

Doc. 4043

Evid

Folder 2

(92)

②

~~Explanation for the fact~~ ~~Answer to the question~~

According to Army, Foreign Minister ^(ARITA) wired decision of 5-Minister Conference of 20 May to Berlin and Rome in such a form, which the Army does not accept, because it does not stipulate automatic state of war against England and France. Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome refused to transmit this. Premier noticed the deviation, after the wire had been dispatched.

Resignation of ARITA is speculated on.

"In view of the stubborn resistance of the enemies of the Alliance rumors are starting about terrorist plans of radical groups". [135954]

Item 26: Telegram 228 from OTT to RIBBENTROP, dated 31 May 1939. >

Item 23: Tel. 217 to State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 23
May, 1939 - In annex to Tel. 213

A leading official in the Foreign
Ministry told OTT that the Minister
President has hit upon wording for the
Tri-Partite Pact which may remove the
opposition within the cabinet. According to
this, Japan would ~~intensely~~ make entry
into war, ~~to be sure~~ against the Soviet
~~Union, but probably~~ against England and
France dependent upon the momentary
circumstances, ^{but not entry into war against U.S.S.R.} Army has agreed, to avoid
retirement of the cabinet. In case ~~the~~
German government does not agree ~~upon~~ to
this wording, the informant believes there
will be a long delay in concluding the pact.
(135950)

Item 24: Tel. 174 to German Embassy in Tokyo, from
German Foreign Minister, Berlin, 28 May, 1939,

1. Not satisfied ^{confirmation of} with General Majiri's
communication of 20 May by Embassy in Berlin
2. OSHIMA said he received a telegram
from ARITA ~~which~~ according to which

Italian friendship ~~relations~~ relations and advised OSHIMA to continue his work in the old direction. (135924-5)

Item 16: Tokyo, 8 Mai, an interview of ITAGAKI with KOISO by DOMEL.

Minister of War stated that it was ~~not~~ a welcome fact that Germany and Italy had bound ~~themselves~~ themselves more closely together by the military pact to maintain peace. When asked if there was a possibility of Japan's entering the German-Italian military treaty, ITAGAKI explained that, in case Germany and Italy so desired, it would not be impossible for Japan to conclude a military treaty with the Axis powers. ^{Overseas-} ~~Colonial~~ minister KOISO said that ^{the success of the} ~~apparently~~ negotiations for the conclusion of a military treaty between the ~~three~~ three Axis power were being held now. KOISO ~~say~~ said the success of these negotiations depended on whether Germany and Italy recognized Japan's place

in the Far East. Koiso said ~~these~~ the three countries could advantageously co-operate.

~~ARITA emphasized that Japan was convinced of the "necessity of further strengthening the Anti pact." Arita said that the Roosevelt message served a double purpose, as a gesture for domestic politics and as a measure to incite the world against Germany and Italy. Arita stressed that Japan's historical mission was the construction of the New Order in East Asia in close co-operation with CHINA and Manchou Kuo. (155926-7)~~

Item 17: Telegram No. 197 to State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 11 Mai, 1939. In annex to Tel. No. 192.

I. Minister of War communicated to OTT that he is battling to overcome opposition of Navy to treaty. He gave the main reasons of Navy opposition as:

- 1) Fear of a merging of America with England in case of war.
- 2) traditional Navy jealousy of the Army.

The Japanese Government ~~wanted~~ wanted to reserve for itself entry into a state of war in case of ~~a~~ a European conflict. Oshima in a telegram to ARITA refused to transmit this stand point to the ~~the~~ German Government. War Minister asked OSHIMA to ~~refrain~~ restrain himself towards ARITA so as ~~not to disturb the discussions in Tokyo.~~ The Army is resolved to see the matter through ~~was to the point of endangering the cabinet.~~

3. The German Foreign Minister requests OTT to have his informant secure more definite information, as the delay is causing scepticism in Berlin and Rome. (135951-2)

Item 24 a: Corrections to above.

State Secretary

Item 25: Telegram 223 to ~~German Foreign Minister~~ from OTT, Tokyo, ²⁷ ~~31~~ May, 1939. In Annex to Tel. No. ²¹⁷ ~~147~~.

(2) ~~From his informants~~ OTT has learned that the Minister President ^{is determined to conclude the alliance} ~~will communicate~~ with Japanese Ambassador in Berlin in about 5 days. ~~Via Minister of War says Army will gradually overcome Navy opposition.~~

~~In explanation of the failure to transmit the decision of 20 May to the German Government, the informant explained new differences of~~

opinion arose directly after dispatching / the telegram / so that retirement of the cabinet appears unavoidable. All informants agree that the treaty question will finally be solved in our favor. (135955)

(Items 26 and 27 follow)

Item 28: Telegram No. 229 to State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 1 June, 1939. To Tel. No. 175.

The Navy attaché is doing all he can to influence the Navy Middle Officer Corps. Admiral FÖRSTER will work on the Navy to shake their valuation of the Anglo-American fleet. The Navy idea against immediate entry into war rests in part upon technical and operative naval questions. Economic concern about America plays an important role. The Anglophile court circle also exerts influence on the Navy. This group is favorable to England in spite of the conflict situation with all the accumulated tension of the 20 years old English-Japanese treaty, which made possible Japan's position as a great power. Since territorial agreements played an important part in the negotiations

for the conclusion of this fact, OTT refers to the possibility that English propaganda may exploit the ~~question~~ ^{matter} of the South Sea Mandate to German disfavor. (135956)

Item 26: Tel. 223, to State Secretary, from OTT, Tokyo, 27 May, 1939. In annex to Tel. 217.

OTT's informant reports in regard to the fight in the cabinet about the treaty. The army declines because it does not automatically fix entry into a state of war against England and ~~France~~ France, but makes it dependent upon the situation.

OTT pointed out to informant that the Navy's ~~the~~ theoretical thoughts towards the Western Powers were in contradiction to its advances in AMOY and were forcing the Western Powers to a Soviet agreement, which would ~~be~~ seriously implicate Japan.

Informant mentions possibility of the foreign minister's retiring. OTT hears from various sources that the Emperor in a

statement to Prince KANIN, who represented the treaty demands of the Army, made the agreement of the Army and Navy the condition ~~for his~~ ~~for~~ upon ~~which~~ which his consent rested. (135954)

Item 27: Telegram 176, ~~from Weizs~~ to DTT, from Weizsäcker, Berlin, 30 May, 1939

According to a telegram from ARITA, which we sent to you in telegram 174, the Japanese Government would reserve ^{for itself} entry into a state of war in case of European conflict. In this sentence the words, "in case of European conflict," are to be replaced by the words, "in case of a conflict of the Axis powers with England and France." (135953)

IPS Doc. No. 4043, Item 25.

Analysis

Telegram 223 to State Secretary from OTT,
Tokyo, 27 May 1939. In Annex to Tel. 217.

OTT has learned that the Minister President is determined to conclude the Alliance. According to Army, Foreign Minister (ARITA) wired decision of Five-Minister Conference of 20 May to Berlin and Rome in a form which the Army does not accept, because it does not stipulate automatic state of war against England and France. Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome refused to transmit this. Premier noticed the deviation after the wire had been dispatched.

Resignation of ARITA is speculated on. "In view of the stubborn resistance of the enemies of the Alliance, rumors are starting about terrorist plans of radical groups."

State Sec'y Japan
vol 1

b.

14

15 ~~16~~ ~~17~~ 18 19

~~1~~ 1

5
1

Oshima

Ito

Minamura Kiichiro

Itagaki Seishiro

Koiso Kuniaki

Arita

Nachiro

Gen Machijiri

Usami

Frame No. 135900

Item 4043E has
been withdrawn by the
Russian for Court use.

9/30/46

Lt. Col. Suranul
by Brown

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE

30 Sept

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO.

4043 E

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. _____

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE

A. C. [Signature]

ROOM NO.

354

Heu

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)
Tokio, den 17. Mai 1939 19 Uhr 50
Ankunft: 17. " " 17 " 35

Ganz Geheim!

Nr.206 vom 17/5.

Citissime !
Ganz geheim !

x) B.RAM.

Für Herrn Staatssekretär

Auf Tel.vom 15. Nr.158 x).

Verwertete Gesichtspunkte obigen Drahterlasses gegenüber General Machijiri, Chef Zentralabteilung, persönlichem Beauftragten Kriegsministers. General erklärte, dass Abschluss deutsch-italienischen Bündnisses weder bei Armee noch anderen beteiligten Gruppen nachteilig gewirkt habe. Marine folgert daraus allerdings, dass hiesiger Regierung für endgültige Beschlussfassung mehr Zeit bleibe. -- General zusagte, dass Armee japanische Entscheidung nach Kräften beschleunigen werde, unterstrich aber hartnäckige Haltung Marine, die er als ständiger Teilnehmer an Beratungen genau kenne. Kernpunkt Auseinandersetzungen offenbar nach wie vor Frage Beginns, Art und Umfangs Beistandsleistung. Marine zustimmt zwar angeblich Verpflichtung Artikel III Paktentwurfs, will sich aber Wahl Zeitpunkts für Angriffshandlungen gegen feindliche Streitkräfte vorbehalten. Habe General unsere Auffassung gemäss Ziffer 3 Drahterlasses 143^x) vom 1/5. nunmehr auch schriftlich übergeben, um Armee in Überwindung Marinewiderstands zu unterstützen. -- General vorfühlte, ob Veröffentlichung Pakts unbedingt erforderlich wäre. Auf meine kategorische Bejahung erörterte er folgende von Marine geäusserte Bedenken: Wiederaufbau und umbildende Verstärkung Rüstungen Marine und Armee sei Voraussetzung für zukünftige wirksame Beistandsleistung. Hierbei sei insbesondere Marine auf Rohstoffe und Maschinen von England und Amerika dringend angewiesen. Marine befürchte Beeinträchtigung Lieferung im Falle Veröffentlichung. Habe darauf hingewiesen, dass schwache Reaktion der Mächte auf unbedenkliches Vorgehen Marine in China

x) B.RAM.

R. T.

135945.

China (Hainan, Amoy) diese Vorsicht nicht rechtfertige .
Heute erneut Kabinettsberatung angesetzt. Empfehle
Ministerpräsidenten, dessen Bündniswillen und Einfluss
für Schlusssentscheidung Armee ständig unterstreicht,
freundliche Antwortgeste des Führers über japanischen
Botschafter zuteilwerden zu lassen und dabei Wunsch nach
Beschleunigung anzudeuten.

Ott

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

JL

Tokio, den 22. Januar 1939

14 Uhr 25

Ankunft: 22. " "

12 "

Nr. 21 vom 22/1. Teil 1.

Japanische Presse zustimmt Reichstagspräsidenten, Ministerpräsidenten und Aussenminister mit gewisser Kritik ihrer zu abstrakten Formulierung. Reden enthalten folgende Hauptpunkte:

- 1.) Lage ernster als je,
- 2.) Fortführung China-Politik nach Dezember-
Erklärung,
- 3.) Betonter Wunsch nach Zusammenarbeit mit Fremdmächten unter Vorbehalt der militärisch und wirtschaftlich notwendigen Sonderrechte des Dreiländerblocks,
- 4.) Bekenntnis zu Verstärkung Antikominternpolitik, nachdrücklicher Dank für "beständige und uneingeschränkte" Hilfe Deutschlands und Italiens, Verschärfung Beziehungen zu Russland,
- 5.) Innerpolitische Straffung durch Massnahmen.

3

Neu gedruckt in 17 St.
Ebenfalls gedruckt

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| Nr. 1 | an | Pol. VIII |
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| " 11 | " | D. Recht |
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| " 17 | " | Kaj. Dienst. |

Zweiter Teil Telegramms mit Beurteilung folgt morgen nach Abschluss laufender Feststellungen.

Ott

3
Ebenfalls gedruckt

135894

Berlin, den 30. Januar 1939

Der J a p a n i s c h e Botschafterrat
übergab mir heute im Namen seines Botschafters die anlie-
gende vertrauliche Notiz über die Inbesitznahme der
Shinnan-Inseln. Der Botschafterrat fügte hinzu, die Japa-
nische Regierung plane eine baldige Veröffentlichung ei-
nes Gesetzes über die Zugehörigkeit der Inseln zum Verwal-
tungsbereich Formosa. Seine Regierung wolle uns aber schon
im voraus und vertraulich auf diesen Schritt aufmerksam
machen, damit wir nicht erst aus der Zeitung davon Kennt-
nis erhielten.

Ich habe dem Japaner gedankt und die als-
baldige Vorlage seiner Notiz bei dem Herrn Reichsaußen-
minister zugesagt.

(gez.) Weizsäcker

Herrn Reichsaußenminister
" Unterstaatssekretär
" Dg. Pol.
" Direktor R.
" Direktor H.
" Gesandten Aschmann

135895

Plm

B

Über die Besitznahme der Shinnan-Inseln.

1. Geographische Lage der in Frage kommenden Inseln.

In dem Ozean zwischen Saigun (Indochina) und den Palawan-Inseln (Philippinen). 114 Grad östl. Länge und 10 Grad nördl. Breite.

2. Der Verlauf der Auseinandersetzung zwischen der japanischen und der französischen Regierung.

Die in Frage kommenden Inseln wurden seit 1917 Japanern erschlossen. Seitdem lebten die Japaner auf den Inseln und haben sich dort angesiedelt. Durch die Wirtschaftskrise im Jahre 1929 wurden sie gezwungen, vorläufig die Inseln zu verlassen und nach Japan zurückzukehren. Jedoch gingen sie wieder in den letzten Jahren zurück zu ihren Geschäften. In der Zwischenzeit, und zwar im Jahre 1933, während eine zeitlang die dort ansässigen Japaner abwesend waren, entsandte die französische Regierung zu den Inseln Kriegsschiffe mit der Mitteilung an die Japanische Regierung, daß Frankreich die Besitznahme der Inseln durchsetzen wolle, wobei dieser Entschluß damit begründet wurde, daß diese Inseln niemandem gehörten. Insbesondere seit Juli 1938 entsandte Frankreich auch Handelsschiffe mit verschiedenem Baumaterial und hat die Absicht durchblicken lassen, daß es die Inseln wirtschaftlich erschließen will. Selbstverständlich hat Japan gegen diese Besitznahme der Inseln durch Frankreich protestiert und dementsprechend notwendige Maßnahmen zur Sicherung der Inseln ergriffen.

3. Die Japanische Regierung hat sich entschlossen, die Zugehörigkeit der Inseln zu Japan eindeutig festzulegen, und das Gesetz betreffend die Zugehörigkeit der Inseln zum Verwaltungsbezirk Formosa wird baldmöglichst erlassen werden.

4. Völkerrechtliche Begründung.

Die Verwirklichung einer Besitznahme, wie im Völkerrecht allgemein anerkannt wird, setzt zwei Momente voraus, nämlich erstens: den Willen eines Staates zur Be-

sitznahme, und zweitens: die wirkliche Durchführung einer Besitznahme. Wenn man von diesem Standpunkt aus den vorliegenden Fall betrachtet, ist die Sachlage folgende:

- 1.) Seit 1917 haben sich Japaner vor allen anderen Ausländern dort angesiedelt und dort mit der wirtschaftlichen Erschließung der Inseln beschäftigt.
- 2.) Die Japanische Regierung hat seitdem ab und zu Kriegsschiffe dorthin gesandt.
- 3.) Ein Denkmal, das die Zugehörigkeit der Inseln zu Japan darstellt, ist bereits im Jahre 1929 errichtet worden. Dieses Denkmal ist später abgebrannt, aber im Jahre 1938 im August wieder neu errichtet worden.
- 4.) Die Japanische Marineleitung hat auf den Inseln im Jahre 1938 Polizeigewalt ausgeübt, indem sie Franzosen zwang, die Inseln zu verlassen, und das Hisen der französischen Nationalflagge wie überhaupt den Aufbau der Inseln von französischer Seite aus zu unterlassen. Diese Polizeiakte hat die Marineleitung damit begründet, daß diese Inseln schon längst zu Japan gehörten.
- 5.) Das Leben und Vermögen japanischer Staatsangehöriger auf den Inseln ist stets durch die Japanische Regierung geschützt und gesichert gewesen.
- 6.) Als die Französische Regierung neulich Kriegsschiffe nach diesen Inseln entsenden wollte, hat die Japanische Regierung gefordert, daß die Französische Regierung dies unterlasse. Die Japanische Regierung hat diese Forderung mit der Zugehörigkeit der Inseln zu Japan begründet.
- 7.) Die Japanische Regierung hat die Forderung der Französischen Regierung, daß ein japanisches Kriegsschiff die Inseln verlassen solle, abgelehnt.

Berlin, den 1. Februar 1939.

Diplomgramm T o k y o
Nr. 30.

T e l e g r a m m in Ziffern
(Geh. Ch. Verf.)

Deutscher und Italienischer Botschafter San Sebastián sind angewiesen worden, Nationalspanische Regierung zum Beitritt zu Antikomintern-Abkommen aufzufordern. Oshima hat bei seiner Regierung entsprechende Instruktion für Japanischen Botschafter erbeten. Bitte dort auf beschleunigte Erteilung dieser Instruktion dringen.

Japanische Regierung macht ferner fortlaufend Schwierigkeiten wegen der Form der Beitrittserklärung Mandchukuoos und Ungarns. Bitte auch in dieser Frage im Sinne einer schnellen Erledigung einwirken.

W e i s s ä c k e r

135898

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 24. April 1939 20.03 Uhr

Ankunft: 24. " " 15.30 "

Nr. 168 vom 24.4.

C i t o !

Geheim!

Für Herrn Staatssekretär.

Ganz Geheim!

Wegen Paktverstärkung ernste Auseinandersetzungen im Kabinett. Höre dazu aus gut unterrichteten Kreisen, daß Armee Außenminister heftig angreift, weil er durch mehrfache einschränkende Weisungen an japanische Verhandlungsführer in Berlin Stillstand der Verhandlungen verursacht habe. Armee sei entschlossen, Bündnis zu erreichen, Volksstimmung und Presse gehen zunehmend mit in Erkenntnis, daß Annäherung an England nur auf Kosten errungener Festlandserfolge möglich und Gefahr Isolierung Japans droht. In gleicher Richtung wirken Nachrichten über Möglichkeit englisch-russischen Zusammengehens im Fernen Osten. Stellung des Außenministers erschüttert, dem außerdem vorgeworfen wird, durch wiederholte Zusicherungen an hiesigen Britischen Botschafter in Handelsfreiheit behindert zu sein. Verhandlungsaussichten daher für Deutschland augenblicklich günstig. Großzügige deutsche Kredithilfe könnte Hauptwiderstand, der von Wirtschaftskreisen ausgeht, nach wiederholten Informationen weitgehend entkräften.

Ott

135903

H. P.

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 26. April 1939 17.-- Uhr

Ankunft: 26. " " 12.40 "

Nr. 170 vom 26.4.

Im Anschluß an Telegramm vom 24. Nr. 168.

Für Staatssekretär.

Unter dem Eindruck wiederholter Ministerkonferenzen, sogar an Feiertagen, fortsetzt japanische Presse starken Druck auf Regierung, sich zu Verstärkung Antikominternpakts eindeutig zu bekennen.

2. Habe Vizeaußenminister gelegentlich Zusammentreffens darauf hingewiesen, daß öffentliche Stellungnahme Japans zu englisch-russischer Fühlungnahme über Fernen Osten vor Führerrede meiner Ansicht nach wünschenswert wäre, zumal zögernde Haltung Regierung offensichtlich mit der Volksstimmung im Widerspruch stehe. Vizeminister zusagte, meine Anregung dem Außenminister weiterzugeben.

Ott

135904

Jer

Ganz Geheim!

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 4. Mai 1939 15. Uhr 08

Ankunft : 4. " " 11. " 10

Citissime

Nr. 183 vom 4.5.

x) B.R.A. M.
xx) B.R.A. M.

Ströng geheim, strengst geheim.

Für Herrn Staatssekretär persönlich.

Laut Mitteilung Gewährmanns eintraf Telegramm Generals Kawabes, wonach die an Kriegsminister direkt über Oshima gegebenen Zusicherungen vom 28.4. (vergl. Drahtbericht Nr. 172 vom 27.4.) Verhandlungsatmosphäre verbessert haben.

Gewährsmann meinte, dass weitere Entscheidungen Kabinetts erst in einigen Tagen zu erwarten. Vermute, dass Verzögerung auf Inanspruchnahme Ministers durch gegenwärtig tagende Konferenz Provinzgouverneure, auf augenblickliche Zusammenkunft Stabschefs Divisionen, möglicherweise auch auf soeben erfolgte Rückkehr Itos aus Berlin zurückzuführen.

Habe auf Grund dortiger Ermächtigung Gesichtspunkte Drahterlasse Nr. 143 x) vom 1.5. und Nr. 144 xx) vom 2.5. gegenüber meinem Gewährsmann zur Geltung gebracht. Gewährsmann wird voraussichtlich Kriegsminister unterrichten, wobei unbedingte Gewähr besteht, dass ich als Quelle nicht in Erscheinung trete.

II. Erfahre, dass Aussenministerium auf Grund europäischer Informationen über Kriegsbereitschaft Englands und Frankreichs überwiegend mit Wahrscheinlichkeit Kriegsausbruchs Herbst bis Frühjahr rechnet und mit dieser These operiert. Erwähnte Haltung Aussenministeriums findet augenblicklich neue Nahrung in zahlreichen, besonders von englisch geschriebener Presse tendenziös aufgemachten Alarmmeldungen über Zuspitzung europäischer Lage, namentlich deutsch-polnischen Gegensatzes sowie in Nachrichten über Antijapanische Debatte amerikanischen Kongresses.

Japanische Presse wiedergab dieser Tage mehrfach offensichtlich zweckbestimmt Reutermeldungen über angeblichen Ausschluss Fernen Osten Fragengruppe aus englisch-französisch-sowjet-

135916

Ganz Geheim!

sowjetrussischen Besprechungen.

Höhere aus gut unterrichteter Quelle, dass Botschafter Craigie in offenkundiger Absicht, unsere Verhandlungen zu stören, Außenministerium gegenüber ausdrücklich gleiche Versicherungen abgab. Anheimstelle fadenscheinige englische Argumentierung durch autoritative deutsche Erklärung zu brandmarken.

III. Angesichts fordauernden Marinewiderstands anrege Einwirkung durch Admiral Endo, dessen Einfluss bei Marine wesentlich stärker als des Vorgängers.

Ott

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)
Tokio, den 8. Mai 1939 22.-- Uhr
Ankunft: " 8. " " 16.30 "

Nr. 192 vom 8.5.

Citissime !
=====

Streng geheim.

Für Herrn Staatssekretär.

Im Anschluß an Telegramm vom 6. Nr. 187.

Weitere Einzelheiten zur Verhandlungslage :

I.) Mein Gewährsmann mitteilt, daß Überwindung Marinewiderstands gegen neueste, angeblich von Berlin übermittelte Fassung "Erläuterungen" Bündnisses nächster Tage zu erwarten.

II.) Im Vortelegramm genannter leitender Beamter Außenministeriums unterstrich erneut grundsätzlichen Charakter der Kluft zwischen Freunden und Gegnern Bündnisses, riet dringend im Interesse japanischer Träger Bündnisgedankens Verhandlungen trotz möglicherweise enttäuschender Wirkung japanischer Vorbehalte in Gang zu halten. Zur Frage "Erläuterungen" bemerkte er, daß Absicht bestehe, bei Veröffentlichung lediglich Erklärung abzugeben, Bündnis darstelle Verstärkung und logische Fortentwicklung Antikominternpakts, und alle weiteren Kommentare, insbesondere hinsichtlich Bündnisgegner, zu vermeiden. Hiervon verspreche man sich Eindruck, daß Bündnis nur gegen Sowjetunion gerichtet.

III.) Meldungen hiesiger Vertreter englischer und amerikanischer Nachrichtenagenturen, wonach Japan bündnismäßige Festlegung gegen Demokratien ablehne, erwecken Verdacht Vorwegnahme uns unerwünschter Bündnisauslegung, wobei allerdings dahinsteht, ob Meldungen auf amtliche japanische Kreise oder auf hiesige Botschaften Englands, Amerikas zurückgehen. Habe Gewährsmann Armeekorps darauf hingewiesen, daß solche Störungsversuche in Berlin und Rom nachteilig wirken müssen und geeignetes Einschreiten erbeten.

Ott

Ganz Geheim!

135923

Berlin, den 8. Mai 1939.

St.S. Nr. 399

Der Japanische Botschafter suchte mich heute Nachmittag auf, um von mir womöglich ein Wort über den geplanten deutsch-italienischen Militärpakt zu bekommen, welches er gegenüber seiner Heimat verwenden könne, und swar:

- a) zur Ermutigung seiner Freunde, den Dreieckepakt noch zu retten,
- b) zur Bekämpfung der Dreieckpaktgegner, welche von einer Mailänder Sensation sprächen und von einem deutsch-italienischen Rückzug auf die Achse.

Ich habe Oshima gesagt, er könne nach Tokio melden, es sei doch nicht zu verwundern, wenn gegenüber der britisch-französischen Einkreisungsaktion von deutsch-italienischer Seite ein kräftiger Ausdruck unserer Solidarität nötig geworden sei. Gerade die Zusammenkunft der beiden Außenminister hätte ohne einen solchen Solidaritätsbeweis einen matten Ausklang gehabt. Im übrigen sei die deutsch-italienische Freundschaft ja so eng und solid, daß in der Kodifizierung dieses engen Verhältnisses doch keine Sensation zu sehen sei.

Oshima insistierte dann aber und wollte wissen, ob der gepante deutsch-italienische Pakt sich in Tenor an den bisherigen Vertragsentwurf Berlin-Rom-Tokio anpasse oder nicht. Wenn ja, könnte Tokio als dritter in Bunde später eingefügt werden,

Herrn B.A.M.
(durch Herrn Sonnleithner)

Herrn U.St.S.Pol.

Herrn Stehner.

135924

den; wenn nein, seien die Sorgen seiner japanischen Freunde vielleicht doch berechtigt. Offensichtlich lag Oshima viel daran, daß der deutsch-italienische Pakttext eben nicht weitergehen möge als jener obengenannte Dreiecks-Text.

Ich habe dem Botschafter hierauf erwidert, meines Wissens sei der deutsch-italienische Text noch nicht definitiv festgelegt. Nach dem Wortlaut des Kommuniqués von Mailand aber möchte ich doch auf eine sehr weitgehende Ausdrucksweise unseres ja auch geografisch begründeten Achsen-Freundschaftsverhältnisses schließen. Ob die Japanische Regierung sich einem solchen neuen Text anpassen könnte, werde Oshima wohl besser beurteilen können als ich. Ich halte es für selbstverständlich, daß er - Oshima - seine Arbeit in der alten Richtung energisch fortsetze.

Zum Schluß bat der Botschafter, möglichst bald ein Stichwort zu erhalten, durch welches er in die Lage käme, seine Freunde in der Regierung bei der Stange zu halten.

gez: Weizsäcker.

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 11. Mai 1939 18 Uhr 50

Ankunft: 11. " " 14 " 30

Ganz Geheim!

Nr.197 vom 11/5.

Streng geheim!

Für Herrn Staatssekretär

Im Anschluss an Tel.192 vom 8/5.

I. Kriegsminister liess mich heute durch General, Chef der Zentralabteilung, mitteilen, er kämpfe zur Zeit mit grösster Energie, um letzten Widerstand der Marine gegen möglichst weitgehende Festlegung Bündnisverpflichtung zu überwinden und hoffe dringend, dass Deutschland noch einige Zeit Geduld haben werde; als Hauptgründe des Marinewiderstands bezeichnete er:

- 1.) Furcht vor Anschluss Amerikas an England im Kriegsfall,
- 2.) traditionelle Eifersucht der Marine gegen Armee.

Gewährsmann hinwies auf Erfahrungen namentlich bei Operationen in Mittel-China und gegen Hainan, wonach Marine, wenn gemeinsame Aktion im Gange, aus Prestige Gründen und um Armee nicht Vorrang zu lassen, über Ziele und Wünsche Armee hinausgehe. Daher sei auch diesmal damit zu rechnen, dass Marine, wenn gewonnen, im Ernstfall mindestens nicht hinter Armee zurückstehen werde.

II. Kurz vorher hatte mir Ministerpräsident durch Privatsekretär unter Betonung seiner in Erklärung enthaltenen persönlichen Ehrenverpflichtung mitteilen lassen, er hoffe dringend, dass Führer für besondere Lage Japans Verständnis haben werde.

Gesamteindruck letzter Tage, dass Vorkämpfer Bündnis-idee stark besorgt sind, Deutschland könnte Verhandlungen abbrechen.

Ott.

135928

H. T.

Jap.

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 12. Mai 1939 17 Uhr 50

Ankunft: 12. " " 12 " 15

Nr.199 vom 12/5.

Auf Tel.vom 10. Nr.153 x).

x)Pol.VIII 706

4

Habe hiesigem Aussenministerium Tatsachen aus Drahtbericht Chungking vom 5.5.mitgeteilt und sämtliche entstandenen Schäden vorsorglich als ersatzpflichtig bezeichnet. Aussenministerium mitteilte, britischer und amerikanischer Botschafter hätten bereits bei Aussenminister Ersatzansprüche für Schädigung britischer und amerikanischer Konsulatsgrundstücke in Chungking angemeldet. Aussenminister habe Rechtsverpflichtung Japanischer Regierung zur Ersatzleistung abgelehnt, jedoch hinzugefügt, Regierung sei unabhängig von Rechtsfrage zur Prüfung Angelegenheit bereit.

Gleichlautend Schanghai.

Ott

Hergestellt in 18 St.

Davon sind gegangen:

- | | | | |
|-------|----|--------------|-----------|
| Nr. 1 | an | Pol.VIII | (Arb.St.) |
| " 2 | " | R.A.M. | |
| " 3 | " | S.S. | |
| " 4 | " | Chif A.O. | |
| " 5 | " | B.A.M. | |
| " 6 | " | D.r. Pers. | |
| " 7 | " | " Pol. | |
| " 8 | " | Dg. | |
| " 9 | " | D.r. W | |
| " 10 | " | Dg. | |
| " 11 | " | D.r. Recht | |
| " 12 | " | Dg. | |
| " 13 | " | D.r. Kult. | |
| " 14 | " | Dg. | |
| " 15 | " | D.r. Presse | |
| " 16 | " | Abt. Prot. | |
| " 17 | " | Kef. Dtschl. | |
| " 18 | " | " Perid | |

3

Dies ist Nr. _____

135929

Telegramm (geh.Ch:V.)

Tokio, den 16. Mai 1939 19 Uhr 05
Ankunft: 16. " " 13 " 40

Nr. 204 vom 16/5.

Hinweise auf DNB Nr. 169 zu Schritt Französi-
schen Botschafters bei Aussenministerium betreffend
englisch-französisch-sowjetrussische ^{Verhandlungen.} Erfahre hierzu
aus guter Quelle Aussenministerium (...Gr.verst.),
dass Regierung Versicherungen Französischen Bot-
schafters über Beschränkung der Paktverhandlungen
auf Europa keinen praktischen Wert beimesse. Vize-
ausenminister habe Botschafter darauf hingewiesen,
dass Entlastung sowjetrussischer Westgränze zwangs-
läufig sowjetrussische Gefahr in Ostasien erhöhe.
Japan müsse daher neuer Entwicklung Rechnung tragen.

Nach Mitteilung Gewährsmannes hat Botschafter
unmissverständlich durchblicken lassen, dass im
Falle Verstärkung Antikominternpakts allerdings
Einbeziehung Fernen Ostens in Verhandlungsbereich
zu gewärtigen sei.

Ott

Hergestellt in 18 St.

Davon sind gegangen:

Nr. 1 an Pol. II (Abt. St.)
2 " R.A.M.
3 " St. S.
4 " Cief. A.O.
5 " B. i. A. M.
6 " Dir. Pers.
7 " Pol.
8 " Dg.
9 " D. r. W.
10 " Dg.
11 " D. r. Recht
12 " Dg.
13 " Dir. Kult.
14 " Dg.
15 " Dir. Presse
16 " Abt. Prot.
17 " Kof. Dschl.
18 " " Pers.

Dies ist Nr.

135944

Geheim!
Berlin, den 20. Mai 1939.

+

Der j a p a n i s c h e Botschaftsrat Usami suchte mich heute auf. Er begann die Unterhaltung damit, daß die Botschaft leider auf ihre letzten Telegramme aus Tokio noch keine Antwort bekommen und überhaupt noch nichts über den Stand der Dinge gehört habe. Eine Paraphierung des Dreierpakts am Montag sei daher sehr unwahrscheinlich; sie hofften aber in diesen Tagen wenigstens eine vorläufige Nachricht aus Tokio zu erhalten, wie die Dinge dort ständen.

Der eigentliche Zweck des Besuchs von Herrn Usami war aber, etwas Näheres über den Inhalt des deutsch-italienischen Pakts zu hören. Ich habe ihm gesagt, daß ich ihm Einzelheiten im Augenblick noch nicht mitteilen könne, und habe das damit begründet, daß der Text ja erst dann als endgültig angesehen werden könne, wenn die beiden Minister das Imprimatur erteilt hätten. Herr Usami stellte dann eine Reihe von Einzelfragen, die ich ihm vorsichtig und unverbindlich beantwortet habe. So erkundigte er sich nach der Dauer des Vertrages, worauf ich ihm sagte, der Herr Reichsminister habe ja schon zu seinem Botschafter gesagt, daß sich angesichts der bekannten Politik der Achse der deutsch-italienische Pakt natürlich nicht auf fünf Jahre beschränken könne. Ferner fragte er, ob der deutsch-italienische Pakt auch eine Klausel über gemeinsamen Waffenstillstands- und Friedensschluß enthielte. Ich habe das als wahrscheinlich be-

zeichnet

135948

R.A.N.
St. S.

M

zeichnet und habe dann das Gespräch mit der Bemerkung abgeschlossen, daß der Pakt, wie der Botschaft schon früher mitgeteilt, in seinen Formulierungen zwar etwas weiter gehe, dem eigentlichen Wesen der Sache nach aber mit dem Entwurf des Dreierpakts doch übereinstimme; er werde also für Japan keinerlei Überraschungen enthalten.

Zum Schluß bat Herr Usami, der Botschaft doch, sobald das möglich sei, den Wortlaut des Pakts vertraulich mitzuteilen; ferner regte er an, wir möchten doch auch Tokio informieren, bevor man dort den Wortlaut aus der Presse entnehme. Meinerseits habe ich angedeutet, daß nach Lage der Dinge eine Mitteilung des Textes an die Botschaft wohl nicht vor Montag Vormittag möglich sein werde.

(gez.:) G a u s .

135949

Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 23. Mai 1939 · 12.20 Uhr
Ankunft " " " " 7.30 Uhr

Nr. 217 vom 23. 5. Geheim . Für Herrn Staatssekretär .

Citissime

Im Anschluss an Telegramm vom 20. Nr. 213 .

Da mir unbekannt, ob Formulierung Kabinettsbeschlusses vom 20. Mai zugrundeliegenden japanischen Standpunkt eindeutig erkennen lässt, gebe ich nachfolgend als Ergänzung hiesiger (Gr. verst.) / ^{eine} von Armees- Erklärung abweichende Darstellung der Entstehung des Beschlusses wieder, die ich von den in Telegrammen Nr. 187 und Nr. 192 genannten leitenden Beamten Ausseministeriums erhielt. Danach habe Ministerpräsident im festen Willen, Dreierpakt zu erreichen, eine Formel gefunden, die für gegenwärtige Regierung einzige Möglichkeit darstelle, über den mehrfach gemeldeten grundsätzlichen Gegensatz innerhalb Kabinetts hinwegzukommen. Hiernach wolle Japan angeblich Kriegseintritt zwar nicht gegen Sowjetunion, wohl aber gegen England und Frankreich von den jeweiligen Umständen abhängig machen. Armees habe zugestimmt, um Rücktritt des Kabinetts, der ihr gegenwärtig durchaus unerwünscht, zu vermeiden. Gewahrsmann rechne personlich mit langwieriger Verzögerung des Paktabschlusses, falls unsere Regierung auf diese Formel nicht eingehe.

Ott

135950

Ganz Geheim!

Berlin, den 31. März 1939.

St.S. Nr. 294.

Zu Pol I M 1125 g.

Der Herr Reichsaußenminister ist mit der Lieferung der vier Verkehrsflugzeuge an die Südchinesische Regierung einverstanden. Er bittet jedoch die Japanische Regierung von der Lieferung in Kenntnis zu setzen, jedoch nicht in dem Sinne eines Ersuchens um Einverständnis sondern lediglich zur Information.

gez: Weizsäcker.

1) Herrn Unterstaatssekretär

2) Herrn Stahmer,

mit der Bitte um beiläufige
gelegentliche Information
der hiesigen Japanischen Bot-
schaft.

135902

Ja

Abschrift

Berlin, den 30. Mai 1939

Diplogerma

T o k i o

Nr. 176

R.A.M.

Tel.i.Ziff.(Geh.Ch.Verf.)

Ausschließlich für Botschafter persönlich !

Ich bitte , im diesseitigen Telegramm Nr. 174, um Mißverständnissen vorzubeugen, folgende Stelle zu berichtigen:

Unter Nr. 2 diesseitigen Telegramms ist von Telegramm Aritas die Rede, wonach sich Japanische Regierung für den Fall europäischen Konflikts Eintritt in Kriegszustand vorbehalten wolle. In diesem Satze sind die Worte " für den Fall europäischen Konflikts" durch die Worte zu ersetzen" für den Fall eines Konflikts der Achsenmächte mit England und Frankreich".

Weizsäcker

135953

Telegramm (gen. Ch. V.)

Tokio, den 31. Mai 1939 20.20 Uhr

Ankunft: " 31. " " 16.— "

Nr. 228 vom 31.5.

Geheim.

Citissime !
=====

Für Herrn Reichsminister.

Auf Telegramm vom 28. Nr. 147 +)

Ganz Geheim!

+) BRAM

Habe weisungsgemäß Gesichtspunkte Ziffer 3 Vortelegramms gegenüber meinen Gewährsmännern nachdrücklich geltend gemacht, deren Stellungnahme folgendes uneinheitliches Bild ergab :

Privatsekretär Ministerpräsidenten teilte mir im Auftrage Ministerpräsidenten, dieser sei fest entschlossen, Bündnis durchzusetzen und hoffe, japanischem Botschafter in Berlin in etwa drei Tagen eine Entscheidung übermitteln zu können.

Gewährsmann Armee, diesmal Vizekriegsminister persönlich, bat mich, Reichsaußenminister im Namen Kriegeministers mitzuteilen, Armee werde in ihren täglichen Verhandlungen mit Marine deren Widerstand bestimmt allmählich überwinden, wobei sie alle Argumente verwende, die für unseren Standpunkt geltendgemacht werden könnten. Armee bitte erneut dringend um Geduld und Vertrauen. Vizekriegsminister auswich meinen wiederholten Versuchen, Erklärung für Nichtübermittlung Entscheidung vom 20. Mai an Reichsregierung zu erhalten. Gewährsmann Außenministeriums erklärte, daß über Entscheidung vom 20. Mai trotz scheinbarer Einigung unmittelbar nach Absendung erneut grundsätzliche Meinungsverschiedenheiten auftreten, die Gegensätze so vertieften, daß Rücktritt des Kabinetts kaum vermeidbar erscheine. Trotzdem würden weitere, allerdings langwierige Verhandlungen schließlich uns befriedigende Lösung bringen. Alle Gewährsmänner übereinstimmten in der Zuversicht auf endgültige Bündnislösung zu unseren Gunsten und in der Bitte um Geduld. Sie unterschieden sich in der Zeitbemessung von wenigen Tagen bis zu langwierigen Verhandlungen im Anschluß an Kabinettssturz. Habe Eindruck, daß Erklärung Vizekriegsministers voraussichtlicher Entwicklung am nächsten kommt, zumal Armee Unterstützung mittleren Offizierkorps Marine zum Druck auf Marineführung zunehmend gewinnt. Weitere Mitteilungen Gewährsmänner bestätigen im wesentlichen Darstellung meines Drahtberichts 223 vom 27. Mai über den Rückschlag in Tokio, wobei Vorgehen Außenministers möglicherweise auf typisch japanische Verschwoemtheit der Beschlußfassung zurückgeführt werden kann. Verlegenheit und Zurückhaltung Vizekriegsministers in Frage Rückschlags erkläre ich mir aus dem Bewußtsein, daß Fehlschlag der Kabinettsentscheidung auf Gesamtkabinetts ungünstiges Licht geworfen hat u. aus Bestreben, peinliche Schuldfrage nicht zu erörtern.

Ott

135955

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 1. Juni 1939 14 Uhr 04

Ankunft: 1. " " 10 "

x) Pol. I M ...g

Nr. 229 vom 1/6. Auf Tel. vom 29. Nr. 175 x).

Citissime ! Geheim !

Für Staatssekretär.

Ganz Geheim!

Baldiges Eintreffen Wennekers erwünscht, sofortige Entsendung aber nicht von ausschlaggebendem Nutzen für Verhandlungen. Einflusskreis jedes Marineattachés beschränkt deren (...Gr. verst.) auf mittlere Offiziere, die uns ohnehin zunehmend zuneigen. Im Rahmen der mir gezogenen Grenzen habe ich Marineattaché laufend auf diese Offiziere angesetzt und gleiches bei Italienischem Botschafter wirkt. Auch eben eingetroffener Kapitän Kojema hat sich angeboten. Werde den bei heutiger Abreise der Presseabordnung zurückbleibenden Admiral Förster auf Führung der Marine einwirken lassen, um Bewertung englisch-amerikanischer Flotte zu erschüttern. Einladungen nächster Tage bieten Gelegenheit. Förster steht als früherer Flottenchef in hohem Ansehen. Bedenken der Marine gegen sofortigen Kriegseintritt gegen Westmächte beruhen aber nur zum Teil auf technischen und operativen Marinefragen; eine wichtige Rolle spielen die Wirtschaftssorgen vor Amerika, die Japan weithin beherrschen, und der starke Einfluss der englandfreundlichen Hofkreise auf die Führung der Marine. Diese arbeitet trotz der gegenwärtigen Konfliktslage stark mit den Spannungen des zwanzigjährigen englisch-japanischen Bündnisses, das Japan seine Grossmachtstellung ermöglicht habe. Da bei den verwickelten und langwierigen Verhandlungen zum Abschluss dieses Bündnisses territoriale Abreden eine erhebliche Rolle spielten, verweise ich auf die Möglichkeit, die Südseemandate besonders im Hinblick auf die Marine taktisch zu verwerten. Die Frage ist von mir oder japanischer Seite nicht angeschnitten worden, habe aber Grund zur Annahme, dass sie von englischer Propaganda zur Zeit zu unseren Ungunsten ausgespielt wird.

Ott

135956

(ROUGH TRANSLATION)

DOC. NO. 4043 C

Item 13

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 6 May 1939
Arrived, 6 May 1939

1400
1415

No. 187 of 6 May

Most urgent!

Top Secret - For State Secretary

Annex to telegram of fourth, No. 184.

Declarations of various General Staff officers, among them my confidant who until now has worked in direct accordance with instructions from the War Minister as well as a talk with the War Vice Minister, reveal the following viewpoint of the army which I consider official.

The Prime Minister has obtained a compromise, which the army indicates as the highest possible offer under present conditions, in the conflict of the five minister conference (War Minister and Finance Minister against the Foreign Minister and Navy Minister.)

Concerning the main points of the declaration, the army explained:

- 1.) On the point of obligation of aid, the army has further proposed a clarification and fuller explanation of the "change in situation" which will make later effective aid possible, so that Japan's neutrality will not in any way enter into the question. The army attributes the present wording to the Foreign Minister. The War Vice Minister declared that the treaty binds Japan definitely to the Axis Powers. We must, however, understand that Japan is isolated in the Far East and is in a considerably worse position than the Axis bloc in Europe which can work directly in cooperation. In case of war, however, independent of the outbreak and extent of Japanese acts of war, the plain fact of the treaty will exert effective pressure on the enemy.
- 2.) Re the "Explanation" the army emphasizes that the present proposal is elastic, contains no precise wording, and negotiations are left open, which should result in favorable views on OSHIMA's telegram of yesterday.

3.) Discussions concerning "Sincerity of my Country" would indicate it as a particularly important personal word of honor of the Prime Minister, after I had referred to the erroneous wording.

The whole statement has been handed to the Emperor through the Foreign Minister, as also mentioned in press suggestions. In case an agreement is not reached, the army expects a resignation of the cabinet, which would be quite undesirable because of foreign and domestic reasons at the present time.

Declarations from navy circles not yet received. Main opposition of the navy comes evidently from Navy Vice Minister YAMAMOTO.

From the Foreign Ministry a senior official, who stands especially close to Ambassador SHIBATORI, has let me know personally that in the entire government there exists a deep cleft between friends and enemies of the alliance. The situation is very serious and complicated. On his personal initiative, the Prime Minister has achieved a declaration of compromise which accepts the principle of an unlimited alliance, limited, however, by two significant reservations. This attitude of Japan must, it is true, surprise the Axis Powers, who are accustomed to unequivocal decisions, but it arises of necessity from the lack of unified leadership. Should negotiations collapse, cabinet crisis is threatened with serious consequences.

General impression is that the active preliminaries of the treaty idea stress extraordinary difficulties and (one word apparently lacking) urgent hope that HIRANUMA's declaration will show the possibility of the final conclusion of the treaty.

alt

/135921-135922/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

(ROUGH TRANSLATION)

DOC NO 4043

Item 13

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO 6 May 1939 1400

Arrived 6 May 1939 1415

No 187 of 6 May

Most urgent!

Top Secret - For State Secretary

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The Prime Minister, in the conflict
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Concerning the main points of the

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^{Discussions}
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~~mistaken~~ wording.
^{erroneous}

^{whole}
The ~~total~~ statement has been
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the Foreign Minister, ^{as per also} ~~no~~
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~~matter~~ what the press may
say about it. In case an
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the army expects a resignation
of the cabinet, which would
be quite ^{undesirable} ~~unwelcome~~ ^{because of}
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all viewpoints at the present
time.

Declarations from navy circles
not ^{yet} so far received. Main
opposition of the navy comes
^{wholly} openly from Vice-Navy Minister
YAMAMOTO.

From the Foreign Ministry
a ^{senior} chief official, who stands
especially close to Ambassador
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personally that in the entire
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The situation is very serious
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On his personal initiative, the Prime

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from the lack of unified leadership.

~~bound to alienate the Axis,~~

~~rising but naturally from the~~

~~lack of unified leadership.~~

^{Should}
In case negotiations collapse,
threat of cabinet crisis, ^{is threatening} with

serious effects consequences.

^{General impression is that}
In my opinion the actual ^{active}
^{origin of the treaty idea} ^{stress} involved

extraordinary difficulties and


(one word apparently lacking) urgent

hope that HIRANUMA's declaration

show the possibility of final
will affect the conclusion of the
treaty.

/135921 - 135922/

Winn



電報(秘密暗号法)

東京 一九三九年五月二十七日 一六時四五分
着 " 二十七日 一一時四五分

大至急

五月二十七日附第二二三号

國務秘書官宛親展

極秘 一 二十三日附電報第二二七号一参照

同盟ヲ撓ル新タル内容ノ紛争ノ噂ヲ傳ヘテ照會ニ對シ

代辯者ハ前電ニ報告ノ矛盾ヲ説明シ得ルハ其ノ旨ヲ達スル

即チ外務大臣ハ五月二十日附ノ五大臣ノ陸軍ノ整理ノ形式ノ決定

ヲ「ハルリ」ニ「ロ」マニ打電シタリ、理由ハ右ノ陸軍ノ整理ノ英國及佛蘭

西ニ對シ戰爭状態ニ入ルコトヲ自動的ニ決定スル時情勢ニ依リ

レメヨウトスルヲテアル。 「ハルリ」ニ「ロ」マノ日本大使ヲ傳達ヲ拒絶シテ

總理大臣ハ右決定ト、此ノ相違ヲ發送後確メ内容ノ彼自身ノ修正ヲ提

スルハ陸軍大臣ハ軍事參議院ノ明確ナル承認ヲ得ル陸軍大臣總理大臣

共ニ「根本問題明瞭ナル觀念」ヲ為ニ奮闘シテナル

西洋列強ニ對スル海軍ノ理論的保留條件「既得」アリ「ニ於ケル処置

トハ最モ極端ニ矛盾シテ居タコト並ニ西洋列強自身ハ日本ニ對シ必然的ニ重大ナル影

響ヲ及ボスニシテ、同盟ノ為メ努力中ナルコトヲ特ニ代辯者指摘スル代辯者ハ個

人的ニ外務大臣特權ノ可能性ヲ當テシメ尚前同保留條件ニ関シテ氣遣ワテナル

ニ見テ總理大臣秘書官モ亦同様意見ヲ表明シテ天皇ハ陸海軍兩ノ一致

ヲ陸軍ノ同盟要求ヲ代表スル閑院ニ答ハル所同意ノ條件トセラレタト他ノ如何

ヨリ聞ク、同盟又對者ノ執拗ナ抵抗ニ関シテハ多ク進連ノテ口計ニ出

尊ガエツテ居ル

極秘

オット

FILE COPY ROOM 361

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cumming
余、W. P. カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ

証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル鹵獲獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ在シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ鹵獲取得セラレ、其關係ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／＼柏林ノ文書本部ニ移官セラレタルモノナル事
三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部ニ當テ命セラレタル事。
是ニ仍リテ該鹵獲獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事。

四余ノ此供述書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、兩獲セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

其茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、寫ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング
(W. P. CUMMINGS)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツチ・ガイド
G. H. Guido

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 18 February 1939

1410 hours

Arrival: 18 February, 1939

1310 hours

TOP SECRET!

No. 70 of 18 February

For the State Secretary personally.

In annex to telegram of the first, No. 44.

Further news concerning Anti-Comintern Pact gives the following picture:-

Japanese Cabinet is supposed to have finally decided upon an intensification of the pact, in opposition to the Anglo-phile ideas, especially of the court circle. The British Ambassador, greatly agitated, depicted Japanese pact policy to me recently as the wrong road, which would strain relations with England extraordinarily. Likewise, the former Japanese Ambassador to Washington urgently warned the Government in the Diet of alienating the Anglo-Saxon powers and succeeded in bringing about a one-hour review of Anti-Comintern policy which was not published. Other Diet members, on the other hand, repeatedly strengthened the government in its pact policy.

Consul General ITO is to be sent to Europe with the special mission of instructing the opposing chiefs of /diplomatic/ missions / abroad /.

The Polish Ambassador and Reuters Agency are spreading the news here that a military alliance has been concluded, which I privately considered /to be/ fabricated. These rumors preoccupy diplomatic and Japanese circles as well as the international press, especially in connection with the intensification of the situation in Europe. In this connection the younger officers and active circles are expressing the hope for a conflict in Europe which might remove the pressure of the great powers in the Far East.

OTT

/135899/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegram (Secret Cipher Proc.)
 Tokyo, 27 May 1939 1645 hrs.
 Arrival: 27 May 1939 1145 "

No. 223 of 5/27

MOST URGENT!

For State Secretary in person.

Strictly secret. -- Reference: Telegram of 23rd, No. 217.

On hearing rumors of new cabinet struggles over alliance asked Army for information whereupon spokesman gave an exposition which can explain the contradictions reported in preceding telegram: Foreign Minister wired decision of the five ministers of 20 May to Berlin and Rome in a form which Army rejects, because it does not automatically fix the entrance into a state of war against England and France, but proposed to make it dependent on the situation at the time. Japanese Ambassadors Berlin Rome had refused transmittal. Prime Minister had ascertained this departure from the decision after it had left and had delivered /his/ own correction to cabinet. With the express approval of Supreme War Council War Minister is again struggling together with the Prime Minister for clear conception of this basic question.

Pointed out particularly to spokesman that theoretical reservations of Navy vis-a-vis Western Powers stood in crassest contradiction of their procedure in Amoy and Western Powers themselves are working for a Soviet alliance that would necessarily affect Japan seriously.

Spokesman personally counted on possibility of resignation of foreign minister. Private secretary of Prime Minister who, moreover, seemed concerned regarding remaining /in power/ of whole cabinet also expressed similar view. Hear from other source that Emperor had made agreement /between/ Army and Navy a condition for his assent in answer to Prince KAN-IN, who represented the alliance demands of the Army.

Regarding stubborn resistance of opponents of alliance rumors are cropping up of terroristic plans of radical groups.

QUITE SECRET!

OTT
 FILE COPY
 TO ROOM 361

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military
Government for Germany (U.S.)

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

4043A-1
au 500

電報 (秘密防務通信)

東京、一九三九年二月十八日 一四一〇時
着、一九三九年二月十八日 一三一〇時

極 秘

二月十八日附第七〇號

國務大臣 親辰 直接

第四四號第一信ニ對スル追加電報。

防共協定ニ關スルソノ後ノニュースハ次ノ如シ。
日本ノ内閣ハ、(官中筋ヲ主トスル親英思想ニ
反對シテ)此ノ協定ノ強化ヲ遂ニ決定シタ様ニ
思ハレル。先日、英國大使ハ非常ニ興奮シテ、
日本ノ防共協定政策ハ英國トノ關係ヲ極度ニ緊
張セシメル誤マレル路デアルト余ニ述ベタ。
同様ニ、前ワシンホン、陸在日公大使ハ緊急ニ
議會ニ於テ、政府ニアングロサクソン諸國トノ
邊境ヲ報告シ、未發表ノ反共協定ニ就キ一時間
ノ審議ヲ行ハセシメタ。
地方、外ノ議員達ハ歸リ返シソノ防共協定政策
ニツキ政府ヲ激勵シタ。伊藤總領事ガ海外ニ於
ケル協定反對ノ大公使達ニ訓令スル特殊命令ヲ
以テ歐洲ニ派遣サレタト云ハレル。

4043A-2

ポランド大使トルーター通信員が當地で、軍事同盟締結ノニュースヲ流布シテキルガ余自身ハソレハ捏造サレタモノダト思フ。

此等ノ噂ハ持ニ歐洲ニ於ケル情勢ノ重大化ト相俟テ國際新聞記者ヲ始メ外交團及日本人側ヲ色メキ立タセテキル。之ニ關シテ青年將校ヤ積極派ハ歐洲ニ於ケル國爭ガ趨衰ニ於テ諸強國ノ壓カヲ可成リ減殺スルダラウトシテ之ヘノ希望ヲ表明シテキル

オ
ツ
ト

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cumming
W. P. カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國山西省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治願
同部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ
於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ
占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事

ニ 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合
國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ
テ國庫取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル
／＼柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ
ニ於テ、上述文書本部管轄ヲ命セラレタル事。
是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫原
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ陸軍在官時、初メテ
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

曰余ノ此供述書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、函達セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ贋本タル事

ニ茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞贋本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢圖覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞贋本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング
(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード
G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

EXHIBIT NO. 503

DOC. NO. 4043 B & D

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 4 May 1939

Arrival: 4 May 1939

No. 184 of 4 May

Top Secret:

FILE COPY
2200 hours
2200 hours
Most urgent
RETURN TO ROOM 361

For the Reich / Foreign Minister personally

The Foreign Minister called me and communicated the following: The negotiations taking place in Berlin and Rome on the Anti-Comintern Pact came to a deadlock 10 days ago. To continue them, Prime Minister MIYAKAWA directed a statement to the Fuehrer and German Chancellor, which the Foreign Minister read and herewith handed over to me for further transmission. I accepted the statement, compiled in Japanese and French text, with the reference that I would communicate them by telegraph to the German Foreign Minister, and I refrained from giving any opinion. The same statement was previously communicated and just delivered to the Italian Ambassador for MUSSOLINI.

Text in translation:

"I cherish great admiration for the lofty wisdom and the iron will with which His Excellency, Chancellor of the German Government, HITLER, is working at the noble task of the reconstruction of his country and at the establishment of an international peace founded upon principles of justice.

"I, for my part, as Japanese Prime Minister, am likewise occupied with the strengthening of peace and with the maintenance of a New Order in East Asia founded on the principles of justice and morality.

"In this splendid hour it is a confirmed joy to me how effective the Anti-Comintern Agreement between our two countries proves itself in the execution of the tasks placed before them. And today if I have in view the conclusion of an agreement, to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and to make closer the co-operation between Japan, Germany and Italy, this does not occur just out of a consideration of the mere expediency/Zweckmassigkeit/ of it, but in the hope that in that way we may contribute to the consolidation of a world peace founded upon justice and morality in consciousness of our common tasks now. As far as the strengthening of our relations is concerned, I can affirm that Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even if one of those two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union and to afford them political and economic aid, to the extent possible to her power, military assistance.

"In spite of this Japan is ready, in accordance with the provisions of such an agreement to take up the military support of Germany and Italy; however, Japan is, in view of the situation in which it now finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical manner any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should become possible through a change in the circumstances.

"I should especially like to receive Germany's and Italy's express consent to the foregoing point.

"Furthermore, in consequence of the international situation which confronts it, Japan would be compelled to exercise the greatest caution in regard to the explication which it would give at the time of the publication of this agreement. I would be glad to receive the unequivocal assent of Germany and Italy on this point also.

"I may add that the planned agreement rests upon the foundation of mutual confidence, and that to doubt the sincerity of my country in the slightest would be tantamount to destroying the real basis of the agreement and would make its execution impossible.

"The thoughts which I have just portrayed arise from reflections of a moral and spiritual nature and can not be influenced by reasons of expediency /Zweckmassigkeit/. If I undertook to express them with all frankness, it was because I was guided exclusively by the sincere desire to bring out endeavors to a satisfactory conclusion.

"4 May 1939

(without signature)

Close of the statement.

I hear from army circles that the Prime Minister took this surprising course to personally counteract any doubts that may have risen in Berlin and Rome concerning the situation and readiness of Japan and to arrive at a compromise as far as possible.

The Foreign Minister when he handed over the statement was visibly in a bad mood. Will try to clarify unobtrusively the Army's interpretation.

OTT

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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s/ W. F. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Eu 503
4043 B+2-1

FILE
COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

報 (秘密暗號法)

東京 一九三九年 (昭和十四年) 五月四日午後十時

着 同 四日午後十時

五月四日附 第一八四號 大至急!

極秘!

國務大臣親展

外務大臣ハ私ヲ呼ンデ次ノ事ヲ傳ヘタ。

ベルリン及ピローマニ於テ行ハレテキル防共協

定ニ就イテノ交渉ハ十日前カラ停頓シテキルト。

交渉ヲ更ニ繼續スル爲ニハ、總理大臣平沼ハ總統

勅諭國首相ニ聲明書ヲ發シコレデソノ聲明書ヲ外

務大臣ハ傳達ノ爲ニ私ニ講讀シ手交シタ。私ハ日

本語ト佛蘭西語ノ原文デ書カレタ聲明書ヲ受ケテ、

私ハソレヲ勅達外務大臣ヲ通ジテ打電スルデアラ

ウト申添ヘスベテノ意見ヲ述ベル事ヲ差シ控ヘマ

シタ。同様ナモノヲ其ノ直前ニムツソリーニ宛イ

タリア大使ニ傳ヘラレ手交サレマシタ。

翻譯原文

「勅達政府總理大臣閣下、ヒットラー氏ガ祖國再
建ノ大業竝ニ正義ニ基ク國際平和ノ樹立ノ爲ニ努
力サレテキル高キ睿智ト鐵ノ如キ意志ニ對シ私ハ

深甚ナル驚歎ノ念ヲ抱クモノデアリマス。

私自身日本總理大臣トシテ同ジク平和ノ確立及
ビ正義ト道德ノ原則ニ依ツテ導カレタル東亞ノ新
秩序維持ニ努力スルモノデアリマス。

此ノ輝カシキ時ニ、我々兩國間ニ確立シテキル
防共協定ガ可憐ニ課セラレタル使命ノ遂行ニ當リ
如何ニ有効デアルカラ確認スル事ハ私ニトリ喜ビ
デアリマス。而シテ若シ私ガ今日、防共協定ヲ強
化シ且ツ日本、猶及ビ伊太利ノ提携ヲヨリ緊密
ニセンガ爲ニ、協定ノ締結ヲ考ヘルトスルナラバ、
此ノ事ハ實ニ純粹ナル合目的考慮カラノミナラズ、
正義ト道德ニ基イタ世界平和強化ノ爲我々ノ共同
ノ使命ノ意識ニ於テ貢獻シヨウト云フ希望ニ於テ
起ルモノデアリマス。我々ノ關係ノ強化ト云フ事
ニ關シテ、私ガ確言シ得ル事ハ、此ノ獨伊ノ一ガ
蘇聯ノ參加ガナク一國又ハ多國カラ攻撃サレル様
ナ時デサヘ、日本ハ獨伊ノ味方デアリ、彼等ニ政
治的ニ且ツ經濟的ニ、可能ノ範圍ニ於テ並ニ力ノ
及ブ限リニ於テハ軍事の援助ヲ爲ス事ヲ固ク搖グ
事ナク決意シテキルト云フコトデアリマス。

然シ乍ラ日本ハ、斯カル協定ノ規定ニ從ツテ獨
伊ノ軍事の援助ノ原則ヲ取り上ゲル事ニ喜ンデ應
ズルガ、然ルニ日本ノ現情ニ於テハ現在ニ於テモ
近イ將來ニ於テモ彼等ニ有効ナ軍事の援助ヲ實際

4043 B + 15 - 3

上ニ與ヘ得ナイノデアアル。然シ乍ラ、之ガ情勢ノ變化ニヨツテ可能ニナルナラバ日本ハ喜ンデ此ノ援助ヲ與フルデアラウコトハ當然自明ノ事デアアル。上述ノ點ニ對シ獨伊ノ明確ナ贊成ヲ得ルコトハ私ニトリ特ニ願ハシイト。×

更ニ日本ハ、直面セル國際情勢ノ爲ニ、止ムヲ得ズ、此ノ協定ノ發表時ニ於ケル説明ニ關シ、極度ノ用心ヲ取ラザルヲ得ナイ。此ノ點ニ於テモ亦、獨伊ノ明瞭ナ贊成ヲ得レバ喜バシイト。

更ニ附加出來ル事ハ、計畫サレタ協定ガ相互ノ信頼ノ基礎ノ上ニアルコト、我ガ祖國ノ眞實ニ聯カデモ疑ヒヲ挾ム事ハ協定ノ眞ノ基礎ヲ動搖サス事ト同ジ意味デアリ（協定）ノ遂行ヲ不可能ニスルデアラウ。

私ガ今丁度述べタ思想ハ、道德的精神的性質ノ考慮ヨリ出ヅルモノデアツテ合目的性ノ理由ニヨリ左右サレ得ルモノデナイ。私ガ其ノ思想ヲ非常ニ卒直ニ語ル事ヲ企テタ時、私ハ其際專ラ、我々ノ努力ヲ満足スベキ結論ニ導ク眞實ナ希望ニ依ツテ導カレタ。

一九三九年（昭和十四年）五月四日

署名ナシ

聲明書ノ末尾

4043 B+D-4

軍部筋ヨリ聞ク處ニ依レバ、首相ハ、ベルリン
及ビローマニ於テ現ハレタ日本ノ情勢及ビ快諾ニ
對スル疑惑ニ個人的ニ反對シ、出來ルダケ妥協ニ
到達セントスル爲ニ此ノ爲クベキ道ヲ選ンダノデ
アルト。

外務大臣ハ聲明書手交ノ際明カニ不機嫌デアツ
タ。軍部ノ意見ヲ控ヘ目ニ明瞭ニシヨウ。

オ
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ト

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cummins
余、W. P. カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸信林所在、信林文書本部ニ於ル國務獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

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流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫真謄本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

504
Doc 40430

NO 1

電報 (秘密暗号法)

東京一九三九年(昭和十四年)五月六日午後二時
着 全 六日午後二時十分

五月六日付第一八七号 大正急心

極秘

極秘 内閣書記官長宛

四日付電第一八七号ニ対スル返電

色々ナシ希察持校一ソノ中ニ直接陸軍大臣ノ指令ニ依リテ活動シテ
ル私ノ従来ノ親友モルレカアルガ一ノ發言甚ニ伊人利人使館任
武官ト陸軍次官トノ談話ハ陸軍ノ次ノ如キ見解ヲ表示シテ口
私ハソノ見解ヲ公式モト考ヘテ也

總理大臣ハ五相會議ノ閉會ニ於テ(陸軍大臣及陸軍大臣ハ外務
大臣及海軍大臣ニ対シテ)軍部が今日ノ状態カニトシテハ
最高ノ能ニ提示ト稱シテル也(陸軍大臣ハ)軍部が今日ノ状態カニ
右明書ノ重要ト點ニ依リテ次ノ如ク説明シヨ

一 援助義務ニ関シテハ陸軍ハ東ニ對シテ援助ヲ可能トシラシムル
テアラウノ事情變化ヨリ明瞭ニ確定シ日本ノ中立が決シテ固
題トナラヌ又中立間單ニ聲明スル事ヲ提案シテ陸軍ハ現在ノ用
語ヲ外務大臣ノ責任ニ歸シテ也。陸軍次官ハ同盟ハ結局知レ
日本ヲ極軸國ニ認ビテケルト詳論シヨ。然レ日本ハ極東ニ於テ
孤立シ直接協力ヲ得ル歐洲ノ極軸ガ中心ヨリモ相立要人イ
扶態ニラル事ヲ我々ハ理解セバナラヌト、然レ戰爭ノ場合シハ
日本ノ戰爭行動開始ト範圍トニ關係ナラシ既ニ同盟トシテ
單ナル事ニ對シテ有効ト圧力ヲ及ボステアラウヲ

(二) 說明ニ依リ陸軍ノ強調スルコトハ現在ノ提議ハハヨリ強力的ナ
アリ、明白ナ明文化ヲ合フズ。昨日到着シタ大島大使電報ニ
依リ有留ナル見込ガアルト思ハレル文済ノ余地ヲ残シテオクテ

(三) 私ハ誤解ヲ受ケ易イ用語ヲ指摘シタル也。我ハ固、眞實ニ
就テノ詳論ハ總理大臣ノ特ニ重要ナル他人の証言ト稱セラレタ
全聲明文ハ外務大臣ニ依リテ天皇ニ御說明申シテアラシ
ソレハ新聞ノ指示ニ依リテ赤明カガリマス。陸軍ハ同盟盟が成
之ニテイ場合、外部的及ビ内部的理由カラ目下、処全ラ均生マ
ンクナイ内閣ノ辭職ヲ期待シテマス。

海軍側ニ致言ハ合テ、処、手ニ入りモシ。

海軍ノオセル反對ハ明カニ山本海軍次官ヨリ發シテマル様デス。
自身大使ト特ニ親キ關係ナル外務省ノ指導的官吏ガ他人
的ニ知ラシテクダ所ニヨリ、政府指導者全体ニ同盟盟ノ賛成
者ト反對者トノ間ニ深刻ナ間隙ガ生ガレタルト、戰執ハ非常ニ
重大テ錯雜シテナルト總理大臣ハ他人の発意ニ依リテ無制限
ノ同盟盟ノ原則ヲ採用シテモ、同盟盟ハニ重要ヲ保留ニ欲シテ
制限サレルガ如キニ妥協聲明文ニ到達シタルト、日本ノコ
態度ハ明確ナル決断ニ馴レタル枢軸國ヲ敬慕カシテマルガ然レ
統一の指導ノ缺乏ノ多クニ反然のニ起ツテナルモノナルト。文済ノ
ガ失敗スル場合ニハ内閣ノ危機ガ重大ナ結果ヲ以テ迫ツテナルテア
ル。全体ノ印象ハ次ノ如クデアリマス。即チ同盟盟理念ハ

最モ活潑ナル豫備行動ガ非常ニ困難ヲ強調シ且ツ平和
ノ聲明書ガ同盟盟ノ決定的締結ガ可能性ヲ子ヘル事ヲ切ニ希
望シテナル
オット

カ一文字クテキル様ニ思ハレル。

供 述 書

余、W. P. Carrington
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ

証言ス

一余ハ合衆國山西省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

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ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

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宣誓ス

中佐

ジー・エツテ・ガード
G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

Ex. 780

Doc. No. 4043 E

page 1

TOP SECRET!

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 23 March 1939 19 o'clock

Arrival, 23 March 1939 18.10 "

No. 121 of March 23

Secret!

For the State Secretary

I hear from well informed Japanese press source that the Japanese conference of the five ministers under the presidency of the Prime Minister had decided at two o'clock tonight after a discussion lasting several hours, to take up diplomatic negotiations with Germany for the purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia. Parts of the Army advocated a further military treaty also against third powers. The same was demanded by the Italian Government. The Navy had recommended limitation on Russia. Ambassador OSHIMA is supposed to have delivered the inquiry of the German Government, whether Japan would be willing to conclude the military treaty. Ostensibly, Germany is supposed to be content with merely anti-Russian pact and has requested an answer by April 3. The government here does not wish to break off the bridge to America and England despite the treaty and is for this purpose supposed to be considering concessions in China. The newspaper ASAHI also mentions in today's morning edition a secret minister's conference and announces that 'an important question of Japanese foreign policy would be decided upon in a few days.'

OTT

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

/135900/

EX. 780

電報 (秘密暗号法)

極秘!

東京 一九三九年 (昭和十四年) 三月二十三日 午後七時

着 同

二十三日 午後六時十分

三月二十三日付第一二一号

秘

内閣書記官長宛

4043E

日本、新聞、確カテ筋ヨリノ情報ニヨレバ、總理大臣ヲ議長トスル日本ノ五相
 會議ハ數時間ニ亘ル協議ノ後、今晚二時、ロシヤニ對シテ向ケラレタル軍ヲ同
 盟締結ノタメノ独逸トノ外交交渉ヲ取リ止メルニ決定シタト。陸軍ノ各部
 ハ亦三國ニ對シテモ亦廣汎テ軍ヲ協定ヲ唱ヘタト。同様ノ事ハ伊太利政
 府カ要求シタト。海軍ハロシヤニ限定スルヲ勸告シテキタト。大島大使
 ハ日本カ軍ヲ同盟ヲ締結スル氣カアルカドウカトイフ独逸政府ノ向合
 セヲ傳ヘタト。独逸モ亦表面上ハ軍ニ對露協定ヲ満足シ四月三日迄ニ解
 答ヲ依頼シタト。同盟ニモ拘ラス当地政府ハ米英トノ橋ヲ破壊スルヲ欲
 セスコノ目的ノタメニ支那ニ於ケル諸讓歩ヲ考慮シテキルト。朝日新聞
 モ今日、朝刊ニ秘密關係會議ニ言及シ、而シテ「二三日中ニ日本外交
 政策ノ重要問題カ決定サレルテアラウトト告ゲテ居ル。」

FILE COPY
 RETURN TO ROOM 361
 オックス

Doc. No. 4043-F

EXHIBIT NO. 596

Extract from a letter of Ambassador OTT - TOKYO - of 15 March, 1939
to Ministerial Director WIEHL.

..... In the question of our preferential treatment in
China I was able to gather from conversations in the Foreign Ministry
that Ambassador OSHIMA has actually telegraphed repeatedly in
accordance with our interests /in Unserem Sinne/. Generally I have
the impression that one is not inclined to admit in writing the
preferential treatment. As a way out, one is thinking of a de facto
preferential treatment which is to be confirmed solely by actual
deeds without written fixation. However, the actual deeds offered
by Japan up to now are not very encouraging.....

Signed OTT

Copy to:

Bureau RAM

ST.S.

POL VIII

U.S.T.S.

W VII

Dg. POL

Dg. W

signed WIEHL

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.
2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.
3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.
4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.
5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

EXHIBIT NO. 596 4043F

オットー大使、東京ヨリ一九三九年三月十五日
ヴァイール局長へ宛テタル手紙ノ抜奉

支那ニ於ケル我々ノ優先的取扱ノ問題ニ關シ、余
ハ外務省内ノ話カラ、大島大使ハ事實繰返シ我々
ノ氣持ヲ打電シテ專ヲ推察出來タ。一般的ニハ余
ハ然シ乍ラ優先的取扱ヲ文書ヲ以テ承認スル氣ハ
ナイトイフ印象ヲ持ツテキル。越道トシテ文書ニ
表明スル專無シニ、單ニ事實ニ依リ證明セラル可
キ實際上ノ優先的取扱ガ考ヘラレル。從來日本カ
ラ示サレタ事實ハ然シ乍ラ其レ程激刺的テハナイ。

署名 オットー

複寫 獨逸國外務省、局長、 U.S.T.S.

D.G.P.O.L. D.G.W. POL. 第八.W 第七

署名 ヴァイール

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cunningham
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
證言ス

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ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原
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供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W.P. Cummings)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツチ・ガード

Ct. H. Garde

高級副官等事務取扱

H. Colonel, A.G.D.

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

128

9/5

Tokyo, 8 May. - Domei Radio presents an ITAGAKI-KOISO interview.

War Minister ITAGAKI declared it to be a welcome fact that Germany and Italy had bound themselves through their military alliance still more firmly to the maintenance of peace in their joint efforts to build up a New Order in Europe. Itagaki ascribed the confusion of the European situation to the lack of equilibrium between old and new rising Powers. Asked whether the possibility existed that Japan might enter the Italo-German Military Alliance, Itagaki declared that the spirit which animated the conclusion of the Tri-lateral Anti-Pact was very deeply rooted and in case for that reason Germany and Italy wanted it it was not impossible that Japan might conclude a military alliance with the Axis Powers.

(continuation on page 2)

135326

/Printed on top of page 2/ Raw Material - For personal information only.
Without editorial guarantee.

No. 128 _____ 9 May 1939 _____ 25 _____ Page 2 _____

(continuation from page) Minister of Colonies KOISO stated that apparently negotiations directed toward the conclusion of a military alliance among the three Axis powers were being conducted. As a private observation Koiso stated: "Whether such negotiations lead to the goal or not depends entirely upon whether Germany and Italy understand Japan's point of view and power in East Asia as well as their own position in Europe." He stated further that it would be suitable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of her policies, while it would not only not be suitable but downright dangerous for Germany and Italy to attempt to carry out their policies vis-a-vis the encirclement measures of their opponents without the closest cooperation with Japan, the strongest power in East Asia. The difficulties are constantly causing the lack of mutual understanding, explained Koiso further. Therefore it lay in Japan's interest, as well as Italy's and Germany's for Germany and Italy to understand not only their own position but also that of Japan and her point of view in the Far East. Nearly all Japanese had more knowledge of Germany and German affairs than the Germans of Japan and Japanese affairs. Japan was convinced, ~~rita /T.N.: sic; error for Koiso/~~ emphasized, of the "necessity of further strengthening of the Anti-Pact" in view of Japan's earlier experiences and present position in order to be able to face the international situation from "Japan's own standpoint." As for the

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

Roosevelt Message, Arita declared that this was a dual-purpose action, namely, first as a domestic political gesture and second as a measure to inflame world public against Germany and Italy. Finally having been directed to the China conflict, Arita emphasized that Japan's historic and racial mission lay in the establishment of a New Order in East Asia in closest cooperation with China and Manchoukuo, although third powers were trying to bring into discredit Japan's military actions in China.

(DNB Representative)

135927

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.
2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.
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/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Doc. No. 4043-G

Page 4

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military
Government for Germany (U. S.)

Ex 2230

Berlin, 28 May 1939

Diplogerma Tokyo

No. 174

Telegram in cipher
(Secret Cipher Processing)

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.
Re your telegrams No. 213 and 217.

1. The formal communication made to you 20 May at the request of War Minister, General Hajiri, that the Foreign Minister there would have us informed at the latest on Sunday, 21 May of the positive or negative decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference has proved to be without effect. The local Japanese Embassy has up to today not been in a position to make any official communication at all regarding the state of affairs.
2. Oshima reported the following in yesterday's strictly confidential and unofficial conversation: He has received a telegram from Arita, according to which the Japanese Government wishes to reserve entrance into a state of war in case of European conflict. In a very energetic telegram to Arita Oshima has refused to pass this point of view on to the German Government at all. Thereupon the War Minister requested Oshima by wire to hold off until later against Arita in order not to disturb the discussions among the various factors in Tokyo. The Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a cabinet overthrow.
3. I request you without making use of the aforementioned confidential communications of Oshima's to make it clear to your authorities that the absence of the communication formally announced to you as well as of every other communication has produced great astonishment in us and in the Italians. It is unavoidable that as a result of this silence the Japanese attitude is now beginning to be regarded with distrust. We can no longer understand here what can be going on in Tokyo and for what reasons the Japanese Government at this advanced stage of the negotiations is still evading a clear-cut attitude. Our local skepticism is of course still further heightened by the attitude of the Japanese delegation at the World Postal Congress in Buenos Aires.

G.F.M.
/German Foreign Minister/

/Franc Nos. 135951-2./

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/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Doc 4043 H

第四〇四三號 丑

柏林・一九三九年五月二十八日發 東京獨逸大使

管宛、第七百七十號

略號電報（ ） 大使宛秘級

貴殿第二一三號及第二一七號ニ關シ

一、貴地外務大臣ハ曉クモ日曜日、五月二十一日迄ニ日本領政府閣議ノ所定のナル所決定ニ就キ當方ニ通報スベキ越五月二十日陸軍大臣マジリ / HATHIR / 將軍ノ要求ニテ貴下宛公式ニ通告アリタルトコロ示ダニ回答ニ答セズ。嘗テ日本國大使館モ今日迄事態ニ關シテハ何等公式通告ヲ為シ得ザル状態ナリ。

(譯者註、陸軍大臣ニ「マジリ」ナル人ヲ指カザルモ、軍務局長ニ可成ナル人アリタリ)

二、大島 / OSHIMA / ハ昨日ノ極メテ内密ナル且非公式會議ニ於テ左ノ如ク報告シ居リタリ。

彼ハ有田 / ARITA / ヲヨリ電報ヲ受領セリ。其ノ電報ニ依レバ日本領政府ハ歐洲ニ戦争ノ發生セル場合ニ以テ状態ニ入ルコトヲ望ムシタク希望シ居レリ。大島ハ有田ニ極メテ

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc 4043 H

硬ナル電報ヲ發シ新カル見地ハ斷ジテ獨逸政
府ニ取次ガズト拒絕シタリ。依ツテ陸軍大臣
ハ電報ヲ以テ東京ニ於ケル諸機關ニ於テ其ノ
審議ヲ爲スヲ妨ゲザルタメ當分有田ニ反對ス
ルヲ思止マル旨大島ニ要請シタリ。陸軍ハ本
件ニ關シテハ迅速且ツ内閣瓦解ヲ防シテモ、
戰ヒ欲クベク堅ク決意シ居レリ。

三、余ハ貴下ニ對シ、前記大島ノ内報ニ尙レズシ
テ、貴地當局者ニ、貴下ニ對シ公式ニ豫告ア
リタル彼ノ通告モ、或ハ他ノ通告モ、何等ナ
キコトニ對シ當方竝伊太利亞側モ太ク驚キ居
ルト告ゲラレタク要請ス。斯ク報告ナキ結果
トシテ、日本ノ態度ハ漸ク不信ノ眼ヲ以テ觀
ラレツ、アルハ止ムヲ得ザルコトナリ。當方
ニ於ケル吾等ハ最早、東京ニ於テ如何ナル事
ガ起リツ、アリヤ及ビ本交渉ノ斯クモ進歩セ
ル虞隱ニ於テ日本ガ今尙ホ態度ヲ明ニスルヲ
避ケ居ルハ如何ナル理由ナルヤ理解シ得ザル
ナリ。當方ニ於ケル吾等ノ疑念ハ當然「ブエ
ノスアイレス」/ BENEHOS ATRES / ニ於ケル

3.

Doc 4043H

高田郵便會議ニ於ケル日本代表ノ態度ニ依リ
更ニ一層深メラレアリ。

獨逸國外務省 / H. A. H. /

ノフレイム / 譯者註、寫眞ノ意ノ第一三五九三二一ニノ

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 6 May 1939 1400
Arrived, 6 May 1939 1415

No. 187 of 6 May

MOST URGENT
VERY SECRET!

Top Secret -- For State Secretary

Annex to telegram of fourth, No. 184.

Declarations of various General Staff officers, among them that of my former confidant who is working in direct accordance with instructions from the War Minister, as well as a talk of the War Vice Minister with the Italian Military Attache, reveal the following viewpoint of the army, which I consider official.

The Prime Minister has obtained a compromise, which the army indicates as the highest possible offer under present conditions, in the conflict of the five-minister conference (War Minister and Finance Minister against the Foreign Minister and Navy Minister).

Concerning the main points of the declaration, the army explained:

1). Regarding obligatory aid, the army had further proposed to lay down more clearly the "change in circumstances" which would later make effective aid possible, and to declare in short that the neutrality of Japan would not in any way enter into the question. The army attributed the present wording to the Foreign Minister. The War Vice Minister declared that the treaty bound Japan definitely to the Axis Powers. We must, however, understand that Japan was isolated in the Far East and was in a considerably worse position than the Axis bloc in Europe which could cooperate directly. In case of war, however, independent of the outbreak and extent of Japanese acts of war, just the plain fact of the treaty would exert effective pressure on the enemy.

2). Re the "Explanation," the army emphasizes that the present proposal was more elastic, contained no specific formulation, and left open negotiations for which there were supposed to be favorable prospects, according to OSHIMA's telegram received yesterday.

3). Explanations concerning "Sincerity of my Country" were indicated as a particularly important personal word of honor of the Prime Minister, after I had referred to the wording which could be easily misunderstood.

The whole statement had been delivered to the Emperor by the Foreign Minister, which fact also follows from the indications made in the

press. In case an agreement is not reached, the army expects a resignation of the cabinet, which would be quite undesirable at the present time for foreign and domestic reasons.

Declarations from navy circles not yet obtainable. Main opposition of the navy comes evidently from Navy Vice Minister YAMAMOTO.

From the Foreign Ministry a senior official, who stands especially close to Ambassador SHIBAMOTO, let me know personally that in the entire government a deep cleft between friends and enemies of the alliance had formed. The situation was very serious and complicated. By his personal initiative, the Prime Minister had achieved a declaration of compromise which accepts the principle of an unlimited alliance, limiting this, however, by two significant reservations. This attitude of Japan must, it is true, astonish the Axis Powers, who are accustomed to unequivocal decisions, but it arises necessarily from the lack of unified leadership. Should negotiations collapse, cabinet crisis is threatening with serious consequences.

General impression is that most active preliminaries of the treaty idea stress extraordinary difficulties and (one word apparently lacking) urgently hopes that HIRANUMA's declaration would offer the opportunity for the final conclusion of the treaty.

OTT

/135921-135922/

AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

TOP SECRET!

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 23 March 1939 19 o'clock

Arrival, 23 March 1939 18.10 "

No. 121 of March 23

Secret

For the State Secretary

I hear from well informed Japanese press source that the Japanese conference of the five ministers under the presidency of the Prime Minister had decided at two o'clock tonight after a discussion lasting several hours, to take up diplomatic negotiations with Germany for the purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia. Parts of the Army advocated a further military treaty also against third powers. The same was demanded by the Italian Government. The Navy had recommended limitation on Russia. Ambassador OSHIMA is supposed to have delivered the inquiry of the German Government, whether Japan would be willing to conclude the military treaty. Ostensibly, Germany is supposed to be content with merely anti-Russian pact and has requested an answer by April 3. The government here does not wish to break off the bridge to America and England despite the treaty and is for this purpose supposed to be considering concessions in China. The newspaper ASAHI also mentions in today's morning edition a secret minister's conference and announces that 'an important question of Japanese foreign policy would be decided upon in a few days.'

OPT

/135900/

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G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Doc. No. 4043-F

Extract from a letter of Ambassador OTT - TOKYO - of 15 March, 1939
to Ministerial Director WIEHL.

..... In the question of our preferential treatment in
China I was able to gather from conversations in the Foreign Ministry
that Ambassador OSHIMA has actually telegraphed repeatedly in
accordance with our interests /in Unserem Sinne/. Generally I have
the impression that one is not inclined to admit in writing the
preferential treatment. As a way out, one is thinking of a de facto
preferential treatment which is to be confirmed solely by actual
deeds without written fixation. However, the actual deeds offered
by Japan up to now are not very encouraging.....

Signed OTT

Copy to:

Bureau RAM

ST.S.

POL VIII

U.S.T.S.

W VII

Dg. POL

Dg. W

signed WIEHL

AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

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s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Berlin, 28 May 1939

Diplogerna Tokyo

No. 174

Telegram in cipher
(Secret Cipher Processing)

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.
Re your telegrams No. 213 and 217.

1. The formal communication made to you 20 May at the request of War Minister, General Hajiri, that the Foreign Minister there would have us informed at the latest on Sunday, 21 May of the positive new decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference has proved to be without effect. The local Japanese Embassy has up to today not been in a position to make any official communication at all regarding the state of affairs.
2. Oshima reported the following in yesterday's strictly confidential and unofficial conversation: He has received a telegram from Arita, according to which the Japanese Government wishes to reserve entrance into a state of war in case of European conflict. In a very energetic telegram to Arita Oshima has refused to pass this point of view on to the German Government at all. Thereupon the War Minister requested Oshima by wire to hold off until later against Arita in order not to disturb the discussions among the various factors in Tokyo. The Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a cabinet overthrow.
3. I request you without making use of the aforementioned confidential communications of Oshima's to make it clear to your authorities that the absence of the communication formally announced to you as well as of every other communication has produced great astonishment in us and in the Italians. It is unavoidable that as a result of this silence the Japanese attitude is now beginning to be regarded with distrust. We can no longer understand here what can be going on in Tokyo and for what reason the Japanese Government at this advanced stage of the negotiations is still evading a clear-cut attitude. Our local skepticism is of course still further heightened by the attitude of the Japanese delegation at the World Postal Congress in Buenos Aires.

G.F.M.
/German Foreign Minister/

/Franc Nos. 135951-2./

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G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

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G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

High Command of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer Headquarters, 3 March 1941

WFST/Abt. L (I Op.)
No: 44 282/41 gk. Chfs.

Top Secret

Only through Officers

14 Copies
4th Copy

Directive No. 24
Concerning Collaboration with Japan.

The Fuehrer has issued the following directives for the cooperation with Japan:

- 1.) The aim of the cooperation based on the Three-Power-Pact, must be to bring Japan, as soon as possible, to active operations in the Far East. Large English forces will hereby be immobilized, the center of the U.S.A. interest will be diverted to the Pacific.

In view of the still undeveloped state of war mobilization on the part of her opponents, the prospects of success for Japan will be the greater, the earlier she intervenes. The "Barbarossa" enterprise provides especially favorable political and military prerequisites for this purpose.

- 2.) For the preparation of the cooperation, it is necessary to strengthen the Japanese war potential by all means

For this purpose, the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces must meet in a comprehensive and generous way, the demands of the Japanese concerning the communication of German warfare and combat experiences and assistance in matters of war economy and technics. Reciprocity is desired, but must not render the negotiations more difficult. These requests by the Japanese which might effect the conduct of the war in a short time must naturally be put in the foreground.

In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decision for himself.

3.) The alignment of the mutual plans of operation is a matter for the High Command of the Navy.

For this, the following guiding principles are to be followed:

- a) It must be emphasized that it is the common goal of the war to force England down rapidly in order to keep the U.S.A. out of the war. As for the rest, Germany has neither political nor military or economical interests in the Far East, which might give rise to reservations with regard to the intentions of the Japanese.
- b) The great successes achieved by Germany in economic warfare, makes it particularly advisable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. Moreover any possibility of assistance for German economic warfare must be utilized.
- c) The raw material situation of the Treaty Powers requires that Japan seizes those territories which she needs, - especially if the U.S. intervenes - , for the continuation of the war. The deliveries of crude rubber must be carried on even after Japan enters the war, since they are of vital importance for Germany.
- d) The conquest of Singapore, England's key position in the Far East, would mean a decisive success for the active warfare of the Three Powers.

Besides, attacks on other systems of bases of the English sea power - of the American sea power only if the entrance of the U.S.A. into the war cannot be avoided - will serve to shake the enemy's power system there and, just as in the case of attacks on the sea lanes, will bind essential forces of every kind. (Australia).

A date for the beginning of discussions on operational matters cannot as yet be set.

4.) The military committees to be formed in accordance with the Three-Power-Fact are to deal only with such questions which concern equally the three participating powers. In the first place the tasks of economic warfare will belong into that group.

It is up to the "Main Committee" assisted by the High Command of the Wehrmacht to make decisions in individual cases.

5.) No hint must be given to the Japanese concerning the operation "Barbarossa".

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
Draft signed by Keitel.

Certified by
(Signature illegible)
Lieutenant Commander.

Distribution:

Commander-in-Chief of the Army (General Staff of the Army)	1st copy
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (1st Skl.)	2nd copy
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces (Air Forces Operations Staff)	3rd copy

OKW:

<u>Wehrmacht Operations Staff</u>	<u>4th copy</u>
Office of Foreign Counter Intelligence ("Amt Ausland Abwehr")	5th copy
Chief, Foreign Countries (and "A.A.")	6th & 7th copies
Economic Armaments Office ("Wi.Rue.Amt")	8th copy
"H W K"	9th copy
"Dept. L"	10th to 14th copies

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 384-PS

I, BERT STEIN, B 210875, hereby certify, that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German language; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 384-PS.

BERT STEIN
B 210875

4043 B

~~(ROUGH TRANSLATION)~~

~~DOC. NO. 4043~~

~~Item 12~~

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 4 May 1939
Arrival: 4 May 1939

2200 hours
2200 hours

No. 184 of 4 May

Most urgent

Top Secret!

For the Reich/Foreign/ Minister personally.

The Foreign Minister called me and communicated the following: The negotiations taking place in Berlin and Rome on the Anti-Comintern Pact came to a deadlock 10 days ago. To continue them, Prime Minister HIRANUMA had directed a statement to the Fuehrer and German Chancellor, which the Foreign Minister ^{here with} brought and handed over to me for further transmission. I accepted the statement, compiled in Japanese and French text, with the reference that I would communicate ^{taking} them by telegraph to the German Foreign Minister, and I refrained from ^{at all times} giving any opinion. The same statement was previously communicated and delivered directly to the Italian Ambassador for MUSSOLINI.

Text in translation:

"I cherish great admiration for the lofty wisdom and the iron will with which His Excellency, Chancellor of the German Government, HITLER, is working at the noble task of the reconstruction of his country and at the establishment of an international peace founded upon principles of justice.

"I, for my part, as Japanese Prime Minister, am likewise occupied with the strengthening of peace and with the maintenance of a New Order in East Asia ^{carried by} founded on the principles of justice and morality.

"In this splendid hour it is a confirmed joy to me ^{to see} how effective the Anti-Comintern Agreement between our two countries proves itself in the execution of the tasks placed before them. And today if I have in view the conclusion of an agreement, to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and to make closer the co-operation between Japan, Germany and Italy, this does not occur just out of a consideration of the mere expediency / Zweckmassigkeit / of it, but in the hope that in that way we may contribute to the establishment ^{only} ^{strengthening} of it.

of a world peace founded upon justice and morality in consciousness of our common tasks. ^{Now} As far as the strengthening of our relations is concerned, I can affirm that Japan ^{is} firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even ^{if} one of these two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union and to afford them political and economic and, to the extent possible, ~~to her power~~ ^{also the} military assistance ^{in her power.}

^{nevertheless} "Japan is ready, in accordance with the ^{provisions} ~~modifications~~ of such an agreement to take up ^{the principle of} the military support of Germany and Italy; however, Japan is, in view of the situation in which ~~is not~~ ^{it now} finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical manner any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should become possible through a change in the circumstances.

"I should especially like to receive Germany's and Italy's express consent to the foregoing point.

^{regard to} "Furthermore, in consequence of the international situation which confronts it, Japan would be compelled to exercise the greatest caution in ~~view of the explication~~ ^{view of the} which it ^{will} give at the time of the publication of this agreement. I would be glad to receive the unequivocal assent of Germany and Italy on this point also.

"I may add that the planned agreement rests upon the foundation of mutual confidence, and that ^{having the slightest} ~~to doubt~~ the sincerity of my country ~~in the slightest~~ ^{undermining} would be tantamount to ~~destroying~~ ^{actual} the real basis of the agreement and would make its execution impossible.

^{which} "The thoughts that I have just portrayed arise from reflections of a moral and spiritual nature and can not be influenced by reasons of expediency /zweckmassigkeit/. If I undertook to express them with all frankness, it was because I was guided exclusively by the sincere desire to bring our endeavours to a satisfactory conclusion.

"4 May 1939

(without signature)

Close of the statement.

I hear from army circles that the Prime Minister ^{had taken} ~~took~~ this surprising course to ^{check} ~~dispel~~ personally any doubts that may have risen in Berlin and Rome concerning the situation and Japan's readiness and ^{to arrive at a compromise as far as possible.}

If possible

The Foreign Minister, when he ^{ing} handed over the statement, was visibly in a bad mood. Will try to clarify unobtrusively the Army's interpretation.

OTT

~~135925-207~~

(ROUGH TRANSLATION)

Doc No 4043

Literal translation
by H. Traynor

Item 12:

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 4 May, 1939 2200 hours

Arrival; 4 May, 1939 2200 hours

No. 184 of 4 May

Most urgent

TOP SECRET!

For the Reich / Foreign / Minister personally.

The foreign minister called me

and communicated the following:

The negotiations ^{taking place} ~~going on~~ in Berlin and

Rome on the Anti-Comintern Pact

came to a deadlock 10 days ago.

To continue them, ^{Prime Minister} Cabinet president

HIRANUMA directed a statement to the

2

^E
F~~U~~HRER and German Chancellor, which the
foreign minister brought and handed over
to me for further transmission. I
accepted the statement, compiled in
Japanese and French text, with
the reference that I would communicate
them by telegraph to the German
Foreign Minister, and I ~~kept a~~ ^{refrained from giving}
^{any opinion.} ~~neutral / attitude.~~ The same ~~the~~ statement
thing
was previously communicated and
delivered directly to the Italian Ambassador

5
for Mussolini.

Text in translation:

" I cherish great admiration for the lofty wisdom and the iron will with which His Excellency, Chancellor of the German Government, ~~Mr.~~ HITLER, is working at the noble task of the reconstruction of his country and at the establishment of an international peace ^{founded} built upon principles of justice.

Prime Minister,
as Japanese Cabinet President
I, for my part I am likewise

4

occupied with ^{the} strengthening of peace and
with the maintenance of a New Order
in East Asia ^{founded} ~~built~~ ^{on} ~~about~~ the ^{principles} ~~theses~~
of justice and morality.

In this splendid hour it is
a confirmed joy to me how effective
the Anti-Comintern ^{agreement} ~~understanding~~ between
our two countries proves itself
in the execution of the tasks placed
before them. And today if I ^{have} ~~keep~~
~~my eyes~~ ^{in view} the conclusion of an agreement,

to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and
to ~~make make~~ make closer the co-operation
between Japan, Germany and Italy, this
does not occur just out of ~~the mere~~ a
consideration of the mere ^{expediency} ~~appropriateness~~ ^(Zweckmässigkeit) of it, but
in the hope that in that way we may
contribute to the establishment of a world
peace ^{founded} ~~built~~ upon justice and morality in
consciousness of our ^{common tasks} ~~joint~~ problem. As for
as the strengthening of our relations is
concerned, I can ^{affirm} ~~assume~~ ~~you~~ that Japan

is firmly and ~~unshakably~~ ^{steadfastly} resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even if one of these two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union and to afford them political and economic aid, to the extent possible ~~possib~~ to her power, military assistance.

Japan is ready, in accordance with the modifications of such an agreement to take up the military

support of Germany and Italy; however, Japan is, in view of the situation in which it now finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical ^{manner} ~~fashion~~ any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should become possible through a change in the circumstances.

I should especially like to receive

Germany's and Italy's express consent
to the foregoing point.

Furthermore, in consequence of the
international situation which confronts it,
Japan would be ~~forced~~ ^{compelled} to exercise the
greatest caution in view of the explication
which it would give at the time of the
publication of this agreement. I ~~should~~ ^{would}
~~also~~ be glad at ~~this time~~ to receive the
unequivocal assent of Germany and Italy ^{on this point} ^{also.}

I may add that ~~the planned~~
the ~~planned~~ agreement rests upon the

foundation of mutual confidence, and that
~~agreement rests upon the foundation of~~
~~mutual confidence~~ to doubt the sincerity
 of my country. ~~even~~ⁱⁿ the slightest ~~bit~~ would
 be tantamount ~~to~~^{to} destroying the real
 basis of the agreement and would
 make ~~to~~ its ~~furth~~ execution impossible.

The thoughts that I have just
 portrayed arise from reflections of a
 moral and spiritual nature and
 can not be influenced ~~by~~ by reasons
 of ^{expediency} ~~appropriateness~~ / Zweckmässigkeit / . If

undertook to express them with all
 frankness, it was because I was guided
 exclusively by the ^{sincere} just desire to lead
 our ^{endeavours} ~~troubled~~ to a satisfactory ~~conclusion~~.

results, conclusion.

4 May, 1939

(without signature)

Close of the statement.

I hear from Army circles that
 Prime Minister
 He ~~Cabinet president~~ took this surprising
^{personally}
 course to dispel any doubts that may have
^{risen}
~~come up~~ in Berlin and Rome concerning
 the situation and Japan's readiness

and to arrive at a compromise as far
much
as possible.

The Foreign Minister when he
handed over the statement was
visibly ~~out of sorts~~ in a ~~me~~ bad mood.

Will try to clarify unobtrusively the
Army's ~~interpretation~~ interpretation.

OTT
(135918-20)

(ROUGH TRANSLATION)

DOC. NO. 4043
Item 5

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 18 February 1939
Arrival: 18 February, 1939

1410 hours
1310 hours

Top Secret!

No. 70 of 18 February

For the State Secretary personally.

In annex to telegram of the first, No. 44.

Further news concerning Anti-Comintern Pact gives the following picture:-

The other day
S Train
Japanese Cabinet is supposed to have finally decided upon an intensification of the pact, in opposition to the Angle-ophile ideas, especially of the court circles; ~~the~~ ^{the other day} British Ambassador, greatly agitated, depicted to me Japanese past policy ~~to me~~ ^{as} recently as the wrong road, which would intensify relations with England extraordinarily. Likewise, the former Japanese Ambassador to Washington urgently warned the Government in the Diet of alienating the Angle-Saxon powers and ~~so decided~~ ^{by bringing about} a one-hour discussion of Anti-Comintern policy which was not published. Other Diet members, on the other hand, repeatedly strengthened the government in its pact policy.

said to have been
Consul General ITO is ~~to be~~ sent to Europe with the special mission of instructing the opposing chiefs of /diplomatic/ missions /abroad/.

The Polish Ambassador and Reuters Agency are spreading the news here that a military alliance has been concluded, which I privately considered /to be/ fabricated. These rumors are keeping diplomatic and Japanese circles as well as the international press busy, especially in connection with the intensification of the situation in Europe. In this connection the younger officers and active circles are expressing the hope for a conflict in Europe which might remove the pressure of the great powers in the Far East. *considerably. relieve*

OTT

7295899

Literal translation
by Lt. Traynor

(ROUGH TRANSLATION)

Doc. No 4043

Item 5.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 18 February, 1939

1410 hours

Arrival: 18 February, 1939

1310 hours

TOP SECRET!

No. 70 of 18 February

For ~~the~~ State Secretary personally.

In annex to telegram of the first, no. 44.

Pact Further news concerning Anti-Comintern gives the following picture:-

Japanese Cabinet is supposed to have finally decided upon an intensification of the pact, in opposition to the Anglo-philic ideas, especially of the Court circle.

The British Ambassador, greatly agitated, depicted Japanese pact policy to me recently as the wrong road, which would ~~intensify~~ ^{strain} relations with England extraordinarily.

Likewise, the former Japanese Ambassador to Washington ^{urgently} warned the Government in the Diet of alienating the Anglo-Saxon powers and delivered a one-hour ^{review} ~~talk~~ of Anti-Comintern ^{policy} ~~politics~~ which ^{was} ~~were~~ not published. Other Diet members, on the other hand, repeatedly strengthened

the Government in its past policy.

Consul General ITO is to be sent to Europe with the special mission of instructing the opposing chiefs of /diplomatic /missions /abroad/.

The Polish Ambassador and Reuters ~~News~~ Agency are spreading the news here that a military alliance has been concluded, which I privately considered /to be /fabricated. These rumors are keeping diplomatic and Japanese

circles as well as the international
press busy, especially in connection
with the intensification of the situation
in Europe. In this connection the
younger officers and active circles are
expressing the hope for a conflict
in Europe which might remove the
pressure of the great powers in the
Far East.

OTT

/135899/

NOTE

26 August 1946

The following have been extracted from this file
for presentation in court as evidence (Mr. Hyde).

Items: 4043-A; 4043-B and D
4043-C; ~~4043-E~~; 4043-F

Frames: 135889; 135918-920;
135921-922; ~~135923~~
135901.

W. D. Wagon

Doc 4043 - 1

Standard 211 Doc 4043-a
Trans. by Nagano Kenji
Charge of Documents

電報 (秘密暗号通信)

東京、一九三九年二月十日 一四一〇時

着、一九三九年二月十日 一三二〇時

極秘

二月十日附第七〇口

親張直披

國務大臣ノ私信

ニ対スル追加電報。

第四号第一信

及共協定ニ商スルノ後ノニユトスハ次ノ如シ。

(官中カシエトスル親張直披ノ長計シ)

日本ノ内閣ハ、官内省ヲキテモ親張直披ニ及シテ此ノ協定

ノ強化ヲ遂ニ決定シタ様ニ思ハレル。先日、英國大使ハ

所定ノ定 (英國ノ自保ヲ極力ニ整張セシム)

非常ニ興奮シテ日本ノ之ヲ政策ハ誤ツテ井ルトナシ
マレハ路アリト余ニ述ハタ

此中、英、國、ト、ノ、關係、ヲ、甚、ク、モ、テ、強、ク、ス、ル、如、ク、ラ、ウ、ト、云、ツ、タ、

軍事

同様ニ、前、ワ、ミ、ニ、ニ、駐、在、日、本、大、使、ハ、議、會、ニ、於、テ、政、府、ニ

ア、ニ、カ、ロ、サ、ク、ソ、ン、諸、國、ト、ノ、遊、離、ヲ、敬、言、告、シ、未、突、表、ノ、反、共

協、定、ニ、反、キ、一、時、間、ノ、審、議、ヲ、行、ハ、セ、シ、メ、タ、

議、員、建、議、ハ、條、リ、返、シ、林、村、ト、ノ、防、共、協、定、の、第、一、ノ、激、勵、シ、タ、

他、方、外、代、議、士、ハ、政、府、ニ、協、定、政、策、ヲ、強、調、シ、タ、

伊藤

伊、藤、總、領、事、ガ、協、定、反、對、ノ、大、使、達、ニ、對、シ、テ、

使、年

ケ、ル、外、交、使、命、ヲ、訓、令、ス、ル、特、殊、用、能、ヲ、以、テ、歐、洲、ニ

派、遣、サ、レ、タ、ト、云、ハ、レ、ル、

ホ、ー、ラ、ン、ド、大、使、ト、ル、ト、タ、リ、通、信、員、ガ、出、向、地、テ、軍、事、同、盟

年、白、身、ハ、

締、結、ノ、ニ、テ、ス、テ、流、神、シ、テ、キ、ル、ガ、ソ、レ、ハ、確、據、ヲ、思、フ、

捏、造、サ、レ、タ、

此、等、ノ、噂、ハ、歐、洲、ニ、於、ケ、ル、情、勢、ノ、重、大、化、ト、相、俟、ツ、テ

4043-3

(3)

國際新聞記者ヲ始メ外交團及日本人側ヨリ色々

立タセテナル。之ニ對シテ青年將校ヤ積極

派ハ歐洲ニ於ケル~~諸事~~如極東ニ於テ強國ノ一方ヲ減殺

スルダラウトシテ之ヘハ一希望ヲ表明セテナル

オソト

諸列強ノ極東ニ於テノ圧力ヲ可成リ輕減スルヲアロシシ
~~歐洲ニ於テノ戰事ヲ待望シテ~~

Doc #4043

Clues

Handed by A. G. ...

Translated by Tomoko Minowa

電信 (秘密暗号用)

Doc 4043-6 #1

①

東京一九三九年(昭和十四年)五月四日 発電

二二〇〇時同

伯林一九三九年(昭和十四年)五月四日 到着

二二〇〇時同

五月四日 一八四號

極秘

親展

独乙外務大臣宛 仰々電報

外務大臣 予ヲ訪問シ次ノ通り 報告ヲシタリ 伯林

及四維馬ニ於テ交渉中、防共協定ハ十日前前停頓状

態ニ到達シタ。此ノ交渉ヲ続行セシメンガ爲メニ平沼首相

ハ独乙總統ニ此乙首相宛ニ電ヲ送リ外務大臣ハ

追加轉送ノ爲メ平沼持参スルニ手交シタ。予ハ其電書

其ノ声明ヲ受取リ、編輯サレ、予ハ之ヲ独乙

外務大臣宛電報ニシテ達スルヲ決メ、之ニ關聯シ

予ハ如何ナル態ニシテモ其ヲトシ避ケタ。有田電文書ガ

ニシテヲ通シテアツタ。

同乙聲明ガ

通達サレハムツソリーニノ爲メ直接ニ

(N) #2

巴三伊太利大使ニ手交ヤラシカムツソリーニ向テ傳達サレ

テオル

譯文。

予ハ独乙政府首相ヒツラノ閣下ガ

以ツテ閣下ノ口家ヲ再建シ茲ニ

正義ニ基ク口際平和ヲ建設セヨトモル 崇高

ニ從事

ハノ高貴ナル智慧ト鉄ノ意志ニ

ナル任務速クモ尽力セラルルヲ絶大ナル諒解ヲ

ヲ抱ク

畢ルモノデアリマス。

私自身トシテハ

ノ原則ニ依リ

予ハ日本ノ首相トシテ同様ニ正義ト人道ヲ兼ルモノニ

行ハルル平和強化並ニ東亞ニ於ケル

ヲ建テル 東亞平和ヲ強化シ新秩序ヲ保持セヨトモ

専念シテ居リマス。

W #3

「此ノ偉大ナル時機ニ於テ我等西土及ニ於ケル防共協定

西國ノ 置カレタ

ガ再々高前ニ推シテ事業ノ遂行ニ對シ如何ニ效果的

私ニ取ツテ

ナルカヲ見ルニテハ悦ビテアル。而シテ本日若シモ予」が

防共協定ヲ強化シ日本ヲ利ハズ伊太利及ノ一致協力

ヲ 念々密ナラシムル本 省察スル

コシハ單々便宜主義ヲ有カシト思考見ノミナラズ

ノ考慮カラ

ト自覺シ

此ノ段係我々共進々事業并廉心ヲ以テ我々ニ

ニ基ケル

人道并建設主義ニ世界平和ノ強化ニ貢獻スル

シ得ルデアラハトノ希望カノ生來シタデアアル。サテ

モキアルト希シカシ。吾々相互乃ハ關係ヲ強化スル

事關スル限リ一俟令独伊中ノ口ガソヒテト聯邦

参加ナクシテ

併進一口兼數ケ口ヨリ攻堅手ヤラレ其ノ政治権柄

夕時ニサレ

援助ヲ與ハルホ由キ也其ハ軍事ニシテ援助ヲ得ルハキ

場在ルニシテ日本、新軍、確軍、私伊例ニ味方ニ
ニ政治上、經濟上並ニ又日本ノ出來ル可能ナル限りノ
幸上カシク決意シテ在ルニシテ亦ハ新軍、確軍、私伊例
軍事的助力ヲ與ヘルコトヲ強ク確リト日本ハ決意スル
テアラウ事ヲ予ハ斷言スルコトガ出來ル。

規定

然乍ラ斯カク協定ノ條文ニ從亦日本ハ独伊ノ軍事

援助ノ原則トシテ取上ケル用意ガアル。然レニ日本ハ

現在ニ在ルニ狀況ニ鑑ミ現在モ亦近キ將來ニ在テ又
的(的)方法ニ於テ

實際ニ其如何ナル効果的軍事援助ノ平ク之

延ハルコトハ不可能ナル。然乍ラ日本ハ情勢カノ

変化ニ依リ若シモ出來ル様ニナレハ七段ニテ軍事的

勿論ナル。

援助ヲスルト云フコトハ果シテハ其明セキニ是也。

#4
④

対する明示的

57

予ハ特ニ独乙及伊太利ル上記ノ島ニ條同ノ意ヲ表ス

ヲ受ケル事ヲ特ニ

表スルニキリ希望スルノテアル

更ニ之ヲ眼前ニ横心処ノ口際事情ノ結果トシテ

日本ハ本協定ノ公表ニ當テ為スベキ説明ニ付テハ

注意

絶大ナル筆致ヲ要スルコトヲ余儀ナクセルテアラウ

予ハ此ノ島ニ付テモ独伊ノ曖昧ナクホル(明瞭ナル)

同クルヲリマス

留意ヲ受理得ハ幸ヒデアラ

ニ基ク

此計畫中ノ協定ハ相互信頼ノ基礎ニ基キ

実

持ツ

此モノヲアツテ我々ノ誠ニ信者モ一トノ疑或ハサレ難キ

ナラハ此協定ノ實質的土台ハ根本多山崩壊

ソノクラシムルコトニ成ル

天白物ニシテ到底實施不可能ナキコトヲ

予ハ附言ヲ爲シテ良シイデアラウ。

考へ

予ガ江上ニ記述シタル思想ハ道德的精神的性質

省察

ノ反映ニシテ便宜主義ノ理由ニ依リ反映ヲ爲ス者若シ

ソレハ

トシクナラハ

予ガ凡ソ極メテ赤裸ニ之を明シス事ハソレ特別ニ

ソレハ

我々ノ力カヲ満足シ得ル結果ヲ招来セシメントスル

専ラ私ハカラナクデアル。

真摯ナル希望ニ道ヲカレタ事トキカレカ。

一九三九年(昭和十四年)五月四日

(署名 名 十)

左ニテ文書終了。

予ハ軍部ノ人達カラ首相ノトク此ノ不意ノ平叛ハ伯林

及羅馬ニ於テ現状並ニ日本ノ有用意ニ関シ起リ

如何ナル

ヲモ

トモ又

得ベキ或疑惑ヲ消シ他人トシテ喰止メ算出スル事



出来ルナラハ妥協ヲ解ニ近 到達セシメントシタモテ

ツクスト

ハ 吾ノ明書ヲ

セル

アヤト衛イタ。 外務大臣加 此ノ支書ヲ平文ニ

ニ際ニ兼外見 機嫌カ悪カツタ 梅ニ見奉ル 一 支書付

上

解釋ヲ明確ニシヨク

同日ニ立タヌ梅ニ 軍ノ報明ヲ此ノ梅ト思ハカ

#7

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

21 Aug, 1946

TO: *Javner, Rm 304*

Attached is Document No. 4043 together with translated material which will be reproduced for you as a result of your request of 2/8, 1946.

It is requested that you review this material and return all of it to this office at the earliest practicable date. No further processing can be accomplished until this is done.

Any questions should be addressed to *M Allen*, Room 364.

W3A
DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT

1st Ind.

TO: DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT

22 Aug, 1946

Approved for reproduction.

[Signature]
Attorney

*Major
Clark*

AUG 15 1946

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

STARRS

15 Aug. , 1946

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 4043 F for Tavener.

Arrange for translation as follows: German to Jap and Eng.

Three-way check.

Item 7--Extract from letter of Ambassador Ott of the 15th of March
1939 to Ministerial Director Wiehl.

gjo

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

St. Sec'y Japan
vol 1
b.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

4043

Doc. No.

Date 14 June - 19 June, 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT Photostat.

Title and Nature: File of ~~Documents~~ ^{memos and telegrams} between German Foreign Office and Embassy in Tokyo (State Sec'y Japan vol 1, 6)

Date: 22 Jan. 1939. Original () Copy (v) Language: German
1 June, 1939

Has it been translated? Yes () No (v)
Has it been photostated? Yes (v) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nuremberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA; ITO; HIRANUMA, Kiichiro; ITAGAKI, Seishiro; KOISO, Kuniaki; ARITA, Hachiro; Gen. MACHIJIRI; USAMI
DAMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Item 1: Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 22 Jan., 1939 (135894)
All Japanese press ^{reacts to statement of} agrees with president of Reichstag, cabinet president, and Foreign Minister. ^{the speeches} Articles contain following main points; contained
1. Situation more serious than ever
2. Continuation of China policy after December Statement
3. Emphatic desire to co-operate with foreign powers with the reservation of the military and economically necessary special rights of the Tri-Partite Block.
4. Renewal, to strengthen Anti-Comintern policy, to thank Germany and Italy for "constant and unlimited" help, to intensify relations with Russia.
5. Tightening of domestic policies through legislation.

Analyst: ~~H. Leo M. Traynor~~ and
H. K. Steiner

Doc. No.

< Insert following pages >

St. Sec'y Japan
vol. 1 b

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Item 2: Memo from WEIZSÄCKER, Berlin, 30 Jan., 1939, prefacing Item 3. WEIZSÄCKER received this note from the Japanese ~~Embassy~~ ^{of the Jap. Embassy} Counsellor, who added that a law would soon be published establishing the fact that the SHINNAN Islands belong to the FORMOSA administrative district. (135895)

Item 3: The ~~Possession~~ ^{Occupation} of the SHINNAN Islands

1. Located between SAIGON (Indo-China) and the PALAWAN Islands (Philippines). 114° East Longitude and 10° North Latitude.

2. The settlement between the Japanese and French Governments.

Since 1917 the islands had been opened to the Japanese, who settled there. In the economic crisis in 1929 they were forced temporarily to leave and return to Japan. In 1933, the French Government sent war-ships and notified the Japanese Government that France claimed possession since these islands belonged to no one. Since July 1938 ~~the~~ France sent commercial ships with construction material

- and let it be known that the islands would be opened economically. Japan protested against this possession and took the necessary measures to secure the islands.

3. The Japanese Government ^{has} resolved to keep the islands and will enact a law proclaiming that the islands belong to Formosa district.

4. Foundation in the law of nations. ~~The~~ states that circumstances to prove that Japan - not France - has realization of a possession, as is commonly recog- nized ^{both} in the law of nations, presupposes two factors: the will of a state to possession; and the actual execution of the possession. ~~In the~~ present case the state of affairs is as follows:

1. Before all others the Japanese settled there since 1917 and were engaged in ^{the economic} opening up of the islands.

2. The Japanese Government off and on sent war ships there.

3. A monument was erected in 1929. It burned down later, but was ~~again~~ erected August 1938.

4. Japanese Navy authorities in 1938 practiced police power on the islands in forcing the French to leave the island.

to refrain from hoisting the French National flag and from construction.

5. Lives + property of Japanese citizens on the islands have long been protected and secured.

6. The Japanese Government demanded that the French Government refrain from sending war-ships to these islands.

7. The Japanese Government refused the demand of the French Government that a Japanese war-ship leave the islands.

(135896-7)

Item 4: Telegram from WEIZSÄCKER, ^{to Embassy, Tokyo, dated} Berlin, 1 Feb., 1938

OSHIMA requested his government to instruct the Japanese Ambassador at SAN SEBASTION to prevail upon the National Spanish Government to enter the Anti-Comintern agreement. ^{The same instructions have been given to the German and Italian Ambassadors there.}

The Japanese Government is making difficulties about the form of the ^{adherence} agreement of Manchukuo and Hungary. (135898)

Item 5: Telegram from OTT to State Secretary, from OTT, Tokyo, 18 Feb., 1939
Concerning the Anti-Comintern Pact.

The Japanese Cabinet is supposed to have decided upon an intensification of the pact, in opposition to the anglophile ideas of court circles. The British Ambassador pointed out to OTT that ^{the} Japanese pact policy would intensify relations with England. The former Japanese Ambassador to Washington warned against alienating the Anglo-Saxon powers. Other Diet members, on the other hand repeatedly strengthened the Government in its pact policy.

Consul General 170 is to be sent to Europe to orient opposing chiefs of diplomatic missions abroad.

The Polish ambassador and Reuters Agency are spreading the news that a military alliance has been concluded. Younger officers and active circles are hoping for a conflict in Europe to remove the pressure of the Great Powers in the Far East. (135899)

1939

Item 6: Telegram for State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 23 March,
According to Japanese Press sources, the
~~meeting of the~~ 5-Minister conference closed with
a decision to begin diplomatic negotiations for a
military agreement with Germany directed against
Russia. Portions of the army are supposed to have
supported an extensive military pact against a
third power. The Navy recommended limiting it
to Russia. Ambassador OSHIMA is supposed
to have communicated the ^{inquiry} ~~problem~~ of the German
Government as to whether Japan ~~should~~ ^{would like to}
conclude a military treaty. ~~Ostensibly~~
Germany was agreed to an anti-Russian
pact and requested an answer by 3 April.
The Government in spite of the alliance does
not intend to break off with America and
England and to this end will discuss
concessions in China. (135900)

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Item 7: Excerpt from a letter from OTT, Tokyo, 15 March, 1939 to WIEHL. In the question of our preferential treatment in China OTT gleaned from conversation with the Foreign Ministry that OSHIMA ^{actually} telegraphed repeatedly in accordance with German wishes. Yet OTT had the impression that they were not inclined to admit preferential treatment in writing. As a way out, they were planning a ^{de facto} ~~practical~~ preferential treatment ~~which was to be confirmed without written settlement in actual fact.~~ ^{fixation} But the facts offered by Japan up to now were not very encouraging. (135901)

Item 8: Memo from WEIZSÄCKER, Berlin, 31 March, 1939. German Foreign Minister agrees to the delivery of 4 ^{commercial} ~~traffic~~ aircraft to the South China Government. Notify the Japanese Government as to be informed. (135902)

Item 9: Telegram for State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 24 April, 1939

Much discussion in Cabinet about strengthening the pact. The Army ~~vigorous~~

^{vigorously}
~~(ARITA)~~

is attacking the Foreign Minister for halting negotiations in Berlin by his many restricting instructions to the Japanese negotiators. The Army is resolved to reach an agreement, and popular opinion and the press realize that an approach to England could be possible only at the cost of successes won on the continent, and that the danger of isolation would threaten Japan. News of the possibility of English-Russian co-operation in the Far East furthers this view. The Foreign Minister is reproached for ^{being} ~~hindering~~ ⁱⁿ his freedom of ^{action} ~~trade~~ by his repeated promises to the British Ambassador here. The outlook for negotiations is therefore favorable for Germany. German help in credit would go far in ~~weakening~~ ^{weakening} opposition emanating from economic circles. (135903)

Item 10: Telegram for State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 26 April, 1939

The Japanese press continues to exert strong pressure on the Government to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact.

OTT pointed out to the Vice Foreign

Minister that it would be desirable for Japan to take a public stand on the matter of the English and Russians making contact concerning the Far East before the Führer speaks, and that particularly the hesitant attitude of the Government was in contradiction to popular feeling. The Vice Minister promised to tell the Foreign Minister. (135904)

Item 11: Telegram to State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 4 May, 1939

Informant reports General KAWABE's telegram came, according to which the promises delivered to the War Minister ^{directly via} OSHIMA improved the negotiation atmosphere of the negotiations.

Informant believes further cabinet decisions cannot be expected for a few days and attributes the delay to the fact that the Minister is absorbed into current conference of provincial governors, in the assembly of the departments of the chiefs of staff, and possibly in 170's return from Berlin.

OTT's informant will presumably instruct the Minister of War, as per telegrams No. 143 and 144,

without revealing OTT as the source.

OTT has learned that the Foreign Ministry, on the basis of England's and France's preparedness for war expects war sometime between autumn and spring, an idea which is fostered by the alarming announcement in the English press concerning the German-Polish opposition and by the news of anti-Japanese discussions in the American Congress.

Japanese press quoted recently the Reuters release over the alleged settlement of the Far Eastern problems by the English-French-Soviet discussions.

OTT has heard from well informed sources that Ambassador CRAIGIE, to disturb German negotiations, has delivered to the Foreign Minister ~~the~~ similar assurances.

In view of the continuous opposition of the Navy, OTT is exerting influence upon Admiral ENDO, whose influence is stronger in the Navy than was his predecessors.

(1135916-7)

Item 12: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 4 May, 1939
re: HIRANUMA's declaration to HITLER to break deadlock in

To ~~the~~ negotiations in Berlin and Rome, ~~and the~~ ^{HIRANUMA} Anti-Comintern Pact, the president of the ministry has directed the following statement to the Führer and Chancellor:
The text of the statement is given in full.

He asserts his endeavours for peace and his desire for the closer co-operation of Germany, Italy, and Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact. "I can assure you that Japan is ~~is~~ firmly and unshakably resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even if one of these two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union and to afford them political, and economic, and, to the extent possible to her power, military assistance.

Japan is ready to take up the thesis of ^{the} military support of Germany and Italy; ~~in the meanwhile~~ ^{however} Japan is, in view of the situation in which it now finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical fashion any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying

~~4032; 11, 15, 18.~~

① ^{after} stressing Germany's and Japan's endeavours for an international peace and a new order built upon justice and ethics he praises the ^{effectiveness} ~~efficiency~~ of the Anti-Comintern Pact and ^{expresses} his desire to strengthen it. ~~and to do~~

that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should become possible through a change in the circumstances."

~~I should especially like to receive Germany's and Italy's express consent to the foregoing point.~~

Furthermore, in consequence of the international situation which confronts it, Japan would be forced to exercise the greatest caution in view of the explication which it would give at the time of the publication of this agreement. I should also be glad at this time to receive the unequivocal consent of Germany and Italy." (135918-9)

~~He adds that to doubt the sincerity of his country would destroy the basis of mutual trust upon which the planned agreement rests.~~

4 May, 1939

~~Close of the statement~~

OTT adds that he has heard from Army circles that the Minister President's statement was drawn up to dispel any doubts of Japan's readiness to compromise. (135918-135920)

Item 13: Telegram to State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 6 May, 1939

(1) Utterances of various general staff officers, ^{OTT'S} informant, and conversation of the Vice War Minister with the Italian military attaché yield the following conception in the Army:

The Minister President in a ~~stagnant~~ struggle in the 5 Minister Conference (War and Finance Ministers against Foreign and Navy Ministers) reached a compromise, which the army considers the ~~most~~ most likely bid for the present situation.

1. Concerning the assistance obligation the Army proposed clarification of the "change in ~~circumst~~ circumstances" which might make possible later effective aid, so that a neutrality of Japan would in no event come into question. The army attributed this phrasing to the Foreign Minister. The Vice War Minister stated that the treaty bound Japan properly to the Axis powers. But Japan's position ~~was~~, isolated in the Far East, was more dangerous than the Axis Block in Europe. But in case of war, ~~the~~ ~~was~~ ~~not~~ independent from the beginning and

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from the amount of Japanese war activity, the mere fact of the treaty would exercise an effective impression upon the opponents.

2. In regard to "explication" the Army is emphasizing that the present proposal is elastic, contains no express ~~firm~~ wording and leaves negotiations open for which, after OSHIMA's telegram yesterday, there should be favorable prospects.

3. The expressions about the "sincerity of my country" were ~~and~~ called the personal word of honor of the Minister President. ~~The~~ In case the treaty does not come off, the Army expects a cabinet retirement.

The main opposition in the Navy comes from Admiral Yamamoto. ~~An official close to~~
An official close to SHIRATORI told OTT that a deep chasm had come into being between friends and opponents of the treaty. The Minister President ~~is supposed~~ has reached a statement of compromise on his own initiative which assumes a foundation

of an unlimited treaty, limited however by two significant reservations. This attitude is bound to alienate the Axis.

~~The general impression is that~~
~~hopes~~ Generally, there is a great hope that HIRANUMA'S statement will effect the conclusion of the treaty (135921-2)

No. 192

Item 14: Telegram to State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 8 May, 1937

in annex to telegram No. 187 containing further details about the negotiations.

1. OTT's informant expects many opposition to be conquered in the next few days by the ^{latest} "explications" of the treaty ~~con-~~

~~ments~~ ~~related~~ to Berlin. Supposed to arrive from Berlin. A Foreign Ministry official close to SHIRATORI explained that it is intended to picture the Alliance

2. ~~The chasm between friends and~~ as a logical development of the Anti-Comintern Pact and to ~~avoid further comments, especially regarding the adversaries of~~ ~~the alliance.~~ ~~This would create the impression that~~ ~~the same official advised that in spite of the~~

Japanese reservations ~~that~~ the negotiations be kept going. In regard to the question of "explications" he remarked that the intention was merely to give an explanation HJT

4043

① OTT describes the viewpoint of the Army ~~report~~
~~to the question~~ of obligation to assistance in the negotiation
for the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, ^{and} particularly
re: HIRANUMA's declaration (Item 12)

This report is based, as OTT states, on "statements of various
General Staff officers, among them my confidante up to now,
who works in accordance to ~~summed~~ direct instructions of
the War Minister."

The treaty represented a strengthening and logical ~~and~~ development of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The impression was that the treaty was directed only against the Soviet Union.

3. OTT requested informant to ~~instruct~~ instruct the army to work against attempts to destroy the treaty negotiations. (135923)

Item 15: Memo 339 from WEISSÄCKER, Berlin, 8 May, 1939.

~~Japanese Ambassador~~ OSHIMA wanted information concerning the projected German-Italian military pact to ~~defeat~~ ^{encourage his friends to save the Tri-Partite Pact and to} defeat the opponents of the Tri-Partite Pact, who were speaking of a German-Italian retreat within the Axis.

Weissäcker assured OSHIMA that that was merely a strong expression of German-Italian friendship.

OSHIMA wanted to know if the planned German-Italian pact fitted in with the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo treaty draft, and if so, could Japan later be added as a third party.

Weissäcker replied to OSHIMA that his impression of the Milan communiqué was just that it was an expression of German-

Informant pointed out how in operations in Central China and against HAINAN, the Navy surpassed the army in objectives and desires. So, ^{once} if the Navy is ~~is~~ won over, it will not ^{fall} ~~fall~~ behind the army in ^{a crisis} ~~actual~~ combat.

II. The Minister President stressed his personal pledge of honor and hoped that the Führer would understand Japan's situation.

The general impression the last few days is a concern on the part of the ~~the~~ champions of the treaty that Germany might break off negotiations. (135928)

Item 18: Tel. 199 from OTT, Tokyo, 12 May, 1939 (to Tel. No. 153).

Concerns Japanese liability for repairs to ~~consulates~~ for damages suffered to ~~the~~ consulates in Chungking. (135929)

Item 19: Telegram 204, from OTT, Tokyo, 16 May, 1939.

re: English - French - Russian negotiations.

~~OTT~~ hears from the Foreign Ministry that the Government attributes no practical value to the ^{assertions} assurances of the French Ambassador concerning restriction of the Pact negotiations in Europe.

The Vice-Minister pointed out that a disburdening of the Soviet Russian western boundary necessarily increased the Soviet Russian danger in East Asia. Japan must therefore take ~~now~~ into account new developments. (135944)

Item 20: Tel. 206 to State Secretary from OTT, Tokyo, 17 May, 1939
(To Telegrams 158) re: conversation with General MACHIJIRI, ^{who} ~~explained~~ that conclusion of a German-Italian alliance worked to the disadvantage of neither the army nor participant groups. The Navy infers that the present government has more time for ^{drawing up} ~~completing~~ a conclusion. The General said the army would try to hurry ~~out~~ ^{to} up a Japanese decision with all its resources, but emphasized the stubborn attitude of the Navy. The core of the matter is the beginning, manner, and extent of assistance. The Navy ostensibly agrees to Article III in the draft of the pact, but ~~seems~~ wants to reserve for itself the choice of time of attack. ~~activities~~ against enemy forces. ~~The~~ ^{misgivings of the Navy} General agreed.

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The Navy ^{is} ~~argues~~ against a publication of the Pact, arguing

that reconstruction and strengthening of Army and Navy armaments were a prerequisite for future effective assistance. In this matter the Navy is especially dependent upon raw materials and machines from England and America. In case of publication of the pact the Navy feared that delivery [of such goods] would ~~be prejudiced~~ suffer.

(135945-6)

Item 21: Tel. 213, to German Foreign Minister, from OTT, Tokyo,
20 May, 1939.

re: ~~Information~~ ^{From General Majiji: (sic)} received from the War Minister:

The 5 Minister Conference today obtained ~~reached~~ a decision concerning the military pact. The Army reached an ~~an~~ agreement within the ~~Army~~ ^{armed forces} Navy, and ~~carry~~ through the demand fundamentally, with a few changes in wording admitted. The Japanese Government hopes that agreement with Germany and Italy will be ~~hastened~~ speeded up as much as possible on this basis. The Army reiterated their sincerity, and their ~~statement~~ ~~reveals~~ reveals

The Army is resolved
 their resolve to make the treaty, like the
 earlier Anti-Komintern Pact, successful both
 internally and externally. ~~on account of~~
~~the long cultivated~~ friendship with
 England. The Army has not been able to
 do away with entirely the long cultivated
 friendship with England, ^{The Army, "the real driving force of Japanese} but hopes to
 state policy" guarantees to
 turn the people gradually towards the
 idea of the treaty. (135947)

Item 22: Memo from GAUS, Berlin 20, May, 1939.
 re. inquiries ^{by} ~~the~~ ^{Councillor of the} Japanese ~~Embassy~~ ^{Embassy} Councillor
 USAMI ~~has~~ ^{has} not yet heard from Tokyo
 and therefore do not ~~expect~~ expect the
 signature of the Tri-Partite Pact for the next
 few days. He really wanted to find out
 something of the content of the German-Italian
 Pact, ^{re:} ~~especially re:~~ ^{re:} Gaus told him it would
 probably not be limited to 5 years
 and also that it probably contained a clause
 about ~~or~~ joint armistice and peace conclusions,
 and assured him that it would be in
 keeping with the Tri-Partite Pact. (135948-9)

Doc # 4043 C

D-11118

Translated by ICHIKAWA,

書類番号 四〇四三C

□

Checked by [unclear] Translator

(秘密暗号方法)

Doc 4043-C ①

電報(暗号秘管理)

(昭和十四年)

東京 一九三九年五月六日

一四時〇〇分

(昭和十四年)

到着 一九三九年五月六日

一四時一五分

五月六日 一八七番

大至急!

極秘 — 書記官長宛

四日電報一八四番ニ追加

諸々、一陳述

彼等ノ中テ

参謀本部各將校 就中 陸軍大臣ノ指令ニ直接從ツテ働イ

リ現在迄私ノ腹ニ友アル者ノ陳述 及び

テ居ル者、私が前カラ知ル者ノ陳述、又 陸軍次官ノイタリ

次ノ如キ

大使館附武官トノ談話ハ 陸軍ノ意見ヲ表シテ居リ、ソレヲ私ハ

公式ノモト考ヘマス。

陸大臣ハ五相會談ニ於ケル紛争(陸相、藏相、対外相、海相)

Doc # 4043C

(2)

書数番号 四〇四三C ③

於テ

ニシテ妥協案ヲ得マシクモソレヲ陸軍デハ現情ニ於テ許シ得ル

(2)

最高度ノ提案アルトシテ居リマス。

蓋陳述ノ主要点ニツイテハ

陸軍ハ次ノ如ク説明シムシク。

ノ案ニ付キ

(一) 援助ノ義務トモトモソレヲ陸軍ハ後日ノ有效ナ援助ヲ可能ナラ

シメルヲナシテ状況ノ変更ヲ日本ノ中立性が問題トナラナイヤウニ

スルヲノミ、
又充分ナ
明カニ簡潔ニ説明スルヲ提議シユシク。

陸軍ハ現在ノ用語法ヲ外務大臣ニ帰スルモトシムシク。

陸軍次官ハソノ條約ハ日本ヲ枢軸國側ニ確定的ニ結ビツケル

ト述ベユシク。 我々ハニカシ 日本ガ極東デ孤立シテ居リ、

歐洲

オ五ニ直接協力出来ルヤウナ 枢州ノ枢軸「ブロック」ニ比ベルトズツト

悪イ立場ニアルト云フコトヲ理解セズバナリコセニ。

Boc # 4043c (3)

(3)

書類番号 四〇四三〇 三

又ハ日本ノ戦争行為

戦争ノ場合ニシカシテラ、日本が戦闘ヲ開始シ擴張スルト吾ト

ヲ働カセ

関係ナリ、條約ノ明白ナル事實が敵ニ対シテ有効ト圧カトルヲ

テ

アリマセウ。

「説明」ニ関シテ、

特ニ

(一) 現在、提督ホヨリ彈力性ニ富ミ何等明カキ表明ヲ含コズ、

交渉ノ存テヲ残シテ居リ、ソノ交渉ハ

昨日受取テ大島ノ電報ニヨリバ有目ナ見込ミガアルト申サレ、

ラレテ居ルノテアル、陸軍ハ強調シテ

來海ヲ放置置キカ、ト云フコトヲ陸軍が強調シテキルコト

説明ニツイテ件。

我

(三) 吾國ノ誠實ニ因ル論議ハ、總理大臣ノ特ニ重要ナル

名譽ニカケ、口約テアルト指摘サレシム

的軍誓ヲスト言ハセ、後ニ私ハソノ間違ヲ表明ニ言及

シマシタ。

新聞ノキアトコロキヨシバ、ソノ全文が外相ニヨツテ

エノ事ハ新聞ノキル處ニ據ルモノナル

天皇ニ上奏サレマシタ。

其見が一致シナイ場合ハ、陸軍ハ

Doc. # 4043c (A)

書類番号 四〇四三〇 [四]

期待

理由

(F)

内閣ノ辭職ヲ豫想シテ居リ、ソレハ 現在ハ 國外及國內事情

ニ依リ現在デハ

キ徴ニ其ガ望ムニカフヌコトデアリマセウ。

空言

海軍側カラノ発表ハ未ダ得ラセセン。 海軍ノ主ナル反対ハ明ラカニ

海軍次官 山本カラ出ニキマス。

有

外務部ノ高級官吏デ、白鳥大使ト特別密接ナ関係ノ有者ガ

間ニ

個人的ニ私ニ、政府全体ニ 枢軸ノ味オト敵トノ深い間隙ガ有

テクレマシタ。

デアツク。

ト云フコトヲ知ラセマシキ。 情况ハ大變重大デ複雑ニ居リマシキ

總理大臣ハ彼ノ個人的ニ安ホニ基キテ、 重大ナルニツノ田保

ニ依リ制限サレテハ中ノガ無制限同盟ノ原則ヲ受諾スル

カ有ナル以外ハ全面的ニ提携スルトマア予ヲ諒ムルニ妥協案ヲ

宣言スルコトヲ得ヌノデアツク。

未達マシキカ

Doc. # 4043c (5)

書類番号 四〇四三〇 [五]

枢軸國の姿勢が、相違ありませぬ (5)

日本ノカカル態度ハ實際に明白ナ決定ニ慣レシキル枢軸國ヲ

併し

敬告カスニ相違アリませぬソレハ余カ統一シテ指導ノ不足ニ起因ス

必然的ニ

ノデアリマス。交渉ガ失敗スルハ重大ナ結果ガ生ジテ内閣危機

トナリマセリ。

概

概括的印象トシテ、條約ノ意圖ヲ活掃カ進備ハ非常ニ困難

ヲ強調シ、(多分コーデ一單語ヲ欠ク) 平沼ノ声明ガ條約

ノ最後の完結ノ機會ヲ提供スルコトヲ切ニ望ムンデ居リマス。

オットー

AUG 2 1946

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

STRAUS.

2 August , 1946

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 4043 for Tavener, Taranenko

Arrange for translation as follows:

- 1)--4043 E: Item 6, Telegram from Ott dated 23 March, 1939.
German-Jap translation and Three way check. Mark as
"4043 E".
- 2)--4043 A (Item 5)
4043 B and D (Item 12)
4043 C (Item 13):
Three Way Check.

JBA

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)