

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REVIEW
OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MY LAI INCIDENT (U)

VOLUME III

EXHIBITS

BOOK 5 - MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS,
OVERLAYS, SKETCHES, STATE-
MENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE

14 MARCH 1970

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

8 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Ground Survey by the Army Preliminary Investigation into the My Lai Incident

1. GENERAL

a. On 3 January 1970, the Department of the Army Preliminary Investigation into the My Lai Incident conducted a ground survey of the hamlet of My Lai (4). It required approximately 3 1/2 hours. Prior to the survey, several high and low aerial reconnaissances were made by members of the Investigation Team. The purpose of the survey was threefold:

(1) To familiarize members of the Inquiry with the hamlet and its environs;

(2) To identify and locate key locales and terrain features;

(3) To assist in resolving conflicts in testimony given by witnesses.

b. Members of the official party were

(1) Lieutenant General William R. Peers, US Army, President of the Board;

(2) Mr. Robert MacCrate, Attorney at Law, Special Counsel to the Board;

(3) Mr. Jerome K. Walsh, Jr., Attorney at Law, Special Assistant to Mr. MacCrate. Accompanying the official party was a special investigative support element as listed at TAB A.

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SUBJECT: Ground Survey by the Army Preliminary Investigation into the My Lai Incident

2. TACTICAL SITUATION

a. While the hamlet of My Lai (4) was considered "safe," except for the prevalence of mines and booby traps, the area surrounding the hamlet was subject to periodic sniper fire. The existing situation prompted the transport of the Inquiry and the special support element in two UH-1H helicopters supported by two AG-1G "Cobra" helicopter gunships which remained on station for the duration of the Inquiry's visit.

b. Upon arrival at My Lai (4), the Investigation Team was given a short briefing to include the mission of the Task Force and organization of Company C, 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry. Copies of the charts used in the briefing are included at TAB B.

c. Security forces accompanying the official party were augmented by a scout, mine, and tunnel dog team, and an electronic mine detecting capability. The accompanying security force was composed of elements of Company C, Task Force Roman, commanded by Captain Reid Purcell. As part of the security arrangements, all members of the Investigation Team were issued armored protective vests and steel helmets before entering the hamlet. The major trails within the hamlet had been marked and cleared of mines and booby traps. Frequently, however, it was necessary for the team to leave the trails to investigate specific sites. In each instance the area was swept and cleared by the security force.

d. The route taken by the group is shown as a green trace at TAB C. Structures and areas of specific interest are shown as red numerals and are identified at TAB D. Photographs taken during the operation on 16 March 1968 of the same structures or areas are tabbed for comparison at TAB E. The blue trace beginning at Numeral number 18 in TAB C denotes ground reconnaissance conducted from armored personnel carriers.

3. CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION AT MY LAI (4)

a. The Inquiry carried with it to My Lai (4) various documents including photographs taken during the operation of 16 March 1968. The team was accompanied by Sergeant Nguyen Dinh Phu, ARVN, an interpreter assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, on 18 March 1968; Sergeant Duong Minh,

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ARVN, an interpreter assigned to the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, on 18 March 1968; and Pham Chot, a "Kit Carson" scout who resided in the hamlet on 16 March 1968. Chot witnessed the operation of 16 March 1968 from hiding and after the action, found his 17 year-old daughter dead in the hamlet. The services of Phu, Minh, and Chot onsite at My Lai (4) proved invaluable to the Inquiry in reconstructing specific events, locating areas of interest, describing routes of march, etc.

b. Photographs of various structures and locales were taken to provide additional current documentation for the inquiry. These are found at TAB D and TAB E, where applicable, to contrast with photographs taken during the operation of 16 March 1968.

4. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MY LAI (4)

a. Despite some brush clearing which had been done by Task Force Roman, the hamlet was largely overgrown with a variety of jungle growth. What were formerly bare trails in 1968 were now heavily covered with grass and all but obscured by arching stands of bamboo, often making it impossible to walk in an upright fashion. As a result of the profusion of the jungle growth, visibility in the hamlet was restricted to 5 to 25 yards.

b. MACV intelligence has assessed the village as 90 percent destroyed. This assessment was borne out by a house-to-house survey of the hamlet and its environs. The hamlet at one time numbered 80 - 90 structures composed of red clay brick or blocks of hardened laterite, plus numerous small, thatched buildings. Many of the brick or laterite structures were faced with plasty cement, and several showed evidence of having decorative stone columns as a part of the structure. The condition of the structures seen in My Lai (4) on 3 January 1970 was in sharp contrast to the same structures identified in the March 1968 photos. Most of the structures have been reduced to shells or rubble.

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In some cases all that remained of a building was a bare foundation nearly obscured by grasses growing through the floor. Existing walls of some structures showed random pockmarks caused by small arms. The standing walls of the structures did not bear evidence of major fire damage, but a number of fallen, wooden roof supports appeared blackened by old fires. Heavy brush, bamboo and several hardwood trees bore evidence of .30 caliber to 2.75-inch projectile strikes. Various household objects were evident in the ruined structures. Objects noted included rags which appeared to be used as dishcloths; a slightly oxidized aluminum washbasin; a blackened, 6-inch diameter brass bowl; and a blue, porcelain-finished terra cotta stand. Water wells not overgrown by weeds and grass appeared to be in fairly good condition. Two vegetable gardens were found under cultivation in the hamlet. Rice fields on the perimeter were found to be fallow and untilled.

c. The overall impression gained by the Inquiry as a result of these observations was that the hamlet had recently been occupied by a small number of individuals, probably Viet Cong.

5. OFFICIAL PRESS AND PHOTO COVERAGE. The events of 16 March 1968 have sharply focused the attention of the world on the conduct of the US Army in South Vietnam. Since the international press had been discouraged from accompanying the Inquiry for security reasons and to prevent interference with the investigation, it was important to provide official press and photo coverage for the media. Accordingly, both black-and-white and color still photographs as well as color motion picture documentation of the Inquiry's survey of My Lai (4) were made and distributed to the press through the Department of Defense. In addition, a press release was prepared and released through the Military Assistance Command Office of Information to the international press.

6. CONCLUSIONS. The onsite survey of My Lai (4) was both useful and productive and has enabled the Inquiry to

8 January 1970

SUBJECT: Ground Survey by the Army Preliminary Investigation into the My Lai Incident

reconstruct some of the events of 16 March 1968 which will have considerable influence on the Inquiry's findings and recommendations.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. R. Peers". The signature is written in a cursive, somewhat stylized font.

W. R. PEERS
Lieutenant General, USA

INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT ELEMENT

LTC Billy Stanberry, INF, SSAN# Chief Inter-
preter for the Peers Inquiry in RVN;

MAJ W. F. Gabella, TC, SSAN# Press Officer
for the Peers Inquiry;

Specialist 5 Robert Fromm, SSAN# US Army Photo-
grapher assigned to the Peers Inquiry;

1LT Leland R. Smith, SC, SSAN# Motion Picture
Photographer attached from the Americal Division; and,

PFC Laszlo Kondor, SSAN# Still Picture Photo-
grapher, attached from the Americal Division.

MISSION

5-46TH INFANTRY SECURES MY LAI (4) (BS716789)
AND PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR THE INVESTIGATION
TEAM COMMENCING AT H-HOUR, D-DAY BY CLEARING
ENEMY FORCES FROM THE AREA; CLEARING MINES &
BOOBY TRAPS IN THE AREA; ESTABLISHING A DEFEN-
SIVE PERIMETER AROUND MY LAI (4) AND BY CON-
DUCTING EXTENSIVE DAY PATROLLING AND NIGHT AM-
BUSHES IN THE VICINITY OF MY LAI (4).

TASK ORGANIZATION

TF ROMAN:

C. "C" 5-46 INF
TM, LT MORT SEC, MORT PLAT, C. "E" 5-46 INF
RCN PLAT, C. "E", 5-46 INF
H TROOP 17 CAV (OPCON)
SCOUT, MINE & TUNNEL DOG TEAMS (OPCON)
1 TRACKER DOG TEAM (OPCON)
NPFF PATROL SQD (SON TINH DISTRICT) (DS)
1 PLAT. POPULAR FORCE (SON TINH DISTRICT) (DS)

BN CONTROL:

2/A/5-46 INF
PLAT, B/26 ENGR (DS)
PATHFINDER TEAM (DS)

DS ARTY:

2 105 MM HOW, 1-14 ARTY (SON TINH)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MỸ LAI (4)

791
719




US-4

MESS


BRIEFING
TENT

5-46




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


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MỸ LAI (4)



— NOT TO SCALE —



AFTER ACTION REPORT

GROUND SURVEY OF MY LAI (4)

3 JANUARY 1970

Index to TAB C

<u>Map Location #</u>	<u>Description</u>
1	Home of Mr Luyen, village chief of Son My
2	Cluster of houses NW of junction
3	VC hamlet chief's house, killed near #4
4	View from N central point of hamlet
5	Mr Chua's house
6	Graveyard
7	Pagoda
8	View of LZ
9	Large house to E of position from which LZ photographed
10	Mr Chan's house, north of briefing tent
11	Mr Anh's house after turning SE on reentering village
12	Old pagoda used and referred to as schoolhouse
13	House from which Phu led old man
14	VC information house on left entering hamlet
15	Road on which many bodies laid
16	Center of large cluster of houses

Index to TAB C (cont)

<u>Map Location #</u>	<u>Description</u>
17	Large house - appears in background of P-17
18	Pagoda-like building
19	Ditch - area first indicated by the Kit Carson scout (Mr Chot) where bodies located
20	Location of portion of ditch with bodies moved 25-30 ft south
21	Area of ditch indicated by Thompson on low level recon of 4 Jan
22	Mr Chot's house (Kit Carson Scout)

AFTER ACTION REPORT

GROUND SURVEY OF MY LAI (4)

3 JANUARY 1970

Index To TAB D

<u>Red-Numbered Site on Aerial Photo (TAB C)</u>	<u>Photo Frame Number Taken 3 Jan 70</u>	<u>Cross-Reference Peers Exhibit</u>
1	F-1	
3	F-2	
3	F-4	
Between 3-4	F-6	
3	F-7	
4	F-9, -10	
6	F-11	
7	F-12	
8	F-13, -14	Peers Exhibit #29
13	F-15	
14	F-16	Peers Exhibit #41
12	F-18	Peers Exhibit #9, 11
13	F-19	Peers Exhibit #3, 4
17	No Recent Photo	Peers Exhibit #13, 17
19	F-20	
22	F-21	
18/20	F-22	
18-20	F-23, -24, -25	
21	F-26	




Site 1, Frame 1 - House located at Site 1. Note roof damage.



Site 3, Frame 2 - Viet Cong hamlet chief killed at point just to right of banana tree in center of photo.



Site 3, Frame 4 - Viet Cong hamlet chief's house. View to the northwest.



Site 3, Frame 7 - Pham Chot, "Kit Carson" scout, identified this dwelling as the house of a Mr. Chua.



Between Site 3 & 4, Frame 6 - View to south of point where Viet Cong ham-
let chief was killed.



Site 4, Frame 9 - View to the east from Site 4 at midpoint of hamlet



Site 4, Frame 10 - View to the west from Site 4 at midpoint of hamlet.



Site 6, Frame 11 - Graveyard located immediately north of building at Site 6



Site 7, Frame 12 - Ruins of pagoda in foreground of hardwood tree. View is to the northwest.



Site 8, Frame 13 - View from west-to-north of landing zone used during operation on 16 March 1968. See Peers Exhibit 29.



Site 8, Frame 14 - View from west-to-south of landing zone used during operation on 16 March 1968. See Peers Exhibit 29.



Site 12, Frame 18 - Vicinity of schoolhouse where medevac of PFC Carter took place. See Peers Exhibit 9 & 11.



Site 13, Frame 15 - House where SGT Nguyen Dinh Phu, ARVN interpreter with C Company, was shown leading out old man in Haerberle photo. See Peers Exhibit 3 & 4.



Site 14, Frame 16 - View to south toward Highway 521 depicts trail where a number of bodies can be seen in Peers Exhibit 41.




Site 13, Frame 19 - SGT Nguyen Dinh Phu, ARVN interpreter with C Company standing at identical location where he was photographed by Haerberle leading old man out of house. Compare extent of destruction of house with Peers Exhibit 3 & 4.



Site 19, Frame 20 - Ruins of dwelling which was the home of Hipp's mother.



Between Site 18 & 20, Frame 22 - East side of north end of ditch used as a burial ground. View is to the south.



Between Site 18 & 20, Frame 23 - View to southeast from area used as a burial ground.



Between Site 18 & 20, Frame 24 - View to east from area used as a burial ground.



Between Site 18 & 20, Frame 25 - View to northeast from area used as a burial ground.



Site 21, Frame 26 - View to south of portion of ditch used as a burial ground at Site 21.



Site 22, Frame 21 - East end of hamlet identified as the area where CI Medina exited hamlet.

AFTER ACTION REPORT: GROUND SURVEY OF MY LAI (4)

3 JANUARY 1970

Index to Tab E

<u>Peers Exhibit Number</u>	<u>Cross Reference to Site & Photo Numbers at Tabs C & D</u>
P3, 4	Site 13, Frame 19
P9, 11	Site 12, Frame 18
P13, 17	See Site 17 No recent photos
P29	Site 8, Frames 13 & 14
P41	Site 14, Frame 16



Exhibits Exhibit #3 - SGT Nguyen Dinh Phu, ARVN interpreter with Company "A", leading old man out of house at Site 13.



Peers Exhibit #4 - SGT Phu in deep shadow at left, Capezza at right at house at Site 13.




Peers Exhibit #9 - Mauro (left) and Widmer assist Carter after he accidentally shot himself in the left foot.



Peers Exhibit #11- Capeza (left) and Flores assist Carter to medevac helicopter at Site 12. Bernhardt is at extreme right.



Peers Exhibit #13 - From the right, LT Alaux, SFC Maroney, SGT Phu, SP5 Flynn, and SGT Fagan (in rear with plotting board) at Site 17.



Peers Exhibit #17 - From the left, LT Alaux, Maroney, SGT Phu, Widmer (on porch), and CPT Medina (standing and pointing) at Site 17.



Peers Exhibit #29 - LZ used at the start of the operation. See Site 8 and Frames 13 & 14.



Peers Exhibit #41 - Group of dead lying on the road at Site 14
See Frame 16.

Exhibit M-112 is published in Volume III,
Book 2, Directives.

EXHIBIT M-112

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INFORMATION SHEET

KIA AND RELATED REPORTS

	<u>LOG</u>	<u>GENERAL</u>	<u>SHARKS</u>	<u>C Co</u>	<u>COORDS</u>
0735	TFB			1	713768
0742	TFB		3		709788
0747	TFB	Lift Com- pleted C Co			
0750	TFB		2		705768
0755	TFB		1		709788
0757 (approx)	Tape	(Coyote 65 C Co has 15)			
0758	TFB			14	716788
0829	Tape	(Coyote 6: Is that 84 KIA's? [apparently to Charlie 6] Coyote 6 rog- ered.)			
0830	Tape	(Coyote 6 tells Coyote 65 Return- ing to Dottie-- "I'll stop in TOC and bring you up to date!!")			
0840	TFB			69	716788
0915	11th Bde	30-40 VC di-di 0700, going east: (Note: No com- parable entry in TFB Log)			
0930	11th Bde			69 due Arty fire	714794

S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T

16 April 68

On 2 April 1968 the Vietnamese National Police and Popular Forces of Son Tinh District participated in a joint Combat Sweep operation with elements of the 4th Bn, 3d Inf, 11th Inf Bde. Cpt Peter L. Lawson, S-2, 4th Bn, 3d Inf, and his RTO, PFC Bruce N. Johnson, were attached to the District Forces conducting the sweep.

After receiving sniper fire from a hill to the South of the operational area, the Popular Forces were deployed to take the hill and kill the 2 VC snipers located there. At this time, the Aero Scout element wounded and captured 2 VC to the West of the operational area and brought them to the location of the District Command Element where initial interrogation was initiated. After this interrogation revealed that the VC that was conscious had no intelligence of immediate value, the District Forces moved approximately 300 meters to the west to carry out a search of a Hamlet at that location. Capt Lawson and his RTO remained with the 2 wounded VC and requested a dust off.

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EXHIBIT M-114

MAJ Thomas/jwk/57084
10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Attack at KHAM DUC, RVN in May 1968 (U)

TO: Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary
Investigation Into the My Lai Incident (Peers Inquiry)

PURPOSE: (U) To provide information concerning enemy attacks against friendly positions in the vicinity of KHAM DUC, RVN between 10 and 12 May 1968.

FACTS.

1. (C) On 10 May 1968 the KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp and the nearby NGOK TAVAK Forward Operating Base (see map at Inclosure 1) were attacked by elements of the 1st VC Regiment, 2d NVA Division. Although neither position was overrun, both were evacuated - NGOK TAVAK on 10 May and KHAM DUC on 12 May. The decision to evacuate the positions was based upon: (a) the difficulty of defending the positions, and (b) the pressing need at that time to use the readily available reinforcing troops at other locations in Southern I Corps where enemy threats were developing. At Inclosure 2 is a chronology of the significant events which occurred in the vicinity of KHAM DUC from 10 to 12 May 1968.

2. (C) The Forward Operating Base at NGOK TAVAK was defended by a 113-man Mobile Strike Force Company assisted by 8 US Army Special Forces and 3 Australian Training Team advisors and 33 US Marines who were manning two 105mm howitzers. This position was attacked by the enemy during the early morning hours of 10 May 1968 and enemy elements had partially overrun the defenses before noon, but the perimeter was restored prior to evacuation. Shortly after daylight, an attempt was made to reinforce the defenders with a second Mobile Strike Force Company. This attempt was abandoned, however, after only 60 men had been inserted at a cost of two helicopters lost to hostile ground fire. At noon the NGOK TAVAK garrison was ordered to abandon the position and to escape and evade to the KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp. By 1330 hours the evacuation of the position was completed.

3. (C) The KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp was initially defended by 11 US and 12 Vietnamese Special Forces members,

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

[REDACTED]

331 Vietnamese Civilian Irregulars, and 125 US Army Engineers. KHAM DUC received an enemy attack by fire at about the same time the NGOK TAVAK base came under attack. On 10 May additional US and Vietnamese Special Forces personnel plus Americal Division units, which included one infantry battalion, reinforced by one infantry company and part of an artillery battery, were committed to reinforce the camp during the afternoon of 10 May. The enemy continued to fire into the KHAM DUC camp throughout the 10th of May and once on 11 May, but no ground assault on the position was attempted. During the early morning hours of 12 May the enemy began attacking the outposts surrounding KHAM DUC and by noon the enemy controlled the commanding terrain in the vicinity of the camp. Evacuation of the camp, by fixed wing aircraft and helicopters, began late in the morning on the 12th of May and was completed at 1623 hours that day.

4. (U) All equipment which could not be readily evacuated from the two friendly positions was destroyed in place to prevent capture. A listing of all equipment destroyed in these actions is at Inclosure 3. At Inclosure 4 is a listing of the casualties resulting from the actions described above. The troop lists for the two positions are at Inclosure 5.

5 Incl
as

Paul Chmar

DONNELLY P. BOLTON
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Operations, ODCSOPS



PAUL CHMAR
Colonel, GS
Assistant Deputy Director of Operations

[REDACTED]



SOUTH VIETNAM

QUANG TIN



Inclosure 1



CHRONOLOGY

**ATTACK ON KHAM DUC SF CAMP AND
NGOK TAVAK FORWARD OPERATING BASE
(Time Zone "HOTEL" - Saigon Local Time)**

10 May 1968

- 0315 - NGOK TAVAK Forward Operating Base (FOB) comes under enemy mortar attack and ground assault.
- 0316 - KHAM DUC Special Forces (SF) Camp begins to receive heavy mortar and recoilless rifle fire.
- 0329 - At NGOK TAVAK, US forces have expended all 105mm howitzer ammunition and they destroy their two howitzers. An AC-47 aircraft ("Spooky") is on station and is firing.
- 0750 - At NGOK TAVAK the defenders are reinforced by 60 men (Civilian Irregulars who are advised by US Army Special Forces personnel). The situation is now critical as the enemy force, estimated to be a reinforced battalion, employs heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, 82mm mortars, and a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire against the FOB.
- 1050 - Americal Division commences operation GOLDEN VALLEY. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry reinforced by Company A, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry and supported by elements of Battery A, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery, is given the mission of reinforcing the KHAM DUC SF Camp and denying freedom of movement to the enemy throughout the KHAM DUC area.
- 1330 - KHAM DUC SF Camp receives heavy small arms and mortar fire. The NGOK TAVAK FOB was partially overrun, but the perimeter was restored. All friendly elements, wounded personnel first, are evacuated from the FOB. The attacking enemy unit is identified as the 1st VC Regiment, 2d NVA Division.

11 May 1968

- 1230 - At KHAM DUC SF Camp the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry receives an unknown number of mortar rounds.


Inclosure 2

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10**

C [REDACTED]

12 May 1968


- 0342 - A friendly outpost, 400 meters north-northwest of the runway at KHAM DUC SF Camp, is overrun by the enemy. A friendly outpost 700 meters north of the camp comes under a ground assault.
- 0445 - The KHAM DUC SF Camp receives a mortar attack.
- 0458 - Two friendly outposts near KHAM DUC SF Camp are surrounded by enemy soldiers.
- 0510 - The Direct Air Support Center (DASC) at I Corps Headquarters scrambles additional tactical air support.
- 0533 - The KHAM DUC SF Camp receives a heavy volume of mortar fire and a rocket attack.
- 0550 - The KHAM DUC SF Camp receives a ground assault from the south and southwest.
- 0900 - The KHAM DUC SF Camp receives a ground assault by three companies from the northeast. The enemy has control of all friendly outposts, with one exception, surrounding the camp.
- 0945 - The KHAM DUC SF Camp is still under attack from the north and is receiving heavy machine gun fire from the south and north. Tactical air support is engaging the advancing enemy units.
- 1030 - Enemy troops are in KHAM DUC village. The enemy is attacking the KHAM DUC SF Camp from the south-west, west, and north and is being supported by mortar fire from the southeast. Equipment within the camp is being destroyed to prevent its capture.
- 1110 - One C-123 aircraft departs KHAM DUC SF Camp with an unknown number of personnel aboard.
- 1230 - Evacuation of KHAM DUC SF Camp is still underway, utilizing C-130 and CH-46 aircraft. Most of the casualties and civilians have been extracted. The enemy has ceased his ground assault at this time. One C-130 aircraft, with 5 crewmen and 150 passengers (all believed to be civilians) aboard, crashed after take-off two miles east of the camp.
- 1623 - Evacuation of the KHAM DUC SF Camp is complete.



SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT LOSSES
ATTACK ON KHAM DUC SF CAMP AND
NGOK TAVAK FORWARD OPERATING BASE

The significant equipment listed below was lost or destroyed in the KHAM DUC - NGOK TAVAK area during the period 10-12 May 1968. The loss or destruction of rations and ammunition was not reported.

10 aircraft	15 trucks
2 C-130	2 bulldozers
1 O-2A	2 front loaders
1 A-1H	1 roadgrader
2 CH-46	1 fork lift
2 CH-47	1 cement mixer
2 UH-1C	40 telephones
7 105mm howitzers	28 radios
1 gun direction computer, M18	675 protective masks
15 81mm mortars	475 protective body armor
4 106 recoilless rifles	

Inclosure 3


DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10



CASUALTIES
ATTACK ON KHAM DUC SF CAMP AND
NGOK TAVAK FORWARD OPERATING BASE

During the period 10-12 May 1968 the following casualties were incurred in the KHAM DUC - NGOK TAVAK area:


	<u>US Army</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>VNSF/CIDG</u>	<u>Villagers</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
KIA	12	12			345
WIA	112 (5 SF)	21	29		
MIA	26 (3 SF)		64		
TOTAL	<u>150</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>93</u>		<u>345</u>
Unaccounted for			508*	107*	

* Includes undetermined number of Vietnamese (up to 150) aboard a C-130 which crashed and burned immediately after take-off from KHAM DUC SF Camp.

Inclosure 4



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10


TROOP LISTS
ATTACK ON KHAM DUC SF CAMP AND
NGOK TAVAK FORWARD OPERATING BASE


1. On 10 May 1968 the following units were at the NGOK TAVAK Forward Operating Base:

- a. 1 - Mobile Strike Force Company.
- b. 2 - Sections (105mm howitzers), Battery D, 2d Battalion, 13th Marines
- c. --- US Special Forces and Australian Training Team Advisors.
- d. 1 - Mobile Strike Force Company (-) (60 men reinforced during the morning).

2. During the period 10-12 May 1968 the following units were at the KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp:

- a. 2 - Camp Strike Force Companies (+).
- b. --- US and Vietnamese Special Forces advisors.
- c. Company A, 1st Battalion, 70th Engineers.
- d. 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry (Americal Division).
- e. Company A, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry (Americal Division).
- f. Battery A (-), 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (Americal Division).

Inclosure 5


DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIVITIES RELATING TO BRIG GEN YOUNG

17 MARCH 1968

- (AM) Holladay and Watke reported information given by CWO Thompson
1200 Gen Young informed Gen Koster of Holladay/Watke report.
1430 Arrived at LZ Dottie -- departed 1445 hours.

18 MARCH 1968

- 0910 Arrived LZ Dottie -- departed 0930 (COL Henderson arrived
LZ Dottie 0905)

20 MARCH 1968

Oral report by CO, 11th Bde to CG Americal Div

LATE MARCH/EARLY APRIL

Possible receipt of written report from CO 11th Bde

24 APRIL 1968

Report of Investigation prepared by CO, 11th Bde

27 APRIL - 7 MAY 1968 (Koster assum comd 8 May 68)

Gen Koster R&R in Hawaii -- Gen Young assumed command
of Americal Div on 27 Apr.

10 MAY - 13 MAY 1968

Evacuation of Cam Duc CIDG Camp

3 JUNE 1968

Gen Koster departed Americal Div -- Gen Young assumed
command in interim


EXHIBIT M-116

18 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Extracted Entries -- Mr. James A. May's Notebook

On 17 Feb 70, Mr. James A. May, former PSA, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam, stated that the inclosed typewritten notes were extracted from his notebook (diary) that he kept while the PSA, Quang Ngai Province, RVN.


JAMES H. PATTERSON
Lieutenant Colonel, Armor
Investigating Officer

March Activities and Problems - March 1968

March 1 - 4 No records

5 1400 to Saigon - (Refugees, Quakers, return, marriage permission formalities with fiancée) - Sir Robert Thompson and Desmond Palmer visit

6 Saigon - SY-PER (Refugees, Quakers, visa, passport, Exit permit, travel reservations)

7 Return to Quang Ngai - get concertina - Improve CORDS #1 defences - local employee problems and policies

8 Visited by Dep. Cmdr. - Amb. Koren for lunch

Sat. 9 Canadian delegation visit - Col. Beach & Miss Special - re TB clinic, etc.

Sun. 10 Visit by Gen. Young; LtC. Dixon, Mr. Cross - Start packing

11 " " LTC Anistranski - Prov. Chief wants America to build TOC for Sector

(1) List of items for personal security

(2) " " " " Ly Son prison

(3) C-A projects by Prov. Chief

(4) Cement

(5) Rice convoy protection

(6) Defoliation

11 Visit by Col. Dean Hutter, new Sr. MACV Adviser to 2nd ARVN Division

12 Phone Gen. Young and request chopper (we are too short - always)

Wed. 13 Danang and see DEP/CORDS - Mr. Cross. Then to Saigon - Lv. 1330

14 Saigon - Medical treatment - travel reservations for H.L. - marriage authorization

15 Volags re Canadians, Quakers, IVS; Agricultural program step-up, audit discussion

16 Return to Quang Ngai: via Danang and DepCORDS. Prepare performance report PSD Adviser

Sun. 17 Packing. Prepare for DepCORDS visit - IVS visit by Novak

18 Hugh Neonke visit
Bob Olson visit
Dan Whitfield - IVS - Chief, VN
Cliff Doke - IVS - Washington, D. C.

23 Amb. Colby visit to Quang Ngai

26 Danang - Regional Meeting

27 D. Bennet; Jack Goodside
Ernie Shaw - new GSO

- March 30 On Gen. Young's chopper - Binh Son with Prov. Chief and Police Chief
(notebook remarks of Prov. Chief re "kill them all"-- next to last leaf)
(Joe Alsop for dinner at Americal & RON)
Still need personnel defense items
P.C. re fortified villages
- 31 Notes re Phuoc Thien, after visit there & Binh Duc -
Need radio for VIS man
Rice
Service Chief visits
nets - loans - ABD
Bob Pessegue - Son Tra
(noted a PF had foot blown off)
Push deep patrolling by PRU

APRIL

Note - Gen. Young's phone - Americal 426 (Qtrs. at night 466)

April 1 Work on HES - Monthly narrative report and statistical summary
DepCORDS - meet at airport for an hour. Harry Mistakos, Rip Robertson

3 Many problems - see notebook

4-8 TDY - Danang, Saigon

8 See Ltc. Green - Grubaugh re:
junk use?
Joe Salzburg visit
radio
civ. auto/comm.

9 Ethnic minority ministerial visit
Canadian delegation visit
New Yorker article by Schell - reply - rice, outpost assessment, defoliation plan, port road
In Nghia attack - Phuoc Hoa attack
Project Recovery report. Special TET refugee report for Koner
Arming PSDG - Fertilizer shortage
Americal construction project - civic action for Province Chief

10 Shots - PWD visitors
1100 - Call on Gen. Koster with Mr. Cross, DepCORDS (ask for captured or other weapons for my men)

11-12 (Notebook comments re corruption, inefficiency, etc) -
Local security problems

TDY 12 (Memos re Special Forces complaint - to Region - re Prov. Chief--thru pg. 14)

Danang (Received guidance re President's speech (resig.?) and bombing halt?)

14 - 18 TDY Saigon - write efficiency reports, immunization--skin rash
17th - RON - Amb. Colby - Inform - check re replacement - ETA
18 - Write recommendations for meritorious service award

19 Loaned Prov. Chief my A.B. 143
Contact Gen. Young re more chopper time

20 Congressman Walde - Duc Pho - Chu Hai - Americal 1st anniversary ceremony

26 - 27 Regional meeting

More data noted in notebook.

^{ACF} Americal Brigade Hits VC 3 Times In Same Village

CHU LAI, (AMERICAL-10)—For the third time in recent weeks, the Americal Division's 11th Brigade infantrymen from Task Force Barker raided a Viet Cong stronghold known as "Pinkville." The raid on the village, located six miles northwest of Quang Ngai, ended with 128 enemy killed.

The action occurred in the coastal town of My Lai where, three weeks earlier, another company of the brigade's Task Force Barker fought its way out of a Viet Cong ambush, leaving 80 enemy dead.

The action began as units of the task force conducted a combat assault into a known Viet Cong stronghold. Gunships of the 174th Aviation Company escorted the troops into the area and killed four enemy during the assault. Other choppers from the 123rd Aviation Battalion killed two enemy.

"The combat assault went like clockwork," commented Lt. Col. Frank Barker, the task force commander. "We had two entire companies on the ground in less than an hour."

A company led by Capt. Ernest Medina killed 14 VC, minutes after landing. They recovered two M1 rifles, a carbine, a short-wave radio and enemy documents.


The attack on the village accounted for 69 enemy killed, some of which were attributed to supporting artillery fire. A

suspect told the interpreter that a large VC force had spent the night in the village.

Another platoon was airlifted to an area south of the village along the beach. This unit, under 2nd Lt. Thomas Willingham, immediately ran into enemy fire. When the VC fled, they left 30 dead.

The platoon then continued to move up the beach where they saw an enemy soldier slipping into a tunnel. The tunnel turned out to be an enemy underground complex, where the platoon killed eight VC.

The swiftness with which the units moved into the area surprised the enemy. After the battle, the 11th Brigade soldiers moved into the village, searching each hut and tunnel.



WARY ADVANCE—Task Force Barker infantrymen from the Americal Division's 11th Infantry Brigade move toward an enemy stronghold near My Lai. Three raids into the area have cost the enemy 272 killed. (Photo by AMERICAL-10)

CHRONOLOGICAL CHECKLIST OF ACTIVITIES OF
MG KOSTER

16 March 1968

0935 Arrived at LZ Dottie
1510 Arrived at Duc Pho -- departed 1535 hours
1645 Arrived at LZ Dottie with LTG Doleman -- departed at 1715
hours

17 March 1968

0825 Arrived at Duc Pho with LTG Doleman -- departed at 0915 hours

18 March 1968

1345 Arrived at LZ Dottie -- departed at 1405 hours (from TF
Barker LOG)
1410 Arrived at LZ Dottie -- departed at 1450 hours (from 11th
Bde LOG)

20 March 1968

Oral report by CO, 11th Bde

Late March/Early April 1968

Possible receipt of written report CO, 11th Bde

24 April 1968

Report of Investigation Prepared by CO, 11th Bde

28 April - 7 May 1968

R&R in Hawaii

10 May - 13 May 1968

Operation in area of Kham Duc CIDG Camp

3 June 1968

Departed Americal Division for United States

EXHIBIT M-119

LINE OF SUCCESSION

March 68 - Jan 70

(Underline indicates in position on 16 March 1968)

III MAF

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>
CG	<u>Cushman</u> (1 Jun 67 - 26 Mar 69)		
Dep Cmdr	<u>Van Ryzin</u> (12 Feb 68 - 26 May 68)		
ACofS, G3	<u>Hoffman</u> (1 Mar 68 - 17 Feb 69)		
OPS OFF, G3	<u>Russell</u> (18 Mar 68 - 3 Oct 68)		

(Underline indicates in position 16 March 1968)

AMERICAL KEY COMMAND & STAFF POSITIONS

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>
CG	Koster (22 Sep 67 - 2 Jun 68)	Young (3 Jun 68 - 23 Jun 68) Actg CG	Gettys (23 Jun 68 - 31 May 69)	Ramsey (1 Jun 69 - Present)
ADC (OPS)	Ryder (5 Oct 67 - 10 Mar 68)	Young (15 Mar 68 - 3 Jun 68)	Cooksey (10 Jun 68 - 31 Apr 69)	Powell (1 May 69 - Present)
ADC	Young (1 Nov 67 - 15 Mar 68)	Galloway (15 Mar 68 - 2 Dec 68)	Clements (18 Dec 68 - 22 Sep 69)	Donaldson (22 Sep 69 - Present)
CofS	Parson (2 Feb 68 - 23 Aug 68)	Tixier (Actg) (24 Aug 68 - 3 Oct 68)	Treadwell (4 Oct 68 - 27 Mar 69)	Donaldson (28 Mar 69 - 21 Sep 69)
CofS (Continued)			Clemons (25 Sep 69 - 19 Nov 69)	Tackaberry (20 Nov 69 - Present)
Asst to CofS	Beasley (7 Feb 68 - 20 May 68)	Powell (20 May 68 - 12 Sep 68)	Hallman (31 Aug 68 - 1 Jun 69)	LeBeam (1 Jul 69 - 28 Nov 69)
Asst to CofS (Continued)				Williamson (28 Nov 69 - Present)
Aide to CG	Roberts (23 Sep 67 - 6 May 68)	Geroll (Unk - 3 Jun 69)	Blanchard (3 Jun 69 - 27 Jun 69)	Ruffing (27 Jun 69 - Present)
Jr Aide to CG	Dickens (11 Mar 68 - Aug 68)	Data Not Available	Mirande (1 Jul 69 - 12 Dec 69)	Harper (12 Dec 69 - Present)
Aide to ADC (OPS)	White (3 Nov 67 - 22 May 68)	Data Not Available	Kendrick (7 Jul 68 - 20 Dec 68)	Geeno (20 Dec 68 - 19 Jul 69)
Aide to ADC	Hance (Mar 68 - 3 Nov 68)	Data Not Available	Abell (15 Jan 69 - 23 May 69)	Durant (23 May 69 - 25 Nov 69)

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>
Briefing Off	<u>Logan</u> (8 Jan 68 - 1 Aug 68)	<u>Kuechemmeister</u> (1 Dec 67 - 15 Apr 68)	Mason (30 Jun 68 - 5 Oct 68)
CSM	<u>Daniels</u> (31 Oct 67 - 28 Feb 68)	<u>Rogers</u> (22 Jan 68 - 15 Jan 69)	Meade (23 Dec 68 - 12 Jun 69)
Admin NCO's Command Group	<u>Ritchie</u> (Unk - May 68)	<u>Saimons</u> (22 May 68 - 11 Nov 68)	Loftis (11 Nov 68 - 11 May 69)
Secy-Stenos Command Group	<u>Herris</u> (Sep 67 - 3 Jun 68) <u>Koster's</u>	<u>Van Able</u> (Oct 67 - Feb 69) <u>Ryder, Galloway, Gettys</u>	<u>Hill</u> (Feb 68 - Oct 68) Parson & Young
ACofS, G2	<u>Trexler</u> (20 Jan 68 - 14 May 68)	<u>Dorf</u> (15 May 68 - 1 Jun 68)	Adkins (31 May 68 - 27 Nov 68)
ACofS, G2 (Continued)			Nerone (3 Jul 69 - 25 Nov 69)
G2, SGM	<u>Dooley</u> (?)	<u>Lillard</u> (20 Sep 68 - 18 Aug 69)	Stevenson (18 Aug 69 - Present)
ACofS, G3	<u>Balmer</u> (7 Dec 67 - 15 Apr 68)	<u>Baxley</u> (13 Apr 68 - 28 Sep 68)	Powell (28 Sep 68 - 1 Dec 68)
ACofS, G3 (Continued)			Davis (17 Jun 69 - 17 Nov 69)
G3 Avn Off	<u>Biddle</u> (15 Jul 67 - 15 Apr 68)	<u>Bittrich</u> (23 Apr 68 - 29 Sep 68)	Data Not Available
G3, SGM	<u>Data Not Available</u>	<u>Franklin</u> (17 Oct 68 - 2 Nov 68)	Skytta (2 Nov 68 - 12 Oct 69)
			Borrelli (30 Dec 69 - Present)
			Drosdick (16 Apr 69 - Present)
			Smith (Unk - Sep 68) Young
			Nelson (28 Nov 68 - 3 Jul 69)
			Knight (25 Nov 69 - Present)
			Lawrence (1 Dec 68 - 17 Jun 69)
			Kennedy (17 Nov 69 - Present)
			Grimm (20 Oct 69 - Present)

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>
SJA	Jones (1 Dec 67 - 2 Apr 68)	Comeau (2 Apr 68 - 7 Apr 68)	Wilson (1 Apr 68 - 24 Jul 68)	Comeau (24 Jul 68 - 19 Dec 68)
SJA (Continued)			Brannen (19 Dec 68 - 1 Jul 69)	Davis (1 Jul 69 - Present)
IG	Heatherly (12 Jan 68 - 6 May 68)	Swain (6 May 68 - 29 Mar 69)	Howard (KIA) 11 Apr 69 - 3 Aug 69	Fischer (6 Aug 69 - 26 Dec 69)
GI, SGM	McDonald (Unk dates)	Hasson (4 Sep 68 - 17 Aug 69)	Coby (17 Aug 69 - 1 Jan 70)	
NCOIC, AC Classified	Data Not Available	Koesser (Unk - Aug 68)	Kalin (21 Aug 68 - 1 Aug 69)	Melkonian (1 Aug 69 - 27 Sep 69)
Div Avn Off	Holladay (13 Jan 68 - 28 Jul 68)	Brandenburg (29 Jul 68 - 30 Nov 68)	Tyrell (1 Dec 68 - 8 Jan 69)	Druener (9 Jan 69 - 30 Jun 69)
Div Avn Off (Continued)				Townsend (30 Jun 69 - Present)

(Underline indicates in position on 16 March 1968)

11th INFANTRY BRIGADE

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>
C0	Lipscomb (21 Mar 67 - 15 Mar 68)	Henderson (15 Mar 68 - 3 Oct 68)	Donaldson (4 Oct 68 - 27 Mar 69)
X0	Henderson (15 Aug 67 - 14 Mar 68)	Barker (9 Apr 68 - 12 Jun 68)	Franklin (11 Jun 68 - Dec 68)
X0 (Continued)			Crowe (21 Mar 69 - 3 Jul 69)
S1	Dankis (22 Jan 68 - 17 Nov 68)	Melton (Nov 68 - Mar 69)	Hayden (Mar 69 - Present)
S2	Blackledge (1 Jan 68 - 31 May 68)	Schleicher (May 68 - Nov 68)	Veatch (Nov 68 - Mar 69)
S2 Intel SGT	Gerberding (Mar 68 - Oct 68)	Camell (Oct 68 - Sep 69)	Suhr (Oct 69 - Present)
S3	Barker (15 Aug 67 - 21 Jan 68)	McKnight (22 Jan 68 - Aug 68)	Crowe (Aug 68 - Nov 68)
S3 OPNS SGT	Johnson	Data Not Available	Bernick (Unk - Oct 69)
			McCloskey (Nov 68 - Jan 69)
			Ludlow (Oct 69 - Present)

TF BARKER

SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)

SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)

SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)

NAME (DATE SERVED)

POSITION

CO	<u>Barker (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
XO/S3	<u>Calhoun (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
S2	<u>Kotouc (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
Asst S3	<u>Lewellen (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
Sig Off	<u>Watkins (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
Arty LNO	<u>Vazquez (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
LNO to 11th Bde	<u>Reid (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
ISG (Fld First)	<u>Biddix (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
Opns SGT	<u>Johnson, W. (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
S2 SGT	<u>Stevens (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
Radio OP	<u>Hall (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		
MI Off atch	<u>Johnson, D (22 Jan 68 - 8 Apr 68)</u>		

(Underline indicates in position on 16 March 1968)

123d AVIATION BATTALION

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>
CO	Holladay (13 Jan 68 - 18 Jul 68)	Brandenburg (28 Jul 68 - 30 Nov 68)	Tyrell (1 Dec 68 - 8 Jan 69)
CO, Co "B"	Matke (14 Jan 68 - 17 Apr 68)	Wilson (18 Apr 68 - 16 Jun 68)	Tanner (17 Jun 68 - 18 May 69)
			Druener (9 Jan 69 - 30 Jun 69)
			Meher (19 May 69 - 30 Nov 69)

174th AVIATION COMPANY

CO	Gibson (3 Feb 68 - 13 Sep 68)	Brown (KIA) (14 Sep 68 - 11 Mar 69)	Gooden (12 Mar 69 - 6 Sep 69)	Blevins (7 Sep 69 - Present)
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(Underline indicates in position on 16 March 1968)

6th BN, 11th ARTY

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>
BN CMDR	Luper (1 May 67 - May 68)	Bernard (May 68 - Feb 69)	Sloan (Feb 69 - Aug 69)
			Gleave (Aug 69 - Present)

(Underline indicates in position on 16 March 1968)

PROVINCE ADVISORS -- QUANG NGAI

SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)

SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)

SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)

NAME (DATE SERVED)

Rev DvLmt Adv I Corps	Keating, Donald R. MAJ			
Admin NCO	Angle, Gates C. SFC (Feb 68 - 28 Feb 69)	Quintana, Jose I. MSG (28 Feb 69 - 22 Dec 69)	Omori, Hiroshi SSG (29 Dec 69 - Present)	
District Sr Adv	Gavin, David LTC (Aug 67 - 3 Feb 69)	Walker, Jerry CPT (3 Feb 69 - 31 Aug 69)	Waite, Grimble MAJ (31 Aug 69 - Present)	
Asst Dist Adv	Rodriguez, Angel M. CPT (15 Nov 67 - 19 Oct 68)	Walker, Jerry CPT (2 Nov 68 - 3 Feb 69)	Kenyon, Morbert L. CPT (22 Jan 69 - 20 Oct 69)	Cochran, Raymond M. 2LT (Dec 69 - Present)
Intel Advisor	Dawkins, Clarence J. CPT			
Enlisted Advisor	Craddock, George J. SFC			
District Sr Adv	Willoughby, Neill J. MAJ (Nov 67 - Jun 68)			
Senior Adv	Ulsaker, Carl C. COL (Unk - 31 Mar 68)			
Dep Senior Adv	Cromwell, Stewart D. LTC (Jun 67 - May 68)			
G2 Advisor	Earle, Thomas B. Jr. MAJ			

DISTRICT ADVISORS -- SON TINH

DISTRICT ADVISORS -- BINH SON

ADVISORS -- 2d ARVN DIVISION

(Underline indicates in position on 16 March 1968)

PROVINCE ADVISORS -- QUANG NGAI

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>	<u>SUCCESSOR (DATE SERVED)</u>
Ch, CORDS Northern Prov	Koren, Henry L.Y.		
Senior Advisor	<u>May, James A. FSO</u> (2 Jun 65 - 2 Jun 68)	Burke, Robert T. FSO (2 Jun 68 - 2 Jun 69)	Dillery, Edward C. FSO (2 Jun 69 - 5 Dec 69)
Dep Sr Adv	<u>Guinn, William D. LTC</u> (Apr 67 - May 68)	Swearingen, George LTC (May 68 - 20 May 69)	Hippler, Richard A. LTC (20 May 69 - Present)
Dep Sr Adv Revolutionary Dev	Grubaugh, William R. LTC USMC		
XO, Advisory Team	Dillery, Edward C. FSO (20 Apr 68 - 1 Jun 68)		
Asst Adv (Admin)	<u>Green, John LTC</u> (24 Jan 68 - 28 Sep 68)		
Adv, Adm-Log	<u>Hacking, David MAJ</u> (Nov 67 - Dec 68)		
G2 Advisor	<u>Lane, Randolph C. CPT</u>		
G2 Advisor	<u>Frosch, Jesse F. LT</u>		
Medical Advisor	<u>Connelly, John (DR)</u> (21 months)		
Admin Off	Chenault, Price 1LT (Sep 68 - 28 Aug 69)	Salamy, William J. 1LT (28 Aug 69 - 11 Oct 69)	Szezeiniak, Edward J. CPT (5 Oct 69 - Present)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

CS (Peers Inquiry)


25 February 1970

S T A T E M E N T

1. Based on telephone conversations with Colonel Thomas F. Whalen, Peers Inquiry Liaison Officer, in the Republic of Vietnam on 9 February 1970, it was understood that the 6/11th Artillery Battalion maintained two staff journals. One journal was maintained at Duc Pho at the 11th Brigade TOC and the other journal was maintained at Artillery Hill, RVN, which is approximately one kilometer from the Brigade TOC. It was further understood that the journal maintained at the Brigade TOC was complete except for the 16th of March 1968.

2. These journals were subsequently reproduced and forwarded to Headquarters, Department of the Army, by Colonel Whalen. When they were reviewed by the undersigned, it became apparent that more dates than just the 16th of March were absent from the 6/11th journal maintained at Brigade. In fact, only three entries can be found for the month of March 1968 in the journal at the Brigade.

3. Based on the conversation of 9 February 1970 between Colonel Whalen and the undersigned, questions were asked in formal proceedings concerning the absence of the journal on 16 March 1968.


J. M. BREEN
Lieutenant Colonel, GS
Executive

Trên đây là bản thảo của...

Trong ngày 16.3.1968, đơn vị lực lượng Hoa Kỳ tại
mở cửa hàng quân táo thành Việt cộng tại các ấp...
Cố gắng & thu hút xa đến Mỹ, quân Sơn
tỉnh. Các hàng quân tiếp diễn đến khoảng 10 giờ sáng trên đơn
vị Hoa Kỳ đã bị VC tấn công tại ấp...
minh VC làm 1 binh ở Hoa Kỳ bị thương và số khác bị
thương. Vì thế LL hàng quân dùng hỏa lực tấn công vào
ấp... trung đồng loạt bắn chết trên 100 người tại ấp
đều cũng và gọi là khác tại ấp... đồng thời VC rút
lưu khỏi ấp... là trực thăng vô trang bị của US
tên và hơn 2... bị thương và bị bắt VC bị thương tại
vùng hàng quân nổi dậy.

Nhận xét: Hàng tại cùng và... là 2 mức thuế
và Mỹ về bị VC chiếm họ... đối với LL cơ hội giành
sơn như bắt khỏa xác phạm - vì thế đơn vị... phải

thường báo tình... hàng và cần...
cử các lực lượng... hàng...
ngày 16.3.68... hàng...
đơn vị... hàng...
giết chết gần 500 thường dân...
thần độ tàn nhẫn nếu không gọi là cường bạo...
tính nhân loại!! Hàng... can thiệp...
điều này.

- Sao kin's...
- BCR 9D2/BB/P2
- Phái bộ MPO/ANL
- Tình hình

[REDACTED]

15 JUN 1968

General Harold K. Johnson
Chief of Staff
United States Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

Dear General:

This responds to your letter of 29 May 1968 concerning the proper handling of captives taken by US and Allied troops in Vietnam. Your concern for the poor impressions created among the American public because of publicized malpractices of the past is well understood. As your letter recognizes, something more needs to be done.

A review of records maintained by the USARV Provost Marshal reveals that most incidents of detainee maltreatment occur in forward combat areas, too frequently with the knowledge of senior noncommissioned and company grade officers present. It is at the point of capture and during the period of evacuation that our training occasionally fails. Reinforced individual and troop leading training are needed in this context.

Instruction in the Geneva Conventions has tended to be abstract and academic, rather than concrete and practical. It is a subject that ought to be presented by troop leaders in field training in addition to that presented by school/center instructors. The teaching point should be the combat benefits which accrue to the soldier and his unit by correct treatment of the prisoner of war. In this connection, we feel that the handling and exploitation of prisoners are receiving adequate attention in the USARV intelligence community. Nevertheless, we will continue to search for ways to make the PW's intelligence value meaningful and timely to the capturing unit.

[REDACTED]

EXHIBIT M-123

[REDACTED]

The USARV Provost Marshal is currently assisting an Army Pictorial Center team in producing a 58-minute training film on PW/detainee operations in Vietnam. The film emphasizes humane treatment of the captive and, when completed, will be useful in both CONUS and USARV training on the subject.

We will update and revitalize the USARV command information program in this subject area, using specially prepared fact sheets, troop topics, posters, and AFVN radio-television programming.

USARV Information Officers down to brigade level have been alerted to look for and report stories which illustrate the payoffs derived from proper PW handling. In-country press and radio-television media representatives will be allowed to cover PW operations when appropriate. A proposal for an occasional "show and tell" session for the press to view post-capture handling of the PW/detainee will be discussed with JUSPAO and the MACV Office of Information.

Below are outlined some actions that might be taken at Department of the Army level to support both the command and public information programs relating to Army interest in proper PW handling. Specific examples of the payoff of proper handling of intelligence in time and additional surrenders induced should be included.


- a. Consider a preembarkation orientation on prisoner handling for both casuals and units coming to Vietnam, even though it is required training for replacements during their first week here.
- b. Publish an Officer's Call devoted to troop leader responsibilities for insuring correct handling and treatment of prisoners.
- c. Produce a "Big Picture" program describing and emphasizing proper handling of PW's at point of capture through evacuation from the battle area. (Since this medium has both command and public information utility, it would serve the dual purpose of teaching the soldier and reassuring the public of Army concern for humane treatment of the captive.)
- d. Prepare a speech kit, including text and visual aids, describing Army PW handling training and operations. This

FOR [REDACTED]

should be a joint effort of the USARV IO and the Command Information Unit of OCINFO. The speech could be used by Vietnam returnees for presentations to business, civic, and church groups.

I hope that the foregoing suggestions can contribute meaningfully to improving our performance in this area of fundamental importance.

Warm regards,



BRUCE PALMER, JR.
Lieutenant General, US Army
Deputy Commanding General

[REDACTED]



PMGS-C

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

FEB 20 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: LIEUTENANT GENERAL W. R. PEERS

SUBJECT: Census of Civilian Casualties - My Lai (C)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, CS (Peers Inquiry), 10 February 1970, subject as above.
2. An estimate of the number of civilians killed in My Lai (4) and a synopsis of the methodology used in determining this estimate is inclosed.

W. H. BRANDENBURG
Colonel, MPC
Acting The Provost Marshal General

1 Incl
Tab A - Census

The Marking FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
is canceled when separated from
the protected material

EXHIBIT M-124

[REDACTED]

PNGA-D2

17 February 1970

SUBJECT: Census of Civilian Casualties - My Lai (4)

Tab A

The Provost Marshal General
ATTN: PMGS-C
Washington, D. C. 20314

1. Reference is made to :

a. Memorandum, CS (PEERS INQUIRY), 10 February 1970, subject as above.

b. Letter, PMGS-C, OTPMG, 13 February 1970, subject as above.

2. The US Army CID Agency estimates 347 persons were killed in My Lai (4) on 16 March 1968. The methodology used in determining this estimate was as follows:

a. From statements of former residents of My Lai (4) and others who were able to provide useful data, a list was compiled indicating all persons believed to have been present in the village on 16 March 1968.

b. Efforts were then made to further identify these persons by family name, aliases, age, sex, relation, occupation, place of residence, or other means.

c. Finally, efforts were made to isolate the names of those persons who were said by the interviewees to have been killed.

3. It must be emphasized that the accuracy of the estimate is questionable and that omissions, duplications, and other errors probably exist for the following reasons:

a. Approximately 20 months passed between the alleged incident and the interviews; consequently, names, ages, and other data given by the interviewees often were conflicting or unknown.

b. Many interviewees were confused and reluctant to talk.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PNGA-D2

17 February 1970

SUBJECT: Census of Civilian Casualties - My Lai (4)

c. Translation was difficult due to illiteracy and variations in dialects.

d. Common names, aliases, and official titles were used frequently.

e. Exaggerated or fabricated accounts might have been given, possibly for personal gain, sympathy, or political purposes. (Intelligence sources classified some of the interviewees as Viet Cong, Viet Cong sympathizers, and civil defendants.)

4. In view of the above, caution should be exercised in the use of this estimate.

HENRY H. TUFTS
Colonel, MPC
Commanding

27 April 68
 "Reporter" # 17 V. E. I.
 W.S.A.R. # 3 J. Roberts
 pg 64

Men Of Task Force Barker Kill 128 VC In Running Battle

CHU LAI, (AMERICAL-10)— For the third time in recent weeks, men of Task Force Barker, 11th Light Infantry Brigade raided a Viet Cong stronghold known as "Pinkville" six miles northeast of Quang Ngai, killing 128 enemy in a running battle.

The action occurred in the coastal town of My Lai where three weeks earlier another company of the brigade's task force fought its way out of an ambush, leaving 80 VC dead.

The action began as units of the task force swept into the stronghold.

A task force company led by Capt. Ernest Medina killed 14 VC minutes after landing. They recovered three weapons,

a shortwave radio and enemy documents.

The ground attack and supporting artillery fire accounted for 69 enemy dead. One detained suspect told the interpreter that a large VC force had spent the night in the village.

Another platoon of Infantry men was airlifted to a area south of the village along the beach and immediately ran into enemy fire. The enemy fled, leaving 30 dead.

The platoon continued to move up the beach, where they saw enemy soldiers slipping into tunnels. Eight VC were killed and the tunnel complex was found to be a hospital and storage area.

After the battle, the unit

moved through the village, searching huts and tunnels and using an interpreter to question the villagers.

Repetition Emphasized In PsyOps Programs

LAI KHE, (1st INF-10) —

Successful Psychological Operations (PsyOps) play an increasingly important role in support of elements of the 1st Infantry Division.

Recently, a new phase of PsyOps was carried out by members of the G-5 section of the 1st INF and the 6th PsyOps

Welfare authorities, refugees are being moved from temporary shelters to a permanent refugee settlement at Petrus Ky.

The work of resettling homeless refugees will not be quickly accomplished. To judge the scope of the task, it took 42 months prior to the Tet offensive to resettle or return to their homes a total of 1,320,253 refugees. The current total is slightly higher than that figure.

South Vietnam. In addition, PsyOps attempts to stimulate interest and participation in government affairs by the people of Vietnam. PsyOps also emphasizes that the United States and other Free World powers will withdraw once aggression is defeated.

E X T R A C T

Quang Ngai Sector (Viet Nameese Operations Journal) for 1968, unnumbered page, entry date 13 June 1968.

* * * * *

13 June 1968:

UNIT	OPN	AREA	TIME
Sector	QT 44/6	660730-660802	110300 Jun
		676785-700738	130400 Jun
		710818-718713	
		720770-745755	

Participating Units: 36th RF Grp: 380,932, and 934th RF Co's.
 38th RF Grp: 424,425, and 468th RF Co's.
 5 PF Platoons.

Results: Friendly: 4 KIA, 8WIA (1PF WIA)
 VC : 20 KIA, 3 Cpt, 1 Carbine, 1 M1,
 1 K44, 1 BAR Captured

2 US aircraft shot down at coordinate BS 717813; 1 observation aircraft and 1 HU1B. All pilots killed in crash.

* * * * *

The undersigned certifies that he extracted the information from the above cited journal and translated same from Vietnamese into English on 5 January 1970 at Quang Ngai, Republic of Vietnam.



 BILLY M. STANBERRY
 Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

EXHIBIT M-126

13/6/68

Don Vi	So HQ	Khu	gio
Thieu Khu	QT 4416	660730-660802 676785-700738 710818-718713 720770-745755	110300/6- 131400/6

Don vi du: LD36: 380 DPQ, 932 DPQ, 934 DPQ
LD38: 424 DPQ, 425 DPQ, 468 DPQ
5 TD NQ

Ket Qua:

Ban 4 Chet, 8 bi thuong (1 - NQ)

Dich 20 chet, 3 bi thuong, thu duoc
1 cacbin, 1 M-1, 1 K/44, 1 BAR

Ben Hoa Ky hai 1 truc thang HU-1B, Va 1
Phi Co Tham sat phi cong chet het.

This is a true copy extracted 4 January 1970 from the Journal
log Quang Ngai Sector Intelligence Operation Center.


BILLY M. STANBERRY
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army

March Activities and Problems - March 1968

March 1 - 4 No records

5 1400 to Saigon - (Refugees, Quakers, return, marriage permission formalities with fiancée) - Sir Robert Thompson and Desmond Palmer visit

6 Saigon - SY-PER (Refugees, Quakers, visa, passport, Exit permit, travel reservations)

7 Return to Quang Ngai - get concertina - Improve CORDS #1 defences - local employee problems and policies

8 Visited by Dep. Cmdr. - Amb. Koren for lunch

Sat. 9 Canadian delegation visit - Col. Beach & Miss Special - re TB clinic, etc.

Sun. 10 Visit by Gen. Young; LtC. Dixon, Mr. Cross - Start packing

11 " " LTC Anistranski - Prov. Chief wants America to build TOC for Sector

(1) List of items for personal security

(2) " " " " Ly Son prison

(3) C-A projects by Prov. Chief

(4) Cement

(5) Rice convoy protection

(6) Defoliation

11 Visit by Col. Dean Hutter, new Sr. MACV Adviser to 2nd ARVN Division

12 Phone Gen. Young and request chopper (we are too short - always)

Wed. 13 Danang and see DEP/CORDS - Mr. Cross. Then to Saigon - Lv. 1330

14 Saigon - Medical treatment - travel reservations for H.L. - marriage authorization

15 Volags re Canadians, Quakers, IVS; Agricultural program step-up, audit discussion

16 Return to Quang Ngai: via Danang and DepCORDS. Prepare performance report PSD Adviser

Sun. 17 Packing. Prepare for DepCORDS visit - IVS visit by Novak

18 Hugh Neonke visit
Bob Olson visit
Dan Whitfield - IVS - Chief, VN
Cliff Doke - IVS - Washington, D. C.

23 Amb. Colby visit to Quang Ngai

26 Danang - Regional Meeting

27 D. Bennet; Jack Goodside
Ernie Shaw - new GSO

March 30 On Gen. Young's chopper - Binh Son with Prov. Chief
and Police Chief
(notebook remarks of Prov. Chief re "kill them all"--
next to last leaf)
(Joe Alsoop for dinner at Americal & RON)
Still need personnel defense items
P.C. re fortified villages

31 Notes re Phuoc Thien, after visit there & Binh Duc -
Need radio for VIS man
Rice
Service Chief visits
nets - loans - ABD
Bob Pesseguie - Son Tra
(noted a PF had foot blown off)
Push deep patrolling by PRU

APRIL

Note - Gen. Young's phone - Americal 426 (Qtrs. at night 466)

April 1 Work on HES - Monthly narrative report and statistical summary
DepCORDS - meet at airport for an hour. Harry Mistakos, Rip Robertson

3 Many problems - see notebook

4-8 TDY - Danang, Saigon

8 See Ltc. Green - Grubaugh re:
junk use?
Joe Salzburg visit
radio
9 civ. auto/commu.
Ethnic minority ministerial visit
Canadian delegation visit
New Yorker article by Schell - reply - rice, outpost assessment, defoliation plan, port road
In Nghia attack - Phuoc Hoa attack
Project Recovery report. Special TET refugee report for Koner
Arming PSDG - Fertilizer shortage
Americal construction project - civic action for Province Chief

10 Shots - PWD visitors
1100 - Call on Gen. Koster with Mr. Cross, DepCORDS (ask for captured or other weapons for my men)

11-12 (Notebook comments re corruption, inefficiency, etc) - Local security problems

TDY 12 (Memos re Special Forces complaint - to Region - re Prov. Chief--thru pg. 14)

Danang (Received guidance re President's speech (resig.?) and bombing halt?)

14 - 18 TDY Saigon - write efficiency reports, immunization--skin rash
17th - RON - Amb. Colby - Inform - check re replacement - ET/

18 - Write recommendations for meritorious service award

19 Loaned Prov. Chief my A.B. 143
Contact Gen. Young re more chopper time

20 Congressman Walde - Duc Pho - Chu Hai - Americal 1st anniversary ceremony

26 - 27 Regional meeting

More data noted in notebook.

11 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation With Mr. Rodriguez

1. Mr. Rodriguez was contacted by telephone this date regarding his movements and the movements of Major Gavin during the period 10-16 April 1968.
2. Mr. Rodriguez states that he departed Quang Ngai for Saigon during the period 1-5 April 1968 for the purpose of taking his retirement physical. He returned to Quang Ngai on 10 April 1968. He recalls arriving during the afternoon and having a conversation with Major Gavin. Major Gavin was somewhat upset that he (Rodriguez) had not returned earlier so that Gavin would be able to depart on leave. Gavin departed later that same day.
3. On the following day, 11 April 1968, Rodriguez had his application for retirement typed and he signed it. He replaced Major Gavin from 10-16 April 1968. Major Gavin had apparently travelled only as far as Da Nang and was unable to get transportation to Thailand.
4. On 17 April 1968 a major operation to the east began. Rodriguez associates Major Gavin's return to Quang Ngai as the day preceding this operation.



H. L. COOP
Major, AGC

EXHIBIT M-128



OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996

MASP

26 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL PEERS

SUBJECT: My Lai Investigation

1. Inclosed you will find a picture of the commanders and principal staff officers of the Americal Division taken after a meeting called primarily to discuss rice denial operations. Names of individuals are also indicated. I believe the picture was taken during the latter part of March 1968, based on the fact that Colonel Henderson was there as commander of the 11th Brigade, had been wounded at the time, and LTC Dionne, who was the Information Officer, was present but not in the picture and he departed the theater about 29 March 1968.
2. I have also ascertained that the period I was away from the Americal Division for R&R and TDY extended from a 1545 departure from Chu Lai on 27 April to a 1300 arrival in Chu Lai on 8 May, this information being obtained from a travel voucher.
3. I have also checked to see if telephone records would indicate when I spoke with Colonel Henderson and have confirmed two calls that are recorded and I know of one other made through the autovon system. These calls took place on 26 November at 1644 hours, lasting five minutes, and another on 5 December at 1629 hours, lasting 21 minutes. The unrecorded phone call was made prior to the 24th of November when I was interrogated by the CID, on the 22d or 23d or perhaps even earlier.

(a) Generally, the first one of these calls consisted of my asking Colonel Henderson if he had been consulted regarding any of the material which was appearing in the newspapers and learning from him that he had been interrogated several weeks prior to that time by the Inspector General. I discussed at some length with Colonel Henderson what appeared to be the exaggerations and inaccuracies of reported accounts of the combat action

MASP
SUBJECT: My Lai Investigation

26 February 1970

in the press and whether he should see the press who were camping on his doorstep. As I recall, we did not then discuss or rehash the investigations or actions taken by anyone during the period under investigation.

(b) The second call was made after the CID interrogated me and I was attempting to get a better fix on the timing of certain actions. I indicated to Colonel Henderson the timing of the different investigations, as I recalled them. He told me that he had remembered them somewhat differently in that there had been his original oral report, then my request to have these statements in writing and, lastly, the investigation of the VC propaganda which he had undertaken at his own instigation. I believe I indicated that that was not the way I recalled it and he generally indicated that's how he thought it was. He also recalled that I had been over the area that day, that I had landed to refuel at LZ Dottie at which time he had told me of the two individuals he had picked up in his aircraft who turned out to be Popular Forces troops, and the fact that I had queried him as to civilian casualties. I did not acknowledge recollection of this visit but on the other hand did not deny it. I did include mention of the possibility that I had flown over the area in the addendum. I also recall that Colonel Henderson brought up the fact that I had had a conversation with Barker or other individuals regarding the return of "C" Company to a village. This resulted in my making note of the possibility of such a conversation in the addendum of my witness statement.

(c) As I recall, the final telephone conversation was generally as a result of having read in the newspapers that Colonel Henderson had appeared before the Peers Committee and I called him to ask how the discussions had gone. I do not recall any of the details of the discussion, other than a general indication on the part of Colonel Henderson that he felt the discussions had been very thorough and that he found that he did not recall many of the details asked for. At the time I was scheduled to appear before the Board on 9 December.

(d) In one of the latter two conversations, Colonel Henderson indicated he had recently drafted a chronological sequence of actions concerning the incident. As I have indicated in my testimony, I queried the CID regarding the propriety of my receiving such a document. I did not receive any

MASP
SUBJECT: My Lai Investigation

26 February 1970

firm guidance from them and I did not seek nor receive the document from Colonel Henderson.

Incl
as



S. W. KOSTER
Major General, USA
Superintendent

THE INCLOSURE, A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE COMMANDERS AND PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION, HAS BEEN ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE AS EXHIBIT P-233. IT IS LOCATED IN VOLUME III, BOOK 6.

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: LOCATION: PERIOD COVERED:
 OFFICER: LT DOTTE FROM: TO:
 HOUR: DATE: HOUR: DATE:

TIME IN	OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN
0001		Journal opened.	
0130		B-6 reported receiving incoming mortar rounds.	11th Bde notified.
0143		B-6 requested dust-off.	
0144		Requested dust-off and light flare team to accompany dust-off.	
0146		B-6 reported having 1 KIA and 5 MIA.	
0244		Dust-off complete - sharks still on station.	11th Bde notified.
0240		Requested Spooky ship from 11th Bde.	
0300		Sharks returned to 11th Bde.	11th Bde notified.
0310		B-6 reported casualties: 011-E-6 Earl Jackson; 11th Bde notified. MIA; shrapnel in right foot and left leg; 100 E-3 Hattwell, William C. shrapnel in face; 118 E-3 David C Williams, head wounds unconscious, 121 Mossford, Gregory F., E-3 head wounds serious; 139 Anderson, Delmer G, shrapnel right arm. 1 US MIA - E-4 Edward Lillus will hold body until morning.	
0325		Spooky 214 now on station.	11th Bde notified.
0345		Random: B-6 received 15-16 mortar rounds plus small arms fire. Possible received a few satchel charges.	
0350		Sitrep negative - all units.	11th Bde notified.
0410		B-6 reported receiving two more mortars one	GROUP 4

EXHIBIT M-130

ORGANIZATION OF INSTALLATION
1101

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

FROM

TO

TF BARKER

LZ DOTTE

9 Mar 68

2100

9 Mar 68

TIME NO	TIME IN	OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN
13	0440		Landed 50 meters West of position and one about 75 meters South.	11th Bde notified.
14	0550		Sitrep negative - all units.	11th Bde notified.
15	0600		Spooly departed off station.	11th Bde notified.
16	0655		Bordrunner Reported PF playing with grenade exploded. Requested dust-off.	Notified MACV, BINH SON.
17	0730		Dust-off completed.	
18	0900		Co A located vicinity 77824 Co B no change.	11th Bde notified.
19	1010		MI burning trash LZ UPTIGHT something went off, MI wounded in leg & foot. Dust-off completed 1025, 1 MI was walking toward dump to pit trash in dump, when something went off, MI had shrapnel in both legs & foot. Roster #091.	11th Bde notified.
20	1045		Road from Southern AO to BINH SON is open.	11th Bde notified.
21	1050		CC ship started extraction of 1 platoon of Co B-4-3 to LZ UPTIGHT.	
22	1045		Road from Southern AO to BINH SON closed.	11th Bde notified.
23	1110		List of Co B element to LZ UPTIGHT has been completed.	
24	1319		1st lift B, Co extraction to LZ DOTTE completed LZ COLD.	11th Bde notified.
25	1330		Co A request Sharks to check out village.	

NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION
 TF B RISKER

LZ DOTTIE

PERIOD COVERED

FROM: HOUR 0000 DATE 19 Dec 68 TO: HOUR 2400 DATE 19 Dec 68

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	IN TI
	IN	OUT			
26	342		Co B lifted to LZ DOTTIE completed.	11th Bde notified.	
27	330		Late entry: Co B picked up one VCS vicinity 751818. Captured at 230 hrs.	11th Bde notified.	
28	425		Lift of Co A-4-3 PAX has been completed.		
29	550		Co A location -20 750838, #0 & CP 756835, A-30 752832.	11th Bde notified. Posted on map.	
30	630		Negative sitrep - all units.	11th Bde notified.	
31	830		Notified E Trp-20 & B-39 Engr of PF ambush at coord BS 623873, BS 625863 and BS 625857.		
32	900		Night locations: B-4-3 #0 at LZ UPTIGHT, B (-) at LZ DOTTIE, C-1-20 at LZ DOTTIE and E Trp-20 at North & South Bridges. A NDP located at BS 757857, A-10 ambush at BS 753852 and A-20 ambush at 759065.	11th Bde notified	
33	1905		LTC B-risker CC ship will arrive at 0700 tomorrow.		
34	2000		Sitrep negative - all units.	11th Bde notified.	
35	2150		Sitrep negative - all units.	11th Bde notified.	
36	2345		Sitrep negative - all units.	11th Bde notified.	
37	2400		Journal closed.	11th Bde notified.	

NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY: CHARLIE R. LEWELLEN CPT SIGNATURE: *Charlie R. Lewellen*



ACSI-CICR

31 DEC 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: ARMY STAFF MONITOR, MY LAI

SUBJECT: Analysis of Enemy Intelligence of My Lai Area (U)

1. References:

a. Chief of Staff Referral Slip Number 41450, subject as above, dated 15 December 1969 (TAB A).

b. Discussion between LTC Moore, CACSI, DA and Dr. Hermes, Office Chief of Military History.

2. Attached at TAB B is an analysis of enemy intelligence of My Lai area from 1964 until the alleged My Lai incident, which was requested in the referenced Referral Slip.

76700

signed

WERNER E. MICHEL
COL, GS
Chief, CI Division

2 Incl
as (CONFIDENTIAL)

Copy Furnished:
Chief of Military History
(ATTN: Dr. Hermes)
ACSI-Executive

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when
separated from classified
inclosures

EXHIBIT M-131



[REDACTED]

BACKGROUND ON EASTERN SON TINH DISTRICT
AND THE MY LAI 4 VICINITY

Control

Evidence indicates that eastern Son Tinh District, including the My Lai 4 area has been under strong VC control since 1964. Son My Village, containing the hamlet of My Lai 4, was rated VC controlled in March 1968, and remained so rated through the end of the year. GVN security has risen substantially in Quang Ngai during 1969. The most recent HES figures indicate Son Tinh District has 73 percent of its population under relative GVN security as opposed to over 92 percent nationwide. The area of My Lai 4 is still considered contested.

Popular Support for VC

General evidence indicates that the population in the vicinity of My Lai has supported the VC by payment of taxes, by providing a manpower base from which VC recruits have been drawn, and by providing food and shelter for the units in the area. The high incidence of enemy initiated activity in this area, and the past relative freedom of movement for the enemy there, substantiates this conclusion.

Infrastructure

The VC infrastructure (VCI) strength of Quang Ngai Province was roughly estimated at 4,900 in January 1969. Of these, some 845 were within Son Tinh District. Although it is impossible to determine how many of these resided in Son My Village or My Lai Hamlet, it is reasonable to expect that the typical VC local control apparatus existed at both village and hamlet level.

Logistics

There is no substantive evidence that prior to mid-1968 the VC has any difficulties obtaining sufficient manpower and logistics support from the population of Quang Ngai Province. Supply routes appeared to be well established, storage facilities numerous and well stocked with all classes of supplies, and ample civilian labor was apparently readily available. The VC appear to have had no difficulties collecting enough food from the civilian population -- primarily through taxation --

Prepared by:
Mr. L. J. Hickey
DIAAP-4A2R&A, 74915
Defense Intelligence Agency
30 Dec 69

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to meet their requirements in Son Tinh District. Moreover, there were several reports indicating the local manufacturing of some supplies and equipment. There was an absence of reports concerning supply shortages or logistics problems.

Order of Battle

The primary enemy maneuver element operating in Son Tinh District is the 48th Local Force Battalion which was raised within the district in 1965. Since then, this unit has generally operated throughout the district, reportedly living among the general population. (For a detailed OB picture of Quang Ngai Province see Annex A).

As of January 1969, the primary enemy forces reported operating in the vicinity of My Lai were the U20th VC LF Company, operating from My Lai 5 with a strength of 100, the 48th LF Battalion, operating from various base camps throughout Son Tinh District with a strength of 170, and the 506A VC LF Company, with an estimated strength of about 60. Accurate figures for guerrilla strengths in Son Tinh District are not available prior to 1969. However, the best estimates placed their number at about 700, 525, 500, and 500 respectively for each of the four quarters of 1968.

Enemy Activity

That Quang Ngai Province and Son Tinh District were areas of primary concentration for the VC, is reflected in the relatively high level of enemy initiated activity from 1966 through the first quarter of 1969. (See Annex B for detailed breakout of enemy activity).

Following an unsuccessful attack against Quang Ngai City during Tet 1968, a large concentration of VC forces dispersed away from the city. What was probably the 48th LF Battalion was contacted twice near My Lai 4 during this period (7 and 15 February) with resultant heavy enemy casualties. There is no available record of friendly casualties for this area.

Reports by the 11th Brigade and Task Force Oregon, which may provide pertinent information on enemy activities in this area are not available at either DIA or MACV. MACV records indicate copies of TF Oregon Quarterly Reports were forwarded to AC of S, Force Development, DA, Washington, DC.

Conclusions

The almost total lack of specific information on My Lai 4


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precludes any detailed assessment of that hamlet. However, the information on eastern Son Tinh indicates that the area was under strong VC control since at least 1964. The VC, at least until recently, have had no difficulties raising and maintaining large military forces in the area. Enemy units, through at least mid-1968, roamed the area with impunity and probably received the general support of the inhabitants.

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ORDER OF BATTLE SYNOPSIS
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE
(31 MARCH 1964-31 MARCH 1968)

1964

On March 1964, the enemy combat forces in Quang Ngai Province consisted of a Viet Cong regiment (2nd Infantry), three local force battalions and ten local force companies and platoons. VC main forces operated from base areas in the piedmont regions of western Quang Ngai conducting small unit operations -- usually in the periods of darkness. Targets included GVN and allied military outposts, new life hamlets, RD centers and the main municipalities of the ten districts.

Son Tinh District was generally under strong VC influence, even though a local force platoon (C20) was actually the only formed enemy unit in the My Lai area at the time.

1965

Through mid-1965, the status of enemy forces remained essentially the same as in 1964. Significant OB developments in 1965 included the growth of platoon-size district forces into company-size entities, as each district now had a local force company.

The 2nd Regiment deployed to Binh Dinh province in August, leaving the province in the hands of local force units (four battalions and eleven companies). The 48th VC Battalion was formed in Son Tinh District in August from personnel recruited in the area.

In December, the 22nd NVA Regiment arrived from North Vietnam, and the 1st VC Regiment arrived from its normal operating area in Quang Tin. The two units apparently used the western area of Quang Ngai as a staging area, and did not initiate any activity during the remainder of the year.

1966

In early 1966, the 22nd NVA Regiment deployed south to Binh Dinh province, and the 21st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division arrived in Quang Ngai from Quang Tin province. Elements of the 21st were subsequently contacted in the northwestern part of Quang Ngai -- the entire regiment returned to Quang Tin in April. The 409th Battalion, which arrived from Kontum in 1965, departed for Quang Tin in mid-1966. In November, the 2nd VC Regiment returned to Quang Ngai after a year-and-a-half's absence.

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62 enemy killed. The unit may have been elements of, if not the entire 48th Battalion.

ARVN estimated the total enemy force to be about 3,600 men, 1,200 of which were reported killed. (MACV message reported 800 KIA in their My Lai assessment).

In the Quang Ngai City attack, the G-2 advisors to the 2nd ARVN Division reported that the 48th Battalion was especially hard-hit. The unit reportedly lost its battalion commander and two of its four company commanders.

February 1968

The enemy forces suffered heavily in the Quang Ngai City attacks. During February, the units dispersed away from the city in all directions. Most of the participating units withdrew south and west, while elements of the 48th Battalion were believed to have transited the My Lai 4 area on its way to the Batangan peninsula. On 12 February, elements of the 48th were contacted 800 yards north of My Lai 4 (BS716795) which resulted in 78 enemy killed and three detained. By 25 February, the 48th Battalion headquarters was located in the Batangan peninsula where it remained until May.

March 1968

During March 1968, enemy forces remained out of contact, probably recuperating and refitting after the losses suffered during the Tet attacks.

Although Son Tinh District remained relatively quiet during this period, elements of the 48th and existing local force units probably roamed the district countryside. The hills north and northwest of the My Lai 4 area were probable base camps for elements of the 48th Battalion and it probably received supplies by sea off Batangan peninsula.

On 1 March, MARKET TIME Forces forced an enemy trawler aground at the cape. The trawler returned fire, but overwhelming allied counterfire forced the crew to abandon the ship - which was destroyed by a self-destruct mechanism. The trawler was believed to be supplying the 48th Battalion.

The following table recapitulates the enemy strength in Quang Ngai province from 1964 to March 1968. Ranged figures represent the minimum/maximum strength levels within the indicated period attributed to the deployment of units to and from Quang Ngai. The figures were obtained from OB

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holdings published by the field during the respective periods. Comparable figures sent by MACV for 1966 and 1967 were essentially within the ranges shown below:

Personnel Strength

<u>Category</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Combat	2,000-3,000	3,400-5,000	3,700-7,300	3,000-10,000
Guerrillas	2,000	2,000-3,000	3,000-4,000	3,000-4,000
Admin Serv	500-1,000	1,000-1,500	1,000	1,000
VCI & Irregular (Self-defense and Secret Self- defense)	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Total	9,500-11,000	11,400-13,500	12,700-17,300	12,000-20,000

1st Quarter 1968

Combat	2,000-4,000
Guerrillas	3,000-5,000
Admin Services	500-1,000
VCI&Irregular Force	<u>4,000-5,000</u>
Total	9,500-115,000

Units

<u>Quang Ngai</u> <u>Number of Combat Units</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>		
					<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>
Division Hq				0-1			
Regiments	1	0-2	1-3	2-4	2	2	2
Battalions	5-7	3-10	4-12	7-13	7	7	7
LF Companies	3	10	9-11	9-10	12	12	12
LF Platoons	8						

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
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QUANG NGAI

31 MARCH 1964




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SOUTH VIETNAM

QUANG NGAI


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SOUTH VIETNAM

QUANG NGAI


31 MARCH 1966



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QUANG NGAI

31 MARCH 1967




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QUANG NGAI

31 JANUARY 1968




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QUANG NGAI


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SOUTH VIETNAM

QUANG NGAI

31 MARCH 1968



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ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS 1966-68
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE AND MY LAI VICINITY

(1) Quang Ngai Province:

Cat*	<u>1966</u>			
	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
1	12	12	14	9
2	5	4	5	4
3	0	0	0	0
4	411	233	170	382
5	19	9	10	14
6	4	13	2	10
7	288	376	399	380
8	7	8	5	0

1967

<u>Cat</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
1	31	23	29	16
2	5	3	2	1
3	0	0	0	0
4	875	408	330	139
5	11	14	10	12
6	4	8	6	7
7	526	722	603	249
8	0	1	0	0

1968

<u>Cat</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
1	18
2	3
3	1
4	106
5	2
6	4
7	237
8	0

* Categories are:

Attacks by fire (1); Ambushes (2); Assaults (3); Firing at friendly aircraft (4); Sabotage (5); Terrorist incidents (6); Mining and harassments (7); and Propaganda (8).

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
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QUANG NGAI

31 MARCH 1968



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ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS 1966-68
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE AND MY LAI VICINITY

(1) Quang Ngai Province:

Cat*	<u>1966</u>			
	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
1	12	12	14	9
2	5	4	5	4
3	0	0	0	0
4	411	233	170	382
5	19	9	10	14
6	4	13	2	10
7	288	376	399	380
8	7	8	5	0

1967

<u>Cat</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
1	31	23	29	16
2	5	3	2	1
3	0	0	0	0
4	875	408	330	139
5	11	14	10	12
6	4	8	6	7
7	526	722	603	249
8	0	1	0	0

1968

<u>Cat</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
1	18
2	3
3	1
4	106
5	2
6	4
7	237
8	0

* Categories are:

Attacks by fire (1); Ambushes (2); Assaults (3); Firing at friendly aircraft (4); Sabotage (5); Terrorist incidents (6); Mining and harassments (7); and Propaganda (8).

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(2) My Lai Vicinity (area enclosed by UTM Grid Coord BS 5090, BS 8090, BS 5070, and BS 8070)

1966

<u>Cat</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
1	5	3	0	2
2	3	0	1	1
3	0	0	0	0
4	145	67	19	91
5	5	1	2	2
6	1	2	2	2
7	50	63	62	79
8	1	1	4	0

1967

<u>Cat</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
1	6	5	10	5
2	0	2	1	0
3	0	0	0	0
4	158	107	155	72
5	1	7	2	2
6	0	0	2	2
7	145	242	221	90
8	0	0	0	0

1968

<u>Cat</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>
1	7
2	0
3	0
4	34
5	0
6	0
7	37
8	0

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E X T R A C T S

from

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SUMMARY

VC Propaganda for the following dates:

16 APRIL 1968

23 APRIL 1968

2 JUNE 1968

24 NOVEMBER 1969

HOANG QUOC VIET REVEALS ROLE IN 'TALKS' MOVE

Paris AFP in English 0720 GMT 16 Apr 68 C (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

[Text] Rome--A leading North Vietnamese trade union official said today that the way to peace in Vietnam is still not open. Hoang Quoc Viet, president of the North Vietnamese Trade Union Federation, said in an interview with the Italian Communist Party newspaper L'UNITA: In North and South Vietnam people are still dying, and in the outside world Washington is carrying out its great maneuvers to deceive public opinion.

Hoang, a member of the VWP Central Committee, outlined the circumstances surrounding his government's decision to take the political initiative, as he termed it, on 3 April. It was he who put forward the proposal for a first meeting limited to the question of suspension of all bombing, he said. Why did we do it? . . . We are a little country--a poor country--and the United States is the largest capitalist power in the world.

The reality is as follows: The Americans are in an impasse and we are on the way to decisive victory. A new military situation exists in Vietnam and a new political situation exists in Vietnam. A new political situation exists in the world as a whole. This was our diagnosis and this was what led us to take the political initiative on 3 April, he said.

NHAN DAN WARNS U.S. ON ATROCITIES IN SOUTH

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 0610 GMT 17 Apr 68 B

[Text] Hanoi--Annihilation is the fate that awaits the killers.

This was stressed by the Hanoi daily NHAN DAN today in a commentary which recalled the most recent savage homicidal acts taken by the U.S. aggressors and their acolytes against the people in South Vietnam, particularly the massacre conducted by elements of the U.S. 82d Airborne Brigade on 18 March 1968, at Son My village in Son Tra district, Quang Ngai Province, during which 501 persons, mostly aged people, women, and children, were slaughtered.

Here the murderers beheaded many aged persons before dumping the headless bodies into ponds and wells. They roasted children alive, and took their will upon expectant mothers until their victims died.

The paper also recalled the fact that since February this year Pak Chong-hui troops have conducted a series of massacres in the northern part of Quang Nam Province, taking the lives of over 700 persons--most odious were the ones on 12, 24, and 25 February and 18 March 1968 respectively at Dien An, Dien Hai, Cam Ha, and Xuyen My villages.

The paper stressed: The U.S. aggressors have perpetrated capital crimes against the Vietnamese people. They have committed unpardonable crimes against the American people and the peoples in those countries where they recruit mercenaries for their war in Vietnam, and progressive mankind as a whole. For this they are sternly condemned and eternally cursed by the world.

It pointed out: The aggressive policy the U.S. imperialists are obdurately pursuing is the origin of all the crimes in Vietnam. Obsessed with their sinister design, the U.S. imperialists have turned their expeditionary corps into a pack of savage beasts. They have turned their mercenaries from South Korea, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, and the Saigon troops into bloodthirsty hangmen.

The paper continued: The recent massacres in Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, and other places in South Vietnam have pointed to one thing--that the U.S. aggressors have been driven to the wall, that they have lost in the fight with the Liberation Armed Forces, and that they are being crushed under the general offensive and widespread uprising of the PLAF and South Vietnamese people.

Confronted with obvious fiasco, they are taking vengeance on old people, women, and children. They are bombing the towns and conducting mass killing in the countryside. All this, however, attests to their desperation and weakness and is a senseless effort made by a doomed aggressor.

These homicidal acts cannot pass with impunity, the paper stressed, recalling the punishing blows dealt up to now at the enemy, particularly in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces, where in a series of attacks launched late in March and early in April this year, the People's Liberation Armed Forces wiped out thousands of enemy troops.

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN SAYS ABRAMS DOOMED TO FAIL

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1551 GMT 16 Apr 68 B

[Text] Hanoi--Johnson's decision to replace Westmoreland by Abrams will not save the moribund U.S. "local war" strategy from total collapse, said the Hanoi daily QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in a commentary today.

The paper noted that the appointment of Abrams as commander of the U.S. forces in South Vietnam is clearly a pis aller of the Johnson clique since he is known as a general with a gloomier background than Westmoreland and whose name is already linked to the inglorious career of the latter.

The Abrams appointment, the paper stressed, can only worsen the situation of the aggressors. It can neither bolster the fast dwindling confidence of the U.S. troops, nor screw up the sagging morale of the puppet army--instead it only sharpens the contradictions among the U.S. military bosses who have been scrambling for power and putting the blame for defeats on one another.

The paper continued: "The replacement of Westmoreland by Abrams also marks the bankruptcy of the 'search and destroy' and 'pacification' strategy initiated by the former. REUTERS reported that the United States was quietly shifting to the 'clear and hold' tactic which is a distinctive feature of the new defensive strategy advocated by Abrams. This, undoubtedly, is a step back, strategically speaking, taken by the United States in its tight straits. Unable to draft more U.S. expeditionary troops to Vietnam, the United States is trying to put the brunt of its aggressive war on the puppet army. Abrams, who was charged with organizing, arming, and training the puppet army, is now told to carry this task through. However, how can the puppet army shoulder a burden the Americans themselves could not? It is clear that even if Abrams tries to give the puppet army a shot in the arm by 'modernizing' it with M-16's, mortars, and other weapons, the moribund puppet army cannot get back on its feet."

On 17 March before withdrawing from the Mang La post, U.S. and puppet troops called in aircraft to fire tracer bullets on the people living nearby, causing many casualties. A Cao Dai pagoda, more than 400 houses, and nearly 14 tons of paddy were burned. The 21 remaining houses were set on fire a few days later by enemy shells.

On 3 March U.S. aircraft also fired tracer bullets on the Can Tho provincial capital, reducing 200 homes to ashes and raising to 5,200 the total of people's houses burned down in the town since early February.

LPA also reported that early on 27 March, the puppet regime sent police to round up people in the Saigon-Cholon area when they were sound asleep. The police broke into one house after another and at gunpoint forced people from 15 to 50 years of age into concentration camps. This mass arrest has aroused great indignation among the Saigon-Cholon people, including many intellectuals and members of the puppet army and administration.

U.S., S. Korean Crimes

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1634 GMT 16 Apr 68 B

[Text] Hanoi--Carrying out their burn-all, destroy-all and kill-all policy, U.S. and Pak Chong-hui troops in South Vietnam since February have killed 1,235 persons in our districts of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces, according to LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY.

On 18 March, elements of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division killed 501 people, mostly old folks, women, and children, in Son Tinh district, Quang Ngai Province. Many children were thrown into flames, babies were stabbed, women raped to death, and people over 70 years of age. [sentence as received] All members of 24 families of puppet troops were slain.

Since February, the Pak Chong-hui troops have killed 734 people including Catholic nuns and believers in Dien Ban and Duy Xuyen districts and Hoi An town, Quang Nam Province.

They bayoneted pregnant women, chopped up children, then threw them into the fire, and broke the skulls of some babies by knocking them against stones.

These crimes were denounced by the committee of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front in central Trung bo in an urgent statement released by LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY recently.

The statement called on the peace- and justice-loving forces the world over to denounce and condemn these crimes perpetrated by the U.S. aggressors and the Pak Chong-hui mercenaries, and to demand that the United States put an end to its aggressive war in Vietnam, withdraw American and satellite troops and war equipment from South Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their internal affairs.

The statement called on the American people, and the people of those countries having troops in South Vietnam to take more vigorous actions in demanding their governments to withdraw their troops from there, and end all barbarous crimes against the South Vietnamese people.

The above crimes were also denounced here today at a press conference held by Nguyen Van Tien, head of the NPLSV permanent representation in North Vietnam. The above statement of the NPLSV committee in central Trung Bo was read at the conference.

COMMUNIQUE DESCRIBES QUANG NGAI 'MASSACRE'

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1647 GMT 23 Apr 68 B

[Text] Hanoi--The NFLSV committee in Quang Ngai Province has issued a communique on the massacre of over 500 people in Tinh Khe village, Son Tinh district, Quang Ngai Province, by the U.S. imperialists (and) their henchmen on 16 March.

The communique said: Early on the morning of 16 March the populace of Tinh Khe village, Son Tinh district, were going about their work when enemy artillery shells from many directions came crashing down on Lang and Go hamlets. Immediately after the shelling stopped, nine U.S. helicopters came and landed troops around the two hamlets. The U.S. aggressors, like a pack of wild beasts, broke into the hamlets in three columns, one to kill, another to burn, and the third to fell trees and kill animals. They came from the third brigade, 82d Division, which was brought to South Vietnam following the bitter defeats suffered by the United States and its henchmen early this spring. The raiders killed people and animals, burned down houses, and felled trees wherever they went. They did not spare even the aged, children, or pregnant women.

In Lang hamlet, the U.S. brutes herded at bayonet and gun point about 100 people, old and young, to a canal in front of Mr Nhieu's house, had them sit in rows, and opened up with machineguns. The victims were mowed down one after another, their blood spilling over the whole place. Many among them were more than 60 years old, and the majority were children between one and 14. Some were cut down as they screamed in terror after the first volleys. Many complete families perished in the massacre.

Seventy-two-year-old Huong was beaten black and blue and thrown into a well and finished off with a burst of gunfire. Little Nguyen, 12 years old, was raped and died with bayonet stabs at her genitals and all over the body. Fifteen-year-old Phan Thi Mui after being raped was thrown into a flaming house. All seven members of old Le Ly's family, including four children--the youngest of whom was four years old--(?died). A married daughter, who live far from home when the slaughter occurred, survived.

Altogether, the U.S. aggressors killed 260 people in Lang hamlet, mostly old people, women, and children.

In Go hamlet, the U.S. aggressors burned all houses and killed everyone they came across. All 15 people in an air raid shelter at Mr Le's were killed. Mrs Vo Thi Mai who had just [words indistinct] on the previous night, was raped and killed. Thirtytwo-year-old Ngyuen Thi Ngon, who was nearing childbirth, was killed by a grenade, and the fetus was still moving when shot out. Nguyen Thi Phu, 32, was nursing her baby when the U.S. brutes broke in. They snatched the baby from her hands, raped her, and then set fire to her house, killing both mother and child. Old Kheo, a woman of 65, was gunned down at the brink of a shelter and hurled into her burning house.

All told, the U.S. aggressors slaughtered 82 people, wounded 10 others, and burned down 304 houses in Go hamlet. Many people coming from other places to visit their relatives were also killed.

Four, on 16 March, in these two hamlets alone the U.S. aggressors savagely massacred nearly 500 people and wounded 50 others. Among the dead were 67 old people and 170 children. All the houses in these hamlets were burned down, all trees felled, and all animals slaughtered.

The communique said that this was a typical massacre committed by the U.S. aggressors. It has aroused burning hatred among the people in Tinh Khe village and Quang Ngai Province in general.

Resolved to avenge the victims, the communique went on, the guerrillas in Tinh Khe and neighboring villages on 17 and 19 March killed 31 enemy, including 17 yanks. During the 12 days ending 28 March the regional armed forces and guerrillas fought dozens of battles in which they (?killed) or wounded 298 enemies.

CENTRAL TRUNG BO PEASANTS CLAIM BIG GAINS

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 0900 GMT
23 Apr 68 S

[Text] Recently, the Central Trung Bo Liberation Peasants Association's executive committee met and issued a communique on the achievements in production and fighting of the peasant compatriots in central Trung Bo during the 1967-1968 winter-spring period, particularly the great strides of the peasants movement in the early spring general offensive and uprising.

The communique reports that the peasants' movement in central Trung Bo has made comprehensive and vigorous progress as follows:

1--Playing the role of a main element in the general offensive and concerted uprising, our peasant compatriots have highly manifested an unprecedented brave offensive spirit. Our peasants in the enemy-controlled areas have seethingly staged an armed uprising, destroying hamlets and the enemy's grip, winning back the right to be masters of their villages and hamlets, and expanding the liberated areas to the cities and towns. To date, over 200,000 additional people have been liberated. In large numbers and in an atmosphere of enthusiasm, our peasant brothers and sisters in the liberated areas have bravely rushed forward, coordinating with the compatriots in the enemy-controlled areas and urban centers in attacking the enemy and disintegrating the puppet army and administration.

Since February 1968, nearly one million people have risen up and taken to the streets to struggle against the enemy. In southern Quang Nam, 44,800 people participated in the early spring offensive and uprising. In Quang Ngai, 50,000 people participated in the struggle, and so forth. These achievements have manifested not only our peasants' extraordinary strength in the violent revolution and mass movement to attack the enemy and win back administrative control but also their firm confidence in the revolution, their indomitable spirit, and their hatred for the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen.

2--The armed, political, and troop proselyting struggles have been thoroughly carried out by the Liberation Peasants Association and the bulk of our peasant compatriots.

We warmly greet the Alliance which comes into being at a moment of historic significance that is filled with elation. We convey special greetings to writers and artists who have joined the Alliance.

Through the Alliance's committee, (we convey to) writers and artists who have joined the Alliance our most affectionate greetings as colleagues, comrades in arms in the anti-U.S. national salvation front. Forced to temporarily live under the oppression of the U.S.-puppet fascist regime, you have used literary and artistic weapons to denounce the U.S.-puppets' crimes, struggled for freedom and the right to live on behalf of artists and writers, and struggled against the decadent, anti-people [word indistinct] culture.

However, as long as the U.S. aggressors pursue their aggression against our country and while the power remains in the hands of the country-selling Thieu-Ky clique, there cannot be genuine freedom and independence. We are convinced that united within the Alliance, artists and writers will use their patriotism to resist the Americans and [words indistinct] along with all the people kick out the U.S. aggressors, overthrow the Thieu-Ky clique, achieve independence and freedom for our people and legitimate rights for artists and writers.

Under the clear-sighted and attentive leadership of the NFISV, many writers and artists of our liberation writers and artists association have scored outstanding achievements in the glorious tasks of using the arts to serve the national liberation cause. (The South Vietnam Writers and Artists Association) with its high fighting spirit and revolutionary optimism has stirred tens of millions of compatriots throughout Vietnam and gained great sympathy from friends throughout the world. At present, all the association's writers and artists are enthusiastically overcoming many hardships and sacrifices and going to all southern battlefields to contribute their talents, intelligence, and songs to the independence and freedom of the fatherland.

We are increasingly enthusiastic and stimulated because we know that the Alliance has (?participated) in the people's common struggle. It is certain that with the invincible strength of the all-people great solidarity bloc, the Alliance will succeed in carrying out its concrete action program [words indistinct]. We are convinced that the Alliance will make more and more positive contributions to enlarging the all-people great solidarity bloc and fulfill the glorious historic task of contributing to stepping up and leading the southern liberation cause to complete success.

We respectfully wish good health to all members of the Alliance's central committee and through them many great successes to the Alliance in carrying out its action program.

(signed) For the executive committee of the South Vietnam Writers and Artists Association: Chairman (?Huynh Minh Xieng), South Vietnam, 8 May.

TEACHERS DENOUNCE U.S. CRIMES, COWBOY CULTURE

Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0100 GMT 2 Jun 68 S

[Text] According to LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY, the Quang Ngai Patriotic Teachers Association committee recently sent an open letter to teachers, students, parents, and university and high school students in South and North Vietnam and throughout the

the world indignantly denouncing the crimes of the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen in destroying and setting afire schools and massacring many school teachers, pupils, and small children on 16 March 1968 in Son My village, Son Tinh district. The letter revealed:

"On 16 March 1968, the U.S. aggressors of the 3d Brigade, 82d Division stormed Son My village, setting afire and massacring the people and torturing to death 502 villagers, the majority of whom were the aged, women, and children. Among the slain were schoolteacher Huy and schoolmistress Tuyet, 22, killed along with their 6-month-old baby. Of 170 small children slain, 76 were pupils--38 kindergarten children and 38 first education degree pupils. The bloodthirsty ghouls also raped and killed 8 small girls, ages 12 to 15."

The letter continued: "In the past 2 years, the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen have destroyed over 1,500 schoolhouses in the liberated areas of our province. Despite all this, undaunted and studious, the schoolmasters, schoolmistresses, and pupils, wholeheartedly assisted by the people, have found the means to erect new schoolhouses or to organize underground classes. Many schools must be moved constantly. Daily the pupils must bring a folding chair and a wooden board to use as a bench and desk. After class they take these home and hide them. Education is extremely difficult. Since we are teachers who constantly care for the happy future of small children and pupils, the youngsters of the country, we vigorously denounce the inhuman and anticultural actions of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys.

"We earnestly appeal to the teachers, students, parents, university and high school students, and progressives throughout the world to unmask the crimes and restrain the bloodstained hands of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys and to determinedly struggle to demand that the aggressors end their aggressive war in Vietnam."

"Teachers and university and high school students in areas under the temporary control of the enemy: Struggle with us to demand that the Americans and their lackeys pay their blood debts, and to resolutely erase the slavish, decadent, cowboy culture and education being disseminated by the U.S. imperialists. The frenzied, agonizing death throes of the U.S. invaders and their puppets cannot save them from total collapse. The Vietnamese people, strongly supported by people throughout the world, will certainly gain glorious victory in their just resistance and in building their happy future."

PLAF ATTACKS CONTINUE THROUGHOUT S. VIETNAM

Saigon Fighting

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 0611 GMT 2 Jun 68 B

[Text] Hanoi--At 0500 yesterday, the revolutionary armed forces in Saigon-Gia Dinh continued harrassing the U.S. and puppet troops inside Saigon-Cholon, inflicting many losses on them, LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY reported.

In the western sector of the city, the patriotic forces attacked the enemy in many districts of Cholon, and stormed many police posts and military installations. Dozens of enemy troops were wiped out in Ly Thanh Nguyen and Khong Tu streets (5th district). Police stations and the civil guard units guarding the Le Quang Liem wharf also came under attack.

I asked the minister of foreign affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government about her views on the question of a referendum broached by Duong Van Minh. Mme Nguyen Thi Binh answered:

"So far we have expressed no opinion on this referendum. But how can one think that the population would be able to express its views freely under the Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime and in the presence of 500,000 American and satellite troops?"

Our position is known [subhead]

Mme Nguyen Thi Binh then reaffirmed the position of the Provisional Revolutionary Government:

"Our position is known. It has not changed. We demand that all American troops and those belonging to the satellite countries be unconditionally withdrawn. We also demand the creation of a coalition government including all the forces in favor of peace, independence, and neutrality and which will organize free and democratic elections throughout South Vietnamese territory in order to enable the population to determine freely its political regime.

"In order to achieve this aim we are pursuing a policy of broadly based unity and national harmony. We welcome all people who declare themselves for the withdrawal of the American troops, against the Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime, and for a provisional coalition government, peace, and South Vietnamese independence and neutrality."

Let us hope that these particulars given by Mme Nguyen Thi Binh will help to put an end to speculations--or soundings--of all kinds concerning the position of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, speculations which have flourished in recent days.

TRUNG BO NFLSV DENOUNCES AMERICAN CRIMES

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 0500 GMT 24 Nov 69 S

[Text] World public opinion is severely condemning the extremely savage crime of the U.S. aggressors who massacred more than 500 of our compatriots in Son My village, Quang Ngai Province, on 16 March 1968. The Central Trung Bo NFLSV Committee on 25 March 1968 issued the following urgent statement vehemently denouncing this barbarous crime of the U.S. aggressors:

With boundless emotion and indignation, the Central Trung Bo NFLSV Committee denounces before public opinion at home and abroad the following gross crimes of the U.S. imperialists and the Pak Chong-hui mercenaries.

On 16 March 1968, the U.S. Division expeditionary troops of the 82d Airborne conducted an operation in the villages of Son My, Son Quang, Son Hai, and Son Hoa in Son Tinh district, Quang Ngai Province. Wherever they went, the U.S. troops burned homes, killed people, committing acts of robbery, and raped women.

Specifically, in Son My village, they carried out a policy of burning all, destroying all, and killing all, in an extremely barbarous fashion. They blew up the shelters and rounded up our compatriots, then opened fire, killing hundreds of people.

They herded our compatriots into various homes, opened fire on and threw grenades to massacre them, then set fire to these homes. They threw young children into the fire to burn them alive, stabbing babies feeding on their mothers' breasts and raping many women to death. Some women who were almost dead were killed and their bodies were thrown into wells and into the river.

In this wave of terrorism, the U.S. expeditionary troops killed 380 people in Lang hamlet, 87 in Nghia Hoi hamlet, and 34 others in Phuong Du hamlet. Thus, a total of 501 villagers, mostly old people, women, and children, were killed. Twenty-four families of puppet army soldiers were annihilated. Some old men and women who were over 70 years of age were also massacred.

In northern Quang Nam, since February 1968, the Pak Chong-hui mercenaries have perpetrated a series of extremely barbarous massacres, killing more than 700 of our compatriots in the districts of Dien Ban, Duy Xuyen, and Hoi An. Specifically, these massacres include those perpetrated in Dien An village on 12 February, in Dien Hai village on 24 February, in Cam Hang village on 25 February, in Kien My village on 18 March 1969, and so forth.

In Dien An village, Dien Ban district, the Pak Chong-hui troops penetrating into the hamlets of Thong Nhut and Thong Nhi searched every home, using rifle butts and bayonets to herd our compatriots toward the (?river). Then they opened fire, cutting down many villagers on the spot. Even more cruelly, they thrust bayonets into the bellies of pregnant women, ripping out the embryos. They also chopped the bodies of young children into pieces, and threw them into the fire.

They cut off the legs of 2- and 3-year-old children, then smashed their heads against stones, fracturing their skulls. Two aggressors cut off the legs of a beheaded 60-year-old woman, then threw her body into a well. A total of 102 Dien An villagers, including relatives of members of the puppet army and administration, were massacred.

Throughout similar, extremely savage maneuvers, the Pak Chong-hui devils massacred 140 people in Dien Hai village, 117 in the villages of Dien Nhon, Dien Tam, Dien Bac, Dien Trung, and Dien Nam, 30 others in Chuong My village, and so forth.

In Chuong My village, Duy Xuyen district, the Pak Chong-hui devils even killed Catholic nuns and many Catholic compatriots in the church. In Cam Ha village, adjacent to Hoi An city, the Pak Chong-hui troops herded our compatriots into the shelters, then threw grenades at and opened heavy machinegun fire on them. The wounded compatriots emerging from the shelters were stabbed to death. More than 120 of our compatriots, including many families which were annihilated, were tragically massacred by the aggressors.

The total number of our compatriots massacred by the Pak Chong-hui mercenaries in the districts of Dien Ban, Duy Xuyen, and Hoi An, amounted to 734. Thus, the total number of our compatriots killed by the U.S. troops and the Pak Chong-hui mercenaries in Son My village, where 502 of our compatriots were massacred, and in the districts of Dien Ban, Duy Xuyen, and Hoi An, amounted to 1,235.

The Central Trung Bo NPLSV Committee vehemently denounces these savage crimes of the U.S. imperialists and the Pak Chong-hui mercenary troops before the people of the nation and the world, and before the international court trying the U.S. imperialists' war crimes. The U.S. aggressors and their lackeys have frenziedly perpetrated crimes in the hope of suppressing our people and relieving their own extremely serious failures.

But all their criminal acts, including the indiscriminate bombing of various cities, have merely shown their desperation and weak position. They are only the writhing of an extremely barbarous aggressor who is facing total defeat. The more the stupid, stubborn U.S. aggressors and their lackeys perpetrate bloody crimes against our people, the more they will sustain increasing and appropriate punishment. More than ever before, with their general offensive and widespread uprising impetus, our armed forces and people are determined to (make the U.S. aggressors) and their lackeys pay their blood debts ten-fold.

The Central Trung Bo NPLSV Committee conveys its regards and condolences to the families whose relatives were massacred, and calls on compatriots to turn grief into action, to contribute together with the entire people toward annihilating extensive enemy forces so as to avenge the country and the people. We call on all compatriots, cadres, and combatants to deeply engrave this hatred in their hearts and to translate it into strength to successively advance, to constantly attack and arise, to strenuously annihilate the U.S. aggressors and puppet and satellite troops, to punish diehard, cruel agents, to direct staggering blows at the U.S. imperialists' heads, to route the puppet army, to smash the puppet administration, to resolutely avenge compatriots with the enemy blood, and to regain independence and the administration.

Let officers, men, and personnel of the puppet administration clearly realize the crimes of the U.S. aggressors, the Pak Chong-hui mercenaries, and the Thieu-Ky clique against their families, rapidly turn their guns on the enemy, and return to the fatherland.

We urgently appeal to all democratic, peaceful, and just forces in the world to denounce and sternly condemn these extremely savage crimes of the U.S. aggressors and the Pak Chong-hui mercenaries, and to demand that the Americans end the war of aggression in Vietnam, evacuate all U.S. and satellite troops and war equipment from South Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese settle their internal affairs by themselves.

We specifically appeal to the American people and to the peoples of those countries which have mercenaries fighting for the Americans in South Vietnam--for justice, the just cause, the honor of their countries, and the interests of their sons--to struggle even more vigorously to demand that their respective governments withdraw their troops from South Vietnam and put an end to every savage crime against the South Vietnamese people.

The Central Trung Bo NPLSV Committee solemnly states that the Central Trung Bo armed forces and people are never afraid of any cruel acts of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. On the other hand, the U.S. aggressors' and their lackeys' cruel acts will only deepen the central Trung Bo armed forces' and people's hatred and heighten their determination to fight and win, to continuously surge forward, to direct even more serious punishing blows at the U.S. aggressors and their satellite lackeys, and to make their worthy contribution toward fulfilling the sacred undertaking of all the South Vietnamese people, that of liberating the south, protecting the north, and proceeding toward peacefully reunifying the fatherland.

6 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD


SUBJECT: List of Prisoners Captured on 11 June 1968

Following is a list of the three prisoners captured by Quang Ngai Sector on 11 Jun 1968 in Tu Cung Hamlet. The prisoners were interrogated for tactical information in the field and returned to Quang Ngai to be interrogated by the police. No reports were made of the field interrogation. Reports were filed by the National Police office in Quang Ngai. These records were read by LTC B. M. Stanberry but included no mention of My Lai or of the operation of 16 March in Son My Village. The information contained in the report was almost exclusively biographical; only one even mentioned the Sub Hamlet where the man lived.

The 3 VC suspects captured were:

Truong Tro, age 42
Phom Hong, age 43
Do Dong, age 43


BILLY M. STANBERRY
Lieutenant Colonel, USA


 WEEKLY SYNOPSIS HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
 APO US Forces 96222

MACJ213-1

31 July 1969

BULLETIN No. 97

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary ICTZ	Capture Data
*	*	*
07-5957-69	<p><u>SUBJ:</u> (C) <u>X78 aka V78 aka 78th NVA</u> <u>Artillery Battalion, Quang Nam</u> <u>Province Unit, Military Region</u> 5.</p>	<p>16 July 1969 BS285982 (Batch No.644) ICTZ B/1/501, 2/101st U.S. Abn Div</p>
*	*	*
	<p>(C) <u>Item 8:</u> (4 pages, typewritten, B-3) Political indoctrination material entitled, "The American Aggressors Must Pay For Their Debts In Blood Against the People of Son My Village", relates crimes committed by the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) in Son My aka Tinh Khe Village, Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, purportedly to kindle the people's hatred against the enemy.</p>	
*	*	*
	<p>s/Henry R. Humphry SP5 THOMAS B. LYNCH for LTC, USA Dir, U.S. Elm, CDEC</p>	

THIS DOCUMENT IS RELEASABLE TO
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND FREE
 WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES.

GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.



[REDACTED]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96317

XIXO

15 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Trip Report, 1 September - 15 September 1967

1. During cited period members of the Brigade staff and battalion commanders conducted a tour of RVN for the purpose of orientation, education, and review of matters incident to deployment. The visit was planned to permit maximum time for visit with opposite members at TF Oregon and elements subordinate thereto. The visit to RVN was cleared for arrival not earlier than 4 Sep 67. In order to arrive on the 4th of September, it was necessary to depart Honolulu on 1 September and RON 2 and 3 September in the Philippines. Party arrived Saigon 2230 hours, 4 September and were met by Colonel Scanlon, Dep G3 (Operations), USARV, and transported by sedan and bus, with MP escort, to Long Binh approximately 20K north of Saigon. Party closed HQ USARV approximately 042400 September.

2. On 050930 September meetings and briefings were conducted by G3 USARV personnel. A tour of the USARV TOC was made and Brigade XO and battalion commanders visited with General Young, DCSOPS USARV. Discussions were held with following personnel:

General Young, DCSOPS
Colonel Gelling, AC/S G3
Colonel Scanlon, Dep AC/S G3
LTC O'Mary, OIC TOC
LTC Tixier, Doctrine and Training Division
Cpt Keller, Doctrine and Training Division
Major Bark, Doctrine and Training Division
LTC Schaub, Doctrine and Training Division

During this period 050930-051200 September above officers highlighted items of general interest to the Brigade and provided USARV publication in the areas of training, ENSURE Program, and military history (ORLL). LTC O'Mary discussed his experiences as a

[REDACTED]
GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
Declassified after 12 years.

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EXHIBIT M-135

XIXO

15 September 1967

SUBJECT: Trip Report, 1-15 September 1967

battalion commander and offered suggestions in the areas of base camp development, action on contact, maneuver, navigation, use of army aircraft, preparation of LZ and lagging (Incl 1).

3. From 051300-051700 party received USARV command briefing and conducted discussion with following personnel:

Col Hayward, OAC/S G3
LTC O'Mory, OIC - AOC
Cpt Dutton, OAC/S G2
LTC Ceglowski, OAC/S G1
Maj Bisson, OAC/S G4
Maj Dietz, OAC/S G3
Col Mattingly, PIO
Maj Duttweiler, OTSG
Maj McCort, Army Avn
Maj Curran, Sig
Maj Cunha, Engr

In general, the information received and answers to questions provided background and were not specifically related to deployment of 11th Brigade.

4. On 060800 September party departed Bien Hoa by Caribou aircraft for Chu Lai arriving approximately 061430 September. Party was met by Col Musser, C/S and LTC Granger, G3, TF Oregon (TFO). Approximately 1700 hours party was introduced to General Matheson, Actg CG TFO and attended evening staff briefing.

5. On 070800 September party received TFO command briefing and held discussions with following personnel:

LTC Malby, G1
LTC Eiblen, G4
LTC Conklin, G5
LTC Owens, G2
LTC Granger, G3
LTC Cully G3

a. G1.

1. TFO has been directed to reduce to 100% of strength all units, except maneuver battalions; these latter units to remain at 105%.

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15 September 1967

SUBJECT: Trip Report, 1-15 September 1967

(2) TFO receives its mail thru DaNang. Experience shows approximately 5 days from CONUS.

(3) Awards and decorations branch requires increase in personnel. Provisions for impact (on the spot) awards.

(4) Infusion program will affect 11th Brigade even if Brigade profile appears reasonable since other units of TFO involved.

(5) Units should deploy with only minimal amounts of khaki and personal clothing and gear.

(6) Promotion to E3 automatic. Boards required for E5-E9. TFO promotes E7-E9.

(7) Personnel requisitions 6 months in advance for known losses. This action must be initiated at home station and copies provided TFO; i.e., Feb 68 requisitions submitted during September 67.

b. G4. The 198th main body arrives on 2 ships, 21 and 23 October. Its advance party of 350 personnel arrives on 6 October and its advance planning group of 15 personnel arrive on 15 September.

c. G3.

(1) Mission is to defeat VC by defending base camps, AF and other fixed installations such as Highway 1.

(2) S&D operation conducted in Recon Zone (RZ). Sustained operation throughout TAOR.

(3) All operations directed by III MAF.

(4) Brigade can expect average of 12 tactical air sorties per day, plus 2 sky spot missions and 1 FAC. ANGLICO at Brigade level. Avn Co, DS each Brigade, one Avn Co GS TFO and 1 Chinook Co GS TFO.

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15 September 1967

SUBJECT: Trip Report, 1-15 September 1967

(5) We can expect a planning guidance letter and Tac SOP o/a 1 Nov 67. A reception plan will be developed following arrival 198th. INTSUM and SITREP to be forthcoming per request commencing 13 September. Also, a terminology listing and lessons learned from 198th will be provided.

(6) 196th responsible for Chu Lai Base with 1/14 and 2 cavalry squadrons attached. Expect to lose 1/14 and one cavalry squadron. 5th Mar Div on north and 2d ARVN and ROK Mar on south. 3-4 responsible for Duc Pho (1-101 moved north on 9 Sep). It has but 2 infantry battalions. 198th probably move into Duc Pho in area vacated by 1-101.

6. On 071300 Sep party moved by 2 each UH1D's to Duc Pho and visited LTC Appelgate, CO 2/11 Arty Bn (155's and 175's). His unit deployed by battery in fire base arrangement. Necessary to form fourth battery by pulling 1-2 guns from other batteries. Visited these fire bases and SF camp.

7. General Koster to command Americal Division and will arrive RVN o/20 September. General Young as ADC. General Linnell is to replace General Young as DCSOPS USARV. Americal Div to become institutionalized o/a 15 Nov 67.

8. On 080830 Sep party visited 196th Infantry Brigade. General Linnell stressed basic fundamentals of soldiering; i.e., discipline, taking care of equipment, physical conditioning. He maintained that one-half of his casualties could have been avoided if basics had been followed. Suggested development of a check list at all echelons. He pointed out that rifle marksmanship training was as important as tactical training. Scope (8 power) required for heavy rifle (M14). Need for reporting precise information and being equally precise in radio communications.

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9. On 090800 Sep party visited 3-4 at Duc Pho. Unit is similarly tasked with security of large base complex. It operates generally from company size bases. Approximately 2/3 of its 2 battalion force is guarding bases and Highway 1. Major tonnage is delivered across the beach. Its TAOR measures some 36K x 15K. It maintains liaison with 2d ARVN on the north and 1 cavalry on the south. Its area consists of a sandy beach, rice paddles, and rugged hill terrain. Key terrain consists of built-up area and some 9 bridges along Highway 1. Col Wear, Brigade commander, stressed the basic fundamentals of bunching and laxity.

10. On 10 Sep Colonel Henderson, LTC Barker, Major Vest and Major Dart remained at TFO and other personnel revisited 196th to secure support battalion briefing and to conduct further visits with infantry battalions. Colonel Henderson accompanied C/S, G2, and G3 to witness heliborne assault operations 1-101 Bde (see incl 2). LTC Franklin and Major Longino RON with battalion, 196th.

MC Adams

11. On 11 Sep LTC Barker and 6 members of party visited mines and booby trap school conducted by 196th Bde.

12. On 12 Sep party returned to HQ USARV arriving approximately 1800 hours.

13. On 13 Sep party again visited with staff members USARV, prepared trip report and finalized plans for departure 15 Sep 67.

Oran K. Henderson


ORAN K. HENDERSON

Executive Officer

11 Incl

1. Remarks by LTC OMory Colonel, Infantry
2. Bde Airmobile Op
3. XO Observation
4. S1 Observation
5. S2 Observation
6. S3 Observation
 - a. S5 Observation
7. 6th Spt Bn
 - a. Log Spt TFO
8. SigO Observation
9. Arty Observation
10. Bn CO's observations
11. Notes for 11th Inf Bde

5



INCLOSURE 1 - REMARKS BY LTC O'MARY, OIC-AOC

1. Base Camp - Brigade CP Forward Area. Security by deploying battalions out and away from BC beyond mortar range. Night patrol, LRP. Bunkering 82mm, 122mm, 9 ft earth.
2. Action on Contact. Preplanned sky spots. Bringing in fire support. Difficulty in keeping troops back. AK 47 all NVA have.
3. Maneuver. Company in Column improper tactic. Ideal formation -- companies on line. Avoid trails--keep off. Security in front. Closing on point platoon should clover leaf. Drop off fire team to rear occasionally. Careful not to lose.
4. Navigation. By battalion commander. Direct by smoke. Ask for smoke and then identify color. Same smoke system for fire support.
5. Use of Army Aircraft. LZ-PZ. Landing zone preparation. Theory no use for hitting hot LZ. Battalion commander, brigade commander, deputy, artillery commander know location of LZ. S3 paper man. 173d runs people sniffer. Possible use of LRP. Center of LZ mined and booby trap. Tear-up with 105. Approximately 1½ hours. 1,000 rounds per battery. 155's and 175's around perimeter up to 350 meters. Center hit with 500 lb bombs. Smoke LZ with smoke pots. Gun ships protect.

PZ - HU1D (7 trips) -- Chinooks 40 people. Extract. Turkey shoot last 70 men; last lift always with HU1D's.
6. 1500 hours lagger in. Fire all night. FPL, Fire support

Inclosure 1






INCLOSURE 2 - BRIGADE AIRMOBILE OPERATION

The objective covered an area of approximately diameter of 10,000 meters. It was divided pie shape with each battalion assigned 1/3 of the total area. The brigade published an Ops Order. One of the most important documents appeared to be the sequential plan published by the 14th Avn Bn. This document showed aircraft, load times, flight serials, take-off and landing times, fire support to include artillery, tactical air and army aviation, and frequencies and call signs. LZ were selected on hill masses in each battalion TAOR. 1st battalion landing on D day 1030 hours was supported by 33 HU1D's for troop lift. The initial assault lift (all 33 aircraft) departed from Chu Lai while subsequent lift were surface moved to a forward area approximately 5 minutes flight time to LZ. The battalion had 3 LZ's, one for each of 3 rifle companies. Aircraft flew a formation of V's in trail with gun ships on either flank. The V's were approximately 30-40 seconds apart. As 3 craft discharged its troops (5 each) the next 3 craft were ready to sit down. Preparatory artillery fire was lifted at H-3 minutes. As the first assault craft commenced its final onto the LZ a single HU1D broke forward and laid down a smoke screen. This operation was repeated after the 3d or 4th V moved in. Gun ships fired to the flanks of the target throughout. Tactical air support dropped bombs and napalm during the assault some 3-400 meters from the LZ. Each of the 3 LZ's were similarly prepared. The first unit, LZ 1, was completed in 7 minutes (commenced at 1030) (33 ships discharged). LZ 2 was assaulted at 1115 and LZ 3 at 1215. Troop initially bunched in close to LZ and later moved out in column formations down various fingers of the hill. Simultaneously, Chinooks were delivering battalion CP equipment and an artillery battalion into LZ 1 while troops were landing on LZ 3. Each company, battalion, and artillery had separate colored panel to make its LZ for Chinook loads. For the artillery, I'm told they should have members to identify location of individual tubes. Each Chinook was on a radio channel with separate ground controls for each unit.

Engineer squad attached to each assault company and to clear mines and booby traps.

Inclosure 2





INCLOSURE #3 - XO OBSERVATION NOTES

1. Brigade can expect 3 each C&C ships. Probably only brigade ship will have console. Others need to be rigged with unit radio, GRC 46/47 or PRC 25's. These ships are used by battalions for resupply and are always available.

2. OH23 is being used as a recon vehicle. Pilot and 2 door gunners. 3-4 Brigade credits these with making most of their VC finds.

3. LRP's being used in conjunction with Recon Plt elements to establish brigade OP's.

4. Front line units, for the most part, do not wear insignia due to clothing exchange system. Commanders and staff normally wear subdued insignia.

5. All units have 2 to 4 PRC 25's per platoon and do not use PRC6's.

6. Body armor is available but rarely used except by pilots.

7. Security of base camp complex is achieved by establishing fire bases forward and out from these installations.

8. Support, combat support, and tactical units share common complex by a mutual cooperation basis rather than single command or op control arrangement.

9. Bunkering required at all fixed installations. Heavy timber and 6,000 sandbags. 122 mortar can penetrate 9 ft of earth, however, only TOC's generally protected to this magnitude.

10. Movement to contact by company on line with platoon echeloned is preferred tactic. Clover leaf habitual.


11. Identification by smoke. Ground element places unspecified color and air identifies.


12. Units prepare LZ by heavy artillery concentration followed by gun ships, tactical air, and smoke pots.

Inclosure 3



13. Units lagger in prior to dark and usually relocate after dark.
14. Use of close-in listening posts discouraged since unit unable to fire FPL when personnel unaccounted for.
15. Bunkering system in base complexes wired with telephones and PRC6.
16. Claymore mines recovered each morning and placed each evening along with trip flares.
17. Senior commanders support M16, junior leaders don't.
18. Increase in administration limits all staff especially S3.
19. Dapsone tablets taken daily by all personnel in addition to Primaquine Chloroquine tablets.
20. Chain saws needed by all units.
21. Lightning rods required at all fixed radio installations.
22. Advance Planning Group should consist of representatives of following:
 - Deputy or XO
 - S1 and AG
 - S2 and ASA and MI
 - S3 and Avn, Engr, Sig, Arty
 - S4 + +
 - S5
23. If additional liaison required Americal Div will advise. Based probably upon problems developed by 198th.
24. Advance party 198th Bde consists of 350 personnel. Div ALO recommends brigade include ALO and all FAC's in its advance party. Theater requirement for 2-3 week Theater Indoctrination School and Survival Training.
25. APO 96374 Chu Lai
26. FAC's operate only in an airborne role.





27. Following six alternatives for brigade employment:

- (1) North of Chu Lai
- (2) Chu Lai
- (3) Between Chu Lai and Duc Pho
- (4) Duc Pho
- (5) South of Duc Pho (Bon Son)
- (6) Chu Lai Base and room.



INCLOSURE 4 - S1 OBSERVATIONS

1. INFUSION: The biggest problem is the personnel aspect. Per USARV direction no unit during its first year in VN will have to rotate ~~no~~ more than 25% of its personnel within any one month. During the second year, this rotational figure is 15%. The Brigade will be infused to meet this requirement. TF Oregon request a by month loss in percent for the Brigade commencing January 1968 for one year. With this, they will commence infusion planning.

COMMENT: We should attempt infusion within the Brigade soon after return to attempt to keep outside infusion to a minimum. G1 TFO indicates E7, 8, 9 and field grade officers will not be infused.

2. AWARDS and DECORATIONS: Brigades commanded by general officers may award up to Bronze Star. Brigades commanded by colonels, Purple Heart. All personnel I spoke to in this area indicate the requirement for additional personnel to handle the large workload. The 196th currently has three enlisted men in this section but is going to add one more making a total of 4.


3. CASUALTY REPORTING: USARV requires notification within 12 hours of all casualties. All units indicate the biggest problem in this area is correct information and meeting time schedule. 196th currently has three people full time keeping a 24-hour casualty section. I have a copy of their regulation.

4. POSTAL: If assigned to TFO our mail will come thru DaNang to the Brigade. We will be required to operate our own APO and for this current authorization is insufficient. It is recommended that the mail section be approximately 1 officer, 12 EM. The mail bulk is extremely heavy according to all concerned. Mail travel time San Francisco to Duc Pho or Chu Lai, 4 to 5 days. It is not known whether Hawaii mail goes first to SF or not; however, TFO is checking and will attempt to resolve.

5. DISTRIBUTION FORMS and PUBLICATIONS: Pin-point accounts for publications will be no big problem as all we do is change our address. Blank DA and DD forms will be provided by Japan and are indeed a problem. All G1/S1 personnel emphatically state bring as much as a year's supply of these forms as they are

Inclosure 4





short in-country and hard to get. Also, each unit should bring as many publications as necessary (AR's, etc) as they are in extremely short supply and in numerous cases non-existent.

6. MORNING REPORTS: The major difference in this area is the USARV transient and medical detachments. Combat units do not carry individuals in the assigned not joined category. All newly arriving personnel are carried in the USARV transient detachment. EDCSA to unit is normally the same day a person reports for duty. On rotations, the day the individual departs unit he is dropped from MR. Casualties evacuated to the various hospitals are also dropped from unit MR's to the casualty detachment. Under this system, a unit can requisition personnel and don't have considerable personnel in transient or hospital.

7. LETTERS OF CONDOLENCE: When an individual is KIA the unit commander prepares and signs an undated letter of sympathy and forwards it to brigade. The brigade commander prepares and signs an undated letter of condolence and both are forwarded to USARV. USARV then dates and dispatches.

8. ID CARDS and DOG TAGS: Brigade AG will have to make both ID cards and dog tags. 196th AG recommends as people get new ID's prior to deployment an extra picture be made and kept in 201 file so if a new ID is needed a photograph is available. This is the only problem area with ID cards. Dog tags will also be made and we will need the machine as well as a supply of blank tags. Tags are extremely difficult to secure in-country.

9. PROMOTION: There are no Privates (E2) in-country unless there is a flagging action. Recommend unit cut orders promoting all personnel to to E3 when they arrive in VN. There appears to be no problem in the field of enlisted promotions. Sufficient quota for up to E6 are available. E7, 8, 9 must get the no fill authority to promote prior to promoting. There can be 3 in-country promotions for the outstanding.

10. SERVICE MEDALS: There are two-- the Vietnam Service Medal which is authorized immediately upon arrival in-country and the Vietnam Campaign Medal after 6 months in-country. It is recommended that VSM be posted to all records and orders be prepared prior to arrival. Upon arrival award the medal.



11. PROFICIENCY PAY AND TESTING. There are no proficiency pay tests administered in-country. Commanders may have 20% combat arms MOS EM drawing pro-pay, 5% of non-combat arms MOS. The system used is the CER. The CER is assigned a point value and from this with CO's recommendation propay may be awarded.

12. NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES: This is a big problem in VN and USARV is very strict. All accident reports require action taken to be explained.

13 CONGRESSIONALS: Unit will in all probability experience a large increase. Most are primarily parents trying to get sons out of VN. It may be necessary to have a small congressional section within AG.

14. INTERPRETERS. The brigade will receive approximately 18 ARVN interpreters on arrival in-country. G1 TFO and brigade advance party will make these arrangements upon arrival.

15. CIVILIAN LABOR: There are three types of civilian labor:


a. Daily Hire. These people do normal labor, i.e., filling sandbags, etc., for camp improvement. They should be searched upon entry to camp, work under constant guard, and searched upon departure. A laborer in this category is paid:

Chu Lai	80 P per day
Duc Pho	70 P per day
Supervisor	90 P per day

b. Permanent Hire. None currently authorized brigades.

c. Personal Hire. Any civilian working in or around foodstuff must possess a foodhandlers certificate. These personnel should be hired through the IRO where health checks and security checks are made.

16. RATION CARDS: All personnel must have ration cards which are handled thru AG. TFO recommends we requisition ration cards while still in Hawaii and issue to troops prior to arrival in-country.



[REDACTED]

17. FUNDS.

a. Unit Funds. Units will close out accounts in Hawaii and bring money with them to reopen account in-country. At present the nearest banking facility is Saigon; however, a branch may be opened in DaNang prior to our arrival. The unit fund rate in VN is the normal 50¢ per man per month.

b. Impress Funds. These funds will be available and will pay for civilian hire. There appears to be no shortage of monies for this fund. Brigade must have an officer appointed on orders as Impress Funds Officer.

c. Mess and Club Funds. These sundry funds can be established upon written approval from USARV. It is recommended that where and when possible, units establish clubs.

18. R&R: Special Service Officer working under Bde S1 handles both in and out of country R&R. Units receive quotas for R&R in sufficient amounts to meet needs. Our departure point will be DaNang in most all cases.

19. UNIFORMS. The khaki uniform is needed for R&R and duty in Saigon. It is not needed elsewhere.

20. POST EXCHANGES: Units may establish PX if desired. At Duc Pho the 3/4 does not have one. They receive their Sundry Kits which provide basic necessities such as cigarettes, cigars, chewing tobacco, matches, lighter fluid/flints, soap, razor blades, and other toilet articles and candy. A unit not in an operations area such as Duc Pho is not entitled to these kits. Therefore, the post exchange is necessary. Items are purchased thru Saigon Exchange and the PX must be operated by your own personnel.

21. MISCELLANEOUS: All personnel are advised to bring as many office expendables as possible. Office equipment such as typewriters, adding machines, etc., should be new if at all possible as they don't last long in VN and repair work takes months. For file cabinets, we should have the one drawer stack type.

22. FINANCE: Security of funds is a big problem as no vaults are available. CONEX containers are used with field safes or small vaults as they become available. 196th has experienced difficulty due to weather with the combination locks on field safes and has converted 100% to padlocks.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Special finance forms should be brought in large quantities as they are difficult to obtain.

Class L Allotments, savings deposits, and bonds are encouraged.

Current finance section not large enough to handle workload. It will, in all probability, have to be augmented.


The fill modified system is in effect.

23. IO: The brigade IO was placed under the PIO Det. 35mm cameras are recommended and if possible a small photo processing shop. It takes 2 to 3 weeks to get prints back. Film difficult to secure; should bring as many as possible.

The IO should have a reproduction capability in order to publish a newspaper or similar device. Local home town releases are pushed.

24. RED CROSS. We can anticipate probably 2 field workers to be assigned to the brigade. If possible, one should join us at Schofield and deploy with us. Red Cross representative with 196th handles 100-200 cases per month.

25. PMO: The 196th has two MP's with each infantry battalion to take immediate charge of detainees, prisoners, etc. 196th recommends as many MG jeeps as possible. They primarily perform TCP's, route patrol, CG security, CID, POW, detainee work. They provide no convoy security missions.



INCLOSURE 5 - INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. General.


a. Intelligence data of all descriptions based on records and reports is available in a multitude of formats and media. For example, printed studies have been published by Combined Intelligence Center, VN (CICV) on everything from VC medical and sanitation intelligence to VC/NVA tactics against large-scale heliborne assaults. Another example is the request service at the Combined Document Evaluation Center (CDEC) where any requestor in the intelligence community may submit specific requirements such as "Order of Battle NVA 2d Division". Researchers will microfilm every agents report, captured document, battlefield report, etc., on file that refers to the 2d Division or of any of its subordinate units, leaders, equipment, tactics, locations, etc., and return this information to the requestor.


b. Separate brigades are better organized for intelligence operations in RVN than are brigades organic to divisions, since they have their own MI detachments. These detachments have the capability to acquire targets rapidly and accurately through I PW, translation of captured documents, imagery interpretation verified by aerial recon with the S2 acting as aerial observer to check his own findings on the ground. At the same time, he is checking information received from agents, prisoners, and other sources. Organic brigades, on the other hand are supported by divisional MI detachments which do not appear to be nearly as responsive to brigade needs.


c. While our initial briefing at USARV told us that maps were intelligence items procured through G2 channels, the XO of the support battalion for the 196th Inf Bde stated that maps were flowing in his supply channels and that he was holding the brigade's basic load.

d. All intelligence agencies must coordinated closely since information found in one place may be of little interest there but be vital somewhere else. S2 must also keep up with the results of tactical operations to help him identify reliable agents, documents, etc.

2. IPW.

a. Virtually no  the Vietnamese language. Interrogation was done wholly thru interpreters (a system with built-in difficulties). While troop commanders want interpreters





to go out on operations with them to be available for immediate interrogation of suspects, etc., the general rule by S2's is that they are held at brigade level and only sent to specific locations when requested. This is to hedge against the sudden large numbers of detainees often encountered at one location (3-4 Bde had over 450 in 1 day). There is also a personnel management consideration. RVN interpreters are usually Saigon students and make extremely reluctant field soldiers. They work well at the PW cages, but are seemingly unable to keep up on the march, go AWOL, and are generally a nuisance out on operations. NOTE: We were unable to find any US personnel fluent in Vietnamese in any of the units we visited. There was general agreement, however, that such capability would be extremely valuable to any organization. On 2 occasions, PW cages were visited. TFO was operating a reasonably well-run, sanitary, coordinated cage. 3-4 Bde on the other hand had an enclosure that was poorly supervised (Bde S1 didn't even know that the cage was part of his staff responsibility and had never visited the cage). (An MP sergeant was in charge but seemed to be satisfied with substandard conditions. Bde S2, however, made a formal complaint to the S1 after we visited the site.) Despite all the above difficulties, 1 PW has produced the majority of reliable information on which units have acted and achieved good results. Agent reports on the other hand are normally less than 50% reliable overall, the identity of the agent being a large factor, since some have a reputation for collecting valid intelligence. In most units, agents are handled by the counterintelligence agents (or the S2 at battalion level). Before taking an agent out to "finger" VC in a village it is necessary to provide a complete disguise (change of clothing, head cover, etc). VC suspects habitually lie about anything and everything but are susceptible to IPW methods and seem to have no loyalty to the cause, once they start talking. NVA soldiers are also valuable talkers, but lousy map readers. They evidently have no "code of conduct" but normally have only limited knowledge due to the cellular command and control structure of their forces.

3. Order of Battle.

a. While most other elements produce "raw" intelligence, OB personnel are primarily engaged in gathering all of these reports and comparing them to determine which information is most likely to be true and to find any patterns being established in enemy movements and operations. One way in which VC/NVA units attempt to hide their movements is by continually changing their designations. OB is

[REDACTED]

therefore required to keep track of and cross reference all known aliases (some units have between 10 and 20) because prisoners and agents are likely to use any of them). The system of NVA, Main Force, and local force identifications is valuable, because movements are dictated by boundaries. LF units always stay within the district. MF units within the province, etc. OB feeds back to SI, CI, and IPW certain EEI, usually questions arising from conflicting reports.

4. Benefits Gained from this Liaison Visit.

- a. Insight into intelligence operations (generally outlined above).
- b. Various studies and documents that will help the brigade to understand VC/NVA techniques.
- c. Physical set up of TOC's and intelligence facilities.
- d. Methods of collection and dissemination used successfully.
- e. Items of equipment and supply that would be valuable if brought with the brigade.
- f. An appreciation of the terrain in our proposed area of operations.
- g. Brigade placed on distribution for daily INTSUMS and other documents from TFO and MACV/USARV.

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INCLOSURE 6 - S3 OBSERVATIONS

1. Organization.


a. Americal Division. Task Force Oregon is tentatively scheduled to be institutionalized on 15 November 1967 as the Americal Division with BG Sam Koster as its commander. The general concept of the division organization is to provide a division base and up to three brigade force with combat support and combat service support capability similar to that of a normal ROAD division. This concept provides for the separate infantry brigades (196th, 198th and 11th Light Infantry Brigades) to retain most of their combat support and combat service support units. The division base will have the balance of the support normally found in a ROAD division; e.g. brigades will keep their organic artillery battalions and division will have DivArty headquarters and the GS battalion. The organizational objectives of the Americal Division are:

(1) To form an austere organization utilizing a minimum of additional spaces.

(2) Make maximum use of assets already assigned to Task Force Oregon.

(3) To maintain brigades with the capability of conducting independent operations.

b. 11th Infantry Brigade. A study group from DA just completed development of five standard infantry battalions for Vietnam which provide for a strength of 920 personnel per battalion. A copy of the approved TO&E for light infantry battalions will be provided to the 11th Inf Bde. In November this group will again visit Vietnam to establish a standard organization brigade headquarters and separate units and detachments. One unit being considered a signal company for each brigade. When the 11th Infantry Brigade joins the Americal Division certain units such as the 23d MP Platoon and the 70th Inf Det (LRP) may be absorbed into the division base. It is anticipated that the brigades will be commanded by colonels with lieutenant colonels as deputy commanders and XO's.



2. Training.

a. USARV Training Requirements. USARV Training Memorandums 350-1 through 350-9 provide training guidance and prescribe training requirements for individuals and units in Vietnam. This includes mandatory training prescribed by DA plus training determined necessary as a result of experience in-country. Training is decentralized.

(1) Individual Training. All individual replacements are required to receive training in care, cleaning and zeroing the M16 rifle, training in mines and booby traps, physical security training, and VC tactics, within seven days after arrival in-country.

(2) Unit Proficiency Training. Battalion size units are required to conduct proficiency training a minimum of twice each year (preferably once each quarter) in small unit tactics, patrolling, ambushes, and mines and booby traps.

b. Americal Division. It is planned that mandatory training requirements for individual replacements will be conducted by the Division Replacement Detachment for all new arrivals. This would take the training burden off the brigades and would be a more economical use of instructor personnel.

c. Leadership Indoctrination. The G3, Americal Division, recommends that the 11th Inf Bde Advanced Party include officer and NCO leaders for the purpose of indoctrinating these personnel on tactics, climate, terrain, friendly and enemy dispositions, etc.

3. Operations.

a. Americal Division. The division is deployed in two tactical areas of operations (TAOR's) with the 2d ARVN Div and the ROK Marines separating the two TAOR's. Overlays of Americal Division dispositions were provided the 11th Inf Bde. The Americal Division has the following missions.

(1) Protection of the Chu Lai Air Base and facilities and LOC (Hwy 1).

(2) Conduct sustained operations in both TAOR's.

[REDACTED]

(3) Conduct search and destroy operations in reconnaissance zones (RZ's) in coordination with GVN.

(4) Conduct combat operations west of RZ's when approved.

(5) Be prepared to reinforce or relieve five US Special Forces CIDG Camps (Tra Bong, Na Thanh, Gia Vuc, Ba To, and Minh Long.)

(6) Support the Revolutionary Development Program.

(7) Provide tactical support to USMC elements of the Combined Action Platoons.

(8) Clear and reconnoiter Highway No. 1 from Chu Lai in the north and Sa Huynh in the south.

b. 196th Light Infantry Brigade. The brigade is deployed in the Chu Lai area with three infantry battalions, one armored cavalry squadron and one 105 Howitzer battalion. Missions of the 196th Inf Bde are:

(1) Provide security of the Chu Lai air base and TAOR.

(2) Conduct tactical operations within its TAOR.

(3) Provide a shield for the Revolutionary Development Program.

(4) Conduct other such tactical operations in RVN as directed by higher headquarters.

c. 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. This brigade is deployed in the Duc Pho area with two infantry battalions, one tank company, and one DS 105 Howitzer battalion; the Brigade has the following missions:

(1) Locate and destroy NVA, VC forces, and VC infrastructure in TAOR.

(2) Conduct counterinfiltration against NVA and VC units.

[REDACTED]

(3) Provide tactical security of Highway No. 1
(includes nine bridges).

(4) Support the Revolutionary Development Program.

(5) Support three US Special Forces CIDG Camps.

d. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. This brigade was in the process of deploying to an area north of Chu Lai to conduct Operation WHEELER and was not visited. The brigade did not have a TAOR. It was used on combat operations in the hills and mountainous areas in the western portion of TF Oregon's area of operation. A copy of the order for Operation WHEELER was provided to the 11th Inf Bde.

e. 11th Light Infantry Brigade. The present plan for deployment of the brigade is in the Chu Lai area to relieve the 196th Inf Bde and assume its mission. The 196th Inf Bde would then be utilized to conduct combat operations throughout the division area. Several other plans for deployment of the 11th Inf Bde are being considered as follows:

(1) Occupy a TAOR between Chu Lai and Duc Pho TAOR's replacing the ROK Marines thus enlarging the division to include the entire coastal area from Chu Lai to Duc Pho.

(2) Occupy an area north of Chu Lai thus extending the Americal Division area in that direction.

(3) Occupy an area south of Duc Pho thus extending the Americal Division in that direction.

(4) Relieve the 3d Brigade 4th Inf Div in the Duc Pho area and assume its mission.

(5) Occupy a relatively safe area within one of the two present TAOR's and conduct combat operations throughout the division area.



INCLOSURE 6A - S5 OBSERVATIONS

1. General. Each infantry brigade has established an S5 section within the brigade staff although not designated as such by TO&E. The brigade civil affairs officer is the S5 and the PsyOps officer is the assistant S5. This primary staff section has staff responsibility for civil affairs, civic action, and psychological operations within the brigade area of operations.

2. Mission. The primary mission of civil affairs (civic action) is to enhance security and to project a favorable image of US forces in RVN. Particular emphasis is on the hamlet level.

3. Revolutionary Development Program. Brigades participate in civil operations rural development support (CORDS). This is a joint civilian and military effort to support the RVN national Revolutionary Development Program. The following activities are performed by the infantry brigades in support of this program.

a. MEDCAP.

(1) Sick call on tactical operations and good neighbor program.

(2) District hospitals.

b. Engineer Civic Action.

(1) Construction - wells, schools, latrines, markets, hospitals, etc.

(2) Repairs.

(3) Materials.

c. Refugee Assistance - transportation, housing, employment, necessities.


d. Psychological Operations - VC/NVA and VN peasants (Chieu Hoi).



4. Support.

a. Civil affairs support is on an area basis. There are two CA companies in the division area.

b. Psychological operations support is on a direct support basis. One loudspeaker platoon supports each brigade.



INCLOSURE 7 - 6TH SUPPORT BATTALION

SUPPLY

1. Expendables - no problem in-country -- country store in Chu Lai -- requisition in DaB Pho -- units should bring 30-day supply.

2. Class I - In this area Class I is handled by Navy and delivered to Log units in divisional area for further breakdown -- supply point distribution.

"A" rations are available and most units are serving at least one hot meal per day in base camps A rations are fed exclusively.

"Operational" rations are available in ample quantities. Divisions are required to have a 15-day operations level - support keeps 12 days and units 3 days.

Refrigeration at divisional and unit level could be a problem. ✓
Bring all we can. In country availability of ~~refrigeration~~ ^{refrigerator} equipment is short and fill time is slow.


When PX facilities are not available "Sundry Pak" are issued to units with rations. Contents of SP appears to be adequate.

3. Class II and IV - There appears to be adequate amounts of combat essential equipment. The nice-to-have items are scarce and the lead time for these items (if available) is up to 60 or 90 days.

Everybody recommends that we take everything we need and can get along with us. This presents somewhat of a problem because USARHAW S&M normally is very strict as to issuing only what is authorized (TOE, TA, etc).

4. Class III and IIIA - No problem. Distribution varies -- retail service stations (5,000 gal tankers), 500 gal transporters for aerial resupply.

5. Class V - No problem. ASR established on some items from time to time - now 105mm HE (36 rds per day) and hand held flares and clusters flares. Log units operate ASP's.



6. Class VI - No problem. Beer and pop is plentiful and consumed in large quantities because of intense heat. Hard liquor available in a rationed basis, 5 qts per month.

7. Water - Appears to be plentiful in and around base camps, in company fire bases water resupply is by water trailer carried to them by resupply helicopters. An operations transport refills from local streams and purify with halizone.

8. Construction Material - Appears to be adequate for both base development and tactical use.

The problem in construction is construction personnel and most projects are self help with a minimum of technical supervision.

MAINTENANCE

The biggest problem in maintenance is that operator maintenance appears to have completely disappeared. The trend is to only "fill-er up", kick the tires, and away we go.

Organizational level maintenance will vary according to units. For the most part, it appears that they concentrate on putting out fires rather than preventive maintenance.

Batteries become inoperative because operators do not check them.

Clutches burn out because operators tend to ride them when operating in sandy soils.

Lubrication appears to be almost non-existent.

Generators burn out because of non-existent PM.

Units will not maintain PLL's and tend to "scrounge" for their parts.

ASL's for the most part are adequate but long lead time 30-45 days are common for resupply.



Divisional and brigade maintenance units seem to keep up with work except in the area of generators and major track assemblies (shortage of parts in both of these items).

Maintenance facilities at divisional and brigade level are field type in nature and during the forthcoming monsoon season, working conditions could become unsatisfactory.

Tire patches, torsion bars (113's), clutch discs (2½), batteries, tires for ¼-tons.

SERVICES

1. Showers are improvised at battalion base camps - almost all are cold water.

At the Chu Lai and Duc Pho base camp complexes, Log command and divisional unit (Americal) furnishing some hot water showers.

2. Laundry at Chu Lai, commercial laundry (Korean) will do bundle work (a set of fatigues, underwear, and socks, 606); workmanship satisfactory.

At Chu Lai and Duc Pho, Log and divisional units (Americal) have QM laundry service available -- troops and company grade officers, bulk; field grade, bundle -- washed, dried, and that's all.

Around most base camps local people will do laundry for troops. Do not recommend as source of water is not known to be safe.

3. Graves Registration Service (GRS) is furnished by log units thru units' medical facilities. Personal effects are also handled the same way - thru medical channels.

Upon battlefield recovery, remains are evacuated by medical aero-evac to GRS collecting points and held (if required) under refrigeration and then aero-evac to Saigon



[REDACTED]

4. Clothing Issue Facilities (CIF) - separate brigades are operating their own CIF (minus weapons). Americal division is studying the possibility of establishing a centralized divisional replacement and training program and will incorporate a CIF with this program.

MISCELLANEOUS

1. Insure material program in being. Results vary as to item being requested.

2. Bring lots of hand tools and power tools along for use in base development program.

3. Develop SOP for removal and storage of tarps and bows for vehicles.

STORAGE

Outside storage is the rule instead of the exception. Maximum use of pallets and tarps must be stressed. Also, locate all storage areas with good drainage and road nets in mind.

[REDACTED]

INCLOSURE 7A - LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TFO

1. Restrictions. There are presently no restrictions on Class I, III, or V, except as indicated below.

(a) 105 HE ASR 30 rds

(b) 175 tubes

(c) hand held flares

(d) White star clusters

2. Class I & III Basis of Issue: As needed; water is plentiful.

3. Class II and IV items peculiar to the Army are furnished thru Army channels, all else thru 3d MAAF.

Class 2 and 4 construction material is readily available and in sufficient quantity to meet our needs. There is, however, insufficient engineer construction assistance. Consequently, the majority of all construction will be accomplished via self-help.

4. TFO presently has one transportation company plus one additional platoon for direct support. The S3 of the support battalion is also the transportation officer for the brigade.

The brigade will also have one aviation company in direct support.

5. Maintenance at user level is grossly neglected and accounts for approximately 80% of deadlined equipment.

6. Accountability of property - paramount.

7. S4 of 196th and 3-4 each have one additional officer (Cpt or Lt) for establishment of an FSA in support of brigade operations.

8. Shower points, laundry and graves registration will be furnished.

[REDACTED]

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INCLOSURE 8 - SIGNAL OFFICER OBSERVATIONS

Met with:

LTC Bailey) 509th Sig An, Americal Div (TFO)
Maj Goode)
Maj Scott - SigO, 196th Inf Bde
Cpt Webb - Sig O, 3d Bn, 4th Inf Bde
Maj Johnson - S3, DivArty, TFO
Maj Lee - USARV C&E (Crypto)
Maj Corbin - USARV C&E (Avionics)
Cpt Jackson - Arty Bn Sig O, 196th Inf Bde
Maj Purdy - Asst G4, TFO
Sgt Sterns - USARV C&E (Supply)

Visited:

1. Comm facilities, TFO
2. Comm facilities, 196th
3. Comm facilities, 3/4
4. Comm facilities, 196th Arty Bn
5. STRATCOM facilities, Chu Lai
6. TROPOSCATTER Site, Chu Lai

1. Observations:

a. Multi Channel VHF Utilization at Brigade Level. The 196th Inf Bde has established a 12-channel VHF system to each infantry battalion. The systems are shared by the artillery batteries in DS of the infantry battalion. These systems provide Hot Line point-to-point telephone service between the Bde TOC and Bn TOC's as well as point-to-point Fire Request Channels between the Bde FSCC and the DS batteries. There are also common user channels between the brigade and battalion switchboards and between battalion and battalion field trains areas. The establishment of the above was accomplished by removing components from the AN/MRC-69 radio relay vans and mounting single system terminals in 3/4-ton trailers. The infantry battalion move their systems by helicopter when they displace their CP's. The 3/4 Inf Bde does the same except that they utilize AN/MRC-112 four channel radio relay equipment which is mounted in 1/4-ton trailers. Although they do not have as much channel capacity

[REDACTED]

as the 196th configuration, I believe it to be a better employment of equipment and I also believe two channels for infantry and two for artillery are sufficient. Meeting with LTC Bailey, DSO, Americal Division indicated that all VHF systems from division to brigade would be terminated by the signal battalion which releases the FASC Platoon for brigade use only.

b. FM Radio. Both brigades operated the same FM radio nets and in the same manner. From brigade to battalion there is a Secure Voice FM Command Net which operates 24 hours per day. This net is remoted into the TOC. They also operate a brigade Admin/Log and a brigade FM Intel Net, however, these two nets are open and are only entered when stations need to make contact. Med Evac FM is monitored by TOC and is an open net. Any unit can enter and request med evac support. Net is operated by Med company. Battalions are operating a command net only. Companies are using command net only. Company FD nets are not required as mortars are located at Base Camps and can use wire. There appears to be no shortage of PRC-25 radios within the brigades and they are operating with less than we are presently authorized. Command ships are used extensively by command and staff elements. RC-292 antennas are used at all levels and are in very short supply. PRC-6 radios are being replaced by the PRT-4 and PRR-9 squad radios. Replacement will be accomplished in-country. Auto retrains using the VRC-49 is used extensively by 101st but not by 196th or 3/4 brigades. PRC-6's are not employed for tactical use but are used for perimeter security communications. It has been recommended by USARV-C&E that we bring our PRC-6's to effect a direct exchange within country. Frequency interference on FM nets is common. Frequencies are in short supply and bootlegging is done frequently.

c. Wire. Wire is used extensively within CP's and cable is presently programmed for use between division and brigades where cable routes are secure.

d. SOI Procedures. The SOI is made at division level and brigades extract. The NSA prepared OpCode is used and the numeral code is used by not extensively. The Point of Origin Code is not authorized but it is being used. Authentication is not enforced. Frequencies and call signs are assigned by division. Radio net operations are generally local and do not conform to the ACP's.

[REDACTED]

e. Higher HQ Communications. FM radio, multichannel VHF and TTY are employed from division to brigades. The FM is secure voice. All TTY is secure on-line. No off-line crypto is in use.

f. AM Radios. No AM radio nets are currently in use due primarily to lack of operational equipment.

2. New Equipment Programmed for Brigade.

a. ARC-122 radios to be replaced by ASC-10's which will be mounted in CC Choppers.

b. GRC-142 AM RATT will replace the AN/GRC 46 radios. Due in-country in Oct 67.

c. AN/GRC-163. New 4-channel FM radio equipment using the VRC-12 radios with a multichannel capability. We will probably get about 8 of these.

d. PRC-77. This is a PRC-25 with secure voice capability. It will replace the PRC-25's. Uses a KY38 voice secure device and will net with KY8.


3. Formation of Signal Companies at Brigade Level. Separate brigades in RVN are combining the FASC Platoon and the Brigade HHC Comm Platoon into a signal company. No definite answer was obtained as to what we should do.

4. Critical Problem Areas.

a. Line packs for SB 86 switchboards are in short supply. Every effort should be made to obtain extras.

b. X Mode Cables for KY-8 crypto devices are very hard to obtain in country and do not stand up well in this climate. We should obtain 200% back-up for these. Also installation kits for KY-8's are not available in country and should be brought with us.

c. BA-30 Batteries are in short supply and do not last long in country.



d. Photo supplies must be stored under refrigeration and should be new and well sealed before deployment.

e. RC-292 Antennas. These are very difficult to obtain in country and they do not last long.

f. VHF Equipment requires air conditioners. Equipment will not stand-up in this heat.

g. New equipment authorized the brigade will, in all probability, be sent to RVN which will preclude training on the equipment prior to deployment. Major problem areas will be operator and DS maintenance training on SSB and VHF equipment.

[REDACTED]

INCLOSURE 9 - ARTILLERY OBSERVATIONS

1. All units have recently been issued FADAC Computers. FADAC should be a big help in accuracy and speed, however, the level of training on use of this computer is rather low and units made several errors during demonstrations. It is necessary to check the operator using manual system.

2. Firing batteries are usually located in fire bases some distance from battalion.


Battery Fire Direction Centers must do the basic computing for most fire missions with the battalion FDC acting as a Fire Support Element (FSE). Battalion obtains clearance of fires, plans H&I's, and monitors battery missions to prevent errors.

3. Battery Fire Direction Centers must have additional personnel. One battalion visited gave the firing batteries additional personnel from HQ Btry. The other battalion required the batteries to train additional FDC personnel within the battery.

4. Clearance of Fires is a big problem in Vietnam. Except for contact missions, a clearance must be obtained from friendly forces, air, and political. Direct support battalion must keep a liaison team with the military advisor at district level to facilitate political clearance. Clearances may take from 2-10 minutes.

5. All Howitzers must have a 6400 meter capability. Howitzers pits must be constructed to facilitate firing in any direction. Azimuth markers are usually placed at 1600 meters, 3200 meters, 4800 meters and 6400 meters to aid section in shifting the howitzer to the proper direction. Direction of fire is the first command from FDC to howitzer section.

6. Artillery Incidents. Safety is a big problem due to the many firing restrictions. There must be at least one independent check of all firing data before a round is fired. Air sentinels must be posted during firing to observe for friendly aircraft. In the case a round is fired out of safety, an investigation is conducted by division artillery.



7. Air Movement. The direct support battalion usually moves by air. It was recommended by all personnel contacted to bring all available slings for air movement. It would be desirable to have training in airmobile operations prior to arrival in country.

8. Training in adjusting fires. Both artillery and infantry air observers should be trained to adjust artillery fire. In addition, infantry platoon leaders should be trained to adjust artillery fire.

9. Perimeter defense. Artillery personnel must be trained in establishing its own perimeter, installation of mines, erection of barbed wire barriers, and bunker construction.


10. Maintenance. There appears to be a relaxation of maintenance standards on the operator level. Most howitzers were well maintained but other weapons, equipment, and vehicles were generally in very bad condition.

11. Countermortar Radar. There appears to be a problem in keeping the countermortar radars on the air because of a shortage of parts and lack of well trained maintenance personnel. Radars appear to be effective when operational. In one case, the radar reported incoming mortars before they landed in the area.

12. Training in Depth. Units must be trained in depth to provide shifts for 24 hour operation. NCO's are critically short, therefore, lower grades must be highly trained and be closely supervised to prevent errors. Errors in gunnery cannot be tolerated.

13. Replacement Training. In addition to the normal replacement training usually conducted at brigade or division level, one battalion sent new replacements out with FO parties for 7 days. They found this training gave the replacements a better appreciation of the artillery mission and a desire to give accurate fire.

14. Artillery units and ordnance recommended bringing at least two float howitzers. Also, unit should arrive with full PLL's. PLL's should be at battery level rather than at battalion level since batteries are normally deployed some distance from the battalions.




15. ASR for 105's is 36 rounds per day per tube. This does not appear to cause any problem as units build up a rather large operational load.

16. Batteries may be split (two or three guns pulled out to support a small operation). The battery cannot operate two FDC's, therefore, battalion must furnish personnel to operate one of the FDC's.

17. Searchlights. Searchlights mounted on $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton vehicles are often attached to the direct support artillery battalion. These do not appear effective for adjusting artillery fire, but are effective for defense of perimeters. Usually they are employed with the infantry. These lights also have an infrared capability which has been used effectively in ambushes. The searchlight beam has also been used to guide relief forces to ambushed patrols.

18. Health and Field Sanitation. Field sanitation is generally poor and many troops were observed with two or three days growth of beard. This area will require continual command supervision.



INCLOSURE 10 - BATTALION COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS

1. Training.

a. Mines and booby traps must receive continuing emphasis. Every item imaginable could be booby trapped, and probably will be. As an example, one soldier was wounded on 10 Sep by a booby trap which was triggered when he picked up a white civilian hat which was lying on a small trail.


b. Security must be stressed; observed units were utilizing trails without placing security well-forward and to the flanks. When a unit stops moving, security must be established immediately. There was a tendency to forget or ignore security, particularly when the troops were hot and tired. In addition, security must be set up around the perimeter at night. It must be far enough out and cover the likely avenues of approach into the perimeter. The objective is to prevent the main unit from being surprised..

c. Communications security is a must. Tactical plans and orders were passed over radios in the clear. An enemy intercept of this information could be disastrous to the unit concerned.

d. Tactical training must include basic infantry tactics to include squad, platoon, and company formations, movement to contact, counter-ambush techniques, meeting engagements, and the night ambushes. Troops must be taught how to thoroughly search an area. Intensified search techniques are employed in which a company is assigned an area of 800 to 1000 meters square and probe it carefully.

e. Troops must be thoroughly trained in the construction of bunkers, protective wire, emplacing and marking of mines/mine-fields. As many individuals as possible should be taught how to use the mine detector.

f. In general, individual marksmanship was poor. The troops fire too fast and too high, wasting ammunition. Training must emphasize the basics of marksmanship -- aim and squeeze the trigger. Some units have solved part of the problem by authorizing only two individuals per squad to fire the M-16 automatically.



g. During search operations, individual dispersion was poor. Large groups congregated whenever something was found (a spider hole, a cave entrance). In addition, large groups were observed on the skyline.

h. All leaders must know how to call for supporting fires--particularly squad and platoon leaders. The dispersed nature of operations often results in the FO being some distance away and not able to observe the target uncovered by a squad or platoon.

i. Demolitions training is essential down to include the squad level. During search operations, units consistently carried demolitions to destroy caves and underground facilities as soon as discovered.

j. Troops must be taught to observe, to visually search an area, and to report accurately and promptly what they see.

k. Sling-loading training is a must. The primary means for moving supporting weapons and supply/resupply operations was the CH-47.

l. There is a requirement to establish and conduct rifle marksmanship and live fire reaction courses in-country. When not participating in operations, troops are given this training in order to improve marksmanship.

2. Maintenance.

a. Many of the vehicles, weapons, and other major items of equipment observed were in a deplorable condition. This was indicative of the fact that the operators were not performing required operator's maintenance and that the supervisors were not demanding that operators maintenance be performed. A major contributing factor was that drivers were not assigned to specific vehicles.

b. Examples of poor maintenance practices noted were dirty and rusty weapons; vehicles with broken and/or missing parts; tents with holes, rips, and tears; radios with frayed and broken cords, connectors, plugs, etc.

[REDACTED]

3. Operations.

a. Battalions operated a command/control facility (the TOC) with representatives of the S2/S3 and fire support elements. Based on the battalions mission, there was some variation as to the location of the TOC. Some battalions had theirs forward in a fire base while others were in a battalion base camp. The essential tasks performed were in all cases identical; an S2/S3 situation map was maintained, current operations were monitored and directed, operations reports were prepared and submitted, and fire coordination and support were accomplished.

b. Vietnamese interpreters (ARVN) are assigned on the basis of at least two per battalion. Battalion conducts immediate interrogation of PW in the area of capture to ascertain, if possible, location of PW's unit, strength, weapons, etc.

c. Maps are both accurate and plentiful. Scale 1:50,000 were used almost exclusively.


d. The battalion S2's maintain source and black list files. These are especially useful during Cordon operations when it is necessary to have information available on VC cadres, etc.

e. Company strength in the field averaged slightly over 100 for search and destroy operations. Units did not move their 81mm mortars from the fire base even though they often operated beyond the range of these weapons. Primary reliance for indirect fire support was the 105mm howitzer. Units continually operated within supporting range of these weapons even to the extent of moving 105mm batteries to insure continued support.

f. Ground surveillance radars were not being used. Reasons offered for this non-use were twofold: there was a lack of trained operators and there was an inadequate maintenance capability.

g. Companies and platoons do not use the AN/PRC-6 on search operations. The primary use of this radio was in base camps, particularly between bunkers. The AN/PRC 25 was used during operations. Although there was variation in the numbers used (from 2-4 per platoon), it is desirable that each platoon have a minimum of four.

[REDACTED]



4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Units were experiencing difficulty in accounting for property. Preparation for change of command and resultant property accountability must proceed rapidly when a DEROS is upcoming. After personnel depart, it is extremely difficult to locate individuals for statements of circumstances and to establish responsibility.

b. RVN nationals are utilized in the base camps for labor details, i.e., trash details, filling sandbags, washing kitchen utensils, etc. Permanent hire personnel are cleared formally while daily hires are escorted at all times while working in the area.

c. The overall police of areas was extremely poor. Most were littered with all types of cans, lumber, cardboards, and other debris.

d. When replacements arrive for a unit, that unit is required to send weapons for them to the replacement unit. This usually results in poor accountability for these serial-numbered items.

e. Hand flares are a critical item. The current ASR was 10 per brigade per day.

f. PLL must be at 100% upon arrival with a 30-day supply on hand. Likewise, a 30-day supply of expendables should be on hand upon arrival in-country.


g. Battalion ammunition sections drew direct from Class V Supply Points. Brigade only monitored.

h. Tires, tubes, and batteries are in short supply. BA-30's are especially critical and an adequate supply of tire patches should be brought.

i. Non-essential equipment can be placed in non-possession storage.

j. Unit fund accounts must be established immediately upon arrival.

k. Troops normally carry 3-4 canteens of water. There was no water discipline practiced. Because of the extreme heat, every effort was made to provide the troops all the water they desired.





NOTES FOR 11TH BRIGADE

Areas in which challenges will occur or emphasis is needed:

S1

1. Obtain and maintain a complete set of USARV Regulations.
2. Keep a record of all that you do from alert for deployment forward to assist in preparation of the Operations Report--Lessons Learned.
3. Start an infusion program immediately upon arrival in country.

S2

1. Provide for practical training in perimeter defense, installation of mines, erection of barbed wire barriers and bunker construction and insure inertia is overcome.
2. Insure all personnel clearances are up to date.
3. Have at least one GSA approved container per battalion to secure classified documents.
4. Establish information collection agency liaison early.
(Special Forces Camps, District and Village Chiefs, MACV Advisors)
5. Aerial observers must be proficient.

WABTEL
list

S3

1. FO's should train with company's and all FO's should know what artillery is available to him and how to get it.
2. FDC's must be [redacted] ed operations. Battalion FDC is more of an FSE and Battery FDC's do the basic computing. FADAC is a big help in accuracy, speed and labor saving. FDC's must be familiar with the submission of air data.
3. Howitzers (and all weapons) must have a 6400M capability.

Inclosure 11



[REDACTED]

4. Brigade S3's and Artillery units must maintain exact friendly locations. Fire planning, especially H&I's must be continuous and H&I's must be ready to fire in the early evening.

5. Clearance, (US, ARVN, and Political) are critical, must be received, and are time consuming. Every effort must be made in the TOC and DS Artillery.

91.

UN15702
list

1. Bring all the lumber, timbers, construction materials and skill tools you can.

2. Bring as many generators and refrigerators as you can.

3. Insure PLL is at 100% or better.

4. Provide your support units with equipment densities and anticipate providing support to medium and heavy artillery units.

5. Repair parts and expendable supplies for radios and meteorological stations are almost non-existent. Bring all you can get.

6. Be prepared to overcome a relaxation of maintenance standards on the operator level.

2 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: LTG PEERS

SUBJECT: April 1968 Americal/ARVN Operations

1. The conditions that existed within the Americal Division, and between the Americal and the 2d ARVN Divisions during the period 13-19 April 1968, provide a reasonable assurance that a meeting of Americal/2d ARVN personnel was conducted during this time frame. The probable dates were between 16-19 April 1968.

2. This conclusion is based on a study of the two combined operations being conducted by these units 8-19 April 1968 which is summarized in Incl 1. Map of area is Incl 2.



JAMES H. PATTERSON
Lieutenant Colonel, Armor

2 Incl
as

OPERATION BURLINGTON TRAIL
(11th Bde - 8 Apr 68 - 11 Nov 68)

FACTS

1. Operation Burlington Trail was a combined operation conducted by elements of the 198th Brigade and the 2d ARVN Division. Units participating were:

<u>198TH BDE</u>	<u>2D ARVN DIV</u>
1-6th Inf (-)	1st Bn, 6th Regt (-)
1-46th Inf (-)	Company, 3d Bn, 4th Regt
1-1st Cav (-)	

2. The operation commenced 081551H Apr 68.
Mission concept was:

Conduct combat sweeps particularly within
Base Area 117 and the road between Tam Ky and
Tien Phouc (See Map A).

3. During period 8-12 April, sporadic contact NW of Tam Ky resulted in no significant results.

4. The period of 13-20 April ARVN forces claimed 8 VC KIA. Contact was made on 13 April by US Forces (B/1-46) in northern part of Base Area 117 (Point 1, Map A), with US losing 17 (WIA) as a result of a 25 minute mortar attack. On 19 April, B/1-1st Cav was conducting a recon-in-force SW on Highway 533 (Tam Ky - Tien Phouc) when attacked by a sizeable VC force requiring artillery and gunship support (Point 2, Map A). Cumulative results for period 8-20 April 1968 were:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
13 KIA	170 KIA
69 WIA	48 IWC
	21 CSWC

5. During the period 20-27 April, the ARVN forces were not active in this operation, and claimed no body count. The US Forces made no significant contacts either, but claimed 36 KIA and 6 IWC, while taking 15 WIA.

6. Operation Norfolk Victory was also initiated on 8 April as a combined operation by the 11th Bde (1st Bn, 20th Inf and C Co., 4th Bn, 3rd Inf) and 2d ARVN (2d Bn, 4th Regt and 3d Bn, 5th Regt). ARVN was quite active during this operation in the vicinity of Base Area 121 and southwest of Quang Ngai City. Norfolk Victory was entirely south of the Son Tra Khuc. This operation terminated on 19 April.

7. Sporadic contact continued throughout Base Area 117 and in the vicinity of Point 3, Map A, resulting in the capture of several weapons caches and the additional loss of 11 US KIA (total 24) and a total of 186 US WIA by 17 May 68.

DISCUSSION

1. During early period (8-19 April 1968) ARVN was more interested in Norfolk Victory than in Burlington Trail probably because Norfolk Victory was aimed at protecting Quang Ngai City, their home base.

2. Results support that ARVN participation was limited in Burlington Trail during this period, while Americal units were stretched quite thin.

3. US losses, and first main contact (Burlington Trail), occurred on 13 April (17 WIA). It was evident that the 198th Bde forces were in an area that could be lucrative. Because of other commitments, however, Americal could not afford additional commitments to the Burlington Trail operation.

4. Norfolk Victory (11th Bde/2d ARVN) was terminated on 19 April 1968, quite suddenly, after achieving fair results. This was probably accomplished so that 2d ARVN (perhaps 11th Bde) could release forces to Burlington Trail where the promise of success appeared greater.

5. Planning for this termination and reorientation of 2d ARVN forces would have occurred between 13-19 April (after contact in Burlington Trail, and prior to termination of Norfolk Victory).

6. The knowledge that Burlington Trail could be lucrative/successful was not ascertained until 13 April, and Norfolk Victory had produced only these results:

FRIENDLY

6 KIA
33 WIA

ENEMY

45 KIA

7. Norfolk Victory was re-initiated (Norfolk Victory II) on 11 June 1968 when the action in Burlington Trail had tapered off to some extent and additional US Forces had become available (4-21 Inf).



NAM PH
-SOUTH CHI

BASE AREA'S - VC

AO-BURLINGTON TRAIL

LEGEND

TRUNG PHAN VIET NAM

2423

4 March 1970


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: "I Saw No Massacre at My Lai" - by John Christine

1. At 1800 hours, 26 February 1970, the undersigned contacted telephonically Mr. John T. Christine, formerly a door gunner and crew chief with Company "B", 123d Avn Bn during the period 23 Feb 1968 through 30 Jun 1969, as a result of subject article which appeared in the National Enquirer.
2. In attempting to have Mr. Christine recall actually flying on 16 March 1968, where and with which pilots, he stated substantially as follows:

"I can't state specifically that I flew on 16 March 1968, but I was flying quite a bit during this period. I recall that we had 4 gunships on the insertion and that we were flying low recon after the insertion. I was on so many operations in the Pinkville area I could not swear on a stack of Bibles that I flew on the TF Barker mission into My Lai on 16 March 1968. I remember flying with the following pilots - Thompson, Staffa, Livingston, Gualtier, Baker and Brown during this period."

3. RECOMMENDATION: That Mr. Christine not be called as a witness. The newspaper article indicates he actually flew on 16 March 1968. However, the telephone conversation strongly indicates that Mr. Christine cannot specifically place himself in the My Lai operation of 16 March 1968. Further research (telephone contacts with former members of Company "B", 123d Avn Bn) failed to place Mr. Christine on any aircraft flying on 16 March 1968.


JOSEPH I. APICI
Major, AGC

C, Witness Section, Peers Inquiry



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

18 MAR 1968

CS (Peers' Inquiry)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

SUBJECT: Americal Division TOC Journal 0001-2400 hours,
16 March 1968

1. An examination of the Americal Division TOC Journal of 16 March 1968 certified as a true copy by Major James M. Hollinan, Americal Division Historian, and the purported original copy for the same date furnished this Inquiry by the CID indicates that the two are not identical. Both the original and certified true copy are presently in the files of the CID.
2. The discrepancies that exist between the carbon copy and the purported original copy require an explanation. This Inquiry has been unable to satisfactorily determine the reason for the differences.
3. Request that the CID continue to pursue this matter in the course of their investigation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W.R. Peers", is located below the list of points.

W.R. PEERS
Lieutenant General, USA

AMERICAL DIVISION TOC JOURNAL

0001 16 March - 2400 16 March 1968

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

STANDARD FORM 135 JULY 1961 EDITION GENERAL SERVICES ADMIN. FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.4	RECORDS TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT	TO BE COMPLETED AT FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER	
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INSTRUCTIONS Send original and two copies to appropriate Federal Records Center.		SIGNATURE	DATE RECORDS RECEIVED
		TITLE	
FROM: (Name and address of Agency transferring records) Headquarters, Americal Division APO San Francisco 96374		TO: Federal Records Center, USA Headquarters, US Army, Vietnam ATTN: AVHAG-AR APO San Francisco 96375	

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5. NAME OF AGENCY CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS BARRY B. BIGGIN	6. BUILDING AND ROOM NO.	7. TELEPHONE NO.
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8. MAY THE RECORDS BE DESTROYED AS SCHEDULED WITHOUT FURTHER AGENCY CONCURRENCE? YES NO

9. AGENCY OFFICIAL (Signature) <i>Barry B. Biggin</i>	10. TITLE Division Records Management Officer	11. DATE 14 Oct 1969
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12. BOX NUMBERS	13. DESCRIPTION OF RECORDS WITH INCLUSIVE DATES (Show organizational component creating records)	14. DISPOSAL AUTHORITY (Schedule and Item No.)
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FRC ONLY

3/4

G3 Operations Section

3/4

206-07, Daily Journal Files, Jan-Sep 68, Filed Chrono-
logically

Permanent

Certified as True Copy
Barry B. Biggin
1st GS
AST. G-3 Cpn.
Americal Division

619

1. 0001 JOURNAL OPENED.
2. 0045 196, B-1-6, 069377, 2355H, detained 2 MAM, they had no ID. Said they will lead patrol to many VC. Patrol went SW for 5 minutes. 2 VC broke and ran; were eng at distance of 5 meters. Res: 2 VC KIA.
3. 0045 196, B-1-6, BT073478, 2330H, entered village, and obs 1 VC break and run from village, to east into cane field. Eng. Res: 1 VC KIA.
4. 0725 Q3 to 11th Ede, Per III MAF msg 11th tasked to police beach area where trawler was sunk. Debris reported to be scattered about 1 sq mile around trawler site
5. 0740 11th, C-1-20, CA, 1st lift PZ-0715 - LZ BS 711791, LZ Cold. 2nd lift - PZ-0715 - LZ Hot, rec'd fire from SE of LZ, CA complete at 0750H G3, C/S, III MAF
6. 0758 11th, C-1-20, vic BS714794 at 0703H, 1 VC KIA G3, C/S
7. 0759 11th, C-1-20, vic BS709788 at 0740H Sharks (gunships) eng'd 3 VC w/wpns and web gear. Res: 3 VC KIA, 3 wpns CIA M, G3, C/S
8. 0806 11th, 17th Avn (gunships) vic BS709788 at 0755H obs'd and eng'd 1 VC w/wpn. Res: 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC M, G3, C/S
9. 0807 11th, AERO Scouts, vic BS705768 at 0750H obs'd and eng'd 2 VC w/wpns. Res: 2 VC KIA, 2 IWC M, G3, C/S
10. 0808 11th, C-1-20, vic BS716788 at 0757H located documents and equipment, 14 VC KIA M, G3, C/S, III MAF
11. 0810 CAG, CAP L-2, vic ^{BT}611008 at 0545H ambush spotted 1 VC male changing clothes, he tried to warn 2 others. Res: 3 VCS detained, taken to Binh Son.
12. 0810 196th, LRP Chili Pepper, vic AT084378 at 0755H LRP team had 2 US WHA (E) by their own (cont)

AP mine, believe the VC turned it around during the night.

- 13 0815 11th, C-1-20, vic BS716788 at 0803H captured short wave radio set on freq of 7.3, documents and complete medical bag.
- 14 0821 196th, C-7-17, vic BT147277 at 0820H a blue-ghost gunship went down as a result of hostile fire. 0840H crew has been extracted, 4 US WHA (E), 2 by hostile fire, 2 as result of crash.. Ship is burning at present time remainder will be dest after salvage of equip. C/S
- 15 0837 11th, B-4-3, vic BS728777 at 0827H CA complete 0827H LZ Cold, BS728777 C/S
- 16 0830 (Delayed) 11th, CC-Task Force Barker, vic BS708779 at 0805H detained 2 VCS evading.
- 17 0845 11th, A-3-1, vic BS719807 at 0840H tripped BT. Res: 2 US WHA, dustoff called M
- 18 0850 11th, B-4-3, vic BS733793 at 0845H tripped BT. Res: 1 US WHA, dustoff called M
- 19 0905 11th, 123 Avn, vic BS718788 at 0855H found 2x60mm mortar rds
- 20 0938 11th, C-1-20, vic BS716788 at 0820H detained 23 VCS for questioning.
- 21 0925 (Delayed) 11th, A-3-1 and B-4-3, ref journal #17 3 WHA (E) instead of 2 WHA. ref journal #18 4 WHA (E), 1 KHA. reason 105mm tied in a tree and BT
- 22 0929 (Delayed) 1/1, C-7-17, vic BT161280 at 0928H 1 WHA (E) resulting from ground fire (doorgunner)
- 23 0945 11th, TOC, ref journal #16 the 2 VCS detained turned out to be captured ARVN troops, captured by VC 15 Mar. They say there's a lot VC in area of BS708779. ref journal #20 the 23 detainees are being interrogated by MI. One so far has said there lots of VC in area BS716788

- 24 0930 1/1, TOC, vic BT147277 at 0930H 2 plts of 1/1 and 1 plt of C-3-21 moving to downed gunship. 196th is aware of this
- 25 0940 11th, B-4-3, vic BS734794 at 0930H 3 US WHA (E) as a result of a BT
- 26 0955 196th, D-1-6, vic BT083490 at 0915H while entering village heard a rining noise believed to be a warning, then a large explosion occurred. Res: 2 US KHA, 6 US WHA 4 (E), 2 (M). Believed to be command detonated, unk type detonation, G3, C/S, G2, III MAF, M
- 27 1005 11th, B-4-3, vic BS742786 at 0955H eng'd unk no of VC. Res: 12 VC KIA G3, C/S, G2, III MAF, M
- 28 0940 (Delayed) 11th, C-1-20, vic BS714794 at 0930H element counted 69 VC KIA as a result of Arty fire this morning. In process of policing up wpns and equip. Additional bodies from previous counts. G3, C/S, G2, III MAF
- 29 1020 196th, A-2-35, vic AT936376 at 1000H found 8 graves freshly dug w/body in each dressed in green uniforms, also found 2 bodies same uniform lying in a hedgerow, all KIA by fragmentation wounds. Res: 10 NVA KIA G3, C/S, G2, III MAF, M
- 30 1027 198th, CAP L-5, vic BS714758 at 0110H tripped 2xM-79 rds. Res: 1 PF KHA, 1 USMC KIA, 2 PF WHA, 2 USMC WHA all evac.
- 31 0910 11, C/1/20 vic BS7167788 0757H fd 3 wpns 1x4-1 2xCarbines. (ref Journal #10)
- 32 1030 11, C/1/20 vic BS716788 1020H 1 US WHA(E) shot in foot, has been dusted off M
- 33 1055 11, B/4/3 vic BS742787 1025H eng'd unk # VC, res: 18 KIA(C). M G3 C/S
- 34 1101 1/1, Black-A CE (spotter plane) vic BT217444 1055H rec'd SA fire took one hit putting arty on above coord.

- 35 1155 196, A/2/35 vic AT938378 1022H came across two hooches fd following inside. 2 x US pounchos, 2 x trip flares, 53 rds 44MM & M-79, 3 x US packs, 3 x US Pak sacks, 1 x chicom lt-XG w/drum mag, empty Serial # 33353, evac wpn & web gear dest-rest. M
- 36 1203 196, LRP JEANIE, vic AT945404 1119H obs'd 1 MAM-2/web gear, called arty, results unk.
- 37 1205 196, D/1/6 vic BT083490 1100H rec'd heavy SA fire from unk size element, gun ship are spaying area at this time, arty being called M
- 38 1203 196, LRP JEANIE vic AT949402 1130H obs'd apparent NVA Security element, eng'd, 1 NVA KIA, 1 CHICORA PISTOL # M117735 CIA, also captured documents. M
C2
- 39 1208 11, A/3/1, vic BS719807 0840H ref journal entry # 17 & 21 change to read 1 US KHA 2 WHA(EVAC).
- 40 1300 196, LRP JEANIE vic AT945402 1250H LRP JEANIE was extracted at 1250H.
- 41 1100 198, reports that diver team at sunben sanpan site did not do a good job. They request a team scheduled for tomorrow, to be picked up by Hel at 1st Mar div pad. Riverside 621010 called 198 & obtained following info depth of water - 20 -30FT, type of bottom sandy. current - minimal, water - clear. Divers to be airlifted to MP site at BT621010 cond riverboat S-6568. Called 1st Recon Bn passed info & obtained following info: Land at lz 401 (1st Mar div Pad) Pal Joey (call sign) leg of 37.90.
- 42 1155 11, 123d AVN, vic BS718788 0855-1155H Ref Journal #19 fd 40 x 60mm mortar rds.
- 43 1230 196 E/3/21 vic BT063242 1210H obs 1 MAM 150m S evading eng'd w/SA res; 1 VC KIA, Black shorts. M

- 44 1407 CAG Cap L-3, vic BT6 55985 1800H ptl apted
3 VN told to halt, Kan, ptl pursued, res;
1 CIA, others escaptured will interrogate.
- 45 1420 1/1 TOC 1420H Task force consisting of 1xplt
of A trp 1xplt of C trp 1xplt of C3/21, still
moving forward down aircraft A trp(-) w/inf
continues Area reconnaissance B trp 3rd plt
continues SB mission.
- 46 1430 11 B/4/3 vic BS742786 1420H engId unk # VC M
in tunnels. res; 8 VC KIA(C) Had headgear
chicom HGs & assorted SA ammo, will dest Hg's
& SA amm.
- 47 1430 196 D/4/31 vic AT930383 1340H fd a camping area b M
between rocks. within this area they fd the following
1. k-44 SN#1561647, 2xm-1 carbines #2889500
& #2892978, 1xmagazine for k-44-loaded,
2xloaded clips for m-1.
- 48 1430 11, S2 request AO for LRRP SUE to be inserted 170800H
LL -BS6538 UR BS6841.
- 49 1430 11 S2 Request people sniffer mission be run on 17 Mar
on following locations BS6335 BS6342 BS7044
BS7536.
- 50 1435 196, A/1/6 1350-1427H FZ 1st lift 1350H
LZ last lift 1427H cold CA complete
- 51 1440 198 A/1/52 vic BS655017 1252H fired on 3 VC M
res 1 VC KIA, had no wpn, ID or other doc.
vc 40 yrs of age.
- 52 1452 A/1/1 vic BT120337 1435H obs'd 2 MAM evading
eng'd, res: 1 WIA, CIA, 1 DETAINEE. Dustoff
for WIA, other will be evac.
- 53 1456 196 C/2/1 vic BT018328 1050H fd 1 VC body
Killed by SA fire lying in hedgegrow. Body
body 2-3 days old, No ID res; 1 VC KIA(C).

- 54 1230-1300 196, Maj Bearden, 1200-1230H, 2 gunships were firing in BS0950, then a TOT at BS074501, then rds at 085494 and BT080500 - does not know who is shooting but must get it stopped IMM as (1) it is out AO extension and (2) we have a planned CA in that area. ROKs were firing on their side of the river. CAPT Coggershall called. Called CAPT Coggershall and asked hit about AO extension. He said ROKs have AO extension plotted. ROKs have not fired in AO extension. CPT Coggershall said he checked Marines and they had no gunships in area. Tried to call Hoi An, could not get through.
- 55 1450 196, LMRP JEANNIE, AT949402, Document reads: (1) travel permit for Nguyen Xuan Mac to go fm 4552 to Unit 4512. Dated 17 Jan 67. (2) TDY LTR - gives permission for cadre unit 430 to go to Quang Nam and to Quang Da Province dtd 20 Feb 68 196th OB: Possibly 2 NVA Div Hqs. (3) Rice receipt made out to a commo Bn for 60 cans of rice dtd 7 Mar 68. (4) Self critic on report written by Nguyen Xuan Mac dtd 17 Jan 68. OB
- 56 1632 196, A-2-1, AT949402, 1520H, fd in hut: 1 (H)
US 45 cal pistol SNE295066, also 6 rds 45 cal ammo. Wpn quite rusty, will be evac.
- 57 1600 196, D-1-6, BT083490, 1100H, reference Journal #37 should read 1 V. KIA.
- 58 1605 ROK, SP Pierce, N/A, ROK results for 15 Mar: 2 ROK WHA, 4 sampans destroyed, 7 South VIETNAM flags CIA, 1 anti personnel mine CIA.
- 59 1615 11, C-3-1, BS830415, 1556H, recd AW and SA fire. Res: 1 US WHA (EVAC), w sweeping area now. C/S
- 60 1620 196, C-2-1, 1050H, correction of Journal #53 correct coord is BT018382.
- 61 1650 CLDC, 1800H, "Condition Green " effective 1800H.
- 62 1640 11th, C-4-3, ES515835, 1500H, detained 3 VCS MAH, no IDs and will be evac.

- 63 1730 Quang Ngai, BS467833-463838, 17COH, Tra Bon G SF detained 2 VC who said they were VC, they also said a VC company is loc at BS467833, a VC plat is loc at BS463838.
- 64 1735 1-1, C-7-17, BT147277, 0820H, ref Journal #14, a SOI was lost when the acft went down. They have checked with personnel that was in acft and they confirm it is lost. Informed 1-1 to send someone from his unit to Americal Division signal officer to show the signal officer what was lost in the SOI.
- 65 1815 11, C-1-20, Ref Journal #31, wpn SN: 1 M1 rifle SN192771, 2 carbines #s 2915453 and 400763.
- 66 1920 198, A-1-52, BS672001, 1850H, routine medivac man had something in his eye, dust off complete at 1905H.
- 67 1920 198, D-1-52, BS665999, 1850H, recd SA fire and AW fire. Calling arty at this time. (M)
- 68 1920 198, A-6, 1-52, BS672006, 1850H, recd fire at above coord. Calling arty now. (M)
- 69 1921 11, reference journal #9 delete 2 wpns CIA.
- 70 1921 11, reference journal #7 delete 3 wpns CIA.
- 71 1921 11, reference journal #8 delete 1 wpn CIA.
- 72 1930 11, A-3-1, BS725822, 0640H, 1 US WHA from SA fire (minor). (m)
- 73 1759 (Delayed) 196, E-3-21, BT074243, 1350H, obs 1 MAM evading from hut, eng. Res: 1 VC KIA wearing US fatigues and blk shirt, no wpn, ID, or documents. Fd in hut 2 US OD towels, fatigue shirt with the name Robinson on it. 1 US entrenching tool, all will be evac. (M)
- 74 1800 (Delayed) CAP LIMA-4, BT622013, 1800H, patient brought in symptoms of plague action taken medivac.
- 75 1818 196, 4-31, C&C acft, BT125270, recd 15-20 rds SA fire, 1 hit to acft, continued mission, fire returned w/unk results.

- 76 1819 196, Minuteman 23, AT968374, 1750H, 4 rds of SA fire directed at acft, no hits recd, continued mission.
- 77 1820 196, LRRP HELEN, BT018206, 1730H, obs 5 MAM in khaki uniforms w/wpas, also 3 females with 1 bicycle, were carrying 1 81mm mortar tube. We re moving NE 800M from above coord. Arty was called w/unlk results.
- 78 1947 8 196, B-2-1, AT965317, 1905H, while moving into night location obs 2 MAM evad 100 M north. Eng w/SA, resulting in 1 VC KIA. (M)
- 79 1535 (Delayed) 1-1, 1-1 TOC, AO Extension request for period 170600-172400H: from grid BT1529 S along N-S line to BT1528, then east to BT1928, then north to BT1929. Also request extension of C-3-21, want it for aerial recon. 196th called.
- 80 1900 198, 198th acft (AO) while flying mission picked up strong radio signal, VN speaking on freq of 42.6, traced signal to coord BT3034.
- 81 1940 196, reference journal #35, should read 2 Chicom LMG captured #930413.
- 82 1945 198, Lt Blanco, the 198th wants to have a practice alert and have 3 acft go to the alert CO's PZ. They will mark the PZ and the acft land, then that will terminate. Want to run it later this evening. Acft are available, nite formation flying is frowned on by Avn officer (Cpt Lenister). Further info: 198th will practice w/o having helicopters land. Want 2 gunships and 1 slick. Will make a pass and then exercise will terminate. Approved by LTC Balmer. Passed approval to Avn and 198th and Col Young.
- 83 2130 196, C-4-31, BT129256, 2030H, urgent dust off for 1 US w/appendicitis, dust off took 2 hits. Due to weather and hits could not be completed.
- 84 2135 198, 198 TOC, 2130H- effecting CLDC practice alert. Also having helicopter move to LZ. Helicopters will not land. They will mark LZ. Practice alert terminated at 2210H.

- 85 2300 198, C-1-52, BS522967, while firing H&I w/SA fire, killed 1 VC, body fd in AM and identified by village chief as VC.
- 86 2308 11, B-1-20, 837393, 2300H, B-1-20 had 3 VC who entered ambush position. Eng. Res: 3 VC KIA.
- 87 2336 11, 3-21, 018306, 2205H, recd 12 rds SA fire from north, called arty and fired mortars. Res: unk, neg cas.
- 88 2337 196, HQs-8131, night NVA obs 2 VC 250 meters to the east through starlite scope. Appeared to be digging, fired illum. Neg sightings.
- 89 2338 A-2-3, 3-21, 146223, 2228H, heard 2 shots in vic of above coord, heard drums to the north-west, 2230H heard shot from same loc, fired arty in valley and drums stopped.
- 90 2339 196, A-2-1, 969307, 2150H, obs 5 blinking lights, called arty and lights went out.
- 91 2340 196, 2-1, 009367, 2000H, obs 6 stationar y lights, called arty and lights went out.
- 92 2351 196, LRRP HELEN, obs 2 flashlights, 1 36° 1000 meters, 1 10° 300 meters moving in unk direction.
- 93 2350 196, 1-6 OP, BT131452, 1355H, OP recd SA fire. Returned fire and checked area. Pd 1 M72 LAW and 100 rds 7.62mm ammo at BT121454. All evac. Res: 1 IWC.
- 94 2400 OPNS SUMMARY: Americal Div units cont S&D opns w/3 CAs being conducted. In Opn Wheeler/Wallowa A-1-6 conducted a CA to vic BT0951 w/D-1-6 block ing, completed 1427H w/light contact. A-2-35 vic AT936376 fd 10 NVA bodies. In Opn Muscatine C-1-20 conducted a CA at 0751 to vic BS7180 rec SA fire vic of LZ, B-4-3 CA at 0827 to vic BS7378. While these two units conducted S&D NE, A-3-1 blocked vic ES7281. Hvy contact resulted in the area and contd until approx 1500H. Arty and gunships were employed with the results of 128 VC KIA, 3 IWC, 2 US KHA, 10 WHA (evac), 1 WHA (M). Americal totals for 16 Mar: 5 KHA, 17 WHA (E), 5 WHA (M), 138 VC KIA, 11 NVA KIA, 8 IWC, 2 CSWC.

AMERICAL DIV TOC

CHU LAI, RVN

0001

16 Mar

2400

16 Mar

95 2400

JOURNAL CLOSED.

CERTIFIED
A TRUE COPY:

James M. Hallinan
JAMES M HALLINAN, MAJ, INF
Americal Division Historian

629

CLARK H, BENN, MAJ GS, Asst G3

11 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Recall of Witness

1. I called Mr. Charles Anistranski at 0720 hours this date and requested that he appear as a recall witness for the Peers' Inquiry. He is a retired lieutenant colonel and resides at Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania (telephone 717 825-7167).
2. I explained that additional witnesses had appeared and that General Peers felt that he should have the opportunity to make a final appearance prior to the Inquiry becoming a matter of history for the purpose of correcting any statements he felt were in error.
2. Mr. Anistranski declined, said he did not have time, and had no additional information to offer.



WILLIAM V. WILSON
Colonel

EXHIBIT M-139



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

9 March 1970

MEMO FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Chaplain (CPT) Kissinger-
Re: Memorial Services

1. Received telephone call from CH (CPT) Kissinger at 0830 hours 9 March 1970. Chaplain Kissinger stated the following:

"I have located six undated letters which were prepared on deceased personnel. I have one pertaining to SSG Cox of C/1/20. They are undated so I do not know what day Cox died. Command policy was that memorial services were to be held within 48 hours of death (at this point, I checked C/1/20 morning reports to determine the date of death of SSG Cox and informed Chaplain Kissinger that it was 14 March 1968). In that case the services must have been held either at LZ DOTTIE or Monastery Hill on 15 March 1968."

2. Based on the above, I requested Chaplain Kissinger to make copies of the letters with a statement to the effect that it was command policy to hold memorial services within 48 hours of death. The statement should also include that services were held either at Monastery Hill or LZ DOTTIE.

1 Incl
MR, C/1/20, 14Mar68

Joseph I. Apici
JOSEPH I. APICI
MAJ, AGC
Peers Inquiry

1. UNIT IDENT CODE: 2. UNIT IDENT CODE: 3. MRIC: 4. REPORTING UNIT: 5. PA. UNIT: 6. MR CONTROL NO.: 7. PERS STATUS: 8. MR CONTROL NO.: 9. COMMAND: 10. PERMANENT STATION OR LOCATION: 11. PRESENT STATION OR LOCATION: 12. PAGE: 13. NO. OF PAGES: 14. REPORTING UNIT: 15. MRIC: 16. COMMAND: 17. PERS STATUS: 18. MR CONTROL NO.: 19. PERMANENT STATION OR LOCATION: 20. PRESENT STATION OR LOCATION: 21. PAGE: 22. NO. OF PAGES:

1. UNIT IDENT CODE: W-DPS-00
2. UNIT IDENT CODE: W-DPS-00
3. MRIC: A
4. REPORTING UNIT: Co C 1st Bn 20th Inf
5. PA. UNIT: 11th Inf Bde
6. MR CONTROL NO.: 8(13Mar68)
7. PERS STATUS: PP
8. MR CONTROL NO.: 8(13Mar68)
9. COMMAND: USARPAC
10. PERMANENT STATION OR LOCATION: APO 96217
11. PRESENT STATION OR LOCATION: APO 96217
12. PAGE: 1
13. NO. OF PAGES: 1

13. STRENGTH SECTION

IDENTITY	ACCOUNTABLE				OPERATING				INTRANSIT				ATTACHED						
	PREVIOUS DAY'S STRENGTH	GAINS	LOSSES	TODAY'S STRENGTH	PRESENT	TDY	LEAVE	HOSP	ARREST	AWOL	MISSING	TOTAL	INCOM-ING	OUT-GOING	TOTAL	PRESENT	ABSENT	TOTAL	
COMMISSIONED	5			5	5														
WARRANT																			
ENLISTED	121		4	117	114		3					117				8		8	
MAJOR DISTRIBUTION	C	GEN	COL	LTC	MAJ	CPT	1LT	2LT	TOTAL	W									
OPERATING	O					1	1	3	5				1	3	13	23	60	3	1
INTRANSIT	M																		

14. CHANGES SECTION

NAME	STANDARD NAME LINE	SERVICE NUMBER	GRADE	ACTION	STATUS	AUTHORIZATION		EDCA EFFECTIVE DATE	DPU
						PARA	SO		
Coz George J			SSG6	SEPARATIONS					
				Decd fr cy fr fragmentation wounds DOA 2nd Surg Hosp RVN APO SF 96374					11Mar68
				REASSIGNMENT LOSSES					
Cummings Thomas R			SP4E4						
Edson Henry D			PFC03						
Marrikkson Richa			PFC03	RFA to USARV Pbt Cas Co atch to 2nd Surg Hosp Chu Lat RVN APO SF 96374					11Mar68

15. AUTHENTICATION SECTION

NAME AND TITLE (Typed or printed): DAVID M STORES
Executive Officer

GRADE AND BRANCH: LLT Inf

SIGNATURE: *David M. Store*

17. NO. OF DA FORMS 1-1 ATTACHED: 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DARMSTADT SUPPORT ACTIVITY (USAG)
APO NEW YORK 09175



REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

AEZFR-D-CH

10 March 1970

SUBJECT:

Peers Inquiry

TO:

PEERS INQUIRY
Army Operation Center
Room BF 741C, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310
ATTN: MAJCR APICI

Enclosed are copies (Zerex) of sympathy letters sent to the next of kin during my assignment with the 11th Infantry Brigade in Vietnam during the early part of 1968.

It was the policy of the Americal Division that correspondence to the next of kin regarding the death of a unit's member be forwarded through channels within 48 hours to Division Headquarters. This correspondence included a letter of sympathy from the unit chaplain. It was furthermore their policy that this letter remain undated, which explains for the missing dates on the attached copies.

The 11th Brigade was very prompt in conducting memorial services for the members of its command. Occasionally services were conducted the same day, but normally two to three days later. Later than this would be a rare exception. Concerning the attached letters, those members of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry who died in combat during mid March 1968 would have had a memorial service conducted in their behalf within approximately two to three days after their death. It is assumed that these services were held at fire base "Dottie" or at "Monastery Hill" believed to be southeast of "Dotti". I made one visit, overnight, to "Monastery Hill" where Company C was situated on a particular evening.

It is assumed that I conducted the memorial services of the individuals whose names appear on the enclosed copies.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H.P. Kissinger", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

H.P. KISSINGER
CH (MAJ), USA
SUPACT Chaplain

encl: 8
mrs

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 20TH INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN
APO San Francisco 96217

XIXX-CH

Mr. & Mrs. Lilburn Cox Jr
526 LaPradira Avenue
Santa Rosa, New Mexico

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Cox:

Please accept my deepest sympathy over the recent loss of your son, Staff Sergeant George J. Cox, Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade. Appropriate ministrations were given and a memorial service was conducted in his behalf.

As a minister of the Gospel, I know the sorrow and the feeling of loneliness that you must bear in this hour, and all of us share it with you. Your son was a dedicated soldier who loved his country and sacrificed his life for a great cause and noble principles.

The Lord is our help in time of trouble, and I encourage you to look to Him for the grace and strength that you need. God has promised life and hope to us beyond the grave through faith in His Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. I trust this hope may be your comfort and blessing at the present and in the years to come.

Again, personally and for the officers and men of this command, please accept our sincere sympathy and prayers in the loss of your son.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY P. KISSINGER, III
Chaplain (MAJ), USA
Battalion Chaplain

NOTE: MORE THAN ONE ADDRESS OR ADDRESSEE BECAUSE INDIVIDUAL'S RECORDS REGARDING NOK IN DOUBT.

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*Chaplain's
File Copy*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 20TH INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN
APO San Francisco 96217

XIXX-GH

Mrs. Brigitte Cox
4516 D McCornack
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

Dear Mrs. Cox:

Please accept my deepest sympathy over the recent loss of your husband, Staff Sergeant George J. Cox, Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade. Appropriate ministrations were given and a memorial service was conducted in his behalf.

As a minister of the Gospel, I know the sorrow and the feeling of loneliness that you must bear in this hour, and all of us share it with you. Your husband was a dedicated soldier who loved his country and sacrificed his life for a great cause and noble principles.

The Lord is our help in time of trouble, and I encourage you to look to Him for the grace and strength that you need. God has promised life and hope to us beyond the grave through faith in His Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. I trust this hope may be your comfort and blessing at the present and in the years to come.

Again, personally and for the officers and men of this command, please accept our sincere sympathy and prayers in the loss of your husband.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY P. KISSINGER, II
Chaplain (MAJ), USA
Battalion Chaplain

637

Chaplain's
File Copy

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 20TH INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN
APO San Francisco 96217

XIX-CH

Mrs. Ruth De Witt
510 Coolidge Drive
Bloomington, Indiana

Dear Mrs. De Witt:

Please accept my deepest sympathy over the recent loss of your son, Specialist Four Bobby Wilson, Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade. Appropriate ministrations were given and a memorial service was conducted in his behalf.

As a minister of the Gospel, I know the sorrow and the feeling of loneliness that you must bear in this hour, and all of us share it with you. Your son was a dedicated soldier who loved his country and sacrificed his life for a great cause and noble principles.

The Lord is our help in time of trouble, and I encourage you to look to Him for the grace and strength that you need. God has promised life and hope to us beyond the grave through faith in His Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. I trust this hope may be your comfort and blessing at the present and in the years to come.

Again, personally and for the officers and men of this command, please accept our sincere sympathy and prayers in the loss of your son.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY P. KISSINGER, III
Chaplain (MAJ), USA
Battalion Chaplain

NOTE: MORE THAN ONE ADDRESS OR ADDRESSEE BECAUSE INDIVIDUAL'S RECORDS REGARDING NOK IN DOUBT.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 20TH INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN
APO San Francisco 96217

XIXX-CH

Mrs. Helen Vaught
510 West Allen Street
Bloomington, Indiana

Dear Mrs. Vaught:

Please accept my deepest sympathy over the recent loss of your son, Specialist Four Bobby Wilson, Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade. Appropriate ministrations were given and a memorial service was conducted in his behalf.

As a minister of the Gospel, I know the sorrow and the feeling of loneliness that you must bear in this hour, and all of us share it with you. Your son was a dedicated soldier who loved his country and sacrificed his life for a great cause and noble principles.

The Lord is our help in time of trouble, and I encourage you to look to Him for the grace and strength that you need. God has promised life and hope to us beyond the grave through faith in His Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. I trust this hope may be your comfort and blessing at the present and in the years to come.

Again, personally and for the officers and men of this command, please accept our sincere sympathy and prayers in the loss of your son.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY P. KISSINGER, III
Chaplain (17A), USA
Battalion Chaplain

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 20TH INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN
APO San Francisco 96217

XDCX-C11

Mr. Harry Wilson
Rural Route 1
Bloomington, Indiana

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Please accept my deepest sympathy over the recent loss of your son, Specialist Four Bobby Wilson, Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade. Appropriate ministrations were given and a memorial service was conducted in his behalf.

As a minister of the Gospel, I knew the sorrow and the feeling of loneliness that you must bear in this hour, and all of us share it with you. Your son was a dedicated soldier who loved his country and sacrificed his life for a great cause and noble principles.

The Lord is our help in time of trouble, and I encourage you to look to Him for the grace and strength that you need. God has promised life and hope to us beyond the grave through faith in His Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. I trust this hope may be your comfort and blessing at the present and in the years to come.

Again, personally and for the officers and men of this command, please accept our sincere sympathy and prayers in the loss of your son.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY P. KISSINGER, III
Chaplain (MAJ), USA
Battalion Chaplain

640

Chaplain's
File Copy

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 20TH INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN
APO San Francisco 96217

XIIX-CH

Mr. and Mrs. Gustavo Rotger
1018 East 163rd Street
New York, New York 10459

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Rotger:

Please accept my deepest sympathy over the recent loss of your son, Private First Class Gustavo Rotger, Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade. Appropriate ministrations were given and a memorial service was conducted in his behalf.

As a minister of the Gospel, I know the sorrow and the feeling of loneliness that you must bear in this hour, and all of us share it with you. Your son was a dedicated soldier who loved his country and sacrificed his life for a great cause and noble principles.

The Lord is our help in time of trouble, and I encourage you to look to Him for the grace and strength that you need. God has promised life and hope to us beyond the grave through faith in His Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. I trust this hope may be your comfort and blessing at the present and in the years to come.

Again, personally and for the officers and men of this command, please accept our sincere sympathy and prayers in the loss of your son.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY F. KISSINGER, III
Chaplain (MCJ), USA
Battalion Chaplain

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 20TH INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN
APO San Francisco 96317

IXIX-CH

Mrs. Odessa Hazel Bell
RR # 1
Perkins, Oklahoma

Dear Mrs. Bell:

Please accept my deepest sympathy over the recent loss of your son, Private First Class Edgar D. Bell, Company A, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade. Appropriate ministrations were given and I have conducted a memorial service in his behalf.

As a minister of the Gospel, I know the sorrow and the feeling of loneliness that you must bear in this hour, and all of us share it with you. Your son was a dedicated soldier who loved his country and sacrificed his life for a great cause and noble principles.

The Lord is our help in time of trouble, and I encourage you to look to Him for the grace and strength that you need. God has promised life and hope to us beyond the grave through faith in His Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. I trust this hope may be your comfort and blessing at the present and in the years to come.

Again, personally and for the officers and men of this command, please accept our sincere sympathy and prayers in the loss of your son.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY P. KISSINGER, III
Chaplain (MCJ), USA
Battalion Chaplain

COMMUNICATIONS
1ST BATTALION 20TH INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96217

Mr. and Mrs. Alvin Francis Weber
2417 Chilcombe
St Paul, Minnesota 55108

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Weber:

Please accept my deepest sympathy in the loss of your son, Specialist Fourth Class William J. Weber.

As a minister of the Gospel, I certainly know the sorrow and the grief that you must bear in this hour, and all of us share it with you. Your son was a dedicated soldier who loved his country and died in its service. Appropriate ministrations were given and a memorial service was conducted in his behalf.

The Lord is our help in time of trouble, and I trust you will look to Him for the grace and strength that you need. God has promised life and hope to us beyond the grave through our faith in His Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. I trust this hope may be your comfort and blessing at the present and in the years to come.

Again I extend my sympathy and prayers to you in the behalf of your son.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY P. KISSINGER, III
Chaplain (MAJ), USA
Battalion Chaplain



HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

APQ 96222

2 JAN 1968

~~2 January 1967~~

MACCOC

EXTRACTS

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: MACV Commanders' Conference 3 December 1967 (U)

1. (U) The MACV Commanders' Conference commenced at the Conference Room of Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Nha Trang, at 030933 December 1967.

2. (U) A list of conferees is at Inclosure 1.

3. (U) The agenda is at Inclosure 2.

4. (TS) The following is a summary, not a verbatim transcript, of the presentations and remarks.

Page 1 of 15 Pages

EXTRACTS

(pages 12 and 13 only regraded)
Regraded CONFIDENTIAL, 7 Mar 70
Letter, Office IG, HQ USMACV



EXHIBIT M-141

Following the discussion, General Westmoreland resumed his closing remarks.

General Westmoreland was concerned over the high rate of firing and bombing accidents. Since US/FW forces have initiated operations in Viet Nam, the rate of accidents has increased. In 1966 we had 103 accidents. In the first 10 months of 1967, we experienced 567, a more than five fold increase; an increase which cannot be accounted for by a corresponding increase in combat assets. This is a matter of concern to us all. General Westmoreland desired commanders to take a personal interest in this matter to reduce accidents to a minimum. Upon the occasion of an accident, the chain of command should endorse the report all the way to MACV level. Other means to consider include:

- a. Appointment of safety officers at several command levels with these officers to check on the state of gunnery training and other measures designed to bring down the accident level.
- b. Special training for replacements to make them more proficient and more cognizant of the hazards involved, safety procedures, and history of past accidents.
- c. Stress on this subject at Commanders' meetings.

General Westmoreland requested J3 to keep monthly statistics on accidents which could direct attention to where accidents are occurring, where the emphasis on safety is strong, and where it is lax.

General Westmoreland then addressed the subject of the conduct of troops in Viet Nam. There is evidence that some of our troops are exhibiting an improper attitude, engaged in horseplay and displaying an arrogant manner. In the formulative days of MACV, great stress was laid in proper indoctrination and orientation of troops in Viet Nam. Pursuant of this, we developed the billfold-size card stating the Nine Rules of Conduct to describe the proper relationship between the fighting man and indigenous personnel. The rules still apply and General Westmoreland wished commanders to stress this subject. All personnel should have the cards and understand the meaning of the rules; for if we antagonize the local inhabitants our



cause will be seriously setback. By and large our troops are well behaved. In this connection General Westmoreland summarized a conversation between General Abrams and Vice President Ky. Vice President Ky stated the Vietnamese have had much experience in relations with foreign troops having been under both Japanese and French domination. The military forces presently in Viet Nam have created a far better impression in the people's mind. Despite this, General Westmoreland believed we must do better. RVN now has an elected government and a free press. A system of free debate and reporting can easily magnify isolated incidents into major events. It behooves us all to tighten up. General Westmoreland cited reckless driving as an area for increased command attention. General Westmoreland continued his remarks by stressing that all commanders should be sensitive to the matter of attitude and conduct. When violations occur, commanders must move in aggressively and punish both the offender and his commander, who should have taught him better. In this connection General Westmoreland cited another MACV card that still provides sound guidance to commanders. This MACV card, Guidance for Commanders in Viet Nam, which prescribes 17 points for leaders gives many guidelines apropos to improving the attitude of our troops. The guidance contained in the card applies to commands to the company level. General Westmoreland directed BG Chaisson to insure that commanders have enough cards to issue down to at least the platoon level.



DCSPER-CSD

FACT SHEET

Mr. Ruberton/54200
12 Jan 70

SUBJECT: Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army

PURPOSE: To provide a review of the background, aptitudes, trainability, and educational level of enlisted personnel assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry.

FACTS

1. The roster of the company furnished by the Peers' Inquiry Committee contained the names of 136 enlisted personnel. Twenty three were NCOs and 113 other enlisted men. The roster includes three NCOs and eight other men who were attached to the company which are included in this review.
2. Records of five men were not available and all items of information were not available in several cases. However, the results of this review are considered to be representative of the entire company. Norms used in the review pertain to the median which divides the upper and lower half of the group.
3. A review of the records of the 23 NCOs reveals that the majority were above the norm.
 - 66 percent were enlistees in comparison to 40 percent of Army wide accessions for FY 67, 68 and 69.
 - Distribution among the four mental categories was nearly identical to accessions of new men during FY 67, 68 and 69.
 - 52 percent were above the norm in general learning ability (GT Score 100).
 - 50 percent were above the norm in Infantry aptitude (IN Score 100).
 - 87 percent were high school graduates in comparison to 69 percent of Army wide accessions (25 percent had some college credits).

EXHIBIT M-142

[REDACTED]

- Median age was 22 years.

4. Review of the enlistees and inductees, less NCOs, shows no significant deviation from the normal cross section of first term enlistees and inductees.

- 39 percent were enlistees which is nearly identical to Army wide accessions.

- Distribution among the four mental categories was nearly identical to accessions of new men during FY 67, 68 and 69.

- 47 percent were above the norm in overall trainability (AFQT 50 percentile) in comparison to 52 percent of Army wide accessions.

- 54 percent were above the norm in general learning ability (GT Score 100) in comparison to 60 percent of Army wide accessions.

- 51 percent were above the norm in Infantry aptitude (IN Score 100) which is nearly identical to Army wide accessions.

- 70 percent were high school graduates which is slightly higher than Army wide accessions (19 percent had some college credits).

- Approximately 8 percent of the entire company were Project One Hundred Thousand men while Army wide accessions are 12 percent.

- Average age was 21.6 years.

5. Regular Army enlistees (less NCOs) comprised 39 percent of the company. A review of their records reveals that the majority were below the norm in overall trainability and general learning ability. Sixty-one percent were above the norm in infantry aptitude. Fifty-six percent were high school graduates (23 percent had some college credits). Average age was 20.8 years.

6. The inductees comprised 61 percent of the company (less NCOs) and were above the norm in practically every area. Fifty-three percent were above the norm in overall trainability, 59 percent in general learning ability, 79 percent were high school graduates; (17 percent had some college credits); 46 percent were above the norm in infantry aptitude. Average age was 22 years.

7. Based upon the foregoing it is concluded that there is no significant deviation in the enlisted personnel of Company C from the normal cross section of first term enlistees or inductees.

Frankie M. Davis

FRANKIE M. DAVIS
1st Lt. US
Infantry
1st Infantry Division
Fort Benning, GA

[REDACTED]

Mr. Ruberton/78540
6 February 1970

SUBJECT: Company B, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army

PURPOSE. To provide an analysis of the background, aptitudes, trainability, educational level and other information pertaining to personnel assigned to Company B, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry.

FACTS

1. The roster of the company furnished by the Peers' Inquiry Committee contained the names of five officers and 126 enlisted personnel (27 were NCO's and 99 other enlisted men).
2. Records of the 5 officers were available. Records of 7 enlisted men were not available and several items of information were not available in 10 other cases. However, the results of this analysis are considered representative of the entire company. Norms used pertain to the median which divides the upper and lower half of the group.
3. Review of the 5 officers' records reveals that as a group the officers assigned to Company B at the time of the incident appear to have been above average in educational level, maturity, and manner of performance. Three had college degrees. All but one had service at company level prior to arriving in Vietnam. Two had prior service as enlisted men. Only 2 joined the unit after it had arrived in Vietnam. The average age was 26 years. Three received their commissions through OCS and two through ROTC. None had prior combat experience. None had any significant identifiable weaknesses.
 - The Company Commander CPT Michles appears to have been an extremely conscientious, hardworking, and Army career motivated officer. He was dedicated and probably sincerely interested in the welfare of his officers and men.
 - His Executive Officer, 1LT Mundy, appears to have been a loyal but plodding worker who had not as yet decided where he was going in life and was not concerned about it. In addition to his reported lack of enthusiasm and force, he probably lacked imagination.
 - CPT Willingham, a platoon leader in Company B, and later Commander of Company E, is probably quite intelligent and capable of performing better than average in any job to which he is assigned; but he appears basically not motivated towards a career as an Army officer and is probably self-oriented.
 - 2LT Lewis' record contains little upon which to base an evaluation. He was a small man physically (5'5", 137 pounds). Although he was described as being enthusiastic by his raters during his service on an instructional committee at Fort Polk, there is nothing to indicate how he performed as a platoon leader in combat.

CS 091 Vietnam (16 Jan 70)

EXHIBIT M-143

[REDACTED]

DCSPER-CSD

SUBJECT: Company B, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry

- 1LT Cochran appears to have been a mature, solid, sincere officer trying to do a job. Although he lacked color and dash as a rifle platoon leader, he probably could be counted upon to come through when the going got tough.

- Evaluation of each officer is attached at inclosure 1.

4. Review of the 27 NCO records reveals that they were above the norm in all areas.

- 67 percent were enlistees in comparison to approximately 40 percent Army-wide accessions.

- Distribution among the four mental categories was better than accessions of new men in FY 67, 68 and 69. Forty-five percent were in Categories I and II compared to 34 percent of accessions; 15 percent were in Category IV compared to 26 percent of accessions.

- 63 percent were above the norm in overall trainability (AFQT 50 percentile) in comparison to 52 percent of Army-wide accessions.

- 85 percent were above the norm in Infantry aptitude (IN score 100).

- 72 percent were above the norm in general learning ability (GT score 100).

- 85 percent were high school graduates or higher in comparison to 69 percent of Army-wide accessions (41 percent had some college credits -- 3 had college degrees).

- Median age was 23 years.

- Two had combat experience in World War II. One also had combat experience in Korea.

- Awards included - 6 BSM, 3 PH, 2 ACM, and 5 GCM.

- 17 records indicated that training had been received on the Geneva Convention during the period Jan 67-Jan 68. The other files were either incomplete or no entry was recorded on the Enlisted Qualification Record.

- 24 were rated excellent in both conduct and efficiency. Ratings for 3 NCO's were not available.

5. Review of 87 enlistees and inductees, less NCO's, reveals that they were below the norm in several areas.

- 29 percent were enlistees in comparison to 40 percent Army-wide accessions.

- Distribution among the four mental categories deviated somewhat from normal accessions. While Categories I and III were similar, Category II was

DCSPER-CSD

SUBJECT: Company B, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry

12 percent below accession level and Category IV 13 percent higher than normal accessions.

- 37 percent were above the norm in overall trainability (AFQT 50 percentile) in comparison to 52 percent of Army-wide accessions.

- 44 percent were above the norm in Infantry aptitude (IN score 100) in comparison to 50 percent of Army-wide accessions.

- 42 percent were above the norm in general learning ability (GT score 100) in comparison to 60 percent of Army-wide accessions.

- 74 percent were high school graduates or higher in comparison to 69 percent of Army-wide accessions. (20 percent had some college credits -- 2 had college degrees.)

- Average age was 21.6 years.

- None had combat experience prior to duty in Vietnam.

- Awards included - 8 BSM, 13 PH, 11 ACM, and 2 GCM.

- 63 records indicated that training had been received on the Geneva Convention during the period March 67 - March 68. Three received the training in June and August 1968. The other files were either incomplete or no entry was recorded on the Enlisted Qualification Record.

- All men (except 2) were rated Excellent in both conduct and efficiency. One was rated good and one unsatisfactory.

- Approximately 10 percent of the company were Project One Hundred Thousand men while Army-wide accessions are 12 percent (50 percent were enlistees).

6. The only significant differences between the enlistees and inductees (less NCO's) were that the enlistees were higher in Infantry aptitude with 56 percent above the norm, while the inductees had a higher percentage of high school graduates and men who attended college. The two college graduates were regular Army enlistees.

7. Based upon the foregoing it is concluded that:

- The officers were generally above average.

- The NCO's were above average and apparently very well selected with emphasis on quality.

DCSPER-CSD

SUBJECT: Company B, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry

- There was some deviation among the other enlisted personnel from the normal distribution of accessions in mental categories and aptitudes. However, most of the high quality NCO's in the company were a part of the regular accessions. They were selected from the same group of first term enlistees and inductees which accounts for some of the deviation. This is considered normal since the higher quality men are most likely to become NCO's.

- The analysis of the NCO's and other men as a group shows that the enlisted personnel of the company are nearly identical to the accessions that entered the Army during the same period of time.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:



FRANKLIN M. DAVIS, JR.
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Military
Personnel Policies

1 Incl
Eval of Off's

7 January 1970

I, Captain Werner O. Unzelmann, hereby certify that on 2 January 1970 I searched the files of the S2 Office of the 11th Brigade at Duc Pho, Republic of Vietnam, and on that date found in a file folder labeled "Security Classification System Files" located in the second drawer of the lefthand file cabinet, a two page report of investigation dated 24 April 1968 from Colonel Oran K. Henderson to Commanding General, Americal Division, with a notation in red ink on the first page "FILE RKB" and with an inclosure of two pages, bearing pencil notation "INCL 2" and an inclosure of one page bearing pencil notation "INCL #1" and that I was unable to find any other copy of these papers in the S2 office at the 11th Brigade.


WERNER O. UNZELMANN

Captain, MI
United States Army

LIFE

TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK 10020

THOMAS GRIFFITH
EDITOR

March 6, 1970

Lieutenant General W. R. Peers, USA
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Peers:

Permission is hereby granted, as you requested, to
reproduce pages 36 to 42 from LIFE, December 5, 1969.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Thomas Griffith". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

EXHIBIT M-145



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

CS (Peers Inquiry)

25 February 1970

Mr. Thomas Griffith
Editor, Life Magazine
Rockefeller Center
New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr. Griffith:

The edition of December 5, 1969 of LIFE magazine, pages 36 to 42, have been entered as an exhibit into the official record of The Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident. These pages have been shown to many of the witnesses for the purpose of identification of the location and persons in the photographs.

It is requested that permission be granted to reproduce pages 36 to 42 so that the official report will contain all exhibits used in the investigation.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "W. R. Peers".

W. R. PEERS
Lieutenant General, US Army



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

CS (Peers Inquiry)

14 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conduct of Search for and Examination of Documents
Relating to the Son My Incident of 16-19 March 1968

1. During the period 15 Dec 69 to 9 Mar 70, detailed searches for and/or examination of all available files, records, reports and other documents pertaining to the Son My incident of 16-19 Mar 68 were conducted in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) as follows:

a. 15 Dec - 28 Dec 69. COL Whalen, with LTC Brandt, conducted a general review and examination of documents readily available at HQ, MACV; III MAF; USARV; Americal Div; 11th Bde; and Quang Ngai Province Advisory Team.

b. 28 Dec - 6 Jan 70. Detailed searches for documents and examination of files, records, and reports were conducted at HQ, MACV; HQ, USARV; HQ, III MAF; HQ, Americal Div; HQ, 11th Bde; Quang Ngai Province Advisory Team; and the Son Tinh District Advisory Team. The primary officers who conducted the incountry (RVN) searches and reviews were:

COL Thomas F. Whalen, INF
LTC Leo M. Brandt, ARM
LTC John E. Rogers, INF
MAJ Clyde D. Lynn, AG

c. 7 Jan - 9 Mar 70. COL Whalen and LTC Brandt continued to search for and review records, files, and reports to provide background data and supplementary information pertinent to documents previously acquired. This effort also included search for material relevant to testimony obtained by the Inquiry at HQ, DA, Washington, DC.

EXHIBIT M-146

CS (Peers Inquiry)

14 March 1970

SUBJECT: Conduct of Search for and Examination of Documents
Relating to the Son My Incident of 16-19 March 1968

2. Additional searches and reviews of records, reports, and files were conducted by personnel of the organizations mentioned in 1b above. Results of these endeavors are listed in the following inclosures:

- a. HQ, MACV (Incl 1)
- b. HQ, USARV (Incl 2)
- c. HQ, III MAF (Incl 3)
- d. HQ, Americal Div (Incl 4)
- e. 11th Bde (Incl 5)

3. A team of investigators, headed by LTC James H. Patterson, conducted a search at the National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, for pertinent documentation on 25 Jan 70. A Memorandum for Record indicating the results of this effort is attached as Incl 6.

4. LTC Brandt departed Vietnam on 29 Jan 70 to review records and files at the USARYIS Records Holding Area on Okinawa and the Overseas Records Center at Kapalama, Hawaii. At the Okinawa area, few records were available since the primary functions of the records facility are inspection, identification, inventory, repackaging and shipment to depositories located within the continental United States. Personnel records are shipped to the US Army Administrative Support Center in St. Louis while all other records of a permanent nature are forwarded to the National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. At the Kapalama Center, the primary effort was to secure retired training records and to verify the absence of documents which possibly might have been misrouted from Vietnam. A survey and review of documents available at HQ USARHAW and HQ USARPAC also was conducted (Incl 7).

5. Throughout the search for and review of documents in RVN, special and particular attention was paid to locating alleged records, reports, documentation or copies thereof identified during testimony as pertaining to:

- a. ROI by COL Henderson or any other officer of the 11th Bde dated on or about 4-6 April (Henderson T-1).

[REDACTED]

CS (Peers Inquiry)

14 March 1970

SUBJECT: Conduct of Search for and Examination of Documents
Relating to the Son My Incident of 16-19 March 1968

b. Orders or records relating to appointment of investigating officer from 11th Bde dated on or about 8-10 May 68 (Henderson T-1).

c. ROI, formal, with attached statements of witnesses, dated on or about 20 May 68 from COL Henderson or LTC Barker (Henderson T-1).


d. ROI, by COL Henderson, 24 Apr 68 (Henderson T-1).

6. Other than the document located by CPT Unzelmann, Exhibit R-5, no documentary evidence was discovered to corroborate the preparation, file, retention, transmittal or existence of any of the items listed in 5 above.

7. The conduct of the searches and examination of records entailed close cooperation, coordination, and participation by US Army, USAF, USN, USMC, US Government civilian agencies, ARVN I Corps, ARVN 2d Division, and Quang Ngai Province and Son Tinh District officials. In addition to the major headquarters listed in 1b above, searches and reviews were accomplished at appropriate and relevant subordinate and supporting headquarters, units, and detachments.

8. All documents contributing general and/or specific information and/or supporting data were copied and forwarded to the Inquiry at HQ, DA, Washington, DC.

7 Incl
as


THOMAS F. WHALEN
Colonel, Infantry


HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222



MACIG

25 FEB 1970

**SUBJECT: LTG Peers' Inquiry into Reporting by TF BARKER, 11th
Brigade, Americal Division**

Peers Inquiry Committee
Department of the Army
ATTN: COL Thomas F. Whalen
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Reference is made to DA message 042032Z Feb 70, Subject: Statement of Knowledge.
2. This letter is to certify that pursuant to the instructions contained in referenced message, an exhaustive search of records and files for the period 16 March 1968 to 20 April 1969, retained at Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was conducted. Results obtained were as follows:
 - a. There is a record in this headquarters of operational reports being received concerning the operation of Task Force Barker of the 11th Brigade, Americal Division, in operation Muscatine, during March 1968.
 - b. There is a record in this headquarters of intelligence reports or summaries being received concerning the operation of Task Force Barker of the 11th Brigade, Americal Division, in operation Muscatine, during March 1968.
 - c. There is not a record in this headquarters of a report of an actual or alleged atrocity in Son My Village, Son Tinh District of Quang Ngai Province, on or about 16 - 19 March 1968, being received from either the Americal Division or III MAF in accordance with MACV Directive 20-4, dated 27 April 1967.



MACIG

25 FEB 1970

SUBJECT: LTG Peers' Inquiry into Reporting by TF BARKER, 11th Brigade, Americal Division

- d. There is not a record in this headquarters of a report of serious crimes or incidents being received from either the Americal Division or III MAF, reference operations in Son My Village, Son Tinh District of Quang Ngai Province, on or about 16 - 19 March 1968, in accordance with MACV Directive 335-1, dated 22 November 1967.
- e. There is a record in this headquarters of spot reports being received from either the Americal Division or III MAF reference operations in Son My Village, Son Tinh District of Quang Ngai Province, on or about 16 - 19 March 1968, in accordance with MACV Directive 335-12, dated 29 November 1967.
- f. There is not a record in this headquarters or reporting and investigation of accidents involving misdirected artillery/mortar fire, naval gunfire, or air delivered ordnance from either the Americal Division or III MAF reference operations in Son My Village, Son Tinh District of Quang Ngai Province, on or about 16 - 19 March 1968 in accordance with USARV Regulation 525-7, dated 5 January 1968.

3. Documents found in the following locations were:

a. In MACJ031:

- (1) Daily MACV SITREPS for March 1968.
- (2) Weekly MACV SITREPS for March 1968.
- (3) TELECONS (Morning and Evening) for March 1968.
- (4) MACV Press Releases for March 1968.
- (5) MACOI Press Summary for 1968.

b. In MACJ2:

- (1) III Marine Amphibious Force PERINTREPs, numbers 05/68, 10/68 through 12/68, and 33/68.



MACIG

25 FEB 1970

SUBJECT: LTG Peers' Inquiry into Reporting by TF BARKER, 11th
Brigade, Americal Division


- (2) III Marine Amphibious Force INTSUMs, numbers 76/68 and 77/68.
- (3) CDEC Intelligence Information Reports of captured document translations, numbers 6 028 3716 69, 6 028 3769 69, and 6 028 3803 69.

c. In MACJ3:

- (1) USMACV OP-5 002 SEASIA GRD OPNS Weekly Summary for PD 091601Z to 161600Z March 1968.
- (2) USMACV OP-4 DAILY SITREP 076 SEASIA GRD OPNS for 16 March 1968.
- (3) Large Scale Operation informal file/control card: Operation Muscatine.
- (4) MACV Command Center Journal entries, 16 and 17 March 1968.

4. COMUSMACV message 07542, DTG 161425Z Mar 68, to Commanding General, Americal Division, Subject: Congratulatory Message, was probably sent based on MACJ3-08 Journal entry number 36 of 16 March 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



LOUIS J. PROST
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHIG

10 MAR 1970

SUBJECT: General Peers Inquiry into the Reporting of MY LAI (4) Incident

Peers Inquiry
Department of the Army
Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Reference is made to:

- a. DA message 052312Z February 1970, subject: Statement of Knowledge.
- b. HQ, US Army, Vietnam, memo, subject: Army Operations Center Daily Summary, 17 March 1968.
- c. USARV message, 40826, 16 March 1968, subject: USARV 8076 150800Z to 160800Z March 1968.
- d. USARV message, 40921, 17 March 1968, subject: USARV 8077-160801Z to 170800Z March 1968.
- e. Standard Form 135, Records Transmittal and Receipt, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, dated 26 January 1970.
- f. Letter, AVHIG, subject: General Peers Inquiry into the Reporting of MY LAI (4) Incident, dated 16 February 1970.
- g. DA message 040257Z March 1970, subject: Peers Inquiry (U).

2. This letter is to certify that in accordance with the requirements outlined in paragraph 1 of reference a above, a detailed search was made of records and files maintained at Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, for the period 16 March 1968 thru 7 February 1970. It should be noted that prior to the search references lb, c and d above were transferred to the Records Holding Area, USARYIS, by reference 1e above. The following results were obtained from the search:

- a. There is no record in this headquarters of any operational reports being received concerning the operation of Task Force Barker of the 11th Brigade, Americal Division in operation Muscatine, during the days 16 thru 19 March 1968.

AVHIG

1 0 MAR 1970

SUBJECT: General Peers Inquiry into the Reporting of MY LAI (4) Incident

b. There is no record in this headquarters of any intelligence reports or summaries being received concerning the operation of Task Force Barker of the 11th Brigade, Americal Division, in operation Muscatine, during the days 16 thru 19 March 1968.

c. There is no record in this headquarters of any report of an actual or alleged atrocity in Son My Village, Son Tinh District of Quang Ngai Province, on or about 16 - 19 March 1968, being received from either the Americal Division or III MAF in accordance with MACV Directive 20-4, dated 27 April 1967.

d. There is no record in this headquarters of any report of serious crimes or incidents being received from either the Americal Division or III MAF reference operations in Son My Village, Son Tinh District of Quang Ngai Province, on or about 16 - 19 March 1968, in accordance with MACV Directive 335-1, dated 22 November 1967.


e. There is no record in this headquarters of any spot reports being received from either the Americal Division or III MAF reference operations in Son My Village, Son Tinh District of Quang Ngai Province, on or about 16 - 19 March 1968, in accordance with MACV Directive 335-12, dated 29 November 1967.

f. There is no record in this headquarters of any reporting and investigation of accidents being received involving misdirected artillery/mortar fire, naval gunfire, or air delivered ordnance being received from either the Americal Division or III MAF reference operations in Son My Village, Son Tinh District of Quang Ngai Province, on or about 16 - 19 March 1968 in accordance with USARV Regulation 525-7, dated 5 January 1968.

3. The certificate in letter form requested in paragraph 3 of referenced message was provided Colonel Whalen, Peers Committee, LNO, at MACV on 11 February 1970.

4. This letter responds to reference 1g above and supersedes reference 1f above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JOHN A. O'BRIEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
FPO. SAN FRANCISCO 96602

IN REPLY REFER TO:
32/kvz
11 Jan 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: IG)

04470

Subj: Request for Certificate (U)

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV 101037Z Jan 70 (C)

Encl: (1) Signed Certificate of Record

1. Reference (a) requested signed certification that all records held by this Headquarters pertaining to Task Force Barker operations during March 1968 in the vicinity of My Lai (4) have been turned over to authorized representatives of the Inquiry Team. Accordingly, enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.

D. H. Simmons
D. H. SIMMONS
By direction

GROUP 2

Exempted from automatic downgrading

667

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

Certificate of Record 

This is to certify that an extensive search has been conducted of all III MAF records, files and reports pertaining to operations of Task Force Barker during March 1968 in the vicinity of My Lai (4) and that all items germane to the inquiry have been turned over to MACV-IG or to the Inquiry Team.

David H. Simmons
DAVID H. SIMMONS
Colonel USMC
Force Inspector
Hq, III MAF


GROUP-2

668 

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (1)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96374

AVDF-CS

5 January 1970

SUBJECT: General Peers Inquiry into the Reporting of the My Lai (4)
Incident

Peers Inquiry
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Americal Division received requests during the period 5 - 28 December 1969 for various documents to be furnished to representatives of Lieutenant General Peers who was investigating the My Lai incident. The items listed in Annex A are copies of, or abstracts from, documents and records held in the files of this Division which were forwarded for delivery to Lieutenant General Peers in connection with the aforementioned investigation.

2. COMUSMACV Message 051010Z Dec 69, requested:

"Reports at all levels pertaining to TF Barker's participation in Operation Muscatine in the vicinity of My Lai (4) during the period 16-18 Mar 68, including but not limited to operational SITREPS, intelligence, police, photographic, graves registration and medical reports, and any other documents, reports, pictures developed subsequent to 18 Mar 68."

To the best of my knowledge, no documents pertaining to this request, other than those reflected in Annex A, were reported as having been found.

3. A search has been conducted in the offices of the Command Group; the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Personnel (G1), Intelligence (G2); and Operations (G3); the Inspector General; the Staff Judge Advocate; the Adjutant General; and the Provost Marshal of this Division for documents pertaining to the following specific matters:

a. Report of investigation or inquiry from Colonel Oran K. Henderson, or any other officer of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, dated on or about 4-6 April 1968.

b. Orders, records or other documents relating to the appointment of an investigating officer from the 11th Light Infantry Brigade dated on or about 8-10 May 1968.

AVDF-CS

5 January 1970


SUBJECT: General Peers Inquiry into the Reporting of the My Lai (4)
Incident

c. Report of formal investigation, with annexed statements of witnesses, dated on or about 20 May 1968, from Colonel Oran K. Henderson or Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Barker.

d. Report of investigation by Colonel Oran K. Henderson, dated 24 April 1968.

4. One or more of the offices searched would normally be expected to issue, receive, review or process the matters listed in paragraph 3 above, although in a combat milieu not all the documents would necessarily be filed nor recorded in any of these offices. None of the documents or records listed in paragraph 3 were found during the course of this search. However, a copy of the report of investigation by Colonel Oran K. Henderson dated 24 April 1968, was reported found in the files of the 11th Infantry Brigade by a member of that organization.

1 Incl
as


T. H. TACKABERRY
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM AMERICAL DIVISION

- 1 Combat Action Report, Task Force Barker, for the period 160730 to 161800 Mar 68.
- 2 Combat Action Report, Task Force Barker, for the period 230900 to 231915 Feb 68.
- 3 Combat After Action Report, 198th Infantry Brigade for Operation Muscatine (formerly Operation Checkers), for the period 162000 Dec 68 through 10 June 1968.
- 4 FRAGORD 3-68, 11th Inf Bde, 221700 Jan 68 w/ch 1, 120800 Feb 68.
- 5 OPORD 1-68, 11th Inf Bde, 041200 Feb 68.
- 6 FRAGORD 5-68, 11th Inf Bde, 140800 Feb 68.
- 7 FRAGORD 7-68, 11th Inf Bde, 171400 Mar 68.
- 8 Change 1 to FRAGORD 7-68, 11th Inf Bde, 20 Mar 68.
- 9 INTSUM 75-68, HQ Americal Division, for the period 150001 to 152400 Mar 68.
- 10 INTSUM 76-68, HQ Americal Division, for the period 160001 to 162400 Mar 68.
- 11 INTSUM 77-68, HQ Americal Division, for the period 170001 to 172400 Mar 68.
- 12 INTSUM 78-68, HQ Americal Division, for the period 180001 to 182400 Mar 68.
- 13 Interrogation Report 52-279-68, Male, CD, Captured 16 Mar 68, vic BS 715789 by C Co, 1/20.
- 14 Interrogation Report 52-262-68, Female, CD, Captured 17 Mar 68, vic BS 735759, by C Co, 1/20.
- 15 Interrogation Report 52-280-68, Male, CD, Captured 17 Mar 68, vic BS 737759, by C Co, 1/20.
- 16 Interrogation Report 52-277-68, Male, CD, Captured 19 Mar 68, vic BS 737759, by C Co, 1/20.
- 17 Interrogation Report 52-276-68, Male, VC, Captured, 19 Mar 68, vic BS 736758 by C Co, 1/20.

- 18 Page 17, Americal Division Operational Report Lessons Learned for Period 1 Feb 68 - 30 Apr 68.
- 19 Contact prints 25 through 36 and 8x10 photographs from negatives processed 17 Mar 68.
- 20 Contact prints ¹25 through 27 and 8x10 photographs from negatives processed 18 Mar 68.
- 21 Undated Americal Regulation 525-4, Combat Operations - Rules of Engagement (U), Confidential. Records indicate that a regulation by this title was published on 16 Mar 68. Based on the signature blocks this regulation was published between 2 Feb 68 and 1 Jul 68. It is assumed this is the regulation published on 16 Mar 68. The existence of a prior regulation cannot be determined.
- 22 Confidential Letter, HQ Americal Division, dated 7 Dec 67, subject: Phased Schedule of 11th Lt Inf Bde (Y).
- 23 Confidential undated Training Memorandum, 350-2, subject: Education and Training, with Annex A (Planning Guidance). This memorandum was apparently published in Hawaii prior to deployment.
- 24 Undated Fact Sheet, Operations - Training. Apparently this document was published subsequent to the arrival of the 11th Infantry Brigade in RVN.
- 25 Undated Lesson Plan, Americal Combat Center (Provisional) subject: Geneva Convention. This is the oldest (of two) lesson plans on file in the Combat Center.
- 26 Letter, HQ, Americal Division, dated 14 November 1967, subject: Improvement of Standards.
- 27 Letter, HQ, Americal Division, dated 24 March 1968, subject: The Safeguarding of Noncombatants.
- 28 Letter, HQ, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, dated 9 December 1967, subject: Standards of Conduct.
- 29 Undated, Draft Tactical SOP for Counterinsurgency Operations, 11th Infantry Brigade (Light).
- 30 11th Infantry Brigade Regulation 525-1, Combat Operations - Rules of Engagement (U), Confidential.
- 31 GO 3601; award of the Distinguished Flying Cross; dtd 1 Jul 68 to WO1 Thompson, Hugh G., W3157206; for action on 16 March 1968: w/ recommendation for award and eyewitness statement by SP4 Lawrence M. Colburn.
- 32 GO 5393; award of the Silver Star; dtd 9 Aug 68 to SP4 Widmer, Frederick J., for action 12 May 1968, w/ recommendation for award; GO 3299, award of Purple Heart, dtd 19 Jun 68; and GO 4700 amendment to GO 3299.

- 33 GO 3044; award of the Bronze Star Medal; dtd 5 Jun 68; to SGT La Croix, Lawrence C., RA 18845616; for action 2 Apr 68; w/ recommendation for award, allied papers, and eyewitness statements by PFC Charles R. Brunner and 2LT Stephen K. Brooks.
- 34 GO 5159; award of the Silver Star; dtd 5 Aug 68; to PSG Buchanon, Jay A., for action 12 May 1968; w/ recommendation for award, allied papers, and eyewitness statement by SP4 Frederick J. Widmer.
- 35 GO 8054; award of the Bronze Star Medal; dtd 17 Oct 68; to CPT Medina, Ernest L., for service 1 Dec 67 - 30 Nov 68; 2/ recommendation.
- 36 GO 6242; award of the Silver Star; dtd 22 Aug 68 to CPT Medina, Ernest L., for action 25 Feb 68; 2/ recommendation, allied papers and eyewitness statement by SP4 John A. Wood.
- 37 Disapproved recommendation for award of the Bronze Star for Achievement, for the period 25 Jan - 9 Apr 68, for CPT Ernest Medina, dtd 22 Apr 68.
- 38 GO 2137; award of the Bronze Star Medal; dtd 23 Apr 68; to SP4 Andreotta, Glenn U., RA 17701280, for action 16 Mar 68; w/ recommendation, allied papers and eyewitness statement by WO1 Hugh C. Thompson.
- 39 Posthumous Awards Feeder Report, dtd 15 Apr 68; and Ltr, AVDF-AGD, subject: Delinquent Posthumous Awards Transmittal, dtd 11 May 68, pertaining to SP4 Andreotta, Glenn U., RA 17701280.
- 40 Memorandum, dtd 14 Dec 69, from AGXO to AG, subject: My Lai Investigation.
- 41 Unit Order 13, HQ 11th Inf Bde, dtd 15 Mar 68, Assumption of Command by COL Oran K. Henderson.
- 42 GO 2224; HQ Americal Division, dtd 27 Apr 68, Assumption of Command by BG George H. Young, Jr.
- 43 GO 2401; HQ Americal Division, dtd 8 May 68, Assumption of Command by MG S. M. Koster.
- 44 GO 2965; HQ Americal Division, dtd 3 Jun 68, Assumption of Command by BG George H. Young, Jr.
- 45 GO 3343, HQ Americal Div, dtd 23 Jun 68, Assumption of Command by MG Charles M. Gettys.
- 46 Unit Order 45; HQ 11th Inf Bde, dtd 6 Jul 68, Assumption of Command by LTC James A. Franklin.

- 47 Unit Order 49; HQ 11th Inf Bde, dtd 13 Jul 68, Assumption of Command by COL Oran K. Henderson.
- 48 Unit Order 81; HQ 11th Inf Bde, dtd 4 Oct 68, Assumption of Command by COL John W. Donaldson.
- 49 SF 135 Records Transmittal and Receipt, dtd 23 Oct 69 pertaining to the forwarding of G3, Operations records to the Records Holding Center.
- 50 Certified True Copy of Letter, HQ, Americal Division Artillery, dtd 15 January 1968, subject: Investigation of Artillery Incidents.
- 51 Daily Journals, TF Barker, for the period 23 Jan 68 thru 7 Apr 68 (excluding 5 mar 68 which is not on file).
- 52 Excerpts from TF Oregon Field SOP dtd 21 Mar 67. (Forward; Page 1, general guidance; Table of Contents; Distribution; Abbreviations; App 4 (Fire Support Coordination to Annex A (Operations); TAB A (Landing Zone Preparation) to App 4, to Annex A; Annex B (Intelligence); and App 3 (Employment of Armed Helicopters) to Annex 6 (Army Aviation).
- 53 Excerpts from Americal Division ORLL dtd 8 Feb 68 for period 1 Nov 67 to 31 Jan 68 (Pages 1, 2, 13-16, 21-28, 43, 44, and Incl 2 (Replacement Training).
- 54 Excerpts from Americal Division ORLL dtd 26 Nov 67 for period ending 31 Oct 67 (pages 1, 2, 11-14, 51, and 52)
- 55 GO 300, HQ, USARPAC, dtd 2 Dec 67, Activation and Organization, HHB, DIVARTY; HHC & Band, DISCOM; 23d Admin Co; 26th Engineer Bn; 23d W&T Bn; HH&A Co, 23d Med Bn; 23d MP Co; 123d Avn Bn; H&MS Bn, 723d Maint Bn.
- 56 Daily Journals, S-2 & S-3, Hqs 11th BdB for 14, 15, and 24-31 Mar 68.
- 57 ICCI 05530.1A, Hq, III MAF, Subj: Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies, dtd 19 Apr 68 (Cancels ICCI 05530.1 which is not available in Americal Div HQ)
- 58 Americal OPORD 2-68 (Redeployment and Realignment of Forces), DTG: 231000 Jan 68.
- 59 Americal FRAGO #1 to OPORD 2-68, DTG: 231000 Jan 68.
- 60 Americal FRAGO #2 to OPORD 2-68, DTG: 260755 Jan 68.
- 61 Americal FRAGO #24-68, DTG: 070510Z Apr 68.
- 62 POW Interrogation Log, 52d MI Det, for Mar 68.
- 63 G3 Input to TF Oregon ORLL Apr-Feb 67, undated.
- 64 DF, CMT 2, From IG to CofS, dtd 9 Dec 69, subject: Haeberle Photograph.
- 65 174th Aviation Co Annual Unit History 1968.

- 66 ICC 5235, dtd 1 Jan 69, subj: Numbrical Index of Effective Force/SA I Corps Orders and Bulletines, I corps Coordinator Instructions and Notices and Headquarters, III MAF Orders and Bulletins.
- 67 Americal msg, subject: OPORD 3-68, dtg 020830Z Feb 68.
- 68 Americal OPORD 3-68 (Post TET Offensive) dtg 021320 Feb 68.
- 69 Americal Weekly PSYOP Report for the period 110001 to 172400 Jan 68.
- 70 Daily Journals, S5, 11th Bde, for period 1-31 Mar 68.
- 71 Officers Roster, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion, 1 Mar 68.
- 72 ORLL, HQ, 14th Combat Aviation Bataillon, for period 1 Feb through 30 Apr 68.
- 73 Daily Aviation Summary, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion, for 16 Mar 68.
- 74 Daily OPREP 5 - 174th Avn Co, dtd 16 Mar 68.
- 75 Daily OPREP 5 - 71st Ava Co for period 16-18 Mar 68.
- 76 Letter, CO, 71st ASHC, dtd 19 Dec 69, subject: Request for Information, re: participation of 71st ASHC aircraft in support of TF Barker.
- 77 Roster of Enlisted Personnel assigned to the 71st Avn Co, Mar 68.
- 78 Mission Requests, 71st Avn Co, dated 16 Mar 68, for missions in support of the 11th Bde.
- 79 Ltr., Co 178th ASHC, dtd 16 Dec 69, subject: Information on the period of 16 Mar 68.
- 80 Certificate, undated, by CO, Co B, 123d Avn Bn regarding the availability of records from Mar 68.
- 81 DF, from CO, Co B, 123d Avn Bn, regarding awards for personnel involved in action on 16 Mar 68 and list of personnel assigned on 16 Mar 68.
- 82 Statement, undated, by Operations Officer, 174th ASHC, 174th Aviation Battalion regarding the availability of records from Mar 68.
- 83 List of personnel present in the 174th ASHC during Mar 68.
- 84 Statement by the DIVARTY Commander, dtd 20 Dec 69, regarding the location of artillery units on 16 Mar 68 and the nonavailability of ammunition data for that date.
- 85 PSYOPS Leaflet Nr: 7-68-68, entitled "Do Not Run from US Forces".

- 86 PSYOPS Leaflet Nr: 7-202-68, entitled "Don't Run from US forces".
- 87 Americal Weekly PSYOP Report for period 010001 Mar 68 to 062400
- 88 Americal Weekly PSYOP Report for period 070001 Mar 68 to 132400 Mar 68.
- 89 Americal Weekly PSYOP Report for period 140001 Mar 68 to 202400 Mar 68.
- 90 UNIT HISTORY, 52d Military Intelligence Detachment, Jun/Jul 69
- 91 DF, Land Clearing, Americal TAOI, Dtd 7 Sep 69
- 92 11th Infantry Brigade Trident, Dtd 4 Jul 68
- 93 11th Infantry Brigade Trident, Dtd 19 Apr 68
- 94 11th Infantry Brigade Trident, Dtd 22 Mar 68
- 95 11th Infantry Brigade Trident, Dtd 15 Mar 68
- 96 Americal Press Release # AM 5-68-431
- 97 11th Infantry Brigade Press Release, XIIIO 40-68
- 98 11th Infantry Brigade Press Release, XIIIO 28-68
- 99 11th Infantry Brigade Press Release, XIIIO 25-68
- 100 Americal News Sheet, Dtd 15 Mar 68
- 101 Americal News Sheet, Dtd 17 Mar 68
- 102 Americal News Sheet, Dtd 18 Mar 68
- 103 Americal News Sheet, Dtd 19 Mar 68
- 104 Americal News Sheet, Dtd 20 Mar 68
- 105 The Americal, Dtd May 68 (Extract)
- 106 Americal Division Combined Interrogation Report dtd 18 Dec 69
- 107 Americal Division Order of Battle Summary-48th Local Force Battalion dtd 13 Jun 69
- 108 True Copy of Ltr, dtd 1 Apr 68, HQ, 11th LIB, subject: Personnel Information Roster
- 109 Copy of GO 2585, HQ, AMERICAL Div, dtd 14 May 68 w/ supporting documents
- 110 Eleven aerial photos, My Lai area, taken 18 Dec 69
- 111 S2/S3 TOC Journal, 11th LIB, 17 Mar 68 to 23 Mar 68

- 112 Viet Cong Propaganda Notice, ref: My Lai Incident, dtd 28 Mar 68 w/
letter of transmittal
- 113 Certificate, dtd 23 Dec 69, by Div G5 (LTC Harper)
- 114 Certificate, dtd 18 Dec 69 by Div SJA (LTC Davis)
- 115 Statement, undtd, by Div SJA (LTC Davis)
- 116 Statement, undtd, by Div ADSO (MAJ Gronich)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE, AMERICAL DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96217

AVDF-BACC

6 January 1970

SUBJECT: Documents Provided Peers Inquiry

THRU: Commanding General
Americal Division
APO SF 96374

TO: Peers Inquiry
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Reference: COMUSMACV message 051010Z Dec 69 which contained a request for

"Reports at all levels pertaining to TF Barker's participation in Operation Muscative in the vicinity of My Lai (4) during the period 16, 17, 18 Mar 68, including but not limited to operational SITREPS, intelligence, police, photographic, graves registration and medical reports and any other documents, reports, pictures developed subsequent to 18 Mar 68".

2. Between 5 Dec 1969 and 5 Jan 1970, the 11th Infantry Brigade received directions to provide or make available information for consideration by Lieutenant General Peers. The Brigade's files and records have been examined by members of the Peers Inquiry, CID investigators, representatives of the Americal Division, Headquarters and personnel of the Brigade. Various documents have been found by these groups, and forwarded for this purpose. These documents are listed on inclosure (1).

3. The files of staff sections S1 (Personnel), S2 (Intelligence), S3 (Operations) and S5 (Psychological Warfare) were examined in an effort to locate the following:

a. Report of investigation or inquiry from Colonel Cran K. Henderson, or any other office of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, dated on or about 4 - 6 April 1968.

AVDF-BACC


SUBJECT: Documents Provided Peers Inquiry

b. Orders, records or other documents relating to the appointment of an investigating officer from the 11th Light Infantry Brigade dated on or about 8 - 10 May 1968.

c. Report of formal investigation, with annexed statements of witnesses, dated on or about 20 May 1968, from Colonel Cran K. Henderson or Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Barker.

d. Original of report of investigation by Colonel Cran K. Henderson, dated 24 April 1968.

4. One or more of the offices examined would normally issue, receive, review or process the matters listed above. A true copy of what purported to be a report of investigation by Colonel Henderson, dated 24 April 1968, was located in the S2 files. All documents located regarding this matter have been made available.


HUGH F. T. HOFFMAN JR
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

INDEX

(Material obtained from the 11th Infantry Brigade)

- Item 1: Letter, Subject: Recommendation for Valor or Merit (DFC), Col Henderson, dated 23 Jul 68, 5 pages.
- Item 2: Letter, subject: Recommendation for Impact Award (Silver Star), Col Henderson, dated 23 Sep 68, 3 pages.
- Item 3: USARV Form 157-R Recommendation for Decoration for Valor or Merit, undated, 7 pages.
- Item 4: Letter, Subject: Recommendations for the Meritorious Unit Commendation Award, Headquarters AMCAL DIV, dated 13 Jul 69, 15 pages.
- Item 5: Message, Subject: New Years Resolutions, Headquarters, III MAF, dated 1 Jan 68, 3 pages.
- Item 6: Message, Subject: Destruction of Enemy Trawler, CG, Americal Division, dated 060612 Z Mar 68, 4 pages.
- Item 7: Historical Supplement, 11th Light Infantry Brigade History "Jungle Warriors", for period 1 Jan 68 to 31 Dec 68, 17 pages.
- Item 8: Letter, Subject: PFC Herbert L. Carter, dated 4 Apr 68, from Headquarters, 11th Light Infantry Brigade, 1 page.
- Item 9: USARV Form 130-R, Subject: Training, Roy M., dated 18 Mar 68, 1 page.
- Item 10: USARV Form 130-R, Subject: Meadlo, Paul D., dated 17 Mar 68, 1 page.
- Item 11: USARV Form 130-R, Subject: Hendrickson, Richard C., dated 14 Mar 68, 1 page.
- Item 12: USARV Form 130-R, Subject: Gonzales, Leonard R, dated 18 Mar 68, 1 page.
- Item 13: USARV Form 130-R, Subject: Disen, Henry D., dated 14 Mar 68, 1 page.
- Item 14: USARV Form 130-R, Subject: Cummings, Thomas R., dated 14 Mar 68, 1 page.
- Item 15: USARV Form 130-R, Subject: Cox, George J., dated 14 Mar 68, 1 page.
- Item 16: USARV Form 130-R Subject: Carter, Herbert L., dated 16 Mar 68, 1 page.

- Item 17: Policy Letter, AVDF-BA-CO, Subject: "Policy", 11th Infantry Brigade, dated 1 Jun 68, 53 pages.
- Item 18: Handbook for Unit Claims Officer in Vietnam, dated 1 Dec 67, 12 pages, both sides.
- Item 19: Letter, Subject: Statistics of Solatium, AVDF-BA-CA, dated 10 Oct 68, 5 pages.
- Item 20: 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery, Combat SOP, dated 18 Nov 67.
- Item 21: Evening Report to Americal IO, dated 16 Mar 68.
- Item 22: Evening Report to Americal IO dated 17 Mar 68.
- Item 23: Americal message (unclas), dated 020100Z Dec 67, Subject: Reporting, 4 pages.
- Item 24: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GCI, Headquarters, T F Barker, dated 24 Mar 68, 6 pages, 1 overlay.
- Item 25: Serious Incident Report, Taskforce Barker, 11th Infantry Brigade, no date, 1 page.
- Item 26: Information Office, 11th Infantry Brigade, Release No. 117-69-152, no date, 3 pages.
- Item 27: After Action Report (Operation (SHOW LOW), Headquarters, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry, dated 23 Mar 68, 19 pages, 6 overlays.
- Item 28: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GCI), Headquarters T F Barker, dated 28 Mar 68, 5 pages, 1 overlay.
- Item 29: Letter, Headquarters 11th Infantry Brigade, Subject: Combat Action Report AVDF-GC, dated 19 Mar 68, 3 copies (1 page each)
- *Item 30: Letter, Headquarters 11th Brigade, Subject: Combat Action Report AVDF-GC, same dated 22 Mar 68.
- Item 31: 11th Infantry Brigade OPRD 1-68 (CONFIDENTIAL), dated 041200, Feb 68, 4 pges, 2 overlays.
- Item 32: 11th Infantry Brigade letter (XIOP), dated 1 Nov 67, Subject: Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM), 2 pages.
- Item 33: 11th Infantry Brigade ADMINO 1-68 (CONFIDENTIAL), dated 261600 Feb 68, w/change 1&2, 10 pages.

- Item 34: FRAGORD 8-68 (U) 1 copy (Copy 39 of 60 copies) 3 pages (S), Annex A (C) 1 page, dated 24 Mar 68.
- Item 35: 11th Infantry Brigade INTSUM 76-68 (U), 5 pages (C), dated 15 Mar 68.
- Item 36: Letter, 11th Infantry Brigade, Subject: Report of Investigation, dated 24 Apr 68. 2 pages (C) with 2 inclosures.
- *Item 37: Letter, 11th Infantry Brigade, Subject: Intelligence Study of Routes of Enemy Movement in the Areas of Operation of the 11th Infantry Brigade, dated 28 Mar 68.

*Items 30 and 37 have not been received for.

[REDACTED] Y

26 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Documents Search, National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

1. ACTION. Upon the direction of LTG W. R. Peers, a team of eight Investigating Officers conducted a comprehensive document search at the National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, on 25 Jan 70.

2. PURPOSE. The purpose of this search was to procure any document or record that pertains to the inquiry being conducted by LTG Peers concerning the investigation(s) of the alleged My Lai (4) (Son My) incident which occurred on or about 16 March 1968 in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam.

3. METHOD.

a. Approximately 1400 storage boxes of USARV documents were identified as being received from the intermediate holding area, HQ, USARYIS, or direct from the USARV Records Center on or after 1 July 1968.

b. Of these, approximately 275 storage boxes contained CY 1968 USARV files and documents. All of these boxes were searched for any documents pertaining to Task Force Oregon, Americal Division, or 23rd Infantry Division and/or any subordinate or attached units. These units were identified by the troop list, 23rd Infantry Division, in effect during March 1968.

c. Each file or document pertaining to any of the units mentioned above was read in total by the investigators. Any reference to the alleged incident of 16 Mar 68 was reproduced and the copy returned to LTG Peers. Other pertinent documents were also reproduced in total or extracts prepared.

d. The shipping documents for the balance of the 1400 storage boxes were studied to insure that no CY 1968 documents from any applicable unit were included.

[REDACTED]



26 January 1970

SUBJECT: Documents Search, National Records Center, Suitland,
Maryland

4. RESULTS.

a. A total of 32 documents were obtained that were not already available to LTG Peers. A list of these documents is attached.

b. This search did not discover any reference to or report of any investigation by any individual concerning the alleged My Lai (4) (Son My) incident.

1 Incl
as

JAMES H. PATTERSON.
Lieutenant Colonel, Armor
Investigating Officer



26 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Documents Obtained from National Records Center,
Suitland, Maryland, 25 January 1970

1. The documents listed hereon were obtained by the team of investigators who searched the RVN files for 1968 stored at the National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, on 25 January 1970. The documents are highlighted as necessary.
2. The documents asterisked (*) are recommended as being especially pertinent and should be considered for exhibits to the report.

USARV

DIRECTIVES

- USARV Cir 310-1 (w/C1) (15 Mar 68), SUBJ: Index of Command Publications
- USARV Reg 320-60 (1 Dec 67), SUBJ: Military Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols.
Establishes that AVDF is office symbol for 23d Inf Div (Americal)
- * USARV Reg 345-200 (30 Apr 68), SUBJ: Records Administration.
Guidance for disposition of files indicating (1) all files with retention of 2 yrs or less -- destroyed after 2 yrs; (2) all files with retention of 2 yrs or more will be shipped to CG, USARYIS; and (3) Cut-off date is end of calendar year or fiscal year as appropriate (AR 345-210 or AR 345-215)
- * USARV Reg 870-2 (11 Mar 68), SUBJ: Daily Journal Files Responsibilities and guidance for daily journal files -- battalions and separate companies and above are required to maintain daily journals that include all staff section input as a minimum

26 January 1970

SUBJECT: Documents Obtained from National Records Center,
Suitland, Maryland, 25 January 1970

USARV Reg 870-3 (7 Mar 68), SUBJ: Combat After Action
Interviews

Military History detachments are required to conduct
bimonthly interviews of significant actions

USARV Dir 345-3 (13 Dec 67), SUBJ: Shipment of CY
1966 and 1967 Publications Records Set

Instructions for records (1966-67) to be shipped to
USARV Records Management Office for subsequent
consolidation and onward shipment to Okinawa.

USARV Memo 870-1 (Project Oregon Memo) (21 Feb 67),
SUBJ: Daily Journals

Prescribes responsibilities for prep, maintaining,
and disposing of Project Oregon Journals/files

USARV TWX (10 Sep 67), SUBJ: Activation of Americal
Division (SECRET).

Request from CGUSARV to CINCUSARPAC to activate
Americal utilizing TF Oregon assets effective
15 Nov 67. 198, 196, and 11th Bde's to-be assigned.

AMERICAL

DIRECTIVES

- * Ltr (25 Nov 67), SUBJ: Behavior of US Forces in
ICTZ (signed by MG Koster personally)
Refers to III MAF TWX (20 Nov 67) reference behavior
of US Forces, and directs "vigorous and sound
principles of leadership" to insure US actions are
above reproach "in every aspect of their enterprise
in ICTZ."

NOTE: III MAF TWX is not going to be entered per LTG Peers)

AMERICAL Reg 220-10 (25 Oct 67), SUBJ: Sponsorship
of Incoming Units

Staff guidance/directives to each staff section to
assure each incoming unit receives all information,
directives, training, and assistance necessary.

26 January 1970

SUBJECT: Documents Obtained from National Records Center,
Suitland, Maryland, 25 January 1970

* TF OREGON Reg 335-6 (21 Mar 67), SUBJ: Reports of Serious Crimes or Incidents.
Refers to USARV Reg 335-6 and MACV Dir 335-1 and requires reports of "serious incidents" involving detainees or others, to include death or serious injury. Format for reports attached.

TF OREGON Reg 335-8 (21 Mar 67), SUBJ: Combat After Action Reports.
G3 exercises staff supervision on reports which are to be submitted by battalion/larger units on all significant combat operations (based on results achieved or size of opn). Format included as appendix. (Agrees with CAR format used by LTC Barker on Mar 68 reports.)

AMERICAL MEMO 340-1 (8 Dec 67), SUBJ: Headquarters Messenger Service.
Establishes internal distribution (mail/correspondence) system under AG.

AMERICAL MEMO 340-2 (1 Sep 67), SUBJ: Papers Addressed to CG, ADC or C/S
Instructions for preparation of memoranda, fact sheets, staff studies, and DF's to include format.

AMERICAL Reg 360-1 (21 Oct 67), SUBJ: Public Information Policies and Procedures
Provides general data that LTC Hill used for his SOP for Info Office.

ORDERS

GO 1398 (25 Nov 67), SUBJ: Organization and Assignment Americal Combat Center (Prov) organized effective 1 Dec 67. Mission: to receive, control, in-process, and train incoming replacements, as well as out-processing responsibilities. GO includes organizational chart and branch general responsibilities. No reference to specific training reqm'ts.

GO 1399 (25 Nov 67), SUBJ: Attachment of Americal Combat Center (Prov) to 23d Infantry Division (eff 1 Dec 67)

26 January 1970

SUBJECT: Documents Obtained from National Records Center,
Suitland, Maryland, 25 January 1970

GO 250 (29 Jan 68), SUBJ: COL Nels A. Parson, Jr.,
assigned as C/S (effective 2 Feb 68) vice COL
Robert H. Musser.

GO 1502 (22 Mar 68), SUBJ: COL James V. Galloway
assigned as Assistant Division Commander effective
15 Mar 68 (per VO CG 15 Mar 68 confirmed)

GO 1955 (14 Apr 68), SUBJ: LTC Wm J. Baxley assigned
as G3 (eff 1 Apr 68) and LTC Melville C. Welton, Jr.
assigned as SJA (eff 4 Apr 68).

TF OREGON TWX (22 Apr 67), SUBJ: Operational Control
(SECRET)
Confirms personal report CG, TFO, to CG III MAF
that eff 200001H Apr 67 TFO OPCON III MAF

* TOC Journal (13 Jun 67) item #8 (0800)
Report of LTC Barker's helicopter crash (6KHA, 1
WHA).

TOC Journal (13 Jul 67) item #47
Report of Congressional Inquiry (DA MSG) re: village
in Quang Tin Prov being destroyed by air/artillery o/a
9-13 Apr 68. Info given by TELECON from Div Toc
to USARV

TOC Journal (27 Jul 68), item #79
Report of Gunships engaging non-combatants vic
BS534766 on 27 Jul 68

DF (3 Dec 67) Info officer to C/S, SUBJ: ABC-TV
Filming of Burning Hut
Tells of ABC-TV witnessing and filming of incident
(30 Nov 67) involving US soldiers committing
serious incident. Included as an inclosure is
Memo from MG Koster to IO, "Do we need to report this
any further in your opinion?"



26 January 1970

SUBJECT: Documents Obtained from National Records Center,
Suitland, Maryland, 25 January 1970

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

REPORT

History of Mo Duc District, Quang Ngai Province
(Undated)
History of Mo Duc District in general terms with
cover letter indicating Mr. May (PSA) provided
"facts and perspective."

11TH BRIGADE

REPORT

TWX (11th Bde to CG AMERICAL) (2 Dec 67), SUBJ:
Programmed Arrival Dates of 11th Bde in RVN (SECRET)

MISCELLANEOUS

DA CINFO Ltr (31 Oct 67) indicating availability of materials
for Cmd Info Program. Includes DA Pam 360-230
(Provisions of War)

Copies of Orders for Awards:

- USARV GO 2717 (6 Jun 68) DSC to Trimble
- AMERICAL GO 1873 (10 Apr 68) BSM(A) to Trimble)
- AMERICAL GO 1582 (26 Mar 68) PH to SP4 LeSure, A/3/1
for 17 Mar 68
- AMERICAL GO 1686 (30 Mar 68) PH to PFC Sevier, A/3/1
for 16 Mar 68

JAMES G. PATTERSON
Lieutenant Colonel, Armor
Investigating Officer





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

CS (Peers Inquiry)

14 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conduct of Search for and Examination of Documents
Relating to the Son My Incident of 16-19 March 1968

1. During the period 28 Jan 70 through 2 Feb 70, a search was conducted at the following headquarters facilities and/or installations for documents and records pertaining to the Son My incident of 16-19 Mar 68.
 - a. Records Holding Area, Okinawa
 - b. Overseas Record Center, Kapalama, Hawaii
 - c. Headquarters, US Army, Hawaii
 - d. Headquarters, US Army, Pacific
2. Records pertaining to the Americal Division, as well as all subordinate and attached units which participated in or were in support of the operation during the period 16-19 Mar 68, were screened and examined. All shipping documents with entries for applicable units were reviewed.
3. Documents of substance were reproduced, and a copy was provided to the Peers Inquiry, DA, Washington, DC.


LEO M. BRANDT

Lieutenant Colonel, Armor

14 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Documentary Evidence Used by LTG Peers

1. All documents that were directly referred to or used during the interrogations conducted by LTG Peers were entered into evidence and are identified as exhibits in the written report.
2. Many documents were reviewed, perused, and analyzed to provide LTG Peers background information as well as to ascertain if the documents were specifically pertinent to the purposes of the Inquiry. Only the documents providing specific evidentiary value were entered into the record.
3. The documents used during the Inquiry, but which were not entered into the record as exhibits, are as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Over fifty foreign service messages and letters dating from November 1967 through February 1970 were furnished. This correspondence represented written information transmitted by Consuls, Ambassadors, or the State Department that generally pertained to the Son My incident or subsequent events.

In addition, a copy of the letter from Ambassador Berger to Mr. Vy, GVN Minister of Defense, dated 17 December 1969, and Mr. Vy's reply, dated 18 December 1969, concerning the US Army investigations of the Son My incident, were available.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DA Pamphlets 310-1 through 310-4 provide a list of the numbered regulatory and policy publications and forms that were available to LTG Peers and the members of the Inquiry. The actual number of those documents used would be extremely difficult to ascertain.

REPORTS

DA DCSOPS Journal and Record Files and NMCC Operational Summary for 16 Mar 68

DA DCSOPS Memo for VCofS, Subject: Enemy Weapons Losses in RVN Less Caches, dated 11 Jul 69

EXHIBIT M-147

DA REPORTS (continued)

DA DCSOPS Memo for SGS, subject: American KIA Data for the My Lai RVN Area, dated 16 Dec 69

DA DCSOPS Memo for SGS, subject: My Lai Incident, undated

DA ACSFOR Debriefing Reports from MG Koster (19 Jul 68), BG Young (14 Oct 68), and COL Beeson (29 Jan 69)

DA OTPMG CID Report to OTPMG, subject: CID Case #69-CID011-00068, dated 27 Dec 69

DA OTPMG Memo for Peers Committee, subject: Criminal Research Check, dated 22 Jan 70

DA TAG Memo for Peers Committee, subject: Casualty Information, TF Barker, dated 23 Jan 70

DA TIG Report of Investigation to IG, subject: Report of Investigation Concerning Alleged Atrocities Committed by Members of C Co, 1/20th Inf., TF Barker, Americal Div., in the Republic of Vietnam, dated 19 Sep 69

DA TJAG Fact Sheet for CSA, subject: Possible or Suspected War Crimes, dated 9 Dec 69

DA TJAG Report to CSA, subject: Summary of Article 32 Investigation - Calley Case, dated 20 Nov 69

MISCELLANEOUS

DA CSA Program of Instructions (1967) for USA Intelligence School and USA Defense Information School

DA ACSFOR Index, subject: Debriefing Reports on File in ACSFOR, undated

DA TAGO Letter (Dist A), subject: Command Information Guidance, third Quarter 1968, dated 3 Oct 67

DA OCINFO Letter to All Commands, subject: Command Information Testing Materials Bulletin No 5, dated 31 Oct 67

DA OTPMG TWX to CINCUSARPAC, subject: Conduct of Criminal Investigations (War Crimes), dated 15 Apr 68

DA OTPMG CID Letter to COL Do Tung (Dep Minister of Def, GVN), subject: US Criminal Investigation of the My Lai (4) Incident of 16 Mar 68, dated 15 Dec 69

U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

DIRECTIVES

- Joint Directive 5-66, subject: Refugees, dated 7 November 1966
- Joint Directive 5-67, subject: United States Military Augmentation of Civilian War Casualties Treatment Program, dated 28 November 1967
- MACV Staff Memo 525-3, subject: Enemy Combat Effectiveness, dated 17 July 1968
- MACV Staff Memo 612-1, subject: Processing of New Arrivals, dated 4 November 1967
- MACV Planning Directive 2-68, subject: Combined US-RVNAF Operations in Populated Areas, dated 8 March 1968
- MACV Directive 10-1, subject: Psychological Operations, dated 11 December 1967
- MACV Directive 20-4, subject: War Crimes, dated 18 May 1968
- MACV Directive 190-6, subject: ICRC Inspections, dated 8 January 1969
- MACV Directive 310-1, subject: Numerical Index of MACV Publications (7 November 1968 and 1 July 1969); dated 1 May 1968
- MACV Directive 310-7, subject: Distribution Lists, dated 29 September 1968
- MACV Directive 310-8, subject: Standard Abbreviations for Cities and Towns in the Republic of Vietnam and Other Commonly Used Geographic Locations, dated 30 April 1969
- MACV Directive 335-1, subject: Reports of Serious Crimes or Incidents, dated 14 September 1968 (also 17 December 1969)
- MACV Directive 335-12, subject: Spot Reports, dated 30 August 1968 (also 20 December 1969)
- MACV Directive 381-11, subject: Exploitation of Human Sources and Captured Documents, dated 5 August 1968
- MACV Directive 380-20, subject: Propaganda Materials, dated 31 December 1967

MACV DIRECTIVES (continued)

MACV Directive 381-21, subject: Reports and Reporting Procedures, dated 18 February 1969

MACV Directive 525-3, subject: Minimizing Noncombatant Casualties, dated 2 March 1969

MACV Directive 525-13, subject: Rules of Engagement in the RVN for Use of Artillery, Tanks, Mortars, Naval Gunfire and Air and Armed Helicopter Support, dated 12 October 1968 (also 9 March 1969)

MACV Directive 525-20, subject: Guidance for US Advisors, dated 26 January 1967

PLANS

MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan 1967, A. B. 142, 7 November 1966

MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan 1968, A. B. 143, 11 November 1967

ORDERS

MACV Command Policy File, 123 pages (undated)

MACV Message (to Distribution), subject: Westmoreland Sends, dated 13 October 1967

MACV Message to VMAC, subject: Instructions for TET Ceasefire, dated 27 January 1968

MACV Message to VMAC, subject: Cancellation of TET Ceasefire, dated 30 January 1968

MACV Letter (to Distribution), subject: Sub-Phase III, Post-TET, dated 30 January 1968, of USMACV 1968 TET Campaign Plan

MACV Message (to Distribution), subject: Counteroffensive Operations, dated 1 February 1968

MACV Message to VMAC, subject: (Classified SECRET) dated 4 February 1968

MACV ORDERS (continued)

- MACV Letter (to Distribution) subject: Activity Guidelines for Corps Tactical Zones, dated 15 February 1968
- MACV Message (to Distribution), subject: Westmoreland Sends, dated 1 April 1968
- MACV Message (to Distribution), subject: Terms for Operational Reporting, dated 12 April 1968
- MACV Message (to Distribution), subject: Allied Forces General Offensive, dated 25 April 1968
- MACV Message (to Distribution), subject: Continued Offensive, dated 6 May 1968
- MACV Message to DA, subject: RVN Senate Communique #289, dated 9 January 1970
- MACV Message to AIG 7810, subject: Song My/My Lai Incident, dated 19 December 1969
- MACV Chronology of Events - My Lai (4), Volumes I and II, period 16 March 1968, dated 8 March 1970

REPORTS

- MACV Command History (1967 and 1968)
- MACV MFR, subject: ICRC Visit to I Corps Area, undated
- MACV IO - copies of news releases and articles from Stars and Stripes, the Observer, and several miscellaneous sources
- MACV CDEC Evaluation Worksheet, Intelligence Reports, period January 1968 - April 1969, 30 documents
- MACV CORDS Field Overview Reports, period January - June 1968
- MACV CORDS Messages (January - July 1968) Reference Pacification Progress (23 messages)
- MACV/JGS Newsletter I, subject: VC Political Infrastructure, dated 17 January 1968
- MACV CORDS - Ambassador Komer's Reports of Pacification to US Political and Military Officials for February - May 1968 (many documents)

MACV REPORTS (continued)

MACV CDEC, DD Form 1396, Intelligence Reports, period
March 1968 - March 1969 (25 documents)

MACV CORDS Reports of Liaison Visits I CTZ March 1968
(8 reports)

MACV Weekly Summaries to CINCPAC/NMCC, for period 091601
March-231600 March 1968

MACV Daily Summary to CINCPAC/NMCC, for period 15-18
March 1968

MACV Message to CINCPAC/NMCC, subject: Special Telecon,
dated 160945 March 1968

MACV Message to CINCPAC/NMCC, subject: Special Telecon,
dated 162200 March 1968

MACV COC Daily Staff Journal (DA Form 1594) for period
16-17 March 1968

MACV Daily SITREPS, for period 16-19 March 1968

MACV/JGS Newsletter II, subject: VC Political Infrastructure,
dated 30 March 1968

MACV Intelligence Reports (to Distribution), subject:
Quang Ngai Province/City, dated 18 March- 10 April 1968

MACV CORDS Evaluation Report, subject: Pacification in
Binh Son, Son Tinh, Tu Nghia, and Nghia Binh Districts,
Quang Ngai Province, dated 29 April 1968

MACV CORDS Report, subject: Weekly Psyops Field Program
Attitude Report, dated 7 May 1968

MACV IO Report, subject: Monthly Summary, March 1968,
dated 25 May 1968

MACV IG Report to Chief of Staff, MACV, subject: Report
of Investigation Concerning Destruction Resulting
from the VC Offensive of 5-13 May 1968, dated 2 June 1968

MACV IG Report, subject: Inspector General Visits to
12th DTA Advisory Detachments, dated 6 June 1968

MACV/JGS Staff Study, subject: Combat Tactics to Minimize
Destruction of Civilian Property in Urban Areas, dated
19 June 1968

MACV REPORTS (continued)

MACV Report to J34, reference, the South Vietnamese Civilian Population, dated, 29 June 1968

MACV/JGS History, subject: The Viet Cong TET Offensive (1968), dated 1 July 1969

MACV Message to CINCPAC, subject: Pacification in South Vietnam during January - June 1968, dated 6 August 1968

MACV J2 Bulletin No 27773, 29 December 1968

MACV CORDS Report, subject: Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), dated 1 May 1969

MACV IG Memorandum and Report for Chief of Staff, MACV, subject: Investigation of Task Force Barker (Report on Psychological Operations, Americal Division), dated 27 June 1969

MACV IG Report to Chief of Staff, MACV, subject: Report of Inquiry to Obtain Information, Task Force Barker, dated 11 July 1969

MACV CORDS Fact Sheet, subject: Son My Village, dated 29 November 1969

MACV Memorandum (Briefing) for LTG Peers, subject: My Lai (4) Briefing, dated 6 January 1970

MACV CORDS Report to LTG Peers, subject: The Refugee Problem March 1968-May 1968, dated 9 January 1970

MACV J2 Bulletin No 29393, 13 February 1970

MISCELLANEOUS

MACV Card, subject: Combat Fundamentals for Advisors, undated

MACV Letter (to Distribution), subject: Lessons Learned Number 44: Elimination of Viet Cong Infrastructure, dated 23 January 1965

MACV Letter (to Distribution), subject: Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned Number 62: Salient Lessons Learned, dated 11 March 1967

MACV Letter to CG, III MAF, Reference behavior of forces in ICTZ, dated 15 November 1967

MACV MISCELLANEOUS (continued)

- MACV Handbook for Unit Claims Officers in Vietnam,
dated 1 December 1967
- MACV Fact Sheets, Weekly Analysis, subject: VC/NVN Radio
and Press Propaganda Analysis, period 12 March 1968 -
22 April 1968
- MACV SITREP to AIG 2053, 17 March 1968
- MACV Letter, subject: Roster of RVNAF Military Personalities
(Special Distribution), dated 18 April 1968
- MACV Message to VMAC, subject: Remarks by General Westmoreland,
dated 3 June 1968
- MACV CIGV Aerial Photograph (Mozaic) - vertical, area of
coordinates enclosed by BS750820, 725820, 725750, 750750
- MACV Replacement Orientation Packet, 1969
- MACV MFR, subject: VN/NVN Press and Radio Propaganda
Analysis, dated 9 May 1969
- MACV JA MFR, subject: My Lai Incident, dated 13 December 1969
- MACV CDEC Letter (to Distribution), subject: CDEC Master
Distribution List, dated 1 January 1970
- MACV Computer Summary - OPG, subject: Named U. S.
Operations Conducted During Period 1-31 March 1968 (ICTZ),
dated 24 January 1970

UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM

DIRECTIVES

- USARV Regulation Number 1-4, subject: Official Visits
dated 17 December 1968
- USARV Regulation Number 40-46, subject: Civilian War
Casualty Program, dated 2 January 1968
- USARV Regulation Number 190-2, subject: Evacuating,
Processing, and Accounting for Detained Personnel,
dated 22 May 1968

USARV DIRECTIVES (continued)

- USARV Regulation Number 320-60, subject: Military Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols, dated 1 December 1967
- USARV Regulation Number 335-6, subject: Serious Incident Reports (SIR), dated 22 December 1966
- USARV Regulation Number 345-200, subject: Records Administration, dated 30 April 1968
- USARV Regulation Number 381-5, subject: Spot Reports Concerning Enemy Attack, Related Incidents and Harassment Activities, dated 17 February 1967
- USARV Regulation Number 600-3, subject: Orientation of Commanders, dated 29 May 1968
- USARV Regulation Number 870-3, subject: Combat After Action Interviews, dated 7 March 1968
- USARV Circular 310-1, subject: Index of Command Publications (also 1 March 1969 and 1 November 1969), dated 15 March 1968
- USARV Circular 345-3, subject: Shipment of Calender Year 1966 Records and the 1967 Publications Records Sets, dated 13 December 1967
- USARV Memorandum Number 1-55, subject: Processing BLUE BELL Reports within HQ, USARV, dated 2 February 1968
- USARV Memorandum Number 20-1, subject: Areas and Items for Special Interest for Annual General Inspections, dated 23 December 1968
- USARV Memorandum Number 870-1, subject: Daily Journals and Journal Source Files (Project Oregon Memorandum), dated 21 February 1967

ORDERS

- USARV Message, CG USARV to CINCUSARPAC, subject: Activation of Americal Division, dated 10 September 1967

USARV (continued)

REPORTS

USARV Army Operations Center Daily Summaries, January - April 1968

USARV Daily Summaries, January-April 1968

USARV IG Chronology of Events - Pinkville, period 16 March 1968 - 13 February 1970

USARV OT Fact Sheet, subject: PW and Geneva Convention Training, dated 9 April 1968

USARV Letter with Report to CINCPAC, subject: Operational Report of 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1968, dated 8 July 1968

USARV Report to MACV IG, subject: Transmittal of Preliminary Report of Inquiry, dated 11 June 1969

USARV IG Daily Staff Journal for period April-June 1969

USARV IG Report to CG, USARV, subject: Annual General Inspection, FY 70, of the Americal Division, dated 4 October 1969

USARV IG Message to DA, subject: Report of Investigation Concerning the Military Operations Conducted by C Company, 1/20th Infantry, Task Force Barker, undated

MISCELLANEOUS

USARV PM Information (to Distribution), subject: III GPW in Vietnamese, dated 6 January 1968

USARV Letter (to Distribution), subject: Claims and Solatium Payments, dated 12 February 1968

USARV Ch Roster, subject: US Army Vietnam Chaplain Roster, dated 21 March 1968

USARV Message to DA DCSPER, subject: Instruction and Indoctrination of US Personnel Regarding War Crimes, dated 22 December 1969

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

DIRECTIVES

- III MAF I Corps Coordinator Instruction 3460.1, subject: Chieu Hoi Weapons Reward, dated 12 July 1967
- III MAF I CORPS Coordinator Instruction 5215.1A, subject: Distribution List, dated 10 October 1967
- III MAF I Corps Coordinator Instruction 05530.1A, subject: Control, Disposition, and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies, dated 19 April 1968
- III MAF I Corps Coordinator Notice 5215, 1 July 1968, subject: Numerical Index of Effective Force/SA I Corps Orders and Bulletins, I Corps Coordinator Instructions and Notices and Headquarters, III MAF Orders and Bulletins (also 19 Jan 68 and 1 Jan 69)
- 1st MARINE DIVISION Order 1610-5, subject: Individual Responsibility, dated 26 March 1968
- 1st MARINE Division Order 003330.2A, subject: Rules of Engagement; Required Reading for Officers, dated 9 June 1968

PLANS

- III MAF ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan I-68, AB 143, for period 1 January - 30 June 1968

REPORTS

- III MAF Message to CG, FMFPAC, subject: Historical Summary (daily) for period 16-18 March 1968
- III MAF Message to COMUSMACV, subject: III MAF Daily SITREP, for period 16-18 March 1968
- III MAF Message to COMUSMACV, subject: INTSUM (daily) for period 16-17 March 1968
- III MAF Reports to COMUSMACV, subject: CORDS Field Overview, for period January - March 1968

III MAF REPORTS (continued)

III MAF Periodic Intelligence Reports, Numbers 11-68 and 12-68 (weekly), period 10-23 March 1968

III MAF/FMFPAC Historical Summaries (monthly), subject: Operations of US Marine Forces Vietnam, for period January 1968 - December 1969

MISCELLANEOUS

III MAF Message to CG Americal, subject: Support for Civil Affairs Functions Involving Refugees, dated 26 December 1967

III MAF Command List for period 1 January - 31 August 1968

III MAF Letter to COMUSMACV, subject: Enemy and Friendly Casualty Statistics from Americal and First Marine Divisions, dated 7 December 1969

III MAF Letter to COMUSMACV, subject: Enemy and Friendly Casualties Generated by ARVN Action in ICTZ, dated 9 December 1969

III MAF Interrogation, subject: Interrogation of Hoi Chanh, dated 16 December 1969

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

Headquarters

REPORTS

ICTZ - Report from Advisory Team 2 to Commander, ICTZ, subject: Combat Operations after Action Report, dated 16 October 1967

ICTZ - Report from Advisory Team 2 to Commander, ICTZ, subject: Combat Operations After Action Report, dated 5 December 1967

ICTZ - Report to MACV, subject: Status of Pacification Assets, Assessment, and Required Actions (February 1968) undated

ICTZ - Army Advisory Group Morning Report for 22 April 1968 (page 3 of 6 pages)

ICTZ Headquarters REPORTS (continued)

ICTZ - Report from Advisory Team 2 to Commander, ICTZ,
subject: Combat Operations After Action Report,
dated 15 June 1968

ICTZ - Report of Advisory Team 1 (to Distribution),
subject: Biographic Data Reports, dated 4 October 1968

MISCELLANEOUS

ICTZ - 2nd ARVN Div Letter to CG Americal Division,
subject: Activities of US 11th Brigade in the 12th DTA,
dated 24 December 1968

ICTZ - Army Advisory Group MFR, dated 30 December 1969
(reference DA OTPMG Team visit to LTG Lam on 22 December
1969)

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

Quang Ngai Province

PLANS

QN - Letter from DFC/CORDS, III MAF (to Distribution), subject:
Combined Campaign Plan Quarterly Summary and Review,
dated 4 January 1968

QN - PSA/Province Chief Plan, subject: General Pacification
and Development Plan of the Province (Extracts of), undated
Also, 14 January 1969, complete plan.

REPORTS

QN - PSA Report to III MAF (CORDS) monthly reports, subject:
Province Monthly Report, for period January - December 1968

QN - Son Tinh District Advisor Monthly Reports to Province
Senior Advisor, period January - December 1968

QN - Phuong Hoang PHX PC Letter (to Distribution), subject:
PH PHX Program Committee Meeting, dated 16 March 1968

QN - MACCORDS-RE Record, subject: Status of Pacification
-05-Quang Ngai Province as of 10 Mar 68 (Tet Offensive)
dated 25 March 1968

ICTZ Quang Ngai Province REPORTS (continued)

- QN - PHPP Operations Newsletter #1, April 1968
- QN - Tien Phuoc District Advisor Reports, Monthly,
subject: Narrative Report Tien Phuoc District, period
April - June 1968
- QN - PHX Coordinator, QN, memorandum to Region I PHX
Coordinator, subject: PHPP Committee Meeting #2,
1 April 1968
- QN - PHX Staff Dir memoranda (2 each) to PHX Coordinator,
I Corps, subject: Monthly Reports on VCI Eliminations,
dated 2 April and 27 May 1968
- QN - I Corps PHX Committee Meeting, 18 April 1968
- QN - PSD/ICTZ Chief memorandum to Joint Staff, CORDS/
III MAF, subject: I Corps Program Assessment - Public
Safety, Period Ending 05 June 1968, dated 5 June 1968
- QN - PHX memoranda (7 each) to DRO/ROIC, subject: PHOENIX,
dated 10 June 1968
- QN - RDC/P Spot Reports to DRO/ROIC, subject: Action as
a Result of Information Passed Through the Binh Son DIOCC
(8 each) dated from 11 June - 25 June 1968
- QN - RDC/P memorandum to DRO/ROIC, subject: Capture of
VCS by PSB, dated 11 June 1968
- QN - RDC/P memorandum to DRO/ROIC, subject: Meeting of
Tu Nghia District SCG Cadre, dated 11 June 1968
- QN - RDC/P memoranda (1 CONFIDENTIAL and 1 unclassified)
to DRO/ROIC, subject: Action as a Result of Binh Son
DIOCC Information, dated 11 June 1968
- QN -(Sector) Vietnamese Operations Journal (extract
translated) for 13 June 1968
- QN - PHX Coordinator, QNG, Spot Report to PHX Coordinator,
DRO, subject: VC Activity, Tu Nghia District, dated
10 July 1968
- QN - Letter to President of the Republic of Vietnam,
subject: Concerning the Military Operation on 16 March
1968 at TU CUNG (H), TU MY (V) belonging to TASK FORCE
BARKER 11th Bde AMERICAL DIVISION, dated 20 November 1969

ICTZ Quang Ngai Province REPORTS (continued)

- QN - PHUONG HOANG Coordinator, Region I, memorandum to PHUONG HOANG Coordinator, Quang Ngai, subject: monthly PHUONG HOANG Report, dated 9 December 1968
- QN - VN Report, subject: Results of Investigation of the US Army Operation at Son My (East of Son Tinh), dated 12 December 1969
- QN - PSA Fact Sheet, Monthly Refugee Field Program for period March - June 1968, dated 19 December 1969

MISCELLANEOUS

- QN - Infrastructure (draft), undated
- QN - Statement by unknown VN, subject: To the Publisher of CAP TIEN Daily Newspaper, undated
- QN - Statement by unknown VN, subject: Some Impressions Concerning the Senate and House Delegation to Quang Ngai Investigating the Incident Called 'Massacre at Son My, Quang Ngai,' undated
- QN - Mo Duc District Fact Sheet, subject: A History of Mo Duc District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN, undated
- QN - Briefing outline, subject: Quang Ngai Briefing Folder, undated
- QN - PSA Letter to Deputy for RD/CORDS/Quang Ngai, subject: Refugees - Assignment of Primary Responsibilities, dated 12 December 1967
- QN - ICEX Coordinator Asst (Sgt Patrick McGarvey) memorandum to ICEX Coordinator, Quang Tinh Province, subject: Weekly ICEX Highlights, dated 27 March 1968
- QN - PSA Memorandum for MACV CORDS, subject: Comments Concerning Audit Report of USAID/CORDS Operations in Quang Ngai, dated 27 May 1968
- QN - PHUONG HOANG Committee, Quang Ngai, message to PHUONG HOANG Committees in Nghia Hanh, Tu Nghia and Son Tinh Districts, subject: Study Session on SVNNLF Policy, dated 29 June 1968

ICTZ Quang Ngai Province MISCELLANEOUS (continued)

- QN - PHPP Newsletter #5, July 1968
- QN - PHX Coordinator, QNG memorandum to PHX Coordinator, DRO, subject Chieu Hoi Highlight, dated 1 July 1968
- QN - PHX Coordinator, QNG, memorandum to PHX Coordinator, DRO, subject: PHX Highlight, dated 3 July 1968
- QN - PHX Coordinator, QNG, memorandum to PHX Coordinator, DRO, subject: Detainee Exploitation, dated 9 July 1968
- QN - PHPP Newsletter #6, August 1968
- QN - Advisory Team Personnel Roster, 1 May 1969
- QN - Letter by unknown VN, subject: An Open Letter to Senator TRAN VAN DON, dated 6 December 1969
- QN - CORDS Officer and Enlisted Personnel Roster, January 1970

AMERICAL DIVISION

DIRECTIVES

- AM DIV TF OREGON Field SOP, dated 21 March 1967
- AM DIV Combat SOP, dated 15 April 1968
- AM DIV Artillery Field SOP, dated 1 December 1967
- AM DIV Information Office SOP, dated 1 March 1969
- AM DIV Regulation Number 1-55, subject: Suspected Criminal Conduct, Wrongdoing, or Mismanagement in the Army BLUE BELL Reports, dated 10 July 1968
- AM DIV Regulation Number 220-10, subject: Sponsorship of Incoming Units, 25 October 1967
- AM DIV Regulation Number 310-2, subject: Distribution Formula, dated 23 January 1968
- AM DIV Regulation Number 335-6, subject: Reports of Serious Crimes or Incidents, dated 16 July 1968
- AM DIV Regulation Number 335-11, subject: List of Approved Recurring Reports, dated 31 March 1968

AMERICAL DIVISION DIRECTIVES (continued)

- AM DIV Regulation Number 360-1, subject: Public Information Policies and Procedures, 21 October 1967
- AM DIV Regulation Number 381-46, subject: Screening, Classification and Disposition of Detainees, dated 4 February 1969
- AM DIV Regulation Number 525-4, subject: Rules of Engagement, dated 8 September 1969 (also 3 February 1969)
- AM DIV Regulation Number 525-6, subject: Reporting and Investigation of Accidents Involving Misdirected Artillery/Mortar Fire, Naval Gunfire, or Delivered Ordnance, dated 11 April 1968
- AM DIV Pamphlet Number 310-1, subject: Index of Americal Division Publications, dated 29 September 1969
- AM DIV Pamphlet Number 310-2, subject: Index of Americal Division Forms, and Form Letters, dated 3 January 1969
- AM DIV Memorandum Number 340-1, subject: Headquarters Messenger Service, dated 8 December 1967
- AM DIV TF OREGON Memorandum Number 340-2, subject: Papers Addressed for Commanding General, Assistant Task Force Commander or Chief of Staff, dated 1 September 1967

REPORTS

- AM DIV letter to CG 2d Infantry Division, ARVN, subject: Report of POLWAR Activities (weekly) period 2 March 1968 - 15 April 1968
- AM DIV message to CG III MAF, subject: Monthly Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Report for period 16 January 1968 - 2 March 1968
- AM DIV message to CG III MAF, subject: Task Organization Report, dated 6 March 1968
- AM DIV letter (to Distribution), subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (also have periods ending July 1967 and January 1968), dated 7 March 1968

AMERICAL DIVISION REPORTS (continued)

- AM DIV message to CG III MAF, Weekly Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Reports (for periods 1-20 March 1968) (3 each)
- AM DIV S2/S3 Daily Staff Journal (DA Form 1594) 10 March - 21 March 1968
- AM DIV IO Daily Staff Journal (DA Form 1594) 14 March - 31 March 1968
- AM DIV message to CG III MAF, SITREP for 16 and 17 March 1968
- AM DIV letter (to Distribution), INTSUM 75, 76, 77, and 78-68, dated 16 to 19 March 1968
- AM DIV letter to CG III MAF, Weekly Civic Action Reports for 15 through 21 March 1968, dated 27 March 1968
- AM DIV IG Daily Staff Journal (DA Form 1594) 11 April - 9 June 1969
- AM DIV G3 input for preparation of ORLL for report on period ending April 1968
- AM DIV 198th Infantry Brigade letter to CG Americal Division, subject: Combat After Action Report (Operation Muscatine), dated 17 September 1968
- AM DIV - numerous directives and correspondence reference reorganization of Americal Division to the ROAD Concept, Period October 1968 to January 1969
- AM DIV - Letter Report (Fact Sheet) (to Distribution), subject: Statistics on Solatium, dated 10 October 1968
- AM DIV message to CO 11th Infantry Brigade, subject: Detainee/PW Serious Incident Report, dated 17 Nov 68
- AM DIV Engineer DF to G3 Plans, subject: Land Clearing, Americal TAOI, dated 7 September 1969
- AM DIV 635th MI Company, Team #3, report, subject: Initial Readout of Interrogation of Detainee #95-12-198, conducted 30 December 1969 at 198th Brigade PW Collection Point, LZ BAYONET, RVN

AMERICAL DIVISION MISCELLANEOUS (continued)

- AM DIV IO DF to Chief of Staff, subject: ABC-TV "Scope" Filming of Burning Hut, dated 3 December 1967
- AM DIV message to CG III MAF, subject: Support for Civil Affairs Functions Involving Refugees, dated 30 December 1967
- AM DIV instructional materials for Combat Center, 1968-1969
- AM DIV letter (to Distribution), subject: Command Information Guidance, third quarter, FY 1968, dated 10 January 1968
- AM DIV letter (to Distribution), subject: Acts of Discourtesy Toward Vietnamese People, dated 30 January 1968
- AM DIV message to Commanders, subject: Destruction of Enemy Trawler, dated 6 March 1968
- AM DIV Itinerary for LTG Edgar C. Doleman, dated 15 March 1968
- AM DIV Headquarters AM DIV Officer Roster, as of 16 March 1968
- AM DIV Form 546, Destruction of Classified Records, Office Chief of Staff, period 27 March 1968 to 10 February 1969
- AM DIV Troop List as of 1 April 1968
- AM DIV letter (to Distribution), subject: Administrative Correspondence, "search and destroy" will not be used in correspondence, dated 13 April 1968
- AM DIV letter to G2, subject: Assumption of Custodial Responsibility, dated 23 May 1968
- AM DIV Officer Rosters for 15 April 1968, 31 October 1968, 30 April 1969, and 17 September 1969
- AM DIV Enlisted Rosters for 31 October 1968 and 30 April 1969
- AM DIV message to DA, reference downgrading instructions, dated 14 October 1969
- AM DIV Records Transmittal and Receipt, DA Form 2172 and SF 135, 10 documents for 1967-1969 records retired

11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (LIGHT)

DIRECTIVES

- 11th BDE Memorandum Number 350-2, subject: Education and Training, undated
- 11th BDE Regulation Number 1-1, subject: Blue Bell Reports, dated 27 October 1966
- 11th BDE Regulation Number 220-10, subject: Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM), dated 30 October 1967

PLANS

- 11th BDE OPLAN 14-68 (Refugee Camps Contingency Plan), dated 10 July 1968
- 11th BDE OPLAN 18-68 (Defense Plan TROY), dated 28 August 1968
- 11th BDE OPLAN 19-68 (Termination of Operation Champaign Grove), dated 12 September 1968
- 11th BDE OPLAN 20-68 (Search and Sweep of Batangan Area), dated 12 September 1968
- 11th BDE OPLAN 23-68 (Natural Disaster Relief Plan), dated 21 September 1968

ORDERS

- 11th BDE FRAGORD 5-68 (Continue Muscatine and Duc Pho/Mo Duc Operations), dated 14 February 1968
- 11th BDE FRAGORD 7-68 (Release of 1-20 Inf), dated 17 March 1968
- 11th BDE FRAGORD 39-68 to OPORD 15-67 (Standard Missions Chu Lai AO), dated 17 September 1968
- 11th BDE SOP DRAFT dated 5 December 1966
- 11th BDE Tactical SOP for Counterinsurgency Operations (Draft), undated

11TH BDE ORDERS (continued)

- 11th BDE Unit Order 45, LTC Franklin assumes command, dated 6 July 1968
- 11th BDE Unit Order 49, COL Henderson assumes command, dated 13 July 1968
- 11th BDE Unit Order 81, COL Donaldson assumes command, dated 4 October 1968
- 11th BDE Policy file letters, subject: Policy, 11th Infantry Brigade, dated 1 June 1968

REPORTS

- 11th BDE message to CG Americal Division, subject: Troop Movement, dated 3 December 1967
- 11th BDE memorandum for G3, Americal Division, subject: 11th Infantry Brigade FTX, dated 19 September 1967
- 11th BDE, 3d Bn, 1st Inf, subject: After Action Report: Deployment of 11th Infantry Brigade, dated 20 January 1968
- 11th BDE, 52nd MID Interrogation Roster, for period 1 March - 31 March 1968
- 11th BDE, message to CG Americal Division, subject: INTSUM for period 1 March - 11 April 1968
- 11th BDE, 52nd MID Report to CO, 11th Bde, subject: Intelligence Study of Routes of Enemy Movement in the Areas of Operation of the 11th Infantry Brigade
- 11th BDE, 52nd MID Unit History, dated June 1969

MISCELLANEOUS

- 11th BDE AG to Overseas Record Center, USARHAW, DA Form 2172, undated, reference 11th BDE 1967 records retained at USARHAW and records taken with 11th BDE
- 11th BDE HHC Officer Roster, 16 November 1967
- 11th BDE Morning Reports (DA Form 1) period 1 October 1967 - 30 April 1968
- 11th BDE HHC EM Personnel Roster 31 October 1967 and 31 October 1968

11TH BDE MISCELLANEOUS (continued)

11th BDE AG Classified, Destruction of Classified Records,
DA Form 546, for 1968 - 69

11th BDE letter (to Distribution), subject: Treatment of
Prisoners of War, dated 6 December 1968

TASK FORCE BARKER

TFB C/1-20 Inf Special Orders 44, reference promotion
orders, dated 17 August 1967

TFB C/1-20 Casualty Reports (USARV Form 130-R) for
Hendrickson, Edison, Cummings, Cox, Carter, Meadlo,
Trevino, and Gonzales

TFB C/1-20 Inf Morning Reports (DA Form 1) period
1 October 1967 - 30 April 1968

TFB B/4-3 Inf Morning Reports (DA Form 1) period 1
October 1967 - 30 April 1968

TFB A/1-3 Inf, Morning Reports (DA Form 1) period
1 October 1967 - 30 April 1968

TFB S2/23 Daily Staff Journal, period 24 January -
7 April 1968

TFB Serious Incident Report to CO 198th Infantry Brigade,
undated, reference incident 30 January 1968

TFB A/1-3 Inf Personnel Roster, 16 March 1968

TFB C/1-20 Inf Personnel Roster, 16 March 1968

TFB B/4-3 Inf Personnel Roster, 16 March 1968

OTHER UNITS

1ST BATTALION, 20TH INFANTRY

Unit History, period through December 1969

Combat Action Report reference destruction of trawler,
dated 28 March 1968

4TH BATTALION, 3RD INFANTRY

Operational Report Lessons Learned, for Quarterly Period
1 February - 30 April 1968

After Action Report reference operation 7-14 March 1968,
dated 23 March 1968

6TH BATTALION, 11TH ARTILLERY

Unit History, period 1 March 1967 - 1 March 1968

Combat SOP, 18 November 1967

Daily Staff Journal, 1 March - 31 March 1968

14TH AVIATION BATTALION

S3 Daily Staff Journal period 14-31 March 1968

Officer Roster, 1 March 1968

Daily Aviation Summary, 16 March 1968

71st Avn Co - Daily OPREP 5, 16-18 March 1968

71st Avn Co - History, 1-31 March 1968

71st Avn Co - Personnel Roster as of 16 March 1968

174th Avn Co - Daily OPREP 5, 16 - 18 March 1968

174th Avn Co Morning Reports, DA Form 1, 1 March -
30 October 1968

174th Avn Co - Personnel Roster as of 16 March 1968

176th Avn Co - Quarterly Report for period February -
April 1968

OTHER UNITS (continued)

26TH ENGINEER BATTALION

Co C Personnel Roster, undated

123RD AVIATION BATTALION

Operational Report for period February - March 1968

DAO/S3 Daily Staff Journals period 8-31 March 1968

Co B Morning Reports, DA Form 1, 1 March - 30 October 1968

Co B Personnel Roster as of 16 March 1968


MISCELLANEOUS

Personnel records (TAG) of all individuals interrogated and/or involved

US Propaganda leaflets (many, undated)

Enemy Propaganda Leaflets (many, undated)


News articles, photographs, maps, overlays, tape recordings, and sketches of many types and quantities from many varied sources.


JAMES H. PATTERSON
Lieutenant Colonel, Armor

Sketched from memory 12 June 1969.
Not to scale.

Flight C. [Signature]

ULHIB EVAC APPROX
9 PERSONS → X
H23 (2nd Landing) → X



MY LA. (4)



X ← H 23 (1st Landing)
X negro M.C.O. allegedly fired into ditch
X ← H 23 3rd landing
Boy Evacuated

App 50 Wounded & Dead
in Ditch





EXHIBIT O-1

PREPARED IN WASHINGTON D.C.
ON 11 DECEMBER 1969

Dan R. Millard CW-2
253-72-7878






LEGEND

TREE

SHELTER W/PEOPLE

SKETCHED FROM MEMORY AND NOT TO SCALE.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Dan L. Melchard



COLORED SGT.
FIRED INTO
DITCH

TRAIL

APPROX 75
BODIES IN
DITCH

OFF LOAD
AREA FOR
CIVILIANS

GROUP OF BODIES
APPROX 10-15

- X Pickup
- X-X Ditch
- Huts
- Vegetation

LZ Dottie




EXHIBIT O-4

COMMUNICATION DIAGRAM TF BARKER

16 MARCH 1968

PREPARED FROM MEMORY

AT WASHINGTON, D.C., 23 DEC 69

Charlie L. Penellen
CPT, Infantry





EXHIBIT O-5

AERO SCOUT TEAM
Commo SOP




PREPARED IN WASHINGTON D.C.
ON 11 DECEMBER 1969

Dan R. Milliam

LEGEND


- FM
 - UHF
- EXHIBIT O-6

COMMAND BUILDING AMERICAL DIVISION



COMMAND AND CONTROL
AIR CRAFT

EARLY MORNING FLIGHT
16 MARCH 1968



DRAWN TO THE BEST OF MY
MEMORY.

William M. Smith

LT. COL., USAF

31 Jan 1970

EXHIBIT O-8

Exhibit S-1, Statement by CW2 Millians, is published in Volume IV, CID Testimony.

Exhibit S-2, Statement by CPT Livingston, is published in Volume IV, CID Testimony.

EXHIBIT S-2

[REDACTED]

STATEMENT OF COLONEL

At approximately 1300 hours on the 15th of March 1968, I met at LZ Dottie (Headquarters location of TF Barker) with LTC Barker, members of his staff and company commanders (less CPT Riggs, A-3/1 who was having helicopter difficulties) to discuss the combat assault scheduled for the morning of 16 March. In attendance were LTC Barker, TF Barker commander; MAJ Calhoun, Executive Officer/S3, TF Barker; MAJ McKnight, Brigade S3; CPT Medina, C-1/20; CPT Michles, B-4/3; the Artillery Liaison Officer (name unknown); and, two or three others whom I do not recall. This meeting was prompted by my interest for details on the concept of the operations and by comment made to me by the former Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Lipscomb, following an operation by TF Barker in generally the same area as that scheduled for 16 March. At the cited meeting I discussed certain aspects and timing of the artillery preparation, the combat assaults and emphasized that upon making contact I expected the enemy positions to be rapidly developed and contact maintained. I stressed that the best protection could be afforded U. S. wounded by forcing the enemy away from the wounded and in this manner the "dust-off (medical evacuation) ships" could operate most effectively. The former Brigade Commander informed me that on a previous operation TF Barker units, after making contact with the enemy and suffering initial casualties, had taken a defensive attitude, close to the point of contact. This condition made it extremely difficult for the "dust-off" ships to evacuate casualties

[REDACTED] Y
EXHIBIT S-3

[REDACTED]

and permitted enemy forces to withdraw undercover of its own mortar fire. Also, in this previous operation the TF commander had on at least two occasions used his command and control aircraft to evacuate casualties and consequently, his services in controlling and influencing the action were lost for a considerably period of time. I discussed this latter matter personally with the TF commander. At no time during this meeting did I discuss any aspect of civilian casualty or control measures. The rules of engagement were known and no additional comment was addressed to this point. ^{I direct questions at commanders present to insure that they had a thorough understanding of the operation's concept.} Following my departure from DZ Dottie the TF commander held the unit commanders to further discuss the operation.

I was scheduled to depart LZ Bronco (Duc Pho) on the morning of 16 March in sufficient time to be in the objective area prior to the firing of the initial artillery preparation. My command pilot (WO Cooney)? reported to me early that morning that the scheduled ship was nonoperational and that there would be a delay in having the console radio transferred to another aircraft. As a consequence, I arrived in the objective area after the artillery preparation and combat assault of C-1/20. Enroute to the objective area, I monitored the TF's command radio and learned that Company C-1/20 had made contact following its combat assault and it had reported approximately 30 enemy KIA. My command pilot was also monitoring transmissions of the gunships supporting the combat assault and he relayed to me that enemy forces were moving out of the area in small groups and were being taken under fire by the gunships. My flight route was North along the coast to a

[REDACTED]

position immediately South of the Batangan Peninsula and then West into the objective area. Approximately 500 meters North of My Lai (4) my command pilot reported two gunships were experiencing difficulty in securing the aid of soldiers from the assaulting unit to police-up weapons from uniformed enemy soldiers that the gunships had killed. Through my command pilot I had the location of these enemy dead marked with smoke by the gunships and then we entered the gunships flight formation for a closer view. I personally observed the two enemy dead, noted that both had rifles, were dressed in a green fatigue type uniform and were both wearing web pistol belts and packs. I then notified LTC Barker to expedite moving a squad into this area to recover the weapons and search the bodies. I also monitored LTC Barker's transmission to CPT Medina. CPT Medina reported that he was moving as rapidly as possible; however, that pilots were dropping smoke all over the area and he had a limited number of troops to spare since he was still heavily engaged. I remained in a position over the enemy bodies until I spotted a small element moving toward them and verified this element had the location under visual observation. At this time I observed the combat assault of Company B-4/3 in the Pinkville (My Lai 1) area and received a report that the initial assault was without enemy contact.

At this point, I overflew the initial LZ of C-1/20 observed a few soldiers moving through the village of My Lai (4). Approximately 150 meters South of this village along the trail, I noted the bodies of a man, woman, two children and a water buffalo. An another location

[REDACTED]

some 200 meters further South I observed the bodies of two men and a woman, all of military age. There appeared to be items of military equipment (packs) with this second group. I directed my pilot to land in this sector; however, the terrain was not suitable and consequently, this effort was aborted. While orbiting the area, I noted a column of some 300-400 civilians moving in a Westernly direction, along Highway 521, away from the objective area. I queried the TF commander as to whether anyone had checked these people out. He advised that the majority had been screened as they departed My Lai (4). I flew down over this column at a couple hundred feet altitude and observed a very orderly movement, except for three military age males, who were running, appeared to be evading, and who were clothed in black pajamas. It was about at this point that I overheard a radio transmission between the commander of the gunships (sharks) (174th Aviation Company) and the TF commander to the effect that there were too many gunships in the area and that if the TF commander desired for the Warloads ^(unknown Company Div Arvn Am) ~~D-1/1~~ to assume gunship coverage, the shark commander should take his ships home. LTC Barker replied that the Warloads were not supposed to be in this immediate area, but had the mission to screen the Northern flank. He advised he would move the Warloads out of the area immediately and have them insert their "animals" (Infantry Platoon ^{unk Co Div Arvn Am} ~~D-1/1~~) in the Batangan Peninsula area. I entered the net and informed LTC Barker that we would look into this mix-up of signals in the critique; however, in the meantime, I wanted him to dispatch one of Warloads OH23's to me in order that I might detain the three suspects I had under observation.



As a consequence, we apprehended two of the three suspects and delivered them to the interrogation center at LZ Dottie.

While my aircraft was being refueled, the Division Commander (Major General Koster) arrived at LZ Dottie and we discussed the operation. The time was approximately 0930 hours and I had received the information that TF Barker was now reporting approximately 60 enemy KIA. I informed General Koster that I had observed the bodies of approximately 6-8 civilians and from the position of their bodies, it appeared they had been killed by artillery fire. I also advised General Koster of the two suspects I had picked up and of my confidence that they were enemy military personnel, and that I hoped to verify that our contact was with the 48th Local Force battalion. He requested early information from these prisoners and I sent a staff officer from the heliport to the PW site. This staff officer returned immediately and reported that the two suspects claimed they were soldiers of the Quang Ngai Popular Force (PF) unit and had been captured some 30 days earlier by the Viet Cong (VC) and held prisoner in the My Lai village. They also claimed that an elder of the village had cut them loose when the U. S. assault commenced. These PW's were transported to Son Tinh District Headquarters, turned over to appropriate civilian authority and a few days later their story was substantiated. I recall General Koster commented on the 6-8 civilians I had reported killed, and I believe he directed that I attempt to ascertain more accurately how they had been killed.

Following General Koster's departure from LZ Dottie, I returned



[REDACTED]

to the objective area. Contacting LZ Bronco by radio I discovered required reports from TF Barker were not being received. I consequently directed LTC Barker to bring his own headquarters (LZ Dottie) up-to-date and insure it submitted the reports on to my headquarters. I also requested LTC Barker to query the commanders on the ground to determine how many civilians had been killed and whether they had been killed by artillery, air or small arms fire.

At approximately 1100 hours I visited General (then Colonel) Toan, CG, 2d ARVN Division at his headquarters in Quang Ngai City to explain the operation of TF Barker. By design, we had purposely not informed any Vietnamese of this operation. The request for an Area of Operation (AO) extension had been coordinated previously with U. S. advisors assigned to the 2d ARVN Division; however, announced to the ARVN only that morning. I had made an appointment with Colonel Toan the previous day to pay a courtesy call as the new commander, 11th Light Infantry Brigade. Following the visit with General Toan I visited LZ Sue (Command location 4/3) and overflow its units operating in the AO. I periodically overflow TF Barker operation and returned to my home base (LZ Bronco) approximately 1900 hours. At no time did I observe any civilian bodies other than those cited above. I talked to LTC Barker on the ground at LZ Dottie twice on the afternoon of 16 March. Our discussions, although centering around the ongoing operation, touched also on future operations. I received a report from him that a total of some ¹³⁸~~160~~ enemy and 24 civilians had been killed in the operation. He was still attempting to secure additional information

[REDACTED]

regarding the manner in which the civilians had been killed. He reported also that he had not determined why the ~~D-1/1 Cavalry unit~~ (Warload) had been operating in the area reserved for 174th Aviation Company (sharks). He had arranged a meeting with the unit commander for 1000 hours the next morning; however, to discuss the matter.

Upon my return to LZ Bronco I telephoned the Division Commander and updated my report of the number of civilians killed. General Koster expressed concern over this report and directed that I have LTC Barker provide a breakout on these showing men, women and children and how they were killed. Although I had earlier placed this requirement on LTC Barker, I telephoned him again that evening to make him aware of the Division Commander's interest.

On the morning of 17 March I returned to LZ Dottie to attend the meeting LTC Barker had arranged with Commander, ^{Warload unit,} ~~D-1/1 Cavalry~~. At this time, LTC Barker provided me a 3" x 5" card which reflected the civilian casualties and how they had been killed. At this time, I do not recall the breakout except that all civilian casualties were reflected as being caused by artillery and air. At this time, I was introduced to a major (name unknown), Executive Officer, ^{Warload unit,} ~~D-1/1 Cavalry~~. This major informed me that he had a Warrant Officer with him who had been on yesterday's operation and he desired that I hear the story direct from the Warrant Officer. I used LTC Barker's quarters and the WO relayed to me generally the following information:

That the ground operation phase he observed was out of control.



That both men on the ground and gunships were shooting at everything that moved. That he had seen ^{many} civilian bodies all over the area. That he had seen a captain shoot a wounded woman. That he had marked the position of wounded civilians with smoke ^{grenades} signals and that small Infantry elements would then move to the area advancing by fire and movement. That he was not in radio communications with the ground elements. That he did not believe these actions were dictated by the tactical situation.

I informed the WO that I would look into this matter and that if any disciplinary action was required, it would be taken. I also informed the major (name unknown) Executive Officer, ^{Warlord unit,} ~~D-1/1 Cavalry~~, that I recommend he report this incident to the Division Aviation Officer. The major in response to my query reported none of his other pilots had observed or reported any of the incidents related above.

I departed immediately to the field location (vicinity of My Lai 1) of C-1/20 and met with Captain Medina. I informed him of the accusation made by the WO, ^{Warlord unit,} ~~D-1/1~~ and asked if he was the captain who had killed the wounded woman. Captain Medina's response was immediate and direct. He stated that an OH 23 helicopter was hovering approximately 150 meters from his position and had twice dropped colored smoke signals which indicated to him enemy dead and armed. Captain Medina had no troops in his immediate vicinity so following the second signal he moved to personally investigate. He observed on the ground a woman in her early twenties, and after he nudged her with his foot or weapon and he got no response, he assumed she was dead. As he moved away approximately



[REDACTED]

10 steps, he caught a movement out of the corner of his eye and on instinct he whirled and fired his M16 into the body. Captain Medina claimed that at the moment he thought the woman was throwing a hand grenade. Captain Medina also reported that on no previous operation had smoke signals been used to identify civilian casualties, but always used to show enemy dead or enemy wounded. That in the interest of reducing U. S. casualties he had been directing his men to move on these smoke signals with extreme caution and not to take any unnecessary risks. Captain Medina assured me that neither he nor any of his soldiers had knowingly caused any civilian deaths.

Returning to LZ Dottie I met with Brigadier General Young, Assistant Division Commander, and relayed to him the report received from the WO aviator and response of Captain Medina. I recall informing General Young that I was looking into the matter further, but it appeared to me that this young WO had been unknowingly marking personnel for death. At this point I informed LTC Barker that Captain Medina's Company (C-1/20) was to sweep back through the area to identify more specifically how the 24 civilians were killed, to determine the accuracy of this number and to search for hidden weapons. LTC Barker informed me that the extraction of C-1/20 was scheduled to commence in approximately two hours, and time was insufficient to accomplish a thorough search. I informed LTC Barker that if we could not rescheduled, the extraction due to nonavailability of aircraft, we would walk the company out in a day or two.

[REDACTED]

The remainder of the day I planned to spend in the Duc Pho AO monitoring engagements of the 1/20 and 3/1. Late in the afternoon I learned that General Koster had visited LZ Dottie and had directed that the extraction take place as scheduled. Upon receiving this information, I returned to LZ Dottie and arrived concurrently with two ^{HUID's and one} CH 47 loads of troops from C-1/20. I assembled some 30-40 troops and spoke to them briefly.

I recall informing them that I appreciated the fine job they had done and it would be some time before the 48th Local Force Battalion could mount an operation. I also informed them that some civilians had been killed and that this destroyed much of the mission's success. I also informed them that some of these civilians may have been killed without provocation and by members of their company. I then asked if anyone had observed any one shooting unarmed civilians or any acts of a questionable nature. To this I received no response. I then directed the question to three or four individuals and in each case received a "No, Sir."

*Added
12/1
P. 16
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~~I am confident that my mind was made up at this point to the effect that no unnecessary acts of violence against the civilians had occurred.~~

These soldiers appeared in high spirits and their replies were given in an unhesitating manner. I did not at the time disbelieve the WO's statement, but I questioned in my own mind his ability ^{fully} to observe that which he had reported. Then too, his report concerning the Captain's actions were explainable and plausible. His marking of wounded by

[REDACTED]

smoke without ground radio contact was although of high purpose, was contrary to the unit's procedure and consequently, possibly responsible for some wounded being killed.

LTC Barker advised me that evening (17 March) that General Koster had stated he did not want to subject the troops to the mission I had given them. At no time did I discuss this matter with General Koster. A latter discussion with General Young; however, suggested that LTC Barker had expressed concern over the men having to walk out of the area normally heavily mined and booby trapped, and General Koster feeling that since the aircraft were then available, they should be used. I did not; however, reopen this issue.

On or about 20 March, I reported to General Koster in his office at Chu Lai and provided him orally with what I considered to be a final report. My oral report included the general statement made by the WO from the Warload unit and that except for the acknowledgement by Captain Medina, his accusations could not be substantiated by either members of C-1/20, TF Barker Headquarters personnel, nor pilots of 174th Aviation Company. These latter personnel were interviewed by Major Gibson, Company Commander, at my request.

On or about mid-April, my Brigade S2 received a copy of a VC propaganda message from a source (unknown to me at this time) in Quang Ngai Province Headquarters. A translation of this message showed it

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[REDACTED]

concerned the 16 March operation and alleged U. S. forces had killed some 470 civilians. I forwarded a copy of this report to the Americal Division. Within a day or two of receiving this message, I visited Colonel Toan and discussed the incident. He informed me that General Lam, I Corps Commander, had directed him to look into the matter. I offered Colonel Toan assistance and advised him I would commit U. S. Troops to support any ARVN movement into the My Lai (4) area. Colonel Toan stated he had turned the subject over to Lt Col Khien, Chief, Quang Ngai Province. He also stated that he did not believe the report was anything other than VC propaganda. Following my visit with Colonel Toan, I visited Quang Ngai Province headquarters and met with Lt Col Khien. Lt Col Khien advised me he did not plan an investigation, but that he would develop a counter-propaganda scheme. He maintained that this report was like many others and were nothing more than VC propaganda. Again, I offered to him the assistance of U. S. forces to enter the area but he replied it would not be necessary. Present at this meeting were Major McKnight, Bde S3 and either Mr. May, Senior Province Advisor, or his deputy, LTC ^{USA} ~~Gayne~~. I informed General Koster or General Young of the results of this meeting.

On or about the 22d of April, Brigadier General Young informed me that General Koster desired I submit to him a written report based upon my informal ^{command inquiry} investigation. As a consequence, I used the notes still available in my notebook and prepared the report dated 24 April 1968. I believe three copies of the report were prepared. I placed

[REDACTED]

a copy of the report in a sealed envelope and had it secured in the safe of the Bde S2 office. The delivery of this report on 24 April 1968 coincided with a scheduled meeting at Division Headquarters ^(Rice control) and I personally delivered the report to the Chief of Staff. Enroute to the Division Headquarters, I stopped at LZ Dottie and had LTC Barker read the report to ascertain if it was correct and to determine if he had additional information. I recall we agreed that this incident was now closed. A few days later, General Young informed me that General Koster had passed the report to him and that he considered it a good report and that the incident was closed.

Approximately two weeks later I received an oral directive from General Young to the effect that General Koster desired that ~~LTC Barker~~ ^{be conducted} ~~conduct~~ a formal investigation of the incident, to include the taking of statements from individuals. I personally telephoned the requirement to LTC Barker. ~~The requirement to conduct a formal investigation was not reduced to writing by either the Americal Division nor my headquarters.~~ In the process of his investigation, I recall LTC Barker asked if I would make a statement, and I informed him, no--that ~~his~~ ^{I had} ~~nothing to offer and he was familiar with people involved whom I had~~ ^{nothing to offer and he was familiar with people involved whom I had} ~~investigation was to be a fresh look into the matter. I also recall~~ ^{nothing to offer and he was familiar with people involved whom I had} ~~that I had certain statements retyped in my headquarters to reduce the~~ ^{nothing to offer and he was familiar with people involved whom I had} ~~number of typographical errors and returned them to LTC Barker to~~ ^{nothing to offer and he was familiar with people involved whom I had} ~~secure signatures.~~ I recall only that the report included statements of company commanders, staff officers, pilots, and some enlisted personnel. All statements strongly denied that any civilians, other

[REDACTED]

than the 24 previously reported upon, had been killed. I forwarded the report to Americal Division by a first indorsement which I signed.

During May 1969, I was requested to appear at OTIG, Washington, D.C. to answer questions regarding the My Lai (4) incident. The investigation was being conducted by a COL Wilson. I was surprised to learn that copies of the reports cited above were not available. COL Wilson requested I attempt to secure these reports and provide them to him. Upon my return to Hawaii, I telephoned the Chief of Staff, Americal Division (COL Donaldson) and requested he have someone look into the 11th Bde S2 safe and send me a copy of my report. COL Donaldson informed me a few days later that the report had been found and forwarded to Hq, USARV, with a copy to me. Upon receipt of this copy, I forwarded it to COL Wilson, OTIG.

Except for the report from the WO pilot, ^{Warlord unit} ~~D-1/1 Cavalry~~, my informal query developed nothing to indicate any disciplinary action or to warrant further investigation. I discussed the killing of the 24 civilians in my Bde staff meetings as an example. Thereafter, I assured that every detail concerning civilian control and evacuation was included in operation plans and orders. It was not treated lightly at the time nor in subsequent operations.

At the time of this incident the 11th Infantry Brigade was operating with some 60 officer and enlisted positions short. These positions were being used by TF Barker. From my assumption of command on 15 March

[REDACTED]

until late June I operated without a brigade executive officer. On 23 March 1968, I was wounded in the leg and for the next three to four weeks wore a cast and used crutches or a cane. It was also during March that the Americal Division infusion program commenced its impact within the brigade. Simultaneous, the R&R program commenced in March. I cite the above, not as an excuse but to reflect on conditions that could possibly have contributed to my inability to ferret out what now appears to be facts existing at the time. I was not a party to nor do I know of any collusion to deceive or play down any facts in this case. The impetus for the initial query into this alleged incident was generated by the unidentified WO pilot from ^{the 1st Cavalry} ~~D-1/1 Cavalry~~. I took the most readily means available and conducted what I considered an appropriate command inquiry. Consequently, I assume full responsibility for any errors or omissions.

ORAN K. HENDERSON
Colonel, Infantry

[REDACTED]

STATEMENT OF COLONEL O. K. HENDERSON

1. The following statement is in direct response to questions requested by this Committee:

A. Question. The official position held by the witness prior to and during Task Force BARKER operation.

Answer. TF BARKER was organized in early January 1968. At that time ^{my position} ~~he~~ was Executive Officer, 11th Light Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry (Americal) Division. I assumed command of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade on 15 March 1968 and was serving in that capacity when TF BARKER was disestablished in April 1968.

B. Question. Information that the witness has regarding TF BARKER and the situations at My Lai prior to, during and after the My Lai incident.

Answer. At approximately 1300 hours on the 15th of March 1968, I met at ^{FSB} ~~the~~ ^{Camp} Dottie (Headquarters location of TF BARKER) with LTC Barker, members of his staff and company commanders (less CPT Riggs, A-3/1) to discuss the combat assault scheduled for the morning of 16 March. In attendance were LTC Barker, TF BARKER commander; MAJ Calhoun, Executive Officer/S3, TF BARKER; MAJ McKnight, Brigade S3; CPT Medina, C-1/20; CPT Michles, B-4/3; the Artillery Liaison Officer (name unknown); and, two or three others whom I do not recall. This meeting was prompted by my interest for details on the concept of the operations. On the morning of 16 March I arrived in the objective area (approximately 0750 hours) after the artillery preparation and combat assault of C-1/20.

Enroute to the objective area, I monitored the TF's command radio and learned that Company C-1/20 had made contact following its combat assault and it had reported approximately 30 enemy KIA. My command pilot was also monitoring transmissions of the gunships supporting the combat assault and he relayed to me that enemy forces were moving out of the area in small groups and were being taken under fire by the gunships. Approximately 500 meters North of My Lai (4) my command pilot reported two gunships were experiencing difficulty in securing the aid of soldiers from the assaulting unit to police-up weapons from uniformed enemy soldiers that the gunships had killed. Through my command pilot I had the location of these enemy dead marked with smoke by the gunships and then we entered the gunships flight formation for a closer view. I personally observed the two enemy dead, noted that both had rifles, were dressed in a green fatigue type uniform and were both wearing web pistol belts and packs. I then notified LTC Barker to expedite moving a squad into this area to recover the weapons and search the bodies. I also monitored LTC Barker's transmission to CPT Medina. CPT Medina reported that he was moving as rapidly as possible; however, that pilots were dropping smoke all over the area and he had a limited number of troops to spare since he was still heavily engaged. I remained in a position over the enemy bodies until I spotted a small element moving toward them and verified this element had the location under visual observation. At this time I observed the combat assault of Company B-4/3 in the Pinkville (My Lai 1) area and received a report that the initial assault was without enemy contact. I then

overflowed the initial LZ of C-1/20, observed a few soldiers moving through the village of My Lai (4). Approximately 150 meters South of this village along ^athe trail, I noted the bodies of a man, woman, two children and a water buffalo. At another location some 200 meters further South ^{at the point where the trail and Highway 521 junctioned} I observed the bodies of two men and a woman, all of military age. There appeared to be items of military equipment (packs) with this second group. I directed my pilot to land in this sector; however, the terrain was not suitable and consequently, this effort was aborted. While orbiting the area, I noted a column of some 300-400 civilians moving in a Westernly direction, along Highway 521, away from the objective area. I queried the TF commander as to whether anyone had checked these people out. He advised that the majority had been screened as they departed My Lai (4). I flew down over this column at a couple hundred feet altitude and observed a very orderly movement, except for three military age males, who were running, appeared to be evading, and who were clothed in black pajamas. My aircraft then detained two of the VC^s; and we delivered them to FSB DOTTIE for interrogation.

While my aircraft was being refueled, the Division Commander (Major General Koster) arrived at ^{FSB}~~E~~ DOTTIE and we discussed the operation. The time was approximately 0930 hours. I informed General Koster that I had observed the bodies of approximately 6-8 civilians and from the position of their bodies, it appeared they had been killed by artillery fire. I also advised General Koster of the two suspects I had picked up and of my confidence that they were enemy military personnel, and that I hoped to verify that our contact was with the 48th

Local Force battalion. He requested early information from these prisoners, and I sent a staff officer from the heliport to the PW^{Collection} site. This staff officer returned immediately and reported that the two suspects claimed they were soldiers of the Quang Ngai Popular Force (PF) or Regional Force (RF) unit and had been captured some 30 days earlier by the Viet Cong (VC) and held prisoner in the My Lai village. They also claimed that an elder of the village had cut them loose when the U. S. assault commenced. These PW's were transported to Son Tinh District Headquarters, turned over to appropriate civilian authority and a few days later their story was substantiated. I recall General Koster commented on the 6-8 civilians I had reported killed, and I believe he directed that I attempt to ascertain more accurately how they had been killed.

At approximately 1100 hours I visited General (then Colonel) Toan, CG, 2d ARVN Division at his headquarters in Quang Ngai City to explain the operation of TF BARKER. I had made an appointment with Colonel Toan the previous day to pay a courtesy call as the new commander, 11th Light Infantry Brigade.

Upon my return to ~~the~~^{FSA} ~~the~~^{Quang} Bronco that evening I telephoned the Division Commander and updated my report of the number of civilians killed. General Koster expressed concern over this report and directed that I have LTC Barker provide a breakout on these showing men, women and children and how they were killed. Although I had earlier placed this requirement on LTC Barker, I telephoned him again that evening

to make him aware of the Division Commander's ^{personal} interest.

On the morning of 17 March I returned to ~~the~~ ^{FSB} DOTTIE. At this time, LTC Barker provided me a 3" x 5" card which reflected the civilian casualties and how they had been killed. At this time, I was introduced to a ~~Major~~ ^{Wilson,} ~~(name unknown),~~ ^{Executive} Commanding Officer, Co. B, 123d Aviation Battalion. This major informed me that he had a Warrant Officer with him who had been on yesterday's operation and he desired that I hear the story direct from the Warrant Officer. I used LTC Barker's quarters and ~~the~~ ^{Thompson} WO _A relayed to me generally the following information:

That the ground operation phase he observed ~~was~~ ^{appeared} out of control. That both men on the ground and gunships were shooting at everything that moved. That he had seen ^{what appeared to him to be} civilian bodies all over the area. That he had seen a captain shoot a wounded woman. That he had marked the position of wounded civilians with smoke grenades and that small Infantry elements would then move to the area advancing by fire and movement. That he was not in radio communications with the ground elements. That he did not believe these actions were dictated by the tactical situation.

I informed ~~the~~ ^{Thompson} WO _A that I would look into this matter and that if any disciplinary action was required, it would be taken. I also informed ~~the~~ ^{Wilson,} ~~Major~~ ~~(name unknown)~~ ^{Executive} Commanding Officer, Co. B, 123d Aviation Battalion, that I recommend he report this incident to the Division Aviation Officer. *Major Wilson had also informed me that none of his other pilots had reported observing anything similar to WO Thompson's report.*

I departed immediately to the field location (vicinity of My Lai 1) of C-1/20 and met with Captain Medina. I informed him of the ^{report} ~~accusation~~ made by ^{the Thompson,} ~~the WO~~ Co. B, 123d Avn Bn, and asked if he was the captain who had killed the wounded woman. Captain Medina's response was immediate and direct. He stated that an OH 23 helicopter was hovering approximately 150 meters from his position and had twice dropped colored smoke signals which indicated to him enemy dead and armed. Captain Medina reported he had no troops in his immediate vicinity so following the second signal he moved to personally investigate. He observed on the ground a woman in her early twenties, and after he nudged her with his foot or weapon, and he got no response, he assumed she was dead. As he moved away approximately 10 steps, he caught a movement out of the corner of his eye and on instinct he whirled and fired his M16 into the body. Captain Medina claimed that at the moment he thought the woman was throwing a hand grenade. Captain Medina also reported that on no previous operation had smoke signals been used to identify civilian casualties, but always used to show ^{armed} ~~enemy, dead or enemy wounded~~. Captain Medina assured me that neither he nor any of his soldiers had knowingly caused any civilian deaths.

Returning to ^{F3B} ~~the~~ DOTTIE I met with Brigadier General George Young, Assistant Division Commander, and relayed to him the report received from ^{the Thompson} ~~the WO~~ ^{evident} and response of Captain Medina. Following the departure of Brigadier General Young, I ^{directed} ~~informed~~ LTC Barker ~~that to have~~ Captain Medina's Company (C-1/20) ~~was~~ to sweep back through the area.

to identify more specifically how the 20 civilians were killed, to determine the accuracy of this number and to search for hidden weapons.

LTC Barker informed me that the extraction of C-1/20 was ^{already} scheduled, ~~the~~ aircraft ^{arranged} ~~commence~~ ⁱⁿ ~~approximately two hours~~, and ^{that} time was insufficient to accomplish a thorough search. I informed LTC Barker that if we could not rescheduled, the extraction due to nonavailability of aircraft, we would walk the company out.

Late in the afternoon I learned that General Koster had visited ^{FSB} DOTTIE and ^{he} had directed that the extraction take place as scheduled. Upon receiving this information, I returned to ^{FSB} DOTTIE and arrived concurrently with two HUID's and one CH 47 load of troops from C-1/20. I assembled some 30-40 troops and spoke to them briefly.

I recall informing them that I appreciated the fine job they had done and it would be some time before the 48th Local Force Battalion could again mount an operation against us. I also informed them that some noncombatants had been reportedly killed and that this destroyed much of the mission's success. I also informed them that some of these noncombatants may have been killed without provocation and by members of their company. I then asked if anyone had observed anyone shooting unarmed civilians or any acts of a questionable nature. To this I received no response. I then directed the question to three or four individuals and in each case received a "No, Sir."

These soldiers appeared to be in high spirits and I observed them move down the trail. No individual made any effort to make contact with me.

On or about 20 March, I reported to General Koster in his office at Chu Lai and provided him orally a report of my inquiry into this incident. My oral report included the general statement made by ~~the~~ WO Thompson, ^{Co.} B, 123d Avn Bn, and that except for the acknowledgement by Captain Medina, his ^{report of observations} ~~allegations~~ could not be substantiated by either members of C-1/20, TF BARKER Headquarters personnel, nor pilots of 174th Aviation Company. These latter personnel were interviewed by Major Gibson, Company Commander, at my request.

On or about mid-April, my Brigade S2 received a copy of a VC propaganda message from a source (unknown to me at this time) in Quang Ngai Province Headquarters. A translation of this message showed it ^{a series of incidents throughout RVN and devoted a paragraph to} concerned the 16 March ~~plus an earlier~~ operation and alleged U. S. forces had killed some 470 civilians. I forwarded a copy of this report to the Americal Division. Within a day or two of receiving this message, I visited Colonel Toan and discussed the incident. He informed me that General Lam, I Corps Commander, had directed him to look into the matter. I offered Colonel Toan assistance and advised him I would commit U. S. Troops to support any ARVN movement into the My Lai (4) area. Colonel Toan stated he had turned the subject over to Lt Col Khien, Chief, Quang Ngai Province. He also stated that he did not believe the report was anything other than VC propaganda. Following my visit with Colonel Toan, I visited Quang Ngai Province Headquarters and met with Lt Col Khien. Lt Col Khien advised me he did not plan an investigation, but that he would develop

a counter-propaganda scheme. He maintained that this report was like many others and were nothing more than VC propaganda. Again, I offered to him the assistance of U. S. forces to enter the area, but he replied it would not be necessary. Present at this meeting were Major McKnight, Bde S3 and either Mr. May, Senior Province Advisor, or his deputy, LTC Guinn. I informed General Koster or General Young of the results of this meeting.

On or about 20 April 1968 I received instructions from Brigadier General Young to prepare a written report regarding certain aspects of the alleged My Lai incident. I do not recall the specifics of this requirement and can now only assume that it pertained to the VC propaganda message since that is the direction my report took. In preparing this report, I used previously held notes and followed this up with some informal discussions with members of the Brigade whom I do not now recall. I personally delivered my written report to Colonel Nels Parson, C/S, 23d Infantry (Americal) Division on or about 24 April 1968.

Approximately two weeks later I received an oral directive from General Young to the effect that General Koster desired that a formal investigation of the incident be conducted to include the taking of statements from individuals.

I selected LTC Barker, Executive Officer, 11th LIB, to conduct the investigation. The investigation was accomplished and submitted to me prior to LTC Barker's departure on R&R on or about 20 May 1968. I forwarded the report to Headquarters, Americal Division.

C. Question. Detailed information as to how and when the My Lai incident came to the witness' attention and what action, if any, he took pertaining thereto.

Answer. Provided above.

D. Question. Whether the witness made a report to his superior officer regarding the My Lai incident and, if so, what was the nature of the report and to whom was the report addressed.

Answer. Provided above.

E. Question. The witness' evaluation as to whether there was unwarranted killing at My Lai.

Answer. The death of 20 noncombatants, including women and children, reported following the My Lai operation is difficult to justify. There is no information that the VC attempted to use these people as shields. ^{or in any other manner although this is a standard VC technique.} These deaths were reportedly caused by artillery and gunship fire. ^{are reluctant to} ~~No~~ ^{will willingly} ~~Commanders~~ admit that noncombatants are killed by small arms fire if any possibility exists that the more impersonal weapons of air and artillery are available. Some deaths to noncombatants are caused by individuals firing blindly after receiving enemy fire. The "rules of engagement" which ^{restrain} ~~restrict~~ an individual from firing except when fired upon or when he observes an enemy performing a hostile act ^{is clear and generally well understood,} ~~is frustrating to the combat soldier~~ ^{who is exposed daily to the acts of a treacherous enemy.} Our soldier's survival is in great measure dependent upon his observation, mental

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The nature of counterinsurgency, the difficulty of identification, the elusiveness of the enemy and his treachery and deceit dictate that upon contact a violence of fire takes place. During this exchange of fire individuals lay down area fire and engage targets of opportunity. Innocent civilians or noncombatants caught in this violence of action had reactions

are often casualties even though US Forces take maximum precautions and efforts. The existing language barrier further compounds the problem.

estimate and reaction. In ^{most}~~some~~ cases the soldier's survival is based upon an instantaneous action or reaction.

I personally have great confidence in our American soldier. He is not hardened to the sight of death--be it the enemy, a buddy or non-combatant. The inadvertent killing of 20 noncombatants at My Lai on 16 March 1968 is by its magnitude a tragedy. I am of the opinion it was caused by a combination of artillery fire, gunship fire and small arms fire.

Even so, the US soldier does not by design fire upon noncombatants -- especially children.

Unsworn statement of PHAN CHOT was taken at Americal Division Headquarters in Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam, on the 3d of January 1970. The questions were posed to PHAN CHOT by LTC STANBERRY, and the entire conversation was in Vietnamese. Colonel STANBERRY has constructed the following from that conversation:

Testimony of PHAN CHOT
Kit Carson Scout Americal Division, Chu Lai
Scout Number 253.

I am Phan Chot. I am 38 years old. On 16 March 68 I lived in Thuan Yen, Tu Cung hamlet, with my wife and 4 children. Early in the morning, as usual, I left the village to hide in the mountains or outside the hamlet. Every day I left the village to avoid being caught by the American forces.

On that day I left my home, vicinity number 1 on the map, and went to the base of the hill at number 2 on the map. I saw the American forces land in the village after firing artillery around the village. I stayed at the area at the foot of the mountain all day. I could see clearly. After noon, they went to the East and along the highway. By about 5 o'clock I could see that all the Americans were gone, so I went back to the hamlet. It was still not dark and I went straight to my house. I saw the bodies of two children before I came to the house. In my house I found my 17 year old daughter's body. She had been shot in the hip and through the stomach.

I had been hiding that day with two more guerillas, Quyen and Nham. These two are still VC. There were 4 guerillas that fled to the north. One was Hoa, the other I don't remember. After I found my daughter's body, I helped the others search the hamlet. I saw about 50 bodies in the ditch SW of the hamlet at number 3 on the map. I was given responsibility for the burial of about 100 bodies which were buried to the South (at 4), near the highway. I also saw about 45-50 bodies in a pile on a road at the south side of the hamlet. Another person was given responsibility for burying about 120 bodies at number 5 on the map. We worked all night and finished about 3 a.m. in the morning. There were a number of people wounded who were treated by my Nguyen Vien, the VC hamlet Medic.

The following day I left the village and went back to the base of the hill, then I waded (swam) the river to Co Luy where I hid for 3 days. During that time, I saw no US forces enter Co Luy, but I did hear that 40-50 people had been killed in My Hoi, up near the bridge the day before. But all during the period I was in Co Luy, no troops entered the area.

Three days later, as I recall, which would be 20 March 68, I returned to Thuan Yen and for the first time found my wife and three other children safe. A number of people had returned to Thuan Yen, but noone lived there any longer. All had moved to Thuong An. There were a number of families that moved to Truong An. I don't know how many.

I stayed there and worked at miscellaneous jobs for a while then started considering coming in to Chieu Hoi. Finally about five months ago, or about July-August 69 I found a Chieu Hoi leaflet and came in to Chieu Hoi. Since then there have been about 9 or 10 of the guerillas come in to Chieu Hoi. We had all been forced to become members of the 48th VC Local Force Battalion. This Battalion had about 10 North Vietnamese Cadre, not officers, but we never got to see them or the Battalion leaders. They usually stayed in the area 710810 about 3 KM north of Thuan Yen. If we found out who the leaders were, we could get killed. After the Americans attacked Thuan Yen village the people would not remain in the hamlet. When the US came back on operation we were extremely afraid but after a few months, we saw that the Americans were good to the people, were very kind, and we thought that they had just made an example of Thuan Yen to let us know that we shouldn't follow the VC. I decided to Chieu Hoi because life with the VC was to difficult, it was difficult to make a living, and I continually lived in fear of being killed or having my family killed. My wife and 3 children now live in Son Tinh. I am a Kit Carson Scout (number 253, Chu Lai). I work for the Americans.


BILLY M. STANBERRY
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

7 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Captain Mai Quang Danh

Reference information extracted from the Quang Ngai Sector Journal log of 13 June 1968. Captain Mai Quang Danh gave the following additional information during an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Billy M. Stanberry on 4 January 1970 at Quang Ngai, Republic of Vietnam:

I was present and participated in the Sector operation QT44/6 in June 68. Other Viet Nameese officers accompanying the operation were Col Ton Than Khiem, Province Chief and LTC Nguyen Dinh Hoai, the Deputy for Security.

US Divisions participating in the operation were LTC Green, Deputy PSA; Major Harking, Sector RV/PF Advisor; and Maj Read, Sector 5-3 Advisor.

During the operation, 2 American aircraft collided and crashed at BS 717383. All US were killed. LTC Hoai participated in the rescue operation and for his action was recommended for the Bronze Star "V." He was awarded the Commendation Medal w/V in or near July 67.


BILLY M. STANBERRY
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

767

EXHIBIT S-6

[REDACTED]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am here today to tell you everything I can about the My Lai (4) accident. Since the combat operation in question has been described to you by previous witnesses, I will limit my initial remarks to those aspects of the matter to which I had direct knowledge.

At the time of the operation I was the Commanding General of the Americal Division. I continued to serve in this capacity until 3 June 1968. The 11th Brigade was assigned to the Americal Division, having arrived in the Division area on 20 December 1967. Prior to being assigned an operational area, the brigade had a few days of combat indoctrination to include instruction in subjects specified by MACV for new arrivals in country.

Task Force Barker, the unit directly involved in this operation, was formed from the 11th Brigade on 22 January 1968 in order that the 11th Brigade could more adequately cover an expanded area of operations due to a readjustment of units. Since the operation on 16 March 1968 was being conducted slightly outside the Division's area of operations, it required coordination with the 2d ARVN Division in whose area these villages were located. Normally this coordination would have been made by the 11th Brigade with information being given to Division Headquarters, which would permit allocation of airlift or disapproval of the operation by Division should there be other commitments considered to be more important at the time. I have no reason to doubt that such coordination took place, since there was nothing unusual regarding the planning for this operation that came to my attention.

[REDACTED]

EXHIBIT S-7

[REDACTED]

It is possible that I watched the initial air assault on 16 March 1968, although as Commanding General, I observed several air assaults in this area on different occasions. I cannot be sure. If I did so, I noticed no unusual activity and undoubtedly left, after the initial troops were safely on the ground, as I was prone to do unless considerable enemy resistance had created a problem during that phase of the operation. My primary concern was in the northern portion of the division area, due to the enemy strength normally located there.

To the best of my knowledge, the first information given to me concerning actions in the operation which were other than routine was in the early afternoon on the 16th or 17th upon my return to Division Headquarters and was presented to me by members of my staff. This information consisted of the fact that a helicopter pilot had reported through his command channels that he believed the troops engaged in the operation were firing indiscriminately in the heat of battle and that the firing appeared to have been more than was needed, considering the enemy opposition. As far as I can recall, I was not given at that time the details of any discussion the pilot might have had with the ground commander. I directed GEN YOUNG, I believe in the presence of my Chief of Staff, COL PARSONS, to have an inquiry made into the matter immediately. Later, I went to COL BARKER's headquarters, Landing Zone Dottie, and asked him what he knew about the operation and any civilian casualties. As I recall, COL BARKER assured me that he or his operations officer had been over the area much of the morning. He also assured me that no activity had taken place which was not warranted. Reports indicated many civilians were departing the area without harm.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

During the next few days COL HENDERSON, who was Commanding Officer of the 11th Brigade, made several verbal reports either directly to me or through GEN YOUNG in which he indicated he had talked to several men of the company, including noncommissioned officers and officers, and to many of the aviators who had flown over the area in support of the operations, including the helicopter pilot making the initial report. He found no evidence of unnecessary firing but did report approximately 20 civilian casualties which he conjectured had been inflicted either by artillery, detonation of booby traps, fire from helicopter gunships, or the firing of M79 grenades or rifles by the ground elements at signs of movement as opposed to identifiable individuals. He also reported that civilians had left the area during the operation. This entire area of operations was normally heavily booby trapped since there had been an almost unlimited supply of mines left in place upon the departure of the Korean Marines. GEN YOUNG spoke particularly of HENDERSON's interview with the helicopter pilot and, as I recall, indicated there were discrepancies in the story. HENDERSON felt that the aviator had undoubtedly seen some bodies, witnessed soldiers firing, and had jumped to an unwarranted conclusion. It was my belief that COL HENDERSON had interrogated all of the individuals concerned with the action who had positions of responsibility insofar as the U. S. Forces were concerned. About a month later, there appeared some Viet Cong propaganda leaflets which denounced the U. S. Forces and their operations in this area. In addition, reports from the local District Chief were received regarding civilian casualties in My Lai which were passed through both the Vietnamese and U. S. channels. It was not clear to me whether his report was based upon the Viet Cong

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

propaganda leaflets or news [REDACTED] made in these leaflets was not particularly unusual, but when related to the helicopter pilot's report, further investigation appeared warranted to insure that fire power had not been overutilized by the attacking troops.

About mid-April, I believe I directed COL HENDERSON to prepare a further report and reduce his verbal reports to writing. I considered this advisable since there might be additional evidence developed by the Vietnamese. COL HENDERSON's report was dated 24 April 1968. About this time I made a visit of about 10 days to Hawaii. I cannot recall whether COL HENDERSON's report was submitted to me just prior to or subsequent to that trip. However, when I did see it, I found that it did not include statements by responsible individuals concerned nor many of the details regarding the investigation which had been given to me verbally by COL HENDERSON and/or GENERAL YOUNG during the course of the initial inquiry.

After my return to Vietnam, as I recall, I directed a formal investigation of this matter be conducted. Sometime later it was submitted by COL HENDERSON. The investigation contained statements by responsible leaders, platoon sergeants, aviation officers and others involved in the operation, and arrived at the general conclusion that some civilian casualties had been inflicted but that they were the direct result of combat operations. To the best of my recollection, the report contained no evidence of undue or excessive firing. This investigation in my judgment and, as I recall that of my immediate staff, included sufficient evidence for me to arrive at the conclusion that no further inquiry or action was warranted. I considered the officers making the investigations to be well experienced combat officers of fine reputation. I cannot believe that they ever would have intentionally misrepresented the facts

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

presented to them or omitted [REDACTED] distorted picture to me. I recall discussing the written, signed statements with members of my staff. If further evidence had come to light during the brief time I remained in Vietnam, I would certainly have reopened the matter.

After receiving the several reports, I discussed the incident with COL KHIEU, the Province Chief and with COL TOAN, the Commanding General of the 2d ARVN Division and the senior ARVN officer in the area, in detail. They confirmed that investigation through Vietnamese channels had provided no substantiation and the information they had received was termed Viet Cong propaganda by them. I am sure I also discussed it with GEN LAM, Commanding General of I Corps. During the course of these investigations I believe I informed GEN CUSHMAN, or members of the III MAF Command Group that I was looking into the matter described above. This would have been normal because GEN LAM was aware of the allegations.

As Commanding General of the Americal Division, I took very seriously any allegations of offenses against civilian or enemy personnel. During my period with the division, of the approximately 12 general court martial cases, 6 were trials of individuals who had committed criminal acts against Vietnamese civilians. At least 1 of these cases had originated in the 11th Brigade and had resulted in court martial charges against a individual for killing 3 Vietnamese civilians. The My Lai (4) matter was consistently presented to me as a contested combat action which involved only possible excessive use of fire power. At no time did the investigation indicate that criminal offenses or possible war crimes had been committed by anyone. Similarly, I did not forward the investigation to higher headquarters since the contents did not appear to warrant further action.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

If the allegations now being made prove to be even partially correct, I am convinced this was not representative of our combat operations in Vietnam and it should not be allowed to tarnish the brave actions and sacrifices of our fine soldiers who served during the course of the war.

Gentlemen, I believe that I know as well as most soldiers the tragedies that inevitably accompany warfare. The nature of the present conflict, as in all wars, has resulted unavoidably in civilian casualties during combat operations in spite of all conceivable precautions. However, at the time I was in Vietnam, I knew of no U. S. combat commander within the Americal Division who ever ordered, or permitted, intentional infliction of injury upon innocent civilians.

WITNESS STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 195-10 - TB PMG 3; the proponent agency is Office of The Provost Marshal General.

PLACE Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam	DATE 12 Feb 70	TIME 1400 hours	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME DROSDICK, William George	SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NO.		GRADE Sergeant First Class
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374			

SWORN STATEMENT

I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

COL WHALEN: Sergeant Drosdick, I'm Colonel Whalen from the General Peers Inquiry. The purpose of my visit here is to attempt to secure more information regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the My Lai incident of 16 to 18 March 1968 in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam.

First, I'd like to read you Article 31 and the Miranda warning:
"Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, provides that: No person subject to this Code shall compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question, the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. No person subject to this Code shall interrogate or request any statement from an accused or person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. No person subject to this Code shall compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement shall be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial."

The Miranda Warning:

1. You have the right to talk with a lawyer at any time, and you may have the lawyer present whenever you are questioned or asked to make a statement.
2. The lawyer may be a civilian lawyer obtained at your own expense, or you may ask for a military lawyer. If you ask for a military lawyer, one will be appointed for you; and if you ask for a military lawyer by name, he will be appointed if he is reasonably available. The services of an appointed military lawyer will be free of charge.
3. If you obtain a civilian lawyer or ask for a military lawyer, you will not be questioned until the lawyer is present; and that questioning will stop at any time that you say you wish to remain silent or say nothing further. If, after waiving your right to counsel, you decide you want a lawyer, questioning will stop at the time you say you wish to see a lawyer.

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT WGD	PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

"STATEMENT OF SFC WILLIAM G. DROSDICK
TAKEN AT CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
ON 12 FEBRUARY 1970, CONTINUED"

COL WHALEN: 4. You may answer some questions and not others, but anything you say or do may be used against you in a court of law.

5. Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you?

SFC DROSDICK: Yes, sir, I understand everything completely.

COL WHALEN: 6. Do you desire to see a lawyer or have a lawyer present during my questioning?

SFC DROSDICK: No, I do not.

COL WHALEN: Sergeant Drosdick, do you swear or affirm that the evidence you are about to give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

SFC DROSDICK: I do, sir.

QUESTIONS BY COLONEL WHALEN

Q. Sergeant Drosdick, would you give your full name?

A. My full name is William George Drosdick.

Q. Would you spell the last name, please?

A. D-R-O-S-D-I-C-K.

Q. Your rank?

A. Sergeant First Class.

Q. Social Security Number?

A. My Social Security Number is

Q. Your job or position?

A. My job is Admin Supervisor and NCOIC of the Command Group, HHC, Americal Division.

Q. When did you arrive in Vietnam on this tour?

A. I arrived in Vietnam on 30 March 1969.

Q. When did you assume your duties in the Americal Division?

A. I started work on approximately 15 April 1969.

Q. Sergeant Drosdick, testimony of Sergeant First Class Saimons, Americal Division Admin NCO during May 1967 to October 1968 and Staff Sergeant Leftis, in the same position from October 1968 to May 1969, reveals that the second drawer from the top

***STATEMENT OF SFC WILLIAM G. DROSDICK
TAKEN AT CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
ON 12 FEBRUARY 1970, CONTINUED***

- Q. of the safe in the Secretary of the General Staff offices was frozen shut and could not be opened. This drawer may have contained a flight helmet, brief case, and miscellaneous papers. Do you recall this locked drawer?
- A. Yes, I do. When I first arrived at the Division this drawer was locked. When Sergeant Loftis left it was still locked.
- Q. Has it since been opened?
- A. Yes. I opened this drawer approximately around June or July; I'm not sure when. The way I happened to get this safe opened was that it was near the close of business one day and Captain Wolfe, who was with MID, I don't remember any more details about him, was reporting in for Staff Duty Officer. We were talking and he said there was a specialist from Saigon over at his unit for the night who was a safecracker. I explained to him the trouble I was having with the safe. He called up this Warrant Officer and the Warrant Officer came over. He and I took the safe apart and opened this drawer. In this drawer I found one flight helmet, one brown leather brief case with nothing inside it, and that was all.
- Q. Once again, in the contents you state there was only one flight helmet and a brief case?
- A. Yes, sir. That's all I found in there. I found no papers or anything else.
- Q. No miscellaneous papers, envelopes, or other types of documents?
- A. Nothing whatsoever, sir.
- Q. Where are the flight helmet and brief case now?
- A. They're in the office somewhere. I believe they're in the back room in the storage closet.
- Q. Who opened the drawer at the time it was first opened?
- A. I physically opened it with the help of this Warrant Officer. We had turned it upside-down and he was using a hammer and some screwdrivers. There was a screw missing in the back and he finally was able to knock the pins inward where he could lift the drawer up enough and I physically picked it up completely out of the safe. I saw everything that was there. I picked it up and put it on the floor and that's what I found in there.
- Q. What was the name of the Warrant Officer?
- A. Sir, I don't know what his name was. The only contact I can give is that of Captain Wolfe who was with MID and G-2 here. He called him over. I do not remember his name. I can give a physical description. He was about 6' 2", 210 lbs, brown hair, stocky build.
- Q. Since you turned the safe over, is it possible documents or papers might've fallen behind the drawer somewhere?

"STATEMENT OF SFC WILLIAM G. DROSDICK
TAKEN AT CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
ON 12 FEBRUARY 1970, CONTINUED"

A. No, sir. The safe is a four drawer safe. Each drawer is a completely sealed and enclosed compartment. Before we had turned it over we had taken the other three drawers out so I know there was nothing else behind there. When we took this drawer completely out we had the whole safe upside-down. There was nothing else in the bottom. There was no way anything else can get in there because, like I say, it's completely sealed on all sides. Each drawer section is a separate compartment.

Q. You could see into the rear corners even though it was dark back in there?
A. Well, it wasn't really dark, sir. We had the safe laid on the floor and with the florescent lights in the office there were really no dark spots.

Q. Sergeant Loftis indicated that he remade the classified logs and after making single log entries for the only SECRET material under his control, he filed the old logs under the Functional Files System in folders numbered 504-12 which are kept for two years. These were filed in the unclassified filing cabinet in the general admin area of the office. The destruction certificates of the SECRET material that he destroyed were filed in folders numbered 504-10 which are also kept for two years and filed in the same cabinet. Can these old logs and certificates be found?

A. All the ones that I know of that he's talking about in his statement are the ones that I showed to you when you were over there the other day. If he means further than this, no. If those are the ones, yes. I presume those are the ones we are talking about.

Q. Did you destroy any old logs?

A. No, I didn't, none whatsoever. The reason I didn't do this is because we still have one active 1967 classified SECRET document. Therefore, I had to keep all the other registered logs due to this fact.

Q. Now, as to all the old logs which were here when you took over and the ones you have since established; where are they located now?

A. In the same filing cabinet in the general admin area.

Q. Is it true that no classified logs for the period we just mentioned or logs showing destruction of material through March and May of 1968 have been found since you've been here? Is this true?

A. Well, sir, I'm not sure of the dates of all of the ones we have over there. I would really have to go through them again to check and see if there's any March of 1968. The ones I showed you the other day are the only ones I know of. The actual dates of them I am not sure of.

Q. The documents that were destroyed by Sergeant Loftis; where are the records of this now?

A. They're in the same file cabinet, sir. Those are the records I have. When he left he said, "This is all the stuff I have and this is what I've destroyed." I have maintained all these files and I still have them over there.

Q. The items that he destroyed, are there documents to support the name of the document and the disposition of them?

"STATEMENT OF SFC WILLIAM G. DROSDICK
TAKEN AT CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
ON 12 FEBRUARY 1970, CONTINUED"

Q. Yes, there is, sir. The DA Forms 455 are over there to justify all of this.

Q. Are you aware of any other documents that might've been forwarded from the Division for destruction somewhere else or for retirement at another location?

A. No, sir; we've never forwarded any documents. We have always destroyed everything we have ever had in the Chief of Staff's Office right here.

Q. Since you have reviewed the files and documents in the Command Headquarters, are you aware of any documents or letters or DFs or Memos which might indicate forwarding of any documents related to the My Lai incident to another headquarters?

A. No, sir. In fact, I never knew anything about the My Lai incident. I had been here four or five months before I ever heard the name of the place and that's when the full investigation had broken. I had never seen a paper making reference to it or even heard it mentioned in the office.

COL WHALEN: Let the record reflect that we're taking a short recess to review the dates of the documents on file in the Command Headquarters.

(The interrogation recessed at 1415 hours, 12 February 1970.)

(The interrogation reconvened at 1441 hours, 12 February 1970.)

COL WHALEN: Sergeant Drosdick, I remind you that you're still under oath.

SFC DROSDICK: Yes, sir, I understand.

QUESTIONS BY COLONEL WHALEN

Q. Let me come back to one of my previous questions, the reason for which we had a recess so you could secure some documents; would you please indicate whether any classified logs showing destruction of material dated March through May 1968 have been found in the Americal Division?

A. (Referring to DA Forms 455 and 546 which he has before him) Yes, sir, I have found some destruction certificates here that indicate there was a destruct on 27 March 1968 which consisted of a total of 11 documents. Ten of these are Weekly Summary Booklets from the Office of the Chief of Staff and the other one consists of a letter, Subject: Report of Visit, from the CO of Division Artillery to the Commanding General which was dated 19 December 1967. These 11 are the only ones I could find.

Q. With reference to the Office of the Chief of Staff, would you indicate which Chief of Staff you mean?

A. The Chief of Staff of the Army, sir.

"STATEMENT OF SFC WILLIAM G. DROSDICK
TAKEN AT CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
ON 12 FEBRUARY 1970, CONTINUED"

Q. Sergeant Drosdick, are these DA Forms 455, Mail and Document Register, and DA Forms 546, Destruction of Classified Records, which we have before us, the only documents available which relate to destruction of classified documents?

A. Yes, sir, they're the only ones we have here in this Headquarters which refer back to the documents in question during the period in 1967 and 1968.

Q. Do you have anything else, Sergeant Drosdick, that might assist us in locating any type of documentation relative to the period in question?


A. No, I don't, sir.

COL WHALEN: Thank you Sergeant Drosdick, that will be all.

(The interrogation closed at 1444 hours, 12 February 1970.)

END

STATEMENT (CONTINUED)



AFFIDAVIT

I, Sergeant First Class William G. Drosdick HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

William G. Drosdick
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Donald C. Williamson
DONALD C. WILLIAMSON
MAJ, GS
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

William L. Harker
WILLIAM L. HARKER
1LT ARTY
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 13th day of February, 19 70 at Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam

[Signature]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)
(HART) [Signature]
CUC INH

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

I have been requested to provide any information I might have to assist Lt. General Peers, USA, in his inquiry into the so-called My Lai Incident of March 1968. I have no recollection of hearing anything from any source concerning that incident at any time during my service in Viet-Nam or subsequently until the story broke in the world press. The following are my answers to specific questions which were sent to me by General Peers in a personal message dated 31 January 1970.

Query: Were you aware of the organization of Task Force Barker, its operation generally North and East of Quang Ngai City?

Answer: I was aware of the organization and operations of Task Force Barker in a general way from the daily operations briefings at 3 MAF headquarters. However, liaison between Task Force Barker and the CORDS chain of command would be directly between the Task Force and the District Advisor or Province Senior Advisor and their respective staffs. I do not know to what extent this occurred while Task Force Barker was in existence.

Query: Did you see or receive or hear of any oral or written reports or rumors concerning possible excessive killing of civilians by Task Force Barker at Sonnyi Village and the surrounding area in which the Task Force operated during the period of about 16-18 March 1968?

Answer: I did not receive or hear of any reports or rumors concerning operations of Task Force Barker.

Query: Did you hear of any VC propaganda broadcasts concerning the above?

Answer: Although I was regularly briefed on VC propaganda, I again cannot recall any mention of My Lai.

EXHIBIT S-9

Query: Did you receive any information, reports of any kind from such individuals as a) General, CG I Corps, or his headquarters; b) General Toan, CG 2d ARVN Division; c) Captain Tan, District Chief, SONTINH District; d) Colonel Khien, Province Chief, Quang Ngai Province?

Answer: I did not receive any information on this subject from Vietnamese officials. It would be unusual for Captain Tan, District Chief, or Colonel Khien, Province Chief, to report to me directly. They would have done so through CORDS advisory staffs. General Toan would not have any direct way of communicating with me. General Lam, whom I saw daily, never mentioned any such incident.

Query: Did any written VC propoganda concerning the incident come to your attention? Was any assessment or report of incident attached or submitted at a later time? What action, if any, was taken on it?

Answer: Although I was regularly briefed on VC propoganda, I again cannot recall any mention of My Lai.

Query: Was any relevant information of any sort, official or otherwise, furnished to you by General Cushman or General Koster or by members of their command or staffs? Did you pass any to them?

Answer: Neither General Cushman nor General Koster nor members of their command or staff furnished information of any sort on this subject.

Query: If you can recall documents, do you know where they may have gone, where they may have been filed, and what was done with them?

Answer: I know of no documents.

Charles T. Cross

Charles T. Cross

February 10, 1970


REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE)
CITY OF SINGAPORE)
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED)
STATES OF AMERICA)

SS:

Subscribed and sworn to before me this eleventh day of
February, 1970.

John Coffey

John Coffey
CONSUL OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA



Tari... n No. 58(a)
No f... rscribed

S T A T E M E N T

On 13 April 1969, I was called on, in my capacity as Chief of Staff, Americal Division, by Colonel Whitaker, Office of the Inspector General, US Army, Vietnam, during which time he explained the background and purpose of his visit. He was seeking information pertaining to an incident alleged to have occurred during March, 1968 in the Batangan area. He was accompanied by the Americal Division Inspector General, LTC Eli P. Howard, who was later killed in action as Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry during the battle of Hiep Duc in late August 1969. I told Colonel Whitaker that the Americal Division would do everything possible to assist him in his investigation and that all of our records were readily available to him for his review. LTC Howard personally accompanied him during his stay. It is my understanding that during Colonel Whitaker's visit the 11th Infantry Brigade was contacted telephonically by Major Thornton S. Saferstein, the Assistant Division IG and requested to review the Brigade files for anything that might relate to the alleged incident. I do not know who received this request at the 11th Brigade, but the Brigade response at the time was that nothing could be found. Major Saferstein, who is now assigned to Office of the Chief of Research and Development, Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, Commonwealth Building, 1320 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia, should be able to provide additional detail on what was requested and the response received. Before departing the Americal Division area, Colonel Whitaker told me that he had enjoyed our full cooperation and had received ready access to all of the records he needed.

Colonel Oran K. Henderson telephoned me from Hawaii on or about 20 May 1969. He informed me that he had been ordered to report to Washington for testimony in connection with an alleged incident involving civilian casualties during the operation of Task Force Barker in the Batangan area in March 1968. He told me that he had made an informal investigation of the incident and that he would appreciate my sending him a copy of this investigation to refresh his memory of the incident and assist him in his testimony in Washington. At this time I do not recall his specifying where this document might be found.

As soon as we had completed this telephone conversation, I telephoned Colonel Jack Treadwell, Commanding Officer, 11th Infantry Brigade. I related to him what Colonel Henderson had told me and requested an immediate review of the 11th Brigade records to find the report of investigation that Colonel Henderson had made. I then instructed LTC Howard and my own office staff to make a thorough check of all records here at the Division Headquarters.

Statement of Brigadier General John W. Donaldson, continued.


On approximately 23 May 1969 I received a telephone call from LTC Godfrey Crowe, Executive Officer, 11th Infantry Brigade, in which he advised me that his staff had been unable to find the above report of investigation in the 11th Brigade files. The efforts of the Division Staff had proved equally unsuccessful. I therefore prepared and sent a backchannel message to Colonel Henderson informing Colonel Henderson: "A thorough search of Division Headquarters files and 11th Infantry Brigade files has failed to produce the informal investigation you requested." The message also included a short paragraph pertaining to the status of Vietnamese decorations that had been awarded to Colonel Henderson during his tour with the Americal Division.

On or about 25 May 1969, two days after my sending of the above backchannel to Colonel Henderson, I received a telephone call from LTC Crowe, Executive Officer, 11th Brigade, in which he stated that a continuing search for the document had located it in the Brigade S-2 safe. As I recall, he stated that it was a single carbon copy, unsigned. I do not now recall communicating with Colonel Henderson or with the 11th Infantry Brigade between the time of my backchannel message to Colonel Henderson and the call from LTC Crowe advising me that the document had been found. On receiving word from LTC Crowe that the document had been found, I instructed LTC Howard to obtain copies of the document from 11th Brigade in order to provide a copy to Colonel Henderson, to the US Army, Vietnam Inspector General, and to the Americal Headquarters file. I then telephoned Colonel Henderson on that same date, informing him that a copy of the document was being mailed to him and that concurrently a copy was being provided to the Inspector General, USARV. The copy mailed to Colonel Henderson was sent without a cover letter. It and the other copies obtained by LTC Howard from the 11th Brigade were "True Copies", not actual file copies. The copy originally found by the 11th Brigade was an actual unsigned file copy, which was later turned over to the investigators. The "True Copies" were authenticated by Major Russell D. Cox, who at the time was 11th Brigade S-2, and in whose safe the document was reportedly found. Major Cox is currently assigned to US Army Training Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and may be able to provide additional information as to the description of the document and its container.


To the best of my knowledge, the individuals who are able to provide the most accurate data on the search for and the finding of the document in question are: LTC Crowe, now assigned to J-1 Directorate, OJCS, Pentagon; Major Saferstein; Major Cox; and MSG Kenneth E. Camell, who reportedly actually found the document in the 11th Brigade S-2 safe. He was a member of 11th Brigade S-2 section at that time. MSG Camell's present assignment is US Army ROTC Instructors Group, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

Statement of Brigadier General John W. Donaldson, continued.

The foregoing information reflects my best recollection of the events, and their sequence of occurrence, concerning the finding of the informal investigation pertaining to Task Force Barker.


JOHN W. DONALDSON
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Division Commander

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of February, 1970 at Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam.


THOMAS H. DAVIS
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGC
Authorized to administer oaths
under Article 136(a)(1),
Uniform Code of Military Justice



[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

26 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM R. PEERS

SUBJECT: Directive for Investigation


Confirming oral instructions given you on 24 November 1969, you are directed to explore the nature and the scope of the original U.S. Army investigation(s) of the alleged My Lai (4) incident which occurred 16 March 1968 in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. Your investigation will include a determination of the adequacy of the investigation(s) or inquiries on this subject, their subsequent reviews and reports within the chain of command, and possible suppression or withholding of information by persons involved in the incident.

Your investigation will be concerned with the time period beginning March 1968 until Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour sent his letter, dated 29 March 1969, to the Secretary of Defense and others. The scope of your investigation does not include, nor will it interfere with, ongoing criminal investigations in progress.

The procedures contained in AR 15-6 are authorized for such use as may be required.

You are authorized to select and use on a full-time basis officer and civilian members of the Army whom you deem necessary for the conduct of the investigation. Your deputy is designated as Mr. Bland West, Assistant General Counsel, Department of the Army. Should you require other assistance, please let us know.

You will inform us at an early date of the expected completion date of your report.


W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff



Stanley R. Resor
Secretary of the Army

EXHIBIT I

~~CONFIDENTIAL FOR ONLY~~

30 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Investigation of the Adequacy of the Preliminary Inquiries
into the My Lai (4) Case

REFERENCE: Memorandum, Sec/Army and CofS, subject: Directive for
Investigation, 26 November 1969

1. This responds to your request in Referral Slip No. 58313, 26 November 1969, for a memorandum outlining the concept of the subject investigation, the organization of the investigative team, and an estimated completion date of the report of investigation.

2. Concept of Investigation.

The above reference assigns me the mission of determining the adequacy of the original inquiries into the My Lai (4) incident of 16 March 1968, the propriety of the command actions based thereon, and whether there was any improper suppression of information by persons in the chain of command or otherwise responsible for reporting the incident to superior authority. I have organized a team of investigative assistants and propose to accomplish the mission by reviewing the facts available to date for background purposes, collecting pertinent official records of the units in Vietnam involved in the assault on My Lai (4), locating and interrogating all witnesses known to have information bearing on the mission, and by preparing a report on the results of such investigation, including appropriate findings and recommendations.

3. Organization.

I will be assisted in the investigation by the following personnel:

Mr. Bland West, OGC (Deputy)
Colonel W. V. Wilson, OTIG
Colonel Robert E. Miller, OTJAG
Major E. F. Zychowski, OPMG
Mr. James S. Stokes IV, OGC
Major Clyde Lynn, Recorder
Four Court Reporters not yet named
Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Breen, Executive
Two or more clerk/stenos

EXHIBIT 2

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Investigation of the Adequacy of the Preliminary Inquiries
into the My Lai (4) Case

Points of contact have been established with OCINFO, OCACSI, TAG
and Headquarters USMC. Others will be arranged as required.


4. Tentative Schedule of Activities.

It is planned that the organization and administration will be
finalized on 1 Dec 69 at which time personnel immediately associated
with the investigation will be sworn in. The interrogation of witnesses
will begin on 2 Dec 69. There being thirty to forty witnesses, the
interrogations will probably go on for at least two weeks. Thereafter,
a visit will be made to Vietnam to review records, reports, files and
other pertinent documents. Upon return to the States additional
testimony will be taken as required and the report drafted and
finalized. The estimated date of completion is 10 Jan 70.

5. It is recommended that:

a. The investigation be given an official title to establish its
separate identity and to facilitate communications.

b. Information as to its title and purpose be disseminated to
appropriate military commands with instructions to provide requisite
assistance.



W. R. PEERS
Lieutenant General, USA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

30 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Functioning of the Board of Investigation

1. Reference: Memorandum, Sec/Army and CofS, subject: Directive for Investigation, 26 November 1969.
2. Procedure. Pursuant to referenced authority, I plan to utilize the procedures outlined in AR 15-6, with appropriate exceptions and modifications to accord with my mission. For example, while I will be responsible for the interrogation of witnesses and the collection of documentary evidence, I propose to have members of the team, at my direction, participate in such interrogations and in the collection of documents.
3. Assistant Investigating Officers. I also plan from time to time to appoint a member or members of the team as an investigating officer with authority to interrogate witnesses and otherwise investigate matters relevant to the mission.
4. Functioning of the Team. I have selected members of the team with broad legal and investigative backgrounds and experience. It is my intention to utilize their individual knowledge and expertise to the fullest. Accordingly, I have requested them to feel free to provide to me at any time any comments, suggestions and/or recommendations which they consider would contribute to the accomplishment of the mission.
5. The above is provided for your information. Unless you have any guidance or suggestions to the contrary I will proceed on this course.



W. R. PEERS
Lieutenant General, USA

EXHIBIT 3

[REDACTED]

1 December 1969


SUBJECT: Appointment of Personnel to Assist in Investigation

TO: PERSONNEL CONCERNED

1. Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Secretary of the Army - Chief of Staff, US Army Memorandum, Subject: Directive for Investigation, dated 26 November 1969, you are hereby appointed to assist me, in the capacities indicated below, in conducting the investigation required by the above-cited memorandum:

Mr. Bland West	Deputy
Mr. James S. Stokes	Investigating Officer
COL Robert E. Miller	Investigating Officer
COL William V. Wilson	Investigating Officer
LTC James H. Breen	Executive Officer
MAJ Edward F. Zychowski	Investigating Officer
MAJ Clyde D. Lynn	Recorder

2. You will perform such tasks as I or my deputy, Mr. Bland West, shall from time to time assign to you.



W. R. PEERS
Lieutenant General, USA

EXHIBIT 4

~~SECRET~~

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS E F T O			
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BOOK	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS						

FROM: DA
TO: AIG 7401 ~~DA~~

UNCLAS E F T O FOUO

OCofSA

SUBJ: Investigation of Reporting of My Lai (4) Incident
General Westmoreland sends.

1. The Secretary of the Army and I have appointed Lieutenant General William R. Peers, to explore the nature and scope of the original U.S. Army investigation(s) of the incident which allegedly occurred on 16 March 1968 at My Lai (4) in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. Mr. Bland West, Office of the Army General Counsel, has been appointed as LTC Peers' Deputy. Selected Department of the Army personnel will assist LTC Peers.
2. LTC Peers' investigation will be referred to as "The Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident" (Short title: "Peers' Inquiry").
3. Request you provide assistance to LTC Peers and members of his team as required.

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DISTR: ADDED DISTR: OCS (PER SGT. CHANNEY, OCS) USOPMA (11-12-68) DCSOPS, DCSPER, TJAG, TPMG, CINPO, TIG, COPO, ACSC-E, TAG, CMH, OSA 998 773
COA, CLL, OCofSA, LTC PEERS' TEAM (LTC BREEN) ~~SECRET~~ 33773
USCONARC-20 USAINTC-20

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE
LTC JAMES H. BREEN, ODSGS(CAR), 50441/x295

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE
GEN W. C. WESTMORELAND, CHIEF OF STAFF

SIGNATURE
W. C. Westmoreland

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
UNCLAS E F T O
~~SECRET~~



[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

CS (Peers Inquiry)

21 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY

SUBJECT: Scope of Investigation

1. Reference, Secretary of the Army/Chief of Staff US Army memorandum, Subject: Directive for Investigation, dated 26 Nov 69 (Tab A).

2. The above-referenced directive appoints the undersigned as the investigating officer to explore the nature and scope of the original US Army investigation(s) of the alleged My Lai (4) incident which occurred 16 March 1968 in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. Our recent visit to South Vietnam as well as the testimony taken to date indicate:

a. The name My Lai (4) as indicated on some US maps is a misnomer in the sense that it is not commonly used by the Vietnamese. That part so designated as My Lai (4) is referred to as Thuan Yen Sub-hamlet of Tu Cung Hamlet.

b. Activities which took place in Tu Cung Hamlet on 16 March 1968 involved at least parts of three other sub-hamlets, namely Binh Tay, Binh Dong and Trung Hoa.


c. There is evidence to show that other atrocities and/or violations of military regulations were committed in the other three hamlets of Son My Village, namely; Co Luy, My Lai and My Khe.

3. A chart showing the Vietnamese names for the hamlets and sub-hamlets in Son My Village as compared to those shown on US maps is attached at Tab B. A graphic portrayal of this information is at Tab C.

4. In light of the above, it is recommended that the geographic scope of the final report be extended to include the entire Son My Village. This would be more realistic in terms of the area and activities involved and would permit better

EXHIBIT 6

[REDACTED]


CS (Peers Inquiry)
SUBJECT: Scope of Investigation

21 January 1970

definition within the report of the actions which took place
in some of the sub-hamlets.

5. Recommend the memorandum at Tab D be approved and signed.



4 Incl
as

W. R. PEERS
Lieutenant General, USA



[REDACTED]
FOR [REDACTED]
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
[REDACTED]

TAB A

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM R. PEERS

SUBJECT: Addendum to Directive for Investigation


As recommended in your memorandum, 21 January 1970, subject: Scope of Investigation, the geographic scope of your inquiry and final report is extended to include the entire Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. This constitutes an addendum to our Directive for Investigation, dated 26 November 1969.

W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Stanley R. Resor
Secretary of the Army


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VILLAGE, HAMLET AND SUB-HAMLET ORGANIZATION



TAB B

SON MY VILLAGE



TAB C



[REDACTED] Y
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

2 FEB 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG WILLIAM R. PEERS

SUBJECT: Son My Investigation

The recommendation contained in your memorandum of 21 January 1970, to the effect that your inquiry in final report should cover all of Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam, is approved. The exploration of matters within Son My Village is considered to be within the scope of your original directive for investigation, dated 26 November 1969.

W. C. Westmoreland

W. C. Westmoreland
General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

Stanley R. Resor

Stanley R. Resor
Secretary of the Army

EXHIBIT 7