

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Nr: C-62802

Page 2

B. An equivalent amount or more for second half FY 49 and,

C. Adherence to the original targets for industrial production and degree of further economic recovery for Japan during FY 50 as was assumed in previous budget submission. On this basis \$155,000,000 for rehabilitation appropriation is clearly minimal.

3. The following items have been changed in the original 50 rehabilitation budget (considering present relative priorities and needs, and recent indications in urads concerning shifts of various items out of 50 GARIOA budgets) representing desired program changes as well as any impact on 50 due to 49 budget picture. These changes have the effect of reducing 50 rehabilitation by \$8,200,000 and are as follows: Elimination of Douglas fir and hemlock logs and squares \$3,600,000; elimination of all industrial machinery and equipment items except for small amounts of communication equipment, medical and hospital equipment, statistical and business machines and replacement parts for industrial machinery amounting to \$800,000.

The following changes in proposed 50 EROA program have the effect of increasing the required amount of rehabilitation funds by \$8,200,000 as follows: Additional rayon pulp financing, \$2,600,000; additional allowance for petroleum products due to higher current prices and shift of fuel oil for steel purposes out of GARIOA into EROA \$1,000,000; additional ores and metals in project 500, group two, to be financed out of EROA as offset to reduced machinery imports, \$4,400,000; additional allowance for technical missions and training of industrial experts, \$200,000.

4. Principal reason for \$155,000,000 as minimum

CM IN 844 (5 Aug 48)

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EROA fund for 50 is extreme doubt regarding actual availability of alternative sources of funds for financing required imports in order to maintain time schedule of Japanese economic recovery toward goal of self-support. Previous submission shows \$236,143,838 of imports financed from SCAP trust fund, other credits, and barter, and \$228,193,375 imports financed from revolving fund, OJEIRF, and sterling. Extremely doubtful that such amounts can be procured and financed under these arrangements. Later complete review of 50 EROA picture must await clarification of outlook on these points as well as complete 49 appropriated fund situation.

5. Only \$4,000,000 cotton procurement at present proposed for 50 EROA funding. Highly improbable that revolving fund, OJEIRF, and sterling can finance the remainder of \$177,000,000 requirement for raw cotton. Possibility must shift some additional raw cotton financing into EROA pending further discussion of policy issues involved.

6. Substantial increase of 50 EROA appropriation request will be necessary if later developments show unlikelihood that SCAP trust fund or other credits can finance other critical raw materials to the extent of \$236,000,000. Principal groups that might be affected by such transfer of funding would be in project 500, group two, metals and metallic ores and group 12, fats, oils, and waxes.

ACTION: CAD

INFO : CAD (STATE), OUS, PO, SANACC, LOGD, FAOA, BUD,
ARMY COMPT

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SANACC SECDEF

PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
PER PARAS 511 AND 60a (4), AR 3

- State Member
- Army Member Buehler
- Navy Member
- Air Force Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Ass't Air Force Member

22 July 1948

SCAP

INFORMATION:

COMGENPHILRYKOM, COMGENUSAFIK

Number: WARX 86279

From CSCAD cite ECON. Reourad July WARX ~~85777~~. This cable in
three parts. File

Part 1. (Budget estimate for FY 50 for economic re-
habilitation for Japan and Ryukyus is subj).

1. Ourad informed you of amts FY 49 appropriated funds
planned to be avail now from GARLOA appropriation for econ
rehab purposes.

2. Request that concurrently with your revision FY 49
programs for Japan and Ryukyus, you evaluate impact of
reduction from amts originally requested for FY 49 on FY 50
budget estimates for econ rehab purposes and furnish your
comments and desired revisions thereof not later than 5 Aug,
with add justifications therefor.

Part 2. (Long range economic plan and presentation for
Japan and corresponding material for Ryukyus is subj).

1. As both your reduced procurement program for this FY
and consequent modification of your FY 50 budget estimates
will affect rate of recovery originally contemplated by basic
Recovery programs outlined in "Green Book" (Econ Rehab Occupied
Areas 1 April 48-30 June 49), which was used to support recent
appropriation requests, this basic supporting material for
both Japan and Ryukyus must be realistically revised and ex-
panded in detail.

OM OUT 86279 (Jul 48)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority NND 750086
By CD/AA NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

SANACC
COPY NO. 8

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PRIORITY

Number: WARX 86279

22 July, 1948

Page 2

2. This expanded material should constitute for Japan long-range economic plan, in whose preparation Japanese Govt has participated to maximum extent of its capabilities under present circumstances, and for whose execution it could--if plan is apd by US Govt--assume increasing responsibility.

(A) Long-range economic plan, covering this and next several FYs, should be designed to achieve balance of Japans internatl pmts in earliest practicable FY at minimum balanced economy level. It should assume, in addition to appropriated funds for FY 49, availability of US appropriated funds for FY 50 and subsequent FY in such minimum amts as you stipulate as essential to achieve this objective. It should include, for each of these years, up-to-date import, export, production, and consumption goals, both for entire economy and for key commodities, as was done in SCAP report of Oct 47: "Possibility of a balanced Japanese Economy."

(B) In its treatment of prospective domestic economic programs, revised plan should be considerably more detailed than "Green Book", and should specify steps to be taken by Japanese Govt in order to restrict domestic consumption and to facilitate production of maximum amts of marketable export products.

(C) This revised plan should set realistic export goals, and import goals which recognize desirability and practicability of procuring imports in non-dollar areas to maximum extent possible. These export and import projections should also reflect and be supported by considerations of:

(1) Present and prospective political and economic conditions in Japans far east trade areas, including potential export sales thereto and availability of food and raw material imports from those areas.

(2) Present and prospective markets for exports to, and import availabilities from, other world trade areas.

CM OUT 86279

(Jul 48)

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PRIORITY

Number: WARX 86279

22 July, 1948

Page 3

- (3) Use of initial and any prospective Ojeiri credits, and extent of estimated SCAP participation in \$150,000,000 natural fibers revolving fund, including realistic appraisal of dollar markets required for SCAPs estimated utilization of these credit sources.
- (4) Prospects of dollar exports to assume increasing burden of providing food and other GARIOA commodities in conjunction with annually decreasing GARIOA appropriations.
- (5) Any plans looking towards stimulation of production, particularly of food and raw materials, in order far east areas through provision by Japan of incentive goods and capital equip on off-set barter basis so that less dependence is placed by Japan on us for such materials or their financing. This would also have added effect of reducing similar dependence of far eastern countries on us.
- (D) Appended to, or included in, long-range plan referred to above should again be info and key statistics of pre-war base period economy, and progress to date in key segments of economy and overall indices by comparisons of year to year (US FY) progress under occupation. Info concerning role and potential contribution of Japan to economic recovery in far east and interdependence of countries of that trade sphere under their present and contemplated levels of trade and industry, as known to you, will add materially to presentation value of long-range plan here. Completeness and effectiveness of this presentation of Japans pre-war, post-war, and prospective self-supporting economy will materially effect degree of success achieved here in securing required appropriated funds.

CM OUT 86279

(Jul 48)

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-53736-1

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PRIORITY

Number: WARX 86279

22 July, 1948

Page 4

3. Approach outlined in Para 2 above for Japan is of course too comprehensive for and in many respects not applicable to Ryukyus. However, presentation of pre-war standards, post-war progress, and current planning goals for these islands economy is essential to support any reasonable request for assistance above maintenance of GARIOA standards. It is suggested that revision of Ryukyus part of "Economic Rehab Occupied Areas" booklet also be expanded to present any prospective export trade for dollars, credits, or barter in terms of balance of pmts statement to reflect overall program, and consequent dollar deficiencies requiring appropriated funds to implement plans.

4. For your info, South Korea aid program will be presented separately from Japan-Ryukyus for FY 50.

Part 3.

1. Recognize magnitude of above requests. However:

(A) It is essential that your comments on, and any revisions of, FY 50 econ rehab budget requests for Japan and Ryukyus be recd not later than 5 Aug for required processing.

(B) Revised long-range program presentation requested in Part 2 will require inter-departmental coordination prior to use in support of FY 50 budget requests before Bureau Budget and Congressional Committee, so request estimate of date of its earliest availability be furnished. Exec Br may have to seek enabling legislation from 81st Congress instead of attempting to secure auth via Appropriation Act language as was permitted finally by last Congress to permit expenditures for econ rehab in Far East occupied areas, and this requested program presentation will be essential for that purpose as well as for support of appropriation requests. Request you furnish 10 copies of this presentation, and, fol exec br coordination, final reproduction will be accomplished here.

ORIGINATOR : CAD
DISTRIBUTION: CAD (STATE), OUS, LOGD, FAOA, BUD
CM OUT 86279 (Jul 48) DTG 222257Z mcs

COPY NO. 28

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C
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YIn reply refer to
JK

April 7, 1947

Since 227
Since 2
09. Japans
Misc -

My dear Mr. Petersen:

In conformity with a recent State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee decision, the United States Government is now forming a U.S. Reparations, Restitution, and Restoration Mission for Japan, which will have as its primary function the representation of United States interests in the foregoing matters. In addition, members of the official mission may act in an advisory capacity to the Supreme Commander in interpreting the various policy directives on reparations and restitution matters which have been issued from Washington.

In considering the composition of the official mission the State Department believes it desirable that the War Department be represented because of its close and intimate relationship both with the formation of policy and the direction of administrative matters pertaining to these problems. I am, therefore, inviting you to consider the appointment of a War Department representative as an official member of the five-men U.S. mission. In view of the issuance of the directive on Advance Transfers of reparations goods in Japan the State Department hopes that it will be possible for the State and War Department members of the mission to leave for Tokyo in the very near future, so that they may be present at the time when the actual beginning of reparations removals is made.

Sincerely yours,

J. H. Hilldring
Assistant SecretaryThe Honorable
Howard C. Petersen
Assistant Secretary of War.

27

AFDTR/Captain Buote/cjg/74786
written 13 June 1946

091 Japan memo
(Cross)

1 WDGPO

2 WDGSP

3 APPROVAL

4 ASW/AIR

4 SIGNATURE
1&2 CONCURRENCE

AFDTR

JUN 14 1946

3 CHIEF OF STAFF

Captain Buote/74786

Applications for Civil Air Operations
Internally in Japan

584.

SUMMARY

1. Requests for civil and contract air operations internally in Japan have been received from two concerns namely, Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., and Asia Airways, Inc.
2. Replies have been prepared for the signature of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air to Mr. Jack Frye, President of TWA, and Mr. Ernest J. Silver, President of Asia Airways, Inc., stating that General MacArthur has adequate air transport facilities within his Command to meet the requirements of the Occupation Forces (Reference: RAD NR CX 61306 dtd 7 June 1946 from CINCPAC, Tokyo); that a policy is now being formulated by the State Department, concerning the establishment of civil airlines within Japan, and that their applications are being forwarded to the State Department.
3. During informal discussions between Mr. Bell of the State Department Civil Aviation Division and Col. Dowd, Civil Aviation Branch, AC/AS-5, it was decided that all applications should be forwarded to the Department of State for further action.
4. A letter of transmittal to the State Department has been prepared for the signature of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, forwarding subject applications.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Incls: -

- 1 - Ltr to Mr. Jack Frye, Pres., TWA
- 2 - Ltr to Mr. Ernest J. Silver, Pres., Asia Airways, Inc.
- 3 - Ltr to Mr. Oscar Cox, Wash DC
- 4 - Ltr to Sec/State w/applications from TWA and Asia Airways, Inc.

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

REUBEN C. HOOD, JR.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

State Member
Army Member
Navy Member
Ass't State Member
Ass't Army Member
Ass't Navy Member
Executive Secretary
Ass't Exec. Secretary
State Adm. Assistant
Army Adm. Assistant
Navy Adm. Assistant
File

AFDTR
Lt.Col. Haley

AFACD

AFEPW

AFESI

Captain Buote

S-W-N Coordinating Comte.

26

COPY FOR STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

AFDTR/Captain Buote/cjg/74786
written 13 June 1946

JUN 15 1946

Mr. Jack Frye, President,
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.,
1740 G Street, N.W.,
Washington 6, D.C.

Dear Mr. Frye:

Your letter of 7 May has been studied and I find your proposal most interesting, however, recent communications from General MacArthur indicate that the air transport facilities now under his control are adequate to meet requirements of the Occupation Forces.

A study aimed at the establishment of a policy to govern the operation of civil air carriers in the area, formerly embraced by the Japanese Empire, is now being made by interested agencies of the National Government. The leadership in this project, by common consent, has been delegated to the Department of State.

Your application for permission to establish civil air operations in the area under the command of General MacArthur is being transmitted to the Secretary of State for his consideration.

Should you desire to submit additional facts concerning your proposal, it is my suggestion that you communicate with the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) W. Stuart Symington

W. STUART SYMINGTON
Assistant Secretary of War for Air

AFDTR
Lt. Col. Haley

AFACD

AFEPW

AFESP

Captain Buote

AFDTR/Captain Buote/sjg/74786
written 13 June 1946

JUN 15 1946

Mr. Ernest J. Silver, President
Asia Airways, Incorporated
67 Broad Street
New York 4, New York

Dear Mr. Silver:

Recent communications from General MacArthur indicate that the air transport facilities now under his control are adequate to meet requirements of the Occupation Forces.

A study aimed at the establishment of a policy to govern the operation of civil air carriers in the area, formerly embraced by the Japanese Empire, is now being made by interested agencies of the National Government. The leadership in this project, by common consent, has been delegated to the Department of State.

Your application for permission to establish civil air operations in the area under the command of General MacArthur, previously submitted to the War Department, is being transmitted to the Secretary of State for his consideration. I am not in position to advise you concerning competing applications.

Should you desire to submit additional facts concerning your proposal, it is my suggestion that you communicate with the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) W. Stuart Symington

W. STUART SYMINGTON
Assistant Secretary of War for Air

AFDTR
Lt.Col. Haley

AFACD

AFEPW

AFESP

Capt. Buote

AFDTR/Captain Buote/ejg/74786
written 13 June 1946

JUN 15 1946

Mr. Oscar Cox,
Cox, Langford, Stoddard & Cutler,
1210 Eighteenth St., N.W.,
Washington 6, D.C.

Dear Mr. Cox:

This is in further reference to my letter of 28 May regarding proper forum to which Asia Airways, Inc. should address their application for permission to operate a commercial airline between points in Japan.

In this connection, there is forwarded herewith a copy of a letter addressed to Mr. Silver, advising him that his application is being transmitted to the Department of State, which agency is formulating a policy as to the establishment of civil airlines within Japan and to which agency future correspondence should be addressed.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) W. Stuart Symington

W. STUART SYMINGTON
Assistant Secretary of War for Air

1 Incl: -
Ltr to Mr. Silver,
Pres., Asia Airways,
Inc.

AFDTR

AFACD

AFEPW

AFESP

Lt.Col. Haley

Captain Buote

AFMTR/Captain Buote/cjg/74786
written 13 June 1946

JUN 15 1946

The Honorable
The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to recent informal discussions between your Civil Aviation Division and the opposite in the Air Staff, there are transmitted herewith applications of the Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. and Asia Airways, Inc., for permission to establish between Japan and Korea, either as contract carriers for the Army Air Forces, or as certificated civil carriers, certain air services.

Because General MacArthur has determined that the military air transport available to him is adequate to meet the requirements of the Occupation Forces, it is evident that these applications, as well as any others for permission to operate in the same territory, including those of the other member Nations of the United Nations Organization, should be dealt with on the basis of national policy, rather than solely from the standpoint of military necessity.

Our informal discussions reveal that a study aimed at the establishment of a national policy now is under way within the State Department and that the results of the study will be submitted to the Air Coordinating Committee for consideration.

I am entirely in accord with this manner of progressing the matter and shall be glad to furnish any information or advice which may be helpful in the course of the study.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) W. Stuart Symington

W. STUART SYMINGTON
Assistant Secretary of War for Air

2 Incls: -
Application - TWA
Application - Asia Airways,
Inc.

AFMTR
Lt. Col. Haley

AFACD

AFEPW

AFESP

Captain Buote

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
DISPOSITION FORMFILE NO. SUBJECT: Asia Airways, Inc. Application for Civil
OPD 360.4 (1 Jun 46) Operations Internally in JapanTO: CG, AAF FROM: OPD, WDGS DATE 3 Jun 46 COMMENT NO. 1
Lt. Col. Barfield/6313/as

For necessary action.

FOR THE ACTING ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPD:

Incl
Memo from GAS/W for
C/S dd 1 Jun 46
w/6 Incls/s/ Francis C. Gideon
FRANCIS C. GIDEON
Colonel, AC
Acting Chief, Pacific Th Sec
Theater Group, OPD, WDGSC
O
P
Y

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AIR
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Asia Airways, Inc. Application for Civil Operations
Internally in Japan

Asia Airways, Inc. has made several requests for civil and contract air operations internally in Japan.

Their application for contract operations in Japan was refused in view of General MacArthur having sufficient troop carrier lift at that time.

However, no satisfactory answer has been given to their various letters or applications for civil airline operations internally in Japan.

Attached letter of Asia Airways, Inc. requests further information and advice in regard to their application. In this connection TWA has also made application to render similar service.

Request the necessary action be taken and reply prepared for signature of Assistant Secretary of War for Air.

/s/ Harold W. Chike
HAROLD W. CHLKE
Colonel, Air Corps
Acting Executive Officer

Attachments:

1. Ltr Mr. Cox to ASWA, w/4 encls.
2. Interim reply to Mr. Cox fr. ASWA
3. ASWA file re Asia Airways, Inc.
4. Two files of TAG re Asia Airways, Inc.
5. Two files of AAF re Asia Airways, Inc.
6. Ltr TWA to Gen. MacArthur w/cable and ltr to ASWA

28 May 1946

Mr. Oscar Cox,
Cox, Langford, Stoddard & Cutler,
1210 Eighteenth St., N.W.,
Washington 6, D.C.

Dear Mr. Cox:

Thanks for your letter of May 27 and it will be
a pleasure to get you that information as quickly
as possible.

Sincerely yours,

W. STUART SYMINGTON
Assistant Secretary of War for Air

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COX, LANGFORD, STODDARD & CUTLER

Oscar Cox
Malcolm S. Langford
Ezekiel G. Stoddard
Lloyd N. Cutler

1210 18th Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
Telephone Executive 6900
Cable Address "Oscarcox"

May 27, 1946

Dear Mr. Symington:

I am enclosing a letter addressed to you by Asia Airways, Inc., a client of ours which has been organized by some young ex-AAF officers.

As you will note from the letter, they would very much like to know the proper forum to which they should address their application for permission to operate a commercial airline between points in Japan.

I would appreciate anything you could do to clear this matter up for them.

Sincerely yours,

(signed)
Oscar Cox

Enclosure

The Honorable Stuart Symington
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

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ASIA AIRWAYS, INC.
67 Broad Street
New York 4, N. Y.

Ernest J. Silver, President
William L. Magistretti, Vice President

Telephone
Whitehall 4-2446

May 27, 1946

The Honorable Stuart Symington
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Symington:

In a letter dated 27 December 1945 and addressed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo, an unincorporated group of United States citizens known as the Far East Air Transport Company, Cleveland, Ohio, applied for permission to operate a commercial airline within the main islands of Japan, and requested a franchise from the Supreme Commander. On the same day, the Adjutant General, SCAP, returned a signed copy of this application acknowledging its receipt. On March 16, 1946, another letter was sent to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, referring to the earlier application and stating that the American group theretofore known as the Far East Air Transport Company had incorporated as a Delaware Corporation, under the name of Asia Airways, Inc. On April 29, 1946, the Adjutant General, SCAP, replied, acknowledging the March 16 letter and stating that further communications on the subject should be addressed to the War Department. Copies of all these communications are attached.

All of the issued capital stock of Asia Airways, Inc. is owned by citizens of the United States. The Corporation has received firm assurance of adequate financing from Allen & Company, New York, New York, and the Investment Corporation of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pa., and is prepared to furnish satisfactory evidence as to the adequacy of these financial arrangements.

We appreciate that the United States Government may not yet have formulated the policy decisions which must be made before an application such as ours can be entertained and passed upon. Pending such a policy formulation, however, we would appreciate your advice as to whom the papers comprising our application should be directed, and as to what additional supporting data should be furnished. In view of the attached correspondence, we would also appreciate your acknowledgment that our application will be considered as having been originally made on December 27, 1945.

Finally, if consistent with War Department policy, we would like to be advised as to whether or not any competing applications have been filed.

Sincerely yours,

ASIA AIRWAYS, INC.

By (sgd) Ernest J. Silver, President

Attachments

COPY

APO 500
29 April 1946

AG 360.7 (29 Apr 46)ESS-EX

SUBJECT: Acknowledgment of Correspondence

TO: Asia Airways, Inc., 67 Broad Street, New York 4, N. Y.

1. Reference your letter of 16 March 1946 and your application of 27 December 1945 which was submitted in the name of the Far East Air Transport Company, please be advised that both documents have been forwarded to the War Department.

2. It is recommended that future queries be directed to that office.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

J. W. MANN
Lt Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant GeneralCOPY OF A COPY

C
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YASIA AIRWAYS, INC.
67 Broad St.
New York 4

16 March 1946

General Douglas MacArthur
SCAP APO 500
San FranciscoAttention: Economic and Scientific Section

Sir:

Reference is made to our former application to your headquarters which was made in the name of the Far East Air Transport Company and which is now on file with the Economic and Scientific Section of GHQ.

Please be informed herewith that we are now incorporated in the state of Delaware as the Asia Airways, Inc. with offices at 67 Broad Street, New York 4, New York. Our change in name was occasioned by the emergence of a Far Eastern Air Transport Company operating in the Phillipines.

We should be happy to receive any indication of your pleasure regarding our former application.

Very truly yours,

ASIA AIRWAYS, INC.

Ernest J. Silver, Pres.

EJS/jts

COPY OF A COPY

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FAR EAST AIR TRANSPORT COMPANY
1008 Guardian Building
Cleveland, Ohio

27 December 1945

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
General Headquarters, SCAP,
APO No. 500
c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, Calif.

Attention: Chief, Economic and Scientific Section

Sir:

We are forwarding herewith a prospectus for our company, the Far East Air Transport Company, and respectfully request that consideration be given to the possibility of our operating in Japan in the near future. The company is organized and will be operated by ex-U.S. A.A.F. personnel who are either now in the theatre or who have had service there.

Should the request be considered too early at the present time, it would be appreciated if this letter and prospectus could be filed against some future date when such applications will be in order. In addition, we understand that it might be proper to make application through the appropriate authorities in Washington, D. C., and would appreciate your consideration of these papers should a query come to you from these quarters.

Some indication of your pleasure at this time would be greatly appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,

Original and 2 copies
Rec'd at GHQ, SCAP
27 Dec. 45, 1100.
/s/ J T Hart
WOJG, USA.

Ernest J. Silver, President
Far East Air Transport Company

COPY OF A COPY

TRANSCONTINENTAL & WESTERN AIR, INC.
1740 G Street NW
Washington 6, D.C.

Office of the President

May 7, 1946

The Honorable
The Secretary of War
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., is keenly interested in the establishment of internal airline operations in Japan, with an additional line from Japan to Korea, and internal routes in Korea, to whatever extent may be necessary to carry out the air transport requirements of the United States military forces in these areas.

Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., now operates extensive domestic and international airline routes under certificates issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Company has total assets aggregating approximately fifty million dollars, and has completed twenty years of airline service, including extensive operation of contract air services for the U.S. Army during the war. It has the experience, resources, and trained personnel necessary to establish and operate the airline services in Japan and Korea described above.

There are several possible plans under which TWA could provide these services, and we will be glad to consider any plan which may meet the requirements of the U.S. military forces in Japan. The following general proposal for establishment of these services is submitted for your consideration as one possible plan:

That TWA undertake on a contract basis, generally following the form of contracts entered into by the War Department and American air carriers during the period of hostilities, to establish and operate necessary air transport services, utilizing such U.S. Army airports and facilities as may be available in Japan and Korea. Such operation would be under the direction and supervision of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers.

At such time as the Supreme Allied Commander determines that Japanese and other nationals may be carried as revenue passengers, it might be feasible to convert the contract operation

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to a standard commercial air transport service, with established tariffs and schedules, subject to such priorities and regulations as the Supreme Commander may determine.

If the operation of such internal air lines is acceptable in principle, we are prepared to submit detailed plans on any basis you may suggest for the purposes of discussion and negotiation.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Jack Frye

Jack Frye

Assistant Secretary of War for Air

cc: Major General O.P. Echols,
Director of Civil Affairs Division.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

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WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

DISPOSITION FORM

FILE NO.
OPD 360.4 (7 May 46)

SUBJECT: Establishment of TWA International
Airline Operations in Japan.

TO: CG AAF

FROM OPD, WDGS

DATE 10 May 46 COMMENT NO. 1
Col. Gideon/6313/hem

Attached correspondence is passed to your command for preparation of reply. It is desired that the reply be routed through Operations Division, WDGS, for approval prior to dispatch

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPD:

1 Incl: - Ltr frTWA dd 7 May 46
to Sec of War

/s/ Robert W. Hain
for PAUL R. GOODE
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Pacific Th Sec
Theater Group, OPD, WDGS

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VFF:aj

SWH-4142
12 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Correspondence Between Japanese and Swiss on Financial Arrangements for Handling U.S. and British Interests and Red Cross Expenses.

At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the enclosure, mimeograph copies of three letters to the Swiss Minister, all dated 17 August 1944, is forwarded for the information of the Department of State.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,
Secretary

Enclosure:
3 Letters (untranslated)

(Enclosure furnished addressee only.
No translation available.)

COPY FOR SWHCC FILE

(25)

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEESTATE

_____ Mr. Cox
_____ Mr. Moseley
_____ Mr. Gardiner

WAR

_____ Colonel Reid
_____ Colonel Schulgen
✓ _____ Lt. Col. Field
_____ Major Karbel
_____ Lt. Weiner

NAVY

_____ Captain Austin
_____ Commander Richardsen
_____ Ensign Whiteside

_____ Note
_____ Circulate
_____ File

REMARKS:

*Although in
French, this is
Greek to me. Let's
send it to State as
indicated.*

ADR



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


SM-5496
11 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE:

Subject: Correspondence Between Japanese and
Swiss on Financial Arrangements for
Handling U.S. and British Interests
and Red Cross Expenses.

Enclosure: Mimeograph copies of three letters
to Swiss Minister, all dated 17
August 1944.

The Enclosure, received from the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers, is forwarded for the information
of the Department of State.


C. R. PECK,
Colonel, Infantry,
Executive Secretary.

APR 12 1946



2580

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

25

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MONTHLY SUMMARY OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN AND KOREA,
NUMBER 1, SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1945

A DIGEST

PART I - GENERAL

091 Japan
misc

Section I - Organization Under SCAP:

1. Initial Actions: Special Staff Sections, to deal with subjects indicated, were created as follows: (1) Economic and Scientific; (2) Civil Information and Education - press, radio, theater, education, religion; (3) Natural Resources; (4) Public Health and Welfare; (5) Government - Military Government in Korea; internal structure of civil government in Japan; (6) Legal; (7) Civil Communications - rehabilitation of signal facilities; (8) Statistical and Reports; and (9) Civil Intelligence - civil public safety and investigations of compliance with instructions by Japanese government. Directives and memoranda have been issued dealing with military phases of occupation and establishing wage and price controls, the stimulation of production of essential products, and other matters.

2. Medium of Control Over Japan: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers exercises control over Japan through directives and memoranda, transmitted through the Liaison Officer, G-2, to the Central Liaison Office of the Japanese Government, which transmits the instructions to the appropriate ministries for compliance. Frequent conferences are held between special staff sections of SCAP and the appropriate bureaux of the Japanese Ministries. The 6th and 8th Armies perform such Military Government activities on the prefectural and local levels as are directed by SCAP and have liaison officers at GHQ.

3. Administration of Civil Affairs in Korea: Military Government at the top level is organized to correspond to the former Central Government organization in Korea. The Military Governor is the Acting Governor General and commands all Military Government detachments and teams not attached to tactical units. He is assisted by a Civil Administrator who coordinates activities of the Secretariat and the Bureaux. The Secretariat is composed of eight sections constituting the staff of the Governor General, while the Cabinet of the Governor General is composed of the directors of the nine Bureaux and the Civil Administrator.

Section II - Political and Social Activities in Japan:

4. Governmental Changes: To implement the democratic reorientation of the Japanese, the following were abolished: Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, War and Navy Ministries, Greater East Asia Ministry, Students Demobilization Bureau, all ultra-nationalistic, secret and other societies which might be inimical to the fulfillment of the terms of surrender, including Greater Japanese Political Association and the Youth Student Corps, together with agencies within the Ministry of Justice administering "thought ideology" activities. The Ministry of Home Affairs has been deprived of much of its authority by a directive referred to as the "Bill of Rights" which resulted in the abolition of secret police organs concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion and assembly. It also forbade the Government to abridge freedom of thought, religion, assembly, and speech; permitted unrestricted discussion of the Emperor and Government; and directed the release of all persons confined on political grounds. At the same time, the Government was instructed to refrain from sponsoring, perpetuating, or in any way participating in Shintoism.

5. Educational Reforms: Military schools have been closed and all laws and regulations which constituted the authority for militaristic and ultra-nationalistic doctrination in the schools have been abrogated. Objectionable teachers have been removed and demobilized military personnel barred from teaching until thoroughly investigated. Religious education is now permitted in private schools.

6. Political Parties: The "Bill of Rights" furnished needed encouragement for the formation of democratic political parties in Japan. There are more than twenty political and quasi-political parties; however, the four important groups are the Extreme Right Wing, the Conservatives, the Socialists, and the Communists.

24

7. Treatment of Non-Japanese Nationals: A SCAP directive prohibited the Japanese Government from arresting members of the occupation forces; Japanese courts from exercising jurisdiction over members of the occupational forces; and ordered all cases instituted against or in favor of any United Nations National sent to SCAP for review.

8. Prosecution of War Criminals: Former Premier Tojo, his cabinet, and other high ranking Government officials, industrialists and businessmen, have been arrested as suspected war criminals. Special attention has been given to investigating atrocities which occurred in prisoner of war camps.

Section III - Economic Activities (This covered in Part IV)

Section IV - Civil Administration in Korea:

9. Political: All objectionable Japanese-imposed laws have been repealed. The courts continue to function and Korean judges and procurators have replaced the Japanese. The same situation applies to the police force. There are fifty-four political parties registered with the Military Government Headquarters, the chief ones being the Korean Peoples' Republic (Radical) and the Koreans Democratic Party (Conservative).

10. Economic: A large rice crop for 1946 is anticipated, with probably three million koku available for export. The fishing industry is being revived, but commerce is generally at a standstill for a lack of raw materials.

11. Social: About 10 percent of the Japanese civilians in Korea have been repatriated and about 160 thousand Koreans have been returned from Japan to Korea. Schools are being opened with Japanese personnel eliminated therefrom and Japanese textbooks being replaced by those which have been rewritten in Korean. The Military Government has sponsored a radio hour, two weekly news digests and daily newspaper as media through which the people are kept informed of events. Medical facilities are generally inadequate and common diseases are widespread. An epidemic of louse-borne typhus is expected to be the greatest hazard during the winter. However, conditions are gradually being improved by the requisition of supplies, the construction of necessary facilities, and the instruction of Korean doctors in public health matters.

PART II - POLITICAL

Section I - Government and Civil Administration:

12. Government: SCAP policy is to make the greatest possible use of the existing Japanese Government structure. Control has been imposed, but with the exception of major changes on the political plane, there has been a minimum of interference with the existing administration. The control of foreign affairs is under SCAP. Governmental activities have included: a session of the diet, formation of two cabinets, and reorganization of some agencies to eliminate certain totalitarian controls. The Japanese Government has been informed that the Potsdam Declaration will require many liberalizing changes in the existing Japanese governmental structure.

13. Japanese Reactions: The Japanese Government has suggested little pointing toward fundamental democratic reform. The most popular topics of discussion by press, public officials, and political parties, concern constitutional revision, democratization of economic institutions, election, woman suffrage, governmental reorganization, and punishment of high policy makers who engineered the war. Political activity is hampered by the concentration of the people on the paramount problems of food, clothing, and shelter.

Section II - Legal, Public Safety, and Intelligence:

14. Legal: The legal questions have been or are being resolved pertaining to domestic Japanese and international law, and phraseology of directives and memoranda. Efforts continue in the gathering of evidence for the prosecution of war criminals.

15. Public Safety: The police have been able to maintain a satisfactory degree of law and order despite numerous changes in the existing police organization. Juvenile delinquency has increased since the war's end, particularly in urban areas where food supplies are more limited.

16. Intelligence: Counter intelligence, under the operational control of a Special Staff Section, has units in the capital of every prefecture and special teams in all the major cities.

PART III - ECONOMICSection I - Natural Resources:

17. General Economic Conditions: Japan's economic situation is extremely poor. Industrial plants are unbalanced and rundown; raw material stocks are being rapidly exhausted. Transportation is inadequate. There has been a disastrous decline in food production; there is also a severe shortage of consumer goods. A black market therefore exists. The supervision of Japan's peacetime economy involves, mainly: (1) Maintaining a normal peacetime economy; (2) Control of foreign trade; and (3) Continuing such economic controls and rationing systems as are necessary to avoid acute economic distress and to assure a fair distribution of domestic and imported supplies.

18. Agriculture: Agriculture is producing less than the normal amount of foodstuffs and the supplies for 1946 apparently are insufficient to maintain even a minimum standard of living without imports. Contributing factors are: (1) Typhoon and flood damage to the current rice crop; and (2) the lack of chemical fertilizers. This drop in production is in spite of the increase of acreage used for food crops at the expense of that used for industrial crops such as tea, mulberry and pyrethrum.

19. Fisheries: Allied Military activity prevented the Japanese deepsea and coastal fishing fleets from operating on their customary scale. At the cessation of hostilities, fishing facilities in the South Seas, Formosa, North China, Manchuria, Korea, Russian Maritime Provinces and Kuriles all passed out of Japanese control. In addition, needed labor had been absorbed by the military forces. To rehabilitate the industry so that it can supply domestic requirements, essential petroleum products must be furnished, damaged equipment repaired or new equipment constructed, the black market must be controlled and the distribution of fish returned to normal channels of trade.

20. Mining and Geology: Mineral production and processing in Japan have declined from approximately double the pre-war level to a level from 20% to 50% of the pre-war figure. Coal is the most important mineral commodity and the current monthly production is only about 20% of 1935. A serious labor shortage exists in the coal industry and to a large extent is causing the drop in production.

Section II - Industry:

21. Industry: With the announcement of Japan's surrender, production in Japanese industry ceased almost completely and employees fled from the urban industrial areas. Although the production of all materials to fill civilian needs has been authorized, factories and workshops have been slow to resume operations because: (1) The reconversion of war factories has been held back by fears of possible violation of SCAP orders prohibiting war production; (2) The government has not stepped in energetically to direct production for civilian use; (3) Government control over production was so complete that its loosening left industry floundering for lack of direction; and (4) in many cases the labor supply is inadequate because shortages of food, clothing, and housing have made working conditions in urban areas unfavorable.

Section III - Transportation:

22. Transportation: Although all types of transportation in Japan suffered heavily as a result of the war, the railroads have come through in reasonably good shape and are now functioning in an almost normal manner. Motor transportation has never been of great importance in Japan but such motor vehicles as now remain are in a very poor condition with little hope of immediate improvement. The manufacture of 1500 trucks a month has been authorized. Shipping has been greatly curtailed due to loss of vessels and a general breakdown of organization at the time of the surrender. Repair and dock facilities are adequate and an effort is being made to recondition or build sufficient tonnage to handle necessary coastal traffic.

Section IV - Imports and Exports:

23. Basic Policy: Basic policy on foreign trade was laid down in the SCAP directive of 9 October 1945 which stipulates that SCAP must approve all exports and imports. Imports are limited to goods considered essential to the minimum needs of the population and must be covered by exports of goods or foreign exchange. Exports are limited to those goods not necessary to meet minimum domestic requirements. Efforts are being made to supply the needs of friendly nations by means of exports from Japan and to obtain the minimum needs of Japan by commercial imports or barter with other countries.

24. Japanese Needs: While the requests from the Japanese have been incomplete and are subject to question, it appears that sizeable quantities of food will be required annually including 3,000,000 metric tons of rice or the equivalent, 1,250,000 tons of petroleum products, 800,000 bales of cotton and 600,000 tons of salt. While these figures appear to be essential even for a very low standard of living, it is not yet known whether they can be provided nor whether the shipping to transport them will be available. Japanese shipping is completely inadequate to handle this tonnage.

Section V - Labor:

25. Occupation Needs: Arrangements are progressing satisfactorily whereby the Japanese Government procures and pays labor employed by the Occupation Forces. The Japanese wage control system itself is a complete failure, but the system is being studied and will be overhauled to correlate it to price controls and also be strengthened its minimum wage provisions. Two Japanese "labor front" organizations have dissolved voluntarily, although one is continuing as a semi-official governmental agency to procure day laborers for the occupation forces; its abolition is contemplated as soon as employment exchanges are capable of operating effectively.

26. Labor Movement: The emergence of a strong unified labor movement is perceptible. Independent labor unions are flourishing and several well-known pre-war unions have already completed reorganization plans. The Government has used a deliberative committee to draft a labor union law to revise the current mediation law and to establish collective bargaining principles.

27. Labor Disputes: Labor disputes between Japanese unions and management have been sporadic, but conflicts between the liberated Koreans and Chinese on the one hand and Japanese employers on the other have assumed serious proportions in Hokkaido. Military intervention has calmed the situation. Nevertheless coal production has been seriously impaired by this unrest and the repatriation of Korean miners. The Japanese Government has instituted a strong recruitment campaign among Japanese people to replace these repatriated miners and the Cabinet has also approved increased food rations and wages to miners.

Section VI - Communications:

28. Communications: At the initial stage of occupation of Japan the electric communications operating and manufacturing industries were completely controlled by the Government and were in a state of disrepair, confusion and inactivity due to war damage, neglect of maintenance, poor control over key supplies by the Japanese Army and Navy, and bureaucratic control. These industries have now been sufficiently restored to serve the needs of the Occupation Forces and partially to meet those of the Japanese civilian economy. A long range program for their rehabilitation has been formulated and the Occupation Forces have been advised on the destruction, guarding or turnover to the Japanese Government of the Army and Navy equipment in order to accomplish the demilitarization of communications for the security of the Allied Forces.

Section VII - Rationing and Price Control:

29. Rationing and Price Control: Rationing and price control have been controlled by the Japanese Government since 1938. Throughout the war prices were continually revised upwards. Each Ministry in the Japanese Government was made responsible for the pricing and rationing of commodities under its jurisdiction and they in turn set up control companies and associations to handle specific items. These agencies were ineffective in holding down the general price advances. At present the situation is one of short supply, excess purchasing power, excessive subsidies, and black market activities. The distribution of food and other essential commodities is unsatisfactory in large cities primarily because of transportation difficulties and the reluctance of farmers and fishermen to sell at ceiling prices. The Japanese Government has been directed to take appropriate measures to cope with the problem to preclude direct action by SCAP. At present, necessary directives are being issued to change the commercial economy gradually. Because rationing and price controls are handled through control associations, certain of these are being allowed to continue to carry out the distribution of essential commodities. As soon as essential commodities can be distributed in a more normal manner without risk of starvation and disorder, such economic controls will be removed.

Section VIII - Finance:

30. Finance: During the course of the war, Japan's financial system had been made completely subservient to war purposes. A vast credit expansion was permitted, for the most part under Government guarantees. Currency circulation and publicly held Government debts were allowed to rise freely. The government guaranteed all property, war damage and other insurance. Owing to the paralysis of economic activity, Government revenues are falling far below budget estimates while expenditures are falling more slowly because although direct war expenditures have ceased, war claims remain to be liquidated and occupation costs have become a new factor. Initial actions of SCAP have been concerned with eliminating the imperialistic and militaristic features of Japan's financial system. The Japanese Government has been pressed to use all possible means to curtail expenditures and increase revenues.

PART IV - SOCIAL SERVICES

Section I - Public Health and Welfare:

31. Public Health and Welfare: During the war years public health and welfare were almost completely neglected. Standards of training fell off and the inefficient manner under which trained personnel were used rendered the system almost ineffective. Supplies were diverted almost entirely for military use. This, plus the disruptive effects of bombing, presented a very poor outlook at the time of occupation. Soon after occupation steps were taken toward alleviating this situation such as rechanneling supplies formerly diverted for Army and Navy use, control of narcotics, control of communicable diseases, and inspection of meat and dairy products.

Section II - Education, Religion, and Media of Expression:

32. Education and Religion: To pattern Japanese thought and education in conformity with standards considered essential to develop democracy, a basic directive was issued in the form of a charter for future educational reform. A supplement directed the investigation, screening and certification of teachers. On 4 October 1945 the directive on "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religions Liberties" was issued to the Japanese Government ordering the abrogation and immediate suspension of all laws, decrees, ordinances and regulations which established restriction on free religion.

33. Media of Information: All media of information dissemination in Japan were strictly controlled during the war period. The post-surrender period revealed the need for removal of all restrictions on expression and encouragement of the full development of the concepts of freedom of speech, thought, religion, and assembly. Domei, the government monopoly news agency, has been dissolved and two independent news agencies have been established. The total circulation of daily newspapers in Japan is approximately 9,500,000.

PART V - KOREA

Section I - Political:

34. Political Parties: All political parties agree that unification of the various groups is a necessary preliminary to political maturity. Chief contenders in the struggle to control the unification movement are the Korean Peoples' Republic (Radical) and the Korean Democratic Party (conservative). The former's platform calls for changes in land ownership, a more rapid ousting of Japanese and pro-Japanese Koreans from high places, higher wages, and stable prices. The conservative program is cautious and full of vague generalities.

35. Trusteeship: "Trusteeship" has met with wide disapproval in Korea. Practically all major parties unite in denouncing it. The Koreans feel that they are capable of establishing an independent government immediately.

36. Coordination With Russian Sector: The present division of Korea into Russian--controlled Northern and American--controlled Southern sections presents many problems of policy and operation. In addition to the administrative problems, there are also problems resulting from the economic and cultural dichotomy. Neither section is self-sufficient; each section has many products which are complementary to the other section.

Section II - Economic:

37. Agriculture: Although a bumper crop is expected in 1946 and there is a sufficient quantity of rice on hand at present, a shortage occurred in October,

mainly in large cities which was only solved by the seizure of all warehouses, quick inventories, and the seizure by US Army officers of the entire Chosen Food Company. It is expected that there will be an acute shortage of fertilizer (which can be produced in the Northern area) unless pending negotiations produce a satisfactory solution.

38. Fishing: The fishing industry all but collapsed during the war. At present, plants and equipment are reported as being in good condition. Oil is scarce and the present supply of nets and rope will be exhausted by 1 March 1946. The fishing industry has already revived in the Jinsin area largely because of the aggressive action taken by US forces.

39. Industry and Labor: The Bureau of Mining and Industry in the Government General supervises this field and has notified the public by broadcast that plants could be opened under Korean owners without waiting for transfer of title from former Japanese owners. This should greatly aid Korean industry in getting back on its feet. The great problem in labor to date has been to persuade the Koreans to return to work. Liberation for many of them meant a prolonged holiday.

40. Trade: Trade is almost at a standstill but will probably revive as soon as raw materials are available and general conditions improve. With the decline of the Japanese silk industry, the Koreans believe that this industry can become very important to their country.

41. Fuel: A fuel problem in Korea is a matter of shortage of coal which produces the familiar vicious circle of limiting transportation and industrial production. It is hoped that closer North-South cooperation will result in alleviating the situation.

42. Transportation: The Bureau of Transportation has under its jurisdiction railroads, navigation and shipping, civilian airlines and air fields and the regulation and control of a group of truck units. It is also responsible for establishing rates, navigational aids and the administration and repair of harbors and docks.

43. Railroads and Shipping: Korea's railroads were built for strategic purposes rather than to meet the commercial needs of the Peninsula. It is estimated that 50% of Korean railroad stock is serviceable. Resumption of commerce is dependent upon efficient railway transportation as other transportation facilities are totally inadequate. There are under the control of the Bureau of Transportation some 165 ships in the sailing or semi-Deisel class which are particularly needed to relieve the coal scarcity in the Southern provinces and to move coal within Southern Korea.

44. Communications: The communication system of Korea suffered no destruction of any kind as a direct result of the war but the efficiency of the system after a careful analysis is estimated to be approximately 40% of that of the United States.

45. Finance: In finance the problem is to establish a sound, independent economy in place of a managed economy devoted to the support of Japan. Among the difficulties are the effects of 35 years of Japanese occupation; a ruggedly individualistic people demanding complete freedom from all foreign controls; the division of the country into two independent zones of occupation; and the usual incidents of military occupation, such as a trend toward inflation, scarcity of consumer goods and food, some disorder and dislocation.

Section III - Social: (Covered in Section 4, Part I).

091 Japan
Huse

SWN-3764 HWK:egs
17 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Request by Japanese Government for Documents and Publications Relating to International Organizations.

1. Reference is made to your SM-4635 dated 3 January 1946.
2. The Secretariat, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has been advised that the State Department perceives no objection to furnishing the documents and publications requested in the letter from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers dated 18 December 1945 to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. There are attached copies of documents and publications relating to international organizations furnished by the State Department for transmission by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,
Secretary.

Encls (7)

1. Charter of the United Nations w/ report to the President.
2. Dumbarton Oaks w/guide.
3. P.L. 291
4. P.L. 264
5. Press Release No. 204
6. Interim Arrangements, UNO
7. Ratification of United Nations Charter, P-262 (No. 21)

SWNCO FILE

23

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT MEMBER OF SWNCC
REQUEST BY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FOR DOCU-
MENTS AND PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Reference: SM-4635

In reference to the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 3 January 1946 that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee furnish a reply to a letter from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on the above subject dated 18 December 1945, there are attached copies of documents and publications relating to international organizations requested by the Japanese Government, for transmission by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander.

H. Freeman Matthews
H. Freeman Matthews

Attachments:

Documents and publications
relating to international
organizations.





THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SM-4635
3 January 1946


MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Request by Japanese Government
for Documents and Publications
Relating to International Organi-
zations.

Enclosure: Letter from the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers, dated
18 December 1945, file AG 461.01
(18 Dec 45) GS.

The enclosed letter from the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers is forwarded with the request that
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee furnish the
basis of a reply.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

ADR



STATE WAR *
COMMITTEE

1658

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

AG 461.01 (18 Dec 45)GS

APO 500
18 December 1945

SUBJECT: Request by Japanese Government for Documents and Publications relating to International Organizations.


TO : Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington 25, D. C.

1. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has requested copies of the following documents and publications relating to international organizations, which it states it is now studying:

- a. "Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization," recommended by the delegations of the Soviet Union, The United States, The United Kingdom, and China following the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which were announced on October 9, 1944, together with Chapter VI, Section C of the above, which was made public on March 5, 1945 following the Yalta Conference.
- b. The "United Nations Charter."
- c. The "Interim Arrangements" made at San Francisco setting up the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to meet at London.
- d. The "Statutes of the International Court of Justice", drawn up at San Francisco as an annex to the United Nations Charter.
- e. The Minutes of the Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco Conferences (if available) or data reporting the proceedings of the Conferences.
- f. Such other data as may be of use in a study of the United Nations, e.g. Publications of the State Department, The American Journal of International Law, The Council of Foreign Affairs, The Institute of Pacific Relations, The Foreign Policy Association, etc.
- g. A list of the nations which have completed ratification of the United Nations Charter, together with the dates of ratification and the dates on which the instruments of ratification were deposited with the Secretary of State.

2. This Headquarters has no objection to furnishing the above documents and publications to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs if it is desired that the Japanese Government be kept informed on these subjects and the material is made available to this Headquarters.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:


M. W. ALLEN.
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

~~SECRET~~

(new file)

BWN-3491 HWK:egs
6 November 1945*misc*
DBI
Japan

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Relations of Neutral Diplomatic Missions
with Japanese Government.**Enclosures:** "A". WARX 77872, dated 22 October 1945.
"B". Message from Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers, CAX 52301, dated
25 September 1945.

The following message was received from General MacArthur and is forwarded to the State Department by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"1. To implement WARX 77872, following memorandum is being handed Japanese Government 4 November:

"Except as hereafter authorized by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers you will cease to carry on relations with neutral governments or representatives thereof in Japan. You will inform such representatives now in Japan that the existence of diplomatic missions is not deemed consistent with the purposes and character of the Allied occupation in Japan and of the position of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and refer them to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for future contacts with the Japanese Government."

"2. With reference to Paragraph 2 of above referred to cable it is requested that State Department inform neutral governments that they may each designate if they so desire a diplomatic agent or representative of that character to maintain contact with SCAP in Japan. Further request advice on developments."

For The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750088By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6 1974H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Acting Chairman~~SECRET~~

(22)

BWNCO FILE



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SM-4010
5 November 1945

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Relations of Neutral Diplomatic Missions with Japanese Government.

Enclosures: "A". WARX 77872, dated 22 October 1945.

"B". Message from Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, CAX 52301, dated 25 September 1945.

It is requested that the following message from General MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff be forwarded to the Department of State:

"Nr CA 54275

"4 November 1945

"Diplomatic agents or representatives of neutral nations is subject.

"1. To implement WARX 77872, following memorandum is being handed Japanese Government 4 November:

"'Except as hereafter authorized by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers you will cease to carry on relations with neutral governments or representatives thereof in Japan. You will inform such representatives now in Japan that the existence of diplomatic missions is not deemed consistent with the purposes and character of the Allied occupation in Japan and of the position of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and refer them to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for future contacts with the Japanese Government.'

"2. With reference to Paragraph 2 of above referred to cable it is requested that State Department inform neutral governments that they may each designate if they

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750086

By CB/AA NARS, Date DEC. 6 1974

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

so desire a diplomatic agent or representative of that character to maintain contact with SCAP in Japan. Further request advice on developments."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ENCLOSURE "A"

From: Joint Chiefs of Staff

To: Commander in Chief, Army Forces Pacific Advance,
Tokyo, Japan.

Commander in Chief, Army Forces Pacific Command,
Manila, P.I.

Nr: WARX 77872

22 October 1945

The following as a basis for reply to your CAX 52301 has been prepared by the State Department:

1. The existence of diplomatic missions to the Japanese Government is not deemed consistent with the purposes and character of Allied occupation of Japan or with the position of the occupying authorities.
2. If it is so desired, neutral nations might designate a diplomatic agent or representative of that character to maintain contact with the headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allies.
3. General MacArthur should be instructed to direct the Japanese Government that it should not carry on relations with neutral governments except in accordance with such procedure as may be established by him. End of State Department message.

It is desired that you take such action as may be necessary in order to implement the sense of the above. Additional instructions are being furnished by the State Department to Mr. Acheson. End

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750086By CD/PA NARS, Date DEC. 6.

1974

Enclosure "A"

~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED~~ENCLOSURE "B"

From: Advanced Echelon, General Headquarters,
Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo, Japan

To: War Department

Information:

Commander in Chief, Army Forces Pacific,
Administration, Manila, Philippines

Nr: CAX 52301

25 September 1945

Swedish Legation has inquired as to what extent neutral diplomatic missions here are to continue relations with Japanese Foreign Office and other Japanese Government officers. Request comprehensive definition United States policy on which to base reply to Swedish Legation and any necessary instructions to Japanese Government and all neutral diplomatic missions in Tokyo.

Neutral diplomatic missions here are continuing to use Japanese radio facilities for communications to home governments. We consider it desirable release neutral diplomatic communications through American, rather than Japanese channels and request policy directive in this respect.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NAO 750086By CR/100 NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

Enclosure "B"

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O.P.D., G.S.

091 - Japan.

OPD 000.7 (10 Oct 45)

BPR, WDSS

**Publicity Regarding Contemplated Invasion Operations
Against the Japanese Empire.**

OPD, WDGS

10 Oct 45
Colonel Hutchin/71684

1

1. On 4 October 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation in JCS 924/20 and the message contained therein was dispatched to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific and the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas.

2. JCS 924/20 is forwarded for your information and guidance.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPD:

1 Incl
JCS 924/20, Cy No. 85

HUGH SAWYER, Lt Col, GSC
Assistant Exec. Officer, S & P Group

Distn:

- SWNCC, w/cy No. 86, JCS 924/20
- G-1, w/cy No. 87, JCS 924/20
- G-3, w/cy No. 88, JCS 924/20
- SPD, w/cy No. 89, JCS 924/20
- I&LD, w/cy No. 90, JCS 924/20
- AGF, w/cy No. 91, JCS 924/20
- G-2, w/o incl
- AAF, w/o incl
- ASF, w/o incl

SWNCC	
COL. MCCARTHY
COMDR. RICHARDSON
MR. R. E. COX
LT. COL. PENNOYER
LT. COL. SILFUS
MR. H. W. MOSELEY
MR. J. R. GARDINER
LT. COL. ROCKEFELLER
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD
MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL
ENS. F. WHITESIDE
FILE

Handwritten signatures and initials over the routing table.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority UNO 760086

By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6, 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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PRIORITY

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY. HANDLE AS SECRET
CORRESPONDENCE PER PARAS 44g and 53a, AR 380-5.

From: Advance Echelon General Headquarters Army Forces
Pacific Tokyo Japan

To: War Department

Nr: CA 53137

11 October 1945

From SCAP to WARCOS pass SECSTATE from Atcheson
CA 53137. 31 October 10.

Reference our number 18 October 4 requesting
telegraphic summary of draft directive on revision of
constitution. Accompanied by Professor Takagi of Imperial
University. Konoye called on me informally last evening at
his request as result of his call on General MacArthur
October 4 at which I was present and at which the General
told Konoye that Jap constitution must be revised. Konoye
asked me for advice and suggestions; lacking the directive
on this subject I offered personal, unofficial comment on
general character as follows:

Begin summary:

1. House of Representatives, only govt branch
purporting to represent the people, enjoyed only limited
powers. Cabinet was not responsible to it and constitution
lacked any provision whereby, for example, cabinet must
have confidence of house and fall upon vote of censure.
House had only limited control over budget and none over
expenditures of imperial household. It was not competent
to pass a bill into law after disapproval thereof by house

CM-IN-5403

(11 Oct 45)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750086

By CP/AR NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ TOT

PRIORITY

Page 2

From: Advance Echelon General Headquarters, Army Forces,
Pacific, Tokyo, Japan

Nr: GA 53137

11 October 1945

of peers which could interminably block legislation. It was subject to dissolution and to facing reelection on arbitrary dictum of higher authority.

2. In such "Bill of Rights" as existed each right was emasculated by restriction to "within limits of the law". There was no specification of the electorate, no guarding of people from evils of centralized police control and centralized control of education.

3. House of Peers was not democratic in any sense, represented only nobles, financiers and payers of high taxes and exercised extraordinary control without support of peoples will.

4. There was no provision for judicial protection of peoples' rights as against govt or for impeachment of officials.

5. There was no provision to regulate and control War, Navy Ministers (if there should be any in future), to make them responsible to the govt and thus deprive militarists of grip on govt through powers not acquired by constitutional means such as direct access to throne and power to block formation of cabinet by refusing to serve; democratic constitution would require such officials to be civilian.

6. Privy Council was extra-governmental body serving in restraint of house of representatives and peoples' rights.

7. There could not be a govt reflecting "freely expressed will of the people" if the peoples' representatives could not initiate and adopt amendments to the constitution

CM-IN-5403 (11 Oct 45)

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

Page 3

From: Advance Echelon General Headquarters, Army Forces
Pacific, Tokyo, Japan

Nr: CA 53137

11 October 1945

and if Emperor could override the veto, enact laws when Diet
not in session and keep Diet out of session in order to
continue such laws. End summary.

Konoye indicated that Emperor was in favor of
revision and that he himself would actively work therefor.
He asked that we have further discussions and that I also
receive Tagaki for that purpose. It would accordingly be
helpful if dept could expedite sending of material requested
in reference telegram. Despatch follows.

End

ACTION: General Bissell (State)

INFO : General Hull, General Hilldring, Mr. McCloy,
C of S

CM-IN-5403 (11 Oct 45) DTG 111155Z da

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*091
7/15/50*

	SWNCC	
COL. McCARTHY	<i>[Signature]</i>
COMDR. RICHARDSON	<i>[Signature]</i>
MR. R. E. COX	
LT. COL. PENNOYER	
LT. COL. KEILFUSS	
MR. H. W. MOSELEY	
MR. J. P. GARDINER	
LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER	
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD	<i>[Signature]</i>
MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER	
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL	
ENS. F. WHITESIDE	
FILE	

~~RESTRICTED~~
O.P.D., G.S.

OPD 000.7 (10 Oct 45)

10 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC,
TOKYO, JAPAN:

SUBJECT: Publicity Regarding Contemplated Invasion Operations Against
the Japanese Empire

1. Reference is made to Operations Division memorandum, OPD 000.7 IS (19 Sept 45), forwarding JCS 924/18 and JCS 924/19.
2. On 4 October 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation in JCS 924/20 and the message contained therein was dispatched to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific and to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas as WARX 72957, dated 4 October 1945.
3. JCS 924/20 is forwarded for your information.
4. Copies of JCS 924/20 have also been forwarded to:

- Commanding General, U. S. Forces, European Theater
- Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations
- Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, U.S.S.R.
- Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific
- Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater
- Commanding General, U. S. Forces, India-Burma Theater
- Commanding General, U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces
- Commanding General, Alaskan Department
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command

J. E. HULL
Lieutenant General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD

HUGH SAWYER
Lt Colonel, GSC
Assistant Exec. Officer
Strategy & Policy Group

1 Incl
JCS 924/20, Cys No. 71 and 72

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority NND 750086
By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

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Copies furnished:
G-2, w/o incl
BPR, w/o incl
Sec ~~SWNCC~~, w/o incl ✓
Theater Gp, w/o incl

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~~RESTRICTED~~

091 Japan
091 Japan

[Handwritten signature]

7- SEP 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This is in further reference to your letter dated 6 July 1945, SWP 711.93114A IR/5-245, and my interim reply of 27 July 1945, concerning the privileges accorded Japanese protected personnel in American custody, as required by the Geneva Red Cross Convention.

A report on this matter has now been received from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific. From this it appears that the Japanese Imperial Forces have not issued to Japanese medical personnel documentary evidence of their protected status, as is contemplated by the Red Cross Convention. No special privileges as protected personnel have therefore been accorded to any Japanese prisoners of war. However, those Japanese prisoners who have been found to be medical personnel, as a result of oral interrogation, have been assigned to the care of sick and wounded Japanese prisoners of war, under the direction of United States medical personnel.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

SWNCC	
COL. MCCARTHY	<i>[Signature]</i>
COMDR. RICHARDSON	<i>[Signature]</i>
MR. R. E. COX	<i>[Signature]</i>
LT. COL. PENNOYER	<i>[Signature]</i>
LT. COMDR. SEILFUSS	<i>[Signature]</i>
MR. H. W. MOSELEY	<i>[Signature]</i>
MR. J. P. GARDINER	<i>[Signature]</i>
LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER	<i>[Signature]</i>
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD	<i>[Signature]</i>
MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER	<i>[Signature]</i>
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL	<i>[Signature]</i>
ENS. F. WHITESIDE	<i>[Signature]</i>
FILE	<i>[Signature]</i>

Secretary of War

914

COPY FOR SWNCC

16

to Japan

SECRET

14 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MATTHEWS
MR. McCLOY
MR. GATES

Subject: Japanese Protest on the Use of the
Atomic Bomb

1. The Secretariat, SWNCC, is in receipt of a memorandum on the above subject from the State member of the Committee, enclosing a memorandum from the Legation of Switzerland in charge of Japanese interests, protesting the use of the atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima.

2. In view of the events which have transpired since the receipt of this note from the Swiss Legation, the State Department recommends that:

- a. The Swiss Memorandum be merely acknowledged.
- b. No reply be made to the Japanese protest.
- c. No publicity whatsoever be given to the receipt of this protest from the Japanese Government.

3. If the Committee concurs in these recommendations, the Secretariat will take the necessary steps to advise the Department of State accordingly.

4. It is requested, therefore, that you indicate hereon your concurrence or comments on the above recommendations and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

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Authority 44075008By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6~~SECRET~~

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091 Japan

SECRET

14 September 1945

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MR. GATES

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For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

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Authority 440750086
By ajh NARS, Date DEC-6 1974

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(15)

WAR PROBLEMS
/~~SECRET~~

September 5, 1945

Mr. Dunn, Chairman, State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee.

SUBJECT: Japanese protest received by the Department of State in a memorandum dated August 11, 1945 from the Swiss Legation in charge of Japanese interests in the United States with the exception of Hawaii, concerning the alleged bombing on August 6, 1945 with "bombs of a new type" by United States airplanes of the town of Hiroshima (Japan).

PROBLEM: Should a reply be made to this Japanese protest? If so, what should be the nature of the reply?

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That the receipt of the Swiss memorandum be merely acknowledged.
- (2) That no reply be made to this Japanese protest in view of the events which have transpired since the receipt of this note from the Swiss Legation.
- (3) That no publicity whatsoever be given to the receipt of this protest from the Japanese Government.

CONCURRENCES:

Le

JA

FE

740.00116 P.W./8-1145

SWP:GTHawley:BB

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority NND 750086
By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
A - D
SEP 11 1945
MR. DUNN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LEGAL COUNSEL
SEP 10 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WAR PROBLEMS
SPECIAL DIVISION

September 5, 1945

Mr. Dunn, Chairman, State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee.

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of State in a memorandum dated August 11, 1945 from the
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the receipt of this protest from the
Japanese Government.

CONCURRENCES:

Le *WVB*
JA *SPD*
FE *JMB*
740.00116 P.W./8-1145
SWP:GTHawley:BB

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Authority *NND 750086*
By *SP/AR* NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

Japan

SP
WVB

291 Japan

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
A - D
SEP 11 1945
MR. DUNN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LEGAL USER
SEP 10 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WAR PROBLEMS
SPECIAL DIVISION

~~SECRET~~

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CONCURRENCES:

Le *WVB*

JA *[Signature]*

FE *[Signature]*

740.00116 P.W./8-1145

SWP:GTHawley:BB

9/11
[Signature]

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750086

By *[Signature]* NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

*Top Secret**336
88-1000*

August 30, 1945.

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Balfour came in this afternoon and handed me the attached Aide-Memoire on the subject of control machinery for Japan.

I told Mr. Balfour that the whole fabric of the arrangements for the control of Japan had been built upon the Potsdam Declaration and the communication by you of August 11th to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Government. Particular reference in your communication of August 11th is as follows:

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who shall take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms."

The next step taken was the communication of August 11th from the President to the Prime Minister stating that the President proposed to nominate General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied forces "to accept, coordinate, and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese armed forces". This designation was agreed to by the Prime Minister. It was not the intention of this Government to have a Control Council in Japan, as the control of Japan would be effectuated by the Supreme Allied Commander based on the above agreements.

I told Mr. Balfour that it was the policy and sincere desire of the President and the Secretary of State that our allies be consulted with respect to the policies to be carried out in dealing with Japan, and this was the reason why the Secretary of State immediately circulated to the other three major Allies the United States proposal to set up a Far Eastern Advisory Commission. It was the idea of this Government that all matters having to do with policies and methods of carrying out these policies could be discussed in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission; that it would be perhaps a few months in any event before it would be possible for any other than military commanders and their forces to go into Japan, as the business of securing the surrender was a very serious one and was a strictly military operation, but there was no reason, if this Far Eastern Advisory Commission were immediately set up, why it could not begin to discuss many matters relating to the application of the surrender of Japan.

I told

SWNCO FILE

(14)

-2-

I told Mr. Balfour that this explanation would seem to me to dispose of the British suggestion for discussion of the Control Commission, in other words that this would be a proper subject to discuss in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission but that we hoped that the Far Eastern Advisory Commission would be the first body which would be set up in order to head up all these discussions in one place.

As far as concerned the communication of the British proposals for a Control Council to other governments, that was a matter which they would have to decide themselves, although I expressed the hope that in view of the proposed establishment of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission the British Government might find it appropriate to withhold discussion of this matter until the Far Eastern Advisory Commission was set up.

As far as the British proposal that India be added to the proposed Advisory Commission, I said this was a matter which would have to be decided by the higher authorities of our Government and that I would bring this whole matter to the attention of the Secretary of State for his consideration.

S/
James Clement Dunn

A-D:JCD:VH

(COPY:A-D:VH)

AIDE-MEMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be grateful if, before replying to the proposals made in Aide-Memoire which Mr. Dunn handed to Mr. Balfour on August 25th, they could have some broad indication of the views of the United States Government as to the machinery which should eventually be set up for the control of Japan. Without some such indication they find it difficult to estimate how far acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the proposals contained in the State Department's Aide-Memoire of August 23rd would prejudice the tentative suggestions for a Control Council in Japan which were made in the Embassy's Aide-Memoire of August 20th. At first sight, for example, it would seem difficult to persuade an Advisory Commission of Ten Powers to agree to the setting up of a Control Council of Five Powers.

In the meantime, as the American proposals are understood to have been communicated to the Chinese and Soviet Governments, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel that they should now give those Governments an outline of their own tentative proposals.

If eventually an organisation is set up on the lines proposed by the United States Government, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would have to insist on the inclusion of India in the proposed Advisory Commission in view of the great part which India has played in the war against Japan, and, pending consultation with the Government of South

/Africa

2.

Africa, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom must reserve their position regarding the inclusion of a South African representative.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 30th, 1945

Lt Col Yudelson/72234/emd

WDGAP 383.6 *Japan*

JUL 18 1945

The Honorable
The Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The War Department is establishing a program of reorientation for Japanese prisoners of war along the lines of the present program now in effect for German prisoners of war. In the formulation of the program the War Department has had the advantage of advice and information from members of your Department and of the Office of War Information.

I wish to express my appreciation for the valuable aid already given to the War Department in connection with this program and to express the desire that the liaison already established will be continued in the extension and future activities of this program.

Sincerely yours,

John W. Martyn
Secretary of War

COPY FOR SWNGC

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Secretary of the Navy

Serial No. 391313
8 4 51

Op13-1/sah 8-10-45

14 AUG 1945

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to your letter, SWP 195.7 Jean Nicolet/6-2545, dated 2 August 1945, and to previous correspondence concerning an attack by a Japanese submarine upon the survivors of the United States Merchant Vessel JEAN NICOLET. It is noted that the Department of State considers that a further protest to the Japanese Government regarding this matter would accomplish little but suggests informing the Japanese Government that its reply to this Government's protest is unacceptable.

The proposed action of the Department of State meets with the approval of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

FORRESTAL

Hon. James F. Byrnes,
Secretary of State.

CC: SWHCC Secretariat L

Prepared by:
Capt. T. H. Tonseth, USN,
Central Div. of OPNAV

(12)

091 Japan *W*

SWNCC	
COL. MCCARTHY
COMDR. RICHARDSON
MR. R. E. COX
LT. COL. PENNOYER
LT. COMDR. BEILFUSS
MR. H. W. MOSELEY
MR. J. P. BARDINER
LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD
MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL
ENS. F. WHITESIDE
FILE

The Honorable Frederick M. Vinson

The Secretary of Treasury

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The rapid progress of military operations against Japan makes essential the immediate assignment of a financial advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Pacific Area Command. His advice will assist greatly in the formulation of detailed plans for the Military Government of Japan, with particular reference to fiscal policies and procedures. After the surrender of Japan he should also be available, if requested, to advise the U.S. Commander-in-Chief who will be charged with the duty of enforcing the surrender terms, regarding financial matters.

I am sure you will agree it is vitally important that a man of outstanding vision, integrity, government fiscal experience, knowledge of the complex international exchange, monetary, taxation, accounting and other fiscal problems of the Far East be nominated for this position. An appreciation of the basic military strategy and requirements will assist him greatly in obtaining and maintaining the essential cordial confidence of the Commanding General to whom he will be directly responsible. I believe he should also be known to the public as a person of sound fiscal reputation in whose judgment and advice great trust can be placed.

I know you are desirous, as I am, to assure the utmost degree of coordination between Treasury and War Department policies in the war against Japan. Since the financial advisor to Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Pacific Area Command, will be a key individual in this relationship, I anticipate your nominations with great interest.

Sincerely yours,

AUG 12 '45



DISPATCHED
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT

H
Acting Secretary of War

SWNCC

COPY FOR _____

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SECRET

Van Slyke Document

Grille

Van Slyke

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Observations on Post Hostilities Policy Toward Japan

1. To be realistic, post hostilities policy toward Japan must be based upon:
 - a. Recognition of the probable reaction of the American public over a period of time. A policy which does not win the continuing support of the American public is doomed to failure.
 - b. Recognition of the lessons taught by history with respect to relations between the conqueror and the conquered.
2. The most important points to be noted in connection with a and b above would appear to be the following:
 - a. The American public will unquestionably become restive under a prolonged occupation of Japan by American Forces. It will not wish to assume the burdens of governing Japan over an extended period. Demands for withdrawal are likely to begin within 6 months after the surrender of Japan and thereafter to build up increasing political pressure to that end.
 - b. Even under the most just and equitable administration, resentment against a conquering nation exercising direct political and military control over a vanquished nation inevitably tends to increase over a period of time. Difficulties arise which present the ruling nation with the alternative of either extending and tightening control or withdrawing without accomplishing the desired objective.
 - c. The conquering nation cannot impose its form of government, ideals, or way of life upon a conquered nation except by permanent military occupation and immigration.
3. The formulation of our policies toward post hostilities Japan, therefore, requires the highest degree of statesmanship. We must look forward as well as backward. We must:
 - a. Avoid to the maximum extent possible policies dictated by current war hysteria which subsequently the American public will repudiate or which will involve commitments which the American public will be unwilling to fulfill.
 - b. Attempt to accomplish the maximum degree of progress towards the regeneration of Japan in the minimum amount of time. Our degree of success in accomplishing this objective will depend upon the intelligence with which we approach the problem of the relations between the victor and the vanquished.
4. It would appear desirable in the light of the above:
 - a. To retain the Emperor and the civil administration. As part of the terms of surrender the Emperor would be forced to dismiss the present cabinet and call a liberal cabinet excluding representatives of the military and naval forces. It would also be part of the surrender terms that the Imperial House would be retained only so long as it cooperated fully with the Allied Control Council.
 - b. To set up a Supreme Allied Council which would in fact be the supreme authority in the country but which would function and issue its directives through the regularly constituted government.
 - c. To give every encouragement to the Japanese to undertake under their own leadership the development of democratic institutions and the elimination of the spirit of military conquest.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
AuthorityBy: CP/ANARS, Date: DEC. 6, 1974SECRET
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5. The following arguments are advanced in support of such a program as compared with the establishment of Allied Military Government in place of the Emperor:

- a. The retention of the Emperor will probably insure the immediate surrender of all Japanese forces outside the home islands. It is assumed that the surrender terms would require the Emperor to order all Japanese Armed Forces wherever located to cease resistance and to prepare to return to the home islands.
- b. Allied Military Government is bound to be bungling, undiplomatic, and inefficient. We must give full recognition to the fact that we do not have sufficient personnel with the proper vision, training, and ability to carry out the task effectively.
- c. There would appear to be a strong probability that the Japanese will be ripe, if permitted to direct it themselves, for a genuine democratic movement:
 - (1) The Japanese are essentially an imitative people.
 - (2) Like all Orientals, they have great respect for power.
 - (3) Having seen what we as a democracy have accomplished, they are quite likely, as in 1867, to attempt to imitate us.
 - (4) Whether or not we invade Japan before her surrender the Japanese military will have lost "face" and been completely discredited.
 - (5) Prior to 1931 the democratic elements in Japan were increasing in strength and, with the military discredited, could probably be revised.
- d. The Emperor, like the British King, can summon a cabinet of any political complexion. If the Emperor after the alienation of the militarists, summons a liberal cabinet and openly supports a democratic program, the people are likely to accept it and support it whole heartedly. If Allied Military Government attempts to impose a democratic program, democracy will be associated with the rule of the conqueror and will be discredited with the people.
- e. The continuation of the Imperial rule with the Allied Control Commission remaining in the background should reduce the possibilities of friction and disturbance to the minimum and permit the earliest withdrawal of Allied Occupation Forces, and of the Allied Military Council. The Allied Military Government, particularly with the quality of personnel available, would almost inevitably create situations that would require a more protracted military occupation than the American public will accept.
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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Observations on Post Hostilities Policy
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b. Recognition of the lessons taught by history with respect to relations between the conqueror and the conquered.

2. The most important points to be noted in connection with a and b above would appear to be the following:

a. The American public will unquestionably become restive under a prolonged occupation of Japan by American Forces. It will not wish to assume the burdens of governing Japan over an extended period. Demands for withdrawal are likely to begin within 6 months after the surrender of Japan and thereafter to build up increasing political pressure to that end.

b. Even under the most just and equitable administration, resentment against a conquering nation exercising direct political and military control over a vanquished nation inevitably tends to increase over a period of time. Difficulties arise which present the ruling nation with the alternative of either extending and tightening control or withdrawing without accomplishing the desired objective.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority

By ca/NARS, Date DEC. 6 1974

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e. The conquering nation cannot impose its form of government ideals, or way of life upon a conquered nation except by permanent military occupation and immigration.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority NND 750086
By CR/JP NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority 440 7500 86By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC. 8 1974

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b. Even under the most just and equitable administration, resentment against a conquering nation exercising direct political and military control over a vanquished nation inevitably tends to increase over a period of time. Difficulties arise which present the ruling nation with the alternative of either extending and tightening control or withdrawing without accomplishing the desired objective.

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e. The conquering nation cannot impose its form of government ideals, or way of life upon a conquered nation except by permanent military occupation and immigration.

3. The formulation of our policies toward post hostilities Japan, therefore, requires the highest degree of statesmanship. We must look forward as well as backward. We must:

a. Avoid to the maximum extent possible policies dictated by current war hysteria which subsequently the American public will repudiate or which will involve commitments which the American public will be unwilling to fulfill.

b. Attempt to accomplish the maximum degree of progress towards the regeneration of Japan in the minimum amount of time. Our degree of success in accomplishing this objective will depend upon the intelligence with which we approach the problem of the relations between the victor and the vanquished.

4. It would appear desirable in the light of the above:

a. To retain the Emperor and the civil administration. As part of the terms of surrender the Emperor would be forced to dismiss the present cabinet and call a liberal cabinet excluding representatives of the military and naval forces. It would also be part of the surrender terms that the Imperial House would be retained only so long as it cooperated fully with the Allied Control Council.

b. To set up a Supreme Allied Council which would in fact be the supreme authority in the country but which would function and issue its directives through the regularly constituted government.

c. To give every encouragement to the Japanese to undertake under their own leadership the development of

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democratic institutions and the elimination of the spirit of military conquest.

5. The following arguments are advanced in support of such a program as compared with the establishment of Allied Military Government in place of the Emperor:

a. The retention of the Emperor will probably insure the immediate surrender of all Japanese forces outside the home islands. It is assumed that the surrender terms would require the Emperor to order all Japanese Armed Forces wherever located to cease resistance and to prepare to return to the home islands.

b. Allied Military Government is bound to be bungling, undiplomatic, and inefficient. We must give full recognition to the fact that we do not have sufficient personnel with the proper vision, training and ability to carry out the task effectively.

c. There would appear to be a strong probability that the Japanese will be ripe, if permitted to direct it themselves, for a genuine democratic movement:

(1) The Japanese are essentially an imitative people.

(2) Like all Orientals, they have great respect for power.

(3) Having seen what we as a democracy have accomplished, they are quite likely, as in 1867, to attempt to imitate us.

(4) Whether or not we invade Japan before her surrender the Japanese military will have lost "face" and been completely discredited.

(5) Prior to 1931 the democratic elements in Japan were increasing in strength and, with the military discredited, could probably be revised.

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d. The Emperor, like the British King, can summon a cabinet of any political complexion. If the Emperor after the alienation of the militarists, summons a liberal cabinet and openly supports a democratic program, the people are likely to accept it and support it whole heartedly. If Allied Military Government attempts to impose a democratic program, democracy will be associated with the rule of the conqueror and will be discredited with the people.

e. The continuation of the Imperial rule with the Allied Control Commission remaining in the background should reduce the possibilities of friction and disturbance to the minimum and permit the earliest withdrawal of Allied Occupation Forces, and of the Allied Military Council. The Allied Military Government, particularly with the quality of personnel available, would almost inevitably create situations that would require a more protracted military occupation than the American public will accept.

f. The United Nation's machinery, backed by the Armed Forces at its disposal, promises to be the most effective instrumentality for exercising continuing supervision over the Japanese Government. It should be our objective to turn the problem over to this instrumentality at the earliest possible date. This method of policing Japan will be far more acceptable to the American public than direct occupation and control. It will be less expensive and have a greater chance of success.

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VAN SLYKE DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Observations on Post Hostilities Policy
Toward Japan.

1. To be realistic, post hostilities policy toward Japan must be based upon:

a. Recognition of the probable reaction of the American public over a period of time. A policy which does not win the continuing support of the American public is doomed to failure.

b. Recognition of the lessons taught by history with respect to relations between the conqueror and the conquered.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
Authority 750086
By CD NARS, Date DEC 8 1974

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Authority NND 750086
By [Signature] NARS, Date DEC 6 1974

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority 440750086By SA/SP NARS, Date DEC 6

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