

one, and not several conflicting systems, if a single problem is held persistently in view than if one indite a book *de omnibus rebus*. Professor Strong's book also, it seems to me, brings out very clearly the needs that must be met before we can expect to find a satisfactory solution of the problems that it considers. Some of these are : a deeper discussion of the basis of the inference to other minds, and of the meaning and method of the action of mind on mind, and thus of the significance of the unity and continuity in the world of mental realities ; a fuller investigation of the nature and the import of the 'transcendence' involved, as the author rightly points out, in memory and perception, as well as in our knowledge of other minds ; a more comprehensive treatment of idealism, consciousness, and the ego ; and a more searching examination of the notion of causality.

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Outlines of Psychology. An Elementary Treatise with Some Practical Applications. By JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1903. — pp. xxvii, 379.

It goes without saying that Professor Royce's book is a fresh and independent treatment of psychology, rich in suggestion. In his introductory chapter on "Definitions and Explanations," he first admirably states the difference between the inner psychological facts and the outer facts, which are "public property," and then—in the opinion of the present writer—rather overstates the social and 'descriptive' nature of the science of psychology. The chapters which follow, on the "Physical Signs of the Presence of Mind" and on "Nervous Conditions," include nothing new except a statement of Loeb's conception of the 'tropism' and the suggestion (later to be developed) that the tropism may be treated as a parallel to some psychic fact. As "General Features of Conscious Life," Royce next considers, very effectively, the unity and the variety of consciousness, "the fact that at any time whatever is present tends to form an always incomplete but still in some respects single conscious condition," and the "equally obvious fact" that "the one conscious state of the moment is always a unity consisting of a multiplicity." The chapter concludes with a criticism of the theory that "our total mental state is . . . a unity consisting of certain ultimate sensations and feelings that we cannot ourselves detect except indirectly." To the present writer this criticism seems unnecessary, because the 'mind-stuff' hypothesis, which it opposes, so long ago slipped out of psycho-

logical systems. The psychologists nowadays still talk of conscious elements ; but every one of them would agree with Royce, that an element is an abstraction, that "analysis alters the consciousness that is analyzed," and that "for any ordinary state of consciousness an analyzed state or series of states may be substituted."

From this point onward, the book discusses phenomena of consciousness on the basis of a 'tripartite division,' not indeed the traditional division into feeling, knowledge, and will, but a classification under the three heads, — admirably chosen from the standpoint of pedagogical application, — of sensitiveness, docility, and mental initiative. The study of sensitiveness is defined (p. 117) as "a statement of the principal kinds of states of consciousness that occur within the range of our psychical experience . . . with especial relations to the sorts of physical conditions on which they depend." The study of docility proves to be a discussion of "the relations that bind the consciousness of any moment to previous experience." The study, finally, of mental initiative is a consideration of "the factors that make possible . . . variation of our conduct and of our mental processes."

It becomes at once evident to the reader that the discussion of sensitiveness, that is, of "principal kinds of states of consciousness," is Royce's equivalent for a study of the conscious elements. It is not, however, a part of his plan to consider these in any detail, except as they offer especial features of practical interest. He groups them under the three heads: sensory experience, mental imagery, and feelings ; and, so far as the first two classes are concerned, offers within the limits of forty pages a very successful sketch of fundamental facts concerning sense-experience and mental imagery. Of especial value is the treatment of extensity as an attribute of sensation, a "primitive character upon which our developed notion of space is founded" (p. 140). The physical parallel of the sensory consciousness of extensity is well described as "reaction of orientation." Significant, also, is the emphasis laid, throughout the discussion of mental imagery, upon "the connection between sensory images and our motor response to our environment" (p. 159).

By far the most important chapter in this division of the book is that which discusses the feelings. Professor Royce here proposes the hypothesis of at least two relatively independent 'dimensions' of feeling and at least four kinds of feeling: feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness, and feelings of restlessness and of quiescence. These two pairs of opposed feelings may be variously combined: "There

are sufferings which leave us relatively quiescent, while there are sufferings which are accompanied with vigorous restlessness (p. 182). . . . On the other hand, pleasure may be of the restless type . . . although we like what we have, we are dissatisfied with the situation, and restlessly seek for more" (p. 183). The description and illustration of these "mixed feelings" form one of the most significant portions of the book.

This chapter concludes the enumeration of "the kinds of conscious experience," and therefore provides a convenient place for comment. The first question which suggests itself concerns the completeness of the enumeration. One is surprised to find that the book contains no analysis of the consciousness of relations. In a later chapter, to be sure, the feeling of familiarity is incidentally mentioned, but it is then too summarily assigned to the class of "feelings of quiescence." Again, the chapter on "Differentiation" discusses the "consciousness of difference," but only in its genesis through repeated, yet partially varying, experiences. No thorough analysis of the content of the consciousness of relation is offered.

With reference, in the second place, to the consciousness of quiescence and that of restlessness, the present writer ventures to question the propriety of classing them with the "feelings." That they form a significant part of experience, and that they are constantly combined with the consciousness of pleasantness and of unpleasantness, Dr. Royce has abundantly shown; but to the writer they seem to be contrasted with the life of feeling as the active to the passive, and to be more plausibly described as aspects of will and belief.

The chapters on "Docility," study perception, memory, and thought, with constant emphasis upon the imitative function, — the tendency to repetition, not only of one's own past experience, but also of other conscious selves. The social nature of consciousness and the close and essential connection between consciousness and motor reaction are the most significant features of these chapters. It may be questioned whether the very interesting discussion of generalization, judgment, and reasoning, — first, with reference to the motor reactions which they involve, and second, as results of social conditions, — offers an entirely adequate or complete analysis. The chapter on "Differentiation" considers a result, rather than a form, of docility.

The highly suggestive chapter on "Mental Initiative" disappoints the reader because of its brevity and its almost exclusive concern with the biological and physiological conditions. "The basis of all initiative," Royce supposes (p. xxiii), "are to be found in 'tropisms'

that lead to a restless persistence in types of action which are not yet adaptive," and "the power to learn decidedly new variations of our habits will usually depend upon . . . our disposition to persevere either in repeating with variations the particular acts that have so far proved abortive, or in searching elsewhere . . . for a chance solution of our problem."

This discussion of "the apparently spontaneous variations" in consciousness brings the book, as outlined in the preface, to an end. Two chapters are, however, added, consisting for the most part of a collection of practical inferences from the study of abnormal emotions, of intellectual disorders, and of "abnormities of volition."

It should be added that Professor Royce has throughout defined with admirable precision the line dividing scientific psychology from philosophy, and that he has kept scrupulously to the psychological side of the line. Not every treatise on psychology, whether written by professed philosopher or by avowed scientist, merits this commendation.

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