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George Foster SCHIECK

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China and the Middle East have engaged in various interactions throughout the post-war period. This thesis looks at those interactions and postulates a purposeful intent underlying Chinese-Middle Eastern activity. Purposeful intent is deduced from a consideration of extant and subsequently probable Chinese and Middle Eastern foreign policies. Vehicles for examining these foreign policies include: aspects of applicable domestic fabrics; those fabrics' perceptions of international requirements; external realities of the countries involved; the regional interaction itself. Economic, cultural, security and diplomatic issues are included. Likely goals and objectives of China and the Middle East through continued interaction are discussed. Israel and the other Levantine states comprise the two primary foci used to identify the Middle East region. China is discussed first from the period beginning with 1949 through to the

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Chinese-Middle East Relations
and their Implications for U.S. Policy

by

George Foster Schieck
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., West Virginia Wesleyan College, 1973
M.A., Boston University, 1978

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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I. INTRODUCTION

The nascent subject of Chinese-Middle East relations has been little acknowledged and even less understood, yet is not of inconsiderable importance. Both China and the Middle East figure prominently in their own respective strategic, economic and political spheres; the manner in which these two regions or spheres choose to interact - or not to interact - may well have larger import than our traditional regional analyses of these areas would indicate. As nations world-wide currently reexamine their roles within the rapidly evolving geopolitical arena of the 1990s and beyond, analyses pertaining to regional interaction deserve timely attention. The many readily apparent economic, political and/or social evolutions now occurring throughout Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Pacific (plus evolutions that are perhaps not so readily apparent), lend the question of Chinese-Middle Eastern relations fresh and, as it will be shown, uniquely pertinent import.

Immediate and long term implications of recent events throughout the Middle and Far East highlight the importance we ascribe to occurrences within these regions. The interaction of these occurrences, both directly and indirectly, generates and reflects considerable impact on the rest of the world. Our understanding (or perception) of the implications of these events as well as, secondarily, the events themselves combine to govern our formulation and prescription of policy. Some of

the more recent and prominent of these events, a few of which are quite remarkable, include Khomeini's reign and legacy, Chinese student-led appeals for democracy and the Tienanmen massacre, Iraqi hostilities with Iran and Kuwait, continued Arab-Israeli dilemmas (illustrated as well as exacerbated by the Intifada), and recent Middle East peace initiatives. This thesis concerns itself with the circumstances and implications of these and other events, viewed both regionally and inter-regionally, then entertains conclusions regarding Chinese and Middle Eastern interaction along with suggestions for the focus and direction of related U.S. policy.

Inherent to the introduction within this first chapter are two major premises. First, that there indeed is, has been and will continue to be, a definite level of measurable and purposeful activity between China and the Middle East. Secondly, that despite the complex, fluid and seemingly disparate qualities associated with so many variables resident within each of the two regions, there yet remains a viable basis for considering the question of current and subsequent interaction(s) between China and the Middle East.

Chapter II reviews the historical sweep of relations between China and the Middle East and concludes with an extensive chronology of Chinese-Middle Eastern events and interaction, plus other significant occurrences, since 1949. Although the Middle East itself may be described as an area from the Atlantic to the Indus and from the Sudan to the Black

Sea, the area addressed here is located primarily within the fertile crescent; this abbreviated area is the hub of the region and more than adequate in scope for this discussion. Pakistan is included within the group of Middle Eastern states due to its ties both to China and to the Middle East. The year 1949 was selected as the primary point of departure because it collectively represents: the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC); the first full year of Israel's existence as a modern state; the basic time frame beyond which the contemporary shape of the Middle East coalesced.¹

Chapter III considers determinants of foreign policy both for China and for the Middle East in terms of their specific regions. Middle Eastern topics will be apportioned, respectively, between Israel and the other Middle Eastern states. An additional premise of this thesis assumes that foreign policies serve the national interests of their respective host states, which incorporates a final major premise holding that any study of foreign policy, especially as a cornerstone for looking at interaction between two or more countries or regions, entails a broad discussion. This discussion includes: 1) national domestic and/or cultural fabrics; 2) compositions and relevancies (or legitimacy), of state leadership; 3) evident policy machinery; 4) national perceptions of international realities and related security requirements; 5) dynamics stemming from interaction within

the international community. Salient aspects from each of these issues, as they relate both to China and to the Middle East, are requisite components in the consideration of foreign policy determinants. Discussion will be confined to salient aspects only, otherwise the subject would readily digress.

Those above several elements include, or might be collectively referred to as, the comparatively recent discipline of Political Culture.² I do not mean to serve as apologist for this new discipline, nor to consider the various ways, quantitative or otherwise, in which Political Culture might eventually acquire sufficient stature so as to incorporate predictive capabilities. Rather I intend to entertain what seems to me an intuitive, seat-of-the-pants procedure: namely, if you want to know what the other guy is thinking or planning, then you have to know what is important to that person or group. This must be done, as far as is feasible, from his/her/their own perspective. Culture, state machinery, and all the rest, are certainly ingredients for uncovering priorities of any one person or group, especially within a governmental or foreign policy framework. The world is not yet small enough, despite explosions of mobility and access to information, to nullify the idiosyncracies of domestic fabrics that are distinctive formulative ingredients of thought processes and also of knee jerk reactions. Indeed, even language, its phonetics, vocabulary, syntax and written form, may well have a profound place (both formative and symptom-

atic), in the process of shaping thoughts, ideas, and hence priorities.

Domestic and regional topics are considered with an eye to their explicatory assistance for cross-regional interaction. China will be considered in two periods, the first being from 1949 to the arrival of Deng Xiaoping's leadership and then subsequently through to the present. Possible policy directions and impacts of recent economic and political changes within China will be included. For the Middle East, Israel's formation and execution of foreign policy will be considered, followed by a look at the policy development, priorities and dilemmas of the other primary Middle Eastern states. National and/or demographic variations among these Middle Eastern states will be taken into account. As with the discussion on China, impacts of growth plus other current and projected events within the Middle East will be considered when postulating probable directions of national and regional concerns in that region.

The international scope and practical levels of Chinese-Middle East interaction itself are addressed in Chapters IV and V. Actual and likely activities of China in the Middle East, as well as Middle Eastern activities vis-a-vis China, will be considered. Economic, cultural, security and diplomatic issues encompass the areas to be addressed.

Chapter VI recaps the central implications and discusses the central conclusions of whether or not meaningful and long

term policies of interaction exist between China and the Middle East (or the Middle East and China), plus their likely continued evolution. Against a backdrop of historical interaction and concomitant consideration of Chinese-Middle Eastern national fabrics and regional interaction since 1949, considerable support is provided for showing purposeful intent within Chinese-Middle Eastern relations. By way of contrast, it will be noted that occasional third party political analysis, from examining selected issues only (e.g. politics, or economics, or arms sales), regards interaction between China and the Middle East, or portions thereof, as sporadic at best and/or opportunistic at worst. I submit, however, that such attempts at analysis are too narrow and very misleading. Similarly, and related to the long term and purposeful Chinese-Middle Eastern interactions here postulated, a no less important conclusion states that the gain or benefit derived from these purposeful policies and interactions (compared to interactions between the Middle East and powers other than China), has far exceeded the relatively limited scale of operational endeavor upon which, so far, these policies have been conducted. That is, the Chinese (and perhaps also the Middle Easterners), have indeed received a big bang for their buck and may well have planned it that way. One additional conclusion maintains that conditions of Chinese-Middle Eastern relations may indeed serve as a general bellwether for Chinese international relations and intentions as a whole.

Implications for U.S. policy stemming from the above will be considered in Chapter VII, pertaining both to China and to the Middle East. Aspects of these closing comments include: 1) the place of ideology; 2) what it means to be a superpower (including perceptions of national decline and/or evolution); 3) the role of an honest broker for the Middle East; 4) effects of the internecine dilemmas within the Middle East itself; 5) China's increasing role within Asian and world affairs; and 6) corresponding impacts of China and the Middle East on U.S. domestic politics.

An appendix containing notable dates for both China and the Middle East - important birthdays, anniversaries of significant events, holidays and cultural landmarks - has been included. The unique forces at work in these regions quite frequently are associated with or catalyzed by, to the extent of being explained or characterized by, calendar reference points.

There is one last assumption, in addition to those utilized above by the thesis, within which the entire thesis is located, as in a venue. Namely that there is an ongoing generic need for reexamining traditional concepts and methods of measurement whereby conclusions are formed regarding domestic and international proclivities of other states or regions. Such reexaminations are requisite, due to the many faceted nature associated with any examination of foreign policy, and especially now for all concerned with the contin-

ued emergence (or perhaps, simplistically, the "realignment"), of China and the rest of Asia through to and including the Middle East (not to mention Europe and the former Soviet Union). It is these overall reexaminations that help to give shape to our recognition and understanding of Chinese-Middle Eastern relations. Post war conceptions such as "bipolarity", plus the traditional nation-state system as derived from the European model (which dominated thinking for centuries), simply no longer apply, if they ever did; this, in turn, effects our perceptions (or new reality, if you will), of current regional interaction. Ferreting out, or making sense of, another country's or region's perceptions and policies so as to better address our own is only as valid as the concepts and measuring devices employed throughout the process. If attempts to understand others' perceptions and policies utilize weak or brittle conceptual tools, then incorporation of subsequent conclusions and directions into our own policies based on those attempts will serve primarily to generate or even perpetuate the possibility of out-of-sync relations as well as the likelihood of bad policy.

This thesis began at a time when the Berlin Wall still appeared secure in its divisiveness. I was confident of finding long term undercurrents of Chinese-Middle Eastern interaction, and wondered then how to best postulate what I took to be their inevitable growth and impact. Since 1989, the world has rapidly shelved long-held traditional assump-

tions not only in Berlin and Europe, but also in Moscow, Beijing, Baghdad and most recently in Arab-Israeli capitals. Concomitantly, Chinese-Middle Eastern interaction has steadily emerged into public view and requires, now, not so much a postulation of its existence but rather a characterization of its tenor and scope. Also, since undertaking this project, and via assignments throughout the Pacific Rim, Persian Gulf, and Arabia, it became increasingly apparent to me, somewhat unexpectedly, just how much information, both relevant to this topic and available within the public domain, is already "out there" waiting to be culled into informative narratives. This material, in the aggregate, is voluminous and found (sometimes piecemeal), in scores of private and public collections throughout these and other regions. Furthermore, as China grows more accessible, despite setbacks, to pursuit by outsiders of indigenous sources, the scope of available material increases exponentially. Information regarding the Middle East is, in similar fashion, substantial and growing: this is an indication not only of increased activity in that region but also of our interest in it. Most of the material employed in this initial study utilizes secondary sources and is but a fraction of the whole. My occasional access to primary sources indicates their tantalizing potential and the intriguing nature (as it seems to me), of this subject. I have tried to keep all material proportionately representative

and to weave historical perspective through the political and social analysis.

Continued development of this subject must include, at the very least, liberal use of primary source material gleaned from national and regional capitals, industrial sectors, agriculture, banking and finance, academia, the military, technical development, telecommunications, diplomatic interchange, and personal voices within all of the above named sectors and also from within the countries to be considered. Despite the introductory nature of this current project, I remain absolutely convinced of the direction and general veracity of its conclusions.

II. CHINA (PRC) AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Since the Hellespont is a traditional dividing line between Occident and Orient, portions of the Middle East (certainly Iran and Pakistan, perhaps also Iraq and Syria), may be said to be parts of Asia. Other portions of the Middle East are said to be African (Egypt, Libya, the Sudan), while still others are said to bridge continents (Arabian Peninsula, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait). Regardless of the geographic rubric under which the Middle East is placed, it is important, first, to regard both the Middle East and China not as immutably fixed locations under this or that label, but rather primarily as centers of fluid activity depicted within national parameters.

Common perceptions of China picture it as a timeless and immutable monolith (full of Asian mysteries, to be sure, but monolithic nonetheless), between the Pacific and Hindu Kush, yet the borders of China have migrated rather frequently and extensively over the centuries. This historical flexibility continues into the present. Xinjiang's incorporation within the PRC, as an example, is by no means as historically inevitable as is that of the provinces closer to the coast. Since 1949, Chinese interests in Tibet plus border consultations and confrontations with Pakistan and India, respectively, are additional illustrations of the mutable dimensions of the PRC. Other changes preceding and during World War II

resulted in the readjustment of China's border in the Mongolian and Manchurian sectors. Negotiations already completed and others pending or anticipated regarding Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan, will further adjust China's national configuration (and add to her diverse national character as well). Novel developments in the Spratlys already promise both actual and perceptual readjustment of China's southeastern frontiers. Still other regions, such as Outer Mongolia, the Maritime Provinces, Korean Peninsula, Ryukyu Islands and portions of Southeast Asia, were at various times integral elements of China.

Similarly, the Middle East has only recently acquired its current cartographic guise. Its contemporary national boundaries, created for the most part by third parties with vested colonial interests, not infrequently serve as fictional (and also frictional), lines between tribal or other more primary and stronger allegiances. These nominal boundaries have been subject to fairly constant flows of redefinition and alteration resulting from a plethora of Middle Eastern sources. These alterations, within the time period we are considering, are not as likely to occur primarily as functions of outlying provincial relations to a strong or weak regional center - as has been the case, historically, with China. Rather, ongoing conflicts or tensions (Hashemite-Saudi, Shi'ite-Sunni, Iraqi-Iranian, Iraqi-Syrian, Iraqi-Kuwaiti, Progressive-Conservative, Iraqi & Iranian & Turkish vs.

Kurdish, Persian-Arabic, Arab-Israeli and Palestinian, Pan-Arabian vs. Nationalist, Secular Zionist vs. Judaic Orthodox, Ashkenazic-Sephardic, Sabra-Immigrant, etc.), render the Middle East susceptible to a kaleidoscopic host of pressures from several directions, often simultaneously. The extensive integration of contemporary Middle Eastern economics into global markets further extends these pressures onto a wider audience. Whether belligerent or beneficent, major or minor, these pressures often generate *de facto* and *de jure* alterations of national landscapes and/or priorities within the region.

China and the Middle East are also fluid in a demographic sense. Chinese culture has touched every corner of the globe and Middle Eastern influence has been legendary in scope. "China Towns" exist within most major cities worldwide and the range of peoples who consider the Middle East as home, ancestrally and/or religiously, are too numerous to count. Demographic influences also move in the opposite direction as well. Significant inputs of ideas and, again, people (most recently dating from the previous century), have penetrated China, now and again, along trade routes and from the coast inland. Moreover, Chinese students, scores of thousands of them, have lately been pursuing academic or practical preparation abroad, beginning with an influx to Japan prior to hostilities during the late Qing and early Republican years, then largely to Europe and now, after a temporary hiatus of

enforced isolation, predominantly to the United States. This youthful and/or professional peregrination provides another very rich source of ideas and experiences for the mainland; this influx of ideas is not unrelated (indeed, it is very much related), to events of current concern to Chinese political leadership. Israel in the Middle East (in the sense of a Jewish homeland), is a nation comprised during the last 100 years almost entirely of immigrants, while the Arab countries have historically - albeit cyclically - always felt the movement of other peoples (merchants, soldiers, clerics, etc.), into and through their precincts. Most if not all of the Arab states, especially along the Persian Gulf, now act as hosts to vast numbers of foreign workers as well as experiencing unprecedented transient movements of their own peoples through non-Arabic and non-Islamic cultures. An outgrowth of this new mobility are expatriate and immigrant Arab communities appearing throughout Europe and North America. In all of these other Middle Eastern countries, various new requirements and adjustments related to societal management, education, political participation, economics, values, immediate information processing, plus increasingly transitory population movements have contributed greatly to cross pollination of peoples and ideas. Such movement and avenues of access, taken largely for granted in the U.S., Europe and even now (almost) in Japan are, for China and much of the Middle East, more threatening than not to current established conservative

hierarchies although again not historically uncommon (especially along traditional trade routes, coastal areas and population centers). For demographic and national reasons, then, both China and the Middle East are very fluid in character.

Still, there remains a fixed timelessness to both regions. China has never truly been conquered, even by the Mongols or Manchurians, for China's Chineseness has always assimilated the would be usurper. China's propensity for focusing on itself as an inland power through the centuries contributes to maintenance of this "Chineseness". For example, the Chinese name for "China" means Middle Kingdom around which all other countries are located. Mongol and Manchurian invaders both quickly recognized the practicality and need for utilizing extant administrative machinery to control populations much larger than their own (entrenched and extensive bureaucracy is one of China's many inventions). Transitions, for the new arrivals, from political management into adopting cultural practices and eventual absorption into the Chinese domestic fabric became variants of *when* and not *if*. During the relatively recent so-called colonial era, China was never entirely under territorial control by European or other powers, much less cultural domination. The Unequal Treaties, plus China's general impotence from the late Qing years through to the first portion of this century, were acute

embarrassments and indicative of severe political difficulties, but not the stuff of complete domination by an outsider.

On the other hand, and contrary to this experience of China, Middle Eastern states have for the most part seldom if ever been free of a conqueror's domination, yet their region also retains a timeless mystique; Levantine and Arabian uniqueness, coupled with the attraction of Jerusalem and Mecca, have been magnets that no conqueror could ever truly control or overcome. Whether politically beholden to Rome, Constantinople, London or Paris, the practicalities of Middle Eastern sovereignty and economic management have not altered the continued primary focus of all concerned with intangibles forever resident in phrases such as "via dolorosa", "the hajj" or "next year in Jerusalem".

Portions of the Middle East have, however, escaped colonization: much of Arabia (comparable in size to the U.S. east of the Mississippi), never felt the sway of anything more sedentary than Bedouin nomads, adding to that region's mystique and timelessness. Another unusual Middle East circumstance, mentioned here if for no other reason than to highlight little known aspects of Arab history and to abrogate stereotypical perceptions, is the Sultanate of Oman; though once saddled with foreign occupiers (Portuguese from 1508 to 1650, Persians from 1741 to 1744), and host to a resident British consul since 1800, Oman has had an unbroken and extended history, mercantile and sedentary, more-or-less its

own for centuries, encompassing far flung extraterritorial acquisitions such as Zanzibar (separated in 1856), and Gwadar (sold to Pakistan in 1958). Regardless, then, of whether the Middle Eastern states were colonized, or atypically, as in the case of Oman, themselves colonizers, or neither of the two (Arabia), the respective sacred tenets of Christian, Moslem and Jew, as well as other traditions, have given the region a unique aspect, rife with variations, all its own.

A. GENERAL HISTORY OF INTERACTION

Given these combined fluid as well as timeless characteristics of China and the Middle East, plus their continental proximity, it is not surprising to learn of their historical contact through the ages. Although this contact was limited in scope by the formidable natural barriers inherent to both regions (the Himalayas in the south and other mountain ranges and deserts spanning the remainder of China's frontiers, plus an effectively inaccessible interior to all but the coastal areas of Arabia), there was definite and measured human traffic between China and regions contiguous to it. The famous overland Silk Road is the most prominent example of this two way flow of people and goods; along it travelled ancient commerce to and from China and Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. Maritime routes supplemented the Silk Road. Occasional Chinese fleets, most notably the Ming dynasty voyages, journeyed from the South China Sea to Arabian waters to advance commercial interests and the tribute system, but these expeditions suffered the fates of political controversy; rulers of China have continuously debated the merits of maritime power (a debate which still continues).³ Seafarers from the Persian Gulf also supplemented Silk Road commercial flows. Arab traders regularly carried goods between Africa, India and China and back to Arabia. Excavations near Salalah in Oman are now uncovering an ancient trade center at least as grand as Pompeii, which is possibly the fabled city of Ubar

(from The Arabian Nights) and/or Iram (from the Koran), with artifacts that span millenia from Rome, Greece, China, Egypt and Syria. Once in Arabia, whether in present day Oman, Shatt-al-Arab, or somewhere in between, caravans then carried these sea-borne goods to the Mediterranean. This latter nautical and caravan link thrived until the 16th century with the arrival of colonialism; Arab societies then fell inland and an attendant growth of coastal piracy occurred. In 1853 a treaty of maritime truce amongst various Gulf Sheikdoms, giving rise to the term "Trucial States", roughly terminated the 200-300 year decline of nautical trade in the Persian Gulf area. Subsequent contemporary transport of petroleum, the goods attendant to its capital generation, and also the Suez Canal on the other side of Arabia, have been leading factors for the resurgence of nautical trade in the region.

For many scores of centuries, commerce along these well defined trade routes continued to be the primary and perhaps only link between China and the territories beyond her western frontier (the Middle East, Russian Principalities and Europe). The only near successful attempt to unite these two areas politically was the work of Genghis Khan and his sons. They pushed their Mongolian empire from the seacoast of northern China almost as far as the Danube, as well as south around the Himalayas to the Persian Gulf and the vicinity of Baghdad. They reached Asia Minor and had a large window on the Mediterranean, nearly enveloping the Black Sea in the process and

stopping just short of bursting into Europe.⁴ All other empires, before and since, remained centered either on the Mediterranean, on Persia, on South Asia, on Central Asia, or on China itself; never again was one political entity to span both China and portions of the Middle East. Even Arab national expansion and the resultant Ottoman Empire did not exceed, politically, the Indus or Caucasus. Subsequent Islamic religious expansion did, however, continue centrifugally into Africa, Southern Europe, Astrakhan, further into Central Asia, South Asia, Indonesia and beyond, providing significant and lasting cultural bridges.

Distinguishing between Islamic religious growth and its political boundaries is not an easy task; difficulties with this distinction are related to Islam's initial 7th century theocratic rush of expansion and its traditional predilection for governing in both civil and religious affairs wherever it resides.⁵ This historical Islamic preference, whenever possible, for the mosque as the preferred seat of government, in addition to clerical or moral authority, effectively removes the distinction between secular and sacred venues and is a primary reason for the muddled distinction between Islamic political - and religious - growth or cohesiveness. Thus political, as well as cultural, connections might be seen among contiguous Islamic settlements, regardless of the timing, purpose or sponsorship of their growth, and the presence (if any) of adjacent or intersecting "national"

boundaries, etc. But in terms of concurrent, singular, and genuine political unification spanning both traditional China and the Middle East, only the great Genghis Khan - a central force from the Asian Steppes - has so far been able to bring this about, and then for only a very brief period.

I want again to reemphasize the fluid national and demographic activity historically inherent within China, especially when considering her expansive interior spaces and the various peoples resident there. This human and historical diversity is not unimportant, even though now comprising, in the sense of population, a mere percentage of China's vast masses. Hard references to steady commerce of goods and ideas between China and the Mediterranean region via the Silk Road date from as early as Ptolemy and, even earlier, from the Han Dynasty. The periodic overland east-to-west migrations by peoples of the Steppes began at least by 500 A.D.; Attila, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane are only a few of the many who contested for power throughout this broad region. Arabs, Mongols, Tibetans, Chinese and others regularly seesawed through Kashi (Kashgar) and/or adjoining areas. Buddhism and Islam traversed the Silk Road through Central Asia. Chinese suzerainty extended, on occasion, around the Pamirs and into Kabul. Kashi and Urumqi are, culturally, as much or more of a home to Pakistanis from the south or former Siberian nomads to the north as they are now, almost, to Han Chinese from the east. Traditional China doesn't even begin to begin until

Jiayuguan, where the Great Wall has its terminus in Gansu province at the eastern fringe of the Taklimakan Desert. This interplay of peoples and rivalries surrounding the routes of Silk Road commerce had perhaps its grandest manifestation during the 19th century's Great Game when Russia, Britain and China all jockeyed for strategic position within Central Asia. Current PRC-sponsored Chinese migrations into Xinjiang now find bureaucratized Han peoples living rather uneasily side-by-side with the free spirited Uygurs, Kirgiz, Kazakhs, and others. National identities throughout central Asia, from Jiayuguan to Kashi (in China) and again as far on the other side of the PRC-CIS border to the Caspian Sea (in the former Soviet Union), parallel many of the flavors and complexities of nationalism and other concerns found in the contemporary Middle East. That these central Asian complexities are themselves physically adjacent to the Middle East does little to inhibit their volatility. Current activity - a reawakening or resurgence of nationalistic and Islamic interests throughout central Asia - is having an increasingly significant impact on Chinese and Middle Eastern (and Russian) decisions made in capital cities thousands of miles distant from each other. Consideration of this resurgent activity will reappear throughout these pages.

When commerce with China was taken up by the maritime interests of industrializing Europe and, subsequently, America, commercial flows along the old overland Silk Road

became superceded in volume and dominated by direct sea routes largely bypassing the Middle East. (Sea routes between Arabia and China had existed for centuries, but as competitive alternatives rather than as monopolistic requirements). During this period the Qing dynasty was the last to rule Imperial China; forms of colonialism and mercantilism proceeded to infiltrate interaction between China and the rest of the world. The Middle East had, by this time, passed from the arabian and Islamic Umayyad Dynasty to eventual Ottoman rule. It was not until this century's two World Wars that the general demise of colonialism then present within Asia and elsewhere occurred, along with the fatal weakening of the Ottoman Empire; Wilsonian self-determination plus the framework of the United Nations were causal influences as well as symptomatic indicators of colonialism's closure. China and the Middle East were now basically, after a fashion, on their own again.

Because of the heated internal Chinese dispute over the direction and directors-to-be of mainland China after the Qing, the People's Republic (PRC) was not proclaimed until late 1949. During the protracted three-way conflict in China involving the Communists, Nationalists and Japanese, Mao Zedong closely observed the Second World War's progress beyond China with an eye to its effect on China's own security; he concluded, as had apparently many Chinese rulers before him, that the Middle East played a pivotal strategic role as far as

the ultimate safety of China was concerned.⁶ If the Germans (or in later decades the Soviets or Americans), should gain uncontested domination over the Middle East, then China's own security would become that much more tenuous. For if Germany gained control of the Levant in the 1940s, that would have isolated South Asia from the global conflict then in progress, thus weakening Europe and providing largely unobstructed avenues for Axis coordination against China from the west, south and east. These observations of Mao were later to expand into his Intermediate Zone theory and the Three Worlds doctrine.⁷

Meanwhile, rule was established in Moscow by the Russian Communists in 1917 and Egypt, after attempts by Saudi Arabia and Yemen, became the first Arab state to establish continuous relations with the USSR in 1943. Other occurrences within this formative period included creation of the UN and Israel, which were among the Second World War's more prominent byproducts. (The War acted, among other things, as catalyst for generation of a forum for nascent ideas of world government, which in turn supported Zionism's drive for a state of Israel. Disclosures of the holocaust provided further impetus for the formation of Israel). Even the PRC may be said to be, indirectly, a byproduct of the postwar era; the struggles which led to the PRC's formation had been in progress, roughly, since the turn of the century and held to their own timetable, although concluding (at least for the time being),

in 1949. Israel then became the first Levantine country to extend recognition to the PRC in 1950, with Pakistan, also in 1950, being the first Islamic country to recognize the PRC. Although China and Israel did not then quite manage to normalize relations, other countries in the Middle East did succeed in establishing bilateral relations with China. There has subsequently been a steadily increasing involvement of China with the Middle East, and vice versa, since 1949.

Before jumping into post-1949 developments, it is instructive to note that despite the fluid (as well as the timeless), qualities of China and the Middle East, plus their relative geographic proximity, China is one of the very few countries where Middle Eastern demographic or cultural influence is relatively sparse. References are made to communities of Arabs and other traders along the Silk Road and coastal areas where commercial activity entered and departed China.⁸ These settlements, however, either became absorbed outright by the Chinese through the centuries, or assimilated as in the case of the north central Hui minority, or otherwise drifted away, failing to exert sufficient presence to ensure their distinctive survival. Islam itself penetrated central Asia and became prominent in China's outlying provinces (which were not always part of China), although its direct impact on China as a whole has been slight; at present China's population is only 4% Muslim and Buddhist (with perhaps only a few hundred Jews, if any).⁹ China is learning, however, of the

potential public relations value intrinsic to its (relations with its) minority peoples and of having over 20 million Muslims resident within her borders. China must also deal with the fact, now unpleasant to Beijing, that much of her outlying territory, though sparsely populated, has been populated almost entirely with Islamic minorities.¹⁰

Likewise with Christianity: Christian impact within China remains comparatively mild, but shows signs of recent (since the 1700s) growth. Official PRC tolerance for approved religious observances within the last decade has afforded a respite for Chinese Christians and other religious groups, though only to a limited and as yet sporadic extent via officially sanctioned churches, both Protestant and Catholic. Initial Chinese restrictions against Christian proselytizing began from the mid-18th century and were instituted for primarily political reasons (catalyzed, paradoxically, by Rome's reaction to Jesuit practices at China's Imperial court). These sanctions grew to cultural proportions, becoming periodically quite severe against all missionary activities, especially during the formative years of the PRC. Recent events in Poland and Romania sufficiently roused contemporary Chinese leadership to renew sanctions against nonofficial or unapproved Christian groups and other religious activities in the PRC. Overall, however, monotheistic religions of the sort descended from Middle East patriarchal lines are generally accorded just enough indigenous merit,

receive just enough international attention, and have just enough open or hidden local support to currently warrant grudging official tolerance within the PRC. (Tibetan Buddhism also enjoys, now and again, similar tolerances). So despite the recognition we ourselves might find for such practices, examples of historically Middle Eastern presences within modern China remain few.

The lack of a historical Chinese presence in the Middle East is similar to the present relative dearth of Middle Eastern influence within China. Although Chinese have settled in almost every corner of the globe, there have been very few, if any, to take up residence within the Middle East.¹¹ Hence the curious dichotomy of naturally occurring and practically inevitable historical and commercial links between China and the Middle East, yet with a modern tradition prior to 1949 largely devoid of lasting or shared cross-national and cross-cultural influences. We will reconsider this dichotomy later.

B. CHRONOLOGY SINCE 1949

Primary events occurring within China and the Middle East since 1949, plus other notable events of international and mnemonic import, mundane and tumultuous, are set in table format during the following pages. Direct Chinese-Middle Eastern interaction and concerns pertaining to their inter-relationships are printed in italics. Fair sprinklings of detail are chronicled, incorporating material indicative of emotive environments as well as items containing political and

diplomatic impact. This format, full yet economical, serves as a hard reference for discussion of post 1949 events of China and the Middle East; it also, in its straightforward fashion, helps to reduce the emotive content of a subject that is frequently associated with significant degrees of passion. It is necessary to have this type of international overview of primary political and social developments (in conjunction with contemporary U.S. domestic milestones), to better appreciate the interactions, and our perceptions, of two globally constituent regions. What might be important to us, at any given moment, might not be important to someone else, or otherwise found to be important or related in different ways. This overview will help to foster bird's eye views of interregional and international relationships that contributed to, or at least coexisted with, Chinese and Middle Eastern events and by extension our understanding of those events.

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1949	1st Arab-Israeli war		U.S. occupation of Japan
	Israel-Egypt cease-fire	CCP forces enter Beijing	Acheson is Secretary of State
	Israel shoots down 5 U.K. aircraft over Egypt		NATO formed
		CCP forces enter Nanjing	USSR jams VOA
	Israel joins UN	CCP forces enter Shanghai	Berlin blockade ends
			Japan reparations payments terminated
		CCP has about 3 million members	U.S. DOD and JCS Chairman established
	Syrian military coup		Geneva Red Cross convention
		Inner Mongolia joins CCP	
		CPPCC Organic Law	U.S. responsible for over 45% of world's total production
		Xinjiang joins CCP	
		CPPCC Common Program	
		PRC founded	
		CCP forces enter Guangzhou	U.S. White Paper explains loss of China to the CCP
		PRC demands KMT leave UN	
		CCP forces enter Chongqing	USSR detonates its 1st atomic device (SEP)
		PRC has relations with USSR, E. Europe, Mongolia	
	Office of Israeli Prime Minister now in Jerusalem		USSR atomic weapons ban proposal is rejected by UN
		PRC seizes U.S. assets in China	

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1950	<p>Entire Israeli govt now in Jerusalem</p> <p>Israel's Law of Return</p> <p>Israel proclaims Jerusalem capital</p> <p><i>Pakistan is first Muslim state to recognize the PRC</i></p> <p><i>Israel is first Middle East Levant state to recognize PRC</i></p> <p>Arab League agrees to expel any member that makes separate peace with Israel</p> <p>Jordan announces annexation of Arab Palestine</p> <p>U.S., U.K., France (Tripartite) arms agreement on transfers to Middle East</p> <p>Israel decides that there will be no return by Arabs to Israeli-held territory</p>	<p>Marriage Law of 1950</p> <p>Agrarian Reform Law</p> <p>PRC-USSR sign 30 yr Friendship, Mutual Assistance treaty</p> <p>PRC-India Relations</p> <p>Shanghai prices rise 70 times from May 1949 to Feb 1950</p> <p>PRC troops told to liberate Tibet</p> <p>PRC demands to take part in U.S.-Japan treaty discussions</p>	<p>Truman says U.S. will not aid ROC or meddle with PRC</p> <p>U.K. recognizes PRC</p> <p>Republic of India</p> <p>U.S. authorizes H-bomb development</p> <p>McCarthy speech claiming Communists are in State Dept</p> <p>Korean War</p> <p>Truman orders: aid for ROC; 7th Fleet to Taiwan Straits; military mission to ROC; aid for S.E. Asia</p> <p>U.S.-led embargo on all Western goods to PRC</p>
1951	<p>ARAMCO decision to split profits with Saudi Arabia 50-50</p>		

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1951 cont	Israel establishes Dept. to recruit foreign scientists Arab League ponders joint foreign policy <i>PRC selects Egypt and Pakistan as part of 7 nation group to consider the Far East situation</i>	Taiwan's population less than 8 million Taiwan's total exports are \$58m	U.S.-Pakistan sign technical assistance agreement
	Israel wants financial credit from any state, East or West <i>Arab League in Cairo calls itself "Block (West and South Asia), to balance East and West"</i>	PRC opposes Japanese rearmament	
	<i>Egypt stays neutral at UN regarding Korea</i>		
	Israel-South Africa Civil Aviation talks <i>PRC-Pakistan begin relations</i>	"Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries" campaign PRC liberates Tibet	U.S. joins OAS
	Egypt restricts Suez Canal shipping King of Jordan assassinated	"Three-Anti" campaign	Transcontinental TV operational in U.S.
	Iranian-U.K. oil dispute U.K. abrogates Anglo-Egypt treaty of 1936	1st PRC revision of education; language reform initiated	U.S.-Japan Peace and Mutual Security Treaties
	U.S., U.K., France, Turkey propose joint Middle East command	PRC supporting Viet Minh	

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1951 cont		<i>Israel agrees with U.K. and France about supporting direct U.S.-PRC talks on Korea; says troops should not be wasted in Korea</i>	
1952	Anti British riots in Egypt; U.K.-Egypt fighting Ba'ath Party founded King Farouk abdicates Hussein is King of Jordan	"Five-Anti" campaign 40% of peasants on rural mutual-aid teams Pre-1949 production peaks of heavy industry surpassed Mass organizations give CCP direct contact with half of all PRC adults	Congressional Hearings on loyalty and security within the U.S. Govt ANZUS formed State Dept bans all travel to Communist countries Eisenhower elected; Dulles becomes Secretary of State
1953	1st Parliamentary election in Iraq USSR stops relations with Israel USSR renews relations with Israel U.S. urges Egypt to join a collective security pact	1st 5-yr plan PRC reliance on USSR assistance Soviets withdrawing from Manchuria CCP has 6.1 million members Halcyon days begin (1953-1957)	Stalin's Death U.S. occupation of Japan ends Rosenbergs executed Korean Armistice USSR H-bomb
	<i>Pakistan begins to vote against PRC in the UN</i> King Ibn Saud dies		Khrushchev to power U.S.-ROK Treaty
1954	U.S. begins military aid to Pakistan Nasser to power in Egypt	Population is 586 million	USS NAUTILUS, 1st nuclear submarine U.S.-Japan Defense Agreement Dien Bien Phu

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S. /OTHER
1954 cont	Egypt-U.K. Suez agreement; Britain withdraws from Suez	PRC-India agreement; 5 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence PRC-U.K. relations PRC shoots down U.K. airliner	U.S. promotes talks about International Atomic Energy Agency Geneva Conference on Indochina; Dulles refuses to shake Zhou Enlai's hand
	U.S.-Israel treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation	1st National People's Congress; 1st State Constitution replaces CPPCC ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense treaty	SEATO formed
1955	<i>PRC-Afghanistan relations</i> Israel attacks Gaza U.K.-Iraq defense agreement U.S. agrees, in principle, to sell arms to Egypt <i>Sino-Egyptian trade agreement</i> <i>PRC is midwife for Egyptian-Czech arms deal</i> Yemen-USSR renew 1929 Friendship treaty Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia agree on Joint military command U.S. agrees to sell arms to Israel	PRC-ROC confrontation on Quemoy Rural collectives begin PLA officer corps patterned after Soviets' Soviets leave Port Arthur naval base PRC-U.S. talks commence at Geneva PRC commences atom bomb development Rural collectives and urban public ownership are accelerated Compulsory military service begins	Baghdad Pact <i>Bandung Conference</i> Warsaw Pact formed Japan joins GATT

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1956	Yemen-Czech arms deal		Stalin denounced in USSR at 20th Congress of CPSU
	Pakistan becomes an Islamic Republic		
	<i>Egypt first Arab state to recognize the PRC</i>		U.S. sends aid to Israel
	U.K. withdraws from Iraqi bases		
	Egypt-Israel threat of war	"Hundred Flowers" campaign	U.S. H-bomb air test
	<i>PRC-Egypt begin relations</i>		
	Mid-East arms race developing	Zhou Enlai proposes peaceful negotiations with Taiwan	U.S. refuses to send arms to Egypt
	Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal	Growing dispute between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi	U.S. Interstate Highway Act
	<i>PRC-Syria begin relations</i>		U.S. withdraws aid for Aswan dam
		8th Party Congress; new CCP constitution; changes made to Soviet-style central planning	
	<i>PRC-Yemen begin relations</i>		Hungarian uprising
		1st UN attempt to seat PRC = 16-33-10	Transatlantic Cable
	<i>Pakistan PM visits PRC</i>		
	Egypt, Jordan, Syria place militaries in joint command	PRC begins work on large missiles	International Atomic Energy Agency formed
	Suez crisis: Israel invades Egypt; U.K. & France invade Egypt		

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1956 cont	<p><i>PRC offers volunteers to assist Egypt during Suez crisis</i></p> <p><i>PRC provides funds to Egypt; PRC-Egypt commodities agreement</i></p> <p><i>Zhou Enlai visits Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and four other countries</i></p>	<p>61st meeting between PRC-U.S. ambassadors is held in Beijing</p>	<p>USSR invades Hungary</p> <p>Eisenhower reelected</p> <p>White collar and service sector workers now outnumber blue collar workers</p> <p>Japan admitted to UN</p>
1957	<p>UN urged by U.S. to pressure Israel's withdrawal to borders of armistice</p> <p>U.S. authorizes cooperation with Middle East against communist aggression</p> <p>Suez Canal is opened by UN to all but the largest vessels</p> <p>Coup attempt in Jordan; all political parties are banned</p> <p>U.S.-Iran Treaty</p> <p>Nasser is President</p> <p>Syria-U.S. crisis in diplomacy</p> <p>Syria-USSR credit agreement</p>	<p>"On the Correct Way of Handling Contradictions among the People" by Mao</p> <p>Pinyin romanization is developing</p> <p>PRC reappraises relations with U.S., Japan; returns to Hard Line (1957-67); <i>encourages worldwide Peoples' Wars vs. Imperialism</i></p> <p>"Anti-Rightist" campaign</p> <p>24 U.S. news groups allowed to visit PRC on trial basis</p> <p>Almost all peasants are collectivized</p> <p><i>Mao in Moscow; PRC-USSR disagree about Middle East policy</i></p>	<p>Eisenhower Doctrine</p> <p>UN debates Kashmir</p> <p>Little Rock, Ark.</p> <p>Treaty of Rome: European Economic Community (EEC) begins</p> <p>U.K. eases trade restrictions with PRC; Italy, Japan and FRG follow suit</p> <p>USSR tests ICBM</p> <p>USSR's Sputnik</p> <p>Asian-African Solidarity Conf.</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1958	Egypt-USSR assistance agreement	2nd 5-yr plan	1st U.S. satellite
	<i>Yemen Crown Prince 1st Arab leader to visit PRC; PRC-Yemeni industry credit and Treaty of Friendship</i>		
		U.S.-PRC talks now in Warsaw	
	Iraq-Jordan form Arab Union	2nd National People's Congress	
	Egypt-Syria form UAR		
	Yemen and UAR form a federation	Mao questions value of formal education	
	Iraqi military coup; Hashemites overthrown		
	Iraq-Jordan Union dissolves	People's Communes are started	
	Iraq-UAR make mutual defense pact		
	<i>1st PRC shipment of goods to Baghdad</i>		
	<i>Zhou Enlai assures Iraq of PRC support</i>		NASA begins
	U.S. Marines in Lebanon	PRC bombards Quemoy and Matsu	
	<i>PRC-Iraq begin relations</i>		
	Ayub Khan to power in Pakistan	Great Leap Forward; voids 2nd 5-yr plan	
	Egypt-USSR Aswan Dam agreement		U.S.-ROC agree that ROC mission does not include force against the PRC
	Egypt represses local communists		John XXIII installed
	Oman-U.S. Treaty of Amity		

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1959	<p><i>8 Iraq delegations to PRC and 3 PRC delegations to Iraq from December 1958 to September 1959</i></p> <p>Arafat forms Fatah: Palestine Liberation Movement</p> <p>Iraq-USSR Economic agreement</p> <p>Arab Petroleum Conf. in Cairo</p> <p><i>UAR ambassador to PRC recalled</i></p> <p>Iraq-U.S. military, economic assistance agreements cancelled</p> <p>Ba'ath tries to shoot Qassem</p> <p><i>PRC and Egypt dispute anti-communist issue</i></p> <p>U.S.-Pakistan treaty of friendship</p>	<p>Anti Chinese turmoil in Tibet</p> <p>PRC-USSR technical assistance agreement through 1965</p> <p>Liu Shaoqi becomes Chairman of PRC</p> <p>Factionalism within CCP beginning</p> <p>Massive drought</p> <p>Lin Biao Minister of Defense; PLA Party Committees restored</p> <p>CCP has 14 million members</p> <p>Mao now stays away from direct administration</p>	<p>Castro to power</p> <p>U.S.-Iran Defense pact</p> <p>Herter is Secretary of State</p> <p>Peaceful uses of Antarctica treaty</p> <p>Rusk calls for reassessment of PRC</p>
1960	<p>Aswan Dam begun</p> <p><i>Several hundred PRC workers still in Yemen</i></p> <p>Iran says Iraq is violating Shatt al-Arab agreement</p>	<p>PRC-Nepal Border Agreement and Aid Package</p> <p>3rd visit of Zhou Enlai to India; no resolution to border dispute</p> <p>Zhou Enlai visits Nepal</p>	<p>OPEC formed</p> <p>France detonates its 1st nuclear device</p> <p>U.S. giving increasing aid to South Vietnam</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1960 cont	<p>Kurdish revolt in Iraq begins</p> <p><i>PRC-Afghan Friendship and Non-aggression Treaty</i></p>	<p>Severe flooding; worst in 100 yrs</p> <p>PRC-Burma border agreement</p> <p>Soviet technicians withdrawn from PRC</p> <p>Zhou Enlai tells a visitor that PRC has taken "first step in a journey of 10,000 miles"</p>	<p>U-2 incident over USSR</p> <p>USS TRITON completes 1st underwater circumnavigation</p> <p>Nixon-Kennedy debates</p> <p>Benelux union</p> <p>JFK elected; Rusk is Secretary of State</p>
1961	<p>U.S.-Pakistan treaty of Friendship and Commerce</p> <p>Termination of U.K. Protectorate in Kuwait</p> <p>Iraq reasserts claim on all of Kuwait</p> <p>PRC recognizes Kuwait</p> <p>Egypt-Syria union is dissolved</p> <p>UAR-Yemen Federation dissolved</p>	<p>PRC-Albania credit agreement</p> <p>PRC buys Canadian and Australian grain</p> <p>Entire countryside now organized into 70,000 communes</p> <p>PRC-N. Korea Mutual Defense Treaty</p> <p>CCP has 17 million members</p>	<p>Yuri Gagarin flight</p> <p>Bay of Pigs</p> <p>1st U.S. manned space flight</p> <p>U.S.-USSR Vienna summit</p> <p>Berlin Wall</p> <p>Hammarskjold killed</p> <p>Peace Corps founded</p> <p>Eichmann convicted</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1962	<p>Iranian Agrarian Reform Law</p> <p>Syrian military coup</p> <p><i>PRC oil and military delegations in Iraq</i></p> <p>Coup in North Yemen forms a Republic; recognized by PRC and USSR; civil war ensues between Republicans and Royalists</p> <p>Algeria Independent</p> <p><i>Nasser mediates between PRC and India</i></p> <p><i>PRC delegation to UAR to explain PRC side of Sino-Soviet dispute</i></p>	<p>Mao sees a trend to revive capitalism within PRC/CCP</p> <p>"Quotations from Chairman Mao" is published by Lin Biao (aka: Little Red Book)</p> <p>Sino-Indian border war</p>	<p>37 nation Conference in Cairo dealing with problems of economic development</p> <p>Cuban Missile Crisis</p>
1963	<p>Ba'athist coup in Iraq; recognized by PRC and USSR</p> <p><i>PRC-Syria economic credit</i></p> <p><i>Sino-Pakistan border agreement; 1st PRC-Pakistan agreement on trade</i></p> <p>Military coup in Syria (Ba'ath)</p> <p><i>Syria and Iraq form UAR; its Premier visits PRC</i></p> <p>Iraq recognizes Kuwait</p> <p>Ba'ath Party loses power in Iraq</p>	<p>Mao reasserting Class Struggle primacy in PRC and CCP</p> <p>PRC-USSR talks on ideology fail</p> <p>"Socialist Education" campaign</p> <p>1st of 9 essays by PRC on differences between CCP and CPSU</p>	<p><i>2nd Afro-Asian Conference</i></p> <p>Birmingham racial violence</p> <p>John XXIII dies</p> <p>Nuclear Test Ban treaty</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1963 cont	Pakistan-U.S. discuss Sino-Pakistan ties <i>Zhou Enlai visits Egypt & nine other Middle East and African countries</i>	PRC-Italian Petro- Chemical contracts	JFK shot; LBJ takes office
1964	Arab summit discusses Israeli use of Jordan River water <i>1st Fatah delegation to PRC</i> <i>PRC delegation to Syria for aid discussions</i> Israeli project for Jordan River water begins operation PLO is established <i>Yemen President visits PRC;</i> <i>PRC-Yemen trade credit</i> 2nd Non-Aligned Conf; 47 countries meet in Cairo Israel-Syria fighting	PRC-France chemical agreement; PRC-France begin relations "Four Cleanups" campaign Zhou Enlai on tours to Africa and Asia, including <i>Pakistan</i> Mao makes changes to education system PRC launches its 1st ballistic missile PRC detonates its 1st atomic device	Nehru dies U.S. terminates aid to ROC Civil Rights Bill Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Brezhnev succeeds Khrushchev LBJ is elected
1965	<i>PRC-UAR industrial credit</i> Fatah's 1st action against Israel <i>PRC-Kuwait trade agreement</i> <i>Syrian Foreign Minister to PRC</i> <i>First PLO delegation to PRC</i> Nasser reelected to 3rd term	3rd National People's Congress; Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai are reelected PRC repays all funds borrowed from USSR	U.S. departs from gold standard <i>Afro-Asian Islamic Conf. in Bandung</i>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1965 cont	<p><i>UAR Premier visits PRC</i></p> <p><i>PRC delegation to Kuwait</i></p> <p><i>Zhou Enlai visits Cairo en route to Algiers Conference; Zhou Enlai also visits Syria; abortive attempt by PRC to hold "Second Bandung" conference in Algiers</i></p> <p>Herut and Liberal Party form Gahal bloc in Israel</p> <p><i>PRC gives diplomatic aid to Pakistan during Indo-Pakistani war; PRC ultimatum to India</i></p> <p>Pakistan-India cease-fire</p> <p><i>Kuwait trade delegation to PRC</i></p> <p><i>Syrian military delegation to PRC</i></p> <p>Israel provides Iraqi Kurds with arms</p>	<p>Cultural Revolution (GPCR) begins</p> <p>Lin Biao's article "People's Wars of Liberation"</p> <p>Military ranks abolished in PLA</p> <p>Tibet Autonomous Region formally established</p> <p>UN vote to seat PRC now 47-47-20</p>	<p>Terrorist bomb destroys U.S. Embassy in Saigon</p> <p>U.S. begins direct combat in Vietnam; continuous bombing of N. Vietnam</p> <p>Singapore leaves Malaysia</p> <p>Anti-Sukarno coup in Indonesia; thousands of ethnic Chinese slain or deported</p> <p>France 3rd state to launch a satellite</p> <p>Asian Development Bank formed</p> <p>Vatican II ends</p>
1966	<p><i>PRC opens NCNA office in Kuwait</i></p> <p>Neo-Ba'ath coup in Syria</p> <p>USSR-Syria credit for Euphrates dam</p>	<p>3rd 5-yr plan; voided by GPCR</p> <p>PRC-FRG trade flourishing; PRC trade with non-communist world exceeds trade with communist states</p> <p>CCP power struggle</p>	<p>Senate Hearings on China policy</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S. /OTHER
1966 cont	Kurds and Iraq govt reach agreement	Zhou Enlai formally announces GPCR "May 7" schools Thermonuclear test over Western PRC Red Guards extremely active; "Four Olds" Liu Shaoqi demoted <i>PRC now providing military aid to Pakistan</i> <i>First PRC arms shipment to PLO</i> Guided missile and nuclear test Deng Xiaoping purged PRC nuclear test	Japan borrows total of \$863 million (m) from World Bank since 1953; largest debtor nation Tashkent Conference ASPAC founded Asian Development Bank inaugurated
1967	U.S. aid to Israel, 1949-1967, is \$1.5 billion (\$1.5b) Suez closed to use by and for Israel Arab-Israeli 6-day war; Israel attacks USS LIBERTY, occupies Jerusalem, Sinai, Golan and West Bank Martial law in Jordan Suez closed entirely USSR breaks relations with Israel <i>PRC trade credit to Egypt</i> N. Yemen coup ends Civil War, returns pro-Saudi government Israel applies its law to all Jerusalem	Worker groups and Red Guards dispute amongst themselves and with others Turmoil in Hong Kong by Red Guards, U.K. police contain it 1.2 million urban youth resettled to countryside 1957-66 Wuhan incident Hong Kong capitalism begins to skyrocket PRC detonates its 1st hydrogen device	Apollo capsule fire Soyuz I accident

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S. /OTHER
1967 cont	<p><i>All PRC Ambassadors recalled except for Ambassador to Egypt</i></p> <p>Israel relying on U.S. more than France for military arms</p> <p>South Yemen formed, recognized by PRC and USSR</p>	<p>PRC agrees to build railway in Tanzania</p> <p>Red Guards storm Soviet and British embassies</p> <p>7th PRC atmospheric nuclear test</p>	<p>Thurgood Marshall to Supreme Court</p> <p>Nixon writes PRC cannot be left "forever outside the family of nations"</p> <p>UNSC Resolution 242</p>
1968	<p>Iraq nuclear reactor completed</p> <p>U.S.-Jordan arms agreement</p> <p><i>Yemen reconstruction bank chairman visits PRC</i></p> <p>U.S.-Iran arms agreement</p> <p>Iraqi Ba'ath Party again in power; coup d'etat</p> <p>Israel relies on</p> <p><i>S.Yemen Foreign Minister in PRC; PRC-S.Yemen diplomatic relations; PRC economic credit to S.Yemen</i></p> <p>Iraqi Kurds fight among themselves</p>	<p>U.S.-PRC talks resume in Warsaw</p> <p>PLA beginning to restore order in PRC</p> <p>Revolutionary Committees now at every level of PRC society</p> <p>CCP establishment fights GPCR to keep access to power</p>	<p>TET offensive</p> <p>M.L. King, Jr. assassinated</p> <p>Robert Kennedy shot</p> <p>USSR invades Czechoslovakia</p> <p>Brezhnev Doctrine</p> <p>Nixon elected; Rogers is Secretary of State, Kissinger at NSC</p> <p>USS PUEBLO captured</p>
1969	<p>Israel training Iraqi Kurds</p> <p>Iran-Iraq dispute Shatt al-Arab</p>	<p>PRC-USSR border fighting</p> <p>9th Party Congress; GPCR formally over but turmoil remains, Lin Biao is heir, new CCP Constitution</p>	<p>U.S. relaxing bans on American contact and trade with PRC</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1969 cont	<p><i>Iraq Chief-of-Staff to PRC</i></p> <p><i>PRC-Yemen technical school agreement</i></p> <p>Kuwait has to allow Iraqis in Umm Qasr</p> <p>Jordanian Civil War: 1969-70</p> <p><i>PRC-Iraq civil air agreement</i></p> <p>Rogers Peace plan</p>		<p>Apollo 11 moon walk</p> <p>Nixon Doctrine</p> <p>U.S. discloses that USSR inquired about possible pre-emptive strike against PRC</p>
1970	<p><i>PRC aid delegation in S.Yemen</i></p> <p><i>PRC completes textile mill in Yemen</i></p> <p><i>Arafat visits PRC (and USSR)</i></p> <p>Kurds and Iraq reach another agreement</p> <p>Jordan civil war with PLO, forces PLO into Lebanon; Syria aids PLO</p> <p><i>S. Yemen delegation in PRC; PRC-S. Yemen aid agreement</i></p> <p>Egypt-Israel cease-fire agreements</p> <p>Nasser dies</p> <p><i>PRC completes Yemen technical school</i></p> <p><i>Israel does not support vote to keep PRC out of UN; PRC gains 1st majority vote for seat at UN</i></p>	<p>PRC is 5th state to launch a satellite</p> <p>Military Security forces persecute May 16 Group</p> <p>Population is 820 million</p>	<p>Japan signs Non-proliferation Treaty and 4th state to launch a satellite</p> <p>U.S. troop reduction from Vietnam is announced</p> <p>U.S. incursion into Cambodia</p> <p>Kent State</p> <p>U.S.-Japan automatic renewal of mutual security pact</p> <p>Third non-aligned conference, held in Lusaka, Zambia</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1970 cont	<p>Sultan Qaboos leads Omani coup</p> <p>Hafez Assad leads coup in Syria</p> <p>Libya, Sudan and UAR agree to federate; Syria also intends to join</p> <p><i>PRC delegation in Yemen for anniversary</i></p>	<p>Mao interviewed by Edgar Snow</p>	<p>Riots in Poland</p>
1971	<p>U.K. withdraws from Persian Gulf; Iran and Saudi Arabia are asked/aided by U.S. to fill the vacuum</p> <p><i>PRC discontinues support to PFLOAG</i></p> <p><i>Kuwait recognizes the PRC</i></p> <p><i>Jordan recognizes the PRC</i></p> <p>Iran seizes 3 Iraqi islands</p> <p>Egypt, Libya, Syria form Federation of Arab Republics</p> <p>USSR-Egypt treaty</p> <p><i>PRC-Iran establish relations; Pakistan assists as intermediary</i></p> <p>Syria closes border with Jordan</p> <p><i>Second Indo-Pakistani war; PRC provides moderate support for Pakistan; Bangladesh formed</i></p>	<p>4th 5-yr plan</p> <p>Mao willing to talk with Imperialists</p> <p>PRC's 2nd satellite</p> <p>CCP reorganization</p> <p>PRC builds its 1st nuclear submarine</p> <p>Kissinger visits PRC</p> <p>Death of Lin Biao; prominence of PLA starts to recede</p> <p>PRC admitted to UN</p>	<p>U.S. Navy stops Taiwan Strait patrol</p> <p>U.S. recognizes PRC as legitimate power on the mainland; citizens allowed to visit PRC if they can obtain Visas</p> <p>India-USSR Treaty of Friendship</p> <p>Pentagon Papers</p> <p>U.S. leaves Gold Standard</p> <p>U.K. 6th state to launch a satellite</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1972	<p>Attempted pro-Soviet coup in Egypt</p> <p><i>PRC sends arms to Pakistan</i></p> <p>Sadat expels 21,000 Soviets</p> <p><i>Kuwait govt delegation to PRC</i></p> <p>Syria agrees to PLO control by Arafat in S. Lebanon</p> <p>Clandestine meeting of Israeli official and King Hussein</p> <p>Union attempted by North & South Yemen</p> <p><i>Kuwait trade delegation to PRC</i></p>	<p>Nixon visits PRC; PRC-U.S. Shanghai Communique</p> <p>Campaign begins to discredit Confucius</p> <p>Deng Xiaoping reappearing</p> <p>PRC provided \$4.4b in foreign aid from 1953-1971</p> <p>1st PRC purchase of U.S. wheat</p> <p><i>PRC, at the UN, does not approve of PLO terrorism</i></p>	<p>Soviet-Iraqi treaty</p> <p>Nixon to USSR; ABM, SALT II Treaties; Detente; 1st U.S. President in USSR</p> <p>Watergate commences</p> <p>Philippines 1st ASEAN state to recognize PRC</p> <p>Okinawa reverts to Japan from U.S.</p> <p>Japan gives full recognition to PRC; regrets and repents past aggression in China</p> <p>Nixon reelected</p>
1973	<p>Iran-Iraq begin clashes over Shatt al-Arab</p> <p>Iraq-Kuwait fighting over Umm Qasr</p> <p>Libya-Egypt attempt to form union</p> <p>Syria border opened</p> <p>Arab-Israeli war; USSR sends arms to Egypt</p> <p>OAPEC oil embargo</p> <p>Israel now largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid</p>	<p>PRC's 1st oil exports go to Japan</p> <p>New birth control campaign</p> <p>10th Party Congress; new CCP constitution</p> <p>French President to PRC; 1st W. Europe head-of-state visit in PRC since 1949</p> <p>PRC wants U.S. to speed normalization</p> <p><i>PRC tacitly approves U.S. force alert in response to USSR</i></p> <p>Deng Xiaoping re-emerges under Zhou Enlai's patronage</p>	<p>U.S. leaves Vietnam</p> <p>Kissinger is Secretary of State</p> <p>USSR threatens to intervene in Middle East fighting</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1973 cont	<p>Israel now largely isolated in international community</p> <p>Likud party forms in Israel</p> <p>25 meetings between PLO and Israel from 1973-77 (unofficial)</p>	<p>CCP has 28 million members</p> <p>PRC-Canada trade agreement</p> <p>PRC begins sustained buying of Western industry and technology</p>	<p>UN cease fire for Middle East conflict</p> <p>UNSC Resolution 338</p> <p>OPEC raises price of oil by 300%</p>
1974	<p>Sadat ends complete reliance on USSR arms</p> <p>Egypt's "Open Door" investment policy</p> <p>Kissinger shuttle diplomacy; Nixon visits Middle East</p> <p>PLO granted observer status in UN</p> <p><i>PRC able to supply spare parts for Egypt's soviet arsenal</i></p>	<p>Deng into Politburo</p> <p>Lin Biao and Confucius discrediting campaign</p> <p>Vice Premier Deng at UN elaborates Three Worlds theory</p> <p>PRC rejects U.S. wheat because of "smut"</p>	<p>Japan enters MFN agreement with PRC</p> <p>Nixon resigns; Ford becomes new U.S. President</p> <p>India detonates its first nuclear device</p>
1975	<p>Suez Canal reopened</p> <p>Iraq and Kurds resume hostilities</p> <p><i>PRC exports more to Kuwait than to any other Middle East country</i></p> <p>Iran-Iraq accord RE: Kurds and Shatt al-Arab waterway</p> <p>Collapse of Kurdish resistance in Iraq</p> <p>Lebanon civil war resumes: bus load of Palestinians massacred by Maronite Catholics in Beirut</p>	<p>4th National People's Congress; 1975 State Constitution; Deng is PLA's Chief of Staff; "Four Modernizations"</p> <p>Chiang Kai-shek dies</p> <p>Deng visits France: highest PRC official ever to visit Western country</p>	<p>U.S. forces in ROC are reduced</p> <p>U.S. suspends aid to Israel during review of regional policy</p> <p>USS MAYAGUEZ incident</p> <p>Cuban troops to Angola</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1975	<p>Jordan is Syria's closest Arab ally from 1973-1979</p> <p>Syria-Iraq quarrel over Euphrates dam</p> <p>Syria now receiving USSR's newest arms</p>	<p>PRC-EEC relations</p> <p>PRC's 3rd satellite</p> <p>PRC begins active role in UN agencies</p> <p>TANZAM Railroad is completed</p> <p>1st FRG head-of-state visit to PRC; PRC opposes "permanent division of Germany"</p> <p>President Ford to PRC</p>	<p>Apollo-Soyuz mission</p> <p>Helsinki Conference</p>
1976	<p>Sadat abrogates 1971 Egypt-USSR treaty</p> <p>Arabs protest land seizures by Israel</p> <p><i>Egyptian delegation in PRC; PRC-Egypt arms agreement</i></p> <p>Syria invades Lebanon</p> <p>Entebbe incident and rescue operation</p> <p>DMC Party formed in Israel</p> <p><i>PRC Muslims better able to make Hajj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia</i></p>	<p>5th 5-yr plan</p> <p>Zhou Enlai dies</p> <p>12 million urban youth resettled to countryside 1968-75</p> <p>April 5th Tiananmen incident; Deng is purged again, Hua Guofeng made Acting Premier</p> <p>PRC-India normalize relations</p> <p>Earthquake in N.E.: 650,000 die</p> <p>Severe drought</p> <p>Mao Zedong dies</p> <p>Gang of Four purged; Hua Guofeng heads CCP and Military Affairs Commission</p>	<p>USSR says detente and revolution are not contradictory</p> <p>Vietnam reunited</p> <p>Carter elected; Vance is Secretary of State</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S. /OTHER
1977	<p>Begin is first Likud Prime Minister in Israel</p> <p>Food riots in Egypt</p> <p>PRC-Kuwait sign first cooperation protocol</p> <p>Libya-Egypt border clash</p> <p>Both Iraq & Kuwait withdraw at Umm Qasr</p> <p>Bhutto overthrown in Pakistan coup</p> <p>Sadat stops debt payments and cotton exports to USSR; forbids navy base use to USSR</p> <p>Egypt allows multiple political parties</p> <p>2nd clandestine King Hussein and Israeli meeting</p> <p>Sadat goes to Israel</p> <p>Carter calls for Palestinian homeland</p> <p>Arab Summit and Tripoli Declaration</p>	<p>Deng Xiaoping begins to consolidate power</p> <p>"Production Responsibility System" in agriculture</p> <p>CCP has 35 million members</p> <p>11th Party Congress; new CCP constitution and revival of party control after GPCR</p> <p>College entrance exams required</p> <p>PRC \$35b arms budget is 3rd largest; USSR is 1st at \$140b; U.S. 2nd at \$101b</p> <p>PRC wants to buy Harrier jets</p>	<p>U.S. arms to Iran from 1971-77 total \$21b (only \$1.2b from 1950-70, \$5.7b in 1977)</p> <p>UN adopts Pinyin as international standard</p> <p>Cuba sends troops to Ethiopia</p>
1978	<p>Sadat and Saudi King meet; 1st Egypt-Saudi high level contact</p> <p>Sadat travels to Beijing</p>	<p>Deng visits Burma, Nepal and Bangladesh</p> <p>PRC anti-USSR stance is alienating some Third World states</p> <p>EEC-PRC 5-yr. trade agreement</p> <p>Japan-PRC \$20b trade agreement</p>	<p>Brezhnev stresses return to Geneva Conference for peace in Middle East</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1978 cont	U.S. \$4.8b sale of advanced aircraft to Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia	5th National People's Congress; 1978 State Constitution, 1st 10-yr plan, primacy of economic growth	USSR requests talks with PRC to improve relations
	Israel invades South Lebanon, occupies strip along border	Revolutionary Committees abolished except at lowest levels	U.S. Nonproliferation Act
		1st PRC high-level delegation to Philippines	
		PRC refuses talks with USSR because of border tensions	
	<i>PRC-Afghanistan agree to increase trade</i>		
	Afghan military coup	EEC is PRC's largest trade partner after Japan	EEC begins European Money System
		Hua visits N. Korea; first trip abroad by PRC leader since 1957	Panama Canal Treaty
	YAR coup	Deng's "Open Door" policy	Carter favors sales of U.S. technology and W. Europe arms to PRC
	<i>PDRY coup; pro-PRC president is killed</i>		
	Arab League forces a peace in PDRY	PRC cuts all aid to Albania	
		PRC-Japan treaty of peace and friendship	
	<i>Hua Guofeng visits Iran</i>		
	Camp David Accords	U.S.-PRC talks about developing PRC communications satellite	
	Martial Law in Iran		
	Iraq expels Khomeini	Deng visits Japan	

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1978 cont	<p>Syria opens border with Iraq</p> <p>Syria-Iraq plan a joint military command</p> <p>Egyptian politics returns to one primary party (NDP)</p> <p>Iraq shifting away from USSR to West for arms</p> <p>Egyptian migrant workers remit \$1.7b</p>	<p><i>PRC at first supports Camp David</i></p> <p>1st PRC-U.S. student exchanges in 30 yrs.</p> <p>PRC buys missiles from France</p> <p>Mao accused of aiding Gang of Four</p> <p>Deng Xiaoping is now primary ruler in PRC</p> <p>Deng says Taiwan may keep its political system even after reunification</p> <p>3rd Plenum of 11th CC</p> <p>PRC conducted 22 nuclear tests from 1974-1978</p> <p>PRC asks ROC for mail service, trade and personal visits</p>	<p>Polish Pope</p> <p>USSR-Vietnam sign 25-yr. treaty</p> <p>Indira Gandhi jailed</p>
1979	<p>Egypt has received more U.S. aid by 1979 than any one country since Marshall Plan</p> <p>Islamic revolution in Iran; Shah leaves</p> <p><i>PRC Deputy Prime Minister visits Pakistan</i></p> <p>Syria-Iraq agree in principle to unite</p> <p>Pakistan adopts more Islamic law</p> <p>U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan killed</p>	<p>U.S.-PRC normalize relations; Deng in U.S. says ROC need not disarm after reunification, wants larger U.S. presence in Pacific</p> <p>PRC receives Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status from U.S.</p>	<p>Salt II negotiations all year in Senate</p> <p>U.S.-Philippine 5-yr base agreement</p> <p>USSR does not like Deng's anti-Soviet comments during his U.S. visit</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S. /OTHER
1979 cont	Iraq-Saudi mutual internal security agreement	PRC-Japan \$2 billion oil accord	
	YAR-PDRY fighting; Arab League tries to stop it	PRC attacks Vietnam in brief land war; PLA does poorly	
	Iraq makes YAR-PDRY cease-fire work	Agriculture and consumer goods receive emphasis	
	Pakistan withdraws from CENTO		
	Israel-Egypt treaty		
	Baghdad Summit	PRC-Portugal normalize relations; agree that Macao is Chinese Territory with Portuguese Administration	Three-Mile Island
	U.S. cuts aid to Pakistan following reports of near nuclear capability		U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act
	<i>PRC, via Pakistan, sends regrets to Iran about Sep '78 visit</i>		
	Egypt given \$1.5b military credits by U.S.	Deng says U.S. may monitor Soviet SALT compliance from PRC soil	Pope visits Poland
	Iraq-Syria unity talks in Baghdad	PRC reports success with a ballistic missile test	U.S. authorizes MX missile
	Saddam Hussein to power in Iraq	Deng tells Japan that PRC will allow 100% foreign ownership of business in PRC	
		PRC added to Olympics	Andrew Young resigns from UN after he meets with PLO rep
	Pakistan says it is continuing nuclear development program	PRC-U.S. total trade now \$2.4b per year	

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1979 cont	<p>Israel-S.Africa joint Indian Ocean nuclear test</p> <p>Mosque in Mecca is attacked</p> <p>U.S. Embassy burned in Islamabad</p> <p>Afghanistan invaded by USSR</p> <p>Israeli inflation at 124%</p>	<p>Hua on 23 day trip to France, Germany, UK</p> <p>Democracy Wall</p> <p>Ministry of Justice reinstated (was abolished in 1959)</p> <p>PRC-USSR normalizing talks end without progress</p> <p><i>PRC asks USSR to exit Afghanistan</i></p>	<p>Shah flies to NYC</p> <p>U.S.-Iran hostage crisis</p> <p>USSR building first nuclear carrier</p>
1980	<p><i>PRC and U.S. agree to coordinate military aid for Mujahidin via Pakistan</i></p> <p><i>PRC sends Muslim delegation to Iran for first anniversary of Islamic revolution</i></p> <p>Pakistan dismisses U.S. \$400 million offer as "peanuts"</p> <p><i>PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua visits Pakistan</i></p> <p>Iraqi Pan-Arab Charter</p> <p><i>PRC is now Pakistan's primary arms supplier; providing aid for Afghan resistance via Pakistan</i></p> <p>Israel expropriates land NE of Jerusalem</p> <p>Saudi supports peace via UNSC 242 & 338</p>	<p>Deng persuading CCP to limit concurrent CCP and PRC office holders</p> <p>6th National People's Congress; Zhao Ziyang becomes Premier</p>	<p>U.S. grain embargo to USSR</p> <p>U.S.-Turkey 5 year military agreement</p> <p>Sakharov exiled</p> <p>Carter Doctrine</p> <p>U.S. selling non-lethal arms to PRC and ROC</p> <p>Oman, Kenya, Somalia agree on U.S. access to bases</p> <p>Selective Service revived in U.S.</p> <p>50,000 refugees/yr allowed into U.S.</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1980 cont	<p>Saudi Arabia is 6th in military expenditures, 1st in per capita; over \$30b purchased from U.S. since 1973</p> <p>Jordan moving from Syria to Iraq</p> <p>King Hussein will join peace talks if Israel withdraws from territories; U.S. sells tanks to Jordan</p> <p>Israel states all of Jerusalem is its Capital</p> <p><i>PRC arms sales and workers in Middle East earn \$1b/yr during early 1980s</i></p> <p>Iran-Iraq war begins</p> <p>Syria-USSR 20 yr. friendship accord</p> <p>Israel at UN asks nuclear weapons ban in Middle East</p>	<p>PRC tests CSSX-4 IBM successfully</p> <p>Hua Guofeng in Japan; urges joint response to USSR; 1st Chinese leader to visit Japan in over 2,000 yrs</p> <p>PRC-U.S. total trade now \$4.9b per year</p> <p>Coastal special economic zones</p> <p>Gang of Four on trial</p>	<p>U.S. attempt to rescue hostages in Iran</p> <p>Vance resigns; Muskie is new Secretary of State</p> <p>France has neutron bomb</p> <p>India 7th state to launch a satellite</p> <p>U.S. boycotts Olympics</p> <p>Birth of Solidarity</p> <p>U.S. to sell 11 advanced computers to PRC</p> <p>Reagan elected; Haig is Secretary of State</p>
1981	<p><i>Iran delegation to Beijing; PRC & Iran both profess Third World membership</i></p> <p>Saudi plan forms Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)</p> <p>U.S.-Saudi Arabia \$2b arms deal</p> <p>Jordan says Syria is involving Middle East in East-West rivalry</p>	<p>6th 5-yr plan</p> <p>PRC has \$6.1b surplus with developing countries</p>	<p>Solidarity active in Poland</p> <p>World refugee total 12.6 million</p> <p>U.S. trade in Pacific now starts to surpass Atlantic</p> <p>Space Shuttle</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1981 cont	AWACS sale for Saudi Arabia		RDF formed
	Israel-Syria almost go to war	Taiwan's population almost 20 million	
	Habib shuttle diplomacy		Pope shot (wounded)
	Israel bombs Iraqi nuclear plant	PRC condemns Vatican interference for naming Chinese Archbishop	
	U.S.-Egypt reach \$2b accord for two nuke power plants		Haig reaffirms U.S. arms sales to PRC as strategic imperative
	60% of Saudi work force are foreign	Hu Yaobang becomes CCP Chairman	
	20 changes in Iraqi government since 1932 Independence	Deng heads Military Commission	U.S. reports joint PRC-U.S. tracking post in Xinjiang since 1979; PRC denies it
	Prince Fahd 8-point peace plan; Israel rejects it	PRC-India agree to discuss border	
	60% of Saudi workers are foreign nationals	Mao portrayed as brilliant leader who made "grave errors"	
	Sadat cracks down on Islamic extremists	PRC reverts to Three Worlds rhetoric after hiatus of several years	U.S. neutron bomb production
	U.S.-Israel joint security, strategic planning agreement	PRC proposes PRC-ROC reunification; ROC rejects it	
	Sadat expels 1,000 Soviets including Ambassador	PRC launches three satellites on same rocket	Sandra Day O'Connor 1st female Supreme Court judge
			U.S. debt exceeds \$1 trillion

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1981 cont	<p>Sadat killed; Mubarak</p> <p>Arafat visits Japan</p> <p>Mubarak arrests Islamic extremists</p> <p>Israel annexes Golan Heights</p> <p>Saudi Arabia/Bahrain say Iran is exporting terrorism; sign pact</p>	<p>PRC offers sea, air and mail links with ROC</p> <p>PRC-Japan \$1.38b industrial aid accord</p>	<p>Japan-USSR agree to discuss Kuriles</p> <p>U.S. launches Trident sub</p> <p>Polish Martial Law</p>
1982	<p>France pledges to rebuild Iraqi reactor</p> <p>Egypt requests USSR industrial aid</p> <p>U.S. arms sales to Jordan increased</p> <p>Sinai returned to Egypt by Israel</p> <p>Israel acknowledges supplying arms to Iran</p> <p>Israel into Lebanon</p> <p><i>PRC promises PLO emergency aid to offset Lebanese losses</i></p> <p><i>PRC-Oman establish relations</i></p> <p>PLD expelled from S. Lebanon and Beirut</p> <p>U.S. Marines enter Beirut</p>	<p>Emergence of PRC's independent foreign policy</p> <p>PRC-Poland agreement to increase trade 25%</p> <p>PRC proposal for arms control at UN meeting</p> <p>PRC approves govt. personnel reduction from 600,000 to 200,000</p> <p>U.S.-PRC discussions about developing PRC nuclear industry</p> <p>PRC-U.S. 5-yr textile agreement</p> <p>12th Party Congress; new CCP constitution</p>	<p>Unrest in Poland</p> <p>USSR desires closer ties with PRC</p> <p>Falklands war</p> <p>Shultz is Secretary of State</p> <p>Japanese 60% defense spending increase through 1987</p> <p>Reagan urges self-rule for West Bank and a freeze on Israeli settlements</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1982 cont	<p>Arab League summit peace proposals for M.E. accepted by U.S. rejected by Israel</p> <p>Civilian massacres in S. Lebanon</p> <p> PRC-U.K. talks on</p> <p>Zaire-Israel renew relations</p> <p><i>Zhao Ziyang in Egypt: accepts Israel's right to exist; supports Arab League plan</i></p>	<p>Deng urges independ- ent foreign policy, pragmatic ideology; right to strike removed; Post of CCP Chairman abolished; Central Advisory Commission begun</p> <p>Hong Kong begin</p> <p>PRC fires its 1st submarine launched missile</p>	<p><i>U.S. suspects PRC of helping Pakistani nuclear effort; suspends talks on assisting PRC nuclear program</i></p> <p>Brezhnev dies; Andropov to power</p> <p>U.S. wants Int'l Conference on global monetary system, debt, unemployment</p>
1983	<p>Advanced USSR arms in Syria</p> <p>Ford and Carter both denounce Israeli settlement policy</p> <p>Israel-Zaire 5-yr military cooperation agreement</p> <p>U.S.-Israel military friction in Lebanon</p> <p>Mubarak sees Reagan in Washington</p> <p>France sells Mirage fighters to Iraq</p> <p>Jordan-PLO do not agree on Reagan's peace plan</p>	<p>Zhao Ziyang on 30 day visit to Africa; cancels Zaire's \$100m debt to PRC</p> <p>PRC press discusses hi-tech revolution sweeping the world</p> <p>Population approxi- mately 1 billion</p>	<p>Soviet satellite falls to earth</p> <p>IMF \$5.4b loan to Brazil, largest ever</p> <p>UN says 20,000 executions in Iran since 1979</p> <p>Reagan "Evil Empire" speech</p> <p>S.D.I. research begins in U.S.</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1983 cont	<p>U.S. Embassy in Beirut is bombed</p> <p>U.S. Navy shells Druze positions</p> <p>USMC barracks bombed in Beirut</p> <p>PLO-Egypt restore relations</p>	<p>PRC visited by U.S. SECDEF Weinberger</p>	<p>USSR nuke sub sinks</p> <p>USSR shoots down KAL airliner</p> <p>U.S.-Grenada action</p> <p>Nuclear Winter concept</p>
1984	<p><i>PRC endorses idea of a Middle East peace conference</i></p> <p>France agrees to sell \$4b of air defense items to Saudis</p> <p>U.S. Navy shells Lebanon</p> <p>Pakistan scientist says Pakistan able to build A-bomb</p> <p>U.S. Navy leaves Beirut coast</p> <p>U.K. bans arms shipments to Iran and Iraq</p> <p><i>Arafat makes 3rd trip to Beijing</i></p> <p>Pakistan bans bank interest payments, including foreign banks, as violation of Moslem law</p>	<p>PRC-U.S. increase trade agreements</p> <p>Zhao Ziyang visits U.S.</p> <p>PRC Defense Minister visits U.S.</p> <p>Deng and Brzezinski talk in Beijing</p> <p>PRC-USSR \$1.2b trade agreement</p> <p>Japan endorses sale items for PRC's 1st nuclear power plants</p> <p>PRC launches its 1st permanent satellite</p> <p>Reagan visits PRC; nuclear cooperation agreement signed</p> <p><i>PRC supports global peace, end to arms race, world market, coexistence of capitalism and socialism</i></p>	<p>Japanese company repairs Iranian missile parts, via Hong Kong and Singapore</p> <p>Chernenko to power in USSR</p> <p>USSR boycotts Olympics</p> <p>Bulgaria and USSR implicated in Papal assassination attempt</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1984 cont	<p>PLO regrouping in Southern Lebanon</p> <p>Egypt-USSR renew Ambassadorial ties</p> <p>First Israeli Coalition Government</p> <p><i>Jordanian company contracts to make four nuclear plants in PRC for \$7 billion</i></p> <p><i>PRC-United Arab Emirates & Abu Dhabi establish relations</i></p> <p><i>PRC trade delegations visit Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Oman</i></p> <p><i>U.A.E. proposes an Arab-PRC Chamber of Commerce (w/22 Arab countries), also Arab-PRC banks</i></p> <p><i>Arabs regard PRC as a prime country for investment</i></p> <p>Israeli government austerity plan</p>	<p>PRC-U.K. agreement on Hong Kong</p>	<p>U.S. deploys cruise missiles at sea</p> <p>Soviet Middle East peace plan</p> <p>Vatican denounces Liberation Theology</p> <p>Mexican \$48.5b debt rescheduled, largest such accord ever</p> <p>Indira Gandhi assassinated</p> <p>Reagan reelected</p>
1985	<p>Israel acknowledges clandestine airlift of 12,000 Ethiopian jews</p> <p><i>PRC trade delegation to Jordan</i></p> <p><i>Kuwait Oil Minister to Beijing</i></p> <p><i>PRC actively encouraging establishment of PRC-Saudi Arabia relations</i></p>	<p>U.S. selling ASW weapons to PRC</p>	<p>New Zealand refuses port visit for U.S. military ship</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1985 cont	<p><i>Muslim PRC delegation to Qatar asks for PRC-Qatar relations</i></p> <p>Israel has 260% inflation rate</p> <p><i>Kuwait Oil and Finance Minister in PRC; Sino-Kuwaiti investment committee forms to help Gulf invest in PRC</i></p> <p>1st Western hostage seized in Lebanon</p> <p>U.K.-Saudi \$4.5b agreement for sale of advanced aircraft</p> <p>4 Soviet diplomats kidnapped in Beirut</p> <p><i>First Arab-PRC top level investment conference in PRC Ningxia province</i></p> <p><i>PRC again supports international peace conference for Middle East</i></p> <p><i>Jordan, Syria want UN Middle East peace conference including all UNSC members</i></p>	<p>PRC announces major teacher training and educational reform</p> <p>PRC military regions drop to 7 from 11</p> <p>U.S. allows sale of reactors and non-military technology to PRC</p> <p>7th 5-yr plan</p> <p>National Party Congress; CCP announces rejuvenation</p> <p><i>PRC arms sales 1981-1985 total \$5.4b; (4.2b to Middle East)</i></p> <p>38,000 PRC students overseas since 1978, 50% in the U.S.</p>	<p>Gorbachev to power</p> <p>MX missile in production</p> <p>Walker spy scandal</p> <p>75% of U.S. trade now in Pacific</p> <p>"Rainbow Warrior" sunk in Auckland</p> <p>U.K., Italy, Germany agree to build new jet fighter</p> <p>U.S. tests anti-satellite missile</p> <p>"Achille Lauro" hijack incident</p> <p>Pollard spy scandal</p> <p>Unrest in S. Africa</p> <p>Gramm-Rudman bill</p>
1986		PRC rejects USSR non-aggression treaty proposal	USSR-Japan agree to resume World War II Peace Treaty talks

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1986 cont	<p>Israel-Spain begin relations</p> <p><i>Jordan says Int'l Middle East peace conference possible</i></p> <p><i>Egypt-PRC create the first Islamic Bank</i></p> <p>U.S.-Israel share SDI research</p> <p>Syrian troops in Beirut</p> <p><i>Zhao Ziyang visits Turkey</i></p> <p>Israel-Soviet reps meet in Helsinki; 1st official contact after 19 yrs</p> <p>Peres to Cameroon; 1st Israeli PM visit to Black Africa in 20 yrs</p>	<p>PRC insists USSR resolve border disputes, Cambodia, <i>Afghanistan</i></p> <p>PRC has relations with over 120 countries</p> <p>PRC eases travel and residence controls for foreigners in PRC</p> <p>PRC is 47th member of Asian Development Bank</p> <p>7th National People's Congress</p> <p>PRC students confront African students in Beijing; Africans protest PRC racism</p> <p>Hu Yaobang 1st CCP leader to visit W. Europe (U.K., France, Germany, Italy), since 1949</p>	<p>Challenger explodes</p> <p>Gorbachev promotes USSR First and Lead By Example themes at 24th CPSU Congress</p> <p>1st conviction of an American spying for PRC in U.S.</p> <p>U.S. Raid on Libya</p> <p>Chernobyl</p> <p>Vladivostok speech by Gorbachev</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1986 cont	<p><i>Over 20,000 PRC workers in Iraq</i></p> <p>Peres-Shevardnadze meet at UN</p> <p>Shamir replaces Peres in Coalition Govt.</p>	<p>Central Committee reaffirms policy of economic reforms</p> <p>U.S. Navy ships visit Qingdao</p> <p>Students protest in several cities for democratic reforms</p>	<p>Japanese Education Minister downplays 1910-37 atrocities by Japan in Korea and China</p> <p>U.S. sanctions against S. Africa</p> <p>Nakasone says U.S. minorities reduce total U.S. IQ</p> <p>London <u>Sunday Times</u> prints Vanunu story on Israel's nuclear weapons program</p> <p>Reykjavik Summit</p>
1987	<p><i>PRC negotiates to launch Iranian satellite</i></p> <p>Waite is kidnapped</p> <p>Israel investigates Pollard scandal</p> <p>Zia says Pakistan is able to build A-bomb</p> <p>Israel-USSR agree to exchange consular delegations</p> <p>Kuwait proposes U.S. and USSR flags for some of its tankers</p>	<p>Hu Yaobang forced to resign</p> <p>CCP decrying "bourgeois liberalism"</p> <p>Li Peng says PRC will not retreat from partial economic reform measures</p> <p>Zhao denounces Western influence, says reforms continue</p> <p>PRC-Portugal agree on Macao return in 1999</p>	<p>U.S.-Mongolia begin relations</p> <p>U.S., Japan, Canada plan joint space station in the 1990s</p> <p>More expenditures for arms in 1987 than any other year in history</p> <p>Turkey requests EC membership</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1987 cont	<p><i>Peres proposes Int'l Middle East peace conference, Shamir denounces proposal</i></p> <p>Egypt breaks relations with Iran</p> <p><i>Iran deploys PRC Silkworm missiles</i></p> <p>11 Kuwaiti Oil tankers reflagged under U.S. in Persian Gulf</p> <p><i>Israeli Communist Party chief in PRC; is told "no relations with Israel until it ceases aggressive foreign policy"</i></p> <p>USSR delegation in Israel for long visit</p> <p>Israel tests new missile: Jericho II</p> <p>Iranian pilgrims riot in Mecca</p> <p>At least 75 Israeli engineers from <u>Lavi</u> project find new jobs in S.Africa</p>	<p>PRC GDP increased 96% from 1979</p> <p>PRC family incomes increased 56% from 1981</p> <p>PRC warns India of "unpleasant event", says India nibbles at PRC territory</p> <p>PRC denies border clashes with India; PRC increases troops on Indian border</p> <p>Deng's 7-yr old speech on Feudal aspects of CCP is widely reprinted</p> <p>PRC shoots down Vietnamese MiG-21</p> <p>1st PRC permanent outposts in Spratly Islands</p>	<p>USSR permits limited private ownership</p> <p>Toshiba forbidden by Japan to sell sensitive items to USSR</p> <p>USS STARK hit by two missiles in the Gulf</p> <p>USSR stops jamming VOA</p> <p>Piper Cub in Red Square</p> <p>Citicorp expects to lose most of \$14.7b Third World loans</p> <p>USSR sends 3 Minesweepers to join 2 Frigates already in Persian Gulf</p> <p>USSR warns Israel not to deploy new IBM</p> <p>U.S. cancels support for Israel's <u>Lavi</u> aircraft</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1987 cont	<p>Pakistan-India clash in Kashmir</p> <p><i>PRC-Israel begin annual foreign minister talks on regional themes during UN sessions in NYC</i></p> <p><i>Five Israeli scientists reportedly visit Beijing to discuss upgrading PRC missile technology</i></p> <p>Mubarak, unopposed, reelected for 6 yrs</p> <p>70 Naval ships from U.S., USSR, U.K., France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium in Persian Gulf</p> <p>Intifada begins in the West Bank</p>	<p><i>U.S. withholds sale to PRC of high-tech items due to Silkworm sales to Iran</i></p> <p>13th Party Congress; Deng retires as CCP General Secretary; Zhao Ziyang elected General Secretary, calls for civil service exams and more foreign investment</p> <p>Li Peng appointed as Premier</p>	<p>International Treaty about CFCs to protect Ozone</p> <p>Wall Street plummet</p> <p>Japan is clearly now preponderant economic force in the world</p> <p>U.S.-USSR INF treaty</p>
1988	<p>U.S. exempts Pakistan from nonproliferation laws</p> <p>Israel announces use of force and beatings in West Bank</p> <p>U.S. LtCol kidnapped in Lebanon</p> <p>Shultz peace plan</p> <p><i>PRC sells medium range missiles to Saudi Arabia; PRC technicians accompany missiles</i></p> <p>Shamir in Washington</p>	<p>PRC averages 10% annual growth during preceding decade</p> <p>PRC navy keeps steady presence in Spratly Islands</p> <p>Unrest in Tibet</p> <p>PRC begins long-term leases near Shanghai</p>	<p>Noriega indicted</p> <p>Armenian unrest</p> <p>UN condemns U.S. plan to close NYC office of PLO</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1988 cont		PRC begins long-term leases near Shanghai to non-Chinese	
	<i>Saudi Arabia confirms purchase of PRC ballistic missiles</i>	PRC-Vietnam fight in Spratly Islands	
	Vanunu convicted in Jerusalem	Li Peng opens Nat'l People's Congress; calls for more economic reform, 1st debates occur	
	Arafat in Syria; 1st time since 1983		USS ROBERTS strikes mine in Persian Gulf
	<i>Pakistan tests new medium range missile built with PRC assistance</i>		U.K., Germany, Italy Spain \$70b agreement to build European fighter aircraft
	Israel expels Palestinian-American; U.S. strongly objects	PRC family incomes doubled since 1978	EEC votes to remove restrictions on all capital movement by 1992
	Iran boycotts Hajj in 1988 and 1989 rather than accept Saudi quota of 45,000 (reduced from 150,000)	Taiwan's total exports now \$60.6b	CPSU declares support for Perestroika
	Israel completes preparation on ABM system		USS VINCENNES shoots down Iran airliner
	Saudi Arabia-U.K. arms package		
	Jordan releases claim to West Bank	PRC-U.S. total trade \$8.8b; PRC-Japan total trade \$17.6b	Developing nations spent 23% more for arms 1978-88 than they received in aid
	Iraq-Iran cease fire		
	Iraq uses chemicals against Kurds: many flee to Turkey		
	Israel 8th nation to orbit a satellite	PRC announces steps to control inflation of 20-50%	Gorbachev becomes President
	Iraq largest Third World arms importer 1969-88 with \$61b in arms purchases;		

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1988 cont	<p>Saudi Arabia second largest arms buyer at \$37b; Syria is fourth</p> <p>Benazir Bhutto 1st woman leader of an Islamic country</p> <p>PLO recognizes Israel renounces terrorism</p> <p>PLO-U.S. begin talks</p> <p>Kenya-Israel renew relations</p> <p><i>PRC begins building Algerian reactor</i></p> <p>Israel forms 2nd National Unity govt; Religious Parties increase their sway</p>	<p>PRC nuclear test indicates neutron bomb capability</p> <p>PRC successfully launches first SLBM</p> <p>Rajiv Gandhi visits PRC</p> <p>PRC students/workers demonstrate against Africans studying in China</p>	<p>Brazilian plan to halt deforestation</p> <p>USSR admits having deficit budgets</p> <p>Bush elected; Baker is Secretary of State</p> <p>Brazil's foreign debt is \$120b, Mexico's debt is \$107b, Argentina's is \$60b.</p>
1989	<p>Central African Republic-Israel renew relations</p> <p><i>PRC continues to nurture military ties with Pakistan, Iran, Saudis</i></p> <p>Khomeini calls for Rushdie execution</p> <p><i>New Soviet ideas for UN International peace Conference on Middle East</i></p> <p>Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, N.Yemen create Arab Cooperation Council</p> <p>Shamir tries to hold coalition together</p>	<p>PRC-Indonesia confer about renewing ties</p> <p>Bush visits PRC; Fang Lizhi incident</p>	<p>U.S. Navy jets down 2 Libyan fighters</p> <p>Europe-U.S. trade dispute over food products</p> <p>Japanese Emperor buried; Bush in Japan</p> <p>Milken's "junk bonds" impacting on U.S. financial world</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1989 cont	<i>PRC Vice Premier visits Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi</i>		
	Mubarak in Europe; seeks economic aid, and <i>support for Int'l Middle East Peace Conference</i>	Unrest in Tibet; violence	USSR nuke sub burns and sinks near Norway
	<i>Saudi Arabia-PRC trade relations</i>	Hu Yaobang dies	<u>Exxon Valdez</u> oil spill
	Riots in Jordan due to worsening economic conditions	<i>establish formal</i>	Solidarity legalized
	U.S. urges Israel to renounce occupied territories, start Palestinian dialogue	Students begin to demonstrate	Hungary dismantles border fence
	Khomeini dies	Gorbachev to PRC; Sino-Soviet summit	Oliver North is convicted
		Student and worker pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing and other cities continue; <u>Tiananmen massacre</u> ; Zhao Ziyang purged	India test fires its 1st IBM
		Fang Lizhi finds shelter in U.S. Embassy	Speaker Wright resigns from House
		PRC asks businesses to return; Deng Xiaoping names Jiang Zemin as CCP General Secretary	Polish elections
		Scowcroft's secret visit to PRC	International sanctions against PRC for Tiananmen
	West Bank schools closed 110 days in 1989 by Israel	Hong Kong bankers becoming primary catalyst for business deals in PRC	Gorbachev warns of enormous danger to USSR from ethnic unrest, nationalism
			S.Africa tests new rocket developed from Israeli missile
			U.S. DOD fails to approve export of supercomputers to Israel
			Solidarity heads new Polish government

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1989 cont		PRC cautions East Europe against political changes	U.S. limits number of Soviet jews able to enter U.S.
	<i>PRC Foreign Minister visits Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Iran</i>		Hungary allows East Germans to go West
	Israel-Hungary renew diplomatic ties	PRC industry grows 16%/yr since 1979	India now world's largest importer of military goods
	Arafat in France		
	Mubarak proposals for Israeli-Palestinian dialogue		
	USSR abstains from annual Arab UN initiative to unseat Israel	U.S.-PRC military, economic contacts gradually being renewed	India builds its 1st submarine
	<i>Almost all hospitals, refineries, power stations and homes in Kuwait are built by PRC companies</i>		Nobel Peace Prize goes to Dalai Lama
		Nixon visits PRC	Hungarian CP becomes Socialist, renounces Marxism
	Elections in Jordan; 1st to be held in 22 years	PRC official foreign debt is \$44b	San Francisco quake
	Ethiopia-Israel renew full relations	PRC purchase of 3 U.S. satellites is approved by White House	USSR calls for NATO, Warsaw Pact gradual dissolutions
	Peres visits Poland		E. Germans have exit visas, Berlin Wall opened, hints of German reunification
	<i>PRC Premier visits Pakistan</i>		
	<i>PRC-Iran, in Teheran, agree on economic, technical, industrial and scientific cooperation</i>		
	N.Yemen-S.Yemen agree to unite	PRC exports total \$52.5b in 1989 (\$12b go to U.S.)	USSR pledges not to force Warsaw Pact cohesion
	Baker Peace Plan for Middle East		U.S.-USSR summit at Malta

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
	<p>Iraq tests 3-stage missile capable of launching satellites</p> <p>Israel helps S.Africa design intermediate range missile; helps also with missile design to launch satellites</p> <p>Saudi Arabia wants to purchase submarines</p> <p>Yang Shangkun visits UAE, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman</p> <p>Egypt-Syria renew relations</p>	<p>67 Japanese banks begin \$2b credit for PRC, first agreed to in 1985</p> <p>Scowcroft visits PRC</p> <p>Haig visits PRC</p> <p>PRC criticizes USSR in internal document over events in East Europe and USSR</p>	<p>USSR removing its troops from Mongolia</p> <p>Ceausescu and wife are shot</p> <p>Non-communist govt in Czechoslovakia</p>
1990	<p>Ethiopia denies plans to divert Nile with Israeli assistance</p> <p>U.S. total aid to Israel \$6b per year</p> <p>Qin Jiwei visits Pakistan, Bangladesh to boost military cooperation</p> <p>Israel expects 250,000 Soviet Jews this year</p> <p>Turkey stops flow of Euphrates into Syria and Iraq for 30 days</p> <p>Shamir fires Cabinet member to enforce no Israel-PLO contact</p> <p>Israel-Poland renew relations</p>	<p>ROC building its own warships</p> <p>PRC requests foreign aid to combat its pollution crisis</p> <p>PRC-USSR military staffs exchange visits; 1st such contact in 30 years</p> <p>Asian 1989 economic growth is 5.4% (9.3% in 1988); 3.2% is entire world average</p> <p>PRC arresting non-official Christian leaders; controls increase for Islam in western PRC</p>	<p>U.S. total aid for Eastern Europe is scheduled at \$300m in 1990</p> <p>Inflation in Peru at 2000% annual rate</p> <p>East and West Germany continue plans for reunification</p> <p>USSR ends CPSU monopoly of power</p> <p>Lithuania declares independence from USSR</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1990 cont	<p>Israel's Coalition Govt. falls</p> <p>Desire for electoral reform and constitutional government grows in Israel</p> <p><i>PRC Foreign Minister visits Iraq, Yemens, Bahrain, Qatar</i></p> <p>Bahrain-Hungary begin full relations</p> <p>IMF urges economic reform in Egypt</p> <p>Lebanon's Bekaa Valley now provides 20% of world's hashish</p> <p>Jewish settlement tried in Christian Quarter of Old Jerusalem</p> <p><i>Li Peng visits Pakistan</i></p> <p>Peres unable to form Labor government; Brooklyn Rebbe sways Knesset for Likud; Shamir creating West Bank settlements</p> <p><i>PRC discussing sale of new medium range missile to Iraq, Syria, Libya</i></p> <p>Islamic theologians call for regeneration</p> <p>Iraq threat to destroy half of Israel</p>	<p>Scowcroft visits PRC</p> <p>PRC forms new Hong Kong constitution</p> <p>Ethnic unrest in Xinjiang</p> <p>PRC renews Fulbright program with U.S.</p> <p>PRC commercial launch of U.S. satellite; PRC's 27th satellite</p> <p>Li Peng to Moscow</p> <p>Beijing finds \$70b of govt guaranteed foreign loans in PRC</p> <p>PRC embassy diplomat defects in U.S.; reveals PRC plan to influence U.S. via release of Tienanmen dissidents</p> <p>PRC-Mongolia renew ties, plan trade increases</p>	<p>Total world military expense in 1990 is \$880b, 5% less than peak year of 1987</p> <p>U.S. executive order allows PRC students to remain in U.S.</p> <p>Mongolia drops "Communist" from its constitution</p> <p>2 U.S. hostages freed in Lebanon</p> <p>U.S. Senate says Jerusalem is capital of Israel</p> <p>450 of 600 million telephones in world found in only nine countries</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1990 cont	<p>Israel launches 2nd satellite with military characteristics</p> <p>Iraq has nuclear weapon "trigger"</p> <p>U.S. helps Arabs at UN oppose USSR Jewish immigration to Israel</p> <p>UAE urges Japan to promote peace in Middle East</p> <p><i>Mubarak visits Beijing; Deng voices concern about Japanese military growth</i></p> <p>Egypt-USSR condemn Soviet Jews' West Bank settlements in Israel</p> <p>Mid East arms expenditures increase by 4% or \$10b over 1989</p>	<p>PRC reemphasizing birth control; 1.4b population expected by year 2000 (300% increase since 1949); 1.1b by 2000 was PRC goal in 1980s; 63% of population under age 30</p> <p>Yang Shangkun visits Latin America</p> <p>5% of PRC population now migrant laborers</p> <p>Taiwan offers reunification proposal</p> <p>Xu Jiatur makes "unauthorized" trip to U.S.; highest PRC official to seek haven outside PRC</p> <p>PRC ends 20 mth austerity program</p> <p>Schmidt in Beijing; exchanges notes with Zhao Ziyang</p> <p>USSR delegation to Beijing</p> <p>50 Xinjiang Mosques closed after ethnic unrest</p>	<p>U.S. consumes 40% of all worldwide goods</p> <p>U.S.-Asia trade now \$308b/year</p> <p>UN says world population now 5.3b; will be 6.25b by 2000, between 11b and 15b by 2099</p> <p>IMF says Eastern Europe needs will reduce aid for poorest countries</p> <p>Japan's defense budget is 3rd largest in world</p> <p>Bush renews MFN trade status for PRC</p> <p>U.S. vetoes UN measure to place observers in West Bank</p>
	<p>Israel says no UN observers allowed in West Bank</p>		

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1990 cont	<p>Pakistan hires women pilots for commercial aviation</p> <p>Arab summit condemns Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel</p> <p>Saudi Arabia now world's largest arms importer</p> <p>Saudi Arabia has opened equivalent of 1 primary school per day from 1970-1990</p> <p>Peres unable to form Labor Govt; New York Rabbi credited with influencing outcome</p> <p>Kuwait projects \$5b deficit budget</p> <p>Shamir forms Likud Government</p> <p><i>PRC has about 20,000 workers in Kuwait</i></p> <p><i>PRC celebrating 2,000 years of Silk Road</i></p> <p>PLO-U.S. talks are suspended by U.S.</p> <p>Israel pledges no Soviet Jews will occupy West Bank</p> <p>Assad in Egypt; says Syria ready to join peace process</p> <p><i>PRC launches Pakistani satellite; launch fee far below Western rates</i></p>	<p>ROC hints at nuclear capability</p> <p>Beijing University students demonstrate on Tienanmen anniversary</p> <p>PRC troops beat students and foreign reporters in Beijing</p> <p>Television reaches 73% of PRC population</p> <p>"Goddess of Democracy" ship unable to broadcast</p> <p>PRC plans 4 futures markets for agricultural goods; Chicago Board of Trade helps to establish them</p> <p>Fang Lizhi and wife leave U.S. Embassy for Cambridge Univ.</p> <p>PRC-Indonesia agree to renew relations</p>	<p>43 nations now have submarines; over 400 subs are not U.S. or USSR (will be 800 by end of 1990s)</p> <p>U.S.-USSR Summit in D.C.; both caution Israel against West Bank settlement of Soviet Jews</p> <p>Quayle meets Chai Ling, prominent PRC dissident, in White House</p> <p>Moscow opens commodities exchange for building items and hi-tech goods</p> <p>Japan plans 5-yr 25% increase in defense spending</p> <p>Russian Federation declares State Sovereignty</p> <p>Hungarian Stock Market reopens</p> <p>Both Germanys use single currency</p> <p>USSR proposes UN Trusteeship for Kuriles</p> <p>Big Seven Summit; Japan "allowed" to resume PRC aid; USSR as receiver of aid is discussed</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1990 cont	<i>PRC bids competitively to launch Arabsat communications satellite</i>		
	Iraq-Kuwait feud over oil, exchange military threats; Saudis and UAE aid Kuwait, U.S. aids UAE	Mid-level officials say astronauts being trained in PRC PRC mayors visit U.S., urge renewal of business ties	Ukraine declares State Sovereignty Gorbachev OKs NATO membership for reunified Germany Yeltsin plans end of state ownership and central planning in Russian Federation by 1992
	<i>PRC strengthens security ties with Saudis; still considers other arms sales in the Middle East</i>		
	Iranian economy grows 10% in 1990; public sector is being privatized	PRC outfits 3rd ship to monitor space flights	E. Germany will not join Warsaw Pact maneuvers Zhu Rongji visits U.S.
	<i>Saudi Arabian envoy meets Li Peng in Beijing</i>		
	Israel Supreme Court forbids Sharon's emergency powers to make housing for Soviet immigrants	Low morale within PLA Zhao Ziyang rumored to be back in govt	Japan completes payment of all its debts to World Bank
	West Bank schools closed 140 days in 1990 by Israel	PRC planning to end free urban housing; shareholding of state industry expected	U.S. defense spending 6% less than 1989, still 30% larger than 1980 USSR defense spending 10% less than 1989, still 38% larger than 1980
	<i>PRC Foreign Minister visits Saudi Arabia; PRC-Saudis begin relations; ROC cuts formal ties with Saudis though still receives 30% of oil from Saudi Arabia</i>		
	Iraq invades Kuwait	PRC-Singapore discuss diplomatic relations	60% of world's arms budgets belong to U.S. and USSR UNSC condemns Iraq; U.S. & USSR sponsor arms embargo against Iraq, <i>PRC concurs</i>
	Turkey closes Iraqi oil pipeline; U.S. troops to Arabia	Li Peng visits Indonesia, Singapore	
	Pakistan considers legalizing Sharia	PRC agrees to stop arms aid to Pol Pot	
	Bhutto ousted	PRC allows foreign firms to sue PRC	Kaifu visits five Middle East states

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1990 cont	Jordan tries to mediate; Israel keeps low profile; U.S./others start military buildup; Arab League supports Iraqi withdrawal	PRC wants to open a stock market PRC-ROC trade \$11.7b in last decade; 46% growth per yr; ROC has \$7.4b deficit	U.S.-USSR share intelligence about Middle East Japan provides funds for Western military costs in Middle East
	<i>PRC does not block UNSC decision allowing general embargo of Iraq</i>		
	Iraq-Iran make peace	PRC planning for Space Station and Space Shuttle	Japan-USSR discuss sovereignty of Kurile Islands
	Thousands of foreign workers in Iraq and Kuwait forced out or made hostages	Rumors of impending Politburo shake up	USSR-FRG reach non-aggression and aid agreements
	<i>PRC discusses possible sale of nuclear attack submarine to Pakistan</i>		U.S. proposes biggest weapons sale ever (over \$21b to Saudis)
	<i>Iran Defense Minister visits PRC</i>		
	U.S. writes off \$7b Egyptian arms debt	State subsidies cost PRC \$20b in 1990 (almost 30% of national budget)	
	Saudi Arabia-USSR renew relations		Japan considers sending non-combat troops to Mid East, many others object
	<i>PRC tries to sell arms to Iraq despite embargo</i>		
	Israeli delegation to USSR	Economic Ministerial post given to ally of Zhao Ziyang	Kissinger in Beijing with Zhu Rongji and Jiang Zemin
	Only Yemen and Libya support Iraq; Jordan caught in middle	PRC hosts Asian Games; <i>Iraq excluded</i>	USSR endorses Market Economy
	Israel-USSR open consulates	PRC-Singapore begin relations	E. Germany leaves Warsaw Pact Germany reunites
	<i>Iraq has F.A.E. bomb; PRC sold the required chemicals to Iraq</i>		USSR begins to legalize freedom of religion
	UNSC condemns Israel for shooting Palestinians in religious incident	PRC troops have 1st nuclear war exercise	
	Pakistani election; Bhutto loses	PRC supports Taiwan in its dispute with Japan over Ryukyus	USSR official tells Hussein he faces a likely UN attack if he does not withdraw

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1990 cont	U.S. suspends aid to Pakistan due to its A-Bomb research <i>Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visits Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq: tells Saddam Hussein he lacks PRC and Third World support</i>	PRC buying arms from France	Developing nations account for 85% of arms spending in world markets Baker visits Middle East, also meets with Qian Qichen
	Kahane shot in NYC by Arab-American		U.S. begins exit from Philippine bases
	Israel allows one UN fact finder to visit	PRC hosts 5 U.S. Congressmen to help promote relations	U.S.-Singapore military pact
	U.S. doubling troops in Persian Gulf	EEC removes most sanctions against PRC from Tiananmen	Japan's 125th emperor
	200,000 Soviet Jews emigrate to Israel, 1 million expected by 1995	Stock markets open in Shenzhen and Shanghai	Cuba hints at better relations with U.S. Bush-Gorbachev summit
	<i>UNSC demands that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait by 15 Jan 1991; PRC abstains</i>		Paris Charter Revolt in Liberia
	<i>Kuwait has provided approximately \$30b in loans to PRC since 1982</i>		Chunnel
	UNSC condemns treatment of Palestinians by Israel	Qian Qichen meets with Pres. Bush	Thatcher resigns Food donated to USSR from around the world
	GCC condemns Iraq, wants Iran's future aid to reduce outside influence in Gulf	Taiwan plans formal cessation of "war" with PRC 8th 5-yr plan	Political Turmoil in India Shevardnadze resigns
1991	<i>Kuwaiti Emir visits Beijing; PRC pledges "full support" to restore Kuwait's sovereignty</i>		1700% inflation in Brazil
	Gulf War; Iraq is bombed; Israel and Saudi Arabia hit by Scuds	Jail sentences for Tiananmen activists	USSR troops enter Lithuania
	Iraqi aircraft flee to Iran; severe oil damage to Kuwaiti wells and Gulf	PRC has \$910m trade surplus for January; exports up 40.8% and imports up 19.8% from JAN '90	East Europe is an environmental disaster USSR peace proposal for Gulf War

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1991 cont	<i>Iraqis confer with PRC in Beijing about Soviet peace proposal</i>		
	Iraq army decimated, Iraq consents to all UN peace conditions	U.K., Japan, USSR, France send Foreign Ministers to Beijing	Coup in Thailand Warsaw Pact disbands
	<i>PLA Generals review Middle East war; debate merits of modernization</i>		Yeltsin and Gorbachev in power struggle
	Civil war in Iraq	Foreign banks allowed to open in Shanghai	
	U.S. urges Israel to trade land for peace	Reformers and hard liners debate economic policies	Japan-USSR discuss Kurile Island sovereignty
	GCC plus Egypt and Syria plan regional military alliance	PRC exchanging its food for military hardware from USSR	Political disarray in Yugoslavia
	Arab League reviews regional security		Baker visits Middle East
	<i>China discusses possible missile sale with Pakistan; promises U.S./UN that it will be prudent</i>		Economic strain grows in united Germany
	U.S./UN establishing a permanent military presence in the Gulf	PRC uses <i>de facto</i> influence over Hong Kong's government	U.S. and others write off half of Poland's \$31b foreign debt
	<i>Pakistan's new Prime Minister visits Beijing; Pakistan bank will open a Shanghai branch, 102 new joint projects started, 26 of 29 are already finished</i>		
	Israeli peace plan	PRC bids to launch Indonesia's next communications satellite	Bush meets Dalai Lama
	UN condemns Iraq's Kurdish policies		Massive U.S. aid effort for Kurds
	<i>China is reportedly helping Algeria develop nuclear weapons</i>		Gorbachev to Japan, discusses Japanese aid, Kurile Islands and Asian security
	Israel insists USSR renew ties before it offers a peace plan	PRC's first wheat futures contract	Baker's third Middle East visit
	<i>PRC losing more than \$2b in Gulf contracts because it did not openly support use of force against Iraq</i>		Japanese minesweepers going to Persian Gulf

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1991 cont	Israel's 2nd test of U.S. financed (72%) Arrow missile	PRC NPC member says reforms will stay no matter who is in power	Baker's 4th visit to Middle East
	<i>Israeli diplomat visits PRC; later says diplomatic ties are inevitable</i>		30% of world's civil air traffic goes to Asia/Pacific region
	Soviet jewish immigration to Israel slows; still could reach 1 million (25% of Israeli labor force) by mid 1990s	PRC-USSR summit PRC had \$1b trade with neighbor states in 1990	USSR plans to permit unrestrained travel in 1992
	Israeli military is 14.09% of population	3 officials associated with Zhao Ziyang partially restored	USSR admits scrapping moon travel program in 1970s: too many problems
	<i>PRC delivering missiles and parts to Iran (from \$300m order placed in 1987)</i>		Rajiv Gandhi assassinated
	Israeli airlift of 18,000 Ethiopian jews	PRC Finance Minister says state subsidies not sustainable; grain subsidy reduced from 50% to 20%; other adjustments also made	USSR troops fight Lithuanian border posts
	Israel nervous about U.S. arms control proposal		Bush proposes arms control for Middle East
	U.S. prepositioning materiel in Israel	PRC buys Su-27 jets from USSR	USSR needs \$250b aid to keep reform going next 5-6 years
	U.S. gives Israel 10 advanced jets	No demonstrations allowed on Tienanmen anniversary	East-west tensions ease in Africa; hosts of local conflicts emerge
	Japan urges Israel to assist peace process, stop West Bank settlements	Jiang Qing commits suicide	
	<i>Israel opens Sciences and Humanities liaison office in Beijing</i>		USSR starts trading in commodities market
	West Bank schools closed 100 days in 1991 by Israel	CCP 70th anniversary Sharp criticism by PRC against western media, especially VOA and BBC	USSR military is 3.32% of population
	Saudi Arabia wants to buy 50% of Nippon Oil in Japan (\$4.5b)		U.S. military is 1.52% of population

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1991 cont	<i>U.S. trying to halt delivery of PRC surface-to-surface missiles to Syria and Pakistan</i>		Japan wants rewrite of UN charter; UNSC members oppose this suggestion
	Jordan permits political parties, new freedoms to press and women, limits executive branch	PRC military is 0.38% of population	Yeltsin 1st popularly elected President of Russian Republic
	Iraqi military is 9.69% of population	Qian Qichen visits Thailand, Indonesia	
	Saudi Arabia renews beheading executions after 10 mth hiatus; 111 executed in 1989	PRC divorces climb; almost 10% of 1990 marriages	Leningrad renamed as St. Petersburg
	West Bank Palestinians threatened by illiteracy; Moslem nationalist and PLO secular youths fight each other	Qian Qichen visits North Korea	U.S. exports to Asia grow 150% in last 5 years
	<i>PRC offers to supply 300mw reactor to Pakistan</i>	PRC wants to join MTCR (Int'l Accord to limit spread of missile technology)	Bush renews MFN trade status for PRC
	<i>PRC helping to develop coal mines in Pakistan; says "vast possibilities exist for additional cooperation"</i>		World military spending declining; 9 yrs at present rate to reach 1980 level, 18 yrs to reach 1970s level
	Israeli mayors protest lack of funds for Soviet immigrants	Qian Qichen visits Japan	Mt. Pinatubo eruption
	Israel wants \$10b U.S. loan for Soviet immigrant housing	ASEAN invites PRC (and USSR) to its July meeting	Congress makes MFN status conditional for PRC
	Beirut govt. controls S. Lebanon for 1st time since civil war started in 1975	Avon cosmetics 1st company to sell direct to PRC consumers: phenomenal success	COMECON disbanded
	Pakistan law & order crisis; Sharif does not go to Hong Kong and Japan	Jiang Zemin says PRC will never permit opposition parties	Warsaw Pact formally ended
			Reunified Germans don't like each other very much
			Yugoslavs begin civil war

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1991 cont	<p><i>Li Peng, Qian Qichen, Li Lanqing visit Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Kuwait; Arms control part of agenda</i></p> <p><i>PRC to attend UNSC Paris meeting for Middle East arms control</i></p>		<p>Soviet liberals begin new party, try to end CPSU monopoly</p>
	<p>Iran wants Iraq to pay reparations; has impounded Iraqi aircraft from Gulf war</p>	<p>PRC sponsors search for new Panchen Lama</p> <p>Severe drought in Guangdong and Fujian</p>	<p>SIPRI says process of arms control now infinitely more complex</p>
	<p>Algeria cracks down on Islamic fundamentalists</p>	<p>100 million dogs in PRC, rabies problem; police squads beat and kill dogs in streets and homes</p>	<p>Moscow and Beijing woo Seoul</p>
	<p><i>UNSC tells Iraq to comply with nuclear inspections</i></p>		
	<p>Shamir says Saddam must not regain power; approves King Hussein's proposal removing "taboo" on Arab-Israeli dialogue</p>	<p>PRC proposes 5 principles to improve trade with Taiwan</p> <p>PRC hard-liners crack down on foreign press corps</p>	<p>IBM-Apple agree to swap technology</p> <p>UN asks Germany to play bigger international role</p>
	<p>U.S. threatens force again in Iraq over nuclear inspections</p>	<p>Severe flooding along major rivers</p>	<p>NATO warns USSR not to interfere in East Europe</p>
	<p><i>PRC proposes broad arms control for entire Middle East: eliminate all CBN weapons in the region, plus general arms reduction</i></p>		<p>Kaifu will visit Beijing</p>
	<p>Israel asks 40% military aid increase from U.S. (from \$1.8b to \$2.5b per year)</p>	<p>PRC approves new Hong Kong airport; U.K. agrees to leave \$3.2b reserves and a debt less than \$650m</p>	<p>Russian parliament allows private home ownership</p> <p>John Major agrees to visit Beijing</p>
	<p>Israel still builds new West Bank settlements; wants \$10b loan guarantees from U.S. for immigration settling costs</p>	<p>France gives PRC \$370m loan for 5 new projects</p> <p>PRC signs Nonproliferation Treaty, will allow inspection of its nuclear program</p>	<p>India slashes red tape for foreign investment; trying to increase trade</p> <p>Yeltsin outlaws CPSU cells in Russia; CPSU ignores him</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1991 cont	Israel agrees to MTCR regulations	PRC sympathetic to CPSU hardliners	Hard-line Coup in USSR fails
	<i>CCP Officials meet Israeli Foreign Minister</i>		ROK joins UN
	<i>PRC has aided Iran's nuclear program</i>		Paris and Bonn want European army
	Saudi Arabia wants to create offensive army; U.S. objects	PRC-backed candidates lose in 1st Hong Kong elections	Judge Thomas confirmation hearings
	<i>UNSC Permanent Member nations all agree to arms export limitations; together they account for 85% of global arms trading</i>		Privatization of East Europe: Berlin selling former East German firms at rate of 10 per day
	Israel-USSR renew full relations	PRC announces plan to end all smoking within 10 years	
	Middle East Peace Conference begins in Madrid	Baker visits Beijing	Bolshevik anniversary ignored
	All Kuwait oil well fires extinguished	PRC-Vietnam normalize relations	Romanov in St Petersburg
	<i>Yang Shangkun in Pakistan and Iran</i>		
	<i>Egyptian diplomat new UN Secretary-General (Boutros Boutros Ghali)</i>		
	<i>Israeli delegation visits PRC</i>		
	Mid East peace talks continue in D.C.	Li Peng to India; 1st visit by PRC leader since 1960	USSR dissolves; new Commonwealth of Republics/Independent States forms; Baltic independence allowed
	<i>UN repeals Zionism/Racism; PRC, Kuwait, Oman, Egypt, Bahrain are absent from the vote</i>		Russia wants Japanese aid in return for resolution of Kurile Islands dispute
	New information says Israel knowingly attacked USS LIBERTY	PRC foreign trade grows 17.5% in 1991 (total \$135.7b); \$8b is trade surplus	Russia-U.S. announce unilateral nuclear cuts
	Last U.S. hostages freed in Lebanon	ROC has \$80b reserve; highest in world	

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1991 cont	<p>U.S. threatens use of force again in Iraq</p> <p>140,000 Soviet Jews emigrate to Israel in 1991 (400,000 were expected)</p> <p><i>U.S., U.K., Russia, PRC, France discuss arms sales to Middle East</i></p> <p>Muslim fundamentalists doing well in 1st free Algerian elections</p>	<p>1st PRC nuclear plant begins operation, at Qinshan</p> <p>PRC foreign reserves now \$40b; PRC 1991 trade surplus with U.S. \$13b</p> <p>PRC will sign Non-proliferation Treaty</p>	<p>Russia wants to join NATO</p> <p>Vatican-Orthodox dispute over East Europe</p> <p>Gorbachev resigns</p> <p>C.I.S. formed</p>
1992	<p>U.S. joins UN condemnation of Israeli West Bank policies</p> <p>Marshall law in Algeria</p> <p><i>Israel-PRC establish diplomatic relations</i></p> <p>U.S. agrees to \$10b loan guarantees if Israel freezes West Bank settlements; Israel refuses</p> <p>Israel-India begin diplomatic relations</p> <p><i>Iran developing ties with central Asian Muslim Republics</i></p> <p><i>Li Peng visits UN and 4 European countries; meets with Bush</i></p> <p><i>PRC has delivered chemicals to Syria that are needed for solid-fuel missiles</i></p> <p>Rushdie and Free Thought receiving support in Cairo</p> <p>Israeli coalition govt falls</p>	<p>PLA is modernizing</p> <p>U.S.-PRC agree on copyright protection</p> <p>Deng tours Guangdong</p> <p>PRC is world's 4th largest ship builder</p> <p>PRC world's largest energy developer; country unable to make enough energy for its needs</p> <p>Taiwan wants to buy 50 Mirage fighters from France</p> <p>Foreign investment in PRC increases 71% in 1991</p> <p>PRC economists criticize hard-liners</p>	<p>Nixon calls for aid to former USSR</p> <p>Bush in Japan with U.S. CEOs; urges opening of Japanese market</p> <p>U.S. stops production of nuclear bombs</p> <p>N. Korea developing long range missile</p> <p>Organized East Asian crime in U.S.</p> <p>France will sign Non-proliferation Treaty</p> <p>ASEAN agrees to make Free-Trade zone</p> <p>Japan wants permanent UNSC seat</p> <p>U.S. ends high-tech sanctions against PRC</p> <p>UN sponsoring 8 peace keeping missions</p> <p>Japan has 2% of world's population, will consume 20% of world's uranium by year 2000</p>

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1992 cont	Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires bombed	Beijing gives more economic freedom to Guangdong Province	
	Israel Prime Minister to be directly elected in 1996	PLA strong supporter of increased reforms throughout PRC	U.S. and Russia to do joint fusion research
	Rabin again leader of Labor Party		U.S. presidential primaries
	<i>PRC-Iran discussing transfer of missile deliverance technology</i>		West makes \$24b aid package for Russia
	Israel begins phone service to Arabs		
	<i>U.S. accuses Israel of illegal arms technology transfers to PRC</i>		Japan plans breeder reactor program to generate plutonium levels
	Sharon says Jews will live in all areas of Jerusalem	PLA has 50% budget increase from 1989 levels	
	<i>Saudi Arabia also suspected of arms technology transfers to PRC</i>		Russia will require extensive private investment to keep reforms alive
	<i>UN votes sanctions against Libya; PRC abstains</i>		
	Saudi King does not want Western style democracy in Saudi Arabia	Jiang Zemin visits Tokyo; PRC wants Japanese Emperor to visit Beijing	
	<i>Butros Butros Ghali in Beijing: praises PRC Third World leadership</i>		Satellite rescued by Space Shuttle astronauts
	<i>Asian Islamic Republic presidents visit Saudi Arabia</i>	Yangtze Dam project approved	Iran outraged by Muslim deaths in Yugoslavian conflict
	Arafat survives airplane crash in Egypt	PRC states intention to launch astronauts by 2000	Congress cuts U.S. troops in Europe to 100,000; 23,000 now stationed in Middle East (most are Navy)
	Moderates prevail in Iranian election	Fang Lizhi says PRC leaders no longer believe in Marxism	L.A. riots

YEAR	MIDDLE EAST	CHINA	U.S./OTHER
1992 cont	<i>PRC missile scientists visit Syria</i>		
		PRC agrees to MTCR	
	Mujahedeen now rule Afghanistan from Kabul	PRC explodes nuclear device: 70 times more powerful than Hiroshima bomb, 6 times larger than U.S. & USSR test limit	India buys Russian rocket motor; U.S. trade sanctions on India and Russia
	U.S. \$1.8b arms sale to Saudi Arabia		
	Israel and Hezbollah fight in S. Lebanon	Indian President in PRC; first ever Indian head of state visit to Beijing	U.S.-India joint naval operations; India tests 1,000 mile IBM missile
	Jerusalem Arabs take Jordan funds and refuse Saudi funds for Dome of the Rock	PRC buying Russian and Ukraine tanks, aircraft, ships, and maybe also the new aircraft carrier	Danes vote against EC
	Saudi Arabia-Yemen border dispute: Saudis tell western oil firms to leave	ROK firms allowed to open offices in Shanghai	Earth Summit in Rio: largest gathering of Heads of State ever; U.S. only nation not to support entire Treaty
	Last western hostage freed in Lebanon		Japan approves troop movement overseas
	Gorbachev in Israel	Shanghai Mayor in U.S. seeking investment funds/projects	Yeltsin in U.S.; Bush calls U.S. and C.I.S. partners; Washington Charter; arms cuts; aid
	Islamic Prime Ministers are in Istanbul to discuss Yugoslavia		
	Labor beats Likud in Israeli election		U.S. troops may go to Yugoslavia with UN group

III. DETERMINANTS OF PRC AND MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN POLICIES SINCE 1949

From the perspective of North America and the industrial West, components of Middle Eastern and Chinese foreign policies are generally unfamiliar. Only Israel has the pluralistic, structured (though complex), and legally formatted input from bureaucratic and other political sources, public and private, that we have come to associate as part of governmental decision making processes. By contrast, state machineries elsewhere in the Middle East and China seem much more opaque; the forces, however many or few, that ultimately influence policy making there are much less amenable to political analysis as it has developed and been construed in the West.

Although our unfamiliarity with these other political systems seems to reside with novel factors pertaining primarily to personality and cultural precedent, becoming familiar with those two factors - within different societal settings - requires a willingness to consider a perhaps unique spectrum of variables. Personality and cultural precedent are complex issues, and their components, therefore, are at least several. The trick, or solution, is to locate the appropriate variables and the relationships that hold between them.

The search to locate these factors has varied. In China's case, discussion has been directed to whether or not bureaucratic issues, power struggles, a core of rational decision

makers, or some set of variations including each of these should receive the lion's share of analysis. For the Middle East, typical choices of factors have included institutionalized legitimacy, national consciousness, and theocratic propensities as the suitable focus for coming to grips with essentials of government in that region. These and other factors, plus the *modus operandi* of the questions themselves, will be considered in our look at determinants of Chinese and Middle Eastern foreign policies.

Recommendations or preferences for any one governmental framework will not be made (i.e.: Chinese vs. Middle Eastern, Authoritarian vs. Pluralistic, Western vs. Eastern). Nor will relative merits merely be compared: that is, whether or not facets of any national level polities and their international ramifications, anywhere on the globe, may be said to seek similar results regardless of their local idiosyncracies. The intent is simply to grasp, as much as possible, the aspects and intent of Chinese and Middle Eastern polities: why their priorities are as they are, why they have the perceptions that they do and what those perceptions are. Once this is done, then theoretical and pragmatic comparisons can be attempted, relative merits weighed, resources adjudged, and so on.

History, politics, and policy - in one sense - are a matter of progression; after-the-fact hindsight allows, usually, for more thorough understandings of events than are perhaps possible during their occurrence. This detached

viewing also allows the luxury of suggesting how events and/or policies might have been pursued differently, for increased advantage of all concerned. We can certainly wonder, for example, what our policies and actions regarding China, and the Middle East, might have been - 45 or 50 years ago - if we had known then what we, as a people, are beginning to understand now. At the risk of sounding overly simplistic, I maintain that the possibility exists - always - that our world views might well experience modifications and thereby become more responsible and effective, prior to our generation of policies and directives, merely through our becoming more aware of what the other guy is thinking and why he is thinking that way. Structures and positions of governments should be studied, as much as possible, on their own merits - rather than as functions or extensions of our perceived requirements or of our own world views.

A. PRC

China's contemporary political processes are now largely referenced into two periods flanking either side of Mao Zedong's death. This categorization is meant to coincide with the two respective priorities that have dominated China's political world since 1949, namely those of class struggle or ideological primacy and the ensuing more recent appearance of pragmatic reforms. Neither of these categories dominated their respective periods completely, but from 1949 until his death in 1976 Mao kept the emphasis of government on ideology

and social revolution, with Deng Xiaoping focusing ever since on more stable and pragmatic economic reform measures. Both Mao and Deng regarded their efforts as absolutely necessary for China's modernization and reform, although they personally differed on how best to achieve that aim. Correlations occur between the two periods, as when economic retrenchment occurred for a few years following the Great Leap Forward (GLF), and when ideological primacy resurfaced after the Tienanmen massacre. These permutations happened if for no other reason than that both Mao and Deng operated through similar bureaucratic layers. Mao and Deng also, along with Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and several others, constituted the bedrock of Communist China's leadership elite from the outset; they shared, in various capacities and at differing times, the leadership decisions and elements of administrative responsibilities. This composite begins to account for the swings and turbulence evident in the People's Republic of China's initial history. A paradoxical cauldron of geography, personalities, catalytic patriarchy, and desires to transition from Confucian to institutionalized (or modernized) values further identifies this period. To get a better feel for China, we will start with some geographic and demographic groundwork:

China, when compared to the coterminus U.S., is only slightly larger in area although contains a population four times as large (exceeding, at present, one billion). It would take a combination of the peoples of Europe, plus all of North

and South America, to gather approximately the same number of persons. Further, average projections indicate, by the year 2050, a resident PRC population of 1.5 billion; in the absence of China's birth control program and based on 1984 fertility rates, this figure grows to 2.1 billion by the year 2080.¹² In 1750 China had a population of about 200 million, which had already more than doubled from a level of 60 million at the beginning of the 15th century. It only took 100 years for another doubling, from 200 to 400 million, in 1850. Another hundred years brought the numbers to 540 million, with almost another doubling after that in less than 50 years, giving China her current host of just over one billion. In 1949, and previously during the Qing, perhaps 80% or more of all Chinese lived in the countryside, engaged in agriculture. That figure is now closer to 70%, which still makes China overwhelmingly rural. However, the remaining 25-30% constitute an urban group which is itself at least as large as all North Americans put together. One obvious concern facing China, regarding her people, is feeding them; she is doing this by having at her disposal only one half of America's total arable acreage, which allows about 10% of her land for cultivation.

Another way to grasp the physical dimension of China's population is to consider that each of China's approximately 30 provinces is roughly equivalent to a European country, with some of those provinces having populations of 100 million. Yet from still another perspective, if the ratio of people to

tillable land in the U.S. was the same as it is in China, the U.S. would now have between 2-3 billion people instead of only 250 million.¹³

China's geography includes not only the world's highest peaks which are still pushing upward at an annual rate of 6", but also many other extensive mountain ranges and deserts (including Asia's lowest point below sea level), that altogether cover over two thirds of her territory. The Taklimakan desert is considered by many to be the harshest desert in the world; it regularly and literally devoured ancient caravans and continues to extract annual tolls on travellers today. China shares 4,000 miles of border with the former Soviet Union (excluding Mongolia), another 3,000 miles with India (along the "roof of the world"), and has over 5,000 miles of coastline (not including the islands of Hainan or Taiwan, or the extensive major rivers and canals). Several minority groups, including 20 million Muslims, figure prominently in China's overall political equations and may still be the local majorities in the large western provinces, also in the north and south, though account for no more than roughly 6% of the total population. Two major world-class river systems, flowing east, dominate the interior and contribute to extensive networks of lakes, canals and coastal irrigation works (the "inland sea"), that have been developed by residents and public works projects over several centuries. Other major rivers add further to this elaborate system. This network of

natural and man-made waterways is essential for transportation and food production; it has been a mainstay both for livelihood as well as a source of serious calamity (vast periodic flooding and drought). Massive flooding has just recently occurred, described as the worst within 100 years, and was responsible for the ruination of 25% of China's 1991 harvests.

Not only is China's geography more apparent or stark, in a visual sense, than ours, but the relation it has to its people is more pronounced and concentrated than that of probably any other land mass anywhere else on the globe. For whereas our own history in North America encompasses, roughly, an extensive millennial westward migration from the Middle East and Persia through to and including Greece, Rome, Europe and finally into the New World (with spin-offs here and there on varying continents), China also contains a similar 4,000 year span of civilization that is at least as dynamic in scope but which could be squeezed into a geography smaller than our thirteen original states. Its historical development, due largely to its landlocked orientation, has been a growth of implosion and readjustment unlike the steady expansions experienced by Mediterranean and European cultures.

These basic comparisons give rise to a sense of diversity within homogeneity, of a place with special or unique understanding for units of measurement and the passage of time. A typical story, making use of this sense of time, is told of Zhou Enlai who spent a work-study summer in France in 1920

(Deng Xiaoping was also with him, as were other future CCP leaders): in response to a question posed to him by a diplomat in Bandung about the efficacy of the French Revolution, Zhou Enlai said (partly in jest and partly in earnest): "It's too early to tell". Similarly, on another occasion, and more seriously than not, Zhou recounted to a visitor in 1960 that the PRC had only taken the first step on a journey of 10,000 miles. China, in having been "itself for so long", and in one place, simultaneously balances new and old in ways that we may not readily recognize or be able to appreciate.¹⁴ So while the Middle Kingdom has developed unique approaches to tempos and culture, yet its people pursue universally recognizable wants and desires.

1. Before Deng Xiaoping

The People's Republic of China did not appear overnight. Mao Zedong's forces passed through Beijing almost one year before the PRC was proclaimed. Nor was it territorily complete in October 1949; Tibet, though shortly thereafter "liberated", was not formally conjoined as an autonomous region until 15 years later, with other additions, reunifications, and clarifications still yet to occur (Macao, Hong Kong, Taiwan). China also continues to revise itself governmentally as well as territorially.

Ostensibly China is a socialist state, the last major communist government left on the globe (aside from Cuba and North Korea), and technically could be described as such: its

Ministries, Constitution, Politburo and National People's Congress, the relationships between cadres and people, the place of the military, and so on. However, if I may, to be more accurate or realistic and to provide a better feel for the climate of the new People's Republic, all of China and its government is not only this array of Party Apparatus and governmental machinery, but also an evolving concatenation of paradoxes that are rife with tradition in an increasingly modern world. These paradoxes are routinely bandaged with novel resolutions regularly produced to heal emerging dilemmas, whether at national, provincial or local levels. Moreover, the Party leadership collectively entertains a vision of future growth for China and the eventual resumption of its historical prominence within the circle of nations; because of the variety, quantity and speed of all that is happening within China, this vision is regularly revised and will continue to be so revised until well into the next century.

It is very difficult, therefore, and perhaps impossible, to provide a pervasive, intelligible, and certain definition or description, politically or culturally, of China and its people and government at this present point in time. Essentially China is in a period of indigenous transition, and has been so (depending on who is providing the referential source on this particular subject), for at least 50 years and possibly for as long as 200 years.¹⁵ I personally regard the

transitional duration to be the latter period, and expect it to continue for at least another 50 to 100 years - perhaps even longer. The paragraphs that follow will attempt to provide a feel for this sense of transition now prevalent in China.

When Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) acquired the reigns of government, the leadership faced a number of tasks. In addition to the immediate matters of consolidating power and establishing a new state administration, the CCP's intended purpose was to usher China into the 20th century. As such, there was much more to do than simply establish a new government, fill vacant posts, and publish a timetable. There was education to be provided and revamped, land reform for the agricultural countryside, inflation to control, wounds from major conflicts to heal, domestic practices to combat, industry to encourage, and basically an entire social and national infrastructure, in every respect, that needed some sort of attention.

No doubt the most prevalent aspect of the social landscape was its Confucian heritage, a system that had been finely tuned through a score of centuries since its inception around the year 500 B.C.E. Confucianism itself, as it came to be embodied, fostered at least one paradox of its own, namely a silent conflict between egalitarianism on the one hand and the status quo - or respect for authority and its Chinese stratification - on the other. All good citizens were

expected "to shape their behavior and perform their duties in a manner commensurate with their status": i.e. maintain the status quo.¹⁶ Then again, within the teachings of Confucius were mandates to a lack of all class distinction, that instruction and education should be pursued without reference to any inbred inequities.

Another way of stating the above paradox is to contrast family with the central government. All Chinese were bound by filial piety to their families, then beyond that to their clan, village, and so on. Yet all power emanated from above, from the center, and hence a subtle contrasting tug of allegiance ensued between the two. The Chinese version of Confucianism that came to be officially adopted in the body politic encouraged all citizens not only to submit to authority in accordance with their station in life, but also to do everything possible during the course of their lives to ensure that society's stratification and status quo were maintained. The idea of plurality or of a loyal opposition simply had no place in Chinese thought or practice. Authority at one level always demurred, at least in form, to the next higher level, and always to the center; if a family or region had specific identifiable interests, then those interests were pursued only insofar as deference to the center could be maintained.¹⁷ Periods of Warlordism and strife between dynasties have appeared, when regions pursued their own interests at the expense of the center, but these periods are the exception

rather than the norm. Preferences for order over chaos have long been a primary and deep seated aspect of the Chinese people.

A central tenet of Confucianism stipulated that the ruler of society, and all who would participate in the ruling process, were deemed to be best equipped for governing only after having thoroughly studied the past. Hence education came to have a dynamically central place in the scheme of things. It wasn't long before an elaborate examination system became the method for identifying qualified civil servants as well as becoming the main route for upward mobility; civil officials in government were literally members of China's intelligentsia. In time, it also became possible for a limited number of persons to finance their way into this governmental bureaucracy through purchasing degrees rather than competing in the grueling examination process - provided their family had enough money. The exam system itself was an incredible journey through a maze of annual and tri-annual testings, often requiring 25-30 years - or more - to entirely complete, if successful: this process wasn't for everyone.¹⁸ Grades were determined on sliding scales, limiting those who passed to only 50 or 100 per province (i.e.: a maximum of only one percent of those who were tested).

Originally the subjects covered by the exams were a wide spectrum, including history, mathematics, law, and the Confucian corpus. The Ming dynasty (1400s), revised the exams

so that they focused around the Confucian classics, which is said to have contributed to the stultification of thought and research in general. As the rewards of government service were great, and successful candidates were able to raise the living standards and status of entire family groups, it has been suggested, therefore, that the country's landed or bureaucratic elite eventually came to focus entirely or primarily around the Confucian classics, which in turn drew attention away from other sciences, etc. This supposed conjunction, however, between a predisposition for the Confucian corpus and a corresponding lack of interest or expertise in other more practical or scientific avenues, is not universally shared.¹⁹ But regardless of the causal factors involved, although China was once far in advance of pre-Renaissance Europe on a host of subjects (medicine, warfare, astronomy, navigation, chemistry, and so on), the West eventually performed an end run around the East, so to speak, and met China from a position of strength in the 1800s and beyond.²⁰ This was much to the embarrassment of China, and still is. Many Imperial civil servants, the liberal intelligentsia, attempted to institute reform measures to counteract China's lethargy; one such reform, which the conservative and weak Qing could no longer refuse, abolished the examination system in 1905, in an attempt to totally revamp the education system.

Another aspect of the examination milieu and of Confucianism in general was "Practice what you Preach": ethical precepts and leadership by example were deemed to be essential to any good ruler. The Chinese emperor, residing at the apex of this studied bureaucracy, therefore led by precept as well as by fiat. The moral example of his life was an important aspect of ruling. Ethical precepts, the power of personality, personal allegiances and maintenance of order, authority from above, and the status quo were all part of the experience of being ruled by the Son of Heaven. Corresponding ethical requirements and expectations were found within every strata of Chinese society. In that setting, who you knew (and who knew you), or *guanxi*, was just as important and more prominent than your position or what you knew.

Other aspects of Confucianism which infused Chinese life were: paternal rule, a meritocracy by skill and also by status and wealth, family oriented allegiances (extending into the clan and region), and an inherent optimism into the educability of man - therefore the goodness or malleability of man - regardless of how easy or difficult it might be for someone to find the time or resources to become educated. Statesmanship was seen as service to the Emperor, and conduct was always in accordance with your status; vertical relationships held throughout all of society. Within the family, for example, there were not simply brothers and sisters and cousins, but - with specific Chinese characters to represent

each of the following - there were older brothers or sisters, younger brothers or sisters, and differentiations between paternal and maternal relatives.

Education, while prized by all and recognized as a worthy achievement and an avenue for mobility or advancement, was not equally available to anyone who might desire to pursue it. Preparation for the civil service examination cycle required such an inordinate amount of study that it simply wasn't possible for peasants to spend their first three or four decades away from their livelihoods so that they could study. There was, therefore, a very distinguishable gap, not easily bridged, between classical literacy found in the landed bureaucracy and governing strata, and utilitarian literacy (the ability to get by with knowing only 1,000 to 2,000 basic characters). The distance between the landed intelligentsia, who had the resources for study, and the vast majority of peasants, was very real.

Additionally, the Chinese language was itself an exacerbating factor in the matter of literacy; almost each ideogram in the language incorporated a host of meanings which were delineated by tonal inflection, sentence position, and various paired conjunctions of characters. The net result was to make literacy not simply a matter of being able to read but rather something more closely approximating an art form. Calligraphy is a related offshoot of this state of affairs,

and helps to indicate the centrality of language and verbal meaning for Chinese life.

One comparatively simple issue related to language that directly affected the CCP was semantic in scope. The CCP had to find translations for European Marxist terminology so that the terminology would fit China's circumstances and be properly understood via Chinese ideograms. China's predominantly rural orientation, nascent industrialization, and slippery semantics did not afford easy solutions to this requirement. Consequently, the Marxist/Leninist "proletarian" became the Chinese "propertyless class person", who could either be urban (European) or rural (Chinese). Similarly, "feudal" became related to the fragmentation of sovereignty or to the period of Chinese history before the first unification (before 221 B.C.E.). Had the term "feudal" referred to landlord relationships, which would more closely approximate the European semantics, then all of China's 2,000 year history would have applied and the Marxist sense would have been lost, not to mention the attendant embarrassment inherent to China and the CCP by such a usage. This incorporation and adjustment of European experience to fit Chinese needs is partially a factor of what is now referred to as Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, although economic and nationalistic senses are the primary intended reference points.

The above elements related to Confucianism and other aspects of Chinese life are very sketchy and brief, but

offered to suggest the variegated and traditional senses of life with which Chinese society had become imbued. Therefore, the CCP's task to reform society, without passing judgment on the manner in which it tried to do so, was at least awkward and also immense due to population size (already 3 times as large as North America in 1949, or 25% of the world's total), the ingrained nature of Chinese traditions, and also due to the geographical diversity within which it was located.

The reforms, of course, were designed for the purpose of enhancing China's modernization process and reinstating China into international life on a par with other countries. Questions had already been asked (and are still being asked), of why China, with its glorious history and enviable record of achievement, had become complacent without realizing its complacency, and consequently upstaged by the West. No ready answers have yet been provided, but apparently it seems that aspects of Confucian stratification and conservative elitism, the preponderance of abundant human labor for any task then imaginable, plus the basis of existing economics in the landed gentry and "squeeze" extracted by officials from taxation or government monopolies (canal trade, the salt market, interaction with foreigners), all combined to make the need for a Chinese Renaissance, or modernization, unnecessary. Capital development that usually heralded industrial growth simply did not appear as it had elsewhere (Europe, Japan).

To be sure, China was not just a sleeping giant; in the 1840s it had been observed that more tonnage passed through Shanghai than through London, and in 1750 there were more printed books in China than in all of Europe. But those observations just make the question of China's relative industrial quiescence that much more enigmatic. The requisite catalysts for industrialization - of the capitalistic variety that had emerged elsewhere - had not (yet) materialized. There were, in fact, severe pockets of resistance to modernization. Circumstances are recorded of peasant displeasure, often violent, at attempts to modernize the countryside, because the peasants felt the considerable hardship of extra and arbitrary taxation that modernization required long before any benefits accrued to them from the modernization itself. Some local persons of authority, in isolated instances, were also actively opposed to modernization. One such incident has a railroad line being ripped out after its construction, possibly due to the fact that its presence may have hurt regular income to the hierarchy from an established canal or other transport artery, or perhaps because it circumvented the vertical authority then in place between the local official and his provincial authority, with the wrong person (foreigner?) having made the decision to construct it and thereby cause loss of face either to the local official, to the higher provincial authority, or to both.²¹

Regardless of the reason for the disparity between China and the West's rate of industrialization, this gap became readily apparent through gunboat diplomacy; many responsible Chinese voices had, as a result, long been in favor of reform measures covering the entire gamut from education to parliaments, including armaments, but societal inertia and Qing reluctance kept those voices in abeyance. The infamous Marble Boat, built at the behest of the Empress Dowager with funds already earmarked for a blue water fleet to buffer Japan, is the most glaring example of reforms and good intentions gone awry. The Marble Boat is indicative of an Imperial court that was unfortunately incapable of directing proper attention or resources even to the one goal it desired above all others: maintenance of the Manchu dynasty and empire.

Although, in the 1950s, it was apparent to the Communists that wide reforms to engender modernization and industrialization were in fact necessary, it was not clear to them how to enact such reforms on a national level; both urban as well as rural facets were part of the whole, and the CCP was by this time familiar only with the countryside. The Soviet Union provided, at first, a convenient model for PRC policies and expectations; this seemed only natural as the Party had already been looking at Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet Revolution, plus many of the CCP members had studied in Moscow. After a decade, however, it became fairly apparent

that the Soviet model, centered on an industrialized base, was not appropriate for the agrarian PRC. The CCP, therefore, literally had to work out its policies via hard experience during the course of actually governing China. Mistakes would be made.

The initial strength which Mao and the CCP found within the peasants of the rural countryside was due partly to China's make-up, but more a result of being forced to leave cosmopolitan centers in the south and east by the Nationalists (KMT) and Japanese, both of whom wanted China for themselves. After surviving the 12-month watershed Long March into northern Shaanxi and finally into Yanan, the CCP proceeded to consolidate their position in north central China. From there they coordinated their fight against the Japanese (in concert with the KMT, at the behest of the Comintern, and after persuading Chiang Kaishek to do so through kidnapping him in 1936), and also prepared for the inevitable resumption of conflict with the KMT after Japan was removed from China. It is this formative period which led, or at least encouraged, Mao to propound and maintain his doctrine of self-sufficiency.

The ramifications of this insight were related to the historical sense felt by China as being the Middle Kingdom, or the Center, with little need and even less regard for others, except insofar as others might be useful for trade, or for keeping minority groups quiet near the frontiers, etc.. In that sense, Mao could argue that autarky was entirely accept-

able, not to mention that he also had to be concerned with maintaining the CCP's revolutionary spirit and wished to avoid any influx of non-communist ideas through contact with foreigners. However, the extremes associated with the autarky that ensued, in trying to make each province self sufficient, led to excesses that later required adjustment. Those difficulties are still being dealt with today as the Chinese leadership decides how best to solve matters related to distribution of resources and the problems of maintaining, consolidating, improving, or shutting down, state owned industries that are now either poorly located, inefficiently managed, or both.

The primary factor that led Mao and the CCP to emphasize provincial autarky was directly related to security concerns. China had, by this time, experienced severe conflict for several years. World War II was only a facet of the prolonged strife that had plagued China for almost a decade. No sooner had the CCP dealt with the KMT than Russia was found to be a fairly dubious neighbor alongside, and inside, Manchuria, plus the United States soon entered the Korean conflict with troops advancing as far as the Yalu River.²² China's involvement in Korea, and her subsequent hot-and-cold relations with the U.S. were contributing factors in the leadership's mindset that led to their requiring strategic industries to be literally moved into the interior, each in a separate location. This was an immense project

which utilized the abundant human physical labor in the countryside. Even while this movement was taking place, the country managed to maintain, during its first decade, an average annual growth rate of approximately 5% (or an average of 8.2% if taken within the period through 1975).²³ Mao's doctrine of "Self-sufficiency" became the CCP's doctrine, applied at both the provincial and national levels.

All things considered, the CCP had set for itself a monumental task. China was not only to be modernized, but hard traditions were to be eroded, if not eradicated, as part of the process or else it was felt that modernization would not hold. Participation by the peasantry within the process, and a transfer of peasant allegiance from family and clan to the new government and Party, required a severe whittling away of ingrained traditional relationships that had been in place for centuries. Consequently the Party essentially declared war on Confucianism and other cultural traditions. The Party knew that China had so far failed to generate the kind of modernization that was then apparent in Europe and even Japan, and therefore that widespread reform in China was required. A combination of May Fourth reformers, returned students from Europe and Japan and other seminal Chinese figures, all full of Marxism-Leninism and nationalism, impressed by the Russian revolution, and especially desirous to speed China's reforms, combined to form the CCP, and the events leading to the formation of the PRC began.

Traditional Chinese values were already weakened due to reform measures that had been attempted from the late Qing era and during the early Republic. Additionally, pressures on family and other Chinese institutions had been severe since the 1920s due to the tremendous disruption and dislocations from prolonged conflict. China had, roughly since 1921, been engaged in continuous struggle: a combination of civil strife between CCP and KMT, plus the war against the Japanese.

The CCP in its first decades was actually channeling existing tides of discontent, in which the Chinese people were looking for relief, respite, and hoped-for opportunities to get on with their lives. But the Party had a larger agenda beyond mere relief and respite and was doing its best to literally revolutionize an entire society. Hence, through Mao's leadership, there came to be no sacred cows, and almost everything - except for revolution itself - was eventually called into question and subject to calls for exorcism. Children were not discouraged from denouncing their parents, attempts were made to bring peasants directly into the education process (previously associated only with the wealthy or well-connected civil servants), clan loyalties and ancestor worship were discouraged, the marriage and agrarian laws (the first major reform measures) did in fact weaken Confucian networks.

On the domestic front, the first major societal actions of the CCP were the Marriage Law and Agrarian Reform

Law in 1950. These two were nothing short of revolutionary, regardless of who might have pronounced them. The intent of the Marriage Law was to hasten the emancipation of women which had already begun at the turn of the century, to underscore the end to foot-binding which occurred shortly before in the 1920s, and - if at all possible - to reorient domestic relationships and allegiance patterns by giving the woman equal marital rights, equal access to divorce, equal expectation to marital fidelity as had been enjoyed by men, and property rights. The new law was therefore designed to encroach on the "three bonds" of traditional Confucianism and to weaken the clan and entire filial network. The marriage law did in fact have its desired effect, although other reform measures soon to follow changed even more drastically the overall relations between China's peasants and their families and the land itself.

Agrarian reform also began simultaneously with the marriage law and with much the same effect, namely to remove the peasant from servitude and loyalty to the landlord, to give him incentive by having land of his own, to foster egalitarianism throughout the countryside by removing feudal relationships, and - at first - to tie the peasant to the Party by making him part of the process which removed and/or ruined the landlords (often by killing them). "Feudal", in this case, does mean the landlord-peasant relationship. No sooner, however, had the 1950 land reform been concluded

(1952), than reorganization of peasants into mutual aid teams began, then cooperatives (where land was still privately owned), and finally into the collectives. By 1957 almost all the peasants were collectivized, which reflected a tremendous amount of enthusiasm by Party members and also a willingness among the peasants to participate in the CCP reform measures.

The CCP, based on its own agenda - again without passing judgment on that agenda or its methodology - was meeting with more than a few initial successes. The face of China had literally been transformed. However, the CCP was trying to do everything at once, or rather Mao's leadership was pushing the Party to pursue all, and more, of these attempts in short order. In the space of only a few years the CCP had taken control of a national government, reorganized the countryside, initiated a wide array of deep attacks on pervasive Confucian truisms, fought a war in Korea, sparred with the U.S. over the Taiwan Straits, decided to make an atom bomb, started compulsory military service and training, pursued self-sufficiency, collared wartime inflation, and started a full-scale ambivalence regarding the place of scholars and higher education. Success was achieved in weaning traditional allegiance away from the bedrock familial unit, although the force of that allegiance was basically unchanged even if the substance was changed; allegiance and expectations were now essentially redirected toward the Party, rather than transformed into something else. It's as though

the result, at a societal level, was to create a new and much larger (national) family.

Quite possibly the major achievement of the CCP was in the arena of national government; everyone in China, with few exceptions, was now for the first time in direct and constant contact with the Center. Previously all contact between peasants and the Imperial center had been indirect through provincial officials; the bureaucratic gentry ensured that directives from above for transport or labor or rice or taxes were met, and then did more or less as they pleased with any remaining squeeze. In the PRC, local officials in the form of cadres likewise were found between peasants and Center, but peasants also belonged to organizations that interacted extensively with those and other cadres, or by extension the center, on subjects of mutual and national import. These local organizations ranged from work units or collectives to youth organizations, the military, and others. For the very first time in millenia, China's peasants were essentially as much a part of the Center's feedback loop as were the local officials. Albeit the layers of bureaucracy were still in place, and contact between peasant and central government passed through several human strainers, yet there was nonetheless a sense of national consciousness - a sense of participation in the national group - which was forming in the minds of all concerned. From another viewpoint, this new circumstance was also a genuinely totalitarian state. There was now more

(or less) to living in China beyond the racial sense of being Chinese, and fulfilling occasional dictates from an unseen higher authority at the center.

Flushed with this initial success, the CCP under Mao's guidance proceeded to push with more and faster reforms. For better or for worse, Mao was obsessed with the idea of egalitarianism and of making that idea a reality throughout all of China. Hence the 1955 collectivization proceeded at a rapid pace, followed by the Great Leap Forward (GLF) in 1957. Support for this rapid pace was not automatic within Party ranks, but Party discipline held and the CCP dutifully supported the Great Helmsman's projects. (Similarly, the principle of the "democratic mass line" was utilized among the people to generate party support and common responses to problems or issues that might arise during the course of carrying out party mandated activities).

There was danger in attempting to do too much too quickly, and that point was in fact reached. Prior to the GLF, Mao announced the Hundred Flowers campaign in 1956 with the intent of enlisting the support of China's educated non-communist elite. China's intellectuals took Mao at his word and began a period of immense criticism, primarily against the domination of a single political entity: the CCP. Both the Party and non-communist elite had the best interests of China at heart, but they did not agree with each other. Mao was already leading the Party away from Soviet models, but this

criticism from China's own intellectuals was too much for him. Technically, while the traditional role of civil servant was to lead by example, using a combination of classical learning and ethical precepts, his calling attention to the ruler of inadequacies or items that needed correction was a procedure that bordered a fine line between duty and treason. The intelligentsia that responded within the Hundred Flowers framework were obviously, in Mao's opinion, going far beyond duty. Accordingly, the campaign was terminated, (hundreds and thousands of) arrests were made, and Chinese education began to experience reforms of its own.

As one of the Communist's intentions had been to render education equally accessible to all Chinese, and the peasants simply could not be inserted into traditional higher education, the educational structure was therefore brought to the peasant's level with the net result of diluting China's entire educational infrastructure. Education was conjoined with manual labor, requirements for mandated schooling were reduced, and seats for higher education were awarded based on class background rather than (solely) on intellectual attainment. Another practical paradox ensued with these particular reforms: education may indeed have been leveled across the population spectrum, but the educational resource base required for modernization was severely weakened.

Mao's leadership of the CCP was not a given. He was involved in an ongoing struggle for primacy over the Party

which was not initially resolved until after the Long March. Subsequently, there was ongoing discussion within the Party over whether to focus on ideological reforms (Mao), or a less intense procedure with fewer state controls (Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping). Up until the GLF was announced, all Party members were behind Mao, despite what may have been their misgivings. Following the GLF, however, when it became apparent that the GLF had been a disaster rather than the glowing success reported by CCP cadres, Mao's leadership again came under question.

At the Lushan meeting of the Central Committee in 1959, Peng Dehuai was highly critical of what was then unfolding as the GLF debacle. Peng's critique, presented within a recurrent forum held for discussion among the Party's hierarchy for thrashing out policy matters, was taken by Mao as a personal attack. Peng was removed from his post, Lin Biao became Defense Minister, Liu Shaoqi succeeded Mao as Chairman, and the stage was set for factionalism that has plagued the CCP ever since. Lin Biao produced the "Little Red Book", steered the PLA away from the professionalism and modernization of Peng, and Mao sought a manner in which to reassert the primacy of social egalitarianism.

To backtrack somewhat and review the State and Party organizations up until this point: Party and State had been established as two separate organizations in the PRC. On the state side, the primary or most visible organ between hierar-

chy and general population was the National People's Congress (NPC). The NPC, elected every 5 years, elects a Standing Committee with Chairman and several Vice-Chairmen who function as a full-time outlet of the NPC. Members of the Standing Committee also appoint the judges to the Supreme People's Court. The NPC additionally elects members of the State Council and can also, theoretically, approve or disapprove national budgets. The State Council presides over the several Ministries of Government, has a Premier and several Vice-Premiers, and is described as the most important organ of national government. Zhou Enlai became the first state Premier and kept that post until he died. Membership of the NPC is based upon one representative for a certain number of Chinese (400,000 in 1978), and includes representatives who are members of the Party, PLA, workers, peasants, national minorities, and others, including a few overseas Chinese. Prior to the establishment of the NPC, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) was established as an interim coalition government, comprised of CCP members as well as representatives from other non-CCP parties. The CPPCC still exists, but has little functional value.

On the Party side, and similarly to the NPC, the CCP begins with the National Party Congress, composed of representatives from lower level Provincial and Local Party Congresses. The National Party Congress, like the NPC, is directed to convene every 5 years, and elects a Central Committee. The

Central Committee in turn elects, while in plenary session, the Politburo as well as the Standing Committee of the Politburo, also the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the CCP. The Chairman of the CCP is also head of the PLA; Mao held the chairmanship of the CCP from the Long March until 1976. He was also Chairman of the PRC until Liu Shaoqi took the post in 1959.

Technically the above frameworks of Party and State are neatly laid out, each with its areas of responsibility. But they hardly function in the sense that our Congress or the British Parliament function; the NPC and Party Congress are largely rubber stamp edifices, with each fully aware of which way the wind is blowing whenever they convene. Form without substance, and another paradox: deliberative government machinery within an authoritarian framework. Authority is still from above.

Both Party and State have written constitutions. The first PRC constitution was adopted in 1954 and the first CCP constitution was adopted in 1945; significant documentary revisions for each have followed with dependable frequency. Despite the written provisions delineating responsibilities and avenues of decision making within the PRC and CCP, the actual weight or authoritative standing of any one member of the CCP or NPC has much more to do with his faction and patron, or his *guanxi* (connections), than with his job description. It is very important for any one Chinese to not

only know who someone is when dealing with that individual, but also who that person works for, who he knows, who his patron is, who is above him, who works beneath him; with that knowledge then it becomes possible to deal with the other person.

From its inception in 1921 to the aftermath of the GLF, CCP membership had risen from less than a hundred to about 17,000,000. During this time the CCP had encroached on the day-to-day administrative and managerial responsibilities of the State Council and its Ministries. This was Mao's way of ensuring Party ideological control over administrative state machinery.²⁴ After factionalism had broken out at the Lushan meeting, and Liu Shaoqi was head of State, Mao perceived additional need for the resurgence of ideological purity, and so the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) was conceived in 1964.

Beyond ensuring ideological purity, the GPCR was also a vehicle for Mao to regain undisputed control over Party and hence the State. CCP factionalism had reached the point where Mao was less and less the controlling figure. In an oversimplified manner of speaking, the GPCR was a glorified power struggle.

The horrendous excesses of the GPCR are well documented, with more information becoming available on a continuous basis. It is not necessary to recount its progression here. Suffice it to say that Zhou survived, Liu and Deng were

purged, Peng Zhen (Mayor of Beijing) was the first high-ranking CCP member to be relieved of his post, thousands and thousands were injured or lost their jobs or worse, education suffered, universities were closed, the Gang of Four were making their play for power, and it became necessary for regular units of the PLA to restore order after competing Red Guard factions began violent conflicts with each other. The worst turmoil was over by the end of 1967, but the entire experience was not entirely put to rest until the death of Mao in 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four shortly thereafter.

Aside from this blatant disruption, much continued to occur in and around China. Domestically, pinyin romanization was well underway, and Mao finally got around to supporting family planning again in 1972; the birth rate had climbed to 2.8% by 1965 from 1.6% in 1949, and the attendant population growth clobbered China with a population increase from 540 million in 1949 to well over 900 million at Mao's death in 1976. CCP membership had also risen to over 30 million (still about 4% of the population). University entrance exams were abolished; one of the legacies of the GPCR. China's GNP had continued to increase an average of 8.2% per year, from a total of \$67 billion (\$67b) in 1952 to \$210b by 1976; this was comparable to achieving an industrial base equivalent in scale to that of the USSR or Japan in the 1960s.²⁵ China had also detonated her first nuclear device in 1964, her first hydrogen device in 1967, launched her first satellite in 1970, and

constructed her first nuclear submarine in 1971. Further, still on the domestic scene, Lin Biao was killed in an aircraft crash near the Mongolian border after having been suspected of planning a *coup detat*, Zhou survived the radicals' anti-Confucious campaign of 1972, and Deng Xiaoping was reinstated only to be purged a second time as a result of the April 5th Incident in 1976.

Internationally, China was almost as busy as she was at home. After the initial PRC-USSR friendship, China had long ago experienced the abrupt Sino-Soviet split (1960) after Mao and Khrushchev disagreed over the proper pace and emphasis of communist revolution. In 1962 China fought briefly with India over a border disagreement. China and the Soviets also skirmished over their border, at the Ussuri River, and nearly went to war in 1969. The UN admitted China in 1971, and in that same year the U.S. and PRC began talks for normalizing relations. Deng started his many travels abroad with visits to the UN and France, and China began her first purchases of western wheat and technology in the early 1970s - the first sign of Deng's later Open Door policy.

One final topic before moving into the post-Mao era of Four Modernizations and Reforms concerns security and the PLA. This particular subject is difficult because it is intertwined with paradoxical issues of its own related to authority, professionalization vs. politicization, modern conflict vs. people's war, expenditures vs. budgetary and earned income,

and its relations to Party and State. Positing the PLA's particular relationship to Party, at any one moment, not to mention its purpose, involves more than a fair amount of gray. As China is going through a transitional period, so also is the PLA experiencing a transition regarding its relation to Party and State; in effect this subject is a transition within a transition. An entire literature exists on the PLA, and we will not treat it at length here.²⁶ We will, however, touch on the special relationship that PLA and CCP have experienced, so as to better appreciate some of the mechanics, options and perceptions resident within CCP leadership. This subject will reappear with the reforms under Deng, the interaction between PRC and the Middle East, the existence of policies between China and the Levant, and again with the implications for U.S. policy. The subject is important, even if it is treated here with respectful distance.

From its inception in 1921 until the establishment of the PRC 28 years later, the Party's survival was closely tied to the health of the PLA and the PLA's own survival against the KMT and Japanese. There were rare times when PLA and CCP were basically indistinguishable (e.g.: the Long March). There have also been times, since 1949, when the sense of PRC statehood has not seemed to require military muscle to make it a reality. Primarily, however, there exists between PLA and the Party and State an uneasy middle ground, occupied more on some occasions by uniforms and on others by government

workers, cadres, or even businessmen. To be sure, the CCP would not exist were it not for the PLA's efforts during the civil war years, and perhaps also during the turmoil of the GPCR. It is also true that PLA personnel often occupied significant positions within the CCP and NPC. But to posit from these observations a specific and identifiable structure, role or relation of the PLA vis-a-vis the CCP is, at least for the time being, to posit too much. At most we will say that the CCP drives the PLA; despite the need for muscle to flesh out the Party's existence, it is not the case that the PLA drives the CCP. If the CCP survives for another 50 years (and it should, with reference only to current states of affairs in China today), there will no doubt be a close relationship between it and the PLA. What that relationship might entail, or to what extent, if any, the CCP might have to change its composition or way of doing business, is hard to say.

That is, some would view the PLA as an arm of the State, whereas others might see it primarily as a military which has had to deal with more than its fair share of governmental caprice, now doing this (espousing the Little Red Book), now doing that (coalescing and modernizing), now doing something else (growing its own food, making and selling its own weapons). Permutations from these musings include the CCP as dependent on the PLA, either as currently construed, or as construed by external (PLA) dictate. As both the PRC and the PLA are still in transition, pendulums will continue to swing

and at this point the PLA will be modernizing, at that point it will be acting on behalf of the PRC domestically or internationally, and at still yet another point it will be looking out for its own best interests.

As Mao's CCP looked at the PRC, it wanted to see a country on a par of dialogue - equally, at least - with all its neighbors, near and far. It also wanted to see a people interacting among themselves, each contributing to the State and each able to contribute in a manner best suited to his/her own talents (egalitarianism of employment and education). Finally Mao's CCP wanted to see the PRC as free at least from strife, if not also from want. This last intent was mitigated against heavily due to the authoritarian vertical structure of control inherent to China, and due to the CCP's strenuous and severe measures designed to offset that inherency (not unlike a vicious cycle) so as to institute measures of equality.

There were constants (the nuclear program, coordinated attempts to join the UN), in the midst of caprice (GLF, GPCR). The simultaneous direction of the growth and cohesion of China, all of China, while concomitantly promoting CCP revolutionary goals, presented Mao Zedong and the others within his circle of leadership with dilemmas that have not abated.

2. Four Modernizations and Reform

After the deaths of Zhou and Mao, a power struggle ensued within the leadership, pitting the radicals (Gang of

Four) against the others (the reformers: Chen Yung, Deng and their groups). Until the political climate was clear of Jiang Qing and her remaining Gang of Four members, factionalism was rife. Deng was purged a second time, in April, after a spontaneous demonstration (the Qingming Festival); students, angered at the lack of official notice of Zhou's death, honored the deceased Premier in a fashion that was critical of Jiang and supportive of the moderates. The net effect of the "incident" was to infuriate the radicals and prompt them to call for Deng's demotion. Deng was their obvious target, as he had been Zhou's protege (notwithstanding that Li Peng was one of Zhou's many wards). Hence Deng, who was still something of a bargaining chip between the moderates (most recently championed by Zhou) and the radicals (led by Jiang, who prospered while Mao lived), again dropped from sight. Hua Guofeng, who was named the compromise Acting Premier when Zhou died, became the Premier and first Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, and therefore Mao's successor.

When Mao died, the moderates, led in this case by Hua, took the political initiative and arrested the Gang of Four before Jiang could further develop her power base. Hua then went on to become head of the Party and State, as well as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. From relative obscurity as a second tier Provincial official, Hua managed to benefit from the GPCR as many of his superiors, who were more visible than he, suffered at the hands of Red Guards and were

taken from their positions. Their sudden and joint departures added room at the top, which was further enlarged when Zhou and Mao died. Hua was in the right place at the right time, and managed to be upwardly mobile. The need to placate moderates and radicals with a compromise candidate, plus the fact that Hua was relatively weak (20 years younger than his new peers), made him a safe choice for senior officials as they waited for the dust of Mao's death to settle. As a result, Hua's new positions at the top of CCP, PRC and CMC gave him authority over those who, a short while before, had all been senior to him.

A short while later Deng applied to reassume his posts in the Party, and was reinstated after promising not to seek Hua's position. Deng, of course, broke his promise and was soon presenting proposals and garnering support that moved backing away from Hua. Almost immediately the production support system in agriculture began, and in less than a year Deng represented China while travelling to Nepal, Burma and Bangladesh. Hua was still the nominal head of State, but Deng was pressing his own agenda: Mao was criticized, the Open Door began, PRC-U.S. student exchanges resumed (after a 30 year hiatus), Deng went to Japan and the U.S. (while Hua went to North Korea), PRC-U.S. relations were normalized, the U.S. gave MFN trade status to China, university entrance exams returned, and finally in 1980 Zhao Ziyang became head of State. Deng's agenda proceeded further with the announcement

of coastal special economic zones, the Gang of Four went on trial, and by 1981 Hu Yaobang became Party Chairman, with Deng replacing Hua on the Central Military Commission. Deng was neither head of State nor head of Party, but it was clear that he was the new and undisputed paramount ruler.

Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were among the new faces in the Party's hierarchy since 1976. Both of them were to prove to be more than able supporters of reform programs; both were, in fact, members of the radical reform wing. Hu Yaobang, as a liberal reformer, not only targeted aspects of the economy and country as a whole for reform measures, but also was willing to practice reform within the Party: he was essentially something of a radical in his own right and too irreverent for his own good. Among his more egregious faults were straightforward suggestions that senior CCP members should retire, an unwillingness to promote children of senior officials, plus a propensity to play down the PLA's civilian role, none of which were popular decisions with elderly CCP members. (These elderly CCP officials were basically a generation older than both Hu and Zhao and very much familiar with traditional ways of doing business; this Chinese propensity has been the regular brunt of periodic campaigns against "corruption" and nepotism). When students staged an escalating series of visible demonstrations in 1986 with political overtones, Hu was forced to retire. Zhao succeeded him as

General Secretary of the CCP, and Li Peng appeared shortly afterwards as head of State.

Li was a moderate reformer, i.e. a conservative or hardliner; his entry onto the scene was part of a compromise either engineered or approved by Deng to keep both moderates and radicals placated. It should be mentioned again that all CCP members were reformers, from day one, but their understanding of the proper scope and speed of reform led them into recognizable argumentative factions, beginning with the meeting at Lushan. While Mao lived, there were leftists (who supported the GLF and GPCR), and there were moderates (who measured results by quantities of food and beneficial industry, and might then also have been termed revisionists). At Mao's death, however, the leftists largely lost their voice, and the moderates filled the vacuum. Hence the vast majority now comprising the CCP are these former moderates, representing either radical or moderate reform wings. They are variously referred to in the western press as go-for-it and to-get-rich-is-glorious "reformers" on the one hand, or as take-it-slow and keep-central-planning-uppermost "hardliners", "conservatives", or "the old guard" on the other. The verbal distinctions thus created suggest that one group is pro reform and the other is not, which is not accurate. Both groups want and seek reform of an economic nature, but some are willing to trust market devices and others want to move slowly from central directives.²⁷

As evidenced, again, by Deng's maneuvering while Hua was in the Politburo, and by his behind-the-scenes compromises to place Zhao and Li in positions of power, Deng has taken it on himself to perform the necessary role of CCP consensus builder, a task formerly handled by Zhou. There has, however, been a perceptible shift in how maintenance of CCP consensus is performed.

Regarding Zhou, in addition to being Premier, he was also the Party stalwart who faithfully occupied the number 2 position in the hierarchy from the outset (and who had more time on the politburo than Mao). Zhou was the quintessential intermediary, the behind-the-scenes worker who performed invaluable services in getting things done and keeping the Party together throughout the United Front, GLF and GPCR. Zhou was also, when required, the foreign trained intellectual diplomat, who more often than not was China's astute "best foot forward" in sensitive international situations. Examples that come to mind are his representation of China at Bandung in 1955 and Geneva in 1954; the latter is particularly poignant, because it was there that U.S. Secretary of State Dulles refused to shake Zhou's proffered hand. Zhou also oversaw the events surrounding President Nixon's memorable visit to China early in 1972. All things considered, Zhou was an intermediary *par excellence*, who performed frequently within that quiet capacity, especially in his later years. He finally came to be the power behind the throne during Mao's

illness, and was more than a little influential in directing the rapprochement between China and the U.S. When the leftists mounted their anti-Confucian campaign in 1973, he managed to deflect the criticism harmlessly onto the deceased Lin Biao. China had profitted greatly from his talents through the years.

Deng, by contrast, performs the intermediary function in a different fashion than Zhou. Before 1976 Zhou was immersed between the two readily identifiable and almost diametrically opposed factions to each other; he took it on himself to keep them - and consequently China - together. With Deng the division between factions is not so readily apparent, as both want reform of more or less the same stripe (i.e. economic); hence both are largely on the same side of the fence. As such, Deng must sometimes assist - and sometimes hinder - to keep his reform agenda moving. Before Tienanmen, he was something of a referee (after the Maoist and holdover Gang of Four influence had dissipated). After Tienanmen, Deng has been more of a coach or catalyst for both moderates and radicals. At first he rallied the senior members and their extensive support networks to silence the wellspring of voices that erupted in Tienanmen (among students, workers, CCP members, even members of the PLA), with the purpose being to preserve unity. Secondly, now that things are quiet, he is prodding and pulling the radicals to get them going again, hoping no doubt to resume the function

of referee. Deng's version of being the intermediary also requires a certain ruthlessness, because he has proved to be more than willing to withdraw his support from persons he previously openly supported (and probably also encouraged: Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang).

The question that arises from these examples of Zhou and Deng is: "Who will serve as intermediary, as catalyst and referee, once Deng is no longer on the scene?" To facilitate this issue, Deng has preferred to have others take, ostensibly, the day to day leadership positions within the hierarchy. Hence Zhao and Hu, now Li and Jiang, as heads of State and Party. Deng has even resigned from the CMC with the probable intent of allowing others the added exposure and experience to generate or enhance their own *guanxi* with the PLA. He is giving them the opportunity to improve their own personal networks, their own lines of support, so as to better survive the inevitable future positioning within the CCP as the leadership decides how to pursue PRC modernization. As the 14th Party Congress approaches, Deng has also been reappearing around the country, speaking out in favor of reform and doing what he can to reassert liberal reform measures that have lagged under the tutelage of Chen Yun since Tienanmen.

Regardless of which person or group will eventually emerge to command the center, it seems clear that the process of succession is devolving more and more into an increasing number of voices. In 1976 the protagonists were squaring off

before Mao's death, but were nonetheless readily identifiable not only by faction but by leaders within those factions. Currently the protagonists are again squaring off, but delineating the participants is not so easy; the factions are apparent enough, but their leadership remains, to the external observer, somewhat obtuse.

Deng, apparently, has allowed for the possibility of Jiang to assume the liberal leadership, if in fact Jiang has been creating and solidifying a power base; common wisdom posits, however, that he has not done this. Zhao Ziyang could reassume leadership of the radical wing, although he will need to distance himself from the extreme liberalism he evidenced at Tienanmen; this state of affairs is also unlikely. Other capable reformers standing by on the liberal side include Ye Xuanping of Guangdong and the recently elevated former mayor of Shanghai, Zhu Rongji. Zhu's ascendancy to the vice-Premiership continues to demonstrate Shanghai's prominence in national politics. Zhao is reportedly on the verge of formal rehabilitation, and has been pictured in a photograph that is making the rounds in CCP circles with Deng, Li Peng, Jiang Zemin and Yang Shangkun. He has also contributed a 58 page article to a official 3-volume compendium of Key Articles Since the 13th Congress; his article is in the first volume, with liberal reformers outnumbering conservatives.²⁸

On the conservative side, Li Peng is the visible front runner, but not a shoo-in; he is stained deeply by Tienanmen

(which, I suspect, was intentional by Deng). Li continues to be Deng's mouthpiece for the Party line, while others are actually moving China forward. Other conservatives include a few from the Long March generation (whose long term utility is doubtful), and Yang Baibing. There could also be another surprise compromise choice for succession to Deng, perhaps from the second tier of provincial officials, which further opens the list of hopefuls.

In the background of all these maneuvers is the PLA: conceivably, in the absence of CCP consensus, the PLA could back a candidate or even provide a candidate of their own. Such dramatic insertion on its part does not ring true, however, with its historical relation to the CCP; typically the Party will thrash out their own leadership, whether or not that might include someone from the PLA (e.g. Yang Baibing). In the unlikely event of CCP stalemate, again, the PLA could also, just as easily - depending on the state of the country-side - choose to do nothing and force the Party apparatus to reach a selection and also begin the process of establishing a succession mechanism, thereby helping to preclude similar dilemmas in the future. (In a round about fashion, Deng is already doing precisely this by drawing more players into the succession and deliberative process). Most likely the PLA would prefer to take a passive role, as it is still smarting from the Tienanmen debacle. Whether or not the PLA will repair its relationship with the people likely depends on its

professional development as well as its deportment during any coming episodes of national import. Mending the citizen-PLA relationship will take time, or an occasion of national significance, or on evolving mechanisms of participation in national government whereby the people might have a greater sense of responsibility for the government, or all three.

Any thoughts on succession, or PLA-CCP and PLA-citizen relationships are, at this point, almost entirely speculative and not very profitable in and of themselves. But the element that does seem preeminent, and that makes the entire subject of China nothing short of fascinating, is the set of issues enveloping China's unique sense of authority. The distinctive conceptualization accorded by the Chinese to leadership, plus how this concept might be evolving, or how their modernizing lives might be evolving around the concept, has extraordinary implications. Observations and prognostications regarding likely transformations of this sense suggest potential ramifications that could reverberate profoundly throughout Chinese society.

From this perspective, the most important single element now present in China, relative to modernization, has to do with the concept and place of authority. Closely tied to this concept are matters of leadership succession, legal codes, criminal vs. civil law, citizen participation in government, individual rights, authority from above vs. authority from below, institutional legitimacy, accountabili-

ty. As the sense of authority continues to transform, or as life evolves around it, so will these integral facets of Chinese society feel this transformation. In short, the very fabric of Chinese society is almost certainly in the midst of adjustment or transition; the repercussions can be expected to be enormous as the country unfolds.

For this reason, what has been occurring in China is far and away more significant than recent events in Eastern Europe or even in the former Soviet Union. For especially in Eastern Europe, and to a lesser degree in Moscow, an existing idea - already alive, so to speak, but temporarily held in abeyance - triumphed over another momentarily embodied idea. But in China, a new idea (not yet formed) is evolving from another, namely how to best or most profitably or most equitably deal with authority and law and participatory government and morality, all amidst 20% of the world's population: the ramifications are simply enormous.

Many in the West would like to name this evolving transformation, or aspects of it, "democracy"; only time will tell what in fact might emerge, or when, from the current PRC incubation. Very likely the Chinese will continue to call it something along the line of "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics", (if the CCP survives), regardless of the result's actual character. Quite frankly, it matters little what the Chinese or anyone else happen to call it, because the transformation will still be occurring, and it will still be

occurring in China; names in politics are indicative both of honest intent and also of window dressing, as well as of the thing in itself. These names must be taken with a large grain of salt, no matter where or what they are, or who pronounces them.

Deng himself has just stipulated that trying to label a practice or policy as being socialist or capitalist is a waste of time and misses the point: the "correct approach is to judge whether something is helpful to developing the productive forces... strengthening the nation and improving living standards".²⁹ He has also just mandated, through the Politburo, that policies of reform will remain unchanged for 100 years, and he required conservatives to resign from posts in the propaganda and culture offices. Clearly Deng wants more economic development, plus continued hints or suggestions to the general population of reform through further viewings of programs similar to "The Yellow River Elegy".

The Four Modernizations (agriculture, science and technology, economics, and defense, in that order), first pronounced by Zhou, are alive and well. Deng is again pulling out all the stops, especially with the 14th Party Congress just over the horizon, for reform, reform, and more reform. China's industrial growth has continued at a pace beyond the capabilities of the energy producers to keep up. In Guangdong, the annual local GNP increased 13.5% in 1991, and industrial output has grown by an incredible 272%, with 38% of

all local industry in that area now in the private sector.³⁰ Total GDP for China rose by 7% in 1991, which is an average to slow year by current PRC standards. At these rates, electricity supplies would have to increase by 20-30% on average throughout China to avoid present shortages. Ironically, China's power program is one of the fastest growing in the world but is still inadequate as presently configured. China's power producing equipment must operate continuously at full tilt, consequently wearing out faster, and requires an even higher level of growth than otherwise mandated just to keep a status quo. Normal energy loads elsewhere in the world leave 15-25% of system reserve capacity dormant for periods of peak loads: China's reserve is 0. Coal now accounts for 70% of PRC's power generation. Plans are set to increase current energy supply levels almost 50% by 1995. Even Guangdong province, with 50% price increases for electricity, is having difficulty keeping pace with demand, despite a more efficiently managed energy program that can better fund its own development. Projections for nuclear energy show only 2-3% of China's energy requirements to originate from this source by the year 2000.³¹

The PLA is beginning to share in the fruits of the Four Modernizations as well. The army has experienced manpower cuts to bring it more in line with a modernized force, also to reduce its budget, but still retains a not insignificant roster of 3.1 million personnel. Rank distinc-

tions have been reinstated, following their removal during Mao's reign. Recent budget increases, as much as 50% over 1989 levels, are further assisting the modernizing process. Possibly Deng promised this added budgetary consideration as part of the maneuvering just prior to Tienanmen: the PLA's initial Four Modernization budget allocation was not to their liking, as they were then assigned the last of four economic priorities. For whatever reason, the added allocations are not mandated by imminent security threats to China's borders.

Observations of the U.S. and allied military performance during the Gulf War caused much discussion among the PLA: they were impressed by the employment of technology and are probably directing recent budgetary largesse to that purpose. Funds are also probably being directed to the acquisition and improvement of projectible sea power, a blue water Navy. If and when China's foreign policies will require military assistance, quite possibly the circumstances will involve either the South China Sea, or South Asia (and the Indian Ocean).

In addition to fairly diverse western arms purchases (especially since the PRC-U.S. rapprochement), China has also been marketing her own arms and thereby generating more foreign currency for other purposes. A brief look at the elaborate bureaucracy controlling these sales will provide added insight into the Chinese government as a whole.

Located between the PLA and the Central Military Commission (CMC) are 23 arms sales related companies, which are purportedly responsible to the CMC. These companies are staffed at the highest levels by family members (sons, wives, brothers, daughters), of high ranking CCP and PLA personnel. Hence decisions about arms sales (how much, what item, which customer), are made primarily if not entirely within a family network, which includes Deng at the apex, rather than the institutionalized bureaucracy. The Foreign Ministry is not a necessary player in this decision loop; it might not even be informed as to sales that have been approved or pending. Comparatively speaking, the Chinese must have considerable difficulty in trying to comprehend the U.S. government's decision making apparatus, since so much of it is open to public scrutiny.

Economic reforms at the hands of the liberals have not been easy. Three up and down economic cycles took place during the 1980s, with inflation at one point reaching 27% in 1988. Both rural and urban sector reforms were occurring. Zhao wanted to lift all price controls in 1989, but was unable to do so.

Meanwhile, U.S. trade with China was approximately \$2b in 1979. By 1989 that same trade was \$18b. China's total worldwide trade in 1980 was \$38b, and it climbed to \$135.7b in 1991. Japan is the PRC's largest trading partner, with the

U.S. second and Germany third. U.S. investment in the PRC, by 1990, was about \$4b.

PRC officials are now reported to be allowing foreign companies to play greater roles in service industries. Plans are being considered to privatize housing, decontrol prices, and convert a large amount of state industry into stockholders' companies. Deng visited the Capital Steel Corporation in May 1992, and complained that the CCP was not implementing enough reform measures; he is said to have mentioned "I don't understand economics, but I know a good economy when I see it". Deng is now travelling in northeast China, drumming up support for reform policies. Hainan, a few months ago, opened a stock exchange of its own, and a deputy prime minister from Beijing ordered it closed; after the official returned to Beijing it was reopened.³²

It is no longer debated whether or not PRC GNP will surpass the former USSR's GNP. Rather the debate centers on when that will occur and what its significance will be; estimates range from an early 2010 to somewhere later in the 21st century.³³ One formula states that at the beginning of the 1980s, China accounted for 5% of world industrial production as well as GNP, and the USSR 15%. But Soviet growth slowed in the 1980s, and China grew at over 8% a year, with its PCGNP doubling between 1977-1987. Now with the USSR out of the competition, and the original 2010 estimate already

looking a bit conservative, China will in relatively short order possess the second highest GNP in the world.

It is also not debated that Chinese PCGNP certainly does not and possibly never will, in the foreseeable future, match that of other nations who all have smaller populations (e.g.: Europe, Japan, Oceania, the U.S.).³⁴ Regardless, the capabilities inherent within the larger PRC GNP will provide China with significant options. Tying present and expected capabilities together with historical Chinese ingenuity and inventiveness provides a picture full of domestic and international potential.

Current calculations of PRC PCGNP vary (\$260 to over \$400), according to the formulas used for the calculation.³⁵ Regardless of the figure, China is obviously an exceptionally poor (per capita) country. Resources at the national level are likewise strained, yet due to the tremendous demographic base, national resources far outstrip the per capita expectations that would be associated with smaller countries. Another indicator of the necessary robustness of China's economy, despite her meager PCGNP, the economy must create approximately 15 million jobs each year just to stay ahead of unemployment.

Despite the reality of China, then, as a poor country, the government will still have tremendous resources with which to work. This power may be regarded as discretionary power; China, unlike virtually any other nation, and despite the

general international climate of stability that is beneficial for its current growth, does not inherently need or prefer to seek alliances for security purposes, or for any other purpose. Without entangling alliances as a check, and with traditional Chinese concerns fluctuating as they will, internally or externally, PRC choices can be expected to be more arbitrary than not. Chinese options will be discretionary because the Chinese will ultimately have to answer to fewer parties for their own choices, if they answer to anyone at all. China's incursion into Vietnam was ostensibly to teach them a lesson, and the Sino-Indian border conflicts were likewise of short duration. There is also a story, unproved but typical, stating that the Ming Court heard disparaging reports of how Chinese in California were being treated: a fleet of Junks was then dispatched to teach the Californians a lesson. But after the Junks reached Monterey, the crews liked their destination so much they decided to stay. So regardless of the amount, type and purpose of her directives, PRC power in future years will more and more be of a discretionary sort. China will be able to afford it, and will have few hurdles to clear, if any, in order to use that power.

A certain few of China's concerns center on her borders. Since 1949, China has been eager to discuss border ramifications with all of her neighbors, especially India. New Delhi is content to rely on the 19th century British formula for the line between India and China, whereas China

wants nothing to do with offering legitimacy to colonialist intrigue of a distant era. China instead insists on direct talks with her current neighbors to discuss border issues, which will render a different and more immediate sense of legitimacy to the process. Other concerns China has, beyond her borders, center on the South China Sea and a combination of territory and natural resources. The PRC claims, outright, the Spratlys and the Paracels, but so do a number of other states (Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei); this last item has potential for friction.

As a way of utilizing and encouraging further development of her resources, China has been urging many of its students to receive educations abroad. When relations with PRC and U.S. were normalized in 1979, 2,230 students were sponsored by the government and sent overseas to receive higher education. In 4 years, the total number of students who had left China were 25,500, of which 7,000 were not officially sponsored. Of all the students to have left China in recent years, roughly half of the officially sponsored students were sent to schools in the U.S.³⁶ According to Li Peng at the 7th NPC annual plenary session this year, there have been a total of 150,000 PRC students to go overseas through mid-1992, and most have not returned (this number is actually closer to 64,000, and many of them are in the U.S.). China wants these self exiled students to come home, regardless of their political persuasion (which, in itself, is a not

unremarkable tacit indication of China's hunger for reform in all its guises).

Despite these increasing numbers of students, China currently has only one-tenth of the number of University level students as does the U.S. (and many of them are overseas). Given the disparities between the U.S. and PRC populations, this low proportion of PRC university students to population is actually far lower and represents a serious educational shortcoming which China needs to correct. China has in fact been aware of this unflattering discrepancy, but the typical Chinese relationship to intellectuals has had such a painful side to it that Mao's blunt response to redress that grievance was totally inappropriate. A recently published interview with Fang Lizhi, conducted prior to Tienanmen, states:

"My (Chinese) students can barely feed themselves. Their wages and fellowships together come to less than 100 yuan a month. ...my students want to keep studying with me in hopes of eventually going overseas. Some students quit school because regulations require that they withdraw before they can go abroad..."

(young people) are at a loss what to do. They don't know what the future holds for China, and in China the prospects for individuals are very tightly linked to what happens to the country. The individual's life is dependent on politics. Not like Hong Kong, or the United States; in the United States presidents can come and go, and people aren't affected very much. But not so in China."³⁷

This interview by Fang continues further and paints a bleak picture in the minds of his students regarding China's chances for continued national progression and unity: indeed, the

concept of "national" is loath to many of them. However, we need to keep these specific observations in wider perspective.

Some of these practical concerns of China's students came to a head prior to Tiananmen in several University cities, when PRC College students actively protested against the presence and favoritist treatment accorded to students who were visiting from Africa.

Of the Chinese students who are overseas, roughly half of these are sponsored by the PRC, and others pay their own way (usually via overseas relatives or funds from the universities themselves as well as from the host governments).³⁸ Much or most of this burgeoning expertise will sooner or later find its way back into China as students eventually return home and other scholars or practitioners wind their respective ways through the PRC. Recent student demonstrations in Beijing and elsewhere in China are especially significant because those same students will eventually move into the PRC governing structure as well as into other facets of Chinese industrial and social life.

A very significant sidelight of the Tienanmen demonstrations indicated that although the students wanted "democracy", very few of them actually knew what it was, or rather how to implement it. The students failed to have a plan of action, which is probably now being corrected as some of them congregate overseas; for them, the sense of individual participation in "politics" was still largely foreign (not-

withstanding that traditional rule requires the "mandate of heaven"). Students who were quoting Lincoln and Jefferson over (global) TV portrayed a remarkable picture, but apparently did not appreciate the inertia of the PRC government and perhaps some of the problems inherent in running the PRC, nor did they grasp the practicalities and implications of "democracy". But whether or not those students actually knew what democracy or multi-party pluralism was, and how to implement it, seemed very doubtful (at least at the time of Tienanmen). Occasional groups of students have been asked to explain democracy, and their responses indicated they did not know too much about it, but they certainly wanted more of it.³⁹ Tienanmen was a spontaneous outburst, and will not be the last such display of feeling; the students will have to do better next time than shout at the authorities if they wish to have an effect on the political process.

China is in fact hard pressed right now to find meaningful occupation for many - most - of its better trained citizens, lending a certain malaise to their perception of how things are. Coupled with their recent memories of Tienanmen, the malaise becomes downright nasty. But it is also the case that in those areas where employment has been found, it is of the highest caliber, and these opportunities will continue to increase at exponential rates as China's reforms take hold. For better or for worse, what we see here is the proverbial jump-start, on a national level, of an old engine that was

retooled and is now lurching down the street as it receives fine tuning and gets up to speed. The students are not satisfied with the pace of reform, and wonder about the appropriateness of national direction and even national integrity. Not only must China work to improve the lot of its university students, but education in general requires much attention. Over 30% of rural children still drop out of school to work, China's national education budget is less than half that of other developing countries (while serving more students), and people generally regard education as something that consumes rather than as something that gives. But, all in all, despite these difficulties, learned complaints, and the overtones that we decry, safe money has it that Chinese national viability is a good bet.

Possibilities of civil war can never be discounted, but indications suggest that sufficient vertical allegiance exists between the center and outlying areas to offset any rending of the national fabric. Stories abound about provinces ignoring the center's directives after Tienanmen regarding reinstitution of various conservative measures, but this need not indicate a lack of cohesion. Rather, it might indicate that the prevailing authority resides in those vertical chains of allegiance that come to rest with liberal personalities at either end rather than with conservatives. There certainly are precedents in China's history for Warlord activities and provinces in full pursuit of their own objectives, but those

examples represent a different and no longer applicable milieu. Deng is convinced, and perhaps rightly so, that the CCP survived June 1989 and the events to have overtaken East Europe and Moscow, by the very fact that economic reform has been in progress and the people are not (entirely) dissatisfied: "without reform, there will only be a dead-end road". He goes on to say that "we (CCP) must not be afraid ...because political power is in our hands."³⁸ Politics may, therefore, continue to be a pursuit for the few and not for the many. But as China continues to unfold, this conception may begin to alter along with the evolution that China's sense of authority is sure to develop, out of necessity and efficiency.

China's minorities, as a factor of reform, are relatively marginal since they are but a fraction of the entire population. They also, however, are found almost exclusively along China's outlying provinces, and have been the local majorities in Tibet and Xinjiang. Many of them are Muslim, and China makes use of this in its public relations with neighboring countries to the south and west. While domestic reform measures are roughly similar throughout the provinces (except for within the SEZs), China has been encouraging joint ventures between these outlying provincial peoples and foreigners from the south and Middle East. We will return to this subject in Chapters IV and V.

The era of liberal reforms prompted the government to relent somewhat with aspects of individual expression, and

religious practice of all sorts emerged into the daylight. The muslim peoples opened old mosques and started construction on new mosques, with this activity leading to skirmishes with the authorities during which several "rebels" and policemen (up to 50) were killed. Minority presence in China is much less than that of the former Soviet Union, and hence not of the same degree of concern to Beijing as to Moscow, but China still responded quickly to these difficulties and much Islamic activity was again curtailed. In the 1980s, especially via the 1982 "Document 19" administered by China's United Front, all religious intolerance was forbidden (although religions were not given inherent rights of expression), as long as belief was not inimical to the state (i.e.: was "Chinese" and, also, not a hindrance to the new reforms).⁴¹ The CCP has taken great liberty to arrest leaders of "unauthorized" or "unofficial" religious groups.

Before Zhao was purged, one method he employed to encourage thinking about reform and China's place in the world was to convene conferences about Toffler's most recent book Powershift. (This was also done for Toffler's earlier work Third Wave, which was a best-seller in China). Zhao urged policy makers to study Powershift whenever they could, which became another best seller in China, second only to the speeches of Deng Xiaoping.⁴²

Indigenous efforts have continued during this period of Dengist reform to enhance the process of eroding tradition-

al Chinese cultural barriers to modernization. The most notable recent effort of this type was a documentary, made in 1988, called "The Yellow River Elegy". It was televised nationally, twice, and television now reaches at least 73% of all Chinese (the largest television station in Asia is based in Beijing).⁴³ This documentary was harshly critical of Chinese icons as depicted by the Yellow River, the Great Wall, and the Chinese Dragon. China's traditional veneration for the Yellow River, around which Chinese civilization has developed, was lambasted for its inward turning focus, for its having kept China preoccupied with itself while the Europeans ventured forth on blue water to explore the world. Likewise, the Great Wall, which had been constructed at immense cost and intended to keep barbarians out, only succeeded in keeping Chinese in. Villages and homes and minds were also walled, to keep people and thoughts prisoner. Finally, the Dragon, which had become a symbol for the all-powerful Emperor, was actually depicting, according to the "Elegy", the limited flexibility of China's rulers because there was no power sharing, no parliaments, no loyal opposition to keep everyone on their toes, no free speaking or thinking. Tienanmen occurred since the viewing of this six-part series, and it came under severe attack by hardliners back in 1989. It may likely begin airing again in the not-too-distant future, especially now that Deng has forced the hardliners to resign from the propaganda and culture ministries.

Other popular reform efforts or documentaries that attempted to maintain the reform efforts are the documentary "Black Snow". This film speaks to the present generation of youth who rebel against family and traditions, then have nowhere to go and don't know what to do. In a lighter vein, the popular TV series "Stories from the Newsroom" satirizes the "corruption and mutual back-stabbing that pervade Chinese society"; it particularly pokes fun (and sharp inherent criticism) at nepotism, leftism, CCP favoritism, graft, bumbling bureaucracy, heavy handed media, robots that are more human than editors, and parodies of the succession struggle where 5 sub-editors all vie shamelessly to succeed the senior editor but bicker so much that the only solution is for the senior editor to stay on.⁴⁴

Continued work by the CCP with the people of China leads to still other reform measures, which demonstrates the extent of reform still required within China. Party members have recently started to persuade Shandong and Hebei Chinese that proper day-care does not include burying their toddlers in bags of sand up to the child's chest. The children remain in these bags, except when the sand is changed (as a diaper), and receive little or no attention, play, etc. Studies show that these children develop slower with low IQs; their poverty laden parents, on the other hand, believe the children to be more polite, obedient and filial - important aspects of Confucian tradition.⁴⁵

A particularly half-hearted reform measure, also recently initiated, is a campaign to eradicate smoking; up to 80% of PRC males may be smokers by 2000 if present trends continue. Hence the PRC on the one hand is encouraging the program, but the deficit ridden state receives up to \$5.1b annually from the tobacco industry, which is considerably more income than is received from any other single source, and will not be easy to do without.

China's reform efforts, in addition to the good reports of industrial capacity and educational awareness, also have a down side. The rush to reform, whether of the plodding central planning variety, or the get rich quick method, has generated difficulties with natural resource management. Significant environmental damage and pollution is being caused by tremendous industrial growth and the use of coal for most of the country's energy. Taipei, across the straits, with its head start on industrialization, has experienced severe ecological havoc; Taiwanese residents, in their nascent democracy, are just beginning to find voices to decry their lamentable environment. Hopefully the PRC can reign in its pollution before it gets out of hand.

Severe water shortages are another side to the environmental damage China is now facing. Recently the Mayor of Beijing warned that the capital city would literally have to be moved if the water shortage could not be solved; ground water in Beijing's vicinity is being tapped so much that the

city is actually sinking. A combination of population growth, industrial expansion, and current shortages will result in a two-thirds reduction of available water in Beijing by 2000. The entire North China Plain, where 200 million now reside, at current rates of consumption, will have 6% less water than required by 2000. In accordance with expected increased demand, Beijing is expected to have a 50% water use requirement increase by 2000, and Tianjin (an industrial city), expects to have a 120% increased rate of water consumption.

China currently subsidizes the water supply to its people by up to 6 times what the individual is charged. Chinese industry, that is old and decades behind advanced countries, uses disproportionate amounts of water. One steel mill, which uses 330 tons of water for each ton of steel, compares to only 10 tons of water per ton of steel in some developed nations. Agriculture has been the least efficient user of water, with its irrigation consumption increasing 6 times during the last 25 years; 60% of the irrigation water is lost in transit. China is planning to divert water north, via the ancient Grand Canal, to the region from the Yangtze River, but without improved consumption practices, this diversion of water will only be a temporary palliative.

A "Green 'Great Wall'" project in Gansu province utilizes irrigation from the Amur to feed a new agricultural village of 1,200 people, where 20 years ago there was only desert. Parts of Gansu are so dry that the evaporation rate

is ten times the amount of average annual rainfall.⁴⁶ This project is typical of efforts being taken in Gansu, and undoubtedly elsewhere, to find new space and arable land. However, this same effort will have to utilize less vulnerable irrigation techniques to avoid water loss as much as possible.

Other subsidies that China provides are a severe strain on the national budget, preventing the application of its economic resources to other more pressing dilemmas, such as wage reform and new employment possibilities for workers of inefficient state industries that are slated for bankruptcy. In 1990, China spent about \$20b on direct subsidies, almost one-third of its budget. This cost has grown 30% annually for the last decade; hidden subsidies (housing, transportation), are not included in this figure. Wang Bingqian, the Finance Minister, said in March 1991 that "subsidies have reached the point where the state treasury cannot sustain them".⁴⁷ Zhu Rongji, as Mayor of Shanghai in March 1991, was working towards eventual removal of all subsidies for housing.

China's problems are many, but the resourcefulness of the Chinese is also something to be found in high quantities. This moment of time in China's history, so to speak, is unique because China now is eager to learn all she can from whoever she can. Meaning that it is now in China's interests to send its people everywhere, to receive guests from almost any quarter, and to avoid antagonizing anyone unnecessarily.

As part of a few final comments on China in this section, Lucian Pye remarks that had it not been for the turmoil of the GPCR, China would not have leaped so decisively into the bold reforms of the post-Mao era:

"If China had not been scarred by the violent turmoil of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the most likely alternative to Mao's revolutionary utopianism would have been little more than the dreary prospect of an orderly, bureaucratic form of Communism".⁴⁸

If Pye is suggesting that the Dengist reforms would not have occurred at all, had it not been for the turmoil of Mao's GPCR, that is a debatable proposition. Then again, if he means by this that reform would likely have happened anyway, though perhaps at a snail's pace, that would seem to be closer to what is the case.

For it should be noted that, during the Maoist era, even then the hierarchy was in constant disagreement over the proper scope and format of economic policies (and hence also the emphasis placed on political or ideological policies as well). Leftists were constantly looking over their several shoulders at the faction of Deng, Liu, Chen and others. Periods of economic retrenchment did occur in the PRC before 1976 as respites from the unrelenting pressures of the GLF and GPCR. Indeed, after 1976, while Deng was reasserting his position and the Gang of Four was being removed, almost all the major figures remaining in the CCP were reformers of one sort or another, whether radical, moderate, or centrist. Indeed, the very reason that the GPCR occurred in the first

place was due to the economic and political retrenchment (i.e.: measures leading to modernization, or reforms), then taking place as a salve to the GLF.

In that case, it might even be argued that if the GPCR had not occurred, that probably would have reflected a weaker position of the leftists throughout the 1960s, suggesting that Deng could have succeeded Zhou immediately at Zhou's death, and possibly also that Deng never would have been purged (in the 1960s or in 1976). Hence the disruption of the GPCR would not have been a factor, and a modest reform program, or at least something closer to stability (i.e.: plodding growth), would likely have already been in place for a decade or more before Mao's death, placing China miles in front of its subsequent position in 1976.

The role of Deng has had to be similar to that of all things to all members. His combined goal required keeping the CCP in power, placating the conservative faction as necessary, and forging ahead with reform measures whenever possible to enhance the inevitability of economic growth and modernization, or reform. Deng's agenda is hard, but he has progressed again and again through the arts of compromise. The network of his support, or *guanxi*, is extensive; his many years in Party and Army have given him contacts throughout the country.

When Deng had to accede to Zhao's purge, Jiang's accession to head of the Party was no accident. From Deng's perspective, Jiang could appeal to the go-slow reformers since

he kept a lid, more or less, on Shanghai during the 6-4 debacle. Plus his Shanghai background meant that he was familiar with economic, industrial and demographic issues of modernization (not to mention his cosmopolitan outlook and pianistic abilities with western music). Jiang was, therefore, a suitable figure until the smoke from Tiananmen cleared.⁴⁹

To return to Pye's observation about the speed or nature of current (post GPCR) reforms deriving their character by reacting to earlier events: there is plausibility in that assertion. Each swing of the pendulum always seems to be offset, sooner or later, by swings in the opposite direction. However, it seems eminently more plausible to maintain that the reforms in question would have proceeded apace regardless, and perhaps even at a faster overall rate.

The biggest dilemma currently facing the CCP and PRC concerns, paradoxically, their own administrative well beings rather than that of China. China's health seems to be in better condition than the risks of transformation currently being faced by the CCP and the PRC. As for the peaceful evolution now ongoing within China that is postulated by Western journalists, and which the CCP finds to be so annoying, and that is related to the prevalent sense of authority which is now evolving: that sense of authority and the Chinese understanding of it seems to be tied to obvious displays of familial or state power that render possible only one choice

or category of choices for those who are governed. If power could somehow be conveyed in a more subtle or institutionalized fashion, if Chinese could simultaneously entertain opposing points of view, then the overwhelming vertical stages required for simple variations of policy would not be required. Some sort of horizontal or lateral access, across a wide spectrum of offices or other concerns, would do much to facilitate institutionalized trust or reliability, where currently there is little or none. Computers and other business or educational procedural opportunities may play an educational role here, where they require the individual to entertain genuine choices between various possibilities, including more than one that could be correct. The national stage of millions may be modified by individual arenas.

B. MIDDLE EAST

Shifting gears from an overview of China to look at the Middle East requires more than a small adjustment, and a few ironies. With China our focus was confined to one national polity, but in the Middle East we must consider several, although the land mass (for the entire region) is roughly equivalent. Further, the Middle East has a much broader demographic range than China but with a smaller population base (a combined 300 million in the region we are considering, or 25% of China's population. One third of this Middle Eastern population group is from Pakistan). While these numbers are

smaller, their growth rate is almost triple that of China's, therefore having other varying characteristics and societal dimensions.

As with China, we shall begin our look at the Middle East with an overview of the geography. Whereas China has the highest point on earth, the Middle East has the lowest spot at a location appropriately named the Dead Sea, 1,312 feet below sea level. Nothing flows out of the Dead Sea; it is so saline and full of other minerals that nothing can live in it. The overwhelming physical impressions conveyed by this region and the entire Middle East are the absence of moisture (except for coastal areas and major river systems), abrupt vertical changes in landscape whenever elevations change, stark contrasts, and heat; much of the land mass is desertified, and is watered by three of the largest and most ancient river systems in the world.

The first of these rivers, the Nile, flows north from central Africa into a fertile delta region that supports Egypt's 53 million (up from 40 million in 1980). Historically, the Nile's annual floods have been the irrigation source for Egypt's agriculture; that source is now supplemented by the High Aswan Dam, constructed in 1960 with Soviet assistance. West of the Nile begins the great Sahara Desert, spreading into and across North Africa to the Atlantic coastline over 1,000 miles away.

The Levant area itself, on the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, enjoys a Mediterranean climate along the coast. Further inland another relatively minor north-south river system, the Jordan, runs south from the Sea of Galilee for about 60 miles to the Dead Sea, providing much needed irrigation and drinking water for inhabitants of the region. East of the Jordan is desert, and to the west is the Judaeen Wilderness, a dry, hilly expanse otherwise known, for the most part, as the West Bank, pockmarked with Arab villages and Jewish settlements. Jerusalem is just a little over 10 miles west from the northern end of the Dead Sea, and the capital city of Jordan (Amman) lies about 20 miles east of the river. East and northeast of Galilee the land rises into a plateau and peak area, between Syria and the Galilee, where snow occasionally gathers and which is much prized as a strategic location: the Golan Heights. Damascus, the capital city of Syria, sits on the lower slopes of Mt. Hermon at just 30 miles northeast of Israel's (current) northernmost point.

The Jordan River valley continues north of Galilee, and is occupied for about 20 miles by the Jordan River (still in present-day Israel). The valley area continues further north, with various other still smaller rivers in place of the Jordan, and the valley now becomes known as the Bekaa - an important central part of Lebanon where agriculture is found, as well as, incidentally, a flourishing drug trade during recent years. This area also has strategic significance. The

Cedar forests for which Lebanon is known have long ago been razed. Beirut, on the coast, is almost due west of Damascus. Further south, midway between Beirut and the Jerusalem area, and also on the coast, is Haifa; this point of land forms a natural harbor area and is utilized as such by the Israelis. South of Jerusalem and the Dead Sea are the Negev and Sinai areas - deserts that fill the space between the Mediterranean, the Nile, and the Red Sea where it divides into the Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aqaba.

These four international capital cities, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus and Beirut, that are the center of so much attention and frequently grace our television screens, could be comfortably placed between Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., or between Los Angeles and San Diego.

Further north of Beirut, and primarily to the East, is found the second of the three major river systems in the Middle East: the Tigris and Euphrates. These two rivers combine to make one system, flow out of Anatolia's highlands, and meander southeastward, past ancient names such as Ashur, Babylon and Ur, finally generating their own delta area at the Persian Gulf. This delta region forms a perennial marsh that runs halfway to Baghdad from the Gulf and covers much of southern Iraq. Baghdad itself is in the vicinity of ancient Babylon, and approximately in the middle of modern Iraq. Mountain areas are to the north, bordering Turkey, Armenia and Iran - where the Kurds live.

Continuing east from Mesopotamia is Persia, a mountainous and inhospitable region which was almost impossible for Alexander's Greeks to traverse. On the other side of Persia are more deserts, or Baluchistan, and the Middle East's last major river system, the Indus. This river flows south out of the western Himalayas near the base of K2 in Kashmir: a high, green, and splendid place that has been described as one of the most gorgeous locations on the planet. The river continues south, through Punjab and into Sindh until it empties into the Arabian Sea near Karachi. Pakistan is essentially a glorified river valley, with the Indus running through the center, except for the open and hot spaces of Baluchistan that extend west along the coast to Iran's mountains. The river valley now supports a population of almost 110 millions; this figure represents an average annual growth factor of 3.1%, and has practically tripled in a few decades from only 36 millions in 1951. To the west, above Baluchistan, is Afghanistan and all its mountains. The famous Khyber Pass is a major avenue on the Pakistani-Afghan border, roughly mid-way between Kabul and Islamabad. To the east of Pakistan will be found the Hindu multitudes of South Asia; Bombay is just around the corner.

Pushing north from Islamabad to Pakistan's border area, and north again about the same distance (500 straight-line miles) across the Karakoram Range, places us at Kashi (Kashgar) in Xinjiang, or at one of China's Silk Road terminuses,

where travellers turned southwest out of China. Kashi was on the southern route, with the next stops being Islamabad and Kabul en route to Baghdad and Istanbul. Today a highway, completed in 1982, links Kashi and Islamabad across the 16,000 foot high Pamirs in the Karakoram Range. Kashi itself, with a 2,000 year old Sunday bazaar, is on the edge of the Taklimakan Desert, a prominent feature of Xinjiang: the desert's name means "when you go in, you don't come out". Once the Silk Road travellers arrived in Islamabad they could continue west or follow the river south to the Arabian Sea.

Nestled in between these river systems, east of the Nile, south of Tigris/Euphrates, and southwest of Indus (or inside the Fertile Crescent), is the Arabian peninsula, an area equivalent to the U.S. east of the Mississippi, and where water may well become more valuable than oil in the next few years. Much of the interior of the peninsula is all desert, a dry and alternately mountainous and sandy expanse. Coastal ranges are lined with wadis, or valleys ranging from a few feet to over a mile in width, and that change from dry boulders and gravel to flood waters that rise quickly enough to catch travellers unawares when it rains in the mountains. The interior is now a unified Kingdom, containing the two holiest shrines for the world's millions of Muslims, many of whom will travel each year to Mecca on the annual Hajj. A large southern portion of the interior is so formidable that it is called The Empty Quarter.

Surrounding the interior, on the east and south, are coastal states, Sheikdoms, sitting between the Sea or Gulf and the coast mountains in the south, and controlling access to most of the world's oil reserves. With the advent of oil and nationalization of its production, the last 20 years - only the space of time since I left High School - have seen incredible growth and construction within these states. Entire cities, with high rises, sewers, communications, transportation centers, utilities, harbors, machinery, manufacturing and retailing, financial centers, hotels, hospitals, universities, and more have all grown out of the sand. They are, for the most part, spotlessly clean. Everyone who drives a car has learned to do so only in the last two decades. Aerial photography is not infrequently incapable of identifying these newly constructed areas, compared to their previous appearance (aside from prominent geographical features), if viewed over spans of only 20 years. Two examples of these "new" cities include Muscat (from 1970, at the location of an occupied but barren ancient settlement), and Abu Dhabi (new from 1966). By contrast, Cairo and Jerusalem and the other cities north of the desert, in the fertile crescent, have been continuously settled, and sometimes little changed for millenia. North of the interior is the Syrian desert: more hot open expanse leading to Damascus, Amman and the Jordan Valley.

The Middle East, then, is an area of stark contrasts, vast open expanses, and rare cushions. Only a few short years ago,

travellers and residents either carried what they needed for survival on their person, on their camel, or had it nearby. Nomad hospitality is legendary. Tribal existence was the norm, aside from the few fixed settlements inland, along the rivers, and at intervals along the coasts.

Demographically, the area is similarly diverse. Entire civilizations developed separate from each other along the three primary river systems. Travellers from Europe and Asia frequented the routes that criss-crossed the region. Nomad life coexisted with the cities. Dark skinned Egyptians mingled with Phoenicians and the Syrians from further north. Persians were a whole race apart, and the Muslims of Pakistan have different lifestyles and priorities, aside from Islam, than their coreligionists.

The population of Jerusalem is remarkable for its vibrancy, where Armenians and Greeks and Jews (Orthodox and secular), and Arabs and Coptics and Romans and Turks and Russians and Templars and still others all combined, and still combine to this day, to share a city with never-ending uneasy live-and-let-live agreements among its inhabitants.

Some population groups share a great deal of homogeneity at the ancient centers (deltas, major cities). Others reflect a wandering tribal existence, which is now being converted to sedentary pursuits by combinations of economic necessity and governmental fiat. Then still others carry the incredible diversity within which they have lived, with Jerusalem as the

prime example; Istanbul is another possible candidate, but beyond our purview, and also a place where riches were deposited instead of a place where riches grew.

Another striking and sobering feature about contemporary demographics in the Middle East are the very size and continued growth of the resident peoples. Population growth in this century has been almost catastrophic, considering the limited resources of the region. The consequent strain on resources and food production, drinking water, employment prospects, attendant security risks and costs, and so on are immense. It is indeed true that water may become more valuable than oil, at least to the inhabitants. The new emphasis on agriculture and the greening of deserts, plus a burgeoning industrial capacity, indigenous armaments industries, and more have all placed demands on the local water tables that can no longer be met.

The last major demographic distinction to be addressed here is related to the near complete arbitrary fashion with which the contemporary Middle East was carved. Only at one end of the Levant is a primarily homogenous grouping of people found within the recently carved national boundaries (Egypt). The area as a whole is much more suited for empire or tribe than it is for states. Iraq is a near impossible concatenation of Marsh Arab Shi'ites, middle class Sunnis, and spirited Kurds, who choose to have little to do with each other; as part of the Ottoman Empire Iraq was a collection of 3 provinc-

es rather than one administrative unit. Moreover, the ruling circle resident in Baghdad emanates from a microcosm in Tikrit, upriver from the capital, which is hardly representative of the country as a whole.

The Gulf states, until very recently, had inland borders that meant nothing to indigenous peoples who did not have, nor care to have, geopolitical concerns. Lebanon and Syria were oddly drawn by the French so as to facilitate French rule and maintain the heterogeneity of the area; it wasn't until the 1950s that persons living in Syria began to feel anything like Syrians, and this happened only after Syria and Egypt formed a brief political union in 1958.⁵⁰ Jordan's make-up is a bit less fractious, but nonetheless a superimposed structure inside neat lines, over a desert people, intended as a buffer against Bedouin for the British, and with a ruling family transplanted from the Hijaz (that still exists uneasily, if not with open feuding, with the House of Saud).

Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most natural of all the Middle East states (along with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC). Here a ruling family of one area of the peninsula took it on their own to unite the entire peninsula, or most of it, and were possibly able to do so because no other Colonial power truly wanted it. All empires skirted Arabia, preferring to stay close to the Mediterranean, rather than penetrate into the Arabian Desert.

Palestine, or Israel, or the Transjordan, is truly the most recent superimposition of a national polity sundering other allegiances in the Middle Eastern area. A combination of British rule, UN partitioning, and Jewish-Arabic war making have generated a state of incredible strength and purpose and with strains of "nationalism", yet with borders that probably have a greater likelihood of undergoing adjustment than of any other state in the world (except for those states, of course, that might be engaged in hostilities, or otherwise pursuing negotiations leading to national redefinitions).

To reiterate earlier suggestions regarding the fluidity of the Middle East (and China), it is helpful to keep in mind the region's development, geography, neighbors, and avenues of discourse or access with surrounding regions (particularly China). The Middle East is a natural window on Asia, it is a region of movement.

Again, by focusing on only the primary Levantine states, this review is somewhat arbitrary and loses the added ingredients of Anatolia, most of North Africa, and much of Persia, but will still be representative of the heart of the region and also of much that concerns international geopolitics. By necessity, a greater diversity of peoples will be covered in this section than was evident with the review of China, and it will be done with a corresponding reduction of in-depth coverage.

1. Israel

The circumstances involving the establishment of this state are utterly unique and without precedent. Placing Israel into its own category for review is not meant as a slight or plaudit, either to Israel or to the surrounding Middle East states. Rather, the intent is to administratively facilitate review of a unique situation.

Israel, insofar as it is a Jewish State, is almost entirely a nation of immigrants. Notwithstanding the cultural or historical attachment of Jews to Palestine and of their desire or wish to reside in Jerusalem, one result of their actual arrival after centuries of diaspora has been local displacement, regional hostilities, and a considerable amount of international diplomacy. One of the essential paradoxes of Zionism, the movement that begat Israel, is that it is (said to be) primarily secular in orientation, or nationalist, intending only to provide Jews with a homeland of their own. Hence, location should not necessarily be an issue, but location did in fact become a crucial issue. Indeed, Theodore Herzl - the movement's most effective initial director, although not its founder - at one point agreed to accept the East African Protectorate (i.e.: Kenya) from Britain as a home for the Jewish people; other proffered or suggested areas for Jewish homelands were Argentina, Cyprus, and the Sinai.⁵¹ But, of course, the Jewish homeland wound up in Palestine, precisely because location was an issue. At this juncture,

any attempt to try to defend zionism as secular becomes very difficult; Zionism is very much related to the question of what it means to be a Jew, insofar as being Jewish is to have a special relationship to a physical place (Jerusalem), and apparently the majority of early Zionists believed that there could be no Jewish homeland unless it was in Israel.

The internal debate of what it means to be Jewish is very much alive to this day in Israel. The primary governmental figures would prefer a secular orientation for the state as a whole, but all Israeli governments have ruled with the assistance of one or more of the small religious political parties; the Knesset was thus obliged to maintain certain requirements about observing the sabbath, kosher dietary laws, and so on. So Israel is secular, but it isn't. Also Zionism is secular, but it isn't. Even with this most recent election, when Labor polled far better than Likud for the first time since 1977 and could have formed a government without incorporating a religious party (for the first time in Israel's history), an orthodox party, the Shas, was included in the ruling coalition. The Ministry of Interior portfolio will thus go to Shas. Given this state of affairs, we find secular Jews who in fact are contributing directly to maintenance of a religious state.

We also have a few Orthodox Jews who do not support the (current) state, secular or sacred. They believe that Israel, now, is heretical: it is a violation of the divine

Will and an affront to the Messiah who will begin the State himself, in his own good time (but hasn't done so yet). These Jews are the Neturei Karta ("Guardians of the City" in Aramaic), and they have carried their beliefs to the point of interacting with the PLO. During the recent peace negotiations, this group had two of their members from New York City attached to the Palestinian delegation (in an advisory capacity). Another Orthodox anti-zionist group, larger than Neturei Karta, is the Edah Haredit; this group will not deal with either the Jewish state or the PLO.⁵² While these relatively small groups actually live in Jerusalem (also elsewhere), they do not regard themselves as citizens of Israel; they do not pay taxes, or serve in the army, and so on.

One of the first acts of the new Israeli government in 1948 was to proclaim the "Law of Return", stipulating that any Jew has full citizenship if he or she chooses to live in Israel. In 1989 Israel's Supreme Court reaffirmed that being a Jew, under the Law of Return, included Reform and Conservative Judaism (the majority of U.S. Jews), as well as Orthodox. For years the Orthodox in Israel have been trying to narrow the focus of this law to include only Orthodox. Recently, as with many other sacred and secular organizations around the world, some of Judaism has been rethinking its own orientation. Hence both Reform and Conservative Jews now train and

utilize women Rabbis, and so on, which is all a bit too much for the Orthodox Jews to understand or accept.

After establishing the Law of Return, Israel was able to in-gather Jews from all over the world, with their citizenship already established based on their being Jewish. Immigration has been in effect long enough for other generations of Jews, from the initial immigrants, to be born in Israel. These Sabras are now entering the higher political ranks. Many now living in Israel, and others still arriving, continue to be Jews born outside of Israel. Eastern Europe was the first primary source for the migrations to Israel. These first and second waves of immigrants, or *aliyahs* ("coming up"), were ashkenazic in character (German or European based Jewry), and received much impetus from post-war experiences in Europe (the holocaust). Subsequent immigrations have originated largely from Jews living in Arab or Islamic lands; these sephardim (Spanish or oriental based Jews) helped to change the composition of Jews in Israel from a predominantly European outlook to where the mix is almost at 50%. Future immigration, particularly those now entering Israel from Russia, may tip the balance back towards the ashkenazim. Almost 25% of the world's Jewish peoples live in Israel, with about the same number or more in the U.S.

Initial Jewish settlement in Israel was of a communal nature, based on *kibbutzim* (collective settlements) and *moshavim* (cooperative settlements). Agriculture and security

were both stressed. Kibbutzim and moshavim are now the minority, but are still prominent in that a disproportionate number of military (IDF) officers come from these communities: while representing only 8% of Israel's total population, they provide roughly 25-30% of all IDF officers.⁵³ As of 1986, there were a total of 269 kibbutzim and 458 moshavim in operation.

Israel's population includes a resident group of Israeli Arabs, those persons (Muslims, Christians and Druze), who were indigenous to the area before the establishment of the Israeli state. Currently there are about 750,000 of these non-Jewish Israelis, plus another 1,800,000 Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. Altogether, including the occupied West Bank, the Jewish Israelis represent about 60% of all inhabitants of greater Palestine. Since current birth rates are higher for the non-Jews (2.62%) than for the Jews (1.34%), the future demographic make-up of Israel will depend upon immigration rates, growth rates (education), the extent of any hostilities, and perhaps other variables as well. Owing to the immense concern for security that Israel has, plus the belief that a high percentage of Jews in the population is required to ensure security, the characteristics of Israel's population will continue to be closely observed by the government.

Returning again to the paradox of Israel's peculiar stasis between the secular and religious worlds, Israel has

looked on Jerusalem as its capital city almost from the moment Israel's independence was declared in 1948. After unifying the city as one result of the 1967 war, Jerusalem's status has become increasingly central to any discussion involving the future of Israel. A lot of emotion, various interpretations of historical material, security requirements, international interest, and now resource management enter into the debate regarding Jerusalem's future. It is a thorny subject. To date the U.S. maintains a consulate there, unrelated to our embassy in Tel Aviv; many other countries have gradually been moving their embassies into Jerusalem.

Israel's governmental structure is also unique, a blend of British and American democracies. The Knesset, or parliament, is a unicameral house with distribution of its 120 seats dependent upon percentage polling by the several political parties. In other words, each party publishes its list of hopeful Members of the Knesset (MKs), prior to national elections. Its seats in the Knesset are determined by computing the percentage of the national vote the party received. Then the published party list is used, in order of rank from highest to lowest, to determine which party members fill the seats it has won. The Prime Minister is usually the leader, or first listed member, of the party to win the most seats. Since no one party will typically win a majority of Knesset seats, governments become ruling coalitions, and this is where one or more of the smaller parties, including the

orthodox, will become part of the government, even though these smaller parties represent only a small percentage of the popular vote.

Through these continued coalitions, then, one or more of the orthodox parties have always been members of the government. This particular reality is a growing sore point for the country as a whole, because many Israelis feel uncomfortable and even resent that these small orthodox groups continue to have access to power, to budgets, to priorities, and all the rest. Recent debates over the applicability of the Law of Return and who is a Jew fueled this dissatisfaction, as did the occasion when a Shas Rabbi changed his mind about the efficacy of trading land for peace. This Rabbi, as a MK, communicated his decision to Shamir in the form of a demand, which resulted in removing the support of Shas from Shamir's ruling coalition. Additionally, as Labor and Likud have been competing with each other for the last 15 years over who is able to form a government, the religious parties have been wooed more and more by either side. Consequently they hold out for the biggest slice of political pie. Legislation and activity via the Rabbinate has been forthcoming, sponsored by the Orthodox, on issues of funding for Orthodox schools, what is and is not proper for the advertising industry (no women in bathing suits, thank you), the closing of pork processing facilities, and so on.

Another insertion of Orthodoxy into the political process occurred when a Brooklyn Rabbi, the leader of a Hasidic sect (who has never visited Israel), insisted that Torah mandated no land could ever be ceded away if Jewish lives were at stake - and hence Peres was unable to form a majority coalition, and the government went back to Likud.⁵⁴ In 1990, over the space of a few weeks, the orthodox Shas brought down Likud, and then the orthodox Lubavitch prevented the establishment of Labor. In short, there has been a growing element very much like caprice into Israeli politics, and Israelis are growing weary of it. Quite possibly this situation contributed to Labor's recent victory over Likud. Also, it has been recently decided, by a Knesset vote and against the wishes of Shamir, that starting in 1996 the Prime Minister will be elected directly by popular vote and not through the Knesset procedure of forming governments or party lists.

The political spectrum in Israel, in addition to the national religious parties, includes a cornucopia of political parties. Largest among them are the Labor and Likud blocs, with other special interest parties on either the left or the right (Peace Now, from the Mapam; Shelli and Rakkah, left of Mapam; Maki, Israeli Communist Party; Kach, extreme right wing; and others), plus the Orthodox, who can be either left or right as we have seen. In 1949, 24 political parties

participated in the elections and 16 earned seats; by 1977, 23 participated and 13 won seats.⁵⁵

Labor's bloc is the oldest and best known political grouping in Israel, with its formation extending before initial statehood into the British Mandate period. Within this bloc, the Mapai party is the cornerstone: Ben-Gurion was its leader and became the first Prime Minister. Mapai members have often held influential positions within the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. Mapam was another Labor stalwart, on the left, supportive more of diplomacy and compromise than of unyielding policies. Other leaders that emerged within Labor's ranks were Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin.

The 1977 elections brought Likud into the government for the first time, and Begin became prime minister; the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) party formed just before the election, took votes away from Labor, and the DMC's 15 seats kept Labor from forming another coalition. One of the purposes behind Likud's formation was to insist that no land from the 1967 conquests would ever be returned to the Palestinians. The Herut party (Begin's, from 1948), the Liberals, and several other opposition parties combined to form Likud in 1973. Other parties include the Tsomet (extreme right-wing), and Meretz (left wing, some of whose members support formation of a Palestinian state). The newly elected Labor government under Rabin has made a coalition with Shas and Meretz; this is

the first government in which the orthodox National Religious Party (NRP) has not been a member since Israel's founding.

Israeli society includes several interest groups, of which the political parties are an extension. The largest, most powerful and oldest societal grouping is the Histadrut, a glorified labor union formed in 1920. It has semi-official status, includes trade union leaders in its membership, shares a directorate with Labor, accepts contracts from developing countries, offers training to labor leaders and women's groups, etc., and sends technicians on missions to developing countries. Histadrut has enjoyed frequent leadership exchanges between itself, the Labor Party, and the Knesset. By the 1970s, over half of all Israelis were members of Histadrut, it was the country's largest employer, 90% of all organized workers belonged to its trade unions, 60% of Israelis were insured by its health fund, and 25% were employed by its companies.⁵⁶

Two other very visible interest groups with political and/or social impact are Peace Now (PN) and the Gush Emunim (GE). PN began from veterans protests after the October War in 1973, based on the premise that the Knesset and Ministries were not availing themselves of opportunities to generate agreements and perhaps even peace with the surrounding Arab communities. In the eyes of PN, climates of opinion had been changing within the Arab world and Israel was not adjusting accordingly and taking full advantage of the situation to make

peace. GE, on the other hand, emerged from the NRP as a vocal supporter of the view that God gave the land of Israel to the Israelis and Israel should not give it back to the Arabs for any reason whatsoever. Hence GE and other kindred groups, plus the Kach (who openly advocate removal of all Arabs from Israel and annexation of the West Bank), are supportive of continued settlement construction and expansion in the West Bank. Kach, by the way, was a political party banned by Israel in 1988 due to its racism and was led by another New York Rabbi, Meir Kahane, who emigrated to Israel in 1971. While he was visiting New York on a speaking engagement in October 1990, Kahane was shot and killed.

Aside from all this political intrigue, Israel has pursued a remarkable course of development over the last half century. Starting with agriculture, and now as a major citrus exporter, Israel parlayed burgeoning investment returns, strength of immigration, and considerable international aid into a GNP that reached \$22b by 1982. However, Israel's predominantly socialist orientation, constant influx of immigrants, and absolute priority of defense created a lopsided state budget heavily dependent on external largesse. Inflation was a major problem, reaching almost 500% per year by 1984; it has now been brought under reasonable control and is down into double digits, under 20%. Israel's exports have increased from \$300m in 1950 to \$1b in 1968 and \$8.2b in 1987.⁵⁷

Israel's uppermost security concerns are reflected by defense expenditures that amounted to 23% of GDP in 1983: 30% of all national output goes to security or defense. Almost half of the national budget is for security, along with one fifth of the labor force. Per capita costs for defense have escalated to \$1,000 as of 1978.

Security has not only been a cause for expenditures, but also significant income. Military sales have provided Israel with as much as 20% of foreign income from manufactured items, and is recorded under the rubric of machinery and electronics. The country's defense ministry, in the 1970s, absorbed as much as 40% of the national budget and 20% of GNP.⁵⁸

One of the most glaringly apparent aspects of Israel's economic life has been the amount of assistance it receives from external sources, especially from the U.S.. On average, annual aid now includes \$1.2b for economic aid, \$1.8b in military assistance, and up to \$1.2b in other special allowances. When bonds sales, and other outright contributions are added, total annual aid to Israel from the U.S. is approximately \$6b. Translating that figure into per capita aid results in almost \$641 per person per year. The next highest U.S. aid recipient is Egypt, at approximately \$2b per year, or not quite \$40 per capita.

Israel's socialized public sector employs more people than any other non-communist country. As of 1982, productivi-

ty in Israel fell lower than in most of Western Europe and only 25% of all workers were in industry.⁵⁹

Obviously Israel's economy would go under without this external influx of U.S. aid; quite apart from the requirements on which the aid is based, one has to wonder about the viability and survivability of Israel's economy. Part of the aid package is the provision that the U.S. purchase a specified amount of Israeli materiel each year, which further assists Israel's arms industry. In addition to these dollars, Israel has been voicing the need to find an additional \$70b to \$80b over the next five years for purposes of settling the Russian immigration.⁶⁰

Energy costs are as much a part of Israel's budget as are found elsewhere. After the Iranian revolution, that major source of Israel's oil supply was cut. (Israel also lost another supply when the Sinai was returned to Egypt). Israel therefore had to rely on world markets, and by 1980 Israel's average annual energy import bill was over \$2b, almost 10% of GNP.

Closely related to Israel's economic and military well-being is the subject of energy and research. Which leads in turn to the Israeli complex at Dimona in the Negev, highlighted by an expose provided by a Moroccan Jew named Mordecai Vanunu through the Sunday Times of London (5 Oct. 1986). That quiet story, combined with subsequent reports, conjecture, and an interesting new book (The Samson Option, by

Hersh, which may have to be taken with a grain of salt), leads to the possible and likely conjecture that Israel is an undeclared nuclear power with as many as 100 to 200 warheads parked under the sand, along with having the means of delivering those devices. Israel has launched her own satellite into orbit, and possesses sufficient aircraft and other battlefield weapons necessary for use with nuclear devices.

On 22 September 1979, Israel was recorded as having performed a low-yield nuclear test in the South Indian Ocean 1500 miles southeast of the Cape of Good Hope; the test was discovered by our VELA satellite. This particular test was one of three, using nuclear artillery shells, with ships from Israeli and South African navies observing.⁶¹ Israel also is said to have conducted at least one successful low-yield neutron bomb test, underground in the Negev, during the mid 1960s.⁶²

Perhaps most remarkable and most sobering of all about these disclosures is that Israel further is supposed to have pursued an active program of targeting the USSR with nuclear weapons, proposing on one occasion that Israel and the U.S. jointly target the USSR. Pollard was providing U.S. military intelligence to Israel at the time, which assisted Israel in doing this. At the height of Pollard's activities in 1984-85, he was providing Israel with information about positions of Baku oil fields and military installations in Southern USSR. These are indeed sobering revelations, if true, for a nation

of four million people to suddenly *de facto* become one of the world's largest nuclear powers.⁶³

There is another sense in which the region of Israel and/or Palestine is top heavy and subject to strain. The combination of population pressures, agriculture, and burgeoning industry are taking their toll on local water resources. Supplies of potable water are so tenuous, with projected availability so grim, that timely changes in habits, plans, and even livelihoods of the region's inhabitants are mandated.

There is a necessity for regional environmental cooperation. Agriculture and urban development have expanded water usage six-fold since 1948: there simply is no longer enough water for Israel's agriculture and everything else. The Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret) is as low as it has ever been in 60 years; it's down to the point where the water will become saline if it drops any further. Israel's two aquifers, one near the coast and Gaza, the other further inland and under the West Bank, are both overdrawn; the water at Gaza is now brackish, unfit for agriculture and human consumption. Conservation measures were instituted last year, but they are hardly sufficient. Israeli agriculture needs to be redirected into less water intensive crops, which will take years to fully implement. Jews use about 9 times the amount of water used by Arabs; the Arab population's consumption rate is capped militarily by the rate they utilized from 1967 (despite their increasing numbers). Added Jewish settlers to the

region from Russia, or wherever, will further overtax the supply. New water must be provided from the Litani, the Nile, from Turkey, or from desalinization.⁶⁴

Agriculture's share of exports is 30%, and the farmers use 70% of Israel's water, with the government subsidizing 30% of the water they use. Most of this water is provided by the limestone aquifer under the West Bank, and the region's supply is dangerously low. An indication of this is provided by the level of the Sea of Galilee, which is now at the point of no return.

One way of finding additional water resources, by the state, has been to employ a growing network of treatment plants to reuse waste water for agriculture. To find still more water, Israel wants to construct a canal from the Yarmuk to the Sea of Galilee, to move water both ways, depending on the season. This particular project contrasts to the Jordanians, who have been trying to dam the Yarmuk, but have been unsuccessful because of needing prior approval from Israel.

Palestinians in occupied lands have been prevented from increasing their water supplies since 1967. New Israeli settlements have dropped more than 40 deep wells, some of which were next to Palestinian springs, causing the springs to go dry. Then, in some cases, the Israelis provided water back to the Palestinians, but only by selling it. Water has become a very potent issue for conservative politicians opposed to giving land back to the Palestinians, and also for Palestin-

ians who wish to regain their rightful share of the region's resources. If present usage of Gaza aquifer water continues, at twice the consumption rate which the aquifer can support, there will be catastrophic results for living standards and agriculture there. All of Israel, in fact, "is on the threshold of a catastrophe".⁶⁵

As if the above strains of economics, security, and natural resources weren't enough, the Intifidah adds ingredients to the region that need to be addressed. Land appropriation by the Israelites for construction of settlements or other purposes, on top of the acquisitions made from vacancies left by refugees who left their homes in 1948 and 1967 (who are not allowed to return), add to the tension on the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians have long been in search of a state of their own, to which Israel is adamantly opposed. Israel also has been reluctant to have any dealings with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); since the PLO claims to be the lawful representative of the Palestinians, Israel's stance on the matter effectively deprives the Palestinians of a voice. Since December 1987 the Palestinians of the West Bank, primarily the youth, have engaged in sporadic yet dependable defiance, strikes, and stone throwing violence directed toward the Israelis. By June of 1991, anywhere from 800 to 1,100 Palestinians were killed by the IDF as part of Israel's effort to curb this defiance and aggression. Additionally, the Palestinians themselves had killed another 350

of their own, described as "collaborators". The PLO leadership was trying to control and stop these latter killings, but without complete success. Aside from responding in the streets by the IDF, Israel also routinely bulldozes the homes of those Palestinians suspected of violence, regularly detains scores or more, has cordoned off particular areas, prevented the locals from going to their jobs or markets, and also closed schools and universities in the West Bank and Gaza areas. This last measure, by depriving Palestinian youths of their education, is creating an in-house tragedy of societal proportions, with literacy rates among Palestinians beginning to suffer. The degree of importance with which the Jews themselves regard education makes this measure particularly malevolent.

Recently deaths have been reported among Jewish settlers and others as the Intifadah continues to take invidious turns. This simmering discontent has become yet another issue for the planners to solve if the region is to attain peace and stability. One domestic effect for Israel, in reverse, has been that since the beginning of the Intifada, 1 in 15 Israelis have refused to serve in occupied territories, and 1 in 10 actually go to prison over this issue. (The "Peace Now" group is not among those who support selective service, based on where the Army sends you).⁶⁶

As a beginning response and partial answer to all of the above, the long awaited Middle East Peace Conference has

begun. It is a slow process, but remarkable if for no other reason than that all Arab-Israeli participants were in the same room together. This peace process is an important aspect of resolving Middle East antagonisms, and will be addressed again in chapter seven. It is often said that this process is characterized as a decision to either trade land for peace, thereby getting an agreement, or not to trade land for peace, thereby getting little if anything at all. There is some truth to this simple characterization, but behind the actual trading of land are all those other issues of government composition, interest groups, economics, and so on. The simple formula of land for peace has a labyrinthine foundation below the surface.

2. Other Middle East States

Our above review of Israel was the portrayal of a state that meets traditional criteria of being, in fact, a nation state. There are an entire range of perhaps insuperable difficulties to be found within the fabric of that state, but all the typically European nation-state trademarks are there, with a few others thrown in. The government is institutionalized, there is stability in the political process (despite the dozens of political parties), there is a functioning infrastructure (even if it might not be able to run on its own), and the people (or at least the Jews) are active and involved with their government (during the electoral process).

Before that, the review of China portrayed a country that was trying very hard, and slowly succeeding, to redefine its nationalism. In so doing, that process indicated a further likely and ongoing modification being made by the Chinese people, knowingly or unknowingly, regarding their perception of authority and tradition. Finally, this last evolutionary adjustment, enhanced by modernization and a growing economy, will quite possibly have profound effects on how the Chinese develop their law, political offices, decision making apparatus, systems of accountability, provisions for succession of central power, and so on.

Moving now to the Other Middle East States, we find a grouping of dissimilar would-be nation states, each with its primary concerns, each with nascent governmental structures that do not yet have legitimacy in their own right (over and above the power of the personalities who occupy those offices), each facing increasingly real-time dilemmas of needing to find employment for multiplying populations and the requirement to husband dwindling resources, each working out its own accommodation with Islamic-modernization tensions, and each wondering how to interact with the others, with the UN, with the Palestinians, and with their nemesis Israel. These Middle Eastern states lack the advantages of Israel's institutionalization, and of China's overwhelming center of authority with all its vertical relationships. They are somewhere in between, attempting to institutionalize their political

apparatus, to make accommodations between Islam and nationalism and modernization, and to draw their constituent populations into the process of government.

Each of these other major Middle East states are known for certain primary characteristics. Saudi Arabia, of course, is known for its bankroll and conservatism. Jordan usually plays the moderate, caught between factions, attempting to serve as an active or passive arbitrator. Iraq, aside from Baghdad and its associated cosmopolitan aspects (in better days), and in a thinly disguised bid to assert Arab leadership, has been focusing attention on military preparedness. Syria, another contender for Arab leadership, and also another state quick to acknowledge the virtue of muscle, has yet to be the center for pan-Arab thought that it would like to be, while working through as best it can a Byzantine political party to institute or carry out its ideas. Egypt, interestingly enough, has no bankroll or army or moderator impulse that stands out above each of its neighbors to give it an immediate and single reference point. However, Egypt falls somewhat into the all-of-the-above category, is characteristically first in the region to carry on with a project or purpose later to be adopted or felt by the region, and was regarded by the others as a necessary partner in their struggle against Israel.

Egypt's 53 million are the single most concentrated national population in the Levant (having rough parity with

Iran), and are projected to double in size within 25 years at current growth rates to 110 millions (or the current size of Pakistan). Compared to 14m for Saudi Arabia, 3m for Jordan, 12m for Syria, and 18m for Iraq, Egypt's population alone (concentrated around the Nile Delta) commands a certain gravity or attraction in personal and cultural affairs amongst the Arab world. Regardless of what the respective government positions are with each other, Arabs from across the Middle East will go to and from Cairo or Alexandria for employment, education, culture, travel, and other activities. Ever since Napoleon first made Egypt aware, in the late 18th century, of the realities of an outside world, and since Muhammad Ali then changed Cairo and the Nile Delta from an agricultural backwater to an industrial and educational center actively interacting with the West, Egypt has been in the general forefront of regional concerns, the first in the Arab world - generally speaking - to pioneer the way. The most recent example of this was the Camp David Accords and unilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace of 1978 (assuming that other Middle Eastern states will also arrive at understandings with Israel). A flurry of activity in Baghdad attempted to isolate Cairo after the Egyptian-Israeli accords were made, but those isolationist measures were ultimately non-effective.

Another feature that the other Middle East states seem to share, whether they want to or not, is that their current national governments, operating through a collection of

political edifices that preside over largely arbitrary borders with only minimal senses of institutionalized legitimacy, are all largely irrelevant or out of touch with the day-to-day living that occurs within their respective national borders. One exception to this characterization is Saudi Arabia: the Royal Family seems to occupy a more stable position than many of the surrounding heads of state. The Koran is regarded as Saudi Arabia's constitution, and the Royal Family governs through the *Sharia*: age-old desert traditions permeate the relation between royal family and the people. The pace of modernization within the Arabian peninsula, however, may require the King to speed his reform plans ahead of schedule, if in fact he does have a schedule for reform (as he claims).

While central authority in China was very much associated with one or more personalities, it was also tied into a bureaucratic edifice of several vertical relationships that would frequently include family members; this was so if for no other reason than that China is a large polity and there is much to keep track of. In Egypt, on the other hand, and elsewhere in the Middle East, central authority (especially in the foreign policy realm) is also associated with a strong personality, but without attendant vertical or horizontal bureaucracy linkages. Nasser and Sadat were very much their own men when it came to the odd momentous decisions that went on to flavor Egypt for years hence. Examples of these include: only 14 people knew in advance of Nasser's decision

to nationalize the Suez; Sadat told no one of his decision to join with Libya and Syria in the Federation of Arab Republics in 1971; only 2 people knew of Sadat's decision to expel Soviets from Egypt (and only a few hours before the Soviet Ambassador was told); Sadat planned the 1973 war with Syria's Assad before telling his own Generals; only one person knew Sadat was going to Jerusalem in 1977.⁶⁷

The Egyptian regime did try genuine multiparty politics in the 1970s, but reverted to a primary party (the government's party) with other minor parties that provide essentially no legal opposition.

Egypt's primary political figure, the President, acquires his perceived legitimacy through the perception of the people of the country before he is really accepted. The fact that he is in office, or was elected, is ancillary to his needing the mantle of popular support. Generally this is done through momentous occasions or decisions, and since Egypt is a fairly homogenous place, despite its population size, such an occasion or decision usually involves the foreign policy sphere.

The leader's ability to garner popular support through foreign policy decisions first requires that domestic needs are basically met. Egypt's population again requires a minimal economic growth per year just to avoid unemployment (currently another 1,000,000 persons every 9 months). In terms of food production, Egypt has been losing its scanty

arable land alongside the Nile due to urbanization and flooding, and 70% of all food is imported. To counter these trends, the country has been trying to extend agriculture beyond its current bounds, into the desert, and since 1981 this attempt has been finding some success. So far 1.6 million acres of desert have been made arable, with most of that occurring since 1981 when the laws were modified to favor private individuals over the government; individuals were then allowed to purchase up to 300 acres, and companies up to 50,000 acres (instead of 100 acres per person or company). The large businesses, with more resources at their disposal, fare better than the individuals. As a result, over all food production is improving: prices of fruits and vegetables have stabilized despite a general 30% inflation rate in the last few years.⁶⁸

This very success has generated its own difficulties, however. Similar to the growing dryness of the Jordan River valley, Egypt has faced its worst drought in a century during the 1980s. The Nile is the primary, and sometimes only, water source in a country without rainfall (the rain falls upriver, away from the delta); in recent years river traffic has been stranded and the strategic reservoir behind High Aswan is reduced by 20%. The government is looking for new aquifers, encouraging the discontinuance of crops such as rice and sugar cane, and looking for other ways to conserve. The Nile meanwhile continues its century-long decline of liquid volume

each year. It is expected that another 2.8 million acres can be brought under cultivation with available aquifer supplies, but this amount added to the current 6 million acres will only meet 50% of the country's food needs by the next century. A former Egyptian diplomat suggests that "the politics of the Middle East after 2000 will be a struggle over water".⁶⁹

Egypt is also proceeding with reforms in the urban sector to increase economic viability. Known for its stifling bureaucracy, Egypt is trying to reduce the public sector, but in doing so will be releasing 40,000 to 150,000 new workers into the job market each year for the next three to four years. As Egyptian law does not permit a worker to be fired outright, the employer must present an alternative employment scheme to the worker in order to release him/her. Accordingly, Cairo plans to use the Social Fund of the World Bank to generate new employment, although unemployment will likely result anyway.

Another source of revenue for Egypt is oil and natural gas, of which it also has significant reserves. However, production has been slowing and companies (BP, Elf Aquitaine, and others), are beginning to reduce their efforts in Egypt so as to provide more assets in better markets. They would like to see an improved business climate.

Egypt is a poor country; its PCGNP is now \$731.⁷⁰ A fair amount of economic growth will be required just to retain

this *status quo*. Unlike China, whose PCGNP is lower but whose GNP is approaching superpower status, Egypt's GNP (\$37b).

The primary wish of Sadat, that economics and foreign relations would improve after the treaty with Israel, has not materialized, or at least not to the degree that was hoped for. The business sector continues to languish, and Israel's primacy with the U.S. congress over approving or disapproving weapons sales to the Middle East irks Cairo. As a counter to this Egypt is entering into production or coproduction license agreements to produce weapons and military support equipment in Egypt. This will help to boost its own economy and generate potential sales for Egypt in the region and possibly elsewhere.⁷¹

Meanwhile, Islamic extremists are increasing their agitation for imposition of Islamic law. The Muslim Brotherhood, technically illegal but tolerated by the government, has been given access to increased employment within the bureaucracy, as of a few years ago, to try and take the sting out of their circumstance. Recent increases in violence suggest that the plan is not working, or not working well enough.

On the intelligentsia side of the dissent spectrum, a new play that recently opened in Cairo lampooned Arabs and pan-Arabism rather severely, claiming that the best attribute of an Arab government is its oppression of its people, and so on. Individual actors represented the various states, with examples being the Egyptian as quiet and naive, the Iraqi as

big, burly and obnoxious, the Jordanian portrayed as a moderate, and the Ladies as more concerned with their make-up than in assisting with the great problems of the day.⁷²

In Saudi Arabia the traditional form of rule is still maintained. The royal family makes the important decisions, as well as meeting other obligations; the family itself is so extensive that it registers as a tiny fraction of the state's entire population. Again, the land presents a tremendous spectacle to see; that plus the tremendous growth of infrastructure during the last two decades has done much to transform the Peninsula.

Saudi Arabia's development expenses from 1968 have been \$776b, or \$65,000 per each of its 12 million citizens. The current 5-year plan, from August 1989, calls for another \$200b expenditure. Results of those expenditures have included 465,000 homes, 22,200 miles of roads, 1,437,000 telephone lines, and 8,631 elementary schools (more than one school per day in the last 20 years), plus over 4,000 other higher level schools.⁷³

The Saudis continue to increase their agricultural yield each year, and now are exporters of food. Yet they are running into the same problem as the Nile and the Jordan regions with water depletion, because continued irrigation for wheat is expected to dry out the underground aquifers in only 20 years. At the moment, Saudi Arabia could import wheat less

expensively than the amount that they pay to grow it, not to mention the potential harm to their strategic supply of water.

Saudi's royal family is now going through the motions of reform measures, with the idea of increasing participatory government, although the King is very much opposed to transplanting western democracy onto the Saudi peninsula. The House of as-Saud has been promising a *majlis*, or consultative assembly, for 30 years, but has not yet provided it. After the Gulf War, however, with the area's sensitivities geared to new expectations, the old promise resurfaced and was confirmed in March 1992. The announcement was not received well, however, because current expectations now far exceed the possibilities of a *majlis*. Rather, as propounded by the Islamic scholar Khalid M. Khalid in 1985, the Saudis want a *Shura*, or a genuine elected parliament. The new system would be based on authority emanating from the people, separation between authorities, a multiparty system, regular elections, and a free press.⁷⁴ The Saudis basically want to live in Britain, and the King is having none of it.

Some of the Saudi clergy, who were initially opposed to a *majlis*, now favor it because "they see it coming and they want to influence the shape it takes".⁷⁵ Other clergy continue to espouse the traditional, and conservative, *sharia*. Several elements of Saudi peoples are eager to try reform measures; these elements include women (who performed essential tasks during the Gulf War, but are now back in seclusion

and not liking it), professionals, other educated persons, members of the royal family.

Currently the King is selected by the royal family council, of which he needs to retain its support. All decision making requires consensus within the family; because the family is so extensive, the net effect is to pursue policies that are consonant with the population at large. The King is finding, however, that one result of all those schools he has been constructing has been the development of a desire by his people to participate more in the world around them.

Saudi Arabia regards Israel as the enemy, or at least one of the primary negative factors in the region. This sense of antagonism has different levels, including, obviously, the military level. But there is also a cultural level, with Israel seen as a Western outpost all too near the heart of Islam. On the military side, Israelis make fairly routine (training?) overflights of Saudi territory, have made practice bombing runs on Tabuk, and used Saudi airspace for the attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981. The AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia by the U.S. apparently have no offensive capability against Israel, and are not capable of detecting Israeli incursions, although those AWACS are able to detect flights of other (Arab) countries.⁷⁶

Saudi Arabia also views Israel as a nemesis because its presence, and support by the U.S., has forced neighboring Arab countries to go to the former USSR for support. Saudi

Arabia has been a good military customer of the U.S., having been one of the best customers of U.S. arms; the Saudis have routinely been the customers during some of the largest military sales in U.S. history. Saudis have also made major purchases from the French and the British.

The Saudi royal family continues to utilize opportunities to take diplomatic pot-shots at Jordan's King Hussein; the antagonism between Hashemite and as-Saud has not disappeared. Recently, the Saudi royal family offered a sum to renovate the 13-century-old Dome of the Rock shrine in Jerusalem. King Hussein, after he learned of this, also offered \$8.25m for this purpose, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Jerusalem accepted King Hussein's money, turning down the Saudis'. This episode represents a 66-yr-old Arab rivalry over who is the rightful caretaker of the Islamic holy places (Mecca and Medina also, as well as Jerusalem), plus a more recent rift between Saud and Hashemite over the Gulf War against Iraq. (The Hashemites were of the Hijaz before being expelled by as-Saud). When King Fahd announced he was donating \$9m for repair of the Dome, King Hussein immediately sold his London home to acquire his own donation for the project.

One other facet of life on the peninsula which effects political decision making is the large community of expatriate workers. Several thousand foreigners from the U.S., Pakistan, Philippines, Europe, China, India, and so on have migrated to

the Middle East to earn petro-dollars and to help with the new construction and introduction of technology that is occurring throughout the region.

Jordan, as a poor and small country nestled between Israel and Saudi Arabia, is not in a good location. If there is fighting with Israel, Jordan is almost inevitably drawn into it. The King is a proud and benevolent leader, usually in the thick of things, and no doubt is keenly aware of the cross channels that lie over the Middle East, as he is under most of them. This time last year, in an effort to foster moderation, growth, and undermine fundamentalism at the same time, the King legalized political parties and "has given birth to a new sort of legitimacy that depends on the democratization process".⁷⁷

Jordan, Syria, and Israel have already experienced fighting over the diminishing water available from the Jordan River. Jordan's non-renewable aquifers are being tapped at a loss of 15%, and its population growth is 3.8%, the highest in the region. President Eisenhower in 1953 brokered an agreement whereby Jordan was to receive 275 million cubic meters annually from the Jordan River, but Israel and Syria take more than their shares and hence make this agreement impossible. Jordan was hoping to acquire more water from a joint project with Syria, based on a dam to be constructed on the Yarmuk, but Israel hasn't allowed it because Israel claims this would deprive Israel of its fair share of the Yarmuk. Syria, mean-

while, is planning 7 smaller dams on the Yarmuk for water that it is losing to Turkey, due to Turkey's extra utilization of the Euphrates.⁷⁸

As one development stemming from the participation of all parties at the Middle East Peace talks, Syria is now allowing Syrian Jews to travel and migrate to Israel. Two weeks ago, Israel repaired a Syrian merchant vessel that was having difficulties, welcomed the Syrian crew into port, and escorted the vessel safely back out of Israeli waters. Israel has also recently allowed Syrian flights over Israeli airspace to provision Syrian troops that are stuck on Syria's Mt. Hermon.⁷⁹

One of Syria's major distinctions prior to 1963 was a proclivity for frequent governmental change. Originally governed by the French, it was partitioned without regard to the inhabitants, and consequently had little to encourage any sense or growth of nationalism. The Ba'ath Party began in Syria before Israel was declared a state, and it advocated pan-Arabism and secularism. In 1963 there was a Ba'ath sponsored coup, only to be supplanted by a neo-Ba'ath coup 3 years later. Minorities were very much a part of public life, as the French hadn't wanted the Sunnis to participate so as to keep the country divided. Druze and Alawis were predominant players in the coup, secularism was encouraged, economics was diverted to the public sector, and an elaborate Party structure and government apparatus took shape. Hafez Assad

eventually emerged as the ruler, and the political climate became one of basic legitimization of Assad by the Party, although in actual practice power still flowed from the top down. The Ba'ath wanted to modernize and penetrate and secularize the countryside, which is not unlike what took place in China, yet the Syrians have provided the electoral process with almost complete disregard: only 5% voted in the 1977 elections.

Assad sees the well being of Syria as closely allied to that of the Palestinians, those who left their homes in Israel in 1948 and 1967 and are now prevented from returning by the Israelis. He also is much involved with the fate of Lebanon, which was a historical portion of Syria. As a minority ruler over a decidedly passive-hostile population, and not well liked either by Saudi Arabia or Jordan, Assad is at the center of any number of controversies. His growing isolation led or at least contributed to his turning to the USSR as a client state in 1980. In the late 1970s, political stability within Syria was very tenuous, with assassinations almost on a daily basis. Later, when Islamic fundamentalists in 1982 were conducting an intifadah of their own in the city of Hama, Assad simply razed the city's center, and bulldozed 20,000 into mass graves; "all such rules of firm dealing are now called Hama rules".⁸⁰

Syria's economy has been slipping, and she also has an increasing birth rate, which is, overall, not that much worse

than is found elsewhere in the region. However, Syria has had a large military expenditure as a client state to the Soviets, and maintains a long-time rivalry with Iraq over leadership in the Gulf and greater Middle East. A 1974 project that placed a dam on the Euphrates, with Soviet help, has turned into a lemon: many of the Soviet-made generators were faulty. Plus much of Syrian soil contains gypsum, and when combined with irrigation it turns to mush. Syria is now trying to ship its water elsewhere, since it is unable to use it all. The dams that Turkey is building will cut the flow of water into Syria by half; Syria's own projects were badly designed, and Turkey's projects will exacerbate the dilemma. Syria is now trying to forge an agreement with Jordan about sharing the Yarmuk (Israel must again be party to this agreement by providing approval to the World Bank in order for funding to commence for Syria's proposed dams on the Yarmuk). Eventually, and not in the distant future, Syria's water and economic problems will supersede its ideological orientations and conflicts.⁸¹

Aside from the political climate, Syria's general economic and physical climate is not inimical to positive growth, although her internally tumultuous national life and continued bad luck with major projects have not conspired to work in her favor. Soviet leaders apparently gave notice to Syria, before the break-up of the USSR, that Syria should not

expect to reach strategic parity with Israel; that is, at least not with Russian assistance.

With Iraq, we have another case of poorly drawn national boundaries, a history of controlled competition internally to the country leading to Sunni and beyond that to Tikrit leadership. The Ba'ath Party also is the underpinning of the government, or nominal base. Basically there was a situation with a fair amount of potential, where the ideals espoused by the Party, if applied selectively and expeditiously, could have done much for the country and reduced instead of aggravated its inherent divisiveness. Despite the elaborate governmental structure, rule continues to emanate from the top down and major decisions are known only to a few. As demonstrated during the Gulf War, even Saddam's Army did not know what was in store, where he was taking them, what they were or were not going to do or face.

The Shi'ite population of Iraq is susceptible to the Islamic climate that prevails in Iran, and Baghdad has been aware of that. Baghdad is also typically harsh on the northern Kurdish population; their desire is for at least autonomy and control of the revenues within their region; Baghdad has not been willing to acquiesce.

The Gulf War evidenced the incredible mismanagement, stupidity, and possibly some terrible cunning, of Saddam. That alone is evidence of another structure in which the power flows from the top down, and only through a few conduits. He

obviously knows what the requirements of maintaining power are in Iraq. Even if the U.S. had been successful in dislodging him, the next ruler would most likely have come from the same geographical faction, or possibly a Sunni from Baghdad. The historical border feud between Iraq and Kuwait is not over, but hopefully future give and take between them will be at a less severe level. As for Umm Qasr, Shatt al-Arab and the border with Iran, those will also be ongoing concerns, no doubt for as long as Iraq wants to maintain her present national configuration. Iran would equally no doubt enjoy being able to redraw the map to include the marshes of southern Iraq, along with the shi'ite shrines and peoples found there.

IV. CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Chapters IV and V are summaries, in either direction, of interaction between China and the Middle East. The summaries' brevity reflects a partial listing only: they do not reflect the complete number or type of activities that have been taking place in this arena. Information for these summaries was collected from sources in the public domain. For each item recorded, others were left out due to a paucity of information, as well as those other items that I am certain were either overlooked or missed.

For China, to speak of the Middle East is not to speak of a readily defined area. China's direct contact with the regions beyond her frontiers occurred at various intervals and distances, from the Great Wall's terminus near the Gobi desert to Genghis Khan's march to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the Middle East as a term encompassing the eastern Mediterranean is a European invention. Contemporary PRC diplomatic delegations of this area, for reasons incorporating internal political reshuffling as well as increased economies of international perception, have alternately placed it under the departmental venues of African, or North African and Middle Eastern, or Asian, or simply Middle Eastern categories.

In addition to this evolving sense of administrative placement, or rubric, of the Middle East, China has also experienced a revised strategic sense of the Middle East.

This revision is to some degree a matter of semantics, and primarily reflects the two main periods of leadership in China (Mao and Deng). But even more than chronological periods, the evolving sense reflects the ideological side (Mao) and the pragmatic side (Deng); within the realm of foreign policy, the respective primacy of these two "sides" do not necessarily represent the corresponding primacy of Mao or Deng in Beijing.

The Middle East had long been regarded as an important area relative to China. Consensus among the CCP in Beijing was that control of this region by a hostile power would lay bare the approaches to China.⁸² A combination of observation of the progress of World War II, early understanding of Marxism, and a decidedly Chinese streak of individualism led to China's postulation of the Middle East as a heart of the Intermediate Zone (also as part of the Third World). The Three Worlds theory was not officially propounded until 1974, but its development hung over Beijing in the years prior.

Basically, Beijing claimed that the USSR and U.S. were in a direct struggle for world domination, with control of the Middle East therefore representing a necessary aspect of gaining control over the intermediate zone. This heart of the intermediate zone, or at least one of its hearts, was in turn necessary to effect control over China.

From World War II, when China was concerned that the Middle East not fall into Axis hands, to subsequent CCP development of the Three Worlds theory where the Middle East

became the locus of struggle between U.S. and USSR (a Chinese variant of the bipolar world theory), the Middle East retained a central position of importance in Chinese political thinking. Whether from the standpoint of hot struggle against the Germans, or cold struggle against the U.S. and former USSR, China was concerned to keep the Middle East free of outside big-power influence. Even now, with the Middle East seen more as a center of economics, and Third World rhetoric passe, it remains crucial not only to Middle East integrity but to the perceived well being of China in a stable world that the Middle East remain free of hegemonic influences.

From this vantagepoint, China's first main contact with the states in that area occurred at Bandung in 1955. The diplomatic forum afforded by that gathering, and China's presentation of her Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, reaped large diplomatic and practical rewards with much direct interaction starting between them almost immediately after the Conference. These Five Principles reflect largely the pragmatic side of CCP thinking, with the Three Worlds theory overlapping both ideology and pragmatism, and Lin Biao's 1965 "Long Live the Victory of People's War" article representing the radical, or ideological, side.

Beginning in 1955, then, China normalized relations with four Middle Eastern states and began an ever increasing series of trade and economic agreements. China also had another side to her activity in the Middle East and elsewhere. With the

memory of the CCP victory still fresh in their minds, the CCP leadership was quick to offer diplomatic encouragement (moral support) and whatever materiel assistance could be found for revolutionary efforts in wars of national liberation found around the globe. It is important to note here, however, that despite this willingness on the part of China to help, however she might, with People's Wars, this was not a blanket policy. China's dictum of self-reliance often meant that the home team might have to fend for themselves. China also would not support liberation struggles against governments, right or left, that were themselves free of colonial domination.

In the Middle East, China's contact with armed struggle occurred with the PLO, and the PFLO/PFLOAG. Arafat first traveled to China in 1964, and assistance for the PLO included weapons, training, and probably advice. By 1971 China discontinued its assistance to PFLOAG, and in 1972 at the UN China announced its disapproval of PLO terrorism. China had been engaged with other economic initiatives in the Middle East prior to 1971, but at this point in time China had gained entrance to the UN, normalized relations with the U.S., and Deng was rejoining the CCP. China's interest in the Middle East had retained the flavor of encouraging independence from hegemony, but the People's War sidearm was being muscled out by the pragmatic missile and "neutral" arms sales to any national players in the Middle East. China's aims remained constant, her approach had adjusted.

As is evident from the above paragraphs, placement of topics within these next few pages will be somewhat arbitrary; many could be listed under two or more headings. As an example: arms sales could be listed under security, or economic, or diplomatic headings, and found under China (as the seller) or the Middle East (as the buyer).

A. ECONOMIC

Economic ties between the Middle East and China have been developing for the last several decades. In 1955 a Sino-Egyptian trade agreement was concluded, and Egypt has since been one of the primary trading partners of China.

China's economic links with Kuwait go back to 1965 when the first cooperation protocol between them was signed. Other arab states with which China now has substantial trade agreements and/or other joint projects include Syria, the U.A.E., Jordan, Iraq (before the Gulf War), Pakistan, and elsewhere through North Africa.

From 1956 to 1975, China sponsored the following numbers of official delegations to the Middle East: 19 in 1956, 3 in 1957, 6 in 1958, 3 in 1959, 4 in 1960, 5 in 1961, 11 in 1962, 5 in 1963, 13 in 1964, 20 in 1965, 19 in 1966, 3 in 1967, 1 in 1968, 0 in 1969, 6 in 1970, 2 in 1971, 22 in 1972, 13 in 1973, 15 in 1974, 8 in 1975. These delegations included members whose interest was economic as well as military. Other parts of the Middle East (e.g.: Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, etc.), had visiting delegations from China as well.

It should be remembered that, aside from contact with other countries in the Socialist sphere, the first major contact China had with the world at large was at and after Bandung (i.e.: the Middle East). It is also very intriguing to note that after Tienanmen, when China was anxious to place her trade patterns and volume back into a higher gear, the Middle East was China's first destination. Yang Shangkun and a large delegation visited Kuwait in December 1989, in search of economic trade and funding to take the place of Western trade that had been cut due to Tiananmen. He arrived in Kuwait after having visited Egypt and the U.A.E., and planned to continue on to visit Oman. Abu Dhabi guaranteed that trade and economic cooperation would increase between the U.A.E. and China. The U.A.E. also expressed its thanks to Yang that China had not yet "set up ties with Israel".⁸³

China has had upwards of 10,000 workers in Kuwait, and others elsewhere throughout the region (Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia). The currency remittances they provide back to the PRC are substantial.

B. SECURITY

Arms sales by China are a strong source for currency, and a well known aspect of Middle Eastern events. These sales not only help China to meet the objectives it has established for itself, but also provide foreign currency reserves. Sales are made either directly from China to the Middle East country, or

involve third parties (North Korea). In addition to conventional weapons sales, China has also been providing nuclear technology to the region (Algeria, Pakistan). A few typical examples of these sales are as follows:

Throughout the bulk of the Iran-Iraq conflict, China quietly sold materiel to both Iran and Iraq, all the while maintaining a formal and strict neutrality. These goods were passed through other intermediaries.

After Afghanistan was invaded by the USSR, China joined Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in getting arms to Afghanistan, with the joint effort coordinated through Pakistan.

In March 1991, Syria purchased Scud-C missiles from North Korea, with Saudi financing. In November 1991, the U.S. elicited a promise from Beijing that China would not export its M-9 missiles to Syria; a week later, China purportedly agreed to help Syria construct its own missiles. On 10 February 1992, PRC missile technologists visited Syrian industrial plants near Hama and Aleppo. On 22 February 1992, Bush reinstated a previous trade agreement between the U.S. and China regarding satellite parts and high-speed computers.⁸⁴

Qin Jiwei (China's Defense Minister) visited Pakistan and Bangladesh, in February 1990, to boost military cooperation. Li Peng had already visited these countries a few months earlier in November 1989 as part of his post-Tiananmen circuit.

China had sold calutrons to Iran, and was helping Iran to construct a small reactor in 1990. Three years ago, China started to help Algeria construct their own reactor. The Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear warheads last July with Chinese sales and technical assistance.⁸⁵

Conventional wisdom has posited that Israel and China began a military liaison, a few years ago, and the appearance was given then of future increased activity between them as a very likely probability. They have indeed normalized relations. Israel is a veritable gold mine for R&D, battlefield lessons learned (with some of the most sophisticated equipment available anywhere), and a source for comparisons between Western (U.S., European, Israeli), Eastern (Soviet), and Other (Arabic, desert, asian), equipment and tactics. There are other accounts as well of Israeli technology sales, both recent and long-standing, to China (Patriot missile?), armor gun sights, improved gun fire control, avionics, and others. Israel has a burgeoning high tech industry and would like to find a backer to help them fund it; INTEL's 386 computer chip was developed in Israel. Israel also has an interest in indigenous aviation design. Other Israeli skills are more prosaic in nature, and will not be mentioned here, but are of no less interest to China. Israel is already providing China with expertise regarding water management and irrigation, animal husbandry, military hardware for tanks, and possibly other items.

Israel is not unlike a laboratory, where various other nations may vicariously learn valuable skills and insights into human and technical matters, ranging completely across the spectrum from military items to industry and agriculture, or even economics and the effectiveness of governmental policy. China knows this and would no doubt like to gain as much access to this laboratory as possible.

C. DIPLOMATIC

Aside from tentative feelers with Pakistan and Egypt, also some unrequited feelers from Israel, China's first real diplomatic activity and success with the Middle East came with its participation in the **Bandung** Conference. At that conference Zhou Enlai met with Nasser, Palestine leader Shukairy, and diplomats from Syria and Lebanon. Within a year, China had normalized relations with Egypt, Syria and Yemen. Relations had already been normalized with Afghanistan just prior to Bandung.

As part of the Korean War experience, China requested both Egypt and Pakistan as members of a 7-nation commission to consider the Far East situation and make recommendations.

From 1953-1957, China emphasized peaceful coexistence between communist and non-communist countries. That emphasis was soon to pass, however, as China entered the turbulent years of the GLF and GPCR.

Very instructive to note is the enlightening fact that, during the GPCR when all diplomats were recalled to China for

consultation, the Chinese ambassador to Egypt stayed in Egypt; he was the only PRC diplomat not to leave his post.

As of 1988, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain still had not normalized relations with the PRC. One of mainland China's primary intents since its inception has been to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. This was done to facilitate PRC entrance into the UN, also to encourage Taiwan to think about eventual reunification with the Mainland under Beijing's suzerainty. The People's Republic has in fact been successful in acquiring full relations with all Middle Eastern countries, although since Tienanmen there has been a resurgence of interest through the region in Taiwan.

PRC and Israel have held regular discussions at the Foreign Ministry level each year in New York since 1987 when the UN General Assembly convenes. These were a precursor to normalization, and China initially claimed, of course, that they were solely for multilateral discussion of regional topics of interest to both and not bilateral topics.⁸⁶

After Tienanmen, China's first international forays to repair diplomatic damage (as well as to reconstruct trade), were into the Middle East, to try to repair her image and to generate some external economic activity. Yang Shangkun, with a large delegation, visited Egypt, Kuwait, U.A.E. and Oman to discuss bilateral concerns, economic interaction and PRC assistance via the UNSC in resolving the Iran-Iraq talks.⁸⁷ Only a few months after Tiananmen, Qian Qichen made multiple

stops throughout the region by calling on Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Unisia and Iran. Li Peng also visited the Middle East in the winter of 1989, stopping at Pakistan. After Yang Shangkun's junket was completed, Qin Jiwei returned to the region (Pakistan and Bangladesh), to improve military competition.

It has been suggested that China's foreign policy in the Arab world reflects China's general foreign policy as a whole. I submit that this statement is more appropriate when reversed: that China's general foreign policy reflects China's foreign policy in the Arab world.⁸⁸

Through a calculated program of economics and diplomacy, Beijing succeeded in isolating Taiwan internationally. This helped the PRC to gain its seat in the UN and access to the various other diplomatic and economic doors around the world. All Middle Eastern states now recognize PRC vice Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwan had provided significant assistance to Saudi Arabia (building projects and personnel training), as well as to other Middle Eastern states.

The recent emergence of independent central Asian Islamic states is of considerable concern to China. The PRC's displeasure with Moscow in losing its grip on the USSR is not just because China is now the last socialist nation, but also because central asia is now potentially more volatile than ever before. Beijing's resettlement of millions of Han Chinese into Xinjiang has inserted a calming (i.e.: bureau-

cratic) influence into those broad provincial areas, but as of late 1991 the Muslims maintained their majority and no doubt have a healthy birth rate.

V. MIDDLE EAST ACTIVITIES IN CHINA

A. ISRAEL

Comments regarding Israel's activity in China mirror those offered in the previous chapter. There is much conjecture, but little black and white evidence in the public domain. It is thought, with a high degree of likelihood, that Israel has provided China with up to \$3b worth of arms, plus expertise and sales in the areas of animal husbandry, drip irrigation, weapons upgrades for tanks and avionics.

Israel has long been suspected of illegally transferring U.S. arms to China (also Thailand, South Africa, Venezuela, Ethiopia, and others). Most recently, this suspicion concerns Israeli sales of Sidewinders and Patriot missiles to China. PRC has reverse engineered the Sidewinder and sold it to Iraq. Moshe Arens has said: "No one should find it unusual that Israel will, from time to time, sell items to other countries, including China".⁸⁹

Whereas Israel was the first Middle East state to recognize the PRC in 1950, full diplomatic relations between the two were waylaid first by the Korean War and then by Bandung, when China saw more political capital to be gained by approaching the Arab states rather than Israel.

B. OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES

Activities of the other Middle East states in China are also mirrored, largely, by comments in the preceding and following chapters. A few additional comments follow.

China is very eager to have Middle Eastern capital applied to its provinces, and accordingly has courted the Gulf States and others in the Middle East to encourage financial activity. Kuwait has provided a number of loans to China, with one of these mentioned here:

Between 1982 and 1984 Kuwait loaned China \$150m for four projects, including the Xiamen Airport.⁹⁰ China, previously, had been Kuwait's primary initial contractor, before the Gulf War, for construction of almost all the new Kuwaiti homes, power stations, refineries, and hospitals.

The entire period from Bandung (and even before) through to the present is marked by increasing trade between the Middle East and China. This is especially true in the early-to-mid 1980s, when a multitude of trade agreements, projects, and joint financial institutions were started.

A symposium in 1986, held in Yinchuan (Ningxia), was intended to attract Arab investment, begin exploitation of local natural resources, initiate Chinese technology transfer to the Middle East, and of course to enhance trade. A similar symposium was held in 1984 in Urumqi; that area, by 1986, had attracted up to \$100m in foreign investment, plus major trade contracts with Syria, UAE and Kuwait.⁹¹

In November 1991, when China was still trying to regain its international prestige and activity after the Tienanmen incident, the Emir of Kuwait was visiting Beijing, ostensibly for trade discussions, at the same time as U.S. Secretary of State Baker. Baker's visit was the PRC's biggest diplomatic coup since Tienanmen, but the People's Daily gave the following coverage to those two events: the Emir of Kuwait received a large story, which dwarfed a smaller front-page story about Baker's visit to Beijing.⁹²

There is no reason why the advantages sought by Israel in China can not also be sought by the other Middle Eastern states. Pakistan is an immediate case in point, where a healthy pollination of Chinese technology is enhancing that state's strategic position; presumably there is, or will be, reciprocity.

VI. POLICY SUMMARIES

There is a spirit akin to the "Wild West" now in China and also in the Middle East, related both to their own spirit and to the unfolding of the New Order. It is a spirit where the inhabitants of both regions sense new horizons and are busy with participating in the several events leading to those horizons. It is this spirit, found here and there elsewhere in the world as well, which will find its natural expression primarily between these two regions toward each other; that, plus their geographical and historical proximities, the precedents of the Silk Road, their fluid characters, and their emerging needs, will encourage interaction between them. Both regions will have other activities as well, and those other activities may well overshadow (in volume) the activity between China and the Middle East. Chances are much better than fair that China will (eventually) be everywhere, or wherever she pleases: this activity will be economic in private or public sectors, it might also be diplomatic, or possibly even military; as the U.S. is "everywhere", so also might China be "everywhere" (and Japan, and Europe). In that sense, positing Chinese-Middle East activity is to posit nothing, precisely because the PRC will have tentacles almost everywhere. But despite such ubiquitous activity, the connections between China and the Middle East will be special, closer than others, for all the reasons mentioned above.

After noting that China's government is more precisely a government of persons rather than institutions, we might ask if "policies" can be resident within this personalized structure. The fairly detailed presentation of China's hierarchy was provided in chapter three so as to better be able to grasp the intricacies of public and private decision making by ruling members of the CCP. While the structure of China's government is vested in its personalities with an institutional framework growing around them, and we are led to suspect that the PRC's governing practice is more fluid than ours, we can still observe PRC activities that remain constant over a period of years, despite personnel turnovers and other vicissitudes. As constancy of effort is taken to represent policy, therefore we can expect to find Chinese policies, even though they might be politically resident in an unfamiliar manner.

Considerable time was taken earlier to review the political aspects of these regions, particularly China. This was done to try and convey the senses of energy and change prevalent within them, as well as to suggest some of their needs. It is necessary to have a flavor of the change or evolution coursing through the polities of the Middle East and also through China to posit the conclusions of this thesis. It is necessary to know that China will always be reforming, regardless of who is in power, and also to recognize the importance China places on the Middle East. It is necessary

to know that the Middle East is experiencing unprecedented growth of infrastructure and demographics, that polities there have yet to establish the degree to which they will become institutionalized, that Islam is in a process of readjustment or rethinking. It is necessary to sense the fluid nature of peoples and (historical) geographical proximity of China and the Middle East. Without these flavors, or senses, it is not enough simply to posit or list trade and delegation exchanges between these two (or any other) regions, and then be able to say that they will continue. The Silk Road is being reborn, and in a big way.

A. DOES CHINA HAVE OR EXERCISE A "MIDDLE EAST POLICY?"

The first item that must be addressed here is a tribute to Zhou Enlai who, quite likely, was the cotter pin who held China's foreign policy together. Throughout domestic calm or upheaval, much of the continuity that China experienced with foreign policy matters was probably attributable to Zhou's activities as Premier, confidant, and mediator. He also was very much a realist - he had to be - so as to know how and where and when to direct his attentions.

To say that the PRC has goals or wants in the Middle Eastern region need not imply that China has an active intent to somehow physically penetrate that region. Diplomatic maneuvering from within the PRC, UN, or other organizations, as well as the existence of economic trade, occasional assistance packages, etc., may all count as activities and as

policy directives and all may count decidedly toward this or that outcome in the Middle East region. So to say that China has activities or goals elsewhere need not be demonstrated by anything more than certain perceptions in Beijing and, for example, perhaps the existence of certain practices within the SEZs or western provinces, where economic interaction is likely or desired to occur.

China's habit of self-portrayal as a Third World country is, at best, of dubious veracity. China has persisted with this portrayal from the time of Bandung, as a calling card for its never ending search for economic and diplomatic partners. Although China has a very poor PCGNP, and will likely retain a relatively poor PCGNP in the foreseeable future, her GNP is not the stuff of a developing country. The section on Superpowers explains this more fully. Secondly, in the light of present day geopolitics, it is highly unlikely that there are any Third World countries. The Third World refers to a group of states that are non-aligned (relative to the U.S. and former USSR) and developing, probably also with a history of having been victimized, more or less, during the age of colonialism. With the Cold War over, however, and the subsequent categories of state types revised, there are several more variables that go into classifying a state aside from criteria of polarity. There are developing, and poor, and debt-ridden states; the Third World state of just a few

years ago is no longer, because there is no First or Second World state.

Any policy that China might adopt can be expected to be beneficial for herself, at least from China's point of view, and China's premier goal, at the moment, is to modernize. We can also expect, therefore, that policies related to the Middle East will somehow be beneficial for China's modernization. For modernization to occur, China prefers and requires a stable international environment, hence her policies might also be expected to enhance international stability from the understanding China has as to what stability actually connotes. We need to remember that China's understanding of stability may not necessarily be similar to our own understanding of that concept.

China also believes that since the demise of the USSR, the world has become a potentially turbulent place. Li Peng in October 1990 mentioned that things are "more dangerous now that the Cold War is over and the New Order is not yet established".⁹³ Taking note of China's current policy for the Middle East (and Central Asia), will say a lot about China's view of that region as well as the current state of world affairs.

If, however, instead of considering all the information available to us and we focused on only one or two specific issues, it is not difficult to see that in place of long term or regional policy we might find directives of a more tran-

sient nature. In this way it is not too difficult to appreciate how a conclusion (focusing only on, e.g., arms sales), might suggest that activity amongst China and portions of the Middle East is sporadic at best and/or opportunistic at worst.

Discussion of the topics in this section, and throughout this chapter, will generally follow the headings provided, although some topics may be found under more than one heading (e.g.: arms sales could be discussed under economic, security, and diplomatic sub-headings).

1. Economic

China's long term interest in the Middle East has not been unrelated to that region's newly acquired wealth. The Middle East, in a manner of speaking, has provided China with the best of all possible external worlds: in addition to diplomatic and security benefits, activity with the Middle East region can also generate needed foreign exchange and, in so doing, demonstrate that the PRC is a reliable neighbor. As of 1985, China's economic interests in the Middle East included these generic facets: to sell as many PRC products as possible, to export surplus labor to the region, and to attract investment for projects inside China.

Despite the checkered history of China's involvement in the region, these facets or principles seem to hold throughout. One example that stands out centers around China's presence in the Yemen during the 1960s and early 1970s. Chinese workers were present in the region simulta-

neously with others from the USSR. Both of them were working on road construction, amidst local hostilities. Despite the situation, the Chinese were steadfast in their pursuit, and left some of their number behind in roadside graves, because they were there to construct a road and not to dodge bullets or wait until the storm passed. By contrast, the Soviets worked on the road as they could, preferring to take everyone home with them. Other observations, based on comparisons between PRC and (former) Soviet workers, indicate that the Chinese do what they indicated they would do, do it well enough, and then go home.⁹⁴ There is no *quid pro quo* extraction. That alone makes Chinese assistance very attractive, when compared to U.S. or former USSR expectations.

Another aspect of Chinese labor characteristics is that, quite regularly, a group of workers will only stay in one location, or on one job, for about 6 months, then go home, to be followed by another group of workers. In this fashion more workers are taught skills, and more receive experiences than otherwise would have occurred. It is as if the Middle East were a big OJT laboratory. In 1988 there were about 10,000 Chinese expatriate workers in Kuwait, with similar numbers elsewhere in the Middle East.

Insofar as China portrays itself as an "Islamic state", depending on who the audience is, there are no doubt officials in Beijing who would like nothing better than for Muslims in the Gulf region and in Xinjiang and Ningxia to

jointly develop thriving trade, industry, and perhaps even research. By doing all of this, presumably there would be less and less room for complaint by China's minorities about whatever, so long as they consent to remain within greater China, thus solidifying Beijing's rule over her vast frontier and allaying any lingering concerns about defense and security matters. Trade and activity of this sort could also be developed between China's frontier provinces and the new central Asian republics; activity in that region and of that type is a natural.

Now, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there is opportunity as well as danger for China with the recent appearance of independent Muslim central asian states. The opportunity is for the Chinese Islamic population, drawing on a stronger center tradition and access to national resources, to set up shop with their neighbors and turn the area into a big bazaar. If trade between the two could be coordinated, with Xinjiang's goods regularly reaching Shanghai and Central Asian goods already linked to Europe, a thriving "steppe economy" could be harnessed. The danger, of course, is in the potential national separatist feelings that could spread (further) into Xinjiang and Tibet. Additional ready-made trade routes would also lead into Pakistan and Afghanistan. That entire area is set to **move**, and Beijing would love to see it happen, provided - of course - that separatist passions

could be held in check, or overridden by the attendant prosperity engendered by a continental bazaar.

China now has the political trust (or at least the growing neutral recognition), of most Middle East countries. This is something that China wants to nurture, and utilize as much as possible for her benefit in the process of securing the above.⁹⁵

2. Security

It was mentioned earlier that China would prefer to have a stable international environment within which to pursue her modernization, so as not to be upset by external wars or other turbulence. The stable environment would allow China to focus her energies on putting her own house in order and get up to speed. What is not clear from this general perception is what China actually regards as stable.

Using the Iran-Iraq conflict as an example, with China's professed neutrality throughout that war, and also with China's sale of arms to both sides through intermediaries, it would seem then that stability, for China, does not require the absence of all conflict. For China, the Iran-Iraq conflict had the effect of keeping the USSR and U.S. off balance, at least in the Gulf and/or Middle East region, if not world-wide. Insofar as individual actors and self sufficiency are prized national characteristics, and insofar as hegemony from any one source is seen as threatening, it appears then that this lengthy conflict between Iran and Iraq

contributed to stability (for China) through requiring the Soviets and U.S. to keep one eye over their shoulder, and hence unable to focus entirely on the Middle East as a whole, or on any other region. Keeping the superpowers looking out of one eye, instead of two, is thus what China regards as stable.

China is large enough that she does not seriously have to worry about being attacked by her neighbors. China also has a credible, even if nascent, nuclear deterrent with which to ward off larger and farther away neighbors. Indeed, by having kept the (other) powers-that-be off balance (with the Iran-Iraq war), China herself was more balanced; stability, for China, might very well mean the presence of low grade conflict in various places around the globe, as long as that conflict is not in China. This perception of stability will hold until China is up to speed, or until there is no more danger from other superpowers acquiring hegemonistic sway, or until all the other developing nations are strong enough to withstand the need to accept someone else's (read the U.S.) influence. Hence China, in her view, was able to maintain her neutrality while selling arms to both sides, or perhaps precisely because China was selling to both sides.

For this off-balance friction to occur and keep the great powers at least somewhat preoccupied, it is not necessary to generate actual hostilities. It is enough simply to generate the possibilities of potential conflict to keep the

other powers off balance. Hence China's missile sales to Middle East countries. With Syria and Saudi Arabia and Iraq and Iran all able to target others among themselves, including Israel, the political equations become more complex and make it harder for interested nations outside the region (the U.S.) to maintain constant policies, or even dispassionate overviews of the circumstances.

Other reasons that China has for developing good relations with the Middle East include not only her general intent to foster international security and stability (i.e.: peace on a global scale, within which the Middle East obviously has a place), but also a more direct interest in securing immediate tactical gains advantageous to China's local, regional and ultimately global intentions. Pakistan figures prominently in such considerations as exemplified by the not inconsiderable efforts made by the PRC to keep on good relations with the Pakistanis. Such efforts help to provide a counterweight for China against both South Asia (India), and Russia, as well as aiding to further secure portions of the PRC border, assist with establishing relations with other Islamic states, provide more avenues of contact with the rest of the Middle East (and other states: N.B. Kissinger's initial contact with the PRC via Pakistan), and to possibly provide future naval facilities accessible to China within the Indian Ocean (N.B. PRC assistance with the construction of port and/or base facilities at Karachi).

The subject of security from China's vantage point must also include Beijing's concern regarding potential Islamic unrest in Xinjiang and other outlying areas. This concern has been heightened by the establishment of the Central Asian Republics. Unrest simmers in those areas. The government has tried to lessen it by relocation of Han to the area, and by relaxing restrictions on some religious activities. Nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism still fester, however. Beijing would very much like to see economic development of the area, either through contacts with neighboring Central Asian Republics or with Arabs or Persians from the Gulf area (with their checkbooks), and growing skills.

a. Technology and Lessons Learned (Israel)

China routinely utilizes a unique strength via its penchant and ability to reverse engineer materials and gadgets, small and large. By this approach, China is able to purchase a few items, remake them into items they want or need, and then make others on a production basis. This process is routinely followed with military hardware and whatever else.

It should therefore come as no surprise that China seeks to purchase quantities of this and that, not only for purposes of employing the new item, but for dismantling it and incorporating its principles into something that is Made-in-China. Undoubtedly one of China's goals and expectations for being in the Middle East, whether via Israel or one of the

Islamic states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran), is to gain access to the multitude of technology that is finding its way into the area, whether it's from the U.S., former USSR, Europe, or indigenous to the region. Recent disclosures of Patriot Missile technology falling into the lap of China is a case in point. This thesis makes no claim as to whether this particular incident was an Israeli or Saudi indiscretion, whether it occurred via paper transfer, part transfer, or on-site inspection, or even if in fact it occurred at all. The point is that this sort of occurrence is one of the expectations and goals, *de facto* if not *de jure*, that China most definitely has with regard to the Middle East.

No other region in the world has such a direct and steady convergence of materiel and interests flowing into it, whether these external sources are North American, European, Russian, South African, or now East Asian. Israel was highlighted in the sub-heading to this section because she has been the major recipient of largesse, bought or donated, in the Middle East. The U.S. intelligence community has long suspected the illegal turn-over of U.S. hardware by Israel to third parties.

b. Offsetting Other Non-Middle Eastern Powers

It is in China's interest for the Middle East to be its own keeper, rather than to have another power dominant in the area. A preponderant U.S. or former USSR in the Middle East would only serve to weaken China's southwest asian flank.

China would rather deal with the indigenous peoples of the Middle East rather than with other powers speaking through or over or for them.

As indicated by the discussion on stability, China recognizes and prefers the virtues of self-sufficiency, especially when those traits contribute to China's increased flexibility. China's initial concern is domestic which leads, in turn, to desires for exterior stability. International stability, on the whole, does not preclude local brush fires, especially if those fires further dilute hegemonic influence of any one power in that region.

China would rather see Israel as completely independent, not beholden to anyone else, if in fact this would add to the innocuousness of the region. But if the affect were reversed, and the states (Israel and/or the other Middle Eastern countries), became overly aggressive or independent to the point of being meddlesome, then China may also find it advantageous to keep closer tabs on her Middle Eastern neighbors. While PRC appears to desire an indigenous Middle East, it could be, eventually, that the clamor of voices from that region will soften PRC's insistence on complete "indigenization" of the Middle East. China may find herself sucked down the same diplomatic hole as everyone else. The other Middle Eastern states likewise find themselves more beholden to outside powers than they would prefer.

China's presence in the region obviously dilutes the presence of other external powers, not only the U.S. and former USSR, but also Europe, Taiwan, South Africa, and etc.. As mentioned above, the diluting of other voices within the Middle East, aside from the indigenous ones already there, would be to China's liking. Two immediate and related effects of such a dilution: remove a potential threat from China's flank and concomitantly make it easier for China to maneuver in that region. Maneuverings may be economic, diplomatic, even military.

China proceeds to act primarily via bilateral relations, eschewing alliances or treaties or promises (outside the realm of institutions such as the UN). But despite this singular procedural quality, I maintain that China seeks to acquire regional influence (or even international influence), via these bilateral relations and/or activities. By affecting a region through her presence, or arms sales, or other economic initiatives, she inserts a ripple effect into the equations considered by other states as they compute current international realities.

Some view China's interests in the Middle East as not, necessarily, for the benefit of the Middle East:

"China's policy toward the Third World is not formulated in a vacuum. It has long been heavily influenced by broader Chinese policy concerns. Thus, even though Chinese spokesmen repeatedly have maintained that support for Third World concerns remains at the center of Chinese foreign policy, careful examination of the record over the past decade shows that

such concerns at best have a secondary role to play in determining China's 1980s approach to foreign affairs. The examination shows that China's foreign policy is based primarily on its perceived need for stability, security and development, a policy that depends chiefly on China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, China does retain a strong interest in maintaining an image of close identification with the developing countries and has demonstrated a tendency to do so whenever it will support, or at least not seriously jeopardize, its primary needs of stability, security and development."

The primary concerns of these leaders have not focused on support for the Third World; they have focused on efforts to guarantee Chinese national security, maintain internal order, and pursue economic development."⁹⁶

"The interrelationship of 'independent foreign policy' concepts demonstrates the typical way China continues to use its stance toward the Third World to define the pattern of its relationship to the two superpowers and as a means of maintaining its distance from them. Chinese explanations of their policy are, of course, idealized if not self-serving. While the independent foreign policy is no doubt conceived as a long-range strategy, it is also subject to change based on changing relationships with the superpowers and on international developments in general. Any particular Chinese policy approach represents a conceptualized reaction to very real events and to perceptions of Chinese self-interest."⁹⁷

"China's efforts to position itself as a Third World leader can be interpreted in light of the effort to find supporters in (its) quest for independence from Superpower control - hence the current strong emphasis on Third World identity."

Experience of foreign encroachment and past Chinese humiliation combine with a traditional preference for self-reliance and a cultural concept of Chinese superiority to prevent China from easily trusting other

states or dealing with them on an equal basis".

China is, in fact, still fighting its way out of centuries of isolation, still deciding how it can maintain its security and "Chineseness" while implementing an apparently necessary integration into the international community. Despite the notions of some outsiders to the contrary, China's foreign policy continues to be propelled by national interests rather than ideology. Identification with the Third World contributes toward achievement of those basic Chinese goals that do not change under successive leaderships: achievement of national security and international recognition of China's rightful position of prominence and authority".

Beijing is conscious of its national self-interests and is unlikely to compromise them for the sake of hallowed Third World principles. Instead, China's representatives have adopted a conservative modus operandi which balances criticisms of the First and Second Worlds with Beijing's own search for development assistance and the protection of international conventions".

The future of China's relationship with the Third World remains uncertain, although China's self-identification with that group will almost certainly continue well into the 21st century. Because it is difficult to define the Third World and because Chinese policy is so clearly driven, as it must be, by China's own national concerns, China's Third World relations will undoubtedly depend more and more on individual relations with Third World states. ...China's need to deal separately with Third World nations, to come out from the refuge of an umbrella Third World policy, will become increasingly clear as the points of conflict between China and Third World countries develop unevenly - as they are bound to do."⁹⁸

That China pursues her own agenda while purporting to assist others is not, nor should it be, surprising. What this points out is the necessity for us to be familiar with

what China's concerns actually happen to be, the time table that China expects them to occur by, and domestic variables that color China's own decision making.

Harding suggests that the PRC will work through bilateral channels, primarily or only, in the course of her diplomatic and/or international activities, rather than seek regional or Third World leadership roles (as Lillian Craig Harris suggests).⁹⁹ I submit that China will actively seek *de facto* regional roles or influence through selective bilateral relationships, thereby effectively offsetting hegemonic influences of other great powers (and any other would-be usurper of regional influence, be it Russian or European or Japanese or South Asian or whatever). This type of interest from the PRC will be most certainly directed toward the Middle East; the Middle East has long been recognized by China's leadership as playing a critical role in international stability and even in the safety of China itself.¹⁰⁰

An initial relative scarcity of resources available for external distribution or otherwise to be allocated via international programs of aid or assistance kept China from being able to compete with other nations (especially the USSR), through economic largesse. The PRC also experienced a unique series of domestic constraints and internal growing pains (the GLF and GPCR) that hampered efforts to implement consistent foreign policy applications.

By the time China began a more active Middle East role in the middle 1950s, her emphasis, like that of the Soviets, had shifted to a predominantly Arab approach. Israel was relegated to aggressor status. Various subsequent trade agreements began with Egypt in 1955. The intermediary aspect of China's Middle East activity also was demonstrated in 1955 as the PRC acted as midwife between Egypt and Czechoslovakia to arrange an arms deal for Egypt; such third party inputs, or more distant political support and encouragement, was frequently China's vehicle of choice (or only vehicle), for Middle East involvement.¹⁰¹ By early 1956 Egypt was the first Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with China.

The Suez crisis of 1956 generated comparatively immense Chinese concern, both of a practical and rhetorical nature. Offers of monetary support and manpower assistance (250,000 troops), were made to Cairo from Beijing.¹⁰² Meanwhile, Syria and Yemen joined Egypt in establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, followed by Iraq in 1958.

Growing contacts with Yemen led to Chinese involvement in the revolutionary struggles located on the southern Arabian peninsula; PRC advisors and materiel assisted the PFLOAG until 1971. Chinese workers also assisted with road building and related projects in Yemen during the early 1960s. The establishment of the PLO in 1964 was followed by PLO delegations to China in 1965 and PRC support (arms and training as well as rhetoric), for the PLO in 1966. As China

grew away from her combative revolutionary approach to international affairs, she toned down her rhetoric and assistance, but without altering the sense of importance associated with the Middle East. Further PRC contact with the PLO grew increasingly moderate, culminating in the 1971 PRC statement that PLO terrorism was not condoned, although PRC support for the PLO continues. These years also saw Chinese rhetorical support (and minimal practical support), for other revolutionary groups or movements elsewhere in Asia and Africa.

China's activity in the Middle East turned a corner as the 1970s began. PRC withdrawal from regional revolutionary conflicts preceded diplomatic recognition by Kuwait in 1971; by 1975 the range and quantity of Chinese exports to Kuwait exceeded those to any other Middle East state. China's diplomatic relations now included all Middle East states except Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain and Qatar.¹⁰³

The 1980s saw continued Chinese political moderation in the Middle East and elsewhere. The PRC was generating over \$1 billion of welcome foreign exchange from that region during each year of the early 1980s. Arms deals and trade continued with other Middle East countries, both those with official PRC relations and those without, although priorities of PRC assistance to ideological lines or revolutionary pursuits were no longer evident. Chinese activity in the UN supported "Third World" aspirations as the first PRC veto in

1981 attempted to aid Tanzania's Salim A. Salim gain the UN Secretary Generalship from Waldheim.¹⁰⁴ The Iran-Iraq war of 1980 eventually found Chinese aid going to both belligerents, as well as elsewhere in the Gulf region; the PRC missile sale to Saudi Arabia in 1988 was one of the final results of that conflict.

In this region China is able, with relatively minimal input, to either: 1) offset U.S. and other influence and/or designs; 2) keep a certain level of friction between the U.S. and other powers by maintaining (just enough) regional instability, though not to the level that threatens international stability; or 3) to assist U.S. and/or other (former USSR) objectives in the vicinity by acquiescence or direct collusion. Even with a quiet presence there China is able to significantly affect the international equation as it pertains to the Middle East.

Among contiguous states, China's main concerns are Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia and South Asia (also, of course, the former USSR). Like Russia, the number of potential disgruntled neighbors is large, but China's great advantages, however, include knowing that anyone would be foolish to seriously invade or otherwise begin hostilities with China, also that China does not suffer from the potentially debilitating internecine strife of competing nationalities (as might the USSR). The PRC's huge population, indigenous resources and growing technological capability would provide insurmount-

able barriers to any would-be antagonist. Only India could perhaps survive such a struggle with China, although the cost would be enormous, for doubtful outcomes.

3. Diplomatic

By contrast to the former USSR, most of China's international activity (aside from the Korean War), from 1950 to the mid 1970s consisted primarily of diplomatic maneuvering. The few economic resources that were available for "hands on" PRC foreign policy were utilized where they were expected to most effectively promote China's interests. Within the Middle East China's efforts centered on Egypt, Kuwait and the southern Arabian peninsula, as she continuously tried to buttress her position vis-a-vis Taiwan and the UN.

It has been suggested that with the USSR's demise, China is actively seeking to promote itself as a Socialist counterweight to U.S. primacy in the Middle East, South Africa, and elsewhere.¹⁰⁵ This, I maintain, has been one of China's aims throughout, regardless of the position or health of other great powers. That is, whether it was the U.S. or former USSR now in the Middle East, China would seek to promote a counterweight, any counterweight, against it: this could be a socialist counterweight, or an economic alternative counterweight, or etc..

China in 1990 has been celebrating the 2,000th anniversary of the Silk Road. Aside from enjoying this birthday, one ostensible purpose of the lengthy event is to help clear

away the negative image caused by Tienanmen. The June 1989 massacre set China's diplomatic initiatives back quite a lot, especially with regard to the large industrial powers. But China's response to repair that episode has been to ply the Middle East with visits, increased trade and economic packages, and gradually work her way back into the international mainstream.

a. Taiwan

It is very much in mainland China's interests, in its dealings with Taiwan, to isolate it diplomatically and otherwise. If Taiwan could be effectively isolated within the international community, then China would have easier access to Taiwan's diplomatic ramparts. Recent pragmatic and constructive initiatives coming from both Beijing and Taipei have been directed toward each other, and imply an interest on both sides to pursue constructive avenues towards discussion.

Regarding eventual reunification of PRC and ROC, the question is becoming not so much a matter of *if* as it is of *when*. Taiwan's concerns include having to experience a drop in living standards, or being swamped by a possible swarm of job seekers. China, in turn, is doing her best to close the PCGNP gap, at least between Taiwan and the coastal provinces.

The Tiananmen episode hurt China's efforts in this diplomatic sphere with Taiwan, as well. Although the PRC established full diplomatic relations with all countries in

the Middle East, Taiwan has continued to maintain some contacts in that area. Immediately after the events of Tienanmen, through April 1990, Taipei has had more success with Third World countries than has Beijing.¹⁰⁶

b. Reduce Great Power Influence

Reduction of Great Power (read U.S. and USSR) influence in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, has long been a central tenet of China's foreign policy efforts, and very similar, if not identical, to Beijing's desire to render the Middle East influence-free. A curious twist of fate has helped to provide at least this one policy of China's with great success. For not only did the USSR pull out of Afghanistan, but its demise (not appreciated by the conservatives or the liberals in Beijing), has also removed USSR presence from all of Central Asia. China now must deal with the independently minded Republics just on the other side of her borders; Beijing is clearly concerned about the impact of potential Muslim or pan-Turkic nationalism, especially as it might develop in Kazakhstan, Kirgystan and Tajikistan, on her western-most, troublesome, and strategic provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang.

China provided direct assistance (via Pakistan), to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This assistance started before the invasion, but was most extensive, in conjunction with aid from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, after the Soviets were inside Afghanistan.

China's aid included the provision of military training to the Afghans. Of all the PRC aid that went to the Afghans, some of it was direct, although much was coordinated (and even paid for) by the U.S. via Pakistan.

B. DOES ISRAEL HAVE OR EXERCISE A "CHINA POLICY?"

Israel, of all the countries under consideration in this chapter, probably has the most pronounced ideas and intents of how to proceed with the Israeli-Chinese rapprochement, and also of what Israel hopes to find in that relationship.

A fact of Israel's existence has been a considerable amount of isolation. To counter this trend, and make some friends in the process, Israel sought relations and interaction with other developing countries (Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and elsewhere). At the peak of this activity, Israel had sent over 7,000 various experts on official bilateral and multilateral missions, and more than 20,000 people came from these countries to Israel for training.¹⁰⁷ But the Arab countries were also getting more involved with the pan-African movement and OAU, which was being reciprocated by the African countries towards the Arabs. In 1973, after the war, most African states (except for Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, severed relations with Israel).

Israel, of all the Middle Eastern countries, has demonstrated the most long-standing interest in establishing relations with China and, as is the case with relations between any two countries, is no doubt doing what she can to

ensure that the relationship remains viable and/or interesting, if not profitable, for China.

Israel began her attempt to secure diplomatic access to China by being among the first states in the world, and the first in the Levant, to recognize China in 1950. For various reasons, including the Korean War, China was unable and unwilling to reciprocate, and then became involved in the Bandung spirit which led China to court the Arabs instead of Israel. Israel has much to gain from increasing her outlets to the world, and can be expected to pursue her new access to China with due diligence; this is true whether for reasons of economics, security and R&D, or increased diplomatic exposure.

1. Economic

Avraham Tamir, director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, said in 1988: "The Far East has two-thirds of the world's population and its emerging economic superpowers...if we don't change our perception, we will lose the future". That quote just about says it all; Israel is plainly aware, or at least more so, of where respective population strengths are located, and so on. Israel's director-general of economic affairs at the Foreign Ministry, Yitzchak Minervi, proceeded to visit Beijing in October 1988. At the visit China "expressed a willingness to supply Israel with oil and coal, while the Israeli representative was said to have come with a list of some twenty proposals for helping China in such fields

as farming, technology, medicine, industry, fishing, and energy, well beyond restricted defense aid".¹⁰⁸

It is obviously in Israel's interest to generate as many outlets or avenues for trade and diplomatic interaction as possible. Not only trade, but also potential sources to share costs of R&D, and perhaps even actual production of whatever, either as a shared venture for domestic purposes only (e.g.: defense), or for joint profit on international markets. The UN (Israel's original benefactor), and the U.S. (Israel's current benefactor), cannot be depended on forever to provide the external support Israel has required to survive and thrive.

a. New Markets

China is obviously full of potential to be a recipient of Israeli goods. It is the old capitalist dream of being able to tap that market. Israel hasn't the capacity to produce enough to saturate China's market (no one does), meaning that Israel, once having gained access, could pull out the stops and reap considerable rewards.

There has been considerable quiet evidence that Israel was offering or providing assistance to China during the late 1980s in the following areas: countertrade, technical assistance, and agricultural programs.¹⁰⁹ For sensitive reasons, not wishing to upset the sensitivities of Arab states or the U.S., etc., this information was not waved about in public by the politicians.

Israel's standing throughout the world is still not on easy street. For example, their embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, was destroyed by a bomb on 17 March 1992; the Argentine government suspected terrorists, internal and foreign, who performed the deed. Argentina now has the largest Jewish community in South America (220,000), is a haven for World War II Nazis, and they are upset at Argentina's improving ties with Israel.

b. Diversification

A combination of avenues for support, regardless of the ties of world Jewry or other links, would make it easier for Israel to follow her own dictates rather than the wishes of someone else. As always, the more avenues of support for Israel, the better. Israel will always attempt to keep the voices of support pluralistic, or disjointed, rather than a harmonized chorus with shared intent and/or direction/purpose.

Israel's economy is more likely to develop on the side of high tech rather than mass production or agriculture, due simply to its relative small size and diversity. Hence Israel has the added requirement to produce a wide variety of smarter goods, and to have a broader distribution available for those goods. This in turn generates additional needs for Israel to lock in the initial funding required to work in this high tech arena.

As another example of Israel's intent to buttress its own support, economically and diplomatically, it has been seeking and establishing broader ties with South Africa recently. In 1991 South Africa's President visited Israel, which was the first time since 1978 for a South African leader to be in Israel. Israel lifts sanctions against South Africa in July 1990.

2. Security

National security is the premier agenda for every Israeli government. One of the benefits Israel hopes to achieve by having established relations with China is to somehow have a voice in China's arms sales to the Arabs, although it is unlikely that Israel might gain, with China, the same access to decision making about which weapons the Arabs receive, as with the U.S. Prospects for generating a China Lobby would seem to be nebulous at best. However, this could be difficult, unless Israel can find some way of making themselves appealing or valuable to the Chinese. After representing Israel at the normalization procedure in Beijing, David Levy (Israel's Foreign Minister) spoke with Qian Qichen and discussed, among other things, the arms race in the Middle East. Levy believed that "the fact that we are listening to one another...will somehow stem this flow of arms."¹⁰ The imperative nature of grasping this particular problem of arms proliferation was literally brought home to Israel during the Gulf War, when Israel experienced being the recipient of SCUD

missiles launched from Iraq as part of Iraq-Kuwait Gulf War, 18 Jan 1991 (Israel did not respond).

Again, with the U.S. as the primary and perhaps only backer of Israel for security purposes, aside from Israel's own burgeoning industries and other European suppliers, Israel more and more places herself at risk to being dictated to regarding what equipment she may have and even what she may do with it. To Israel, this is not attractive, to say the least.

It is conjectured that China, as of 1987, had purchased as much as \$3b of military equipment from Israel.¹¹¹

a. Possible R&D Assistance

Again, obviously, China is probably better situated to gain more from, and to better utilize through reverse engineering, R&D than any other country in the world. China is also probably better situated to participate in whatever R&D projects she wishes, with whomever she wants to participate with, than any other country - at least in the long run. This is due to her relative isolation from other entangling alliances and the obligations/restrictions imposed by those alliances, plus China's relative wealth (on a national scale), that will allow her to pursue almost anything. Israel is "banking" on this set of realities, that China could readily make use of R&D, and that Israel can provide it for them. The only true restrictions China will face, regarding R&D, will come from her perceptions of the

reactions of others and whether or not China will wish to respond to those perceptions.

Israel has certain projects that she would very much like to proceed with, such as the Lavi fighter aircraft. However, the expense of the unit, its proposed utility and so on were not conducive to the U.S. to warrant continued funding of that project for Israel. Hence Israel received another pill of awareness reminding her of the degree of dependence (to the U.S.) she is in right now.

To that end, and from Israel's point of view, the encouragement of the development of internal lines of communication (i.e.: infrastructure) within China is a good thing. Ironically, strengthening China will have the concomitant effect of keeping her pliant and malleable. Isolating China will make her moody and possibly dangerous, in a capriciously unpredictable sort of way. Israel seems to have grasped this fact, and is proceeding with her program of economic and diplomatic diversification.

b. Diversification

There is evidence that Israel was offering and probably providing military assistance to China from the late 1980s on, as was mentioned above.¹¹² For China, this is good, at least for the moment. China is in the midst of modernizing her forces, and also of reconfiguring her forces. Assistance of the sort that Israel might be able to provide would be very handy. This type of assistance will not always

be useful, because China will, sooner or later, make all the adjustments and additions she wants (militarily). At that point, Israel will need to make a readjustment in terms of what Israel might continue to be able to provide which China would find useful.

The danger to this approach is that, sooner or later, if China manages to come up to speed, China herself will be able to provide all and more than what she needs or wants. At that point, Israel will have to find something else to do or offer, if she wishes to be unique.

One obvious immediate goal for Israel is to find a plethora of markets within which to sell her war products and thereby help to keep them affordable. China just might be able to provide some help in this respect.

Defense Minister Arens visited Beijing in November 1991, followed by a business delegation and the head of a state-run arms manufacturer. Various sources have confirmed Israel as having sold items to China in the areas of missiles, guidance systems, and fire-control systems for tanks. Israel is also strong in avionics, tank armor and armaments, and may well have sold some of these items to China as well: "Israel is known to be less than scrupulous about onpassing embargoed arms technologies, as recently revealed in South Africa".¹¹³ This trip by Arens to Beijing was preparatory to subsequent Israel-PRC normalization.

3. Diplomatic

Unlike other states, Israel's relation to the effects of diplomacy is much closer to home. It was diplomacy (in equal or greater weight than economics or other concerns), that first gained for Israel her charter as an independent state. It is the continued use of diplomacy, with at least as much importance or clout as economic and military venues, that continues to retain for Israel her lines of support and her viability as an independent state.

Israel is also concerned about China's arms sales to the Middle East in general, some of which are ironically improved by virtue of Israel's own initial assistance to China. With normalization, Israel feels it will have a greater voice in calling China's attention to this concern.

a. Recognition

Direct recognition by China is expected to be a boon to Israel's diplomatic maneuverings. Such recognition would do much to open other doors for economic, etc., interaction, as well as provide another (ostensibly) friendly voice within international councils/perceptions. With each advantage comes disadvantages: China's increased presence, or more immediate accessibility, via diplomatic normalization of relations may also increase the weight of Israel's reliance upon China, if the PRC should ever be displeased with Israeli actions/reactions, on whatever subject.

b. Dilute U.S. Influence

This factor, above all the others, and throughout all the others, is a primary concern for Israel in its quest for diversification. It will reduce the necessity of maintaining an exceptional lobbying apparatus in the U.S., and it will possibly broaden avenues of financial support. This potential added support, however, will not be of the variety and quality and dependability of the sort found through the U.S. Jewish community. Israel will have to play a careful diplomatic game for many years, while at the same time endeavoring to stabilize and wean their economy away from reliance on external largesse.

C. DO OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES HAVE OR EXERCISE A "CHINA POLICY?"

The answer here is also yes, but possibly to a lesser degree, relatively speaking, than the policy maintained by Israel, or than that evidenced by China towards the Middle East. This is partially because the other Middle East states are still learning their statecraft, and partially because of the plethora of voices resident within the Levant.

Egypt, influenced partially by Soviet contributions to the Allied effort during World War II, was the first Arab state to establish continuous relations with the USSR in 1943. Iraq and Lebanon followed suit in 1944. In 1947 the USSR voted in favor of the Palestine Partition, then in 1948 was the second state (after the U.S.) to recognize Israel and even helped

supply arms to that new country, thus assisting the initial Zionist war effort. Shortly after, however, the Soviets reoriented their efforts in favor of the Arab states and Israel grew more isolated.

1. Economic

The benefits of interaction with China are much the same for the other Middle East states as they are for Israel. Perhaps even more so, because most external powers interacting with the Middle East historically have wanted a slice of the Middle East pie (oil rights, profit sharing, base agreements, landing rights, overflight rights, etc). China does not give this appearance; her "slice" may simply be the added benefits to security and diplomatic maneuvering and economics afforded by interaction with the Middle East. China simply doesn't have a history of interfering in that region, nor does she now indicate or show a desire that she wants to do so. That alone makes China especially appealing to the Levant, and more than offsets any real or apparent quality dilemmas with Chinese goods or range of services available through aid. Most of the benefit in Chinese/Middle East interaction now goes to China anyway.

a. New Markets

Abu Dhabi, in the Gulf Coast, is planning trade missions to go to the Far East. Abu Dhabi's earnings are now \$15b/yr from oil revenues (and they are pumping extra to make up for the shortfall by Kuwait and Iraqi), plus \$90b/yr from

investments. Abu Dhabi, and the other Gulf states, are looking wisely to increase their economic interaction overseas.¹¹⁴

A major concern of Oman is precisely to increase their avenues of economic participation, either by inviting activities into the country, or by utilizing investment and going abroad. Oman among all the Gulf states has a cosmopolitan tradition, and has hosted several leading Chinese delegations in the process of exploring economic alternatives.

One can only wonder at the reactions of the other Middle Eastern states to this new circumstance. We are aware of Chinese arms sales to the region, but little mention is made of Chinese economic ventures into or out of the Middle East. As of 1985, indirect trade between China and Saudi Arabia had reached \$100m annually.

Prior to the Gulf hostilities between Iraq and Kuwait, China had done extensive contract work in Kuwait. It is said that most of the public buildings there were built by the Chinese, although contracts for their reconstruction after the war have gone to U.S. companies.

b. Location for Investment

The Director of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Abdul-Latif Yousif Al Hamad, believes that a united Gulf market could take the place of Hong Kong as an international banking center when Hong Kong reverts to China in 1977. This would require the GCC states to pool their

financial and human resources, and work together to defend and develop their position. This is seen as a genuine possibility by the Gulf residents, with their advantage increased by geographic advantages. However, if they do not act soon, and act together, this idea to replace Hong Kong could be swamped by globalization.¹¹⁵

In December 1984, a manager of the International Business and Credit Bank told the correspondents of Xing Hua News Agency that Middle East investors regard China as one of the best countries for investment in the world.¹¹⁶ Certainly the rate of return on investment will be good, provided the investment itself survives.

As mentioned previously, China as a vehicle for investment or other services is generally regarded favorably within the Middle East, relative to what the Middle East has experienced when receiving help from other sources (Britain, U.S., USSR, and so on).

2. Security

The topic of security, between China and the Middle East, needs little introduction. At the height of arms sales during the Iran-Iraq war, China was selling about \$2b worth of weapons annually, with most of that going to the Middle East.

As for the arms sales to the Middle East that originate with the U.S., Israel exercises a fair amount of veto power over how much and what type may be sold to other Middle East states. For this reason alone, it is not hard to imagine

a hard pressed or determined buyer going out to find another supplier, regardless of whatever else the buyer might think of the seller.

a. "General Store"

In keeping with China's general attractiveness to Arabs as a source of aid and/or investment, and also of China's apparent willingness to sell whatever is available (provided that "stability" is maintained), and in keeping also with China's desire to offset the influence of other major powers, it makes a great deal of analogous sense to consider China as an international "General Store", or 7-11, open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

This is not meant to be sarcastic or belittling, but to emphasize the nature of the economic reality now facing the world. But having said this, I still do not want to suggest that money is the only criterion used by China when considering a sale of whatever. The other factors that go into the sale are all of the above: modernizing China, maintaining stability in the region, offsetting the influence of other powers. As an example of this type of selective largesse: in Oman the local Chinese medicine clinic (two of them, staffed by Chinese), received just as much press as any of the arms sales in the gulf, and that was while the allied armada was massing for the attack on Iraq to free Kuwait.

b. Diversification

The obvious entry in this section starts with the Saudis, who were not happy with their inability to purchase *Lance* missiles from the U.S., so they went to China instead. There is another entry to make for the Syrians, who recently managed to acquire needed materials for their own construction of missiles (so China could say the PRC didn't sell any missiles to Syria).

Added to this are other instances of China's assisting Middle Eastern countries (Algeria, Pakistan) with materials and advice for the construction of nuclear facilities.

3. Diplomatic

Aside from groups such as the PLO, who need all the support they can find, diplomatic muscle has not been a primary goal sought by the Middle Eastern countries with respect to China. They are impressed, of course, with the weight China carries by having a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, but in terms of individual bilateral recognition, that has not been a primary goal.

In 1964, Arafat helped to establish the PLO liaison office in Beijing. His third visit to China occurred in May 1984, and in December 1991 he visited there again. China has consistently supported the PLO through moral support, and also through materiel and training during the early stages of their relationship. China has since taken a more moderate or

balanced tone with the PLO; shortly after Arafat's visit to Beijing in December 1991, China's Vice Foreign Minister Yang Fuchang visited Israel to discuss normalization plans.

As but one example of China's regional presence now in the Middle East, even in view of their overall relatively modest investment in the area, the New UN Secretary General praised China as a "leader and defender of the developing world". The new Secretary General is Boutros Boutros Ghali, an Egyptian, who made those remarks during a visit to Beijing on 13 April 1992.

VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Before delving into policy implications for the U.S. regarding China and the Middle East, initial comments on world affairs and the nature of foreign policy will assist our methodology and provide additional support for the conclusions.

The requirement is little short of paramount for America to be judicious and steady with its policy decisions in the coming years. Much is changing in the world, much more than mere discussion about Bipolarity being superceded by Multipolarity. Politics the world over are reorienting themselves as the New Order continues to unfold. Europe is on the verge of political union, Moscow now rules a nation (and perhaps a Commonwealth) instead of an empire, the UN is gaining new responsibilities, China is evolving, the Middle East is joining the global community, satellite coverage is being provided for all of China and East Asia, Cold War antagonisms are fading¹¹⁷ and both older and newer frictions are surfacing.¹¹⁸

Additionally, global environments and economics are also changing; they themselves are perhaps the primary impetus for the evolving New Order. Economies are expanding, but domestic spending is tight. Many developing nations, not to mention the U.S., are heavily in debt and seeking ways to reschedule their obligations or otherwise lessen the repayment severity.

The U.S. S&L bailout alone has a higher price tag than our bill for World War II. Gaps between rich and poor, both domestically and internationally, have grown exponentially in the last 30 years: on average, 20% of the population controls 80% of the wealth. Evidence of environmental despoilation in Eastern Europe, also Taiwan, China and East Asia, plus the developing countries, has created a new global issue that is attracting everyone's attention. The recent UN sponsored environmental discussion and treaty preparation at Rio was the largest gathering of heads of state ever to occur; ecological concerns are rapidly becoming priorities with domestic as well as foreign agendas.

Asia, now with well over half of the world's population, figures more and more prominently in U.S. politics and economics. The Pacific Rim is fast supplanting every other region of the globe in just about every measurable category. Six of the nine largest armies of the world, not including the U.S. and former USSR, are located in the region; the next five are found in the Middle East and Taiwan.¹¹⁹ For the last 20 years, average annual economic growth in Asia has been almost 10%, with this expected to continue; during the next decade Asian growth rates are projected to double those of the U.S. and Europe.¹²⁰ In 1980, half of all U.S. gross trade was in the Pacific. By 1986, this trade grew to be an overwhelming majority (75% more than with Atlantic countries).¹²¹ It is anticipated that by 2000, U.S. trade in the Pacific will be

twice as much as that in the Atlantic. Much of this trade is with Japan and the NICs, also ASEAN, but there is nothing to suggest that China will not eventually share her respective percentage (an enormous percentage), of this economic activity.

Economies in the region, even across the Pacific, are highly intertwined: multinational companies, instantaneous communications, rapid transit, floating currencies, cross-national television, shared environmental concerns, fluid skilled adult relocations, investments and more are combining to reduce national purviews. Such is the close interaction of the region that it has been suggested, for example, that Japanese representatives in the not-too-distant future may well be in Washington and vice versa, with these officials having at least observer status if not themselves becoming active participants in the political process.¹²² When and if this occurs, officials between Washington and Brussels may also likely make exchanges.

Central Asia is now a big question mark, as five new Republics have appeared through the USSR's demise. A host of new international ramifications emerge in the process of sorting out traditional rivalries and tensions in that area, not to mention reassessing former Soviet relations with the Northern Tier (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey). China as well will be keenly interested in developments in the region, as Tibet and Xinjiang border on three of those five new

Republics. Secretary of State Baker travelled there shortly after their formation to make assessments and try to insert a modicum of stability through diplomatic activity and recognition.

Traditional U.S. emphasis on NATO and Europe ought not to be discarded, but readjusted; there must be due recognition of current and future centers of trade, populations, and all of their attendant concerns. An editorial by Kissinger, early in 1989, saw Europe as the continued undisputed center of future global events, despite Gorbachev and *perestroika*; the events in Berlin, Beijing, Moscow, and the Persian Gulf, which were then just around the corner, had unfortunately for Kissinger not yet occurred.¹²³ One example of this shifting emphasis has been military reallocations by Congress: U.S. troop strength in Europe has recently been cut to 100,000, with future cuts likely as Europe readjusts. Meanwhile, 23,000 are now stationed full time in the Persian Gulf region (75% of those are with the Navy).

As for the current state of world affairs in terms of armaments, modern weaponry is coming into a world of its own. One indication of how weaponry impacts our lives is provided by this comparative review on space requirements for tactical troop movements: in Ancient times, 1 square kilometer was required for 100,000 troops. Napoleon required 20 square kilometers, World War I saw that requirement increased to 248, World War II increased it further to 3,000, Israel's Yom

Kippur War needed 4,000 square kilometers for 100,000 men, and 1978 NATO maneuvers in West Germany required 55,500 square kilometers for 100,000 men.¹²⁴ Participating units in World War II's nautical battle for Midway utilized much of the entire Pacific Ocean; current naval architecture and technology allows for future nautical engagements to cover multiple ocean groups. The recent Gulf War saw a UN coalition of scores of unlikely allies opposing Iraq; the combination of high-tech and medieval tactics that ensued, even through a relatively short duration, completely engulfed the region (including Iran, whose passive acquiescence generated as many ramifications as her active participation would have). Hostilities in the contemporary arena, then, especially on sensitive issues, have broad tentacles and are not to be taken lightly.

It is clear, then, that proper response to the question of U.S. policy regarding China and the Middle East in the 1990s and beyond, with special reference to China's own interaction with the Middle East, requires that we take into account several variables, in differing regions, that may well affect or otherwise be affected by the U.S.-PRC-Middle East triangle. Moreover, the Middle East is very fast becoming a region unlike anything which we have seen or known in that area within corporate memory, and is doing so very much at the visible heart of extensive trade routes and the not-so-visible heart of religious and emotional concerns. Ramifications for

any one issue involving these relationships may well spill over into other issues.

Items, therefore, that may likely affect our dealings with the PRC and/or the Middle East, over and above relations that might exist directly between the Middle East and China, or between the three of us together, include: the UN's evolving roles, China and the Spratlys and the Paracels, the Soviet Union's dissolution, Europe's emergence as a unified bloc, trade blocs in general, regional security concerns plus the arms trade, technology and communication advances, the phenomena of fundamentalism, and resource management to include ecological concerns. Each of these items is a subject in itself. But the speed with which various concerns are called to our respective attention, or with which they are intertwined, causes us to be mindful of the others while directing specific attention to any one of them.

Two more comments on method before proceeding:

1) It was stated earlier that our world views might well experience modifications and thereby become more effective and responsible, prior to our generation of policies and directives, if we first became aware of what the other guy was thinking and why he thought that way.¹²⁵ The other side of this, of course, is that we also have thoughts, in a certain collective manner, and do so - or try to do so - as responsibly as possible. Which is quite a mouthful. Because it requires us, in the realm of policy, to be as absolutely

certain as possible about the other guy, about what he is thinking and why, about the environment in which he lives, plus what he wants for his life - in addition to knowing those things about ourselves. Then, and only then, may we proceed with policy and its implementation.

A natural question at this point is to ask where we should first direct our attention: to the other guy or ourselves? Because knowing one effects how we know the other. There is no rule, other than that we do both as best we can. Chicken or egg dilemmas do not apply, for we start wherever we happen to be, and the rest is a process. Usually we begin with ourselves, but understanding someone else helps us to know ourselves (and vice versa), much as learning another language provides insight into our own. It is a back and forth process, which, sooner or later, hopefully incorporates dialogue, communiques, and all the rest. If there is no dialogue, then we do everything possible to make genuine dialogue happen, ensuring throughout that the integrity of everyone concerned is scrupulously maintained. Every fence has (at least) two sides; if we live with fences, then we need to demarcate them and become mutually comfortable and familiar with each side, arrange for its maintenance and security, and so on. If we live without fences, or with gates or other access from side to side, then we need to be prepared for subsequent developments and recognize, all the more, that effective dialogue is a *sine qua non*.

(When we broach the extremely sensitive realm of suggesting or even claiming what the other guy should do, aside from what he wants to do, we run the risk of being no more effective than the most extreme fanatic regarding whatever).

2) Still yet another assumption surfacing through these pages is the accepted premise that, all things being equal, it is the case that people will - for the most part - choose the positive (or better, or good) side of an issue, provided the individual or group has all the pertinent information and facts at their disposal. Which is not unlike Confucianism. In other words, if someone knows the good, then they will choose the good, which is why dialogue and exchange and education become so meaningful. Now this proposition is by no means certain, for it depends on what any particular group or society regards as acceptable or necessary, and has been much debated from the Greeks through to the present (if for no other reason than simply a lasting curiosity over how best to prove or disprove it). But regardless of its place in reality, and whether or not it is true or only just wishful thinking, I mention it here because it is incumbent on us to ensure that "good" decisions are made, to ensure that all the education and training and quality of life necessary to enact proper decision making are available not only to ourselves but also to all those with whom we interact.

A tricky aspect of this is in the manner of providing or recognizing the tools (education, etc.), available to all who

need them, without impairing the system which receives or perhaps already has some of those tools, or without assuming that since "they" are not like "us" it therefore becomes necessary for "them" to first change in order to benefit from (our) tools and education.

Dialogue is learning as well as teaching, accepting as well as proselytizing, with the entire process leading to agreements, compromises, and hopefully further appointments. Dialogues, by definition, require participation from more than one party: if the required participation is not present, then the dialogue is either shut down or someone takes the trouble to somehow, and respectfully, inform the other that some sort of agreeable participatory exercise must occur. The sun shines over all of us. Each fact must be considered, not just those that might be in front of our noses, or those which we prefer. Responsibility is sometimes extremely difficult, and might even be impossible under severe cases; perhaps a proper response in those instances, all things being equal, would simply be to keep the doors clean, strong, and open (or hinged and able to open), then hunker down and wait. If we were ever to come under attack, then we respond accordingly, proportionately, and, if necessary, we "whip their ass".¹²⁶ Where other measures might be required for the sanctity of life and freedom of choice, then so be it.¹²⁷ These procedures are all aspects of passive and active diplomacy, as Clausewitz reminds us. Anything less is irresponsible.

A. U.S. AND THE PRC

China's overriding concern, as we have seen, is to modernize. The absolute crux of any U.S. policy process with regard to China in the 1990s and beyond is recognition of this fact, as well as, especially, also recognizing that virtually all of China's leaders are themselves reformers. They are all entirely intent on reforming China. They differ, however, on their understanding of how reform is to occur. Therefore, again, during this current period of Four Modernizations, some are "liberals" or "reformers", while others are "hardliners" or "conservatives". Under Mao, all of them would have been "moderates" (with the Maoists being "leftists"). There are undoubtedly some leftists in the government today, but their heyday is over; the moderate distinctions which now prevail were less pronounced during the 1950s and 1960s.

This current hierarchy of Chinese rulers, with its differences of reformist categories, generates interesting responses when superimposed on the ethical realm. First of all, the fact that the hierarchy is entirely reformist of one stripe or another, is "good", in a strictly utilitarian and/or historical sense. Beyond that, the choices they make of how or even why to enact this reform, as liberals or hardliners, and how they choose to be liberal or conservative, can be "good" or "bad". There are at least two levels of activity within the Chinese political spectrum as presently configured. It is of crucial importance for us to note these two strata;

on the one hand we can appreciate the underlying and primary task that all members of the PRC hierarchy are genuinely involved with, on the other hand we can, as required, respond more critically regarding their methodology and day to day choices.

Passing judgment on an official's methodology, simultaneously along with the fact that he/she occupies a place in the government to begin with, is wrong. To pass judgment on a hardliner simply because it is expected that there was nothing he/she could do that was beneficial for China, regardless of the probability that it would be excruciatingly slow, is wrong.

On top of these two strata, there is the intriguing and difficult position currently occupied by Deng. As mentioned before, not only does he balance conservatives and liberals, but he alternately supports one faction, then the other, despite his preference for reform at full speed ahead. While he has been trying to retire older (conservative) members, and bring younger technocrats and others likely to back liberal reform measures into the CCP, he still needs the support of his major players to maintain the viability of the CCP. This was especially true after Tiananmen. Regardless of appearances that take center stage from one month to the next, it is unwise to pin specific labels on Deng, especially if those labels are of a conservative bent.

It is absolutely imperative for the U.S. to keep China, as much as possible, interacting with the world community. China will, eventually, reach the point where few options will be unavailable to her; for China to be in such a position and at the same time shunned by the world community, hence alone or not on speaking terms with other states, would certainly not give China much reason to make decisions that would be in concert with the best interests of the international community. It simply makes good sense, not to mention the opportunity we might have in passing to share other alternatives or options with the Chinese, to continue as much contact with them as possible. We must keep China involved in a two way street of exchange and interaction.

1. Ideology and the "Death of Communism"

Among China's classical corpus is a work entitled The General Mirror for the Aid of Government. It was compiled before 1086, as an aid to Chinese Emperors on how to best conduct their business. Mao studied this work while in Yanan after the Long March. Deng was also a student of this work, and studied it thoroughly while living in Nanchang, Jiangxi, after being purged from the central government during the GPCR. On Aug. 3, 1972, Deng wrote to Mao, at Zhou's suggestion, admitted that he had made mistakes, and confessed that he had been wrong with saying in 1962 (after the GLF), that it mattered not whether a cat was black or white so long as it caught the mouse. In February 1973 Deng and his family left

Nanchang and the Jiangxi tractor factory for Beijing; on March 10, Mao and Zhou formally proposed to restore Deng as vice premier of the State Council.¹²⁸

These episodes and many others indicate that there is something else going on within the CCP than just a borrowing of Marxist thought, or even the creation of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. There is something very "Chinese" about what Mao and Zhou and Deng have been doing (and also with Chiang Kaishek and Sun Yixian before them). Obviously, to recount the early history of the CCP is to discover the Russian influence, the Moscow trained Party officials, the Comintern directives, and the constant references by Mao to the need for maintaining Marxism over revisionism. But there are other influences or aspects of the early CCP as well, such as the modernization attempts that had been ongoing for almost a century within China, the legacy of the May Fourth movement, the influence of Europe, Japan and the U.S. as well as that of Russia, and the difficulties of voicing or representing western ideas through the Chinese language.

This last item is significant, because regardless of the ideas being translated into Chinese, whether they are religious, political, or whatever, direct translation from western Judeo-Christian romanization into the ideogrammatic, Confucian and Buddhist milieu of the Chinese language is just about impossible. This one hurdle is almost enough in itself to question whether what the Chinese have been doing can be

best described as Communist, in the Soviet sense, rather than any other label. That is, no matter what revolutionary system the Chinese might have borrowed, it would eventually have had to be translated so as to give primary weight to the Chinese countryside, as we have seen, and so on. As for other issues such as the primacy of central planning (Soviet style) rather than decentralized control: this topic has been an ongoing subject of debate within the CCP since before the GLF. The CCP has basically agreed that modifications to the Soviet model had to be made for proper utilization within China, but the degree and scope of modifications have been debated ever since.

As for Deng's successor, there is probably no one within China who has the same authority to keep the military and political coalition together, as we mentioned earlier.¹²⁹ However, to therefore say that China will probably follow the route just taken by the USSR under Gorbachev (dissolution) is not at all self evident. Gorbachev's focus was on political reform, whereas Deng's Four Modernizations have been economic. What we do not know is the extent of Chinese political reform that will follow from those economic changes, or even how inevitable such political changes might be. Some changes are inevitable, and dissolution is certainly one of the possibilities, but there are others at least as probable if not more so, and they include:

While the overall transition which China is experiencing may well continue for another 100 years or so, the point at which China enters some sort of representative government may not be quite as distant. The type of "representative" government which might emerge, or the degree to which input from below enters into the decision making apparatus, depends much on the corresponding development of things such as law, communication, mechanisms for redress of grievances and - if need be - alterations of governmental composition, accessibility of economic advancement, quality of life, education, and so on.

It is not impossible that the Chinese predisposition for a strong center, or a version of some sort of beneficent authoritative figure, will continue to hold sway at the apex of a pyramid, as long as, for example, those at the lower rungs are satisfied that their concerns, needs, etc., were being taken into account. If advances in communication continue to make themselves available to all elements or aspects of society, which certainly appears as though this will be the case, it is not hard to imagine that a considerable degree of information would be available to whomever was at the bottom of this pyramid, hence the pyramid itself would have to be carefully responsive to its members in order to retain its integrity, continuity, longevity, and all the rest. The mandate of heaven might still somehow apply, though in a more timely manner. In other words, it does not seem impossi-

ble or even unlikely that a Chinese government could emerge in years hence that would be entirely satisfactory (and "accessible") to its people, yet be quite unlike what we now understand as representative democracy, or a federal republic. Plus, even though the governmental apex might well retain a certain appearance of immutability, yet it could preside over a vast array of ongoing change and innovation, provided - of course - that all, or a sufficient majority within the pyramid/society, were truly satisfied that their requirements for quality of life were being met.

Regardless of the fate of the term "communist", relative to the PRC, it is the studied opinion here that ideology is, at best, an adjunct to other factors in the long and short term courses of a nation's business. Fang Lizhi firmly espouses that the hierarchy no longer believes in Marxist principles (if they ever did).¹³⁰

Many in the West are now hailing the death of communism, or otherwise wondering how it has "changed", perhaps even expecting new and wonderful things for the simple reason that "Communism" is becoming unalterably compromised with capitalistic ingredients. Quotes from Lenczowski and Hamrin on the idea or role of ideology will provide frameworks for discussion:

Carol Lee Hamrin

"Ideology plays a dynamic role (in all political systems), to a greater or lesser extent. That ideology is malleable does not in any way

dismiss the fact that it performs certain functions in shaping policy behavior".

Policies require 'justification' or 'rationalization', although this is something more important than cynical window dressing for naked pursuit of national interest."

Enforcement of ideological orthodoxy serves actively to screen out ideas. (Assumptions and prevailing world views also serve this purpose)."

Imposing Orthodoxy renders illegitimate any policy options that would threaten the interests of those in power."

Foreign policy flexibility is (therefore) constrained. In the short term, some policy moves are easier and some more difficult. In the long term, major departures in strategy are almost always postponed; thus major changes in policy occur normally only with a shift in the leadership and without careful forethought and planning."¹³¹

George Lenczowski

"It is possible to debate whether (ideology) is an independent entity, using the power of the Soviet state, or whether the Soviet state has employed ideology as a useful psychological device."

Ultimately, a dynamic Soviet state interest to expand and dominate is complemented by Communist ideology and vice versa."

Interpreters (Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Gorbachev), of dogma face the age-old dilemma inherent in the adaptation of any old and petrified document to current reality: either the reality had to be molded to suit the dogma or the dogma had to be changed."

Any change in dogma is risky: the modifier is either a heretic (i.e. revisionist), or, if he becomes the victorious leader, the true believer."

Any comprehensive analysis of Soviet policies should not, therefore, rest on a mere reconstruction of observed behavior. To understand the mainsprings of such policies, it is necessary to take into account their doctrinal foundations and to follow the evolution, if any, of ideology."¹³²

Hamrin's position supports the role of ideology; for Hamrin, ideology has a role not only within an ostensibly ideological system, but also within any political system. Lenczowski, on the other hand, does not provide ideology with the same leverage, if he provides it with any leverage at all. Rather than say outright that ideology serves no purpose, however, he says that the same political outcome may be observed whether ideology is claimed to be the originator or not.

Hamrin's assumption is that, given the ubiquitous presence of ideology, and once ideology is given sway, it does not cease to relinquish that sway. This premise is very problematic. For example, even during the personal rule of a Mao Zedong, where ideology supposedly has all the advantages, it is difficult to say with certainty that decisions about policy occur without forethought or planning, or that static natures of policy are due primarily to ideology.

There is the further qualifier that interpersonal relationships vary from culture to culture, which in turn largely account for the not insignificant differences we observe between democracies (U.S., U.K., West Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy), not to mention the differences between the

formerly so-called communist bloc. The mechanisms of governing encompass a broader scope than mere bureaucratic structure or the "reasons why" certain procedures are followed or beliefs held. No doubt certain ruling individuals follow prescribed procedures because they are correct or because they believe in "the creed" above all else, but a ruling structure that deals in realities and maintaining its own position makes decisions because they are prudent or necessary. Structure wins over creed. Basically, it was not primarily ideology that safeguarded Mao's position (which was contested), but his early successes, the force of his personality and *guanxi*, and the PLA. Likewise, reforms are being propounded by Deng to give needed life to structures, not in order to find a pure or correct socialism or communism. The Cultural Revolution was largely a power struggle, not merely an exercise in ideological purity.

Probably the most telling aspect of China's modified communism was its initial appeal to the individual Chinese peasant, unlike previous domestic rule in China and guaranteed to give Mao at least the peasant's curiosity if not his loyalty. Mao's utilization of translation, etc., for purposes of leading and conveying ideas was a standard Chinese practice: that those phrases happened to incorporate or embody Marxist or Leninist thinking is secondary. If it were not Marxist then it obviously would have been something else. The point is that very similar things, Chinese things, would have

been done regardless of the reasoning provided; nomenclature is, in the final analysis, supremely irrelevant.

In this sense, Lenczowski is more correct by suggesting that ideology and the state serve or complement each other. Leaders make choices, and in the course of exercising judgment choose whether or not to chart new ground or follow existing territory.

When Hamrin speaks of "a general ideological vacuum" during the early 1980s as "the achilles heel of the (PRC) reformers", I believe she oversimplifies the dilemma of instituting various novel reforms into a traditional societal structure.¹³³

It was earlier suggested that dialogue was essential for any interaction between groups, that education or a sharing of ideas was somehow a part, a prerequisite, for dialogue. With that in mind, it is very instructive to note the degree of North American culture and/or entertainment now circling the globe and penetrating places like China. That alone has probably had more effect on the Chinese (and French, and Japanese), populous than any heretofore diplomatic interchange. The ability to turn on the TV and see Hong Kong or Taiwan or Bangkok or Seoul television programs, many of which might well have originated within the U.S., can be a very powerful stimulus. Any number of subtle impressions deposit themselves, so to speak, with the viewing audience, such as economic choices, evolving western ideas of gender

roles and sexual harassment, pluralism and participatory government, etc.

2. Superpowers?

In order to state if China is a superpower, it becomes necessary to define what a superpower is. It is presently accepted that the U.S. is a superpower. It was previously also accepted, just a short while ago, that the former USSR was a superpower. Virtually every book printed until the early 1990s, when discussing superpower reactions or relations or competitions, invariably spoke both of the U.S. and USSR as superpowers; only with rare exceptions was mention ever made of China in this regard.

Now, however, we see that the USSR was a very strong nut but with disparate pockets of meat inside, so disparate as to be non-mutually supportive (i.e.: a lousy economy). Indeed, that paucity of meat has given rise to questions of whether or not the USSR could have in fact utilized the strength of its shell, for any appreciable purpose or lengthy intent, other than defense of the homeland. After achieving this hindsight, our former certitude of assuming superpower status for the USSR now develops into a question if that status was appropriate in the first place.

Russia is still a strong country. The Central Asian Republics, members of the C.I.S., are also strong countries. As also are Israel, France, Pakistan, Iran, and (in the near future, again) Iraq. It doesn't require superpower status to

be "strong", or to be able to throw the world upside down or divide the global community into divergent hostile camps literally overnight. Russia is so strong as to actually be dangerous; bureaucrats and academicians now ask themselves if Russia can control the weaponry at its disposal, if it can prevent the disappearance of an insignificant warhead, if it can keep its troops from selling their arsenals. Superpower status, it would seem, requires not only strength but a certain stability and/or cushion (i.e.: infrastructure), from which to direct that strength.

To be ranked a superpower, therefore, requires not only a strong shell, but enough meat to hold it together and to keep it vibrant. Resources, population, infrastructure, economic and military strength, all far in excess relative to international neighbors, are superpower prerequisites. Even if these attributes are only perceived by others as resident in the superpower, or as inevitable potentials that require others to reassess their own actions in light of the looming colossus over the horizon, this is enough to grant superpower or candidate superpower status. Japan is on the verge of acquiring this rank; Japan will also never quite make it. A unified Europe is another superpower candidate; the odds are excellent of this occurring. As for China - there is no doubt that superpower status will someday be appropriate: the question is when. Tacit recognition of this reality has already been accorded China by other countries (e.g.: Israel

and Japan). This awareness of China as superpower, or as candidate superpower, needs to spread, not because it is good or bad, but because it is real.

By 2010, given a Chinese average growth rate of only 4.7%, China would surpass the former USSR and be at 50% of U.S. GNP (although have only 10% of U.S., European, or Japanese PCGNP). It's quite possible, due to sheer population pressures, that China will always be stuck with PCGNP that is appreciably lower than any other developed area of the globe. Despite this fact, China's diversity and infrastructure would guarantee continued growth, whether or not she was an active member of the international community. The PRC's infrastructure is probably already more than sufficient to maintain its own industrial modernization, although the rate of growth might be slower since the Chinese operate from a smaller PCGNP. Then again, as China is at least five times as populous as any other country, having a low PCGNP is not a major impediment for development of national resources; at worst, China's GNP growth would be normal instead of meteoric. For decades after World War II, the U.S. relied primarily on its own market to fuel GNP: such a procedure for growth is certainly feasible (it also has been responsible, as we know, for the corresponding lack of U.S. ability to effectively compete, now, in international markets).¹³⁴ In fact, since much of China still lags decades behind the rest of the industrialized world, and also since China could fuel its own

GNP, then theoretically China could survive a global depression with comparative ease, serving possibly even to facilitate general recovery from such a catastrophe. All things considered, the conservative growth rate of 4.7% posited for PRC development by 2010 guarantees that China will become the number two economic power and the eventual challenger to, sharer and/or successor of America's global position.¹³⁵

Jonathan Pollack suggests another way of viewing China's eventual superpower status:

"...weapons, economic strength, and power potential alone cannot explain the imputed significance of China in a global power equation. ...China has very shrewdly and even brazenly used its available political, economic, and military resources. ...As a result, China becomes all things to all nations. For all these reasons, China has assumed a singular international position, both as a participant in many of the central political and military conflicts in the post war era and as a state that resists easy political or ideological categorization... Indeed, in a certain sense China must be judged as a candidate superpower in its own right - not in imitation or emulation of either the Soviet Union or the United States, but as a reflection of Peking's unique position in global politics."¹³⁶

While numbers do not tell the full story, the following items are intriguing and further buttress the prognosis of China as superpower:

USA PCGNP was \$5000 during our first ICBM test. China's PCGNP during their first ICBM test (its range was 7000 nautical miles) was \$400.¹³⁷

Based on 7% GNP annual growth, China's year 2000 GNP (\$1600b) will exceed the (former) USSR year 1978 GNP (\$1254b). China's growth

has actually averaged 9% during the late 1970s and into the 1980s.

By 1990, China - if she wishes - will be able to spend \$100b annually for defense (at 1979 prices).¹³⁸

Recently, 10% of all PRC industrial output goes into defense.¹³⁹

The PRC became the 10th largest shipbuilder in 1980.¹⁴⁰

Although the PRC is approx. 75% rural and requires extensive agricultural investment, that still leaves, currently, 335 million persons for urban industrialization (91 million in Japan, 189 million in the U.S., and Manchuria alone is as big as Western Europe). A shift in PRC population to urban areas is already occurring, but even if that shift was controlled or forbidden, quality in the industrial base could be maintained by the CCP merely by threatening to relocate urban dwellers into the countryside and vice versa.¹⁴¹

In Japan and the East Asian Four, the growth of economic performance was due to growth in productivity (i.e.: personal skills, training, etc.), and not due to inputs into production (i.e.: capital, etc.). China is well along the path of growth in productivity.

China in the early 1930s had a University enrollment of 40,000. In all of sub-saharan Africa there were only about 70,000 students in secondary school as late as 1960.¹⁴²

"China's total foreign trade has grown from \$38b in 1980 to \$135.7b in 1991. About one third of this passes through Hong Kong, and most of Hong Kong's direct trade represents ultimate trade with the U.S."¹⁴³

As a superpower candidate that is potentially self-sustaining, China should be encouraged to remain an active participant in international matters. There is no need to have her discretionary power available to rulers in Beijing

without any corresponding feedback or dialogue from the U.S. and others to temper their judgment about why or how they employ their discretionary power. Isolating Beijing serves no productive purpose.

Those who persist in believing that the U.S. could actually "punish" or hurt Beijing by withdrawing Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status, or by the imposition of general sanctions, simply do not have a clear picture of the multitude of facets that combine to form China. Rescinding MFN would in fact slow the rate of China's GNP growth, but the net effect would be diametrically opposite than intended by those wishing to punish the PRC. While the U.S. market would no longer be as accessible to China, other world-wide markets probably would be, especially those markets not sympathetic to U.S. policy ends. Further, as a considerable amount of Hong Kong trade is with the U.S., an effect of slowing China's GNP would actually be to hurt the U.S. and not China, because China would keep growing (albeit slower), whereas America's already slow GNP would become even slower (probably with the loss of some employment), plus the rescission of MFN could well invite retaliatory measures. On top of that, the passage of each year makes other markets stronger, relative to the U.S. market, as they grow and establish themselves; this does not mean that we are weakening, but that the world's resources are experiencing broader distribution. Hence withdrawal of MFN in 1993 would not be as painful as it might have been in 1983;

but regardless of the level of pain it might inflict, rescinding MFN is not a good idea. It would be instructive for those who think China can be "punished" or "hurt" to note a Congressional joint study, with inputs from almost 60 independent sources of widely diverging and responsible views, that despite China's innumerable problems through the 1990s and beyond, somehow she will "muddle through".¹⁴⁴ Lastly, Fang Lizhi makes the eminently plausible suggestion that a few specific and achievable political requirements, attached to MFN, are attainable measures and beneficial to all parties, rather than the barn door approach which would be ignored by Beijing and not provide anyone with anything positive whatsoever.

Lastly there is the undeniable effect where modernization of China assists the process of reform intended by the ruling hierarchy. Increasing the trade, investment, and cash flow in China obviously enhances modernization. However, modernization also has the effect of increasing individual responsibilities and personal realms of activity; how these might spill into the political arena and/or be part of the evolution of China's deep rooted sense of authority, remains to be seen. The point is, modernization helps China and hinders the CCP (as presently configured), which may or may not be apparent to current Chinese leaders; by the same token, retarding modernization would hurt China without necessarily

hurting the CCP. We saw that the Tienanmen events strengthened the hardliners' position, though only temporarily.

For those who think we compromise our principles by not withdrawing MFN, nothing could be further from the truth, precisely for the reasons elaborated here. Responsible trade, within the realms permitted by national security concerns, is the best thing we can do for the Chinese; those who truly wish to hurt the "Butchers of Beijing" should encourage trade, not restrict it.

a. Kennedy, Nye, Toffler, et. al.

In recent years, a plethora of voices have emerged describing purported aspects of U.S. decline, the juggernaut of world trade, and so on. The following are just a few comments on those issues:

As in the discussion of what being a superpower meant, the topic of national decline also requires a relative comparison with other states. During the first post-war decade, the U.S. provided over 40% of the world's entire GNP. Even in 1960 that figure was over 33%, but currently it is probably less than 20%.¹⁴⁵ These numbers do not mean that the U.S. is shrinking. The truth is quite the contrary. What these numbers mean is that the rest of the world has finally picked up steam. That result is what we intended and worked for after World War II. We ought not to decry those results now that we have to become competitive again. (Indeed, it is arguable that the U.S. never really had to compete on an

international level, at least not at the extent required today, either due to our preoccupation with home or through the distinctiveness of our North American products prior to World War II).

To underscore this point, Kennedy specifically states that the rate of post-war growth for Britain and the U.S. was "unlikely to be as high as in those countries recovering from years of military occupation and damage", also that the Allies' decline and the growth of Germany was both relative and natural.¹⁴⁶ Great Power status (and by extension superpower status), is a joint function of the balance between defense, consumption and investment (or military, economy and infrastructure); when all three are present, then Great Power status is achieved. When these elements are present dispro-portionately, then Superpower status is achieved. (By this description, it might be said that the USSR was never a superpower). That a country may once have a surfeit of these elements relative to its neighbors, only to lose them or be surpassed, is not to say that decline took place, but that natural growth occurred.

Nye deals with much the same information, suggesting that the U.S. can draw on its strengths and prepare a strategic vision for ensuring the world's continued economic and social evolution through unrestricted trade. This latter suggestion is more of a mandate, due to the requirement for maintaining open access to trade and other interaction as the

world continues to grow smaller. If trade blocs were to develop, tit for tat measures would actually increase the cost of domestic economies rather than provide protection as intended.¹⁴⁷

Reich touches on yet another aspect of global economies, namely that regardless of ultimate ownership of a particular product, what counts is the skill of your work force, because they are your real asset.¹⁴⁸ He goes on to reiterate that closed borders and trade wars serve to do more damage than not.

Toffler's work addresses the interdependence of contemporary life, but he goes beyond this and speaks of much more fundamental change. Evolutions are now occurring which will have the same impact that previously occurred with the shifts from hunting to agriculture and from agriculture to industry. The "powershift" now underway, which will profoundly alter the manner in which we do things, has to do with speed and how economies and societies process information. Wealth and power are now more dependent upon knowledge than upon industrial might or raw armies. What you know, how fast you know it, and the timeliness of delivery is what counts in today's world. Again, continued interaction amongst societies is crucial for cooperation and access to necessities. Speeds of transactions and economies will approach real time; we can expect, as a matter of natural course, interaction to cross national borders in ways unimaginable a short while ago.¹⁴⁹

These comments all point to emergent times where advances in communications and other processing devices (computers, etc.), will have ineradicable effects on how we live our lives and who we live them with. Flexibility and openness are key elements. The U.S. may well be in a relative state of "decline", but simultaneously the U.S. will be miles ahead of other societies regarding issues of quality of life, legal matters, education, religious tolerance, family, and the new universal culture where races, cultures, creeds, and genders genuinely intermix. Some of these issues seem ephemeral and not the stuff of national pride, but those areas that represent the highest danger for potential and real damage in the decades ahead are precisely those areas where fanaticism, ideology and nationalism gone awry - old solutions for new dilemmas - will interrupt requisite global interaction and interdependence, try to assert themselves, and cause friction and harm to the possible point of hostilities.

These several authors, then, provide more ammunition for the premise that efforts must be made to maintain interaction with China and to draw China into further participation in the world community.

The Chinese themselves are pursuing various avenues of activity, as we have seen. We have also seen that a very natural outlet for Chinese interest and activity is into and through the Middle East. The U.S. should not be upset by this turn of events, as long as international

standards of decency, and so on, are met. It would be appropriate, in fact, for the U.S. to encourage Chinese involvement in the Middle East and wherever else, as long as it is not intended in an exclusive manner.¹⁵⁰

Perspectives from Stephanie Neuman are added to this section to highlight aspects of the evolving New Order, also for the opportunity to stress that her difficult position is now irrevocably untenable. Neuman's premise has been that the superpowers and other primary arms suppliers, in the event of major conflicts, could and would - through concerted and mutual overt or covert action - affect the outcome of the conflict by regulating the flow of arms to that region. Regardless of how nice it would be if this were true, the sources for arms have - like everything else - grown and represent not only an increase in suppliers or retailers, but also in producers.

Traditional producers of armaments are of course still active. These include the U.S., C.I.S. (former USSR), France, Germany, Britain, Italy, China, Israel, and others.¹⁵¹ There are also additional producers entering the world arms industry, and old producers that are becoming more active. Additionally, as the New Order emerges, those countries who once may have relied on the U.S. or some other power to provide their security, now are relying more on themselves. Hence arms sales are finding new buyers.

During the Iran-Iraq war, China's arms supplies to those belligerents were not part of U.S. and USSR equations to control that conflict, rather the U.S. and USSR were reacting to the PRC's sales/inputs to the region. These sales by China indicated her willingness to be independent as an arms producer and supplier; China did not first confer with the U.S. or USSR before proceeding with those transactions. In the words of a then contemporary observer:

"The extension of the Iran-Iraq war runs counter to the will of the two superpowers, but they cannot press the belligerents to cease fire as they did in the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. The ability of the superpowers to control Middle East affairs is diminishing."¹⁵²

As China, Israel, Brazil, and other producers of arms become more active and independent, the ability of any one power, or any one pair or trio of powers, on a regular basis, to control the flow of arms to any particular area, will be severely curtailed. Each case may well require another coalition, diplomatically or in the field, to control the flow of goods into and out of the region.

A significant aspect of (former) USSR and PRC relations with the Middle East has been their respective participation in the flow of arms to that region. In 1985 35% of the world's arms imports went to the Middle East region, which is a decrease from 1983 when the Middle East recorded its highest intake of weaponry. While the U.S. and (former) USSR together accounted for approximately 63% of all arms

sales worldwide and over half of the arms sales going to developing countries, China's arms exports reached \$2b in 1984, or half that of France and one fifth that of the U.S.. Most of the PRC's arms sales have been going to the Middle East and represent an older, though reliably constructed, style of conventional weaponry which carries a lower price tag than that of munitions available elsewhere. Even though over half of all developing country's military needs are being met by the U.S. and USSR, this added PRC source - again, almost entirely going to the Middle East, sometimes via unofficial channels - was an important factor which alone helped Iran and Iraq to continue their war for 8 long years. The Soviet (and American) arms exports represent fairly constant figures throughout at least the preceding decade, whereas the PRC figures indicate a sharp increase from a modest \$175m level in 1977 to their current amounts. The \$2b of Chinese arms sales in 1984 fell to \$575m in 1985 and \$1.1b in 1986 as Middle East demand slackened, but clearly the PRC capacity for production and sales is there. These figures represent the following percentages of total national exports: China 7.2% (\$2b); France 4.2% (\$4.1b); USA 4.9% (\$10.6b); USSR 19.7% (\$18b).¹⁵³

3. The UN and Regional Issues

Concomitantly, it likewise behooves the U.S. to maintain the strength and dispassionate character of international organizations, particularly the UN.

As we've seen, China is interested in stability, but a stability where everyone is an independent actor, or at least not dominated by the influence of any one major power or superpower. This would be analogous, relative to the Cold War period, of international anarchy, with China being the largest bulwark to safeguard against it (the center). Typically China does not think in terms of alliances: "good relations do not require an alliance".¹⁵⁴ (This is the case even though China may have sought normalization with the U.S. to offset Soviet activity and less-than-agreeable presence along her northern border). As such, it therefore becomes incumbent on us to keep China involved in international organizations.

Other regional issues that come to mind, and which will be front and center both in China and the Middle East, have to do with the environment. This is no longer a "pretty" subject, to clean up the park or regional waterway. Rather, this subject is taking on serious implications, with ramifications similar to those regarding the eventual disappearance of liquid fossil fuel reserves. What happens when there is not enough water to drink in the Nile, in the Jordan, when Turkey gathers so much water behind the Ataturk Dam that Syria and Iraq lose 40% of the Euphrates? Desalinization is one answer. Whatever the response, it needs to be an international effort, and both China and the Middle East need to participate in the formulation and implementation of that effort.

Then, once desalinization occurs, subsequent population growth can not be allowed to grow unchecked, without some sort of responsible mediation. There are still other resources to think about, employment to find, and space to breathe in.

Regarding U.S. security requirements, much discussion is now centered on the Pentagon's recent draft proposal of endeavoring to keep the U.S. a military superpower. Further, not only to keep the U.S. in superpower status, but also to prevent anyone else from acquiring that same status. Without wanting to sound alarmist or defeatist, I doubt if that is a workable policy. It almost sounds like a blueprint for confrontation; the world as it is developing does not need any more confrontation built into it. We should remain strong, but if others also wish to become militarily strong, it will be difficult for us to preclude that.

The opening paragraphs in this chapter spoke of intertwined and interacting economies, changing environments, new trade patterns, an evolving New Order. The prognosis was, aside from a period of transition, basically good - even going so far as to postulate the high probability of having Japanese and/or EEC representatives in our Congress. Regardless of how shocking or unorthodox that particular scenario might seem, there are other far less sanguine alternatives. If old solutions are attempted for current dilemmas, if nationalism is resurrected as a panacea, if ideology (east-west) or racism

(occident-orient) or wealth (north-south) become rallying points, then sparks may well fly. Hard and fast trade blocs could also generate unassuageable competition, leading again to sparks. Sparks, as part of contemporary arsenals, with delivery mechanisms, throw weight, TNT equivalencies, and ever increasing accessibility (whether over-the-counter or via basement laboratories), will render future overt arguments to be very deadly and painful, as well as probably unnecessary, regardless of how short or long the altercation might be. It is absolutely imperative that the U.S. mandate, therefore, as a basis for all of its policy directives, the requirement to establish and maintain dialogue, leading to interaction on a less-than-hostile plane. This mandate must include support of the United Nations and other world bodies.

B. U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Interdependence between the U.S. and the Middle East was, for several years, increasing almost on a daily basis. Israel was alternately a democratic outpost in the region, or our strategic ally to offset the strength of the Soviet Union. The Islamic states were, of course, the great providers of oil, and as such could be counted on to receive support from almost any major industrial power in the world. Small items that affected the Middle East were also felt in various places around the globe.

Both Israel and the Arabs had procured and/or built vast quantities of sophisticated arms. The Sinai, Negev, and Golan

Heights were battlefields three times over, and new antagonisms have extended hostilities into other quarters of the Islamic world. Mistrust between Persian and Arab is no less than it has ever been, and even the Arabs themselves are now looking over their shoulders.

In addition to all this, the world decided to become a different place. We still have two superpowers, but their locations have changed, and one is doing his best to grow out of adolescent development stages. Europe's police vigilance has dissipated, and activity on the Pacific is escalating in exponential increments.

Returning to the Middle East, we now have the same oil producers, but the strategic value of Israel - aside from the question of its survival as one country - is now of some question. The central role the U.S. has played in the region since World War II is also evolving. We needn't protect the northern tier, at least not from Soviet hordes (but rather, perhaps, from Islamic Fundamentalism). Israel is now on speaking terms with the two other Major Powers who once tried to make life so difficult for her. One of them is even giving Israel a sizable chunk of its population, as they emigrate south.

New questions arise as to who has what responsibility now, and for what, or against what. Israel is still armed to extremis, and has the most potent, inch for inch, arsenal in

the world, as well as a mobilization factor that is terribly efficient.

What does the U.S. do now, with the Middle East almost a different place? What emphasis do we continue to provide on the peace process that has gotten underway?

1. Israel

Israel's "presence" within the U.S., as well as the Levant, has always been significant: personal ties, families, the Israeli lobby, military supply lines and increased high-tech interaction (Star Wars), to name a few.

Two items that focus in even further when thinking of this relationship: Israel's mind boggling annual aid figure from the U.S. that obviously is carrying their economy, and their hefty military arsenal (not to forget about Dimona).

Any policy developments between the U.S. and Israel in the coming years must address at least these two items. We should add a third: namely that of the Middle East regional (and international) peace process that is now underway.

In dealing with those items, other issues will present themselves, and they include the state of the Levantine environment (water), population pressures on economies that are already strained (including Israel's), and the matter of deciding how to go about maintaining a viable (conventional) deterrent in the Middle East, when each opponent has an entire array of hostile options from which to choose.

Sooner or later, risks have to be taken; every possible contingency simply can't be protected against or warded off. But which risk? And who takes it?

Now that there is a big "General Store" over the horizon, that adds another interesting variable to the already complex equation.

Clearly, decisions can not be made without consultation, and no one should expect to receive what he wants, and perhaps not even what he or she thinks he or she might need. There will have to be introduced into the region a mechanism whereby armaments can be kept track of, and perhaps with that some sort of ceiling specifying what the arbitrary cut-off point will be for weapons that are too dangerous and those that are OK.

Equally as clear, the Israel economy will have to stand on its own feet. Since the aid amounts are so incredible, some sort of phased program specifying so much percent per year reduction in aid, with annual review of the formula, as long as the aid keeps going down. Figures showing only 25% of the labor force in industry, with a socialized center, and productivity lower than most of western Europe, do not indicate a healthy situation.

Israel's slice of the U.S. aid pie is one-fifth of total U.S. economic, development, and military aid (\$3b/year), plus another \$3b/yr from other sources. U.S. annually has been buying \$1b of defense related items from Israel. On top

of these numbers, Israel has 20% of its work force in defense related industries; if the U.S. was to reduce this defense related support, it would be a significant blow to Israel.

Israel is basically addicted to U.S. aid, and needs to start some sort of antabuse or AA program; Israel should be able to stand on its own two feet. Current per capita U.S. aid to Israel is \$680, for Egypt it's \$41, \$4.80 for Pakistan, and \$1 for Africa.¹⁵⁵ With the imbalances now so prevalent the world over, those ratios simply must become more equitable. The New Order requires that we do what we can to redress these imbalances.

As for environmental resources, the inhabitants will have to be the keepers of that issue, and decide how much they want to do without, or how much they are willing to pay (extra) to not do without (desalinization).

Israel historically is not shy about following its own dictates, or what it perceives to be in its best (security) interests. We need only to recall the (still unresolved) USS LIBERTY affair, also the Pollard spy scandal, and other items, to realize the implications of Israel's intentional power. It is crucial that we keep Israel involved somehow with international organizations, much as it was crucial to do the same with China. It will not be healthy for either China or Israel to go off on their own to who knows where.

The UN should try as best it can to keep tabs on these several issues, and feel free, within proper jurisdiction

guidelines, to step in and see how watertight the ships of state are.

a. Arab-Israeli Dilemma

The Arab-Israeli dilemma alone poses difficulties that 40 years of diplomacy and several wars have not managed to solve; in its most simple formulation the dilemma seems to have devolved into a problem involving an exchange of territory for peace, although other ingredients underlie this exchange. Compounding this dilemma are: 1) complex Israeli politics; 2) Arab Petrol politics infused with degrees of Islamic fervor; 3) indigenous technologies; 4) typically unquestioned U.S. support to Israel; 5) (former) Soviet presence within the region; 6) UN involvement; 7) old fashioned hatred weaving through different strata; 8) an increasingly internationalized interest in this problem by other states including China; 9) the dilemmas attendant to tensions or other outcomes when religious value is associated with physical places or symbols.

The Knesset must be receptive to peace issues. Deliberate sandbagging to gain time and a larger status quo are not honorable methods. Shamir, on the day after the elections, openly said that if he had had the opportunity, he would have dragged out the peace talks as long as possible so as to build as many settlements as possible all over the West Bank. Intransigence, regardless of the side of the fence that it's on, is equally damaging to the fence.

It should be noted that: 1) Israel's negotiating team for the Mid East peace talks indicated that Israel is prepared to bargain with Syria over new borders - a reference to the Golan Heights - but not insofar as it would mean a return to the 1967 frontiers; 2) Retired senior officers, in 1972, were more willing to trade land for peace than was the Israeli population in general.

The U.S., or the UN, may have to decide to what extent it is willing, or unwilling, to allow its policies and actions to be dictated by religious ideologies. In other words, the separation of Church and State as an issue is not yet settled, because it may well have to be applied on a global basis, and not just internally by various national polities. Applicable topics include the status of Jerusalem, international terrorism, nationalism that is indistinguishable from proselytizing.

b. Israeli U.S. Lobby

The legendary Israeli lobby, that is "virtually unmatched", might acquire principles in keeping with the realities of a complex situation. The sixty pro-Israel PACs in the U.S., up against only 2 or 3 pro-Arab PACs, are holding forth in a grand manner, but also in a very grand style; the style does not match the complexity. As a small example of their power, the Israeli military attache went to the Pentagon in October 1973, and requested Maverick anti-tank missiles:

"If you can get the missiles, we can take care of Congress".¹⁵⁶

Another example of resources, where the cost does not quite match the justification: Carter decided in March 1979 to provide Israel access to the KH-11 satellite, something Israel had wanted since its launch 3 years earlier. This decision was very unpopular with U.S. intel community, because it meant that the satellite's fuel would be used faster, and it would be less available for U.S. agencies.

As if all that were not enough, AIPAC was prepared to argue (over a year ago) that a further increase in U.S. aid to Israel was justified, "even if programs for Americans must be cut back".¹⁵⁷ That does not compute.

2. Other Middle East States

The Middle East is clearly in the midst of an exciting stage in its history. Lifestyles are changing, relationships and responsibilities are undergoing redefinition, new possibilities and new requirements are being tempered by traditional textual interpretations. There is clearly much to be done, and much to redefine. The region should be able to deal with itself without resort to hostilities. When aberrations are noted, there needs to be some sort of procedure to be able to deal with it.

If and when fundamentalist regimes are voted in by democratic means, we should not exert undue influence to

having them removed. Sooner or later they will be voted out; the inhabitants must reach those conclusions themselves.

Recent finds, via satellite and ancient maps, of the lost Arabian city of Ubar in present day Oman provide glimpses of a time when the Silk Road was in full tilt; how appropriate for that city to be unearthed when the Silk Road is about to go back into operation. Also the discovery, in the same fashion, of what may be the ancient metropolis of Saffara near what is now Salalah. This second site probably controlled the entire coastal sea trade from at least 1500 B.C.E. until 300 C.E., when both cities were abandoned, probably because the frankincense trade lost its value after the Roman Empire collapsed.¹⁵⁸

Regional methods of discourse and redress and planning should be devised. The GCC and ACC, along with the UN and current Peace process should all be investigated for timeliness, purpose, efficacy, and all the rest. Clearly the region is not communicating or performing as optimally as it could be.

a. *Infrastructure and Resources*

Environment is now just as crucial an issue as ideology ever was. Who lives where is surely just a moot question, if in fact underlying it is the reality that no one is able to live anywhere. In a semi-perverse kind of way, "quality of life" now has a real tangible side to it. The fact that water is rapidly becoming another precious commodity

throughout the Middle East, and a primary bargaining chip or bone of contention between states, speaks of the way resources have been mismanaged.

The other intangible environment should be addressed. Religion and government need to accommodate each other. Fear or misunderstanding ought not be the principles which guide unknowns. Governments need to be able to communicate to other governments, and the inhabitants need to gear up for a period of potential protracted change.

Water resources again need to be examined and equitably resolved: the Jordan River basin, Dead Sea, Arabian Aquifer, desalinization: they are issues that mandate regional interaction, and not unilateral control.

b. Islam

The Middle East is probably experiencing, as we saw in chapter three, a similar adjustment in its relationship to the practice of power as now occurring in China. Starting with the patriarchal tradition, conjoined with Islam (where sacred and secular are indistinguishable), and experienced through a Sheikh or Imam or Sultan or some other figure whose word was literally law, and where law was not complicated but fairly black and white (*lex talionis* in the desert), the result is more of a familiarity with or expectation of absolutes, rather than discussion or voting or even the work of a jury. From this it follows that Sadat and King Fahd and Saddam and King Hussein are, to a certain extent, solitary

figures. Also that they are even expected to be that way. In other words, they continue to utilize time honored methods, but in settings where populations have mushroomed, education is engendering opportunities, the rank and file are finding choices and want to choose, and nascent (but basically foreign) institutions of national scope are just beginning to find their way in a world still in the shade, more or less, of patriarchy. Also, these rulers are aware of possibilities that the rank and file are not, the hierarchy have intelligentsia in their families, more and more persons are being schooled in other cultures, and Islam is having to deal with modernization in a big way.

Typically the response has been to attack westernization as evil or imperialistic. But in order to compete with modernization, to garner its benefits without the cross, Islam will first have to embrace it and make its own determination instead of standing afar off

Islam is struggling to define what is Islamic. Somehow it needs to be able to function in the contemporary world without thinking that the world is out to get it. Means need to be established whereby Middle East/Arab nations find ways to compete with non-Islamic countries (in economic markets, on the battlefield, in the classroom).

Among the changes we are dimly witnessing may well be the forefront of an Islamic Reformation, or another way in

which the Koran is seen so as to become a part of life, instead of life itself, or to understand life more equitably.

d. An Honest Broker

Israel will have to generate an effective combination of creative diplomacy with military and commercial R&D to combat the regional advantage provided by the petro-dollars of her neighbors. More and more, whether it's missiles or salt resistant plants, it can be had in exchange for \$ or services. Israel will not find that working from strength will be sufficient, because everyone will be a goliath in a few years.

Quite possibly the U.S. will eclipse its opportunity to serve as an honest broker in the Middle East, especially after recent history. Part of that lies with the Arabs having been diplomatically and collectively behind the Eight Ball for so long. Part of that lies in the seeming duplicity with which the U.S. has apportioned its decisions and aid. But an International Conference is in the works, which means that Russia and the PRC, among others, are on the scene. It might even mean that China alone becomes the "disinterested" mediator; the "General Store" with a heart.

What is clear in the midst of all this conjecture, is that the U.S., as part of its policy formulation preparedness, will need to be able to gauge as accurately as possible the intentions and perceptions of the C.I.S., PRC and Middle East. Again, ideology and polarity should not be topics that hold sway or overwhelm; they must be reconsidered to emphasize

the need for clarity and to avoid categorizing issues under traditional rubrics that may have long since ceased to be of value, if indeed they ever had any value. The methodology of analyzing issues - knowing what to analyze - is seen to be just as important as the issues themselves.

3. The UN and Regional Issues

The UN is acquiring its own *raison d'être*. The Gulf War, engineered by President Bush, may have sent more precedent in the direction of the United Nations Security Council than was perhaps intended. The U.S. must come to grips with our relative position; the U.S. must stand for what it believes and believe what it stands for, but it should not coerce, and should also recognize that the goals and perceptions of an international body will not always coincide with those of our own; when that happens, we must not assume that one side or the other is correct.

Israel's refusal to allow UN observers into Gaza and the West Bank spells another ominous precedent; unfortunately, such a precedent cannot be encouraged. It could be that we are entering an era where the primary roles for armed forces are international peace keeping, or some sort of environmental policing.

Recent discovery of oil in a disputed region between Saudi Arabia and Yemen is starting to draw out true colors among the inhabitants of the Peninsula. Yemen desperately needs the money from oil revenues, and regards the territory

in question as Yemen's. Saudi won control over the area in 1934 during a war with N. Yemen, and the treaty will be up for renewal in 1994. Yemen is now producing 200,000 bpd, and expects new finds to generate a total of 800,000 bpd; 12 of the 20 oil concessions currently working this oil find are in this area claimed by Saudis.

One of Saudi Arabia's concerns might reflect that with a larger population in Yemen (13m) than in Saudi Arabia (10m), this oil find might well tip the balance scales over a period of 20 years or so in the direction of Yemen. Yemen's unification is doing well, but the country needs income from the oil. Current production is 220,000 bpd, and is expected to rise to 350,000 bpd by 1995.

Yemen joined Iraq, Jordan and Egypt to form the Arab Cooperation Council before Gulf War, to balance the GCC. During the Gulf War, Yemen appeared to back Iraq and Saudi Arabia evicted about 800,000 Yemeni migrant workers (hundreds of millions of remittances per year); unemployment increased by more than a third and now 40%. Saudi Arabia is serious about this episode, and has said it will take "any necessary action to protect the sanctity of its borders" in a letter to the oil companies in the region. The Saudis must genuinely be concerned, even scared. Hunt Oil of Texas is the only concession to ignore the Saudis, and continues to pump 180,000 bpd in the Marib area.¹⁵⁹

One hopeful indication is the slowing of population growth around the world. Egypt and Thailand family preferences are changing from 4 children per family (cpf) in the 1970s, to just over 2 cpf in the 1980s. But only half of all women in the developing world yet have access to family planning. East Asia has compiled the best record for reducing population growth, from 6.1 cpf in early 1960s, to 2.7 cpf in late 1980s. 70% of couples in China practice some form of birth control. World population, now 5.4 billion, has more than doubled this century and can be expected to rise to 6.2 billion by the year 2000. UN projections are forecasting that number to double again, or perhaps to even triple, before stabilizing in the middle of the next century. Pakistan's current population could also double again in another 20 years at its present rate of growth. (Japan's birth rate now 1.53, which is a declining rate, and one of the lowest among industrialized nations).¹⁶⁰

As a major supplier of weapons for Israel, the U.S. is being left in the lurch: a 1977 GAO study found that it took the U.S. four years to rebuild its supply of M-113 tanks after the Israeli 1973 war, due also to the U.S.' policy of continuing weapons sales and deliveries to other international customers (e.g. Morocco), before supplying our own troops.

The U.S. confirmed Saudi Arabia's illicit transfer of military hardware, reportedly indicated to us by two PRC diplomats, to Iraq, Syria and Bangladesh. This transaction

is, by present standards, fairly harmless, coming as it does in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia is now trying to purchase 72 F-15 aircraft from U.S. (San Diego Union-Tribune, 21 April 1992).

Saudi Arabia, after the Gulf War experience, is seeking to thoroughly improve its own forces to the extent of having offensive capabilities. The U.S., seeking its own land based materiel located in the region, and not looking forward to a squabble between the Saudis and Israelis, is not supporting the Saudis desire on this point. In terms of expenditure, by 1980 Saudi Arabia was ranked 6th overall and 1st in per capita military spending. The Saudi total military budget was then \$20.7b. Military purchases from the U.S., through 1980, totaled \$34.9b (most of which had been made since 1973). In that same Gulf region, from 1950-1970, a total of \$1.2b of U.S. arms went to Iran, and from 1971-1977 that figure escalated to \$21.0b, with \$5.7b in 1977 alone.¹⁶¹

The U.S., therefore, needs to come to terms with how it allocates aid funding, needs to accept its position as the major arms supplier for the Middle East, and needs to encourage the peace process, along with doing what it can to alleviate and solve pressing environmental problems (that will shortly be crises).

Charles Birch, the 1990 Templeton Prize winner, speaks to some of these issues in his book On Purpose, and he suggests very simply that we need to be concerned about our

surroundings whether or not they are useful to us. We no longer have the luxury of choice over what to save and what to despoil: there are no more Wild Wests. Quality decisions require seeing or placing equal value on all things. Generic values, rather than mere management, will make the difference.

Policy formulation's new challenge will be to cut across traditional national fences and address the heart of the issue(s). Ideologies, assumptions, and prejudices, whether of nationalistic, religious, or worse varieties, simply do not apply any more, and can not be tolerated.

To reiterate earlier suggestions regarding the fluidity of the Middle East and China, it is helpful to keep in mind the region's development, geography, neighbors, and avenues of discourse with surrounding regions (particularly China). The Middle East is a natural window on Asia, it is a region of movement.

In retrospect, regarding Chinese-Middle East relations: I discovered little in the literature that dealt with the subject as a whole. Aside from sporadic articles, plus a few pre-Tienanmen journal pieces that broached the topic of "China wooing the Arabs", there are exceptionally few students of this subject. Even if we do not take an interest in the relationship between those two regions, both the Middle East and China are doing just that: there is considerable activity between them, and it is going to increase.

APPENDIX - SIGNIFICANT CALENDAR YEAR DATES FOR CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

CHINA:

- Founder's Day (ROC)	1 Jan
- New Year's Day (PRC)	1 Jan
- New Fourth Army Incident	4 Jan 1941
- Zhou Enlai	8 Jan 1976 (d)
- La Ba Festival	22 Jan (8th day, 12th lunar month)
- Abdication of Pu Yi	12 Feb 1912
- Chinese New Year aka: Spring Festival	13 Feb (1st day, 1st lunar month)
- Lantern Festival	27 Feb (15th day, 1st lunar month)
- Feb. 28 Incident (ROC) aka: 2-28	28 Feb 1947
- Qingming Festival aka: Clear and Bright Festival	5 Apr (15 days after Spring Equinox)
- April Fifth Incident aka: 4-5 Revolutionary Act	5 Apr 1976
- May Day	1 May
- May Fourth Movement	4 May 1919
- May Thirtieth Incident	30 May 1925
- Tienanmen Massacre aka: Tienanmen (or) 6-4	4 Jun 1989
- Dragon Boat Festival	15 Jun (5th day, 5th lunar month)
- Marco Polo Bridge Incident	7 Jul 1937
- Army Day	1 Aug (PLA founded in 1927)
- Month of Ghosts begins	9 Aug (1st day, 7th lunar month)
- Double Seventh Festival	15 Aug (7th day, 7th lunar month)
- Moon Festival aka: Mid-Autumn Festival	21 Sep (15th day, 8th lunar month)
- Confucious' Birthday aka: Kongfuzi	28 Sep 551 B.C.E.
- National Day (PRC)	1 Oct 1949
- National Day (ROC) aka: Double Ten; 10-10	10 Oct 1911
- Double Ninth Festival	15 Oct (9th day, 9th lunar month)
- Overseas Chinese Day (ROC)	21 Oct
- Chiang Kaishek	31 Oct 1887 - 5 Apr 1975
- Sun Yixian	12 Nov 1866 - 12 Mar 1925
- Mao Zedong	26 Dec 1893 - 9 Sep 1976

ISRAEL:

- Fatah Day	1 Jan	
- Purim	19 Mar	
- Egyptian-Israeli Peace	26 Mar	1979
- Pesach (Passover)	18 Apr	
- Holocaust Remembrance Day	30 Apr	
- Theodor Herzl	2 May	1860-1904
- Independence Day	14 May	1948
- Six Day (June) War	5 Jun	1967
- Shavuot	7 Jun	
- Rosh Hashana	28 Sep	(1st and 2nd days of Tishri)
- Yom Kippur	7 Oct	(10th day of Tishri)
- October (Yom Kippur) War	6 Oct	1973
- Sukkot (Tabernacles)	12 Oct	
- David Ben Gurion	16 Oct	1886-1973
- UNSC Resolution 338	22 Oct	1973
- 1956 (Sinai-Suez) War	29 Oct	1956
- Balfour Declaration	2 Nov	1917
- Chaim Weizmann	17 Nov	1874-1952
- UNSC Resolution 242	22 Nov	1967
- Intifadah Anniversary	8 Dec	1987
- Hanukkah	20 Dec	(25th day of Kislev)

OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES:

Islamic Calendar: The Muslim calendar is based on actual sightings of the moon. Accordingly, the observations of various feast days may vary by one or two days from place to place. The Islamic (lunar) year is 11 days shorter than the Gregorian (solar) year; hence Islamic feast days occur 11 days earlier each year when measured on the Gregorian calendar.

- Lailat Al-Ma'raj (Prophet's Night Journey to Heaven, aka: Ascension Day)	27 Rajab	1 Feb 1992
- Ramadan	Mth before Shawwal	5 Mar 1992
- Eid Al-Fitr (End of Ramadan)	1 Shawwal	4 Apr 1992
- Hajj (Mecca Pilgrimage)	9 Dhu'l-Hijja	10-18 Jun 1992
- Eid Al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice)	10 Dhu'l-Hijja	11 Jun 1992
- Muslim New Year	1 Muharram	1411
- Mawlid Al-Nabi (Muhammad's Birthday)	12 Rabia	17 Sep 1991

OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES (cont):

Western Calendar:

- New Year's	1 Jan	(Bahrain/Iraq/Kuw/Leb/Syria/UAE)
- Army Day	6 Jan	(Iraq)
- Tree Day	15 Jan	(Jordan)
- Anniversary of '63 Revolution	8 Feb	(Iraq)
- Anniversary of '79 Islamic Republic	11 Feb	(Iran)
- "Desert Storm"	17 Feb '91	(Iraq/UN Coalition States)
- Accession of Shaikh Khalifah	22 Feb	(Qatar)
- National Day	25 Feb	(Kuwait)
- Revolution Day	8 Mar	(Syria)
- Nowruz	21 Mar	(Iraq)
- Independence Day	17 Apr	(Syria)
- Sinai Day	25 Apr	(Egypt)
- Labor Day	1 May	(Lebanon/Egypt/Iraq/Jordan)
- Independence Day	25 May	(Jordan)
- Evacuation Day	18 Jun	(Egypt)
- National Day	14 Jul	(Iraq)
- Revolution Day	17 Jul	(Iraq)
- Revolution Day	23 Jul	(Egypt)
- Iraq's Kuwait Invasion	2 Aug '90	(Kuwait/Iraq)
- Accession of Ruler	6 Aug	(Abu Dhabi)
- King Hussein's Accession	11 Aug	(Jordan)
- Independence Day	3 Sep	(Qatar)
- National Day	23 Sep	(Saudi Arabia)
- Armed Forces Day	6 Oct	(Egypt)
- King Hussein's Birthday	14 Nov	(Jordan)
- National Day	18 Nov	(Oman)
- Sultan Qaboos' Official Birthday	19 Nov	(Oman)
- Independence Day	22 Nov	(Lebanon)
- National Day	2 Dec	(UAE)
- National Day	16 Dec	(Bahrain)

FOOTNOTES

1. The Middle East is still "coalescing" and has arguably been involved in that process since long before the middle of the 20th century. However, for purposes of this discussion, a temporal sounding board (which, when placed at 1949, is not entirely incorrect), is helpful to facilitate the generation of regional perspectives.
2. Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre (University of Michigan, 1988) Chapter I.
3. Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Seapower (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982) 28-43.
4. According to James Chambers' The Devil's Horsemen, Mongolian advances beyond the Danube were halted only due to Genghis Khan's fortuitous death, requiring the collective absence of his Field Commander sons from their lines of advance for attention to requisite familial burial proceedings and rites of succession in Mongolia. The resultant hiatus included a redistribution of power; when added to logistic complications, this provided the breather required by a sleepy, divisive and incredulous Europe to stave off further Mongol encroachments.
5. This predilection was responsible for the initial breakup of the Indian sub-continent into two (now three) states after gaining independence from Britain, not to mention the current strife occurring in India. It is also a major concern for the Soviets as many of their southern constituent Republics are composed primarily, if not entirely, of Islamic peoples.
6. Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977 (Cambridge University Press, 1979) 2.
7. Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, (University of California Press, 1970) 10-18. Lillian Craig Harris and Robert L. Worden, eds, China and the Third World (Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1986) Chapter II.
8. Kaifeng, in Henan, once housed the largest Jewish settlement in China. They arrived via the Silk Road around 1040 A.D., becoming very active in local society. The last rabbi in Kaifeng died in 1850; a few hundred Sinitized descendants remain. "China Discourages Ties With Jewish Minority," Christian Science Monitor (CSM) (17 July 1990) 5.

9. The Chinese government has been making efforts to resettle Han Chinese into outlying provinces; that process is intended, at least in part, to offset local Islamic majorities. CSM (2 August 1988).
10. Zhongqing Tian, "China and the Middle East: Principles and Realities," Middle East Review (Winter, 1985/86) 7.
11. John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution; 1800-1985 (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) 357.
12. Michel Oksenberg, Remarks made at the World Affairs Council (WAC) of Northern California Symposium on Choices for China at Asilomar, 27-29 April, 1990.
13. Fairbank 7.
14. Fairbank; also Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles (Westview, 1982).
15. Frederic M. Kaplan, Julian M. Sobin and Stephen Andors, eds., Encyclopedia of China Today (New York: Harper & Row) 218.
16. Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics (Harvard University Press, 1985) Chapters III and VII.
17. Ichisada Miyazaki, China's Examination Hell; The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China (Yale University Press, 1981).
18. Kaplan 218-219; John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Harvard University Press, 1980) 74-77; Joseph Needham, Science in Traditional China (Harvard University Press: 1981) 128-131.
19. Examples of items that first appeared in China are gunpowder, the compass, and printing, not to mention the mysteries of acupuncture, plus literary and artistic achievements. The first three items were said to have been the core around which Europe was later to grow.
20. This issue is discussed further in: Fairbank Chapters VII & VIII. Also in Albert Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization (Harvard University Press, 1968).
21. China and the USSR had not yet signed their 30 year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
22. Dwight H. Perkins, China: Asia's Next Economic Giant? (University of Washington Press, 1986) 9; Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution; Reform After Mao (Brookings Institution, 1987) 30.
23. Harding 27.

24. Harding Chapter II.
25. It was the "hard liner" Li Peng who said, in 1987, that there would be no retreat from partial economic reform measures.
26. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) (13 February 1992).
27. CSM (10 March 1992).
28. Claude A. Buss, "Hong Kong and Beijing: Trip Report", (March 1992).
29. FEER (11 June 1992).
30. Seattle Sun (28 June 1992).
31. Andrew Marshall, DOD Analyst, at "U.S. in the Pacific" Conference, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, (August 1987).
32. It should be noted, however, that any significant increase in PCGNP, especially the current official target of \$1000 by year 2000, will produce an immeasurable effect on a population whose current PCGNP is around \$400. Not only would such an increase generate presumable improvements in individual living standards, but would also - most likely - correspond with developments in mobility, education, information sharing and general pluralism within a society that has known, universally, great hardship and arbitrary dictates.
33. Dwight H. Perkins suggests a 1985 PCGNP of \$500, which is almost twice the official number. Journal of Economic Literature (June 1988).
34. Leo A. Orleans, Chinese Students in America (Washington, D.C.: 1988) 79-80.
35. Fang Lizhi, Bringing Down the Great Wall (Knopf, 1991) 234-236.
36. Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, A Relationship Restored: Trends in U.S.-China Educational Exchanges, 1978-1984 (National Academy Press, 1986); and Orleans Chinese Students
37. From Li Yunqi, of Stanford, at the WAC N. Ca. symposium on Choices for China at Asilomar, 27-29 April, 1990.
38. CSM (10 March 1992).
39. CSM
40. Alvin Toffler, Powershift (New York: Bantam Books, 1990) xx.

41. International Herald Tribune (IHT) (23 May 1990).
42. Los Angeles Times (LAT) (25 February 1992).
43. CSM (29 January 1990).
44. Asahi Evening News (AEN) (28 September 1990).
45. Daily Yomiuri (DY) (27 May 1991).
46. Pye, Mandarin 132.
47. Information provided by PRC student, former employee of Jiang, now in U.S. ("Choices for China" Conference, sponsored by World Affairs Council of Northern California, Asilomar; 27-29 April 1990).
48. R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis M. Snider, Middle East Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1983) 239-241.
49. Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse University Press, 1985) 4, 543.
50. NYT (1 May 1992).
51. McLaurin 157.
52. LAT (30 April 1990).
53. McLaurin 135-136.
54. McLaurin 155. Asher Arian, Politics in Israel (Chatham House, 1985) 28-30.
55. Aaron S. Klieman, Israel and the World after 40 Years (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990) 27.
56. McLaurin 144.
57. McLaurin 175.
58. CSM (24 June 1991).
59. Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 1991) 271-283.
60. Hersh 131.
61. Hersh.
62. CSM (19 August 1991).

63. CSM (14 March 1990).
64. **KPBS-TV** (2 March 1992). Documentary on the Intifadah.
65. McLaurin 32-33.
66. CSM (16 January 1992).
67. CSM (8 March 1990).
68. The Middle East Review: 1990 59.
69. McLaurin 66.
70. CSM (4 March 1992).
71. CSM (15 May 1990).
72. CSM (16 March 1992).
73. CSM (5 June 1991).
74. McLaurin 209.
75. CSM (12 June 1991).
76. CSM (8 March 1990).
77. "All Things Considered", National Public Radio (28 April 1992).
78. NYT (5 March 1992).
79. "All Things Considered", National Public Radio (4 December 1991).
80. Schichor 2.
81. Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World (London: KPI, 1981) Appendix 5.
82. The Japan Times (TJT) (26 December 1989).
83. NYT (5 March 1992).
84. CNN (28 May 1991).
85. From discussion with a Chinese UN Mission official in New York, June 1988.
86. Associated Press (26 December 1989).

87. Behbehani 428.
88. CNN (13 March 1992).
89. Zhongqing 13.
90. "Made in China: sold in the Middle East", The Middle East No. 143, September 1986.
91. San Diego Union (SDU) (16 November 1991).
92. National Public Radio (December 1991).
93. From conversations with embassy officials in Muscat, and also with John Duke Anthony.
94. Zhongqing 13. This was also confirmed by discussions with U.S. Embassy officials in Muscat, and with John Duke Anthony of the U.S.-Middle East Foundation in Washington, D.C.
95. Harris & Worden 14-15.
96. Harris & Worden 61.
97. Harris & Worden 3-4, 9-10.
98. Lillian Craig Harris, China's Foreign Policy Toward the Third World x.
99. Shichor.
100. Harris 75.
101. Harris 62.
102. CSM (21 October 1991).
103. Harding, Asilomar, April 1990.
104. McLaurin 169.
105. Klieman 161.
106. Klieman 170.
107. LAT (25 January 1992).
108. "China and the Middle East", The Middle East (September 1987).
109. Klieman 170.

110. FEER (16 Jan 1992).
111. FEER (November 1991).
112. FEER (30 November 1989).
113. Zhongqing 13.
114. Opening of the Berlin Wall in late 1989; North and South Korea sign an Armistice two years later.
115. Civil War between the Serbs and Croats in what was formerly Yugoslavia; sporadic fighting throughout the new Central Asian Republics based on politics and ethnic/religious tensions; multiple claims on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
116. Excluding the U.S. and former USSR, they are in order of size: China, India, Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan. The other three largest are France, Germany, United Kingdom. Taiwan is 14th, and the others (not necessarily in order of size) are: Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel. Japan is 23rd (although expenditures are at the same level as France, Germany, and Britain).
117. "The World's Biggest Boom", World Monitor (December 1991).
118. Remarks by James H. Webb, Jr., Secretary of the Navy, at a National Press Club Luncheon (Washington, D.C.: 13 January 1988).
119. Toffler 464.
120. "Kissinger's World View", CSM (6 January 1989).
121. Lester R. Brown, State of the World: 1991 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991) 134.
122. Chapter one, p.4, and chapter three, p. 86. "The other guy" and "he" are used here strictly in generic senses. These terms represent male and female, groups, individuals, polities, regions, and so on.
123. As quoted from various military greats.
124. A case in point where direct intervention might be required is the current strife in the area formerly known as Yugoslavia. The discord there is reaching proportions that endanger adjoining areas, not to mention the utter mindlessness with which the strife is proceeding.
- Another case where potential direct intervention would not apply, are the June 1989 events of Tienanmen. No matter how deplorable we might regard that occurrence, it was contained within the polity and of short duration. Other avenues of showing our

displeasure were available to us, and we in fact used them correctly.

125. Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors (New York: Little, Brown, & Company, 1992) 319-336.
126. MacFarquhar, Asilomar.
127. SDU (26 April 1992).
128. Harris & Worden 35-37.
129. George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1971) 2-3.
130. Harris & Worden 44.
131. "The World's Biggest Boom", World Monitor (December 1991).
132. Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1990) 130-131.
133. Harry Harding, ed., China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (Yale University Press, 1984) 173-4.
134. Dwight Perkins, International Consequences of China's Development. This is a splendid case of reverse engineering, even if only from a distance.
135. Dwight Perkins, International Consequences
136. Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85 (SIPRI: Oxford, 1987) 85.
137. Bruce Swanson, 8th Voyage of the Dragon (USNI Press, 1982).
138. Perkins, International Consequences
139. Perkins, China: Asia's Next?
140. Buss 4.
141. DY (16 May 1991).
142. "The New Orient Express", World Monitor (November 1988).
143. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987) 423, 427.
144. Nye Chapter VIII.

145. Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).
146. Toffler.
147. This does not include the Spratlys and Paracels. Clearly China's interest in these Island groups exceeds current international norms, even if the Chinese may actually believe in the justification of their claims.
148. The C.I.S., if not as active as was the USSR with production of armaments, at least for the moment, still has stockpiles of materiel that it is redistributing and selling.
149. Zhongqing 12.
150. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1987. ACDA, Washington, D.C.
151. Buss 14.
152. CSM (20 March 1990).
153. CSM (28 June 1991).
154. CSM (20 March 1990).
155. SDU (21 April 1992).
156. NYT (7 June 1992).
157. CSM (17 September 1991 and 8 July 1992).
158. Morris Mehrdad Mottale, The Arms Buildup in the Persian Gulf (University Press of America, 1986) 50.

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Room 4C840, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
24. Professor Nadav Safran 1
Department of Government
Littauer Hall
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
25. Professor Michael Oksenberg 1
Political Science Department
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
26. Professor Kenneth Lieberthal 1
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
27. Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 2
Plans, Policy and Operations
Navy Department (ATTN: OP-602)
Washington, D.C. 20350

28. CAPT Charles S. Kraft, Jr., USN 1
Commanding Officer
USS DURHAM (LKA-114)
FPO San Francisco, CA 96663-1710
29. COL H. Emmett McCracken, USA 1
Office of the Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
Deputy Director, East Asia and Pacific Region
Room 4C839, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
30. CAPT M. Holmes, USNR 1
Naval Attache
U.S. Embassy
Beijing, PRC
31. COL Seibert, USAF 1
Defense Attache
U.S. Embassy
Muscat, Oman
32. LT George F. Schieck, USN 1
Air Department
USS Midway (CV-41)
FPO San Francisco 96631

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