

(J)
MI's
#1-15

(J) II-1
December 31, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION

NO. 1 PROCEDURE ENROUTE

Note by the Secretary General

1. OFFICES The Commission Office aboard will be the Operations Office, located on the Flag Bridge, 2 decks above the 0200 deck just forward of the Emergency Cabin, Phone 941. Mr. Mosley and Mr. Farley will be available there for all matters concerning Commission business.

A second, Distribution Office, will be maintained in the Flag Office, one deck below and forward of the Wardroom on the starboard side, phone 027, 043, 052, or 005. Miss McKenna will be in charge of this office. Papers and other communications for delegations and passengers will be distributed in boxes at this office. Typewriters, desks, paper and other working materials will be available there.

2. SUPPLIES AND SERVICES With the exception of those personal services described in the mimeographed sheet, "General Information for all Passengers", all supplies and services should be requested via the Commission Office.

3. DOCUMENTS A complete file of all Commission documents is available for use in the Commission Office.

All Commission papers afloat will be reproduced and distributed on board with the letter "J" in parentheses before the document number in order to distinguish this series from the Washington documents. These papers will be forwarded to Washington for distribution there.

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4. MEETINGS Notices of meetings enroute together with Agenda will be posted on the bulletin board in the Messroom.

5. COMMUNICATIONS Mr. Moseley and Mr. Farley have been designated as authenticating officers for all incoming and outgoing messages. Messages from the Commission or delegations, either in the clear or encoded, should be left with either of these officers in the Commission Office. They will pass such messages to the ship's Communications Officer for transmittal to Washington, where appropriate distribution will be made via the Commission's home office in the Department of State.

Likewise, all incoming messages for the Commission and for delegations will be distributed via the Commission Office and will be delivered in boxes at the Distribution Office.

Official Commission communications from Washington, such as the activities of the Working Committees, will be mimeographed and circulated on board.

All papers of the Commission enroute will be forwarded to Washington for distribution there. A daily summary of Commission activities, both on board and in Washington, will be exchanged and circulated for information.

6. LIBRARY The Commission has a small library in the Commission Office, where the following titles may be borrowed for use:

I

U. S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, I, II and III

Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, I and II

Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

II

BOOKS

Allen, G. C. Japanese Industry - Its Recent Development and Present Condition (New York 1940)

Bisson, T. A. Japanese War Economy (New York 1945)

- Dorton, Hugh Japan Since 1931 - Its Political and Social Developments (New York 1940)
- Embroe, John F. The Japanese Nation - A Social Survey (New York 1945)
- Fleisher, Wilfrid What To Do With Japan (New York 1945)
- Crow, Joseph C. Ten Years in Japan (New York 1944)
- The Japan Yearbook, 1943 to 1944 (Tokyo 1943)
- Johnstone, M. C. The Future of Japan (New York 1945)
- Kodama Report (IPR, New York 1945)
- Maki, John H. Japanese Militarism - Its Cause and Cure (New York 1945)
- Hishikiori, Hideo Togo-kura - A Village in Northern Japan (IPR, New York 1945)
- Norman, E. Herbert Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (New York 1940)
- Quigley, Harold S. Far Eastern War 1937-41 (Boston 1942)
- Quigley and Blakeslee, Geo. H. Far East, An International Survey (Boston 1938)
- Snow, Edgar The Pattern of Soviet Power (New York 1945)
- Trewartha, Glenn T. Japan: A Physical, Cultural and Regional Geography (Madison, Wisconsin 1945)

III

PAMPHLETS AND MISCELLANEOUS

- Dentwich, Norman International Law (Royal Institute of International Affairs)
- Far Eastern Survey (29 August - 19 December 1945)
- Occupation Map of Japan and the Far East
- Roster of Far Eastern Commission
- Stannard, Harold What Is A Nation? (Royal Institute of International Affairs)
- Taylor, E. G. R. Geography of An Air Age (Royal Institute of International Affairs)
- Whyte, Sir Frederick (KCSI) The Rise and Fall of Japan (Royal Institute of International Affairs)
- Wyndham, H. A. Britain and the World (Royal Institute of International Affairs)
- Map of Japan and Korea (National Geographic Magazine)

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

(J) MI-2

December 31, 1945

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 2

DAILY SUMMARY

Note by the Secretary General

1. The following message was wired to the Commission on 30 December 1945:
 - "1. Commission arrived Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, at 2100 on Friday, 29 December, and embarked on Lit. McKinley that evening. Sailed from Pearl at 0700 on Saturday, 29 December, at speed of 14 knots, course west to Latitude 30 N°, Longitude 150 E°, and thence north to Tokyo, estimated duration of passage 12 days and time of arrival in Tokyo Bay the afternoon of 9 January 1946.
 - "2. All personnel scheduled to be aboard are on board and well. Weather excellent, spirits high, accommodations comfortable, ship's company unusually hospitable.
 - "3. First meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 1 January, with tentative agenda (a) The Terms of Reference, and (b) Information desired in Japan.
 - "4. Recommend distribution of this and other daily summaries marked 'Dickover for normal Commission distribution', to all local embassies for information as standard Commission document."

2. On 31 December, Washington was informed that (J) FEC-1, Terms of Reference, was being circulated with the suggestion that it be distributed in similar fashion there. Also, (J) FEC-2 was forwarded for distribution there.

Nelson T. Johnson
SECRETARY GENERAL

(J) MI2/1
January 3, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 2/1

DAILY SUMMARY

Note by the Secretary General

1. The following message was wired to the Supreme Commander on January 1, 1946:

"New Year's Greetings to you from the Far Eastern Commission enroute Japan with wishes for continued success in the difficult task of occupation and administration which you have conducted so admirably and for which the United Nations, particularly those in the Far East, will be forever deeply indebted."

2. The following message was wired to Dr. Evatt the same day:

"New Year's Greeting to you from the Far Eastern Commission enroute Japan with regrets that you are not in our company and with hopes that the New Year may find you once again associated with the Commission."

3. The record of the first (J) meeting was wired to Washington on January 3, together with the texts of the two above messages.

4. Washington was also informed that General McCoy had begun a series of talks by Commission members to the ship's company by addressing them on the subject of the Commission and its members.

5. The full text was requested of Secretary Byrnes' radio discussions of the Moscow agreements.

(J) MI-2/2

January 4, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 2/2

DAILY SUMMARY

Note by the Secretary General

1. On January 4, 1946, the Commission received the following message from General of the Army MacArthur:

"Many thanks to the Commission for its cordial message.

I am looking forward with anticipation to its arrival in

Tokyo. Signed MacArthur."

2. On January 4 the Chairman was informed that the Soviet Government had officially notified the U. S. Government that Mr. Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the U. S., had been appointed Soviet Representative on the Far Eastern Commission, with Mr. Novikov Minister Counsellor in Washington, as his deputy; and that Lieutenant General Derevyanko had been appointed Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan, with Mr. Malik, former Soviet Ambassador at Tokyo, as his political advisor and Razin as his economic advisor. The Soviet Embassy has approached the Commission's Washington office regarding participation in the Commission's work. Copies of all FEC papers have been supplied to the Soviet Embassy.

3. The Army and Navy are making the following arrangements for berthing the U.S.S. Mt. McKinby in Japan:

a. Estimated time of arrival at Yokohama is now Wednesday, January 9, 1946.

b. Upon arrival at Yokohama the ship will reduce draft and adjust trim, an operation which will require approximately 12 hours. The ship will then move on the following high tide during daylight to her berth alongside pier at Tokyo, where appropriate communications and other services will be available.

Nelson T. Johnson
SECRETARY GENERAL

(J)MI-2/3
January 4, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 2/3

DAILY SUMMARY

Note by the Secretary General

1. On January 4, 1946, as a consequence of information received concerning the Soviet appointees to the Far Eastern Commission (circulated in (J)MI-2/2) and after informal clearance with the members of the Commission, the following message was sent to the Commission's office in Washington:

"You may inform the Soviet Embassy that the Chairman and members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission would welcome participation by the Soviet representative appointed to the Far Eastern Commission and his assistants in the studies and the work of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission pending the organization of the Far Eastern Commission."

2. A message from the Commission's Washington office, dated January 5, 1946, gives the following information:

"Australian minister states advice received from Canberra that W. D. Forsyth, J. D. Andrews and A. B. Jamieson leave Australia today (January 5) by air for Tokyo to join Australian delegation on Far Eastern Commission. They expect to arrive Tokyo January 5."

3. Washington also reports that Working Committee V, on War Criminals, is scheduled to meet on Thursday, January 10.

4. The following sample press reactions to the Moscow agreement were received from Washington:

"Strongest criticism comes from Republican Congressmen along the line that MacArthur should not be interfered with and that if the Commission and the Council fail to follow the statesmanship of MacArthur, control of Japan must be handed to the United Nations Organization. Lippmann, Leon Henderson, Harkness and Vandercook join in praising 'extraordinary farsightedness' of the communique. Patterson and Howard press regard the Moscow negotiations as 'giving in to Russia.' Lippmann, endorsing the results, says the U. S. has recognized the 'leading but not exclusive' influence of Russia in Eastern Europe, while Russia has recognized the 'leading but not exclusive' influence of the U. S. in the control of Japan. The New York Times calls the provisions for Korean trusteeship 'incomparably better than the present situation' and hopes for establishment of a suitable government within five years.

"Lippmann, Washington Post, and Vandercook are sympathetic to the French position concerning Germany. Lippmann says, 'Until Britain accepts the French view, which is also the Russian view, that Germany is not to be reconstituted with the

industrial potential of a great military power, Moscow and London will be dangerously at odds wherever they meet."

5. The following summary of the leading editorial in the Manchester

Guardian on January 2 has also been received:

"The Manchester Guardian's leading editorial of January 2 expresses scepticism concerning the workability of the control system for Japan as revised by the Moscow agreement, and calls for American sincerity in allowing participation of other powers.

"Declaring that the chief aim of Secretary Byrnes was to devise a formula which would preserve American control of Japan while appearing to share it with the Allies, the editorial says that whether or not this has been achieved, it must be admitted that the machinery created is so complex that only a miracle of good will can make it work. Four agencies--the Far Eastern Commission, the four-power Control Council, the U. S. Government and the Supreme Commander in Tokyo--are given unequal authority over Japan. This ambiguous dyarchy exists in Washington and in Tokyo, where 'we find General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander, who is at once the servant of the United States Government, "the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan," the Chairman (and United States member) of the Allied Council, and an authority in his own right.' The only check on his power is the Allied Council, whose own authority is loosely defined. Concerning the Secretary's press conference explanation that General MacArthur would still retain the power to appoint a whole new Japanese Government one by one, and that the United States member of the Control Commission could always veto any changes in Japan suggested by other members, the Guardian asserts: 'This sort of cleverness may win applause among the smart attorneys of the Middle West, but it will hardly do credit to President Truman's administration. A statesman is judged not by his skill in making a bargain--still less by his skill in getting out of it--but by his good faith in keeping it. It is true that every representative of a democratic state must bear in mind the limitations of public opinion, but if Mr. Byrnes heard that Americans would resent the diminution of General MacArthur's powers, he would have done better to have explained the need for the agreement rather than to have explained it away as non-existent.' The editorial holds that any attitude that a bargain had to be made with the Russians and the British but that is without meaning 'does little credit to the greatest of the great powers.' It fears that it must also inevitably encourage General MacArthur--'who on his own showing needed no encouragement'--to disregard the spirit of agreement and ride roughshod over the Allied members of the Commission and Council. The editorial declares that the machinery established at Moscow is clumsy but that the idea behind it is sound, and that the machinery may still be made to work if all the Allies endeavor to cooperate in a spirit of good will. The Guardian adds 'It will certainly not work if the Americans make up their minds in advance to ignore it. No one would deny the United States a leading voice in the control of Japan, but that is not the point. The United Nations are all alike committed to a great attempt to work together in the world for good. There can be no exceptions to this policy. *** Americans, who are so ready to criticize Russia in Eastern Europe and Britain in her empire, should be the first to recognize this principle.'"

(J) MI-2/4
January 7, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 2/4

DAILY SUMMARY

Note by the Secretary General

1. Washington reports that the text of Ambassador Pauley's remarks at the 10th meeting of the Commission on December 21, 1945, have been circulated to the Commission. General Mac Arthur's orders to the Japanese, dated November 10-24 inclusive, have also been circulated, as have been the first and second weekly reports on Japan and Korea, from the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department.
2. The following press comments have been forwarded:

General Reactions

Moscow Agreement continues on the whole favorable. Lippman defends Byrnes as a practical negotiator, calling allegations that Byrnes obtained agreement by yielding to Russian demands "unfair and untrue", and reiterates that Russia is obtaining no more control over policy in Japan than U.S. had in Eastern Europe. Magazines "Time" and "Newsweek" agree Moscow results clear the air at cost of concession to Russia. "Time" concludes "world is waiting with crossed fingers" to see how agreements will work out in practice.

Scripps Howard Press and Cedric Foster advocate greater consideration of General Mac Arthur's judgments and ask whether Washington is making policy decisions without adequate information. Philadelphia Inquirer feels Mac Arthur's hands "must be kept free". Chicago Tribune declares Mac Arthur has been "sold out by his own Government".

Andrew Roth in Nation Magazine comments favorably on administrative machinery, but adds "There is many a slip twixt the communique and its realization". Roth welcomes decision concerning Korea.

3. Additional press commentary follows:

Following are sample reactions to Secretary Byrnes' report on Moscow Agreements. Washington Star, Elmer Davis and Baukhage think he removed most of the apprehensions. Scripps Howard consider report not altogether convincing, but, with other critics, welcome his frankness. Washington Post thinks

Byrnes unduly defensive, especially about atomic agreement, which Post considers a real accomplishment. Washington Star thinks words regarding satisfactory settlement of Rumanian and Bulgarian questions "didn't ring true".

Byrnes' explanation of control arrangements for Japan is welcomed and most common interpretation is that U.S. will continue to have "primary authority". Washington Star, Post, Lowell Mellett and David Wills welcome U.S. "recognition" of "legitimate interests of other nations".

Some Congressmen continue to express concern about diminution of authority over Japan on the part of U.S. and General Mac Arthur.

Further comment by columnists on Moscow Agreements is mostly favorable. Exceptions to generally favorable group are Dorothy Thompson and New York Sun.

Senator Morse attacks four power trusteeship for Korea as breach of faith with weaker nations, but Wilfred Fleisher welcomes the agreement for terminating an "impossible situation".

Emperor's rescript disavowing claims of divinity is hailed in news stories and some comment as revolutionary act often credited to General Mac Arthur. New York Times would have Hirohito add to the "great reform" by proclaiming popular sovereignty. New York Herald Tribune and Baltimore Sun find rescript "not as radical as seems", while Elmer Davis and Daily Worker stress Hirohito's efforts to retain his throne.

Lead editorial in magazine "New Republic" stresses difficulty Byrnes had to find a course between recognition that Soviet must be brought into full partnership with U.S. in Far East and the pressure of anti-Russian congressional groups which were ready to tear apart any agreement which might seem to circumscribe powers of Mac Arthur. Allied Council and FEC Agreements are so loosely drafted, according to "New Republic", that Big Three Meeting in March will be none too soon to solve the fundamental conflicts inside allied command in Japan.

(J) MI-2/5

January 8, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 2/5

DAILY SUMMARY

Note by the Secretary-General

1. On January 7 the following message was received by the Chairman from General of the Army MacArthur:

"Major General William F. Marquat will meet you on arrival in Yokahama with a tentative agenda and program which can be modified as may be desired. Every facility will be given to individual members to make such informal contacts with the Japanese as they wish and all side trips that you may have in mind can be readily arranged. I am sure that you have no concern that the entire purpose of this headquarters will be to facilitate the work of the Commission. All data that we have is, of course, available to you and I believe will be quite adequate for your purpose... I would like to have the ten members of the Commission, Mrs. McCoy, and Secretary Johnson take their first meal ashore with me and have asked Marquat to arrange the matter with you. It is hardly necessary to add my warmest welcome to you all."

2. On January 7 the following message was received from

Mr. Dickover:

"During the last several days I have received visits telephone calls from various persons connected with the Commission in the British, Dutch, French, Chinese, Australian and New Zealand delegations, in regard to the present status of the Working Committees. The general opinion seemed to be that the work of the Committees should be halted unless the Soviet representatives are willing to participate in the work or until the Commission is established under the revised Terms of Reference. I took the position that, whereas the Working Committees might have no legal status under the new Terms of Reference, they could continue as study groups, but that without the participation of the Soviet delegation misunderstanding and suspicion might be engendered. Therefore, I advised them to take no steps to call meetings for a few days, as it is hoped that the Soviet delegation will soon be informed whether or not it should participate at once informally and unofficially in the work of the study groups."

3. Estimated time of arrival in Yokohama is now before noon on Wednesday, January 9, escorted by two destroyers and one plane with which the ship will rendezvous at approximately 0700 that morning.

Nelson T. Johnson
SECRETARY - GENERAL

X
January 8, 1946FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONNote by the Secretary-General

The following message has been received from Mr. Dickover:

"During the last several days I have received visits or telephone calls from various persons connected with the Commission in the British, Dutch, French, Chinese, Australian and New Zealand delegations, in regard to the present status of the Working Committees. The general opinion seemed to be that the work of the Committees should be halted unless the Soviet representatives are willing to participate in the work or until the Commission is established under the revised Terms of Reference. I took the position that, whereas the Working Committees might have no legal status under the new Terms of Reference, they could continue as study groups, but that without the participation of the Soviet delegation misunderstanding and suspicion might be engendered. Therefore, I advised them to take no steps to call meetings for a few days, as it is hoped that the Soviet delegation will soon be informed whether or not it should participate at once informally and unofficially in the work of the study groups."

Nelson T. Johnson
SECRETARY-GENERAL

(J) MI-2/6

January 14, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 2/6DAILY SUMMARYNote by the Secretary-General

1. Washington has informed us that SCAP's orders to the Japanese Government through December 23 have been received and circulated, and also the Third Weekly Report on Japan and Korea. Reproduction and distribution of other back Commission papers requested by the various delegations have also been completed.

2. Circulated to the Commission in Washington was a communication from the Chinese Ambassador that he was leaving for China for consultation and that Dr. Liu Shih-Shun, Chinese Ambassador to Canada, would act as China's representative on the FEC during Dr. Wei's absence.

3. The following notice of additional reports received has been circulated in Washington:

"1. The Secretariat of the Commission has received from the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department two sets of reports on various Japanese industries, as listed on the appended sheet. These were prepared for Ambassador Pauley, representative of the President on reparations, by the Economic and Scientific Section for Supreme Headquarters in Tokyo. They were compiled hastily from data submitted by the Japanese authorities, and time did not permit of detailed verification. However, it is believed that the reports will be of value to the Commission.

"2. Reports are somewhat lengthy. It will not be possible for the Secretariat to reproduce and distribute all of them to the Commission. They will therefore be made available to interested members of the Commission in the rooms of the Secretariat (Room 276½ State Department Building), and any individual reports which members of this Commission, after perusal, believe to be of unusual value can then be reproduced and distributed.

" For the Secretary General: Erle R. Dickover. Appended List:

1. Iron and Steel Industry
2. Coal
3. Other Mining
4. Light Metals
5. Other Non-Ferrous Metals
6. Shipbuilding
7. Railway Rolling Stock
8. Automotive

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9. Electric Power
10. Other Machinery
11. Chemicals
12. Food Processing
13. Petroleum and Synthetic Oils
14. Industrial Alcohol
15. Building Materials
16. Rubber Goods
17. Fisheries Products
18. Ceramics
19. Communications and Communications Equipment
20. Handicraft Products
21. Paper
22. Synthetic Rubber
23. Textiles and Leather
24. Army and Navy Arsenal
25. Export Capacities of Japan
26. Short Requirements of Japan."

Nelson T. Johnson
SECRETARY-GENERAL

(J) MI-3

January 8, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 3

PRESS RELEASE

Note by the Secretary-General

1. At the second meeting on board the U.S.S. Mt. McKinley the Commission approved the following press release for use upon arrival in Japan:

The purpose of this Commission in visiting Japan is to consult with General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and his staff and to learn at first hand of the progress of the occupation and the facts necessary for the formulation of sound Allied policy for dealing with Japan under the surrender terms.

The execution of Allied policy in Japan is, as you know, General MacArthur's responsibility. For this reason, the Commission will deal officially with the Japanese only through General MacArthur's headquarters.

It is the intention of the Commission to visit such places in Japan as may be necessary for the purpose for which we have come. We expect to remain in Japan about three weeks. While here our headquarters will remain the U.S.S. Mt. McKinley, on which we have travelled from Pearl Harbor.

Since we left Washington it has been announced that the United States, Great Britain and Russia, with China concurring, have agreed to broaden the authority of the Commission by giving it the power on behalf of the participating states to formulate rather than to advise as to policy in regard to the occupation of Japan. We do not yet know when the Far Eastern Commission will become fully operative under its new charter and with Russian participation. In any case, the fact-finding purpose of this visit by the representatives of ten nations is not affected.

We have already drawn up a list of items of information we desire to collect while in Japan and places we need to visit. My first task as Chairman of the Commission is to arrange with General MacArthur the details of how we may most conveniently and expeditiously go about our task. When that has been done we can be more specific as to our plans.

Nelson T. Johnson
SECRETARY-GENERAL

(J) HI-No.4

9 January 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 4SECRETARY BYRNES' PRESS CONFERENCE, JANUARY 7, 1946Note by the Secretary General

The following radio report of the Secretary's press conference on January 7 is circulated as of interest to the Commission.

At press radio conference today, Secretary Byrnes said that in as much as he had talked over the radio last night, he preferred to see correspondents today so that they could ask him any questions that they wished. He said there was little that he could add to his speech. The Secretary added that he didn't think it had appeared anywhere, but it was the purpose of the Council of Foreign Ministers that the deputies of the Council of Foreign Ministers could meet the week beginning January 7. The Secretary reminded the correspondents that the Commission, composed of Mr. Harriman, Mr. Clarke Kerr, and Mr. Vishinsky, were to leave two nights ago for Rumania in carrying out that part of the agreement.

Mr. Byrnes said that Generalissimo Stalin looked fine and talked better than he did at Potsdam. The Secretary said that Stalin told him it was the first vacation that he had had in years and that his rest had done him a lot of good. Mr. Byrnes said that he thought all of the stories that had been heard about his bad health had been greatly exaggerated.

The Secretary was asked in connection with his conversation with Stalin, if Stalin said anything at the same time which might shed light on his plans for the future, whether there was any hint of retirement. Mr. Byrnes replied in the negative, saying that, on the contrary, at the dinner tendered the Foreign Ministers on Christmas Eve, Stalin had been present with the political leaders. The Secretary said he was sure he had the impression that there was no evidence of any retirement by the Generalissimo.

Now asked if he had had any general reaction to the communique, the Secretary replied in the affirmative, adding that while he told correspondents before he left that he believed that these meetings should be held and that the Government could not expect agreement on all of the questions outstanding, he was agreeably surprised at the Foreign Ministers' ability to reach agreement on as many questions. The Secretary added that when people in America differ as to these foreign problems, we should not be surprised that there are differences between governments; and when a conference produces as many agreements, there are bound to be differences of opinion as to this or that particular subject. But on the whole, the Secretary said, as the people analyzed it, he thought they would agree with him that they gave evidence of a spirit of cooperation and conciliation that promises good for the future. Mr. Byrnes said he had a note from Cordell Hull that he greatly appreciated, because with his long experience that was the view that he took. The text of Hull's letter was:

"My dear Jim:

My heartiest congratulations on the splendid progress made at the Moscow Conference. Understanding, confidence, friendliness, and the whole spirit of international cooperation have been greatly improved by the work of this Conference.

Sincerely yours,

Asked about the President's reaction, the Secretary said the President was greatly pleased at the result of the Conference and what he regarded as its constructive work. Mr. Byrnes said he was spending the afternoon with the President.

The Secretary was asked about general reaction to the statement of General MacArthur. He said that the facts as he got them about the statement of the General were as follows: A statement issued by Mr. Blake was not authorized by any official of the Department. The General was correct that he was not advised of the progress of the discussions at Moscow. The Secretary added that he had never expected to advise him of them, but he was conscious always of preserving General MacArthur's administrative authority and his proper insistence upon the importance of his authority to the efficient control of Japan. He added that he firmly believed that that was achieved by the agreement. The Plans for the Far Eastern Commission and the Council were drafted back in October. At that time they were submitted to the War Dept. and to General MacArthur for comment. As a result of their comments, changes were made to make certain what was his objective: Control in the United States so far as administration of Japan was concerned. The Secretary said that he knew that later General McCoy, who is Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission, communicated with The Army Headquarters in Tokyo as to the changes suggested by the various governments who were members of the Far Eastern Commission, and who had been meeting in Washington. The Secretary said he just assumed that Mr. Blake was under the impression because he also had the impression that as a result of these communications, the Supreme Commander did regard the plan for the Commission and the Council as workable, but that did not mean at all that General MacArthur liked the plan or any plan that affected the administration; and that the General made plain his insistence that nothing be done that would impair his ability to continue to administer without any serious interference.

Asked if the General properly had any voice in the making of policy, the Secretary replied in the negative, saying that that policy was for the President, of course, but in these matters he would not interfere in the drafting of the plans for the Far Eastern Commission and the Council without consulting the man who was administering and whose views would certainly be of value to the Government in the drafting of the plans. Mr. Byrnes said he submitted it to the War Dept. for that reason and got their views and got the views of the General, who, he added, in his opinion, had been doing a fine job. Mr. Byrnes repeated that he thought he had done a fine job and he wanted to make certain that, while he was bringing about an agreement, nothing should be done to adversely affect his administration. The Secretary said he was delighted to learn, from his statement, of his determination to see that the plans work. He added that in negotiations men would always differ about the effect of words, but his task was to bring about an agreement, yet to see that that agreement did not affect the United States' ability to properly discharge its primary responsibility in Japan. The Secretary said he had not the slightest doubt that the plan as agreed upon would not affect the efficiency of our administration, and he was convinced from the General's statement that when he said he would do his best to see that it worked, that it was going to work. The Secretary concluded by saying that he only regretted that by the issuance of a statement that there had been created the appearance of a controversy when no controversy existed.

A correspondent said it was the general impression here that the United States did not want to permit any other power a veto on any question affecting Japanese occupation administration, and asked if the plans which the Secretary brought with him to Moscow allowed for a receding from that position to the extent which was evident in the communique, or was that the result of the negotiations at Moscow. The Secretary said that that was a policy decision which had been discussed: when votes were taken in the Far Eastern Commission, whether it should be a majority and require the concurrence of two of the powers, or three of the powers. When it was argued that it be left to three of the powers, which was seriously urged by various governments, if there was a division, one government refusing to concur would hold up everything. The Secretary added that that worked two ways, and said if there was a proposal of a policy that the United States did not like, and the United States did not concur, then no matter what the other ten did, the policy would not become effective. The Secretary explained that as it

now stood, it did require unanimity, which gave to the United States the power, if it did not like any policy that was proposed, to veto it. He added that that was one place where the United States was in control: in Japan. Mr. Byrnes added that these questions as to voting were discussed here for about two months, and discussed there; and he never did get excited about it because this thing was based upon the spirit of cooperation between the nations. He was glad to say that there was every evidence of that cooperation. There was no dissent at the Conference to the position that the United States took, that the United States had the primary responsibility in Japan. He said that that gave him great comfort that it would be carried out in that spirit.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary would mind explaining about how that review provision would work, recalling that it said the Commission, that is, any member of the Commission, could request the review of some directive or policy already established in Japan. The correspondent said, let us suppose that the directive is 167, just to use a hypothesis, and is already in effect or had been given to General MacArthur by his Government, awaiting implementation. The correspondent asked if the implementation of that directive or the exercise of that directive could be suspended or held in suspense by this review. The Secretary said that, except for those three reserve questions, whatever the question was, General MacArthur could issue an interim order which went into effect. But, as to the three questions, the constitutional structure, the regime in control, and the change in government as a whole, on those questions there was this, too. When the Foreign Ministers agreed on those three and they got to the last, he presented the view that the whole government might resign and in such case, the United States would want to write an interim directive to carry on. There was inserted a provision that individual ministers could be appointed. He added that that, of course, really nullified the other things. If the Japs did reject their Government as a whole, the Supreme Commander could appoint a Secretary of State today, a Secretary of War tomorrow, and a Secretary of Treasury the next day. He said he really believed that it left two questions as to which interim directives could not be issued, but must await policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission. He added there was no idea, and never had been, of embarking upon a complete revision of the Constitution of Japan. If that was undertaken, the United States really would want the advice of the Allied Governments and would not want to assume the responsibility of drafting a Constitution for the future of Japan, unilaterally.

A correspondent said, let's suppose that one of our representatives on the Commission raised a question about some existing directive over there, which antedated the agreement, and the review becomes compulsory. The correspondent said, as he read the communique, it said, "At the request of any member". He added that during the process of review or while this matter was sub curia, would the directive go into suspension? The Secretary replied in the negative, adding that because of the interim directive, it continued. But, on that review, the United States having given the original directive to MacArthur, would vote against the review and it would stop right there. The interim directive then would remain in force. The correspondent said that the Secretary had come to the real basic question: whether the failure of an agreement in the Commission on the thing would not hold it up. The Secretary replied that it meant no action would be taken because there would not be the votes, and when there were no votes, General MacArthur's interim directive continued in force. He added that that was the language and that was the purpose agreed to without question, because everybody realized the necessity of carrying on. But if there was a matter here, if it was submitted for review, and if the United States voted for that review and voted to change the directive, then the United States was only doing what it had concluded was right in the premises. No changes could be made in what had already been done (that General MacArthur had already done) without our concurrence. The Secretary said that that was made plain. The Secretary replied in the affirmative when asked if he conferred with the War Dept. in October, and sent messages which it was assumed got to MacArthur, and added that the Department got his opinions on it, and from the War Dept. and Secty. McCloy who was out there. But the Secretary said that he had made it plain that when a statement was made through the officials of the War Department, that headquarters regarded it as workable but they were insistent that no concession be made that might impair the control machinery; that was in accord with department views. He said there was no controversy at all, but that there was

an exchange to get comments and see whether the language did meet the situation and to take steps to prevent misunderstanding.

Asked if he talked with Secretary McCloy when he returned from Tokyo, and if it was his understanding that Secretary McCloy had discussed this machinery with General MacArthur, directly, the Secretary replied in the affirmative. He also replied in the affirmative when asked if, when he went to Moscow, he felt that the Japanese proposals which he took with him were proposals which General MacArthur regarded as workable. The Secretary added that he also wanted to say, in justice to MacArthur, that he didn't know that from October when he talked to Secretary McCloy, whether after that date there had been any change in the wording or not. There well might have been, he said, but certainly it was not material. He continued by saying that the material questions which were discussed, had his view as to the necessity for reserving the primary responsibility. He added he had had that in mind always in negotiations with the British who had been really more intent upon greater participation with the Soviet Government.

A correspondent asked if basically the Secretary thought that the plan he took to Moscow, which was in essence the one adopted, was the one that General MacArthur regarded as workable. The Secretary said that General MacArthur was not advised as to these two reservation questions.

Asked in what respects, if any, the provisions with regard to Japan differed from those he brought to Moscow with him, the Secretary replied in no important respects.

The Secretary replied in the negative when asked whether the President invited General MacArthur to return to this country in October to confer about this, and did not General MacArthur ask that it be put off for a while.

A correspondent asked if the Japanese Cabinet should resign as a whole, whether it would be up to the Far Eastern Commission. The Secretary replied in the negative, saying that under the directive, MacArthur could appoint individual ministers and then the next day he could appoint other individual ministers.

A correspondent asked what really happened to the existing Far Eastern Advisory Commission. Was it understood that it would just keep the personnel, add a Soviet member, and change the Terms of Reference?

The Secretary replied that that was all, adding that the Soviet had been invited but had never joined. The Commission was going ahead without the Soviet representative.

Asked if it was his understanding that the Soviet representative would join the Commission in Tokyo now for this survey, the Secretary said that if they wanted his guess, he would say not. What would happen, he added, is that this Government was communicating the invitation to the other countries to join under these new Terms of Reference. Pending the determination of that, he would just assume they would not. But he said he would assume, further, that they would when they return take the same staff and carry on. He added that that was what he would do if he were the Chairman. He just assumed General McCoy would do that.

A correspondent asked if the directive situation would apply to the abdication of the emperor. The Secretary said it would not, adding that there was no reservation at all, that there were only the three things, with no reference to the Emperor or any change in his status at all.

Asked if the abdication of an individual emperor would not be regarded as a fundamental constitutional change, the Secretary replied in the negative, adding that it would not be regarded as a change in the Government as a whole, though it would be important out there, but it would not come in the category of the three reservations.

A correspondent said there were two things which were not mentioned in the communique: Turkey and Iran. The correspondent said the Secretary had discussed the creation of a tripartite commission which was almost agreed upon, but fell through, and wondered if the Secretary could elaborate. On that point, too, could he tell the correspondents anything about Turkey? The correspondent added that everybody was wondering why that was excluded from the communique.

The Secretary replied that the subject of Turkey was never on the agenda for discussion. Iran was on the agenda because he asked that it be put there. With regard to the request that he made for the withdrawal of troops, that is why he mentioned Iran but did not Turkey, because it had not been considered as a subject for discussion. As to Iran, the Secretary said he could add nothing to what he had said last night. He said that his information was that the last U. S. soldiers left yesterday afternoon or early this morning, so this Government had complied with the statement made, that by January 1, United States troops would be entirely out of Iran. On the other, he said that after much discussion and after he had had real hopes for an agreement, the Ministers were unable to reach it and adjourned. But he still had hope, that the Ministers came so very nearly reaching an agreement, that something might develop. He did not wish to go into a discussion of it right now. He added that he was still hopeful.

Asked if the Russian attitude on the establishment of an autonomous government in the province of Azerbaijan was a fait accompli with which they had no connection, the Secretary replied that their position had been, as stated: that it was a democratic movement and required the implementation of constitutional provisions which had not been carried out, and that they were not responsible for it.

A correspondent said there was a report out of Turkey this morning that the Foreign Ministers agreed in Moscow to give Russia access to a Bulgarian . . . He said that when he left here he was determined to use the Ethridge Report to help him secure some agreement on the Balkan situation. He added that it did help him with regard to judging what was the best thing to do. He thought the best thing, when an agreement was reached with people, was not to go into a review of arguments.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary could give any indication that there was a meeting of minds on the Italian Peace Treaty, particularly with the colonies, reparations, or any modification in the armistice terms. The Secretary replied that there was no discussion of the merits of the Treaty. He pointed out that there was the statement that the Deputies would now avail themselves and be guided by the agreements made at the conference in September. The Secretary said he called attention to that because it really was important. There was no discussion as to the merits of the issues involved in the several treaties. He added the Deputies would resume their work and then report back.

A correspondent said that he understood that the United States Government had sent a proposal to modify the armistice regime to London and to Moscow, that London had sent a reply, but that possibly the Secretary might be bringing back the Russian reply.

For answer the Secretary said that the Foreign Ministers did not go into it at all because they devoted themselves to trying to hasten the consideration of the Peace Treaty itself. His hope in that situation was that while May 1st was made the extreme date for the holding of a peace conference, it could be arrived at long before that date. The earlier, of course, it was done, the better, because until there was a settlement of the Peace Treaty, the nation cannot proceed with the removal or withdrawal and the economic situation would continue to be

very bad. The Secretary said the support of an Army and the payment of reparations all go to make it exceedingly difficult for these countries to make any headway in recovery. That was why the Ministers could not and never had lost sight of the importance of getting to work on these treaties. He said he had always taken the position that, if this could not be done, he would like to bring about a revision of armistice terms. It would not do for Italy, for instance, what it was necessary to do. That was a complete settlement of the peace issues and the war issues.

A correspondent said that General MacArthur's statement mentioned that in October he had expressed disapproval of the plan for new control machinery. The correspondent said the Secretary had said that after comment by the War Department, there was some revision in the plan. The correspondent asked if it was correct that the Secretary understood the plan was revised to take account of any disapproval expressed by General MacArthur.

The Secretary replied in the affirmative, stating that as he revised it, he thought it had been done. He said that he did say that he did not recall any telegram of that kind, adding that if the General said it was sent, it was probably sent to the War Department. He pointed out that that was where ordinarily Department communications go, and are then transmitted.

He was sure, while he might be wrong, that the General might have reference to the telegram that he had seen.

Asked if the United States and Britain decisions to recognize Yugoslavia were reached at the Moscow conference, the Secretary said that they were really reached before. Asked if they were not part of the discussion, the Secretary replied in the negative, saying that, as a matter of fact, Yugoslavia, Austria, Finland, Poland and Hungary - the United States had recognized most of the states in question. He added that there were these two states that had been the source of a lot of controversy and really demanded settlement.

Asked if this plan he discussed in October with General MacArthur originated with the Department or the Far Eastern Commission, the Secretary replied that he would not know right now, because it was so far back. His recollection would be that it was first by the Department. Then the Far Eastern Advisory Commission came along, and the British Government and particularly the Australian Government, which had always insisted that the United States was not permitting them to participate in the control of Japan. They were insistent that they be given greater opportunity to take part and to be advised of what was going on.

A correspondent said that Dr. Evatt in a public speech here before he left, said that only the United States should have the veto power. The Secretary replied that he did not know what the Doctor had said in his speech, but he liked to hear him speak.

Asked if he had any formal action from Australia or any other smaller members of the Commission as to the revised Terms of Reference, the Secretary replied that he had not heard from any of them.

Asked if he wanted to say anything about peace in the new year, the Secretary said that last year he was Director of Mobilization and thought he was having a bad time between horse-racing and curfews, but he would say now that mobilizing a nation for war was a small job compared with the effort to mobilize the world for peace. He hoped, however, that he would be successful,

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and that, just as we were successful last year in winning the war, may we be successful next year in winning the peace.

A correspondent said that as the question of Germany was not discussed in Moscow, he wondered if there were any plans today for Four Power discussion of the administration of Germany and the western border question.

The Secretary replied in the negative, adding that there was no plan at this time for such a conference or discussion. He said he really did not know that one had been proposed, and that he was sure it had not been.

Asked if the United States had made up its mind with regard to the French proposal for the Ruhr and the Rhineland, the Secretary replied that the United States had not made any definite response to the request of France's representative for its views.

The Secretary, in answer to a question, said that Mr. Molotov was not going to London, but that Mr. Vishinsky was going. The Secretary expressed regret that Mr. Molotov was not going, but said that Mr. Vishinsky was fully informed on all matters.

Asked when he was coming to London, the Secretary said he really didn't know, because since his return he really had not had a chance to do anything. He said that Mr. Linn was going to London.

Asked if Spain was discussed or if there was an exchange of views on Spain, the Secretary replied in the negative, saying there were no exchanges of views on Spain. He added that, as a matter of fact, after a war there were an unlimited number of problems involving all states. He thought that the Ministers covered a lot of ground.

Asked if there had been any response from the French Government as yet, the Secretary replied in the negative. Asked if he consulted them before he entered into the first agreement, the Secretary replied in the affirmative, saying he advised them before he left that the Foreign Ministers would not consult on matters concerning France with the exception of one on the agenda which was the peace conference. He said he would advise the French and added he kept them advised as to the proceedings. The French were advised when it was practically decided at least forty-eight hours before the signing of the communique.

Asked if the Russians were going to accept the United States invitation to send troops to Japan, the Secretary said that was not even under discussion.

(J)MI-5

January 9, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 5

STATUS OF THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

Note by the Secretary General

1. The following message was received this morning, January 9, by the Chairman from Mr. Dickover:

"The Department today has sent the following message through our diplomatic missions to all governments concerned with the Far Eastern Commission:

'It is the view of this Government that the Far Eastern Commission succeeded the Far Eastern Advisory Commission on 27 December, the date of the Moscow Communique, and that there is no need to implement this succession by formal dissolution, inauguration or other formalities.'

The diplomatic missions were requested to explain that this Government's position is based solely on the desire to free the Commission from confusing and burdensome detail.

"In view of the above message we have altered your invitation to the Soviets to participate in working committees by deleting the phrase 'pending the organization of the Far Eastern Commission' and substituting therefor 'pending their return to the United States.'"

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

(J).I-5/1

January 23, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 5/1TRANSITION FROM FEAC TO FECNote by the Secretary General

1. On January 5, 1946, as a consequence of information received concerning the Soviet appointees to the Far Eastern Commission and after informal clearance with the members of the Commission on board the USS MOUNT MCKINLEY, the following message was sent to the Commission's office in Washington:

"You may inform the Soviet Embassy that the Chairman and members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission would welcome participation by the Soviet representative appointed to the Far Eastern Commission and his assistance in the studies and the work of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission pending the organization of the Far Eastern Commission."

2. A few days later, advice was received from Washington that the United States Government had sent the following message to all governments concerned with the Far Eastern Commission:

"It is the view of this Government that the Far Eastern Commission succeeded the Far Eastern Advisory Commission on 27 December, the date of the Moscow Communique, and that there is no need to implement this succession by formal dissolution, inauguration or other formalities."

This position was based on the desire to free the Commission from confusing and burdensome procedural detail.

3. As a consequence of the message quoted in paragraph 2 above, the message to the Soviet Government as proposed by the Commission in paragraph 1 above was altered to read as follows:

". . . and the work of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, pending the organization of the Far Eastern Commission, pending their return to the United States."

4. On January 23, advice was received from Washington that the following response had been received from the Soviet Government:

"The Soviet Government considers that it is time to proceed to the realization of the decision of the Moscow Conference of the three foreign ministers on the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission and, for its part, also believes it expedient in the interests of matters at hand to keep to a minimum the procedural details connected with this."

"At the same time the Soviet Government believes it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States that in the decision of the conference of the three foreign ministers it is stated that the Far Eastern Commission being formed will replace the

(J)A.I-
23 Jan 45

Far Eastern Advisory Commission and that the Government of the United States, on behalf of the four powers, should present the terms of reference to the other governments specified in Article I and invite them to participate in the Commission on the revised basis. Thus it does not follow from the decision of the conference of the three ministers that the Far Eastern Advisory Commission with its former committees, rules, etc., will be automatically transferred into the Far Eastern Commission.

"The Soviet Government assures that as soon as the members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission return from Japan to Washington, the Government of the United States will take measures to convene an organization session of the Far Eastern Commission so that the latter may without delay begin to function on the basis of the decision of the three ministers. (This portion was garbled and is now being serviced.) The U.S. Government has referred the Soviet view to the British and Chinese Governments, stating further, 'That this Government desires to cooperate in expediting full functioning of the Commission and that it is willing to follow any reasonable procedure agreeable to its allies.' "

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

(J) MI-6

20 January 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 6FACILITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS IN JAPANNote by the Secretary General

1. By approving the itinerary described in (J) FEC-3/1, the Commission agreed that the ship will remain in Tokyo throughout the Commission's stay in Japan. Consequently, it is understood that the members of the Commission and their staffs will live and eat aboard the ship insofar as possible.
2. There are no open hotels in Japan because those which were left have been taken over by the military authorities as officers' billets. This means that there are not accommodations for the members of the Commission to eat freely at any hotel in Tokyo. In view of the fact that the Commission personnel will frequently be ashore the whole day, GHQ has made arrangements for Commission personnel to purchase meals at two messes in Tokyo. Billoting cards will be issued by the Secretariat to each member of the Commission, authorizing him to purchase meals at the mess to which he is assigned. All Commission personnel are earnestly requested not to attempt to eat in any other mess except as the guest of a regular member of that mess. The chief delegates will be assigned to mess at the Imperial Hotel, and all others, to the Dai Ichi Hotel.
3. The Commission will have an office ashore at GHQ, Rooms 319-20-21 in the Dai Ichi Building. There will be personnel from the Secretariat on duty at this office during working hours every day, with direct phone connections to the ship, to GHQ and to the Tokyo exchange. There will also be mail courier service between this office and the ship. The office includes a conference room where the conferences scheduled with the various sections of GHQ will be held.
4. Each delegation will be assigned a car for its use, and there will be an additional transportation pool available for other vehicles in case of need. Regular bus service will be maintained be-

tween the ship and the Commission's office in the Dai Ichi Building on a schedule to meet the Commission's business.

5. Incoming mail will be delivered directly to the ship. Outgoing mail may be left in the Commission Office or be dropped in the ship's mail. Members of the Commission are entitled to the armed service privilege of 6 cent air mail to the States. Special communications for Washington may be left with the Secretariat for inclusion in daily air mail pouches to the Commission's Washington office.

6. Copies of daily State Department Bulletins and of the local edition of the Stars and Stripes will be distributed each morning on the ship.

7. The district where the ship is docked is called the "Shiba-Ura".

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500
10 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Farley.

1. Please issue at once a memorandum for information, over my signature, containing the substance of the following information:

a. There are no open hotels left in Japan. All hotels have been taken over by the military authorities as officers' billets. GHQ have notified us that it will not be possible to accommodate the entire Commission at any one of the ~~three~~ billets established in Tokyo. The Commission, therefore, has been divided into ~~three~~ approximately equal parts for the purpose of assignment to ~~these~~ three messes. Billeting cards will be issued by the Secretariate to each member of the Commission, authorizing him to purchase meals at the mess to which he is assigned. All personnel of the Commission are earnestly enjoined not to attempt to eat in any other mess except as the guest of a regular member of that mess.

Nelson T. Johnson

NELSON T. JOHNSON,
Secretary-General.

*live & eat aboard ships -
Dai Ichu - all others
Noguchial - chief deleg.*

*conf. &
Com. conference*

car pool - ea. car for ea. deleg.

bus serv. \leftrightarrow Office -

Commission Office -

Dai Ichu Bldg -

where SCAP is housed

Rms 319-20-21 -

Daly - courier service -

mail \rightarrow Com Office on ship \rightarrow

(J) NI-6/1

10 January 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 6/1FACILITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS IN JAPAN: TRANSPORTATIONNote by the Secretary General

1. One car and a driver will be assigned to each delegation for use throughout the period of the Commission's stay in Japan. This car will be completely at the disposition of the chief delegate of each delegation, and the driver will be considered a personal chauffeur. Consequently, each chief delegate will be responsible for his chauffeur's daily schedule, including such matters as arrangements for the chauffeurs to eat at Army messes. Chauffeurs will be assigned as follows:

<u>Representative</u>	<u>Chauffeur</u>
Gen. McCoy (U.S.)	Miller
Sir George Sanson (U.K.)	Lynn
Lt. Gen. Chu (China)	Pierce
Sir Carl Berendsen (N.Z.)	Wood
Monsieur Lacoste (Fr.)	Davis
Dr. de Kat (Neth.)	Lewis
Mr. Norman (Can.)	Barker
Mr. Forsyth (Austr.)	Pellard
Mr. Confesor (P.I.)	Ferrette
Mr. Saksena (Ind.)	Tucker
Mr. Johnson (Sec.)	Reyer

2. Additional cars as may be required will be available from the GHQ motor pool, and should be requested via the Commission Office, either Mr. Farley or Mr. Moseley.

3. Beginning on Friday, January 11, the following bus schedule, subject to later alteration, will be maintained between the ship and the Commission Office at GHQ in the Dai Ichi Building:

<u>Time</u>	
0900	Leave ship
11:45	Leave Dai Ichi Bldg.
12:15	Leave ship
13:30	Leave ship
17:15	Leave Dai Ichi Bldg.
17:45	Leave ship
19:15	Leave Dai Ichi Bldg.
19:45	Leave ship
2300	Leave Dai Ichi Bldg.

(J) MI-6
January 17, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

Memorandum for Information No. 6

PAPERS FROM WASHINGTON

Note by the Secretary General

The following papers have been received from the Washington Far Eastern Commission office, and are available in the Secretariat files on board ship. In view of the fact that the papers have been reproduced and distributed in Washington, they will not be so reproduced on board ship:

- (a) Address to Far Eastern Advisory Commission, by Major General Hilldring
- (b) MI-12, First Weekly Report on Japan and Korea, from the Civil Affairs Division, U. S. War Department
- (c) Civil Affairs Division, U. S. War Department, Second Weekly Report on Japan and Korea to the Far Eastern Commission

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

(JMI-7)

January 18, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION # 7Note by the Secretary General

Circulated herewith for the information and use of the Commission are two different translations of the Emperor's most recent rescript, January 1, 1946 - one by the Nippon Times and one by the Mainichi.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

NIPPON TIMES

In greeting the New Year, we recall to mind that Emperor Meiji proclaimed, as the basis of our national policy, the Five Clauses of the Charter-Oath at the beginning of the Meiji Era. The Charter-Oath signified:-

1. Deliberative assemblies shall be established and all measures of government decided in accordance with public opinion.
2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying on the affairs of State.
3. All common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall be allowed to fulfill their just desires, so that there may not be any discontent among them.
4. All the absurd usages of old shall be broken through, and equity and justice to be found in the workings of nature shall serve as the basis of action.
5. Wisdom and knowledge shall be sought throughout the world for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the Empire.

The proclamation is evident in significance and high in its ideals. We wish to make this oath anew and restore the country to stand on its own feet again. We have to reaffirm the principles embodied in the Charter, and proceed unflinchingly towards elimination of misguided practice of the past, and keeping in close touch with the desires of the people, we will construct a new Japan through thoroughly being pacific, the officials and the people alike, attaining rich culture, and advancing the standard of living of the people.

The devastation of war inflicted upon our cities, the miseries of the destitute, the stagnation of trade, shortage of food, and the great and growing number of the unemployed are indeed heart-rending. But if the nation is firmly united in its resolve to face the present ordeal and to seek civilization consistently in peace, a bright future will undoubtedly be ours, not only for our country, but for the whole humanity.

Love of the family and love of the country are especially strong in this country. With more of this devotion should we now work towards love of mankind.

We feel deeply concerned to note that consequent upon the protracted war ending in our defeat, our people are liable to grow restless and to fall into the Slough of Despond. Radical tendencies in excess are gradually spreading and the sense of morality tends to lose its hold on the people, with the result that there are signs of confusion of thoughts.

We stand by the people and We wish always to share with them in their moments of joys and sorrows. The ties between Us and Our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world.

Our Government should make every effort to alleviate their trials and tribulations. At the same time, We trust that the people will rise to the occasion, and will strive courageously for the solution of their outstanding difficulties, and for the development of industry and culture. Acting upon a consciousness of solidarity and of mutual aid and broad tolerance in their civic life, they will prove themselves worthy of their best tradition. By their supreme endeavours in that direction, they will be able to render their substantial contribution to the welfare and advancement of mankind.

The resolution for the year should be made at the beginning of the year. We expect Our people to accomplishment of this great undertaking with an indomitable spirit.

MAINICHI

We greet the new year. On looking back, the Emperor Meiji at the beginning of the Era of Meiji proclaimed as the national policy the Five Chartered Oath, namely:

1. Deliberative assemblies shall be established on a broad basis in order that governmental measures may be adopted in accordance with public opinion.
2. The concord of all classes of society shall in all emergencies of the State be the first aim of the Government.
3. Means shall be found for the furtherance of the lawful desire of all individuals without discrimination as to persons.
4. All purposeless and useless customs discarded, justice and righteousness shall be the guide of all actions.
5. Knowledge and learning shall be sought after from the whole world in order that the status of the Empire of Japan be raised ever higher and higher.

The august aim is fair and just. There is need of adding anything else thereto. By renewing the oath We wish to develop the fate of Our country. All of you, in pursuance of this purport, must get rid of corrupt conventions, and practices

as heretofore, enhance the spirit of the people, be thoroughly imbued with the principle of peace, and the officials and people alike build up a highly refined culture and thereby construct new Japan by endeavoring for the promotion of the living of the people.

The ravages of the war wrought on the large and small cities, the hardships of the war sufferers, the standstill of industry, the shortage of food, and the trend of the increasing number of jobless indeed make Our hearts ache. However, if Our people reaffirm their resolve to seek after civilization in peace through and through and realize the unity thereof in the face of the present trial, there is no room for doubt that there shall be brought about a bright future not only for Our people alone but for entire mankind.

The sense of love for each home and the country is particularly high and burning among Our people. Now is high time when the people must expand that love and exert self-sacrificing efforts for the realization of the love of humanity.

As the result of the defeat of the war which lasted long, We think the people are apt to become fidgety and sink into the abyss of despondency. Certainly it is a cause for profound concern that there are signs of confusion of thought due to the marked decline of morality affected by the growing tendency of radical sophistries at last.

Be that as it may, We are with you, the people, and wish always to share common interests, joys and sorrows with all of you. The bondage between Us and you, the people, is constantly tied with mutual trust, love and respect; it is not brought about by mere mythology and legends. It is never founded on a chimerical conception which ascribes the Emperor as a living deity and, moreover, the Japanese as superior to all other races of people, hence destined to rule the world.

In order to mitigate the afflictions and the trying ordeals through which the people are going, Our Government is bent on proceeding courageously and straightforwardly toward executing all the necessary counter-measures and operations. In the event Our people unite themselves in their civic life, rely and help one another, and enliven the spirit of broad-mindedness and mutual tolerance, the people will become able to exemplify the true merits worthy of Our high tradition. There can be no doubt that such an attitude and efforts on the part of the people will contribute beyond measure to the promotion and development of the happiness and welfare of mankind.

The plans for the year should be drawn up at the beginning. We fervently wish that you, the people, whom We trust, will consummate this great task by bolstering up and encouraging each and every one in oneness of heart with Us.

(Imperial Sign Manual)

(Imperial Seal)

(J) MI-8

January 22, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 8Excerpt from TIME - January 14, 1946

1. The following article, appearing on pages 11, 12 and 13 of the January 14, 1946, issue of TIME, is reproduced and circulated herewith at the suggestion of the Chairman of the Commission.

POLICIES & PRINCIPLESUnder MacArthur Management

Douglas MacArthur's first detailed account of his stewardship in Japan and Korea ran to some 100,000 words and had the usual MacArthur attributes. It read well; detailed facts punctuated its sweeping perspective. And it boiled down to one basic fact; General MacArthur had done a bang-up job of occupying Japan.

He had also looked the future in the eye. Last month's meeting of the Foreign Secretaries had put an eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and a four-power Allied Council for Japan over the General, at the same time leaving him in operational control. MacArthur, who had worked largely on his own since the surrender, promptly said that, although he did not like it, he would obey orders. His report was calculated to show that he should be allowed to continue with a minimum of outside interference.

THE SITUATION In September, MacArthur began his job of giving orders to a god (see FOREIGN NEWS) and of occupying a land whose fanatical army of 4,000,000 was undefeated. Four months later, a lone G.I. could travel from one end of Japan to the other without even thinking of danger.

In the meantime, MacArthur had moved firmly toward destroying Japan's war potential; finding ways to sustain an impoverished island economy which had lost its ships, markets and empire; laying plans for punishing war criminals and collecting reparations; limiting industry and science to the bounds of Japan's restricted peacetime needs; removing militaristic and nationalist influences and restoring civil liberties. It was a tall order. No man or nation had ever before attempted, let alone succeeded in, shifting a whole country from totalitarian feudalism to representative democracy, primarily through use of the country's own nationals.

THE REPORT Though principles had often outrun performance, MacArthur's 19-section report showed this enormous undertaking begun. Items:

There had been "growing consciousness of Japan's war guilt."
Schools, teachers and textbooks are being completely

reformed. (Last week MacArthur invited 30 leading U. S. educators to visit Japan and make recommendations.) Instead of thought control, "the press, radio, cinema & theater are now free to express themselves." The number of Japanese magazines has increased from 32 to 306. Among the new radio programs: The Man on the Street, The Woman's Hour, The Voice of the People. The theater, which during the war was "solely a militarist propaganda medium," has been "given liberal themes from which new educational plays can be drawn." (Added MacArthur sadly: "Liberal" means saying something, however little, against war or for democracy. No truly liberal scripts have appeared yet.") More than 20 political parties have begun campaigning, with no topics barred--but "the participation of the people is being hampered by their anxieties over the problems of living." Unless food can be imported, some Japanese will starve this winter. For exports, Japan could provide up to 2,000 tons of tea and 135,000 bales of raw silk. To preserve silk for export, MacArthur has forbidden the Japs to use it themselves. After a long ban on unions, workers are now allowed to organize, and "emergence of a strong unified labor movement" is in prospect. Businessmen had been under Government control so long they found it hard "to plan and operate independently," hence reconversion has been "slow and unsatisfactory."

FOR THE PATRONS Like a good steward, MacArthur carefully included statements that would interest his patrons. Both Britain and Russia received a tribute.

Jap laborites, the General reported, are sponsoring the Social Democratic Party in the belief that "political action along lines followed by the British Labor Party is the most certain means of attaining their objectives."

Japan's Communists have been "keenly felt on the political scene" and have "carried on a vigorous program of activity."

(Less tactful were MacArthur's occupational forces on Hokkaido, who were reported last week to have told striking Japanese miners to get back to work or "we'll get the Russians in, and they'll make you return to the mines.")

ON THE FARMS That there should be a gap between the General's directives and their implementation was inevitable.

For one thing, MacArthur notably lacked trained supervisors. Said a top U.S. official in Osaka last week: "What can we do about starvation? We have only eight Government officers in a city of nearly three million." In another prefecture, less than half the 250 war plants that wanted to make peacetime products have even been examined--and after each such survey, it takes weeks to divest local Jap authorities of their national aptitude for red tape, graft and apathy, before the factory gets going again.

Nor has MacArthur made much progress with the inscrutable Jap mind, which has found it no trouble at all to evade or "misunderstand" his directives. Large landowners have proved especially skillful at dodging. Instead of breaking up their estates under MacArthur's ordered land reforms, many have just registered part of their holdings under other names.

Last week one ranking American in Japan admitted that nothing practical could be done about land reform until there was a strong farmer's cooperative which could exert pressure on the Jap Government

through future Diet representation. Many another MacArthur reform needed similar backing by interested Japs before it would be effective.

MULTI-MANAGED FUTURE Even in outline, MacArthur's blueprints for Japan shone in comparison with the haphazard and piecemeal planning which Russia, Britain, France and the U.S. have done independently in Germany. His sweeping experiment has had the great virtue of unity. How will it fare under the newborn multinational Commission and Council?

The Commission was due to visit Tokyo this week, and MacArthur planned to "cooperate fully" with it. But one of his senior officers summed up the prevailing attitude more realistically. The purpose of the Commission's trip, he said, was "a little sightseeing, a little souvenir buying, and some education".

The chief value of both the Commission and its watchdog Council may be psychological. In that case they will serve as an extension of the same role U.S. criticism has already played: keeping MacArthur on his toes. The Commission will sit permanently in Washington, and its policy directives will presumably be as broad as those which MacArthur has hitherto received.

JAPAN

DIVERSION FROM DIVINITY

Hirohito, Son of Heaven and Scion of the Sun Goddess, last week denied his own identity:

"We have to proceed unflinchingly toward elimination of misguided practices of the past The ties between us and our people do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world. . . . The Emperor is not a living God"

Thus, in the 18th year of the Era of Enlightened Peace, an ideological harakiri was committed on the anachronistic body of Shintoism. For Japan and all the Far East the consequences of Emperor Hirohito's proclamation might well be profound.

By Allied order, Shintoism had been disclaimed as Japan's state religion. Hirohito now carried the process a revolutionary step farther. He threw overboard the whole fantastic doctrine that the Japanese people and their ruler are divine, and that they have a divine mission of world conquest. This doctrine, as zealously inculcated as Nazi ideas in Nazi Germany, had been the mainspring for half a century of Kamikaze fanaticism and grandiose visions.

MAN ON THE THRONE With this anachronism blasted, the building of a new Japan could proceed with some chance of success. When and if the Japanese revise their constitution, they will not stumble over Article III, which says that "the Emperor is sacred and inviolable." In denying his godhead, Hirohito appeared to be making a very human effort to lead the way in constitution revision.

Reaffirming the "national policy" announced 78 years ago by his grandfather Meiji, who envisioned modern Japan as a popular parliamentary monarchy, Hirohito expressed concern for "the desires of the people" and his wish "always to share . . . their joys and sorrows." It seemed like an effort to bring the ex-god closer to his ex-worshippers--quite in line with the Tokyo press's recent featuring of pictures of the Emperor and his Empress: in civilian instead of ceremonial clothes, strolling or puttering in their garden with their children, more like people than divinities.

MAN IN THE STREET Most Japanese were not visibly affected by the Emperor's disavowal. The Nippon Times rationalized: "No innovation, as many foreigners think, but a return to the true traditions of Japan after a period of temporary perversion. It can occasion no astonishment . . . only a quiet and profound satisfaction." Communists sneered: "The statement of non-divinity shows a retreat caused by international pressure and attacks by the people. It is like an octopus eating its own tentacles when hungry."

The Japanese man-in-the-street, interviewed by Allied newsmen, reacted in typical Japanese fashion: he himself had never really believed the Emperor divine. Perhaps he meant it. Perhaps he was characteristically saying what he thought his interviewers wanted him to say. Perhaps he was just being bafflingly Japanese.

POLITICAL PURGE From General Douglas MacArthur came an order: henceforth all "who had deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest" and all "influential" members of nationalist (or terrorist) societies are to be barred from public office.

Premier Kijuro Shidehara was abed with a cold, but he was not as sick as his Government. MacArthur's order covered a majority of Shidehara's colleagues, and sent them scurrying to the Premier's bedside for counsel. Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida was assigned to ask the Allied Commander for clarification. Should the Cabinet resign en masse, merely eliminate its undesirables, or stay on as exempt?

MacArthur's purge of officialdom stirred most Japanese more than Hirohito's scuttling of his divinity. The new parties and the press, consistently more liberal than the Government, gleefully belabored Shidehara's "do-nothing" administration. Cried Tokyo's influential Yomiuri Hochi: "The pursuit of those responsible for the war will soon be made by the people themselves. . . up to the Emperor himself if they continue to cling to their positions without any thought of repentance."

(J)MI- 9

January 25, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 9WORKING COMMITTEE DOCUMENT ON JAPANESE STEEL INDUSTRYNote by the Secretary General

1. On January 23, 1946, a message was received from Washington which forwarded the conclusions of a working committee document, WC-2/3, dated January 21. The conclusions form part of a study of the Japanese steel industry submitted by the United Kingdom delegation and circulated for the information and use of members of Working Committee No. 2.

2. The conclusions are as follows:

"(A) Japanese consumption of steel for home civil requirements and indirect export should be limited to a maximum of 3.5 million ingot tons. Of this it is visualized that 150,000 tons will be indirect exports whose value may be expected to be 120 million yen.

(B) Japan should not be permitted to make finished steel for export without further fabrication.

(C) Japan should be allowed to import iron ore and coking coal to the extent required to provide a supply of 3.5 million ingot tons of steel, as, if the necessity were imposed of importing finished steel, it would seriously disturb the balance of trade.

(D) 3.5 million ingot tons will not constitute a war potential unless capacity to make special alloy steels becomes the determining factor. Although Japanese domestic supplies of alloys are inadequate, it is doubted whether control of imports could be an effective measure of security.

(E) Plant surplus to that required for the production of 3.5 million ingot tons should be dismantled and removed."

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

(J).I-10

January 24, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 10WORKING COMMITTEE DOCUMENT ON REPARATIONSNote by the Secretary General

1. On January 23, 1946, the Commission's Washington office forwarded the information that a proposal by the United Kingdom delegate for the establishment of a separate working committee on reparations had been circulated for the information of the Commission prior to its formal presentation by the United Kingdom delegate at the first meeting of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington.

2. The proposal is as follows:

"The United Kingdom delegate on the Far Eastern Commission proposes that the Commission should set up a committee to report on the guiding principles which should govern the exaction of reparations from Japan. The terms of reference suggested for this committee follow:

(1) To consider and recommend what general principles should govern the framing of the reparations plan so that it will make the maximum overall reparations to countries entitled to reparations but compatible with the disarming of Japan's industrial war potential, and be such as to insure:

(a) that the successful conclusion of the five tasks entrusted to the forces of occupation will not be prejudiced,

(b) that Japanese reparations will not result directly or indirectly in a burden being imposed upon any of the Allies,

(c) that the Japanese people will be left able to exist without enlisting relief from outside, and it a standard not out of line with other Asiatic countries.

(2) To consider and recommend what form reparations should take, in particular:

(a) in what forms reparations in kind should be exacted and, if continuing deliveries are required, how long they should continue,

(b) questions arising out of the disposal of Japanese overseas assets.

(3) To consider and recommend what criteria should govern the assessment of the planes of countries entitled to reparations."

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

January 29, 1946

NOTE FOR THE FILES

This memo, (J)MI-11, was originally prepared, with approval of the Chairman, for distribution to the Commission. It was later decided that the memorandum should not be so distributed; and, consequently, the typewritten sheet was prepared from the memorandum and given by General McCoy to General MacArthur in advance of the Commission's meeting with General MacArthur on January 29.

HDF arley/mkw

HDF/m

(J)MI-11
24 January 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 11
SUMMARY OF POLICY QUESTIONS

Note by the Secretary General

See "Note for the Files" in (J) MI folder.

1. Since the arrival of the Commission in Japan, a good many broad policy questions have been raised. The Commission has the opportunity of hearing directly from General MacArthur on such matters next week. Consequently, the following summary of these broad points has been made for the consideration of the Commission as a tentative and flexible basis of discussion with General MacArthur.
2. Occupation: The effectiveness of the Japanese Government as an agent in carrying out occupational policy and the possibility of easing controls; transitional phases of occupational control; duration of the occupation; relationships of FEC, SCAP and Allied Control Council; steps toward a peace conference.
3. FEC-SCAP Relations: Problems General MacArthur feels FEC should tackle or avoid; priorities in FEC Agenda; future consultation and report between SCAP and FEC.
4. Political: The necessity and the desirability of retention of the Emperor institution and person of the Emperor; the prosecution of the Emperor as a war criminal; the need for constitutional reform and proper agency for sponsoring such reform.
5. Democratization: Necessary future measures or policies.
6. Reparations: The relative urgency for a reparations policy; the validity of the Pauley interim proposal; the type of reparations machinery to be established.
7. Economics: The necessity for importing food in the near future; the determination of a viable economy or a minimum standard of living; the related necessity for a trade program.
8. The Zaibatsu: The adequacy of policy; methods of control.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

(J) MI-11
January 29, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION

PAPERS FROM WASHINGTON

Note by the Secretary General

The following papers have been received from the Washington office of the Commission and are available for reference in the Commission's office. In view of the fact that these have been given distribution in Washington, it is not planned to reproduce them again on board ship.

(1) Third Weekly Report on Japan and Korea from the Civil Affairs Division, U. S. War Department *see MI-12/2*

(2) Status of Suspected War Criminals (a list of suspected major war criminals now in custody, as reported by SCAP to the Judge Advocate General of the U. S. War Department) *see WC 5-4.*

(3) Replies by Japanese Government to Orders from SCAP (an estimate of the food situation in Japan).

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

(J) MI-12
24 January 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 12
KYOTO-OSAKA-HIROSHIMA-KURE TRIP

Note by the Secretary General

1. It is suggested that all chief delegates notify their chauffeurs to report to the USS MT. MCKINLEY not later than 8 p.m. (2000) on Friday, January 25. The Motor Pool will arrange for them to report to the Station upon return.

2. The following schedule for the trip has been established:

Friday, January 25

- 2000 - Cars report to USS MT. MCKINLEY.
- 2025 - Caravan leaves MT. MCKINLEY for Station.
- 2040 - Caravan arrives at Tokyo Central Station.
- 2100 - Special train departs for Kyoto.

Saturday, January 26

(Breakfast on board train)

- 0830 - Detrain
- 0900-1000 - Conference at Miyako Hotel with local officials.
- 1000-1200 - Driving to and inspection of Mitsubishi heavy industries and Kawashima silk mills; or alternate tour of shrine areas.
- 1200 - Lunch at Miyako Hotel
(Transportation at Kyoto other than that scheduled above will be difficult).
- 1315 - Leave Miyako Hotel for train.
- 1330 - Special train departs for Nara.
- 1515 - Arrive at Nara for conducted tour.
- 1700 - Special train leaves Nara for Kure
(Dinner on board train).

Sunday, January 27

- Arrive Kure early, with breakfast on train.
- 0800 - Detrain at Kure.

0800-1000 Conference with local officials, and visit to Kure Base and installations.

1000-1100 Drive by car to Hiroshima.

1100-1300 Tour of Hiroshima (Note: X Corps will conduct tours of Kure and Hiroshima).

1300 Special train leaves Kure for Osaka (Lunch and Dinner will be served aboard the train).

2100 Train arrives at Osaka. Commission will detrain at Osaka and spend the night at the New Osaka Hotel.

Monday, January 28

(Breakfast at the Hotel)

Morning: Inspection of Osaka heavy industries and the Mint, which is in operation. Items such as silver, platinum and opium have been collected here.

1130 Special train departs for Kyoto.
(Lunch on board train)

1230 Arrive Kyoto. Afternoon at Kyoto left open. Transportation for parties of 4 will be available.

1900 Special train leaves Kyoto for Tokyo.
(Dinner on board the train).

Tuesday, January 29

0800 Arrive Tokyo Central Station.
(Breakfast on board the train).

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

(J) MI-12
24 January 1946

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Mr. Farley
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FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 12

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- 0830 - Detrain
- 0900-1000 - Conference at Miyako Hotel with local officials.
- 1000-1200 - Driving to and inspection of Mitsubishi heavy industries and Kawashima silk mills; or alternate tour of shrine areas.
- 1200 Lunch at Miyako Hotel
(Transportation at Kyoto other than that scheduled above will be difficult).
- 1315 Leave Miyako Hotel for train.
- 1330 *By car* Special train departs for Nara.
- 1515 Arrive at Nara for conducted tour.
- 1700 Special train leaves Nara for Kure (Dinner on board train).

Sunday, January 27

- Arrive Kure early, with breakfast on train.
- 0800 Detrain at Kure.

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
U.S.S. MOUNT MCKINLEY (AGC-7)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

18 Jan 1946

LIAISON OFFICE

To: Mr. Hugh D. Farley

SUBJECT: Tentative Schedule for Kyoto Trip (25, 26, 27, 28 Jan 46)

1. The following schedule is proposed for the tour thru the Kyoto-Osaka area:

- a. Leave Tokyo, 2000 25th January (Via special train), arrive Kyoto 0800, 26th January. (Breakfast will be served aboard the train.)
- b. Detrain at 0830.
(1) Tour Kyoto (Conducted by I Corps) to include: Shrines, Imperial Universities and Electrical factories.
- c. Lunch at the Miyako Hotel 1200-1330
- d. Drive (Cars) to Osaka 1330-1400
- e. Visit Mint 1400-1530 (Mint is in operation. Items such silver, platinum, and opium from Southern Japan have been collected here).
- f. Trip - Inspection of Sumutomo Industries 1545-1700.
- g. Return to train 1700 (Dinner to be served aboard train 1700-1830).
- h. Leave for Kure 1800
- i. Arrive Kure early, have breakfast on train and detrain 0800, 27th January.
- j. Visit Kure Base and Installations 0800-1000
- k. Drive to Hiroshima 1000-1100
- l. Tour of Hiroshima 1100-1300 (Note - X Corps will conduct tours of Kure and Hiroshima.)

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
U.S.S. MOUNT MCKINLEY (AGC-7)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

- m. Entrain and leave for Osaka 1300 (Lunch will be served aboard train)
- n. Arrive Osaka 2100
- o. Spend night at New Osaka Hotel
- p. Leave hotel and return to train 0900, 28th January.
- q. Leave for Nara 0900
- r. Arrive Nara 0930, Visit Shrine Temples and Parks
- s. Entrain for Kyoto 1130 (Lunch aboard train)
- t. Arrive Kyoto 1230, Afternoon at Kyoto left open, Transportation for parties of four will be available.
- u. Leave Kyoto 1830 (Dinner to be served aboard train)
- v. Arrive Tokyo Central Station 0800, 29th January, (Breakfast on train, if desired)

/s/ CARL W. MEYER,
Col., Eng.

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0800-1000 Conference with local officials, and visit to Kure Base and installations.

1000-1100 Drive by car to Hiroshima.

1100-1300 Tour of Hiroshima (Note: I Corps will conduct tours of Kure and Hiroshima).

1300 Special train leaves Kure for Osaka (Lunch and Dinner will be served aboard the train).

2100 Train arrives at Osaka. Commission will detrain at Osaka and spend the night at the New Osaka Hotel.

Monday, January 28

(Breakfast at the Hotel)

Morning: Inspection of Osaka heavy industries and the Mint, which is in operation. Items such as silver, platinum and opium have been collected here.

(Those who wish - by car -> Kyoto & Kurama Miyoko Hotel)

1130 Special train departs for Kyoto.

(Lunch on board train)

1230 Arrive Kyoto. Afternoon at Kyoto left open. Transportation for parties of 4 will be available.

1900 Special train leaves Kyoto for Tokyo.

(Dinner on board the train).

Tuesday, January 29

0800 Arrive Tokyo Central Station.
(Breakfast on board the train).

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

Dr. Blakeslee

(J) MI-13

January 30, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONMEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 13PRESS RELEASE, JANUARY 30, 1946Note by the Secretary-General

1. The following release to the press was approved by the Commission formally and released by the Chairman on January 30:

"The Far Eastern Commission came to Japan to consult with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to study conditions on the spot. The Commission has now completed its mission and is leaving with the feeling that, while the time spent here has been short, it has been well spent. The Commission returns to Washington better prepared for the important work ahead.

"The Commission began its work on Thursday, January 10, with a formal call upon the Supreme Commander and a meeting with the special staff of his Headquarters. Thereafter the Commission at once entered upon its task of informing itself on the problems facing the Supreme Commander and the machinery set up to meet those problems.

"Altogether, the Commission has spent three weeks in Japan. During that time the bulk of its activities have been in conferences with the various sections of the special staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on such subjects as the following: Reparations, Education, Natural Resources, Government, Economics, Science, Public Health and Welfare, Industry, Labor, Finance and War Criminals.

"In addition, the Commission has made several trips outside of Tokyo during which there was opportunity to see conditions in various parts of the country and to confer with local military commanders and Japanese authorities.

"The Commission feels that its visit has been of great value and that what it has seen and heard will be of continuing value as it proceeds in its work. The Commission has been impressed by the leadership of the Supreme Commander and with the deep thought and energy that characterizes his activities as well as those of his staff. The Commission has also deeply appreciated the complete frankness and sincerity with which its earnest desire for information has been met by everyone: by the Supreme Commander himself, and all members of his staff and occupation forces."

Nelson T. Johnson
SECRETARY GENERAL

(J) MI-14
February 2, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 14

NOTES ON KANAGAWA PREFECTURE

Note by the Secretary General

1. The following written report was presented at the meeting with local Japanese officials in Yokohama on Thursday, January 31, 1946, and is circulated herewith for information.
2. The report is an English summary of a longer report in Japanese. The Japanese report is in the file of the Secretariat and may be circulated upon return to Washington if the Commission so desires.
3. The following Japanese officials were present at the conference:

Yokohama Liaison Office

Mr. Tadakatsu Susuki	Chief of Yokohama Liaison Office
Mr. Yosoe Ohgimi	Liaison Officer of Yokohama Liaison Office

Kanagawa Prefecture

Mr. Iwataro Uchiyama	Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture
Mr. Masao Goto	Director for Home Affairs, Kanagawa Prefecture, Welfare, Health, Finance.
Mr. Yoshinobu Yagi	Director for Police Affairs, Kanagawa Prefecture
Mr. Yasuo Tashiro	First Director for Economic Affairs
(Asst. Mr. Kochichi Nabeta, Chief of Food Section.)	
Count Sanemitsu Hirohashi	Second Director for Home Affairs, Kanagawa Prefecture
Mr. Minoru Tanuma	Director for Public Works

Yokohama

Dr. Yoshio Tajima	Asst. Mayor, Yokohama
Mr. Michaga Toyohara	Director of Reception Center at Uraga.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

ENCLOSUREKANAGAWA PREFECTURE REPORTA. OUTLINE

1. Population:-	<u>Total for the prefecture</u>		
	<u>before war-devastation</u>	<u>after</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
	2,409,605 persons	1,863,974	545,631

<u>Devastated Cities</u>	<u>Before Devastation</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
Yokohama	1,019,366	623,658	395,708
Kawasaki	380,919	180,042	200,877
Hiratsuka	47,346	39,165	8,181

2. Area:- 235,281 square kilometers of which the city of Yokohama covers 17%.

3. Administrative Divisions:-

7 cities (Yokohama, Yokosuka, Kawasaki, Hiratsuka, Kamakura, Fujisawa, Odawara)

8 districts (Miura, Kamakura, Koza, Naka, Ashigara-Shimo, Aiko, Tsukui)

119 towns and villages

Furthermore, there are 7 branches of the Prefectural Office established in the 8 districts under the control of the Kanagawa Prefectural Government.

B. INDUSTRY

1. Agriculture

1. Size of agricultural management is as follows:

Area of cultivated fields .	.40,327 acres paddy fields
	69,776 acres ordinary fields
Total	<u>110,103 acres</u>

Number of farming families.	.26,000 families of pure farmers
	47,345 families of part farmers
Total	<u>73,345 families</u>

Of the above:

2,345 families	are land owners
17,300 "	" farmer proprietors
24,500 "	" tenant farmers
28,200 "	" both tenant and proprietors farmers

Average area under cultivation per family -
1.225 acres

2. Quantity of production of staple foods

Rice	890,000	bushels
Land rice	855,000	"
Barley	972,000	"
Rye	59,500	"
Wheat	705,000	"
Sweet potatoes	260,104,000	pounds
Irish potatoes	90,692,000	"
Other cereals.	23,780	"
Vegetables	54,940,000	"
Fruits	5,412,000	"

2. Extension and Improvement of Fields

To meet the conditions prevailing after the end of the war concerning food problem and demobilization, requiring the making of new farming villages, efforts are being made on a large scale to open new fields and to improve existing fields. This is also intended for the self-supply (support) in foodstuffs and to recall factory hands and demobilized soldiers back to farming. Including 4,606 acres of land used formerly for military purposes, 6,818 acres will be opened as fields, 980 acres will be subjected to large scale drainage, and small scale drainage will be applied on 6,370 acres, transfer of fertile soil 2,450 acres, readjustment of fields 735 acres, and readjustment of field paths 4,165 acres until the sowing period of this year. However, further efforts are required caused by the lack of various materials.

3. Livestock

Cattle	17,600	heads
Horses	6,000	"
Swine	15,500	"
Sheep	1,100	"
Goats	5,272	"
Rabbits.	15,658	
Fowl	112,000	

4. Sericulture

Number of families raising silkworm	abt. 9,700
Area under mulberry cultivation	4,875½ acres
Production of cocoons.....	2,050,000 lb.
Production of textiles from cocoons..	508,400 lbs.

Estimate of future production of raw silk
 137,760 lbs. (1,050 bales
 (However this includes equipment completed until June)

5. Fisheries

Fishers pure fishers....9,400 persons
 part fishers....3,500 persons

Registered fishing boats:
 With motors.....1,650 boats
 Without motors.....3,222 boats
 Total 4,873

of which movable boats are
 with motors about 70% (This will see improvement when gasoline can be had)
 without motors about 90%.

In Tokyo Bay, besides the collection of seaweeds, beds of "tapes Philippinarum" (assari) and clams are widely cultivated.

In Miura Peninsula and the Bay of Sagami, coastal fishing is extensively carried on. Sagami Bay is famous throughout the country for yellowtails.

The fishing port of Misaki is the center of thuna and bonito fishing overseas. In 1940, this port was used by over 50 boats registered in this prefecture and over 250 boats from other prefectures, these boats having travelled over 2,000 miles in the South Seas, landing over 410,000,000 lbs. of fish. However, since the opening of hostilities, production declined to such an extent that during 1945 it showed only 80,000,000 lbs.

6. Forestry

Total area of forests . . . 283,710 acres
(This being 48% of the area of the prefecture)

This area is divided as follows:

Private owned forests . . . 264,110 acres
Imperial household forests. 19,600 acres
Nation owned forests 2½ acres

Forest Products (For Year 1945)

Charcoal 13,000 tons (871,000 bales)
Firewood 70,000 tons (7,000,000 bales)
Lumber 1,040,000 cubic feet

During the last 4 years, trees were cut down in areas covering about 4,000 cho; in order to increase the production of lumber we are trying to replant about 1,000 cho each year.

Plans are also being formed at present to construct roads between rows of trees and to get further supplies of saplings, etc.

7. Industrials

1. Number of factories during the war.. 4,448
Factories with no damage..... 2,212 (49%)
Factories damaged by war..... 2,236 (51%)

Out of which:

Factories partly damaged by war.. 314 (14%)
Factories disabled by war damage. 1,922 (86%)

2. Condition of operation:
According to the investigation of Oct.1,1945, on 1,465 factories, the conditions are:
In operation 826 factories (56%)
In preparation..... 204 " (13%)
Operations not known..... 367 " (25%)

Number of employees at present.... 87,650

Estimated no. of employees in future 95,230.

3. Switching over to civil productions:
Those having permission from the Military Govt...95
Those submitting necessary documents for operation.19

8. Labor Conditions and Measures for the Prevention of Unemployment

1. Before the termination of the war, there were 700,000 factory workers (including arsenals). To avoid confusion, gradual dismissals were resorted to, giving preference to those desiring to return to farming, or to former jobs and to businesses conducted in one's own family. Furthermore, efforts were made to retain as many men as possible by the rebuilding of factories destroyed or damaged in the course of the war, or by changing munitions factories to peace-time industrial enterprises. These measures succeeded in preventing confusion and in retaining work for the factory hands, so that, as shown hereunder, the estimated unemployed persons in this prefecture number about 230,000.

For the present, efforts are being made to reduce unemployments and utmost use is being made to fill demands for labor 53,000 hands and also of about 30,000 laborers required by the occupational forces.

In the case of the requirements of the occupational forces, a department for the supply of labor to the occupational forces has been established in the prefectural Government. The daily output of labor during the month of December is as follows:

Requirements of the Occupational Forces

Liaison Office	Yokohama.....	20,273
" " "	Yokosuka.....	5,176
	Atsugi.....	2,221
	Total	27,670

Labor supplied by Liaison Office

	Yokohama.....	21,389
	Yokosuka.....	5,199
	Atsugi.....	2,090
	Total	28,578

Unemployment Estimate (Refer to Paragraph 1 under "Labor Conditions, etc.")

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Jobless</u>	<u>Obtaining Work</u>
Demobilized Soldiers	164,995	62,599	3,557
Dismissed Factory Hands	<u>304,122</u>	<u>169,579</u>	<u>10,278</u>
Total	469,117	232,178	13,835

2. Formation of Labor Unions

Total Number of Labor Unions . . . 56

Machine and tool industries...	29
Metal works.....	6
Gas & Electric Works.....	8
Provision Industries.....	1
Forwarding Agents.....	1
Transportation (traffic)	8
Public Works.....	2
Government Works.....	1

Total Number of Members of Labor Unions.... 35,169 persons
of which there are 31,189 men and 4,007 women.

3. Labor Strikes

1. Number of Cases
24 strikes
18 came to agreement
2. Causes of Strikes
Increase in pay
Re-employment of dismissed persons
Recognition of Labor Unions
Recognition of collective bargaining
Entry of management in union
Improvement in welfare equipments
Against dismissal
Reduction of working hours

C. PERTAINING TO DISTRIBUTION OF FOODSTUFFS

1. Staple Food

The required quantity of rice for the 1946 Rice Fiscal Year is _____ of which only _____ or 32% can be produced within this prefecture, so that 68% or _____ must be imported from other prefectures.

In recent times the delivery of rice per day is only about

whereas stocks on hand are about (as on January 25th), that is to say the quantity is enough for only 11 days. Every effort is being made to obtain further deliveries of rice within the prefecture, and to import rice from other prefectures, but in view of transportation difficulties, the supply of rice is in a very serious condition.

2. Bean Paste and Soy

The annual requirement of bean paste is _____ of which only 70% is produced in this prefecture. It is probable that by increased production the balance can also be filled. However, in the case of soy, the inter-prefectural production is only 30%, the main imports coming from Chiba Prefecture. For the moment, we are having difficulties due to the very unfavorable condition of transportation. The distribution at present is being delayed by half a month, or in some districts even one month, and efforts are being made to expedite delivery. But, in view of the shortage of soya beans and other necessaries, it is feared that there will be absolutely no soy after three or four months.

3. Vegetables and Fruits

Since the liberation of official prices for vegetables and fruits in November, 1941, delivery has turned for the better but prices sky-rocketed to such an extent, that we are trying to put a control. However, price control in this prefecture alone would be disastrous to the persons in this area, so that we are following the direction of the Central Authorities.

(Reference) Distribution per day per person in Yokohama
October November December until Jan. 20th

4. Fish

As for vegetables and fruits, price control has been released since November 1945, resulting in price-rocketing; since the prefecture's policy is to keep down prices for

the welfare of the people of this prefecture, the consequence was that goods did not flow into this area. It has been decided to found since 20th of this month to form a link system governed by a committee so that it is expected that fish will be delivered in larger quantities and at reasonable prices.

(Reference) Distribution per day per person in Yokohama.
 October November December until Jan. 20th

D. FINANCE

Effects of War Damages on the Finances of This Prefecture

Due to the destruction of principle cities and the discontinuation of munition factories since the termination of the war, the finances of this prefecture have been unfavorably affected. Based on the revenue for the 1944 fiscal period amounting to ¥ 31,624,000.--, comparison for the last two years are given hereunder:-

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Estimated Revenue</u>	<u>Comparative Decrease</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1945	¥ 25,442,000.--	¥ 6,182,000.--	2.42
1946	20,929,000.--	10,695,000.--	5.11

To counteract deficits strong efforts are being made in re-trenchment but it is feared that deficits cannot be avoided.

Foreign Loans

As on January 25, 1945, for the Prefecture ¥ 124,218,500.00
 Subletting 19,594,945.00
 Total ¥ 143,843,445.00

These loans must be returned at the rate of ¥ 9,730,000.00, so that difficulty is experienced in looking for sources of revenue.

Expenses for the Recovery of War-Damaged Institutions

21 middle schools, police and fire-stations within this prefecture have been destroyed. The estimated cost for the recovery of these institutions is ¥ 54,796,150.00 which can be covered only by floating loans.

E. EDUCATION

<u>Kind of School</u>	<u>No. of Schools</u>	<u>No. Teachers</u>	<u>No. Pupils</u>
Middle	25	740	19,622
Commercial	29	755	15,377
Higher Girls'	42	901	24,729
Girls' Commercial	22	352	9,920
Appointed School	9	125	2,486
	<u>TOTAL 127</u>	<u>2873</u>	<u>72,133</u>
Young Men's School	172	1044	Male 17,691 Female <u>11,374</u> Total <u>29,065</u>
Primary School	334	6712	Male 138,407 Female <u>121,535</u> Total <u>259,942</u>

Number of Schools Damaged by Air Raids

Type of School	Complete	Half	Part	Total	Value
Middle	5	3	3	11	¥ 7,683,000
Commercial	6	3	1	10	7,922,000
Higher Girls'	9	-	-	9	405,000
Girls' Commercial	6	1	-	7	3,92,000
Appointed	3	3	-	6	1,720,000
Primary	45	13	-	58	41,630,000
TOTAL	74	23	4	101	68,442,000

Using same class twice over:-

At present the following schools are using their classrooms to teach more than two classes:

Primary Schools	50
Middle Schools	1
Higher Girls' Schools	4
Commercial Schools	2

All teaching materials have been burned down in air raids, and equipments of schools that survived have been neglected and have no means of replenishing at present. At this condition, we are having great difficulties in teaching democratic principles to pupils. We have formed some plans but are having much trouble in putting them into effect.

Other Educational Institutions

Public Library	65
Museum	4

Above are figures checked in 1943; therefore, some of them have been damaged by air raids.

F. SANITATION

Anticipating contagious diseases after the war damages, we have tried our best to prevent same and to a certain amount we have succeeded in same. The cleaning up of the devastated areas is being done, but the process is very slow and we are trying to push this work at present.

Pre-War (As of January, 1945)

	No. of General	No. of Dentist	Total No.
Hospitals	113	-	113
Clinics	1025	650	1675
Doctors	1461	760	2221

Present (As of January, 1946)

	No. of General	No. of Dentist	Total No.
Hospitals	103	-	103
Clinics	816	488	1304
Doctors	1254	519	1773

Number of Patients (As of 18 January 1946)

Hospitals	103
Beds in Above	10381
In-patients	4943
Out-patients (One day-Jan.18)	4950

Comparative List of Contagious Diseases				
	1944	1945	1-26 Jan.45	1-26 Jan.46
Dysentery	2593	1553	25	3
Children's Dysentery	385	122	4	1
Typhoid Fever	4287	2851	110	74
Para-Typhoid	665	281	14	6
Eruptive Typhus	52	77	-	4
Smallpox	-	48	-	3
Scarlet Fever	417	102	8	3
Diphtheria	4031	2830	358	131
Sleeping Sickness	69	142	5	3
TOTAL	12499	2006	525	225

Remarks: Number of tuberculosis cases is increasing which might be due to overwork and under-nourishment.

G. POLICE

No. 1 Police Force

1. Personnel

The Police Force at Kanagawa Prefecture consists of the following members:

Director of Police	1
Police Supervising Official	1
Superintendents	32
Inspectors	60
Assistant Inspectors	282
Police Sergeants	494
Policemen	2,669
TOTAL	3,539

2. Mechanism

Mechanism of Police Force in the Prefecture comprises the Headquarters, Police Stations, Police Boxes and Police Substations.

The Headquarters consists of six sections, namely: Police Affairs, Police Guards, Criminal, Public Safety, Administrative Police and Traffic; also, have the Police Supervisor's Office, Police Secretary's Office and Police Training School, besides which there are Police Guard Battalions, having three garrisons, but the latter will be abolished in the very near future.

There are thirty Police Stations throughout the Prefecture, under which there are Police Boxes and Police Sub-stations numbering 490.

3. Present Condition of Public Peace Maintenance

The condition of public peace maintenance after the termination of war is turning for the worse.

It might be mentioned that the crimes committed are getting more atrocious in their nature and the number of arrests are getting less, when compared with those before the end of the war.

For your reference, the following are the comparative lists of crimes committed and arrests made, before and after the termination of the war:

<u>Kinds</u>	<u>From: Jan. 1945 to: 14 Aug. 1945</u>		<u>From: 15 Aug. 1945 to: 20 Jan. 1946</u>	
	<u>Crimes</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Crimes</u>	<u>Arrests</u>
Murder	4	4	11	8
Attempted Murder	3	3	5	5
Robbery & Murder	1	-	2	1
Robber & Injury	3	3	12	4
Robbery	3	3	69	10
Rape	1	1	2	1
Bodily injury re- sulting in death	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>
	TOTAL 21	19	106	33

Further, we might add the following list of incidents of the Allied Soldiers:

From August, 1945 to end of December, 1945

<u>Kinds</u>	<u>Incidents</u>	<u>Arrests</u>
Murder	10	1
Rape	36	2
Taking money, etc. by force	1373	21
Injury	54	1
Violence	34	1
Taking motor cars by force	36	-
Others	<u>121</u>	<u>4</u>
	TOTAL 1634	29

Judging from the above, the recent public peace condition is in very poor state and in consideration of the anticipated shortage of foodstuffs and increase of Unemployed, we believe that we should increase the Police Force, both in quantity and quality, to maintain peace and order throughout the Prefecture.

No. 2 Fire Brigade

1. Personnel

Fire Brigade in Kanagawa Prefecture consists of 1767 Firemen, including one Fire Brigade Commander.

2. Mechanism

Fire brigade mechanism in Yokohama, Kawasaki and Yokosuka is considered to be an Official Mechanism, having at Headquarters one Fire Brigade Section and Firemen's Training School.

There are 11 fire stations and 33 fire sub-stations, plus an organization of civilians known as "Kei-bedan" which assists these fire fighting mechanisms.

In other Prefectural Districts, besides Yokohama, Kawasaki and Yokosuka, the "Kei-bo-dan" alone are fighting the fires.

3. Recent Fire Conditions

The numbers of fires are increasing since the termination of war. Since Aug. 15, 1945 to the end of December, 1945 there were 148 cases, the estimated value of damages of which amounts to ¥ 148,000,000.

(J)MI-15
February 8, 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 15

ARRANGEMENTS AT PEARL HARBOR

Note by the Secretary General

1. Prior to the anticipated arrival of the ship at Pearl Harbor on Monday, February 11, at 0800, it is requested that all Commission personnel complete the customs forms which have been circulated and forward them to the Ship's Secretary. All baggage should be clearly labeled.

2. Arrangements have been made for customs, immigration and agricultural officials to meet the ship and complete the necessary inspections as soon as possible. Personal baggage should be packed, labeled and readied for departure in the cabins. Word will be passed through the ship's public address system when the inspections have been completed. As each individual is cleared, he may call for a steward to take his baggage ashore, at extension 042.

3. Immediately upon completion of the customs clearance, all baggage will be removed from the ship, loaded on trucks and taken to Hickam Field for transfer to the ATC. An officer of the Commission will accompany the baggage and see that it is properly handled. It is suggested that Commission personnel keep with them only the essential small bag or bags for the air trip back to Washington.

4. Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor, General Richardson has arranged for the entire party to be taken to Fort Shafter, where accommodations will be provided. Transportation will be furnished for all in order to visit the city and tour the Island. The Willard Inn and the Fort Shafter officers' club have been put at the disposal of the Commission for luncheon and dinner.

5. Admiral Adolphus Andrews has invited General McCoy, Mr. Johnson, Sir Carl Berendsen, Mr. Norman, Mr. Lacoste, Sir George Sansom, Dr. deKat Angelino, Major Plimsoll and Mr. Saksena for luncheon at the Pacific Club. General Richardson has invited the same group for dinner

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at his quarters. These arrangements have been accepted by the
Chairman.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General