

8 September 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Mr. L. C. Dunigan
RE: SAITO, Yoshie

The above named person submitted an Affidavit on June 12, 1947 (Defense Doc. 1592) which was rejected by the Tribunal. Discussion of that Affidavit is contained in pages 24,239 to 24,252 of the Record.

Mr. Sutton called Owen Cunningham, Defense Lawyer, in my presence on Friday, September 5th and Mr. Cunningham intimidated that he was going to re-submit the original Affidavit and read certain portions thereof. He promised to furnish Mr. Sutton with a deleted copy which would indicate those portions that he intended to re-submit. Anticipating that we may not have much time after Mr. Cunningham furnishes his deleted copy, I submit to you the following items which the Cross-examiner may decide to use in lieu of cross-examination:

Exhibit 552 (R 6350) is a record of a conference of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council on the subject of conclusion of the Tripartite Pact held on September 26, 1940, just one day prior to the signing of the Pact. TOJO, MATSUOKA, HOSHINO and MUTO of the Accused were present. The Exhibit indicates the considerations which motivated Japanese leaders in concluding the Pact.

At (R 6353) War Minister TOJO said "As far as the Army is concerned, only a part of its strength would be employed in case of war with the United States."

At (R 6360) Foreign Minister MATSUOKA said "By Greater East Asia I mean the area which includes French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Straits Settlements and the Oceanic group comprising the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Caledonia, etc."

At (R 6365) War Minister TOJO said "As for the Army, the supply of oil on hand would be enough to cover our operations for some time to come but I have no confidence in this respect if war should continue three to four years further."

Memo to Mr. Sutton (Cont'd)

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At (R 6367) War Minister TOJO and Navy Minister OIKAWA said "Since the man-power needed by our Army in the war against America would be comparatively small in number while Navy personnel is by its very nature limited in size, we feel no concern in respect to number of personnel."

At (R 6369) HOSHINO of the Planning Board said "In our Commodity Mobilization Program the center of gravity is laid on the items of military purposes. We have, however, paid a good deal of consideration to secure also the necessaries for the civilians living."

Exhibit 553 (R 6379) is a record of the meeting of the Privy Council on September 26, 1940 at which the draft of the Tripartite Pact was approved.

At (R 6382) it is stated "Japan recognizes and respects the leading position of Germany and Italy in construction of a New Order in Europe while Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leading position in the construction of the New Order in Greater East Asia. (Compare with GEA where mentioned countries in New Order referred to in Exh. 552). (The above quote is from the Preamble to the Tripartite Pact).

Exhibit 43 is the Tripartite Alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy. It was read into the Record at (R 6391) and Article II thereof reads as follows: "Germany and Italy shall recognize and respect the leadership of Japan for establishment of a New Order in Great Asia."

Exhibit 551 (R 6345) is a recital of the salient points of questions at a Privy Council meeting on September 16, 1940. At (R 6347) it is stated "By the conclusion of the present Alliance, it becomes imperative that preparation of our Navy for Japan-American war be accelerated and strengthened. And this might well be impossible to be realized, unless our Government gives serious consideration and cooperation with the Navy."

Exhibit 542 (R 6277) is a report of a conference with KURUSU signed by Weizacker dated August 1, 1940 shortly after MATSUOKA became Foreign Minister. KURUSU pursued subject of renewal of negotiations for closer Japan-German relations and defined the intentions of Japan to construction of "New Order of Greater East Asia."

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At (R 6279) it is stated "Apparently KURUSU is not thinking of a speedy end to the war and reckons at any rate on the state of tension which had to be estimated to last for years in which the relations of Japan with Russia and the USA are naturally most important."

Again on page 6279 it is stated "The Ambassador reminded of the fact that the Reich Foreign Minister on the occasion of the visit of Minister SATO had pictured the German-Japanese friendship and cooperation as being very important."

Again at (R 6280) it is stated "The Ambassador would certainly be grateful if he could obtain a hint in the near future - either through the Reich Foreign Minister personally or through me - as to which advice he should give his Government. He is clear about the fact that this advice must fully lie within the framework of the German-Japanese policy of friendship."

Exhibit 543 (R 6282) ^{mm app 6282} is dated August 2, 1940, shortly after MATSUOKA became Foreign Minister. On page 6282 it is stated "In addition to the memorandum concerning my talk yesterday with the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to add the following: KURUSU's words expressed the hope that Japan may belong to the New Order after the war and that Japan not be forgotten in the new apportionment of the world."

Exhibit 544 (R 6277) reading page 6284, 6285, it is stated "KURUSU named Japan, Manchukuo and China as the core of the Great East Asia Sphere for which he used the term 'East Asia Axis'. he was not quite clear on the ways and means of enlarging upon this friendship and now would be the time to learn the German conception of these Japanese plans for the East Asia Sphere."

Also at page 6285 it is stated "At the end KURUSU expressed the hope to be able to discuss these farreaching problems soon with the Reich Foreign Minister."

Exhibit 545 (R 6277) at page 6285, is an outline of the conversations between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and German Ambassador Ott. At page 6286, MATSUOKA said "But I think that Fuehrer Hitler and Foreign Minister of the Reich must know the fact as well as your Excellency knows it, that I am one of the proposers and originators of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact."

Again on page 6286 MATSUOKA said "As you may find out easily, both the government and the people have inclined to strengthen the power of the Axis but it is not decided yet with the Cabinet Council."

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On page 6287 MATSUOKA said "Japan is intending to establish a New Order of Greater East Asia as made already public by the Japanese Government, in a circle of Japan, Manchukuo and China including the South Seas."

Exhibit 541 (R 6271) consists of decisions made by the conference of Prime Minister KONOYE, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, War Minister TOJO and Navy Minister on September 4, 1940. It relates to the strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis. At (R 6307) it is stated "The trend towards the strengthening of collaboration among Japan, Germany and Italy have likewise become very pronounced...."

At (R 6308) in outlining the basic principles it is stated

- "1. To make a fundamental agreement among the three countries in order that they shall mutually cooperate by all possible means in the establishment of a New Order in Europe and in Asia.
- "2. To carry out consultations among the three countries in as short a period of time as possible in regard to the best means of the above mentioned cooperation.
- "3. To begin with, publicity will be given at home and abroad, to the purpose in 1 and 2 above, in the form of a joint declaration of the three countries."

The above exhibits cited in connection with the motives of the Japanese leaders in concluding the Tripartite Pact. These are mentioned by SAITO in numbered paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 which appear on pages 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of his Affidavit.

With respect to SAITO's statements that the Tripartite Pact was not concluded in anticipation of war which appear in numbered paragraph 8 on page 13 of his Affidavit, TOJO's statements appearing in Exhibit 552 (R 6350) cited above, are particularly pertinent.

LESTER C. DUNIGAN

SAITO, Yoshie

1. In paragraph 3, p. 3 of Affidavit re Stahmer leaving Germany for Japan, cite Exhibit 541 (R 6271 reading at p. 6308) where it is stated "The German Government has specifically sent Minister Stahmer to Japan although his mission may merely be to improve the situation here, yet the fact is that he enjoys the special confidence of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop."

Omit

2. In connection with the last paragraph of numbered paragraph 4, which appears on page 6 of the Affidavit, cite Article II of Tripartite Pact (Ex. 43 read into the Record at p. 6391) which states "Germany and Italy shall recognize and respect the leadership of Japan for establishment of New Order in East Asia."

Omit

3. In connection with the preamble of the Tripartite Pact mentioned at bottom of page 5 of Affidavit and continuing on page 6 with the ending of the words "may thus be realized", cite Exhibit 553 (R 6379 at p. 6382) where it is stated "They, (Japan, Germany and Italy) have decided to act in harmony and cooperate regarding the efforts to be based on this object (aim) and furthermore, they will give unstinting cooperation to countries in every part of the world who desire to make the same efforts."

Omit

4. In connection with page 7 of Affidavit beginning with the second paragraph thereof and continuing to numbered paragraph 6 on page 8, cite Exhibits 542 and 543 (R 6277 at page 6279). Reading from Exhibit 542 it states "Apparently KURUSU is not thinking of a speedy end to the war and reckons at any rate on a state of tension which has to be estimated to last for years in which the relations of Japan with Russia and the USA are naturally most important." Also Exhibit 543 (reading at page 6282) where it is stated "In addition to the memorandum concerning my talk with the Japanese Ambassador yesterday, I would like to add the following: KURUSU's words expressed his hope that Japan may belong to the New Order after the war and that Japan not be forgotten in the new apportionment of the world."

Omit

This is conflict with statement

5. In connection with paragraph 8 of the Affidavit, cite Exhibit 549 (R 6323) wherein it is stated "Germany does not look for Japan's military assistance at this juncture in connection with her war with England." Also on page 6324 where it is stated "Germany hardly thinks that she and the US will come to blows in the near future but that clash and war between Japan and US cannot eventually be avoided."

this is conflict with

statement that pact was not in anticipation of war.

use
6. Also in connection with paragraph 8 of Affidavit, on page 13 where it is stated the Tripartite Pact was not in preparation for war, cite Exhibit 551 (R 6345 at page 6347) wherein it is stated "By the conclusion of the present alliance it becomes imperative that preparation of our Navy for Japanese-American War be accelerated and strengthened." Exhibit 551 is "salient points of questions" (Privy Council).

Omit
7. In connection with paragraph 7 of Affidavit re Adjustment of Russo-Japanese Relations, cite Exhibit 551 (R 6345), "salient points of questions" (Privy Council) at R 6348 wherein it stated "Should this Tripartite Alliance come to exist, Germany and Italy and especially Germany, will use its good offices with plenty self-confidence in ironing out Soviet-Japanese relations. In view of the present amicable relations now existing between Germany and the Soviet Union, it must be far easier to iron out with the aid of Germany, the difficult problems which involve Japan and the Soviet Union.

Omit
8. In connection with paragraph 8 of Affidavit on page 14 wherein it is stated "policy of preventing America from entering the war" cite Exhibit 549 (R 6323) "some of the salient points" in the informal conversations between MATSUOKA and Stahmer with the German Ambassador assisting, it is stated "Germany does not want the present conflict to develop into a world war..... She particularly wants the US to stay out."

Omit
9. In connection with paragraph 10 of the Affidavit on page 19 beginning with the words "I agree entirely" and continuing on page 20 to the bottom of that page, cit Exhibit 43, the Tripartite Alliance (R 6391).

Consider paragraph 5^{pb} written for concluding tripartite pact.

(1)

X
(1)

1. Allocate ex 5741 to affidavit
beginning with paragraph 4 (p4)
+ stopping on page 5 at point
marked A. In reference quote
marked space in R 6272.

2. Affidavit page 6 - paragraph marked
1 quote Article 2 of Tripartite
part ex 43 Reads into record at 639/
Art 2 being pag 6392

(3) Beginning on page 7 with paragraph
marked B + continuing to bottom
of page 8 where marked C
cite exhibits 542 + 543 - 544 (but
check these exhibits)

(4) In connection with paragraph 8
of affidavit cite exhibits 5569 - B
(Record 6396)

(2)

(4) Beginning at paragraph 9 on page 15 cite ex 43 which is tripartite part, also negotiators leading up to formation of pact.

(6) paragraph 10 page 16 of

affidavit cite ex 43 - 552 - 553 - 554 - *

(7) Beginning page 19 with statement "I disagree entirely" cite provision of ex 43.

(8) on page 18 where refers to Anti American sentiment due to tripartite pact see if we have exhibit to cover.

(9)

(3)

⑨ top page 22 referring to prior negotiations might cite provision of ex 542 at record 6277. also ex 543-544.

⑩ the affidavit top page 14 cite ex 549, R 6323 where Germany doesn't need Japan in European War & cite ex 545 R 6288 re Japan handling China alone. Re last point cite exhibit 550 in evidence R 6329 at page 6333 where underlined

(4)

~~11~~ Beginning with paragraph 3 (page 3)
& continuing to paragraph 4 (page 4)
cite exhibit 555 A-B-C-exhibit
556 & ex 550 also ex 552.

~~12~~ paragraph 8 beginning p 13 of affidavit
point marked "D" on page 14.
cite exhibit 549

~~13~~ page 22 of affidavit re dismissal of
diplomats see ex 548 R 6299
telegram from Ottawa re dismissal
recalling of ambassadors etc from
various countries.

~~14~~ page 3 of affidavit re Stohmes
coming to Japan see ex 541 R 6308 (4)
where refers to Stohmes

(5)

(15) Affidavit p 13 re Japan remaining outside of was being visited by German & all see ex 547 but on R 6323 & top of page 6324.

16 Re Stahmer coming to Japan in August mentioned on page 3 of affidavit paragraph 3 cite also ex 550 (R 6334) where underlined. (This is Matsukata's explanation to Imperial Conference)

(17) Connection with Jap-Soviet relations mentioned page 12 of affidavit see exhibit 551 (at R 6346) question in Priming Council

18 also connection with paragraph 8 of affidavit on page 13 where says Tri-partite pact not in preparation for war cite ex 551 R 6347 question no 3 put by Supreme Command (see preceding page 6346)

6

(19) Connection with paragraph 7 of affidavit re adjustment Russo-Japanese relations see exhibit 551 R 6348 question of navy ministry where underscored.

20 Connection with statements re Matsumoto for Tri-partite pact consider exhibit ⁶³⁵⁰R 552 at R 6367 where Tokyo process was with America. (Get appropriate sections of date affidavit)

(21) Connection with preamble of Tri-partite pact mentioned at top of page 5 and continuing on page 6 to point marked X etc exhibit 552 beginning page 6381 at bottom + continuing on page 6382

22 Ex 42 (Tripartite Alliance) Read into record 6391

7

②3 Reference to New Order in S.E. A + Europe
referred to paragraph 4 page 4 of Sato
affidavit refer to ex 5, 5, 5 B in evidence at
R 6396 (see underlined portion R 6397)
(Be sure to describe ~~at~~ exhibit as letter
from Ott, the German Ambassador to
Watsuoka)

*Bilangs in Saito
file*

Resume by: Lester C. Dunia
Date: 12 June 1947

SAITO, Ryosai (Yoshie)

The above named person served in various consular and diplomatic capacities, and in July 1940 he became advisor to the Foreign Office.

Decorations Received:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29-4-34	Order of the Compound Light Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
9-5-34	2nd Class Chingyuan-chang (Manchukuo)	Japanese-Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry

Information in IPS Files:

An examination has been made of IPS files and little information of value has been found.

Case #281, Serial #13, contains an interrogation of one SUMA, Yakichiro, which was conducted by Mr. Tavenner on 16 April 1946.

In connection with the affidavit submitted by SAITO, SUMA stated that, in substance, when MATSUOKA was appointed Foreign Minister in July 1940 his first act with respect to bringing about a closer relationship between Germany and Japan was to arrange for the journey of Stahmer without publicity--that he organized a plan to instruct the consulates and Consulate Generals on Stahmer's way to make every effort not to reveal his journey. SUMA stated that that was the forerunner of the Tripartite Pact. He stated further that MATSUOKA had advised him personally of the importance of secrecy. SUMA stated that prior to Stahmer's journey to Japan that MATSUOKA had prepared the Japanese inner, political figures as to the importance of a pact and that MATSUOKA had been in touch with such persons as General TOJO, who was War Minister at the time, and Marquis KIDO.

SUMA stated further that he made the public announcement of the Tripartite Pact; that the announcements were prepared by SAITO, the witness herein, who SUMA stated was the collaborator of Mr. MATSUOKA, together with SHIRATORI. He said the public announcement of the pact was made after consultation with such Army people as MUTO and ABE of the Navy.

In so far as the affidavit submitted by SAITO is concerned, no further information of value is contained in the interrogation.

SAITO, Ryoei (Yoshie) - continued

References to Prosecution Case:

- (1) Prosecution Exhibit #541, received in evidence at R 6271, is an outline of the basic national policy. It should be considered in connection with pages 3 and 4 of SAITO's affidavit.
- ✓ (2) Prosecution Exhibit #542 was received in evidence at R 6277. It relates to a conference in which Ambassador KURUSU and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA pressed the subject of a renewal of negotiations for closer Japanese-German relations.
- ✓ (3) Prosecution Exhibit #543 was received in evidence at R 6277 and the contents thereof are found at R 6282, and relates generally to the same subject matter as exhibit #542.
- ✓ (4) Prosecution Exhibit #544 was received in evidence at R 6277 and the contents thereof are found at R 6284 and R 6285. It relates generally to the same subject matter as Exhibits #541, #542, #543.
- (5) Prosecution Exhibit #545 was received in evidence at R 6277, and the contents thereof are found at R 6286-6292.
- (6) Prosecution Exhibit #546, received in evidence at R 6293, is a telegram from German Ambassador Ott, dated 31 June 1940.
- (7) Prosecution Exhibit #547, received in evidence at R 6294, is a telegram from German Ambassador Ott, dated 15 August 1940.
- (8) Prosecution Exhibit #548, received in evidence at R 6296, is a telegram from German Ambassador Ott, dated 23 August 1940.

(Exhibits #546, #547, and #548 indicate strong action upon the part of the Japanese Government officials in promoting Japanese-German coalition and in making preparations for the execution of their plans for expansion.)
- (9) Prosecution Exhibit #549, received in evidence at R 6323, is "some salient points in the informal conversations between MATSUOKA and Stahmer, with the German Ambassador assisting."

bottom
p 13 of
affidavit

SAITO, Ryoei (Noshie) - cont'd)

- (10) Prosecution Exhibit #550, received in evidence at R 6329, relates to the conclusion of the treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, the subject of an Imperial Conference, and contains Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's explanations regarding the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.
- (11) Prosecution Exhibit #551, received in evidence at R 6345, is salient points of questions (Privy Council).
- (12) Prosecution Exhibit #552, received in evidence at R 6350, relates to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy.
- (13) Prosecution Exhibit #553, received in evidence at R 6379, relates to a meeting of the Privy Council in connection with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.
- (14) Prosecution Exhibit #43, which was read into the Record beginning at R 6391, is the Tripartite Alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy.
- (15) Prosecution Exhibit #554, received in evidence at R 6394, is the Imperial Rescript in connection with the Tripartite Pact.
- (16) Prosecution Exhibits #555-A, #555-B, #555-C and #556, received in evidence at R 6398. These documents contain the secret letters exchanged at the time of the conclusion of the pact as referred to by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in his explanation of the Pact in Prosecution Exhibit #550, referred to above.
- (17) Prosecution Exhibit #557, marked for identification at R 6405, is an extract from "The Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" by Toshio, SHIRATORI.
- (18) Prosecution Exhibit #558, received in evidence at R 6411, is a radio speech by Dr. Nobumi ITO, President of the Board of Information, commemorating the first anniversary of the conclusion of the three-power pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy.
- Prosecution exhibit #559, received in evidence at R 6417, is a memorandum showing the collaboration between Japan, Germany and Italy under the Tripartite Pact and its date is 20 December 1940. It is signed by Ott. Indelli, and MATSUOKA.

not important
re Saito & Indelli

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Page 53

SAITO, (Yoshie) - continued

*more important
re Saito's affidavit
nature*

Prosecution Exhibit #560, received in evidence at R 6421, is a telegram from Ott, dated 13 December 1940.

Prosecution Exhibit #561, received in evidence at R 6490, is a collection of addresses by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. One of these addresses was read into the record beginning at page 6423.

✓ (23) Prosecution Exhibit #561, received in evidence at R 6427, is a confidential memorandum by Weizsacher regarding a conference he had with Ambassador Kurusu in Berlin on 29 November 1940.

(23) Prosecution Exhibit #562, received in evidence at R 6429, is a telegram from German Ambassador Ott to the Reich Foreign Ministry, dated 31 January 1941, and relates in part to the Tripartite Pact.

(24) Prosecution Exhibits #563, 564, 565, and 566, which were received in evidence at R 6444, are telegrams from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, dated respectively 21 November 1940, February 6, 1941, February 17, 1941, and March 12, 1941.

(NOTE: SAITO speaks of this on page 8 of his affidavit.)

(25) Prosecution Exhibit #523, received in evidence at R 6175, is a telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo and concerns Japanese efforts to obtain Germany's aid as mediator in talks between Japan and Chiang Kai Shek, and to obtain Germany's views concerning Japan's military aggression in Indo-China.

(26) Prosecution Exhibit #524, received in evidence at R 6176, is a memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador SAITO, wherein SAITO renewed Japanese efforts for closer relations with Germany.

(27) Prosecution Exhibit #778-A, received in evidence at R 7903, is Ribbentrop's talk with OSHIMA relating to the Tripartite pact.

(28) Prosecution Exhibit #779, received in evidence at R 7904 relates to the Tripartite Pact.

(29) Prosecution Exhibit #780, received in Evidence at R 7909 relates to the Tripartite Pact.

Connection part not in anticipation
of was use by 552 R. 6367 (Affidavit Paragraph 8)
Use this also in description of structure
2nd reason mentioned start paragraph
6 page 8.

2nd reason for part mentioned paragraph
5 page 6

Tri partite part not for purpose of
negotiation was mentioned on page 19.

Rec'd of court find exhibit to break out
paragraph 11 of affidavit on page 22
where says tri partite part, entirely
separate from the negotiation which
took place before Matsushita's time

Ex 552 (R 6350) is a record of a conference of the investigation committee of the Privy Council on the subject of conclusion of the Tripartite pact held on Sept 26, 1940 just one day prior to the signing of the pact. Tojo, Matsuoaka, Hashino & Mitsu of the agreement were present. The exhibit indicates the considerations which motivated Japanese leaders in concluding the pact.

Quote following

1. Tojo bottom page 6353 ✓
2. Matsuoaka bottom page 6360 ✓
3. Tojo page 6365 ✓
4. Tojo page 6367 ✓
5. Hashino page 6369 ✓

Ref 553 (R 6379)^{is} record of the meeting of the Privy Council on Sept 26, 1940 at which the draft of the Tripartite Pact

was approved,

Cite following

1. page 6382 underlined in pencil (compare with 659 where mentions countries in New Order referred to in Ex 552
This quote from preamble on page 6381

Ex 43 for id R 513 read at R 6391 ✓
Cite Article II thereof.

Ex 551 (R 6345) is a recital of the ✓
salient part of questions at a Pring ✓
Council Meeting on Sept 16, 1940 ✓
cite page 6347 where underlined

Ex 542 (R 6278) report of conference
with Kurusu signed by Weisacker
dated August 1, 1940 shortly after
Matsumoto became Foreign Minister.
Kurusu pressed the subject of renewal
of negotiations for closer Japanese -
German relations and declared the
intention of Japan to construct
"New Order of S.E.A."
cite p 6279-6280 ✓

Ex 543 (R 6277)
cite p 6282 where underlined ✓

Ex 544 (R 6277)
cite pages 6284-6285 where
underlined. ✓

Ex 545 (R 6277) is "An Outline of the
conversation between Foreign Minister
Matsumoto and German Ambassador O.T.
cite p 6286-6287-6286 ✓

Ex 541 (R 6271) Reading p 6307-6308

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent ; -- SAITO, Yoshie

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, Yoshie Saito, under oath testify the following facts;

I was born in 1880, and live in Shoto, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo-to. After graduating from the Tokyo Imperial University, I entered the Foreign Office, was stationed as diplomatic and consular attache in Peking and Tientsin, China, became Secretary of Embassy in Washington under Ambassador Shidehara, became Director of the Bureau of Commercial Affairs of the Foreign Office; after resigning in 1926, I became a Director of the South Manchurian Railway Co., Ltd., in July 1940, upon formation of the Kono cabinet, at the request of Foreign Minister Matsuoka I became adviser to the Foreign Office and held that position until I resigned in July 1941.

1. I was on intimate terms with Mr. Matsuoka for 30 years; at

the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy, as advisor to the Foreign Office I stayed day and night at the private residence of Foreign Minister Matsuoka where the negotiations were taking place, and throughout the entire period I was responsible for the technical side of the negotiations concerning this pact. Due to this, I am comparatively accurately informed regarding the ideals, and motives on the Japanese side which led to the conclusion of the pact, and the circumstances concerning the conclusion of the pact.

2. Before entering into details I would like to testify as to Mr. Matsuoka's general idea concerning the method to bring about peace throughout the entire world. Mr. Matsuoka was of the opinion that it was impossible to establish world peace through the power of the League of Nations, and he considered a separate formula was necessary; this he often spoke of before he became Foreign Minister. When Mr. Matsuoka was President of the South Manchurian Railway Co., and when I was advisor to the S M R, I once called on him at his villa at Gotemba concerning company business, he spoke as follows after finishing the company business:

"The world is too large. Races, national sentiments and policies are different, and the past ideas of establishing world peace through a centralized and unique organ is a mistake when dealing with such a world. For this, I can think of no better method than that friendly neighbouring countries with mutual interests should form a union, then a larger union should be formed among these unions, and among these larger unions peaceful relations:

should be established, and finally this should be spread through the world. Should I become Foreign Minister, I intend to realize this idea. However, this will not be easy, and sufficient study must be made of the problems. I would like you to think about it."

When I met him again at Gotenba, in the spring of 1937, as I recall Mr. Matsuoka said:

"Well, have you studied my idea? A union including Japan, Manchuria and China and their neighbouring countries must be formed. However, unfortunately, this cannot be hoped for considering the present situation of long-standing disputes between Japan and China. So, I, as President of the SMR and as a man with many Chinese friends, am in a good position to take steps to further Sino-Japanese peace as a private individual, and I should like to go to China some day soon and see what can be done. Therefore, I wish to request you to go to China, and make thorough observations on the situation."

I had been studying Chinese affairs for many years, and since I considered this my life-work, I went to China in accordance with Mr. Matsuoka's suggestion with great pleasure.

The reason why Mr. Matsuoka said that Japan should form a union with the East Asiatic countries was according to what he often told me, because he thought that these countries are neighbours with similar races, and both from a historic and realistic view-point, are as closely related as cogs in a machine;

therefore these countries could comparatively easily construct a new order on the basis of mutual interests. Then the reason for his urgent desire to solve Sino-Japanese conflicts was not only in order to realize Sino-Japanese economic collaboration, but also because he considered it was absolutely necessary for the construction of an East Asiatic new order as one stage toward world peace.

3. After Mr. Matsuoka resigned his post as President of the S M R, in March 1939, for a time he lived a leisure life, and during this period he spoke to me from time to time of his opinion concerning inter-states unions as a method of establishing world peace. In July 1940 when he became Foreign Minister he made me an advisor to the Foreign Office, and he gave much thought to the method to be taken to establish world peace.

Mr. Matsuoka decided to conclude the Tripartite Pact in August 1940 when he received a telegram from Ambassador Kurusu saying that Mr. Stahmer had left Germany for Japan. His motives were:

- (1) to realize his above-mentioned concerning the establishment of world peace,
- (2) to solve the China Incident.
- (3) current Japanese-American relations were in such a bad condition that they could not be improved by ordinary diplomatic methods due to the extremely strong American attitude, and no other method could be found.

These were the 3 circumstances behind his decision, and this I

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also 555

was told by Mr. Matsuoka two or three days after the negotiations were begun concerning the conclusion of the pact.

4. First, on the content of Mr. Matsuoka's idea for establishing world peace, I have already given a rough idea. Mr. Matsuoka considered, according to what he told me that it was necessary first of all to construct an inter-states union in the East based on the mutual interests of the various countries. The area to be covered by this inter-state union was to be decided in accordance with the attitude taken by the countries concerned, and Mr. Matsuoka's ideal was that Japan, Manchuria and China should form the core, and that it should include the whole of East Asia. Moreover, if interests identical to the mutual interests of East Asia, forming the basis of this inter-state union, should exist in other parts, these countries should of course join the union-- this was Mr. Matsuoka's opinion. The meanings of mutual interests are too broad to be defined in one word; but, for example, one of the ideas was economic co-existence and co-prosperity. Mr. Matsuoka thought that all the treasure lands of the East Asiatic countries were either the colonies of the European and American Powers or else were of a semi-colonial nature, and in cases where the territorial or colonial policies of the European and American Powers did not necessarily coincide with the interests of the East Asiatic countries themselves, then it was to the mutual interest of East Asiatic countries that these policies should be appropriately modified. In other words, Mr. Matsuoka thought

that amendment of the policies of these European and American countries to a certain extent had to be asked if the new order in East Asia should really be established. However, Mr. Matsuoka never told me that it was inevitable that the European and American Powers would have to be excluded in order to construct the East Asiatic new order. Surely, the European and American Powers with territory in Asia would not utterly oppose some changes in their policies if this was to the benefit of the inhabitants of the territory and also to the benefit of world peace, Mr. Matsuoka's thought was that, even if these changes could not take place rapidly, it was not impossible to make gradual changes after due discussions. At the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Matsuoka did not have the intention of using force in order to improve this situation. He was not so vain as to suppose that Japan had so much actual strength.

A The first time this idea of an East Asiatic new order was announced to the public was in the preamble to the Tripartite Pact. In it it reads:

"The Government of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and to co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe wherever it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to

Handwritten:
Matsuoka
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promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the people concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Government to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized"

See underlined portion p 6382

This English text was written and proposed personally by Mr. Matsuoka, and German side did only accept it.

As such was what happened, leaving aside the question of how Germany and Italy regarded the Tripartite Pact. Japan was firmly convinced that it was one way to establish world peace. The so-called "new order in East Asia" referred to in this pact indicated the situation which would be brought about once the peaceful region in East Asia was established.

②

5. The second Japanese motive for concluding the Tripartite Pact was the Chinese question. To say the truth, Japan was greatly troubled by the Chinese question. At that time, Japan was worried over her extraordinary increase in population, and there was no solution except the encouragement of industry. Therefore, Japan thought that on Sino-Japanese economic collaboration depended the very existence of the nation. However, due to the irresponsible anti-Japanese movement in China many difficulties were created to prevent its realization, in addition to the Japanese vested interests were violated, and the lives and properties of Japanese residents in China were

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continuously threatened.

Even after the China Incident broke out in July 1937, Japan intended to withdraw her forces as soon as possible. For example, an order was issued to the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces (which later became the China Expeditionary Forces) not to advance beyond the Soo-chow River, which flows through Shanghai, and also that permanent measures should not be taken in the Shanghai area. (this order was issued in or about August 1937). The reason why this order was not strictly obeyed was because Chinese resistance was so strong that Japanese forces could not halt at this line.

In this way, after the Japanese Army occupied Nanking, and after further advances were made, the situation continued to deteriorate. Therefore Japan was in a hurry to end the China Incident, and turned to various measures. The statement that no dealings would be made with Chiang Kai-shek, the pronouncement of the three Konoye principles, the emergence of Wang Chingwei, all these measures were taken for this purpose. On the other hand, Japan earnestly desired to open direct discussions with General Chiang Kai-shek on the entire peace question, and military personnel, diplomats and private experts on Chinese affairs who were thought to have formerly been on familiar terms with the Chiang Kai-shek clique took every available step, unfortunately all of them ended in failure. Although there may have been many reasons for the failure, Japan considered that at the time America, Britain and other countries wholely sympathized with China, and did not hesitate to

Is there any rebuttal
they could
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B

was reason for
territory
so much
& refused to withdraw

was reason + sympathy extended to anti-fascist Gov aggression

offer concrete and abstract assistance. By obtaining Anglo-American assistance, General Chiang Kai-shek maintained his position and did not shift one iota his thorough anti-Japanese policy, this was thought to be the main reason on the Japanese side: To be frank, Mr. Matsuoka and others on the Japanese side thought that it was the intention of America and Britain to have General Chiang Kai-shek bitterly oppose Japan, and then taking advantage of the weakening of Japanese strength, to overpower Japan by force. Therefore, on one hand, facing Japan, they argued that peace was profitable, and repeated strong protests based on the stipulations of treaties were made, on the other hand, toward General Chiang Kai-shek, material and moral support was given, and efforts were made to prolong, as long as possible, the Sino-Japanese armed conflict--this was considered to be the Anglo-American policy vis-a-vis Japan. Setting aside the question of whether this opinion was false or not, Mr. Matsuoka believed in view of this situation that Japan's power would necessarily have to be strengthened by allying herself with other Powers in order to settle the Chinese question. By doing so, America and Britain could be checked and their policy toward Japan would be changed, thus leading to the early solution of Sino-Japanese questions. This was one of the motives leading to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

Was the Anglo-American Policy of

3rd reason for Pact

6. The third reason why Mr. Matsuoka was forced to conclude the Tripartite Pact was the so-called A B C encirclement problem. Among these, Mr. Matsuoka was most concerned over

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the American attitude. At that time, America, Britain and China combined and formed the so-called A B C encirclement front, and planned to crush weak Japan--this was the problem which caused endless concern to the Government and the people of Japan. Setting aside the question of whether America and Britain actually had this idea in mind, the pressure put by these 3 Powers on Japan actually increased daily, and unless some means were found to break through the encirclement, Japan would be faced with the danger of extinction--this was the opinion held by Mr. Matsuoka and many other informed Japanese at that time. Mr. Matsuoka was constantly bothered by this problem, and continuously worried about how it could be possible to dissolve this encirclement. Especially, the fact that America concentrated the larger part of her navy--the largest in the world--in the Pacific greatly stimulated Japanese feeling as it was considered to be a threat by force. Again, the rumour that America possessed bases in Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma, etc., and the American naval vessels would in the near future enter Singapore, was becoming stronger from day to day. Therefore, Mr. Matsuoka and many other informed Japanese becoming increasing worried over the danger that Japan would soon be attacked by the combined Anglo-American forces. On the other hand, America abrogated the Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911, and trade with Japan was in reality extremely curtailed, thus causing Japan to suffer under military and commercial pressure. Mr. Matsuoka was constantly concerned

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over this, and one day said to me:

"If Japan and America should ever go to war, it would be most unfortunate for Japan, and it would inevitably have the most disastrous results for Japan. Not only that, but the culture of the human race would be completely destroyed, and the world would become darkened. To prevent this is something that I, as Foreign Minister, cannot forget even in my dreams."

Mr. Matsuoka, day and night, studied measures concerning this problem. In fact, Mr. Matsuoka often told me:

"If it were possible to dissolve America's high-pressure policy, the problems of Japan, America and Britain, and the Sino-Japanese problem would be naturally easy to solve. Moreover, if this were realized, it might even be possible for Japan to take a step forward, and could alone, or together with the Soviet Union, act as arbitrator in the Anglo-German war. However, since American policy is so high-handed, Japan cannot oppose America single-handed with her own power, so Japan must shake hands with some other strong Powers."

To express what Mr. Matsuoka told me then in a simple way, the countries he had in mind by saying to shake hands with some Powers were the Soviet Union and Germany. However, to combine with the Soviet Union would probably irritate America, and it was certain that the Soviet Union would immediately refuse Japan's proposal to shake hands with her. So, Mr. Matsu

reached the conclusion that there was no other measure for the time being but to associate with Germany.

7. Another motive besides the above-mentioned three which Mr. Matsuoka had in concluding the Tripartite Pact was to attempt to adjust Russo-Japanese relations through the good offices of Germany. At the time, although there did exist a small dark cloud over Soviet-German relations, at any rate they were on friendly terms. So Mr. Matsuoka thought to shake hands with the Soviet Union by utilizing, if possible, Germany after associating with her. Mr. Matsuoka thought of shaking hands with the Soviet Union for a considerably long time, when Mr. Matsuoka was President of the S M R he said to me:

"I was a great favorite of Count Shimpei Goto who was a well-known Russophile and made all sorts of efforts to realize a Japanese Soviet rapprochement. Recently, he has gone himself to Russia and carried on negotiations. I believe that I myself am responsible for making Count Goto a Russophile. In this way, my pro-Sovietism is considerably old, and now that I have become President of the S M R, I am even more impressed by the necessity."

In this manner, he based his opinion on the actual conditions of Japan, and went on to discuss world currents, speaking in a logical way of Soviet-Japanese friendship.

Long after that, when he returned from his trip to Europe in 1941, he spoke to me of the events which occurred on his departure from Moscow where he had stayed and said:

"Mr. Stalin came to the station to see me off. Both Soviet officials and Ambassador Tatekawa assured me that this was without precedent. He appeared to be sincerely reluctant to say goodbye to me, and when I was about to leave he hugged me and kissed me very hard. And he said to me, "The Russian race is not a European race. They are real Asiatics. Since they are both Asiatics, shouldn't Japan and the Soviet Union be good friends?" So I thought utilizing this opportunity to delay my departure, and carry on further negotiations concerning Soviet-Japanese friendly relations beyond the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. However, since arrangements had been made on affairs to follow my return to Japan, I thought that to postpone my return would have a delicate effect on the international situation. So I reconsidered, and thought that I could again come at some appropriate time."

At the time, since it was urgent for Japan to settle the Chinese question, as mentioned above, and the Soviet Union had a important influence on this question, if friendly relations could be established with the Soviet Union, it would naturally minister to the solution of the question. From this view-point also, it was necessary to establish Soviet-Japanese friendly relations. Mr. Matsuoka once said to me:

"The China Incident is less a problem having to do with China, than it is a problem concerning America and the Soviet Union."

From this view-point, Mr. Matsuoka attempted to realize his cherished plan to establish Soviet-Japanese friendship by

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shaking hands with Germany, and utilizing her good offices.

This was also one of the motives behind the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. In addition, Mr. Stahmer told Mr. Matsuoka at the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact that Germany was prepared to act as intermediary.

8. As stated above, the Tripartite Pact was not concluded in preparation for war. However, since an association was formed with Germany and Italy then actually at war with England, Mr. Matsuoka was aware of the danger of Japan being forced against her will into the war by Germany and Italy notwithstanding Japan's desire not to enter the war. So, he thought of making reservations at the very beginning of the negotiations concerning the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, and made two reservations in connection with the negotiations. One was that Japan would remain outside of the war waged by Germany and Italy against Britain, and the second was that the European War would be prevented from spreading to America and East Asia. Mr. Matsuoka told both Mr. Ott and Mr. Stahmer at the beginning of the negotiations that Japan considered that the most important mission of the Tripartite Pact was to establish peace throughout East Asia, therefore, Japan should not be forced into the Anglo-German war because of the Pact, and a German guarantee on this point was desirable.

He demanded that the following two points be promised:

- (1) Germany would not interfere in the political questions of East Asia, and Japan would not interfere in the political

questions of Europe;

(2) The European war should be carried on by Germany and Italy alone and Japan's aid should not be sought, on the other hand, the military operations against China would be carried out by Japan alone and Germany's aid would not be sought.

The German side immediately agreed to this. Concerning the policy of improving the relations with the United States and of preventing America from entering the war, agreement was

In the summer of 1941, the Soviet-German war broke out, and reached almost in the same procedure. ^{shortly thereafter} Mr. Ott

brought Ribbentrop's personal message to Mr. Matsuoka, which I also saw and read at that time. This was a fairly short note; one sheet typed in German, but its contents were very important.

Its point was that Japan should speedily attack the Soviet Union from the rear. Its wording was impolite, and to the point, moreover its contents were in violation of the promises given at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. When Mr.

Matsuoka saw it, he was very angry, and utterly declined to give any consideration to the proposal as it was in contravention to the mutual understandings exchanged at the time of the

Tripartite Pact. Another thing, after Mr. Matsuoka had returned from his trip to Germany and the Soviet Union, I asked Mr. Matsuoka about the information I had received that he had been

advised by Hitler and Ribbentrop to attack Singapore. To this Mr. Matsuoka replied:

Study to see if... find more in files

*Also 545-
Mr. R. P. ...*

"There was such talk. I was Foreign Minister, and not one of the Service Ministers. So no matter how earnestly this was recommended to me, I was not in a position to assent to the proposal. Moreover, concerning the use of armed force by Japan to further the development of the European war, reservations were made at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Whether Japan should attack Singapore or not was a matter concerning which Germany had not right to say anything. I am absolutely opposed to conquest. As you know, my motto is non-conquest, non-aggression, non-exploitation. I did modify my words. For example, I said that if Japan were to be presented with a chance that came only once in a thousand years, Japan would fight. I also said that if Japan were to fight, the sooner the better. This was only because I wished to prevent further conversation on the same line. However, I did not make any promise with reference to an attack on Singapore, nor did I say anything to commit myself, so you needn't worry."

9. At the time of the conclusion of the pact Mr. Matsuoka said to me:

"The Tripartite Pact may temporarily worsen Japanese-American relations, and may lead to a very dark phenomenon. In half a year, however its darkness will fade, and world peace will be more firmly established. I must pour all my wits and abilities into it for this object. I do not even dream of fighting with America, and I must not do so."

Again Mr. Matsuoka had often declared in the Diet that

the Tripartite Pact was a means to the establishment of world peace. The following happened at the time of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. The question of Japanese-American negotiations was put before a Cabinet meeting, and I was instigated to be present at the conference. ~~Then~~ the Home Minister, Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma spoke in detail for about 30 minutes opposing war from all angles, and said that Japan must not fight for any reason whatsoever. All of the other Ministers remained silent. Only Mr. Matsuoka spoke and said:

"I agree with Baron Hiranuma. War must be avoided at all costs." That day after Mr. Matsuoka returned to the Foreign Office he said to me in the Minister's office:

"I am in entire agreement with what Baron Hiranuma had to say today. The very fact that Baron Hiranuma, who is usually silent, should have spoken in detail against war must have been because of the importance of the matter, and because he came prepared to deeply impress all the Ministers with a thorough sentiment against war. Coming from his mouth, anti-war opinion carries much more weight than if it were voiced by someone else."

10: Since Mr. Matsuoka was well aware that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact might greatly irritate American nerves, he paid much attention ^{on} to this point. He repeatedly persuaded Admiral Nomura, who was reluctant, to finally accept the post of Ambassador to America, and this was because he considered as I

heard from him that the post must be given to a man who would be welcomed in America, and that Admiral Nomura was the best person. To this Admiral Nomura he begged that all efforts be made to improve Japanese-American relations. Again, for the same purpose he tried to dispatch Count Kabayama, who had many friends in America, to America. He tried to dispatch Mr. Toyohiko Kagawa, an American-type missionary who was considered to have the best comprehension of America, to the United States. He was very polite in his conversations with Ambassador Grew. One day (the date I have forgotten) after Ambassador Grew had returned, I asked Mr. Matsuoka how the conversations went on. Mr. Matsuoka answered:

"Recently conversation have become somewhat difficult.

Although the policy of giving absolute importance to

Japanese-American friendship has not changed, at a time like

this when the situation is critical, unless a strong

attitude is shown, it can have no effect. At the same time,

if the other party is angered, it will be disastrous, and to

maintain a proper balance is difficult. So I was very

careful in choosing my words."

At the end of 1940 Mr. Steinhardt, the American Ambassador to Russia, passed through Japan on his way to his post, and saw Mr. Matsuoka. At this meeting, Mr. Matsuoka spoke at great length of Japan's difficult position, and the necessity of Japanese-American friendship. Later in 1941, when Mr. Matsuoka went to Europe to visit Russia, Germany and Italy, he repeated

similar sentiments to Mr. Steinhardt in Moscow and consulted him on the means to attain Japanese-American friendship. This I learned from Mr. Matsuo. Before his journey to Europe, he told me:

"My journey to Europe is, on the surface, in order to visit the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy, but hardly anyone knows that my hidden mission is to adjust relations with Soviet and America." At this time, he had already prepared and kept hidden a draft of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty, and was prepared for negotiations with America. On his departure he said:

"I intend to cut as short as possible my sojourn in Europe and then go to America. I intend to indicate Japan's actual situation and a concrete draft of the basis of a Japanese-American understanding, and by negotiating directly with the Secretary of State to endeavour to improve Japanese-American relations."

On another occasion he said:

"It is regrettable that American sentiment towards Japan has grown greatly tense owing to the Tripartite Pact. However, this I anticipated at the time of the conclusion of the pact. But this situation must not be neglected. I must go to America at any cost, and after directly bearing from the authorities America's real intentions, I must take appropriate measures."

So I spoke of my opinion and said:

"Since I believe that the tension of American sentiment toward Japan is due to the Tripartite Pact and the Chinese question, if a Japanese-American understanding is to be made possible, something must be done about the Tripartite Pact. The entire withdrawal of troops from China must also be considered. If these two things are possible, I think the other questions are secondary."

To this Mr. Matsuoka replied:

"I agree entirely. As you well know, the Tripartite Pact is not for the purpose of waging war. If such a situation should be created that Japan might be forced into war, the way of thinking concerning the Tripartite Pact must be fundamentally changed. If a pact aimed at preserving Japan should become a pact leading to the destruction of Japan, drastic measures will have to be taken against the pact. Concerning the whole-scale withdrawal from China, if one were to advocate that at the present moment, it would not pass in Japan. In any case, I must first of all directly negotiate with the American authorities."

Then I asked:

"Have you confidence in your ability to influence America if you were to go there?"

Mr. Matsuoka answered:

"I believe so. Americans do not indulge in intrigues nor in plots. They are fair and do not hamper themselves with what has passed or with barren logic. The reason why American diplomacy has always been so clear, is because of this. If I were to go and adequately

explain Japan's true intentions, and demonstrate Japan's sincerity, although it may be difficult to alter American opinion at one stroke, I do not think it impossible. For this, Japan must necessarily make great concessions, and I have prepared my own draft."

At that time in America, Mr. Matsuoka was looked on in an extremely unfavorable light, and in my opinion I thought it might be better if someone else were to go, but Mr. Matsuoka was confident that if he were to go himself there was hope that Japanese-American negotiations would be successful, Mr. Matsuoka was cared for by an American missionary and spent his early years in America so he was well acquainted with American circumstances and American sentiments. In fact, when he returned from his European journey in May 1941, he said he would go in spite of the fact that his lungs were already in a bad condition and repeatedly took council with Premier Konoye. Premier Konoye was opposed to it, and Mr. Matsuoka's trip to America was not realized. Soon, the third Konoye Cabinet commonly said to be a reshuffle to eliminate Matsuoka came into existence, attitude of the Japanese Government at the time of the third Konoye Cabinet towards the Tripartite Pact became cool. It was rumoured that Foreign Minister Toyoda said that Japan did not exist for the Tripartite Pact, but that the Tripartite Pact existed for Japan. When Mr. Matsuoka heard of this he said that it was possible that things would go so far as the abrogation of the pact.

Further he said.

"There are many instances of abrogations of newly concluded

treaties ~~of abrogations~~ during the effective period of treaties. I should like to know on what grounds in international law this can be justified. When I visited Mr. Matsuoka, who was confined to bed, as soon as I learned of the outbreak of war between America and Japan on 8 December 1941, he said:

"So it finally ended in war."

Then for a short time he maintained a sorrowful silence, and continued:

"If I had remained, I should have made all efforts to avoid war." In September 1940 when Mr. Matsuoka resolved to conclude the Tripartite Pact he said to me:

"I am neither pro-Anglo-American nor pro-Italo-German. I am pro-Japanese, and believe in world peace. The Tripartite Pact, the policy of Soviet-Japanese rapprochement and the Japanese-American problem, all these were because I wished to bring about world peace, and because I thought about Japan. If Japan combines with Germany and Italy at this time, the public may say that I am pro-German. In foreign countries they may say that I support aggression. No matter what they may say, I do not care. However, I am absolutely against conquest. Not only am I opposed to Japanese conquest, but I am also opposed to conquest by other countries. If the Tripartite Pact should be used as a tool of aggression, such a pact must not be allowed to exist."

11. The Tripartite Pact was entirely separate from the negotiations among the three Powers which took place before Mr. Matsuoka's time, and was not a continuation of the former negotiations, which took place from the summer of 1938 to about August 1939 between Japan, Germany and Italy. As was informed to the American Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington at the end of August 1939, the former negotiations were absolutely dropped and have no connections with the Tripartite Pact of 1940. Mr. Matsuoka was a man with considerable self-confidence. Mr. Matsuoka was a senior member of the Foreign Ministry and the four or five Foreign Ministers preceding him were his juniors or were absolute amateurs. So Mr. Matsuoka did not think much of the men who preceded him. Mr. Matsuoka often told me as well as other people, that the Japanese diplomacy to date was utterly incompetent, and that fundamental reforms would have to be carried out. So when he became Foreign Minister, he immediately dismissed a large number of higher diplomats including Ambassadors and Ministers. Although this move was severely criticized by the public (some foreign papers called this mass dismissal a clean-out of the pro-Anglo-American school, but that was absolutely not so. Many people of pro-German tendencies were also dismissed), this measure was taken as an unavoidable step to reform diplomacy. Since that was his character, he disliked being bothered with events in the past concerning important diplomatic questions. So he never looked at the Foreign Office

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records concerning the former negotiations between the three Powers, nor did he order his subordinates to study them. At times, some persons spoke of the past negotiations, but he did not listen to them, and said that it belonged to the past and had no bearing on his diplomacy. In this manner, when Mr. Stahmer arrived in Tokyo in the autumn of 1940, at a meeting of the three persons Mr. Stahmer, Mr. Ott and Mr. Matsuoka, Mr. Matsuoka presented them with his own draft and the pact was concluded.

One of the reasons why Mr. Matsuoka conducted diplomacy on his own in the second Konoye Cabinet is due to the following circumstances: In 1940, when Prince Konoye was entrusted with the forming of the cabinet, immediately preceding the formation, a meeting known as the Big Four Conference was held for two or three days, with Konoye, Tojo, Navy Minister Yoshida and Matsuoka taking part at Prince Konoye's private residence. At this conference Mr. Matsuoka stressed that if he were to become Foreign Minister all diplomatic questions would be left to him. If other Ministers were to interfere he would not be able to accept the post. The other three leaders agreed to this. This fact was told to me by Mr. Matsuoka, and ever since, diplomacy was carried on solely by Mr. Matsuoka. These circumstances continued at least until about the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. One day at that time I saw Prince Konoye in the Japanese room at the Premier's official residence on official

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business at the order of Mr. Matsuka, and I remember that
Prince Konoye complained about Mr. Matsuka's arbitrary actions.

On this 11th day of April, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT SAITO, Yoshie (seal)

I, USHIBA, Nobuhiko hereby certify that the above
statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature
and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) USHIBA, Nobuhiko (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAITO, Yoshie (seal)

22 September 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. David H. Sutton
FROM : Mr. Lester C. Dunigan
SUBJECT : SAITO, Yoshie

1. The above-named person has previously testified on two occasions in the general phases. He has now submitted an affidavit, Def. Doc. 2558 on behalf of HIRANUMA.
2. I have examined his previous testimony and see no conflict with the contents of his present affidavit. I have discussed his latest affidavit with Mr. English, and he has the benefit of whatever suggestions I have to offer with respect to it.

LESTER C. DUNIGAN

Def. Doc. # 2558

Exh. No.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al,

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al,



SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent :-- SAITO, Yoshie

I, SAITO, Yoshie, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the usages and customs in my country, depose and state as follows:

I was born in 1880 and now live in Shoto, Shibuya-Ku, Tokyo. I attended the Tokyo Imperial University and after graduation, entered the service of the Foreign Office. I have been stationed as diplomatic and consular attache in Peking and Tientsin, China; was at one time Secretary of the Embassy in Washington, D.C., under Ambassador Shidehara. Later I became Director of the Bureau of Commercial Affairs of the Foreign Office, which position I resigned in 1926 to accept a position as a director of the South Manchurian Railway Company, Ltd.

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In July, 1940, upon the formation of the Konoye Cabinet, by request of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, I became an advisor to the Foreign Office and held that position until I resigned in July, 1941. In May, 1941, I attended a cabinet meeting with Premier Konoye and Foreign Minister Matsuoka. Other cabinet ministers attended. At this meeting the question of Japanese-American negotiations which were then in progress, was discussed. On this occasion I distinctly recall a speech made by the accused, HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, who was the then Home Minister. He stated, and the theme of his speech was, that Japan must not fight for any reason whatsoever. He gave as his reasons that if a war were started between big powers, it was highly probable, and almost inevitable, that it would develop into a world wide conflagration. Once started, it was evident that such hostilities would become a protracted war and no one could foretell the damage and devastation which would be wrought by the destructive forces of new weapons and scientific devices and appliances which had been, and were then being developed. Undoubtedly untold damage would accrue to the industries of all nations of the world and the human race would be thrown into misery. He also stated concerning the then present economic conditions of the country, that he firmly believed Japan would not be able to withstand or face a protracted war. He spoke generally along these lines for approximately thirty minutes in an impassioned

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plea against war. I remember this speech of HIRANUMA's particularly well because he was usually a silent and reticent man, and it was most unusual for him to speak at such great length. I received the impression, and there was no question among those present, that he spoke from an innermost, compelling conviction that he must state his position strongly. There is no question that he was opposed to war.

Def Doc No. 2558

On this 30 day of Aug., 1947

At above address.

DEPONENT SAITO, Yoshie (seal)

I, USAMI, Rokuro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the above address.

Witness: (signed) USAMI, Rokuro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SAITO, Yoshie (seal)

Def Doc No. 1133

I M T F E

United States of America et al

against

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN

DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent : SAITO, Yosnie

having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and
in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby
depose as follows.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARA. I, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

Name: SAITO, Yoshie

I entered the Foreign Ministry shortly after graduating in the 42nd year of Meiji (1909) from the Law Department of the Tokyo Imperial University. In the beginning, I served at Peking and Tientsin as an assistant to diplomats and consuls. During this period I made journeys to the Outer Mongolia and Kansu. In the 1st year of Taisho (1912) I returned to the main office of the Foreign Ministry to serve in the China Affairs Section of the Political Affairs Bureau. In the 4th year of Taisho (1915) I was appointed Secretary of the Commercial Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry and was ordered to concern myself in Chinese affairs. Thereafter I was appointed Consul in Hankow and then in Fushow. After finishing these services, I served for a certain interval as Secretary of the Embassy at Washington when SHIDEHARA, Kijuro was Ambassador. In the 11th year of Taisho (1922), prior to the Washington Conference, I returned to Japan and served in the European-American Affairs Bureau for about a half year. Subsequently, I was appointed Chief of the 1st Section of the Commercial Affairs Bureau, and during this term of office, served concurrently as Acting Director of the Commercial Bureau when the Director was absent. It was then that I made a draft of the instructions for the Chinese Tariff Conference. Thereafter, I was

formally appointed Director of the Commercial Affairs Bureau. I was devoting myself to the Chinese and Russian affairs by the 15th year of Taisho (1926).

In the 1st year of Showa (1926), retiring from the Foreign Ministry, I was appointed Director of the South Manchuria Railway Company to deal with the matters concerning foreign countries and foreigners. At the end of the 6th year of Showa (1931) I was commissioned as an advisor to the Kwantung Army.

Since the 9th year of Showa (1934), I was an advisor to the South Manchuria Railway Company and was despatched to China. During this term, I was also temporarily commissioned as a diplomatic advisor to the China Expeditionary Army. During these 7 years in China, I visited almost all the provinces in Central and Southern China.

I was appointed as a diplomatic advisor to the Foreign Ministry when Mr. MATSUOKA, Yosuke became Foreign Minister in the KONOYE Cabinet which was organized in July, the 15th year of Showa (1940). After retiring from this post upon the resignation en bloc of the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet in June, the 16th year of Showa (1941), I was appointed Supreme Advisor of the South Manchuria Railway Company up to the time just before the termination of war.

Among books I have written on Manchuria and China problems, the principal ones are as follows:

"Legal Bases of Economic Activities of Foreigners in China"
12 volumes in all

"Comments on the Economic Treaties Concerning China"
Vol. I (Only "Nature of Opened Market" published)

Vol. II and following volumes
in manuscripts. Not published.

"Outline of International Relations with China"

"Study on the Chinese Guild System"

"Introduction to the Recent History of China's Foreign Policy"

The Main Subject: Vols. I, II, I

It may rightly be said that the Manchuria Incident and the China Incident were brought about by the positive diplomatic policy which Japan was compelled to take in order to maintain her national existence, rights and interests. As the basic causes which have led to such incidents, the following must be mentioned:

1. Peculiar conditions existing within China.
2. Peculiar diplomatic trickeries resorted to by the Chinese authorities.
3. Special geographical and economical relations existing between Japan and China.
4. Prohibition or restriction of Japanese immigration and trade by foreign nations.

The truth of the Sino-Japanese conflict can never be fully understood without having sufficient knowledge about these matters. Therefore, I shall further explain the above-mentioned items, basing my explanation on my experience of more than 20 years as a diplomat, on the results of my observations in various parts of China (I have visited various places as far as the Outer Mongolia, Kentsu Province, etc.), and on my knowledge acquired by many years' investigation on China problems and so forth.

Chapter I

Peculiar situations existing within China inevitably call for peculiar diplomatic measures to cope with the nature of the incident and the general situation.

A. According to the result of my observation and research, there exists in China no government with sufficient power to control the entire land. Therefore, it is often very difficult to make a diplomatic agreement of great importance and consequently, even when an agreement is reached, we sometimes cannot expect it to be completely enforced.

From old times, there existed in China no strong government able to dominate the entire territory. Every government, since

the time of the Tang and Sung Dynasties, had set up itself after overthrowing the existing government by force and I have heard of no one who had reigned over the land by the will of the people. The government, therefore, is in substance an organization merely composed of civil and military functionaries, and usually has no direct representation of the people's will in respect to its formation and actual politics. All that the government did was to rule the people within the scope of its armed influence. "Unruled regions", as they are called by the Chinese government, are those districts outside the sphere of influence of the government where independent and self-existing administration is conducted.

Although the Republic of China, established in 1910 with democracy as its principle, has carried out considerable reforms in its policy and administration, the long-established people's idea of a government and their time-honored customs cannot easily

changed. The old situation still remained unchanged. The entire China, as a matter of fact, has been controlled by a number of independent political organizations and they have had little time except for fighting civil wars. These are worldly known facts. It was because of these facts that the international treaty of 1922, known as the Nine Powers' Treaty, had to include a clause, "To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity for China to develop and maintain a strong and stable government."

Then, why do such situations still exist in recent China? We cannot overlook that the cause is so deep-rooted and old that they cannot easily be removed. The reasons are innumerable but the main points are as follows:

First, the people's idea of a government is quite different from that of the people of a modern, unified state. That is, the people, as a rule, regard a government as belonging to the

officials and has little interest in it. A famous proverb of China, "Going out in the morning to till the soil and coming home in the evening to sleep, we have nothing to do with an emperor," tells us most clearly the people's idea of a government.

Secondly, extreme lack of communication facilities can be mentioned. It is true that, even in China proper, the time required to reach somewhat distant places is calculated by 'months'. Thus, it is natural that so-called 'preservation of the central political power' could not be expected.

Thirdly, I must point out the lack of homogeneity of language and the variety of races. China has various languages, each coming under an entirely different category. The Northern Mandarin and Southern Mandarin which are most widely spoken have different vocal sounds and are not generally understood outside of the officialdom. Furthermore, dialects are spoken besides Mandarin. For instance, Kwangtung has the kwangtung dialect, Shanghai has the Shanghai dialect and in this way each Province has its own dialect. It is a well-known fact that only several miles from Fuchow, the capital of Fukien Province, entirely different languages are spoken and that there are many non-literate native dialects. Still more, in the frontier regions the Tibetan language is spoken in Tibet, the archaic Asiatic language in the southern part of Kwanghsi, the Mongolian language in Mongolia, and the Persian language in Ili and Hsinking. The official gazettes of China were at times written in both the Chinese and Persian languages in the south-western districts. Such being the case with the languages and literatures, we frequently come across not a few Chinese in the streets and other places who converse in English with one another. Racial differences intensify the complexity of languages and letters. The majority of populations in Kwanghsi and

Kansu Provinces seem to belong to foreign stock in the eyes of Chinese who live in China proper. In such border regions as Mongolia, Hsinking, Tibet, etc., all the inhabitants are of foreign races with a very few exceptions. These foreign races are different in their manners, customs and ideas from the Chinese. It is no exaggeration to say that there is none of them who does not harbour a hostile feeling against the Chinese. The lack of homogeneity of language and the variety of races have been great impediments to realizing the political unification of China and it is not at all possible to expect the central political power pervade throughout China. The government of General Chiang-kai-Shek, in view of this condition, has made a great effort to spread the national language and to unify languages. But the results are not noticeable up to present.

The foregoing explains the fact that the lack of control and a strong government in China contributes greatly to the fundamental cause of the situation. Consequently, very often a situation develops whereby, unlike between other civilized nations, unconventional diplomatic negotiation had to be carried out. The first reason is that, occasionally the government authorities, because of inability to fulfil their agreement with other nations in regard to the matters seriously affecting the people's interests especially the matters concerning different races, cannot take full responsibilities.

Secondly, the government, in spite of its intentions, is sometimes influenced by some group who is powerful with a great army at its command. The third is frequent occurrences of civil wars. Fourthly, mass power of the people is so strong as to influence the government policy. Accordingly diplomatic negotiations frequent run into difficulties and the important matters are left unsettled.

The states concerned, in regard to minor matters, can unwillingly drop them. But as a matter of course, they cannot do so when they are confronted with a problem of vital importance. As for matters concluded with the Chinese government, we can expect them to be carried out within those regions to which the government's authority is extended. If an agreement covers the entire of China, the foreign states concerned can only realize that it will be enforced locally, and their only consolation will be the fact that at least it is written on paper. There is an alternative to make up for this and that is to negotiate with the local governments. However, their political power does not, as a rule, pervade through the regions which come under them.

B. Military men, with armies at their command, can easily sway the government's intention, and this fact greatly complicates diplomatic negotiations. Successive governments of China had, without exception, secured their power by force of arms. Consequently, in contrast with the influential power of military men, civil officials curry favor with them, and, unless they blindly follow the intention of military men, they could not even expect the security of their lives and properties, not to speak of maintaining their positions. Military men with substantial power meddle in legislation, administration and judicature, according to their own interests, while the government could do nothing about it. This state of affairs has been important to some extent since the establishment of the Republic of China. But speaking of China on the whole, the old situation remains unchanged. China has both the theory and system by which legislation, administration and judicature are made independent of each other but in actuality this does not work out. Often we find it difficult to succeed in diplomatic negotiations when we deal only with the central or local

government. Therefore, while negotiating with the government, it becomes necessary to persuade the military men with power. When powerful military officers did not care to agree with us, we could not, as a rule, hope for bringing any diplomatic matter to a conclusion.

C. When the brutal force of the mass is directed against diplomatic matters, it becomes impossible to take a normal course of diplomatic negotiations. There is no modern state, above all, no democratic state, which does not make it an iron rule of politics to have respect for public opinion. In such a nation the people are given an opportunity to lawfully express their will and there is a system through which the people can do so. Furthermore, there is a way to judge and adjust people's will so as to keep it rational in order to reflect it in the national administration. Thus in such a nation the people's will and the politics are in line. In China, however, because such organizations and systems are lacking, so-called public opinion becomes confused and inconsistent in the process of its formation or in the process of translating it into action.

Let me hereupon observe the process of forming public opinion in China. A small group of people (leaders at times used to be young and inexperienced students, and other times hoodlums) first taking advantage of the Chinese people's susceptibility to agitation, spread their opinion among their circles; as soon as they obtain approval of a slightly larger number of people, they form a faction and win over the mass by exercising their group power. And thus after shaping so-called public opinion, they try to realize it by the force of mass movement of the people. Furthermore, such a movement is unconventional, accompanied by violence. Both natives and foreigners made an object of this

movement, were subjected to violence and threat, their livelihood disturbed, their residences burned down or demolished and their possessions destroyed by fire and relinquished. Such offenses were often accompanied by killing and wounding.

And it may be Britain and Japan who suffered the heaviest damage on account of such mass movements. The recent examples are the anti-British riots of 1924 in Hongkong, Canton and other cities, the May 30 Incident of 1925, and the riot of 1926, in an attempt to restore the British Exclusive Settlements in Hankow and Kuikiang. All these violent movements were aimed at encroaching upon the British rights and interests, and consequently the lives and properties of British subjects were at all times subjected to violence. At Shameen and Canton, even a state of hostilities existed. As to those movements which have been so often repeated for the purpose of discrimination of Japanese goods, the Chinese people first took such passive measures as the boycott of Japanese goods and the withdrawal of Chinese employees from the Japanese, then resorted to positive actions as attacking the Japanese lives and properties. Their outrages were undecribable. Every nation became from time to time an object of the mass movements. Not to mention the Boxer Incident of 1900, the general anti-foreign agitation at the time of the Nanking Incident of 1926 is one of the most outstanding examples.

As to the Chinese Government's attitude towards the above-mentioned movements, they were either unable to do anything or had no plans. With no sincerity to suppress the movements, they always waited with folded hands until the agitation cooled off. When the mass movements against Japanese goods took place, the Government tried to make Japan give in by instigating people or by utilizing them. Although a law to prohibit anti-Japanese movements was

promulgated, (the writer does not remember the date of the first law but the second law was promulgated in 1935) it proved to be ineffective and dead. To know why a Chinese mass movement can be so fervent and disorderly is absolutely necessary in grasping the true nature of such a movement, which has greatly to do with the Chinese conception of politics. The Chinese people have from ancient times been enjoying freedom and unrestrictedness almost unparalleled in any other country of the world. If anyone interferes in any way with their freedom, they stand up and fiercely resist him. Such is their characteristics. On the other hand, they heartily love their own homeland; and in their commercial and industrial business they usually organize a strong guild which is mainly maintained by members coming from the same province. The origin and functions of a 'guild' are quite different from those of an industrial association in other nations. A 'guild' is not stipulated by law and regulation. It has existed from old times as an organization for self-defense and mutual assistance. This organization is unique in the world in that its function is not merely to deal with industrial matters, but also to stipulate the ways of daily life and ceremonious affairs. Moreover, it tries in autonomous manner civil and criminal cases involving its members and even carries out capital punishments. The Government can not usually interfere with their business and they dare to resort to violence in case the Government policy is contrary to their interests or intentions. The Chinese people also have a peculiar and firm conception of self-defense. This conception originates from the fact that they cannot expect much legal protection in spite of disorderliness, repeated civil wars, rampancy of bandits, and the impotence of the administration. A traveler in China will witness that houses even in the interior rural districts

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are surrounded by barrier walls with firing ports or high walls. And not a few rural millionaires have private armed guards of their own, numbering from scores to thousands. This is one of the reasons why mounted bandits and thieves form groups and equip themselves with weapons. Private corps, trained and armed in the military manner, are often organized when a civil war breaks out. They are called Commercial or Industrial Corps and are out of government control. Meanwhile, the Chinese people think the appearances of these corps to be a natural phenomenon as self-defense measures. In China there is another kind of self-defense corps called a "mixed army". While defending themselves, the members of the army protect their leader's life and property as his personal soldiers. In addition the army in response to a request of rural people, especially of wealthy classes, engages in the protection of their lives and properties. And, neither the Chinese army authorities nor the government has nothing to do with the organization and existence of the "mixed army". Units of the mixed army are often enlisted in the regular army under the name of Subsiding Armies and come under the control of the regular army. In such cases, however, what the "mixed army" mainly aims at is to derive financial support and the employment of personnel and the decision on their provisions are still undertaken by the "mixed army" leaders. There are many peculiarities of self-defense of the Chinese. Firstly, their self-defense is backed up by the use of armed strength. (Self-defense organizations possess swords, rifles, pistols and sometimes guns. It is told that even airplanes are used in the "Delta" zone of Canton.) Secondly, factions are formed and the power of multitude is always exhibited. Self-defense measures are indeed legitimate in any nation, but they are allowed only when an acute situation calls for them and the victim has no

alternative. But in China a self-defense measure is often resorted to even when there is no imminent threat. Thirdly, the actions of these self-defense organizations do not always conform to the laws and orders of the government. As evidence in the anti-foreign agitations, these organizations launch campaigns in answer to other mass movements. The above-mentioned peculiarities clearly indicate how mass movements originated in China and show the reason why they resort to peculiar actions. And these peculiarities have not only helped to develop a special form and system of the Chinese internal administration, but also have fostered a singular conception of diplomatic problems in the minds of the Chinese people. They take it for granted that they deal, on their own accord, with diplomatic affairs which they want to develop in their own favor, not wishing to leave them solely to the government. Hence it follows that they resort to the force of mass in tackling diplomatic matters. Such an instance is never seen in any other nation. The people's resorting to violence in regard to diplomacy and the lack of power and sincerity on the part of the government in suppressing mass movements make it necessary for the nation dealing with China, in respect to problems affecting the very existence of that nation, to stop such violent actions and to take whatever steps necessary to make the Chinese government follow a regular diplomatic procedure.

D. The fact that the Chinese have an intense feeling of discrimination and contempt toward foreigners cannot be overlooked. In the 3,000 years of Chinese history, the "Han" tribe, the backbone of the Chinese people, have enjoyed a higher culture than that of any other tribe. They called other tribes barbarians or regarded them as no better than birds or beasts. In spite of this, the Han tribe have suffered from trickeries played upon them by the neighboring tribes and their entire territory has more than once

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been occupied by other tribes. The consequence is that the contempt for and the fear of other races has become a part of their traits. When Europeans and Americans began residing in China for the first time in the 18th century, the Chinese people regarded the white man as barbarians and treated them with contempt and discrimination. The fact that in the Nanking Treaty of 1842 between Britain and China one article stipulates that foreigners should not be called "barbarians" explains what went on during these days. As the Chinese had more chances to associate with foreigners, their antipathy towards aliens gradually subsided but it still remains unchanged in the interior regions of China. And this antipathy in the interior has mainly been directed to foreign missionaries, who exceptionally had the privilege to make permanent residences in the interior. This attitude of the Chinese was not shown merely because of religion, but was partly prompted by the idea of contempt and discrimination against foreigners. In fact, nearly all Chinese conflicts or wars against foreign nations (the Opium War of 1842 between Britain and China, wars against the Allied Armies of Britain and France in 1856 and 1860, the Yunan Incident of 1874, the Boxer Incident of 1900, the Sino-Japanese Incident of 1932 and 1937, the Nanking Incident of 1926, etc.) were caused by their attitude of disdain and excluding foreigners. So were often repeated mass movements. The Chinese people's strong feelings of disdain and excluding foreign nations made it necessary for any nation negotiating with China to take special measures in diplomacy.

It was Japan that was placed in the most difficult position in confronting the excluding and disdain attitude of the Chinese. As will be explained in another section, the Japanese relation with China involves not a few conditions which can neither be conceded nor overlooked from the standpoint of maintaining Japan's right of existence. It is because Japan was in such a difficult position the

she was forced to overcome the anti-foreign idea of the Chinese.

Chapter II

The peculiarities of the Chinese diplomatic measures call for peculiar means of diplomatic negotiations.

The Chinese policy of checking one nation by means of another makes diplomatic dealings with China complex and difficult. Since the opening of the country in 1842, China has suffered under the oppression of other civilized nations. Whenever she felt it impossible to alleviate a difficult situation by her own strength, she has adopted a makeshift measure which is to check one nation by means of another. And Britain has, for the longest period, been the object of such policy, as she has held a dominant position in China longer than any other nation. Japan has also been often victimized by the same policy. It is because Japan has sought to settle the Sino-Japanese issue smoothly and without causing further complication that she has tried to avoid a third party's intervention or interference. Nothing is further from her intention than to establish the "Monroe" doctrine in the Far East. It was because of her such intention that she refused the mediation proposal of America, Britain and France in 1932 concerning the Sino-Japanese conflict, and declined to accept the advice of the Lytton Commission.

3. Evasion of responsibility by both the Chinese central and local governments makes it extremely difficult to reach an agreement in diplomatic negotiations.

It has so far been Japan's policy towards China to negotiate mainly with the central government in regard to general issues pertaining to the entire China or to more than two provinces, and with the local government as to local matters. The relations of interest between these governments are so complex and intricate that Japan could not always adhere to this policy, and very often had to

negotiate with both governments. In such cases, Japan has often confronted with evasion of responsibility on the part of both of them. The central government refers to the intentions of the local government, while the latter asks Japan to negotiate directly with the former. The complexity and prolongation of negotiations on this account may be forbearable; but the writer remembers a number of cases where even matters of greatest urgency and importance have been left unsettled without any sign of agreement in spite of long years' efforts. The lack of unity and other circumstances in China may inevitably cause such a situation but the nations dealing with China had to bear with her for a long time and suffered losses of interests and rights. As to a matter of greatest urgency and importance, a nation dealing with China sometimes comes to feel it impossible to proceed with ordinary diplomatic measures in reaching an agreement in negotiations. This cannot always be judged unreasonable.

C. The fact that the Chinese government made the most of mass movements as a means of executing its policies has become one of the peculiarities in China. China, ranking among the first-rate countries in the art of propelling diplomatic negotiation by smooth words and secret means, has often tried to turn the negotiation to her advantage by making use of mass movements. In making use of them, however, the government is bound to take up such an issue as can win public favor, since the Chinese masses do not always move as the government wishes. Along these lines, the Chinese government as of late succeeded in making good use of the mass movements for "Recovery of Rights". In fact, the "Recovery of Rights" is a matter every Chinese government was deeply interested in and even the government of General Chiang-kai-Shek adopted this principle as a gist of its diplomacy soon after the capital was removed to Nanking in 1926. We can trace back the origin of the popular sentiment for

"Recovery of Rights" to the Russo-Japanese War and this was the subject most suitable for gaining popular sympathy because it had been so deep rooted in the heart of every Chinese.

On the other hand, her official negotiations by diplomats for "Recovery of Rights" came to a deadlock with difficulties every time when they were carried on. When the Government found it difficult to attain its object concerning the "Recovery of Settlements", "Abolition of Extraterritoriality" and "Regaining of Customs Autonomy" on account of (1) the situations existing within China, (for instance, as to the abolition of extraterritoriality, it was agreed to be abolished in principle only with a condition that the Chinese legislation be remolded), (2) of the complication of the interests of other powers, (for instance, concerning the extraterritoriality, every power concerned, for fear of upsetting the equal status of the powers, agreed to abolish it on condition that all the other powers also agree to do so, and (3) of the disapproval of some powers concerned, (for instance, Italy opposed strongly to yielding her exclusive concession), it continued on one hand its diplomatic negotiations, and on the other hand undertook to agitate, utilize and instigate the masses in order to facilitate the negotiations. But the people engaged in the movements did not always move as the government desired and they occasionally went so far as to assault the government authorities concerned, blaming them for their slow and poor tactics in diplomatic negotiations, (for instance, in 1927, Foreign Minister Wang Cheng-ting was beaten by a mob in his office). Yet so far as the movements are directed toward the foreign nations, the government tactfully took advantage of them, idly watching at the mobs violate treaties and commit inhuman acts such as assault, threat, setting fire and damaging foreign goods, and forcing their way into foreigners' residences and destroying them.

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With this force of violence, the government expected to turn the negotiation to their advantage. Every power concerned, annoyed by the menace of such mass movements, repeated a strong protest to the government in every case. The Chinese government, however, did more than issue a formal admonition to the people or acted perfunctorily in checking such movements, lacking sincerity and ability to settle the agitation. As a matter of fact, the Government on many occasions seemed to hope secretly for more violent movements. In an extreme case the Chinese government once dared to declare, as a reply to the protest made by a foreign nation, a mass movement carried out in the spirit of patriotism should not be suppressed. Thus the powers had to make a concession to the Chinese government repeatedly and accept her demands. There are many instances of this kind and one of these is that the United Kingdom, suffering from the outrages committed by the local mobs against her exclusive concessions at Hankow and Chiuchiang in 1926, had no choice but to sign the agreement, giving up the concessions and announcing the so-called "New Policy towards China". Though the policy of "checking the nation by means of another nation" is not right in the way of diplomacy, it cannot be condemned as unlawful. However, it is the most unfriendly and outrageous precedent ever seen in any other country for the government to instigate the people to do grave harm and menace to the foreigners and their properties and interests in China, to do nothing when those violent actions are committed and to use the situation for the advantage of their diplomatic negotiations. The Japanese government and the people are the victims who suffered most from those frequent and extreme atrocities. Harms done in the course of repeated anti-Japanese movements to all of the Japanese residents, including young and old, women and children, are incalculable and the atrocities and outrages committed by the participants of the mass movements are beyond description. The

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Japanese government was continuously making protests to the Chinese government to suppress the outrageous masses, to indemnify the sufferers and to guarantee against similar troubles in the future. But the hundreds of her protests brought no result as if they were gravel thrown into deep waters. As a result a great number of Japanese residents had to face a miserable condition, losing their jobs and properties, driven out of their homes, hardly being able to make a living and many being left to die. Under those circumstances to continue to trade with China even within minimum limit was difficult. Needless to say, Japan was driven into a plight in which she could not even dream of such a thing as economical cooperation with China which is a vital problem affecting the life of Japan. In the beginning the situation existed locally and it did not last too long but it spread all over China in time and began to last for a long period. Consequently, Japan found herself in such a plight that she had to resort to something other than a conventional course of diplomacy in order to protect her lawful rights and interests in China and to save herself from being ruined. In studying the causes of the outbreaks of the Manchurian Incident and the China Affairs, one can never make a right judgment unless he bears these things in mind.

Chapter III

The peculiar relation between Japan and China created many important conditions which directly affected the existence of Japan, and none of these conditions could be left unsettled.

Although there are many nations which have great interests in China, Japan alone had many grave problems which had to be settled diplomatically as soon as possible for her to maintain her existence.

It is based, needless to say, upon geographical proximity to China that China's problem is a problem of life or death for

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Japan. The relation between Japan and China is not at all comparable to that between America or European countries and China. The Ishii-Lansing Agreement, concluded between Japan and America in 1917, endorsed the fact that Japan is in a peculiar relation with China because of her geographical position. But when we make a further study on this problem, we find that what really makes the China problem so important is her plight caused by her over-population for the solution of which the special position of China was considered

Japan was worried about the increase of her population amounting to 800,000 to 900,000 a year. And the inevitable difficulty and uneasiness caused by this in her political, social and economical aspects grew more serious year after year. Thus whether or not an effective measure can be taken in respect to this problem became a grave and burning problem upon which depended the existence of the state. But unfortunately, Japan had practically no room to exploit in her own land. "Birth Control" policy could not be effectively put into practice. There were only two alternatives left; one was emigration and the other was further development of national industries. However, every state and land suitable for immigration closed the door to Japanese emigrants and there was a country, with all her vast territories and limitless resources, that went so far as to deport the Japanese immigrants already settled there. Thus, to solve the problem of over-population by means of emigration became entirely hopeless. Consequently, the only way left for Japan was to develop her industries if she wished to continue her existence. However, Japan not being blessed with natural resources and lands, had to seek outside of her territory those materials essential to the development of her industries. Although a market for Japanese manufactures had also to be found abroad, things were far from what she expected. To speak about industrial materials, as Japan's industries recently increased its productive power and her

manufactures became more active in debouching into the world markets many of the productive countries gradually limited their supply of industrial materials to Japan. And just prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Affair, Japan's industries suffered a terrible oppression by some countries, such as restriction or prohibition of export and import, operation of customs systems, denial of making bargains, and other bold steps to restrict Japan's export. Furthermore, as for foreign markets, Japanese goods, soon after the First World War, met with heavy customs duties which increased year by year and with other restrictions or they were totally prohibited. And the Japanese government, with little hope for the future, did all she could to map out counter-measures to deal with various boycotts.

Consequently, in order to maintain her existence, Japan was obliged to concentrate all her efforts towards the China continent, giving up her industrial policy to trade with the world at large. This ultimately led up to the outbreak of both the Manchurian and the Chinese incidents. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the states which excluded Japanese from emigrating into their countries and oppressed Japan in regard to her trade are partly to blame for the above two troubles. Japan never had a territorial ambition in China. Japan's intention was nothing but to ask China for materials Japan is wanting and to meet the demand of China for goods which China needs and thus, by the combined efforts of the two to bring forth an intimate relation and peace in the Far East, which ultimately contributes to the world peace. This is, of course, not a hypocritical diplomatic eulogy. This is the fundamental principle of Japan towards China which I have been inculcated by the senior authorities and which I have endeavored to realize through my over twenty years of diplomatic service. The reason why Japan had been patient and tolerable in spite of the "anti-Japan and exclude Japan movements", which were insultingly and outrageously repeated

for scores of times, is that Japan considered that the two nations were destined to cooperate with each other in the end. But between these two nations there were some grave factors which obstructed the achievement of this ideal. Unequality between Japan and China was important among those factors. There is no cooperation without equality. Japan hoped for a long time that the two states, by discarding inequality, come to good terms and unite amicably and completely on equal basis. Originally, Japan's privilege of inequality in China was acquired only when the "Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation" was concluded in 1895, about fifty years later than England and the other countries had come to enjoy a privilege of the kind. But already, in 1901, Japan agreed with China on a principle to abolish the extraterritoriality by concluding the supplementary treaty of Sino-Japanese Commerce and Navigation. Then she willingly signed the various treaties and agreements concluded or adopted at the Washington Conference in 1922. Furthermore, at the international conference on the "Chinese Tariff Reform" held at Peking in 1925, she led the meeting by proposing the draft of a most liberal treaty in regard to the restoration of customs autonomy of China in spite of her enormous loss in foreign trade. Thereafter, she always expressed her greatest sympathy towards the desire of the Chinese people to denounce "unequal treaties" and hoped that they could attain their object as soon as possible. Although unfortunately the realization of the Chinese people's desire was delayed because of the complication of rights and interests of the other states involved and other reasons, Japan, by concluding several agreements with the Nanking government in 1940, waived the extraterritoriality, gave back her special concessions and provided a basic principle of economical cooperation. Although these treaties are invalid today, they are evidences through which one can learn what the Japan's principle towards China has been.

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In those days Japan was ready to go a step further to conclude with China such treaties as could contribute to the welfare of China. Japan would have been willing, as a matter of course, to cooperate with the Chiang-kai-Shek government if the Chiang-kai-Shek government had so desired. She would also have been ready to make further concessions if the Chiang government had accepted her proposition for economical cooperation between Japan and China. Japan's withdrawal of her troops from every part of China, which was considered most important by the Chiang government, was to be realized as soon as an agreement could have been reached on the principle laid down when the troops were first dispatched. Much to our disappointment, however, the frequent negotiations for peace proposed by Japan to the government was unfortunately not accepted in any way and the situation finally developed into what it is today. World-wide questions are: "Why Japan tried to realize, by force, her principle towards China if she aimed at economical cooperation?" "Would not the use of arms make economical cooperation between Japan and China impossible?" Although Japan can easily answer in affirmative to these questions in principle, what was there for her to do? The situation in China forced her to take measures other than a conventional course of diplomacy and to resort to a strong method the fact which I have roughly described in Chapters I, II and this chapter. In short, Japan, while obliged to maintain her state existence, was unable to reach anywhere through years of diplomatic negotiations, hampered by the peculiar situations in China, but instead, confronted with the challenge of the Chinese mass movements, she was thus compelled to take up arms to protect her vested rights and interests, the lives and properties of the Japanese residents, and to lay a foundation on which Japan and China might be able to realize complete economic cooperation in the future.

The necessity and enthusiasm of the Japanese to depend upon

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China have never been so great as during the periods of the Manchurian Incident and the China Affair. In such times, why should Japan voluntarily undertake to do something that might even temporarily impede the diplomatic relations with China? Primarily, diplomatic dealings are often carried out by taking advantage of the weak point of the opposing people. For example, intimidation or use of force was often applied in order to make the most of the Chinese weakness in power. It is no exaggeration to say that by such tactics was concluded the majority of the treaties between China and Britain, France, Russia, etc., in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century since China opened her door in 1842. Especially, China was made by the combined forces of many big powers to conclude the treaties in settling the Boxer Uprising in 1900. Although lately we do not hear many instances that European states or America audaciously used such a means, we can not say that there has not been any. As a matter of fact, in the "May 30 Incident" in 1925, Britain landed big forces as many as 20,000 in China, and other powers also landed their marines at Shanghai; in 1926 the British warship fired on Wansien; in 1920 (?) the Soviet Russia attacked the Manchurian forces in the border districts of China and Siberia when Gen Chang Tsuo-lin carried out anti-Russian movements; when the Nanking Incident broke out in 1926, warships of America, Britain, France, Japan, etc., bombarded the fort of Nanking.

For a long time, many powers stationed their garrison troops in Peking-Tientsin district; and regularly posted many warships with marines on board in the ports or rivers of China along which principal cities were located. And a kind of fighting troops were often organized by their residents and trained under the leadership of military officers. The aim of all these preparations was to apply force in emergency. Of the above, the system of stationing forces in North China was abolished according to the decision at the

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For a long time, many powers stationed their garrison troops in Peking-Tientsin district; and regularly posted many warships with marines on board in the ports or rivers of China along which principal cities were located. And a kind of fighting troops were often organized by their residents and trained under the leadership of military officers. The aim of all these preparations was to apply force in emergency. Of the above, the system of stationing forces in North China was abolished according to the decision at the

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intimidation thereof, was the common means which many powers adopted in settling important diplomatic affairs.

Therefore, the fact that Japan used force in settling anti-Japanese problems should not be regarded as a deviation from these precedents, and even if her use of force did violate the common international laws, the peculiar situation in China forced Japan, much to her regret, to resort to such measures.

Let me repeat the real objectives for which Japan mobilized her troops in the Manchurian Incident and the China Affair. What Japan wanted was no more than to protect her own rights and interests guaranteed by the treaties between Japan and China by stopping violent actions on the part of Chinese people and by making Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations follow a normal course and to help to bring about a happy solution in respect to economic cooperation between the two states which was the matter of life and death for Japan. Therefore, it was the Japanese government's intention from the beginning to withdraw all her troops if it was possible to reach such a solution and understanding. The Chungking government under the control of General Chiang-kai-Shek took up the problem of troop withdrawal first of all and declared that no diplomatic negotiations will be carried out as to economic cooperation, etc., unless Japan withdraws her troops. However, it is regretful that the peculiar state of affairs in China, as already explained, did not allow Japan to concede to the intention of the Chinese government.

In short, Japan's dispatch of her troops to China in both incidents was pure self-defense military action without any aggressive intention and such a military action was not a violation of treaties. Upon conclusion of Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, Japan, like America and Britain, attached a reservation to the effect that the said Pact should not be applied in respect to the right of self-defense. Japan naturally had approved the statement, made at that time by the Secretary of State of U.S., to the effect that when and

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to what extent the right of self-defense can be used can only be decided by the party concerned. Accordingly, it is no other nation than Japan that can decide the extent and ways of using military forces in the incidents.

There may be differences of opinions as to whether or not the incidents can be regarded as wars. However, we must bear in mind that Japan had no intention to wage a war, that neither Japan nor China declared a war, and that there were many instances in the past when the use of force by other powers against China was not considered as a war. To judge any use of force in China as a war is to disregard the peculiar state of affairs in China. It is quite natural for Japan, who does not consider the China Affair and the Manchurian Incident as wars, to insist that none of the laws of war can be applied to these incidents. It is not right to consider the Japanese plan for economic cooperation between her and China as aggressive even though Japan used force in the Manchurian Incident and the China Incident. If the word "aggression" means extension of influence abroad, it is not only Japan that committed economic aggression. But if it means aggression in the true sense of the word, to call Japan an economically aggressive nation is a great slander.

Japan only tried to solve her acute problem of over-population on a mutual understanding with China so as to maintain her existence. Although various powers appealed to their big forces in North China in 1900, no one called their economic expansion to China economic aggression. And although warships of Britain, France, etc. shelled the city of Nanking during the Nanking Incident in 1925, I have never heard of anyone say that their economic activities in China are economic aggressions. It is difficult to see why the Japanese economic activities based upon the rights of treaties and aimed at economic cooperation between China and Japan should be aggressive on the ground that Japan used military forces in the Manchurian

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Incident and the China Affair.

The above mentioned plan for Sino-Japanese economic cooperation was not mapped out to deny the principle of equal opportunities in commerce and industry in China to various powers. Since the acceptance of the U.S. Secretary of State Hay's proposal in 1900, Japan participated in all treaties or agreements which acknowledged this principle of equal opportunities, promised to observe it strictly, and made every effort to conform to the treaties even in those cases in which her economic interests were unfavorably affected. Therefore, Sino-Japanese economic cooperation which Japan advocated was not for Japan to monopolize interests in regard to economic activities in China. However, there is one thing which I must add.

It is the fact that during the Manchurian and China Incidents, certain situations did not permit the principle of equal opportunities to be observed strictly. These situations were, generally speaking, attributable to the following causes:

(a) In purchasing goods which were absolutely necessary for military use, the quantity involved was so large that there was very little left for foreigners to buy.

(b) Owing to fighting, etc., general transactions were exceedingly cut down for a certain interval.

(c) As peace and order in the areas in which battles were fought were, for a certain term, disturbed so much that foreigners in general were compelled to hold off their business.

(d) On account of the strategical necessity of operation, foreigners were, for a certain term, prohibited from travelling in some districts.

Sometimes privileges similar to monopoly were granted to some Japanese firms, but they were limited only to specified enterprises and it was never denied to foreigners to run the same kinds of enterprises.

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But such situations as resulted from Japan's use of military forces against China were quite unavoidable, temporary and abnormal. They were of such nature as would be gradually brought back to normalcy with improvement of the condition. It is an extreme slander to say, judging from these matters, that Japan refused to give other powers equal opportunities in commerce and industry. Considering that Japan did intend to withdraw all her forces from China from the beginning, it is not justifiable to put too much stress upon the temporary measures referred to above. There are many precedents where the rights of foreigners granted by treaties were unavoidably restricted or suspended temporarily due to incidents, civil wars and conflicts. In such cases, the states concerned used to tolerate these things even when they could not but regard them as infringements of treaties. Why can it be that a generous attitude cannot be assumed towards Japan alone?

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Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan
22 April 1947

Def. Doc. # 1133

On this 18th day of Dec., 1946

At T.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT SAITO, Yoshie (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness: (signed) KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

3 July 1947


MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. L. C. Dunigan
FROM : D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT: SAITO, Yoshie

As you recall, SAITO, Yoshie has twice been presented as a witness, Defense Documents No. 1133 and 1592, and in each instance the Tribunal sustained the Prosecution's objections to the affidavits and rejected them in toto. In concluding the presentation of the Tri-Partite Pact phase of the case, the Defense on 19 June 1947 stated that there were several matters which they reserved the right to present in this phase. One was the SAITO affidavit (R. 24,758).

You have done considerable work in listing references which might be made to pertinent prosecution evidence in lieu of cross-examination. Mr. Comyns-Carr did the same. We will appreciate it if you will, after conference with Mr. Comyns-Carr, prepare a list of references allocating each to the appropriate section of SAITO's affidavit and, following each reference, state in one line or phrase the character of the reference.

While we have no way of telling what will be included in the new affidavit, we anticipate that it will cover the same general subject matter and since we are likely to have only 24 hours notice of the recall of SAITO as a witness, the preparation of the suggested memorandum in advance may prove exceedingly helpful at that time.


D. N. Sutton,
Assistant Counsel.

cc: Mr. Tavenner

SAITO, Ryoci

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CLASS OF DECORATION</u>	<u>ACHIEVEMENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDING MINISTRY</u>
29-4-34	Order of the Compound Light Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
9-5-34	2nd Class Chingyuan- chang (Manchukuo)	Japanese- Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry

SAITO, Yoshie

Request by: TOJO, Hideki

Address: 42 Shoto-cho, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo.

Advisor to Foreign Ministry during negotiations between Japan and American.

He is able to testify concerning intentions and purposes concerning negotiations between Japan and the United States in 1941.

REPORT BY: John A. Curtis

4 Feb 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: SAITO, Yoshio

Address: Resident of Tokyo.

He was a diplomatic advisor to Gen. MATSUI.

✓ File 378, serial 97: Report for interrogation to ✓
Lt. Leonidov, Room 352, WMB.

File 99, serial 256: Letter from above requesting ✓
release of TANAKA, Kiyoshi (Yoshihei).

File 281, serial 13: Prepared the public announce- ✓
ment of the Tri-partite Pact (Yoshiye).

No further information concerning the above is contained ✓
in the files.

FILE: 3 Copies
1 Mr. Newbill

16 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David H. Sutton
FROM : Lester G. Danigan
SUBJECT: SAITO, Yoshio (Byoei)
FOR : Central Files

The above named person has been subpoenaed to testify on behalf of SHIRATORI, TOJO and MUTO. I have agreed with Mr. Cunningham that I will prepare on this witness.

Copy: Mr. F. Cunningham

Saito, Royce

Investigation file shows he was
political advisor to Foreign Office
from August 1940 to July 1941

REPORT BY: John A. Curtis

4 Feb 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: SAITO, Yoshio

Address: Resident of Tokyo.

He was a diplomatic advisor to Gen. MATSUI.

File 378, serial 97: Report for interrogation to Lt. Leonidov, Room 352, WMB.

File 99, serial 256: Letter from above requesting release of TANAKA, Kiyoshi (Yoshihei).

File 281, serial 13: Prepared the public announcement of the Tri-partite Pact (Yoshiye).

No further information concerning the above is contained in the files.

FILE: 3 Copies
1 Mr. Newbill

SAITO, Yoshio

Def. Doc. 1592

Born: 1880

Address: Shoto, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo-to

Graduated: Tokyo Imperial University

Foreign Office in Peking & Tientsin China

Secretary of Embassy in Washington

Director of Bureau of Commercial affairs of the Foreign Office.

Director of South Manchurian Railway Co. 1926

Advisor to Foreign Office July 1940 - July 1941

REPORT BY John A. Curtis

20 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SAITO, Yoshio

SUBJECT: SAITO, Kyozi

Nationality - Japanese

Address: Shibuya-ku, Shoto, Tokyo.

Residence - Tokyo

Paper No. 967 disposes of oral application and orders the
August 1944 to July 1941.

issuance of a summons for the witness in behalf of the defense.

No further information concerning the above is con-
tained in the files.

COPIES: 3 File
1 Mr. Newbill

REPORT BY: John A. Curtis

4 Feb 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: SAITO, Ryoei

Address: Shibuya-ku, Shoto, Tokyo.

He was political advisor to the Foreign Office from August 1940 to July 1941.

No further information concerning the above is contained in the files.

COPIES: 3 File
1 Mr. Newbill

SAITO, Ryohei

19 Feb 47

Gave copy of Curriculum Vitae to Mr. Dunigan; to be returned to us.

SAITO, Yoshie

Request by MUTO, Akira

- a. This person is a Japanese, resident in Tokyo.**
- b. This person was a diplomatic adviser to General Matsui and can give relevant testimony bearing on Muto's lack of responsibility for the so-called Nanking Affair.**

R. H. Larsh

SAITO, Ryu (Kiyoshi)

Reserve Lt. Gen., he was sentenced for his part in the
2-26 incident

Sentence:

5 yrs, reduced to 3 yrs 9 mos on 11 Feb 38;
reduced to 2 yrs 9 mos 22 days on 11 Feb 40;
civil rights restored on 11 Sep 42.

SOURCE: "The Brocade Banner"

SAITO, ^{Ryu}~~RYU~~ (Kiyoshi)

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a. This person is a Japanese, resident in Tokyo.

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(7.0.)

SAITO, Yoshie

Request by: MUTO, Akira

Address: Resident of Tokyo

This person was a diplomatic adviser to
General Matsumi.

(A. O.)

SAITO, Yoshio

Request by: SHIRATORI, Toshio

Address: No. 42 Shotomachi, Shibuya-Ku, Tokyo.

His last official position was diplomatic advisor in the Foreign Office at the time of Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

Address: No. 42 Shotomachi, Shibuya-Ku, Tokyo

*His last official position was diplomatic
advisor in the Foreign Office at the time of
Foreign Minister Matsuoka.*