

Doc. 2239 Evid.

Folder 13

(17)

Σ 3371

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

United States of America et al.

versus

ARAKI, Sadao et al.

AFFIDAVIT

I, TAKEBE, Rokuzo, former Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Manchukuo Government, born in 1893, testify under oath as follows:

In addition to my testimony which I myself, in my own hand, put down in the interrogation of March 26, 1946, I must make the following supplementary statements:

1. On page 11 of the Japanese text of my testimony there is some inaccuracy which was due to an error of my memory, and which I wish to correct. Speaking of the amount of subsidies disbursed by the Manchukuan Government to the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development Company, I wrote that beginning from 1937 the total amount of subsidies had been about 500 million yen; now I have recollected that this amount was 300 million yen or thereabouts.

2. On page 11 of the Japanese text I, speaking of the prefectural governors' conference at which I had heard ARAKI's and SUZUKI's addresses, did not express my thoughts quite correctly. As the result of this, there is some inaccuracy in my answer. To make the whole of my answer regarding this matter absolutely clear, I wish to make the following additional statement:

While I was the governor of Akita Prefecture from June, 1932 to January, 1935, I attended the Prefectural governors' Conferences several times. The conference was convened regularly every year in Tokyo. At one of these conferences which took place, as far as I remember, in 1933, at the Great Auditorium of the Toyama Military School in Tokyo, I heard the address made by the Japanese War Minister, ARAKI, Sadao.

The gist of ARAKI's address was that Japan had brought about the Manchurian Incident, established the state of Manchukuo, and her interests came to a clash with the interests of the states - members of the League of Nations. In this critical period it was necessary for Japan to strengthen her defense, her internal conditions and to secure military bases on the continent. Japan

from the latter for future matters. In case of necessity, he met the Commander-in-Chief in the middle of the week to get instructions. All basic and important matters as well as measures undertaken by the Manchukuo Government had to be sanctioned by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. Besides the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, the following persons were usually present at the conferences on Saturdays: Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, his deputy, chief of the 4th Section, and Lt. General MIYAKE, Chief of the Central Headquarters of the KYO-WA-KAI Society. Lt. General MIYAKE also reported to the Commander-in-Chief on the most important matters pertaining to the activities of the KYO-WA-KAI Society and received from him instructions concerning his work. Thus, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army directed not only /the activities of/ the Manchukuo Government but also /those of/ the KYO-WA-KAI Society.

4. On page 3 of the Japanese text of my testimony dated March 26, 1946, I enumerated principal measures which had been carried out by the Manchukuo Government for the purpose of creation of a military base for a war against the Soviet Union. To this I add that detailed instructions concerning the realization of the measures enumerated by me, i.e., concerning the construction of various military objectives, strategic railroads, airfields, border fortifications and others were given me by General UMEZU, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.

5. I must add the following to my testimony concerning the Kan-Toku-En /plan/. In summer 1941, I went to Tokyo and visited Prime Minister TOJO. During our conversation he said to me that in connection with the military Kan-Toku-En plan it was necessary for the Manchukuo Government to take measures for supplying the Kwantung Army /with all that was necessary/.

I received all instructions concerning the realization of the measures for the Kan-Toku-En plan as regards the Kwantung Army from General UMEZU, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and from Chief of his Staff. It is also necessary to point out that 5th Section under Colonel IKEDA, Sumihisa was organized in the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army in 1941. This section was engaged in studying an occupational system for the territories of the Soviet Union, which was planned to occupy. The leading Japanese officials of the Manchukuo Government participated in this study.

6. Concerning the construction of military objects in Manchuria, it is necessary to point out that the construction had been carried out even prior to my appointment as chief of the General Affairs Department of the Manchukuo Government.

was to inevitably clash with the Soviet Union in the course of the effectuation of her policies, therefore it was necessary for Japan to secure for herself through military methods the territories of the Maritime Province, Zabaikalye and Siberia. After ARAKI had finished, Lt. Colonel SUZUKI, Teiichi, a member of the War Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Japanese War Ministry, stated orally in ARAKI's presence (using a map of Manchuria, China and the Soviet Union which had been hung), SUZUKI described the various problems on matters pertaining to the international situation.

The gist of SUZUKI's oral statement consisted in laying the ground for the necessity of Japan's war against the Soviet Union and for the necessity of capturing the Soviet Maritime Province, Zabaikalye and Siberia.

Naturally, at the present time I do not remember the exact wording of ARAKI's and SUZUKI's statements, as many years have elapsed since then.

3. To clarify the nature of my activities as Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Manchukuo Government in the period from 1940 to 1945 I must add the following:

The General Affairs Department guided by me was under the direct control of the Prime Minister of Manchukuo. All the ministries of the Manchukuan Government were under the control of the General Affairs Department. Thus, the ministries with the General Affairs Department formed the Government of Manchukuo. The responsibility for the administration throughout the whole country rested with me. The Vice-Chief of the General Affairs Department and all vice-ministers who in Manchuria were all Japanese were under me. All these persons met for conferences once a week, on Tuesdays. Drafts of decisions on some or other matters made at these conferences were submitted for deliberation to the cabinet meetings which would take place on Wednesdays.

As chief of the General Affairs Department of the Manchukuo /Government/ I was directly under the control of General UMEZU, Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army and from July, 1944, under General YAMADA.

The Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army carried out actual guidance of the Manchukuo Government. According to the established rule, chief of the General Affairs Department met the Commander-in-Chief on Saturday each week. On those days, chief of the General Affairs Department reported to the Commander-in-Chief on various matters and received instructions

My predecessor at this post up to 1940 was HOSHINO, Naoki who in his activities, and in particular to the activities pertaining to the construction of military objects in Manchuria as a military base against the U.S.S.R. acted in accordance with the instructions of the Kwantung Army Commander and the Chief of its Staff.

Chiefs of the Kwantung Army Staff TOJO, Hideki and ITAGAKI, Seishiro endeavored to carry out military measures directed against the Soviet Union and used Manchukuo resources for that purpose. From 1935 through 1938, I stayed in Manchuria holding the offices of Chief of the Administrative Section and then of Chief of the Kwantung Territory Bureau.

s/ TAKEBE, Rokuzo

October 20, 1947.

Sworn and subscribed to before the Undersigned Officer by the above-named TAKEBE, Rokuzo at the Mitsubishi 21 Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 20th day of October, 1947.

s/ T. D. White

Captain,
1st Summary Court Officer

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Steve S. Yamamoto, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said TAKEBE, Rokuzo was duly sworn in my presence, and signed said affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 20 day of October, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

s/ Steve S. Yamamoto

O-888916, Capt., INF.

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Doc 2239-A

極東國際軍事裁判所

米合衆國其他
荒不負夫其他ニ對スル

供述書

明治三十六年生元滿洲國政府總務長官武部六藏ハ誓
約ノ下ニ次、如ク證言ス

余、昭和三十一年三月二十六日、證人訊問調書ニ於テ、自
筆ヲ以テ證言シタル事項ニ補充的ニ次、如ク證言
スル所アリ

ハ余、日本文、證人訊問調書、第十一頁ニ記憶違
ヒニ依リ間違アリ之ヲ訂正セントス、滿洲國政府ヨリ
滿洲重工業開發株式會社ニ對シ補充金、總
額ニ付テ述ベタル際、昭和十二年ヨリ、補助金、總額
ハ五億圓にナリシト記載セラル之ハ三億圓前後
ナリシニトテ思ヒ出セリ

ハ日本文、證人訊問調書、第十一頁ニ荒木及鈴木
演説ヲ聞クニ、地方長官會議ニ付テ述ベタル際
自分、方々余リ正シク表現シテカクヲ爲答弁ニ多少不
明瞭ト所アリ此、問題ニ関シ余ノ答弁ヲ明確確
實ニ爲人補充的ニ次、如ク證言セントス

昭和七年六月ヨリ十年一月迄秋田縣知事ノ職ニ在リタルニ於
 同地方長官會議ニ出席セルトシ同會議ハ定期時ニ在リ
 東京ニ於テ開催セラルカ余ノ記憶スル所ニ依ルニ昭和八年
 東京陸軍戸山學校大講堂ニ於テ開レタル會議ニ於
 テ日本陸軍大臣荒木貞夫、訓示ヲ聞キタリ荒木、訓示
 重要ニ意味ハ日本カ滿洲事變ヲ起シテ滿洲國ヲ建設
 國際聯盟中諸國下衝突忘ルカ此、重要時期ニ於
 テ日本ハ國防ヲ充實シ國內態勢ヲ強化シ大陸軍
 事基地ヲ確保スル必要アリ。日本ノ國策ヲ實現スル際
 聯ト、衝突ハ避ケ得ニサルヲ以テ日本ニ取テ北滿州
 カハインカ、ソビエツ、領土ヲ軍事ノ方法ニ依リ占領スル必要
 アリト云フ云々ニテツタ

荒木、訓示後、彼ノ列席ノ下ニ日本陸軍省軍務局
 軍事課員鈴木貞一中佐カ口述セリ、掛ケテ下ツ所
 滿洲支那ノ聯、地圖ヲ利用シ、鈴木ハ國際情勢ノ
 諸問題ヲ説明セリ、鈴木、口述ノ大要ハ日本ニ取テ對ソ
 戰、重要性及、聯、沿海州カハインカ、ソビエツ、占領ノ必要
 性ヲ理由ケルニ在リタリ

ソノ時ヨリ已ニ長キ年月ヲ経ルニ為テ荒木ト鈴木、口述ニ
 付テ其、一、一、言義方ニ從ッテ其、内容ヲ今日記憶シ
 テ居タイノ人ト云然、コトナリ

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(三)昭和十五年乃至二十年ニ於ケル滿洲國政府總務長官
トシテ余ノ活動ノ内容ヲ明確ニスル爲次ノ事項ヲ言ヒ
加ヘル要アリ

余ノ指導スル總務廳ハ滿洲國總理大臣ノ直轄スルモノ
ナリ。滿洲國政府ノ各部ハ總務廳ノ統轄ニ服セリ
カクシテ各部ハ總務廳ト共ニ滿洲國政府ヲ構成セリ
余ハ全國ノ行政ニ付責任ヲ有セリ。總務廳次長及
滿洲ニ於テ全ベテ日本人ナリシ各部次長ハ余ノ隷
下ニアリ

以上ノ者ハ每週一回火曜日ニ會議ヲ開キタリ。此ノ
會議ニ於テ作成セル諸問題ノ解決ニ関スル案件ハ
毎水曜日ニ開カルル大臣會議ニ審議ノ爲メ提出
セラレタリ

No. 3
滿洲國總務長官トシテ余ハ直接關東軍司令
官梅津大將及昭和十九年七月以後ハ山田大將
ニ隷屬セリ。關東軍司令官ハ實際上滿洲國政
府ノ指導ヲ行ヘリ。慣例ニ依リ總務長官ハ每週
土曜日ニ軍司令官ト會見シ各般ノ報告ヲ爲ス
ト共ニ將來ノ問題ニウキ指示ヲ受ケタリ。必要
ナル場合ハ指示ヲ受ケルヲメ他ノ日ニモ軍司令官
ヲ訪問セリ。滿洲國政府ノ總テノ最モ基礎的且
重要ナル事項及方針策ハ必ズ關東軍司令官
ノ承認ヲ受クル要アリ。以上ノ土曜日ノ會見ニハ軍
司令官ノ外常ニ關東軍參謀長、副長、第四課

No. 4

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長及協和会中央本部長三宅中將が列席ヒリ三宅
中將モ亦協和会ノ活動ニ関スル旨取モ重要ナル事
項ヲ軍司令部官ニ報告シ業務上ノ指示ヲ受ケタ
リカクヒテ関東軍司令部官ハ滿洲國政府ノミナラ
ズ協和会ヲモ實際上指導ナセリ
(四)昭和二十一年三月二十六日ノ日本文ノ証人訊問
調書ノ頁三百頁ニ對シ戰ノ爲ニ軍事基地ヲ作
成スル爲滿洲國政府ニ行ヒタル重要ナル方策
ヲ述ベタルが同方策即チ種々ノ軍事建設中戰
略鐵道、飛行場、國境築城等ノ實現ニ關スル具
体的ノ指示ヲ関東軍司令部官梅津大將ヨリ受ケタ
ルトトテ此ニ追加ス

以下次頁

No. 5 98.5.2

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(四) 関特演ニ関スル余ノ証言ニ昭和十五年夏東京ニ在リ東條總理大臣ヲ訪問セルコトヲ追加スル要アリ、東條トシテ見トキ彼ハ関特演ト云フ軍事ノ計画、為滿洲國政府ハ関東軍ヲ補給スル方策ヲ採ル必要アルコトヲ余ニ述ベタリ

余ハ関東軍ノ関特演ノ方策實現ニ関スル凡テノ指示ハ関東軍司令官梅澤大將及其參謀長ヨリ受ケタリ、又昭和十一年ニ関東軍司令部ニ返田純久大佐ノ指導ヲ受ケテ五課ガ編成セラレタルコトヲコトニ述ベル要アリ、同課ハ占領豫定ノ所聯領土ニ於ケル占領制度ノ研究ヲ行ヘリ、此ノ研究ハ滿洲國政府ノ中堅日本人官吏ガ参加セリ

(五) 滿洲ニ於ケル軍事ノ的建設ニ関シテハ余ノ滿洲國政府總務長官ニ任命セラレタル前ニモ已ニ行ハレタコトヲ述ベル要アリ、昭和十五年迄總務長官タル余ノ前任者ハ星野直樹ニシテ、彼モソノ業務上對ソ基地トシテ、滿洲ニ於ケル軍事ノ的建設ニ関シテ関東軍司令官參謀長ノ指示ニ從ヘリ、関東軍司令官參謀長東條英機及ヒ板垣征四郎ハソ聯ニ對シテ軍事ノ方策ヲ考メ之ニ滿洲國ノ資源ヲ利用セリ

昭和十年リ昭和十三年迄余ハ滿洲ニ在リテ関東局司令部長、後ニ總長ノ職ニ在リタリ

昭和二十二年十月二十日

武部六藏

No. 6

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證

余、コステイグエス、ヤマモトハ余が日本語及英語ニ精通セルモノナルト並ニ本日、上記武部六藏が余面前ニ於テ正式ニ宣誓シ且余、面前ニ於テ該宣誓口供書ニ署名セシト又前記宣誓、施行並ニ該口供書、署名ニ関スル事項ハ凡テ眞實且正確ニ日本語ヨリ英語ニ又英語ヨリ日本語ニ翻訳セラレ且該宣誓口供者ニ充分理解セラレタルモノナルトヲ茲ニ証明ス

一九四二年（昭和二十二年）十月二十日 於日本・東京

署名

コステイグエス、ヤマモト

歩兵大尉 〇一八八九六

右武部六藏ハ昭和二十二年十月二十日日本東京三菱才ニテ号館ニ於テ下記署名係官、面前ニ宣誓シ且署名シタルトヲ証明ス

略式 裁判所

歩兵大尉 テイ、テイ、ホワイト

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE 16/9/46

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 2239

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. 670

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE A. Col. Yaranemo

ROOM NO. 354

Exh 670

Affidavit of the Witness
KHADAROVSK
26 March (SHOWA 21) 1946

I, Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN, Military Interrogator for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, with Lieutenant Petrov as interpreter, interrogated, having warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony according to Article 25 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., as a witness the below named, who testified:

1. Name - TAKEBE, Rokuzo
2. Age - 54
3. Name of Profession - Former Chief of General Affairs Department of the Manchurian Government.
4. Kind of Political Party - None.
5. Present Address - Khabarevsk.

The certificates of the witness being warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony and of the interpreter for giving false translation are attached to the affidavit.

Interrogation was done in Japanese.

0.1

Q. Mention the names of persons among the leaders of Japan with whom you had close relation.

A. My acquaintances or those whom I met are the following: GENERAL TOJO; Former Prime Minister KOISO; Former Prime Minister SUZUKI; Former Prime Minister ABE, Nobuyuki; Generals UMEZU and YAMADA; Lieut-Gen. HATA; Former Commander of the Kwantung Army UEDA; Former Commander of the Kwantung Army MINAMI; Former Minister of Greater East Asia Affairs AOKI, Kazuo; MATSUOKA; and ODATE, Shigeo, Former Minister of Home Affairs and Former Head of General Affairs Bureau during SHOWA 11-12 (1936-1937), and Chief of General Affairs just before my installation; HOSHINO, Naoki and Former President of the South Manchurian Railway and Former Transportation Minister KOHJIMA, Naoto.

Q. What was the purpose of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria?

A. The most important aim of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was to build up a military base on the continent.

Q. Against what country was this base built?

A. Mainly against the U.S.S.R. and China.

Q. Where did you find out that the aim of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was to make Manchuria a military base against the U.S.S.R. and China?

0.2

A. This was the opinion of the Japanese political leaders and the Kwantung Army. I know that the problem of preparing for a war against the U.S.S.R. was discussed at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. I heard about it from the Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals UMEZU, UEDA, MINAMI, and Lieutenant-General IKEDA. I have attended conferences held at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army when I held high positions of leader in Changchun.

Q. What was the fundamental mission of the Kwantung Army?

A. The purpose of the Kwantung Army being stationed in Manchuria was for defense, and it maintained an offensive stand to attain this purpose. In SHOWA 19 (1944) the Greater East Asia War became very difficult and disadvan-

tageous; and at the same time the Kwantung Army changed its attitude to a defensive one. Until the Nomonhan Incident, the Kwantung Army had taken an offensive stand towards the U.S.S.R., but after the above incident it changed to an attitude of aggressive defense. After SHOWA 19 (1944) it became absolutely on the defensive.

Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the operation of the base of operation against the U.S.S.R. within Manchuria?

A. The Kwantung Army kept its military plan secret, but it demanded the government to take up many kinds of measures in political and economical administration.

Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive?

A. First I received orders from the Kwantung Army concerning the first and second plans on developing Manchuria. The main points of this plan are to develop industry, to supplement the demands of the Kwantung Army, to set up railways and roads which can be useful in the case of a war breaking out against the U.S.S.R., and to prepare a food base.

Q. The ultimate aim was for Japan to prepare an economical base for operations against the U.S.S.R., wasn't it?

A. Yes, it was for an attack against the U.S.S.R.

Q. When and from whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the first and second plans?

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A. I received documentary orders through the secretariat, and I met the Commander of the Kwantung Army to talk it over. Also, every year I went up to Tokyo to report and received orders concerning my future work.

Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the preparation of the base for a war against the U.S.S.R.?

A. After all the political and economical demands of the Kwantung Army to the government were the preparation for a war against the U.S.S.R. I received orders from the Commander (Generals of the Kwantung Army UMEZU and YAMADA), Chiefs of Staff (Lieut. Generals KIMURA, YOSHIMOTO, KASAHARA, and HATA), Assistant Chief of Staff (Lieut. Generals HATA and IKEDA), and Chief of the Fourth Section (Colonels KUROKAWA and OBI).

Q. Have you ever talked with the Japanese War Minister?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. What kind of orders did you receive from the War Minister?

A. I didn't receive any concrete orders from the War Minister. For instance, the situation just after the beginning of the Russo-German War not being clear, I went to TOJO by aeroplane to make sure whether reinforcement of the Kwantung Army meant the opening of a war against Soviet Russia. War Minister TOJO said only that it was necessary to reinforce the Kwantung Army and didn't explain the reason.

Q. What was the reason for the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army which began about the summer of SHOWA 16 (1941)?

4

A. The reinforcement of the Kwantung Army began just after the beginning of the Russo-German War, and its purpose was to complete the preparation for the war against Soviet Russia.

Q. What do you know about the measure by the "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre, the plan called "Kantokuen"?

A. The "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre" was a name for keeping secret the actions of the Kwantung Army. Actually the Kwantung Army was reinforced by this plan. According to this plan there were orders concerning the delivery of food and other things, supplying laborers, and transportation of goods.

Q. When and by whom were you made to know the existence of the "Kantokuen"?

A. I heard about it at the beginning of July SHOWA 16 (1941) from KUROKAWA, Chief of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and also from UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. What kind of concrete things did UMEZU say concerning the "Kantokuen" plan?

A. During his talk with me, UMEZU told me about the increase of the troops of the Kwantung Army and demanded the delivery of food for these troops.

Q. Under your command what measures should be taken by the Manchurian Government regarding the "Kantokuen" plan?

A. First of all, the delivery of goods necessary for the reinforced troops, transportation of these goods, the mobilization of laborers, and anything else necessary for the Army.

Q. When were the measures of the Manchurian Government according to the Kantokuen plan to be realized?

p.5 A. Its measures were to be realized within six months.

Q. Was food to be replenished with the crop of SHOWA 16 (1941)?

A. At the beginning food was prepared with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940).

Q. It proves that the measures had to be realized in a very short time, doesn't it?

A. Yes, there was no time to wait for the crop of SHOWA 16 (1941), and we had to prepare it with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940).

Q. What really did the head of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army inform you concerning the plan of the Kantokuen plan?

A. He informed me of two things. One is that the troops of the Kwantung Army would be greatly reinforced, and the other is the delivery of goods for the Army must be increased.

Q. What kind of steps did you take towards the organs under you in the Manchurian Government to realize these measures?

A. Conferences which I attended were held many times.

Q. To whom did you report about the demands concerning the Kantokuen plan? And in what way did the actual realization of the plan begin?

A. I informed the Prime Minister of all the demands of the Kwantung Army, and also the vice-chief. I also held meetings of the vice-chiefs of each section.

p.6 Q. Was the military mobilization of the government officials to be prepared by the Kantokuen plan?

A. Yes, I relieved the officials so that they might be mobilized by the army by the Kantokuen plan.

Q. What do you think is characteristic of the political and military actions of TOJO?

A. I think that TOJO should take the responsibility of preparing for the attack on Soviet Russia, and also of starting a war against America and England in the South.

Q. What part did TOJO play in the war against China in SHOWA 12 (1937)?

A. At that time TOJO was the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and I think he is responsible for leading the troops of the Kwantung Army into a certain district of China and also, after he became War Minister and Prime Minister, for the whole management of the China Incident.

Q. Was the National Service Law of SHOWA 14 (1939) in Manchuria proposed by the Japanese?

A. The National Service Law was proposed by the Kwantung Army, and it was made by the demand of UEDA, Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. What was the reason for this demand?

A. The reason was that it was necessary to have a large army for the war against the U.S.S.R.

p.7. Q. By whom was the mobilization of laborers enforced in Manchuria?

A. The mobilization of the laborers was enforced in compliance with the Kantokuen plan according to two ways. One was by supplying in the administrative way, and the other was supplying by the Labor Service Law. More than a million people were mobilized every year.

Q. How long was the term of this mobilization? And in what way was it realized?

A. The mobilization of the laborers was compulsory. They were mobilized for from 4 to 6 or 8 months. By the Labor Service Law youths of 21 to 23 years of age were mobilized and by executive order people were mobilized regardless of age.

Q. By whose proposal was the mobilization carried out?

A. It was carried out by the proposal of UMEZU.

Q. When was mobilization by the Labor Service Law enforced in Manchuria? And what was its purpose?

A. The mobilization of laborers by the Labor Service Law was enforced in Manchuria in SHOWA 18 (1943). Its purpose was mainly to fill deficiency of laborers in the military production factories.

p.8. Q. What do you know about the KYOWA KAI?

A. I myself was a member of this association, and also a member of the Central Headquarters Committee. The leader of the KYOWA KAI was Prime Minister CHANG, and the actual leader was Lieutenant-General MIYAKE, Chief of Central Headquarters. The Central Headquarters Committee held a meeting once a month. At this meeting the problems concerning guidance of the Manchurian people were discussed. For instance, the problem of the mobilization of laborers: the Chinese disliked the law of Labor Mobilization, so the mobilization of the laborers had to be carried out with the aid of the KYOWA KAI.

Q. By whose proposal was the KYOWA KAI organized?

A. The KYOWA KAI was established by the proposal of the Japanese, especially General HONJO, former Commander of the Kwantung Army. In this association, the Japanese held the position of leaders and through this association the Japanese thoughts were made known.

Q. How was the KYOWA KAI made use of for the preparation of the war against the U.S.S.R.?

A. As mentioned before, the government received orders concerning this from the Kwantung Army, but the KYOWA KAI cooperated in making Manchuria a base for preparations for a war against the U.S.S.R.

Q. Mention the facts of the cooperation between the KYOWA KAI and the Japanese Government in preparing for the war against the U.S.S.R.

A. The KYOWA KAI did not cooperate directly with the Japanese Government but only through the Kwantung Army. Lieutenant-General MIYAKE, representative of the Kwantung Army, appointed the leaders of the KYOWA KAI. Also, officers of the Kwantung Army often attended the conferences and took the lead in its actions.

p.8 Q. How many members were there in the KYOWA KAI?

A. There were more than 4,000,000.

Q. What do you think is distinctive of the activities of AYUKAWA in Manchuria?

A. He played an important part in developing the heavy industry in Manchuria according to the first 5-Year Plan. Almost all of his activities were concentrated upon the establishment of the munition industry. He directed the production of coal, iron, light metals, aeroplanes and motor cars. He established the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development Co., Ltd., and directed it from December of SHOWA 12 (1937) to SHOWA 17 (1942).

Q. Did AYUKAWA'S activities in Manchuria bring forth great profit?

A. All the industries under AYUKAWA'S direction showed a deficit.

Q. Who supplemented the loss?

A. The Manchurian Government granted a subsidy. From SHOWA 12 (1937) the total subsidy came to be about 500,000,000 yen.

Q. Was the compulsory mobilization of the laborers mainly for AYUKAWA'S work?

A. The laborers who were mobilized were, in the field of developing heavy industry, used for AYUKAWA'S work.

p.10 Q. Have you ever heard ARAKI'S speeches?

A. When I was the governor of AKITA Prefecture around SHOWA 8 or 9 (1933, 1934), I heard ARAKI'S speech at a meeting of prefectural governors. He was at that time the War Minister. ARAKI hung up a map of the U.S.S.R. and Manchuria, and explained the necessity of the Maritime Province of the U.S.S.R., Siberia and Zabaikalye (Phonetic) for Japan. SUZUKI, Teiichi also spoke on the same thing as ARAKI did.

- Q. What did you learn from OSHIMA, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany?
- A. I have never met OSHIMA personally. But I have heard of him from MORISHIMA, Japanese Minister at Moscow. According to MORISHIMA, OSHIMA trusted the ability of Germany and Hitler, and he always reported to the Japanese Government that Germany would surely win. Last year, when the Japanese residents of Germany passed CHANGCHUN, I heard from them that OSHIMA had prohibited them from reporting to Japan the actual circumstances in Germany.

(Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo

I prove by my signature that the above answers are written in my own handwriting.

(Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo

Interrogator: Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo. Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN.

Interpreter Lt. Petrov

Secretary-Stenographer Timoleeva

Beginning of Interrogation 11:35

Close of Interrogation 17:15

C E R T I F I C A T E.

At Khadarovsk, 26 March 1946

Swearing that I, former Chief of General Affairs of the Manchurian Government TAKEBE, Rokuzo, will, as a witness, make only true statements concerning the chief war criminals to Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN, Military Interrogator at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, I deliver this certificate.