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Remarks on the policy of  
recognizing the independ-  
ence of the Southern  
States of North America.

By Nemo.

London, 1863.



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## REMARKS

ON THE

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POLICY OF RECOGNIZING THE INDEPENDENCE  
OF THE SOUTHERN STATES OF  
NORTH AMERICA,

AND ON THE

STRUGGLE IN THAT CONTINENT.

BY

N E M O.



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## REMARKS, &c.

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I AM neither statesman nor lawyer, but amid the multiplicity of despatches, pamphlets, and speeches regarding the war now raging in the United States, the words of an ordinary, and an unprejudiced person, who has seen a good deal of the world, may have some weight with others, who like myself, feel a deep interest in that terrible struggle. And who does not?

I have been to America, and have listened to the "tall talk" of New York about "squashing" the South in ninety days, and to the very questionable philanthropy of New England in its protestations against slavery. But no one could tell me *how* their dicta were to be carried into practice.

I have also read the letters of "*Historicus*" which appeared in the "Times;" and though I may not reason so fluently as he has done, it strikes me that even these letters are to a great extent substantially as hollow as the "tall talk" of New York and the pseudo-philanthropy of New England.

He hunts for precedents, yet can find none which suit his purpose. But what did our forefathers do when they had no precedent? Why, they made one. What should we do if our existence depended on the termination of this war? We should do as our forefathers did! Why should *Historicus* seek for a precedent for the recognition of the South, if we think it wise and well to admit that country into the family of nations?

It seems to me that the principles governing this question are very simple, though nations may hesitate or doubt about their application.

In that public law, to which all nations profess obedience, the principle would seem to be that when a new power comes into existence, and presents itself as a distinct, well organized, and independent community, it has a strong claim to be ad-

mitted into the society of nations. It may have separated itself from another power; but if it has maintained its separate existence for a reasonable length of time, despite the utmost efforts of that power to compel it to return to its allegiance, and has shown that it is animated by a strong spirit of independence, and that it has ability and will to resist all efforts to attempt its subjugation, I say that under such circumstances it is the duty of other powers to recognize or acknowledge the new power, and to extend to it all the rights and immunities due to a sovereign state. Nay, it strikes me that if nations act otherwise, they neglect a great and solemn duty, and may countenance, as in this case, the continuation of a war fraught with misery to the human race. If the conditions I have named really exist it is incumbent on other powers to recognize the community which has complied with them; and if the recognition is withheld the refusal is against the principles of public law and of sound policy.

On the question of the recognition of the Confederate States of America, *Historicus*, as I have said, resorts to "precedents." He labours to show that, as the case of these states now stands, there is no precedent for their recognition. Indeed, he insists that all the precedents are against it. But what is a precedent? It is only an agreement by certain powers in regard to the conduct they thought proper to pursue in a certain case which is supposed to have some analogy to the case under consideration. But no two cases can ever be exactly parallel. For the most part they differ very widely, and at the best merely afford what may be called indications or suggestions of the course proper to be followed. History does not inform us of any civil war in which a people, owing *no* allegiance except to their respective states, withdrew from a confederation formed only for the convenience of each state; and brought such vast and well organized armies into the field to defend their undoubted rights, and the unquestionable position they had taken as the Confederate States. *Historicus* overlooks altogether these stern and important facts. He seeks for a precedent amongst nations sworn to allegiance to a sovereign power, and rent asunder by a section of the people.

In such cases as these, which are apart from the question at issue, he endeavours to show that when a state or nation, claims a separate existence as a sovereign power by separation or by excision from some other state or nation, the rule from precedent requires that the war which may have followed such excision must come to an end before the independence of the excised state could be said to be attained. But if this be true, even on the grounds on which he has based his arguments, it would follow that the recognition of independence of the new state would depend wholly on the will of the nation suffering the excision, however hopeless the war for reunion may have become in the eyes of all powers, including even the recusant belligerent. If Europe is to wait till the North recognizes the independence of the South, a generation, yet unborn, may have arisen to fill the places of those who now rule the destinies of nations before this event takes place. Nearly half a century elapsed before Spain recognized the independence of Holland.

Yet Historicus admits, in contradiction to his own rule, that in the case put, the question of the independence of the new power does *not* depend upon the will of the parent state.

In the struggle, however, with precedents, Historicus is confronted with the recent cases of Greece and Belgium, which he somewhat evades; and his labour would seem to be, rather by ingenuity and sophistry to maintain the cause of a client, than as a statesman to deal with facts as they present themselves, conceding to these facts their proper weight and influence. He makes no mention of the part this country took when Holland and the Low Countries seceded from Spain, and to the manifest benefit resulting to Europe and to the cause of civil and religious liberty from their independence. In this case we did more than recognize the rebellious provinces. We gave Holland, not merely moral, but physical support, for we supplied the "rebels" with stores and munitions of war of every kind, and sent an army of English soldiers to maintain the independence of the revolted states.

When Belgium separated from Holland, in exactly the same way as the Southern have separated from the Northern States,

but for less valid reasons, it was said to be a rebellion, and war ensued—and what steps, may I ask, did this country take? Why, though our interests were affected to a very small extent, though the Belgian rebels had sworn allegiance to the crown of Holland, and while the armies of both parties were in the field, we recognized the independence of Belgium.

Again, in the case of Greece, while the war was pending, waged by the Sultan to reduce the rebellious Greeks to submission, and restore the integrity of the Ottoman empire, on which we affect to set a high value, we did not hesitate to recognize the independence of Greece, and interfered effectively in its establishment.

These are modern precedents. In both, the conditions required by *Historicus*, that the war should have come to an end before independence could be recognized, was not only *not* fulfilled, but recognition was extended whilst the struggle between the contending parties was doubtful, and the war raged in all its fury.

In dealing with these precedents, *Historicus* does not attempt to meet them with the arguments of a statesman, which I presume he is. He affects to ignore them, and sneers at an Honourable Member, who had referred to them, charging him with ignorance in mistaking a case of "intervention" for a case of "recognition." But this is very like pettifogging; *Historicus* cannot but know that an open intervention is in most, if not in all, cases combined with and supposes a recognition. To recognize a country is merely to acknowledge her as independent, as one with whom we may contract treaties and engagements. But when we intervene in favour of a country which has revolted, we not only signify our approval of her proceedings, but we undertake to support her in the career on which she has entered, and to assist her in establishing her independence. Hence it is that intervention is recognition, and much more: it is an acknowledgment of independence combined with an offer or a gift of the means to make it effectual. It is trifling with a great subject to contend that because we intervened in the case of Greece and Belgium



there is no precedent for our recognition of the Southern States.

Belgium was a constituent part of Holland, or rather of the kingdom of the Netherlands. The Belgians differed essentially from the Dutch, not merely in their religion, but what is much more important, in their national affinities. After a considerable period of discontent they revolted. They did not, like the Confederates, withdraw from an association of free states, which they were entitled to renounce, but they *revolted* against the sovereign power, and declared their independence. They assumed a name, and, in a few days, organized a Government, and elected a sovereign; and at the very outset of the war which Holland immediately waged to reduce the rebellious province, England treated the act of separation as a thing consummated, and acknowledged the independence of the new kingdom.

Historicus has more ability than fairness. Why should we not treat the people of the Southern states as we treated those of Belgium and Greece? And willingly admit that they are, what they have proved themselves to be, one of the family of "created" nations, and receive at our court the minister they send to represent them.

Historicus labours to show that there can be no recognition until it is ascertained what are the boundaries of the country to be recognized. The fact that the enemy is in possession of a small portion of the sea coast in some of the Atlantic and Gulf states, by means of their maritime ascendancy, and that their invading armies are planted for a time (often a very short time), in other portions of the interior states, are assumed by Historicus as proofs that the boundaries of the new republic are still unascertained, and therefore he insists, that until ascertained, there can be no recognition. But the question in regard to boundaries has in truth nothing to do with the question of independence. They may be arranged between the contending parties or settled by a congress. Did we wait before we intervened in favour of Greece till she had settled her limits with Turkey? If we chose we might recognize at once the independence of Poland, leaving for

future consideration the question whether Posen and Lithuania should be included in her limits. The Confederate States know their own boundaries, and we have the most convincing proofs that they will and can maintain them. Whilst they were constituent parts of the United States the boundaries of each state were known and undisputed, and the new confederacy is bound to guarantee those boundaries to the respective states which have seceded.

It may be that, in the fortunes of a war of invasion, portions of the invaded territory may from time to time be occupied by the invading army, such occupation changing as the invaders advance or recede ; but who, before the lucubrations of *Historicus*, ever imagined that the boundaries of invaded states fluctuated with the fluctuations of war. The dictates of common sense tell that no power has a right to cavil about boundaries, except the conterminous states. It is a question which no way concerns remote nations, and I am at a loss to understand why *Historicus* has raised it when considering the main and all-important question of recognition.

The new power claiming the right to recognition is the "Confederated States of America." It consists at present of thirteen states, long known as such, whilst constituents of the "United States." It may be, at some future day, that additional states may be admitted, or it may, by possibility, happen that by treaty hereafter the frontier boundary of some of the frontier states may be altered ; but none of these events affect the existing body politic.

To the arguments of *Historicus* I have devoted greater space than I would otherwise have done, had I not, from the conspicuous position which his letters occupied in the columns of the "Times," felt that they had exercised greater influence over the public mind in this country than his facts or his reasonings entitled them to receive.

I have seen no other letters or pamphlets on the same side of the question worthy of notice, nor have I read any of the speeches derogatory of the South and its claims to be admitted into the family of nations, which call for any special com-

mentary. But two men have spoken on that side, distinguished amongst their fellows,—Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden,—men who in their day and generation have done a good deal to commend themselves to the notice of the public. Mr. Bright, however, by his zeal on the one hand for republican institutions, and on the other, his abhorrence of slavery, is led away from the great question at issue, and tells us, despite all we have seen, that in time all monarchical governments must become republican, and that the institution of slavery, is alone the cause of this disruption. On these matters I will not argue with Mr. Bright, I would rather refer him to one of his own class, one of the people, who has visited the states, and who, notwithstanding the ties of friendship and of interest which bound him to the North, pronounced at the first outburst of the war his conviction of the folly and wickedness of a struggle to maintain the integrity of a union from which 12,000,000 of people had solemnly resolved to secede. If he will turn to the speech of Mr. Lindsay, delivered in the House of Commons last session of Parliament, he will find the true causes of secession clearly and concisely set forth. I give that speech at length in the Appendix, as reported in many of the journals of the United and Confederate States immediately after it was delivered, and which the author has been good enough, at my request, to revise. Far more able and eloquent speeches have been delivered in the Commons, more particularly by Mr. Horsman and Mr. Gregory, but as no other speech gives in so condensed a form the great facts connected with this unhappy struggle, and as no public writer or speaker had so clearly foretold what would be the consequences of this suicidal war, I commend it to the study of Mr. Bright. Let him ponder over it before he again addresses Mr. Adams in the name of the “working men” of England, nine-tenths of whom, I believe, would agree with Mr. Lindsay rather than with Mr. Bright, in regard to the real objects of the war; and nine-tenths of whom, I also believe, would hold up their hands to-morrow in favour of the recognition of the South. They must see, and they do see, that the institution of slavery had

very little to do with this fratricidal war, which Mr. Bright, the advocate of peace, and the abhorrer of bloodshed, with singular consistency, implores the people of England to encourage till it sweeps from the face of the earth every white person, male and female, old and young, who inhabits the Southern States, or who owns slaves by purchase or inheritance. But I turn from the speeches of Mr. Bright, which really, on this American question, are unworthy of notice, except as showing the mild evangelism of this chosen advocate of republicanism and freedom, to the more calm and logical reasoning of his colleague, Mr. Cobden. I agree with Mr. Cobden in most of his general principles, and had he been correct in his facts and accurate in his deductions there would have been some force in the speech he recently (April 1863) delivered in the House of Commons.

Mr. Cobden's theory in that speech appears to me to be that the United States had set the example of a prohibitive "foreign enlistment" policy so early as 1794, from a tender regard of its duties toward foreign powers, duties which, he said, they always scrupulously regarded, and which they continued to enforce by the subsequent law of 1818. This theory is very pretty, and the principles he has laid down are very much to be commended; but, unfortunately, it has little foundation in fact, as the history of the first enactment too clearly proves.

The facts are as follows, and any person may easily satisfy himself in regard to them by reference to the history of the United States.

During the war of the revolution of 1776, the struggling colonies formed a treaty with France, by an article of which they guaranteed to France her West India colonies. After peace was concluded with England in 1783, and during the war between that country and France, begun in 1793, the latter, presuming upon the grateful feeling of the American people, and upon their animosities towards England, threw herself back upon the treaty of guarantee, claiming under it the active aid of the United States in her war with England.

With that object and for that end Monsieur Genêt was sent



by France to America in the twofold character of minister and incendiary emissary, with orders to land in one of the southern states remote from the seat of the Federal Government then at Philadelphia, and with instructions from his Government that on his way to the capital, he was, at all available points on the route to make known his mission to the people, and invoke their aid in behalf of France.

In the winter of 1793 Monsieur Genêt landed at Charleston in South Carolina, and at once informed the *people* of the United States by proclamation that he had full power from his Government to issue military commissions for the purpose of enrolling troops for the French service, and that he was authorized by *his* Government to issue letters of marque to cruise against British commerce. From Charleston to Philadelphia, his journey was a slow triumphal parade, halting at important points in the intermediate states, and disseminating his proclamation wherever he went, inviting popular meetings, and adopting any measure which he thought was calculated to arouse the popular feeling in favour of their late ally France, and against their "ancient enemy" England.

General Washington was then President, and Mr. Jefferson was his Secretary of State, but, like many other great men, though one in patriotism, they had their differences. Now it so happened that, at even that early period of the life of the infant republic, divisions of party had not merely arisen, but had assumed some consistency, and the two conflicting sections were then designated as *Federalists* and *Republicans*. General Washington, it was supposed, favoured the policy of the former, whilst Mr. Jefferson was understood to be the leader of the latter; and some acrimony was beginning to arise, on the popular supposition that the Federal party leaned towards England, whilst the Republicans sympathised with France in the war then raging between those powers.

Every writer on this question admits that at that time there was certainly a strong pro-Gallic and anti-English feeling with a considerable portion of the people, and it was upon these divisions that the French minister undoubtedly relied

to drag the infant republic, on the side of France, into a war against England.

But, though differing, on comparatively minor points, both General Washington and his Secretary of State, without hesitation, met Monsieur Genêt by a decided and firm remonstrance. He, however, disregarded alike the remonstrances of the President and his ministers. He insisted in his correspondence that he had a *right* to issue French commissions, and to arm and equip both vessels of war and privateers for the service of France in the ports of the United States. On the question thus raised, there could be no difference of opinion between American statesmen of either party, and consequently, to put a stop to these offensive and insulting proceedings, the Government issued a "Proclamation of Neutrality," setting forth what were the duties of good citizens in abstaining from any acts which would tend to involve the country in war, and warning the people of the United States against the consequences; but, in defiance of this proclamation, Monsieur Genêt persevered in his purpose, and took issue with the Government of the United States on the points of neutrality which the proclamation raised. It was during this state of things, that Congress in 1794 passed the first Act embodying a somewhat new branch of policy in regard to foreign nations. It was entitled "An Act in addition to the Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States." It prohibited enlistment for foreign service, and it made it penal to fit out and arm ships with intent that they should be employed in foreign service, to cruise or commit hostilities against those with whom the United States were at peace, or within the jurisdiction of the United States to deliver a commission for any such ship. It further made it penal to increase or augment, within the jurisdiction of the United States, the force of any ship of war or other armed vessel in the service of any foreign state then at war with another with which the United States were at peace.

But Monsieur Genêt paid no respect even to this Act of the Legislature. He actually appealed to the *people* of the United

States *against* the foreign policy of their own Government, on which General Washington very properly dismissed him and sent him home. Now Mr. Cobden endeavoured, by his speech, to lead the House of Commons and the people of England to believe that this Act was passed out of pure friendship for us, whilst history clearly shows that friendship for England had nothing whatever to do with it, and that Congress passed it solely to stop the revolutionary mission of this French minister, and to save the United States from another war with Great Britain.

The Act of 1818, to which Mr. Cobden also refers, repeals the Act of 1794, substituting for it various provisions, not varying the intent or policy of its predecessor, but more distinctly defining the offences embraced within it. And this latter Act was intended more particularly to prevent the United States becoming entangled in the various revolutions and wars then prevailing on the continent of South America. In neither of these Acts is there to be found any curtailment, far less prohibition of trade or commerce, in any article whatsoever. Both Acts were intended to prevent the citizens of the United States, by any act at home, from taking part in any foreign war.

Mr. Cobden knows full well, that, by the plainest principles of international law, when war exists the belligerents have a right to require that other nations shall remain neutral, and that if they do not, they make themselves parties to the war and are to be treated as enemies. To be made a party to the war, however, the act complained of must necessarily be of a hostile character whilst it is performed or is in course of performance, within the neutral territory. To show this the *intent* is everything, and this will be found the key to the rightful construction of the American statutes.

Common sense tells us, without any reference to international law, that every citizen must be held as innocent, unless by his act whilst within the jurisdiction of his country, he either directly or by implication takes part in a war against a power with which his country is at peace. Belligerents have a right to demand that citizens or subjects of a neutral

power shall be so restrained, and if they are not it may be treated as *casus belli*. Hence these foreign enlistment laws in their structure, in their interpretation and to what extent they shall be enforced, are purely domestic questions, with which foreign powers have no right to interfere, as the country which makes them determines all these questions for itself and on its own responsibility.

But the difference between the fitting out of a ship of war, to which Mr. Cobden refers at some length, and the supply of munitions of war to the country engaged in hostilities against the nation with which we are at peace, is indeed a very nice distinction. If it be penal to build and equip a vessel of war for the Southern Confederacy, it ought to be equally penal to supply the Government of that country with "munitions of war;" for what is a ship thus fitted and equipped if she is not a munition of war? It is difficult for ordinary people to comprehend distinctions such as these, nor will it be an easy matter to get an English jury to convict an English ship-builder for constructing a ship of war for the Confederates, whom we have acknowledged as belligerents, whilst any one may supply any number of ships of war to the Federals.

So that, whilst "there is no law in this country which prohibits the purchase, sale, manufacture, or export of arms or munitions of war," Mr. Cobden need hardly have expressed "great surprise" at the people of England confounding that license "with the vital question of furnishing and equipping ships of war."

Notwithstanding my high respect for Mr. Cobden, I am astonished that he, of all men, could express sympathy for a people whose clergymen from the platform and from the pulpit, and in the name of religion express a hope that the war may go on until the white race be exterminated in the South, and who pray that the feeling of scorn and hatred which they bear to the North may be "whipped out by shot and shell." I am indeed surprised that he should advocate the cause of a Government which tolerates in high places such men as General Butler, which inundates millions of acres of fertile plains, and despatches stone fleets to destroy for ever those harbours which



God had given for the convenience of commerce, the safety of life, and the general use of mankind. Mr. Cobden must know that the attempt to destroy, *for ever*, the harbour of Charleston was an outrage against humanity and an insult to Providence.

And yet I have heard the partizans of the North say that acts such as these are the "contingencies of war," and that this wicked and diabolical war "is no business of ours." But it has become our business. Our ships are stopped in their legitimate voyages. Premiums of insurance on such voyages have advanced from two guineas to ten guineas per cent. through the interference of American cruisers, and hundreds of thousands of our people are starving in our manufacturing districts. And for what? For not venturing to do that which we are called upon to do by the highest interests of humanity, and which we have repeatedly done on less urgent occasions.

The day is fast approaching when the nations of Europe must interfere to arrest the enormities which are perpetrated in a struggle which can have no end but that of separation. Humanity demands that they should remonstrate, and if remonstrance proves in vain, let them receive into their family, and if necessary assist, a people who have proved themselves worthy to be a nation. The moral effect of that reception would, I am convinced, produce peace; and I know that a large section of the people of the Northern States who are now weary of this vain and wicked war, and who can see no end to it unless the powers of Europe recognize the South, would hail with delight this great act of mercy and of justice.

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## APPENDIX.

SPEECH of W. S. LINDSAY, Esq., in the House of Commons,  
on the 18th July 1862.

SIR,

I DESIRE, before you leave the chair, to bring under the notice of the House, and submit for its consideration, the following resolution:—

“That in the opinion of this House the States which have  
“seceded from the union of the Republic of the United States  
“have so long maintained themselves under a separate and  
“established Government, and have given such proof of  
“their determination and ability to support their indepen-  
“dence, that the propriety of offering mediation, with a view  
“of terminating hostilities between the contending parties,  
“is worthy of the serious attention of Her Majesty’s Govern-  
“ment.”

This subject, Sir, is one of no ordinary importance. We are about to part for the session, and, considering the great distress which prevails, I think the people will expect that its representatives should express an opinion on a subject in which they are deeply interested before we separate. The means of communication are so rapid, and the course of commerce is now such that nations have become almost as one family, and no person can seriously pretend to say that the people of this country have no right to offer an opinion in regard to the course of events on the other side of the Atlantic. In offering that opinion, I will endeavour to avoid any remarks which may give pain to the people of the Northern States of America; but, at the same time, as the great principle which has hitherto guided their conduct has been perfect freedom of speech, I presume they cannot consistently refuse to concede to us the right which they themselves have so long exercised. Considering, however, the object which I have in view, it is not necessary for me to say anything (though it is not easily avoided) which can create irritation, or rouse the already too excited passions of those with whom we have long held commercial and friendly intercourse.

I will, therefore, whatever my opinion in regard to such acts as the sinking of the stone fleet at the entrance to

Charleston Harbour, or the recent proclamation of General Butler at New Orleans, refrain from expressing my thoughts, and I will confine myself,—

1st. To a condensed review of the war.

2ndly. To what I conceive to be the causes of that war.

3rdly. To the question of how we are affected by the war.

4thly. To the reason why I am of opinion that the only termination to that war must be the separation of the Northern from the Southern States.

And, lastly. To the opinion which I hold that humanity and the interests of the people of Europe, and more especially our own interests,—and might I add, the interests of the people of the United States,—requires and demands that the war should *cease*.

In taking a condensed view of the war itself, it may not be out of place if I bring to the recollection of the House the extent of the country where the war is now raging, and its commercial intercourse with other countries.

In the United States there were 34 distinct states, each independent and sovereign, each with a governor and legislature, and these states were formed into a Federal Union for objects solely for what was considered to be the general public good, or, more properly, for the convenience of the whole. I will leave others to argue whether this compact is one which any given number of states have a right to dissolve, or from which any of the states were justified in withdrawing when their interests were prejudiced by it. I may, however, be allowed to remark, that I have read the constitution of the United States, and I can find nothing in it which binds any one of those states to remain for any specific period, much less for ever, by the Union; and I certainly cannot find any clause in it which gives power to the Federal Government to coerce any state, which, by the votes of its legislature, desires to withdraw from the compact. Indeed, the great men who framed that constitution could not have had any such intentions, for as the compact was formed merely for the convenience of the respective states in their intercourse with other countries, for affording facilities to their postal arrangements by sea and land, and for the collection of a revenue sufficient to maintain the army and navy, and cover the current expenses of the Federal Government, it appears to me absurd to suppose that the founders of the constitution meant that the majority of the states were to be vested with the power to coerce the minority to continue parties to a compact which was framed solely for the convenience of all, when it did not suit any one

of the states to remain. No such powers appear to have been given to the majority by the constitution.

Neither the President, nor the Cabinet, nor Congress, have any sovereign rights, like the Queen of England, or the Emperor of the French; and it seems to me to be a monstrous abuse of power for any officer in the Federal army to proclaim martial law in a sovereign state over a people who owe *no* allegiance, except to the governor of the state to which they belong; and I think history does not record an act so unjust as the act of Congress voting the money which the people paid for specific purposes, for the purpose of forcing, by bloodshed and rapine, the persons who have paid that money, back to a compact in which they find it contrary to their interests to remain. But other honourable members can deal with this question better than I can pretend to do.

The territory of the 34 states is about 1,880,000 square miles, and the population of these states was 32,000,000 at the census of 1860. It is divided thus: the 21 states which remain by the Union comprise a territory of 1,011,000 square miles, and a population of about 20,000,000. The 13 states which have withdrawn from the Union, or the compact, have a territory of 870,610 square miles, and a population of 11,609,117, of which 3,912,573 are slaves. Some of the states, and more especially a few of the Northern and North-western states, are very thinly peopled. For instance, Kansas, with an area of 114,978 square miles, has a population of not more than 143,000 persons; and Oregon, with 185,000 square miles, has a population of only 52,000, or not one person to every three square miles. Besides the United States proper, or the states within the Union, there are the territories of the United States, viz., Utah, New Mexico, Washington, and Nebraska, covering an area of no less than 900,000 square miles, but with a population of very little more than 300,000.

The commerce of the United States with other countries has hitherto been very large. The value of the exports in 1860 amounted to somewhere about 350,000,000 dollars (of which two-thirds were the produce of the South), and its shipping exceeded 5,000,000 tons, or nearly as much as the shipping of Great Britain and all our colonies and possessions; a very large portion of that shipping was and is still employed in our trade, and by far the largest proportion of the exports, especially the cotton and corn, was bought by the people of this country, in payment for which we exchanged our minerals and our manufactures; so that our commercial relations with the United States, both in the direct and indirect trades, have



been very extensive. Indeed, a very large portion of the cotton of the Southern States was grown for the use of the people of this country.

The vast country I have thus so briefly described was in the early part of last year thrown into all the horrors of a civil and fratricidal war. The war seemed to us to be the impulse of a moment, but it was not so, as I will hereafter endeavour to explain ; the first blow, I admit, was struck by the South, by the capture of Fort Sumpter in April 1861, but the House should understand that *self-preservation prompted that blow*. Differences of opinion on very many questions had long existed between the people of the Northern and Southern States, and the discussions between the representatives of the respective people in Congress had for years been of a character which led every reflective mind to feel that the separation of the Union, or rather the dissolution of the compact, was a mere question of time. The extension of the slave states, the violent language of some few of the representatives from the North against the institution of slavery, the bitter declamation against the owners of slaves, and the personal animosity which existed between those who argued that slavery ought at once to be abolished, those who held the opinion that it could only be done by degrees, and those who argued that without slave labour the rich plains of the South would become a desert, all undoubtedly tended to widen the breach between the Northern and the Southern States. But as the great majority of the people of the North had no desire to see slavery abolished, and considered with the South that it was, if not a wise, at least a necessary institution, the main cause of disunion was therefore not the question of slavery, but the steady, and, to the people of the South, the oppressive increase of taxation in the shape of protective import duties from which they, the Southern people, so far from deriving any advantage, were subjected to serious injury in their intercourse with other nations. The overwhelming majorities in Congress of the representatives of the people of the North, where the Morrill tariff originated, and the election of Mr. Lincoln, who was pledged to a high protective policy, and to carry out to the letter that most impolitic and unwise tariff (the last act of Mr. Buchanan's administration), brought to a point the disruption of the compact which had been pending for many years, and from which various states had threatened to withdraw in 1832. The people of the South said, and said with great force, that it was contrary to the spirit and to the letter of the constitution, to call upon them to bear so

undue a proportion of the Federal taxation : a taxation levied *not* for the purposes for which the compact was formed, but for the special and peculiar benefit of the ironmasters of Pennsylvania and the manufacturers of New England, who, by the increase of population, had obtained undue influence in Congress, and were exercising it for their own personal gains, regardless of the interests of the states as a whole.

South Carolina withdrew from the Union. She had actually done so before, in 1832. The separation of a state so small, and, as the people of the North thought, so insignificant in itself, was treated with contempt. But this time South Carolina resolved to adhere to her resolution. She sent, in January 1861, three of her best and most distinguished citizens to Washington to arrange the terms of the separation. I understand that the President would not even receive them to hear what they had to say, and when they embodied their proposals in a memorial, it was returned to them in silent contempt. In February 1861 that state again sent to Washington her Attorney-General, vested with full powers from the governor, legislature, and people of his state to represent their case, and he was vested with the fullest powers to make ample concessions, so as to avoid a rupture. He was treated in a similar manner. The news spread rapidly throughout the Southern States. They, too, had been equally oppressed. The states of Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas were forced by necessity, and, in fact, by self-preservation, to follow the example of South Carolina, and by the votes of the people, and by ordinances of their respective conventions, they declared themselves separate from the Union,—from an oppressive compact which they could no longer endure. It was towards the end of February 1861 that these seven states assembled in Congress at the city of Montgomery, in Alabama, and there formed the Provisional Government, of which Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, was elected the President.

Now, Sir, the *first* act of this Government was to send commissioners to Washington, who, in the language of President Davis, had full power “to settle all questions of disagreement between the two Governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith.” They arrived in Washington on the 5th of March 1861, immediately after President Lincoln had been inducted into office, and on the 12th of that month they officially communicated their mission to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State; but no reply was received until the 8th of the following month, and, when

received, it was a peremptory refusal to treat with them; in fact, the Government of Washington would not even hear what they had to say. If hon. members will refer to the message of President Davis of the 29th April, and his supplemental message of the 8th May 1861, which were published at the time in this country, they will find the history of that mission and its incidents fully set forth. I may merely state in reference to it, that I do not think the annals of statesmanship furnish any instances of such bad faith and deception as Mr. Seward appears to have displayed and practised on that occasion. These documents show (and we have never had any reason to doubt the veracity of President Davis), 1st. That at the earnest request of Mr. Seward, and, as he stated, "with a view to promote the *peaceable* " *settlement* of all difficulties," the commissioners were induced, through the medium of Mr. Justice Campbell, of the Supreme Court of the United States, to forbear from pressing for an early answer to their communication. 2ndly. That during the interval the Commissioners were assured, through the same source, that Fort Sumter, which commanded the entrance to Charleston harbour, and threatened that city, would be evacuated; that no measure changing the existing status, which could prejudice the Confederate States, was then contemplated, and that an immediate demand for an answer would be productive of evil; and 3rdly, that, while these assurances were given in the most solemn manner, the Government of the United States was *secretly* preparing a great naval and military expedition, which had for its object the reinforcement of Fort Sumter, and that this expedition had actually sailed for Charleston, while the commissioners were kept at Washington waiting for the "peaceable settlement of " all difficulties" promised by Mr. Seward.

The knowledge of this expedition reached the Confederate States only two days before its actual arrival off the port of Charleston. The people of the South were aghast. Their appeals for justice, their remonstrances against oppressive taxation, their prayer to be relieved—and, Sir, it was the prayer of 5,444,323 people (for that was the population of these seven states)—was to be answered at the cannon's mouth. One shout of indignation rang throughout the South. That shout was re-echoed from state to city, from city to town, from town to hamlet; and from the mansions of the wealthy to the abodes of the humblest poor it made a never-dying impression on every man's mind. Who could feel surprised at this sudden change from peace to war! Sir, under this



monarchy, where every man has not merely sworn allegiance to his Sovereign, but where all love and adore that Sovereign, if the constitutional memorials of 5,000,000 of the people to be relieved from oppressive taxation, not necessary for the safety or even the welfare of the country, were to be answered by an appeal to arms, and, by a naval and military expedition, clandestinely got up to crush the memorialists, what would be the consequence? Why, there would most assuredly be a *Revolution!* Even our ancient and much and deservedly loved constitution could not stand the shock. Is it, then, surprising that the spark of revolution flew with lightning speed through every town in the Southern States, where no man had sworn allegiance to the President who sent forth that warlike expedition, or the Government who, in an evil hour, concocted it?

Fort Sumter was taken possession of by the people of Charleston in self-defence. President Lincoln then issued his first proclamation, calling for a force of 75,000 men to "subdue the South." The men of the South flew to arms, not to make an aggressive war on the North, but to defend their homes and their hearths and the sovereignty of their states. Virginia, by the votes of her people, then joined the seven states which President Lincoln called for troops to subdue. North Carolina, Arkansas, Tennessee, Missouri, and Kentucky followed in rapid succession; and thus commenced the most terrible civil war recorded in history. With the sad incidents and events of that war the House is already too familiar.

May I now state what appears to me to have been the chief cause of the disruption? Each of the 34 states sent two members to the Senate; the smallest sending two as well as the largest. On the other hand, the measure for the number of representatives returned for each state to the Lower House was altogether regulated by population. But the ratio of population had of late years entirely changed. In 1790, shortly after the constitution was framed, there was one member in the House of Representatives to every 33,000 persons, while in 1850 there was one to every 93,420. For many years past the tide of emigration had flown to the Northern and Western States; and as numbers alone formed the basis of representation, the wealth, the power, and the intelligence of the Southern States had been rapidly losing their influence, and, in fact, their independence, in the Lower House. For instance, in 1800 Virginia had 23 representatives and Indiana only one, but in 1850 Virginia had only 13 representatives and Indiana, instead of one, had 11.

Again, in 1800 North Carolina had two representatives, while Ohio had but one; whereas in 1850, while North Carolina had increased from two to eight, Ohio had increased her representatives in Congress from one to 21. So that in 1850, while the North and West had very materially increased the number of their representatives, the South had materially diminished. It then became a serious question with the people of the South, and they saw the effect of this in the rapid increase of taxation, or rather of protective duties; they felt that they were saddled with heavy taxes, while practically they had no voice in their imposition, because the majorities of the West and of the North swamped on almost every occasion the representatives of the South. I need hardly remind the House that the South is a purely agricultural country, and its policy and interest is perfect free trade—to sell its cotton in the dearest market, and buy the manufactures it required in the cheapest. But the interest, or the supposed interest, of the North was protection; and when the exports and imports of the United States are analyzed, it is not very difficult to arrive at the main causes of the disruption. It was, in fact, taxation without representation.

I have thus given in the briefest possible form what I conceive to be the immediate cause of the war, but the causes which led to that war are of long standing and are deep rooted. A few words will, I think, suffice to show that the institution of slavery had very little to do with it, at least, much less than many people in this country suppose. President Lincoln, in his inauguration address of the 4th of March 1861, made this solemn declaration:—"I have no intention," he said, "to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the question of slavery where it exists; I do not think that I have the *right to do so legally*, and I am by *no means* inclined to do so." Such was the policy of the Lincoln administration, and they have acted upon it. For the House will remember, that when *General Fremont* proclaimed freedom to the slaves in Missouri, he was forthwith recalled from his command; and the House cannot fail to remember that when *General Hunter*, at a subsequent date, issued a proclamation giving freedom to all the slave population at Beaufort under his immediate command, and in three neighbouring states (which, however, were not under his control), that proclamation was at once disowned by President Lincoln and his cabinet. Again, when *Mr. Cameron*, the Secretary of War, in his report to the

President, stated that *one* object of the war was to free the slaves, the President struck out that clause, and would not admit that even *one* object of the war was the abolition of slavery, and the report appeared without it. But what do the people of the Northern States say to the question of slavery? I am not about to give to the House the opinions of the "New York Herald" as worthy of any very great consideration, but it is a paper which has by far the largest circulation of any newspaper in the United States. When I was in New York, about 18 months ago, it had reached a circulation of 120,000 copies daily, and was, I daresay, read every day by a million people. Well, the editor himself, I believe, admits that his paper is published for sale, and that it would not sell if he did not advocate views in accordance with the sentiments of the large majority of the people of the North, and to suit their tastes. What then does the "New York Herald" say about the institution of slavery? In a leading article which appeared in that paper not very long ago, and which many honourable members may have read, the editor, reviewing various sermons which had been preached on a day set apart for humiliation and prayer, says that "Negro slavery is a part of the constitution, and the attempt to abolish or impair it by Northern majorities in Congress, or by the influence of the Executive, is a violation of the Federal compact,—the incipient treason, the egg of the serpent from which rebellion has been hatched. It is, moreover, an imputation upon the character of Washington and Madison and the other founders of the Government, who agreed, by a solemn league and covenant, that protection of the rights of slaveholders should be guaranteed for ever to the Southern States. As to negro slavery," he continues, "being a sin, not one of the clergymen who preached against it on Thanksgiving Day attempted to prove it, if we except Mr. Sloane, who quoted the case of Pharaoh being punished for refusing to let the Israelites go from under his yoke."

Then the editor, writing, let the House remember, to please the Northern people, goes on to reason as if slavery was a divine institution, for he says:—"The Government is warned by Cheever and others that God will not permit it to be successful in the war unless the national sin of slavery is abolished. When the war of the Revolution commenced, every one of the thirteen colonies held slaves. Yet the colonies triumphed. When the constitution was adopted every state but one held slaves, and the institution was made



“ part of that instrument. Yet the country prospered. In the war of 1812–15 the institution flourished in all the Southern and some of the Northern States. Still the hand of God was with the nation, and England was again whipped.”

He then winds up as follows :—“ It is not negro slavery that is the cause of the present national troubles, but the satanic attempt to meddle with a benevolent institution, which is equally for the benefit of blacks and whites on this continent, and for the interest of the whole civilized world. If the clergy will persist in turning the pulpit into a political stump for preaching disunion, the sooner their conventicles are shut up the better for the United States and the rest of mankind.”

I think, after these proofs, the House will be disposed to agree with me in the opinion that the abolition of slavery has very little to do with the war; and that in the event of a division, I would be entitled to claim the votes of many honourable friends around me who have hitherto been earnest in the cause of the North, because they were under the impression that the Government and people of the North were earnest in their desire to suppress slavery. I need not enter upon the question of the utter impracticability of dealing in a summary manner with a question of such vast magnitude. Nor need I stop to inquire where the money is to be found to pay for the four million slaves, valued at 500,000,000*l.* sterling. Nor need I attempt to picture to the House the confusion, and, I might say, anarchy, which would arise from the immediate demolition of that institution. However much we may deplore the institution of slavery, we must look at the question of its immediate abolition not merely as benevolent but as practical men.

May I now inquire how this unhappy war affects us. The great bulk of the cotton, as I have stated, which was produced in the South, was exported to supply the manufacturers in Europe, and we were much the largest customers. I need hardly call the attention of the House to the amount of suffering in the manufacturing districts, arising entirely from the stoppages of the supplies of cotton from the Southern States of America. By the last accounts the distress had increased to a degree almost unparalleled. At Preston the poor-rates amounted to no less 18*s.* in the pound. At Blackburn there were somewhere about 15,000 persons receiving relief; at Preston upwards of 12,000, and at that place there were no less than 17,000 claimants upon the relief fund. The English people

were patient, and bore their trials often without complaint, but we must not test their patience and endurance to too great an extent. Only two days ago I received a letter from a labouring man, who told a very simple tale. "I can assure you," he said, "that in this part of the country (Ashton-under-Lyne) we are very anxious. We think it high time to give the Southern States the recognition they so richly deserve. It would break a heart of stone to see the privations of the people here. We are willing to work, but what can we do? We can get no work, so we are obliged to go to the parish to get relief, which we are ashamed to ask for."

The people already begin to inquire, What is the meaning of all this suffering? and they had already arrived at the conclusion that it was brought about by a war as vain as it was wicked; for they felt that no power in the North could restore the Union, and that the conquest could only result in permanent separation; but how few members of this House now feel that the broken Union can be restored. From the first I had but one opinion, for when I saw that 13 states, with a population of 11,500,000, had resolved to govern themselves, it was clear to my mind that the Union could no longer be maintained; and I have been confirmed in this conviction by the temper of the Confederate Congress to enforce their independence. Their determination cannot be better evinced than by the following resolution, unanimously adopted on March 5, 1862:—

"Whereas the United States are waging war with the Confederate States, with the avowed purpose of compelling the latter to reunite with them under the same constitution and Government; and whereas the waging of war with such an object is in direct opposition to the sound Republican maxim, that 'all government rests upon the consent of the governed,' and can only tend to consolidation in the general Government, and the consequent destruction of the rights of the States; and whereas, this result being attained, the two sections can only exist together in the relation of the oppressor and the oppressed, because of the great preponderance of power in the Northern section, coupled with dissimilarity of interests; and whereas we, the representatives of the people of the Confederate States in Congress assembled, may be presumed to know the sentiments of the said people, having just been elected by them, therefore be it Resolved, That the Congress do solemnly declare and publish to the world that it is the unalterable determination



“ of the Confederate States (in humble reliance upon Almighty  
 “ God) to suffer all the calamities of the most protracted war,  
 “ but that they will never, on any terms, politically affiliate  
 “ with a people who are guilty of an invasion of their soil and  
 “ the butchery of their citizens.”

The victories of Manassas, Balls Bluff, Springfield, Shiloh, Fair Oaks, Charleston, Richmond, and the expulsion of the Federals from the Valley of the Shenandoah, prove that, even under the most adverse and the most trying circumstances, the Confederates can not merely successfully resist, but can triumphantly conquer the superior forces of the North when beyond the range of their gun boats; and that they are a nation, with a well organized and established Government, and with an army, and with some of the most distinguished statesmen and generals that any country ever produced, are facts which cannot be disputed.

But even if the legions of the North overcame the armies of the South, there was a passive resistance still to be overcome, which no army could subdue. This was shown in the case of the mayor of New Orleans—“ We are at your mercy,” said that brave man, when the Federal army entered the capital of the South, “ We are at your mercy, and you may deal with us as you please, but your flag we cannot honour, your laws we cannot respect, and your taxes we will not pay.” Such was the unanimous feeling of the whole of the Southern States. Throughout the whole of this war, we have been told, “ Only let the Union flag be hoisted in any part of the South, and you will see how the Southern people will rally round it.” Well, that flag had now been flying at New Orleans for more than six months, and how many Southern people had returned to the Union? The hoisting of that flag was to open a trade at Beaufort; but though the people of the South were suffering for the very necessaries of life, yet they would have no dealings with the Northern people. The re-establishment of the Union was indeed hopeless. It was vain to suppose that the Northern and Southern states would ever again be united; there was a yawning gulf between them which no power on earth could fill; the Union now broken could never be restored. That being so it behoved England, in concert, he hoped, with the great powers of Europe, to offer her mediation, and in the name of our common humanity to adopt means to attempt at least to put an end to this vain and fratricidal struggle. Europe was deeply interested in it. Mediation on the basis of separation would be hailed with delight by the South, and if declined by the North I think

we should be justified in recognizing the South, and I am thoroughly convinced that the moral effect of recognition would produce peace. I have held from the first but one opinion in regard to this war, and if the House will bear with me, I will read an extract from a letter which I addressed more than 12 months ago (May 1861) to an eminent banker in New York. That letter found its way to the newspapers of the United States, and was extensively circulated, but I will not intrude upon the House the sufferings I have endured, and the annoyances to which I have been subjected through its publication.

“Your deeply interesting letter,” I wrote, “reached me in due course. I read it with feelings of no common interest. The great problems to which you refer are now about to be solved,—can the vast republic be held together without bloodshed? Events have already proved that it cannot. You are now about to enter upon the second and more terrible act of the sad drama, and see if the Union *can* be restored and held together by bloodshed and coercion. I daresay three-fourths of the people of the Northern States are of that opinion; and therefore it may appear presumptuous on my part to offer any opinion; but you invite me to do so. Well, then, when I look to history, when I consider the vast extent of your country, and find that the interests of the South are opposed to the policy of the North; when I see that the two sections of your people differ in feeling and in associations, in fact, differ in almost everything except language; and when I hear that they are resolved, by the votes of their several State Legislatures, to arm themselves and raise a vast army, not to coerce other states or attack the North, but to defend themselves, I cannot but feel that there must be separation, and that no force which the North can bring to bear will ever re-unite the Southern with the Northern States. But even if re-united by force of arms you cannot treat them as a conquered people. That would be contrary to the first principles of a republican form of Government. You cannot force them to be content and happy, and unless they are so it is impossible for the Union to be held together. My political feelings are all in favour of the people, and that form of government which has been their form of government; but I cannot hide from myself the fact that thirty millions of people, spread over thousands of miles of territory, cannot be held together by a republican form of Government **WHEN** a large portion of them are discontented and unhappy. Almost every friend

" I have resides in the North, and as the business of my firm  
 " comes from that quarter, I would, if I could, view the ques-  
 " tion as you do ; but history, reason, and common sense  
 " appear to me, under the circumstances I have named, to be  
 " opposed to your views. You will ask, what, then, is to be  
 " done ? That question is not so easily answered ; but I will  
 " venture to say what I think you ought *not* to do, and that  
 " is, *Do not, I beseech you, march your armies into the South.*  
 " *If you do, there will be the most terrible bloodshed the world*  
 " *ever saw, and, after all, you will be further from the object*  
 " *you have in view than you were when you commenced the*  
 " *carnage.* What then ? The only answer I can give is to  
 " PART, and *part in peace*, and I say so in the cause of hu-  
 " manity and in your own interests, as well as in the interests  
 " of the world. Feeling, as I do, that the civil war can have  
 " but one termination, the separation will be much more easy  
 " now than it will be after you have roused every angry  
 " passion, sacrificed thousands of lives and millions of treasure,  
 " and given a blow to your country and your commerce from  
 " which they will not recover in our generation.

" I will not presume to offer an opinion in regard to the  
 " terms of separation, but the good sense of your people, and  
 " the spirit of justice which pervades their actions, will soon  
 " settle the conditions when once the sword is laid aside."

Events have proved how terribly true have been my pre-  
 dictions.

But apart altogether from my anxious desire to see an end  
 put to this fearful war, and to the distress which our people  
 are suffering, I do not hesitate to say, that both politically  
 and commercially, it is for the interest of Europe, and above all  
 for the interest of England that separation should take place.

We know that the South would be prepared to adopt a free  
 trade policy, and that they would be ready to enter into  
 relations with this country to exchange directly their cotton  
 and the other products of the South for our manufactures.  
 And politically, it would be well for us and well for the world  
 that a vast power like the United States should be divided.

But is it really the case, as has been stated, that the offer of  
 mediation would be scouted by the North ? I daresay if  
 England or France alone made that offer it might be so, but I  
 am certain it would not be so if made by the great powers of  
 Europe combined. What was the present state of things in  
 the North ? Why men of position, intelligence, and property  
 were not allowed to express an opinion, unless it was in  
 accordance with the views of an imbecile Cabinet, or an excited



mob. In proof of how earnestly mediation was desired by the better class of American citizens, I will read a portion of a letter which I have received from New York only this day, and which bears date of July 4th; the writer says:—

“Will England hesitate any longer to offer mediation?  
 “Why, if she had in the past month of the war forcibly inter-  
 “ferred no greater ill-feeling could have been shown towards  
 “her than has been shown under her magnanimous forbear-  
 “ance. Nor need a war be feared if you recognize the South.  
 “. . . . Gold is at 10 per cent. premium; silver is dis-  
 “appearing; ‘shin plasters,’ or tradesmen’s debt tickets,  
 “becoming a currency; millions of irredeemable paper con-  
 “stantly issuing by Government, and millions more to come  
 “if the war continues. . . . What is all this against  
 “the stupendous power of England? No, indeed, there is no  
 “war short of England declaring it. . . . Is she afraid  
 “of her Northern supplies of breadstuffs? Let her consider  
 “that her demand for these is the life-blood of our agricultural  
 “states. They must sell to her. The probable loss of her  
 “custom alone would cover her from any danger on our part.  
 “We await her action in sad dismay.”

Such were the sentiments of many of the Northern people, and I believe the Government of Washington, seeing the hopeless position in which they have placed themselves, would be glad to have some excuse to bring to a termination this vain and terrible war. But the feeling expressed in the foregoing letter is not confined to New York. I have also this morning received a letter from Brunswick, in the State of Maine, dated also the 4th July, in which the writer, a gentleman of strong union feeling, says he now saw that the war was hopeless, and he trusted that the Powers of Europe would offer mediation. And now, I may ask, would Foreign Powers be prepared to go with us in offering this mediation? Let our Government put it to the test. Let us, at least, offer to do so in concert with them. Humanity demands it; reason suggests it.

So far as regards France, I think there cannot be a doubt of the Emperor heartily concurring with this country in that line of policy, and of his anxious desire to act in concert with England. In fact, it is generally known and admitted that, from the beginning of this terrible and most unhappy war, the French Government saw the amount of evil that would arise from it, and that the Emperor with great reluctance acknowledged the blockade of the Southern ports. There is also every reason to believe that despatches were sent by him, and a communication made to Her Majesty’s Government on the

subject of the inefficiency of the blockade and the hopelessness of re-union. We also all know that his people are suffering most severely for the want of cotton ; and there are many circumstances which must lead us to feel, almost to a certainty, that the Emperor is of opinion that the moment has arrived when the contending parties, greatly exhausted in men and means, would be disposed to listen to proposals of mediation, if made in a friendly spirit, by the great Powers of Europe.

Our own interests require that the proposal should now be made, and humanity, as I have said, demands it, for the war has now become one of hatred and revenge. I say nothing about the vast sums of money which have been expended in this unnatural and terrible war, nor the tens of thousands of lives which have already been sacrificed, nor the awful misery which the war has inflicted, not merely on the people of America, but I might say upon the human race. It is clear that the South cannot be conquered. It is still more clear that the broken Union can never be restored, and therefore it does seem strange—it seems to me unnatural—that this war, involving ruin to millions on both sides of the Atlantic, should be allowed to continue without the Powers of Europe offering one word of counsel or remonstrance, while their own people are suffering through it, in all the manufacturing districts, an almost unparalleled amount of distress. Surely we have now seen enough of the stern endurance, and of the heroic conduct of the people of the South, and the perfect organization of their Government, to warrant us in saying that they are worthy to be admitted into the family of nations.


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
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












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