

EXHIBIT No. 3014

(11)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent ; -- KONDO, Nobutake

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was formerly an admiral.

I was appointed Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff on December 2, 1935 (Shōwa 10) and Commander-in-chief of the Fifth Fleet on December 15, 1938 (Shōwa 13), in which position I served until the following year, 1939 (Shōwa 14).

2. The operation of occupying Hainan Island was planned while I was, as above-mentioned, in the position of the Chief of the First Department of the Naval General Staff (around November 1938 (Shōwa 13)). I then, as chief of the First Department, that is, the chief of the Operation Department, had charge of

drafting the operation plan. Besides, occupying Hainan Island was carried out by the units under command of myself as the Commander-in-chief of the Fifth Fleet. Such being the case, I am very well informed concerning the military situation of those days, the subject of this operation and the state of affairs of the occupation movement.

3. Since the outbreak of the China Affair, Japan keenly realized that, with a view to the early settlement of the Affair, it was strategically necessary, aside from her continuous military efforts, for her to prevent arms and other munitions which had become the source of the Chinese resitant power against Japan from being imported from outside .
4. As a result of the Japanese occupation of Kwangtung which was carried out in October 1938. (shōwa 13), it was possible to keep in check the transport and supply of munitions island from there. Japan, however, found another inland supply route in the south-west of China. Thus the coastal of Kwangchow Bay and Annan Bay areas increased in importance to such an extent that Japan began to feel the necessity of blockading this area in her attempt to check the inland supply from the sea. For doing this thoroughly, the occupation of Hainan Island which it was intended to make one of our advanced

bases, was considered indispensable.

5. Japan, with the progress of her military operations against China, occupied important zones one by one and got into a position to deliver long air attacks upon other important zones. The result of our blockade operation of ingoing supplies to the Chinese Army however, turned out to be far from thorough-going because the spear-head of the Japanese Army did not reach the western part of Kwangtung Province, Kwangsi Province or the Kweichow and Yunan area and especially because it could not attack the South Route at several inner important points. Thus Japan desiring to accomplish the aim of blockading her enemy's supply route, found it necessary to establish an air base on Hainanan Island and to make it an advanced base of hers.
6. The Hainan Island Operation was based upon an order, "Occupy Hainan Island," which was issued by the Imperial Headquarter in January 1939 (Showa 14) and was carried out in the form of a joint operation by the Army and Navy. On February 10, 1939 (Shōwa 14) an Army force (one mixed brigade) on a little more than ten transports which had been escorted by the Fifth Fleet under my command, landed on the island at Chengmai - Wan Bay on its northern end and occupied Haikow and its vicinity. This started a series of occupations which was made at

various strategic points by our Army and Naval forces. This Japanese-held Island became of not a little help in our subsequent operations against the continental inland regions and the coastal areas of South China. Above all, the successive air attacks upon the South Supply Route were delivered by the air group of this Hainan Air Base.

7. As I mentioned above, the occupation of Hainan Island was made exclusively on the basis of purely strategic requirements. With the development of the conflict to the stage when Japanese troops advanced into French Indo-China and when the Pacific War broke out, this Island came to play a strategic role from considerations of its topography. In no way, however, was this planned from the outset nor did we operate with the intention of occupying the Island permanently.

On this 15th day of May, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ KONDO, Nobutake (seal)

I, YASUDA, Shigeo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) YASUDA, Shigeo (seal)

DEF. DOC. #1637

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KONDO, Nobutake (seal)

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