

Ex 3565

Def. Doc. #2392

ERRATA SHEET

Affidavit of SHIMADA, Shigetaro

Page 19, Line 20

"Article 17" should be read "Article 16"

Page 20, Line 5

"Article 18" should be read "Article 17"

" Line 11

"Article 19" should be read "Article 18"

Page 20, Line 18

"Article 20" should be read "Article 19"

Line 3 from the bottom

"Article 21" should be read "Article 20"

EX 3565

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI. Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Shigetaro SHIMADA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. (a) My name is Shigetaro SHIMADA. I was born in Tokyo in 1893, entered the Naval Academy in 1901 and graduated as a mid-shipman in 1904. In August, 1905 I was commissioned an ensign. In 1913 I entered the Naval War College as a lieutenant and graduated in 1915 as a lieutenant commander.
(b) I then went to Italy as Assistant Naval Attache in the spring of 1916. In December of 1917 I became Naval Attache there and remained until the end of World War I. In 1919 I became a staff officer of a training squadron and toured Europe, returning to Japan in 1920 at which time I became a staff officer in the Naval General Staff.
(c) I was promoted to the rank of commander in 1920 and assigned to the HYUGA as second in command for one year from the latter portion of 1922. At the end of 1923 I became an instructor in the Naval War College and at the end of the following year, 1924, was promoted to the rank of captain. In 1926 I became Commander of the Seventh Submarine Unit consisting of three submarines. In August of 1928 I was assigned as Captain of the cruiser TAMA. In December of that year, I was removed to the post of Commander of the battleship HIEI.

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(d) I was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in November of 1929 and at that time became Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet. In December of 1930 I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, and in December of 1931 became Chief of the Submarine School at Kure. In February of 1932 I became Chief of Staff of the Third Fleet serving under Commander in Chief NOMURA (later ambassador to the United States). In June, 1932 I became Chief of the Naval Information Bureau of the Naval General Staff and later in November of the same year became Chief of the Operations Bureau. In December, 1934 I had become a vice admiral.

(e) I was with the Naval General Staff as an attached officer in February, 1935 and became Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff in December of the same year. In December, 1937 I then became Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet and in December, 1938 was removed to the Kure Naval Station as Commander in Chief.

(f) In May of 1940 I became Commander in Chief of the China Fleet succeeding Admiral OIKAWA whom I later succeeded as Navy Minister. In November, 1940 I became a full Admiral. I served in the last mentioned position until September, 1941 at which time I returned to Japan. From September 18th, 1941 until September 27th I made a tour of naval hospitals visiting the sick and wounded and then assumed the post of Commander in Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Station on October 1st, 1941.

(g) On October 18th, 1941 I was appointed Navy Minister, succeeding Admiral OIKAWA, Koshiro. Later, in February of 1944, I also assumed the post of Chief of Naval General Staff in connection with the Ministership. On July 17th, 1944 I resigned the post of Navy Minister and later, on August 2nd, 1944, I resigned as Chief of Naval General Staff. I was made a naval councillor and on January 20th, 1945, upon my request,

was relegated to the retired list.

2. (a) At the time I assumed my new post as Commander in Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Base I had not the slightest idea or thought that I would be considered as the next Navy Minister. I did not even know that the KONOYE Cabinet was in danger of falling and of course knew nothing of the dispute between the War Minister and the Premier. Actually, my knowledge of the political situation was dependent upon information obtained from newspapers.

(b) On October 17th, less than three weeks after assuming the command of the Yokosuka Naval Base, I was ordered to report to the Navy Minister in Tokyo. Upon arriving at the official residence of the Navy Minister that evening I was met by Admiral OIKAWA. He then told me he would like to recommend me as his successor for the Navy Ministership under a new cabinet which was being formed. He said that he had carefully considered all of the available high ranking naval officers and had come to the conclusion that I was best qualified for the post.

(c) My immediate reply was a refusal to accept the recommendation. I told him that since December of 1937 I had been away from Tokyo, a period of four years, on routine naval assignments and hence did not feel that my knowledge of the political situation at home nor of present international complications was such as to qualify me. I also related to him that my past career in the Navy had largely been on the sea or connected with the Naval General Staff and that I had never served in the Navy Ministry. And lastly I emphatically stated my distaste for politics and desire not to become involved in that line of work. I suggested that he continue on in the post and I did not question him further on this point. Thereupon I excused myself and returned to my Tokyo home.

(d) On the following morning, October 18th, 1941, I was again summoned to the Navy Minister's official residence where both Admiral OIKAWA and the Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGANO, were awaiting me. This time Admiral NAGANO urged me to reconsider my refusal of the recommendation as next Navy Minister and told me he felt it was my duty as a high ranking full admiral and the man best qualified to accept. While I again told him the same things I had told Admiral OIKAWA he did not change his opinion. They then told me that Prince FUSHIMI, the oldest and most highly respected of naval officers and a Prince of the Blood, had surveyed the field of candidates and suggested that I was the logical candidate.

(e) It so happened that during our conversation several telephone calls came in from the Cabinet Formation Headquarters urging that a candidate for Navy Minister be recommended as soon as possible since all of the other ministers of the new cabinet had been determined. I recall hesitating and being greatly perplexed as to what to do. Fully realizing that I was actually one of the few senior naval officers available for the high position and because of the joint opinions of Prince FUSHIMI, Admiral OIKAWA and Admiral NAGANO I ~~reasoned~~ that my personal dislike for the assignment must not override my obligation to serve as best I could and I reversed my earlier decision and agreed tentatively to accept the recommendation.

(f) I then excused myself and went to visit Prince FUSHIMI personally. There I discussed the matter of acceptance or refusal of the Ministership and the Prince himself urged me to accept the post. It was thus upon the recommendation and insistence of the outgoing Navy Minister, the Chief of Naval General Staff and Fleet Admiral Prince FUSHIMI that I

accepted the assignment. It was never solicited, initially refused and in fact was an unwanted and unwelcome assignment.

3. (a) The statement made in the course of this trial by the Prosecution that, "It is submitted that the defendant joined the TOJO Cabinet because he was, and was known to be, an active supporter of the TOJO policy and that his participation in the conspiracy prior to October 1941 must be inferred from his joining the cabinet at that juncture" is utterly unwarranted and not founded upon fact. In the first place I did not know TOJO, having met him only once and for a few moments in Shanghai in 1940. Again, it would have been impossible for the Premier, an Army man, to even suggest a certain individual in the Navy for the post of Navy Minister since it would have met with violent opposition, not only because it was a step contrary to custom and prejudicial to naval prestige invading the province of the Navy, but because of the natural rivalry and opposing viewpoints of the two branches of the armed service. Of course the fact of the matter is that I did not know what the TOJO policy was. Admiral OIKAWA had briefly discussed the then existing situation at the time of my acceptance of the recommendation for the Navy Ministership but I certainly did not fully know the problems involved.
4. (a) Immediately after informing Admiral OIKAWA on the morning of October 18th that I would accept the recommendation I went to visit Lt. General TOJO. The purpose of my visit was to lay down a prerequisite which must be agreed to before I would officially accept the Ministership. It was approximately 11 A.M. that morning when I spoke to him personally and told him that I would insist that negotiations with the United States be pursued to the utmost with the firm determination to seek a peaceful solution to the then existing

differences between our countries before accepting the cabinet post of Navy Minister. The use of the words "United States" does not preclude Great Britain and the Netherlands for we spoke of the United States as the negotiating power for the others.

(b) TOJO emphatically agreed that it would be the policy of the government to start from scratch in attempting to wholeheartedly and sincerely reach a diplomatic understanding to the end of preventing war in accordance with the Emperor's wish. I was quite impressed and relieved by his attitude and felt that with the Army and Navy in complete agreement on this important point, the essential disagreement leading to the fall of the KONOYE Cabinet had disappeared and chances for our success were excellent. Consequently I would be remiss in relating the truth if I did not say that it was then and still is my honest conviction that TOJO accepted the Ministership realizing the full responsibility of his new assignment and resolving to do his utmost toward settling matters through diplomatic channels rather than by the sword regardless of what previous stand he might have taken.

(c) As evidence of the thinking of the new Premier, I recall a particular incident shortly thereafter. On October 23rd before any liaison meeting had been called a ceremony for the war dead was held at the Yasukuni Shrine. TOJO called and suggested that I appear ten minutes earlier than scheduled saying he would like to talk to me. This I did and he then told me he was planning to call the first Liaison Conference that day and reiterated his firm resolve to commence the discussion of negotiations with America from a clean slate and to explore deeply into the maximum concessions Japan could afford to make to the United States.

5. (a) Thus I did not have the impression that I was joining a war cabinet under which the nation would be plunged into the bitter and tragic struggle that followed but rather I believed it was an appointment in a government which by its very military strength, control and attitude would seek to exhaust the last possibilities in a peaceful effort to settle the grave international dispute.

6. (a) Liaison Conferences began on October 23rd with all present exhibiting confidence that matters could be settled by negotiations. Every one moreover was whole heartedly in favor of peace but the question was how to secure it. Long and continuous meetings were held. The vital issues then present were not of my creation nor had I even a minor part in their formation unless my lifelong career in the Navy qualifies me as responsible. Therefore since the problems had already crystallized, my only function was to attempt a solution of them in my new capacity, as Navy Minister. Thus followed the most taxing assignment and trying days of my life.

(b) In the period between the Liaison Conferences and the Imperial Conference of November 5th, 1941 I recall that all my thoughts were focused on the following two problems:

(1) How best to ease the most difficult conditions of withdrawal of troops from abroad and to reconcile this fact with the views of the Army Section of the Imperial General Headquarters.

(2) What were the greatest possible concessions that Japan could afford to make in its endeavor to reach an understanding with the United States.

The greatest difficulty concerned the withdrawal of troops from China and French Indo-China. I studied the issue deeply. I ascertained the general sentiment in naval circles, fully

observed the thinking of other government members and the trend of public opinion at the time. Since the Navy had opposed and had never attached a strong interpretation to the Tri-Partite Pact I did not feel that that was a problem incapable of solution if a meeting of the minds could be achieved as to the other issues. Regardless of how Japan found itself in such a perplexing international situation my consideration of the questions was from the approach of the present. The best solution therefore was a compromise with the United States and Great Britain with each side giving ground. Consequently I directed my efforts along this line of action in a sincere attempt to avoid the possible tragic effect of hostilities.

(c) There was a strong prevailing opinion that matters had developed so far as to make it physically impossible to withdraw all of our forces from China and that it would have been a psychological blow which would stun the Japanese people. It was argued that it would have amounted to a victory for China over Japan and would have raised the prestige and standing of the United States and Great Britain in the Far East thereby relegating Japan to a position of being dependent upon these two powers for its economic existence and position as a world power. Therefore my thinking at that time was that it would be advisable to effect a compromise by a strategic withdrawal of our forces over a period of time from China proper and to effect an immediate withdrawal from French Indo China if this could be correlated with the opposition to such a step. There was no doubt that Japan then would be making deep concessions which had not been possible to make at the time of the Third KONOYE Cabinet.

7. (a) On November 5th at an Imperial Conference a decision was made to put into effect preparations for war while at the same time steadfastly maintaining our efforts toward peace through diplomacy. This was not inconsistent reasoning considering the plight of Japan at that time. The Allies had effected an economic encirclement of Japan with a result more telling than we dared admit to the world. We viewed with alarm the increasing armaments of the United States and could not reason that such military steps were taken in contemplation of war with Germany alone. The American Pacific Fleet had long before moved from its west coast base to Hawaii and there stood as a threat to Japan. The United States policy toward Japan had been strict and unsympathetic, revealing a determination to enforce their demands without compromise. The American military and economic aid to China had aroused the bitterest of feeling among the Japanese people. The Allied Powers had carried on military conferences which were pointedly directed against Japan. It was a tight, tense and trapped feeling that Japan had at that time.

(b) Considering these facts which have already been laid before the Tribunal there were two solutions open to Japan. One being to relieve the over-all situation through diplomacy, hoping that a give and take policy on the part of the United States and Japan would answer the problems. The other was to overcome by our own power the actual and impending difficulties caused by the Allied encirclement. At all times we considered this last measure to be purely defensive and to be adopted only as a last resort. I never entertained a doubt that Japan or any other nation had the sovereign right to act in self preservation and to determine for herself what accumulation of events would entitle her to exercise

that right. The Government working in conjunction with the High Command studied the situation seriously. Not a single member of either group wanted war with the United States and Great Britain. The military men knew too well that Japan had on its hands the China Affair of over four years duration and which promised no hope of being successfully terminated. Therefore to reason that we would voluntarily incur additional hostilities with such powers as the United States and Great Britain would be to attribute to us unthinkably juvenile military reasoning.

(c) The Government had been carefully considering the maximum amount of concessions that could be made and was exerting every effort to reach an agreement with the United States thereby performing its proper function. On the other hand the High Command was faced with the problem of being called upon to carry out its function if peace negotiations failed. Their situation was simply a practical one. The High Command argued that the Navy had approximately a two year supply of oil on hand. There was no more coming in. The civilian oil could not have lasted more than six months. With the advent of December, northeasterly monsoons would blow with force in the Formosan Straits, the Philippines and Malaya areas rendering military operations difficult. They charged that if forced to wait until the following spring they would be unable to risk a naval fight if called upon to do so by the government because of the steadily decreasing oil supply.

(d) It was in this setting that the High Command revealed its position at the Imperial Conference of November 5th and argued that if diplomatic negotiations failed and they were called upon to go into action it would have to be a step taken by early winter or they would not be able to act at all. It was then in an atmosphere of growing desperation

brought on by the factors which I have described that caused the government to take detailed steps for war even though they hoped for and still felt peace possible through negotiations.

8. (a) Regarding the so-called Pearl Harbor Attack Plan, the Prosecution stated in its summary, "SHIMADA has admitted that he knew that YAMAMOTO had prepared his plan for the attack early in 1941 and that the plan was adopted in May or June. (Transcript p. 10,194) He also admitted that he knew that early in 1941 the Navy commenced the development of a shallow water torpedo because the water at Pearl Harbour was shallow and that the fleet practised the use of this torpedo during the summer of 1941." This is misleading for it tends to infer that I knew about the Pearl Harbor plans before I assumed the Navy Ministership. Such is not the case. It was after my appointment to the post of Navy Minister that I first learned of the Pearl Harbor Attack Plan and of the practice and research that had gone on in the past. I learned of this from the First Division Chief of the Naval General Staff FUKUTOME. Since I was serving with the Fleet in China it would have been quite improbable and in fact impossible for me to have been informed of such vital information. Being primarily engaged with the administrative functions attached to my cabinet post I did not direct my attention to the operational procedures over which I had no jurisdiction, especially since they had been worked out prior to my becoming Navy Minister and were entirely within the hands of the Naval General Staff.

(c) While I of course had within my power the ability to know exactly when the Fleet headed for Pearl Harbor I actually did not know the exact date. Stressing that the

operational and strategic problems were left entirely to the General Staff and the Combined Fleet I can only say that because I did know definitely all operational movements of the Navy could have been called off in a matter of minutes I did not concern myself with the location of the various fleet units at any given time. The over-all question was whether or not peace through negotiations could be reached before hostilities commenced, and as I said before, the early winter deadline was what we were all working against.

9. (a) The Government's determination to peacefully conclude matters was further expressed with the dispatch of Ambassador KURUSU to the United States to contribute to the immediate solution of difficulties. There was no subterfuge or deceit attached to his going to the United States. It was a fight against the time element and a redoubling of our efforts to succeed in diplomacy before we were forced into hostilities. Unless this point is clearly understood and believed a great injustice will result. In the days that followed I was still very hopeful that peace would eventually come through some diplomatic arrangement. It was during this time that I began to fully appreciate the gravity of affairs. This complicated situation weighed heavily on my mind. Each day I went to the shrine to ask for divine guidance so I might serve the Emperor in bringing about his fervent desires for peace. I was not a statesman nor a diplomat but I tried to borrow upon all of the skill and reasoning I possessed to seek a solution. It was in this mixed atmosphere of doubt, hope, fear and speculation that the Hull Note of November 26th was received.

(b) This was a jarring blow. It was my prayer that the United States would have viewed whatever concessions we had

made as a sincere effort to avoid war and would attempt to meet us half way thereby saving the whole situation. Here was a harsh reply from the United States Government unyielding and unbending. It contained no recognition of the endeavors we had made toward concessions in the negotiations. There were no members of the Cabinet nor responsible officials of the General Staff who advocated acceptance of the Hull Note. The view taken was that it was impossible to do so and that this communication was an ultimatum threatening the existence of our country. The general opinion was that acceptance of the conditions of this note would be tantamount to the defeat of Japan.

(c) It seems clear that no nation willingly relegates itself to a secondary position as a world power if it can help it. History to this very minute dictates that every leading power constantly seeks to preserve its rights, prestige and dignity and to this end constantly follows a policy which it deems most beneficial to itself. As a patriotic Japanese loving my country I was confronted with the question of whether or not Japan could bow to the American demands and yet preserve its standing in the world. It would have been treasonable to have advocated a step contrary to the best interests of my country.

(d) Therefore I frankly state that it was this reply of the United States that caused me to step the boundary line of peace when the final decision was made at the Imperial Conference of December 1st, 1941. Even at this twilight hour however there would still have been time to prevent hostilities had the United States recognized that we were sincerely attempting to reach a compromise. In the latter days of November the government had all but

lost hope of peace and felt that war was inevitable. The contingency upon which hinged war or peace was the attitude of the United States. Using the Hull Note as a criterion I did not personally feel it was possible to expect any improvement. The Navy was never confident of achieving victory over the United States but we were confident that we were better prepared at that time to fight than we would have been at any later date. Admiral NAGANO had several times previously, as Chief of the Naval General Staff, expressed this opinion. Hence Admiral NAGANO and I on November 30th told the Emperor that the Navy had made adequate preparations. The question of confidence in the ultimate outcome of the war was not the theme of our conversation but only whether we were confident of the preparations which the Navy had made.

10. (a) The Prosecution statement that fortification of the Mandated Islands was carried out in secret over a period of years prior to 1941 is completely unfounded. While I knew nothing of the blueprint map introduced in evidence I can only say that it is natural that desk plans be held in reserve for this most vital geographical area in order to meet all eventualities. The United States forces must have recognized even after the occupation of the various South Sea Islands that there was little resembling fortifications. The defenses of these islands were hurriedly carried out from the time immediately prior to the commencement of war with only necessary equipment such as medium calibre guns being installed and the converting of airfields with the main objective in mind of preventing the enemy from capturing and using these strategically important islands against us.
11. (a) At no time did I favor a change in the government in

the midst of war because it would betray to the world disunity existing in Japan and would encourage our enemy towards renewing their efforts against us. Regarding Prosecution's reference to my talk with Mr. TOGO, then Foreign Minister under the TOJO Cabinet, concerning his resignation I would like to say that my action was based upon what I felt to be the Emperor's feeling at that time. This however does not mean that I did not personally feel the necessity of preserving the unity of the government at that time. The point is clearly covered in Exhibit 1273 which reveals that KIDO advised the Emperor to seek my assistance in solving the dispute between TOGO and TOJO.

(b) The Prosecution statement "It is also to be observed that SHIMADA was a member of the Imperial Rule Association Political Society and that when in July 1944 the reorganization of the Cabinet was under consideration, including a change of Navy Minister, TOJO, according to KIDO's Diary (Exhibit 1277, Transcript p. 11,376) suggested the advisability of SHIMADA being appointed Welfare Minister in order to have a member of that society in the Cabinet" is misleading. The person to whom reference is made is Mr. Toshio SHIMADA and not myself. It would seem that a cursory investigation of the circumstances would clearly have revealed this. I can not but accept the use of this excerpt as an unfair attempt to cast me in the role of a politician so as to comply with the charges in the Indictment. The Navy traditionally opposed involvement in politics and even when an officer serves as Navy Minister he guards this principle of the Navy.

12. (a) Part of my duties as Navy Minister entailed the issuance of regulations providing for the handling of prisoners taken by the Navy. In pursuance of this

responsibility the Ministry did issue these regulations, one of which is Exhibit 3055. After reception of such regulations it became the duty of the commanders in chief of the various areas wherein the prisoners might be located to follow and enforce such directives. In turn they could issue such orders as were deemed necessary to fit the immediate circumstances confronting them so long as these did not violate the provisions of the Ministry regulations.

(b) Such regulations as were issued by me or the Navy Ministry did not contravene the accepted standards of international thought pertaining to that subject. However the evidence here before the Tribunal has revealed that, on some occasions at least, naval personnel have been guilty of reprehensible conduct inviting severe and justifiable denunciation. Words of explanation given now will not cure the evil that has been done. As I sat in this court room, and heard for the first time the recounting of many instances where Japanese naval personnel mistreated prisoners of war, I was both shocked and ashamed. Under no conceivable interpretation of Japanese naval regulations and teachings could such conduct have been tolerated. Although I was seated in the Navy Ministry in Tokyo, heard nothing of these matters and lacked the command ability to control the conduct of men on the scene I must nevertheless, because of my supervisory position, assume responsibility. While it is not a chain of command responsibility it certainly is more a moral responsibility such as might be felt by a father for the misconduct and misdeeds of his son. I did not receive Allied protests concerning mistreatment of prisoners of war. This is not to say that copies of

them may not have reached the Navy Ministry but certainly they were never routed to my personal desk.

13. (a) There has been placed in evidence what purports to be a secret order concerning submarine warfare - Exhibit 2105, Transcript Page 15,184. Not even by stretching my imagination can I believe that such an order was ever issued. But if it was it did not come from the Navy Ministry. The Navy Ministry did not issue orders relative to matters of this kind. It is a matter entirely within the jurisdiction of the Naval General Staff. As to cooperation between Germany and Japan regarding submarine warfare I can state that there was little. Two submarines were sent from Germany to Japan with only one of them arriving. The object was to assist Japan in building better submarines by taking advantage of the more modern German construction. Nothing however resulted from this and we did not change our ships. As to following the German policy of submarine warfare I can only say that to my knowledge nothing of this kind ever took place. Again it is a matter of operational plans which would be within the sole knowledge of the Naval General Staff, but I do not think that such a thing occurred. I feel Admiral Wenneker, whose testimony was read here, may have had adequate grounds to complain concerning our lack of cooperation with Germany for the Navy never viewed with favor our German relations. With modern methods of warfare on the seas it is reasonable to assume that many of the old rules and regulations regarding submarine warfare became antiquated. Most certainly the United States and Great Britain realized this as well as Japan. But this is not to say that any orders were issued by the Navy Ministry

which were contrary to existing international law regarding submarine warfare.

14. (a) The Prosecution has introduced in evidence a so-called speech made by me in front of a Diet Committee on February 10, 1942 after commencement of war. This was really not a speech but a discussion among twenty or thirty men. I have no way of knowing whether the contents reported are accurate, except that I at no time ever advocated cruelty to the enemy or to the nationals of any countries. As I recall it, this was more or less an informal gathering of a very minor committee whose function was to check on expenditures of past budgets. Comments which were made back and forth might, if considered in their entirety, lend a different light to the few reported words that have appeared in evidence. The Committee was addressing questions to me and I was answering. Therefore I do not believe any statement which could be called a speech was made. I was explaining that the meager economy of Japan necessitated support of the war effort from occupied countries. I did not speak in terms of eliminating or exterminating individuals but in the abstract sense of achieving the supply of necessary materials and the elimination of economic opposition.
15. (a) The question has been raised as to whether or not the Japanese Navy favored an attack on the United States without a declaration of war or the giving of notice beforehand. It was my firm belief that in respect to such matters I could rely upon the knowledge and skill of the Foreign Minister and his experts. Consequently I never felt any concern about the procedure that was adapted until the question was raised after the end of the war. Never at any Liaison Conference or other meeting that I attended was there

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a discussion in which the Navy advocated an attack without notice. I do not even recall such notification was discussed at a Liaison meeting, much less the question of whether any notice should be given at all. I believe as a result of consultations between the Foreign Office, Army General Staff and Naval General Staff that it had been decided to deliver the notification at least one hour before commencement of hostilities. The testimony of Mr. Kumaichi YAMAMOTO of the Foreign Office given here August 10th, 1947, that Vice Chief of Naval General Staff ITO insisted on an attack against the United States without notice and did so at a Liaison Conference on December 2nd, 1941 is in error. I do not recall a Liaison Conference being held on December 2nd, 1941. Not long before his death Admiral NAGANO and I were told of this contention and we jointly questioned every one of the accused who had attended the Liaison Conferences including TOJO, SUZUKI, KAYA, HOSHINO, OKA and MUTO. None of them except TOGO remembered such a thing occurring.

17. (a) The Prosecution has stated that I received awards in 1934 for services in connection with the 1931 - 1934 China War and in 1938 for services in connection with the Anti-Comintern Pact and in 1940 for services in the China War and that the award to a naval officer for his services in connection with the Anti-Comintern Pact has a special significance. I wish to state that I received an award of a silver cup, which was not a high decoration, simply because at the time of the execution of the Anti-Comintern Pact I occupied the post of Vice Chief of Naval General Staff. It is not unknown for high ranking officers to receive decorations on such occasions even though they did nothing in regard to the event. I certainly did nothing toward the execution of this pact. As to the other decorations received,

they are dependent simply upon my service in the Navy and the rank that I held during the various times mentioned. Many other naval officers received similar decorations and no significance has been attached to it.

18. (a) As to my membership on the China Affairs Board (KOAIN) - I would like to say that it was a post I assumed by virtue of becoming Navy Minister. Before my term of office and in previous cabinets it was a routine procedure for the Minister of Army, Minister of Navy, Finance Minister and Foreign Minister to assume a vice-presidency on that board. I had no specific duties and exercised no specific function.

19. (a) The issuance of military currency and its connection with the Navy Ministry must have been a matter inherited by me when I assumed the post. I have no recollection whatsoever either of approving or requesting such. It is undoubtedly quite possible that such a matter was taken care of by subordinates in the Navy Ministry who handled the matter before and knew its history.

20. (a) Some significance appears to have been attached to the fact that my name appeared as a member of the Imperial General Headquarters. The Imperial General Headquarters was composed of the Army Section and the Navy Section. The Army Section was controlled by the Chief of Army General Staff. The Navy Section was controlled by the Chief of Naval General Staff. I never attended these meetings as Navy Minister and had no right to do so. Purely operational and strategic problems were discussed there and since I had no voice in such matters it would have been considered inappropriate for me to have attended.

21. (a) I came to know HOSHINO, KAYA, KIDO, KIMURA, MUTO, SATO, SUZUKI and TOGO after assuming the post of Navy Minister in October, 1941. If I met any of these men

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before this time I do not remember the occasion. As I said before, I met TOJO for the first time in a very brief meeting around December, 1940 when he visited Shanghai in the course of a tour. I next saw him in October 1941 at the time of the formation of the new cabinet. I met Mr. SHIGEMITSU for the first time in Shanghai in 1932. We met again in April, 1943 when he assumed the office of Foreign Minister in the TOJO Cabinet. I met UMEZU for the first time in 1932 and HATA and ITAGAKI in 1940. My first acquaintance with Mr. KOISO was in July, 1944 when he was organizing his new cabinet. My acquaintance with Admiral OKA was slight even though we served in the Navy together and it was only after I became Navy Minister that I talked with him at any length. The following accused I met for the first time after my confinement in Sugamo Prison - ARAKI, DOHIHARA, HASHIMOTO, HIRANUMA, MATSUI, MINAMI, OSHIMA and SHIRATORI.

On this 2nd day of December, 1947

At the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East
Tokyo, Japan

DEPONENT: Shigetaro SHIMADA

I, Shigetaro SHIMADA, hereby certify that the above
statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his
signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) Yoshitsugu TAKAHASHI (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Shigetaro SHIMADA (Seal)

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 嶋田繁太郎

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一、余の姓名は嶋田繁太郎、一八八二年東京に生る。一九〇一年海軍兵學校入校。一九〇四年同校卒業少尉候補生となる。一九〇五年少尉に任官。一九一三年大尉として海軍大學校入校。一九一五年少佐として同校を卒業した。

二、一九一六年春海軍武官輔佐官としてイタリイ赴任。一九一七年十二月同國大使館附武官となり。第一次世界大戦終了迄在職。一九一九年練習艦隊參謀となり歐洲巡航、一九二〇年歸航と共に軍令部々員となる。

三、一九二〇年中佐に進級。一九二二年より一年間「日向」副長、一九二三年末海軍大學校教官。翌一九二四年末大佐に進級。一九二六年三隻の潜水艦を以て編成せられたる第七潜水隊司令。一九二八年八月巡洋艦「多摩」艦長。同年十二月戰艦「比叟」艦長に轉補せられた。一九二九年十一月少將に昇進、同時に第二艦隊參謀長。一九三〇年十二月柳合艦隊兼第一艦隊參謀長。一九三一年十二月吳の潜水學校校長。一九三二年二月第三艦隊參謀長として野村司令長官（後の駐米大使）の幕僚となる。一九三二年六月軍令部第三班長、次いで同年十一月第一班長となり。一九三四年十二月中將となる。

四、一九三五年二月軍令部出仕。同年十二月軍令部次長。一九三七年十二月第二艦隊司令長官となり、一九三八年十二月吳鎮守府司令長官。

に轉補せられた。

(ハ) 一九四〇年五月及川大將の後を襲つて支那方面艦隊司令長官に補せられた後に余は同大將の後を承けて海軍大臣となつた。一九四〇年十一月大將に昇進、翌一九四一年九月内地に歸還する迄は右の地位にあつた。一九四一年九月十八日より九月二十七日迄各地海軍病院に傷病兵慰問旅行をした後、一九四一年十月一日横須賀鎮守府司令長官に就任した。

(イ) 一九四一年十月十八日余は及川古志郎大將の後任として海軍大臣に任命され、その後一九四四年二月海軍大臣と兼ねて軍令部總長を拜命。一九四四年七月十七日海軍大臣を辭し、次いで八月二日軍令部總長を辭して、軍事參議官に補せられ、一九四五年一月二十日依頼予備役に編入せられた。

(ロ) 横須賀鎮守府司令長官の新地位に就任當時余は余が後任海軍大臣に選せらるゝが如きことは夢想だもしなかつた。近衛内閣が瓦解の危機に瀕してゐることさへ知らず、況んや陸相と首相の意見の對立などは素より知る由もなかつた。實際余の政局に關する知識たるや新聞記事より得たるものの範圍を出でなかつたのである。

(ハ) 横須賀鎮守府司令長官に就任後三週間をも経過せぬ十月十七日余は海相により上京を命ぜられ、同日夕刻余は海相官邸に入り及川

大將と會見した。その際及川大將は目下組閣中の新内閣の海軍大臣として彼の後任に余を推薦したを旨述べた。彼は起用し得る全高級將官に就き慎重考慮の結果余が海軍大臣として最適任者であるとの結論に到達するに至つたと述べた。

い余は即座にこの推薦を辞退し一九三七年十二月以降四年間東京を離れて通常の海軍勤務に服して居た爲、國內情勢にも又現下の錯雜せる國際情勢にも通せず從て適任であるとは考へられないこと、又余の從來の經歷は主として海上もしくは軍令部關係の勤務に服すること、に在つて海軍省に勤務せる經驗絶無なりし旨を述べ、最後に余は政治を好まず、その方面の業務に關係するの希望を有せざる旨を強調した。余は寧ろ彼の留任を勧めこの問題を更に論議することなく官邸を辭去して東京の自宅に歸へつた。

い翌朝即ち一九四一年十月十八日再び余は海相官邸に招致されたが官邸には及川大將と軍令部總長永野大將が待ち受けてゐた。此の度は永野大將が後任海相推薦拒絶を再考慮せんことを求め、最高級の將官たる海軍大將として又最適任の者たる以上、この推薦を受諾することは義務であると思ふと述べた。余は及川大將に述べたと同じことを繰返したが、彼は主張を迂げず更に及川、永野兩大將は、海軍の最長老にして且皇族たる伏見宮殿下も各候補者を勸察せられて余

が後任たるべきが至當であるとの仰せがあつたと述べた。

四) たまたまこの會談中組閣本部より幾回か電話がかゝつて新内閣の他の閣僚は全部決定せるにより海相候補者を速かに推薦するやう督促して來た。如何にすべきかと頗る逡巡困惑したのを、今でも余は記憶してゐる。余が大臣に起用せられ得べき少數の高級將官の中の一入であることは充分承知してゐたし、又伏見宮殿下及川大將永野大將の一致した意見でもあぬので、政治的業務に携はるを好まざる私情を去り最善を盡すことは余の義務ではないかと感ずるに至つた。茲に於て、余は遂に先の決意を翻へして一旦推薦に假承諾を與ふるに至つたのである。

五) 依つて、余は自ら伏見宮殿下の許に参向して大臣就任を受諾すべきか否かについて御相談申上げた所、殿下には御自身余の就任を促された。余の海相就任受諾は實に前海軍大臣、軍令部總長及伏見元帥宮殿下の推薦と勸説の結果であつて、自らは何等求むる所なく、ひたすら辞退したのであつた。眞にそれは希望せざる又歡迎すべからざる任命であつたのである。

三) 本審理に於て檢察側は一被告が東條内閣に入閣したのは、彼が東條政策の積極的支持者であり、且つこのことが知られてゐたからであり、この時彼が入閣したことによつて、一九四一年十月以前に彼が

共同謀議に参加してゐたことが推定せらるべきであることを主張する」と述べてゐるが、これは全く謂れなきことであり、無稽のことである。第一に余は、東條とは一九四〇年上海に於て唯一度、然も極めて短時間會つた以外に面識がなかつた。又陸軍々人である首相としては、海軍の誰かを海軍大臣に指名することさへ猛烈な反對に遭つて不可能であつたであらう。何となればかゝる手續は慣行に背き海軍の威信を傷つくるものなるのみならず、陸海軍間には自ら對等感及見解の相違が存して居たからである。余は東條政策の何たるかを知らなかつた。

及川大將とは海相推薦受諾の際當時の情勢に就て簡單な會談を遂げたが、勿論各種問題につき深く理解したといふ譯ではなかつた。

四

(イ)十月十八日朝及川大將ニ推薦受諾を告ぐるや、直ちに余は東條陸軍中將を訪ねた。訪問の目的は、正式に海相就任を受諾する前に必要な前提條件を取極める爲であつた。

依て同日朝十一時頃、余ハ自ら東條中將に對し日米間に現に存する紛争を平和的に解決する爲め確乎たる決意を以て對米外交々渉に全力を盡し之れを促進すべきことを主張したきを旨述べた。

「米國」といふ言葉を使ふのは英國及和蘭を除外したのではなくて、他の二國をも代表する外交々渉の當事者として米國と言ふのである。

(ロ)之に對して東條は望意を休して、在來の決定を白紙に還し戦争回避の目的を以て誠心誠意外交々渉妥結に努力することを政府の政策とすることに全然同意である、と確言した。

余は彼の態度に深い感銘を覚え大いに安心した。

そしてこの重要問題に關して陸海軍が完全に一致し近衛内閣の瓦解を來した不一致の根源は解消した以上、成功は期して待つべきであると思つた。

従て東條中將は自己の新しい地位に伴ふ責任を充分に自覚し、以前の自己の立場は如何なるものであつたにせよ、之を無視し、銃劍に依らず外交手段を以て懸案を解決すべく最善を盡すことを決意した上で首相就任を受諾したものと、當時余は心から信じ今尙斯く信じてゐると

いふのが余の偽はらざる心情である
 (ハ) 新首相がどんな考へであつたかと示す證左として思ひ出すことがある

それ迄に連絡會議がまだ一回も開かれてゐない十月二十三日靖國神社で新御祭神の祭典が行はれた。東條は電話で余に話したいことがあるから定刻より十分許り早く来て貰ひたいと言つて來た。その通りに出掛けると、彼は當日から連絡會議を開き、凡てを白紙に返して對米外交交渉に關する討議を開始し、戦争を避ける爲に日本は米國に對して最大限何處迄讓歩し得るかを深く研究する心算であると固い決意を繰り返したのであつた。

五 (イ) それ故に余は、國民を苛烈悲惨なる争闘に突き落す如き戦争内閣に入閣するなど、は思はず、否寧ろ其の有する軍部の實力統制力並びに方針によつて、この重大なる國際紛争の平和的解決の爲にあらゆる手段を盡すであらう内閣の閣員になること、信じたのである。

六 (イ) 連絡會議は十月二十三日から始まり、出席者何れも、外交交渉によつて事態を拾收し得るとの確信を披瀝し、實に心から平和を念願して居たが、問題は如何にしてその平和を確保するかにあつた。長時間に亘る討議が行はれた。當時の重要諸問題は余が創り出したものではなく又、生涯を海軍に勤務したといふ事實のみにて責任ありとせらるゝ

ならば格別、余はそれ等問題の生起に何等の役割をも演じたことにはなかつた。従つて既に問題が生起してしまつてゐる以上、余は唯海軍大臣としての新地位に於てその解決を計ること以外に途はなかつたのである。斯くして余の生涯中最大責任を負荷せられ試練の日が續いた。(口)連絡會議と一九四一年十一月五日の御前會議との間に於て、余の考意は次の二問題に集中されて居た。

(一)如何にすれば、良く在外部隊を撤収する最も困難なる問題を緩和し得らるか、而して此の事實と大本營陸軍部の見解とを調和し得られるか。

(二)米國と了解に達する爲に日本の爲し得べき讓歩の最大限度は如何なるものであるべきか。

最大の難問題は中國及び佛印からの撤兵問題であつた。余はこの問題を深く考究した。海軍部内の見解を確かめ他の閣僚の意同を詳知し、又當時に於ける輿論の趨向を充分に見極めた。海軍は嘗て三國同盟に反對し又常に之れに重點を置くを避け居りし次第なれば、他の問題に就て了解に到達し得れば三國同盟は解決不能の問題とは感じなかつた如何なる経過を辿つて日本はかゝる國際的難局に直面するに至つたかに付いては之れを意外に置き、余は専ら現在を如何にすべきかの觀點より問題を考察したのである。夫れ故、最良の解決策は米國及英國と

互譲妥協を圖ることにあつた。茲に於て、余は此の線に沿ふて誠心誠意力を盡し以て不幸なる敵對行爲の發生の可能性を除去するに努めた。(ハ) 斯く事態が發展したる以上は中國より我が軍隊を全面的に撤收することは事實上不可能にして、又日本國民を驚愕せしむる精神的大打撃なるべしとの強硬なる意見が支配的であつた。斯くする事は即ち中國に付て言へば、中國が日本に對し勝利を獲たと等しく、これにより米國及英國の東亞に於ける威信と地歩は昂騰するがこれに反し日本の經濟生活及國際上の地位は低下せしめられ、此等兩國に従屬するの余儀なきに立到るであらうと論ぜられた。故に當時に於ける余の考へは、若し反對論を斯る措置に同調せしめ待べくば中國本土よりは我が軍隊の漸次戰略的撤收をなさしめ、佛印よりは即時撤收を爲さしめ、以つて妥結に達することが望ましいと言ふに在つた。

これは明かに日本が近衛第三次内閣當時に爲し得なかつた大讓歩を爲さんとするものであつた。

七、(イ)十一月五日の御前會議に於て、外交手段により平和的解決に對する最善の勢力を着實に繼續すると同時に、他方戦争に對する準備にも着手することが決定された。當時に於ける日本の苦境を思へば、これは矛盾した考へ方ではなかつた。聯合國の行つた對日經濟包圍の効果は實に想像以上に深刻であつた。我々は米國の刻々の軍備の増強を驚愕の眼を以つて見守つたが、如何にしても單なる對獨戰のみを考慮してかゝる軍事的措置が執られつゝあるのであるとは考へられなかつた。米國太平洋艦隊は遙かに以前よりその西海岸の基地からハワイに移動して日本に脅威を與へて居た。米國の對日政策は冷嚴にしてその要求を容赦なく強制する決意を示してゐた。米國の軍事的經濟的對支援助は痛く日本國民の感情を害してゐた。聯合國は明らかに日本を對象とした軍事會談を實施してゐた。窮地に陥つてどうにもならないといふのが當時に於ける日本の切迫感であつた。

(ロ)既に當法廷に述べられた之等事實を考量すれば、日本には唯二つの解決方法が残されてゐた。一は、日米相互のギイヴ、アンド、テイクの政策による問題解決の目的を以て、外交手段によつて全局面を匡救することであり、他は自力を以て聯合國の包圍態勢による急迫せる現實の窮境を打開することであつた。この第二の手段に出でることはいさく防衛的なもので最後の手段としてのみ採用せらるべきものである。

と考へた。日本のみならず如何なる國家と雖も自存の爲め行動を爲し得るの權利を有すること、又如何なる事件の發生により其の權利を行使し得るに至るかを自ら決定し得る主權を有することを余は些かたりとも疑はなかつた。政府は統帥部と連携して眞剣に考究したが、政府統帥部中誰一人として米英との戦争を欲した者はなかつた。日本が四ヶ年に亘つて繼續し然も有利に終結する見込のない支那事變で手一杯なことを、軍人は知り過ぎる程よく知つてゐた。従つて自ら好んで、更に尙米英の如き強國對手の戦争を我より求めたと爲すが如きことは、信すべからざる程幼稚なる軍事的判斷の責を強いて我々に歸するものである。

(ハ) 政府は、譲歩の最大限度を慎重に考究し、日米交渉妥結の爲万策を盡し、以てその本來の職責を果しつゝあつた。他方統帥部は、政府の平和的交渉が失敗に歸した場合には、その要求によつて自己の職責を遂行しなければならぬといふ問題に直面してゐた。統帥部の立場は簡明直截なものであつた。即ち海軍の手持石油は約二ヶ年分でそれ以上入手の見込はなかつた。民需用石油は六ヶ月以上續かなかつた。十二月に入れば北東信風が臺灣海峡、比島、マレー地域に強烈になり、作戦行動を困難ならしめるであらう。翌春迄待てば、石油補給力の漸減の爲、日本海軍は假令政府の要請を受くも海戦を賭することは不

可能に陥つて居るであらう。

(二) 統帥部が十一月五日の御前會議に於て、その立場を明かにし、もし外交交渉が失敗に歸し、行動開始に移るべき要請を受くるが如きことあらんか、初冬迄に何等かの手を打たねばならぬ、然らざれば行動不能に陥る惧ありと論じたのは、この考慮に基くものであつた。かくて政府をして、なほ外交交渉による平和の望を捨てずその可能なものを感じつゝも、戦争に對する措置を講ぜしむるに至らしめた所以のものは、以上述べた如き事實が齎らした絶体絶命の情勢によるものであつた。

八、(イ)所謂眞珠灣攻撃計畫に付いて、檢察側はその要約中に於て「島田は、山本がその攻撃計畫を一九四一年初に準備し、その計畫が五月もしくは六月に採用されたことを知つてゐたことを認めた」(法廷速記録一〇、一九四頁)、彼は亦、一九四一年初海軍が、眞珠灣が浅い爲淺海魚雷の改良を始め、艦隊は一九四一年の夏中石魚雷の使用を練習したことを知つてゐたことを認めたと述べてゐるが、これは誤りである。何となれば若し然りとすれば、宛も余が海相就任前に眞珠灣攻撃計畫に就て知つてゐた如き推定を下される傾きがあるからである。そうではなくて、余が初めて眞珠灣攻撃計畫、及びその演習、研究のことを知つたのは、海相就任後であつて余はこれを福留軍令部第一部長から聞いた。余は支那方面艦隊に勤務してゐたから、かゝる重要な機密事項を知つてゐるといふことは全く有り得べからざることであり、亦事實不可能であつた。余は元より閣僚としての地位に伴ふ行政上の業務に携つてゐたので、所管外の事項たる用兵上の處置には注意を拂はなかつた。而もそれが余の海相就任前から研究されて居り、全く軍令部の所掌であつたので殊更さうであつた。

(ハ)勿論余は艦隊が何時眞珠灣に向けて發航したかを知らうと思へば正確に知り得る術はあつたのであるが、事實正無な日附を知らなかつた。敢て強調するが用兵上の問題は全然軍令部と聯合艦隊に委ねられ

てゐたのであつて、余としては海軍の全作戦行動は寸秒の内にも之れを中止せしめ得ることになつて居たことをはつきり知つてゐたので各艦隊が何時々々には何處にゐるかといふことには關心を持たなかつたのである。根本問題は敵對行爲開始前に外交々渉によつて平和に到達し得るや否やにあつた。且又、前にも述べた如く、初冬といふデツドラインを克服すべく我々は皆懸命だつたのである。

九、(イ)政府の案件を平和的に妥結せんとする決意は、難問の急速解決に寄與せしめんとして來栖大使を米國に派遣したことに依り、一層明白に表示せられた。彼の渡米には何等の欺瞞もなければ奸策もなかつた。

(何) これは晴天の霹靂であつた。米國に於て、日本の爲した讓歩がその如何なるものにもせよ、これを戦争回避の爲の眞摯なる努力と解し、日米國もこれに對し歩み寄りを示し以て全局が收拾せられんことを余は祈つて居た。

然るにこの米國の回答は頑強、不屈にして冷酷なものであつた。それは我々の示した交渉への眞摯な努力を寧も認めてゐなかつた。ハル・ノート^ハの受諾を主張したものは、政府部内にも、統帥主腦部にも一人もゐなかつた。その受諾は不可能であり、本通告は我國の存立を冒かす一種の最後通牒であると解せられた。右通告の條件を受諾することは日本の敗退に等しいといふのが全般的意見であつた。如何なる國と雖も、尙方迷あるに拘らず好んで第二流國に轉落するものゝないことは明かである。凡ての主要國は常に其の利益、地位及尊嚴の保持を求め、この目的の爲め常に自國に最も有利と言ぜらるゝ政策を採用することは、歴史の明證するところである。祖國を愛する一日本人として、余は米國の要求を容れ、尙且世界に於ける日本の進歩を保持し得るや否やの問題に當面した。我國の最大利益に反する措置を採るのを支持することは疑行爲となつたであらう。かゝるが故に、平直に言へば一九四一年十二月一日の御前會議に於

て最後の決定の行はれた際、余をして平和の境界線を定ましめたのは實に米國のこの回答であつたのである。若し米國が日本の交渉安結に對する眞摯な努力を認識して居たならば、この平和の黄昏に於てすらなほ戦争を防止する余裕はあつたであらう。十一月末には政府は殆んど平和に對する望を失つて戦争の避け難きことを感じた。和戰の別るゝ所は一に米國の態度如何に懸つてゐた。ハル。ノートから判断して、余自身事態好轉の期すべからざることを感じた。海軍は全く對米戰の勝利に就て自信は持たなかつたが、時日遷延の後よりも寧ろ今の方がまたしも有利な準備を爲し得ると我々は確信した。水野大將は軍令部總長として屢々この意見を表明した。隨て水野大將と余とは十一月三十日、海軍は相當な準備が出来てゐる旨陛下に奉答したのである。拜謁の際問題となつたのは戦争の終局に對し自信があるか否かではなくて、海軍の爲した準備につき自信ありや否やの點のみであつたのである。

後、余は委任統治諸島の要隘化か一九四一年以前數年に亘つて秘かに行はれたと述べてゐるか、これは全く根拠なき主張である。善證として提出された青島眞面目に就ては余は不測の事態に應ずる爲、この最も重要な地域に對して机上計畫を準備して置くのは當然であ

十六日) 如何なる時にあつても、余は戦争最中の政府更迭には不賛成であつた。

ると言ひ待るのみである。米軍は南洋諸島を占領してそこに何等設置らしきものなかつたことを認めたと相違ない。これら諸島の防衛措置は戦争開始直前より急遽行はれたものであつて中口經砲の据附或は飛行場への轉換等はこれ等戦略要地が敵の手中に入り敵により利用せられんことを防止する目的を以て必要なる施設を施したのに止まつたのである。

何となれば、それは國內不統一を世界に曝露し、敵の戦意を昂揚せしめるからである。

檢察側は、東條内閣の外相東郷氏の辭職に歸する余と同氏の話合について言反してゐるが、余の行動は陛下の御意向を推察申し上げて爲したことであつた。

余自身内閣の統一保持の心安を感じなかつたと言ふのではない。その點は明瞭に法廷證一二七三號で盡されて居り、それによれば木戸が陛下に東郷と東條の意見の對立の解決に余を利用されるやうお勧めしたことが明かである。

何 檢察側は「嶋田は眞實政治會の一員であつて、一九四四年七月海相の更迭を言めて内閣改造が考慮された時、木戸日記（法廷證一二七七

DD. 25/2

十二(4)

號速記録一一三七六頁一によれば東條は同會員を入閣させる爲に嶋田を厚生大臣に任命してはどうかと提言した。一と述べてゐるが、これは間違つてゐる。そこで言はれてゐるのは島田俊雄氏であつて全ではない。當時の状況を一寸調べればこのことは明瞭になつた筈である。この抜粹を用いて余に政治家の烙印を押し付けようとする不公正なる企圖には如何にしても承服することとは出来ない、海軍は其の傳統として政治に關與することと反對し、海軍々人が海軍大臣に就任した際に於てすらこの方針を守つた。

十二(4)海軍大臣としての任務の一部として、余は海軍の變た件變の取扱に關し規則を發布する責務を負ふて居た。此の責務に従ひ海軍省は諸規則を發布した。その中の一は法廷證第三〇五五號である。斯かる規則を受けた件變の存する各地司令長官は右規則を遵守、勵行する責任を有するに主り、茲に於て司令長官は規則の定むるところに反しない限度に於て現地實情に適合する必要な命令を出すことが出来た。

(4)余又は海軍省に依り發せられた右諸規則は、當該事項に關して承認せられたる國際思想の一般基準と相容れざるものではなかつた。併しなから本法廷に提出せられた證據に依れば、少くともある場合に

於ては海軍の者が重大なる批判を免れ難き非議せらるべき行爲のあつたことを示して居る今茲に釋明するも既に行はれた不詳事を緩和するものではないであらう。余は本法廷に於て初めて日本海軍の者に依る件は虐待の多くの事例を聞かされ、愕然として驚き且辱の感に堪へない。如何なる日本海軍諸規則及訓育の趣旨より見るも、斯かる行爲は許さるべきものではない。余は東京に於て海軍省に在り斯かる事項を全く知らず、又現場に於て各人の行ふ行爲を直接監督する権能を缺いて居つたか、余の占めて居た統督者たる地位に鑑み責任を負はねばならない。尤も右は指揮系統上の責任にあらざして、實に父か且の子の不行跡非行に對し感ずると同様寧ろ道義上のものである。余は海軍大臣として俘虜虐待に關し聯合國の抗議のあつたことを知らなかつた。余は抗議書通が海軍省に送致せられなかつたとは言はない。唯此の種のものには確かに余自身の机上に届かなかつた。

十三

潜水艦戦艦に関する秘密命令と稱するもの

一五八四頁一が證據として提出された。想像を逞しくするもかゝる命令が発せられたことは余には全く信じられない。然し假にこの命令が出されたとしても海軍省から出たものではない。海軍省はこの種の事項に關する命令は發せずそれは全く軍部の所管である。日獨間の潜水艦に於ける協力を就ては斯る協力は殆んどなかつたと言ひ得る。二隻の潜水艦が獨乙から日本に送られその一隻だけが到着した。その目的は獨乙の潜水艦のより近代的なる構造を學び日本に於ても一層優秀なる潜水艦を建造する助けとする爲であつた。併しその効果は全然無はれず我々は自己の潜水艦の構造を變へなかつた。

獨乙の潜水艦戦艦政策の採科に就いて言へば余の知る限りかゝる事實はなかつたと言ひ得るのみである。又それは作戦計畫上の問題であつて軍令部のみが司知せる事項であるが事實そいふことがあつたとは思はない。海軍は對獨關係につき好感を持つて居なかつた故ヴェンネッカー大將其の證言は堂法廷に於て朗讀せられた。我が我々の協力の快如につき不平を述べたのには十分の理由がある。現代海軍方法に於つては潜水艦戦艦に関する法規の多くは時代導れのものとなつたとすることは理由あることである。米英も日本と同様にこのことを認めたとはいへない。併しながら新しく言へばとて海軍省が潜水艦戦艦に関する現行國際法規に反する命令を出したといふのはない。

十四(イ) 檢察側は開戦後一九四二年二月十日の議會委員會に於ける所謂余の演説なるものを證據に提出してゐる。これは實際は演説ではなくて二十三人の委員の間で行はれた質疑に對する應答である。報告された内容が正確であるか否かに就ては知る術がないが然し少くとも余は未だ嘗て敵國もしくは敵國人に對する殘虐を主張したことはない。それは大体非公式な會合であつて前年度の決算を検討する小さな委員會であつた。その時の質疑應答を全六として考察すれば警證として提出された可い記録とは全然違つた印象を與へるであらう。委員會は余に對して質問を發し余はこれに答へてゐるのである。従つて演説と言はれる程のことはしなかつたと信じてゐる。戰爭遂行に寄與する爲には奮闘を日本經濟は占領地露國の支持を必要としてゐることを説明したのであつて個人を撲滅もしくは排除するといふやうな言葉は使はなかつた。唯抽象的に所要物資の入手と經濟的反抗の排除とにつき述べたに過ぎない。

十五(イ) 日本海軍が米國に對して無官戰の儘又は事前の通告を與へずして攻撃を加ふることと贊成したか否か、問題になつてゐる。かゝる問題に就ては外務大臣及びそれを輔佐する専門家の知能に信賴し得るといふのが余の固い信念であつた。従つて終戦後それが問題になる迄は採用

された手續に就ては余は全然無關心であつた。余の出席した連絡會議
 以外の如何なる會議に於ても海軍が無通告攻撃を主張したことはな
 い。如何なる連絡會議に於ても通告を與ふべきか否かの問題の如きも
 のを討議したことは全く記憶に存しない。外務省參謀本部、軍令部の
 協定の結果少くとも開戦一時間前に通告を交付することに決定したと
 信じてゐる。外務省の山本熊一氏は一九四七年八月十日當法廷に於て
 伊藤軍令部次長が對米無通告攻撃を主張し一九四一年十二月二日の連
 絡會議に於ても同様の主張をしたと證言したがこれは誤りである。一
 九四一年十二月二日に連絡會議が開かれた記憶はない。その逝去の程
 遠からぬ前、永野大將と余はかゝる言懸りのあることを聞き兩名で東
 條、鈴木、賀屋、星野、岡、武藤など連絡會議に出席した全被告に訊
 ねて見たが東郷を除くの外誰一人としてかゝる事實のあつたことを記
 憶してゐる者はなかつた。

十六(イ)檢察側は余が一九三四年に一九三一年より一九三三年に至る滿洲事
 變の功により一九三八年には防共協定に關する功により一九四〇年に
 は支那事變の功によりそれぞれ叙勳されたと言ひ防共協定に關する功
 により海軍士官が叙勳されるといふことは特別の賞義があると述べて
 ゐる。これに對しては余が受けたのは勳章ではなく銀杯であり唯たま

たま防共協定締結の際軍令部次長の地位にあつたが爲に受けたに過ぎ
 ないことを申し述べて置きたい。斯る場合高級士官がたとへ其の件に
 つき何事をなさずとも賞を拜することとは異例なことでないのである。拜受
 實際余は本協定締結に當つて格別なことはしなかつたのである。拜受
 した他の勳章に就ては何れも唯單に余の海軍に於ける勤勞と夫々の時
 期に占めてゐた地位に基くものであつたに過ぎない。他の多くの海軍
 士官も同様な勳章を拜受して居り別段それには特殊の意義はなかつた
 のである。

十七(イ)余が興亞院の職員になつたことに就て言へば、その地位は余が海軍大臣となつた爲に與へられたものに過ぎない。余の就任前歴代内閣に於ては、内相、海相、藏相、外相が興亞院の副總裁になる規定になつて居た。副總裁になつても余には格別の義務も制限もなかつた。十八(イ)軍票の發行とその海軍省に關係する事項は海相就任と共に余に引繼がれたものに相違ない。これを許可したことも要求したことも記憶してない。

前にこれを取扱つてその経緯を知つてゐた海軍省の下僚がかゝる事項を處理したといふことは勿論有りそうなることである。

十九(イ)余の姓名が大本營の一員として表はれて居ることにつき、多少の意義を附せんとする如くである。大本營は陸軍部と海軍部とを以て構成せられ、陸軍部は參謀總長により統轄せられ、海軍部は軍令部總長により統轄せられてゐた。余は海軍大臣として此等會議に出席したことなく、又斯かる権限も持つて居なかつた。純然たる用兵作戰の問題はそこで討議せられたが、余は此の種の事項については發言權を有して居らなかつたので余が出席することは不適當と認められたのである。

二十(イ)現在起訴せられてゐる被告で收容せられる前に余と親しかつた人

は一人もない。
 星野、賀屋、木戸、木村、武藤、佐藤、鈴木、東郷とは、一九四一
 年十月海相に就任して知合になつた。それ以前にこの人達に會つた
 ことがあつたとしても、記憶にはない。前にも述べた如く、東條と
 は彼が一九四〇年十二月頃視察の途次、上海に立寄つた時初めて一
 寸會つた。次に會つたのは一九四一年十月新内閣組織の際である。
 重光氏とは一九三二年上海に於て初めて會ひ、再會したのは一九四
 三年四月彼が東條内閣の外相に就任した時であつた。梅津には一九
 三二年畑、板垣には一九四〇年初めて會つた。小坂氏と初めて知つ
 たのは一九四四年七月氏が新内閣を組織せる際であつた。岡中將と
 は同じ海軍に勤務しながら面識深く深く談合したのは海相就任後に
 過ぎなかつた。荒木、土肥原、橋本、平沼、松井、南、大島、白鳥
 の各報告とは巢鴨拘置所に收容せられて、始めて會つたのである。

宣
審
審

フ
良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺祕セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ審

署名捺印
嶋田繁太郎

Doc, Doo, 等

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）拾貳月貳日於極東國際軍事裁判所内

供 述 者 嶋 田 繁 太 郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立 會 人 高 橋 義 次

正 誤 表

辯護側文書第二八九二號

島 田 繁 太 郎 口 供 書

第一四頁、九行目の次に挿入願ます

夫れは時間的要素を克服し戦争に追ひ込まれる前に外交交渉に成功せんとする我々の努力の倍加であつた。其の點が明瞭に理解信用せられざる場合には大なる不公正な結果が招來せらるであらう。爾來余は當外交措置により平和は遂に來るべしとの大なる希望を抱いて居た。余が尋常の容易ならざる事を深く認識するに至つたのは實にこの當時の事であつた。斯る紛糾情勢は痛く余の心を重くした。余は毎日神社に参拜して陛下の平和愛好の御熱願に添ひ奉るべく神明の加護を祈願した。余は政治家にもあらず又外交官にもあらず併し唯余の有する全智全能を傾けて問題の解決に努めた。十一月二十六日のハル。ノートは實に斯くの如き疑念、希望、心痛、苦心の鎔綜した零團氣柱に接受せられたのであつた。