

10 April 1946

"Questioned by the Foreign Minister for the real and deeper reason of the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this reason is the fight of Japan against the system of the Nine-Power Treaty. Japan does not fight against the principle of this treaty. Politically, she is quite ready to respect the independence of China. Economically, she also agrees to a so-called principle of the open door. However, she wants to turn the table and be the host while the other nations could only be guests in East Asia.

"In replying to a second question of the Foreign Minister for the deeper reasons of the difficulties between Japan and America SATO states that the points of friction with America are less in the economic than in the humanitarian fields. America's sympathies are with China. America feels that she is, so to speak, the protector of that country and wants to police the Pacific Ocean further by means of her naval superiority. Under these circumstances Japan endeavors to finish the war with China soon. SATO declared that he personally did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. In this his opinion differs to a certain degree from the Japanese military. Therefore, it is necessary to find a solution of the Chinese question not in a military way, but in a different manner. For this reason Japan aided the Wang Ching-wei government and is ready to make a very generous agreement with it. Japan does not wish to interfere with Chinese matters or to force something upon the Chinese, but is ready to negotiate with Wang Ching-wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese are reasonable it will be possible to achieve a result which allows China not to lose face. In this case America would also little by little change her attitude and act more friendly towards Japan . . ."

"The Foreign Minister expressed the supposition that maybe America is disturbed by the increasing power of Japan and by her increasingly strong fleet and that the divergences of opinion with that country may be based on the fact that America which so far had ruled the Pacific Ocean alone now is forced to share this rule with Japan. To this SATO replied in the affirmative and added that particularly the Japanese endeavors to obtain a naval parity with America and the fact that the new naval constructions had been kept secret had put America in a very bad temper. Therefore, Japan has to be very careful towards America, especially after Stimson entered the Cabinet, so as not to provoke that country to strong measures against Japan. America has already canceled the trade treaty, but has not yet declared the embargo against Japan. Japan is extremely dependent on America because of the petroleum and iron supply."

The Foreign Minister then points out the connection between a strong policy and a good economic situation. He relates the experiences which Germany

10 April 1946

had in this connection. He then discusses the attitude of the South American countries. SATO replies that "as far as the United States are concerned Japan is not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and has to be careful for this reason. Besides the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she gets into a conflict with Japan.

"The Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation is difficult and that Japan has to accommodate her policy to the actualities of the situation."

The next point deals with German-Russian relations and in conclusion Ambassador SATO asks about the future form of Europe according to German plans. The Foreign Minister replies that at present the one question is how to win the war and that he is not able to say much about the political future. The memorandum is signed by Ambassador Schmidt.

Analyst's note: A partial State Department translation of this document is in IPS Document #21, on pp. 4 ff.)

- (2) Memorandum about the conversation between Hitler and Ciano in presence of Ribbentrop, Von Mackensen, Alfieri and Meissner on July 7, 1940. Hitler begins the conversation by giving an extremely optimistic picture of the situation, stressing particularly a success of German propaganda in France and England. He pays great attention to the methods of dealing with France, and talks about the meeting of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, where he will demand air bases in Morocco. He states that France, despite her overtures for German-French friendship, remains an enemy. In order to the German press to treat France a little more mildly was purely tactical. Ciano agrees to this. (The last page or pages of this memorandum are missing in the photostat.)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. **1379**

Date **10 April 1946**

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: **Photostat: Memorandum re Conversations between German Foreign Minister and Jap. Ambassador SATO in presence of KURUSU and STA HMER and between HITLER and others**
Date: **July 1940** Original () Copy (**4**) Language: **german**
1 and 8

Has it been translated? Yes () No (**X**)
Has it been photostated? Yes (**X**) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc. Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

War Department

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

H. STA HMER, OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SATO, ~~Isamu (?)~~

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Conspiracy for aggressive warfare

Proj. No.	233
S. A. No.	_____
Sack No.	_____
Item No.	21

15 pages

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

- (1) Memorandum about conversation between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador SATO in presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General Stahmer on July 8, 1940. After a few introductory words SATO states that "just as the new order is coming into existence in Europe through Germany, Japan for her part has been endeavoring for the last three years to construct a new order in the Far East and the South Seas. This parallelism seems to afford a close cooperation between Germany and Japan. Japan has drawn the attention of the English, French and American governments to herself for these three years and in doing this facilitated in a way Germany's task of creating a new order in Europe. In this way the governments of the two countries may assist each other mutually." In speaking about Soviet Russia he states that both countries are forced to have good neighborly relations with Russia. "About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of" the

Analyst: **Ahemer**
crisp

Doc. No.

Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic ~~methods~~ ^{at present}.

"In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is ^{at present} putting forth ~~at present~~ strong individuals to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to have free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies."

The Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He always advocated this cooperation which has already borne fruits for both parties. "Without the existence of a Germany which has become strong again, Japan would not have been able to penetrate as deeply into England and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it actually happened." Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had been taken into consideration sometime ago. They did not materialize because Japan lacked interest in European matters. As to the form of this cooperation he declared himself unable to give any explanations, since he was not sufficiently informed about Japanese political aims. He asked for such information and adds that "he would be especially interested to hear from Japanese side how they thought about cooperation with Germany, whether only in a sphere of economy or in which way besides this." Ambassador SATO replied that Japan has endeavored to orient her policy in a definite direction but has always been forced to mitigate this new orientation somewhat. "In the new order in the Far East Japan is first of all interested in the creation of a new China, with which ~~she~~ ^{she} could have ~~free~~ ^{friendly} relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan should secure order in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan fought for years stubbornly against the so-called regime of Washington, which finds its expression in the treaties of 1921, and especially in the Nine-Power Treaty. This Washington regime gives preponderance in the Far East, not to China and Japan, but to the Anglo-Saxons. However, it is not Japan's intention to exclude foreigners from the Far East; quite to the contrary, Japan also wishes to give a proper position to the economic cooperation with Germany in China. In her relations to America, Japan has to be cautious indeed.

"Questioned by the Foreign Minister for the real and ^{deeper} basic reason of the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this reason is the fight of Japan against the system of the Nine-Power Treaty. Japan does not fight against the principle of this treaty. Politically, she is quite ready to respect the independence of China. Economically, she also agrees to a so-called principle of the open door. However, she wants to turn the table and be the host while the other nations could only be guests in East Asia." ^{new paragraph} In replying to a second question of the Foreign Minister for deeper reasons of the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO states that the points of friction with America are less in the economic than in the humanitarian fields. America's sympathies are with China. America feels that she is, so to speak, the protector of that country and wants to police the Pacific Ocean further by means of her

1379

naval superiority. Under these circumstances Japan endeavors to finish the war with China soon. SATO declared that he personally did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. In this his opinion differs to a certain degree from the Japanese military. Therefore, it is necessary to find a solution of the Chinese question not in a military way, but in a different manner. For this reason Japan aided the Wang Ching-wei government and is ready to make a very generous agreement with it. Japan does not wish to interfere with Chinese matters or to force something upon the Chinese, but is ready to negotiate with Wang Ching-wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese are reasonable it will be possible to achieve a result which allows China not to lose face. In this case American would also little by little change her attitude and act more ~~free~~ ^{friendly} towards Japan

"The Foreign Minister expressed the supposition that maybe America is disturbed by the increasing power of Japan and of her increasingly strong fleet and that the divergences of opinion with that country may be based on the fact that America which so far had ruled the Pacific Ocean alone now is forced to share this rule with Japan. To this SATO replied in the affirmative and added that particularly the Japanese endeavors to obtain a naval parity with America ~~with America~~ and the fact that the new naval constructions had been kept secret had put America in a very bad temper. Therefore, Japan has to be very careful towards America, especially after Stimson entered the Cabinet, so as not to provoke that country to strong measures against Japan. America has already canceled the trade treaty, but has not yet declared the embargo against Japan. Japan is extremely dependent on America because of the petroleum and iron supply."

The Foreign Minister then points out the connection between a strong policy and a good economic situation. He relates the experiences which Germany had in this connection. He then discusses the attitude of the South American countries. SATO replies that "as far as the United States are concerned Japan is not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and has to be careful for this reason. Besides the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she gets into a conflict with Japan."

"The Foreign Minister admitted ^{that} the Japanese situation is difficult and that Japan has to accommodate her policy to the actualities of the situation."

The next point deals with German-Russian relations and in conclusion Ambassador SATO asks about the future form of Europe according to German plans. The Foreign Minister replies that ~~there~~ at present the one question is how to win the war and that he is not able to say much about the political future. The memorandum is signed by Ambassador Schmidt.

7 (Analyst's note: A partial State Department translation of this document is in IPS Document No. 11, on pp. 4 ff.)

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- 477
- (2) Memorandum about the conversation between Hitler and Ciano in presence of Ribbentrop, Von Mackensen, Alfieri and Meissner on July 7, 1940. Hitler begins the conversation by giving an extremely optimistic picture of the situation, stressing particularly a success of German propaganda in France and England. He pays great attention to the methods of dealing with France, and talks about the meeting of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, where he will demand air bases in Morocco. He states that France, despite her overtures for German-French friendship, remains an enemy. Any order to the German press to treat France a little more mildly was purely tactical. Ciano agrees to this. (The last page or pages of this memorandum are missing in the photostat.)

855 - Hand written records Privy Council meetings
deliberating exchange of special rights

874 - Japanese treaties with China & Manchuria

1611 - Economic conditions Program Embassy Jap Manch & China
Tibetly

1089 - Minutes Privy Council (10 May 33 re Tel + Tel)

1612 - Plan of Import & Export with China & Manchuria

948 - Privy Council Proceedings re Manch 1935
re N Man RR

947 - Proceedings Privy Council - 13 Sep 32 - Protocol - Russians
314-

1085 - Proceedings Privy " Review against Manchuria - Japan

1100 - Privy Council re abolition Extra limitations
Expulsion in Manchuria

1764

~~Manchurian 5 year Plan Essay - Not official~~

1692 - Two charts 5 year Plan etc

1106 - Report Privy Council Meeting re Russian Relations Japan & China

885 Treaty of 24 Feb 39 between Japan & Germany - Manch & Korea

1538 Tables of Jap Demand & Supply important materials
from Jap Manch - 1939 published
by Manchurian Government

1597 Treaties between Japan & Manchuria

1600 - Treaty re abolition Extra Tariffs

419
H-2) 913 5 Year Plan

April 1942

New Plan

1016

Speechman Inst. C. Maden

1560 → Public Government

1155- Plan 1933

9/15/32 The Protocol Jap. Manchur.

3/1/32 The March for General Outline
of Economic Const. Program

3/1/34 - Organic Law

7/15/34 Japanese Joint Economic Commission
art II, - III & IV
Annex 2-4

7/1/37 - Political Reorg.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

JUL 24 1946
C

23 July , 1946

JTB

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 4035B for Lt Col Taranenko.

Arrange for translation as follows: Item 2, Tel. from OTT to Ribbentrop of April 27, 1939:

- 1) German to English: (A rough translation can be found in the analysis)
- 2) German to Japanese

JTB

J. B. A.

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

See

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

30 July, 1946

Jarantenko, Rm 354

Attached is Document No. 1340 together with translated material which will be reproduced for you as a result of your request of 3/6, 1946.

It is requested that you review this material and return all of it to this office at the earliest practicable date. No further processing can be accomplished until this is done.

Any questions should be addressed to St Ohberg, Room 364.

MBL
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TO: DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT , 1946

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Attorney

Proc

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

30 July, 1946

TO: *Jaranenko, Rm 354*

Attached is Document No. 4035B together with translated material which will be reproduced for you as a result of your request of 23/7, 1946.

It is requested that you review this material and return all of it to this office at the earliest practicable date. No further processing can be accomplished until this is done.

Any questions should be addressed to H. Ohlberg, Room 364.

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Attorney

C
JUN 27 1946

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

E3 JUN 1946 *J. A. M.*

TO THE TRANSLATION DIVISION

Staff Attorney Taranenko requests that Doc # 1340

be translated from German to Eng & Jap as follows:
(Cut proofread stencil in Japanese x)

Notes on the conference in Berlin between R.A.M. and the
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka. p.p. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14.

Lt Boyd.

J.W.
Document Officer

see

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

30 July, 1946

TO: *Sarantko, Rm 354*

Attached is Document No. 1329B together with translated material which will be reproduced for you as a result of your request of 10/7, 1946.

It is requested that you review this material and return all of it to this office at the earliest practicable date. No further processing can be accomplished until this is done.

Any questions should be addressed to Lt Ahberg, Room 364.

YBA
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TO: DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT , 1946

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Attorney

RAM 18/40

MEMORANDUM On the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SATO, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General STAMER, 8 July 1940.

After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador SATO declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas. In these parallel efforts a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.

About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. ~~It is Japan's opinion that America must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters.~~ The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavours to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to gain free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.

The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU'S predecessor, General OSHIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it has actually happened. The natural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.

Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had already been taken into consideration

some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns.

As a result of Germany's victory over France, a great revision in all factors of foreign policy would follow. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this cooperation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with Japan's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which Japan proposed to pursue. He would be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of cooperation with Germany, whether only in the economic sphere or in which other way.

Ambassador SATO replied that it was comprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese Policy had been difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in a set direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several years been fighting obstinately against the so-called regime from Washington which finds expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary! It also wished to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.

In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.

To the question of the FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REICH as to what in reality then was the basic reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in Eastern Asia.

When the question by the Foreign Minister of the Reich concerning the deeper reasons for the difficulties which Japan was having with America was interpolated anew, SATO answered that the causes of friction with America lay less in the economic than in the humanitarian sphere. American sympathies were with China. America felt that she was in a way the protector of this country and wanted to extend her police power in the Pacific Ocean with the help of her superiority at sea. Under these circumstances Japan was at pains to end the war with China soon. SATO declared that he

personally, perhaps in a certain sense in opposition to the Japanese military authorities, did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. It was, therefore, necessary to seek a solution of the Chinese question on some other than on a military basis. For this reason Japan had supported the government of Wang Ching Wei and was prepared to conclude a generous agreement with it. Japan absolutely did not wish to meddle in Chinese affairs or force anything upon the Chinese, but on the contrary was prepared to negotiate with Wang Ching Wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese were sensible, a result would doubtless be achieved, under which China would not lose face. In this case America would also perhaps gradually change its attitude and be more friendly toward Japan. America's economic interests in China were not large, but just this fact alone did not absolutely tend to help clarify the situation. In view of the considerable economic interests of England in this area, an agreement could much more easily be made with her than with the Americans, who take an entirely different view of things.

At the conjecture of the Foreign Minister of the Reich that perhaps America was uneasy about the rising power of Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and that the differences of opinion with that country were based on the fact that America, who up to now had been ruling alone in the Pacific Ocean, now found herself in the position of being forced to share this rule with Japan, SATO answered in the affirmative and added that the efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity with America, and the fact that Japan was keeping the new additions to her fleet a secret had especially aroused ill feeling in America. For this reason, in particular after the entry of Stimson into the Government, Japan had to be very careful in regard to America in order not to provoke this country into taking severe measures against Japan. To be sure, America had already abrogated the commercial treaty, but an export embargo against Japan had not yet been instituted. Because of the supply of petroleum and iron, the Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on America.

The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER replied that he had always held the view that a strong policy also promotes the economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. Germany has her own experiences in this sphere. At the time when she was politically weak and the governments at the time maintained that one had to give way for economic reasons, Germany had, in the end, obtained no economic advantages for her conciliatory behavior. Now Germany is strong and her trade is flourishing. She gets all she needs supplied from other lands in addition to all the economic alleviations such as credits and the like.

Even a few months ago Germany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely encircled as no other land in world history. In gold, which has streamed in such great amounts to America, Germany is no more interested. The German Reich in its thousand years existence would never again build anything on gold. In Germany gold has been dethroned and other countries would be bound to follow this example. Now, when England is so menaced, the stores of gold had been transported from there to the United States, so that about 85-90% of all the world's gold might be found there. The result of that is that the United States at the end of the war will be choked by gold

and goods and would be glad to sell to other lands, for example Japan, under favorable conditions everything that those lands needed.

Germany, economically, is as good as completely independent. Many things, which were previously imported are produced by herself or else she has found a substitute for them. After the war the European economic sphere will be completely independent. That does not mean that Germany no more desires any world trade. Quite the opposite! However this new world trade must run on the basis of the independence of the participating economic spheres and the exchange of surplus. The old world trade rested on the possibility, always, possessed by England, of blockading other countries and cutting off their raw material supplies. In the New World Order Japan in East Asia, Russia in Asia, Germany and Italy in Europe would have the power of decision and also in Africa would Germany and Italy particularly, perhaps with some other interested party, exercise predominance.

The Foreign Minister of the Reich then came to speak on the attitude of the South American countries. The South American states, which Roosevelt tried to link economically with North America, appeared to know that after the war the United States would not be able to import the South American raw products and already turned towards Europe in order to insure the export of their goods after the war. But whoever wishes to trade with Europe, must in the future turn towards Germany.

SATO replied that he, not being an economist, could not express any opinion on economic questions. If, however, the exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis, then one could not very well turn back to a free exchange of goods with the rejection of commercial arrangements with foreign bills of exchange and other trade barriers.

As far as the United States are concerned, Japan was, possibly, not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and had to be careful for that reason. Besides, the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she came into a conflict with Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to orient her policy according to the opportunities of the situation. He stated moreover, regarding the gold question that it was not a question of Germany not possessing any gold, but that German economy would never again be dependent on gold, i.e., on international speculation.

As regards Russia, the Reich Foreign Minister referred to the efforts which he had made for some years past to influence Ambassador OSHIMA in the direction of an understanding between Japan and Russia. Germany concluded a lasting agreement with Russia and the interests of both countries were very clearly outlined by one another. He welcomed the efforts which Japan had also made, in the previous months, to come to an understanding for her part with Russia.

In conclusion, SATO put up one more question which he himself said was a little indiscreet. What does Germany think the future shape of Europe will be?

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was only busying itself with one question at the moment, namely how is the war to be carried on and how is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not yet say much about the political future. The only thing that is certain is that the still remaining enemy of Germany - England - will be defeated.

Berlin, 9 July 1940.

Signed SCHMIDT
Envoy

Demonstr. No. 1379.

Translated by Yoshiaki OTANI
Child by Kotaro KUROSAWA

~~来書~~ 七九番

「^{及び}来栖大使、スターキー總領事立會の下に於ける、一九四〇年(昭和十五年)

七月日の独乙外務大臣と佐藤日本大使との會談に因する覺書。

「独乙政府に依つて示された^{款待}厚遇に対する感謝と独乙の對佛

戰勝利に対する祝賀とを一言述べた後に、佐藤大使は、

「^{今や}独乙に依り^極新秩序を建設し得るのと同様に、

日本の方では三年間東^極と南洋方面に^{同趣旨}新秩序を建設しよう

と努めて来たと言明した。之等類似の努めをする場合に、日独間の

提携は非常に緊密に行はれて来た様に思はれる。三年間日本

は、英・佛・米三ヶ国政府の注意を惹き付け、それによって威意味

では、独乙の^{活ける}政權に^{工作}新秩序を建設する^{工作}に^{工作}を

斯の様に

容易にして来た。斯様は休むが西国政府は幾互に扶け合ふ

のひある。

事が出来た

に關する限り

ソビエト、ロシヤ、南米は、日本は、独逸も亦、中東と友好

關係を保つる。余儀なくされり。おるのと同様、現状は、

東路西亜との

セーラを得たのである。

友好的隣邦關係を保つ様努力する事、余儀なくされ

之は独逸が又露西亜との友好關係を保たざるを得た。このと同様である。

此の点でも亦日独西國は協力出来るのである。

米國に對しては、佐藤大使は、日本は支那事變の初から

意を考へて来て、

米國の注目、米國艦隊を太平洋に釘付けにしたとは

べた。日本の考では、米國は北米及び南米から成る

之はならざり、
政羅巴
極

地域を踏み越え、又、東亞の事には

てはならざりといふと

介入しない事、此の原則を遵守する事

益とある

も亦兩國相互に利害關係のありてある。佐藤大使は、言と統へるに當り、再び日独共通の相互利害關係と日独提携の必要とを力説した。此の提携は又至清めたる柄をも包含せねばならぬ。

自由な行動が取れる様にと

「中華民國に對しては、佐藤大使は現在日本は最早三年間も續

支那事変を了へて自由な關係を求めんと懸命の努力をこのころと付け加えた。

是に因駢して、佐藤大使は、日本の輿論が、印度支那及び南洋東印度に對して非常に鋭敏になつて來て

のるるを指摘した。

凡ゆる今野

外務大臣は、如何なる地域に於ても独こと協力し度いとい

ふ日本の利益を満足と認められた。彼は日独提携はよく

小目体新なるものを表すものやないと思つてみた。彼自身

来栖大使の前任者の大島將軍と、数年前此の提携を

と促進した人達の中の一人为、ソート其の成果は既に曲

者

のひある。

平等なる権利を要求する其の

~~西~~ 柳田 権を奪つて来た。独乙は、新秩序建設の戦いに、それを

に至る

著しく利用し、一方日本は支那を手中すこと、今日迄、独乙

と云ふ強力な存在が、^{あつた}分には、非常に有利であつたと云ふ事は

疑ふは出来ない。若しも再興独乙の存在がなかつたら、日本は

現に行つた程、^{予て}東亞に於て、英国や其の他の國々の、^{權益圏内}利権に立ち入る事

は出来なかつたであらう。

斯様なる事から、協力するニ ^國 勢あり

利害關係が生じて来たのは、當然の事である。

日独伊が緊密に協力しようとする案は、既にナシのみに考へられて

政治者の

演説

現れぬ

の下。此の案は、日本の最近の聲明にも再び、^{現れぬ}日本が

1379

5

西羅巴

心を持たぬか

成功

この事件に肉撃は必ずに実現したかである。

要因に

「独この対佛戦勝利の結果、外交政策の全この果は

自身と一は、

に於ては、

大なる変革が生じた。彼は他人の将来日本ともこと友如

の協力関係を増すかかお来るかどうかといふは現在形

西羅巴

と懸つた。西羅巴。新秩序の具組如何いよると信じつた。

彼は、独この意回を知つたが、日本政治目的は知らなかつたので、

現在は此の提携の予定の形式の細目就ては

何も言はなかつた。

それ故彼は佐藤大使に、

日本の進まんとする政治的原則をもつと詳しく説明して呉

れる様に要請した。彼は、日本が独協力に就てそれが單に

経済的な分野に於けることも亦他の分野に亘るとも如何なる

考へて持つてゐるかも、日本側から聞きたかつた。

特に

「佐藤大使は、日本の政策が局外者にとって理解し難いものであり

とふるは、^{無理もなかつたことである}お解りなすべからぬものと答へた。九年向即ち

満洲事変勃発以来、日本は其の政策を東亞本位一本建し

ようと努力して来たが、併し其の後幾度も東亞本位の政策を

幾分

加減せざるを得なくなつた。^極東亞新秩序に肉しては、日本が友好好

肉係に入る事が出来る様な新支那を興すといふ事が由本位と

が固く結ばれは、之

就中問題である。此の新支那と日本との関係は東亞の平和

障

を保護するにあり。此の目的を達成するに日本は一九二二年の

諸條約特に九ヶ國條約に表はす所謂

頑強に

制

中國

戦つて来た。此のワシントン議定書は日本や東亞の平和に、アングロ

華盛頓ルール

教員問題

問題なのがある。

日本にしてみれば、何は

此の政策確立を

一方向に確立し

サウソンに東亞に於て有利な地位を與へ併し下ら日本は決して東極

華から外國金を追ひ出さ積りてはなら。全然逆である。日本は

中國亦東亞に於て独乙と経済的提携の爲に適當な場所を

讓出す積りである。

「勿論、日本は日米関係に深甚な注意を拂ひぬはらうが、

實際

争論の根本理由

「独乙外務大臣が、それでは曩日米向の基本的懸案

であらう

の對

は何かと問ふに對し、佐藤大使は、其の原因は日本九ヶ國

制戰

條約の組織に對し、戰事ありはるに在ると答へた。日本は九ヶ國

條約の基本的原則に對し、戰事ありはるに在らば、政治的いは、

中國

日本は全東亞に於て其の獨立と尊重する積りである。併し日本は

に對し、日本は所謂内戸開放の原則に賛成である。併し日本は、

1379

8

東亞に於て互に侵は滲するが

日本は

他の諸国如東亞^の軍なるお客とあはれ対し東亞^を排して

東亞なる殺割を果し東亞の盟主たり度ありとある。』

W

414

IV

CHECK SHEET

7-10-46

DATE ISSUED:

TITLE OR DOCUMENT NO.:

a) Sec ~~Stain~~ Stain
b) Sec _____

Taranenko
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

10 JUL 1946 1946

TO THE TRANSLATION DIVISION

Attached is Document # 1379 b which requires:

1. Translation from eng to jap
2. Cutting and proofreading of mimeograph stencil in _____

Memo re conversation between German Foreign Minister and Jap. Ambassador Sato in presence of Kurusu and others, July 7-8 1940, pp. 1-2.

- a) Check German to English translation.
- b) Translate pp. 1-2 of English to Japanese.

DL: 18 JUL 46.

Document Officer

Waiting for call from Delman

D.L. July 18, 1946

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