

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

included a substantial portion of the Japanese carriers?

General Miles: I do not believe that I did know exactly what that force was.

Mr. Gesell: I have no further questions, if the committee please. I simply would like to again point out that we have not included in General Miles' examination anything concerning the "wind" code messages or the events of the 6th and 7th as they relate to the fourteenth part and one o'clock messages, for the reason that those subjects are to be covered later on and General Miles will return to the stand for that purpose in accordance with the procedure we have outlined.

The Chairman: Very well.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question before the cross examination of this witness begins?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Does counsel have here the testimony of General Miles on all previous occasions? Is it available for examination? He said he testified five other times.

Mr. Gesell: I notice you said five, General Miles.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to see all five of them.

Mr. Gesell: I think on five occasions. Will you tell us what those five occasions were, General Miles, so that I can answer Congressman Murphy's question?

Witness Miles:

The Vice Chairman: He said this was the fifth.

General Miles: I appeared before the Roberts Board; I appeared before the Grunert Board, the Army Pearl Harbor Board; I appeared and gave testimony before Brigadier General Clark G-2 the month after my appearance before the Grunert Board and I was again under oath as shown by my affidavit to Lieutenant Colonel Clausen.

Mr. Gesell: All of that material has been available to us.

The Chairman: All right.

Mr. Murphy: And it will be available during the course of this examination?

Mr. Gesell: Well, we have in some instances only one copy. In some instances we have seen the material.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I make this request owing to the statement just made, that when counsel gets material that is available to the committee, if not for a member of the committee asking for it, that the committee members be individually advised as to the receipt of that material or of their having it so that we might inquire about it.

Mr. Gesell: Well, I am sorry. We will try to do that. I thought the committee understood that we had received all of the reports and transcripts of testimony of all of the various inquiries conducted by both the Army and the Navy, as

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well as the Roberts material.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you understand that the committee knew that Colonel Clark or General Clark had made an investigation?

Mr. Gesell: Yes, I thought so.

Mr. Keefe: I never heard of that one. It is news to me.

The Chairman: Permit the chair to make this observation: In many instances in which documents or testimony has been made available, or in some instances at least, it has not been available in sufficient copies to permit each member to have a separate copy of his own. In other cases it has been. And in cases where there is only one copy of available testimony it is more or less difficult for all members to examine it simultaneously and in instances of that sort those who get it first ought to seek to accommodate themselves to the desires of other members so that sooner or later all of them can see it. I do not know how many have seen this.

Mr. Gesell: Well, would this be helpful to the members of the committee, if prior to the appearance of each witness we handed to each member of the committee the record references in these various reports and documents where that particular witness has appeared on prior occasions? We will do that if the committee wishes it.

The Chairman: It would help. The chair might suggest

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that it obviously is impossible, as the chair understands it, for each member of the committee to have simultaneously the complete record of the testimony given by all the witnesses in all the previous investigations that have been held. Is the chair correct in that?

Mr. Gesell: We have only one copy of quite a bit of that material.

The Chairman: And to make additional copies sufficient for all members would be quite a task and quite an expense, but if any member gets possession of one of these copies first the chair would suggest that as soon as possible that he make it available to other members in turn.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I have a request to make.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson, you may go ahead.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if we get this material that we at least have it forty-eight hours beforehand or twenty-four hours, so that we may review it, rather than receive it at the time that a witness is on the stand or coming on. It is very difficult to prepare and we will cut down the period of time that it takes to question a witness if we have it sufficiently in advance.

Mr. Gesell: The Senator is quite right on that and we will try to make up a list for the members of the committee

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showing where each person testified and have it available as much ahead of time as we can.

The Chairman: And it is obvious that in cases where only one copy is available that, naturally, counsel who under our arrangement have the first examination of a witness, would like to feel that they should have the right to examine it first in order to become familiar with it, but as soon as possible in such cases after they do so that it be passed around as rapidly as possible to the various members of the committee.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I have one request.

The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: It seems to me in view of the nature of the testimony we have received from General Miles that each member of the committee ought to be furnished before Monday morning or before Sunday if possible with a photostatic copy of all of his previous testimony. I think it is extremely important and I would like to go into it pretty thoroughly.

The Chairman: The chair is unable to say whether that is physically possible but every effort will be made to do that.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: I thought that I was more or less familiar

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with all of the so-called Pearl Harbor investigations but reference has now been made to a General Clark investigation, which is entirely new to me. I never heard of it until General Miles mentioned it and I would like at this time to make some inquiry as to the nature and scope and character of that investigation. When was it held and under whose direction and for what purpose and where are the records, if available?

Mr. Gesell: Congressman Keefe, I think I can explain in this fashion. That was a technical investigation into a very detailed aspect of this situation and I have just explained --

Mr. Keefe: You mean with respect to the codes?

Mr. Gesell: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Keefe: And that sort of thing?

Mr. Gesell: And I have just explained the situation to the Senator from Michigan. I will be very glad to discuss it with you, Congressman Keefe, after we adjourn. That has been available to the staff and to the committee from the outset of the inquiry.

Mr. Keefe: Well, it has never received any particular notice so far as the committee is concerned, I think; at least I have never heard of it before. Is it because of the fact that it does contain restricted material relating to

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codes and code breaking and that sort of thing?

Mr. Gesell: I believe that must be the reason, Congressman Keefe, yes.

The Chairman: The chair might say he has heard in a general way of a report made by General Clark, who is a member of the General Staff as he understands, but the chairman of the committee has not seen the result or the testimony which General Clark took on the code situation, with which the chairman understands he dealt exclusively.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I presume that will be made available to the committee at a certain time.

Mr. Gesell: Oh, yes, Congressman.

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, I am sure this is not in the spirit of "I told you so", but I raised this question at the very first meeting of the committee in executive session.

It now appears that there have been eight exhaustive investigations, eight reports written and testimony given in support of those reports. I knew that, with the exception of the Clark investigation, when we had our first meeting and I made the request that the testimony be digested so that we

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would have it in such form that we could compare the testimony of witnesses given at different times and I was given the impression as a result of that first meeting that that was being done.

Then at the last meeting of this committee in executive session I learned to my astonishment that nothing had been done along that line. I then asked, after having gone out of my way to call one of the great law book publishing companies to see if they could furnish us an editorial staff, I made the suggestion that even at that late hour that we employ people to compare that testimony for us, classify it as to subject so we could compare the testimony given by individual witnesses at different times to the same points and at that time the committee referred it to a sub-committee.

So today we are now confronted with the situation where we have a tremendous mass of testimony, probably thousands upon thousands of pages, probably eighty or ninety or a hundred volumes according to figures that have been given to me offhand and now we are talking about bringing that testimony in and dropping it on the desks of the different members of this committee expecting us to analyze that testimony on the spot, testimony given by the same witness at different times and then intelligently cross examine a witness sitting on the stand here in respect of what he may have said at dif-

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ferent times.

If anyone has ever been vindicated in offering something which should have been acted upon in the first place, which has not been acted on at all, I certainly am in reviewing the situation which confronts the committee at this particular time.

The Chairman: Well, the chair simply wishes to observe that Congressman Gearhart did at one of our executive meetings suggest that the staff of the West Publishing Company of Minneapolis, Minnesota be brought down here to digest the previous testimony. The matter was discussed. No action was taken upon it. Whether wisely or unwisely may be a matter of opinion. It was not done. The Congressman did suggest that that be done.

Now, counsel, are you through with your main examination?

Mr. Gesell: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

General Miles: Mr. Chairman, may I add one thing that I am afraid I did not make myself wholly clear on?

The counsel asked me several questions in regard to the messages of November 3rd, I believe -- or December 3rd, sent by Navy regarding the Japanese and the burning of their codes and pointed out also to me that on some other occasions the War Department had specifically asked that the Navy messages be transmitted to Army.

Witness Miles:

I think it only fair to state, therefore, why I believed and why I think everyone in my department believed that Navy messages were being transmitted to the Army in Hawaii and vice versa.

I come down to three principal reasons. One is my intimate knowledge of the basis and policies governing the plans for the defense of Hawaii, in which it was always emphasized, so far as I can remember, the great importance of close liaison between Army and Navy. It was a tight little fortress which demanded primarily the close cooperation of the two services.

Second, my knowledge that General Marshall as Chief of Staff always emphasized the necessity of close cooperation and liaison with the Navy here in Washington and, I felt sure, to his senior officers in command of the major units of the Army that had any connection with Navy, as was particularly the case in Hawaii.

And, third, I received an official letter on the 17th of September, dated the 6th of September, from the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, Colonel Fielder, stating, inter alia:

"The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete."

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Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I believe that the whole letter should go in. We should not have only the inter alia.

General Miles: I will read the entire letter.

The Chairman: Let the whole letter or message go into the transcript at this point.

General Miles: This refers to summaries of intelligence which we were sending them.

Senator Ferguson: What is the date of that?

General Miles: The date? I will read the whole message.

(Reading):

"6 September 1941.

"SUBJECT: Summaries of Information

TO: War Department General Staff
 Military Intelligence Division G-2,
 Washington, D. C.

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

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"3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A.C. of S., G-2."

The Chairman: Is that all?

General Miles: That is the complete letter, sir.

The Chairman: General, I would like to clear up some of the terminology used by the War Department with respect to matters about which you testified.

You have down there, I believe, "G" by itself and G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 and maybe some other G's, but what is "G" by itself?

General Miles: "G" was an abbreviation that we adopted in the first World War from the French. To us it meant the General Staff Division.

The Chairman: Or the Chief of Staff? Would that also indicate the Chief of Staff?

General Miles: It was used both to describe an office or a department of the General Staff and loosely applied to the individual heading that department. There were five divisions of the General Staff, four G's and the War Plans Division.

The Chairman: So that standing by itself "G" either

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means the General Staff or the Chief of Staff?

General Miles: A General Staff division or the Chief of Staff, depending upon context.

The Chairman: What is G-1?

General Miles: Personnel.

The Chairman: And G-2?

General Miles: Intelligence.

The Chairman: Intelligence.

General Miles: G-3 was operations and training; G-4 supply and War Plans Division.

The Chairman: And you designate that by the initials "W.P.D."?

General Miles: "W.P.D.," yes, sir.

The Chairman: Now, did the Chief of the Division of Intelligence, in Military Intelligence under the symbol G-2 have charge of all military intelligence in the War Department?

General Miles: He was the Assistant Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff. He was the man in charge of military intelligence of the General Staff.

I had better read it directly from the Army regulations. The Army regulations current at that time, No. 10-15, state in paragraph 9 (Reading):

"Military Intelligence Division, general duties.

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"a. The Military Intelligence Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military information.

"b. The Military Intelligence Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of all activities concerning--

"(1) Military topographical surveys and maps, including their reproduction and distribution (except special situation maps prepared by G-3).

"(2) The custody of the General Staff map and photograph collection.

"(3) Military attaches, observers, and foreign-language students.

"(4) Intelligence personnel of all units.

"(5) Liaison with other intelligence agencies of the Government and with duly accredited foreign military attaches and missions.

"(6) Codes and ciphers.

"(7) Translations.

"(8) Public relations, to include all forms of publicity.

"(9) Censorship in time of war."

And added to it the acquisition of military topographical

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Questions by The Chairman

maps, as well as their reproduction and distribution, and the custody of the War Department map collection.

The Chairman: Did each of these divisions, G-1 and G-2, 3 and 4 and also the War Planning Division have at the top an officer who was a member of the General Staff and designated as Assistant Chief of Staff?

General Miles: Yes, sir, or Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

The Chairman: Yes, Acting Assistant.

Now, yesterday I think you testified that you had no control or supervision or what you call S.I.S., which I understood was Signal Intelligent Service?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

The Chairman: How does it happen that there would be any lack of supervision by the member of the General Staff or the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence of any particular phase of military intelligence such as S.I.S., Signal Intelligence Service, which is under the Signal Corps? Why would there be that hiatus between the control or supervision of the Chief of Military Intelligence of that branch, of that essential branch of military intelligence that came under the Signal Corps, which was very active and no doubt expected to be active in the obtaining of information?

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General Miles: Senator, the theory on which the General Staff was established was that the divisions of the General Staff were not operating agencies. They were divisions of a staff serving the Chief of Staff whose principal duty was as military adviser to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States.

Now, the S.I.S. was a technical branch which served Military Intelligence just as the Quartermaster Corps was a technical branch which served the Supply Division of the General Staff, if I may use that analogy.

Does that answer your question, sir?

The Chairman: Yes, in a way, but I would like to know to whom S.I.S. was responsible and to whom it was expected under the regulations to make its reports?

General Miles: Directly to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

The Chairman: And they were under no obligation then to report to you as head of the Military Intelligence Division?

General Miles: They formed no part of the Military Intelligence Division. They were part of a technical service, the Signal Corps of the Army.

The Chairman: But that technical service was charged with the responsibility of obtaining information, was it not?

General Miles: No, sir, of transmitting. It was a com-

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communications service.

The Chairman: So that it reported under that arrangement directly to the Chief of Staff?

General Miles: No, sir, it reported directly to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

The Chairman: To whom did he report?

General Miles: All heads of the different branches of the Army were directly under the Chief of Staff. Those branches of the Army were divided in General Staff Divisions and the technical or service staff if you like to call them that.

The Chairman: So that there was no obligatory connection between the Military Intelligence of which you were the head and the Signal Service Corps except such as might be informal or voluntary?

General Miles: That is true, sir. I had no right or authority whatever to give any orders to the S.I.S. or any other part of the Signal Corps or any other part of any other technical branch of the Army. It was, of course, expected that great cooperation would exist and if I went to General Maughborne, Chief Signal Officer, and said that I wanted something very badly he would and did get it for me if he possibly could.

The Chairman: Would there or not have been an advantage

Witness Miles:

Questions by The Chairman

in a crisis such as that which we are discussing, an imminent conflict, if there had been a more direct connection between the Signal Intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service of which you were the head?

General Miles: Well, Senator that goes pretty deeply into the theory of the organization of the General Staff and the organization of the War Department which I do not feel competent to go into at this time. I can only say that it was set up that way with the approval of the Congress of the United States.

The Chairman: In this exhibit number 2 entitled, "Japanese Messages concerning Military Installations, Ship movements, etc.," which covers Hawaii and the Panama Canal, the Philippines, Southern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, the West Coast and then miscellaneous and under the respective headings of which we find many intercepted messages with respect to the movement of ships through the Panama Canal and also the movement of ships in Hawaii and in the Philippines and in the Southeast Atlantic, Southeastern Asia and the Netherlands, which is the Southeast Pacific region or Southwest Pacific -- which was it geographically, Southwest Pacific? It was Southeast Asia, but it was geographically where?

General Miles: Southwest Pacific, yes, sir.

Witness Miles:

Questions by The Chairman

The Chairman: The Southwest Pacific?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Was there any particular difference in the relative importance given to these intercepted messages with respect to the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the Philippines, Southeast Asia or any other regions covered by these intercepted messages relative to the movement of ships?

General Miles: If I understand your question, Senator, these messages as a whole primarily indicated to us what we already knew or could very easily suspect, that the Japanese were doing everything they could to follow the movement of our warships, as I said yesterday, just as we were doing with regard to following the movement of Japanese warships.

The Chairman: And they were getting information from their representatives either in Panama, for instance, or through some South American country with respect to all movements of not only warships but commercial ships through the Panama Canal in both directions?

General Miles: I did not get the question.

The Chairman: I say they were receiving information as to the movement of ships both naval and commercial through the Panama Canal in both directions, according to these intercepted messages?

General Miles: That was their intent and I have no doubt

Witness Miles:

Questions by The Chairman

they carried it out pretty thoroughly.

The Chairman: And they also were receiving information, as these intercepted messages show, concerning the movement of ships in and out of the Philippines region in Manila Bay, were they?

General Miles: That is true, sir. I mentioned yesterday that I have counted 56 of those that I have deciphered.

The Chairman: And the Hawaiian Islands. Somebody in each of these regions was reporting to Tokyo, or somebody who reported to Tokyo the movement of these ships over the various periods running from 1940, some period in 1940 up to and approaching the 7th of December 1941 and the question I would like to ask is whether the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department treated all of these intercepts, so far as you know, in the same way and with the same degree of importance, or whether they singled out this information from either the Panama Canal or from Hawaii or the Philippines or Southeast Asia for any special treatment in regard to precautionary measures which might be taken in any of these different regions?

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Witness Miles

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W.D. & H. L. WASHINGTON
C. S. PHOTOGRAPHY - JULY 5, 1945

General Miles: Well, they were primarily messages which concerned the Naval Intelligence rather than the Military. Obviously, Senator, we were more interested in the fact that the Japanese were following our ships in our own waters, Panama, Hawaii and the Philippines, than we were the Dutch East Indies, or any other places headed here "miscellaneous".

The Chairman: In view of the activity of the Japanese Government in obtaining this information through these messages from various people at the Panama Canal, Manila, Honolulu, the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia, was there anything in any of them, so far as you know, as head of the Military Intelligence Division, to indicate whether the Japanese Government intended to make an attack at any of these points, and, if so, which one was singled out as the most likely to be the object of such an attack?

General Miles: No, sir, taking the messages as a whole, I do not think they indicated any particular place in which you could say the Japanese will attack there, or the most probable, that they will attack there, solely based on those messages.

The Chairman: Now yesterday I think you testified with reference to the shortage of competent help in the interception, the translation and decoding of these various messages. I would like to ask you specifically what effort you made, as

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Questions by: The Chairman

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2 head of that Division, to secure additional help so that
3 they might be translated, decoded and intercepted more promptly
4 than they were in many cases?

5 General Miles: I testified this morning, Senator, that
6 for a considerable period of time before Pearl Harbor, I cannot
7 definitely define it, we had lent one of our language officers,
8 successively through at least six of those gentlemen, to the
9 SIS. We were not permitted, due to restrictions on personnel,
10 to do more than that with those language officers. Although
11 they were trained language officers, even then we had to put
12 them through a course of training for that particular duty
13 of translating from telegraphic Japanese, which is a language
14 within a language, before they became fit to carry on.

15 In addition to that, we did what we could to find for
16 the Signal Corps competent civilians, to aid them in this
17 work. That, as I explained this morning, was very difficult,
18 because there were very few in existence who could translate
19 telegraphic Japanese accurately into English, and we must be
20 accurate, and they had to be not only American citizens but
21 American citizens on whose absolute loyalty and discretion
22 we could count.

23 We were handling a very important secret.

24 The Chairman: How were those appointments made? Were
25 they made under Civil Service, or did the War Department have

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

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some special plan by which it was able to secure competent persons who were able to intercept and also to translate and decode these messages?

General Miles: Well, the interception, Senator, was made by various stations of the Army, Navy, and FBI, and the FCC. That was simply a matter of pulling a message out of the air, then transmitting that message as it came out of the air in coded Japanese to Washington. Now the decoding and translation was altogether another matter, a very difficult proposition.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

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The Chairman: Now, pulling the message out of the air at Hawaii or Panama or the Philippines, or any other point, was simply pulling it out of the air as it was going through the air in Japanese?

General Miles: In coded Japanese.

The Chairman: In coded Japanese. They recorded the message in the Japanese code, and it had to be then transmitted from whatever station it may have been intercepted, Panama or elsewhere; is that true?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

The Chairman: Then in Washington it had to be decoded and translated into English; is that it?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

The Chairman: So that those who were charged with that responsibility and that duty had to be, in the first place, able to pull the message out of the air, then they had to be able to decode it and translate it so it could be understood in English, and then passed on to whoever was expected to get it finally; is that true?

General Miles: Yes, sir. The same personnel that pulled it out of the air was not the same that decoded and translated it.

The Chairman: He could pull it out of the air just like it was but he could not translate it after he got it

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

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out of the air?

General Miles: That is so, sir.

The Chairman: I notice many of these messages were translated and decoded within a few days after they had been received and in many other cases it was a month or maybe in some cases two months before the translation and decoding took place. How did that happen? It seems they were not being decoded or translated in the order of their receipt or in the order of their being pulled out of the air.

How did that happen, that they were not decoded and translated in relation to the date of their receipt?

For instance, some messages received in December were not decoded and translated until February, and others were translated within a few days. Now, until they were decoded and translated, did anybody have any idea of the relative importance of these messages so as to give priority to their translation and decoding? And if that is true, how did it happen that some of them waited a month, or two months, to be decoded and translated while others were decoded and translated within a week, and in some cases three or four days, and some on the same day?

General Miles: Obviously, Senator, we could not evaluate the messages or give them any priority in the ordinary case. In the case that we were looking for a particular message,

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

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as was the case in the days before the receipt of the Japanese reply beginning on the 6th of December, we knew that message would be coming. We knew it would be along, we knew to whom it would be addressed, and undoubtedly that got a high priority.

But to answer your question, primarily the delay was due to two factors: One, the fact, as I have already testified, that, as I understand it, the intercepting stations that picked these out of the air -- and there were various stations -- did not have the same facilities for transmitting that message to Washington. Some had teletypes, and they could put the message on in teletype and send it through.

Sometimes I imagine they had to be checked and resent because many errors were made, and would be a perfectly meaningless message to the person sending or receiving it. Other stations had no such facilities, and had to send them by mail, and airmail usually was used.

The second reason, of course, was the traffic rate. Sometimes that increased enormously, and a backlog was created in the decoding and translating agencies here in Washington.

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The Chairman: I find here a message intercepted from Honolulu (Okuda) which I suppose means the Japanese repre-

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Questions by: The Chairman

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sentative there, to Toyko. It is No. 003. It seems to be in reply to No. 002.

"Battleships New Mexico (flag)" -- which I presume means flagship -- "Oklahoma, Idaho, and Mississippi, together with many cruisers and destroyers left Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 6th for training."

That is the day before this message was sent.

"It is reported that they will return on the (12th?)"

Then there is a question mark after that in parentheses, indicating probably some doubt as to whether they would return on that day. That was a Navy translation on the 10th, which is three days after that message was transmitted.

Then there is another one on January 9, 1941, translated on the 25th, with reference to other movements:

"It is reported that the light cruiser Cincinnati returned here from the Philippine Islands. This message sent to Washington and Manila."

That is a message by some Japanese representative to the Japanese Government at Tokyo.

Then on the 16th of January, 1941:

"1. The capital ships returned to Pearl Harbor immediately. The Pennsylvania arrived on the 14th.

"2. The number of vessels seen in the harbor on the morning of the 16th was as follows: Five battleships

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairmen

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(Mississippi, New Mexico, Idaho, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma), five light cruisers of the Omaha class (of which one is in dock) 19 destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders, 1 - - - - -, about 6 small submarines, 1 submarine tender, 1 patrol boat, 7 vessels which may have been patrol boats, 2 transports.

"3. The Yorktown is not in port."

All of which would indicate that somebody in Honolulu almost day by day was reporting to Tokyo the movement of all of our ships in and out of Pearl Harbor, and in and out of Honolulu. Some of these messages were translated and decoded within a very few days, while others were not.

Some of these translations were by the Navy, probably most by the Navy, and some by the Army.

Do you know, as head of the Intelligence Division of the War Department, by what rules, or lack of rules, some of these messages detailing the movements of our ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and in and out of Honolulu as far back as January 1941, nearly a year before the attack was made, were translated and decoded in some cases almost immediately, and in other cases not for weeks? Have you any explanation from your knowledge, as to why that happened?

General Miles: Beyond what I have testified, Senator, I have not. I understand you are going to have Colonel Sadler

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

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as a witness, who can give you the details of that. I could add, however, of course, that these messages we had already discarded. We knew the Japanese were following the movement of our ships, very naturally, in Hawaii.

Much has already been said before this committee as to whether or not the presence of that Fleet was a deterrent to the Japanese, but their interest in the movement of the ships was a perfectly natural activity on their part, because of the obvious fact that there was a fleet on their flank, whatever direction they chose to go, north or south.

The Chairman: The question which arises in my mind is, in view of the fact that these decoded, intercepted and translated messages go all the way from January practically up to the attack, showing that they had detailed information with respect to the movement of the ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and in and out of Honolulu in the Hawaiian Islands, whether that gave any emphasis to the possibility of an attack in Pearl Harbor more or less than any emphasis that might have been given with respect to a possible attack on Panama, in view of the same information they were receiving from Panama or Manila, in view of the information they were receiving from Manila, or the Southwest Pacific, or Southeast Asia, with respect to the same traffic information they were

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

h7

receiving from that region. In other words, as these intercepted messages show that Japan at Tokyo was receiving from these various points similar information with respect to the movement of all ships in these four or five regions, did the War Department, through you or your division, give any particular emphasis to anyone of these points over other points about which the same information was being conveyed?

General Miles: No, sir. Those messages as a whole, as I tried to testify yesterday, meant simply to us what we already knew, or suspected, that the Japanese were following the movement of all of our ships anywhere they appeared.

The Chairman: Did the knowledge of that fact cause any particular apprehension to the Intelligence Division that there might be an attack at any of these points in the event the situation developed to a point where there might be hostilities between the two countries?

General Miles: We knew, Senator, that, as I have said before, attack on our principal bases, Honolulu, Hawaii, and Panama, including the Philippines, was practically inherent as a high possibility or probability in any war with Japan. The messages themselves had very little effect in emphasizing that point.

The Chairman: You testified I believe this morning

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Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

h8

with respect to the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor and the possibility of a sudden surprise attack. How do you evaluate the possibility of a sudden and surprise attack at Pearl Harbor or Hawaii with relation to the possibility of a sudden or surprise attack on Manila or on the Panama Canal, or any other of these points about which the Japanese Government was making inquiry as to the movement of ships?

General Miles: I should say that our evaluation would have been that Hawaii and the Panama Canal were about equally likely to be attack for somewhat different reasons, but both of them were of immense strategic importance to us and immense value to the Japanese, if they could be injured or put out of business.

The Chairman: When you were in Hawaii -- as operations officer was it?

General Miles: G-3, operations officer, yes, sir.

The Chairman: Yes. For how long? Some three years?

General Miles: Three years, sir.

The Chairman: And you indulged in many war games, based upon assumptions of various kinds?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: And in those war games, you assumed that there might be an actual physical invasion of the

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

b9

Hawaiian Islands by the landing of troops in the harbor at Honolulu, did you, or Pearl Harbor, or both? Which was it?

General Miles: I only remembered one in which we envisaged the landing of Japanese troops in Honolulu Harbor. It was generally presumed they would land at different points of the Island.

The Chairman: That was based, of course on the possibility of landing military troops from transports and engaging such forces as we might have on land in the Hawaiian Islands?

General Miles: Based on the principle of surprise.

The Chairman: Yes. That they might produce a surprise landing of troops and actually invade the Hawaiian Islands.

General Miles: Yes, sir. One maneuver, or war game, that I mentioned was based on that.

The Chairman: Testimony has been adduced here to the effect that the Japanese rather insisted that we take the entire Pacific Fleet out of the Pacific Ocean and put it back into the Atlantic, in which event, of course, the air raid on the Fleet itself in Pearl Harbor would not have taken place. But if that had been the situation, would you wish to express an opinion -- which may be more or less speculative -- as to whether the Japanese would have attempted or could have attempted and succeeded in effectuating a landing

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

h10

on the Hawaiian Islands by an Army and thereby capture the Islands themselves, instead of bombing from the air the fleet that was in Pearl Harbor? Would you care to express any opinion on that?

General Miles: Well, sir, it was subject to a long study during my time in Hawaii, and also it was up time and time again during my course of duty here in the War Plans Division.

I remember running a general staff study on that when I was in Hawaii. It was always considered a possibility. There were very cogent reasons why the Japanese, even with the fleet in the Atlantic, should have attacked Hawaii, preferably an attack based on the capture of Hawaii. Had the Japanese captured Hawaii, we knew perfectly well we could never begin the offensive war which we have fought against the Japanese until we recaptured Hawaii -- a very difficult operation.

Could they have knocked out the Naval facilities of Hawaii, it would have given them a lesser time, but still a very considerable period of time before we could have begun any offensive operations in the Pacific, because those facilities would have had to be built up again. All those things were inherent in the situation, if I may so express it.

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

h11

The Chairman: Well, if we may presume that the object of the Japanese attack, as it took place, was to cripple or destroy the Fleet in Pearl Harbor so as to make it ineffective in resisting the encroachment, the movement of the Japanese Army and the Fleet from Japan south, and into Indochina, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or any of that territory, is it, from a military standpoint, sound to assume that if that Fleet had not been there, or within that region, that instead of making an attack upon the Fleet from the air and leaving with whatever damage occurred they could have captured the Islands -- and of course, such attack would have brought war just as the attack on the Fleet had brought war -- what effect would that have had on our ability to fight Japan in the region where we had to fight her, with the Hawaiian Islands in her possession and the necessity to recapture them before we got far beyond them, and if they had captured the Islands, would they have been able to base their own fleet in Pearl Harbor instead of our own? What would the effect have been on our ability to fight Japan further west in the Pacific, in the region where she was up to that time making her depredations?

That may be an involved question.

General Miles: The effect would have been that we would have been forced to recapture the Hawaiian Islands

c9

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

1 before we undertook any major offensive against the
2 Japanese in the middle or western Pacific.

3 The Chairman: Now, when did you first go to Hawaii,
4 General?

5 General Miles: April, 1929.

6 The Chairman: Did the military or naval authorities
7 while you were there -- you were there until 1932?

8 General Miles: Yes, sir.

9 The Chairman: Were you there when the Fleet was
10 maneuvering in the Hawaiian region in 1932, 1931 and 1932?

11 General Miles: I was, sir.

12 The Chairman: You were in the Hawaiian Islands
13 when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931?

14 General Miles: In 1931, yes, sir.

15 The Chairman: You were there when they made the attack
16 on Shanghai?

17 General Miles: No, sir, that was considerably later,
18 I think, sir.

19 The Chairman: What year was that?

20 General Miles: Somewhere in the middle thirties. I
21 do not recall offhand.

22 The Chairman: Probably 1935. I do not recall exactly.
23 As Operations Officer in charge of G-3, I believe you said,
24 in the Hawaiian Islands from 1929 to 1932, was any considera-

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

h13

tion given to the possibility that the Japanese aggressions in Manchuria and the possible attack upon Shanghai, or an attack upon any European possession or any American possession in that region, would bring about hostilities between the United States and Japan, and was that in any way related to the maneuvers of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters in 1931 or 1932?

General Miles: To answer your last question first, I do not believe that the Japanese aggression, which began in September of 1931, if I remember correctly, in Manchuria, had any particular bearing on the maneuvers, the joint Army and Navy maneuver of February or perhaps March of 1932.

To answer the second question, I think it is fair to say that beginning with the Japanese aggression of Manchuria in the fall of 1931, the possibility of a Japanese American war increased from then on. They were a bandit nation out on the rampage in a war game that was real.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 The Chairman: Our Government protested against the
3 invasion of Manchuria at the time it took place?

4 General Miles: It led the protest.

5 The Chairman: It led the protest and never at any time
6 recognized the Manchukuo Government set up by Japan?

7 General Miles: I believe that is correct, sir.

8 The Chairman: Are you familiar with the position of the
9 Secretary of State at that time as stated by him that when the
10 maneuvers of the Fleet were concluded that the Fleet was still
11 retained for a time in Hawaiian waters because of the Manchurian
12 situation; are you familiar with that?

13 General Miles: I have heard that. I read that in
14 Secretary Stimson's book. I did not know it at the time.

15 The Chairman: When did you finally conclude your service
16 as Chief of Military Intelligence here in Washington?

17 General Miles: I think it was the 31st of January, 1942;
18 30th or 31st.

19 The Chairman: Some two months, approximately, following
20 the Pearl Harbor attack?

21 General Miles: That is correct.

22 The Chairman: I think that is all.

23 Congressman Cooper.

24 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I desire to inquire
25 briefly of General Miles.

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 First, General, along the lines of the Chairman's original
3 questions to you, I might refer to the fact that I had a brief
4 service in the Army of two years during the first World War
5 in the Infantry. Of course, the Signal Corps of the Army is
6 a definite branch of the Army like the Quartermaster Corps or
7 any other part of the Army.

8 General Miles: That is correct. It is one of the technical
9 branches of the Army, -- technical services of the Army.

10 The Vice Chairman: And this Signal Intelligence Service
11 is simply part of that branch?

12 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: Of course, the Signal Corps has the
14 responsibility of stringing telephone lines and indulging in
15 various and sundry types of service -- furnishing communica-
16 tions?

17 General Miles: Many other activities.

18 The Vice Chairman: Yes, and this Signal Intelligence
19 Service was simply a part of that?

20 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

21 The Vice Chairman: And, of course, intelligence was
22 distributed all through various units of the Army; isn't that
23 true?

24 General Miles: Yes, sir; all the tactical units and
25 to a certain extent the technical services, particularly the

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
The Chairman

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Air Force, the Air Corps in those days, were running an intelligence of their own.

The Vice Chairman: Even during the first World War an infantry regiment had what was called an operation and intelligence officer.

General Miles: Oh, yes. All combat units in the field.

The Vice Chairman: Had intelligence service.

General Miles: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: If I may interrupt, Congressman Cooper, there is one question I overlooked.

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

The Chairman: When these intercepted messages, intercepted at Panama, Hawaii, or the Philippines, or Southeast Asia, were sent here for decoding and translation, were the officers in these various regions thereafter notified of the contents of the message which they had intercepted but which they could not translate or decode?

General Miles: No, sir.

The Chairman: That was true of all these points, including the Hawaiian Islands?

General Miles: That is correct.

The Chairman: There was no different treatment of these messages, or no information given to high authorities, those at Panama, Manila, and Southeast Asia, after these messages

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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were sent here in the original form and decoded and translated, that information was kept with the War Department here and not disseminated to these various points?

General Miles: There was no difference made between the different overseas departments.

The Chairman: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: General, I would like to inquire briefly, if I may, with respect to certain pages of Exhibit 2, with which you are thoroughly familiar, beginning on page 16, which has the heading "B. Messages translated after 7 December 1941", and continuing to and including page 29 in this same exhibit, which, I believe, embraces the messages received before the attack on Pearl Harbor which were translated after the attack on Pearl Harbor; is that correct?

General Miles: Yes, sir, though not necessarily received in Washington, probably not received in Washington. This one, as an example, is dated November 24. It was not translated until the 10th of December. In all probability that was picked up, although I cannot state it as a fact, by an intercepting station which did not have the facilities for rapid transmission to Washington.

The Vice Chairman: Well, that was the next question I had intended to present to you, General. These pages to which I have referred show that the space of time from the date shown

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 at the top of the message to the date shown at the bottom
3 as the date of translation varied all the way from two days
4 to 22 days.

5 Now, I was in the act of asking you whether that date at
6 the top of each of these messages indicates the date that the
7 message was received by the Army Intelligence Service here
8 in Washington.

9 General Miles: No, sir, it does not.

10 The Vice Chairman: That means --

11 General Miles: It is the date which that message was
12 sent from Tokyo, or wherever it was sent from.

13 The Vice Chairman: The date at the top of the message
14 is the date that it was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo or from
15 Tokyo to Honolulu, or whatever the case may be?

16 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: Now, is there anything on this page
18 16, to which I now invite your attention, that shows the date
19 or the time that that intercepted message came to the attention
20 of the Intelligence Service here in Washington?

21 General Miles: Yes, sir. The date at the bottom of the
22 page is the date of its translation and almost invariably it
23 was passed on from SIS to MID, ONI, on that same day.

24 The Vice Chairman: Then is it correct to understand
25 that all of these messages contained on the pages to which

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 I have invited your attention were decoded and translated in
3 Washington the day they were received in Washington?

4 General Miles: No, sir, I do not say that. You asked
5 me, as I understood it, Mr. Congressman, was there anything
6 in this message to indicate the date on which the Military
7 Intelligence Division received the message. I replied yes,
8 that was the date on which it was translated in the great
9 majority of cases, or at least the next day.

10 The Vice Chairman: Well, let's try to be more specific,
11 if I may, General. I am just seeking light. I know you are
12 anxious to help us and give all the light you can.

13 Take this page 16 in Exhibit 2:

14 "From: Honolulu (Kita)

15 "To: Tokoy

16 "November 24, 1941.

17 "Number 234 (part 1 of 2)

18 "Re your number 114-a.

19 "Strictly secret.

20 Now, I will not take the time to read the message, which
21 covers most of the page.

22 Down at the bottom:

23 "a - Not available."

24 Under that:

25 "Army

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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"26351

3

"(Japanese)

4

"Trans. 12-16-41 (2)."

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What is there on that page to show when this intercepted message reached G-2 of the Army?

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General Miles: The date of translation, sir, was almost invariably the date on which we received it. In other words, when this message was decoded, translated, it was very promptly sent from SIS to Military Intelligence Division. If it came in very late one night it might arrive very early the next morning. There might be one day's difference on the record.

13

Mr. Gesell: May I interpose, Congressman?

14

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

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Mr. Gesell: I believe the difficulty is that General Miles is telling you when the message was received by G-2 and I believe the Congressman is anxious to know when the message reached Washington, i.e., the Signal Corps. That is, perhaps, the difficulty in the question.

20

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General Miles: To answer the last one, sir, there is nothing to show when this intercepted message, uncoded and untranslated, was received by SIS.

(3)

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The Vice Chairman: That is the Signal Intelligence Service?

24

General Miles: Yes, sir.

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But I have no doubt that they have records in addition to

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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what is shown on this page which might indicate that.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could I -- will you yield, Congressman?

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: I have in mind that if counsel through General Miles over the week-end may be able to find in the Department some information on that, it will be helpful, so that we could have when each one of these messages was received by the Signal Corps here in Washington. The information is not complete on this data.

Mr. Gesell: The information is not complete here, Senator.

If I may suggest, since the question of receipt and translation is a matter within the province of the Signal Corps and not in the province of General Miles, it would be appropriate to present that information through the Signal Corps officers who are going to testify.

The Vice Chairman: They will appear?

Mr. Gesell: They will appear. Colonel Sadler and others, who will be familiar with those details.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

The Vice Chairman: I might say, naturally I felt disturbed when I examined these pages and saw that from what was apparent here from two days to 22 days of time had elapsed between the date of the message and the time it was translated.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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I was concerned about that.

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Now, I was just wondering how General Marshall, Chief of Staff, to whom this information was given by you as G-2 of his Staff, could operate with a full degree of understanding if 22 days had elapsed from the time that a message was intercepted before it was translated and decoded and presented to him for his attention.

9

10

That was one thing I was hoping to get some light and information on.

11

12

As I understand it, officers of the Signal Corps would be the ones to whom I should address those questions?

13

14

15

General Miles: They would be able to give you more tactical information than I. I think you will find that the average time was far less than 22 days.

16

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18

The Vice Chairman: Well, this particular one to which I have been inviting your attention was sent November 24 and translated December 16. That is 22 days.

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22

General Miles: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And the same thing is true of the one appearing on page 17. It was sent on November 24 and translated December 16, which was 22 days.

23

24

The one appearing on page 18 was sent November 28, translated December 8, which was 10 days.

25

The one appearing on page 19 was sent November 28,

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 translated December 8, which was 10 days.

2 The one appearing on page 20 was sent December 1st,
3 translated December 10, which, of course, is 10 days.

4 The one appearing on page 21, the first one, was sent
5 December 2nd, translated January 30, which was 28 days.

6 The Chairman: December 30th.

7 The Vice Chairman: December 30th, which was 28 days.

8 The second one on that page was sent December 3, trans-
9 lated December 10, which was 7 days.

10 On page 22, one sent December 3, translated December 11,
11 which was 8 days.

12 And so on, without calling attention to each individual
13 one. The time varies from 2 days to 28 days that elapsed
14 from the time the message was sent until it was transmitted.

15 Mr. Keefe: Will the gentleman yield?

16 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

17 Mr. Keefe: I would like to ask counsel whether or not
18 there has been produced up to this time the report of the SIS
19 or the Signal Corps of the Army. Have you any reports from
20 either the SIS or the Signal Corps with relation to their
21 transactions during this period under questioning?

22 Mr. Gesell: I believe, Congressman, that some of the
23 information that you inquire about is contained in the Clark
24 Report to which reference has been made.
25

Witness Miles

1
2 Mr. Keefe: I have been trying to get my hands on the
3 report of the Signal Corps and the SIS without success up to
4 date. Now, is that a restricted report?

5 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Congressman, you asked for the annual
6 report of the Signal Corps. It came into our hands either
7 yesterday or the day before and I dictated a note and ordered
8 it delivered at your office. It was a Signal Corps Report
9 for one year that you asked for.

10 Mr. Keefe: That is what I wanted.

11 Mr. Mitchell: It ought to be in your office now.

12 Mr. Keefe: Well, I haven't been there, of course, this
13 afternoon.

14 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, might I inquire from
15 counsel --

16 Mr. Mitchell: I might say, I looked it over. I don't
17 think there is much in it that helps but if there is anything
18 else you want we will try to get it.

19 Senator Ferguson: Will the Congressman yield for a
20 question?

21 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

22 Senator Ferguson: These messages, the Japanese messages
23 concerning military installations, ship movements, and so
24 forth, in the yellow booklet, do they come to us in the original
25 showing all the checks and information on them? Do they come

Witness Miles

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to us just as you print them here?

Mr. Gesell: These messages, Senator, as contained in Exhibit 2, as I am quite certain was explained at the Executive Session of the committee, have certain technical data deleted for reasons of security, but the text of the message is not in any way affected thereby.

(4)

Senator Ferguson: What I am trying to get at is this, did they have any method of time stamping on the receipt of these messages by the various departments, so that if we saw the original message we could get the information that Congressman Cooper is now endeavoring to get?

Mr. Gesell: No. It is my understanding that that information is not on the originals of these messages that are in the file. I believe to the extent that the data is available, and there is a great deal of it that is, it will have to be assembled from work sheets and other detailed notes of the people concerned with translating and decoding in the SIS.

Senator Ferguson: Well, so that I understand, what is deleted from the messages? Let's take the one on page 25 as an example.

Mr. Gesell: I would prefer to discuss that question with the Senator, as we have done before, in Executive Session, but the text of the message is complete and full as here printed.

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Witness Miles

1
2 Mr. Mitchell: The only thing deleted, Mr. Senator, is
3 some technical information.

4 Senator Ferguson: You mean the kind of a code?

5 Mr. Mitchell: Things of that kind.

6 Senator Ferguson: I haven't any desire to get that kind
7 of information, but I am desirous of getting the information
8 as to the time of receipt of the message in the various de-
9 partments and if they are not marked I would like to have some
10 witness explain why the departments didn't keep track of when
11 they received the message.

12 The Vice Chairman: That is exactly what I have been
13 trying to secure but I got the impression from the statements
14 of counsel and General Miles that probably we could get that
15 information better from officers of the Signal Corps.

16 Mr. Gesell: That is correct.

17 Mr. Mitchell: We will also produce photostats of some
18 of these messages which are of particular moment, like the
19 14th part message, so you will have an exact copy of just the
20 way the record looks in the War Department. We will have
21 the original here and the work papers. That has been arranged
22 for.

23 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I will ask one more
24 question and suspend, as the hour of adjournment has about
25 arrived.

Witness Miles

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 General, I understood you to say that for years it had
3 been understood by the Army -- I assume that means, of course,
4 the high ranking officers of the Army -- that hostilities
5 with Japan would involve an attack on Hawaii, and that a
6 knowledge of the Japanese people caused the anticipation of
7 a surprise attack.

8 That is substantially and in essence your statement on
9 that, isn't it?

10 General Miles: That the possibility if not the probability
11 of an attack on Hawaii was inherent in a Japanese war. You
12 gentlemen of the Congress appropriated millions of dollars
13 for that Fortress. Against whom were you building it?

14 The Vice Chairman: I understand that, but what I am
15 trying to get at is your statement that it had been understood
16 by the Army for years that that was the situation.

17 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: Then would it naturally follow that
19 the military commander at Hawaii might reasonably be expected
20 to understand that also?

21 General Miles: I could certainly say that the four
22 Generals under whom I have had the honor to serve at Hawaii
23 gave me every indication that they understood that situation
24 all right.

25 The Chairman: The committee will stand in recess until

Witness Miles

1
2 10:00 o'clock on Monday morning.

3 (Whereupon, at 4:00 o'clock p.m., the committee
4 recessed until 10:00 o'clock a.m., Monday, December 3,
5 1945.)

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