

Tom's Coffee house June 8th 17

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A
TRANSLATION
OF
Part of the First Book
OF
MACHIAVELL'S
ART of WAR.

[Price One Shilling.]

A
TRANSLATION

OF
Part of the Pink Book

OF
MACHINERY'S
ART of WAR.

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A
TRANSLATION

O F

Part of the First Book

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MACHIAVELL's
ART of WAR:

TREATING OF

The best METHOD of defending
a Country against Invasions and
Popular Tumults.

WITH AN

INTRODUCTION and PREFACE,
in Answer to Modern OBJECTIONS.

L O N D O N:

Printed for M. COOPER, at the *Globe* in *Pater-*
noster-Row. MDCCXLIV.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE following Translation was made, and the Preface to it wrote some Years ago, and at different Times, as the Affairs of *Europe* happened more and more to evince the Necessity of *Machiavell's* Scheme; but the Author of the Preface fearing it might be censured as Chimerical, and laid aside Unread or Unconsidered, as impracticable, being unsupported by any interested or party Views chose to defer publishing it, till the Publick might be more disposed to consider it.

The late Alarm of an immediate Invasion from the greatest Power in *Europe*, and a War actually declared with *France* and *Spain* united, are Circumstances sufficient to awaken every thinking Person to the Consideration of any reasonable Proposal for the Defence and Security of his Country from Popery and Slavery, and all their calamitous

tous Consequences, and the Behaviour of the whole Nation upon this occasion, crowding to offer their Lives and Fortunes in defence of the present Establishment, and only waiting to be shewn, wherein they can be made serviceable, affords a favourable Conjunction for the Consideration of *Machiavell's* Scheme, and obviates an Objection which might otherwise have been made, that it might be dangerous to trust the whole People with Arms, because if the Majority, or a large Number of them were disaffected, they might employ them against the present reigning Family; for it now appears, that notwithstanding the Dislike which has been sometimes shewn to the Measures of the Administration, there is no real Disaffection to his Majesty, or Fondness for a Popish Pretender; but, on the contrary, the warmest Zeal for the one, and the utmost Abhorrence of the other. Nor can any be suspected of desiring so hateful a Change but Papists, whose Religion itself is an Absurdity; and these may be easily guarded against, by being forbid the use of Arms; a Method which, if a Militia be established, will make them less considerable than at present; and a Method not liable to any Complaint of Persecution.

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Can there be a stronger Proof of what is advanced in the following Sheets, *viz.* That the Nation is not able to raise and constantly support a sufficient Number of standing mercenary Troops for her Security, than the sending for six thousand *Dutch* Troops from *Holland*, for our immediate Defence against a small embarkation from *Dunkirk*, at a time when we pay for Forty thousand National Troops, and Sixteen thousand foreign, besides Forty thousand Sailors, and Eleven thousand five hundred Marines, and find the utmost Difficulty to lay any new Tax that shall not distress our Trade, or lessen the produce of some former one, only to pay the Interest of the new Debts we contract.

And if the Nation be in such distressed Circumstances already, after above twenty Years of Peace, and only four of War with *Spain*, how is it possible for her to support constantly such a Number of mercenary Forces, as shall be sufficient to defeat all the Attempts of *France* and *Spain* united. The expence of such a Number of Troops, and the entire loss of so many labouring People, will reduce us to great Poverty, and possibly oblige us to submit to the most unreasonable

viii *INTRODUCTION.*

sonable Demands of our Enemies, and, in time, perhaps render us little better than a Province to *France*.

Whereas the Method proposed of arming our whole People would render us secure even from such Enemies, and capable of defending ourselves without the precarious and expensive Assistance of Foreigners, and the mutual Obligation of entering into all their Quarrels.

P R E-

P R E F A C E.

IT has been for many Years past, a Debate in Parliament every Sessions, whether a greater or lesser Number of standing Mercenary Forces were necessary for the Security of this Kingdom; but it has never yet been consider'd by that honourable Assembly, whether a mercenary standing Army be at all necessary in Time of Peace, or whether a better Method might not be found, more effectual for our Defence against Invasions or popular Tumults, more consistent with the Security of the People's Liberty, and less expensive and inconvenient.

Upon a Subject of this Importance, it cannot be amiss to know the Opinion of a Man, who has a most undoubted Reputation for Wisdom and Skill in Political Affairs, who wrote about two Hundred Years ago, and cannot be suspected of being bias'd by any sinister Motives, and whose Authority ought at least to be of so much weight

as to procure him a fair Hearing, and mature Consideration. It is for this Reason I have translated the greatest Part of Machiavell's first Book of the Art of War, which contains his Opinion concerning the best Method of forming an Army for the Defence of a Country. The following Books containing his Opinion, concerning the best Method of arming and disciplining them, I have thought unnecessary to translate, being design'd chiefly for the Consideration of Military Men.

His Opinion in general is, that no Kingdom or Commonwealth can be secure, but by arming and training their own People, and forming a well regulated Militia for their Defence; for that Standing Armies, if they are large, are expensive and ruinous to a People, as well as dangerous to their Liberty; if small, they are insufficient for their Defence.

It may be said perhaps, that the Standing Armies which Machiavell thought dangerous to Liberty, were Armies of Foreigners, such as the Italian States in his Time employ'd, when they made War upon each other; but that a Standing Army, composed of our own Countrymen, and officer'd by them only, and provided for annually by Parliament, is not liable to the same
Objections;

Objections; to this I answer, that it is not being born in the same Country, nor speaking the same Language, nor the Ties of Alliance that will restrain Men from pursuing their Interest or their Ambition to the Prejudice of their Countrymen, as Examples from History will testify: Rome was enslaved by Roman Armies, and our own Country by an English Army under Cromwell, though raised at first, and paid by an English Parliament; and most of the arbitrary Governments now in Europe are supported, and the People held in Subjection by Standing Armies compos'd of their Countrymen, who, when listed into the Service of a Prince, have then an Interest of their own, different from that of the Community; and forgetting the Ties of Consanguinity, or former Friendships, regard only the Commands of the Person on whom they depend, being generally incapable of subsisting by any other Means than by executing his Commands.

And though Princes in general as well as their Ministers, are too apt to be fond of Standing Armies, the sudden Alterations which are frequently brought about in Turkey merely by the Janizaries, as well as the Revolution, which happen'd not long ago in Russia, furnish flagrant

Proofs of the Danger of such Armies even to the Princes who pay and employ them, whenever they think it their Interest to change their Masters: Since all our Accounts from Petersburgh agree, that it was the Army which deposed the late Regent of Muscovy and her Son, (tho' officer'd and paid by her) and placed the present Empress on the Throne, as was the Practice of the Prætorian Bands among the Roman Emperors, whenever their own Interest or Caprice furnish'd them with Motives for a Change: Whereas, if we look back in our own History to the Times when a Militia was established in this Kingdom, we shall not find that any Prince was ever depos'd by them by meer Motives of Caprice or selfish Views, but generally for gross Mal-Administration or Attempts upon the publick Liberty. It is true indeed, when these had laid the Foundation of general Discontent, the different Branches of the Royal Family, and the Ambition of great Men took the Advantage of it to pursue their own Interest, and assert their respective Claims, and by that Means frequently brought about Revolutions, and removed the Crown from one Branch to another: But in all the Changes of the Crown between the Houses of York and Lancaster, we may observe, that the conquering Party took Advantage of some general

neral Discontent, occasion'd by the ill Management of the reigning Family; as for Instance, Henry IV. ow'd his Success to the Folly of Richard II. in supporting his Favourites, the Spencers and the Gavestons in their Oppressions notwithstanding the general Clamours of the People, and introduced the Line of Lancaster to the Throne; and the House of York owed their Accession to the Imbecillity of Henry VI. and the tyrannical Temper of his Wife and her Favourite Suffolk: And the Cruelties of Richard III. made Way for the Union of the two Houses in Henry VII. and the Princess Elizabeth: But where Standing Armies govern, it is not the bad Behaviour of a Prince that dethrones him, nor the good Government of his People that can establish him, but the Humour or Interest of his Tyrant, the Army.

But because it has been alledg'd, that there are some Circumstances peculiar to this Nation, which (though Machiavell's Opinion in general may be true) render us an Exception to it, it may be proper to answer such Objections as I have heard.

And first, it has been objected that we are a trading People, and carry on several Manufactures; and that if our People were to be train'd it would take them off too much from their Employments,

ments, and raise the Price of Labour, so that Foreigners would undersell us in the same Manufactures. — To this I answer,

Doubtless a People might live cheaper, more commodiously, and more plentifully, were there no Occasion to provide for their Defence; — but as this can never be with any Security, the first Consideration ought to be what Method of Defence is the most effectual, the Expence or Inconvenience are but secondary Considerations, and I shall undertake to shew that a well regulated Militia would not only be a more effectual Defence against an Enemy, but also less detrimental to our Trade; and less expensive and inconvenient than our present Method of a Standing Mercenary Army, liable to be augmented upon every Alarm of Danger, whether real or imaginary.

And 1st, Supposing that our Militia were to be regulated in the same Manner that the Militia of Switzerland now is, where it is found sufficient “ to appoint an Officer, call’d a Grand
 “ Major in each District, whose Business it is to
 “ visit both Officers and Soldiers, and draw them
 “ out at least once a Year for a general Review;
 “ and likewise an inferior Officer in every Bail-
 “ liage of their Districts, call’d a Commissioner
 “ of

“ of Arms, whose Business it is to ride all the
 “ Year round from one Community to another to
 “ have the Men exercised every Sunday and
 “ Holiday after Divine Service, to take Care
 “ that their Arms and Accoutrements be in good
 “ order; to see that every Community have a
 “ proper Room to lay up their Arms in, and in
 “ Case of Failure in any of these Particulars
 “ to punish the Offenders according to the Na-
 “ ture of their Fault; — besides this publick
 “ Exercise there are Butts set up in every Com-
 “ munity, where the People at certain Times of
 “ the Year meet every Day to shoot with their
 “ Muskets, that they may learn to be good Marks-
 “ men.” * A Practice of more Service against
 an Enemy than most of the Tricks exhibited in
 our Reviews.

I say then, if so little Time as this, is neces-
 sary to train Soldiers to the Use of their Arms,
 as appears by the Practice in Switzerland, (whose
 Troops are esteemed as good as any in Europe,
 if not better) if our People were train'd in the
 same Manner, here would be no Loss at all ei-

* The above is a Quotation from Mr. Stanyan's Account of
 Switzerland, where may be seen all the other wise Regulati-
 ons of their Militia, which render it not only the most effec-
 tual Defence, but the least expensive to a Country, not at all
 remarkable for its Riches.

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ther in our Agriculture or Manufactures, (for we observe Sundays and Holy Days as well as they) excepting in the general Reviews, which among them are but once a Year; whereas every Man who is listed in a Standing Army is taken entirely from every other Employment, and no longer of any Use either in Agriculture or Manufactures; so that if we suppose an intire Day in every Week were necessary for training a Plowman or Manufacturer to handle his Arms, the Avocation of 180,000 Men from their Employments for this purpose once a Week, would be no more than Equivalent to the Avocation of 30,000 Men entirely from theirs the whole six working Days; — but if once a Month were sufficient, then the Loss of 30,000 Men taken entirely from Agriculture and Manufactures is equal to the Loss of 780000 Men exercis'd only once a Month.

And if the Militia of a Country, or some such large District, should have a general Review twice or three Times in a Summer, such Reviews would not require more Time than is now wasted in Horse-Racing and Cock-Fighting; and they might be ordered at such Times of the Year, when they would least interfere with the Business of Husbandry or Manufactures; and
surely

surely the Splendor of such an Appearance would be more than an Equivalent for the Forfeiture of those trivial and barbarous Diversions, and contrived in this Manner, would be no Hindrance at all to the Trade and Wealth of the Nation.

Almost all our Colonies in the West-Indies, (though Hands and Labour are as much wanted there as they can be any where) arm their whole People and trust to that Defence only, and even the Government of France, though arbitrary, has ventured to arm great Numbers of her People as a Militia, and to incorporate them with her Standing Troops, when she finds Occasion for the Defence of her own Territories or the Invasion of her Neighbours; nor are they deem'd less formidable than if the whole consisted of their Standing Forces only, though in Time of Peace they are a much less Expence to the Crown, and much less Burden to the Subject than their Standing Troops.

Another Objection may be that our Country is an Island, and so well defended by our numerous Fleets that we have no Occasion for a Land-Force to defend us; but as no Body now makes this Objection, and the Nation submits every Year to the Expence and Danger of a Standing Army, rather than trust entirely to the De-

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fence of our Fleets, I think it unnecessary to answer it.

Another Objection may be, the little Use or Advantage of our present Militia, and the Aversion which the Nation discovers to incur any further Expence on that Account; to which I answer, that the little Use or Advantage of our Militia upon the Foot it now stands is owing to the want of Care in the Management and Improvement of it, occasioned by an entire Dependance on our Standing Army.

But if the Nation were convinced, that by a proper Care of their Militia they should be eas'd of the Danger and Expence of a Standing Army, an Expence amounting in all Shapes to very near a Land-Tax of 2s. in the Pound yearly, even in Time of Peace;^a they would then with more Chearfullness apply themselves to the Improvement

^a In computing the Expence of a Standing Army, besides the Money given by Parliament, expressly for their Pay, Cloathing and Subsistence, I think it reasonable to compute some Expences which are the Consequence of it. It is well known that in all the Southern Parts of the Kingdom where Troops are quartered, the Inn-keepers are obliged to maintain them at a certain Rate, upon which Terms they are known to be Losers, beside the other Inconveniencies they must submit to on that Account, such as the Exclusion of more beneficial Customers, &c. Now if they are Losers by the Subsistence of Soldiers, and by lessening the Number of their other Guests, they must have a larger Profit from the Travellers who stop at their Houses, and considerably larger too, in order to balance

provement of the Militia and would soon find it a much less burthen, as well as a more effectual defence than the present number of mercenary Forces.

Perhaps it may be further objected, that in a Militia the common Soldiers cannot be in the same Degree of Subjection to their Officers as they now are in a standing Army; to which I answer that in Switzerland and even in the Militia of France, the common Soldiers are as much in Subjection to their Officers, as is requisite for the training them to the use of Arms, which is all that is needful in time of Peace, though in time of War a more absolute Power in the Commanders is necessary. As to that constant State of Slavery and Submission to ill Usage, which is the condition of common Soldiers in a standing Mercenary Army; I should rather think, it must have a bad Effect by breaking their Spirits and rendring them less couragious to face an Enemy, and less interested in the Success of their Arms.

I think I have now answered all the Objections

lance the before-mentioned Disadvantages, and enable them to keep open their Doors, which additional Profit necessary on this Account, is no less than a Tax on all Travellers, and an addition to the Expence of the Nation.

arising from the peculiarity of our Situation and Circumstances, I shall now mention some Advantages which would arise from the Improvement of our Militia by training the body of our People.

And first, as the Island of Great-Britain is by Computation thought to contain upwards of nine Millions of People, and it is likewise computed by the most able Calculators, that in all mix'd Numbers of People, a fourth part are Men capable of bearing Arms; instead of an Army of 20 or 30,000 Men scatter'd over the whole Nation, here might be forty Armies of 50,000 Men each (for I will suppose 250,000 Men on one account or another exempted from the Service) distributed over the whole Island without any Inconvenience, but living comfortably in their own Habitations, and following their Employments, and notwithstanding ready to be call'd together without the Fatigue of long Marches, and the Inconvenience of waiting for distant Supplies, and prepar'd to repell an Invader before he could be encamped, much less accommodated in an Enemies Country; and an Invader in these Circumstances would be as in a Snare doom'd to certain Destruction; for though our Fleets might by unfavourable Winds, and the Uncertainty of knowing

knowing where the Enemy design'd to make their descent, be unable to prevent them; yet when they were landed they might with great certainty intercept all Recruits or Supplies, by defending only two or three adjacent Ports.

Another Advantage would be, that Husbandry and the other laborious Employments of our lower sort of People, would render them more hardy to endure the Inclemencies of Seasons, and more able to undergo the Labour and Fatigue of digging Trenches, and other Toils incident to War, than our present mercenary Forces weaken'd by Idleness and Debaucheries. And as a Militia would have Families and Property of their own to defend, these would be inducements to a more gallant Behaviour than the wretched Pay of Mercenaries, which they might receive on either Side; or the hope of precarious Plunder. Moreover a Militia would have Property and Employments to subsist upon in time of Peace, far preferable to Soldiers Pay; and therefore they would have nothing to hope from the continuance of War, or to fear from being dismiss'd.

Such a Force as I have mention'd, properly train'd and so qualified; no Power on Earth would think of invading, hardly of opposing.

Another Advantage would be, that as we
have

have probably a better Breed of Horses for Strength and Military Service, than any other Kingdom in the World, and a greater Number of Gentry and People of midling Rank, who already keep numbers of Horses for their Diversion in hunting and Country Sports, as well as for travelling and taking the Air, we should have the best Cavalry in Europe, the most numerous, the best mounted and the best accoutred, and with very little additional Expence. What an Appearance would such a Cavalry make in their more general Reviews, how much superior to the meeting of a County at a Horse Race, or even the meeting at New-Market itself on the same Account?

It would be a farther Advantage, that by these means we might save the Expence of hiring foreign Troops, and of making useless and expensive Alliances with Foreigners for the sake of their Troops; for if England formerly without the assistance of Scotland, but having her often an Enemy, and always apprehending it; and without the extensive Trade, which she now has, and the numerous Fleets owing to it, could (when Military) not only defend her own Coasts without the Assistance of mercenary Armies, but make and retain large Conquests on the Continent, under

der our Edwards, and our Henries; surely now that Scotland is united with her, and her Power at Sea so greatly augmented, were she once again Military, she might set at defiance any Power on Earth to invade her. Or should she think fit to interpose in any of the Quarrels of Europe, in behalf of injured Liberty or Justice, it would be easy to make large draughts of Volunteers out of her numerous Forces, by selecting such only as might be most conveniently spar'd from their other Employments, which the injur'd and less powerful Party would be glad to pay for their Defence; so that, instead of soliciting the Assistance of less powerful Nations, at a great Expence, they would be glad to procure ours at the like Expence and these Forces so generously employ'd, would, by these means, have an Opportunity of seeing real Service, and of being accus-tom'd to the Perils and Fatigues of War; and, when such Service was over, might return to their own Country, and subsist by peaceable Employments, and mix with the Militia of their Country; which, by this Mixture of Veterans, would be upon an equal foot with any Army that might be oppos'd to them, in Experience as well as Discipline.

Another

Another Benefit would be, that were our whole People military, in the manner I have been speaking of, we might employ almost our whole Maritime Force in protecting our Trade, and our distant Colonies, and in annoying our Enemies, and by that means bring them sooner to Peace, on Terms advantageous to us, since we might be less solicitous about defending our own Coasts against an Enemy, who would not be desirous of encountering almost inevitable Destruction by their vain Attempt of invading us, an Attempt which we should rather wish than fear, since their certain Destruction would be the Consequence.

A TRANS-

A
TRANSLATION

O F
Part of the First Book

O F
Machiavell's Art of War.

FABRITIO COLONNA returning from *Lombardy*, where he had a great while commanded an Army for the Catholick King, passing thro' *Florence*, resolved to rest some Days in that City, in order to visit the Great Duke, and to see again some Gentlemen with whom he had formerly been intimate; at which time *Cosimo* thought fit to invite him to his Gardens, not so much for the sake of shewing his Magnificence, as to have an opportunity of a continued Conversation with him, and of hearing and learning from him such things as might be expected from so great a Man.

B

Fabritio

Fabritio came as he desired, and was received by *Cosimo*, together with some other of his intimate Friends, among whom were *Zanobi Buondelmonti*, *Battista dalla Palla*, and *Luigi Alamanni*, young Gentlemen beloved by him, and fond of the same Studies, whose good Qualities we shall pass over, because they every Day speak for themselves. *Fabritio* was received with the utmost Honours suitable to the Season and the Place; and the Feast being ended, *Cosimo*, for avoiding the heat, thought fit to carry the Company into the most retired and shady part of his Garden, where having seated themselves under the shade of the highest Trees, *Fabritio* commended the Place, and considering particularly the Trees, seem'd in suspence. Which *Cosimo* perceiving, said, Perhaps you are not acquainted with some of these Trees; but be not surprized, for they were better known among the Antients than by the usage of the present Times. And having told him their Names, and that *Bernardo* his Grandfather employed himself in such kind of Improvements; *Fabritio* reply'd, I imagin'd so; and this Place, and this Amusement of his, put me in mind of some Princes of our Times, who are delighted with these Plantations and Shades in the ancient manner. And then after pausing, he continued; If I was not afraid of offending, I would give you my Opinion on this Subject, but I believe I shall not, speaking my
Opinion

Opinion among Friends, by way of discussing Things, not by way of finding Fault. How much better had they done, had they endeavoured to imitate the Antients in things which were valiant and hardy, than in those that were delicate and effeminate; and in what they did in the face of the Sun, rather than in the Shade; and to catch the Manners of Antiquity in its true and perfect State, rather than when it became degenerate and corrupted? because when these latter Amusements became in fashion among my Countrymen the *Romans*, the Country was ruined. To which *Cosimo* reply'd, You have opened the way to a Discourse, such as I desired; and I request you, that you'd speak without Ceremony, because I shall question you without any. And, if in questioning or replying, I shall excuse or accuse any one, it will only be for the sake of knowing the Truth from you.

Fab. I shall be very glad to inform you of all I know of the Subject you shall question me upon; and shall appeal to your Judgment, whether I am right, and your Enquiries will be pleasing to me, because I as much expect to learn from what you shall ask of me, as you do from my Answers; for oftentimes the Questions of a wise Man cause one to reflect on many things, and to come to the knowledge of what, without such Enquiry, one should never have known.

Cof. In answer then to what you said first, that my Grandfather, and the Princes you mentioned, had done more wisely, if they had imitated the Antients in their Hardiness, rather than in their Delicacy; I will excuse my Ancestor, and leave the other Princes to you. I do not believe there was a Man in his time, who so much detested a luxurious Life as my Grandfather, or was so much a lover of that Hardiness which you commend; nevertheless, he was sensible that neither he nor his Children could practice it, being born in so corrupt an Age, when any one who should deviate from the common Usage, would be infamous and despised by every one; for if any one should present himself naked upon the Sand to the mid-day Sun in Summer, or in the most frosty Months in Winter, upon the Snow, as *Diogenes* did, he would be thought mad. If any one should educate his Children like the *Spartans*, should make them sleep in the open Air, go with their Head and Feet bare, and wash in cold Water, to make them support Hardships, and to make them less fond of Life, and less afraid of Death, he would be despised, and thought rather a wild Beast than a Man. If he was known to feed upon Roots, and to despise Gold, like *Fabricius*, few would praise him, and none would imitate him. So that being terrify'd from it by the present manner of living, he did not attempt to copy
after

after the Antients, but contented himself to imitate Antiquity in what would be less wonder'd at.

Fab. You have excused him very well, and you say true, but I did not speak of these hardy manners of living, so much as of others more humane, and which have greater Conformity with the present time, which, I should think, to one who was reckon'd among the principal Men of a Commonwealth, would not be so difficult to introduce. I shall always choose to quote the Example of my Countrymen the *Romans*, and if we consider their Manner of Life, and the Disposition of that Commonwealth, we shall see many things in it, not impossible to be introduced in a state, where something good still remains.

Cof. What are those Practices resembling the ancient which you would introduce?

Fab. To honour and reward Virtue, not to despise Poverty; to esteem the Customs and Orders of military discipline; to constrain Fellow-citizens to love one another; to live without Factions; to regard private Interest less than the Publick, and such like things, which might be accommodated to these times, which Manners are not difficult to be inculcated, if you find but the right way, and begin with the proper Means, because in them the Truth is so apparent, that every common Understanding is capable of apprehending it; and whosoever shall institute these Manners, will

will plant Trees, under whose shade we may enjoy ourselves, and be more happy and more pleased than under these.

Cof. I will not enter into the Discussion of what you have said, but leave it to these who are capable Judges of it; and shall return to your Accusation of those, who in serious and great Actions do not imitate the Ancients, hoping, by this means, I shall be more easily satisfied in my Intention. I would then know from you whence it is, that on one side you condemn those who in their Actions do not imitate the Ancients; yet on the other Hand in War, which is your Profession, and in which you are thought to excel, it is not known that you make use of any ancient Method, or what bears any Resemblance of it.

Fab. You are just arrived at the Point I expected, for my Discourse led to this Question, nor did I desire any other; and though I could easily excuse myself, nevertheless I will enter further into it for your greater Satisfaction and my own. Men who would accomplish a thing, ought first to prepare themselves with all Industry, to be ready, when the Occasion happens, to execute that which they proposed to bring about; and because when Preparations are made cautiously they are unknown; no one can be accused of Negligence, unless it be discovered when the Occasion happens; in which if they do not succeed, it appears that the Preparations were
not

not sufficient, or that something was overlooked; and because I have had no Opportunity of showing how far I am prepared to reduce the Military Art into the ancient Regulations, if I have not shewn it, I am not to be blamed by you or any body else. But because you may possibly doubt if this Occasion has happened or no, I will at large discourse what Preparations are first necessary to be made, what Occasion must happen, what Difficulty may prevent the Success of these Preparations and the Occasion from happening, and how this is at the same time a thing very difficult and very easy to be done (which appears a Contradiction)—— I will begin from your Words: When you told me, that in War (which is my Profession) I had not made use of any ancient Regulations; to which I say, that War being a Profession by which Men cannot with Honour live constantly, it being to be used as a constant Employment by a Commonwealth only, or a Kingdom; and either of these States, if they are well regulated, never did consent that any Citizen or Subject should live by it as a Profession; nor did any worthy Man ever exercise it as an Art to live by, because he can never be judged a worthy Man who exercises a Profession to live by, which for a Constancy, he must be rapacious, fraudulent, violent, and have many Qualities inconsistent with that Character; nor can the Men, who
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make a Profession of it, whether great or small, be otherwise; for this Profession will not maintain them in Time of Peace; whence they are necessitated, either to endeavour to prevent Peace, or to make so much advantage in Time of War, as to enable them to maintain themselves in Time of Peace. And neither of these Views are consistent with the Character of a worthy Man; for from the Desire of being able to maintain themselves at all times, arise Robberies, Violences, and Assassinations, which Soldiers of Fortune commit on Friends as well as Foes. And the Fear of Peace occasions the Frauds which such Leaders practice upon those who hire them, that War may continue; and if Peace comes often, it happens that the Leaders, being deprived of their Wages, and of living licentiously, turn *Banditti*, and without any Pity pillage the Country. Have you not an Account in your own History, that there being a great Number of Soldiers in *Italy* without Pay, they assembled themselves in Parties, and went about taxing the Lands, and sacking the Country, and no Remedy for it could be found? Have you not read, that the *Carthaginian* Soldiers having finished the first War which they had with the *Romans*, made a more dangerous War upon the *Carthaginians* under *Matbo* and *Spendius*, two Leaders, chose by themselves in a tumultuous Manner, than that which they had finished with the *Romans*?

Romans. In the times of our Fathers, *Francisco Sforza*, for the sake of living splendidly in time of Peace, not only deceived the People of *Milan*, whose Soldier he was, but took from them their Liberty, and became their Prince. Like him have been all the other Soldiers of *Italy*, who have made Arms their Profession ; and if they have not attained to be Dukes of *Milan*, by means of their Wickedness, so much more do they deserve to be blamed, because they have all had the same Designs, if we examine their Lives, without the same Success. *Sforza*, the Father of *Francisco*, constrained the Queen *Joanna* to throw herself into the Power of the King of *Arragon*, having suddenly abandoned her, and left her disarmed in the midst of her Enemies, only for the sake of gratifying his own Ambition, by plundering her, or taking from her the Kingdom. *Braccio* with the same Industry endeavoured to seize the Kingdom of *Naples*, and had succeeded, if he had not been defeated and killed at *Aquila*. These Mischiefs proceed from no other Cause, than from Men's having exercis'd the Trade of Soldiery, as an Art to live by. Have ye not a Proverb, which confirms what I say, *That War makes Robbers, and Peace hangs them* ; for those who have no other Livelihood, not finding Subsistence by this, nor having Virtue enough to submit to an honest

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nest laborious Life, are of necessity forced to rob on the Highway, and Justice is obliged to execute them.

Cof. You have made me consider this Art of Soldiery as of no value, and I before thought it the most excellent and the most honourable, insomuch that, if you do not further explain yourself, I shall remain unsatisfy'd; for if it be as you say, I know not whence arises the Glory of *Cæsar*, *Pompey*, *Scipio*, and *Marcellus*, and so many *Roman* Generals who have been celebrated as Gods.

Fab. I have not yet discuss'd all that I propos'd, which were two things: One was, that a worthy Man could not follow this for a Livelihood; the other, that a well regulated Commonwealth or Kingdom never permitted that their Subjects or Citizens should make a Trade of it. Concerning the first, I have said what occurred to me: I am now to speak of the second, where I come to answer this last Question of yours, and say, that *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, and almost all the Generals which were at *Rome* after the last *Carthaginian* War, acquired Fame as able Men, not as good Men: and those who liv'd before them acquired Glory, both as able and good Men; for this Reason, that these did not make War their Trade, and those whom I nam'd before did: And while the Commonwealth continued uncorrupted,

neither

neither did any Citizen of Condition presume to make Profit of his Arms in time of Peace, by breaking the Laws, spoiling the Provinces, usurping and tyrannizing over his Country, and advancing himself by all kind of Means : Nor did the lower Sort think of breaking their Oath, attaching themselves to particular Men, despising the Senate, or inlisting themselves under some tyrannical Invasion of the publick Liberty, in order to be able to subsist themselves by Arms at all times. But the General, contented with the Triumph, returned to private Life, being desirous of it; and the private Men laid aside their Arms with a better Will than they took them up; and every one returned to the Employment to which he had been bred; nor were there any who hoped to maintain himself by Plunder and by this Profession. As to the eminent Citizens, we may with great Reason infer this from the Example of *Regulus Attilius*, who, being Chief of the *Roman Armies in Africa*, and having almost conquered the *Carthaginians*, asked leave of the Senate to return home to look after his Farms, which were neglected by his Husbandmen. Whence it is as clear as the Sun, that if he had followed War for the Improvement of his Fortune, and had propos'd to make Advantage by it, having it in his Power to plunder so many Provinces, he had never asked Leave to return to look

after his Lands; because he might every Day have gained more than all of them were worth. For these worthy Men, who did not make War their Livelihood, fought nothing by it but Fatigue, Perils, and Glory: When they had Reputation enough, they were desirous to return home, and live in their accustomed Manner. As to the common Soldiers, that they were in the same way, appears by this, that in general they chose to be excus'd from this Service, and such as might desire it were not always employed, and those were employed who might wish to be dismiss'd: Which is known many ways, and principally by this, that among the first Privileges which the *Roman* People gave to a Citizen, this was one, that he should not be compelled to go to War against his will. *Rome* by this Means, while it was well constituted (which was till the time of the *Gracchi*) had no Soldier, who made War his Trade, and therefore had few bad ones, and as many as were so were severely punished. A well constituted Commonwealth then ought to endeavour, that this Art of War should be us'd by way of Exercise only, in time of Peace, and in time of War, for Necessity and Glory; and that the Publick only should make constant Profession of it, as *Rome* did; and whatever Citizen has any other View, in the exercise of Arms, is not an honest Man; and whatever

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Commonwealth is governed otherwise, is not well constituted.

Cof. I am pleas'd and satisfy'd with what you have said thus far, and with this Conclusion which you are come to; and as far as it regards a Republick, I believe that it is true; but as to Kings, I don't know why a King should not have about him Men who make this Art their Profession.

Fab. A well constituted Kingdom ought so much the more to avoid such Artists, because they only corrupt a King, and are in every thing Ministers of Tyranny; and you must not mention any of the Kingdoms of the present time, as instances of the contrary, because I shall deny any of them to be well constituted; for Kingdoms which are well constituted never give absolute Power to their Kings but in their Armies; because in the Field only a speedy Determination is necessary, and for that Reason only single Power: In other Affairs, nothing is to be done but by Council and Deliberation; and those who counsel a Prince have reason to fear his having People about him who in times of Peace may be desirous of War, as having no other Livelihood. But I will be a little larger upon this Subject, though I shall not proceed so far as to enquire into the Case of a Kingdom perfectly well constituted, but of such as resemble those of our own Times, where such as make War their Profession,
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are to be feared even by Kings themselves, because the Strength of Armies is, without doubt, the Infantry; so that if a King has not so contrived that his Foot in time of Peace shall be content to return home, and live by their Employment, he must necessarily be ruined; for there is no Infantry more dangerous, than that which is composed of such who make War their Trade; for you are forced either to be at War constantly, or to pay them constantly, or to run the risque of their taking from you your Kingdom: To make War constantly is impossible, nor can you always pay them; therefore your Kingdom must necessarily be in danger. My Countrymen the *Romans* (as I said) whilst they were wise and honest, never permitted their Citizens to make War their Trade, altho' they could maintain them constantly, being always at War; but to avoid this Inconvenience that continual War might produce, as the Times did not change, they chang'd the Men, and went on shifting in such a manner with their Legions, that in fifteen Years the Men were all changed for new; and by this Means they had Men in the Flower of their Age, which is from eighteen to thirty-five, in which Age the Legs, the Hands, and the Eye answer one to the other; nor did they keep them till their Strength declin'd, and their Viciousness increas'd, as they did afterwards in
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the corrupt Times; for *Octavius* first of all, and then *Tiberius*, consulting more their own Power than the publick Welfare, began to disarm the *Roman* People, the more easily to govern them, and to keep continually the same Armies upon the Frontiers of the Empire; and because they did not think these sufficient to enslave the People and Senate of *Rome*, they appointed an Army, call'd the *Pretorian*, which was stationed near the Walls of *Rome*, which were as a Citadel upon their Backs to keep the City in awe: And because then they began to permit freely, that the Men listed in these Armies should make War their Trade, they soon became insolent and formidable to the Senate, and hurtful to the Emperor: And the Consequence was, that many of the Emperors themselves were murder'd by their Insolence; for these Armies gave and took away the Empire to and from whom they pleas'd; and sometimes it happen'd, that there were several Emperors created by different Armies; which first caused the Division of the Empire, and afterwards the Ruin of it. Kings ought therefore, if they would live in safety, to have their Foot composed of Men, who, in time of War, will for his sake go to War; and when afterwards Peace comes, will more willingly return home; which will always be the Case, if he list Men who have another Livelihood of their own.

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So that he ought to endeavour, that his Nobles should return to govern the People under them; the Gentry to look after their Estates; and the private Men to their particular Employments; and that every one should go to War willingly for the sake of Peace, and not study to break Peace for the sake of having War.

Cos. This Discourse of yours appears to be well considered; but being contrary to my former way of Thinking, my Mind is not yet quite clear of all doubt, because I observe many Lords and Gentlemen maintain themselves in time of Peace, by means of their military Profession, as some of your Equals do, who have Pensions from Princes and Communities. I see also almost all your Men of Arms remain as Garrisons of Towns and Fortresses; so that it seems to me, that there is Provision for every one in time of Peace.

Fab. I think you can hardly be of this Opinion, because, if there were no other Reason, the small Number of those who are garrison'd in Places, as you mention, would be a sufficient Answer. What Proportion do the Infantry, necessary in War, bear to those made use of in time of Peace? For the Fortresses and Towns, which are garrison'd in time of Peace, in War require much larger Garrisons; to which must be added the Soldiers, who keep the Field, which are a great Number, who are all left to shift for themselves

selves in time of Peace. And as to the standing Guards of States, which are a small Number, Pope *Julius* and you have shewn to the World how much those are to be feared, who know no other Trade but War, and ye have, for their Insolence discharged them your Service, and employed *Swiss*, a People born and bred under the Laws, and chosen by their Communities in a proper Manner; so that you must not say any more, that there is Provision for all in time of Peace. As to your Guards, these having their Pay in time of Peace, it may appear a more difficult Consideration, nevertheless all things being well considered, the Answer is easy: For this way of keeping standing Guards is a bad Custom, and answers no good Purpose; for they are Men who have no other Subsistence, and from such every Day would arise a thousand Inconveniences in States, if they were numerous; but being but few, and not able to form an Army of themselves, they cannot so often do great Mischiefs; nevertheless they have often done some, as I told you in the Case of *Francisco*, and of *Sforza* his Father, and of *Braccio de Perugia*, so that I do not approve of this Custom of keeping Guards, it is corrupt, and may cause great Inconveniences.

Cos. Would you be intirely without them? Or having them, in what Manner would you manage them?

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Fab.

Fab. By a Regulation, not like that of the Kings of *France*, because it is dangerous as ours is ; but like to that of the Ancients, who raised their Cavalry from among their own Subjects, and in time of Peace sent them home to live by their Employments, as I shall discuss more largely anon : So that if now this Part of an Army can live by their Profession in time of Peace, it arises from a corrupt Regulation. As to the Pensions, which are allowed to me and other Chiefs, I say, this also is a most corrupt Regulation ; for a wise Commonwealth ought not to grant these Pensions to any one, but ought to make use of its own Citizens for Chiefs in War ; and in time of Peace dismiss them to follow their own Professions. So also a wise King either ought not to give them, or, if he does, it should be as a Reward for some great Action, or in order to gain to himself a Man of Worth to serve him in Peace, as well as War ; and because you have mentioned me, let me be the Example ; and, I say, I have never made War my proper Profession, for my Business is to govern my Subjects, and defend them ; and in order to enable myself to defend them, to love Peace and understand War ; and my King esteems and rewards me, not so much for my Knowledge in War, as for being an able Counsellor in time of Peace. No King ought then to have any but such about him, if he be a wise Man, and proposes to govern

govern prudently, because if he has about him People too fond either of Peace or War, they will mislead him. You may by this time perceive what Difficulty there is to introduce the ancient Methods in our present Wars, and what Preparations a wise Man must make, and what Opportunities must be waited for to put them in execution. But you will by degrees know these Things better, if my Discourse does not tire you, comparing every part of the ancient Discipline with the present.

Cof. If before we requested to hear you discourse on these Subjects, what you have hitherto said, has doubled our desire; in the mean time we thank you for what we have heard, and wish to hear the rest.

Fab. Since it is your pleasure, I will begin to treat this Matter from the Beginning, that it may the better be understood. The End which every one proposes who makes War, is to combat the Enemy in the Field, and to conquer in the Day of Battle; in order to this, it is necessary to form an Army; to form an Army, it is necessary to find Men, to arm and discipline them, and to exercise them in small and large Numbers, and to lodge them, and afterwards, either standing or marching, to draw them up before the Enemy. In this consists all the Industry of War in the open Field, which is the most necessary, and the most honourable: And he

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who knows how to form his Troops well in the Day of Battle, other Errors which he may have made in other Branches of the War, are supportable; but he who is deficient in this Branch of Discipline, will never conduct a War with Glory, though he be never so able in other Branches: Because a Battle gained cancels every former Mistake; and if it be lost, every other former piece of good Conduct is rendered of no value. It being first necessary then to find Men, the next Thing is to make choice of them. Those who have given Rules for War, direct, that Men should be chosen from the temperate Countries, that they may have both Spirit and Prudence; because a hot Country produces Men prudent, but not bold; a cold Country bold, but not prudent. This Rule may be given to one who is Prince of the whole World; and such a one may raise his Men from what Country he pleases: But if one is to give a Rule which may be useful to all, it is proper to say, that every State and every Kingdom, ought to raise Soldiers from their own Territories, whether they be hot, cold, or temperate; for it appears by ancient Examples, that in every Country good Soldiers are formed by Exercise, because Industry makes up the defects of Nature, and is in this Case of more Consequence than Nature itself; and raising them from foreign Countries, cannot be call'd making choice

choice of them, because that supposes picking the best of a Province, and having the Power of chusing such who are unwilling as well as those who are willing to go to War. This sort of Levy therefore cannot be made but in Countries subject to you; for you cannot take whom you please in Countries not subject to you, but you must take such as offer themselves.

Cos. But you may, however, out of those who offer themselves, take or leave whom you please; and this may be called a Choice.

Fab. What you say is partly true; but considering how defective such a Choice is, it is often, in reality, no choice at all. In the first place, those who are not your Subjects, and who war as Volunteers, are not the best, but generally the worst People of a Country; for if there be any in it Scandalous, Idle, Licentious, without Religion, Runaways from their Parents, Blasphemers, Gamesters, ill educated in every respect, they are such who offer themselves as Soldiers; and none are so unfit to make a true and good Soldiery as such sort of People. When a greater Number of these offer themselves than you have occasion for, you may chuse out of them; but the whole being bad, it is impossible your choice should be good: But it often happens that there are not enough to compleat the Numbers you have occasion

occasion for ; so that being forced to take them all, it cannot be called a choice. In this disorderly Manner, the Armies in *Italy* are now formed, and elsewhere, excepting in *Germany*; for they are not listed by the order of the Prince, but as Volunteers are to be found: How do you think then the antient military Discipline can be introduced in an Army of Men got together by such Means?

Cof. What Method should be taken then?

Fab. The Method I spoke of, to chuse them from among the Subjects, by the Authority of the Prince.

Cof. Among Men chosen in this Manner then, the antient Discipline might be introduced.

Fab. Yes, certainly; if he who commands it were their natural Prince or Lord; if it were a Principality, or their Fellow-Citizen, and at that time their proper Captain, if it were a Commonwealth; otherwise it is difficult to do any thing well.

Cof. Wherefore.

Fab. I'll tell you in its proper Place; at present let this suffice. It can't be well done any other way.

Cof. Supposing then this Levy to be made in your own Dominions, whence should you judge it best to raise Men from the City or the Country?

Fab. Those who have wrote about it, all agree, that it's best to chuse them from the
Country,

Country, being Men us'd to Hardships; bred in Fatigues; accustomed to face the Sun, and avoid the Shade; to understand working in Iron, and digging Trenches; us'd to bear Weights, and being without Craft or Malice: But here my Opinion would be, that there being two Sorts of Soldiers, Horse and Foot, the Foot should be chose from the Country, and the Horse from the great Towns.

Cof. Of what Age would you chuse them?

Fab. If I was to form a new Militia, I would take them from Seventeen to Forty; if I was to recruit, from Seventeen always.

Cof. I do not well understand this Distinction.

Fab. I will tell you. If I was to constitute a Militia where there was none, it would be necessary to take all who were fit, provided they were of a military Age, in order to instruct them, as shall be told hereafter; but if I were to make Levies in Countries where a Militia was already established, for a Supply of it, I would chuse them of seventeen; for those of more advanced Age would be already listed.

Cof. Would you then form a Militia, like what is in our Country?

Fab. I would arm them, appoint Officers over them, exercise them, and muster them in a Manner which, whether it be like yours, I do not know.

Cof.

Cof. Do you then approve of a Militia?

Fab. Why should I condemn it?

Cof. Because many wise Men have always found fault with it; the ill Proof we have had of it makes us of this Opinion.

Fab. Have a care it be not your own fault, not the fault of the Thing itself; which you shall be sensible of before this Discourse is finished.

Cof. You will do an acceptable thing; but I will tell you the Objections, that you may the better answer them. They say, either it will be uselefs, and if we trust to it, we may ruin the State by it: or it will be powerful, and then he who commands it may enslave the State. They mention the *Romans*, who by means of their own Arms, lost their Liberty; and they instance the *Venetians* and the King of *France*; the first, because they are unwilling to obey one of their Fellow-Citizens, use foreign Arms, and the King of *France* has disarmed his own People the more easily to govern them. But they are most afraid of their being uselefs, for which they alledge two Reasons: One, that they are unexperienced; the other, that they are compelled to it; for, they say, that People of Condition won't submit to be taught; and that nothing is ever done well by compulsion.

Fab. All these Reasons which you mention, are from Men who see but a little way,

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as I shall plainly demonstrate. And first as to their useflessness: I say there is no Soldiery so useful as what is compos'd of your own People, nor can such a one be constituted any other way: And because this is indisputable, I will not lose much time about it; for all the Examples of antient Histories confirm as much; and since they alledge Inexperience and Compulsion, I say, it is true, that Inexperience causes Diffidence, and Compulsion Discontent; but Courage and Experience may be taught them, by the Method of arming them, and exercising them, as you shall see in the prosecution of this Discourse: But as to force, you are to understand, that Men who are hired to be Soldiers by the command of the Prince, are not altogether forced, nor altogether Voluntiers: For if the Service were entirely voluntary, it would cause the Inconveniences I have mentioned before, that there could be no choice, and they would be few who list'd, and force alone would likewise produce bad Effects. Therefore a middle way is to be taken, which should be neither intirely compulsive, nor voluntary; where they shall be induced by the regard they have to the Prince, and be more afraid of his Displeasure, than of the present Punishment; and Compulsion should be mixt with good liking in such a manner, that no such Discontent shall arise, as to produce ill Effects. I do not say, that

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such a Soldiery shall never be overcome; for the *Roman* Armies were often overcome; and *Annibal's* Army was conquered; so that it's plain, no Army can be formed in such a manner, that one can be sure it shall not be beaten. Wherefore these wise Men of yours ought not to infer their useflessness from their being once defeated, but believe, that they may conquer, as well as be vanquished, and find a Remedy for the cause of their defeat; and when they enquire into this, they will find that it did not happen through the defect of this Method, but of the particular Disposition, that it was not perfect, and, as I said, they ought to provide against its Imperfection, not by condemning a Militia, but by correcting it; which, how it should be done, ye shall learn by degrees. As to the doubt, lest such a Militia should destroy the State, by means of some Person who may make himself head of it; I answer, that Arms in the hands of Fellow-Citizens and Subjects, given them by the Laws and by the Constitution, never did any harm but always good, and Commonwealths are kept longer faultless, by means of such Arms than without them. *Rome* continued free 400 Years, and was armed all the while; *Sparta* 800. Many other Commonwealths have been unarmed, and have not continued free so long as forty Years; for Commonwealths stand in need of Arms,
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and when they have not their own they must hire foreign; and foreign Arms are more dangerous to the publick Welfare than their own, for they are more easy to be corrupted; and a Citizen who is become powerful, may sooner make use of them, and has less Opposition to cope with, having to oppress only an unarmed Multitude. Moreover, a Commonwealth should be more afraid of two Enemies than one; they who make use of foreign Arms, have to fear at the same time the Foreigner which they hire, and their own Citizen; and that there is reason for this double fear, recollect what I said just now of *Francisco Sforza*; they who make use of their own Arms have only some Citizen of their own to fear. But instead of all the Reasons that may be urged, let this suffice, that no Legislator ever constituted a Commonwealth, or a Kingdom, who did not take it for granted that the Inhabitants themselves were to defend it by Arms: And if the *Venetians* had been as wise in this as in all their other Regulations, they had made a new Empire in the World; and they are the more blameable, being armed by their first Legislators; but having no Territory on Land, they were armed only for the Sea, where they made War with great Spirit, and by their own Arms enlarged their Country: But the Time coming when they had occasion to make War

at Land, to defend *Vicenza*, where they ought to have sent some Citizen of their own to fight on Land, they hired for their Captain the Marquis of *Mantua*. This was what disabled them from climbing to Heaven, and enlarging their Empire; and if they did thus, distrusting themselves by Land, although they understood making War by Sea. It was an unwise Diffidence; for a Commander at Sea, who is used to combat with the Winds and the Waves, as well as Men, will more easily become a Commander at Land, where he is to combat with Men only, than a Commander at Land will become one at Sea: And my Countrymen the *Romans*, who were skilful at Land and not at Sea, being at War with the *Carthaginians*, who were powerful at Sea, did not hire *Greeks* or *Spaniards*, who were expert at Sea, but made their Land Soldiers become Sailors, and conquered. If the *Venetians* did this lest one of their own Citizens should enslave them, it was a groundless fear; for besides those Reasons I have already mentioned, if no Citizen armed for the Sea had ever enslaved this Commonwealth situated in the Sea, he would have been much less able to compass it with Land Arms. And by this means they ought to have seen, that Arms in the hands of their Citizens could not have made Tyrants, but that bad Constitutions of Government

cause a Commonwealth to be enslaved ; and these having a good Government needed not have been afraid of their own Arms. They took therefore an imprudent Step, which has been the cause of their losing much Glory and Felicity. As to the mistake which the King of *France* makes in not disciplining his People to War, which your wise Men bring as an Example, there is no unprejudiced Person who will not esteem this a Defect in that Kingdom, and that this Negligence alone makes it weak. But I have made too great a Digression, and perhaps gone from my purpose ; but I did it to answer you, and to demonstrate to you, that you cannot depend on any Arms but your own ; and that your own Arms cannot be regulated otherwise than by means of a Militia ; nor by other Means can you introduce the Forms of Armies in a Country, nor by any other Method appoint a military Discipline. If you have read the Constitutions of the first Kings of *Rome*, and principally of *Servius Tullus*, you will find, that the Constitution of the Classes is nothing else but a Regulation, to enable them of a sudden to bring an Army together for the defence of the City. But returning to our levy ; I say again, that if I were to recruit an old Establishment, I would take them of Seventeen ; but if I were to create a new one, I would
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take them of every Age, from Seventeen to Forty, to make use of them on a sudden.

Cof. Would you make a difference from what Profession you chose your Men?

Fab. Writers do so, for they caution you against taking Poachers, Fishermen or Cooks, or any who are only Purveyors for our Pleasure; but they advise to take besides Husbandmen, Smiths, Farriers, Carpenters, Butchers, Hunters, and the like; but I should give but little Preference as judging the fitness of the Man from his Trade; but a good deal on account of his Trade being useful in the Field: And for this reason Countrymen, who are us'd to work in the Ground, are of more use than any others, because of all the Occupations this is most used in Armies: After these are Smiths, Carpenters, Farriers and Shoemakers; of such it is convenient to have a good Number, for their Trades are useful in many Cases; and it's a great Convenience to have a Soldier serviceable in a double Capacity.

Cof. By what Means do you know those who are from those who are not fit for Service?

Fab. I will first speak of the Manner of chusing a new Militia, to form from thence an Army afterwards; I say then, that the fitness of a Man whom you are chuse for

a Soldier, is known, either by Experience, from some gallant Action he has done, or by Conjecture. In Men that are quite new, and have never been list'd before, no tryal of Valour has been made; and of those who have already been in Service, few or none are to be found in Militias which are newly appointed. It is necessary therefore, where Experience is wanting, to recur to Conjecture, which is to be form'd from the Age, the Trade, and the Appearance of the Man. Of the two first we have discours'd; it remains to speak of the third. Some have advised that the Soldier should be large, of which Opinion was *Pyrrhus*: Some others have chosen them for their Strength of Body only, as did *Cæsar*. Both Strength of Body and Spirit are to be guess'd at from the Disposition of the Limbs, and the Expression of the Countenance: and therefore those who have wrote about it, say, they would chuse to have the Eyes lively and chearful, the Neck nervous, the Breast broad, the Arms muscular, the Fingers long, but little Belly, the Sides round, the Leg and Foot taper: Which disposition of Limbs generally renders a Man active and strong, which in a Soldier are two Qualities desirable above all others; but principally his Manners are to be considered, that he have honesty and modesty, otherwise you'll chuse an Instrument of Scandal, and a Cause of Corruption; for no
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one can believe, that in a debauched Education, and a brutish Mind, a single Virtue is to be found, which can be in any shape laudable. Nor do I think it superfluous, but necessary, that you may the better understand the Importance of this Choice, to mention the Method which the *Roman* Consuls observed in the beginning of their Magistracy, in electing the *Roman* Legions. In which election Veterans being mixt with new Men, by means of their continual Wars, they might judge by Experience in the Veterans, and by Conjecture proceed in the new Men. This also is to be remarked, that these Elections were made either for immediate use, or to exercise the Men, and prepare them for another Time. I have already spoke, and shall continue to speak of what is necessary to prepare them for a distant Time; for my Intention is to shew you, how an Army may be formed in Countries where no Militia has been appointed, in which Countries no Levies can be made for immediate Service; but in those whence it is customary to raise Armies, they may be had for immediate Service, as was the Custom in *Rome*, and now among the *Switzers*. For in these Levies, if there are new Men, there are also so many others accustomed to stand in military Order, that the new Men and the Veterans mixed together, form a firm and united Body. And tho' the Emperors, after they had begun to keep their

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Troops in fixed Stations, appointed a Master to exercise the new rais'd Soldiers, as is seen in the Life of the Emperor *Maximus*. Yet while *Rome* was free this was not done in the Armies, but within the City only, where the young Men being sufficiently practis'd in these military Exercises, were easily made useful in real War. But the Emperors afterwards, when these Exercises were put an end to, were necessitated to make use of the Methods I now mentioned. Now coming to the manner of the *Roman* Levy, I say, that when the *Roman* Consuls who had the charge of the War, had enter'd upon the Magistracy, and were about to form their Armies (for it was the Custom that each of them should have two Legions of *Roman* Soldiers, which were the Strength of their Armies) they created twenty-four military Tribunes, and designed six for each Legion, who performed the same Office with those we now call Colonels. Then all the *Romans* fit to bear Arms were collected, and the Tribunes of each Legion were placed separate one from another. Afterwards, they drew by Lot the Tribe from which they were first to make choice, and from that Tribe they chose four of the best Men; of which one was elected by the Tribunes of the first Legion; and of the other three, one was elected by the Tribunes of the the second Legion, and of the last two; one was elected by the Tribunes of the third Legion, and the last belonged to the fourth Legion; after these four, four others were chose;

of which the first was chose by the Tribunes of the second Legion; the second by those of the third; the third by those of the fourth; the fourth remained to the first; then four others were chose; of which the third Legion chose the first; the fourth the second; the first the third; and the fourth remained to the second: And thus they varied successively, till the Elections became equal, and the Legions equal in number. And, as we said before, this Levy was fit for immediate Service; because it was made from Men, of whom good part were experienced in real War, and all had been exercis'd. This choice might be made both by Conjecture and Experience; but where a new Militia is to be appointed, and to be chosen for a distant time, this choice can be made only by Conjecture; which is formed from their Age and Appearance.

Cof. I believe that all you have said is true; but before you proceed, I would ask one thing which you have brought to my Mind, by saying, that the choice which is to be made where there are not Men used to War, must be made by Conjecture; because I have heard our Militia blamed in many Places, principally as to the Number; for many say, a lesser Number should be taken, which would have this Advantage, that they would be better, and better chosen; that there would not be so much Inconvenience to the Men; that you might give them some Pay, by which Means they would be better contented, and more easily commanded. Therefore I

desire to know your Opinion in this Matter, and if you would like better a large Number or a small, and what Methods you'd observe in chusing them in the one or the other Number.

Fab. Without doubt, a large Number is better and more necessary than a small; or rather, where a large Number cannot be appointed, a perfect Militia cannot be constituted, and I shall easily confute all the Reasons alledged. I say then, first, that the smaller Number, where there are People enough, as in *Tuscany*, for instance, will be no cause of your having them better, nor that the choice shall be more select, because if in chusing your Men you would judge of them from Experience, very few will be found in that Country who have had any trial; for few of them have been in War, and of those few still fewer have given any Proof of their Merit for which they should be preferred to others. So that he who is to chuse in such Countries, must quit Experience, and chuse them only by Conjecture. Being reduced then to this Necessity, I would know, if twenty young Fellows of good Appearance come before me, by what Rule I should chuse one and leave another? So that, I believe, every Man will confess that it is better to take them all, and to arm and exercise them, not being able to know which of them is to be preferred, and to defer making your choice, till by practising them in their Exercises you may discover which of them have most Activity and Courage: So that all things considered, selecting only a few for the sake of having them better, is

the wrong Method. As to bringing Inconvenience upon the Country and the Men, I say, that this Regulation, whether it be extensive or otherwise, brings no Inconvenience; because this Appointment does not take Men away from any of their Employments, for it obliges them only on leisure Days to meet together to exercise themselves, which does no damage to the Country or to the Men, but is generally pleasing to Youth; for whereas on Holidays, they now stand shamefully idle, in publick Places, they would go with pleasure to these Exercises for the handling of Arms, which, as it would make a fine Appearance would be very agreeable to young Men. As to the Advantage of being able to pay the lesser Number, and by that means keeping them more obedient and more contented; I answer, that you cannot form a standing Army of so few as can be paid in such a manner constantly, as that Pay shall satisfy them: For example, If a Militia was appointed of 5000 Foot, to pay them in such a manner as should content them, it will be proper to give them at least 10000 Ducats a Month: And first, this number of Foot is not sufficient for an Army, and the Expence is insupportable to a small State, and too little to keep the Men contented, or to oblige them to exert themselves with chearfulness: So that by this Method you'll be at great Expence; you'll have but few Forces, and they will not be sufficient either to defend you, or to execute any Enterprize. If you give them more pay, or hire more Men, so much greater is the impossibility of

of paying them; if you give less pay, or hire fewer Men, they will be so much the less contented, or of so much the less use to you; so that those who talk of forming a standing Army, and paying them constantly while they stay at home, talk of Things either impossible or useless, tho' it is very necessary to pay them, when they are led to War. However, if the Method we have mentioned causes any Inconvenience to those who are listed, which I do not perceive, there are for recompence all the Advantages which a well regulated Militia produces in a Country, for without it there is no Safety. I conclude therefore, that he who chuses the smaller Number, that he may be able to pay them, or for any other of the Reasons alledged by you, does not understand his Interest; for, in my Opinion, the smaller Number will always diminish under your Hand, by numberless Accidents to which Men are liable, and dwindle to nothing; but if your Militia be large, you may at your choice make use of a larger Number or a less. Beside this, the Advantage you receive by your Arms may be either in Service, or in Reputation, and the larger Number will always give you more Reputation. It may be added to this, that if you form Regulations to keep Men exercis'd, and you list but few Men in a large Country, the Bodies will be at such a distance from each other, that you cannot, without great Inconvenience to them, get them together to exercise them; and without this Exercise your Regulation of a Militia is useless, as shall be observed in its Place. *Cof.*

Cof. What you have said Answers sufficiently this Question of mine ; but I now desire that you would clear up another Doubt: They say such a multitude of armed Men will cause Confusion, Scandal and Disorder, in a Country.

Fab. This is another groundless Opinion, for the Reason I shall now give you. Those who are train'd to Arms may cause Disorder two ways, either among themselves, or with others, both which may be easily obviated, if it be not so by the very regulation of the Militia itself; for as to Quarrels among themselves, this Regulation prevents them, instead of nourishing them; for in mustering them, you give them Arms and Chiefs: If the Country where you muster them be so unwarlike, that there are no Arms among the Men, and so united that there are no Party Divisions. This Regulation will make them stouter against Foreigners, but in no degree more disunited among themselves; for Men well regulated fear the Laws, arm'd as well as unarm'd, nor can ever do otherwise, if the Leaders which you give them do not cause the Alteration; and the Method of doing this shall be told anon. But if the Country where you muster them be armed and disunited, this Regulation only is a Cause of uniting them, for they have Arms and Leaders among themselves; but their Arms are useless as to War, and their Leaders Fomenters of Quarrels; and this Regulation will give them Arms useful for War, and Leaders Extinguishers of Quarrels; for in a divided Country, as soon as any one is offended, he runs

to the Head of his Party, who, to maintain his own Reputation, exhorts him to Revenge and not to Reconciliation. The Chief appointed by the Publick does the contrary; so that by this Means the cause of Quarrels is taken away, and Union is promoted. Thus Provinces that are united but effeminate are freed from their Imbecillity, and keep their Union; those that were disunited and quarrelsome are united, and that Fierceness which us'd to produce Disorder, is converted to the publick Advantage. As to preventing them from hurting others, it is to be considered that they cannot, but by means of the Chiefs who command them: And to prevent the Chiefs from committing Disorders, it is necessary to have a care that they do not acquire too much Authority. Now it must be consider'd, that this Authority is acquired either by Nature or by Accident: And as to Nature, it is proper to provide, that a Man be not set over Men list'd in the same Place where he was born, but be made a Chief in Places where he has no natural Interest: As to Accident, it should be contrived in such a manner, that every Year the Chiefs should change their Commands from one to another; for continued Authority over the same Men, begets such a Union between them, as may be easily converted to the prejudice of the Prince: How useful these Changes are to those who have made use of them, and prejudicial to those who have not observed them, is manifest by the example of the Kingdom of the *Assyrians*, and from the Empire of

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of the *Romans*, where it is seen, that that Kingdom lasted a thousand Years without Tumult and without any War ; which was owing to nothing else than the Changes from Place to Place which were made every Year of the Generals of their Armies ; and in the *Roman Empire*, after the Death of *Cæsar*, the many Civil Wars among the Generals of the Armies, and their Conspiracies against the Emperors arose from no other Cause than keeping continually the same Generals fixed in the same Commands ; and if any of the Emperors who ruled the Empire with Reputation, as *Adrian*, *Marcus Severus*, &c. had been so prudent as to have introduced this Custom of changing their Generals, without doubt they had made it more quiet and durable ; for the Generals would have had less opportunity of causing Tumults, and the Emperors less occasion to fear them ; and the Senate in the failures of Successions would have had more Authority in the election of an Emperor, and consequently it would have been better in every Respect. But ill Customs contracted either by the Ignorance or Negligence of Men, are not to be cured either by ill or good Examples.

F I N I S.