister of Finance, reveals that he is subject to removal from public office and exclusion from government service as an undesirable person within the meaning of Paragraph 3 of Category G, Appendix A to SCAPIN 550 in that:

a. As Managing Director, Chief Editor and President of the Oriental Economist, Japan's leading financial journal, from 1924 to the present time, he was responsible for the editorial policy of that journal, which from 1931 to 1941 consistently supported policies and activities of ultra-nationalistic and militaristic groups that engineered the Manchuria and China Incidents, and eventually led Japan into war against the United States and Great Britain. As a writer, writing under his own by-line on the editorial pages of his publication, he personally contributed to the propaganda of imperialism.

b. The Oriental Economist, under ISHIBASHI's leadership, consistently supported Japanese imperialism in Manchuria from 1931 to 1937 while maintaining the fiction that Japan had no territorial ambitions in Asia.

While it is believed that this fact may be relevant in appraising the character of ISHIBASHI and determining the nature of the editorial policies that he dictated, it is not mentioned here in order to substantiate the recommendation that he be removed and excluded.

c. A painstaking review of these issues of the Japanese edition of the Oriental Economist that appeared during the pre-determined critical period from July 1937 to 7 December 1941 has revealed ample substantiation for such a recommendation as will be shown by the excerpts quoted below. If these excerpts seem less inflammatory than those appearing in the jingoistic pre-war daily press, if they appear to be couched in more moderate terms, and if they often mention alternatives to immediate war and conquest, the reader is urged to bear in mind two facts; first, the nature of the Oriental Economist, and secondly, the nature of its subscribers. The Oriental Economist, as the name implies, was a journal supposedly devoted to economics and business. It did not purport to deal with political subjects, although in its treatment of economics it time and time again encroached upon the political field. It was not distributed to nor was it intended for the general reading public. Rather, it was designed for and read by the leaders of Japan's finance and industry, men who had a very real interest in maintaining the status quo and to whom the maintenance of trade with the United States was in many cases a matter of economic necessity. It is the belief of this analyst that consciously or unconsciously, ISHIBASHI, Tanzan early took upon himself the three-fold mission of convincing his wealthy and influential readers:

(1) That the Militarists' adventure in China could be profitable to them.

(2) That Japan faced economic ruin unless she created a co-prosperity sphere.

(3) That the creation of such a sphere would necessi tate a clash with the Western Powers but that they stood to gain more by expansion than by the continuation of amicable relations with the West.

d. Admittedly, the excerpts below are not compounded of passion and hysteria, nor predicated on any superstitious belief in the divine mission of the Yamato Race. Rather, they are the calm and calculated statements of an educated writer and economist, one who knew his subscribers to be realistic businessmen who would not recklessly gamble for an empire unless first convinced that the game was worth the stakes. He accordingly suited his arguments to his audience. When it is remembered that his audience consisted of those leaders of finance and industry whose approval and support had first to be won before Japan could make her bid for hegemony over Asia, it will be seen that the influence of the Oriental Economist over the formation of national policy was considerable and the reader is asked to pause and consider if its editor should not be placed in the very forefront of those men who by their control of the media of public information and opinion helped lead the Japanese people down the road to war and ruin.

e. The Japanese Government's own Public Information Investigation Committee has ascribed to the Oriental Economist magazine and formally reported 32 articles printed during the critical period, that bring this publication under the purview of SCAPIN 548. Moreover, the Committee has reported that the Oriental Economist Publishing House printed six entire books also coming under the provisions of this directive. While it is believed and will be shown below that this estimate errs on the side of leniency, such a report by Japanese authorities themselves is, nevertheless, a powerful indictment of the policies followed by the Oriental Economist and its publisher.

The Oriental Economist became increasingly militaristic and forthright in its espousal of aggression after the critical year of 1937. From that date until the outbreak of the Pacific War, articles and editorials appearing in this magazine specifically:

(1) <u>Blamed China for Japanese Aggression.</u>

(a) <u>Chiang's Resignation Held Price of Peace</u>: During the early days of the North China incident, the Oriental Economist following the official propaganda line steadfastly maintained the fiction that Chinese provocation, not Japanese imperialism, was responsible for hostilities. The following editorial which appeared on 7 August 1937 was not considered by the Japanese Government's Public Information Media Investigation Committee to fall

within the scope of SCAPIN 548 on the grounds that "the basis of the argument is sound and sensible". The reader's attention is directed, nevertheless, to the fact that only one month after the outbreak of the China "Incident", the Economist was already:

1 - Suggesting that a puppet government be established in North China.
2 - Charging the Chinese government with war guilt.
3 - Asserting that Japan had no intention of halting her campaign in China.
4 - Arrogantly demanded that the president of a sovereign power be replaced by a man more amenable to Japanese influence.

"In what way will the future diplomatic relationship between Japan and China in general turn out?

The first possibility is the establishment of a sort of a half independent government which is of a pro-Japanese nature in North China and to carry on the administration of North China without regard whatsoever to the attitude of the Nanking Government...Under the present circumstances, a clash between the Nanking Central Army and the Japanese forces seems almost inevitable...It is true that it was through the Anti-Japanese education which the Chinese National Government imposed upon her people which was the very reason that resulted in Japan reluctantly taking up arms...Unless a change takes place in the present situation, the Sino-Jap anese war which would be the greatest misery that can happen to the Chinese people is inevitable. Consequently, Japan will contrary to her initial wishes implant a hostile feeling to the Chinese and thus in despair lead to the downfall of that country. In view of this almost hopeless crisis, there is only one way in which the Chinese people can be saved. This is in the resignation of the supreme commander of the Nanking Government, Chiang Kai-Shek, taking full responsibility in bringing China to this sad plight and also in another man capable of carrying out diplomatic policy towards Japan taking over the administration...In this present North China incident, we can no longer put a stop to the military campaign by our army."...

(b) "Crush China" Urges Economist: In an editorial of 4 September 1937 entitled "To the Chinese People: Solution unlikely if Anti-Japanese Activities Continue", the Economist voiced its hearty approval of a statement by the late Prince Konoye on the necessity for crushing China, in these words: 'there is no other way but to suppress and rid China of her will to fight. And to do this not only with our military might but also with all other conceivable means...We are heartily in accord with his statement.'

(c) Defies Powers to Intervene: Japan's successful defiance of the Western Powers and the victories that attended her armies on the continent emboldened the Government's propagandists to abandon the monstrous fiction that Japan had no territorial aims in China. Faithfully reflecting this change, the Economist on 14 January 1939 in an editorial entitled "The Position of Japanese Government in Regards to China. China and the three Great Powers must acknowledge this Position".

significantly compared the invasion of China to Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, and asserted: "Though Japan is said to be waging an undeclared war, she is without any question the victor. As the victor, Italy did not tell Ethiopia that she did not have any designs for territorial acquisitions, and she also did not say that she was not going to carry out a monopolistic economy. Even if Japan does have designs for territorial acquisitions, which country, aside from making protests on moral grounds, can prevent her from attaining this end in this present international situation?".

(2) Advocated Imposition of Totalitarian Controls

(a) War Economy Held Necessary: Abandoning their defensive stand against the Western Powers, Japan's propagandists next took the offensive. In an editorial of 30 September 1939 implying that Chinese resistance was primarily the result of British and American support, the Economist urged the adoption of a war-time economy to convince the powers that Japan could and would conquer China.

"One of the reasons for the protraction of the (China) Incident is, to put it straightforwardly, the fact that the world unfortunately still doubts that our country is certain to achieve final victory in this Incident."

"The Incident is being prolonged because other nations believe that Japan's economic strength will be exhausted by Chinese resistance. Accordingly, the urgent task facing Japan today is to adopt every measure to foster our economic strength and revise their (the foreign powers) notions."

"When one considers these matters, it is not enough simply to place Japanese economy on a war-time footing and somehow overcome the present crisis. It is absolutely necessary to increase productive strength in a positive fashion and improve its quality."

(b) Permanent Totalitarian Structure Urged: The war-time economy urged by the Economist in 1939 was duly instituted, but the editor was not satisfied. In an editorial of 13 September 1941, he urged that a permanent totalitarian economy be imposed upon the nation.

"Our production circles are preparing for a wartime organization. We already know that the financial circles are in the midst of establishing a totalitarian system in compliance with the above and so that they can fulfill the important duties of financing wartime enterprises. The stock market have also become a united body by placing cooperative securities under one form of control association. In such a manner, the industrial circles, financial circles, and the stock market have united into one body and are preparing to complete the totalitarian wartime system. This measure is most necessary in our country today from the standpoint of applying it to the circumstances which prevail in the world war."

"As repeatedly stated, the existing wartime totalitarian economic structure has been established solely to meet wartime needs. However, with the view to abundance of raw material and intensified world economic competition in the postwar period, a mechanical structure established only to meet the wartime objectives cannot be adopted. It is felt most urgent that a totalitarian structure in peacetime as well as in war be planned and put into effect. A sound planned economy must be established with due consideration to these aspects rather than as a temporary feature. It is most necessary at this time to give consideration and enforce a totalitarian system which can be applied during war-time and the post-war period."

(c) Imperial Rule Must Be Strengthened: In the fascistic Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Economist perceived a suitable means of implementing the totalitarianism it had long been advocating. Therefore, in a marked digression from the field of economics, the editorial columns on 27 September 1941 suggested ways of making the organization more effective under the headline, "Imperial Rule Assistance Association Must Be Strengthened."

". . .Observing as it is mentioned above, it may be said that the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association following its reorganization are diverged into three main principles. These are: first, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, centering the influence of bureaucracy; 2nd, Confederacy of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, consisting of the important members of the former Political Parties; 3rd, development of the Asia League, centering the Reform Party."

"The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which possesses these three main principles, has logical conclusions, depending on viewpoints, and it could undoubtedly be regarded as reflecting the actual circumstances of our country. And, as circumstances now stand, it seems that each one of these principles are taking an active part in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association with the understanding that they form a part of the organization. This could be highly appraised as an acquired result of the activities of the new organization. However, they well understand, thoroughly and mutually, that they are part of the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and during that time show fidelity to the Corporation's regulations."

"If we allow the reporters to speak frankly concerning conditions as they exist, it may be thought that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, diverged into three principles, each have a possible tendency to proceed in becoming oppositive. Therefore, to keep these principles of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in accord with the actual circumstances of our country, the relative functions of these three principles each has to be regulated distinctly by the Executive Board of The Political Directors of our country, and they must cooperate mutually, making an effort to accomplish the duties of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. If each individual drives the activities selfishly and infringes upon the other's duties, friction is apt to be unavoidable."

(d) Purge of Liberal Teachers Insufficient: In 1939 Education Minister General Araki undertook to remove all suspected liberals and leftists from Japan's Universities. The Oriental Economist far from opposing this move to control the minds and thoughts of the nation's youth criticized the measure as inadequate and took the stand that mere removal of liberal elements was

not enough. In an editorial of 11 March 1939 the Oriental Economist goaded the Education Ministry for its alleged complacency in thinking that the job had been completed, urged further extension of government control over education and proposed a thorough "reform" of the University System to insure that liberality was thoroughly crushed in these words:

"The "Screening" at Tokyo Imperial University has been generally completed. Instructors connected with the economic department, were dismissed or resigned, and the greater portion of the assistant instructors and assistants remain.

"However, it is evident that the problems of the University were not solved through the resignation of some instructors. The easiest act the Education Ministry can do is to dismiss persons. The authority of the Education Ministry is limited to such rights. However, it is not profitable for the nation or the educational circles if their authority is limited as mentioned above. Rather than taking the above course, it is most necessary to reform the University System which has been a problem hitherto.

"The writer thinks it is very strange that through discussions on the limits of authority of various individuals and through adjustments of a faction of the faculty, Araki, Education Minister, and the Education Ministry possess an attitude that everything will be settled. The points mentioned above are the details and not the main points. Does the Education Minister think that because several university instructors quit, the university education can be reformed? The writer thinks that reform cannot be brought about merely through such spiritual policy, and it is natural that the system must be affected. Looking at the results, doesn't it seem as if the Education Ministry is not exerting much effort.

(3) Praised Hitler and Nazi Economic Policies:

(a) Hitler Brings Hope to Germany: In view of the Oriental Economist's affinity for totalitarianism, it is not surprising that enthusiastic descriptions of the new Nazi economy often appeared in its columns. On 21 August 1937, an editorial entitled "German Trade Control, its Facilities and Functions" eulogized Nazism in these glowing terms: "When Hitler came to power, a change for the better was soon made noticeable. The German people seemed suddenly awakened with new hopes. It was as if the sun had suddenly risen to the sky. Even the faces of unemployed on the street looked cheerful. It was a sudden change. This writer was impressed by the difference that hope can bring to people."

(b) Funk's Theories Quoted at Length: On 25 June 1938, the Oriental Economist saw fit to print in its entirety an article by Heinrich Funk entitled "Principle of the German Nation and the Economy of National Defense". Although this was reprinted without comment the foregoing excerpts under (2) above clearly indicate that in printing Funk's article, the editor saw a convenient means of advancing his own economic theories.

"Our war economy failed during the First World War because of the following considerations:
1. The people had not been adequately drilled in wartime -economic policies..."

"We must apply the lessons learned from the previous war based on an economic and Nazi viewpoint, and plan a program of military preparedness which will be worked out gradually."

"Prior to the First World War, economics was considered self-regulating and self-sustaining. Moreover, government and history were considered to be based upon it. In view of the stupendous economic developments and the concomitant violence of war, a long struggle was considered out of the question. The Bourgeousie considered that war would be impossible in view of economic developments; Marxists predicted eternal peace whenever class struggle was obviated. Economics contradicts this line of thinking...Since taxes and war which burdened the people were looked upon as obstacles to the natural progress of the economy, even the consideration of the nature of national preparedness was out of the question. As a result, free trade and internationalism were adopted. Only in the communication and financial circles were the close connection between military preparedness and economics recognized. In food circles and in resource circles, this relationship was not recognized. Thus a preliminary policy for economic mobilization was not possible."

(4) Supported Greater East Asia Doctrine:

(a) Co-Prosperity Key to Economic Crisis: The Belligerent policies of the Militarists, which the Oriental Economist had endorsed, led inevitably to the severance of Japan's important trade with Great Britain and the United States. The Economist's ingenious editor however advocated the establishment of the co-prosperity sphere as a solution for the resulting economic difficulties. An editorial of 9 August 1941 propounded this idea as follows:

"No matter how difficult the situation may be, it could be said that the word impossible is not in the vocabulary of a foreign diplomat. There is much work for the Foreign Affairs Department and for Ambassador Nomura who continue in their heroic efforts. However, as to the determination of the people of the nation, it is keenly thought that it is necessary that their minds be strengthened not abstractly, but definitely in regards to the worst situation between Japan and America, and that it could develop into the worst situation between Japan and the so-called A.B.C.D. nations."

"However, in compensation for the severance of trade by Britain and America, basically there is no way but to establish a Greater East Asia Self-Sufficiency Sphere to maintain the existence and honor of our nation. That is not impossible depending on how it is done, but it is not an easy task. However difficult it may be to progress the thorny path, it is clearly evident that Japan cannot survive without brushing those thorns aside and progressing on a single course."

(5) Instigated War Against the Western Powers: Since the inception of the Occupation the fiction has been steadfastly maintained that throughout the critical years preceding the Pacific War, ISHIBASHI was pro-American and opposed to war with the Western Powers. That certain quarters have sincerely believed this to be the truth is evident. That it is not the truth, that in fact the very opposite is true, that from 1939 until the first bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, the Oriental Economist directed a continuous campaign of misrepresentation and falsehood designed to reconcile the Japanese people to war with the United States and Great Britain, the excerpts below abundantly prove:

(a) Establishment of Bases Against West Lauded: In a revealing editorial of 18 February 1939 the Oriental Economist justified the occupation of Hainan as a means of blocking aid to China. By stating that the Western Powers are already carrying on anti-Japanese activities in Indo-China and Burma, the writer early in 1939 established an excuse for subsequent Japanese aggression in those areas as well.

"In order to check the Chiang Kai-shek Government, which is anti-Japanese and which had its start in South-western China, politically and militarily, it was not enough to stop at Canton. It was necessary to advance Southward to secure key positions whereby pressure could be applied in a wide area."

"Moreover, the matter which cannot be overlooked is a check against the activities of England, America and France. It is a well known fact that these countries are busy supporting the policies of th Chiang Kai-shek government, and as mentioned previously, they are active in the Louichow Peninsula, French-Indo China, and Burma. There fore, if our troops are stationed at strategic places on the Hainan Island, it is possible to put up an adequate check against the forces mentioned above."

(b) Powers May Divide China: On 2 September 1939, the Oriental Economist reported on a round-table discussion on Foreign Policy in which Ishibashi personally participated. In the course of this discussion, Ishibashi is quoted as making the almost incredible statement that the defeat of the Japanese Armies which at that very moment were dividing up China would not be to China's advantage since upon the withdrawal of Japan, China might again face partition at the hands of the Western Powers. The exact quotation is as follows:

"In regards to your statement a short while ago about the impossibility of a ridiculous thing as a five power joint intervention on the China issue in the event a war breaks out in Europe, I am not certain as to what development will take place in Europe, but I do know for sure that this tense situation without any hostilities cannot continue to last for long. However, supposing that the situation in Europe should become a little stable and Japan is forced to withdraw from China under pressure of the European powers, what then will happen to the Chungking regime and China? The defeat of Japan will not be to China's advantage. The complete reversal of Japan's scheme of ousting the white race from the Orient may take place. It may mean the eventual division of China. All this may be an unnecessary anxiety, but as long as there is a possibility of this fear ever becoming a reality, both Japan and China should irrespective of the past differences get together."

(c) Preparation for War Urged: After the outbreak of the European War, the Oriental Economist with monotonous regularity sounded the tocsin of war. The usual device was to remind the nation of its treaty commitments with the Axis Powers and to urge preparedness and more preparedness lest Great Britain, the Soviet Union and later the United States should overcome their fascist enemies in Europe and turn upon the fascists in the East. This line of argument is clearly set forth in an editorial of 5 October 1940.

"Reading the situation of the European War in the news, there are no doubt many in the world who think that it would end soon with Italy and Germany completely victorious. It is needless to say that our nation as an ally of Germany and Italy eagerly hope for this, and we must do all we can to help.

However, it is not easy to predict actually how the tide of battle will develop. It is probably better that our nation think seriously on the contrary, except that the outcome of the European War cannot be decided easily, and that the safest policy is to prepare. This is because if there is laxity in thinking simply that Germany and Italy will be victorious and that there would be such a great difference if the outcome is not as was expected."

(d) America Seen as More Deadly Foe: Noting fearfully the growing support given by the United States to embattled Britain, the Oriental Economist on 21 September 1940 pointed out the incongruity of amity, if such actually existed, toward the United States and hositility toward Britain, but instead of recommending that friendly relations be restored with Britain, this editorial implies the necessity for an eventual clash with America and urges preparation for War in the Pacific.

"The decisive battleground of the world would probably move from Europe to the Pacific. At the present in which the incorporation of Britain and the United States is taking place, our friendly policy with America and our Anti-British policy are, as never before, completely at a standstill. Is it possible to establish the Greater East Asia Sphere without being prepared for the clash against the combined forces of Britain and the United States? Although the wolf at the front door, Britain, has a tendency to retreat, we will have to confront the United States, the lion at the back door. We must either curry favour with the United States or repulse her; or now, we must prepare the Pacific for tomorrow with foresight and perseverance."

(e) War With America Called Inevitable: In October 1940 the Oriental Economist conceded that further aggression in Asia would bring war with the United States, but advocated such aggression just the same. An editorial entitled "Japan's Only Way is but to Advance Southward" states as follows:

"As American economical oppression increases, in any case, whether Japan likes it or not the only way is but to advance into Dutch East Indies. If Japan tries to advance into Dutch East Indies, there is no alternative but war with America. With this significance, it cannot be forecast when war will happen. However, this is not the time to talk about it. The world has been divided into two parts. There is an encampment of Japan, Germany and Italy on one side and on the other side there is an encampment of England and America. Hitler tried so many times against England to surrender but England, who depends on Prime Minister Churchill as her greatest weapon, rejected this firmly. It is totally unthinkable for Germany to surrender

to England. Both countries have to fight to the bitter end. They have to fight until one country loses its manpower and goods. The struggle of this century has started. Stay your voice, and Soviet Russia may be the one that makes the largest profit. The event has already arrived. We, too, must respond to the call of our Government to struggle and in every respect we have to open the way to advancement to the South."

(f) Prepare for Economic War With U.S.: In view of the preceding excerpt preaching the inevitability of war with the United States, the opening paragraph of this editorial printed on 18 January 1941 may appear incongruous. It is, however, logical enough that an economist should understand how vulnerable Japan's economy would be in the event of war with a great power and that he should seek to avoid precipitating such a war until Japan through her exploitation of conquered Asia should be ready for battle. Consequently, he again and again exhorts the government and people to prepare.

"Nevertheless, following the trend of the majority and taking for granted that a clash is absolutely unavoidable, hastiness to plunging one's self into war or rash actions should be absolutely disregarded. Tenacity is most necessary now. In order to avoid this crisis, there are still statesmen who do not put forth their utmost effort. However, to neglect preparation by anticipating the possibility of avoiding this crisis in this manner is dangerous. Ultimate effort should be an effort goving its all without future regrets, and even if this effort comes to naught, our nation should have undisconcerted preparation. Without losing hope and without leaning towards individual gain, the writer now demands that the government and the people have this determination and preparation.

Why did we come to this? Instead of looking back and questioning the origin and reasons, we should think in dead earnest the steps to be taken in the future.

However, if Japan should come to war with the U.S., it will be in the nature of an economical warfare. Accordingly, together with the plan to meet this change in Japanese economy resulting from the commencement of war, the securing of essential goods from the Southern Area and export markets will become the vital problems. No matter how soon we prepare for this end, it is absolutely not too early."

(g) Indirect Attack by U.S. Charged: In the same issue, the editor declared that the United States was already guilty of an overt act against Japan and warned his readers against hoping for peace in the following words:

"It is also clear that the American fleet is being disposed for any eventuality ... In this manner, the United States is carrying on a war against Germany without a declaration of war. This attitude toward Germany is likewise directed against Japan automatically because of her tie with Germany. Aid to Chiang Kai Shek on a greater scale is to be anticipated. The

relationship between Japan and the United States becomes increasingly critical.

(h) Naval Defeat of U.S. Foreseen: One of the most effective means of propagandizing a people into war is to tell them that they are sure to win the victory. On 8 February 1941, the Oriental Economist prophesied a Japanese naval victory over the United States in these words:

"Although America may be filled with a sense of superority which arises from her superior position in the Far East, the world knows that if the Japanese Navy and the American Navy fights in the Pacific, victory will definitely fall in the hands of the Japanese. The world also recognizes that the Far Eastern problem is a matter of life and death to Japan, but on the other hand, it is a matter of luxury to America."

(i) Advocated More Support for Axis: In a signed editorial on the international crisis written by ISHIBASHI himself for the 22 Feb. 1941 issue of the Oriental Economist, the editor remarks that while he had once desired that Japan "go hand in hand with America", he has changed his mind. Urging Japan to keep her treaty commitments, he concludes:

"At this time, in fact, I may sound like a theorist, but I have been advocating an opinion ever since last year to go hand in hand with America and to mediate in the hostilities in Europe. Undoubtedly, Japan is an ally of Germany and Italy; especially when the United States indicated a hostile feeling toward the three countries as she did recently, we must assist Germany and Italy to the end and put our efforts to lead our allies to victory."

(j) Recognition of Axis Ties Demanded: Apparently perturbed over the Government's hesitation to honor its Axis commitments, the Economist on 12 July 1941 pointed out that the exigencies of war were such that Japan must recognize that it belonged in the Axis camp and act accordingly.

"That is to say, the world at present consists of the camp of Germany, Italy, the other European Axis powers, Japan, Manchukuo and the Nanking National Government on the one hand, and England, America, the Soviet Union and the Chungking Government on the other hand, engaged in a 'kill or be killed' struggle unto death...Whatever the maneuverings that may be engaged in peace-time diplomacy, in a war where national survival or destruction is at stake, it is utterly impossible to maintain the grotesque foreign policy of being on both sides at the same time...The above position of our country is already a stern fact which can permit no criticism whatsoever."

(k) American Retaliation Minimized: Smarting under American economic measures imposed upon Japan, the Economist on 2 August 1941 attempted to minimize their importance, urged the people once again to prepare for war, and deplored the pro-American tendency still apparent in some quarters.

"It is necessary for our people to strengthen their unwavering determination in case Japanese-American trade relationship is severed completely in the future. However, the editor believes that though this severance in trade is not a favorable condition, it does not mean in any way that our economic strength will not be able to withstand it. If the American Government thinks that they can dishearten the Japanese people by applying such an economic pressure, it just shows that they do not know the Japanese people nor the Japanese economy.

The editor warned our people and officials that it would be useless for our country to adopt a pro-American policy after our country concluded the Tri-Partite agreement.

It could be that the American Government is waiting for a new turn in development. Even in our country, there are some people who are harboring hopes for a pro-American policy. However, we are at the threshold of a crisis in which we cannot rely on such hopes. The editor again asks our officials and people to strengthen their determination."

(l) Japan "Encircled" by Western Powers: In what the world has wearily come to recognize as a stock excuse for aggression, the Economist for 2 August 1941 stated that Japan's expansion into Indo-China was necessitated by "the Anti-Japanese encirclement policy" of America and Great Britain.

"America and England are taking positive measures to strengthen their control of the world which has been damaged and which is crumbling by taking advantage of the opportunity offered them by the war between Germany and Russia. They are trying to apply this plan to the Far East as mentioned in this column previously. One feels that the enveloping pressure applied by America and England is reaching the final stages. This feeling is caused by the fact that if Japan is to establish the Far East Co-Prosperity Sphere, which is her national policy, she must continually resist American and English pressure. The joint defense agreement between Japan, French-Indo China, was nothing more than a counter-measure to the anti-Japanese encirclement policy taken by America and England".

(m) Sacrifice Necessary to Match U.S.: Stating that Japan's honor and existence were threatened by Allied economic reprisals, the Economist on 9 August 1941 urged the creation of a self-sufficient economy, demanded that the people sacrifice for war and again reiterated the familiar preparedness theme:

"The reason why America supplied oil to Japan was because America did not want Japan to touch the oil supply in the Dutch East Indies. The reasons why America cut off the oil supply in the past was to protect her own interest to protect English defense and to prolong war in the South Pacific

In order to maintain the honor and existence of our country in the light of the economic severance by England and America, there is no other way but to strive to construct a "Great East Asia Self-Sufficiency Sphere". Depending on a manner in which this project is handled, it is not absolutel impossible; however, it is not an easy task. No matter how much obstacles there are on the way, we must overcome them. It is already clear that Japan cannot live unless she accomplishes this project. If we consider this matter from the standpoint of our daily life, we must realize that many of the industries of Japan will perhaps revert back to the days of the Meiji Era. ages.
Through these sacrifices, we must maintain a high level of production of industries which are directly connected with national defense. If possible we must endeavor to elevate this level so that we will not lose the balance between America's expansion of armament and ours."

(n) Britain and U.S. Held Peace Menace: In an attack upon the Atlantic Charter, the Economist in an Editorial of 23 August 1941 called Great Britain and the Unit States the destroyers of world peace, and charged them with hypocrisy in these words:

"Therefore, the Anglo-American powers, which possess the bulk of the wealth of the world, were the real destructive powers of world peace. In other words, the basic reason for the unrest in the world today lies in the fact that they had lost the right to determine the economic prosperity and the development of peace of the peoples of the world. If they are to revive the ideals of ancient peace, they must make it clear that they are going to make it a reality at any cost through definite plans or it would be practically meaningless. In reviving the old ideals of peace of ten years' ago now after such a long period, lies the deceit and emptiness of the cooperative declaration."

(o) American Bad Faith Implied: The issue of the Oriental Economist that appeared on the day that Japanese planes attacked Pearl Harbor carried an editorial indicative of the distrust with which its editor regarded the United States. In it, the writer states that America entered into negotiations with Japan only because she was confronted by Germany and did not want a war on two fronts; further, that should an agreement be reached, Japan should take advantage of it to prepare with all possible haste for an ultimate showdown in the Pacific.

"Undoubtedly, it is possible to maintain the peace of East Asia. If we believe this to be so, it appears very fine and there is no reason for friction in the negotiations between Japan and the U.S. If it is actually so, our government would have undoubtedly endeavored towards this end.

However, there is an issue to be considered. Since the U. S. is now faced with a powerful enemy in Germany, she might compromise with our country. Should we relax because of this compromise, there are some who caution the unpredictability of the consequences of the future. The writer ag ain does not necessarily interpret that the U. S. have any bad intentions, but believes that this fear always exists.

Morality will be maintained by us in our international relations, but the deciding factor in the end is might. Force of arms is essential in might; and in order to plan the advancement of the destiny of a nation, economic power is necessary to back up this force of arms and act as a vanguard to force of arms in many cases. Together, it is called national power. If the national power of our country is low, there will undoubtedly be some grief in the future. Accordingly, if the Japanese-American agreement is realized, our people must withgreater determination than in case of a break with America, strive for the increase of this national power with an all-out effort."

(p) America Refuses to Understand Japan: The Oriental Economist for 29 November 1941 carried an editorial comment on Tojo's "Three Principles", placed all the blame for strained relations between the two countries upon the United States. Accusing the American government of dogmatism and refusal to understand Japan's position, the editor concludes with the significant remark that the people will back the government in the event of war:

"....now, as never before, the policy is definitely thought of as the so-called Three Principles of Tojo. It is as follows:

1) To keep the Big Three (the three nations) from interfering with the Empire's plan to terminate the China incident.
2) The reason why the nations surrounding the Empire do not carry on direct military intimidation is of course to eliminate the feeling of enmity such as that of economic blockade and to revive harmonious economic relationships.
3) Should the European War spread, to do the utmost to keep it from affecting confused Asia.

....Probably, the reason why negotiations between the United States and Japan was at a standstill since April is because misunderstanding and dogma controlled the governing body of the United States.

....thus, not only are the Three Principles indicated every appropriate for the forthcoming foreign policy, but even by the unmentioned factors it could be seen that they are sound."

"...If our thoughts should take such a trend, besides the aforementioned principles, there must be broader and more fundamental principles. Accordingly, they would supplement the Three Principles, and must be put to practice with consideration to practical problems. However, fortunately, the correspondents also find similar principles in the speeches of Foreign Minister Togo. However, that is something else."

"....It could be said that: If the American Government could understand the Empire's natural needs, the position of the Empire in Asia, the situation of the Orient; and with the Empire, genuinely desire world peace, with consideration, it would be sufficient to make it a reality."

"....The thing that especially encourages a correspondent is the earnest attitude of the 100,000,000 people of our nation. After the beginning of the China Incident, the people of the nation have always been earnest; however, their earnesty has never been so profound as it is today. The people of the nation are already conscious of the destiny of the nation. With nationalistic devotion as a background, it is believed that they would be earnestly devoted if the government adopts an Anti-American policy. At least, it could be possible that it would erase the suspicions, misunderstandings, and dogmas of the United States."

3. The English edition of the Oriental Economist which had approximately one-tenth the circulation of the Japanese version was primarily designed to be read by British and American business and diplomatic representatives in Japan. Its articles were, accordingly, couched in somewhat more moderate terms and often varied in subject matter from those appearing in the vernacular edition. But with monotonous consistency it followed the same propaganda line and dutifully repeated the distortions and falsehoods with which the Government sought to cloak the true nature of its imperial adventure before the eyes of the Western world. A partial survey of the English edition of the Oriental Economist reveals that between 1937 and the outbreak of the Pacific War articles and editorials appearing in this journal specifically

a. Blamed China for the War and Approved the Actions of the Japanese Army in China.

(1) China Branded as Aggressor: An editorial entitled "Comment on the China Incident" published in the August 1937 issue claims that "one prominent cause of this turn of events was China's over-confidence in force ... China had become dangerously aggressive toward Japan ... this Chinese feeling of hate and antagonism is now running so high". In a further attempt to place the onus for the outbreak of hostilities upon the Chinese this same article added, "after the remnants of the 29th Army have been swept out of the Peiping area, the Japanese Army would not carry the fight into the heart of China until challenged by the Chinese Central Army". The article concludes with a routine reaffirmation of the Japanese Government's propaganda line designed to allay the suspicions of Western Powers by stating that "As has been repeatedly announced by successive governments, Japan entertains no territorial ambitions in North China". But in an effort to prepare in advance an excuse for continued Japanese aggression the editorial adds, "It would appear that the longer the delay by Nanking in starting negotiations with Japan the harder it will be to arrive at an understanding".

(2) China Blamed For Japanese Invasion: An editorial comment on the Chinese situation appearing in the September 1937 edition again attempted to blame China by stating that, "China blinded by an infantile anti-Japanese sentiment has lost North China when she sought to take it and has brought destruction upon herself". In conclusion the editor warned the Chinese that, "It must be said most plainly that as long as the anti-Japanese movement persists in China, our pressing hands will not relax".

(3) No Compromise with China: An editorial in the May, 1938 issue put the editor of the Oriental Economist on record as saying, "It is our experience that the more profound one's knowledge of China and the Chinese is, the more is he convinced that any halfway solution of the hostilities on such conditions would be only postponing the evil and breeding a far greater one for the future".

b. Urged the Wholesale Exploitation of North China

(1) Exploitation Held Japan's Responsibility: An article appearing on the editorial page of the September 1937 issue offered as a logical reason for exploitation of China's resources by Japan the statement that, "Under the existing conditions in North China, however, Japan would have to assume the chief responsibility for peace. Subsequently, in the field of economic development, combinations of Japanese capital and technical talent with Chinese labor and resources should be worked out without any opposition"

(2) Continued Hostilities Favor Japan: Looking ahead optimistically to an era of profitable imperialism in China the editor of the Oriental Economist stated in an article entitled "The Outlook for 1938" that, "In North China the new regime has been established and it may be some time before orderly industrial development gets under way". Frankly acknowledging that continued hostilities favored Japan's imperialistic program, the article continues, "It is our opinion that the longer Chiang clique continues its resistance, the better it will suit the purposes of this country, for as long as Gen. Chiang takes this attitude, Japan can go ahead unconcernedly with her own programs of North China development".

c. Laid down a Philosophical Basis for the Establishment of a New Order in Asia and to Exclusion of other Nations from the Orient.

Hails Closing of the Open Door: In an article entitled the "International Settlement Question" published in the July 1939 edition, the writer stated, "The Japanese must endeavor to give third-power nationals a clear grasp of the character of the New Order which this country is at pains to construct in East Asia. Some of the people of the third-powers ... still cling to the old-fashioned outlook on the Far East, simply demanding that Japan observe the kind of equal opportunity and open door principles that were provided in the Nine-Power Treaty. Conditions have changed so completely, however, that it is no longer possible to preserve order and restore economic conditions to the China of today by acting upon principles of yesterday".

d. Asserted Japan's Natural Right to Dominate Asia:

Japan only Nation to Lead Asia: In an article entitled "Regional New World Orders" published in the March 1940 issue the Economist asked the question, "Is there any other nation besides Japan which is capable of maintaining peace and order in the Far East?", and then answered this question with the statement that " . . . there is no doubt that Japan is the only fit nation to take the lead in East Asia." The article then adds, "Japan is endeavoring to establish a tri-partite relationship of mutual help and cooperation with Manchukuo and China as the basis for a new order in this part of the world."

(e) Accused the United States of Instigating War in the Pacific.

(1) U.S. Accused of Will toward War: Throughout the critical years immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor the Oriental Economist consistently took the position that American intransigence, not Japanese aggression, was responsible for the strained relations between the two nations. In June 1940 an editorial in the Economist accused the United States of diplomatic duplicity with the statement that, "Japan is willing to go half-way in order to realize a peaceful settlement with the United States...It is the United States, however, which, though avowing peace in her diplomatic policy, is in practice extremely negative and passing to peace...."

(2) War with America said Inevitable: By October 1940 the editor of the Economist proclaimed the inevitability of war between the United States and Japan with the statement that, "As long as America sticks to the policy of co-operating with Britain in applying ever-increasing pressure on Japan, war is inevitable sooner or later."

(3) Indirect Attack by U.S. Charged: Writing under his own by-line in the January 1941 issue, ISHIBASHI declared that the United States was already guilty of an overt act against Japan and warned his readers against hoping for peace in the following words, "The United States has already embarked upon undeclared war against Germany. This action against Germany simultaneously is an action against Japan, the ally of Germany. Soon she, the U.S., will give open support to the Chiang Kai-shek faction, The relations between Japan and America have become extremely serious. It would be extremely dangerous if we overlook the ever-critical overall developments by relying on the perspective colored with the slightest wishful thinking."

(4) Appeasement of U.S. Decried: As early as February 1941 the Economist took the final step in the development of its belligerent policy and rejected even the idea of attempting to keep peace in the Pacific, An editorial of that date stated that "It is essential for Japan to make up her mind to aid Germany and Italy to the fullest extent and fight the war to a finish. The situation has now become so critical that nothing could be gained now from a mere appeasement policy."

(f) Defended Japan's Adherence to the Axis

(1) All Out Aid to Axis Powers: The Oriental Economist saw in the Tri-Partite Pact a device for intimidating the United States which was becoming increasingly critical of Japanese imperialism in Asia and enthusiastically defended Japan's adherence to it. In the February 1941 edition, the Economist's editor stated, "we propose that Japan go to the aid of Germany and Italy no matter what the cost, so that they may emerge victorious in the coming struggle."

(2) Japan Must Abide by Pact: The April edition of the same year remarked that, "Japan's first and foremost duty will be to make common cause with Germany and Italy and prepare for the worst."

(g) Approved the Suppression of Trade Unionism and Totalitarian Control of Labor:

Creation of Labor Front Lauded: In the August 1941 issue of the Economist the editor outlined the new "Work Record Pass-Book Law" which instituted a system of strict control over labor and denied workers the right of changing their occupation or place of employment. The same issue lauded the establishment of the Industrial Patriotic Society, the Japanese version of a fascist labor-front organization, and commented on the suppression of trade unions as follows:

"This prosperity in the Patriotic Industrial labor movement coupled with the growing tension of international relations led to the voluntary wind-up in July 1940 of the labor union based upon class consciousness."

Noting that the trade union movement in Japan was the result of baneful western influence the article added, "Thus ended in Japan that product of liberalistic ideology, trade unionism. That the trade union went out of existence of its own accord, and not because of pressure from the government speaks eloquently of the distinctive character of the Japanese spirit which the occidental mind has difficulty comprehending."

(h) Heartily Endorsed the Newly Created Tojo Cabinet:

Necessity for Strong Cabinet Seen: Seeing in the Tojo Cabinet a group sufficiently dictatorial and militaristic to carry out the program that its editorial columns had long advocated, the Oriental Economist gave Tojo its hearty endorsement after the formation of his cabinet in the following words:

"In a cabinet with a predetermined policy and with the power and ability to translate that into action the nation is ready to repose an unqualified confidence. Moreover, the Tojo cabinet is the most powerful one which can be desired...This is the conviction of all.

"Premier Tojo is in a position where the administration of State Affairs and the Supreme Command can go well together in a much better degree than has ever been the case before. If so, of all the cabinets in the past, this one under General Tojo is well qualified to handle deftly the disposition of the China Incident, general foreign relations, internal affairs, financial and economic matters. What Japan is in dire necessity of today is a strong cabinet such as the Tojo cabinet gives every indication of being."

4. By the propaganda that he wrote or edited and caused to be published, ISHIBASHI, Tanzan is clearly and unmistakeably identified as one who supported military and economic imperialism in Asia, advocated Japan's adherence to the Axis, fostered belief in the inevitability of war with the Western Powers, and urged the imposition of totalitarian controls over the Japanese people.

5. ISHIBASHI, Tanzan has remained in office as Finance Minister since May 22, 1946 as the extension of the application of purge directive of January 4, 1946 to embrace the public information media was not promulgated until January 4, 1947. Thereafter, by the terms of the pertinent implementing ordinances, officers on the national level were permitted to continue at their posts despite falling within the purview of the purge extension until May 3, 1947, the effective date of the new constitution. Translation and study of the Japanese language files of the Oriental Economist has now proceeded to the point where the character of the magazine is clearly established.

6. In view of the above, it is concluded that ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, Minister of Finance, should be removed and excluded from public office under the provisions of Category G, Appendix A, Scapin 550.

Recommend approval:
(sgd) JACK P. NAPIER,
Major, C.A.C.
Chief, Public Service
Qualification Division

(sgd) Guy Wiggins,

(tpd) GUY WIGGINS,
Research Analyst

1 May, 1947.

Approved for action:

(sgd) Courtney Whitney,

(tpd) COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Chief, Government Section

THE PURGE

Joint Press Conference of Civil Information & Education Section and Government Section. Statement made at 1000 on 26 February 1947.

The enforcement of the new Constitution on the third of May inaugurates perhaps the most significant period in Japan's history, a period which will provide one of the most important chapters of contemporary history, a period marked by the concerted effort of its people through the machinery of a democratic government to reform, peacefully and through non-violent means, its political, social and economic structure on a scale and on a time-schedule unprecedented to date.

Success or failure in carrying out these reforms will determine the degree to which the present and future generations of Japan will benefit from the rights and privileges guaranteed to them by their new Constitution. This vast reform program, however, requires the full cooperation of every citizen of Japan.

Specifically, the responsibility for this program is shared by the Government, private economic enterprise and the cultural institutions. All of these groups are charged with full responsibility - and are mutually inter-dependent.

The elections scheduled during the month of April constitute a challenge to the Japanese people which will test their capacity to choose a government capable of leading them to a full realization of the benefits inherent in a democratic state.

Two conditions, however, limit the full and effective exercise of power by the people. These conditions are:

a. The degree of knowledge possessed by the people concerning basic issues and the methods to be used in dealing with them.

b. The continued exercise or acquisition of influence and power in Government and in social, political and economic institutions by persons who were responsible for the suppression, excessive regimentation or exploitation of the people, and who developed and executed a series of wars, the full consequence of which you are well aware.

This latter condition can seriously retard the achievement of reforms which the citizens desire and toward which the Government is working.

You are also acquainted with the fact that the Government last year on the 4th of January undertook a systematic program for the detection and elimination of these undesirable persons from public life, and that on 4 January of this year the Government promulgated Imperial and cabinet ordinances extending this program to local government and to influential political and economic posts.

The Government, however, cannot be charged with sole responsibility for the successful accomplishment of the purge program. All private citizens share this responsibility. The Government can successfully administer this program only with the full and intelligent cooperation of the people.

The people can cooperate effectively only if they possess the necessary information.

The transmission of necessary information to the citizens of Japan is the moral, if not the technical, responsibility of the press and other public information media. To date the press has not fully discharged this responsibility.

You are urged, therefore, to make the utmost effort to inform every responsible citizen in Japan of his responsibility in this matter and of the manner in which he can effectively assist his Government.

All of you know the provisions of the so-called Purge ordinances of 1946 and 1947. It is not necessary to review them. However, certain recent press and editorial comments and requests for information which have been received by the Government and SCAP indicate a certain lack of understanding concerning certain provisions of the ordinances, the general method by which the Purge program is being administered by the Government, and the manner in which the public may participate. Some of the most significant questions and matters requiring clarification are:

1. What is the legal basis of the Purge?

The Program for the removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from public office is based upon SCAPIN 550 of 4 January 1946, as implemented by Imperial and cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinances.

2. How is the Purge program administered and who is responsible?

The Government is responsible for the administration of the Purge program in accordance with the provisions of Imperial ordinances Nos. 1 and 2 of 1947, and cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, and such amendments and interpretations as may be subsequently issued.

The mechanics of administration are based upon a public office qualifications screening system consisting

of a central screening committee responsible to the Prime Minister and 46 prefectural committees including the methropolis of Tokyo and the five principal cities of Osaka, Kobe, Yokohama, Kyoto and Nagoya. The committees of the 41 prefectures, including the metropolis of Tokyo, are responsible to their respective governors, and the committees of the five principal cities are responsible to their respective mayors. Furthermore, there are 118 municipal committees in cities with a population of 50,000 or more who are responsible under their respective mayors to the governors of the prefectures in which they are located.

The Prime Minister makes the final decisions on cases screened by the central committee. The governors and the mayors of the 5 principal cities make all final decisions on cases screened by the committees under their jurisdiction. The mayors of the 118 cities having municipal committees recommend action on cases screened by their respective committees to the governor of the prefecture or metropolis of Tokyo or the mayor of any of the five principal cities in which they are located.

3. What is the definition and scope of public service?

The term public service includes:

a. National, prefectural, city, town and village governments.

b. The Imperial Diet, commissions or committees at the prefectural level or above, provided by law and ordinance, and in the case of land committees includes those of cities, towns or villages.

c. Organizations, etc. listed under the following categories in Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 1947:

(1) Special companies, corporations (Hidans) special banks and other companies in which the government or listed organizations of this type, are the largest stockholders.

(2) Companies or other corporations designated under the temporary supply and demand adjustment law.

(3) Organizations established under special legislation, organizations subsidized by the government or corresponding organizations serving the public.

(4) Principal newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theater companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication.

d. Political parties represented in the Diet and their branches and other organizations required to file a declaration under the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946.

4. What do the terms principal public office and ordinary public office mean?

a. Principal public office in the national government means any position customarily filled by a person with a civil service rank of Chokunin or above, or its equivalent, or any person not a member of the civil service having an equivalent or superior rank.

b. Ordinary public office in the national government means all other positions, including the

lowest civil service rank or its equivalent.

c. Principal public office in the prefectural, city, town or village government and in the organizations listed or referred to in Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 means only those positions specifically designated by title under the appropriate provisions of the ordinances.

d. Ordinary public office in the case of prefectural, town, city, or village governments means all positions other than those designated as principal public office.

e. Ordinary public office in organizations listed under the various categories enumerated in Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 means only those persons specifically designated as such by title. It does not include undesignated positions of lesser importance.

5. Who is subject to screening?

All persons occupying positions designated as principal public office and all candidates for appointment or election to a principal or ordinary public office in the public service who have not previously been screened under the provisions of the Imperial and Cabinet Ordinances of 1947 previously referred to.

6. Who is subject to designation as an undesirable person and subject to removal or exclusion from the public service?

The following types of persons, as specifically defined in Appendix I of Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are subject to disqualification:

a. War Criminals.

b. Career military and naval personnel, members of special police and officials of war ministries.

c. Influential members of ultra nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies.

d. Persons influential in the activities of IRAA, IRAPS and the Political Association of Great Japan.

e. Officers of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion.

f. Additional militarists and ultra-nationalists. This category is specifically elaborated in an interpretation of Category "G" of SCAPIN 550 by the Japanese Government, which is appended to and forms an integral part of the Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947.

7. What are the non-succession provisions of the Purge Ordinances?

The so-called non-succession provisions refer to a provision in two different Imperial Ordinances, namely, Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, to the effect that any person who is a relative within the third degree of relationship by blood, marriage or adoption of any person designated as a purgee shall be ineligible for a period of ten years from the date of designation to succeed or be appointed to any position or positions in the public service from which the latter has been removed or specifically barred,

or to exercise any of the powers of the latter. A person affected by this provision is not, however, designated as a purgee or prohibited from being appointed to any other position in the public service, or from being a candidate for election to any public office, unless he is disqualified by some other provision of the ordinances. The second non-succession provision refers to the provision of Imperial Ordinance No. 3 of 1947 to the effect that persons who have held the position of mayor or deputy mayor, headman of a ward in Tokyo metropolis, headman or deputy headman of town or village, consecutively from the day of or prior to 1 September 1945, shall be barred, even though they do not fall under the pertinent provisions of Imperial and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Purge Ordinances. Persons affected under this provision are likewise not barred from appointment or election to any other position in the public service unless they fall under other disqualifying provisions of pertinent purge ordinances

8. Do the Ordinances provide penalty provisions?

Yes. Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 contains a clause providing for a maximum penalty of three years' imprisonment or a 15,000 yen fine for persons convicted of falsifying entries or of omitting information from their questionnaires on relevant and material matters or who otherwise fail to comply with official instructions concerning the screening procedure to which they are subject. The penalty provision is also applicable to persons violating various injunctions, of which the following are of particular significance:

1. Prohibition against any purgee maintaining the continuity of his influence or power through any person in the public service or in specified organizations;

2. Prohibition against any person in the public service seeking or accepting advice or guidance from a purgee;

3. Prohibition against any purgee occupying a position in a newspaper, magazine or other publishing company, broadcasting corporation, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations, or companies controlling any other media of mass communication;

4. Prohibition against any purgee entering the premises of the governmental entity or other organization from which he has been removed or specifically barred.

9. Can persons designated as purgees and removed or barred from public service appeal for reconsideration, and if so, to whom do they appeal?

Yes. Any person who has been affected by the provisions of the so-called Purge Ordinances may appeal to the Prime Minister directly or through the prefectural governor if the prefectural governor was responsible for his designation.

10. Will all candidates for elective public office be screened before the election?

All candidates for membership in the House of Councillors and the House of Representatives, Governors of Prefectures, including Tokyo-to, mayors of cities and headmen of towns and villages will be screened before they are allowed to campaign for election. An exception, however, is made in the case of candidates for a prefectural, city, town or village assembly, in view of the tremendous number of applicants and of the limited time available before the elections. All candidates for these positions, however,

Must file a questionnaire in accordance with the regular procedure and such questionnaires will be made immediately available for public inspection and their names listed on special bulletins which are posted for public inspection.

11. How can the public obtain information concerning the screening program?

The Government, through the Prime Minister, the Governors and Mayors of the five principal cities, will release to the press, and post every two weeks, bulletins for public inspection listing the names of all persons whose cases have been reviewed by Screening Committees and on whom final action has been taken. These bulletins will indicate whether the persons have been passed, removed or barred from the Public Service, as well as the availability and location of questionnaires of the persons listed thereon for public inspection. The questionnaires of the persons whose names appear on the bulletin will be available for public inspection together with copies of the purge ordinances at the offices of The Screening Committees concerned. The questionnaires of candidates for elective positions will also be available at the office of the Appropriate Election Administration Committee. The public should make full use of their prerogative to examine the questionnaires of candidates for appointive and elective office. It is of particular importance that the public report to their respective Governors or to the Prime Minister any instances of falsification or omission of relevant or material information in the questionnaires which they examine, as well as violations of the injunctions previously referred to and of mal-administration by any official connected with the administration of the Purge.

12. How many candidates for elective public office will be screened before the election?

The Government estimates that there will be a total of 70,000 candidates for Governor, Mayor and Headman, and Member of the House of Councillors and House of Representatives, out of which 10,563 officials will be elected. It also estimates 26,200 Holders of Principal Public Office in Local Government and Organizations listed in the Purge Ordinances who will be screened before the elections are completed. This makes an estimated total of 96,200 persons whose screening will be completed by the 10th of May. The Government also estimates that there will be 1,111,500 candidates for Prefectural, City, Town and Village Assemblymen, of which 222,300 Assemblymen will be elected and post-screened.

13. Is the Purge a form of punishment for people considered undesirable?

No, the Purge Ordinances are not either in conception or in administration considered or used as a punitive measure. The Purge Ordinances and Screening System are a technique designed to eliminate or prevent the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons who are designated as undesirable personnel under their specific provisions and the Government will consider and correct any injustice in an individual case whenever reasonable proof of error or injustice is submitted.

The answers to the above questions represent the minimum amount of information required by any public spirited citizen who desires to share in the administration of his Government and to exercise his prerogatives in the selection of its public officials. It is, therefore, your duty and responsibility to see that this information is transmitted to the public.