

IPS 4201

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INTERROGATION OF

Toshio Shiratori

Date and Time: 19 March 1946, 1400-1600 Hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Toshio Shiratori
Worth E. McKinney, Interrogator
C. C. Hardin, Interrogator
Ruth F. Anderson, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. McKinney

Interrogation taken in English.

BY MR. MCKINNEY:

Q. How do you spell your name?

A. S-h-i-r-a-t-o-r-i.

Q. What is your first name?

A. Toshio.

Q. About how old are you? About what is your age?

A. I was born in 1887. That would be not quite 58 yet. Fifty-eight it is next June.

Q. Where were you born?

A. Fifty-nine, next June. I was born in Shiba Prefecture.

Q. That is right in Tokyo, isn't it?

A. Two hours from Tokyo on the train.

Q. What elementary school, or what school did you first attend?

A. Elementary school, primary school, in the place of my birth. I went about seven years there, then I came up to Tokyo for middle school.

Q. What middle school?

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- A. That is perhaps what you call grammar school?
- Q. Yes. What school did you go to here in Tokyo?
- A. Hippon Chugaku school. That is a common name attached to every middle school. Chugaku.
- Q. How long did you attend this middle school that you talk about after your seven years elementary school?
- A. I entered the second year class, so I was four years there and I graduated from it.
- Q. What year did you graduate?
- A. That is a long time ago. I don't remember exactly.
- Q. That is all right. Approximately.
- A. When I was 19 - of course, I can count it -
- Q. 1906?
- A. 1906.
- Q. After you graduated from the middle school, did you go to any college or university?
- A. I went to the high school, First High School in Tokyo.
- Q. How long did you attend the high school?
- A. Three years. I went through all the courses there and then went to the Imperial University of Tokyo.
- Q. What course of study did you take in the Imperial University? What special courses?
- A. Political economy. They had a special faculty for that.
- Q. How long did you attend Tokyo University?
- A. I think four years, but I was sick and absented myself a whole year from college, so it comes to five years.
- Q. Five years?

A. Yes.

Q. After you graduated from Tokyo University, what was the first -

BY MR. HARDIN: Imperial University.

Q. Imperial University, what was the first work that you did?

A. Since I lost one year on account of illness, I took the examination of the Foreign Office during - before I graduated, I had taken an examination and passed, so immediately on graduating, I entered the service of the Foreign Office and became a diplomat. It was 1914.

Q. What position did you first take under the Diplomatic Corps? What was your first position?

A. My first government appointment was Vice Consul in Mukden, but I didn't go. Before going there, I was appointed in Hongkong.

Q. That is in China?

A. Yes.

Q. As Vice Consulate?

A. As Vice Consulate. We have a consul general there in Hongkong.

Q. Who was your Foreign Minister at the time you entered the diplomatic service in Hongkong?

A. Viscount KATO.

Q. Now, as Vice Consul for the Embassy in Hongkong, what were your duties there? Just describe briefly your duties.

A. It was during the war, and Japan was allied to England. We were on the same side against Germany, and there was much work to be done, especially work to be done by men who could speak English. I was especially chosen for that purpose, so my duty was writing letters to the Governor General there and seeing authorities of the British colony. That was my part of the duties there.

Q. Then you were then the liaison man between the Embassy there and the British Government?

A. Yes.

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Q. How long were you there? The whole time during the war? How long did you stay there?

A. A little over one year. In 1916 I was transferred to Washington Embassy.

Q. Washington, D. C.?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was the Ambassador from Japan to America at the time you went to Washington?

A. At the time Count CHINDA had been transferred to London and was in charge of the affairs for a short time, then came Mr. SUTTLE as Ambassador, and after SUTTLE -

BY MR. HARDIN: You mean to Washington?

A. Yes. And after SUTTLE came Viscount ISHII.

Q. How long were you in Washington?

A. Nearly four years.

Q. Let me ask you this. When you first moved to Washington, or were sent to Washington, what position did you have with the Embassy?

A. In the Embassy, my position was that of what we call student secretary.

Q. Under-Secretary?

A. Yes. Less than secretary.

Q. Under-Secretary is probably what we would call it. Did you start as an Under-Secretary when you first arrived in Washington?

A. Yes. And I was promoted to Secretary.

Q. About how long after you got to Washington was it until you were promoted up to Secretary?

A. About two years, I think.

Q. Then did you remain Secretary as long as you were in Washington?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Describe to us briefly what your duties were when you were in Washington.

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- A. Mostly my work was to read newspapers and magazines and make resumes and write telegrams for the Ambassador of things.
- Q. You were supposed to get all the newspapers and periodicals on world affairs and to brief them slightly, shorten and -
- A. Yes.
- Q. And mark important items for the Ambassador?
- A. Yes.
- Q. During the four years that you were in Washington, were you there all the time or were you sent on missions to other countries?
- A. I was there almost the whole time in Washington, only except once when Viscount ISHII came there on a special mission more or less for ceremonial purposes. He came there as special Ambassador. I had to go to San Francisco to meet him and accompany his party all the way across.
- Q. But you didn't leave the United States to go to some other country?
- A. No, I stayed in the United States all the time.
- Q. About what year would you say that you finished in Washington? What year was that?
- A. 1920. I left Washington in April I think it was. In April 1920.
- Q. Where did you go when you left Washington?
- A. I went from Washington to the Foreign Office in Tokyo. I served there about a year - a little over one year - then I went to the Washington Conference.
- Q. Let me ask you a little more. What position did you have when you came back to Tokyo from Washington? What was your position with the Foreign Office?
- A. As Secretary in the new department which had been started in the Foreign Office. The Department of Information.
- Q. What was that Bureau or new department supposed to do? What were the functions of it?
- A. It was more or less the same as the information section of other Foreign offices. Foreign Offices of other countries. Information Bureau.

- Q. You were supposed then to collect political items and news from all world papers and brief it?
- A. Yes, and besides seeing foreign correspondents and domestic newspaper men.
- Q. Now, it was the function of this Bureau to establish the policy of the Foreign Office in regard to foreign nations?
- A. Our Information Bureau had little to do with the formation of policy. It had more to do with the execution of the policy.
- Q. But the work of this Bureau was to gather information and transfer it to the Foreign Office, to the Foreign Minister, so that he would know what was going on in the rest of the world?
- A. Those things are reported by our ambassadors and ministers. They attached more importance to those officials' reports than articles appearing in newspapers and periodicals.
- Q. Didn't this new bureau or new department, didn't they look over all these newspaper reports, articles and periodicals, and things, and file a report with the Foreign Office on what they found?
- A. It was just studied and the preliminary report was rather meager, so we didn't. For instance, we didn't have any foreign newspapers, no foreign newspapers to read and no department handling those things.
- Q. Now, you stayed in this Bureau or new department up until some time in 1921, didn't you?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. What did you next do after that?
- A. My next appointment abroad was to accompany our delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Washington in 1921. November 1921.
- Q. What office did you have when you attended this conference? What were your duties?
- A. My principal work was to attend the conference and make notes on what was going on in the meetings and sessions, especially in connection with the Shantung negotiations between Japan and China with English and American observers. I had to take notes on the conversations and make a resume of the minutes.

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- Q. Were you one of the delegates to this conference?
- A. I was still in the rank of secretary.
- Q. You want in the rank of Secretary to an ambassador?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, there were notes that you had to take. Whom did you report that to, what you had taken down?
- A. It was needed for the meeting of the next day, what had gone on the previous day.
- Q. Who went with you to this conference from Japan?
- A. Japanese Ambassador SHIDAHARA, Mr. HANIHARA, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- BY MR. HARDIN: The ambassador was a delegate, but the Premier wasn't there?
- Q. It was just the two of you that were delegates or were there more?
- A. There were three delegates. Prince TOKUGAWA, Baron SHIDAHARA, and Baron Admiral KATO. They were delegates.
- Q. How long were you attending this conference?
- A. This conference lasted from November 1921 to March or April, I think April 1922. After the conference adjourned, we came home.
- Q. All right. Then when you got back to Tokyo, what did you next do? What was your next position?
- A. My next position was a little while in the Department, in the Bureau of European and American Affairs.
- Q. What was the object of this Bureau? Just give us briefly what this Bureau was supposed to do.
- A. It had charge of our relations with America and European countries. These colonies of Europe and Asia, Siam. Those countries.
- Q. What position did you hold in this Bureau?
- A. Secretary. The same as the Information Bureau before.
- Q. Who was in charge of this Bureau?

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- A. This Bureau was headed by Mr. YOSHIZAWA then.
- Q. I believe you stated you were secretary for the Bureau?
- A. Yes. That was 1922.
- Q. Now, the functions or the object of this Bureau was to make a study of foreign relations, was it not?
- A. Yes, with countries in Europe and America.
- Q. How long did you stay with this Bureau?
- A. I don't remember very exactly. Perhaps a little over one year.
- Q. Were you secretary all the time that you were there?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then, by being secretary, you were familiar with practically everything that was done by the Bureau during the year that you remained?
- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. You would have the opportunity to see all the correspondence, telegrams, things of that sort and communications with foreign nations?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You say you were just in this position for about a year?
- A. Yes. If I remember correctly it was a little over one year.
- Q. Now, that would make it about up until around 1922, then wouldn't it?
- A. 1923, I think.
- Q. 1923? Now, after staying in this Bureau for a year, what did you next do after you left that?
- A. Afterward I think I was appointed to Peikin, to our embassy in Peikin as Second Secretary.
- Q. Who was the Ambassador then?
- A. Mr. YOSHIZAWA.
- Q. How long did you stay in Peikin as Second Secretary?
- A. A little less than two years there.

- Q. Well, as secretary to the Embassy in Peikin, you became pretty familiar with what was going on in China at that time, did you not?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. You had an opportunity to study the government and the customs and the way of living of the Chinese people?
- A. Yes, those things.
- Q. I believe this was your second trip to China?
- A. The first was to the English colony and this was in China Proper.
- Q. How long did you stay as Second Secretary in China?
- A. Less than two years, I think.
- Q. Well, where did you go to from Peikin?
- A. I was recalled to the Home Office again and became Chief of the Archives Section in the Foreign Department.
- Q. Now, what - describe to us what the Archives Section did?
- A. The Archives Section had charge of archives, both incoming and outgoing. Copies are kept there and also originals of treaties and other things.
- Q. This was the archives of the Foreign Office, then?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long were you in this position as Chief of the Archives Division of the Foreign Office?
- A. A year and a half, about.
- Q. Then, by being Chief of this Division, you were very familiar with all treaties, correspondence, and so forth with all foreign nations?
- A. Yes, if I cared, I could reach everything.
- Q. You did everything -
- A. I was supposed to check everything in the way of archives.

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- Q. You say you were supposed to check all treaties and correspondence from the other ambassadors from other countries coming and going out from Japan?
- A. Well, check in the sense that they were preserved and kept.
- Q. Where was the office of this Bureau or whatever you call it?
- A. Right in the same compartment as the other Bureaus.
- Q. Is that in the Diet building or what building was that in?
- A. It is now burned. It was in the old Site.
- Q. This was in the year about 1925, wasn't it?
- A. 1925 or 1926, yes, about that.
- Q. Did you make any special study of the treaties?
- A. No, sir. Well, but it was a rather - it was a Bureau with very little work because the bulk of the work was done by servants. All the routine work. It was of no importance from the standpoint of police. I had much time, so I could read books that were being kept by that Department.
- Q. What books did you read along about that time?
- A. I don't remember. I was quite a literary reader, and read almost everything that came to us.
- Q. You still kept up your study of political economy?
- A. No, sir. I studied diplomatic history and other things.
- Q. How about diplomatic history, did you make any study of that?
- A. No special study. Just in a general way.
- Q. After leaving this job, what did you do next?
- A. I was appointed to Berlin. The Embassy in Berlin as the First Secretary.
- Q. That was about 1925?
- A. 1926 or 1927.
- Q. Do you recall who was the ambassador from Japan to Germany at that time?
- A. Mr. NAGAOKA. H. NAGAOKA.

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- Q. What were your duties as First Secretary of the Embassy in Berlin?
- A. First Secretary generally takes charge of the Secretariat work, everything. We had no Consul of the Embassy then, so I was at the same time doing the same work as Consul of the Embassy.
- Q. And Secretary?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In filling these two positions, you had an opportunity then to see about all that was going on in the embassy?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. That is, all the communications and everything?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long did you stay in Berlin as First Secretary?
- A. I arrived in September and left in - about three years. Less than three years.
- Q. Did you at that time know Hitler and Ribbentrop?
- A. No, sir. They weren't so important as yet.
- Q. They weren't important at that time?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Did you make the acquaintance at that time while you were there of any Germans that later became prominent in the Nazi Party?
- A. None that I know of.
- Q. That was rather early for that?
- A. Yes. It was at the time of Mr. STRESSEMAN. He was a famous man in European politics.
- Q. All right, you stayed there about two years, I believe? 1927 to 1928? Where did you go to from Germany?
- A. I went to the Home Office and became Chief of the first and second sections of the Information Bureau.

- Q. Is that the same Bureau you had been connected with before going to Germany?
- A. Yes. That Bureau had then become a little more amplified in its appointments and its workings - extended.
- Q. That Bureau was rather important to the Foreign Office, wasn't it, in gaining information?
- A. Not so much in gaining information but giving out information to the press. It had nothing to do with the framing of policy of the government, but it had to speak for the government to the outside world.
- Q. So this Bureau that you were in then would control any publicity in regard to Japan that would go to the outside world?
- A. Well, not all publicity in regard to Japan, because in those days this sort of work, that is, publicity work, was done by every government department by their own staff, you know. For instance, the War Ministry had a very important information section, so did the Navy Department and the Home Department and the Treasury. Every department had its own information bureau, so the Foreign Office Information Bureau handled only questions concerning directly with diplomatic relations.
- Q. That is the Foreign Office handled foreign relations?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long were you in this place or this position?
- A. Nearly a year and a half or two, I think. I was promoted to be the Chief of the Information Bureau after a year and a half or perhaps two years. Altogether I stayed in the Information Bureau more than three years, until 1933 in which year I was appointed Minister to Scandinavia.
- Q. Let me ask you this before we get that far. Did you attend the Disarmament Conference in Geneva along while -
- A. That was during my stay in Berlin.
- Q. During your stay in Berlin?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Were you a delegate to the Conference?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. What were you?

- A. I was Secretary in the seat of the Japanese delegation.
- Q. Then at the time of what is known as the Mukden Incident in China, you were Chief of the -
- A. Information Bureau.
- Q. Information Bureau of the Foreign Office?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long before the Mukden Incident did you know that there would be an attack at Mukden?
- A. Well, to say the exact truth, I was as much surprised as any one in the Foreign Office about the Incident which was brought to me by a newspaper man on the morning of September 19th.
- Q. That is 1931?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Well, you had been in the Foreign Office for a good many years, connected in different capacities, up until this Incident happened?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Didn't the Foreign Office know that prior to this date that Japan had sent armed forces into China?
- A. Well, we always had the armed forces in Manchuria along the railway, Manchurian Railway, by treaty rights.
- Q. You had a treaty to that effect?
- A. Yes.
- Q. But they were limited to a certain amount by the treaty were they not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. About how many soldiers did you have there, could you have under the treaty prior to the Mukden Incident?
- A. I don't know exactly, but the whole strength, I think, amounted to less than one division.
- Q. One division would be about how many men?

- A. It is less than ten thousand, I think. Perhaps they had more. They had special railway troops, railway guard.
- Q. Prior to the Mukden Incident in September of 1931, how long had you had, had Japan had armies in this section? How long had they been there?
- A. It was after we had taken over the railway from Russia, the result of the Russo-Japanese War, so that was in 1906. We were there about thirty years, I think.
- Q. You mean to say you kept around ten thousand men in there up until 1931?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And I believe you stated that was by treaty agreement with China?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Now, you say you were surprised to hear that there had been an attack in September at Mukden?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What did the Foreign Office do when you heard about the attack? What did they do?
- A. The Foreign Office was entirely dumb-struck. They didn't know what to do, for a few days, because everything was kept from the Foreign Office, from the minister down nobody knew anything about what was happening or what was going to happen, although the atmosphere was rather gloomy before that on account of various incidents occurring in various parts of Manchuria.
- Q. Let me ask you this. Who kept this away from the Foreign Minister? You say it was kept away from the Foreign Minister?
- A. No information was given to the Foreign Minister. I don't know whether they kept - Of course, if Baron YOSHIZAWA had known of the plan before it was put into execution, he, of course, would have strongly protested and placed obstacles in their way.
- Q. But somebody had planned this Mukden Incident, hadn't they, in Japan?
- A. Yes, apparently. I don't know who exactly. It was planned or else it could not have been executed so nicely.
- Q. It couldn't have happened unless it had been planned?
- A. That is my impression.

- Q. Who would be responsible for planning that? Somebody did. Did the Foreign Office try to find out who had planned it and who had carried the plan into execution?
- A. The Foreign Office didn't institute any examining board or anything like that, because it was very difficult for the Foreign Office to go into the archives of the War Ministry. There was practically very little means for the Foreign Office, unless the government as a whole took a strong step beside it, and investigated the matter, but it was not done.
- Q. You mean to say then that the Foreign Office didn't investigate or try to find out anything about what caused the incident, who planned it or anything of that kind?
- A. No.
- Q. But you and all the others connected with the Foreign Office knew and could see that somebody had planned this attack and then executed it, couldn't you?
- A. It was our impression that the thing was mainly done on the spot by the military in Manchuria.
- X Q. Well, who was in charge? Who was the Minister of War at the time?
- A. At the time it was General NINAMI.
- Q. Was he stationed in Tokyo?
- A. He was, of course, in Tokyo.
- Q. Well, did any one from the Foreign Office talk to him and ask him why this occurred, why this incident in China happened?
- A. Of course, as a Cabinet colleague, Baron YOSHIZAWA had many occasions, almost daily opportunities, to see the War Minister, but I remember the Foreign Minister, Baron YOSHIZAWA saying that it was impossible to know anything exactly from the War Minister because the War Minister is entirely being kept in the dark. He didn't know much about it, and whatever he tells Baron YOSHIZAWA, for instance, exactly the reverse would happen the next day.
- Q. Who was keeping the War Minister in the dark about what was happening there? Somebody was. Who?
- A. Well, perhaps it was people in the low positions. Especially in Manchuria.
- Q. In low positions? What? In the army?

- A. In the army, of course.
- Q. Then the War Minister knew and the Foreign Affairs Minister knew that somebody, as you say, of the lower rank in the army were responsible for planning and executing this incident at Mukden?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Well, now you say the Foreign Minister didn't try to find out who it was or did anything about it? Did the War Minister try to find out who was responsible for it?
- A. I wonder. It was a very abnormal condition in those days in Japan. We call it KOKYOJO. The lower gets the better of the upper. It was in the hands of the petty officers, officers of the rank of Lieutenant, Captain, at most Commander.
- Q. Well, now, who was in command of the army in Manchuria when the Mukden Incident happened? Who was in command?
- A. General HONJO.
- Q. Did anybody from the Foreign Ministry or from the War Ministry communicate or talk to him?
- A. General HONJO, himself, was more or less a rubber stamp.
- Q. Who was in charge of the army if he was a rubber stamp? Who was telling him what to do?
- A. During the time mentioned, several people. Most famous among them was ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA.
- Q. What positions did they hold?
- A. ITAGAKI was regiment commander.
- Q. What about ISHIWARA?
- A. ISHIWARA was Lieutenant Colonel.
- Q. So then you think that they were the leaders then in this incident? Planning and executing this incident at Mukden?
- A. I don't know if they can correctly be called leaders. At any rate, they were not rubber stamps.
- Q. Well, did they take the initiative and lead the men and incite them on to the incident, or did you find that out?

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- A. We had no means. The Foreign Office hadn't any means to verify those things, but it was generally the talk at that time that they were the spirit of the whole movement, of the whole affair.
- Q. Now, you have named these two. You say they were the spirit of it. Was there anybody of higher rank over there that was along with them?
- A. There were very few men of higher rank than they except NONJO.
- Q. Who was next under NONJO? Who was the Vice Commander?
- A. Perhaps the Chief of Staff.
- Q. Who was Chief of Staff?
- A. I have forgotten his name. He was a major general. I have forgotten his name. He has long died, I think. He was not a man of very important - of strong character. Together with NONJO they were more or less in the hands of the younger officers.
- Q. So the Chief of Staff and the Commander in Chief, as you say, were rubber stamps, and the lower officers had charge of the army? That was it?
- A. Yes.
- X Q. Did the War Minister do anything about removing these two men that he claimed were rubber stamps and putting somebody in there that could control the army?
- A. The fact is the War Minister was relieved of his post because the Cabinet resigned. There was a change in the War Ministry.
- Q. Who took his place as War Minister when it changed?
- A. General ARAKI.
- Q. General ARAKI knew that when he was appointed War Minister, that this Mukden Incident happened and it was caused by younger officers in the army? Did he do anything about removing the rubber stamps and putting somebody there in charge that could handle the army?
- A. I don't think he did. The thing was not handled in that way. There was no formal investigation.
- Q. Well, then, you say that neither the Foreign Office or the Office of the War Minister made any investigation or tried to remedy or to do anything about the Mukden Incident?
- A. Yes.

- Q. They knew it happened but didn't do anything about it? That is correct, isn't it?
- A. That is about it.
- Q. Well, it was necessary for the Cabinet and the Diet to make the laws and to make the appropriation to support this army, wasn't it?
- A. Well, it was not so very necessary, because it didn't require any special expenditure over and above what they had on the spot.
- Q. All right. If that is the case, what did the Cabinet and the members of the Diet do about finding out who the leaders were of the Mukden incident.
- A. The Diet, if I remember correctly, did almost nothing in this matter.
- Q. What about the Cabinet? What did the Cabinet do about it?
- A. Neither did the Cabinet.
- Q. Then here are some young officers, as you say, who are occupying a portion of China to guard a railway, starting a war and there is not a thing officially done about it in Japan? They just let it go?
- A. Pardon?
- X Q. I say. No one in authority, the War Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Cabinet, or the Diet tried to do anything to stop it, did they?
- A. Of course, they did all they could to stop it. --
- Q. What did they do?
- A. From spreading farther. That was all they could do.
- Q. Do you mean you had two men over there that you say were responsible for starting this incident and you had about eight million Japanese here in China, you mean there was nothing you could do to stop these younger officers from going on in the plan they had started?
- A. In point of that, the fighting was only for short duration. It ended very soon. The Foreign Minister was stopped from going farther into the direction of Inner Mongolia on toward China Proper. As far as Manchuria itself was concerned, the fighting didn't amount to such. The rest was -
- Q. That is, you mean the Mukden Incident, it didn't amount to such?
- A. No.

- Q. All right, after the Mukden Incident, did the Foreign Office hear anything from China about what had happened?
- A. Yes, we got a protest from China, but China appealed to the League of Nations, so the matter was between Japan and the League of Nations.
- Q. What did China ask the Foreign Office to do about this incident? You were in the office. You know what took place.
- A. Well, China, of course, protested to Japan to stop all aggressive acts of war.
- Q. That was right?
- A. Yes, it was, of course, right, but it was at the same time submitted to the League of Nations. Japan wanted to deal directly with China, not with the League of Nations, but China wouldn't have anything of the sort. So the direct approaches from China were only removed.
- Q. But Japan wasn't willing, even after the Mukden Incident and after you had heard from China - Japan was not willing to remove the armies from this territory they had taken possession of, was it?
- A. Of course we -
- Q. Just answer that?
- A. We were entitled to station troops.
- Q. But that was to guard the railway, not to take outside territory?
- A. But the China army or Chinese troops had been driven away, and for the preservation of peace and order, the Japanese troops had to be kept there until the matter was settled in a diplomatic way. That was the position taken by Japan.
- Q. Then the position after the Mukden Incident that the Cabinet took, that the Diet took, and the Foreign Office and the Office of the War Minister was that it was right for Japanese soldiers to take this territory? For protection? Wasn't it?
- A. For protection of the lives and property.
- Q. Lives and property?
- A. Yes.

- Q. Then the Japanese government ratified the acts of these soldiers in starting the war there of the Mukden Incident, didn't they?
- A. They took the position that it was done in self-defense because the Chinese attacked the Japanese. They were told that and they apparently believed it.
- Q. Now, the Mukden Incident - all that happened, was some little bomb went off on the railway there that didn't even stop a train? That is all that happened, wasn't it?
- A. Before that the atmosphere over there was pretty dangerous. Some Koreans had been driven from their farms, and there was the murder of a Japanese captain at Manchuria somewhere on the China border and there was a hostile atmosphere all over Manchuria.
- Q. And that had been transmitted here to Japan through the Foreign Office?
- A. Through the War Minister we got those informations- those reports.
- Q. And as a matter of fact, due to that feeling, Japanese thought was in China, you did send in more troops than you originally had prior to the Mukden Incident?
- A. Apparently they thought reinforcements had not been sent. Only after the thing happened it seems part of the garrison in Chosen had been transferred to Manchuria.
- Q. Then Japan, after the Mukden Incident, instead of trying to stop the soldiers from taking over more territory, sent them reinforcements, didn't they?
- A. Not that. It was arranged between the commander of the Chosen Garrison and the Mukden war authorities. This reinforcement.
- Q. Now, there were some new troops sent a short time after the Mukden Incident, weren't there, into China? You know about that, don't you?
- A. I don't remember exactly, but there were reinforcements. At any rate, the movement of troops was greatly increased.
- Q. Greatly increased immediately after the Mukden Incident, wasn't it?
- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. Why did Japan send in troops in there if the Mukden Incident wasn't right? Why did Japan want to send reinforcements in there to aid this uprising of young officers?
- A. Well, it is not right, I think, to say that Japan increased. The War Office did it.

- Q. That is Japan acting, isn't it?
- A. If you mean the Cabinet, then I think it was Mr. YAMASAKI's Cabinet. It was against the whole thing. I don't think it consented to any increase of troops, but they perhaps didn't consult the Cabinet, consult the government.
- Q. You mean to say that troops could be sent over there to reinforce this uprising without somebody in Japan in the high official positions knowing about it?
- A. Well, in the Japanese Constitution it is provided that the military operations are in the hands of the War Ministry, and the head of the Administrative Department can not to anything, cannot interfere with the operations, with the sending of troops from one place to another, and -
- Q. You mean to say then that the War Minister at that time, in 1931, had the right to send in troops if he wanted to under the constitution?
- A. Yes. The War Minister perhaps. But it is rather the Chief of the General Staff.
- Q. You mean to say that the Chief of the General Staff has a right to send men in to China without the War Minister knowing about it?
- A. I don't know how exactly it is.
- Q. You know that? Who was Chief of Staff in 1931 at the Mukden Incident?
- A. General KANAYA.
- Q. Then if troops were sent to reinforce the troops already there immediately after the Mukden Incident, he is the man that sent them?
- A. Well, if -
- Q. That is right, isn't it?
- A. Pardon?
- Q. That would be right? The Chief of Staff would have to send them?
- A. The Chief of Staff would say in this way. There is going to be a change of this battalion or that brigade, you know, and that can be done without any talk with the government. The reinforcements, if estimated correctly, I don't think amounted to much, so they could have increased the actual strength in that way. Not as sending any new detachments, but as sort of relief and those things.

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- Q. You mean to tell me that after this incident happened in China and the Chinese had sent a protest to the Foreign Office that you were a part of, that you didn't do anything to find out whether new troops had been sent over there or what was happening?
- A. New troops?
- Q. I mean, did you do anything to find out about it?
- A. I don't remember whether we did anything special in that way.
- Q. As a matter of fact you sort of agreed with these younger officers there, didn't you? The Foreign Office did the same as the War Minister? It was all right for them to do that for self-protection, didn't you?
- A. You know -
- Q. Just answer that. That is -
- A. I didn't get your point.
- Q. As a matter of fact, your office, the Foreign office, and the War Minister really agreed with what was done at Mukden? You didn't think it was wrong, did you?
- A. I don't think the Foreign Minister and the military formally agreed.
- Q. He didn't do anything about it?
- A. He did what he could. He almost daily saw the War Minister and gave it up.
- Q. Why did he give it up?
- A. It was impossible, he said. What the War Minister promised him, he wanted, would be reversed the next day. I remember he said -
- Q. Who would reverse it? Who did the War Minister say would reverse it?
- A. The fact is, I think, it was not executed as the War Minister ordered, executed by Japanese on the spot.
- Q. Then the War Minister told the Foreign Minister there was no use of him doing anything because the ones over in China around Mukden would go ahead and fight in spite of him?
- A. I don't know if the War Minister told the Foreign Minister in so many words. That would seem to amount to that.

Interrogation of Toshio Shiratori

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- Q. What did the Foreign Minister send back to China when they received a protest? What did you tell them you were going to do about it?
- A. About China's protest?
- Q. Yes. You say there came a protest from there about the Mukden Incident. What did your Foreign Office send back to China and tell them they would do?
- A. It was a matter of record. I don't remember it was so long ago. My office didn't have charge of this matter and it was done by the Asiatic Bureau.
- Q. You there was a record of that? Where would that record be now?
- A. In the Foreign Office it would be found.
- Q. Do you know whether or not the records of the protest of China and the answer of Japan about the Mukden Incident are still preserved?
- A. I think so if it is not burned by raids during the war?
- Q. Weren't those papers before the raids started, weren't they preserved and put somewhere where they wouldn't burn?
- A. The most important documents would be. I don't know what about the others.
- Q. You were there right up through the war and all in last year?
- A. I had nothing to do with the Foreign Office.
- Q. You know something about what happened to those records, don't you?
- A. All the buildings had been burned, and I have not been told that any special archives were taken away, but the important things must be kept somewhere.
- Q. So you think they are still in existence then?
- A. I think so. Also in the Chinese Government.
- Q. Don't you have some recollection as to what the Foreign Office answered when they received a protest from China about the Mukden Incident?
- A. There was not much direct talk between Japan and China. China was so angry that she flew into the hands of the League of Nations and asked the League of Nations to do everything for China, so there was not, practically nothing such, - discussion between Japan and China.

- Q. Then the League of Nations, after they took charge, requested that Japan remove her troops, didn't they? From the territory they had conquered?
- A. Yes.
- Q. They advised Japan to withdraw her troops?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was through the Foreign Office?
- A. Yes.
- X Q. Did you transmit that request from the League of Nations to the War Minister?
- A. Yes, of course.
- Q. And to the Cabinet and to the Diet?
- A. To the Diet no.
- Q. I mean through the proper channels?
- A. Yes.
- Q. They didn't remove their troops, did they?
- A. No.
- Q. Why didn't they remove them when requested?
- A. I don't know. It was not done.
- Q. Well, did the Foreign Office advise the War Minister to remove them?
- A. That is almost all on record about -
- Q. Well, you can recall something about it, can't you?
- A. At Geneva, we didn't exactly accept this decision of the League of Nations for Japan to withdraw troops immediately into the railway zone. That was the advice they gave. Japan gave reasons why that couldn't be done.
- Q. What reason was that?
- A. Mainly for the preservation of local peace and order. That was the answer.

- Q. Then Japan was not willing to abide by a decision of other nations that they were in the wrong were they?
- A. In Geneva it was so.
- Q. That is right here. Japan had already reached in and taken Manchuria and a territory of a foreign country and had their arms in there and was in charge of it, and even though they were members of the League of Nations at that time, they refused to abide by the decision of the League and withdraw, didn't they?
- A. They didn't withdraw.
- Q. You mean in China they didn't?
- A. From the League of Nations? That was later.
- Q. But you refused to follow the advice of the League of Nations?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Still held your troops in the conquered territory?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And the excuse that Japan gave was that it was for the protection of the people and the property?
- A. Yes, I think that is about right.
- Q. That was given through your office, wasn't it? That excuse?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Who transmitted that to the League of Nations if it wasn't through the Foreign Office?
- A. Our delegate to the League of Nations, Mr. TOSHIZAWA.
- Q. This was something connected with your office?
- A. With the Foreign Office.
- Q. And he was directed and advised by your office what to do?
- A. By the Foreign Minister.
- Q. I mean that is the office you were in?
- A. Yes.

- Q. And you handled the messages and correspondence, didn't you?
- A. I didn't handle it. It was done by the Department of the Asiatic Affairs Bureau.
- Q. But you know what was --
- A. I knew, of course, as Chief of the Information Section. I had to see newspaper men, I had to give them any information about that.
- Q. Then the information transmitted that you knew about was to the delegate not to abide by the decision of the League, wasn't it?
- A. I gave facts, you know. Those facts to newspaper men.
- Q. The ones in authority in Japan had decided they were not going to remove the troops even though the League of Nations told them to?
- A. I don't think Japan said they were not going to withdraw, but they had to wait. They could not do it at once.
- Q. In other words they said, we are not going to move them now even though you tell us to move them now. We are not going to move them now?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that message went through your office?
- A. That was instructions.
- Q. Yes. And through your office?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, who decided that policy? What officials in Japan decided this policy that they weren't going to move them now? It went through your office.
- A. Those important matters were settled by Cabinet conference. It was, of course, from the Prime Minister down, all the Cabinet ministers had to attend the meeting and put their signature to the decision.
- Q. Was there any record kept of this Cabinet meeting and the instructions to the Foreign Office?
- A. I don't know. Perhaps. There must be.

- Q. Where would that record be?
- A. Either in the Cabinet office or in the Foreign Office or both.
- Q. You know, of your own knowledge, that they did have a meeting?
- A. Yes. They had so many conferences. Two or three times a week.
- Q. Then you did get instructions from the Cabinet what to notify your delegate, didn't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Would that be in writing?
- A. By telegram.
- Q. I know you would send telegrams, but how did the Cabinet notify the Foreign Minister what to say? Would that be by letter?
- A. Of important messages, copies are given to the Cabinet ministers.
- Q. What I am driving at is this. You said you had Cabinet meetings and they decided these important questions? When they would make a decision, how would it be transmitted to the Foreign Office?
- A. The Foreign Minister himself is a member of the Cabinet. He knows it and that the question was settled by the Cabinet, was decided upon by the Cabinet, so we sent this telegram to Geneva.
- Q. So they decided to send a telegram to notify them that you wouldn't remove your troops?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And this telegram was sent at the direction of the Cabinet?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you receive any reply from the League of Nations to this telegram? If so, what did they tell you?
- A. Well, there was so many exchanges between the League Secretariat and the Foreign Office, I don't remember exactly. All those telegrams conveyed to us the sense of that. There were so many resolutions and decorations and other things. But the sum of the whole matter is that the League of Nations went to an assembly and decided that Japan's act in Manchuria was against the covenant of the League of Nations and they branded Japan as an aggressor, as a result of which Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.

- Q. This also was in violation of other treaties Japan signed, wasn't it, this incident?
- A. Unless it could be shown to be contrary to a treaty between Japan and the Nine Power Treaty.
- Q. Nine Power Pact?
- A. Yes.
- Q. So Japan then violated by the Mukden Incident and taking over Manchuria, violated the covenant of the League of Nations she had signed and also violated the Nine Power Pact she had signed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was there any other treaty she had signed this would be a violation of?
- A. We had a treaty of commerce and navigation with China. Perhaps it was a violation of that treaty too.
- Q. Who decided that Japan would withdraw from the League of Nations now? What body here decided that?
- A. That was decided by the Cabinet.
- Q. What year was that?
- A. It was 1932, wasn't it? 1933? 1933. The Spring of 1933, I think.
- Q. Now, the Foreign Minister was also, I believe you stated before, a member of the Cabinet, and he attended the sessions, and -
- A. Yes, not only he attended the Cabinet sessions, but he was the chief person at the Cabinet to speak.
- Q. So the Cabinet that was in power at that time voted to withdraw from the League of Nations?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And instructed the Foreign Minister to notify the League of its action?
- A. Yes.
- Q. There is a record, I suppose of that also?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. And you don't know where that could be found at present?
- A. It could be found in the Foreign Office as it is kept in the Foreign Office.
- Q. During this time, did you keep any diary of what was taking place and what you were doing?
- A. Myself?
- Q. Yes.
- A. No, I didn't.
- Q. You didn't keep a diary when you started your diplomatic service?
- A. From time to time I kept memos, but everything was burned when my house was burned. I escaped with the body of me.
- Q. I just thought maybe you might have some personal notes or records that you had kept that would refresh your recollection on what happened.
- A. By questioning several persons, you could get almost a complete history. Here is a man who was Chief of the Asiatic Bureau at the time, Mr. TANI. He had more direct contact with this affair. Mine was more or less indirectly.
- Q. Who else could give us the picture around the Mukden Incident and the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations? What other person?
- A. The head of the Asiatic Bureau who had charge of this matter, Mr. TANI.
- Q. Was there any other person that could give us some light on it?
- A. Not from the Foreign Office.
- Q. How about from the Cabinet at that time. Who from the Cabinet could tell us about that?
- A. Who was it resigned? SHIDAHARA was the Foreign Minister for several months. He resigned.
- Q. He could tell us about what happened around the Mukden Incident?
- A. I don't know if he could tell much more than I myself told you. Of course, he was in the Cabinet discussions. He may have more information, but for the past fifteen years he had no touch with political statesmen here.
- Q. Did you attend these meetings of the Cabinet as secretary?

- A. No, sir. It was not allowed.
- Q. After the Mukden Incident, in China, the army of Japan conquered the whole of Manchuria, didn't it? Occupied it?
- A. They went into Jehol.
- Q. And set up a government there, didn't they?
- A. Yes.
- Q. An independent government?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, this government set up in Manchuria was a puppet government under the domination of Japan, wasn't it.
- A. We don't call it domination, but at any rate there are many Japanese officials in important positions too, so it could be said it was dominated by Japan.
- Q. Wasn't the plan to set up a model state in Manchuria by the Japanese and to govern it so that the rest of China would come in without any fighting and join? Wasn't that planned?
- A. The talk at the time was there should be a country of five races. I don't know what five races. The Japanese, the Koreans, the Russians perhaps, and the Mongolians. There was going to be a country of five races where everybody would be happy in the enjoyments of peace and prosperity and all that.
- Q. Who originated that plan of the five governments? Who was responsible for that five-nations plan?
- A. I don't remember the five nations, but there was no representative of those nations. Perhaps it was done by Japan or some prominent Chinese in Manchuria -
- Q. Did this plan originate prior to the Mukden Incident, or did it come into being after?
- A. Apparently it must have been after the incident.
- Q. When did you first hear of this plan? How long after 1931?
- A. When we recognized Manchukuo.
- Q. Well, who did you first hear of this plan from? Who was the first one that told you about it?

- A. I don't remember. It appeared in the newspapers. I don't remember the exact date.
- Q. Did they quote somebody as setting up a plan? It appeared in the newspapers? Who was talking?
- A. It first happened in Manchukuo. It came from Manchukuo that the thing was going to be done.
- Q. It came from Manchukuo? Who started it in Manchukuo?
- A. People on the spot.
- Q. Was it Japanese or was -
- A. It was Japanese and Chinese.
- Q. What did the Cabinet and the Foreign Office think about such a plan?
- A. Well, what they think was not so very important. It was done by Manchukoans and Japan's part was whether to recognize it or not.
- Q. How were they going to accomplish this plan? By Japan going in and conquering these territories and being the predominant power?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Is that what it was?
- A. Apparently it was the plan that it was necessary at first for the Japanese to occupy all the principal positions, but gradually more positions in power should be given to Chinese representatives and actually there were more elements in Manchukuo, Chinese elements to attend to positions of influence and power.
- Q. There was a plan, what they were going to do, how they were going to accomplish that, by negotiation or by taking a country over. How did Japan plan to do that?
- A. Well, it was not Japan practically, but the people on the spot.
- Q. Why wasn't it Japan? Here it comes from Manchukuo and Japan was governing Manchukuo at the time that plan originated. It was Japanese people that started it, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right now, how did they plan to get all this other territory and make this five races and everybody be happy?

- A. Well the government of Manchukuo itself.
- Q. You mean to say that the plan was for the State of Manchukuo to take over all the other territory?
- A. Not other territories, but there was not such besides Manchukuo. Only part of Mongolia, Inner Mongolia.
- Q. The rest of China, wasn't it?
- A. The rest of China had nothing to do with it.
- Q. That was one of the races who were going to come in?
- A. There were no more than thirty million Chinese in Manchuria itself.
- Q. There was about one hundred million outside of the rest of it?
- A. Not in regard to Manchukuo.
- Q. You said all agreed - so I am talking about your plan of making - taking over five nations and making everybody happy - to a plan. How were you going to effectuate that plan?
- A. I am not in a position to speak about -
- Q. You were here and you were in the Foreign Office and heard about it?
- A. When those things came up I was not here. I went to Scandinavia.
- Q. But you heard something about it before you left?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right. You heard about the plan. How were you going to carry it out? As you conquered a place, what was the next step how to accomplish -
- A. I say five races. They didn't mean all the races, but people who are on the spot in Manchukuo. There are five races. Japanese are there. the Koreans are there, more than thirty million Chinese are there. Those people should get together and make a government. That was the idea.
- Q. You mean Japan - in a new nation that she was predominant of - didn't do anything about an uprising like that in a new country, having a plan to get everybody in and make them happy?
- A. If the government was a sound one. Perhaps that could have been done. I am not in a position to speak about this Manchukuo, its origin and its purpose, but historically speaking, Manchukuo has always been considered the key position, the occupying key position in the history of

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the Far East. Whoever controls that position controls the Far East. That is almost common sense with us, so Japan wanted that part of the continent in the hands of any nation who could not potentially become Japan's enemy. We wanted a neutral territory there where all the inhabitants would be taken care of, where it could be kept neutral and peaceful. That was the idea.

- Q. That was the reason Japan decided to conquer and occupy that territory, wasn't it? For that reason?
- A. Yes. Well, conquer is a very strong word.
- Q. There were pretty strong means used to take it over. An army took it over, didn't it? What lesser word would you use than to conquer?
- A. We wanted not to have it in the hands of the Chang family which was rather hostile to Japan, which could make disturbances, which could at any moment bring in other forces hostile to Japan.
- Q. And the only way you could get it was to take it by the army, wasn't it?
- A. I don't think there were any other means of doing it.
- Q. No other means to do it. Now, you, yourself, in the Foreign Office were in favor, for the reasons you have given, for Japan to take over Manchukuo, weren't you?
- A. I didn't know the plan at all, so I can't say whether I was in favor of it or not, but after the thing had actually been done, I tried to explain it to other people in a way which can be made comprehensive to them. That is the duty of any man serving the Foreign Department of any country.
- Q. In other words, it was a good thing for Japan to take it over? Apparently it would be?
- A. Judging from the results, it was not, but at the time it seemed good. At any rate I had to say that it was good. It was not only for Japan, but for everybody concerned.
- Q. It was good for the reason you described? It gave Japan more territory for immigrants of Japan to move into, didn't it?
- A. There were many people who thought Manchukuo wasn't a good territory to immigrate to for Japanese.
- Q. After you conquered it, you did send Japanese over there?
- A. But I personally didn't believe Manchuria was suited for the immigration of Japanese. The Japanese don't like cold climates. They wouldn't survive, and they weren't successful in colonizing.

Q. It was a good place to obtain raw materials for Japan?

A. Well, it contained raw materials.

Q. And food stuffs?

A. Yes, but those things could be gotten by Japan by peaceful means. That was not necessarily the cause of the Manchukuo Incident.

Q. The only way you could get them by peaceful means would be by treaties, wouldn't it?

A. Yes, treaties and by trade.

Q. By treaties and trade?

A. Yes.

Q. But the government of Japan, the people in power would say they didn't want to wait for treaties or trade agreements, they would just take it by the army?

A. Well, the government -

Q. Well, the people in power in the government?

A. It is a rather shameful thing to admit, but the Japanese government was entirely in the hands of the War Ministry, you know, so to accuse the Japanese government is not very, well, kind.

Q. I know that, but you say they were under the domination of the army and the War Ministry, and the army did take over the territory by force? Then the Japanese government did too do this, didn't it? They recognized the country that the army had taken over?

A. Yes. They did.

Q. So that wouldn't be shameful for them to do that?

A. Seeing that it was likely to succeed. Perhaps later the government --

Q. Well, you say they didn't approve of the army taking it over, but after the army got it, they were glad to recognize it? That is what happened?

A. More or less the Japanese government was contacted before the Manchurian Incident. It was mainly in the hands of big financial people. They had

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the greatest influence on the government of Japan. The other people at first were rather pessimistic, but seeing the thing was done and no great difficulty was encountered, they came into Manchuria and started business.

- Q. What big corporations and companies were responsible for that?
- A. Almost all of the big concerns in Japan have something to do with Manchurian business.
- Q. Just give me the names of some of the officers of these companies you say had something to do with Manchurian business.
- A. Not individual officers, but the concern itself. All the big concerns. The FUKUJI, MITSUBISHI, OKURA, and other business interests came over to Manchuria.
- Q. Did they encourage the Army to take this territory over and furnish funds?
- A. I wouldn't say that. I think they didn't have anything to do with the thing at first, but after the thing had been done and after the Manchukuo government was established and it promised to stay, I think they thought there was no sense for them to stay away there was such a chance, so they came, I think.
- Q. That is, these big corporations you have named moved into Manchuria?
- A. Of course, they had business in Manchuria before that.
- Q. But they expanded?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did they encourage the army to further expansion after they came into Manchuria?
- A. They didn't exactly encourage, but they had to keep in favor of the military there. Without the favor of the military, they couldn't do anything.

INTERROGATION OF

Toshio Shiratori

Date and Time: 20 March 1946, 1400-1530 Hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Toshio Shiratori
North E. McKinney, Interrogator
Ruth F. Anderson, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. McKinney

Interrogation taken in English.

Q. Yesterday we were talking about the corporations moving into Manchuria. That is about what we stopped on. And you stated then that you didn't think they had anything to do with the starting of the expansion in Manchuria, but after the territory was conquered they moved in?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think these companies had any influence on the army after moving in for further expansion? That is, it happened later, after the Mukden incident?

A. I don't think the activities came so soon. It took a long time later before they developed the natural resources. It took time, of course. At first the Japanese military in Manchuria, being mostly young officers, objected to Japan's financial interests moving in. The young officers said they were going to further an idea with the exclusion of many people such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui. These multimillionaires of Japan shouldn't come into Manchuria. That was their idea, so at first there was little to do for these financial people, so it had nothing to do with the further development of the Manchurian embryo.

Q. Let me ask you this. This plan of the younger officers there to keep the financial interest out of Manchuria, they made that known to the Cabinet and the Foreign Office?

A. There was not any formal plan or statement, but the idea was cast abroad. It was generally said they were going to build a new state with five races there. Trying a new world. Establish a new world, excluding all old things such as dictators or political parties and the economic system of Japan Proper. They were going to have a new try there. It was a sort of Utopia they had in view. That is why the Manchurian affair appealed to the young men in Japan Proper who were for entire re-organiza-

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tion of Japan's economic and political and social organization and all that.

- Q. Well, now, what did the Foreign Office and the War Minister and the Cabinet and the Diet do to stop this plan that the younger officers had to set up a new state?
- A. There was very little they could do, because you know the atmosphere at home went from bad to worse because of attempts at the lives of prominent statesmen and mere rumors of such reports against prominent statesmen.
- Q. You mean by that the army group was so powerful that the government officials and the Cabinet and the War Minister couldn't control them?
- A. Yes. Not only the army, but the young men in Japan generally.
- Q. Here in favor of this?
- A. Yes. Newspapers and periodicals were entirely on their side. There was a time when Baron ISHIHARA, he is the nationalistic diplomat, was at the lowest of his reputation. ISHIHARA's name was a synonym of diplomatic policy, and he was a synonym of weakness, so there was very little the government could do to check the general tendency.
- Q. Then you say that the government officials, due to the uprising in Japan could do very little to stop this trend?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, who would you say were outstanding in the advancement of this policy? There is bound to be somebody at the head of it.
- A. The truth is at the time the tail was wagging the dog. The tail means young officers of the War Department, young officers in Manchuria. Baron YOSHIZAWA could do very little with the War Minister, General MINAMI. I remember his telling the young officers in the Foreign Office to approach the tail because the Foreign Minister Baron YOSHIZAWA couldn't approach the tail, but the young men in the Foreign Office might be able to approach the youngmen and influence them.
- Q. Who among the younger officers were the leaders of this plan? There is bound to be somebody outstanding in it.
- A. It is very difficult, from the outside, to know who were at the seat of the plan. It is not a few. Perhaps many. But every one, the names which every one know, which every one perhaps remembers even today is, as I told you yesterday, that of ITAGAKI, Lieutenant General now and then ISHIHARA. K. ISHIHARA. He is still alive.

- Q. Is the other one alive?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Both are alive?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What made them outstanding? Was it what they said? Did they make speeches?
- A. What they actually did. The fighting was actually under them. Guided by them. Especially Kengo ISHIHARA. ISHIHARA was a very good strategist.
- Q. Did either one of them make any speeches over the radio?
- A. Not that sort. They are just men of action.
- Q. So it was generally understood then that they were heading this plan to develop Manchuria and to take over new territory?
- A. Yes, and they went with men in Japan whose names were not known at all. They were new men, young men who had ideas, dreams, you know.
- Q. Did the Foreign Office or the War Minister ever say anything to them about it, contact them, to see what they could do to stop them?
- A. The atmosphere then prevented the Foreign Office - the Foreign office people could do very little, but I think the Foreign Office people, while discussing for instance what we should do before the League of Nations, could to a great extent influence the other people, because they didn't know much about international treaties, the League of Nations, and the problems there, so in that way we could do some service for the country in influencing these people.
- Q. Now, what I am driving at is this. What was done by the War Ministry or by the Foreign Office of the government? You say that these men were the head of this new plan. Did the War Office or any government agency approach them to stop them from the plan that they had started?
- A. The War Ministry sent officers, higher officers, officers above these young officers in Manchuria to convey the sense of the government, the wishes of the Foreign Department. It worked to some extent. For instance, they were going to Chinchow.

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- Q. What did the government want them to do?
- A. The government wanted them not to go farther. Just to await the decision of the League of Nations. The matter is now being handled by the League of Nations, so you don't go too fast.
- Q. Who did they send over? What men did they send? What officers, high ranking officers? What were their names if you recall?
- A. I don't remember now, but at any rate officers who were chiefs of bureaus in the War Ministry. One was this man who recently died who was ambassador to Moscow, TAKEKAWA. He went to Manchuria to tell the gentlemen not to go too far too fast.
- Q. After Manchuria was recognized by the Japanese government, did the army still advance into other parts of China?
- A. Well, what appeared afterward as the facts, they were proceeding further, further south from north. They were not active in Peikin, but what actually happened, I am not in the position to tell with any authority because I was away in foreign countries, but which naturally led to this clash with China in 1937 was a sequence to the Manchurian embryo.
- Q. What year did you go to China as a member of the committee for the investigation of culture work?
- A. Cultural work? I don't know. I never joined any such mission.
- Q. You were sent there to make some study.
- A. The League of Nations did. Is that what you mean, sir? Cultural work? In what year was it?
- Q. I was thinking it was around 1931, right after 1930. After the Manchurian Incident. To visit China after the Mukden Incident.
- A. Long afterwards.
- Q. How long?
- A. I think it was after I came back from Sweden in 19--
- Q. Then you didn't go then until after you returned from Sweden?
- A. No.
- Q. What was the occasion of your trip to Sweden?
- A. I was appointed Minister to Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, all four countries.

- Q. What year was that?
- A. It was 1933.
- Q. Who was the Foreign Minister at that time?
- A. At that time it was - who appointed me was Count UCHIDA, but before I left Japan he resigned and Mr. HIROTA took his place.
- Q. Then you were appointed, you served under HIROTA while you were in Sweden and Norway?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was about the year 1939, I believe?
- A. Something like 1933 to 1934. 1936.
- Q. 1936?
- A. Yes, the end of 1936 I came home.
- Q. Now, during that time, while you were in Sweden and Norway, who was the ambassador to Germany?
- A. At first it was Viscount UGAKI who was succeeded by MUSHANOJI.
- Q. Now, those two served the whole time you were in Sweden and Denmark?
- A. Yes.
- Q. While you were in Sweden and Denmark, did you visit Germany while you were over there?
- A. It was fully three years I was in Scandinavia, and each time I went to France, I had either to go through Berlin or through from Gothenburg to London. It was mostly France and London by way of Berlin I visited. I think in three years I visited Berlin three or four times.
- Q. Did you make the acquaintance of Hitler and Ribbentrop?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. They were not so prominent yet?
- A. They were not yet in power. Yes, they must have been. Hitler came to power in 1933. Of course, I had no need to approach him.

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- Q. After you returned from Norway and Sweden as ambassador, did you return to Tokyo?
- A. Well, from Sweden to Tokyo is a long way. I came by the way of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
- Q. What I mean is your next position?
- A. I was placed on the waiting list in the Spring of 1934. I was placed on the waiting list. That is, I am not assigned to any work. I have no access to any official information. I just had to wait until the next appoint, if it was coming at all.
- Q. Well, now, during that time, what did you hear about Japan's plan for Greater East Asia along about 1936?
- A. Japan's?
- Q. Japan's plan for the development of Greater East Asia?
- A. Well, nobody yet talked about Greater East Asia.
- Q. That hadn't started at that time?
- A. No, not yet.
- Q. How long did you remain on that inactive list?
- A. It was a long time, until the China affair was two years old. Until 1938.
- Q. What position were you appointed to in 1938?
- A. In 1938 I was appointed ambassador to Rome.
- Q. Who was the Foreign Minister that appointed you ambassador?
- A. My appointment was under General ARAKI who was Foreign Minister.
- Q. Now, at that time, the time you were appointed ambassador to Rome, had you heard anything about Japan's plan for Greater East Asia?
- A. No, sir. Not at that stage yet.
- Q. Back in 1938?
- A. No.

Q. When did this plan first come up?

A. Well, I think the first time that name appeared was in the treaty of alliance with Germany, and Italy under Mr. HATSUOKA.

Q. You are talking about the Tri-Party Pact?

A. Yes. In the Tri-Party Pact it was said Japan - this name Greater East Asia was mentioned, I think for the first time, it appeared officially.

Q. When you went to Rome as ambassador, who was ambassador in Germany at that time?

A. At that time General OSHIMA was ambassador.

Q. Who was the military attache for Japan in Germany?

A. In Germany it was Major General - this man who flew to the Philippines to accept Japan's surrender.

Q. You don't remember his name?

A. I ought to know.

Q. It can be determined. Was it Oshima?

A. OSHIMA was ambassador, and a Major General, yes, I think I remember. KAWABE. T. KAWABE. The one who is here now in town is S. KAWABE. The older brother.

Q. Now, when you went to Rome in 1939, you say OSHIMA was the ambassador to Germany?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you know him prior to the time you were both appointed? Were you acquainted with him?

A. Just a speaking acquaintance. I met him several times in the Berlin embassy when I visited Berlin from Sweden.

Q. Now, when did he first - did you ever talk to him about Japan, Italy, and Germany making an alliance?

A. Well, the fact is, when I first learned about this talk of approachment between Japan and Germany and Italy, was when I was appointed ambassador to Italy. 1938. Somewhere in 1938 I was appointed ambassador. General ARAKI, then Foreign Minister, and Prince KONOYE, then Premier, said there was talk about an alliance with Germany and Italy. The proposal was pre-

mented to the Cabinet by the War Office. It was all in a very nebulous condition yet. Nothing concrete was done. The talks which were going on between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP were more or less in the nature of preliminary conversations. What the Japanese government wanted to know was the attitude of the Italian government.

Q. Who wanted to know?

A. The Japanese government wanted to know what Mussolini would think of this plan. Prince KONOYE, the Premier, also said that there was talk of an alliance with Germany, so he said. I rather hesitated to go to Italy because our relations with Italy was very scant. I was afraid there would be nothing to do. I was three years in Sweden doing nothing. I had had enough of doing nothing in Sweden, so I didn't rather like the idea but he said it would be this time more lively there. There would be more to do because of this alliance talk. That is the first time I learned that there was a proposition for an alliance with Germany and Italy.

Q. What did Prince KONOYE tell you was to be gained by Japan or by Germany or by Italy from forming an alliance?

A. He didn't have any concrete idea yet. Only in a vague way the War Ministry wanted approachment or alliance or some treaty with the Axis power.

Q. UGAKI, the Foreign Minister, what did he think about the alliance, or what did he think Japan would gain?

A. He didn't say that either. He only wanted to know how actual conditions were then. To what extent Germany and Italy were serious about the proposition. It was only informal talk between OSHIMA and the German Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP. Japan was not yet considering the matter in a very serious way.

Q. Now, who did you say first thought of or started the plan for the three governments to make an alliance? Who was responsible for it?

A. I think it was RIBBENTROP who told OSHIMA that it would be better if we had a treaty with Germany and Italy on the comintern pact. Perhaps Germany wanted to give it a more political color. That was the start of the talk, I think.

Q. Then at the beginning of the talk for the Tri-Party Pact, Japan, the government here, and officials here were not in favor of it?

A. Not necessarily not in favor. I remember Prince KONOYE saying that Japan must stop this China mess. The China affair was at that time two years old and Japan was sticking in the matter, couldn't withdraw, couldn't do anything. He thought it was his responsibility because

it started under his government. He wanted to settle this question as soon as possible. He said Japan's position was a weak international one since the Manchurian affair. The sympathies of America and England had been transferred to China, but Chiang Kai Shek wouldn't negotiate with Japan directly without the good offices of America and England. Settling up the Chinese affair with the face of the military saved to some extent was impossible through direct negotiation with China, but if America, for instance, were to bring pressure to bear upon China, the thing might be settled, but Japan's position diplomatically was weak. If we could make it known to England and America that unless they tried to keep Japan on their side, Japan might fly into the arms of Germany and Italy, that was the start of this talk of alliance, you know. There was strong pro-Anglo-Saxons here in Japan, but in the face of this harsh treatment America and England presented to Japan, these people, the voice of these Japanese was silenced. They couldn't say anything in favor of close alliance with America and England without provoking the angry wrath of the general public who see with their own eyes that America has made a decision against Japan, how England is against Japan. How could we approach them if we wanted? That was his position. He wanted to tell England and America unless they did something Japan would be drawn toward the Axis. In spite of pro-American and pro-English people, in spite of their efforts, Japan would necessarily be, almost automatically be drawn toward Germany. That is the idea, so I think when Japan consented to negotiate this treaty, her statesmen were not seriously considering the matter. They wanted to use it as a lever with which to move America to intervene in the China affair. That was my personal feeling in putting forth efforts in the negotiations.

- Q. Now, after you arrived in Rome, when did you first hear about negotiations? Who talked to you about it first after you arrived in Rome, about the Tri-Party Pact?
- A. I arrived in Rome in 1938 and saw Count CIANO immediately on my arrival in Rome. I saw him, but I found that Count CIANO didn't give much thought to this question of alliance between the three countries.
- Q. Did you approach him and talk to him about it when you arrived in Italy?
- A. I asked him if he knew anything about this proposed alliance between the three powers. He said he knew that there was some such talk in Germany between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP, but nothing concrete was known to him he said. He was rather non-committal about this question.
- Q. At that time had you seen any rough drafts or any notes on what was proposed?
- A. No. It was not that far along, but when I saw Mussolini on the 5th - I think it was the 5th or 6th of January, a week after my arrival there, I was introduced to Mussolini. He said he was for a treaty of alliance

between Germany and Italy and Japan, but he said that until that time there was difficulty on the side of Italy on account of Germany's relation with the Vatican. Because of Hitler's policy toward the church Italy couldn't conclude an alliance with Germany because of the Vatican, but that difficulty had now been removed. Italy could now conclude a treaty with Germany and Japan. He said the sooner the better because Italy needed some such treaty on account of her policy in Europe. He wanted to accept that alliance for the promotion of his policy there, it seems.

Q. Then Mussolini thought then by this alliance that that would aid Italy in her war of aggression against the -

A. I don't know what conquering policies he had, but at any rate, for the promotion of his policies in the Mediterranean he wanted some such -

Q. His policies up to that time had been to go in and take over territory for Italy, hadn't it?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. And he told you then that they needed some sort of alliance to bolster -

A. To strengthen the position of Italy in the European political stage.

Q. He didn't say they were going to give up any of this territory that conquered, did he?

A. He hadn't conquered such territory at that time.

Q. In 1938?

A. Yes.

Q. Ethiopia was conquered in 1938, wasn't it.

A. It was started -

Q. Then after you talked to Mussolini, what was next done about this? Who did you talk to next?

A. Mussolini being the head of the government, the foreign ambassadors are not allowed to see him very often. I was in Italy about eight and one-half months, and saw Mussolini only on that occasion and on my leaving Italy. It was on two occasions; I saw him at dinners several times. But I had to talk with CIANG the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister said that he was more or less in a secondary position in this matter.

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He said Italy's government had left this matter entirely to Ribbentrop so he was not in a position to discuss the matter in any concrete form himself. He had to wait developments in Berlin.

- Q. Did you report what Mussolini and the Foreign Minister of Italy had told you about the alliance?
- A. Just as I told you.
- Q. Who did you report to?
- A. The Foreign Minister.
- Q. The Foreign Minister? What was his name?
- A. Foreign Minister UGAKI. He resigned soon after my leaving Japan and was succeeded by Mr. ARITA.
- Q. What did ARITA tell you to do after you reported that Italy was willing to go into a pact?
- A. In the meantime, talk in Berlin between OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP was pushed.
- Q. Were you notified that OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP were talking about this, and if so who notified you?
- A. Of course, OSHIMA reports to his government and he just repeats his telegrams to Rome, so I could learn almost all the important phases of the negotiations in Berlin.
- Q. Then you got a telegram from ARITA that OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP were talking the matter over?
- A. From ARITA, yes.
- Q. Then did you then visit Berlin, or did OSHIMA come to see you?
- A. Yes, other times I saw OSHIMA. Either he came to Rome or I went to Berlin.
- Q. What was the discussion. Did you start to draw drafts of the pact and discuss what was to be in it?
- A. The first draft of this treaty -
- Q. Let's don't get to the draft yet. Did you talk about what should be in the treaty, you and OSHIMA?
- A. Not I. OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP did and he reported it to the Foreign Office and the Foreign Office replied and gave its opinion. I was more or less

an on-looker. There was little for me to do because Count CIANO was very reluctant in the matter.

- Q. Didn't you have any ideas if you were going to enter into a pact what should be in it?
- A. As an ambassador I had to give my opinion.
- Q. What was your opinion of what should be in it when you started talking about the pact? What did you say should be in it?
- A. My idea was that it was an entirely passive, defensive alliance. There was little danger of England and America attacking either Germany or Japan, so there was very little danger of being involved in a war even if we concluded this treaty. So if we were a party to this treaty, we could decide, in case Germany or Italy started trouble in Europe a result of it led to war, Japan was in a position to say who could attack the other side, because we were not obliged by the terms of the treaty to help too. We could say what Germany and Italy would do, so I didn't see such harm in the thing. Moreover, the German authorities said that Germany was not trying to conclude this treaty for the purpose of fighting any war, but just to strengthen the position of Germany to promote her legitimate requirements in European states.
- Q. Well, now, at the time you were talking, you and OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP were talking about a Tri-Party Pact, at that time Japan had occupied Manchuria hadn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And also, in 1937, they had advanced further over into China, north and south?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And they still held the territory that they had conquered?
- A. Yes.
- Q. At that time Germany had taken over territory, hadn't it?
- A. Yes. I think it was after Germany annexed Austria.
- Q. Austria and some surrounding territory there?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, of course, when Japan took over Manchuria and Germany took over Austria, there was a great deal of commotion throughout the world about them going in and taking territory of other countries?

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- A. Yes.
- Q. But neither Germany or Japan had given up a single foot of the territory at the time you were talking there, had they?
- A. Well, as far as Japan is concerned, they didn't want to take any.
- Q. I am not asking that. I am asking had they given up any they had conquered?
- A. Japan was in China in force.
- Q. Wasn't the idea of Germany and Italy and Japan that if they would form a pact they could keep the territory they had and this was to keep anybody else from interfering with the policies they had started? Wasn't that the talk?
- A. Germany's -
- Q. Just a minute. Answer that question. Wasn't that the talk between you and OSHIMA and HIBBERTOP?
- A. Not in that way, sir.
- Q. Well, what way was it?
- A. Germany wanted to have her policy recognized by other states concerned. Of course, as far as her policy was legitimate, was right.
- Q. Germany thought taking Austria and that territory was right, didn't it?
- A. Of course, she thought she was right, I think.
- Q. And Japan thought taking Manchuria over and the territory in Manchuria was right?
- A. No, sir. As I told you, Prince KONOYE wanted to withdraw from China.
- Q. But he didn't want to give back Manchuria and the territory they had conquered, did he?
- A. As for Manchuria, Japan's real intention was to make it an independent state, to have it recognized by China and by other states, and to give the substance of an independent state as international relations gradually settled and enabled Japan to do so.
- Q. But Prince KONOYE wanted to do that, but if he wanted to do the right thing, why didn't he withdraw all support from that government and let them live as they had been?

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- A. If he could have had his way, he would have withdrawn his troops.
- Q. How about Manchukuo?
- A. It would have been much more difficult.
- Q. Nobody in Japan wanted to give up Manchukuo, did you? You had your business settled there, you had your people, you had your army? Nobody in Japan ever intended to give up Manchukuo, did they?
- A. It would have been very difficult.
- Q. It would have been very easy to come back home?
- A. It would have been very easy if we could, yes.
- Q. But nobody wanted to. They did not agree to come back, did they?
- A. There were many persons that wanted to give up Manchukuo in Japan. I think there were many people wanted to give up Manchukuo. Mr. DEVUCHI, our ambassador -
- Q. You were never in favor of giving up Manchukuo, were you?
- A. Not unconditionally. We, as a result of the Russian war, we had our railway rights, we had there leased territory.
- Q. And the fact of the business is your statements, publicly and privately have been that you were in favor of Japan occupying Manchuria.
- A. Well, after what had been done there and after what the government had done there, it was very difficult for any one to declare himself against it.
- Q. As a matter of fact, you have talked in favor of it, haven't you?
- A. Well, everybody who talked in public or in private had to talk in favor of it.
- Q. Didn't you make public statements that you were in favor of occupying Manchuria?
- A. What do you mean by public statements?
- Q. To people around, to the press and over the radio?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And at dinners?

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- A. Yes.
- Q. Then there was Germany taking over Austria and other countries. Japan had marched into and was taking over Manchuria and part of China and still holding it while you were there as ambassador in Rome?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right. Now, Germany, Italy and Japan wanted to make an agreement or an alliance to protect what you had already gained, didn't they?
- A. We didn't put it in that way?
- Q. That is really what it amounted to?
- A. It may be interpreted that way.
- Q. It ended up that way?
- A. It is common sense.
- Q. Yes, that is common sense. That is what you were trying to do?
- A. Yes.
- Q. The three countries you have named agreed among themselves that, we have taken territory here, the rest of the world is against us on it, we have got to agree together to protect our own interests?
- A. No, sir. It was not so.
- Q. It couldn't be anything else, could it?
- A. There was some talk between the Foreign Minister of England who came there and practically recognized what Germany did in Austria, in Czechoslovakia -
- Q. But that is not answering the question. That is -
- A. So in trying to conclude a treaty with Germany, we didn't think they were trying to keep us from forming a treaty because some people suggested England recognize Germany's position as far as Austria and Czechoslovakia is concerned.
- Q. Let me ask you this question. Here is Germany, it had Austria. Japan had Manchukuo and part of China, and of course, Italy had taken over some territory. There are three of you that reached out and took territory that didn't belong to you. That is correct, isn't it?

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- A. Yes.
- Q. All right, now.
- A. But here, the Japanese government wouldn't ever admit that we took Manchuria.
- Q. Wouldn't admit it, but you had it?
- A. We didn't have it. We established the state, but we didn't actually do it. It was done there on the spot by people -
- Q. You don't mean to tell me Japan wasn't controlling Manchuria at that time?
- A. Perhaps the Japanese were in control there, but the Japanese government never admitted that she established it.
- Q. I know they didn't publish it to the world.
- A. So for a government officer of Japan, we had to stick to that position.
- Q. You had control of Manchuria economically, politically, and militarily, didn't you?
- A. Yes. There is no doubt about that. But then we were there with a treaty with that country.
- Q. But to the outside world, you were setting it up as an independent state when in reality it was nothing but Japan in full control?
- A. They called it.
- Q. That is what we call a puppet government?
- A. Yes, you call it puppet.
- Q. What did they call it in Japan?
- A. We called it a baby.
- Q. In other words, it was a baby state?
- A. And on its own status.
- Q. And Japan had to control it economically, politically, and militarily, didn't it?
- A. I think so.

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- Q. That is right. I will ask you this. If the reason you didn't form a plan or were trying to form a plan with the three countries, Germany, Japan, and Italy was to keep the United States and England from interfering with what you had done.
- A. I am not quite sure.
- Q. It couldn't be anything else?
- A. An alliance with Germany and Italy to be so strong as to exclude the possibility of interference? Unless also for Russia -
- Q. Wasn't the reason you decided to form this plan for an alliance to keep England off Germany and the United States off Japan, to be strengthened so they wouldn't interfere with what you were doing?
- A. As I told you, sir, my idea was that we give publicity to this thing. To the fact we were negotiating with Germany and Italy, and, of course, I thought England and America, their statesmen would come in and stop this negotiation.
- Q. You mean stop the three countries from making a pact? How could they stop it, they didn't know it? It was secret.
- A. It was supposed to be secret, but I was very indiscreet. I wilfully was indiscreet and told the newspaper men that the talk was going on. I wanted them to know that unless they stopped it there was serious results. That is what I felt.
- Q. Right along that line, you worked pretty hard to get the alliance together? You made statements, talks.
- A. Yes, it took more than seventy conferences. There was much talk, and it was known all over the world.
- Q. But, now, that was to keep the United States - you mean to tell me that Germany, Japan, and Italy thought that Britain and the United States would come in and keep you from making a treaty?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How could they do that?
- A. Just by proposing to the Japanese statesmen, for instance, to please come ahead, that America and England would advise Chiang Kai Shek to come to terms with Japan on the condition Japan would withdraw entirely from China proper.
- Q. And keep Manchuria?

- A. Not keep, but leave Manchukuo as an independent state, because there was every possibility of Chiang Kai Shek recognizing that. As a matter of simple justice, Manchukuo is a territory which formerly belonged to the Manchukian Dynasty. When they conquered China proper, they annexed Manchukuo and China Proper, but when they started liberating there, there was this Manchukian king, they promised many privileges to the Manchukian king which they didn't fulfill.
- Q. So then you say that was a scheme, and what Japan intended was to have the United States to come in and say well, keep Manchukuo but withdraw from the rest of China, and that was what you expected to get out of the Three Power Pact?
- A. If we were to reap any benefit.
- Q. If that was the case then why didn't you just put that in the Three Power Pact?
- A. Put which in?
- Q. If that was the scheme of Japan -
- A. I didn't say that was the scheme of Japan, of the war party. It was my idea.
- Q. You were representing your government?
- A. No, sir. Not necessarily.
- Q. You mean the ambassador, what an ambassador says is not representative of his government?
- A. If we said so, why Germany and Italy, what would Germany say?
- Q. You were spokesman for your government on this foreign policy.
- A. Whenever I got any instructions, -
- Q. You followed your instructions, didn't you?
- A. Yes. As far as I got instructions, I had to transmit it to them, but my personal idea was that -
- Q. The fact of the business is you went farther than your instructions, didn't you?
- A. I was telling you my motive.
- Q. I am not asking that. You did go further than your instructions?

- A. I don't think so.
- Q. You say you were backed up in everything you said all the time about the Three Power Pact by your government?
- A. We were not in a position to say --
- Q. I am not asking you that. I am asking you to say whether or not --
- A. I didn't say anything against the instructions of the government. Everything I said or did was within the proper limit of the instructions.
- Q. Now, you helped work out several drafts of what should be in the pact, didn't you?
- A. I didn't do any drafting. It was done here in the Foreign Office in Tokyo or in Berlin, but, of course, any drafting of a plan is in consultation with the other party.
- Q. All right, you made certain suggestions as to what should be in there, didn't you?
- A. Well, in fact, there were very few occasions for me to submit any propositions because the basic plan, the basic ideas with Germany and with Japan were already made. There was very little chance of changing it very drastically.
- Q. Did you tell OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP that your idea about it was if you had some pact between the three countries that America would come in and stop the war in China and give you Manchukuo?
- A. No, sir. I didn't mention that.
- Q. Who did you tell that to? You mean you never discussed that with anybody?
- A. No, sir. Just with SOMOYE, that if we were to gain any benefit out of any such alliance with Germany, that would be to stop this China affair.
- Q. Why did you want to keep that idea secret from OSHIMA who is one of your countrymen?
- A. Well, OSHIMA, I don't know. Perhaps I told him.
- Q. You know you discussed it with him, don't you?
- A. We discussed many things. I don't remember.
- Q. That was your own idea and you mentioned it to your Foreign Minister and you mean to say you didn't talk with OSHIMA?

- A. It was not the Foreign Minister. Prince KONOYE was Premier and resigned soon after, so he had nothing to do with negotiations any more.
- Q. Did you tell your Foreign Minister about your plan?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Why not?
- A. Of course, without my telling that was almost common place in Japan.
- Q. It had been discussed so much that was Japan's plan, not yours?
- A. If it was discussed that was, Japan would be taken as being too cunning.
- Q. You made a number of trips to talk to OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP about this, didn't you?
- A. Not so often. I think I went to Berlin twice, three times, I think. Once it was on the occasion of Hitler's fiftieth birthday. We were invited as guests, you know. Of course, I had occasion to talk this matter over on that occasion.
- Q. Did you talk to Hitler about it?
- A. No, I never had any discussion with Hitler.
- Q. Did you talk to RIBBENTROP?
- A. RIBBENTROP once or twice I met him.
- Q. Did you discuss the Tri-Party Pact?
- A. Yes, we talked about it.
- Q. What did you tell RIBBENTROP your ideas were about it? What you should do?
- A. What I remember now is the crux of the question, the difficulty, was whether we should have this treaty directed against England and America or only against Soviet Russia. RIBBENTROP wanted it to be a general treaty against any other who attacks the Three Powers to come into effect. Japan's idea was to make reservations in case of America and England. About Soviet Russia, Japan would unconditionally be bound by the treaty, but in case of America and England, Japan had to make reservations, reserve the rights to consider the question. That was the main point of the negotiations.

- Q. What do you mean by the main point?
- A. The main point of difference between Germany and Japan.
- Q. You mean if America attacked Japan, it had the assistance of Germany?
- A. Germany wanted it in a general way. If any third party were to attack any of the contracting parties all the countries together would reject such attack. Japan wanted some reservation in regard -
- Q. Did Japan want to leave out of the pact that if America and Britain attacked Japan, Germany would have to help them?
- A. Not in that sense.
- Q. Explain what sense.
- A. Japan's idea was that there was more likelihood of England and America going to war with Germany than with Japan, so if Germany went to war with America, Japan didn't want to be unconditionally bound by the treaty to help them. Japan wanted rights to consider the circumstances leading up to war between Germany and America.
- Q. Let me ask you this. Turn it around. If England and America attacked Japan, what did you want then? Did you want Germany to help you?
- A. If there was likelihood Japan would be attacked, that would be to Japan's benefit.
- Q. Did you discuss it both ways?
- A. Yes. It comes to that. Japan didn't want to conclude any treaty openly against England and America, but about Soviet Russia, she had already -
- Q. You just told me awhile ago the whole world knew you were trying to fix a treaty, that you had told the newspapers about it. Why is it they didn't want to have a treaty?
- A. Well, against Soviet Russia, maybe that was the idea.
- Q. But you didn't tell the newspapers that they were going to have a treaty, that is, Germany, Japan, and Italy, that might be directed against England and America, did you?
- A. Well, not in that way. There was a treaty of alliance, military alliance, going on between Japan, Germany, and Italy. No terms of the proposed treaty was argued, and that can't be given. In a general way there was a talk of alliance. I wanted that to be known to the world.

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- Q. Now, while you were there, you say you talked to RIBBENTROP? How about STAHRER?
- A. I saw STAHRER. STAHRER's position was not so important, and he was more or less in the position of a private secretary to RIBBENTROP.
- Q. Don't you know STAHRER was appointed by RIBBENTROP to handle relations between Japan and Germany in 1938?
- A. It was later.
- Q. 1938?
- A. No, sir. In 1940, when he came to Japan.
- Q. But he was appointed in Germany as RIBBENTROP's right hand man in 1938, before he came to Japan wasn't he?
- A. He was in the Foreign Office. I saw him in RIBBENTROP's office at that luncheon he gave to us.
- Q. Didn't OSHIMA tell you he and STAHRER had talked over the Tri-Party Pact?
- A. STAHRER's position was not so very important then. OSHIMA talked directly with RIBBENTROP it seems.
- Q. How many different drafts of the Tri-Party Pact did you see before it was finally completed, or notes on it?
- A. There were so many modifications, you know. There were no drafts made, full drafts, but ideas, modifications, were all added up together, you know.
- Q. You don't have any of the notes or drafts?
- A. Not I. Those negotiations in Berlin came to naught. No importance is now attached to what was done there after the German government entered into negotiations with Soviet Russia. The whole thing came to nothing.
- Q. That was during the latter part of 1938?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then negotiations were re-opened in 1940, weren't they?
- A. Well, more exactly speaking, I think negotiation was not opened, but the developments and the war situation in Europe scared the Japanese statesmen and Japanese public opinion in favor of OSHIMA and Germany,

so there was practically no negotiation at all. STANBEE came and saw MATSUOKA. They, I think, had about three or four conversations and agreed about that treaty. They were not much of negotiations.

- Q. Didn't you work in Italy trying to get this pact through after you saw that the war was changing -
- A. I didn't stay in Italy long enough. The war started in September 1939. I came away, left on the 16th of September, soon after the war started I came home, so after Germany concluded this treaty with Russia the thing was dropped by the Japanese government entirely. The development of the war situation in Europe then made it possible for the party, I mean the military, and statesmen who were in favor of approachment with Germany to come to power again. That was in - it was the end of 1939, no 1938, 1940.
- Q. Were you present in 1940 when the plans were worked out for the renegotiations
- A. I was appointed advisor to the Foreign Office by Mr. MATSUOKA and HONOYE, his Second Cabinet it was, but there was another advisor, an intimate friend of MATSUOKA. MATSUOKA put more confidence in him. I practically didn't do much advising. MATSUOKA is not a person to take advice much. I was still ambassador on a waiting list, and MATSUOKA wanted to dismiss all old time diplomats on a large scale. I was ambassador. He wanted me to resign as ambassador to show an example to other ambassadors. I am a poor man. I had to live. I needed my salary. He said he would appoint me advisor and give me salary as advisor and resign as ambassador. That is what I did.
- Q. What year was that?
- A. 1940.
- Q. About what month?
- A. I think in July. In August after MATSUOKA became Foreign Minister.
- Q. Then you were in Tokyo when the Tri-Party Pact was signed?
- A. Yes. I was not only in Tokyo, but was advisor to the Foreign Office. I came there almost daily to read official documents and telegrams.
- Q. Did you read over the Tri-Party Pact before it was signed?
- A. Of course, I had a chance to read it. Moreover, I was made to translate into English the pre-amble of the treaty. It was originally in Japanese. I had to translate it into English. That is all I had to do with the treaty. I didn't have anything to do with the articles, but the treaty I had to read it in English.

- Q. It says in the first paragraph of the Tri-Party Pact, "Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in their establishment of a new order in Europe." What was meant by new order in Europe?
- A. Perhaps with the Axis powers leading the countries in Europe and perhaps along fascist or totalitarian lines.
- Q. That had some meaning, didn't it? Didn't Japan recognize what Germany had done, they had taken over all the world?
- A. That is entirely Mr. MATSUOKA's idea, and I never asked him his real meaning, but I thought that it was a good thing to have Germany promising, engaging herself to respect Japan's leadership in the Far East, because in that stage there seemed to be every possibility of Germany winning the war in Europe; so long as America stayed away, she would have won, then France, Poland and England would be defeated and their colonies in the Far East would fall into the hands of Germany. I figured Germany would be a much worse enemy to have in the Far East than England, America, France, or Poland. To have Germany recognize Japan's leadership in the entire Far East would be a benefit to us in case Germany won, so I thought it was a good article in the treaty. Of course, what we were to do as leaders is another question, but that was later.
- Q. There was an idea and a plan here in Japan at that time that Japan would govern economically and politically all the Greater East Asia?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Why did you want to put it in a treaty if there wasn't such a plan?
- A. The word leadership is used.
- Q. Leadership?
- A. Leadership may be interpreted in various ways, but under General TOJO there it was a Far Eastern Conference in Tokyo -
- Q. Let's don't get to that. Let's talk about this here. When this pact was drawn, there was a plan in Japan, since you had taken over Manchukuo and part of China that you wanted to govern all the English territories and French territories, as well as the Philippines and Hawaii and all the Greater East Asia. Now, that plan was talked of here, wasn't it, that Japan ought to have all that territory and govern it?
- A. Nobody said that.
- Q. That is what you were after?
- A. Japan was going to have it?

- Q. Certainly.
- A. I don't think so. I don't understand it in that way. There wasn't any discussion about what we should do.
- Q. Why use those words if you didn't have some sort of plan?
- A. The principal thing was to have Germany promise in advance that she wouldn't behave in the Far East as other white nations did.
- Q. You also write on this same pact right here Germany agrees in a secret protocol to this Tri-Party Pact to turn over all those islands to Japan.
- A. I don't think so. I can't recall.
- Q. Don't you know?
- A. Secret pact to turn over -
- Q. Didn't you see the secret pact to the Tri-Party Pact, secret protocol, secret letters?
- A. I don't think there was anything secret.
- Q. Didn't STAMMER and OTT and OSHIMA sign letters?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. You don't remember about that?
- A. No. I don't think there was a secret understanding to the treaty.
- Q. I am talking about some letters signed about possessions that Germany used to have in the South Pacific, Mandated Islands. Wasn't there an agreement about the Mandated Islands on the Tri-Party Pact?
- A. It was a reservation in favor of Germany that Germany had, wasn't it?
- Q. You were there. I am asking you what you know about it.
- A. I don't remember. My recollection is that there was nothing very important which was kept secret from any body.
- Q. Don't you know that there were letters signed by OTT and by your Foreign Minister here agreeing that if Germany won the war that the Mandated Islands would be turned over to Japan for a small consideration or a nominal consideration?
- A. Yes, there was talk to some effect. I don't know that it was in any formal document.

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Q. That was discussed before the Privy Council wasn't it, to get them to consent to the Tri-Party Pact?

A. Of course, the Privy Council had all the documents concerning it.

Q. Do you know anything about the secret agreements and letters?

A. My remembrance is not very clear about that. At any rate, my recollection is that there was nothing very important in the form of any secret agreement.

I, Ruth F. Anderson, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I, Worth E. McKinney, a civilian, certify that on the 20th day of March 1946 personally appeared before me Toshio Shiratori and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

____ Mar 46

4201

INTERROGATION OF
Toshio Shiratori

Date and time: 29 March 1946, 1415-1530 Hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Toshio Shiratori
North E. McKinney, Interrogator
Ruth F. Anderson, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. McKinney

Interrogation taken in English.

Q. What I want to talk to you today about is an article appearing in "Contemporary Japan" for December 1940.

A. 1940?

Q. Yes. By you.

A. Translation of the article, translation from a Japanese paper? (Examining book.)

Q. You did write an article on the "Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow?"

A. Well -

Q. 1940 or prior thereto?

A. Yes. It is a translation of what I wrote in a Japanese magazine, perhaps for a paper. I remember only once when I talked to this reporter from the "Osaki." Strange I haven't read that.

Q. Let's see if it is what you wrote if you remember. It appears in "Contemporary Japan" the December volume or edition of 1940 and begins on page 1514 and is entitled "The Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" by Toshio Shiratori. I will read this and then see if that is what you wrote.

"In point of importance to the future of mankind, the Japanese-German-Italian treaty concluded in Berlin on September 27 must be considered of epoch-making significance."

How about that? Did you write that?

A. Not in such - It was in Japanese, you know.

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- Q. But this would be a correct translation of what you said from Japanese into English, wouldn't it?
- A. My memory is not very clear, but I may have said that.
- Q. Any how it was published in a magazine here back in 1940 that would go all over the world, wasn't it, under your name?
- A. Yes, but I never authorized that, authorized my name on that. They are very free in Japan to translate things which are published in Japanese.
- Q. You mean to say then you didn't authorize this speech to be published?
- A. It was published, I think in Japanese, but I never authorized translation or its publishing in an English magazine. The magazine never came to me to get my consent.
- Q. Well, this magazine was sent all through Japan, all over the world, wasn't it? This "Contemporary Japan?"
- A. Well -
- Q. I will ask you if it is not world-wide, this magazine, if it doesn't go all over the world? It is published in Japan? It is published right here in Tokyo?
- A. Yes. I don't know whether it is continued -
- Q. It was in 1940?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who was the publisher that published it?
- A. The editor used to be one Mr. INAHARA.
- Q. So then you say that the editor of this paper then evidently had this translated from Japanese and printed without your permission?
- A. Yes, I think that is the case. That is very often the case. What has been published, they think they have every right to translate it into English without asking the original author. They do it very often.
- Q. Well, this editor had translators that were excellent, didn't he?
- A. Yes, I think there are many articles which have been done in the same way.
- Q. And there is no reason to believe it is not a correct translation, is there?

A. Well, ordinarily they are very exact.

Q. What was wrong with the first sentence I have read you then? You said that, didn't you?

A. I don't remember exactly what I told the Japanese newspaper men, but it is very likely I said this is a very important treaty.

Q. You don't deny then using this particular language I have read to you?

A. It is perhaps a little too strong. If I were to write it myself -

Q. That is not very strong language. Just a statement of a simple fact?

A. Yes.

Q. Let's read a little farther.

"As clearly stated in the preamble, the three signatory Powers intend by this treaty to set up a permanent world peace by enabling all the nations to take their proper places under the sun and thereby translating into fact the principle of co-existence and common prosperity among them."

That is correct isn't it?

A. It is what the people generally said, and I think I would say that.

Q. You said that?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Let's read a little farther.

"Peace is a natural desire of mankind and for its fulfilment repeated attempts have been made ever since the dawn of history."

You said that, didn't you?

A. In this article, I don't remember what for.

Q. You don't see anything wrong with that?

A. I don't think there is anything wrong.

Q. You think that is a good translation?

A. The fact is I don't remember the reason, you know. It was only dictated to newspaper men coming to my office in the Foreign Office.

Q. Where did you write this article? Where was it written?

A. I didn't write it, but a man came from the "Osaki." I told him what was in my mind. He put it in proper form and published it in the "Osaki."

Q. Did you read over what he put down before it was published?

A. I generally just looked it over. Perhaps in that case I did too.

Q. This is a well prepared statement. You didn't just dictate this off hand?

A. Off hand? I generally don't prepare my articles or speeches. I have a bad habit of speaking ex tempore and writing what I think.

Q. Let's read a little farther and see.

"No religion worth the name has ever failed to profess as its primary object the realization of peace and tranquillity among men."

You said that, didn't you?

A. It may be said by anybody.

Q. I am not asking you what somebody else said. I am asking you if you said that. Here is an article appearing under your name in a world-wide magazine, a magazine distributed throughout the world, and you know whether or not it appeared under your name, you know whether or not you are the author of it. I am just asking you if you didn't say -

A. I remember the "Osaki," the original Japanese article, but I don't remember the contents. But those things I think I did say.

Q. Let's read a little farther.

"There is, for example, a Biblical teaching, intended, no doubt, to work out the salvation of man, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.'"

Q. How about that?

A. Well, a famous portion of the New Testament. I remember quoting that.

Q. "It has become clear, however, by what has transpired since that no salvation of man, with human nature as it is, can be accomplished by such methods as the Scripture enjoins us, making as it does a distinction between what is God's and what is Caesar's and separating as it does flesh and spirit and substance and mind from each other."

You said that, didn't you?

A. That is Japanese Shinto doctrine. I think I said that.

- Q. "Not only that, but it has become increasingly clear that the course of international politics, based upon the principle of rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's, has developed into sheer materialism, allowing the strong to prey upon the weak in denial of God's injunctions of justice and fraternal love for mankind."

You said that didn't you?

- A. I don't find anything objectionable in that?

- Q. I am not asking whether it is objectionable or not.

- A. It is a pity I don't remember what I said, but it doesn't sound very strange to me. I think I said that.

- Q. "It is clear that such a system can produce nothing other than confusion and conflict in the world."

What about that?

- A. What?

- Q. "It is clear that such a system can produce nothing other than confusion and conflict in the world."

- A. I may have said so.

- Q. You don't deny it was in the article prepared by you?

- A. It is as I said. I do not remember the original or the exact wording I used then.

- Q. But that is the thought that you tried to express?

- A. That is along the line of what I thought in.

- Q. "In view of these failures in the past, Japan, Germany and Italy have come out to solve this all-important problem confronting mankind by an entirely new and hitherto untried means."

That is correct, isn't it?

- A. It is a time when Japan was crying for a new order based upon the original Japanese idea, so I think it is very possible I used those words.

- Q. Here is the next line:

"Herein lies the fundamental idea which has motivated the conclusion of the tripartite treaty."

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A. As far as Japan is concerned.

Q. That is what you said?

A. Yes.

Q. "The new world order, to which reference is made in the treaty, has been conceived with such a motive."

You used that language, did you not?

A. I wasn't speaking for the government.

Q. I am just asking you if that was your idea.

A. I think I did.

Q. "But as things stand today, with armed struggles raging in Europe and Asia, it would not be quite reasonable to expect the intentions of the signatory Powers to be evaluated readily at their full and proper significance by other Powers."

A. I think that is what I said.

Q. That is correct, isn't it?

A. I think it was what I said.

Q. "This is especially true when many of them are either directly or indirectly involved in these struggles and are either aroused with feelings of hostility and hatred or are experiencing extreme uneasiness over their own future."

Q. That is correct?

A. Yes, I think that is.

Q. "Considering moreover the fact that the great historic change which is now taking place under our eyes requires of many Powers the abandonment of views of a world and life to which they have been accustomed for past centuries, it obviously would take a considerable time for the real meaning of the new world order to be generally understood and much more accepted."

How about that?

A. I think I said that.

Q. "This means that the interim years which will intervene between now and the time when the fullest significance of the instrument will be understood can by no means be peaceful ones."

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- A. Why, yes. Germany was actually fighting, The Japanese were fighting China, and I think I said that.
- Q. "Most probably, therefore, a long period of perseverance and strenuous endeavour is in store for the three signatory Powers, which will do well to be fully prepared to meet adequately these eventualities."
- A. That would seem as if I were --
- Q. You said that, didn't you?
- A. Not exactly in those words, but we must be prepared for efforts any way.
- Q. Then you said that? That would be what you wrote?
- A. I think it was what I said.
- Q. "Despite this fact, Japan, Germany and Italy are far from being eager to welcome a new struggle."
You said that, didn't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. "Japan, for instance, has for the past three years of the China affair consistently demanded that China reconsider her attitude, understand Japan's real intentions, grasp fully the spirit of the new times and take advantage of it."
You said that, didn't you?
- A. I think I did.
- Q. In Europe, too, the leaders of Germany and Italy have since before the outbreak of the present war, continued to make to Great Britain and France proposals for a similar peaceful understanding."
- A. Yes. I was referring to the fact that Germany was planning to make those efforts.
- Q. You said that?
- A. I think I did.
- Q. "Unfortunately, the opposition and antagonism between the new and old ideologies in both the East and West was so profound as to render it essentially impossible to find a middle course of reconciliation, the result being the continued life or death struggle between them which we witness today."
- A. Yes.

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Q. You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right.

"The issue of the wars in Europe as well as in Asia is clear beyond doubt; and the sooner the final submission of the vanquished comes, the less will be the tribulation of mankind."

You said that?

A. In the abstract, I think it is all right.

Q. "The present wars in the East and West are fundamentally different in character from those of the past."

You said that, didn't you?

A. I may have said that.

Q. Didn't you say that? That would be a correct statement, wouldn't it?

A. I don't remember, that is the trouble.

Q. You wrote that at the time you were writing this article, didn't you?

A. Well, when you write a composition you say the things you know, which you do not necessarily hold in belief, or is the case, just for -

Q. But when you write a composition you are willing to let that appear under your name and pass throughout the world, you wrote it as you thought.

A. If I see the original perhaps I can better -

Q. Where is the original?

A. I don't know, but I think it is the "Osaki" article. In translation it sounds so strange to me, as if some body else were saying it, so different from the original, you know, but those things I may have said. I do not find anything very -

Q. It is substantially what you said, isn't it?

A. I think so.

Q. All right.

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"Although they entail a tremendous amount of destruction, their primary object is construction, as witnessed in the gradual emergence of a new order out of the ruins, and reconstruction where destruction has taken place."

Q. That is correct, isn't it?

A. That seems to be contrary to what was actually happening in Europe or Asia.

Q. You were looking to the future when you were writing this?

A. Yes, I was looking to the future.

Q. And you knew there would be some destruction and you thought it would be rebuilt?

A. There is no doubt about that.

Q. That is correct? That is what you thought and what you were writing?

A. I think that is what was in my mind.

Q. "The three victorious nations, despite their immense sacrifices incurred in waging war, are steadily growing in power both materially and spiritually."

You said that?

A. Materially and spiritually?

Q. They are "growing in power both materially and spiritually?"

A. It was a territory occupied by us.

Q. You put that in the article?

A. Perhaps I did.

Q. Don't you know you did?

A. Yes, I remember at the time I was thinking in that way, that we shall be strengthened while the war was on.

Q. So at the time you were writing this article in 1940, in December, you were of the opinion that Japan would win, Italy would win, and Germany would win.

A. well -

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- Q. Just answer that.
- A. To be honest, they are duds, but any one who gave utterance to his thoughts in public at that time had to say that we are to win.
- Q. You had to win?
- A. Not necessarily, we were quite sure we would win, but that was what everybody was required to say.
- Q. And this article was written for the purpose of consoling your people and other people of the world, showing them what you thought here in Japan?
- A. I didn't have such free objects, but the newspapers wanted me to say something, so I said those things.
- Q. You said those things?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right.
- "This has been made possible due to the real strength of those who create, not destroy."
- You said that, didn't you?
- A. Well, maybe I said that.
- Q. "But to those who hold to conventional ideas, who are prone to judge everything in terms of materials and figures, this would seem quite fantastic."
- You said that didn't you?
- A. It is in there. Perhaps the translation on the whole isn't correct, but I take it for granted that I did write or speak it.
- Q. "In fact, it is for this reason that there are a number of people who have not yet awakened to the reality of the situation which is looking straight in their faces."
- That is correct too, isn't it?
- A. Well, please go on, sir.
- Q. Well, I just want to read each sentence to see if it was correct.
- A. Well, it is very difficult to say that I actually stated the idea in those phrases, but on the whole, I think it is correct.

- Q. This testifies incidentally to the great difficulty with which the hard crust of conventionalism can be broken through. This type of people fail to discover where the real source of strength and power which Japan, Germany and Italy are at present displaying lies."

That is substantially correct too, isn't it?

- A. I don't think - Maybe in those days I may have said that.

- Q. You think that is the proper interpretation of what you said in those days?

- A. I think so.

- Q. "Clapping eyes on only the superficialities, they seem to be entirely ignorant of the great fact that the principle for which the three Powers stand cannot be overcome by mere material strength."

That is what you said in those days too, isn't it?

- A. That seems to be very over-confident.

- Q. Well, it is not a question of what it is.

- A. I may have said that, I think.

- Q. Don't you think that is about what you said?

- A. Yes.

- Q. "Blissful in their ignorance, they continue their stubborn resistance against the three Powers in the hope of conquering the new order or at least of prolonging the tenure of life of the old one."

That is correct, isn't it?

- A. Well, that is, I think, putting it rather in too concrete a form. Japan was not fighting any other power than China at that time, and the Tri-Power Pact was - it was not quite sure if it would be approved or not.

- Q. I am asking you if that isn't what you said.

- A. There is something wrong. It sounds as if we were already fighting on the same side.

- Q. It doesn't seem that way, does it?

- A. It doesn't?

- Q. No.

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A. Public opinion was fighting us in spirit.

Q. Isn't that a correct translation of what you said then?

A. Whether correct or not, I don't know the original. I do not remember the original, but on the whole, I think it is all right.

Q. "But theirs is a vain effort. To protect what is naturally doomed to downfall in a historical process is nothing short of tragic."

A. That is in defense of a new order.

Q. New order?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. "In truth, it is because of the existence of many such people that Japan, Germany and Italy have found it necessary to enter into this treaty."

That is correct, isn't it?

A. I believe so.

Q. "In this respect the treaty is bound to wield immense power and influence, and no doubt constitutes a menace in no small measure to those who cling to the old order of things."

That is correct, isn't it? That is what you said?

A. In the frame of mind I was in then perhaps I said that.

Q. "This may be called the negative side of the treaty." You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "The true purpose of the tripartite treaty, however, lies in its positive side. To contribute toward the construction of a new world order is the primary object which the three Powers desire to establish under the pact, and it is solely in consideration of its operation in such a positive sense that the writer emphasized at the outset of this article the importance of this treaty from the viewpoint of world history."

That is correct, isn't it?

A. I think I said that.

Q. "What, then, is the new order which Japan, Germany and Italy intend to bring about, first in their respective spheres and ultimately throughout the world, as stipulated in the instrument?"

You said that?

A. That is in the pressable of it.

Q. You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right.

"To give a clear-cut answer to this question is difficult at the present stage; but in view of the fact that the three Powers, discarding the ideologies of individualism and democracy, have adopted the principle of dealing with human society from the totalitarian point of view, the character of the new order to be created under their leadership must for the most part be clearly perceived."

That is correct, isn't it?

A. That is saying Japan is also a totalitarian?

Q. No. It just means what you said there.

A. I never grouped Japan in this totalitarian group of nations. I always thought Japan -

Q. You don't say that there. I will read that again.

"To give a clear-cut answer to this question is difficult at the present stage; but in view of the fact that the three Powers, discarding the ideologies of individualism and democracy, have adopted the principle of dealing with human society from the totalitarian point of view, the character of the new order to be created under their leadership must for the most part be clearly perceived."

A. Then I think it is all right. I never thought Japan a totalitarian nation.

Q. No, you don't here. You say,

"From the time of ancient Greece down to the modern age, Western civilization has undergone various changes in form, but the basis upon which it has developed has consistently been the individualistic view of the world."

That is correct?

A. I think I said that.

Q. "It was the movement for Kultur" that is K-u-l-t-u-r.

A. German?

Q. Yes. " - staged in various fields of activity by the German people with the rise of Prussia to power which revolted for the first time against this conception of civilization."

You said that?

A. I think I did.

Q. "Yet because of the structures of her state and society as well as the thoughts of her people not yet being entirely free from liberalism and individualism, Germany was ultimately defeated in the last European war, and the German term Kultur was accordingly made the butt of ridicule and contempt by the conquerors." You said that?

A. Yes. Now, you see that was the translation of one article I contributed to a Magazine in Germany, published in Berlin.

Q. So that is correct then?

A. Yes.

Q. "By its subsequent development, however, Kultur -" That is Kultur?

A. That is Kultur, yes.

Q. "- Kampf has proved that, though its steps may be temporarily interrupted, it is after all in line with the inevitable course of progress which mankind is destined to take."

That is correct, isn't it?

A. I think I said that.

Q. "The totalitarian movement, started by the Fascist Revolution in Italy and now about to reach its zenith in the National Socialist Revolution in Germany, is spreading like a prairie fire, leaving no room for doubt that the world of tomorrow will be thoroughly permeated with this new concept of world and man."

You said that?

A. Yes, I may have said that because I contributed it to a German magazine. The "Berlin, Rome, Tokyo" is the magazine.

Q. "The writer understands the totalitarian movement to mean, in the West, a return to that simple but virile human instinct which characterized the German and Latin peoples of more than a thousand years ago."

That is correct, isn't it?

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A. I think I said it. It relates to the time to the period when the German people led the life in the world, prehistoric.

Q. So you think then this would be about correct?

A. I think so.

Q. "Simultaneously with the appearance of such a movement in Germany and Italy, there also arose in Japan a similar movement for going back to the intrinsically Japanese way of ancient days."

You said that?

A. I think I did.

Q. "In Japan, however, no such drastic change as warrants being called revolutionary was necessary, as was the case in Germany and Italy."

Q. That is correct?

A. Yes.

Q. All right.

"For Japan's policy has since the foundation of the Empire been established and maintained upon a permanent and unchanging basis, and the pure and unadulterated totalitarianism embodying the unity of sovereign and subjects as one organic body has always been the immutable faith of the Japanese people."

A. Yes, I think I said that.

Q. "But it would be untrue to say that the evils of liberalistic civilization have not for the past half-century poisoned her ancient tradition."

A. In Japan?

Q. Yes, in Japan? You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "Indeed, the accumulation of its harmful influences had become so intolerably large in both internal and foreign affairs that at last the nation revolted and its dissatisfaction found expression in the form of the Manchurian incident of 1931."

You said that?

A. Yes.

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- Q. "This incident meant the bursting out of the thitherto suppressed healthy, racial instinct of the nation, in challenge externally of unjust conditions long forced upon mankind by the democratic Powers and internally of all alien ideas and thoughts grafted upon the people." You said that?
- A. That is about the Manchurian affair. It is entirely different from what I thought.
- Q. I know it, but you wrote that at that time?
- A. It was in this article, this Berlin magazine. Yes.
- Q. "It called for a re-examination and a return to what is really Japanese in politics, economics and indeed in all activities of the people." You said that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. "The characteristics of this movement in Japan have become evenmore accentuated in the current China affair, in which the classic expression, Hakko Ichiu, "H-a-k-k-@ I-c-h-i-u" has been adopted as the national slogan, and the ultimate object of the affair, in consonance with the spirit of the slogan, is to be the establishment of a new order in East Asia." You said that?
- A. Well, I think I said that. It is what everybody was saying.
- Q. What is meant by this word Hakko Ichiu?
- A. That is an expression used by the first Emperor of Japan when he founded this Empire. Everybody uses that. The literal meaning is the entire reverse, made into one family.
- Q. "The controversies of the past ten years in the Far East, therefore, may well be called the racial revivalist-reform movement of the Japanese people, chief obstacles to which having been offered by the machinations of the democratic Powers who have clung to the old order as the best purveyor of their own interests." That is correct, isn't it?
- A. Yes, it may have been.
- Q. "The war in Asia can thus be regarded as essentially a conflict between the view of the world as represented by these democratic Powers and the Kohdo spirit which has consistently been protected and fostered by the Japanese nation since the foundation of the Empire." You said that?
- A. I think I did.

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- Q. "Since the current war in Europe is, fundamentally speaking, a struggle between two different ideologies and a clash between old and new civilizations, it may safely be said that in this sense the wars in the East and West are essentially the same."
- A. Well, I think I said so, because it was necessary.
- Q. Necessary to say it?
- A. To talk it.
- Q. All right. "Unless one views the present wars in the above light and takes into consideration the fact that the so-called new order movement is ultimately an ideological and cultural movement for a return to man's innate character, one will never be able to understand correctly the real nature of the new world order of tomorrow which is to be established through Japanese-German-Italian corporation." You said that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. "Before a new world order is fully established, there must first of all be effected a radical change in the thought of the people in general."
- A. Racial?
- Q. Radical it is. I said racial, but it is radical change in the thought of the people in general. That is correct, isn't it?
- A. I think it is.
- Q. "In other words, the mental habit must be broken which has for past centuries controlled mankind. Everything requires reappraisal, and even the essential qualities of God and man must necessarily be re-examined."
- A. What did you say? Mental -
- Q. Mental habit. That is mind. You said that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. "In this process many a dogma and prejudice will have to be wiped out, for in order to achieve the contemplated change, such things as freedom and equality of individuals, the inherent rights of man, the absolute sovereignty of a state and right of self-determination of the people must be viewed from a completely different angle from that of the past."
- A. It was what I said, I think.

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Q. "In the new world, many things which formerly were highly evaluated as making this early life worth living may lose their value, for it must be emphasized that the very things which the old forces in the world have specially prized constitute the sources of injustice, irrationality, tyranny, and exploitation."

A. Yes.

Q. You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "It is not expected, of course, that such a tremendous reformation which has no parallel in world history can be accomplished in a brief space of time."

A. Yes.

Q. You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "But now the trend of the age is definitely in that direction. Not only that, but the construction of a new order is in fact already progressing over wide areas of Asia and Europe and promises to be greatly accelerated hereafter." You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "In view of this epoch-making movement now under way in Europe and Asia, there should be no doubt as to the reasons for the birth of the treaty among Japan, Germany and Italy or as to the duty with which it has been charged."

A. Yes.

Q. All right.

A. This is not an article in the "Osaki," but an article - as a guest of the German Embassy here, I wrote for the German organization of the German Foreign Office.

Q. What was the name?

A. "Berlin, Rome, Tokyo" is the title of the magazine.

Q. Then it was later reprinted, translated and reprinted in this magazine?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, there was another article in April 1941 "Contemporary Japan" entitled "Preparing for a New World Order." Did you write such an article?

A. Not for this magazine. I never wrote anything for this magazine.

Q. I mean you wrote the treatise?

A. It appeared in April?

Q. It appeared in the April "Contemporary Japan."

A. So that it was written, perhaps early in that year. I was too sick to write anything in April. It must have been written before. What does it say?

Q. Do you remember what paper that was written for or what magazine?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Let's read it and see if this is a correct translation of it.

"We are now face to face with the most serious crisis in history, both at home and abroad."

You said that?

A. That is what anybody would say.

Q. That is what you said?

A. Yes.

Q. "Japan is confronted by unprecedented difficulties while the world at large is plunged into an enormous struggle which promises to be protracted for how long no one knows."

You said that?

A. I don't know what article. It may be -

Q. You did write such an article?

A. It is impossible to remember, you know, the exact words, what I said.

Q. Doesn't that sound -

A. Because I never remember contributing any article to this magazine. It must have been translated from some other magazine.

Q. Maybe if we go ahead -

A. It is impossible to confirm at each step that I wrote it or not. Please go on and read it, sir.

Q. "Ten years have already elapsed since the cry of emergency was raised in our country. Of this period, we have spent the last three and a half years in carrying on a war on the largest scale in the history of our country."

You said that?

A. Well, that is a fact, I think.

Q. "In the meantime, considerable changes have occurred in our internal situation."

You said that?

A. I wouldn't say I said it or didn't say it. Please go on and read. Anybody can say things, but -

Q. Anybody could, but this appears in this magazine under your name. I am asking you if you didn't say it.

A. I don't remember even the fact it appears in the paper, in this magazine. They frequently reprint things published in other places.

Q. That is the reason I am reading it to you.

"About one hundred thousand precious lives have been lost, leaving behind several hundred thousand men, women and children who have been deprived of their fathers, brothers, or children."

You said that, didn't you?

A. It is a statement of fact. I think I said so, wherever it may have been.

Q. "The peoples' livelihood has also been considerably restricted with various inconveniences experienced in their everyday life."

Q. You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "There is no Japanese who is not desirous of the return as soon as possible of the days of peace and comfort."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "But the present emergency has by no means arisen on account of Japan alone."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "The China affair is not a conflict that broke out for reasons concerning the Orient alone, nor only as the result of Sino-Japanese relations."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "Its origin must be traced to deeper causes as well as to the inevitability of world-wide developments."

A. Yes.

Q. "It is impossible, therefore, for Japan alone to solve the present extraordinary situation and return to 'normalcy.'"

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "In order to stabilize the situation, it is imperative that the difficulties of the world as a whole be solved."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "That Japan, Germany and Italy entered into a military pact last fall was due to such circumstances."

A. Yes.

Q. You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "It is true that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact has resulted in growing aggravation of relations between Japan on the one side and Britain and the United States on the other."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "But it must be admitted that by this very fact the inter-relationship between the wars in Asia and in Europe has become clearer than it was before."

A. Yes.

Q. "This is not necessarily to be considered an outcome of the Tripartite Pact alone."

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "Since the time of the Manchurian incident and through the China affair, the interests of Japan and those of Britain and the United States have clashed on more than one occasion, with the opinions and claims of these countries at loggerheads."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "It became plain that it is entirely hopeless for Japan to settle satisfactorily the China affair and to establish a new order in East Asia by compromise or cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon Powers."

You said that?

A. Well, what I was driving at -

Q. I mean, first, did you say that?

A. I don't remember exactly that I put those ideas in writing, but I think it is, since it is -

Q. Since it is there?

A. Yes.

Q. "That is the reason why Japan grasped the hands of Germany and Italy, both of whose interests and views are in complete accord with those of Japan."

A. Well, after conclusion of the treaty, I think I said that.

Q. You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "The aggravation of our relations with Britain and the United States is, therefore, the cause and not the result of the Tripartite Pact."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "An argument is advanced in some quarters that Japan's diplomatic dealings have become difficult because of the conclusion of this alliance."

A. Yes.

Q. "I want, however, to point out emphatically that such an argument is nothing more or less than a reversion of the order of the substance and the shadow."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "In such circumstances, the world has become completely divided into two camps, of old and new forces, which are altogether incompatible with each other, politically, economically and ideologically."

A. Yes.

Q. "This in brief is the picture of the great war which we witness today."

A. Yes.

Q. "Composing one camp are the countries of Britain, the United States, France and the Netherlands, which have monopolized the best part of the world and have founded their present wealth and influence by oppressing and exploiting the backward peoples of Asia who are kith and kin of our own race."

A. That is in April, 1941. I must have. I see no reason not to admit I included the United States in that statement.

Q. "On the other side are countries like Japan, Germany and Italy, whose people have all the superior qualities of industry, honesty, bravery and a spirit of unity, but whose lands and resources are limited due to their belated appearance on the international stage, with the consequence that they are experiencing not a little difficulty in maintaining the livelihood of their peoples."

A. Yes. Now I see where it appears. That article was contributed to an Italian magazine published in Shanghai. This magazine got it from there.

Q. So that is correct?

A. On the whole I think it is.

Q. "It is natural that these nations should have gallantly risen in order to reconstruct the world order which is against humanity, right and justice." You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "The present war is a headlong clash between such groups of countries whose ideas are so diametrically opposed to each other."

A. Yes.

Q. "To restore peace between them is, therefore, a task that cannot easily be accomplished."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "Let us consider, for instance, the question of the China affair. It is not as yet settled, because, as everyone is now aware, Chungking is not the only regime to be reckoned as our opponent, for there are countries like Britain and the United States which are evidently manipulating China from behind the scenes in order to exploit that country and keep her in a semi-colonial status."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "We have been fighting all alone against these influences. These countries cannot understand nor are they willing to learn what the national policy and ideals of Japan are, as well as what Sino-Japanese co-existence and co-prosperity mean to the peoples of Japan and China."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "They have devoted their energy to put Japan in a bad light by accusing her, without warrant, of oppressing weak China and of being an aggressor."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "In fact, they have not only stopped abusing Japan's good name, but have gone the length of aiding Chungking morally and materially to Japan's detriment ever since the outset of the unfortunate affair."

A. Yes.

Q. "The memory of their anti-Japanese acts will never be effaced from the minds of the Japanese nation! It has sunk so deeply in their hearts."

A. Yes.

Q. "The protraction of the Sino-Japanese conflict had been a foregone conclusion so long as such anglo-American assistance continued. With the outbreak of the European war, however, the situation began to change. Britain and the United States claim, of course, by force of past circumstances, to continue their aid to Chungking, and have actually been increasing their economic pressure on Japan."

A. Yes.

Q. "But whatever they may claim to do for Chungking against Japan, the actual developments of the world situation are such that they cannot be as much concerned with China as before."

A. As before?

Q. As before. "But whatever they may claim to do for Chungking against Japan, the actual developments of the world situation are such that they cannot be as much concerned with China as before." You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "To help Chungking effectively is now impossible. The principal scene of battle has already shifted to Europe and the Chinese scene has gradually been relegated to the background."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "This is quite natural since the principal actors, or more aptly, the stage directors, of the Sino-Japanese drama have become engrossed in the European theatre and have neglected the China scene."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "Without these, Anglo-American ringleaders, Japan and China, being racially and culturally brother nations of Asia, ought to be able to come to an understanding."

You said that?

A. Yes.

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- Q. "Chiang Kai-shek, however, is still under an illusion, being unaware of the fundamental changes in the world situation which are rapidly overtaking him, as well as of the change in character which the China affair has gradually undergone."
- A. Yes.
- Q. "Chiang continues his resistance against Japan, still relying upon British and American assistance, but the time will surely and shortly come, when he will come to wish to take back what he has said and done. This may or may not take place when it is too late."
- A. Yes.
- Q. You said that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right. "We must not forget, however, that those international mischief-makers, who are now temporarily engaged elsewhere, will sooner or later reappear in East Asia to play their old game. So we cannot afford to be idle in their temporary absence."
- A. Yes.
- Q. "Even if they are defeated in Europe, they are not nations which will completely withdraw from such an international game."
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right. "Indeed, when they are shut out of Europe, Asia will prove an even greater attraction, and they will unquestionably concentrate their efforts on the affairs of this part of the world."
- A. Yes.
- Q. "Since Japan's plan of establishing a sphere of common prosperity in greater East Asia is what they consider an encroachment on their interests, Britain and the United States will oppose it with Greater vigour than in the case of the China affair."
- A. You said that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. "In view of such circumstances, we must bear in mind that our country's position will not be made easier through their defeat alone, not to speak of the possibility of its growing worse in case of their victory in Europe."

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "As for Germany, she will not be able to rest content by merely defeating or even occupying Britain in Europe. The German-British struggle will not come to a conclusion by such developments alone. It is to be expected that Britain will move her navy to her Asiatic colonies, Canada or Australia, and try to continue her resistance."

A. Yes.

Q. "Besides, it seems now a foregone conclusion that the United States will participate openly in the war when her preparations are completed, though her immediate entry is problematical, as she is not at present prepared, and, moreover, there exists a division of opinion in that country regarding her involvement in the war."

A. Yes.

Q. "Nevertheless with President Roosevelt taking an attitude as if he were already in the war, American participation must be considered inevitable, although when she will cast her lot is another question."

A. Yes.

Q. "At any rate, the United States is now virtually a belligerent, whatever name she may choose to adopt to cover up her actual belligerency."

A. Yes.

Q. "Under these conditions, the war is bound to be protracted for an extraordinarily long time throughout the world. "

A. Yes.

Q. "It may continue for ten, nay, twenty years, and Japan will naturally be involved."

A. Pardon?

Q. "Under these conditions, the war is bound to be protracted for an extraordinarily long time throughout the world. It may continue for ten, nay, twenty years, and Japan will naturally be involved."

A. Yes.

Q. "This is clear enough from the Tripartite Pact."

A. Yes.

Q. "Such an eventuality may, from one point of view, be considered an

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expansion of the China affair into a general world war, and from the other, a merger of the Eastern and Western conflicts. Be it what may, it is clear as day that Japan can never remain aloof from such a world-wide conflagration."

A. Yes. Aloof.

Q. "There are some in this country, who, perceiving the development of such a situation, are extremely apprehensive and try to stem the flames of such conflagration."

A. Yes.

Q. "Such an effort will after all serve no good purpose. History is eloquent in testifying to the truth that all great changes in human thought have resulted from long periods of struggles."

A. Yes.

Q. "No human power can check the overwhelming tide of a great movement of mankind - a movement which is in short an historic inevitability."

A. Yes.

Q. All right. "In meeting such a long-term world war, our nation should never be disconcerted or worried, much less should its effort run counter to the progression of the historic movement."

Did you say that?

A. Yes.

Q. "The writer may perchance be chided for voicing such an opinion by those who think otherwise - that it would be wholly impossible to endure the tribulations of war for ten or twenty years after going through the trials of the China affair for over three and a half years."

A. Yes.

Q. "He is, moreover, behind none in hoping for termination of the war as quickly as possible."

A. Yes.

Q. "But, in view of the trend of the times and its inevitable development, it is imperative that we should be fully prepared."

A. Yes.

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- Q. "That the ways and means employed to carry on the hostilities in the China affair are not appropriate to the coming occasion is clear enough. We must completely overhaul our methods for dealing with the coming extraordinary situation."
- A. Yes.
- Q. "It is true that the United States has amassed an enormous quantity of gold flowing into her coffers from various countries of the world, valued, it is said at \$100,000,000,000, while in Japan the people have been obliged to donate their rings, watches and other articles of gold for national purposes."
- A. Yes.
- Q. "If anyone thinks, however, that with such a difference in wealth Japan is no match for the United States, he is utterly mistaken."
- A. Yes.
- Q. "It is indeed a pity that one should be so blind to his own priceless treasure as to be envious of other's ephemeral wealth."
- A. Yes.
- Q. "The time already has passed when gold is essential for waging war."
You said that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. "Without a bit of gold, Germany has succeeded in preparing her gigantic armaments and is winning the war."
- A. Yes.
- Q. "The things that count in emergency are the harmony, spiritual power and industry of the people."
- A. Yes.
- Q. "We should never for a moment forget that the unique polity of our country and its concomitant virtues are, indeed, an inexhaustible source of our wealth and strength."
Did you say that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right. "Moreover, Japan is endowed with an enviable geographical

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position, which renders the country almost immune to war's havoc, in spite of the improvements made upon the instruments of war."

Q. You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "As regards the countries adjacent to her, China is in a position on which no comments are necessary, and our relations with the Soviet Union will progressively improve, leaving no cause for anxiety from that quarter."

A. Yes.

Q. "It is only on the Pacific side that we must keep watch. The Pacific, however, is a boundless ocean. It behooves us not to entertain unnecessary concern. In the invincible forces of our navy let us place our trust."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "In a long-term struggle, economic and ideological warfare becomes more important than an actual clash in arms. This method is, to use an analogy, a marathon race as compared to a battle on the field which would be likened to a short sprint. In a struggle of this kind serenity of mind and strong nerves are essential, for it is impossible to wage a long war with only a temporary tension of mind."

A. Yes.

Q. You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "There must be enough mental reserve to spare which will enable the people to improve their domestic conditions while they are also engaged in hostilities."

A. Yes.

Q. "The final object of constructing a defence-state lies in the adjustment of the internal structure which can cope with a long-term war."

You said that?

A. Yes.

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Q. "Its immediate purpose is to expand the country's productive power. But this can not be achieved unless the people are fully awake to the reality of the situation and give up every kind of self-indulgence."

A. Yes.

Q. "Even if the government may try to force its will on the people by legislation and authority, it will bring no good results if the people are not consciously receptive."

Did you say that?

A. Yes.

Q. "Human instincts and human nature must be put to practical use instead of being suppressed. We must, therefore, avoid any such method as will make the people feel unnecessarily despondent simply because of the requirements of wartime, and lose their hope for the future, although any relaxation of their mental attitude must be strictly guarded against."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "The extraordinary situation with which Japan has been confronted in recent years arise from very deep causes. Both the Manchurian incident and the China affair have been inevitable from the historical standpoint: they are not of our own making, -"

A. Yes.

Q. "- and no one of us alone is responsible for them. What we should do is to grasp the meaning of their historic inevitability. Frankly speaking, our people seem to have failed to be in dead earnest so far as their attitude toward the China affair is concerned, having made light of their opponent."

A. Yes.

Q. "Moreover, since the dregs of individualism and materialism have not altogether been eliminated from their thought, there have been various defects in the country's wartime system, resulting in complaints, decrease in production and failure of goods to appear on the market."

Did you say that?

A. Yes.

Q. "But, once the country is drawn into the great maelstrom of world war, whether we like it or not, the attitude of the people will naturally assume a grim determination to endure and overcome all difficulties: -"

A. Yes.

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Q. " - and so it should. Once preparations for a long and total war are completed on the basis of a new national structure along the lines of a high-power defence-state, we can well expect the country to overcome all dangers, with its future full of promise."

You said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "The present conflicts in the East and West are fundamentally traceable to the fact that the old order has reached its limits throughout the world."

A. Yes.

Q. "Its defeat is a matter of course. If, however, after the life-and-death grapple between the new and old orders at enormous sacrifices, the old order emerges victorious, making the efforts of the new order so much waste of energy, lives and blood, it will be a retrogression of human society, which we can never bear with."

A. On the whole, I think I did write those things.

Q. I might say it is a well written article and it shows thought.

A. It is a shame after what happened, but I still -

Q. At the time it was -

A. Still I think there would be a better world. I never lost that hope. And the other article you have about me, what is it?

Q. I have some more, but I didn't bring them.

I, Ruth F. Anderson, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I, Worth E. McKinney, a civilian, certify that on the 29th day of March 1946, personally appeared before me Toshio Shiratori and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

2 April 1946

INTERROGATION OF

Toshio Shiratori

Date and Time: 28 March 1946, 1415-1530 Hours

Place : Sugamo Prison

Present : Toshio Shiratori
Worth E. McKinney, Interrogator
Ruth F. Anderson, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. McKinney

Interrogation taken in English.

- A. May I make a few remarks about what I said yesterday? I am afraid I may have given you the idea that I had anything to do with this idea of Greater East Asia. It was explained to you from the standpoint of what was in the minds of KONOYE and MATSUOKA when they used this word. My purpose was that, when I made any public statement to that effect. They wanted to exclude the Asiatic people from economic and political exploitation. That is not what they said, but that was in the mind, I think, of people who advocated that. That was first used in KONOYE's public statement when he formed the Cabinet, and that first came in a document, in this treaty with Germany and Italy, which MATSUOKA used it in. Greater East Asia can not be, I remember, used before that in an official way. Much less, I didn't invent this word or I didn't have any special idea of my own on that point.
- Q. Then you think MATSUOKA was the first man that used that?
- A. In an official document, yes. The same idea was what Mr. SUN YAT SEN used in a speech in Kobe. He accepted the word. Greater Asia is the word I think he used, and then there was something, an association, Great Asia Association after SUN YAT SEN made his speech called the Great Asia idea.
- Q. How long ago was that?
- A. Before SUN YAT SEN died. He made a very famous speech in Kobe advocating that China and Japan should cooperate to rid Asia of the domination of the white races, and that was adopted, of course, by many Japanese. When MATSUOKA used that word, I think he had that in mind.
- Q. How many years ago would you say that was? About what year, that this speech was made?

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- A. I think it was - at least the China Revolution was nearly thirty years old. It was -
- Q. It was before the last world war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Before the last world war?
- A. Yes. He has many daughters. Mrs. Chiang Kai Shek is one. He is called the father of the Chinese Revolution.
- Q. So SUN YAT SEN was the one who first introduced this idea of Greater East Asia for the Asiatics? That is his idea?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, you say that after he made this speech, a great many Japanese took up the idea?
- A. Yes. In their mind there was always the object that Japan and China should cooperate together, so when this China affair came up, that put an end to this idea, because Japan and China were the principal actors in this idea and were at loggerheads with each other. That is why this Great Asia Association of Japan disbanded itself as soon as this China affair happened.
- Q. But even though this association disbanded, there were still certain people in Japan that had this idea in their minds and adopted it for Japan?
- A. Well, yes. Some Japanese thought even without China we should work for that purpose.
- Q. For Japan to go ahead with the idea?
- A. Yes, and the Chinese would come ahead and join us later.
- Q. So instead of having China and Japan as the leaders in the development of Greater East Asia, after the China incident certain people in Japan decided that they would go ahead with it but have Japan as the leader alone?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, who would you say was the most predominant in the expansion of this idea after the China Incident? Who do you think started it and carried it on?
- A. Well, no person in a predominant position, but the idea spread itself pretty widely.

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- Q. You say you think MATSUOKA had that in mind when he drew the Tri-Party Pact? Weren't there some leaders in the Japanese government prior to that time that had this same idea and maybe talked about it and advanced the theory?
- A. Well, always the generals had that idea.
- Q. The generals of the army?
- A. Generals of the army.
- Q. Many of them you think had this idea and made statements?
- A. I don't think they made any formal statement, but they gave expression to such idea on several occasions.
- Q. Can you name some of them?
- A. General MAZANE and General KIKUCHI. They are all here I think. Many people -
- Q. Now, who else was there? Any other leaders that you know of?
- A. Not now, but there have been a number of people.
- Q. No more that you can think of now? But the generals you have named?
- A. No.
- Q. Where did they make these statements? In the press or just general talk?
- A. Perhaps lectures they made these. Generals don't write for newspapers or magazines much, but they generally give interviews and all these things.
- Q. Do you know whether or not this idea was expressed by either one of the generals you have mentioned above in the press in an interview?
- A. I don't know. It would be awfully difficult to get any newspaper man who would -
- Q. But you recall they did make such statements?
- A. I have a vague remembrance that they made them. At any rate, these people entertained such idea. That was true.
- Q. Then since the generals that you have named and others were in favor of this idea of Japan working alone for greater East Asia? That is where the army under officers got the idea?
- A. Japan working alone is not the important part. They expected the Chinese

to come in later, even if we were fighting with Chiang Kai Shek. There was the Nanking government you know. People under that government were in cooperation with Japan. They, of course, agreed that these Nanking people should come with us from the start, so when Japan thought she would be alone the leader of the Far East, they always counted upon leaders of China to cooperate.

- Q. But when, after the China Incident, when China wouldn't respond to this idea, then certain leaders in Japan decided by aggression to take over the territory, didn't they?
- A. Well, these people who were for this Greater East Asia idea, were opposed to this China venture, I think. They wanted to have this thing ended up, to put an end to it as soon as possible. I think they worked for that. I think of another name. Kenji ISHIWARA, who was the center of the Manchurian affair. He had an organization called Asia League.
- Q. About when was that formed? About what year?
- A. I think fourteen or fifteen years ago.
- Q. That was about 1928 or 1929?
- A. Yes. I think about that time. I remember there were many Chinese too. Perhaps a branch in China.
- Q. Was it a very large organization? Did many people join it?
- A. Yes, quite a number of people.
- Q. What was the purpose of this organization?
- A. It was the same language, I think. The re-organization of Asia. The leaders of Japan and China was the abstract idea he gave us.
- Q. Did any members of the Army or Navy join this association that you know of?
- A. Well, Navy or Army men in active service are not allowed to become members of such organizations. They may have been sympathizers, but they never joined as members.
- Q. The function of this association? What was it to be? To propagandize and built up the public in favor of it?
- A. Well, they made speeches, I think. Speech making meetings were held very often, otherwise they were trying to get members to their organization.

- Q. Right after the Mukden Incident, the Manchurian Incident, whatever you want to call it, I believe at that time, by your speaking and your writing you gained quite some favor with the army, did you not?
- A. I was in the favor of the army?
- Q. Yes, on account of your ability to write and to speak well, by being outspoken, as you say?
- A. As I explained to you, sir, my connection with the army began when Baron YOSHIZAWA said he couldn't do anything with the head of the army. The Foreign Minister wanted us younger men to go to the younger men in the army and ask their real intention and so report to him, you know. It started in that way, and YOSHIZAWA saw that it was quite impossible for him to insist upon his idea, his own policy, quite apart from that of the army. He knew that he had to compromise to some extent with the army's insistence or policies. I was made to go with the other young officers in the Foreign Office, to become the instrument of that liaison with the army. There began my connection with the army people and people, for instance, the papers and all these things, you know, saying that the Foreign Office, saying they acquiesced in the policy enacted by the Foreign Office, while it is not the case. Even since, my name became known to the people generally as pro-military.
- Q. You were sent by the Foreign Office to talk with these younger officers?
- A. The young officers in the War Ministry came to the Foreign Office in the beginning of the Manchurian affair almost every other day. They came to the Foreign Office to the office of the Director of the Asiatic Affairs, Mr. TANI is his name. TANI was Chief of the Asiatic Bureau. I was head of the Information Bureau. They came to TANI's bureau almost every other day for conferences, and I attended these conferences pretty often.
- Q. What did you discuss there? Was it discussed what the army intended to do about the expansion in Manchuria and later in China?
- A. No, those things, what the army intended, they didn't let us know very well, but they wanted to know our idea, how to fight the matter at Geneva, in the League of Nations, how to answer to America, and those things. On matters especially concerned with foreign countries and diplomacy or legal aspects, they consulted us.
- Q. And you got the credit then for working the thing out satisfactorily to the army and to the Foreign Office?
- A. To the Foreign Office. That is the beginning of my connection in public with the army.
- Q. Then you were in the newspaper? Why, you were built up as being the man

that was able to get the Foreign Office and the army together in the program that they were carrying on?

A. Yes. Well, I don't - that wouldn't go against my conscience. I felt that I could do service to my country and keep the people from going too far or committing excess.

Q. You were able to accomplish this by the conferences you had with the leaders of the army, to get the Foreign Office and the army together on a policy?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, now the army didn't promise to stop advancing in China, did they, or in Manchuria?

A. Yes, I think they said they were not going beyond the great walls time and time again before I went to Scandinavia, so I was quite sure they would never pass the greatwall, but they did to my great surprise, they did, and they started things there which they said they would never do.

Q. Now, the Foreign Office then agreed with them. It was all right what they had conquered to hold that, but not to go any farther? That was the agreement?

A. That was about the ~~limit~~ the Foreign Office could go with the army.

Q. In other words, you told them, as a representative of your Foreign Office, you have conquered Manchuria. Hold what you have. Don't go any farther, and we can straighten it out with the foreign nations?

A. We said we would do our best to straighten it out with the foreign nations and we hoped we might induce America in time to recognize Manchuria as long as we were not going to monopolize the situation there.

Q. After you agreed on this question, as a representative of the Foreign Office, and the army didn't stop, what did you do then when they went ahead and took more territory?

A. They never told us they were going to take more territory. I would have opposed it.

Q. What I am asking you is this. After you reached this agreement and thought everything was settled, then the army, without notifying you did go out and take new territory. They did march further and take territory they hadn't conquered before?

A. Nobody in the army ever said they were going to take new territory.

- Q. I know they didn't say that, but they did take new territory.
- A. For military purposes they did.
- Q. After they did take the new territory, as you say, for military purposes, did you talk to them and tell them that is not what they agreed to?
- A. The Foreign office didn't agree to any expansion, taking of any more territory. They were for stopping it, putting an end to this China mess as soon as possible.
- Q. What did they -
- A. That point was made very clear by Prince KONOYE, that Japan was not for annexation of any territory for any indemnity of other things -
- Q. Here. What I am trying to ask you is this. When the army did go ahead and take new territory, did you, as a representative of the Foreign Office, tell them they had broken their promise and they would have to stop that?
- A. Well, but their promise as it was made, was not made formally. It was only a few army officers that said that we wouldn't go any farther to officers of the Foreign Office. Only private talk.
- Q. Didn't the Foreign Office ever notify the army that was in Manchuria and in parts of China that if they kept going on and taking new territory there would be no way to explain their action to the United States and England and other countries of the world?
- A. I think it would have been very difficult for the Foreign Office to explain things to the satisfaction of England or America.
- Q. I am not asking you that, I am asking you, did you say anything to the army? What did you do to stop them from taking new territory?
- A. I don't know. I was not in Japan since the Manchurian affair. Three long years I was in Scandinavia. I had nothing to do. I had not a single friend either in the Army or the Navy. I don't know what was in their minds. When I came back the situation in North China was so strained it seemed pretty hard to stop it and it almost naturally drifted into this state of war. But the Emperor never formally recognized it. He never declared war on China, so this China war was always considered more or less not as a war by Japan because without the approval of the Emperor it is not right for any Japanese to engage in any war, so the China affair was always called the China affair, not China war.
- Q. Not war?

- A. But the military was doing a thing quite against the constitution of the country, without the desire of the Emperor, so every thinking man in Japan wanted to have this thing stopped as soon as possible. Many other things we did, for instance, conclusion of the treaty with Germany and Italy was, as I told you, for the purpose of moving England and America to coming to the help of this element in Japan, to strengthen their hand, and, you know, to suppress the influence of the military as far as possible, and withdraw from China unconditionally except concerning Manchukuo, about which we had every reason to hope that it would be possible to come to terms with China with the approval of America and England. To influence America I thought this: to approach Germany and Italy would be effective. My experience in America in the First World War when I was there, my uncle Viscount Michi came there on a war mission and concluded this agreement concerning Manchuria and America recognized Japan's position in Manchuria, because when America wanted to fight Germany, she wanted to be quite safe about Japan. Although we were an ally of England, America still didn't feel us quite a safe power. They wanted to stop us, you know. Any nation behind their back, and so they allowed us this special position in Manchuria. That matter being so near to me personally, my uncle being connected with this treaty, and I was pleased by the honor, by the important experience, you know. That remained in my mind all the time. This time America is going to fight Germany again, and if she is going to fight Germany, America would be willing to help Japan out with this China mess if we stayed neutral or if possible favorable to the side of America and England.
- Q. But, now -
- A. That is my idea of it. It was a very dangerous game and playing with fire, but Japan's position was desperate at that time.
- Q. How could that be true? Take the wording of the pact. Because if America attacked Germany or Italy, Japan had bound herself to side against America, hadn't she?
- A. On the face of the treaty, that was not phrased in that way. It was strictly defensive and no mention of America was made.
- Q. What was said on the face of the treaty, the sense of it?
- A. I don't remember very well. There were many drafts. But the idea was Japan and Germany and Italy didn't want any war. They wanted to strengthen their political position in their respective spheres. Japan had the position in view in China and Germany about her conditions or wishes or desires, I think she had Czechoslovakia and Poland in view. Italy had the situation in the Mediterranean. Each had that in view and each hoped we might avoid war and attain our purposes, legitimate purposes. That was the contention, and I thought it was quite lawful. We had no particular nation in view as a potential enemy. We just wanted

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to strengthen our position.

- Q. It could be aimed at but two nations. You excluded Russia all the time. It couldn't be aimed at any nation but the United States and Great Britain.
- A. We had nothing against the United States or Britain.
- Q. These were the only two nations that could bother you, were they not?
- A. At any rate, it was a defensive treaty. Even in that sense, the Japanese government didn't want to have it made into a general treaty, alliance. They wanted some reservation concerning America and England.
- Q. If you were going to have a reservation for the United States and England, there would be no use entering into a pact?
- A. That is what Germany said.
- Q. It would be just a piece of paper worth nothing?
- A. That wasn't quite the case, but Japan didn't want that treaty in earnest. It just wanted as a gesture to use it, and Germany did use it. She used it in concluding this non-aggression pact with Moscow while Japan did nothing.
- Q. Japan made one too later, didn't she? She made a non-aggression pact?
- A. Afterward.
- Q. But you used this treaty, pact?
- A. Germany didn't use the pact, but the effect of our negotiation. We ought to have done the same. That was my idea.
- Q. Then Germany would have Russia out of the way and you would have Russia out of the way. Each one would have a non-aggression pact. That would just leave the United States and Great Britain that would interfere with anything you were doing?
- A. Well, yes.
- Q. So it was bound to be aimed at Great Britain and the United States, this Tri-Party Pact?
- A. Well -
- Q. Just answer that? It was bound to be aimed at them whether for peaceful means or for aggression.

A. What it applies -

Q. This Tri-Party Pact, the way it was worded, it could be used to bluff the United States? It could be used that way, couldn't it? Because you had strength now, because you could call on Germany and Italy if America attacked you for military aid?

A. But from my experience and my knowledge of American policy, American sentiment, I thought it almost impossible for America to attack either Germany or Japan, so Japan was quite safe in concluding that treaty. That is what I thought, but Germany might attack, and Japan even might attack America, but America would never take any overt action from her side. I was quite sure about that, so unless we wanted war I thought it was pretty safe, and I thought our statesmen, people around the Emperor, never wanted any war with America, so while I might be considered a wild man or a dangerous man, it does not matter if it wouldn't bring any real danger to Japan. I thought I could take some chance on being called names. That is why I so openly advocated the treaty while it was not known whether it would be made or not. I knew the length to which Japan can go. During the China war when it was only two years old, Japan was too exhausted. Prince KONOYE in the Diet applied his handkerchief to his eyes. He said this is my responsibility and I don't know how to put an end to this affair and all that. All the members of Parliament wept, shed tears, with him. Japan was so hard pressed for this war with China when it was only two years old, we didn't know how Japan could make her mind up to fight America or England, to big nations, when her military equipment was so poor and all that, so I thought it was quite safe to conclude this treaty with Germany. Even today I don't know how they made up their mind to attack America. I really don't understand.

Q. Well, wasn't this the reason they decided to attack Pearl Harbor? Because Germany was getting along pretty good in Europe, it looked like Germany was going to take Europe, and they thought this is the time for us to take Greater East Asia?

A. I believe that is what they thought. They attached too much importance to the apparent successes of Germany.

Q. It looked as if Germany was going to take over and dominate Europe under the Pact, and Japan thought, well, now is the time for us to take over Greater East Asia, so we can dominate Greater East Asia?

A. I am afraid so.

Q. That is really what happened, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, whom do you think was responsible for causing the attack on Pearl Harbor? Who planned it and was responsible for it?

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- A. I was sick, you know, from the early part of April that year, 1941. I was seriously taken ill, and didn't recover until the Spring of the next year. Fully one year or a little over one year I was entirely retired and unable to see any one. I was very, very seriously sick. I don't know what happened at all.
- Q. You read about it?
- A. I didn't even read newspapers.
- Q. Were you sick in December when that attack occurred?
- A. Yes, very bad. I had a relapse in November again. It was a brain disease. I didn't have any consciousness for more than three weeks. When I came to myself, I found myself in the hospital in April. I didn't know when MATSUOKA came back from his trip to Europe.
- Q. The attack on Pearl Harbor couldn't have been planned and executed without the War Minister and the Minister of the Navy and the heads of the Army and Navy being in it could, it?
- A. I think not. I don't know. Probably it is purely a strategic question. I think the War Minister and the Navy Minister would be consulted.
- Q. The cabinet would have to approve that too, wouldn't it?
- A. I don't know. Perhaps not.
- Q. Why wouldn't the Cabinet have to approve it?
- A. Of course, the Cabinet must first decide in case of necessity Japan go to war with America. If that fundamental point is settled with the approval of the Prime Minister and the other ministers, when to attack and where to attack must be left to the Navy and Army, I think, so I can't see actually how to begin the war was in the hands of the War and the Navy Ministers.
- Q. Didn't the Cabinet pass on whether or not Pearl Harbor would be attacked?
- A. I don't think the Cabinet would pass on that. It would be militarily technically dangerous.
- Q. The Cabinet did pass on ~~it~~ that Japan was going to war with America before Pearl Harbor was attacked?
- A. I don't know. Perhaps they did, I think.
- Q. Wasn't it in the newspapers, and wasn't it generally talked that the Cabinet had decided to declare war against the United States?

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- A. What I remember in the newspapers was that there was an important Cabinet meeting in July under Prince KONOYE whether we should go to war or not.
- Q. I will ask you if they didn't decide at that time they would have to go to war?
- A. I don't think that they came to any definite decision.
- Q. When did they decide they would actually attack or go to war with the United States? What month?
- A. I don't know anything about that, but there are people who ought to know.
- Q. Who could tell me that?
- A. All the members of the TOJO Cabinet ought to know that, and perhaps Marquis KIDO and HIRANUMA. The important persons must know.

I, Ruth F. Anderson, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I, Worth E. McKinney, a civilian, certify that on the 28th day of March 1946 personally appeared before me Toshio Shiratori and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

1 April 1946

INTERROGATION OF

Toshio Shiratori

Date and Time: 27 March 1946, 1415-1530 Hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Toshio Shiratori
Worth E. McKinney, Interrogator
Ruth F. Anderson, stenographer

Questions by : Mr. McKinney

Interrogation taken in English.

- Q. I believe the last time we were talking we were discussing a secret protocol or letters to the Tri-Party Pact. I think that is about the last question we had. I believe your answer was that you didn't remember about whether they had them or not?
- A. There is a letter exchanged between MATSUOKA the Foreign Minister and STAHRER, I think, about the disposition of the former German colonies. We didn't attach much importance to that, so I didn't remember. I just forgot.
- Q. Wasn't that letter used to influence the Privy Council to pass on the Tri-Party Pact? Wasn't that the plan?
- A. I don't know. Perhaps not.
- Q. Didn't MATSUOKA tell STAHRER that he wanted something to offer to the Privy Council to get them to sign the Tri-Party Pact?
- A. If I remember correctly, I think that is rather in the nature of a concession from Japan to Germany.
- Q. Well, now, by that secret letter, Germany agreed to sell for a nominal sum these former islands or possessions that they had if they won the war?
- A. But reserving some for herself. Germany had entirely lost these islands. She had no right to them. If she could recover them by means of Japan's armed forces and she could get back something that would be to her interest instead of any favor to Japan. I don't think that had anything to do with influencing the Privy Council.

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- Q. Then, at the time -- In September 1940, at the time of the signing of the Tri-Party Pact, MATSUOKA, OSHIMA, and you discussed the former German islands. Then it was discussed among you?
- A. There was no discussion. It was entirely between MATSUOKA and STAMMER. It wasn't submitted to any conference of the persons concerned.
- Q. Well, then, MATSUOKA and STAMMER knew at that time then, or thought that at that time Germany was going to win the war and would naturally take these islands over?
- A. Perhaps she was afraid that in case Germany won and recovered those islands Japan's position would be weakened. I think that is perhaps what Mr. MATSUOKA said. I never had any discussion with him about that matter. In fact, about the contents of the pact, actually concluded. He never consulted his advisers. He had perhaps consulted Prince KONOYE, I don't know. At any rate, the thing was concluded so speedily, in a matter of only a few days, and KONOYE approved. The Emperor perhaps also.
- Q. Well, now, if the Tri-Party Pact was the peaceful instrument, as you said before, how did Japan expect to get these islands unless Germany was aggressive and won the war?
- A. Of course, if Germany won, that would mean that France and England and Holland were beaten in Europe, so their possessions in the Pacific would perhaps fall to Germany. That is what Japan was afraid of, and if there was any commitment made by Germany in advance, Japan's position would be improved. I think that is the line of reasoning we had.
- Q. Then MATSUOKA, OSHIMA, and you knew at the time the Tri-Party Pact was signed that Germany had planned to conquer France, England, and Europe?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You knew that?
- A. It was pretty likely at the early stages of the war. Both the United States and Russia remained outside, and France was almost crushed at that time, I think.
- Q. That was before the advance on France, wasn't it, when the Tri-Party Pact was signed? September 1940?
- A. The advance on France was in June, wasn't it, of that year?
- Q. Probably was 1940. Then the Tri-Party Pact wasn't considered as a peaceful instrument, then was it, by Japan?
- A. Of course, it was called a military alliance. Generally it was supposed to be a peaceful pact. It was strictly defensive we said, and unless

either Germany, Italy or Japan were attacked, there would never be war, but whether we are attacked or not is a matter of consideration. It depends on whether we were attacked by a third party.

- Q. But even before the war started with the United States and with England at the signing of the Tri-Party Pact, Japan, before she did sign the Tri-Party Pact, asked Germany to concede to her possessions of France, Dutch, and England, didn't it, in the Pacific?
- A. We didn't mention any other possessions of France or Germany or Holland or England, but just only former Germany colonies were mentioned by name. The rest were covered by this word leadership. Japan should have leadership in East Asia.
- Q. That meant to dominate militarily, and economically?
- A. Well, in fact, at that time, if I remember correctly, that term was never defined by any board. I don't know what was in MATSUOKA's mind.
- Q. Wasn't that term so plain it does not need being defined?
- A. What is meant by leadership is an important matter. They never tried to define it.
- Q. How can you have leadership unless you dominate politically, economically, and militarily any country that is free?
- A. As I told you often, I didn't have any idea -
- Q. Let's not go into your idea. Isn't that the only definition you could give on that leadership?
- A. If you say sphere of influence, I think that amounts to the same thing.
- Q. How could Japan have leadership of some other nation unless she could dominate it now? They wouldn't listen to Japan unless you could dominate and put into effect -
- A. I think the plan was that Germany would win and the possessions of England, France, and Holland would be without any mistress. In that case, Japan would perhaps be the leading power in the Far East, but the leading power in the Far East would be allowed the leadership unless the conqueror, Germany, insisted on her rights of the conquest. That was the point of the greatest importance.
- Q. And Japan was willing to pay Germany for those islands. You said for a consideration. That means pay, doesn't it?
- A. Germany -

Q. Well, just answer that. That was in this letter?

A. It is a very difficult -

Q. It was in there, wasn't it?

A. Well -

Q. You know that was in there?

A. If the treaty is a matter of give and take, that is perhaps what Japan was willing -

Q. You were going to pay for those islands, pay Germany if she won the war?

A. Yes, but I personally thought that it was Germany does that they should refrain from having her way in the Far East.

Q. And Japan was going to pay money to Germany and take the islands over?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you mean to tell me you were in the Foreign Office, a representative of your country, and don't know that?

A. I wasn't a representative.

Q. You had been ambassador to Rome at that time?

A. No.

Q. You had returned from Rome?

A. I was then -

Q. You were advisor to the Foreign Office right at that time?

A. Yes, advisor.

Q. Do you mean to tell me that as advisor to the Foreign Office you didn't know anything about what they intended to do?

A. It is on the face of it. It is very clear in the treaty.

Q. What is the use of having an advisor to the Foreign Office if they don't talk to him?

A. Actually MATSUOKA didn't consult me at all. I can say it was very seldom I saw him.

- Q. He didn't have to consult you. You had already made your position plain prior to that time in public utterances, hadn't you?
- A. As far as America getting in this treaty it is true, but what motive is another question, but MATSUOKA had his own idea.
- Q. You were one of the strongest men for the Tri-Party Pact in late 1938 or 1939 Japan had, weren't you?
- A. On what appears in the papers I was, maybe so.
- Q. You were the leader of it?
- A. No, sir, not the leader.
- Q. One of them? You took a very prominent part in trying to make the alliance of the Tri-Party Pact with Germany and Italy back in 1938? You advocated that?
- A. 1939.
- Q. 1939.
- A. But that treaty, that negotiation came to nothing, and an entirely new thing was concluded.
- Q. I know it, but the one that came to nothing, you were very active in trying to get it through -
- A. The situation had entirely changed.
- Q. I didn't ask you if it changed. I asked you if at first you didn't work on it and didn't try to put it through with all your efforts, used all your efforts -
- A. Yes, I used my efforts in the direction of concluding the treaty.
- Q. And I will ask you if the reason you were not appointed ambassador to Rome is because of the fact you had worked so hard on the Tri-Party Pact, trying to do something for your government, strengthen your government.
- A. Yes, I thought it would help Japan in a diplomatic way, in the way I explained to you the other day, that that would place a trump card in Japan's hand.
- Q. And you worked hard to get that trump card for Japan?
- A. I did all I could as ambassador with instructions from my government. I never went against instructions.

- Q. I don't know so well about that. You were accused of getting a little too strong a time or two.
- A. I was generally accused of that, but it was not the case.
- Q. Didn't the Foreign Minister and quite a few people in Japan accuse you of going too far to make this alliance?
- A. I am too outspoken for them to like. That was the case from the time of the Manchurian affair. I was outspoken and I generally disclosed things which were considered strictly secret, and I had many newspaper men friends to whom I disclosed too much.
- Q. But you always talked in favor of the military clique, didn't you? The plans that they had?
- A. No, but you couldn't go against that atmosphere.
- Q. You knew what the military clique had planned?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. How did you talk for them if you didn't know what they had planned?
- A. I didn't talk for them. I didn't know what was in their mind, but what did become Japan's policy and was translated into facts, we had to try to explain them in a way that would be acceptable.
- Q. In other words, you had to spread propaganda to prepare the people of Japan for what the military clique had planned?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. That is what you did?
- A. What I did was to explain to them.
- Q. That is propaganda.
- A. For instance, after the Chinese affair happened, I had to explain to them in a way that would be acceptable to them, but I never worked in any way for the China affair. I was one of the most strongly opposed to Japan going into China Proper.
- Q. You may have been strongly opposed to it, but your talks, your speeches, and your public utterances made the military clique think you were right for them?
- A. No, but if you didn't advocate it, you had to say things or the criminal would -

- Q. You have to talk to please the criminal, don't you?
- A. Not please a criminal, but to explain the case as far as possible.
- Q. If you explained it and it was against the wishes of the criminal, you would get in trouble, wouldn't you?
- A. People might consider me as one of them. I wouldn't care for that.
- Q. I will ask you if you weren't from 1931 on up until the end of the war considered a friend of the military clique that was aggressive in Manchuria and in China?
- A. I am not a friend of theirs, but I am a Japanese. Being Japanese I had to side with them. Not side with them, but try to cast a plausible and as bright a surface as possible on the things they had done.
- Q. What you were trying to do then was to sort of cover up and pacify the public and make them pleased with what the military clique had done?
- A. Not so much the inside public, but the outside world.
- Q. You were sent out to explain that it wasn't wrong, what the military clique was doing? It was the right thing as far as Japan was concerned?
- A. It is generally the instructions of the government in sending ambassadors and ministers abroad.
- Q. You were sent out for that purpose, to defend Japan's policies in China and in Manchuria, weren't you?
- A. As far as possible.
- Q. Well, you knew, you were a sensible man, that it was wrong for Japan to go over and violate treaties and to invade and conquer another country, didn't you?
- A. Well, if -
- Q. Just answer that question. You knew that was wrong?
- A. Yes.
- Q. But in spite of knowing that was wrong, you accepted a position with your government to go out and try to pacify other nations and defend Japan's policy in China?

- A. Yes, that is the position every Japanese official had to take.
- Q. Well, you did that willingly?
- A. Yes, I won't deny that. Only the Japanese government tried its best to make it appear that what Japan did was not pure aggression or pure infringement of treaties. They tried their best, for instance, to put it in the light of self-defense and sometimes the treaties were too old now to adjust to a new situation. Of course they would have placed another construction upon their actions, and in that atmosphere we could defend the policy of our government of our government without doing much violence to our conscience.
- Q. In other words, what you were doing and what all the leaders of Japan were doing, you could do with a free conscience?
- A. In our quiet moments we were not without conscience visitations.
- Q. In other words, Japan thought that it wasn't wrong to take over Manchuria and govern it? Because it was beneficial to Japan? They didn't think that was wrong, did they?
- A. They didn't admit they were wrong.
- Q. And they always defended the policy of taking it to all the other nations, didn't they?
- A. Well -
- Q. You were the spokesman for them?
- A. Not the spokesman.
- Q. You were the spokesman, you were in the Foreign Office when all this was happening, in some capacity.
- A. Yes. Chief of the Information Bureau, but it is not in the sense you call, for instance, your president was called spokesman, but -
- Q. You had plenty of chances to talk and express your opinion and defend the acts of the military clique which you always did do?
- A. The military clique? No, I didn't have much chance. My contact with them is very slight.
- Q. I am not asking you about your contacts. You knew what they were doing in China and Manchuria, what the military were doing?

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- A. Generally we didn't know. For instance, when the Manchurian affair occurred, it was a bolt from the blue. When the China affair occurred, we didn't know anything. I wasn't in a position to know anything before hand. I was a minister coming back from Scandinavia and on the waiting list.
- Q. But after it happened, you knew?
- A. After the government defended it and the people supported it.
- Q. Then you had to go out and support it and talk in favor of it, which you did freely and voluntarily?
- A. I did as an individual.
- Q. And as an official of your government?
- A. Well, in the Manchurian -
- Q. In all of them?
- A. But in the China affair, I was out of an official assignment.
- Q. Then you talked personally?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And defended the action of Japan in taking over the territory, in what you were doing?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right, now. The Manchurian affair happened, or the Mukden affair as you call it, happened, and in 1937 the other, the Marco Polo Bridge incident happened?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When did the leaders of Japan decide on the new era for Greater East Asia. When was that decided, that there should be a new era for Greater East Asia?
- A. A new era? New order?
- Q. Call it what you want to.
- A. I don't know when it came.
- Q. Give me some idea. About what year it was. Was it in 1931?

- A. No, not so early.
- Q. What year would you say?
- A. I think Prince KONOYE was the one who started that expression.
- Q. About what date, would you say Prince KONOYE started it?
- A. In the first Cabinet.
- Q. During his first Cabinet?
- A. Yes.
- Q. All right. You were in favor of a Greater Era for East Asia, weren't you? A New Order for Greater East Asia?
- A. In favor of a New Order? But that new order was never plainly explained by anybody. Defined. Everybody had his own idea of New Order.
- Q. You had a pretty good idea of what it should be?
- A. Not necessarily. I tried to explain it to the people that new Asia should be so and so. I tried, but it is only my personal opinion.
- Q. You were an official connected with the Foreign Office all the time you were talking?
- A. Until -
- Q. From 1931 on through the war, you were connected with the Foreign Office practically all the time?
- A. A member of the Foreign Office.
- Q. A member of the Foreign Office in different capacities? And I believe your idea of a Greater East Asia was that Japan should take the leadership of the whole sphere? That was right?
- A. Well, not in that sense. Not domination, but new order is pretty well expressed, I think, in that explanation.
- Q. But we have not reached that. I am talking about when you began to talk about a new era for Greater East Asia.
- A. It doesn't support any leading nation. Japan and China would be the leading nations with Siam being the only dependent nation, but the idea, I think, was to rid Asia of exploitation, especially economic and political exploitation of white countries.
- Q. Your idea - right after KONOYE expressed this or started this phrase or whatever you call it of the new era, your idea was Greater East

Asia should be for the Japanese and for the Chinese?

A. Not for us.

Q. What?

A. Not for Chinese and Japanese, but a committee of Far Eastern nations independent and not being dominated politically or exploited economically. That is, I think, their peaceful idea.

Q. That was your idea?

A. Yes.

Q. And that meant the exclusion of all Caucasian races? English, French?

A. I mean the riddance of their political domination and exploitation. That is what SUN YAT SEN, the Chinese leader first advocated in his speech in Japan. Since then there came up in Japan the organization called the Great Asia Association. The fundamental idea is to free the Asiatic people from exploitation, from bondage. That is at the bottom of the whole idea.

Q. Now, you wanted Japan to be the leader of the whole thing, didn't you? Your nation? You expressed that opinion, didn't you?

A. I don't remember exactly. But Japan would naturally be the main person if force of arms must be employed.

Q. Don't you remember thinking back, you expressed that opinion publicly?

A. That is one statement I made, but I don't remember when and how.

Q. That was in your heart and in your mind? You wanted that?

A. That is, of course, not the main thing.

Q. Let's stick to this one question at a time. You were in favor of that? Japan leading?

A. Well, I didn't attach special importance to leadership of Japan.

Q. You were here. You were in the Foreign Office trying to help set the foreign policy of Japan, and you didn't want Japan to go forward and be the leader?

A. I -

Q. You wouldn't be very patriotic to your government if you were otherwise.

- A. That object can be obtained without any leadership.
- Q. I am not asking how you were going to obtain it, were you in favor of it?
- A. Not in such a blunt way as you express it.
- Q. That is just plain language. It all boils down to that, doesn't it? You might as well express it bluntly as to go around and express it softly.
- A. If Japan wanted to be the leader, if the leadership were used purely -
- Q. Let's don't get away from this. That was your idea, that she should be the leader?
- A. Japan would naturally be the leading nation.
- Q. And you thought she should be and expressed it? You know you said that.
- A. There was a great mental reservation.
- Q. But I want you to answer that and then defend it if you want to. You made those statements, didn't you?
- A. I don't remember. If you show me the speech or article I may perhaps remember, but I do not have any clear recollection of either having said or expressed the idea in that way, that Japan should be the leader. It is very possible. I may have, but I didn't attach such importance to that particular point.
- Q. That was the whole thing. There was no use of fooling with the Tri-Party Pact and doing all this work if Japan wasn't going to get to be the leader. That was the important thing you were all working for.
- A. The important thing was that Asiatic people should enjoy freedom.
- Q. Yes.
- A. And under whose leadership didn't matter very much.
- Q. Of course, since we have got that settled, that Japan was to be the leader, now we come to how she was going to attain this plan or the dream or whatever you want to call it. Here was the United States. They had possessions in the South Pacific, didn't they, at that time?
- A. In the Philippines.
- Q. Yes. Honolulu.

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- A. Honolulu was never considered as part of the Far East.
- Q. Not to begin with, but finally you did, didn't you?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. Didn't the circle just keep getting bigger and bigger?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Tell me this. What possessions did you consider first, to begin with? You say you didn't consider Honolulu. Name me the ones you first considered.
- A. I remember making a statement to some Japanese that this is a very queer treaty. We speak of Greater East Asia, but the sphere of Greater East Asia has never been defined. It has never been defined by anybody. The vague idea, as you say, sir, it might include very much, but it is only common sense that deals with that term. It pre-supposed the defeat of England and France and Holland, so what were dominated by those three countries, I think, was the conception. That was the first consideration.
- Q. So then after Germany was getting along so well in the war, the circle was increased to take in the Philippines?
- A. I never heard of the Philippines being included in that.
- Q. How about Honolulu?
- A. No, sir. I never heard of anything like that.
- Q. Then Japan had in mind that the possessions of Holland, France, and England would come to Japan at the end of the war? The leadership of those possessions would come to Japan?
- A. No, as independent nations, they formed part of this great committee of nations of Asia.
- Q. The plan was that these possessions were to be nations like Manchuria?
- A. I don't know what kind.
- Q. Well -
- A. It is very possible, but Manchuria was to grow into a real independent nation.
- Q. Under the control of Japan economically, politically, and militarily, wasn't it?

- A. That control of Manchukuo was to be decreased.
- Q. After they were peaceful and doing what you wanted to you could withdraw your armies, that was the plan?
- A. There was no necessity -
- Q. But wasn't it Japan's plan to take over the possessions of France, the Dutch, and the English and to put armies in there to control them until they got peaceful?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You know you couldn't do it any other way.
- A. As I told you when we concluded that Three Party Pact, there was no such concrete plan in the mind of any Japanese, I think, and since that -
- Q. Well, you had some sort of dream that that might happen, didn't you?
- A. I didn't have any such dream, any concrete plan of East Asia, I never dreamed of anything.
- Q. You made the statement publicly that East Asia should be for the yellow race, with the exclusion of the white, didn't you?
- A. No, sir. I never put my idea in such a term. Never. I saw it in the paper that I made such a statement somewhere, but I never could have, because I am not so narrow minded. I have no racial prejudice against anybody.
- Q. But what you meant by that is that you didn't mind the Caucasian people being there as long as the country was dominated politically, economically by Japanese.
- A. But that domination was to be thrown off, that yoke upon Asia, if it is thrown off, it would be a desirable thing, but that didn't mean to exclude white people.
- Q. You meant to let them come in, but still Japan would govern.
- A. Not Japan, but that particular nation.
- Q. Under the direction of Japan.
- A. I never said that.
- Q. But there wouldn't be any other way. That is common sense. Why go to all this trouble that you were going to to turn them lose?

- A. Why could they not be independent? China was independent and Siam was independent. If your western nations got hand of it, it would be much better off, I thought.
- Q. So you wanted to free these possessions from England, France, and Holland?
- A. Yes, from political and economic exploitation.
- Q. What was Japan going to get for freeing them? What did you have in mind for your country for freeing these people?
- A. Nothing.
- Q. You mean you were willing to go to war just to free these people and turn them loose?
- A. Japan would get an advantage. For instance, we could trade freely with the Dutch East Indies without any restrictions upon the export of oil and rubber.
- Q. So Japan was to get something out of it?
- A. We weren't dominating politically.
- Q. But after you freed them from Holland, England and France, if they wouldn't agree to trade with you you would have to conquer them?
- A. Well, we could try to make it to their interest to trade with us. That is what we had done, I thought. I think still.
- Q. So then Japan was willing to lend aid to Germany by going into this pact, Tri-Party Pact, so Germany would whip England and France and Holland so you could get these possessions, or get the right to trade with them without any interference?
- A. That could happen.
- Q. Isn't that what you had in mind?
- A. I didn't have anything so concrete in my mind, because, you know, it was in more a very vague contention. It was provided, on the proviso -
- Q. You misunderstand my question. You are trying to explain how it might be accomplished. I am asking if that wasn't what you wanted done if it could be done?
- A. As I told you, I have no definite idea. There are many ways of realizing the idea or dream I have just mentioned.

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- Q. You did have the idea, the dream, that that ought to happen? That these countries should be freed, these possessions, so Japan could trade with them unmolested?
- A. That was done, as far as that is concerned, that those people should be freed.
- Q. That they would be free and you could trade with them uninterrupted?
- A. Uninterrupted, yes.
- Q. Now, as you say, the method of what you would have to do to put into effect this plan, you didn't have a very concrete idea whether you could do it by treaty or by force at the time you entered into this agreement?
- A. When we concluded that treaty, nobody had any definite idea about what should be done.
- Q. Well, if these countries were going to be freed from the domination of their mother countries, did you have any plan about Japan governing or aiding and assisting in building up an independent government?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. You hadn't reached that point?
- A. No.
- Q. You say you thought that after these countries were freed from the domination of their mother countries that you could obtain the trade by treaty?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Well, now, was that ever discussed or anything said about the obligations of these countries? If they were freed, didn't they agree to sign a treaty with Japan for this trade? What were you supposed to do then?
- A. I didn't think of that.
- Q. You didn't get that far?
- A. No.
- Q. Well, you knew at that time that if they were freed and they were closer to Japan, you had an army and navy, that you could go in and take them over in a short time?
- A. I never thought Japan would be the only power with armed forces left.

America would be a strong country any way, and how could Japan have her own way in a district where everybody was interested, including the United States. We didn't have an exclusive control of the South West Islands in mind. Nobody, I think, entertained such an idea.

Q. But the first state, the first country you formed under this plan, you had exclusive control over that, didn't you? Manchuria?

A. Well, Manchuria we had.

Q. So the first step you made in the development of Greater East Asia, you did have full control of it?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, that worked pretty well, didn't it?

A. What was going on in Manchuria -

Q. Just answer that question. You had control of it?

A. In Manchuria?

Q. Yes.

A. We had to have control of it.

Q. Didn't the same thing follow in your plan there that as soon as one of these other possessions were freed, you would have to take control of that just like you did Manchuria before you could do any good with it? That is the only way it could be done, isn't it?

A. Not the only way.

Q. It is the only practical way?

A. It is very possible you might have done the same thing.

Q. So you would have to take over each one of them like you did Manchuria for Japan to get any benefit?

A. There is this difference, I think. In the case of Manchukuo, Manchukuo was a part of China. We had to go against the treaties with China. Against treaties, come into the League of Nations, and those things, but in case those colonies of the Western nations were to be, for instance, left adrift as a result of the defeat of their mother countries, the thing would be somewhat different. Perhaps we wouldn't have to go to any unlawful method.

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- Q. In other words, you thought that they would be weak and you had a big army and a big navy and when you went over there and told them you wanted to take over the trade here, they would be afraid to do anything else but sign up with you, and you wouldn't have to use your navy or army to get it?
- A. I didn't have such an idea. It is going too far.
- Q. But you didn't mind going far?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. If you got what you wanted?
- A. It was that I knew in a general way there should be a new order with no exploitation by other people and all that. Of course, I knew the record of the Japanese, and I didn't have much confidence about the Japanese people, especially the military, behaving all right.
- Q. The military? That is the people you have been talking for all the time.
- A. Not to them.
- Q. I mean talking to defend their actions.
- A. Not their action. No, sir. I was opposed, but of course I can not do it openly, publicly, but in private I talked against them, always opposed -
- Q. In private speech you opposed them, but in public you talked in favor of them.
- A. Because the Japanese government was condoning it or had adopted it as its policy.
- Q. And naturally, since the Japanese government had adopted it as its policy to defend them -
- A. Being part of the government I had to go ahead and defend them publicly, as far as that is concerned.
- Q. Now, you say these possessions, if they were freed from the mother country, you were going to keep them from being exploited by some other nation?
- A. Well, not keep them ourselves. I never said that.
- Q. What did you say about that?
- A. They would be a free nation, but I didn't enter into such detail at that stage. I never entered into such details and argument. I never remember having done that.

Q. You said this. That it would be all right for Japan to exploit them wouldn't it?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. Exploiting is not to be condoned by whomever it is done.

Q. You did the first country you took over? Japan exploited Manchuria?

A. That always is said to us, and that is where we have a poor case.

Q. That is right. A poor case. So the inference would be then, following up the plan you had started, to exploit the first country you took over, the interest would be to exploit them all if you followed the plan that you first started?

A. That would be very difficult.

Q. That would happen, wouldn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, when KONOYE first talked of this plan of Greater East Asia, did he have many followers in the government that thought -

A. KONOYE didn't speak of Greater East Asia. He only said new order.

Q. New order for Greater East Asia?

A. New order, including conditions in Japan proper. That it, of course, might wind up their policy in Manchukuo and their China policy. Japan was to turn over a new leaf. That would be new order in Japan itself and new order in Asia. It was quite an ideal plan he had in view. New order meant both ways to it. Internal new order, that was what KONOYE said.

Q. If he meant just an internal new order, why didn't he just say new order for Japan instead of East Asia, if he didn't intend to include other territory?

A. In that sense, there would be a new order of things politically, economically and socially perhaps in Japan Proper. He admitted the way Japan had been following was wrong. He wanted to mend her ways. For instance, especially he had political phases in view. The whole political party was all wrong. He wanted a new economy.

Q. Japan didn't take his suggestion, did it?

A. Many people followed. That is why -

- Q. But the people in power didn't take his suggestion, did they?
- A. That means -
- Q. That means whoever can rule the government? Military?
- A. Military, perhaps not.
- Q. Then they took the phrase that was starting a new order for Japan and made it a new order for Greater East Asia, didn't they?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You know that. You were here?
- A. No, sir. You are attaching too much importance to my position here, to the role I played. I am not a very important man. If I could in any way move in the military, I would have been promoted much more quickly and occupied a more important position.
- Q. Well, you pleased them so well that instead of demoting you, you were advancing all the time from 1931 on up until the start of 1939?
- A. But my promotion was before that. Until I became the head of the Information Bureau.
- Q. That is a rather important position, isn't it?
- A. Not so important as people abroad think. It had nothing to do with framing of the policy. It had to do with giving out of statements for the Foreign Office.
- Q. Why, even the military wanted you as Foreign Minister at one time?
- A. If the military wasn't so strong and I wasn't so strongly opposed to them, I might have been considered as Foreign Minister.
- Q. You and OSHIMA were on about a par standing, about equal with the military authorities?
- A. No, sir. I never considered OSHIMA a rival.
- Q. I will ask you if you and OSHIMA weren't both considered for Foreign Minister?
- A. When?
- Q. In 1939, before you were appointed to go to Italy? From the latter part of 1938?
- A. I don't think our names ever came into consideration.

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Q. Everybody in Japan knows that.

A. Everybody talks.

Q. Talks that you were mentioned for Foreign Minister and OSHIMA was.

A. It did not come true.

Q. There was one man who stood in your way?

A. No, sir. Who?

Q. You know who. He was just a little stronger.

A. In fact, my name never came in seriously as a candidate.

Q. But it was mentioned?

A. By newspapers, sir.

Q. Yes, carried in newspapers.

A. Newspapers only.

Q. And OSHIMA's name was carried in the newspapers?

A. I don't remember.

Q. You read it. It was right in the same paper?

A. I never thought of OSHIMA being able to become a Foreign Minister.

Q. Who was MATSUOKA?

A. That was the time of the conclusion of the treaty. MATSUOKA was an important man. He had friends and money.

Q. But he was a little more powerful than you, but you stood well enough with the military clique to be put up with MATSUOKA as Foreign Minister? You were considered? It was printed all over Japan, your name, that you would probably be Foreign Minister?

A. I might have been appointed once during the war. There were many Foreign Ministers.

Q. I am talking about back in 1938 or 1939.

A. I don't think my name seriously came into consideration.

Q. It was published in the newspapers?

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- A. Japanese newspapers carry all kinds of reports.
- Q. But the Japanese newspaper was suppressed. The only thing that went in the Japanese newspaper is what the government allowed to go in?
- A. Not at that time yet.
- Q. You mean in 1939 the Japanese newspaper wasn't censored or controlled by the government?
- A. About the news of Cabinet representatives or all that, they were controlled, but they were the freest papers in the world.
- Q. They were free when you were talking about important people in the government, weren't they?
- A. Not so free as you imagine.
- Q. You stood so high with your government, that it was all right for them to print that you would probably be named Foreign Minister? That wasn't censored, was it?
- A. Until later I felt -
- Q. I am not asking you how you feel. I am asking you if it wasn't printed.
- A. Very often my name was mentioned.
- Q. Mentioned as Foreign Minister?
- A. Possible candidate for Foreign Minister.
- Q. And MATSUOKA finally won out, didn't he?
- A. On the politics?
- Q. Yes, in 1938 or 1939?
- A. MATSUOKA was appointed.
- Q. Was appointed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you raised considerable trouble about that, didn't you?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Because you weren't named?
- A. No.

- Q. You were disappointed, weren't you?
- A. Disappointed?
- Q. Yes, that you didn't get that job?
- A. Well, I don't think so.
- Q. Don't tell me that. You know after being mentioned for Foreign Minister and then being defeated you were disappointed?
- A. Not disappointed. Of course, I didn't put forth any efforts to be nominated. For instance, KONOYE, I knew KONOYE pretty well. I might have called on him or asked him to get me nominated, but I never did anything, I never seriously thought I might become Foreign Minister, because my record is too well - I don't know how to put it. I was too outspoken. The Japanese politics are very queer things. No one who is too honest or too frank, too outspoken, is taken as a Cabinet member. No Prime Minister would think of having such a man as me as Foreign Minister. I know myself. I never dream or have any false ideas of myself, and I freely admitted then that MATSUOKA was a very much better man than myself. It was what made KONOYE choose him. I remember having told somebody to that effect. I was not born as an official. I was too free, too outspoken, a characteristic of mine which I contracted in my early years, in my five years in America.
- Q. If you had been outspoken against the policies of the military clique in the development of Greater East Asia, naturally you would have lost out politically in Japan?
- A. I would not have been allowed to say anything.
- Q. So you chose to talk then in favor of them so you could go forward?
- A. That was the case almost with everybody. But in my case, I was perhaps more free with pointing out the difficulties. The wrong done by the military, than most other people. I think I was apparently more outspoken in that respect than many of the others.
- Q. But that was done in private, not in public? You didn't criticize what the military clique was doing publicly?
- A. In many articles I wrote. Of course, not in a blunt way, but I pointed out their mistakes.
- Q. Have you got any articles you have written?
- A. Yes, especially since the war started with America, I think my articles called the military men to task very often.

Interrogation of Toshio Shiratori

27 Mar 46

Q. Have you got any articles you have written back in 1931 to 1941? Have you got any of those articles written by you?

A. I have nothing with me.

Q. Have you got them at home?

A. My house was burned and everything was burned.

Q. Do you know where any of them could be found?

A. Well I don't know. In newspapers and magazines, but I don't remember in what particular article.

Q. I am asking about any of them that you were writing on as to Japan's policy in Greater East Asia.

A. Well, I never had that idea from any military. I had no friend in the army or navy. I never got any help from the Army or Navy. What I knew was from the newspapers. My knowledge of their action, their intentions, and their plans was exactly the same as other Japanese readers of newspapers. Especially since I resigned from the Foreign Office.

Q. You resigned in the latter part of 1939, wasn't it?

A. No, sir. 1940.

Q. 1940?

A. Yes.

I, Ruth F. Anderson, certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I, Worth E. McKinney, a civilian, certify that on the 27th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me Toshio Shiratori and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.
