

Notice:

Exhibit 686A to be

Corrected in accordance with Language

Board decision, as shown on Court

Record p 8906, 14,950

Doc. Div.

1622B

全 120 部 中 第 98 號

第一回總力戰机上演習關係書類

昭和十六年八月

總力戰研所

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EXHIBIT NO. 686A

No. 1.

第一回總力戰机上演習實施規程

第一節 演習目的

第一條 本演習ハ當研究所第一期研究生ニ對シ總力戰高級幹部トシテ之ガ運營、具體的方策ヲ演練シ併セテ總力戰ニ關スル基本的且綜合的研究ヲ行フヲ目的トス

第二條 本演習ニ於テ研究演練スベキ主要項目ヲ左ノ通り定ム

- 一 内外ニ宣布スベキ皇國國是及國家目的
- 二 皇國、執ルベキ當面、總力戰方略
- 三 總力戰實施ニ必要ナル諸計畫ノ一部ニ對スル立案策定、要領
- 四 總力戰態勢充實強化、要領
- 五 總力戰指導、要領
- 六 特定國ニ對スル思想戰、經濟戰及外交戰實施上、具體的方策ノ一部
- 七 總力戰指導機構及思想戰、經濟戰、外交戰ニ對スル各指導機構

八在外皇國總力戰遂行上緊急對策ヲ要スル
認ル事項

第三條 前條所定研究演練項目、細項ニ付テハ演習指導要領ニ於テ別ニ之ヲ定ム

第四節 講評 (六頁)

第九條 第十期演習研究會終了後統監ハ演習員ニ對シ講評ヲ行フ。講評スベキ要矣概ニ存如シ

- 一 事前諸計畫ノ適否
- 二 演習實施(計畫適用)ノ適否
- 三 事後研究ノ適否
- 四 演習規律ノ整否
- 五 將來ニ對スル訓示

第十條 想定情況ニ對スル實演終了後(第十期演習終了後)各審判部ハ講評資料ヲ統監ニ提出スルモトス。但シ各審判部ハ講評資料ニ関シ豫メ所屬審判官ノ所見ヲ整理スルヲ要ス

講評、起草、講評會議ニ於テ之ヲ行フ。本會議ニ出
席スベキ人員ハ別ニ之ヲ指定ス。

第五節 演習成果ノ整理(七頁)

第十一條 當研究所各所員ハ分擔ニ應ジ演習ノ諸
記錄、研究項目ニ對スル所見、演習ノ計畫指導
ニ於テ改善スベキ事項ニ関スル所見等ヲ整理保存
シ又ハ所要ノ向ニ通報スルモノトス

第六節 特定符号

第十二條 機密保持、為本演習ニ使用スベキ圖
名及地名等ハ左ノ特定符號ニ依ルモノトス

- A. 米國
- B. 英國
- C. 支那
- D. 蘇聯
- E. 蘭領東印度
- F. 佛印
- G. 壕洲
- H. 布哇
- I. 印度
- J. 內南洋
- K. 加奈陀
- L. 中南米
- M. 滿洲國
- N. 日本
- O. 不ルネ不
- P. 比島
- Q. 馬來
- R. 露領極東地方
- S. 新嘉坡
- T. 泰國
- U. 浦鹽

No. 6.

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X	W	V
枢軸國 (X ₁ 獨 X ₂ 伊)	アリウシヤン・アラスカ地方	ビルマ

207.

備考	第九期			第八期			第七期			第六期			第五期			第四期			期		
	四月至十月			一月至三月			二月			十一月			十月			九月			八月		
	23 (土)	22 (金)	21 (木)	20 (水)	19 (火)	18 (土)	16 (土)	15 (金)	14 (木)	13 (水)	12 (火)	11 (土)	9 (土)	8 (金)							
參集審判官甲範圍——ナルバク金審判官 同乙範圍——各審判官部主要審判官 同丙範圍——各審判部關係審判官 同丁範圍——特ニ關係深キ審判官	一〇、〇〇〇	〇八、三〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇	一〇、〇〇〇		
	各演習員、作業提出演習中止	追加情況交付說明	八月末迄、處置提出、之ニ對スル審判	第九期情況交付說明	三月末迄、處置提出、之ニ對スル審判	二月末迄、處置提出、之ニ對スル審判	二月末迄、處置提出、之ニ對スル審判	青國政府、一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示	十一月末迄、處置提出、之ニ對スル審判	第七期情況交付說明	青國政府、一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示	十月末迄、處置提出、之ニ對スル審判	第五期情況交付說明	青國政府、一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示	九月末迄、處置提出、之ニ對スル審判	審判追加情況交付說明	九月二十日迄、處置提出、之ニ對スル審判	青國政府、一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示	第四期情況交付說明	八月末迄、處置提出、之ニ對スル審判	
	丁	乙	乙	丙	甲	乙	丁	丙	甲	乙	丁	甲	乙	丙	甲	乙	丁	丙	甲	乙	
	(4) 今後、對シテ執ルニ付、青國總力戰ヲ略	(3) 對D開戰決意	(2) 對D開戰決意	(1) 前期(4)、繼續	(4) 對E、F、T、P、Q 經濟的及政治的措置	(3) 對D、L措置	(2) 對議會措置	(1) 東京空襲措置	(3) E進出開戦ニ 伴フ措置	(1) P作戰決意及 之ニ伴フ措置	(2) 對D交渉	(3) E進出開戦ニ 伴フ措置	(1) 對E行動線上 決意之ニ伴フ措置	(2) 對D交渉	(3) E進出決意ニ 伴フ措置	(2) A、B、E、Lト對 易於應付ニ對シテ 措置	(1) 對X應酬	(3) A對N應酬 化ニ對シテ措置	(2) N對X應酬	(1) 前期(1)、繼續	(3) 對D(1)對備

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(總機演第四號別紙第一)

第一回總機演第三期乃至第九期演習
指導豫定(案)

期七	第	期六第	期五第	期四第	期三第	期列	演習
月二	十	月一十	月十	月九	月八年六十和昭	期日	想定
18(月)	16(五)	15(金)	14(木)	13(水)	12(火)	11(日)	9(五)
一四〇〇〇 一五〇〇〇	一〇〇〇〇 一三〇〇〇	〇八三〇〇 一〇三〇〇	一四〇〇〇 一五〇〇〇	〇八三〇〇 一〇三〇〇	一四〇〇〇 一五〇〇〇	〇八三〇〇 一〇三〇〇	一四〇〇〇 一五〇〇〇
十二月二十日迄, 處置提出, 之二封之 審判追加情況交付	青國政府, 一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示 十一月二十日迄, 處置提出, 之二封之 審判追加情況交付說明	青國政府, 一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示 十一月二十日迄, 處置提出, 之二封之 審判追加情況交付說明	青國政府, 一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示 十月二十日迄, 處置提出, 之二封之 審判追加情況交付說明	青國政府, 一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示 十月末迄, 處置提出, 之二封之 審判追加情況交付說明	青國政府, 一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示 九月末迄, 處置提出, 之二封之 審判追加情況交付說明	青國政府, 一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示 八月末迄, 處置提出, 之二封之 審判追加情況交付說明	青國政府, 一般方針ヲ統監部ニ内示 八月末迄, 處置提出, 之二封之 審判追加情況交付說明
乙	丙	甲	乙	甲	乙	丙	甲
(2) 对B, D措置 3) N对AB間戰。	(1) P作戰, 決意及 之ニ伴, 措置	(3) E進出開戦ニ 伴, 措置	(1) 對E行動線上 決意之伴措置 (2) 对D交渉	(3) E進出決意ニ 伴, 措置	(2) ABE L上買 易社進出措置	(1) 前期(1), 繼續 (2) NX條約ニ関ス ル對X應酬	(1) 对A交渉及之伴 經濟的要素 (2) 对XD應酬 (3) 对D(A)戰備
乙範圍	丙範圍	甲範圍	乙範圍	甲範圍	乙範圍	丙範圍	甲範圍

演習指導行事

參集
審判官

主要演練項目

No. 8

1622 B.

総机演第六部之三

金一〇部中第098號

昭和十六年七月二十四日

総机統監 飯村 穰

情 況

七月三日青國總力我方略ニ関シ政府統帥部連絡會議ノ結果

一、青國ハ其ノ自主的ニ必要上特別ノ情勢ニテ限リ
好機ヲ捕捉シテ對ニ進出ヲイヌノ方針ヲ以テ諸
準備ヲ促進ス
トノ意見一致セリ

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總机演第六號一五別冊

全120部中第98號

機密

昭和十六年度第一回總力機上演習

第二期演習課題作業答申

第一部 内外ニ宣布スルニ青國國是及國策

第二部 青國總力機計畫一部

昭和十六年七月三十日提出

青國政府

(總力機研究所内)

處	機密保持	既付者
理	演習関係員以外ニ秘	
演習終了後返却		

第一類	全國防空計畫要領	二二三〇
第二類	關東地方防空計畫	二三四〇
第三類	海上交通線管制保護計畫	二三五〇
第四類	青島對外改略綱領	二三三〇
第五類	外交計畫	二三一〇
第六類	支那事變處理方針	二三二〇
第七類	滿洲國對處方針	二三三〇
第八類	占領地統治計畫	二三四〇
第九類	青島思想計畫	二四〇〇
第十類	青島經濟計畫	二五一〇
第十一類	經濟力補充綱領	二五一〇
第十二類	生產力補充方針	二五一〇
第十三類	經濟共榮圈，補充強化方針	二五〇六
第十四類	貿易方針（物資交流）	二五二六
第十五類	不足資源，補填方針	二五二〇
第十六類	經濟力動員綱領	二五二〇
第十七類	物資動員方針	二五二〇
第十八類	資金動員方針	二五三六

總机演第十三號ノ三 (案)

昭和十六年八月三日(〇八三〇交付)

第三日經濟戰實施計畫

總机演第十三號ノ三 (案)

昭和三十七年九月下旬ニ至ル情況

第一回總机演第九期演習追加情況及課題

(一) 昭和三十七年九月下旬ニ至ル情況

(二) 勞務動員方針 三五三九

(三) 交通動員方針 三五三九

(四) 財政計畫ノ方針 三五三九

(五) 財政計畫ノ方針 三五三九

(目次終)

總力戦机上演習統監 飯村穰

第一回總机演第九期演習追加情況及課題

(一) 昭和三十七年九月下旬ニ至ル情況

一七月十日廟議ハ討D用戰決シ八月一日作戰行動開始
 M D 玉境附近ニ於テハ各所ニ相當ノ戰鬥ヲ惹起セルモ
 爾後大ナル抵抗無クN軍ノ急進ノタメ九月下旬迄六
 極東陸軍ノ大半ヲ懐滅シ又其ノ海空軍ノ大部ヲ撃テ
 滅スト共ニR要域ヲ占領確保セリD國ハ戦線ヲ後退
 セシメ長期抗戰ヲ呼號シツアルモ其ノ持久力ハ疑問ナリ
 (十三—十頁)

七春季以來ノXノ討DB大攻勢ハN國ノ作戰ト相俟テ
 顯著ナル効果ヲ收メタルモ未ダ決定的トラス迄界動亂ノ
 終局ニ関シテハ何人モ豫測ヲ許セザル實狀ナリ
 (十三—十二頁)

第二部青國總力戰計畫(一部)

(三〇〇一頁)

第一類 青國總力戰方略(内案)

第一總力戰ノ目的

- 一 青國存立ヲ確保スルト共ニ大東亞新秩序建設ヲ妨害セ
ントスル敵性諸國ノ勢力ヲ排除スルニ在リ
- 二 當面ノ主敵(性)國ヲ A B (Eヲ含ム) 及 C (重慶政權)
トシ 副敵性國ヲ D トス
- 三 大東亞ノ範圍ハ N M Cヲ中心トスル R V (含ム) 以東 G (含ム)
以北、東經百八十度線以西ニ包含セラルル地域トス

第二總力戰ノ指導方針

- 一 既定ノ方針ニ從ヒ C 專攻ノ旨遂ニ務ムルト共ニ爾餘ノ敵性國
トノ戰爭ニ即應ジ得ル總力戰態勢ヲ充實強化ス
- 二 南方ニ對シハ其ノ資源確保ヲ當面ノ目標トシ外交的手段
ニヨリ積極的進出ヲ圖ルモノトス
- 但シ情勢カ依リテハ武カ行使ヲモ辭セザル方針ノ下ニ之ガ準備
- ニ萬全ヲ期ス而シテ對 A B 戰遊ケ難キニ至ラバ之ニ對シ先
制開戰シ先ツ其ノ東亞ニ於ケル勢力カヲ排除スルト共ニ我
ニ對スル敵性ヲ放棄セシムルニ務ム

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- 三、北方對シキハ我武力ノ威壓ノ下ニX、對D處理ヲ容易ナラシメND中立條約ノ履行ヲ監視シ外交的手段ニヨル經濟的進出ヲ阻ルモノトシ、武力我ハ狀態ノ許ス限り之ヲ回避ニ務ム但シ狀況已合得ナル場合ニ武力ヲ行使スルコトアリ
- 四、Xト、協力ニ依リ同盟條約ノ企圖ノ達成ヲムル外、A、對X對我ニ備ヘ、對AB先制ヲ用、我準備ノ萬全ヲ期ス
- 五、爾後情勢ノ推移ニ依リ各取ノ方策ヲ定メ、以テ總力我目的ノ達成ヲ期ス

第五 武力我ノ指導方針

(三〇〇七頁)

一、対C

重慶改権ニ対シハ、占領地域ノ拡大ヲ避ケツク
活潑ナル武力ヲ及復行使シテ敵武力ノ壊滅ヲ
圖ルト共ニ、短敵ヲ破推シ、経済封鎖ヲ強化シ、
民衆ノ抗我意識ノ崩壊ヲ図ル

他ノ敵性國トシテ我軍ヲ遂行スルニオリテモ、項ノ
方針ハ極力之ヲ堅持シ、我果ヲ重慶屈服ニ察
與セシム

二、対F及T

Fニ対シテハ共同防衛ノ趣旨ヲ強化ス

Tノ対N態カ非友好的ニシテ我要求ニ応セザル
場合、ABがTニ於ケル我勢力ヲ配逐セムトス

ノ舉ニ出ズル場合ニ於テハTニ対シテ武力進駐ヲ行ス

其ノ対N態カ悪化シ、特ニ我國ノ必需物資ノ

供與ヲ拒否スル場合ハ対AB我ヲ決意シテ好機
ヲ捕捉シテ武力進駐ヲ敢行ス

対AB我辭々難キ場合ニ於テモ対E進出ヲ行フモトス

四、対A B

A 対 X 作戦の場合、A が対 N 全面的禁輸ヲ断行シタル場合、我ト武力衝突、若ハ対 N 武力攻撃ニ虞アル場合等、対 A B 我避テ難キニ至ラバ、先制用我ニ速ニ P Q 及 E 等ヲ攻略シテ我略的経済的態勢ヲ強化スルト共ニ敵兵力ノ撃滅及其ノ我ニ対スル敵性ノ放棄ヲ圖ル

五、対D 國

D ニ對シテ北 M ニ於テハ防備ヲ強化ス、而シテ我南才處理ニ般落近ハ極力武力我ヲ避クルモ、D X 我ニ於テ D が崩壊ノ類ニシタル場合、D が對 N 敵對行為ヲ為サントスル場合、A が R ニ武力進出ヲ為サントスル場合、其他ノ情勢ニヨリ南我ノ必要ニ生ジタル時ハ、時機ヲ捉ヘテ之ヲ決行シ、R ノ我略的要域ヲ占領ス

総札演習

全120部中第98部(十一)

昭和十六年八月十四日

(一四三〇交付)

機密

総力戦北上演習統監 飯村 穰

総札演習第六期演習情况及課題

(一)十月上旬の情况

一、國際情勢

- (一)DX我ハ酷寒到来ト共「ド」河地ニ「モスクワ」及「シニガラド」東方地区ニ於テ我勢漸膨着セントス
- (二)XB我ハ「スエス」及「バラルタル」方面ニ進展セントスル兆候アル外大ナル変化ナシ
- (三)AX我亦大ナル發展ナシ、大西洋方面、A兵力ハ一部太平洋方面ニ移動ヲ開始セルモノ、如シ、十月一日Aハ対X宣戦セリ
- (四)東洋ニ於ケルAB(E)兵力ハ未ダ増勢ノ模様ナキモ所在兵力ヲ以テ急遽大規模ノ防備ニ着手スルト共、ABENノ行動牽制ノ為盛ニ感

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赫宣傳ヲ行ヒツコアリ

青國、企圖ハ一部 A B Eニ察知セラレタル疑アリ

(五) Cニ於ケル N 軍ノ行動活潑トシ、伴ヒシ亦盛ニ
及攻宣傳ニ努メツコアリ

A B C 軍事協定成立セリト、確報アリ

(六) R 方面ハ依然緊張ヲ続ケアルモ、其ノ兵力ハ多少
減少セル形跡アリ、

D M 國境ハ平靜ナリ

D H N A 雙方ニ對シテ決定的態を示サズ

二、統帥部及軍ノ情況

(一) 青國統帥部ハ既定ノ對 E 行動ヲ極力繰上ゲ
決行シ、夜キ要望ヲ有ス

(二) 統帥部ノ對 E 行動準備ハ進捗中ニシテ
十月中旬ニハ、応急ニ準備完了ノ見込

1622 B

總札演第十號、三全120部中第98號(十一八)

昭和十六年八月十五日(一二〇〇交付)

機密

指 定 者	商工省 西大條審判官
機 密 保 持 者	演習關係員外秘
處 理	演習終了後返却

總力、我机上演習總監 飯村 稜

第一回總札演第六期演習追加情況

十月中下旬、追加情況

一、青國軍、十一月十五日行動ヲ開始シ、數日中ニ實力ヲ以テEノ若干要地ヲ急襲確保ヤリ(地力我況等口述以下倣之)

青國軍、損害輕微ナリ

二、Eハ、Nノ侵略ニ對シ、飽ク迄抵抗スレトノ宣言ヲ發シ

ABノ援助ヲ求メツツアリ

E防備軍、相当、抵抗ヲ試ミツツアルモ青國軍、為逐次圧迫セラレツツアリ

E領内經濟施設、青國軍ニ急襲セラレタル沿岸地域ニ於テ一部、破壊ニ止マリタルモ他、地域

No. 19

ニ於テハ相当程を破壊セラレツツアリ

三 E 作戦ニ於ケル押收物件中判明セルモノ如シ

船舶八萬噸、原油ニ十一萬噸

普通揮發油九萬七千噸、重油十一萬六千噸、

四 ABハ青國ノ行動ヲ不法侵略ト難詰シ共同

シテ對N經濟斷交ヲ宣言スルト共ニ在A國N

領事館ノ閉鎖ヲ要求シ来レリ

大西洋方面ノA海軍兵力ノ一部ハ急遽太平洋

洋ニ移動ヲ開始セルモノノ如シ

A國內對N主戦論盛ナルモ政府真意ハ不明ナリ

五 在東洋 AB軍ハ極度ノ緊張ヲ示シツツアル

モ未カ積極的ナラス

六 對A作戦準備トシテ新ニ兵員 萬

船舶 萬噸動員(徵用)セラル

1622 B

總札演第十六號 全四部中 第三號 (十六二)

昭和十六年八月二十八日

機密

指 定 者	機 密 保 持
處 理	演習終了後返却

總力我机上演習統監飯村穰

第回總力我机上演習講評

茲一月總力我机上演習ヲ終結スルニ際シ演習作業
 中重要事項ニ付本職ノ所見ヲ述ベ演習員今後ノ
 研究ニ資セントス

第一期演習

一、各演習員ノ提出シタル皇國國是及國策ノ檢討、
 皇國ノ執ルベキ總力我方略及之ニ必要ナル情勢
 判斷ハ一般ニ努力ノ跡ヲ認ムルモ我爭ノ本質及
 總力我ニ關スル原則ノ理解不十分ナルモノ及思索
 考察ノ粗漫ナルモノ少シトセズ

No. 2 /
 當時ニ於ケル演習員ノ基礎知識充分ナラス且作業
 中ノ不足等已ムヲ得ガレ事情アリト雖全演習
 実績ヲモ加味シ今後尚層ノ研究ヲ重ヌルノ要アリ

1622 B

二、第三期演習ニ於テ青國政府ノ外交方針ハ著シク緩和セル当中ノ國際情勢ヲ利用シ総力戦方略ノ彈力性ヲ發揮シ外交ヲ以テ方略ノ目的達成ニ最善ノ努力ヲ盡スノ要アリシモノト認ム例ヘバ對AB關係ニ於テ單ニ對AB衝突ノ遷延ヲ目的トスル外交策ヲ採リタルハ不ナリ

三、第三期演習ニ於テAノ提案ハAニ弱身アリテノ申出トスル情勢判断ハ通ヤルモAノ提案ヲ基礎トスル受身ノ外交ニハ同意シ難シ先方ノ弱身ヲ利用シ寧ロ我ヲ進テ積極的ナル一大提議ヲ爲シAノ敵性除去ヲ試ムル氣概ナカラス而シテ之ガ爲ニハ寧ロNX關係強化ノ必要アルニ着目スルヲ要ス

No22
一、第五期演習ニ於テ對E進出問題ノ検査ハ層々慎重且深刻ナルヲ要ス即單ニ準備完了ニ關スル時期的吟味ノミニ止マラス大勢趨向ノ洞察當面ノ目的限外進出直否ニ於ケル改戦略相互ノ協力關係國內ノ実情及之ガ対策等各般ニ亘リ深ク検討ノ要アリシモノナリ

B 五. 对 A B E 戰爭遂行能力之判断之関シテハ資料ト付向トノ關係上限定セル部分ニ就キ其要領ヲ試ミシメタルモノナルカ右範圍ニ於テハ志ノ作業ト認ム特ニ其ノ研究態カノ眞摯ナリコトハ大ニナリ

而シテ之カ實際ノ場合ニ在リテハ人的物的靜的動的各敵ノ諸元ニ亘リ軍民兩相互ノ分野及關聯ヲ検討スルト共ニ此等一切ヲ綜合的ニ企圖シ地域的ニ N M C ヲ包括シ付向的ニハ全戰爭期間ヲ包含セザルベクハス
尚右企圖カ全活動ヲ開始スルニ至ル期間ノ判断ハ不十分ニシテ甚ダ短キニ失ス

一六. 对 E 武力進出カニ於テハ改戦兩略一致ノ活動ハ甚ダ不十分ナリ

廟議既ニ武力進出ニ決定スル以後ニ於テハ依數ヲ容易ナラシムルヲ外交戰ヲ始メ思想戰經濟戰ノ各敵ニ亘リ統一セヨ方針ニ基キ諸施策ヲ遂行ス
深ニ展開スベキモノナリ即チ A B ヲ弛緩センメテ

No. 24

1622 B

各個專破ヲ容易ニシテ油断セシメテ奇襲ノ機
会ヲ構成スルコト等是ナリ
殊ニ企圖ノ秘匿乃至偽騙ヲ行ヒツ、而カモ國
家總力ノ集中ヲ完結スル爲ニ顯著ナル具體的
目標ノ下ニ統一的国家總力ノ全活動ヲ展
開スベキモノナリ

一八、第六期演習末期、情勢ニ於テ對AB圍戰問題
ヲ輕クニ取扱ヒタルハ亦ナリ、E進出後AB未ダ起
ザルノ情況ニ於テ先制圍戰ノ利ヲ失ハザルヲ念
頭ニ置キツ、對AB戰ヲ避ケベキ最後ノ手段ナキ
ヤ、検討ト對AB圍戰ニ伴フ重大ナル結果ニ付更ニ
慎重考慮ヲ要ス

(註) 研究、便宜上假ニN×條約ニ基クNノ
考戦ハ自動的ナラズトノ解釈ノ下ニ本演習
ヲ実施セシメタリ

一九、然レドモ中期演習初期、情勢ニ於テ尚對AB
圍戰ノ決断ニ缺ケタルハ遺憾ナリ情勢急轉シ
ABノ對N意志ハ明瞭トナリ大勢ハ重圍ノ自主的

1622 B.

打開ヲ必要トシ而モ北方ノ安全感今日ノ如キハ未
ダ曾テ非ズ即對AB開戦決断ノ好機ト謂
フベシ

二〇、對AB開戦ニ伴フ對外措置ニ關シ豫メカニ委
員會が一応ノ研究ヲ遂ゲ之ニ基キ青國政府ノ執
リタル措置ハ概ネ適當ナリ

但シ對AB戦争目的(出師名目及終局ノ構和條
件)及對入單據不備和申入レニ付テハ尚研究ノ餘地
アリ

二五、九期演習ニ於テEPQ方面ニ於ケルAB勢カ
カヲ概ネ驅逐シ且A海軍ノ主力ヲ盡破シタル情況
ニ於テハ更メテ今後ノ對AB戦争指導ノ方針ヲ
考定スルノ要アリモト認ム

No. 25
二六、對D我國力判断ハ前回ノ對ABEニ於ケル
モノニ比シ其要領進歩ノ跡マルハ否ナリ然レドモ國家
存亡ノ狄ニ於ケル非常手段ニ付テハ更ニ獨創的研
究工夫ヲ望ム

總機演第十三號ノ三(案)

昭和十六年八月二十三日(〇八三〇交付)

總力戰机上演習統監 飯村 穰

第一回總機演第九期演習追加情況及課題

〔一〕昭和十七年九月下旬ニ至ル情況

一、七月十日廟議ハ対D兩戦ニ決シ八月一日作戰行動開始。M D 五境附近ニ於テハ各所ニ相争、戦闘ヲ惹起セルモ爾後大ナル抵抗無クN軍ノ急追ノタメ九月下旬迄ニハ極東陸軍ノ大半ヲ懷滅シ又其ノ海空軍ノ大部ヲ殺滅スルト共ニR要域ヲ占領確保セリ。D五ハ戦線ヲ後退セシメ長期抗戦ヲ呼號ニツツアルモ其ノ持久力ハ疑問ナリ

七、春季以來ノMノ対D B 大攻勢ハN五ノ作戰ト相俟ツテ顯著ナル効果ヲ收メタルモ未ダ決定的ナラズ。是界動乱ノ終局ニ因シテハ何人モ豫測ヲ許ササル實狀ナリ

1622 cert-1

証 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號

國 際 檢 察 部 第一六二二號

典據及び公正ニ關スル證明

余、栗山廉平ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ内閣書記官トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、

頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ八

月附、下記題名、即チ總力戰研究所ニ依リ發行サレ

タル**機密**第一回總力戰机上演習關係書類ノ文書ノ

保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及び文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ

ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類

及び綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番

號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書

ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

内閣書記官室

1622 cert-2

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月六日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 栗山廉平／署名及官印／

右ノ者ノ公的資格 内閣書記官

證 人 ヒラマツカヅミチ

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、E.W.フライシヤハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月六日

東京ニ於テ署名

Eric W. F. Jelisha. 2nd Lt
米陸軍情報部少尉 エリック・ダブ
リユ・フライシヤ

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際檢察部調査官

證 人 ゼイ・エイ・カーティス
/ J.A. Curtis /

DOCUMENT NO. 1622-B

Photostat - Translate as Indicated

Third page of exhibit: Cover Sheet of Document

Shows table Top Maneuvers divided into periods from June 11, August 31, 1941 and the gist of the work.

Pages 6 to 14, following II, Pink Sheet: but translate and photostat only, part I:

Purpose of Maneuvers is to produce as policy for total war.

Part IV:

Criticism of the Maneuvers.

Part V:

The adjustment of the results (smoothing out the kinks)

Part VI:

Specially designated symbols.

Page 7, following III Pink Sheet:

Containing a chart giving draft of a hypothesis for the leaders of the Maneuver during periods 3 to 9; things to be done depending upon changing conditions as set forth.

Page 9, following V Pink Sheet:

On July 24, 1941 at a Liaison conference it was decided that Japan should speed war preparations in order to move south against Netherlands East Indies.

Page 12, following Pink Sheet V:

The title sheet sets forth the "Titles, subjects and work for the 2nd Maneuver period for the 1st Table Top Maneuver."

Also pages 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, following pink sheet V:

This sets forth table of contents for matter within several hundred pages and gives the scope of the Institutes work.

(Photostat-Translation Cover Sheet, Doc. No. 1622 Cont'd)

Also the following pages of the textual matter referred to by Table of Contents Page 21001, except 3 lines; gives definition of Greater East Asia, including Australia.

Page 21002; statement about full preparation for opening war against United States and Britain.

Pages 21008, 21009; deals with leadership policy for a war of force with Great Britain and United States.

Page 10 - 1)
Page 10 - 2) Following Pink Sheet IX

Shows maneuvers situation and subjects for the sixth term of the 1st Table; gives attitude of high command towards movement south into Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China.

Page 10 - 8) Supplementary situation for the sixth term maneuvers;
Page 10 - 9) August 15, 1941.
(Marked secret and stamped as being received by Commerce and Industry Ministry as of August 21, 1941)

Shows hypothetical situation in middle 10 days of November 1941, example: Japanese Army on November 15 initiates movements and after several days when its forces have been fully mobilized a certain number of strong points of the East Indies have been taken by sudden attack. The East Indies have announced that she will resist Japan aggression and are requesting help from United States and Great Britain.

Part I following Pink Sheet XV:

Criticism by Imura (Head) after completion of Maneuver dated August 28, 1941.

P 1 - all

P 2 - lines 1 - 4

P 6 - last line

P 7 - lines 1-7

P 8 - all

P 8 - all

P 9 - lines 1-8

P 10 - all

P 11 - 1-4

P 12 - last line

P 13 - all

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1622

15 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: File re "First Table Top Maneuvers," published by Total War Research Institute and marked "Top Secret."

Date: Aug 1941 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Cabinet Secretariat.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: IIMURA, Izuru (or Minoru) (head of Institute). Japanese Gov't (1941 Aug-Dec)

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Planning and preparation aggressive warfare; background Japanese-American negotiations.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains complete general plans for opening of war against allied powers by Japan, written by Total War Research Institute, particularly by Chief. (Interrogation of said Chief suggested to establish connection of Institute with government.)

Plans are written in August of 1941, cover from Sept 41 to June 42, divided into ten coded periods.

Fact that (1) moves as described in these plans closely coincide with actual events; (2) this document and others like it found in cabinet secretariat, suggest value as evidence.

Page 1 indicates as object: "Study and Performance of Total War Against A, B, (C)." (Note: In code table, A-America, B-Britain, C-China, D-Russia, E-Dutch East Indies, P-Philippines, X-Germany) etc.

Doc. No. 1622
Page 1

"Coincidences" include the following:

(1) In middle of Sept. X (Germany) is to request N (Japan) to declare war on A (America) if X is involved in war with A, in accordance with NX treaty. (pp. 8-2)

(2) Foresees proposal latter part of September of American proposal of Japanese withdrawal from FIC and peace in China, hardening of Japanese-American negotiations. (p. 8-8)

(3) Middle of October T (Thailand) is to provide rice and tin for Japan by treaty, but refuses to provide bases for N, prior to war with B (Britain). (p. 9-2)

(4) Preparations for war against E begun in F (FIC) and T (Thailand) by N in October. In homeland, activity against E together with national mobilization simultaneously begun. (p. 10-2)

(5) Activity of "Green Country" (Japan) begins 15 Nov, and soon thereafter operations against E (NEI). (Note: Actually Japanese task forces formed about 20 Nov 1941) (p. 10-5)

(6) Early December "Green Country" completes troop mobilization and preparations for war against "Q" (Malaya) and "P" (Philippines). (pp. 11-1, 11-2)

(7) Japanese ship carrying munitions "sunk illegally" by A off Philippines in "neutral zone" and N opens war against A on 15 Dec 1941 with sudden attack on P (Philippines) (pp. 11-6, 11-7)

(8) End of NEI, Philippines and Malay campaign planned for April-May 1942. (Note: Bataan fell 9 April) (p. 12-6)

Plans for opening attack on Russia July-August 1942, on grounds America using Alaska and Russia for sub bases, also discussed. (p. 13-10)

Includes criticisms of plans, discussion of economic measures, plans for diplomatic strategy, and statement by Iimura (in criticism), that students were indecisive in measures in first part of December, because "then was the time to make up your mind to open a war with A & B." (end of p. 2)

65

113
65

1

1622

"Document relating to the First Table-top
maneuver"

Aug, 1941

The Total-War Institute

This volume would be of highly significant materials to trace back as to what extent Japan had been preparing to conduct the War. In fact, the military clique seems to have been training young government officials, mostly civilians for war under the cloak of "a table-top sham-war" under a prescribed plan. In this maneuver the government is represented as the SEI-KOKU (which seems to be an abbreviated form of SEITOSHU (Dragon-gly state) an old designation of Japanese Island), and all nations related to the war are represented by notations for which keys are furnished giving distinctly the names of nations.

Y. Tasaki

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65-

(2)

1st page

Program - Under date of June 11, 1941
NIIMURA, Izuru, Superintendent of the institute
forecasted the program as follows:

Remarks	1st Manoeuvres	2nd Manoeuvres
Date	Middle June/Sept, 1941	Middle Dec. ¹⁹⁴¹ / Feb. 1942
Object	Study + performance of Total-War against A, B (C).	Study + performance of Total-war against D (C).
Commander	Superintendent of TWRI	Same
Assistant	Secretary to	"
"	MATSUDA, member	WATANABE, member

Officers + Umpires | Participation of a part of the members of the institute and concurrent members (a part of the students), General Headquarters and Government officials.

GIST | Manoeuvres to be conducted by whole or a part of first term students, who are to ~~practice~~ ^{exercise} judgment determination and ^{estimation} ~~measure~~ by being given a certain task.

N^o 4

Instructions for carrying out Table-top
maneuver I.

Date, Aug 1, 1941

N^o 4 - annex 1.

(7) pp 1/11

Ditto.

(7) = pp 1/11 Circumstances and ~~tasks~~ ^{Problems of}
periods 3rd to 9th. (Basic projects)
Date: July 30, 1941.

(To be kept secret to members of maneuvers)

[T.N. Circumstances described appear to refer to the
actual international condition current at the
time.]

(8) pp 1/9 Ditto for 4th ^{Period} ~~term~~ (September) ~~plan~~

Dated Aug. 9, 1941.

(9) pp 1/10 Ditto for 5th ^{Period} ~~term~~ (October) ~~plan~~

Dated Aug. 12, 1941.

(10) pp 1/7 Ditto for 6th ~~term~~ (November) ~~plan~~

Dated Aug. 14, 1941.

(11) pp 1/8 Ditto for 7th ^{period} ~~term~~ (December) ~~plan~~

Dated Aug. 18, 1941 -

(12) pp 1/8 Ditto for 8th ^{period} ~~term~~ (Jan. 1942) ~~plan~~

Dated Aug 19, 1941

pp 13 - ^{Problems of} Circumstances and ~~Tasks~~ 9th term.
(April + May 1942) ~~plus~~
pp 1/14. Dated Aug. 21, 1941.

Nº 5 p 1. Circumstances ^{Problems of} ~~Tasks~~ for 1st term Maneuver.
Date given June 11, 1941.

Nº 6 Circumstances & Tasks for 2nd term Maneuver
Date given July 12, 1941.

A table giving names of ³⁶ students is attached.

" (5) Answers for the tasks for 1st Top-table maneuver.
This section consists of somewhat voluminous pages as the answers cover a wide range of national politics under mobilization.

Nº 7 - 11 pp. Circumstances & Tasks for 3rd term Maneuver
Date given Aug 8, 1941.

Nº 8 - 11 pp. Ditto for 4th term Maneuver.
Date given, Aug 8 1941

Nº 9 - 35 pp Ditto for 5th Term Maneuver
Date given, Aug 12, 1941.

Nº 10. - 14 pp. Ditto for 6th Term Maneuver
Date given Aug 14th 1941

Nº 11(-12 pp) Circumstances and Tasks for 7th Term Maneuver

Date given, Aug 16th, 1941.

Nº 12 (28 pp) Ditto for 8th Term Maneuver

Date given, Aug. 19th 1941.

Nº 13 (18 pp) Ditto, for 9th Term

Date given, Aug. 21, 1941.

Nº 14 (2 pp) Ditto, for 10th Term.

Date given, Aug. 21, 1941

Nº 15

Table-Top maneuver ~~Investigation Association,~~
~~Investigation Society,~~
a society to criticize the measures adopted
by the students in their function as
government officials.

Date, Aug 28, 1941.

Nº 16

Criticism by Commander - Tuzuru NIIMURA

Nº 17-1

Criticism on military ~~war~~ war

Nº 17-2

" on diplomatic - war

Nº 17-3

" on Thought - war

Nº 17-4

" on Economic - war

Proj. NO. 113
S.A. No. 15022-I
SACK NO. -
Item No. 65

CRITICISM ON THE ^{THE 1st} SHAM-TOTAL WAR MANEUVER, Aug 28 '41
By Minoru IIMURA, Superintendent

IIMURA, the Superintendent^{sent} addressed the students of the first sham-total war maneuver.

"In closing the first sham-war, I am going to disclose my views on the important points in the maneuver operation. I hope you will add something to your further study of the maneuver through my comment."

The First Period of the Maneuver
1, pp. 1-2. "I can ^{generally} appreciate your devotion that is apparently seen in your submitted plans in which you have earnestly inquired into the Imperial Policy, the national measures for the situation, the total-war strategy to be practised by our Empire with the judgement pertaining to the strategy. However, it is regrettable to find that some of you have not been well qualified in comprehending the basic principles of the total-war and the nature of wars, and that not a few of you have treated with the total-war superficially, thoughtlessly somehow."

"I am well aware that you could not afford to make yourselves fully prepared for the maneuver, and still more there was not plenty of time for operation of the maneuver, but I advise you that you should take this result into consideration and apply yourselves to the study furthermore from now forth."

P. 10

The Sixth Period of the maneuver

"It is your fault that you dealt so carelessly with the problem of declaring war on the supposed enemies A and B despite the unfavorable situation in the end of the sixth maneuver. Under such a situation that E (JAPAN?) had already advanced forwards while A (AMERICA?) and B (BRITAIN?) have not yet stood on foot, you had better consider not to lose the advantage that E (JAPAN?) had acquired previously. You should have fully recognize the grave consequence following the war with A and B. You should have contemplate more tentatively whether there was still left any ^{ultimate} measures to avoid the war with A and B.

(Note: the maneuver was practised ^{under} the assumption

that N (RUSSIA?) would not resort to arms because E and N had concluded NX treaty (Neutrality Agreement?). This assumption was set up chiefly in convenience of studying.)

But it is regrettable that you were so indiscreet in proclamation of war on A and B under the first stage of the Seventh Maneuver despite the advantageous situation. All of sudden the situation has changed. A and B's intention toward N ^{have} become apparent. The situation needs E's (JAPAN?) own exertion to solve the urgent problem of ring-offensiveness by A and B; we have never encountered such a crisis on the north front as is today. It must be said ^{that} now is the best chance to make up your mind to open a war with A and B.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. *1622*

Date *13 May 1946*

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: *File Re "First Table Top Maneuvers"*
Published by Total War Research Institute, and Marked "Top Secret."
Date: *August 1941* Original Copy Language: *Japanese.*
Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc. Div

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *Cabinet Secretariat*
(or Ministry)
PERSONS IMPLICATED: *IIMURA, IZURU (head of Institute)*
Japanese Govt (1941 Aug - Dec)

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:
Planning and Preparation Aggressive Warfare;
Background of Japanese-American Negotiations.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains complete general plans
for opening of war against allied Powers
by Japan, written by Total War Research
Institute, particularly by chief. (Interrogation of
said chief suggested to establish connection of
Institute with government).
Plans are written in August 1941,
cover period from Sept '41 to June 1942, divided
(cont p. 2)

Analyst: *WJF Wagner*

Doc. No.

into ten coded periods ~~as follows~~

Fact that 1) moves as described in these plans closely coincide with actual events,
2) ~~These~~ This document and others like it found in cabinet secretariat, suggest value as evidence.

Page 1, indicates ~~volume concerned with~~ as object: "Study and Performance of ^{Total} War against A, B, C" (Note: In code table, A = America, B = Britain, C = China, D = Russia, E = Dutch East Indies, P = Philippines, X = Germany) etc.

"Coincidences" include the following:

- 1) ~~In~~ In ~~the~~ middle of Sept. X (Germany) is to request N ^(Japan) to declare war on A (America) if ~~it~~ ^{it} is involved in war with A, in accordance with NX treaty. (p. 8-2)
- 2) Foresee proposal letter sent 7 September of American proposal of Japanese withdrawal from FIC and peace in CHINA, heralding ↑ Japanese-American negotiations. (p. 8-8)

1622
3) ~~later part of~~ Middle ^{of October (T)} ~~of Thailand~~ (Thailand)
is to provide rice and tin for Japan
by treaty, but refuses to provide
bases for N, prior to war with B (Britain).
(p. 9-2).

4) Preparations for war against E begun in
F (FIC) and ~~E~~ T (Thailand) by N in October.
In homeland, activity against E together with national
mobilization simultaneously begun. (p. 10-2)

5) Activity of "Green Country" (Japan)
begins 15 Nov., + ~~soon~~ ^{soon} thereafter
operations against E (NEI). (Note: Actually
Japanese task forces formed about 20 Nov. 1941)
(p. 10-5).

6) Early December "Green Country" completes
troop mobilization + preparations for war against "Q" (MALAYA).
~~pp. 11-1~~ and "P" (Phillipines). (pp. 11-1, 11-2)

7) Japanese ship carrying munitions supposedly
"sunk illegally" by A off Phillipines in "neutral
zone" and N opens war against A on ¹⁵ Dec 1941

4,

1622

with sudden attack on P (Philippines). (pp. 11-6, 11-7).

8). Part of NEI, Philippines and Malay Campaign ^{planned} ~~forecast~~ for April-May 1942. (Note: ^{Bataan} ~~Bataan~~ fell 9 April.) (pp. 12-6).

Plans for opening attack on Russia. ^{August} July, 42, on grounds America using Alaska ^{and} Russia for sub bases, also discussed, (p. 13-10).

Includes criticisms of plans, discussion of economic measures, ~~the~~ plans for diplomatic ~~strategy~~ strategy, and a statement by IIMURA ~~that~~ (in criticism), that students were indecisive in measures in first part of December, because " ^{There was} ~~that~~ the time to make up your mind to open a war with A + B." (end of p. 12)

917

Second Period

2. To Japanese troops, the true relations of sovereign and subjects ⁱⁿ exercising force is especially necessary. The Japanese troops shall move ^{to} ~~for~~ declare the Imperial way and manifesting moral and shall never move immorally. This is the substance of Japanese troops and is not a mere implement of name or propaganda.

1622

Seventh Period

11. It is too clear that this situation requires a resolution. The situation changes from time to time and if one lacks in seizing the opportunity, loses every circumstance. During this manoeuvre, there is almost not a single case of plain resolution being made. The resolution belongs to one of the necessary factors in war. Reconsiders carefully. Namely for seizing fighting opportunity, it is necessary to make resolution prior to the enemy, to complete preparations before the happening of the event and further to form opportunity by positive methods and take resolution by seizing the opportunity.

12. The acquisition of SHANGHAI is first to be carried out at N by military occupation and it is proper to adjust in due course. On that occasion, it is necessary to arrange to have the subsistence problem of the inhabitants tackled by the administrative bureau as before.

~~does not allow her to~~ force her to do.

XI State of affairs in the
beginning of December.

Aug. 16, 1941.

1. The progress of battles:

(1) The war with E is going on well. Blue Country's forces, finishing the occupation of the land near the landing points, are progressing towards the inner strategic points. ^{A part of the} materials acquired are now ^{being} sent to Japan, but it will be some time till the required quantity can be acquired.

E navy retreats to S (Singapore) and G (Australia) and seems not to attack, having ~~she has~~ lost a part of her vessels.

VIII State of affairs at the beginning
and the middle of September

Aug. 8, 1941.

IIMURA, Minoru.

6. In the middle of Sept. X (Germany) is to request N (Japan) to declare war on A (America) ^{immediately} because the action of A means the attack ^{as} ~~which~~ defined in the NX Treaty and X is obliged to reply with arms.

VIII — p. 2

IX State of affairs at the beginning
and the middle of October.

Aug. 12, 1941.

IIMURA, Minoru

- In the middle of October ~~is~~
(5) T (Thailand) is to provide ~~in the middle of October~~ rice, tin and rubber for Japan by treaty, but refuses to provide ^{military} bases before the opening of NB war ~~because~~ with the excuse that B oppresses T with force and that the ~~state~~ political conditions

PP. 1, 2, 7, 8, 13-10, 13-11,
13-12, 21001, 21002, 21008, ~~23106,~~
~~23107, 23202, 23301-23302,~~
~~24049-24050.~~ J-E

==

no. 1

Translator HARA, Masanori

Proj. No. 113

S. A. No. 15022-I

Top Secret

No. 98 of Total 120

SUBJECT: Documents regarding Theoretical
Maneuvers of Total War No. 1.

Title

Regulations for the enforcement of the
"Document related to First ~~Shan~~ Total War
Maneuvers," no. 98 of 120 volumes, published
by (Total War Research Institute, August, 1941)
and marked "Top Secret."

Dated August 1941

By Total War Institute

Article 1

The object of the maneuver shall be to make

the first-term students of this institute practice the concrete

measures of operating total war as high-class leaders and to

study total war fundamentally and comprehensively. (p. 1)

Article 12

The following specific marks shall be used

for the names of countries, places, etc. in this maneuver

No. 2.

Reserving
for the purpose of observing secrecy.

A = U. S. A.

B = Britain

D = U. S. S. R.

N = Japan

Russian Territories in the Far East
R = Far Eastern Russian Occupied Area

(p. 7)

5. The Guiding Principle of Armed Warfare
Principles for guidance of military war

(5.) Against D (The Soviet Union).

Against D (the USSR) we strengthen the defences in

(Manchuria) are to be north M and avert military war as much as possible

until our disposal of the south would be brought to a

pause. But in case that D is threatened to collapse

in D-X war, or that D is going to commence hostile

activities against N (Japan) or (America) that Axis going to advance into

R (the Soviet Far East) by force, or that the opening of war became necessary

according to other circumstances, we enter into war

taking an opportunity and occupy the strategically important

areas in R (the Soviet Far East) (p. 2/008)

(3)

p.3 a tabulated plan for manoeuvre

p.7. Keys

- A = U.S.A. B = Britain C = China
- D = Soviet E = Dutch E. Indies F = French Ind. China
- G = Australia H = Hawaii I = India
- J = ^(Mandates Island) Inner South Seas K = Canada L = Central + South America
- M = Mandukuo N = Japan O = Borneo
- P = Phillipines Q = Malay R = Far Eastern Russian, ^{Occupied} Area
- S = Singapore T = Thai U = Vladivostok
- V = Burma W = ^{Alaskan and} Aleutian area. X = Axis
- (X¹ = Germany; X² = Italy)

[The ~~Shan Government~~ ministers and officers of the
 pseudo-government are given in Table ^{opposite} page 7.]

(4)

(Table Top)

S of No. 13, ~~Shan~~ Total War Maneuvers (plan)

August 23, 1941 (submitted at 0830)

(Table Top)

Superintendent of ~~Shan~~ Total War Maneuvers

IIMURA, IZUMI (of Minoru)

Additional Situations and Problems of 9th Period Manuever

(Table Top)

of First ~~Shan~~ Total War Maneuvers

up to

[I.] Situations ~~until~~ the latter part of September, 1942

W

The

1. In the cabinet meeting of July 10 it was decided to open

the opening of

war against D (Soviet Union) and the military operations were commenced

on August 1. Substantial hostilities occurred in many

fighting

places around the M-D (Manchuria - The USSR) frontier; but thereafter there was

not

not major resistance. As the result of the Japanese sp

by N^(Japan) Army, and a large part of it
 pursuit, a greater part of the far eastern army, navy
 and air forces ^{were} destroyed and the important areas ^{of}
 (the Soviet Far East)
 "R" ¹⁹⁴⁰ were occupied and secured until the latter part of
 September

D^(Soviet Union) retreated its front and is showing long-term
 resistance, but its endurance is doubtful. (pp. 13-10-

13-11)

7. The #s great offensive ^(the axis powers) against D^(the USSR) and B^(great Britain) since ~~the~~

spring, reaped conspicuous effects corresponding with the
 N's ^(Japan's) operations, but is not yet decisive. ~~It is in the~~
 condition that anyone cannot afford to precast the conclusion
 of the world disturbance. (p. 13-12)

(1) sphere of
 (The Soviet East) (Burma) (including them), north of G (Australia) (not including it)
 East longitude
 and west of the 180th degree of east longitude, centering
 on N, M and C. (Japan, Manchuria & China).

2. Principles for guidance of total war

(3) As for the north, we facilitated X's disposal of D under the pressure of our military power, and watch the fulfillment of N-D neutral treaty and design economic advance by the diplomatic measures. We endeavor to avert [unclear] of arms to be averted military war as long as the circumstances permit. However, force of arms will be used. But we may use arms if really necessary.

Ex 686-A

Document No. 1622

Page 1

Document Relative to the Maneuvers
for Total War.

August 1941

No. 98 of 120 volumes.

The Total War Research Institute.

RETURN TO ROOM 361
COPY

Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War, No. 2

11 June (16 SHOWA) 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers
for total war,

IIMURA, Yuzuru

We have decided on the enforcement plan of the first theoretical maneuvers for total war for 1941 as per the attached.

(partly revised on 11, July)

Attached List of the first theoretical maneuvers for total war, No. 2.

The Enforcement Plan of the First Theoretical
Maneuvers for Total War.

Month	Date	Day	Morn- ing	After- noon	Term	Imagi- nary	The Outline of Operations	Remarks
June	Middle	end	Delivery of problem		The first phase of man- euvers	Inter- nal & Exter- nal situa- tions main- tain their pres- ent condi- tion.	The following personal work are given to all of the post-gradu- ates: 1. The in- vestigation of our na- tional policy. 2. strateg- ic plan- ning for total warfare. 3. The judg- ing of situa- tion neces- sary for the above.	The maneu- ver will be di- rected mos- tly by the assis- tant super- visor MATSUDA. 2) Each mem- ber of the Bureau will give neces- sary in- structions.
July	first							
July	middle	end	Delivery of problem.		The second phase of man- euvers	"	The principle organs of Blue land will be con- stituted by all of the post-gradu- ates and they will be re- quired to do the following work: 1. The	All the mem- bers of the Bureau will participate in directing the maneu- vers accord- ing to par- tial charge (designated separately).
August	middle	and last						

					planning of total war strategies. 2. Preparations for the development of total war strategies.	Review-period.
Sept.	4 Thursday	Judgement	Third Term of	The period of trained national relations.	Imaginary situation is given to the principal organs of Blue land, & the management of the situation will be studied.	Henceforward the maneuvers will be directed under the following organization: 1) Supervisory Div. Super-Head
	5 Friday		Maneuvers.		1) Completion of preparation for total warfare within and abroad.	visor of the Bureau
	6 Saturday	Judgement off	The Fourth Phase of	The period of trained national relations.	2) Preparation of armed warfare. The directing of psychological and economic warfare.	Secretary Matsu
	7 Sunday	Holiday	Maneuvers.		3) The decision for war.	Help-er
	8 Monday				4) The directing of total war after this decision.	2) The judging division for armed warfare.
	9 Tuesday	Judgement	The Fifth Phase of	The period when war is inevitable.	5) Directing the outbreak of war.	3) The judging division for diplomatic warfare.
	10 Wednesday		Maneuvers.		6) Directing of total war immediately after the outbreak of war.	4) The judging division for psychological warfare.
	11 Thursday	Judgement	The Sixth Phase of	Half a month after outbreak of war.	7) Directing of total warfare during wartime according to circumstances.	5) The judging division for economic warfare.
	12 Friday		Maneuvers.		8) The maneuvers will be suspended on the morning of the 20th.	6) The judging division for international situations.
	13 Saturday	Judgement off	The Seventh Phase of	A month after.		(Note) The respective divisions constitute of the members and part-time member of the Bureau and government officials outside the Bureau. The particulars will be decided separately.
	14 Sunday	Holiday	Maneuvers.			
	15 Monday					
	16 Tuesday	Judgement	Eighth Phase	Three months after.		
	17 Wednesday					
	18 Thursday	Judgement	Ninth Phase	Six months after.		
	19 Friday					
	20 Saturday	off				

Sept.	21 Sun- day	Holiday	Tenth		1) Drafting of criti- cism.	
	22 Mon- day	Judgement	Phase of		2) Prepara- tions for the Research Meeting.	
	23 Tues- day	Holiday	Maneu- vers.			
	24 Wed- nes- day				1) Research Meeting.	Outside officials will be requested to partici- pate in the meet- ing.
	25 Thurs- day				2) Criticism (After this the maneuvers will be concluded.)	
	26 Fri- day					
	27 Satur- day		The arrange- ment of the re- sults of the maneu- ver.		1) The arrange- ment of the results of the maneuvers.	The arrangemer of maneuve records, and the arrangemen of the re- sults of research by each member of the Bureau
	28 Sun- day	Holiday			2) Research for the future.	
	29 Mon- day					
	30 Tues- day					

Remarks:

- (1) Judgment stands for judgment conference.
- (2) Graph shows the operation of all the members concerned.
- (3) The prescriptions for the carrying out of maneuvers and the principles of instruction (items for investigation) will be decided separately.

Prescriptions for the Execution of
the First Theoretical Maneuver for
Total War.

Part I. The Object of the Maneuvers

Article I. The object of this maneuver is to let the first term post-graduates of this Research Bureau practice definite measures for total warfare, as well as to make fundamental and thoroughgoing researches on it as superior executives.

Article II. The following are the principal items which should be studied and practiced during the maneuvers:

- 1) The national policy and object which should be propagandized within and abroad.
- 2) Strategies for total warfare to be adopted by our Empire.
- 3) The points in drafting part of the various plans necessary for the execution of total warfare.
- 4) The main points of consolidating and strengthening positions for total warfare.
- 5) The outline for directing total warfare.
- 6) Part of a definite policy for the execution of psychological, economic and diplomatic warfares against a specific country.
- 7) Directing organs for total warfare, and directing organs for psychological, economic and diplomatic warfare.
- 8) Other matters recognized as necessary for the execution of total warfare by Japan.

Article III. The particulars of items for investigation and practice mentioned in the preceding articles are prescribed separately in the outline of maneuver instructions.

Section IV.

Article 9. When the research meetings on the tenth term maneuvers are over, the Supreme Commander will comment on it for the benefit of those who participated in the maneuver.

The main points on which comments will be made are approximately as follows:

1. Whether the plans set up beforehand were suitable or not.
2. Whether the maneuvers execution of the plans were carried properly or not.
3. Whether ex post facto research was carried out properly or not.
4. Whether proper discipline was maintained during the maneuvers or not.
5. Instructions for the future.

Article 10. Following actual maneuvers carried out under estimated situations (or after the conclusion of the ninth term maneuvers), each umpire department shall submit materials for comment to the Supreme Commander. Each umpire department, however, must adjust beforehand the opinions of the umpires belonging to that department regarding the materials for comment.

The draft of the comments shall be made by the critics' council. The members who are to attend the council meeting shall be specially designated.

Section V. - Gathering the Results of the Maneuvers.

Article 11. Each staff member of this Institute shall, depending on his assignment, arrange and preserve the records of the maneuvers as well as the opinions, etc., on the items for research and matters which should be improved concerning the plans of the maneuvers, or report them to other organizations which require such information.

Section VI. - Specific Symbols.

Article 12. In order to preserve secrecy, specific symbols given in the following list shall be used in place of the names of the nations and places, etc., which will be used in the maneuvers:

A. U. S. A.	B. Britain	C. China
D. The Soviet Union	E. Dutch East Indies	F. French Indo-China
G. Australia	H. Hawaii	I. India
J. Inner South Sea	K. Canada	L. Central & S. America
M. Manchukuo	N. Japan	O. Borneo
P. Philippine Islands	Q. Malay	R. Far Eastern Regions of the Soviet Union.
S. Singapore	T. Thailand	
U. Vladivostok	V. Burma	
W. Aleutian and Alaskan regions	X. The Axis Powers	
	X ₁ , Germany	
	X ₂ , Italy.	

Program for directing the Third to Ninth Term Maneuvers, inclusive, in the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

The Term of Maneuvers	Imaginary Time	"Date of Enforcement Date (Day)"	Hour	Functions for directing the maneuvers	The assembled empires	The principal maneuver items.
Third Term	August 16 Shawa 1941	6 Wednesday	08:30	The opening of the maneuver. The supervisor's address. The explanation of the situation for the third term. Explanations concerning the Empires will follow in the same way.	C scope	(1) Negotiations with A and the economic demands thereof.
			09:30			
		7 Thursday	09:00	Secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country to the supervising section.	D scope	(2) The reply to A and D
			13:00 14:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 August. The criticism regarding this. Delivery and explanation of supplementary situations.	B scope	(3) The preparations of war against D and (A).
The Fourth Term	September	8 Friday	08:30	The presentation of the measures to be taken until the end of August. The criticism regarding this. Discussion of the situation for the Fourth Term.	A scope	
			10:30			
			14:30 15:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation for the Fourth Term.	C scope	(1) Continuation of No. 1 in the preceding term.
		9 Saturday	11:00	Secret report to the supervisors on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) The response to A concerning the "A" Treaty.
		11 Monday	08:30 10:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 September. The criticism regarding this. Announcement and explanation of additional situations.	B scope	(3) Measures against the stiffening attitude between A and H.
The Fifth Term		12 Tuesday	08:30 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of September. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation for the fifth term.	A scope	

The Fifth Term (cont'd)	September	12 Tuesday	14:30 15:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation	C scope	(1) The reply to X.
	October	13 Wednesday	09:00	The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Measures against the suspension of the commercial relations with A, B, E and L.
			14:00 15:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 October. The criticism regarding this. The announcement and explanation of additional situations.	B scope	
The Sixth Term	November	14 Thursday	08:00 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Oct. The criticism thereof. The announcement and discussion of the situation of the sixth term.	A scope	(3) Measures in regard to the resolution to advance into E.
			14:30 15:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation of the sixth term.	C scope	(1) Resolution to hasten actions against E.
	15 Friday	10:00	The secret report to the supervisory section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Negotiations with D.	
		14:00 15:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 Nov. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situation.	B scope		
		16 Saturday	08:30 10:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Nov. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the seventh term.	A scope	(3) Measures for commencing the advance into E.
13:00 13:30	The announcement and explanation of the situation of the seventh term.		C scope	(1) The resolution for 'P' operations and the measures thereof.		
The Seventh Term	December	18 Monday	10:00	The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Measures against B and D.
			14:00 15:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 Dec. The criticism thereof. The announcement of the additional situations.	B scope	
		19 Tuesday	08:30 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Dec. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the eighth term.	A scope	(3) The measures in accordance with the outbreaks of war between N and A, B.

Doc 1622

The Eighth Term

From
January
to March
17 SHC.A
(1942)

20 Wednesday

14:30
15:00
10:00

The announcement and explanation of the situation of the eighth term.

The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.

The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Feb. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of additional situations.

The presentation of the measures to be taken until the end of March. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the eighth term.

The announcement and explanation of the situation of the ninth term.

The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of June. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situations.

The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of August. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situations.

The presentation of the works of each participant. Maneuver to be stopped.

C scope

D scope

B scope

A scope

C scope

B scope

B scope

D scope

- (1) The measures against the air-raid on Tokyo.
- (2) The measures towards the diet.
- (3) The measures towards D and L.
- (4) The economic and political measures towards E, F, T, P and Q.

- (1) The continuation of the No. 4 in the preceding term.
- (2) The measures in relations with D.
- (3) The resolution of war against D.
- (4) The total war strategies to be taken by the Blue country hence-forward.

The Ninth Term

From
April
to
October

22 Friday

14:30
15:00
10:00
11:00

23 Saturday

08:30
09:00
12:00

REMARKS:

The assembled judges: A scope - all the judges if possible. B scope - the principal judges of each section. C scope - the concerning judges of each section. D scope - judges having special concerns.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total
Warfare, No. 6 -- 3

No. 098 of the 100 volumes

24 July, Showa 16, 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers
for the total warfare:

JIMURA, Yuzuru

(1) The Situation. As a result of the liaison conference with the Supreme Command of the Government on July 24th regarding the strategy of total warfare, we have agreed on the following unanimously.

1. Blue land, from necessity, will promote all preparations for the object of advancing into E on a favorable occasion, if no special circumstances arise.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total
Warfare, No. 6 -- 5

(Secret)

No. 98 of 120 volumes

Designated Distribution	
Maintenance of Secrecy	only for those concerne with the maneuvers.
Disposal	To be returned on con- clusion of the maneuver

The 1st Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War for
1941 (SHOWA 16).

The Report on Activities in Regard to the Subjects
Given for the Second Term of the Maneuvers.

Part I. The national policy of Blue land to be propa-
gandized internally and abroad.

Part II. A part of the plan for total warfare by Blue
land.

Presented on 30 July 1941 (SHOWA 16).

The Government of Blue land

(or the Total Warfare Research Bureau)

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Additional Situations and Problems of
9th Period Maneuver of First Total War
Table Top Maneuvers.

- I. Situations up to the latter part of September 1942.
1. The Cabinet meeting of July 10 decided on the opening of war against D and the military operations were commenced on August 1. Substantial fighting occurred in many places along the M-D frontier, but thereafter there has not been a great resistance. As a result of speedy pursuit by N army, a greater part of the Far Eastern army and a large part of its navy and air forces were destroyed and the important area of "R" was occupied and secured by the latter part of September.

D retired its front and has declared long-term resistance, but its sustaining power is doubtful.
(pp. 13-10 - 13-11)

7. The great offensive by X against D and B since the spring gained conspicuous effects correlative to N's operations, but is not yet decisive. The present situation does not allow anyone to make any assumption as to the conclusion of the world confusion. (p. 13-12)

Part II Plans for Total Warfare for Blue land

Classification I - Programme for Total Warfare
for the Blue land (plan)

No. 1 - The object of total warfare

(1) The object of total warfare is to securely establish the existence of Blue land as well as to exclude the influence of all hostile powers interfering with the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

(2) The present principal hostile countries shall be A, B (including E) and C (Chungkiang Regime), and the secondary hostile country shall be D.

(3) The center of the Greater East Asia Sphere is comprised of N, M and C, R, V, and the areas east of them, also the areas north of G (G itself exclusive), and those west of 180° East Longitude enter into the Greater East Asia sphere. (p. 21001)

No. 2 - Guiding Principle for Total Warfare

(1) Every effort shall be made for the complete execution of the C Incident according to established principles; while at the same time, our position for total warfare shall be completed and strengthened so as to be able to cope immediately wars with other hostile countries.

(2) Our present object in the south lies in the securing of materials and positive advancement shall be projected through political measures.

However, every possible preparation must be made with the determination to resort to arms whenever the circumstances demand. When a war with A and B becomes inevitable, we will take the initiative and ~~declare war~~^{take the initiative}. We will exclude their influences in East Asia, and at the same time endeavor to ~~make~~^{cause} them give up their ~~hostilities~~^{enmity} against us.

(3) Regarding the North, we shall by force of arms facilitate A's disposal of D; and supervise the fulfillment of the neutrality pact between N and D. We shall devise economic advancement by diplomatic means, and avoid armed warfare as far as the situation allows. However, if it is inevitable according to the situation, we shall resort to arms.

(4) Through cooperation with X, we shall strive to realize the plan for an alliance treaty with her, while completing every possible preparation for an initiative war against A and B as a precaution against A's participation in a war with X.

(5) Thereafter, we shall decide on our different plans in accordance with the transitions in the situation, thereby anticipating the achievement of the purposes of total warfare.

The Guiding Principle of Armed Warfare

1. Against C. By avoiding the expansion of occupied areas, we shall execute repeated and active armed actions against the Chungking Regime to destroy her armed power. At the same time, we shall take measures to deprive her people of their will to fight by destroying her establishment and strengthening our economic blockage of her. In the presentation of war against other hostile countries, the principles enumerated in the preceding article shall be strongly maintained in the hope that the consequences will contribute to the surrender of Chungking Government.
2. Against F and T. The spirit of joint defense with F will be strengthened. When the attitude of T is unfriendly towards N, and she does not comply with our demands, and also when A and B try to exclude our influences in T we shall make military advances into T.
3. Against E. If E's attitude towards N is to be aggravated and especially if she refuses to supply us with the necessary materials, we shall make military advance on a favorable occasion with a resolve for war with A and B. In case a war with A and B is inevitable, we shall advance into E.
4. Against A and B. If a war with A and B becomes inevitable, in the event of, for instance, A participating in the war against X, or A completely cutting off all commercial relationship

with N, or danger of armed collision with A and our country, or N being threatened with military invasion by A, we will take the initiative in starting a war and immediately occupy P, Q and E, thereby strengthening our strategic and economic situation; and at the same time, we shall plan to destroy the enemy's military power and to make them abandon their hostilities towards us.

5. Against D. We shall strengthen our defense against D in North M. Although we shall avoid as far as possible any armed warfare until our move in the South is finally concluded, we shall occupy the strategically important areas in R by executing armed warfare at a favorable occasion; that is, when D is near collapse in the D-X war, or when D is about to take hostile action against N, or when A tries to make military advances into R, or whenever war becomes inevitable under any other condition.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War, No. 10
No. 98 of the 120 volumes.

14 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)

(delivered at
1430)

Appointed distributor
Judge Mihidaijo of the Ministry of
Commerce & Industry

Maintenance of secrecy - only for mem-
bers concerned in the maneuvers.

Disposal - to be returned on the conclu-
sion of the maneuver.

Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers
for Total Warfare

IIMURA, Yuzuru

The circumstances and subjects for the Sixth Phase of
Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

- (1) The circumstances in the middle and end of November.
 - A. The international situation.
 1. With the approach of the severe cold of winter, the D-X war is gradually nearing a stalment in the areas east of the River Don, Moscow and Leningrad.
 2. There is not much change in the BX war except that there is an indication of advance towards the Suez and Gibraltar.
 3. There is also no great change in the A-X war. It seems part of A's forces in the Atlantic seem to have commenced a move to the Pacific. A declared war against X on the 1st of November.

4. Although the A, B and (E) troops in the East show no signs as yet of increasing their strengths, they have commenced speedy and large scale defense programs with what troops they have stationed in these areas, while A and B are executing threatening propaganda activities to divert N's movements. Part of Blue land's plans seem to have been intercepted by A, B and E.
 5. As the activities of N's army in the area of C becomes more active, C is also carrying out antagonistic propaganda activities. There is a reliable report that a military treaty has been concluded among A, B and C.
 6. Although conditions in the R district are still strained, there is evidence that troops in this area are decreasing. All is quiet on the D-M border. D shows no definite attitude either to M or B.
- B. The conditions of the supreme command and the army.
1. The supreme command of Blue land desires to carry out the actions already planned against E as early as possible.
 2. The preparations of the supreme command for action against E is now under progress, and all preparations are expected to be completed temporarily by the middle of November.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 10-3

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Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers for
Total Warfare -- IIMURA, Yuzuru

Supplementary situations for the sixth phase of the first
theoretical maneuvers for total warfare.

Supplementary situations for the middle and last part of Novem-
ber.

- (1) The troops of the Blue land commenced to move on 15 Novem-
ber; and after making sudden attacks, they have secured
effectively several important areas in E. (Names of
places and the war situation stated orally, now and here-
after.) The casualties of the Blue land are slight.

- (2) E has declared she will "resist to the utmost the invasion of N", and is asking for the aid of A and B. Although B's garrison troops are withstanding the attack comparatively well, they are gradually being pushed back by Blue land's army. Of the economic installations in the territories of E Country, only a part of those in the Maritime Province, which has been exposed to surprise attacks by troops of Blue land had been destroyed; but those in the other areas are being destroyed to quite an extent.
- (3) The articles known for sure to have been seized in the E operations are as follows:
- | | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| Vessels | 80,000 tons |
| Crude oil | 210,000 kilolitres |
| Ordinary benzine | 97,000 kilolitres |
| Heavy-oil | 186,000 kilolitres |
- (4) A and B have stigmatised the actions of Blue land as an illegal aggression, and they have united to declare the severance of economic relations with N as well as to demand the closing of the N consulate in A. It seems that a part of A's naval forces in the Atlantic are being rapidly transferred to the Pacific. Although public opinion in A is for war with N, the true intention of the government is not clear.
- (5) Though the A and B forces in East Asia are showing extreme tension, they have not yet taken any action of their own.
- (6) _____ thousand soldiers and _____ thousand tons of vessels have been newly mobilized in preparation for operations against A.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 16

No. 98 of the 100 volumes

28 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)

Appointed distributor -

Maintenance of secrecy - only for members concerned in the maneuvers

Disposal - to be returned on the conclusion of the maneuvers

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers for
Total Warfare -- IIMURA, Yuzuru

The Criticism of the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

In concluding the first theoretical maneuvers for total warfare, I shall hereby state my opinions regarding the important matters in the maneuvers, and thereby contribute to future researches by participants.

The first term of the maneuvers

- (1) Although I acknowledge generally the efforts of the respective participants in their presentation of their

studies in the national policy, the tactics to be taken by our country for total warfare, and the necessary judgment of the situations, I find not a few instances of lack of understanding in the fundamental nature of war and the principles of total warfare, and also there is a certain immaturity in their contemplation and consideration.

At that time, the participants lacked basic knowledge, the working hours were short, and there had been unavoidable circumstances, but in view of the actual results of the maneuvers, I feel it necessary to further continue our studies.

-
- (11) In the third period of the maneuvers the diplomatic policy of the government of Blueand is to take advantage of the noticeably easier contemporary international situation to manifest the elasticity of the measures for total warfare, and I am aware of the necessity of doing our best to attain the object of the measures by diplomatic means. For instance, in our relation with A and B, I think it was a failure of ours to have taken a diplomatic policy aimed at evading war with them.
- (12) In the third period of the maneuvers, I think the judgment that the proposition of A resulted from its weakness is appropriate, but I cannot approve of a passive diplomacy based on the propositions of A. We should possess enough spirit to ignore the hostile feelings of A by taking advantage of her weakness and presenting positive proposal of our own. Therefore, to realize this we must observe the necessity rather of further strengthening the relations with N and X.
- (14) In the fifth period of the maneuvers a more careful and deeper consideration will be necessary in the advance into E. For instance, we should not concentrate merely on the period concerning the completion of preparations. It will be necessary to make a thorough-going investigation into our knowledge of the general trend, the limit of our present aim, the mutual cooperative relations of the political and military strategies just before the advance, the actual domestic situation and the policy concerning them, etc.
- (15) Concerning the judgment on the ability to execute war against A, B and E, it was an attempt at a partial outline only as it was restricted by shortage of materials and time, but, to this extent I acknowledge it to be a comparatively fair work, and I especially approve of the sincere attitude taken in the investigation.

However, in reality, we must carefully study the material scope and connection of military and civilian needs in all phases, such as labor and material, static or dynamic, as well as to plan all these as an overall geographic unity involving N, M and C, and from the standpoint of time including the whole length of the war. Moreover, the assessment of the period until the commencement of all the activities in the above plan is insufficient and is altogether too short.

- (16) The cooperative activities of the political and military strategies prior to the advance into E are gravely insufficient. After the decision is made for the military advance, all measures concerning diplomatic, psychological and economic warfare should be actively developed under a single policy so as to facilitate operations. That is, to put A and B off guard, to facilitate their individual destruction, and to catch E napping to get a chance for a sudden attack. In particular in order to complete the concentration of the nation's total power by keeping the plan secret and imaginary, it will be necessary to develop for a plain and definite object all the activities of the total power of a united nation.
- (18) It is wrong to have treated lightly the matter of declaring war on A and B under the circumstances in the last stage of the sixth period. It will be necessary to study carefully whether there can be no last measure to avoid war with A and B, and to consider prudently the serious results arising from the outbreak of war, although it must always be kept in mind that there is advantage in taking the initiative in declaring war on A and B when they are still unprepared.
(Note) In order to facilitate study, we have executed this maneuver on the supposition that N's participation in the war by virtue of the NK treaty is not automatic.
- (19) However, I regret that there was no decision to start a war against A and B even under the circumstances detaining in the early stages of the seventh period maneuvers. There has been a rapid development in the situation, and the intentions of A and B towards N have become clear. The general situation demands our finding independently a way out of our impasse. Moreover, we have never before felt so secure on the northern borders as we do today. This must be considered a good chance to make our decision for starting war against A and B.
- (20) The measures taken by the Government of Blue land on the basis of the studies made beforehand by the Second Committee about the measures to be taken toward foreign countries in connection with the outbreak of war, were as a whole quite suitable.
- However, there is still room for study in regard to war aims against A and B (the pretext for despatch of troops and peace terms) and representations to X about not concluding a separate peace.
- (25) In the ninth period of the maneuvers when A and B influence had been generally expelled from the EPQ districts and the main force of A's army had been destroyed, I think it was necessary to study and determine the policy for the subsequent direction of the war against A and B.
- (26) It is good to note the improvement in the way you assessed the national strength in the war against D compared with that of the war against A and B, but I desire to see further creative studies and more ingenuity in devising emergency measures to cope with the situation at a time when the national existence is at stake.

Document Relative to the Maneuvers
for Total War.

August 1941

No. 98 of 120 volumes.

The Total War Research Institute.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

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I. P. S. No. 1622

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I, Rempei Kuriyama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Cabinet Secretary and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated August, 1941, and described as follows: File re "First Table Top Maneuvers", published by Total War Research Institute and marked "Top Secret"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this
6 day of Sep, 1946

/s/ Rempei Kuriyama
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Hiramatsu, Kajumichi

Cabinet Secretary
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, _____, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

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Japan - Total War

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Page 1

Document Relative to the Maneuvers
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August 1941

No. 98 of 120 volumes.

The Total War Research Institute.

Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War, No. 2

11 June (16 SHOWA) 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers
for total war,
IIMURA, Yuzuru

We have decided on the enforcement plan of the first
theoretical maneuvers for total war for 1941 as per the
attached.

(partly revised on 11, July)

Attached List of the first theoretical maneuvers for total war,
No. 2.

The Enforcement Plan of the First Theoretical
Maneuvers for Total War.

Month	Date	Day	Morn- ing	After- noon	Term	Imagi- nary	The Outline of Operations	Remarks
June	Middle		Delivery of problem		The first phase of man- euvers)	Inter- nal & Exter- nal situa- tions main- tain their pres- ent condi- tion.	The following personal work are given to all of the post-gradu- ates: 1. The in- vestigation of our na- tional policy. 2. strateg- ic plan- ning for total warfare. 3. The judg- ing of situa- tion neces- sary for the above.	The maneuve will be di- rected most by the assi- tant super- visor MATSUDA. 2) Each mem- ber of the Bureau will give neces- sary in- structions
July	first							
July	middle		Delivery of problem.		The second phase of man- euvers	"	The principle organs of Blue land will be con- stituted by all of the post-gradu- ates and they will be re- quired to do the following work: 1. The	All the mem- bers of the Bureau will participate in directing the maneuv- ers accord- ing to par- tial charge (designated separately).
August	middle							
	and							
	last							

					planning of total war strategies. 2. Preparations for the development of total war strategies.	Review-period.
Sept.	4 Thursday	Judgement	Third Term of	The period of trained national relations.	Imaginary situation is given to the principal organs of Blue land, & the management of the situation will be studied.	Henceforward the maneuvers will be directed under the following organization: 1) Supervisory Div. Super-Hea
	5 Friday		Maneuvers.		1) Completion of preparation for total warfare within and abroad.	visor of the Bureau Sec
	6 Saturday	Judgement off	The Fourth Phase of	The period of trained national relations.	2) Preparation of armed warfare. The directing of psychological and economic warfare.	tant Sec
	7 Sunday	Holiday	Maneuvers.		3) The decision for war.	er Matsu
	8 Monday				4) The directing of total war after this decision.	2) The judging division for armed warfare.
	9 Tuesday	Judgement	The Fifth Phase of	The period when war is inevitable.	5) Directing the outbreak of war.	3) The judging division for diplomatic warfare.
	10 Wednesday		Maneuvers.		6) Directing of total war immediately after the outbreak of war.	4) The judging division for psychological warfare.
	11 Thursday	Judgment	The Sixth Phase of	Half a month after outbreak of war.	7) Directing of total warfare during wartime according to circumstances.	5) The judging division for economic warfare.
	12 Friday		Maneuvers.		8) The maneuvers will be suspended on the morning of the 20th.	6) The judging division for international situations. (Note)
	13 Saturday	Judgement off	The Seventh Phase of	A month after.		The respective divisions constitute of the members and part-time member of the Bureau and government officials outside the Bureau. The particulars will be decided separately.
	14 Sunday	Holiday	Maneuvers.			
	15 Monday					
	16 Tuesday	Judgement	Eighth Phase	Three months after.		
	17 Wednesday					
	18 Thursday	Judgement	Ninth Phase	Six months after.		
	19 Friday					
	20 Saturday	off				

Sept.	21 Sun- day	Holiday	Tenth	1) Drafting of criti- cism.	
	22 Mon- day	Judgement	Phase of	2) Prepara- tions for the Research Meeting.	
	23 Tues- day	Holiday	Maneu- vers.	1) Research Meeting.	Outside officials will be requested to partici- pate in the meet- ing.
	24 Wed- nes- day			2) Criticism (After this the maneuvers will be concluded.)	
	25 Thurs- day				
	26 Fri- day				
	27 Satur- day		The arrange- ment of the re- sults of the maneu- ver.	1) The arrange- ment of the results of the maneuvers. 2) Research for the future.	The arrangemen of maneuve records, and the arrangemen of the re- sults of research by each member of the Bureau
	28 Sun- day	Holiday			
	29 Mon- day				
	30 Tues- day				

Remarks:

- (1) Judgment stands for judgment* conference.
- (2) Graph shows the operation of all the members concerned.
- (3) The prescriptions for the carrying out of maneuvers and the principles of instruction (items for investigation) will be decided separately.

Prescriptions for the Execution of
the First Theoretical Maneuver for
Total War.

Part I. The Object of the Maneuvers

Article I. The object of this maneuver is to let the first term post-graduates of this Research Bureau practice definite measures for total warfare, as well as to make fundamental and thoroughgoing researches on it as superior executives.

Article II. The following are the principal items which should be studied and practiced during the maneuvers:

- 1) The national policy and object which should be propagandized within and abroad.
- 2) Strategies for total warfare to be adopted by our Empire.
- 3) The points in drafting part of the various plans necessary for the execution of total warfare.
- 4) The main points of consolidating and strengthening positions for total warfare.
- 5) The outline for directing total warfare.
- 6) Part of a definite policy for the execution of psychological, economic and diplomatic warfares against a specific country.
- 7) Directing organs for total warfare, and directing organs for psychological, economic and diplomatic warfare.
- 8) Other matters recognized as necessary for the execution of total warfare by Japan.

Article III. The particulars of items for investigation and practice mentioned in the preceding articles are prescribed separately in the outline of maneuver instructions.

Section IV.

Article 9. When the research meetings on the tenth term maneuvers are over, the Supreme Commander will comment on it for the benefit of those who participated in the maneuver.

The main points on which comments will be made are approximately as follows:

1. Whether the plans set up beforehand were suitable or not.
2. Whether the maneuvers execution of the plans were carried properly or not.
3. Whether ex post facto research was carried out properly or not.
4. Whether proper discipline was maintained during the maneuvers or not.
5. Instructions for the future.

Article 10. Following actual maneuvers carried out under estimate situations (or after the conclusion of the ninth term maneuvers), each umpire department shall submit materials for comment to the Supreme Commander. Each umpire department, however, must adjust beforehand the opinions of the umpires belonging to that department regarding the materials for comment.

The draft of the comments shall be made by the critics' council. The members who are to attend the council meeting shall be specially designated.

Section V. - Gathering the Results of the Maneuvers.

Article 11. Each staff member of this Institute shall, depending on his assignment, arrange and preserve the records of the maneuvers as well as the opinions, etc., on the items for research and matters which should be improved concerning the plans of the maneuvers, or report them to other organizations which require such information.

Section VI. - Specific Symbols.

Article 12. In order to preserve secrecy, specific symbols given in the following list shall be used in place of the names of the nations and places, etc., which will be used in the maneuvers:

A. U. S. A.	B. Britain	C. China
D. The Soviet Union	E. Dutch East Indies	F. French Indo-China
G. Australia	H. Hawaii	I. India
J. Inner South Sea	K. Canada	L. Central & S. America
M. Manchukuo	N. Japan	O. Borneo
P. Philippine Islands	Q. Malay	R. Far Eastern Regions of the Soviet Union.
S. Singapore	T. Thailand	
U. Vladivostok	V. Burma	
W. Aleutian and Alaskan regions	X. The Axis Powers	
	X ₁ , Germany	
	X ₂ , Italy.	

Program for directing the Third to Ninth Term Maneuvers, inclusive, in the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

The Term of Maneuvers	Imaginary Time	Date of Enforcement Date (Day)	Hour	Functions for directing the maneuvers	The assembled empires	The principal maneuver items.	
Third Term	August 16 Shows 1941	6 Wednesday	08:30	The opening of the maneuver. The supervisor's address. The explanation of the situation for the third term. Explanations concerning the Empires will follow in the same way.	C scope	(1) Negotiations with A and the economic demands thereof.	
			09:30				
		7 Thursday	09:00	Secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country to the supervising section.	D scope	(2) The reply to A and D	
			13:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 August. The criticism regarding this. Delivery and explanation of supplementary situations.	B scope	(3) The preparations of war against D and (A).	
The Fourth Term	September	8 Friday	08:30	The presentation of the measures to be taken until the end of August. The criticism regarding this. Discussion of the situation for the Fourth Term.	A scope	(1) Continuation of No. 1 in the preceding term.	
			10:30				
			14:30 15:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation for the Fourth Term.	C scope		
		9 Saturday	11:00	Secret report to the supervisors on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope		(2) The response to A concerning the Treaty.
		11 Monday	08:30 10:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 September. The criticism regarding this. Announcement and explanation of additional situations.	B scope		(3) Measures against the stiffening attitude between A and H.
The Fifth Term		12 Tuesday	08:30 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of September. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation for the fifth term.	A scope		

The Fifth Term (cont'd)	September	12 Tuesday	14:30	The announcement and explanation of the situation	C scope	(1) The reply to X.
			15:00			
	October	13 Wednesday	09:00	The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Measures against the suspension of the commercial relations with A, B, E and L.
14:00 15:00			The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 October. The criticism regarding this. The announcement and explanation of additional situations.	B scope		
The Sixth Term	November	14 Thursday	08:00 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Oct. The criticism thereof. The announcement and discussion of the situation of the sixth term.	A scope	(3) Measures in regard to the resolution to advance into E.
			14:30 15:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation of the sixth term.	C scope	(1) Resolution to hasten actions against E.
	15 Friday	10:00	10:00	The secret report to the supervisory section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Negotiations with D.
			14:00 15:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 Nov. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situation.	B scope	
	December	16 Saturday	08:30 10:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Nov. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the seventh term.	A scope	(3) Measures for commencing the advance into E.
13:00 13:30				The announcement and explanation of the situation of the seventh term.	C scope	(1) The resolution for 'P' operations and the measures thereof.
18 Monday		10:00	10:00	The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Measures against B and D.
			14:00 15:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 Dec. The criticism thereof. The announcement of the additional situations.	B scope	
19 Tuesday	08:30 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Dec. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the eighth term.	A scope	(3) The measures in accordance with the outbreaks of war between N and A, B.		

Doc 1622

The Eighth Term

From
January
to March
17 SHOLA
(1942)

20 Wednesday

14:30
15:00
10:00
14:00
15:00

The announcement and explanation of the situation of the eighth term.
The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.
The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Feb. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of additional situations.

C scope
D scope
B scope

- (1) The measures against the air-raid on Tokyo.
- (2) The measures towards the diet.
- (3) The measures towards D and L.
- (4) The economic and political measures towards L, F, T, P and Q.

21 Thursday

08:30
10:30

The presentation of the measures to be taken until the end of March. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the ninth term.

A scope

The Ninth Term

From

April

to

October

22 Friday

23 Saturday

14:30
15:00
10:00
11:00
08:30
09:00
12:00

The announcement and explanation of the situation of the ninth term.
The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of June. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situations.
The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of August. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situations.
The presentation of the works of each participant. Maneuver to be stopped.

C scope
B scope
B scope
D scope

- (1) The continuation of the No. 4 in the preceding term.
- (2) The measures in relations with ..
- (3) The resolution of war against D
- (4) The total war strategies to be taken by the Blue country hence forward.

REMARKS:

The assembled judges: A scope - all the judges if possible. B scope - the principal judges of each section. C scope - the concerning judges of each section. D scope - judges having special concerns.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total
Warfare, No. 6 -- 3

No. 098 of the 100 volumes

24 July, Showa 16, 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers
for the total warfare:

JIMURA, Yuzuru

(1) The Situation. As a result of the liaison conference with the Supreme Command of the Government on July 24th regarding the strategy of total warfare, we have agreed on the following unanimously.

1. Blue land, from necessity, will promote all preparations for the object of advancing into E on a favorable occasion, if no special circumstances arise.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total
Warfare, No. 6 -- 5

(Secret)

No. 98 of 120 volumes

Designated Distribution	
Maintenance of Secrecy	only for those concerne with the maneuvers.
Disposal	To be returned on con- clusion of the maneuver

The 1st Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War for
1941 (SHOWA 16).

The Report on Activities in Regard to the Subjects
Given for the Second Term of the Maneuvers.

Part I. The national policy of Blue land to be propa-
gandized internally and abroad.

Part II. A part of the plan for total warfare by Blue
land.

Presented on 30 July 1941 (SHOWA 16).

The Government of Blue land

(or the Total Warfare Research Bureau)

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3 of No. 13 -- Total War Table Top Maneuvers (plan) August 23, 1941 (submitted at 0830) Superintendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers IIMURA, Minoru	

Additional Situations and Problems of
9th Period Maneuver of First Total War
Table Top Maneuvers.

I. Situations up to the latter part of September 1942.

1. The Cabinet meeting of July 10 decided on the opening of war against D and the military operations were commenced on August 1. Substantial fighting occurred in many places along the M-D frontier, but thereafter there has not been a great resistance. As a result of speedy pursuit by N army, a greater part of the Far Eastern army and a large part of its navy and air forces were destroyed and the important area of "R" was occupied and secured by the latter part of September.

D retired its front and has declared long-term resistance, but its sustaining power is doubtful.
(pp. 13-10 - 13-11)

- - - - -

7. The great offensive by X against D and B since the spring gained conspicuous effects correlative to N's operations, but is not yet decisive. The present situation does not allow anyone to make any assumption as to the conclusion of the world confusion. (p. 13-12)

Part II Plans for Total Warfare for Blue land

Classification I - Programme for Total Warfare for the Blue land (plan)

No. 1 - The object of total warfare

(1) The object of total warfare is to securely establish the existence of Blue land as well as to exclude the influence of all hostile powers interfering with the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

(2) The present principal hostile countries shall be A, B (including E) and C (Chungkiang Regime), and the secondary hostile country shall be D.

(3) The center of the Greater East Asia Sphere is comprised of N, M and C, R, V, and the areas east of them, also the areas north of G (G itself exclusive), and those west of 180° East Longitude enter into the Greater East Asia sphere. (p. 21001)

No. 2 - Guiding Principle for Total Warfare

(1) Every effort shall be made for the complete execution of the C Incident according to established principles; while at the same time, our position for total warfare shall be completed and strengthened so as to be able to cope immediately wars with other hostile countries.

(2) Our present object in the south lies in the securing of materials and positive advancement shall be projected through political measures.

However, every possible preparation must be made with the determination to resort to arms whenever the circumstances demand. When a war with A and B becomes inevitable, we will take the initiative and declare war. We will exclude their influences in East Asia, and at the same time endeavor to make them give up their hostilities against us.

(3) Regarding the North, we shall by force of arms facilitate X's disposal of D; and supervise the fulfillment of the neutrality pact between N and D. We shall devise economic advancement by diplomatic means, and avoid armed warfare as far as the situation allows. However, if it is inevitable according to the situation, we shall resort to arms.

(4) Through cooperation with X, we shall strive to realize the plan for an alliance treaty with her, while completing every possible preparation for an initiative war against A and B as a precaution against A's participation in a war with X.

(5) Thereafter, we shall decide on our different plans in accordance with the transitions in the situation, thereby anticipating the achievement of the purposes of total warfare.

The Guiding Principle of Armed Warfare

1. Against C. By avoiding the expansion of occupied areas, we shall execute repeated and active armed actions against the Chungking Regime to destroy her armed power. At the same time, we shall take measures to deprive her people of their will to fight by destroying her establishment and strengthening our economic blockage of her. In the presentation of war against other hostile countries, the principles enumerated in the preceding article shall be strongly maintained in the hope that the consequences will contribute to the surrender of Chungking Government.
2. Against F and T. The spirit of joint defense with F will be strengthened. When the attitude of T is unfriendly towards N, and she does not comply with our demands, and also when A and B try to exclude our influences in T we shall make military advances into T.
3. Against E. If E's attitude towards N is to be aggravated and especially if she refuses to supply us with the necessary materials, we shall make military advance on a favorable occasion with a resolve for war with A and B. In case a war with A and B is inevitable, we shall advance into E.
4. Against A and B. If a war with A and B becomes inevitable, in the event of, for instance, A participating in the war against X, or A completely cutting off all commercial relationship

with N, or danger of armed collision with A and our country, or N being threatened with military invasion by A, we will take the initiative in starting a war and immediately occupy P, Q and E, thereby strengthening our strategic and economic situation; and at the same time, we shall plan to destroy the enemy's military power and to make them abandon their hostilities towards us.

5. Against D. We shall strengthen our defense against D in North M. Although we shall avoid as far as possible any armed warfare until our move in the South is finally concluded, we shall occupy the strategically important areas in R by executing armed warfare at a favorable occasion; that is, when D is near collapse in the D-X war, or when D is about to take hostile action against N, or when A tries to make military advances into R, or whenever war becomes inevitable under any other condition.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War, No. 10
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14 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)

(delivered at
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Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers
for Total Warfare

IIMURA, Yuzuru

The circumstances and subjects for the Sixth Phase of
Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

- (1) The circumstances in the middle and end of November.

A. The international situation.

1. With the approach of the severe cold of winter, the D-X war is gradually nearing a stalment in the areas east of the River Don, Moscow and Leningrad.
2. There is not much change in the BX war except that there is an indication of advance towards the Suez and Gibraltar.
3. There is also no great change in the A-X war. It seems part of A's forces in the Atlantic seem to have commenced a move to the Pacific. A declared war against X on the 1st of November.

4. Although the A, B and (E) troops in the East show no signs as yet of increasing their strengths, they have commenced speedy and large scale defense programs with what troops they have stationed in these areas, while A and B are executing threatening propaganda activities to divert N's movements. Part of Blue land's plans seem to have been intercepted by A, B and E.
 5. As the activities of N's army in the area of C becomes more active, C is also carrying out antagonistic propaganda activities. There is a reliable report that a military treaty has been concluded among A, B and C.
 6. Although conditions in the R district are still strained, there is evidence that troops in this area are decreasing. All is quiet on the D-M border. D shows no definite attitude either to M or to B.
- B. The conditions of the supreme command and the army.
1. The supreme command of Blue land desires to carry out the actions already planned against E as early as possible.
 2. The preparations of the supreme command for action against E is now under progress, and all preparations are expected to be completed temporarily by the middle of November.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 10-3

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Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers for
Total Warfare -- IIMURA, Yuzuru

Supplementary situations for the sixth phase of the first
theoretical maneuvers for total warfare.

Supplementary situations for the middle and last part of Novem-
ber.

- (1) The troops of the Blue land commenced to move on 15 Novem-
ber; and after making sudden attacks, they have secured
effectively several important areas in E. (Names of
places and the war situation stated orally, now and here-
after.) The casualties of the Blue land are slight.

- (2) E has declared she will "resist to the utmost the invasion of N", and is asking for the aid of A and B. Although B's garrison troops are withstanding the attack comparatively well, they are gradually being pushed back by Blue land's army. Of the economic installations in the territories of E Country, only a part of those in the Maritime Province, which has been exposed to surprise attacks by troops of Blue land had been destroyed; but those in the other areas are being destroyed to quite an extent.
- (3) The articles known for sure to have been seized in the E operations are as follows:
- | | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| Vessels | 80,000 tons |
| Crude oil | 210,000 kilolitres |
| Ordinary benzine | 97,000 kilolitres |
| Heavy-oil | 186,000 kilolitres |
- (4) A and B have stigmatised the actions of Blue land as an illegal aggression, and they have united to declare the severance of economic relations with N as well as to demand the closing of the N consulate in A. It seems that a part of A's naval forces in the Atlantic are being rapidly transferred to the Pacific. Although public opinion in A is for war with N, the true intention of the government is not clear.
- (5) Though the A and B forces in East Asia are showing extreme tension, they have not yet taken any action of their own.
- (6) _____ thousand soldiers and _____ thousand tons of vessels have been newly mobilized in preparation for operations against A.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 16

No. 98 of the 100 volumes

28 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)

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Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers for Total Warfare -- IIMURA, Yuzuru

The Criticism of the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

In concluding the first theoretical maneuvers for total warfare, I shall hereby state my opinions regarding the important matters in the maneuvers, and thereby contribute to future researches by participants.

The first term of the maneuvers

- (1) Although I acknowledge generally the efforts of the respective participants in their presentation of their

studies in the national policy, the tactics to be taken by our country for total warfare, and the necessary judgment of the situations, I find not a few instances of lack of understanding in the fundamental nature of war and the principles of total warfare, and also there is a certain immaturity in their contemplation and consideration.

At that time, the participants lacked basic knowledge, the working hours were short, and there had been unavoidable circumstances, but in view of the actual results of the maneuvers, I feel it necessary to further continue our studies.

- (11) In the third period of the maneuvers the diplomatic policy of the government of Blueiland is to take advantage of the noticeably easier contemporary international situation to manifest the elasticity of the measures for total warfare, and I am aware of the necessity of doing our best to attain the object of the measures by diplomatic means. For instance, in our relation with A and B, I think it was a failure of ours to have taken a diplomatic policy aimed at evading war with them.
- (12) In the third period of the maneuvers, I think the judgment that the proposition of A resulted from its weakness is appropriate, but I cannot approve of a passive diplomacy based on the propositions of A. We should possess enough spirit to ignore the hostile feelings of A by taking advantage of her weakness and presenting positive proposal of our own. Therefore, to realize this we must observe the necessity rather of further strengthening the relations with N and X.
- (14) In the fifth period of the maneuvers a more careful and deeper consideration will be necessary in the advance into E. For instance, we should not concentrate merely on the period concerning the completion of preparations. It will be necessary to make a thorough-going investigation into our knowledge of the general trend, the limit of our present aim, the mutual cooperative relations of the political and military strategies just before the advance, the actual domestic situation and the policy concerning them, etc.
- (15) Concerning the judgment on the ability to execute war against A, B and E, it was an attempt at a partial outline only as it was restricted by shortage of materials and time, but, to this extent I acknowledge it to be a comparatively fair work, and I especially approve of the sincere attitude taken in the investigation.

However, in reality, we must carefully study the material scope and connection of military and civilian needs in all phases, such as labor and material, static or dynamic, as well as to plan all these as an overall geographic unity involving N, M and C, and from the standpoint of time including the whole length of the war. Moreover, the assessment of the period until the commencement of all the activities in the above plan is insufficient and is altogether too short.

- (16) The cooperative activities of the political and military strategies prior to the advance into E are gravely insufficient. After the decision is made for the military advance, all measures concerning diplomatic, psychological, and economic warfare should be actively developed under a single policy so as to facilitate operations. That is, to put A and B off guard, to facilitate their individual destruction, and to catch E napping to get a chance for a sudden attack. In particular in order to complete the concentration of the nation's total power by keeping the plan secret and imaginary, it will be necessary to develop for a plain and definite object all the activities of the total power of a united nation.
- (18) It is wrong to have treated lightly the matter of declaring war on A and B under the circumstances in the last stage of the sixth period. It will be necessary to study carefully whether there can be no last measure to avoid war with A and B, and to consider prudently the serious results arising from the outbreak of war, although it must always be kept in mind that there is advantage in taking the initiative in declaring war on A and B when they are still unprepared.
(Note) In order to facilitate study, we have executed this maneuver on the supposition that N's participation in the war by virtue of the NX treaty is not automatic.
- (19) However, I regret that there was no decision to start a war against A and B even under the circumstances detaining in the early stages of the seventh period maneuvers. There has been a rapid development in the situation, and the intentions of A and B towards N have become clear. The general situation demands our finding independently a way out of our impasse. Moreover, we have never before felt so secure on the northern borders as we do today. This must be considered a good chance to make our decision for starting war against A and B.
- (20) The measures taken by the Government of Blue land on the basis of the studies made beforehand by the Second Committee about the measures to be taken toward foreign countries in connection with the outbreak of war, were as a whole quite suitable.
- However, there is still room for study in regard to war aims against A and B (the pretext for despatch of troops and peace terms) and representations to X about not concluding a separate peace.
- (25) In the ninth period of the maneuvers when A and B influence had been generally expelled from the EPQ districts and the main force of A's army had been destroyed, I think it was necessary to study and determine the policy for the subsequent direction of the war against A and B.
- (26) It is good to note the improvement in the way you assessed the national strength in the war against D compared with that of the war against A and B, but I desire to see further creative studies and more ingenuity in devising emergency measures to cope with the situation at a time when the national existence is at stake.