

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

OPNAV 16-223
Form ACA-1
Sheet 1 of 5

I. GENERAL

SECRET

(a) Unit Reporting VF-49 (b) Based on or at USS SAN JACINTO (c) Report No. ACA-1-64
 (d) Take off: Date 13 August 1945 Time (LZT) 0603(1) (Zone); Lat. 35°23'N Long. 142°42'E
 (e) Mission Strike - TOKYO (Shibaura Electric Co. No. 1) (f) Time of Return 1015(1) (Zone)

II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
<u>F6F-5</u>	<u>VF-49</u>	<u>16</u>		<u>16</u>	<u>12 planes carried 1-1000# G.I. bomb. 3 planes carried 6-5" HVAR rockets. 1 photo plane, ammo only.</u>	<u>Mk.140A-1.025 delay nose. Mk.102A-2.025 delay tail. Mk.149 Inst. nose & Mk.159 base fuze .015</u>

III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
<u>TBM-3</u>	<u>VT-49</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>USS SAN JACINTO</u>	<u>F6F-5; TBM-3; SB2C; 16, 15, 15</u>			<u>USS HANCOCK</u>
<u>F6F-5 & TBM-3</u>		<u>16 & 9</u>	<u>USS BELLEAU WOOD</u>	<u>F6F-5; TBM-3; SB2C; 16, 15, 15</u>			<u>USS LEXINGTON</u>
<u>F6F-5; TBM-3; SB2C; 16, 15, 15</u>			<u>USS BENNINGTON</u>				

IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
<u>None</u>			<u>(ZONE)</u>			
			<u>(ZONE)</u>			
			<u>(ZONE)</u>			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) X
 Did Any Part of
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? X If so, Describe Clouds _____ (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
 (YES OR NO)
 Time of Day and Brilliance
 (j) of Sun or Moon _____ (NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (k) Visibility X (MILES)

V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:			GUNS USED	(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER			
<u>NONE</u>						

Enclosure (KK)

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VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	(c) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	(d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
F6F-5	VP-49	Loss of fuel pressure	Operational	Plane ditched within Task Group screen.

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
	NONE			

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	(c) MILES RETURN	(d) AV. HOURS IN AIR	(e) AV. FUEL LOADED	(f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				(h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING
						.30	.50	20MM	MM	
F6F-5	145	145	4hrs 12 min	400	325	100 (average per plane)				16

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB,
at various altitudes

URNS
DIVES
CEILINGS
RANGE
PROTECTION
ARMAMENT

No airborne enemy aircraft were observed.

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) Target(s) and Location JAPAN INTERNATIONAL A/C Co. Hiratsuka (b) Time Over Target(s) 0830(I) (Zone)
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)

(c) Clouds Over Target 1500 broken cumulus 5/10
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Partially obscured by haze (e) Visibility Surface 3 miles
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide bombing Bomb Sight Used Mk. 8 Illuminated sight
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)

Bombs Dropped per Run 1 Spacing X Altitude of Bomb Release 3500 - 5000
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed 0 Probably Destroyed 0 Damaged 0

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
Submarine 1000 yards N., NE tip Yokosuka	250 ft. in length	1 VF-49	1 - 1000# G.P.	X	Bomb hit within 75 ft. Not possible to assess due to low visibility, but probably caused severe damage to hull.
2					
3					
Japan International Aircraft Co. Hiratsuka, Southeastern bldg. area.		11 VF-49	11 - 1000# G.P.	3	Target was barely vis- ible but 3 good hits were seen on aiming point. Large explosion and fires seen.
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

(p) Were Photographs Taken? Yes. Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

Lt. Comdr. G.M. Reusee led a group of sixteen Hellcats and nine Avengers from the USS SAN JACINTO at 0603(I), 13 August 1945, on a strike mission which had as its primary target the Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company Number One at Kawasaki. The original plan had been to approach from the west, but when the enemy coast was reached south of the Tokyo plain, it was found that the entire area was obscured by overcast and haze, and the mission was forced to orbit north of Tokyo while they waited for a break in the weather. Occasional rifts in the overcast permitted some view of the ground and it was thought that the clouds might "burn off" enough to afford an opportunity for the strike to attack the main target. After a long period of waiting the Target Coordinator was finally forced to direct all flights to take secondary targets if they could be seen, and if not to take targets of opportunity. The VF-49 fighter group had in the meantime become separated from their Torpedo bombers and when they could not get in at the Tokyo Electric plant assigned, went south to the coast near Hiratsuka where the visibility was thought to be better. The secondary target at this point was the Japanese International Aircraft plant, an important element in the Japanese aircraft potential which had suffered little damage in the big bomber raids. There was fair vision through a hole in the overcast directly above the target. However, the haze, surrounding baked clouds made it inoperative that an attack be made before the area was again covered. The southeastern portion of the plant was selected as the aiming point as it contained a large part of the vital units of the factory and all bombs were dropped in that area. Only three bombs were actually seen to hit the installations in that section of the target, but all other bombs and rockets were directed on the same aiming point and it is believed that they struck in the building area assigned. One bomb hit in the northernmost buildings in that section, and the other two hits were in the southeastern part of the factory. Six rockets were seen to hit in the center of the area. Three large explosions and intense fires were seen as the group retired, and while low visibility prevented accurate assessment, the damage caused must have been of major importance. Lt. Fols was unable to get lined up on the indistinctly seen target and so retained his bomb. When he recovered after his run he had gotten separated from the main group. By the time he was again in position for another run, the target was again completely covered and he headed westward in a search for some unobscured objective upon which it would be worthwhile to drop a half ton bomb. When over Yokosuka he saw a submarine in Tokyo Bay about 1,000 yards north of the northeastern tip of the Naval base. He immediately made a bombing run on this ship, and his bomb was seen to explode within seventy-five feet of its side. Meagre visibility again prevented assessment of damage caused by the proximity of the hit insured that major if not lethal damage was inflicted on the sub. The oxygen equipment in the plane piloted by Lt. Comdr H.J. Trun, III would not function properly and he, directed by the flight leader, remained with the VT group. When they became separated from the fighters he acted as top cover for them in their search for a target. A portion of these bombers hit the Naval Air Technical Arsenal north of Yokosuka, and Lt. Comdr. Trun joined in their run. All his rockets were fired at the largest building in the installation, but the damage caused could not be assessed. No Anti-aircraft fire was seen over any of the assigned target areas. The fighter group was not directly fired upon although when they passed the Chiba peninsula they saw some bursts being fired at another group which was flying a mile or two to their north. Lt. Fols was fired on by meagre inaccurate heavy A/A at Yokosuka. The Torpedo group, which included the one fighter, was fired on by heavies on their course to Tokyo Bay from the west and on departure, but the firing while moderate in intensity was inaccurate.

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Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

- Guns, Gunsights
- Turrets
- Ammunition
- Bombs, Torpedoes
- Bomb Sights
- Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

- Radio, Radar
- Homing Devices
- Visual Signals
- Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

- IFF
- Signals
- Battle Lights
- Procedures

PROTECTION

- Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
- Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

- Parachutes
- Life Belts, Life Rafts
- Safety Belts
- Emergency Kits
- Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

- Compasses
- Driftsights
- Octants
- Automatic Pilots
- Charts
- Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

- Flight
- Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

**CAMOUFLAGE AND
DECEPTION DEVICES**

STRUCTURE

- Airframe
- Control Surfaces
- Control System
- Dive Flaps
- Landing Gear
- Heating System
- Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

- Engines
- Engine Accessories
- Propellers
- Lubricating System
- Starters
- Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

- Auxiliary Plant
- Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

- Plane Servicing Equipment
- Personnel Facilities

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One plane lost fuel pressure and had to ditch at the screen. This loss was operational, however, and not through battle damage. No airborne enemy aircraft were seen. Return to base was made without incident.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

DATE

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FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

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- Personnel Facilities

**One plane lost fuel pressure and had to be ditched.
All other equipment performed normally.**

REPORT PREPARED BY:

P. A. SMYTHE, Lieut., USNR

SIGNATURE **A. C. I. Officer**

RANK AND DUTY

APPROVED BY:

G. H. ROUZEE, Lieut. Comdr., USN

SIGNATURE **Commanding Officer, VF-49**

RANK AND DUTY

13 August 1945

DATE