

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NNDG# 740132

SWNCC 091 - ITALY

Miscellaneous

LIST OF PAPERS

FILE UNDER NO. 091 ITALY (MISCELLANEOUS)

Serial No.	From	Date	To	Synopsis
1	Col. Whitson	1/17/45	Messrs Dunn, McCloy, Gates	Memo re assignment of Italian service attachés with attachments.
2	J.C. Dunn	Undated	Sec of State	Memo re assignment of Italian Service Attachés to neutral countries
3	J.J. McCloy	Undated	Sec, SWNCC	Assignment of Italian Service Attachés.
4	Col. Whitson	2/21/45	JCS	Memo on request of Italian Committee for an increased army.
5		7/4/45		SWMCC Memo re Appointment of <u>ad hoc</u> Committee to deal with SWNCC 155
6		7/5/45		ADDENDUM TO "
7	Col. McCarthy	6/5/45	Sec., JCS	Memo with correspondence attached re American Military strength in Europe, particularly in Italy (circulated for information).
8		8/7/45		SWNCC 170/D - Disposition of U.S. Equipment Furnished Italian Combat Units and Italian Units of the International Commitment (cross ref. 400.7, Disposition of War Material, Italy)
9	Col. Chanler	7/27/45	SWNCC	Memo re: Informing Italian Government of Contents of Interim Agreement AFGQ/Yugoslav Authorities, letter to Sec/S from Sec of War attached.
10		8/13/45		ADDENDUM (2nd) To SWMCC Memo dtd 7/4/45 (serial # 6 above)
11	Col. W.C. Chanler	8/9/45	Sec, SWNCC	Memo re SWNC Ad Hoc Committee Membership change.
12	Sec. of War	10/5/45	Sec. of State	Letter Re: Complaints from the Italian Ambassador of Italian Prisoners in the U.S.
13	Sec. of War	11/10/45	Sec. of State	Letter re: American Ambassador to Italy, Kirk, forwarded views of the Problems in Greece of Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Morgan.
14	G. C. Marshall	11/12/45	Sec. of State	Re: Movement of our headquarters to Rome Ambassador Kirk's reluctance etc.

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FILE NO. 091 ITALY - MISCELLANEOUS

NO.	FROM	DATE	TO	SYNOPSIS
15	Sec. of War	5/27/46	Sec. of State	Re: Claim of Satta di Burgos Marcello for Ordnance items delivered to the U. S. Army Ordnance Depot, Anmara Arsena
16	Col. McFarland Mr. Hilldring	9/27/46 9/30/46	SWNCC - State Secretary	RE: Return of Italian Flag Tankers to Italy.
17	Sec. Moseley Col. McFarland	12/30/46 12/28/46	SWNCC mbrs SWNCC	Re: Reduction of British Forces in North Italy.
18	JCS Capt. Lalor Sec. Moseley	12/31/46 1/3/47	SWNCC SWNCC MEMBERS	Re: Situation in Italy. CM-IN-4548 SCAP
19	Col. McFarland Mr. Moseley	2/5/47 2/6/47	SWNCC SWNCC Members	Re: Air Reinforcement of Anglo-American Forces in Italy.
20	Col. McFarland Mr. Moseley	24 Feb 47 25 Feb 47	SWNCC SEC of State	Re: Return of Italian Flag Tankers to Italy.
21	JCS SWNCC	11 Mar. 47 14 Mar 47	SWNCC Sec. of State	Re: Return of Italian Flag Tankers to Italy. (JCS 1642/5)
22	Gen. Hilldring		Sec., SWNCC	Re: Request of Views of Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Disposition of the Italian Colonies
23	SWNCC Col. Schulgen	2 Jun 47 8 Jul 47	JCS State Member	Re: Disposition of the Italian Colonies
24	Capt. Lalor, JCS	3 Jul 47	SWNCC	Re: The Military Implications Involved in the Disposal of the Italian Colonies.
25	Capt. Stephens, JCS Sec., SWNCC	9 Sep 47 10 Sep 47	SWNCC State Mbr., SWNCC	Re: Procedure for Handover of Italy-Yugoslav Provisional Frontier. SM- 8909 - SWN-5688
26	Sec. of Navy	8 Oct 47	Sec. Army, Navy & Air Force	Re: Govt. of the US received invitation from the Govt. of Italy on behalf of the Geographic Mil. Institute to be represented at their 75th Anniversary. To be held at Florence, Italy.
27	Sec. of State Act. Lovett	1 Dec 47	Mr. Forrestal	Re: National Security Council adopted report on position of US with respect to Italy which was submitted to the President and approved he has directed that they be implemented by all Departments and Agencies concerned.
28	Sec. Draper, Jr.	7 Jan 48	Sec. of State	Re: Invitation for Dept. of Army to nominate a representative to U.S. Delegation of the Comm. investigating disposition of the former Italian Colonies

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JAN 7 - 1948

091 Italy
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The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The very kind invitation extended in your letter of 3 December 1947 for the Department of the Army to nominate a representative to the United States Delegation of the Commission Investigating the disposition of the former Italian Colonies is appreciated.

Inasmuch as the Commission has now been engaged in the accomplishment of its mission for a considerable period and as there would be an additional lapse of time before an Army representative could join the Commission in Africa, it is considered inadvisable at this late date to nominate a representative for assignment to the Delegation.

However, the Army is interested in the ultimate disposition of the Italian Colonies and if a need should arise in the future for military advice relative to their disposition, the Army will be glad to provide such guidance as may be desired.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) William H. Draper, Jr.

Acting Secretary of the Army

JAN 9 1948



ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION

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- File _____

[Handwritten marks and signatures in the routing column, including a large signature on the right side of the list.]

Dear Mr. Forrestal:

At its meeting on November 10, 1947 the National Security Council adopted a report on the position of the United States with respect to Italy (NSC 1/1) which was submitted to the President by the Secretary of State with a notation that the section entitled "Conclusions" constitutes an expression of the Council's advice to the President. The conclusions contained in this report have now been approved by the President who has directed that they be implemented by all Departments and Agencies concerned under the coordination of the Secretary of State.

It is assumed that the necessary steps to implement the military aspects of this report will now be taken under your direction. In the opinion of this Department the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force should be advised that developments in the Italian situation may shortly require implementation of the measures envisaged in paragraph 12 of the National Security Council's report. It would, therefore, be prudent that the appropriate plans be made at an early date.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

Robert A. Lovett
Acting Secretary of State

The Honorable
James V. Forrestal,
Secretary of Defense,
National Defense Building,
Washington 25, D. C.

DEC -1 1947

EUR: SReber: ELM
11/29/47

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SWNCC SECRETARIAT

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 State Adm. Assistant _____
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091 Italy Cross

In reply refer to
 IC 592.3 Florence/S-547

October 8, 1947

The Secretary of State informs the Secretary of the Army ~~and~~ the attention of the Corps of Engineers that the Government of the United States has been invited by the Government of Italy on behalf of the Geographic Military Institute to be represented upon the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the founding of the Geographic Military Institute, at Florence, Italy, from October 27 to November 9, 1947. A National Exhibition and Meeting of Cartography and Optics will be held in conjunction with the Anniversary and while participation in the Exhibition is limited to Italian organizations, directors of foreign geographic institutes and official cartographic organizations are invited to participation in the scientific meetings.

Receipt of the advice and recommendations of the Department of the Army as to the desirability of accepting this invitation will be appreciated. In the event of a favorable reply, the Department requests that the Department of the Army make recommendations as to the nature of this Government's participation and submit names of suitable persons who will be able to represent the United States without expense to the Department of State. A prompt reply would be appreciated.

A summary of background information is enclosed.

A similar letter has been sent to the Secretary of Commerce and to the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force.

Enclosure:

Background information.

A true copy of the signed original.
[Handwritten signature]

IC:JCBrooks/DP
 10/8/47

cld w/ - SE - Mr. Dowling
 NI - Mr. Guthe

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Surice

In reply refer to
IC 592.3 Florence/8-547

October 8, 1947

The Secretary of State informs the Secretary of the Navy that the Government of the United States has been invited by the Government of Italy on behalf of the Geographic Military Institute to be represented upon the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the founding of the Geographic Military Institute, at Florence, Italy, from October 27 to November 9, 1947. A National Exhibition and Meeting of Cartography and Optics will be held in conjunction with the Anniversary and while participation in the Exhibition is limited to Italian organizations, directors of foreign geographic institutes and official cartographic organizations are invited to participate in the scientific meetings.

Receipt of the advice and recommendations of the Department of the Navy as to the desirability of accepting this invitation will be appreciated. In the event of a favorable reply, the Department requests that the Department of the Navy make recommendations as to the nature of this Government's participation and submit names of suitable persons who will be able to represent the United States without expense to the Department of State. A prompt reply would be appreciated.


A summary of background information is enclosed.

A similar letter has been sent to the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force.

Enclosure:

Background information.

IC:JCBrooks/DP
10/8/47



Swann

In reply refer to
IC 592.3 Florence/8-547

October 8, 1947

The Secretary of State informs the Secretary of the Air Force that the Government of the United States has been invited by the Government of Italy on behalf of the Geographic Military Institute to be represented upon the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the founding of the Geographic Military Institute, at Florence, Italy, from October 27 to November 9, 1947. A National Exhibition and Meeting of Cartography and Optics will be held in conjunction with the Anniversary and while participation in the Exhibition is limited to Italian organizations, directors of foreign geographic institutes and official cartographic organizations are invited to participate in the scientific meetings.

Receipt of the advice and recommendations of the Department of the Air Force as to the desirability of accepting this invitation will be appreciated. In the event of a favorable reply, the Department requests that the Department of the Air Force make recommendations as to the nature of this Government's participation and submit names of suitable persons who will be able to represent the United States without expense to the Department of State. A prompt reply would be appreciated.


A summary of background information is enclosed.

A similar letter has been sent to the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy.

Enclosure:

Background information.

IC:JCBrooks/DP
10/6/47



TOP SECRET**SWN-5688
10 September 1947**

MVB:aj

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC:**Subject: Procedure for Handover of Italy-
Yugoslav Provisional Frontier.**

At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the attached message from the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Mediterranean, is forwarded to the
Department of State.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

**H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary**

**Enclosure:
Copy of NAF 1368 (CM-IN-1138)**

*Circulating copy given
to Mr. Rusk SPA
by Mr. Moseley.*

TOP SECRET*(Col. Field)*

COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

Inf. **(25)**

TOP SECRET

From: SACMED Leghorn Italy cite FHCOS

To: AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of
Defence London for British Chiefs of Staff

Nr: FX 77329

NAF 1365

7 September 1947

1. The execution of a smooth and orderly handover will entail careful preparation and minute instructions from GHQ CMF to the Italian and Yugoslav commanders.

2. If it is necessary to await confirmation on R minus 3 from the US/UK Ambassadors at Belgrade and Rome that the appropriate communications have been made before parallel action can be taken by GHQ CMF with the land force commanders, much valuable time will be lost.

3. Unless you instruct me to the contrary I propose to proceed with the instruction contained in FAN 779 on the morning of R minus 3 on the assumption that the diplomatic communications will have been made at that time.

End

NOTE:
FAN 779 is WARX 83708 (Aug)

CM-IN 1138 (7 Sep 47)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Sum - 5688
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SM-8909

9 September 1947

09. Italy
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY
COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Procedure for Handover of
Italy-Yugoslav Provisional
Frontier.

Enclosure: NAF 1365 (CM-IN-1138)(Copy No. 33).

The enclosed message from the Supreme Allied
Commander, Mediterranean, is forwarded for transmittal
to the Department of State.

M. M. Stephens
M. M. STEPHENS,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Executive Secretary.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
PER PARAS 51i and 60a (4), AR 380-5

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SECRET**

From: SACMED Leghorn Italy cite FHCOS

To: AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of Defence
London for British Chiefs of Staff

Info: TAC GHQ, GHQ CMF, G-5 AFHQ Rome

Nr: FX 77329 NAF 1365 7 September 1947

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NOTE: FAN 779 is WARX 83708 (Aug)

End

ACTION: CCS

INFO: Gen Spaatz, Adm Leahy, Mr Draper, Gen Noce,
Gen Chamberlin, Adm Nimitz, Gen Norstad, CSA

CM-IN 1138

(7 Sep 47)

DTG 071255B

svc

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THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

9-7-47

TOP SECRETTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.SM-8527
3 July 1947*091 Italy
muc*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: The Military Implications
Involved in the Disposal
of the Italian Colonies.

Reference: SWN-5436.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered a memorandum from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee dated 2 June 1947 requesting their views on the military implications involved in the disposal of the Italian colonies with particular reference to the British requirements for bases.

"It is in the interest of United States security to prevent any potentially hostile power from obtaining a firm hold in the Middle East and/or Mediterranean areas. Unfortunate and potentially catastrophic though it is, the USSR is our ideological enemy and our most probable enemy should war occur. Further, the USSR, militarily the strongest power in the world today with the exception of the United States, is engaged in improving its strategic position and increasing its military potential by attaching to itself states, peoples and areas to which it has no legitimate claim and to the great military disadvantage of the United States and our potential allies. The United States is now attempting to check this unwarranted expansion of Soviet control. Therefore, it would be contrary to announced United States policy and to United States military interests to accept any disposition of the Italian colonies which gave the USSR either unilateral or joint control of any of the colonies in question, even though this control were obtained in the guise of trusteeship under the United Nations.

"The objections to unilateral Soviet control are too obvious to warrant discussion. The objections

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to joint control stem from our previous experiences in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria where the Soviets have not hesitated to negate almost completely the effects of United States participation in joint control by means immoral, contrary to previous agreements with the United States and disadvantageous to the state concerned. If allowed to participate in joint control of any of the Italian colonies, the Soviets would be most likely to employ like tactics to gain for themselves complete control in all but the legalistic sense.

"The Soviets could exercise effective control of any of the colonies if a satellite or a non-satellite communist government were granted control. It would, therefore, be militarily disadvantageous to the United States to allow Italy to resume control of any or all of her colonies unless it had previously become clear that the future government of Italy will be non-communist and affiliated with the Western Democracies. This consideration is over and above the consideration of whether Italy would be able to maintain peace in the colonies, which, in view of the armed forces granted her by the treaty of peace, appears doubtful unless appropriate increases in her armed forces were authorized. In view of the strong ties existing between the various states of the Arab world, armed conflict between Italian forces and Arab forces native to the Italian colonies would threaten world peace.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider Great Britain and her Empire to be our most probable and most important allies, in the event of war with the USSR. A firm hold in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean is one of the basic tenets of British strategic policy. Facilities must, therefore, at all times be available somewhere in the area Palestine--Egypt--Cyrenaica which will enable United Kingdom sea, land and air forces to operate effectively in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. The future of Palestine is obscure. The revision of the 1936 treaty between Great Britain and Egypt is deadlocked. Cyrenaica is, therefore, more important than ever for the successful implementation of British strategic policy.


"However, there is doubt that the British can, within the next ten years, deploy sufficient land, sea and

air forces in the area to insure, with a reasonable degree of certainty, adequate protection of Anglo-American strategic interests in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. In spite of this and in view of the great strategic importance of this area to the United States and to the United Kingdom, retention of British forces in the area is, from the security point of view, the least objectionable alternative to

a. Joint United States-United Kingdom responsibility for the military security of the area, or

b. Assumption by the United States of unilateral responsibility for the military security of the area."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


W. G. LALOR
Captain, U.S. Navy
Secretary

JUL 7-1957



STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATION
COMMITTEE

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091 Italy
Misc.SWN-5543
6 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC

Subject: Disposition of the Italian Colonies

Reference: SWN-5436

In response to a request from the Department of State forwarded by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in the above reference, the following has been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered a memorandum from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee dated 2 June 1947 requesting their views on the military implications involved in the disposal of the Italian colonies with particular reference to the British requirements for bases.

"It is in the interest of United States security to prevent any potentially hostile power from obtaining a firm hold in the Middle East and/or Mediterranean areas. Unfortunate and potentially catastrophic though it is, the USSR is our ideological enemy and our most probable enemy should war occur. Further, the USSR, militarily the strongest power in the world today with the exception of the United States, is engaged in improving its strategic position and increasing its military potential by attaching to itself states, peoples and areas to which it has no legitimate claim and to the great military disadvantage of the United States and our potential allies. The United States is now attempting to check this unwarranted expansion of Soviet control. Therefore, it would be contrary to announced United States policy and to United States military interests to accept any disposition of the Italian colonies which gave the USSR either unilateral or joint control of any

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of the colonies in question, even though this control were obtained in the guise of trusteeship under the United Nations.

"The objections to unilateral Soviet control are too obvious to warrant discussion. The objections to joint control stem from our previous experiences in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria where the Soviets have not hesitated to negate almost completely the effects of United States participation in joint control by means immoral, contrary to previous agreements with the United States and disadvantageous to the state concerned. If allowed to participate in joint control of any of the Italian colonies, the Soviets would be most likely to employ like tactics to gain for themselves complete control in all but the legalistic sense.

"The Soviets could exercise effective control of any of the colonies if a satellite or a non-satellite communist government were granted control. It would, therefore, be militarily disadvantageous to the United States to allow Italy to resume control of any or all of her colonies unless it had previously become clear that the future government of Italy will be non-communist and affiliated with the Western Democracies. This consideration is over and above the consideration of whether Italy would be able to maintain peace in the colonies, which, in view of the armed forces granted her by the treaty of peace, appears doubtful unless appropriate increases in her armed forces were authorized. In view of the strong ties existing between the various states of the Arab world, armed conflict between Italian forces and Arab forces native to the Italian colonies would threaten world peace.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider Great Britain and her Empire to be our most probable and most important allies, in the event of war with the USSR. A firm hold in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean is one of the basic tenets of British strategic policy. Facilities must, therefore, at all times be available somewhere in the area Palestine--Egypt--Cyrenaica which will enable United Kingdom sea, land and air forces to operate effectively in the Middle

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East and Eastern Mediterranean. The future of Palestine is obscure. The revision of the 1936 treaty between Great Britain and Egypt is deadlocked. Cyrenaica is, therefore, more important than ever for the successful implementation of British strategic policy.

"However, there is doubt that the British can, within the next ten years, deploy sufficient land, sea and air forces in the area to insure, with a reasonable degree of certainty, adequate protection of Anglo-American strategic interests in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. In spite of this and in view of the great strategic importance of this area to the United States and to the United Kingdom, retention of British forces in the area is, from the security point of view, the least objectionable alternative to

"a. Joint United States-United Kingdom responsibility for the military security of the area, or

"b. Assumption by the United States of unilateral responsibility for the military security of the area."

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

W. A. SCHULGEN,
Acting Secretary

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Italy



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

Subject: Request of Views of Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
Disposition of the Italian Colonies.

According to Article 23 of the Peace Treaty with Italy, the final disposal of the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, i.e. Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland shall be determined jointly by the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the United Kingdom, of the United States of America, and of France within one year from the coming into force of the present treaty. Under the terms of Annex XI of the treaty, a Commission of Investigation, composed of representatives of the four powers mentioned above, is to be sent to the Italian Colonies for the purpose of consulting the wishes of the local inhabitants and of supplying the Deputies with the data necessary to enable the Foreign Ministers to arrive at a decision regarding the future disposition of these areas. In making their recommendations to the Foreign Ministers, the Deputies will take into consideration not only the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants but also the interests of peace and security, as well as the views of other interested governments.

The Deputies may soon resume the consideration of the question, and it is therefore imperative that the United States formulate a general policy which may guide its Deputy during the period of negotiation.

Briefly, the United States Government has advocated trusteeship with the United Nations as the administering authority for these territories, and independence to be granted to Libya and Eritrea at the end of ten years. At the present time, however, the Department is contemplating modification

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
of the ten year provision for Libya, so as to allow for a longer period of trusteeship, if deemed desirable, as a result of the Commission's findings. Alternative plans for the disposition of Eritrea are also being discussed as there is increasing doubt that this territory can become a viable state within the foreseeable future. This government has also favored a territorial cession of southeastern Eritrea giving Ethiopia access to the sea through Assab.

Although the Department is not informed of the present position, France has not previously wavered in its proposal to place the Italian Colonies under Italian Trusteeship. France has opposed any suggestion that the Colonies be granted independence, even after a period of trusteeship.

On April 29, 1946 the Soviet Union abandoned its demand for an individual trusteeship over Tripolitania, and in May 1946 supported the French proposal. At the present time the views of the U.S.S.R. on the subject of the Colonies are unknown.

While Great Britain has been sympathetic to International Trusteeship, it has not concealed its concern over the future of Cyrenaica. Reference has frequently been made by the British to their pledge to the Senussi, that these Cyrenaicans would never again be placed under Italian rule. Great Britain has also indicated an interest in Cyrenaica from a strategic point of view. It is likewise obvious that the disposition of Italian Somaliland is of great concern to the United Kingdom in view of that territory's contiguity to the British East African possessions, which may play an important role in future military plans of the United Kingdom, once the British Army has evacuated Egypt. The British have indicated their sympathy for Ethiopian aspirations in Eritrea.

This memorandum is submitted for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military implications involved in the disposal of the Italian Colonies, with particular reference to the British requirements for bases in Cyrenaica and perhaps in Italian Somaliland.

for  John H. Hildring

SECRET

SECRETSVN-5438
2 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Disposition of the Italian Colonies.

The following has been received from the State Member,
SWNCC:

"According to Article 23 of the Peace Treaty with Italy, the final disposal of the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, i.e. Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland shall be determined jointly by the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the United Kingdom, of the United States of America, and of France within one year from the coming into force of the present treaty. Under the terms of Annex XI of the treaty, a Commission of Investigation, composed of representatives of the four powers mentioned above, is to be sent to the Italian Colonies for the purpose of consulting the wishes of the local inhabitants and of supplying the Deputies with the data necessary to enable the Foreign Ministers to arrive at a decision regarding the future disposition of these areas. In making their recommendations to the Foreign Ministers, the Deputies will take into consideration not only the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants but also the interests of peace and security, as well as the views of other interested governments.

"The Deputies may soon resume the consideration of the question, and it is therefore imperative that the United States formulate a general policy which may guide its Deputy during the period of negotiation.

"Briefly, the United States Government has advocated trusteeship with the United Nations as the administering authority for these territories, and independence to be granted to Libya and Eritrea at the end of ten years. At the present time, however, the Department is contemplating modification of the ten year provision for Libya, so as to allow for a longer period of trusteeship, if deemed desirable, as a result of the Commission's

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findings. Alternative plans for the disposition of Eritrea are also being discussed as there is increasing doubt that this territory can become a viable state within the foreseeable future. This government has also favored a territorial cession of southeastern Eritrea giving Ethiopia access to the sea through Assab.

*Although the Department is not informed of the present position, France has not previously wavered in its proposal to place the Italian Colonies under Italian Trusteeship. France has opposed any suggestion that the Colonies be granted independence, even after a period of trusteeship.

*On April 29, 1946 the Soviet Union abandoned its demand for an individual trusteeship over Tripolitania, and in May 1946 supported the French proposal. At the present time the views of the U. S. S. R. on the subject of the Colonies are unknown.

*While Great Britain has been sympathetic to International Trusteeship, it has not concealed its concern over the future of Cyrenaica. Reference has frequently been made by the British to their pledge to the Senussi, that these Cyrenaicans would never again be placed under Italian rule. Great Britain has also indicated an interest in Cyrenaica from a strategic point of view. It is likewise obvious that the disposition of Italian Somaliland is of great concern to the United Kingdom in view of that territory's contiguity to the British East African possessions, which may play an important role in future military plans of the United Kingdom, once the British Army has evacuated Egypt. The British have indicated their sympathy for Ethiopian aspirations in Eritrea.

"This memorandum is submitted for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military implications involved in the disposal of the Italian Colonies, with particular reference to the British requirements for bases in Cyrenaica and perhaps in Italian Somaliland."

It is requested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be obtained on this matter and forwarded to the SWNCC Secretariat for transmittal to the Department of State.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

SECRET - 2 -

SECRET*091 Italy Misc.*

VFF:bjh

SWN-5228
14 March 1947**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:****Subject: Return of Italian Flag Tankers to Italy**

Pursuant to the approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 January 1947 of J.C.S. 1642/5 and the approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 21 February 1947 of Appendix "A" thereto, the enclosure is forwarded for the information of the State Department in connection with the enclosure to SM-7673. GM-IN-92604 (21 Feb 47) the enclosure to SM-7673 was forwarded to the State Department as an enclosure to SWN-5167 on 25 February 1947.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:**H. W. NOBLEY,
Secretary****Enclosure
J.C.S. 1642/5**

Copy No. 54 - Sec. State
55 - Navy Mbr
56 - War Mbr
57 - State Mbr
58 - ACNO

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COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

(21)

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

SM-7761
11 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Return of Italian Flag Tankers to Italy.

Reference: SM-7673, dated 24 February 1947.

Enclosure: J.C.S. 1642/5 (Copy No. 61).

Pursuant to the approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 January 1947 of J.C.S. 1642/5 and the approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 21 February 1947 of Appendix "A" thereto, the enclosure is forwarded for ^{the} information ^{of the State Dept.} in connection with the enclosure to SM-7673.

MAR 12 1947

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

3844



STATE-WAR & NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A. J. McFarland
A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

- State Member -----
- Army Member ----- *WHS*
- Navy Member ----- *6*
- Ass't State Member -----
- Ass't Army Member -----
- Ass't Navy Member -----
- Executive Secretary -----
- Ass't Exec. Secretary -----
- State Adm. Assistant -----
- Army Adm. Assistant -----
- Navy Adm. Assistant -----
- File -----

SECRET

SECRETCOPY NO. 61J.C.S. 1642/520 December 1946Pages 39 - 44 incl.JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFRETURN OF ITALIAN FLAG TANKERS TO ITALY

References: a. C.C.S. 941/12
b. C.C.S. 941/8
c. C.C.S. 941/9
d. C.C.S. 941/10
e. C.C.S. 941/11

Report by the Joint Military Transportation Committee
(In consultation with the Army-Navy Petroleum Board)

THE PROBLEM

1. To comment and make recommendations on the message to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED) proposed in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 941/12.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "B".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "C".

CONCLUSION

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff should agree to the dispatch to SACMED of the message in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 941/12.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in Appendix "A" be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. A copy of this report be forwarded to the State Department for information.

S E C R E TAPPENDIX "A"D R A F TCOMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFRETURN OF ITALIAN FLAG TANKERS TO ITALY

Reference: C.C.S. 941/12

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the views and recommendations of the British Chiefs of Staff contained in C.C.S. 941/12 and agree that there is nothing to be gained by further discussion on a military level of the employment of the Italian flag tankers.
2. The United States Chiefs of Staff do not feel assured that the assumption of responsibility by the Italian Government for the importation and distribution of petroleum products for the civilian economy will be completely satisfactory. The failure of this program, as the British Chiefs of Staff realize, would be a source of serious embarrassment to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED). The United States Chiefs of Staff consider, however, that should a necessity for further discussion of this matter arise in the future, it should be conducted on a governmental level.
3. Subject to the above, the United States Chiefs of Staff agree to the dispatch to SACMED of the message in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 941/12.
4. A copy of this dispatch is being forwarded to the State Department for any action it may wish to take in the matter.

S E C R E T

APPENDIX "B"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. On 18 June 1946, SACMED dispatched a request (NAF 1155 - Appendix "B" to C.C.S. 941/8) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending that necessary action be taken to return sufficient Italian flag tankers time-chartered to the British to provide for the needs of the military, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and the Italian national programs.

2. In C.C.S. 941/8 the British Chiefs of Staff were invited to obtain the release from the British Government of sufficient Italian flag tankers to provide for the needs stated in paragraph 1 above.

3. In C.C.S. 941/9 the British Chiefs of Staff stated that owing to a deficiency of tankers from non-dollar sources to carry military and other supplies for which the British are responsible, withdrawal of the Italian tankers would necessitate the Ministry of Transport chartering equivalent tonnage from the War Shipping Administration (WSA) on a dollar basis; approximate cost, \$480,000 per month.

4. The British Chiefs of Staff further made recommendations for the improvement of the shuttle service between Italian ports and asked the United States Chiefs of Staff to agree to the retention by his Majesty's Government of the deep-sea Italian flag tankers.

5. In C.C.S. 941/11 the United States Chiefs of Staff advised the British Chiefs of Staff that the responsibilities of UNRRA for the importation of petroleum products (POL) to Italy would be terminated on 31 December 1946, and that it would be necessary that the Italian Government make its own arrangements for the importation and distribution of POL for their civilian economy.

S E C R E T

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff further advised the British Chiefs of Staff that they could not agree to the retention by the British of the Italian tankers, and considered that the only satisfactory solution to the Italian shuttle problem was the immediate return of the tankers.

7. The British Chiefs of Staff, in C.C.S. 941/12, have stated that they consider there is little to be gained in further discussion of this matter and also stated that investigation leads to the conclusion that the Italian Government has sufficient tankers to operate a coastal shuttle service without the use of those chartered to the British; that when the Italian Government assumes responsibility for the importation and distribution of POL for the civilian economy, the employment of the chartered tankers will be the subject of discussion between the Ministry of Transport and the Italian Shipping Board. The British Chiefs of Staff, therefore, invite the United States Chiefs of Staff to agree to a dispatch to SACMED advising him of these facts.

8. It is reliably understood that, shortly after 31 December 1946, UNRRA will no longer be responsible for the importation of POL to Italy.

9. In view of the critical condition of the Italian economy, there is no assurance that the Italian Government will be able to support an import and distribution program of POL without outside financial assistance.

S E C R E TAPPENDIX "C"DISCUSSION

1. Six months have elapsed since SACMED made the original request for the transfer of the Italian flag tankers to the Italian Government. During this period, the only results obtained have been a futile exchange of papers between the United States Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff. In C.C.S. 941/12 the British Chiefs of Staff state that they feel there is little to be gained by pursuing further this discussion and invite the United States Chiefs of Staff to agree to a dispatch to SACMED which would presumably close the matter.

2. It is agreed that there is no point in further discussion of this matter on a military level. The responsibility for the importation and distribution of POL to support the Italian economy does not rest with the military. The occupation forces in Italy, however, are vitally concerned that an adequate supply of POL is imported to the Italians in order to prevent disease and unrest.

3. The fact that the British Chiefs of Staff have stated that they are assured that the Italian authorities have sufficient tankers to operate a coastal service, and that the employment of the six chartered tankers will be the subject of discussion with the Italian Shipping Board when the Italian Government assumes the responsibility for the importation and distribution of POL, should not be accepted as definite assurance that the Italian Government can handle this program. It may well happen that it might fail to meet the needs of the Italian economy and that the United States Government would be called upon to furnish some aid subject to the policy the State Department may wish to pursue in providing assistance to the Italian Government.

S E C R E T

4. The Italian Government now has in the United States a Technical Mission which is negotiating with the Maritime Commission for a certain number of tankers per month for the first six months of 1947. UNRRA's import program for Italy will be completed not later than March, and at that time the Italian Government will assume all responsibility for the import and distribution program. The extent, however, to which they will be able to maintain this program depends on the funds and credits they have.

5. Subject to the above, the United States Chiefs of Staff should agree that there is nothing to be gained by further discussion of this matter on a military level. As matters now stand, the future employment of the six Italian tankers chartered to the British should be resolved by the British and Italian Governments. The United States Chiefs of Staff should further agree to the dispatch to SACMED proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff should also be advised that any further discussion of this matter which may become necessary should be conducted on a governmental level.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

SM-7673
24 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Return of Italian Flag Tankers
to Italy.

On 21 February 1947 the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched the enclosed message to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, copy of which is forwarded herewith, for any action the State Department may wish to take in the matter.

FFR 25 1947



STATE-WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. McFarland
A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

3598

Enclosure.

WARX 92604 (Feb 47) - Copy No. 52.

SECRET

20

Combined Chiefs of Staff
Capt M. M. Stephens, USN,
W.D. Ext. 77500

21 February 1947

Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D. C.

Nr: WARX 92604

Book Message to Morgan for action, to AMSSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FAN 730 to Morgan from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, reference NAF 1155 and further to FAN 688.

It is considered, for the reasons given below, that there is little to be gained in pursuing the matter of release of Italian flag tankers outlined in NAF 1155:

a. No representations are known to have been made by the Italian Government for the return of the tankers and there appears to be no essential requirements on the Italian coast which cannot be met with the alternative Italian tanker tonnage which is now available.

b. As it is understood that the Italian authorities have sufficient tankers to operate the coastal shuttle service without the assistance of the six tankers on charter to the Ministry of Transport, the question of the return of these tankers does not now arise.

c. The employment during 1947 of the six tankers on charter to the British Ministry of Transport will be the subject of discussion between the Ministry of Transport and the Italian Shipping Board.

End

NOTE: NAF 1155 is CM IN 3739 (18 Jun 46)
FAN 688 is CM OUT 98104 (21 Aug 46)

CM OUT 92604

(Feb 47)

SECRET*091 Italy*SWN-5167
25 February 1947

VFF:do

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Return of Italian Flag Tankers to Italy.

On 21 February 1947 the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched the enclosed message to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, a copy of which is forwarded herewith, at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for any action the State Department may wish to take in the matter.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. W. MOSELEY,
SecretaryEnclosure
Copy No. 52, CM OUT 92604

COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

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Combined Chiefs of Staff
Capt M. M. Stephens, USN,
W.D. Ext. 77800

21 February 1947

Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D. C.

NR: MARK 92604

Book Message to Morgan for action, to ANSSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FAN 730 to Morgan from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, reference NAF 1155 and further to FAN 638.

It is considered, for the reasons given below, that there is little to be gained in pursuing the matter of release of Italian flag tankers outlined in NAF 1155:

a. No representations are known to have been made by the Italian Government for the return of the tankers and there appears to be no essential requirements on the Italian coast which cannot be met with the alternative Italian tanker tonnage which is now available.

b. As it is understood that the Italian authorities have sufficient tankers to operate the coastal shuttle service without the assistance of the six tankers on charter to the Ministry of Transport, the question of the return of these tankers does not now arise.

c. The employment during 1947 of the six tankers on charter to the British Ministry of Transport will be the subject of discussion between the Ministry of Transport and the Italian Shipping Board.

End

NOTE: NAF 1155 is CM IN 3739 (19 Jun 46)
FAN 638 is CM OUT 98104 (21 Aug 46)

CM OUT 92604

(Feb 47)

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**SWN-5121
6 February 1947**

HWK:aj

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC**

**Subject: Air Reinforcement of Anglo-American
Forces in Italy.**

The enclosure, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 February 1947 and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is circulated to the Committee for information.

**H. W. NOSELEY,
Secretary**

Enclosure

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

State Member	_____
Army Member	_____
Navy Member	_____
Ass't State Member	_____
Ass't Army Member	_____
Ass't Navy Member	_____
Executive Secretary	_____
Ass't Exec. Secretary	_____
State Adm. Assistant	_____
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Navy Adm. Assistant	_____
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ENCLOSURE

AIR REINFORCEMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN FORCES IN ITALY

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. In C.O.S. 739/90 the United States Chiefs of Staff set forth the current and probable future air capability of United States forces in Germany to reinforce Anglo-American forces in northern Italy, and indicated that the capability for air reinforcements might be limited by conditions existing at the time of the requirement. The Commanding General, U. S. Forces European Theater (CG, USFET) was directed to plan to furnish such air reinforcements as practicable, in the event of an emergency.

2. In the light of the forthcoming dissolution of Allied forces in Venezia-Giulia and the necessity of disposing of supplies currently stocked at Treviso, the United States Chiefs of Staff have released CG USFET from any definite commitment to furnish air reinforcements to SACMED, effective upon date of signature of the Italian peace treaty.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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SM-7540
5 February 1947

*091 Gloty
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Air Reinforcement of Anglo-American Forces in Italy.

The Enclosure approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 February 1947 and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff is forwarded herewith for information.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. McFarland
A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

Enclosure.

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

Initials

- State Member -----
- Army Member -----
- Navy Member -----
- Ass't State Member -----
- Ass't Army Member -----
- Ass't Navy Member -----
- Executive Secretary -----
- Ass't Exec. Secretary -----
- State Adm. Assistant -----
- Army Adm. Assistant -----
- Navy Adm. Assistant -----
- File -----

3546
FEB 5 1947



STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

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same as original.
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E N C L O S U R E

AIR REINFORCEMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN FORCES IN ITALY

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. In C.C.S. 739/90 the United States Chiefs of Staff set forth the current and probable future air capability of United States forces in Germany to reinforce Anglo-American forces in northern Italy, and indicated that the capability for air reinforcements might be limited by conditions existing at the time of the requirement. The Commanding General, U. S. Forces European Theater (CG, USFET) was directed to plan to furnish such air reinforcements as practicable, in the event of an emergency.

2. In the light of the forthcoming dissolution of Allied forces in Venezia-Giulia and the necessity of disposing of supplies currently stocked at Treviso, the United States Chiefs of Staff have released CG USFET from any definite commitment to furnish air reinforcements to SACMED, effective upon date of signature of the Italian peace treaty.

Enclosure

SECRET091 Italy Miss.
det.SWH-5022
3 January 1947

VFF:do

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

Subject: Situation in Italy

The enclosure, a copy of a message from the
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, is cir-
culated for your information.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. W. NOBLEY,
SecretaryEnclosure:
Copy No. 55, CM IN 4548

COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

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COPY

From: BAGMED Caserta Italy cite FRGOT
To: War Department for Combined Chiefs of Staff; Cabinet
Offices Whitehall for British Chiefs of Staff
Info: GHQ GMP
Nr: FX 74030 NAF 1255 30 December 1946

1. You will have seen reports on the Anti-British demonstrations in Padua during the period 10-12 December which were set off by a traffic accident involving a British vehicle.

2. As this subject may be brought up during the forthcoming visit of Signor De Gasperi to Washington and Signor Nenni to London, I wish to give you my views.

3. While spontaneous, local outbursts may occur immediately following such accidents the situation would soon revert to normal were it not for the activities of agitators awaiting just such opportunities to inflame the emotions of the crowd and to direct its anger against the Allies. The presence and activity of such agitators during the Padua demonstrations was obvious.

4. There is further evidence that a plan exists for use of such accidents as a basis of disorder. On 10-11-12-14 December residents of Milan were stopped on streets or telephoned and falsely told by persons unknown to them that members of their families had been killed or injured by Allied vehicles. These were apparently efforts to foment disorders in Milan comparable to those then going on in Padua. Due to the cooperation of the Milan Chief of Police and the Milan Newspapers these efforts were unsuccessful.

5. A large section of the Italian Press, particularly the Communist and Socialist Papers, are quick to seize on any incident or even to invent incidents which may be used to discredit the Allied Forces in Italy and inflame public opinion against them. It is impossible to believe that this campaign is not deliberate. It is certainly scurrilous and unfair. On the other hand factual statements issued on behalf of the Allied Forces are given poor publicity or more often ignored. At present this campaign is mainly directed against the British.

6. While everything possible is being done to eliminate causes of friction I believe that efforts will increase to direct future public demonstrations, whatever their original cause, against the Allied Forces. Political agitators will endeavour to exploit for Anti-Allied purposes the present

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temper of the Italian people who are disappointed at what they feel is the severity of the Peace Treaty, resentful at the high cost of living and the shortage of food and inevitably tired of the Allied occupation.

End

CM IN 4548

(31 Dec 46)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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SM-7342

31 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY
COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Situation in Italy.

Enclosure: NAF 1255, CM-IN-4548 (31 Dec 46)
Copy No. 55.

The enclosed message from the Supreme Allied
Commander, Mediterranean, is forwarded for your infor-
mation.

3446

W. G. Lalor
W. G. LALOR,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Secretary.

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

- State Member -----
- Army Member -----
- Navy Member -----
- Ass't State Member -----
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- Executive Secretary -----
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- Army Adm. Assistant -----
- Navy Adm. Assistant -----
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PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS SECRET
CORRESPONDENCE PER PARAS 511 and 60a (4), AR 380-5.

From: SACMED Caserta Italy cite FHGCT

To: War Department for Combined Chiefs of Staff; Cabinet
Offices Whitehall for British Chiefs of Staff

Info: GHQ CMF

Nr: FX 74030 NAF 1255 30 December 1946

1. You will have seen reports on the Anti-British demonstrations in Padua during the period 10-12 December which were set off by a traffic accident involving a British vehicle.

2. As this subject may be brought up during the forthcoming visit of Signor De Gasperi to Washington and Signor Nenni to London, I wish to give you my views.

3. While spontaneous, local outbursts may occur immediately following such accidents the situation would soon revert to normal were it not for the activities of agitators awaiting just such opportunities to inflame the emotions of the crowd and to direct its anger against the Allies. The presence and activity of such agitators during the Padua demonstrations was obvious.

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CM IN 4548

(31 Dec 46)

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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Page 2

From: SACMED Caserta Italy cite FHGCT

Nr: FX 74030

NAP 1255

30 December 1946

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6. While everything possible is being done to eliminate causes of friction I believe that efforts will increase to direct future public demonstrations, whatever their original cause, against the Allied Forces. Political agitators will endeavour to exploit for Anti-Allied purposes the present temper of the Italian people who are disappointed at what they feel is the severity of the Peace Treaty, resentful at the high cost of living and the shortage of food and inevitably tired of the Allied Occupation.

End

ACTION: CCS

INFO : AAF, Adm Leahy, ASW, CAD, ID, Adm Nimitz, P&G, CSA

CM IN 4548

(31 Dec 46) DTG: 301837A bfr

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TOP SECRET*091 Italy*
*(w/VPF) aj*SWN-5014
30 December 1948MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
WAR MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC**Subject: Reduction of British Forces in
North Italy.**

At the request of the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the enclosed memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff which is being presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff is forwarded to the Committee for information.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. W. ROSELEY,
Secretary

Enclosure

COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

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(17)

TOP SECRETMemorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff note that the British Chiefs of Staff find it necessary, in consonance with the demobilization policy of His Majesty's Government, to proceed with plans to reduce the Royal Air Force strength in north Italy to three squadrons, supported by three more British squadrons in Germany as reinforcements to be utilized in the event of an emergency. Further, the United States Chiefs of Staff have noted SACMED's comments set forth in RAF 1241 and the memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff dated 10 December 1946.

2. While the United States Chiefs of Staff have made no firm commitment for furnishing American reinforcements from Germany to SACMED in the event of an emergency, they have directed the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater (CG, USFET) to plan to furnish such air reinforcements, as practicable, to SACMED in such an event. While the latest capability for reinforcement from Germany, as announced by CG, USFET to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, on 10 October 1946, is one hundred and ten fighters in seventy-two hours of which seventy-two would be operational, it will be appreciated that the capability of United States forces in Germany to reinforce SACMED with fighters depends on conditions which may exist at the time of the requirement. In the event of a reduction of occupation forces in Germany, this capability to reinforce SACMED is likely to be reduced materially.

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091 Italy, Misc -

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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SM-7302
28 December 1946

SM-

5014

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Reduction of British Forces
in North Italy.

The enclosed memorandum by the United States
Chiefs of Staff, which is being presented to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded herewith for information.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

3433

A. J. McFarland
A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

Enclosure.

*Circulate for
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SWNCC SECRETARIAT

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Navy Member	<i>5</i>
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Ass't Army Member	-----
Ass't Navy Member	<i>C</i>
Executive Secretary	-----
Ass't Exec. Secretary	-----
State Adm. Assistant	-----
Army Adm. Assistant	-----
Navy Adm. Assistant	-----
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HWK:bjh

SWN-4784
30 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Return of Italian Flag Tankers
for Italy

The enclosed copy of JCS 1642/3 is forwarded to the Secretary of State at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On 27 September 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in JCS 1642/3.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

J. H. HILLDRING,
Chairman

Enclosure
JCS 1642/3, Copy No. 63

SECRET

COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

16

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

SM-6777
27 September 1946

*091 Italy misc -
over by [unclear]*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Return of Italian Flag Tankers
to Italy.

Enclosure: J.C.S. 1642/3 (Copy No. 63).

On 27 September 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
approved the recommendations in J.C.S. 1642/3.

The enclosed copy of J.C.S. 1642/3 is forwarded
for transmittal to the Department of State for information.

SWINCC SECRETARIAT

- State Member _____
- Army Member _____
- Navy Member _____
- Ass't State Member _____
- Ass't Army Member _____
- Ass't Navy Member _____
- Executive Secretary _____
- Ass't Exec. Secretary _____
- State Adm. Assistant _____
- Army Adm. Assistant _____
- Navy Adm. Assistant _____
- File _____

lms
add
war
SEP 28 1946

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]
A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U.S. Army,
Secretary.



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SWNCC SECRETARIAT

	State Member	-----
	Army Member	-----
	Navy Member	-----
	Ass't State Member	-----
SPFILE 201 Satta, Marcello	Ass't Army Member	-----
	Ass't Navy Member	-----
	Executive Secretary	-----
	Ass't Exec. Secretary	-----
	State Adm. Assistant	-----
	Army Adm. Assistant	----- 27 MAY 1946
	Navy Adm. Assistant	-----
	File	-----

copy Italy

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated 9 May 1946 inclosing a copy of a memorandum of 29 April 1946 from the Italian Embassy concerning the claim of Satta di Burgos Marcello, in the amount of \$33,567.17, for Ordnance items delivered to the United States Army Ordnance Depot, Asmara Arsenal, Asmara, Eritrea.

You are advised that necessary action will be taken to examine this claim and settlement will be made, if appropriate, when essential investigation has been made and necessary information received to substantiate payment.

It is requested that the Italian Embassy be advised accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT T. PATTERSON

Secretary of War

"INFORMATION COPY FOR THE SECRETARIAT, SWNCC."

15

SECRET

OPD 384 ETD (11 Nov 45)

091 gtd by vice

Move of Allied Hqs to Rome 12 NOV 1945

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In view of your very strong recommendations against the movement of our headquarters to Rome, I am deferring to your judgment on this matter. I feel, however, that Ambassador Kirk has constantly attempted to avoid the presence of American soldiers in Rome, without giving full consideration to the military factors involved. On 22 June 1944, during the campaign which had resulted so recently in the capture of that city, Ambassador Kirk cabled "therefore, I believe that it would be well for the highest authorities in London and Washington to give a word of caution to the competent authorities to place Rome as much 'out of bounds' as permitted by the exigence of military operations and of metropolitan administration and an innocuous and restrictive use of Rome by troops during the day for sight seeing purposes".

This recommendation was made when our soldiers in Italy were in the midst of a major battle, following a bitter winter of intense suffering, and, had it been accepted, would have denied adequate rest areas to our weary combat troops. On 29 June 1944, Ambassador Kirk again cabled re-iterating his former stand.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd.) G. G. MARSHALL

The Honorable
The Secretary of State

S.W.N.C.C.	
COL MCCARTHY
COMDR. RICHARDSON
MR. R. E. COX
LT. COL. PENNOYER
LT. COMDR. SILFUSS
MR. H. W. MOBELEY
MR. J. P. GARDINER
LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD
MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL
ENS. F. WHITESIDE
FILE

AA

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Copy for S.W.N.C.C.

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091-Italy
Mace

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SWNCC	
COL. MCCARTHY
COMDR. RICHARDSON
MR. R. E. COX
LT. COL. PENNOYER
LT. COMDR. SILFUSS
MR. H. W. MOSELEY
MR. J. P. GARDINER
LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD
MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL
ENS. E. WHITESIDE
FILE

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State
 Dear Mr. Secretary:

In a message to the Secretary of State on 2 November, the American Ambassador to Italy, Mr. Kirk, has forwarded the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, General Morgan, on the latter's problems in Greece. The message indicates that Prime Minister Attlee may discuss this matter with the President during his visit to Washington with a view to obtaining active U.S. participation in Greece.

Our intelligence sources indicate that the problem in Greece is more likely to be internal than external. The majority of the Greek people tend toward acceptance of a Rightist regime but an important minority is attracted toward an activist form of Communism. It is only the presence of British troops which has prevented the renewal of civil war. During the coming winter with the inevitable suffering due to shortages of food, shelter and fuel the dangers will be aggravated.

External sources which may endanger Greece comprise the possibility of Greek involvement in case of military operations against Turkey and the possibility of a Yugoslav and Albanian attack on Greece. These are possibilities only and are not considered likely.

Progress has been made in the organization of the Greek Armed Forces but these are not yet in a position either to defend the country from attack or to maintain public order against internal threats. Many of the officers in the Greek forces are aligned in party politics and in the event of a political crisis might well split into opposing factions in a civil war.

The British forces in Greece comprise approximately 50,000 troops including 2 divisions and 1 armored brigade. These forces are deployed generally in small groups throughout the country with the mission of maintaining internal order and assisting the Greeks in the organization of their armed forces.

It is believed that the present British forces in Greece are

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adequate to carry out the present mission maintaining internal order in conjunction with the establishment of a stable government. Participation by the U.S. on an equal basis in this commitment would thus require about one reinforced division, or some 25,000 men. It is estimated that a minimum of 7 or 8 divisions with proper air support, including about 4 U.S. divisions (100,000 men), would be required to assist Greece in the event of an external threat.

There are no U.S. troops in Greece at this time beyond the small detachment carrying on Air Transport Command activities. In addition to requirements for occupation troops in Austria and Germany, U.S. forces in the European Theater are presently being retained in Czechoslovakia until 1 December and in Venezia Giulia where the U.S. has a commitment until the peace settlement or until that commitment is otherwise liquidated. The transfer to Greece of one of these divisions with its divisional equipment, accompanying supporting troops and necessary air units would reduce our forces in Eastern Europe below the minimum believed essential. In addition, due to lack in the Atlantic of combat loaded type transports, such movement would take approximately two months. Other U.S. forces in Europe awaiting repatriation are neither organized nor trained to perform operational or occupational missions. There is a definite question as to our capability to find the manpower to implement commitments already made.

Considering the difficulties being encountered in fulfilling existing U.S. commitments for occupation forces, the length of time required to deploy operationally effective forces to Greece, the necessity for further demands on selective service and enlistment machinery to carry out such an obligation, and the pressure for early repatriation and demobilization of the U.S. Army, it is recommended that the United States not assume any military obligation in Greece.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Secretary of War

SECRET

091 - Italy
WDGAP 383.6 (13 Aug 45)The Honorable
The Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

SWNCC	
COL. McCARTHY
COMDR. RICHARDSON
MR. R. E. COX
LT. COL. PENNOYER
LT. COMDR. WEILFUSS
MR. H. W. MOSELEY
MR. J. P. GARDINER
LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD
MAJOR W. E. DUNTER
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL
ENS. F. WHITESIDE
FILE

Major Brown/72234/vk
OCT 1945

I have your letter dated 18 September 1945, SWP 711.65114/E-3145, with which you forwarded a note from the Italian Ambassador concerning complaints he had received regarding the alleged worsening of conditions in camps containing Italian prisoners of war and members of Italian Service Units.

These allegations have been made the subject of a careful study by the Provost Marshal General, from which it would appear that the complaints referred to by the Italian Ambassador are substantially unjustified.

With regard to items for sale in canteens, members of Italian Service Units have access to regular Army post exchanges, and may purchase therein any article available to an American soldier. Italian prisoners of war not members of such Units, however, are subject to the same restrictions with regard to items for sale in their canteens as all other enemy prisoners of war. These limitations have been necessary because of the shortages of the items concerned in this country.

The only restriction from the point of view of liberty recently placed on members of Italian Service Units has been the limitation that they could not be given emergency furloughs or be permitted to engage in group sight-seeing tours which required the use of any public transportation facility other than local streetcars, buses, or ferries. It will be well understood that this restriction was necessary in the public interest because of the over-burdened conditions of the railroads and other transportation facilities.

With regard to the food rations available for Italian prisoners of war and members of Italian Service Units, it is the opinion of the War Department that such rations comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, being equal in nutritional value to those provided for American troops in base camps, and are fully ample to assure the maintenance of health and working efficiency. The national dietary tastes of Italians present particular problems in this connection, and it is appreciated that the cooking oil issued is insufficient to satisfy fully their requirements. The critical shortage of this commodity, however, makes it impossible to increase the rations of oil issued, and the same is true with regard to the sugar ration.

It is not the intention of the War Department to impose particular restrictions on Italian Service Unit members during their last days in this

COPY FOR SWNCC

1114

The Honorable
The Secretary of State

country. Such restrictions as have been imposed have been the result of necessity and will be removed, it is hoped, as rapidly as improved conditions permit. The War Department is fully cognizant of the contribution made by members of Italian Service Units to our war effort and it is believed that such personnel have been appropriately rewarded by the granting of privileges not normally given to prisoners and by being given first preference in the repatriation of able-bodied prisoners of war.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Secretary of War

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE

- Mr. Cox
- Mr. Moseley
- Mr. Gardiner

WAR

- Colonel McCarthy
- Lt. Colonel Pennoyer
- Major Field
- Major Gunther
- Lt. Spittall

NAVY

- Commander Richardson
- Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller
- Lieutenant Geilfuss
- Ensign Whiteside

- Note
- Circulate
- File

REMARKS:

Evidently Gen.
Spofford does not
replace Col Chanler
but is an additional
member only.



WAR DEPARTMENT
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

891 JWC
9 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIAT, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE:

SUBJECT: SWNC Ad Hoc Committee Membership Change

Reference: SWNCC 155

It is requested that the name of Brigadier General Charles ^{USA} (42945)
M. Spofford be added to the list of members of the SWNC Ad Hoc
Committee to draft the articles for the treaty of peace with
Italy.

W. C. Chanler

WM. C. CHANLER
Colonel, GSC
Acting Director,
Civil Affairs Division

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
AUG 10 1945



AUG 10 1945



9 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIAT, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE:

SUBJECT: SWNC Ad Hoc Committee Membership Change

Reference: SWNCC 155

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WM. C. CHANLER
Colonel, GSC
Acting Director,
Civil Affairs Division

NEW MEMORANDUM
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
SEP 11 1945



SEP 10 1945

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COPY NO. _____

13 August 1945STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEADDENDUMTO S/WNCC MEMORANDUM, DATED 4 JULY 1945SUBJECT: APPOINTMENT OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE

Brigadier General Charles M. Spofford, USA, (W 2945)
is designated as an additional member of the ad hoc com-
mittee to consider the treaty of peace with Italy.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

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*091 Italy
Misc*

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1
2 Approval
Signature

WDSCA-Government Branch
Capt Miller 3968

1 Chief of Staff
2 Secretary of War

WDSCA 014 Italy
(21 July 1945)

Informing Italian Government of Contents
of Interim Agreement AFHQ/Yugoslav Authorities. 27 July 1945

SUMMARY

1. In letter dated 21 July 1945, the Acting Secretary of State proposed informing the Italian Government of the provisions of the interim agreement negotiated by Allied Force Headquarters with the Yugoslav authorities for the administration of Venezia Giulia. The Acting Secretary requested that if Secretary of War concurs, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should instruct Allied Force Headquarters to so inform the Italian Government through the Allied Commission.

2. The State Department has verbally stated that from a political point of view they desire the Italian Government to be so informed, thus leaving only the military questions to be decided. It is suggested that the matter be turned over to J. C. A. G. for consideration and recommendation to the J.C.S., who in turn will make their recommendations to the C.C.S.

3. It is recommended: (a) that the attached letter, if approved, be signed and dispatched and (b) that thereafter the file be returned to CAD for implementation.

COORDINATION

4. None, except informally discussed with OPD, S. & P. (Col. Woolnough and Lt. Col. Brister).

2 Incls.
1 Ltr for sig of S/W
2 Cy ltr fm Act S/S
dtd 21 Jul 45

WM. C. CHANLER
Colonel, SSC
Acting Director
Civil Affairs Division

SWNCC	
COL. MCCARTHY	<i>[Signature]</i>
COMDR. RICHARDSON	<i>[Signature]</i>
MR. R. E. COX	<i>[Signature]</i>
LT. COL. PENNOYER	<i>[Signature]</i>
LT. COMDR. STILFUSS	<i>[Signature]</i>
MR. H. W. MOSELEY	<i>[Signature]</i>
MR. J. P. BARDINER	<i>[Signature]</i>
LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER	<i>[Signature]</i>
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD	<i>[Signature]</i>
MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER	<i>[Signature]</i>
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL	<i>[Signature]</i>
ENS. F. WHITESIDE	<i>[Signature]</i>
FILE	<i>[Signature]</i>

SECRET

WCH
NOTED-OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
AUG 3- 1945

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SECRET

31 July 1945

The Honorable

The Acting Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I refer to your letter of July 21, 1945, suggesting that the Italian Government be informed through Allied Force Headquarters of the contents of the interim agreement negotiated by Allied Force Headquarters with the Yugoslav authorities for the administration of Venezia Giulia.

I assume that your letter refers to the agreement dated June 20, 1945, rather than to the so-called Belgrade Agreement dated June 9, 1945.

Your letter has been referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and you will be informed of any action taken.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

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091 Italy TOP SECRET

5 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: American Military Strength in Europe and its Effect upon the Implementation of American Foreign Policy.

Attached is a copy of a letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and the Navy enclosing a paraphrase of a message from the American Embassy in Rome, which is forwarded for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

Encl.

Cy ltr fr AS/S dtd
4 Jun 45 w/Encl.

TOP SECRET

⑦
SWNCC FILE

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

June 4, 1945

C-O-P-Y

My dear Mr. Secretary:

At Mr. Stettinius' request I am sending you a paraphrase of a top secret telegram which we have received from the American Ambassador at Rome concerning the importance of American military strength in Europe and its effect upon the implementation of American foreign policy.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ JOSEPH C. GREW

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Paraphrase of top secret
telegram from Rome,
May 25, 1945.

The Honorable

Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of War.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

C-O-P-Y

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From: American Embassy, Rome
To: Secretary of State, Washington
Date: May 26, 1945
Number: 1409

I desire to submit the following even though it goes beyond my province:

Adequate evidence exists in the actions of the French and Yugoslavs, and even in the Polish situation, that there are here in Europe elements at work that will inevitably destroy the fruits of our victory. Nor is it unrealistic to count on their becoming more rampant still once we have withdrawn the mass of our military forces in Europe.

I personally am entitled to appraise the situation only with respect to Italy. On that basis, however, I can with all certainty say that reports of unreplaced U.S. troops withdrawals and generally advertised plans to cut down our European military force are causing disruption all through Italy and disastrously working against the establishment or maintenance of order in this country.

There is no question of overlooking the necessity for maximum prosecution of the Far Eastern war or for avoidance of needless risks of sacrificing more American lives in Europe. However, to display present power is one of the best ways to avoid having to resort to force. It is unthinkable that mere fear of potential additional sacrifices should make us fall short in our debt to those who have already given their lives in a just cause by failing to consolidate the benefits yielded by victory in that cause.

After the last war we were charged with leaving Europe in the lurch. This precedent is already being used as an argument against us by those whose present support of our principles is of dubious sincerity. Moreover, these elements are holding implementation of their ulterior objectives in abeyance until we are no longer in a position to challenge them immediately and effectively. Many months will, in fact, be required to effect the withdrawal of American forces. I am certain, however, that reticence in announcing withdrawal plans - or even denial of them, plus delay in implementing them - will afford the best possible guarantee for establishing such conditions in Europe as alone can be propitious for the building of a world order such as is envisaged by the Americans.

Nor

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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Nor can I believe that the American people will not respond to the necessity of seeking to avert the danger by keeping our forces in Europe until it is possible to appraise the face as realities the various factors and elements that today are only potentialities, provided the public is properly presented with the fact of the existence of dangers today germinating in Europe to world order and leading to possible crises even surpassing those of the past.

KIRK

TOP SECRET

S E C R E T

5 July 1945

COPY NO. 40

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

ADDENDUM

TO SWNCC MEMORANDUM, DATED 4 JULY 1945

SUBJECT: APPOINTMENT OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE

1. Commander Charles B. Gary, USNR (N 4072) is designated Navy member of the ad hoc committee to consider the treaty of peace with Italy.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

SECRETCOPY NO. 404 July 1945STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walter E. Dowling, State Department,
Steering Member (S-623)

Colonel William C. Chanler, USA (W-2945)

(Navy Department member to be appointed later)

Subject: Appointment of an ad hoc Committee.

1. By informal action, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee agreed to appoint an ad hoc committee to draft the articles for the Treaty of Peace with Italy which would fulfill the general objectives stated in the enclosure to SWNCC 155. These studies will embrace the military and military aviation clauses for Part VI of the general draft and also for Part VII, dealing with the subjects of Prisoners of War and Graves, as shown in Tab to Annex of SWNCC 155.

2. The individuals listed above have been designated by their respective departments to serve on this ad hoc committee.

3. A copy of SWNCC 155, "Treaty of Peace with Italy", is forwarded herewith.*

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

*Furnished to members of ad hoc committee only.

~~SECRET~~C O P Y

21 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Request of Italian Committee of National Liberation for an Increased Army.

The Department of State has been informed by the British Embassy at Washington that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will consider the request of the Italian Committee of National Liberation for an increased army. As the Department of State understands that neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the British Chiefs of Staff have the text of the Italian request, it encloses for information a paraphrase of a telegram, dated 13 January, 1945 from the American ambassador at Rome on the subject.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

WALLACE E. WHITSON
Secretary

Encl.
Paraphrase of telegram
13 Jan 45 fr AmAmbassador
at Rome to S/S.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 740132
By CD/KMS NARS, Date NOV 24 1976

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(4)

~~SECRET~~C O P Y

TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE AMERICAN
AMBASSADOR AT ROME DATED JANUARY 13, 1945.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has requested that the following message from the Italian Central Committee of National Liberation be forwarded to the President.

"The Central Committee of National Liberation of Italy has the honor to inform you of the desire which it has expressed to the Italian Government for a larger participation of our country in the war against Nazi oppression.

"The Italian people welcome with heart-felt gratitude the sacrifice of blood of the glorious Allied Armies and bows in admiration before the example of heroism displayed by the soldiers of the United Nations on every war front. In view of these great sacrifices the Italian people feel that the heroic action of the Patriots the admirable contribution of the Navy and the efforts of army and air force units can and should be rounded out by a larger participation of soldiers on the front of liberated Italy.

"Interpreting the sentiment and desire of the people the Central Committee of National Liberation assures the heads of the United Nations that in accordance with the renewed national conscience and in contrast to the aims and methods which brought about the military and moral collapse of so large a part of the Italian Army Italy's war effort could be reinforced through the creation of a strong national army

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capable

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capable of entering the lines alongside the glorious Allied Armies. This must be the way by which Italy arises again morally revindicating its good name stained by Fascist dishonor and satisfying its urge to contribute more effectively towards regaining its national independence and to the victory of liberty for the people. Every Italian citizen is aware that the surest deliverance will result from action: action which linking in the heroic war effort Italian formations with those of the United Nations will bring about the destruction of Hitlerite and Fascist savagery and the triumph of democracy.

"The Central Committee of National Liberation trusts that the great heads of the United Nations will not wish to deny to the Italian people the right to fulfill their duty."

In his note transmitting the above message the Minister adds that "the continued enlargement and development of Italian military participation also is one of the fundamental desires of the government which consequently participates in and fully supports the proposals and sentiments expressed by the Central Committee of National Liberation".

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~C O P Y

21 February 1945

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For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

WALLACE E. WHITSON
Secretary

Encl.
Paraphrase of telegram
13 Jan 45 fr AmAmbassador
at Rome to S/S.

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

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21 February 1945

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For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

WALLACE E. WHITSON
Secretary

Encl.
Paraphrase of telegram
13 Jan 45 fr AmAmbassador
at Rome to S/S.


~~**SECRET**~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
^{Southern}
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

February 21, 1945

Memorandum for Mr. Cox.

I am informed by the British Embassy that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will consider the request of the Italian Committee of National Liberation for an increased army. I am further informed that neither the United States Joint Chiefs nor the British Chiefs have a text of the Italian request. Consequently, it is attached herewith for forwarding to the Joint Chiefs if you consider it appropriate.


SE:JWJones:fl

SECRET

TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE AMERICAN
AMBASSADOR AT ROME DATED JANUARY 13, 1945.

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strong

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strong national army capable of entering the lines alongside the glorious Allied Armies. This must be the way by which Italy arises again morally revindicating its good name stained by Fascist dishonor and satisfying its urge to contribute more effectively towards regaining its national independence and to the victory of liberty for the people. Every Italian citizen is aware that the surest deliverance will result from action: action which linking in the heroic war effort Italian formations with those of the United Nations will bring about the destruction of Hitlerite and Fascist savagery and the triumph of democracy.

"The Central Committee of National Liberation trusts that the great heads of the United Nations will not wish to deny to the Italian people the right to fulfill their duty!"

In his note transmitting the above message the Minister adds that "the continued enlargement and development of Italian military participation also is one of the fundamental desires of the government which consequently participates in and fully supports the proposals and sentiments expressed by the Central Committee of National Liberation".

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
STATE DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

20 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF.

Subject: Assignment of Italian Service Attachés
to Neutral Countries.

The attached memorandum to the Secretary of State
was dispatched this date.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

WALLACE E. WHITSON
Secretary

Enc.
Memo to Sec'y of State, fm
Chairman, SWNCC, and file.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE, WAR AND NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

SUBJECT: Assignment of Italian Service Attaches

1. Reference is made to letter from the Secretary of State, dated 2 January 1945, with inclosed paraphrase of cable from the U. S. Political Adviser, AFHQ.

2. The views of the War Department on the questions raised in this message are generally in accord with those expressed in the letter from the Secretary of State. Detailed views are as follows:

a. Since the Italian Government is recognized as a cobelligerent in the war against Germany, Italian interest in military matters is legitimate. Therefore, from a military point of view, the appointment of Military Attaches to Italian diplomatic missions in neutral and cobelligerent countries is proper. However, because of the predominant military factors in our relations with Italy, in cases of countries in theaters of operations, the views of the theater commander concerned should be sought and given careful consideration.

b. Pending the establishment of Italian diplomatic representation in Washington, the appointment of a small military mission in lieu of a Military Attache would be the appropriate means of liaison in military matters in Washington.

c. As soon as Italian diplomatic representation is established in Washington, the assignment of an Italian Military Attache would be proper.

JOHN J. McCLOY
Assistant Secretary of War

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
STATE DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Assignment of Italian Service Attachés to Neutral Countries.

1. Reference is made to letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and Navy, dated 2 January 1945, with inclosed paraphrase of cable from the United States Political Adviser, AFHQ, which was referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for consideration and action.

2. The views of the War and Navy Departments on the questions raised in this message are generally in accord with those expressed in the letter from the Secretary of State. Detailed views are as follows:

a. Since the Italian Government is recognized as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany, Italian interest in military matters is legitimate. Therefore, from a military point of view, the appointment of Military Attachés to Italian diplomatic missions in neutral and co-belligerent countries is proper. The War and Navy Departments agree with the State Department view, that the question of Italian service attachés in neutral countries should be referred to the Chief of the American Mission in the country concerned in each instance. However, because of the predominant military factors in our relations with Italy, in cases of countries in theaters of operations, the views of the theater commander concerned should be sought and given careful consideration.

b. As soon as Italian diplomatic representation is established in Washington, the assignment of Italian Service Attachés would be proper.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN,
Chairman.

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SECRETSTATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
STATE DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Assignment of Italian Service Attachés to Neutral Countries.

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b. As soon as Italian diplomatic representation is established in Washington, the assignment of Italian Service Attachés would be proper.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN,
Chairman.

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
STATE DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

17 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dunn
Mr. McCloy
Mr. Gates

1. The question of the assignment of Italian service attachés has been referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

2. The enclosure, a draft of the proposed reply to the letter from the Department of State, (Appendix "A") is submitted for your approval.

Wallace E. Whitson
WALLACE E. WHITSON
Secretary

Enc.

*Prepare letter & despatch
Done 20 Jan '45
WAW*

SECRET

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Memorandum for The Secretary of State

~~Draft of Proposed Reply to the State Department~~Subject: Assignment of Italian Service Attaches
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dated 2 January 1945, with inclosed paraphrase of cable from the

U. S. Political Adviser, AFHQ,

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2. The views of the War and Navy Departments on the questions

raised in this message are generally in accord with those expressed

in the letter from the Secretary of State. Detailed views are as

follows:

a. Since the Italian Government is recognized as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany, Italian interest in military matters is legitimate. Therefore, from a military point of view, the appointment of Military Attaches to Italian diplomatic missions in neutral and cobelligerent countries is proper. The War and Navy Departments agree with the State Department view, that the question of Italian service attaches in neutral countries should be referred to the Chief of the American Mission in the country concerned in each instance. However, because of the predominant military factors in our relations with Italy, in cases of countries in theaters of operations, the views of the theater commander concerned should be sought and given careful consideration.

b. Pending the establishment of Italian diplomatic representation in Washington, the appointment of a small military mission in lieu of a Military Attache would be the appropriate means of liaison in military matters in Washington.

b. ~~e.~~ As soon as Italian diplomatic representation is established in Washington, the assignment of ~~a~~ Italian ^{Service} Military Attaches would be proper.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

James Clement Hoover
Chairman (V)

SECRETAPPENDIX "A"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

January 2, 1945

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of War and encloses a paraphrase of a telegram from the United States Political Adviser at Allied Force Headquarters concerning Italian military and naval attachés in United Nations and neutral countries.

With respect to Italian service attachés in neutral countries it has been the practice of this Government to be guided by recommendations of the American mission in the country concerned. In those neutral capitals where Italian service attachés were considered useful to the war effort by the American and British missions no objection has been raised by this Government to their continued presence there. Consequently the specific question raised in Mr. Kirk's telegram under reference concerning an air attaché to Madrid and a military attaché to Ankara might appropriately be referred to the United States diplomatic missions in those capitals.

With respect to anticipated requests from the Italian Government for the assignment of service attachés to the Italian embassies at Washington and London, the Italian position in this regard would not appear to be unreasonable. The relations of this Government with Italy have until very recently been of a military character. The Italian Government is recognized as a cobelligerent in the war against Germany. United States armed forces are using Italy as a base of operations against the enemy. As long as hostilities continue in Europe Italian interest in military and naval matters would appear to be legitimate.

It is recognized that the question raised in Mr. Kirk's enclosed telegram is of primary interest to the War and Navy Departments. The Department would appreciate receiving the comments of the Secretary of War in formulating a reply to the United States Political Adviser.

Enclosure:

Paraphrase of a telegram 1839,

December 20, from Caserta.

SECRETANNEXTO APPENDIX "A"

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED

To: Secretary of State
From: American Political Adviser, Caserta
Date: December 20, 4 p.m. 1944
Number: 1839

AFHQ did not concur in a proposal made some weeks ago by the Italian Government to send an Air attaché to Madrid. The Allied Commission has recently sent through another request to AFHQ for permission to send a new Italian military attaché to Turkey. AFHQ is at present considering the latter request. I anticipate similar requests for assignment of Italian military and naval attachés to Washington and London. I would appreciate the Department's views, consequently, with respect to the assignment of Italian service attachés not only to neutral countries but to London and Washington as well.

KIRK