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c. You will, so far as practicable, cause to be protected and preserved, all historical, cultural and religious objects, against depredations by the occupational forces, or others.



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*Chambers*  
COPY NO. 36

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1 November 1945

FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSION

ADDENDUM TO FEAC 3

BASIC INITIAL POST-SURRENDER DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME  
COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS FOR THE OCCUPATION  
AND CONTROL OF JAPAN

Note by the Temporary Secretary

Holders of FEAC 3 are requested to attach the enclosed  
Parts II and III (Economic and Financial Directives) to their  
copies.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Temporary Secretary

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PART II

A. ECONOMIC

Objectives and General Basic Principles

11. The policies of the American Government in regard to the economic affairs of Japan during the period of occupation are intended simultaneously to accomplish the following purposes:

- a. To eliminate existing specialized facilities for the production of arms, munitions, or implements of war of any kind.
- b. To destroy the economic ability of Japan to create or support any armaments dangerous to international peace.
- c. To execute such program of reparations and restitution as may be decided upon by the appropriate Allied authorities.
- d. To encourage the development within Japan of economic ways and institutions of a type that will contribute to the growth of peaceful and democratic forces in Japan.
- e. To supervise and guide the operation of Japanese economic arrangements and operations to assure that they conform to the general purposes of the occupation, and make possible the eventual readmission of Japan to the ranks of peaceful trading nations.

The instructions composing the economic part of the directive are intended to advance these objectives during the first and immediate period of occupation that lies ahead; they will be subject to addition and revision in the light of the circumstances which you encounter and the conduct of the Japanese people.

12. Your supreme authority as Supreme Commander for the Allied powers in Japan will extend to all matters in the economic sphere. In the exercise of that authority, to the extent that the accomplishment of your objectives permits, you will use the services of the Emperor and the machinery of the Japanese Government to accomplish your objectives. You will require them to



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carry out your orders, and to make such changes in the administrative organization of those branches of government concerned with economic matters as may seem to you necessary to carry out your objectives.

You should act directly:

a. If because of the very nature of the task action through Japanese authorities will not effectively accomplish your economic objectives.

b. In the event that operation through the Japanese Government clearly fails in any particular phase of your operations to prove a satisfactory method.

In acting directly, you will establish administrative machinery independent of and superior to the Japanese officials and agencies to execute or assure the execution of the economic measures contained in this directive until such time as you may deem that the tasks can be satisfactorily assigned to the Japanese Governmental authorities.

13. You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy. You will make it clear to the Japanese people that:

a. You assume no obligations to maintain, or have maintained, any particular standard of living in Japan, and

b. That the standard of living will depend upon the thoroughness with which Japan rids itself of all militaristic ambitions, redirects the use of its human and natural resources wholly and solely for purposes of peaceful living, administers adequate economic and financial controls, and cooperates with the occupying forces and the governments they represent.

It is not the policy of the United States to prevent the eventual achievement by Japanese working effort and resources of conditions of living in Japan consistent with objectives specified in paragraph 11.



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Economic Disarmament

14. In order to effect the economic disarmament of Japan

a. You will stop immediately and prevent the future production, acquisition, development, maintenance, or use of all arms, ammunitions, and other implements of war; naval vessels; all types of aircraft including those designed for civilian use; and all parts, components, and materials especially designed for incorporation in any of the foregoing.

b. You will take such measures as you deem necessary to safeguard the facilities used or intended for use in the production or maintenance of any of the items above mentioned. Pending further instructions as to their ultimate disposition such facilities are not to be destroyed except in emergency situations.

c. You will not postpone the enforcement of the prohibitory program specified in subparagraph a or carrying out instructions that you will receive pursuant to subparagraph b without specific approval through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Should you, however, find that production of any of the items enumerated in subparagraph a is essential to meet your requirements for military operations, the occupying forces, or temporary military research, you will make suitable recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and pending the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you are authorized to make arrangements for production to the minimum extent necessary therefor.

15. Instructions which will be subsequently transmitted to you for carrying out programs for economic disarmament, reparations and restitution will involve the reduction or elimination of certain branches of Japanese production, such as iron, steel, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, aluminum, magnesium, synthetic rubber, synthetic oil, machine tools, radio and electrical



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equipment, automotive vehicles, merchant ships, heavy machinery, and important parts thereof.

Pending, however, final and specific decision on these matters, you will permit continued production in these industries and the repair of production facilities to the minimum extent required to meet the needs of the occupation forces, and the minimum peaceful requirements of the population.

You will make clear to the Japanese that any permission to continue production or to repair production facilities is granted without prejudice to final decisions, as to either the limitations that may be imposed upon any branch of the Japanese economy or deliveries which may be required as reparations or restitution.

16. You may also permit the conversion of plant and equipment, including those types mentioned in paragraphs 14 and 15, to the production of essential consumer goods. You will satisfy yourself that any such conversion undertaken is a genuine move towards a peaceful economy and not a disguised attempt to preserve capacity to produce for military purposes.

You will also make clear to the Japanese that any such permission to convert is granted without prejudice to subsequent decisions as regards removal of plant or equipment on account of reparations or restitution or scrapping for security reasons under paragraph 11.

17. You will

a. Immediately establish a system of inspection, and control to insure that production of the type forbidden in paragraphs 14 and 15 is not undertaken in concealed or disguised form.

b. Have prepared as rapidly as possible inventory reports upon all significant facilities that have been producing or are intended to produce the products covered in paragraph 14, and in all the industries specifically mentioned in paragraph 15. These reports should specify the condition and



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capacity of plant and equipment and the extent of raw materials stocked, finished goods, and goods in process. You will also inventory the Japanese merchant fleet.

In order to furnish the information necessary for further decisions concerning economic policy you will communicate these reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Develop and recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff controls which will prevent Japanese rearmament after termination of your occupation.

18. You will insure that all laboratories, research institutes, and similar technological organizations are closed immediately except those you deem necessary to the purposes of the occupation. You will provide for the maintenance and security of physical facilities thereof when deemed necessary, and for the detention of such personnel as are of interest to your technological or counter-intelligence investigations. You will at once investigate the character of the study and research conducted in such closed organizations and as rapidly as possible permit the resumption of those forms of study and research that have an obviously peaceful purpose under appropriate regulations which (1) define the specific type of research permitted, (2) provide for frequent inspection, (3) require free disclosure to you of the results of the research, and (4) impose severe penalties, including permanent closure of the offending institution whenever the regulations are violated.

The Operation of the Japanese Economic System

19. The Japanese authorities will be expected to develop and effectively carry out programs of working activity that will enable them out of their own resources and labor to accomplish the following:



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- a. To avoid acute economic distress.
- b. To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.
- c. To meet your demands for the needs of the occupying forces.
- d. To meet the requirements for such reparations deliveries as may be agreed upon by the Allied Governments.

In order to achieve these aims, the Japanese authorities will have to make the utmost effort to maximize production of agricultural and fishery products, coal, charcoal, housing repair materials, clothing and other essentials. In the event that they fail to do so, you will direct them to take such measures as in your judgment are necessary.

20. You will require the Japanese authorities to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress.

21. The Japanese authorities shall be permitted on their own responsibility to establish and administer any controls over economic activities that are appropriate or necessary in order to achieve the economic ends specified in paragraph 19. Both the policy and the administration of these controls shall be subject to your approval and supervision particularly in so far as they may conflict with paragraph 15. This paragraph shall not preclude your taking direct action as provided in paragraph 12.

22. Serious inflation will substantially retard the accomplishment of the ultimate objectives of the occupation. You



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will, therefore, direct the Japanese authorities to make every feasible effort to avoid such inflation. However, prevention or restraint of inflation shall not constitute a reason for limiting the removal, destruction, or curtailment of productive facilities in fulfillment of programs for reparations, restitution, demilitarization, or economic disarmament.

Elimination of Certain Elements in the Japanese Economic System

23. You will prohibit the retention in or selection for positions of important responsibility or influence in industry, finance, commerce, or agriculture of all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, of those who have actively participated in the organizations enumerated in paragraph 5 g (Page 8, Political and General Part) of this directive, and of any who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends. (In the absence of evidence, satisfactory to you, to the contrary, you will assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937, in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.)

24. You will require the protection from destruction and the maintenance for such disposition as may be determined by this and other directives of all plants, equipment, patents, books and records and all other significant property of the large Japanese industrial and financial companies and trade and research associations that have played an important part in the Japanese war effort or economy.

Democratization of Japanese Economic Institutions

25. It is the intent of the United States Government to encourage and show favor to:

- a. Policies which permit a wide distribution of income and of ownership of the means of production and trade.



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b. The development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture organized on a democratic basis.

Accordingly, you will:

(1) Require the Japanese to establish a public agency responsible for reorganizing Japanese business in accordance with the military and economic objectives of your government. You will require this agency to submit, for approval by you, plans for dissolving large Japanese industrial and banking combines or other large concentrations of private business control.

(2) Establish and maintain surveillance, until satisfactory plans for reorganization have been approved, over the Japanese businesses described in subparagraph (1) above in order to ensure conformity with the military and economic objective of your government.

(3) Dissolve the Control Associations. Any necessary public function previously performed by these associations should be transferred to public agencies, approved and supervised by you.

(4) Abrogate all legislative or administrative measures which limit free entry of firms into industries to be reorganized where the purpose or effect of such measures is to foster and strengthen private monopoly.

(5) Terminate and prohibit all Japanese participation in private international cartels or other restrictive private international contracts or arrangements.

(6) Require the Japanese to remove, as rapidly as practicable, wartime controls over labor and reinstate protective labor legislation.

(7) Require the removal of all legal hindrances to the formation of organizations of employees along democratic lines, subject to any necessary safeguards to prevent the perpetuation of militaristic influences under any guise or the continuation of any group hostile to the objectives and operations of the occupying forces.



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(8) Prevent or prohibit strikes or other work stoppages only when you consider that these would interfere with military operations or directly endanger the security of the occupying forces.

Foreign Economic Transactions.

26. You will establish controls over all Japanese foreign trade in goods and services. Such controls should be so operated as to give effect during the initial period to the following policies:

a. Exports shall not be approved if such goods are clearly needed to meet minimum domestic requirements.

b. No exports of plant and equipment shall be permitted until determination has been made as to whether they may be required for reparations or restitution.

c. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange.

d. All proceeds of exports shall be controlled by you and made available in the first place for the payment for approved imports. No person, corporation or organization in Japan shall be permitted to acquire foreign assets of any kind except with your special approval.

e. Approval should be given only to imports which are clearly in accord with the economic policies elsewhere set down in this directive.

f. Neither the need for imports or exports (including exports that might be made on reparations account) shall be deemed a reason for requiring or permitting any branch of Japanese industry to be restored or developed to an extent that might significantly contribute to Japan's war-making potential, or promote dependence by other countries on Japan for strategic products.



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27. The Japanese authorities are to enter into no economic agreements of any kind with foreign governments or interests except after prior consultation with you by your express approval. Any such proposed agreements should be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

Reparations and Restitutions.

28. You will assure the execution of programs of reparations in kind and of restitution of identifiable looted property in accordance with decisions of the appropriate Allied authorities transmitted to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reparations will be accomplished:

- a. Through the transfer of Japanese property located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan;
- b. Through the transfer from Japan of goods, existing plant, equipment, and facilities that are not necessary to the operation of a peaceful Japanese economy, or the supplying of the occupying forces.

All requests received by you, for reparations or restitution from the United Nations which have been victims of Japanese aggression will be reported with your recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

B. CIVILIAN SUPPLY AND RELIEFCivilian Supply Policy and Standard of Provision

29. a. You will assure that all practicable economic and police measures are taken to achieve the maximum utilization of essential Japanese resources in order that imports into Japan may be strictly limited. Such measures will include production and price controls, rationing, control of black markets, fiscal and financial controls and other measures directed toward full employment of resources, facilities and means available in Japan.



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b. You will be responsible for providing imported supplies only to supplement local resources and only to the extent supplementation is needed to prevent such widespread disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces or interfere with military operations. Such imports will be confined to minimum quantities of food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies and other essential items, including those which will enable local production of such supplies which you would otherwise have to import.

c. Supplies necessary to be imported under paragraph 29 b above will be obtained to the extent possible from surpluses available from other Asiatic and Pacific Ocean areas. To the extent that such surpluses are available in areas under the jurisdiction of other United States commanders, arrangements may be made by you directly with such other commanders. To the extent that such surpluses are available in areas under the jurisdiction of governments other than the United States, or the military commanders of such governments, negotiations necessary to obtain such surpluses will be conducted by or with approval of local United States diplomatic representatives in the areas in question. In the event such diplomatic representatives are not available, you will report the situation, with your recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. If you deem that you should assume responsibility for additional imports to accomplish the objectives of your occupation, you will submit your recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Methods and Conditions of Distribution

30. You will require that all practicable steps be taken to assure the fair and equitable distribution of supplies under uniform ration scales.

31. To the maximum extent consistent with military expediency, imported supplies for the civilian population should, in so far as



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practicable and desirable, be delivered to such Japanese public supply agencies or other consignees as are acceptable to you and under your direct supervision or control. Whenever possible, such deliveries will be at ports of entry, but if necessary, deliveries may take place at appropriate inland centers of distribution.

32. You may make sales directly to wholesalers or other commercial dealers in the event that no satisfactory public supply agency exists or that operational or other reasons render distribution of civilian supplies through such an agency impracticable. In order to limit direct provision and distribution of supplies by you to the civilian population, you should assure that the Japanese do not unnecessarily involve the occupying forces in such responsibility. Such direct sales by you as are necessary will be paid for by the purchaser in local currency at prices determined by you to be consistent with the internal economy.

33. Supplies delivered to supply agencies or other consignees will be sold by them through distribution channels and in accordance with distribution policies satisfactory to you and at prices determined by you to be consistent with the internal economy. When military necessity requires, civilian supplies may be made the subject of direct relief issue by you or by supply agencies under your supervision or control.



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PART III

FINANCIAL

34. In the financial field you will make full application of the principles stated elsewhere in this directive, acting through the Japanese Government to the extent that effective execution of the policies and programs hereinafter enumerated will permit, but establishing administrative machinery not dependent upon Japanese authorities and agencies to the extent necessary to execute or assure the effective execution of such policies and programs. You are specifically directed to establish such independent administrative machinery in order to execute or assure the effective execution of the provisions of paragraphs 40, 41, 45, 46 and 47 of this directive.

35. Japanese financial organizations and the public finance system will be expected to function on the basis of Japanese resources. You will take no steps designed to maintain, strengthen, or operate the Japanese financial structure except in so far as may be necessary for the purposes specified in this directive.

36. You may authorize or require the Bank of Japan or any other bank or agency to issue bank notes and currency which will be legal tender; without such authorization no Japanese governmental or private bank or agency will be permitted to issue bank notes or currency.

37. You will require the Japanese authorities to make available to you legal tender yen notes or yen credits free of cost and in amounts sufficient to meet all expenses of your forces including the costs of your military occupation.

38. a. In the event that for any reason adequate supplies of regular legal tender yen notes are not available you will use supplemental military yen (Type "B") issued



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pursuant to military proclamation. Supplemental yen will be declared legal tender and will be interchangeable at par without distinction with other legal tender yen currency.

b. Regular yen currency will include currencies which are now legal tender in the area.

c. Japanese military yen issued for circulation in territories occupied by the Japanese will not be legal tender and will not be acceptable nor interchangeable with supplemental yen or regular yen currencies.

39. You will not announce, establish or permit the use or publication, until receipt of further instructions, of any general rate of exchange between the Japanese yen on the one hand the U.S. dollar and other currencies on the other. However, a rate of conversion to be used exclusively for pay of military and naval personnel and for military and naval accounting purposes, namely 15 regular or supplemental yen equal one U.S. dollar, has already been communicated to you.

40. You will remove and exclude from positions of important responsibility or influence in all public and private financial institutions, agencies or organizations all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression or who have actively participated in the organizations enumerated in paragraph 7 of this directive. It may be generally assumed in absence of evidence to the contrary that any persons who have held key positions in any such institutions, agencies, or organizations are active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression. You will also prevent the retention in or selection for places of importance in the financial field of individuals who do not direct future financial effort solely towards peaceful ends.

41. You will close and not allow to reopen banks and other financial institutions whose paramount purpose has been the



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financing of war production or the mobilization or control of financial resources in colonial or Japanese occupied territories. These include:

- a. The Wartime Finance Bank,
- b. The National Financial Control Association and its member control associations,
- c. Offices, in the area, of the bank of Chosen and the Bank of Taiwan,
- d. The various banks and development companies whose fields of operation have been outside Japan proper such as the Southern Development Company, the Southern Development Company Bank and the Tokyo offices of the Central Bank of Manchu, Bank of Mongolia, Federal Reserve Bank of China, and Central Reserve Bank of China. You will take custody of all the books and records of these banks and other institutions.

42. You are authorized to take such financial measures as you may deem necessary to accomplish the objectives of your military occupation, specifically including, without limitation, the following:

- a. Close banks, other than those indicated in paragraph 41 above, only where clearly necessary for the purposes of introducing satisfactory control, removing objectionable personnel and taking measures to effectuate the program for the blocking of certain accounts and transfers or the determination of accounts to be blocked or for other reasons of military necessity. You should reopen any banks so closed, except those indicated in paragraph 41 above, as promptly, as is consistent with the accomplishment of the foregoing purposes;
- b. Prohibit, or regulate transfers or other dealings in private or public securities or real estate or other property;
- c. Establish a general or limited moratorium or moratoria only to the extent clearly necessary to carry out the



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objectives of your military occupation;

d. Close stock exchanges, insurance companies and similar financial institutions for such periods as you deem appropriate.

43. You will prohibit the payment of:

a. All military pensions, or other emoluments or benefits, except compensation for physical disability limiting the recipient's ability to work, at rates which are no higher than the lowest of those for comparable physical disability arising from non-military causes;

b. All public or private pensions or other emoluments or benefits granted or conferred:

(1) By reason of membership in or services to the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Taisei Seijikai), their affiliates and agencies or any successor or similar organizations, and all Japanese nationalistic terroristic and secret patriotic societies and their agencies and affiliates,

(2) To any person who has been removed from an office or position in accordance with paragraphs 5 or 40 of this directive,

(3) To any person interned in accordance with paragraph 7 of this directive, during the term of his internment, or permanently in case of his subsequent conviction.

44. a. Any laws, ordinances and regulations or practices relating to taxation or other fields of finance which tend to discriminate for or against any person because of nationality, race, creed or political opinion will be amended, suspended or abrogated to the extent necessary to eliminate such discrimination. The collection of contribu-



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tions of any kind for nationalistic, imperialistic, militaristic or anti-democratic societies of any kind will be prohibited.

b. You will insure that Japanese public expenditures are consistent with the objectives stated elsewhere in this directive.

45. You will impound or block all gold, silver, platinum, currencies, securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers, and all other assets within the categories listed below:

a. Property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by any of the following:

(1) The Japanese national, prefectural and local governments, or any agency or instrumentality of any of them, including all utilities, undertakings, public corporations or monopolies under the control of any of the above;

(2) The Governments, nationals, or residents of Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, including those of territories formerly occupied by them and by Japan;

(3) The Japanese Imperial Household;

(4) The Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, their affiliates and agencies or any successor or similar organizations, and all Japanese nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies, agencies and affiliates and their officials, leading members and supporters;

(5) The National Shinto;

(6) All organizations, clubs or other associations prohibited or dissolved by you;

(7) Absentee owners of non-Japanese nationality including United Nations and neutral governments and



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Japanese outside of Japan;

(8) Any person or concern in any area under Japanese control at any time since 1894, except the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and whatever minor islands are left to Japan;

(9) Persons subject to internment under provisions of paragraph 7, and all other persons specified by Military Government by inclusion in lists or otherwise.

b. All Japanese (public and private) foreign exchange and external assets of every kind and description located within or outside Japan.

c. Property which has been the subject of transfer under duress, wrongful acts of confiscation, dispossession or spoliation, whether pursuant to legislation or by procedure purporting to follow forms of law or otherwise.

d. Works of art of cultural or material value of importance, regardless of ownership.

You will take such action as will insure that any impounded or blocked assets will be dealt with only as permitted under licenses or other instructions which you may issue. In the case particularly of property blocked under a (1) above, you will proceed to adopt licensing measures which will maintaining such property under surveillance would permit its use by you or by the licensees in consonance with this directive. In the case of property blocked under c above, you will institute measures for prompt restitution, in conformity with the objectives of this directive and subject to appropriate safeguards to prevent the cloaking of militaristic and other undesirable influence.

You will require from the Japanese Government such reports as you deem necessary to obtain full disclosure of all assets mentioned in b above.

46. You will seek out and reduce to the possession or control of a special agency established by you within your command all



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Japanese (public and private) foreign exchange and external assets of every kind and description located within or outside Japan.

47. All foreign exchange transactions, including those arising out of exports and imports, will be controlled with the aim of preventing Japan from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives set forth in this directive. To effectuate these purposes you will:

a. Prohibit, except as authorized by regulation or license, all dealings in gold, silver, platinum, foreign exchange, and all foreign exchange transactions of any kind.

b. Make available any foreign exchange proceeds of exports for payment of imports directly necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of this directive, and authorize no other outlay of foreign exchange assets without specific approval of your government through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Establish effective controls with respect to all foreign exchange transactions, including:

(1) Transactions as to property between persons inside Japan and persons outside Japan;

(2) Transactions involving obligations owed by or to become due from any person in Japan to any person outside Japan; and

(3) Transactions involving the importation into or exportation from Japan of any foreign exchange asset or other form of property.

d. You will provide full reports to your government with respect to all Japanese foreign and external assets.

48. No extension of credit to Japan or Japanese by any foreign person, agency or government will be permitted except as may be authorized by your government through the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon your recommendations.



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49. It is not anticipated that you will make credits available to the Bank of Japan or any other bank or to any public or private institution. If, in your opinion, such action becomes essential, you may take such emergency actions as you may deem proper, but in any such event, you will report the facts to your government through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

50. You will maintain such accounts and records as may be necessary to reflect the financial operations of your military occupation and you will provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with such information as it may require, including information in connection with the use of currency by your forces, any governmental settlements, occupation costs, and other expenditures arising out of operations or activities involving participation of your forces.



**TOP SECRET**TOP SECRETCOPY NO. 2FEAC 424 October 1945Pages 1 - 2, incl.FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONTHE FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONNote by the Secretary

1. The enclosure, the Terms of Reference for the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, is circulated for the information of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

2. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

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THE FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSION

TERMS OF REFERENCE

I. ESTABLISHMENT

The Governments of the \_\_\_\_\_ hereby establish a Far Eastern Advisory Commission composed of representatives of the Participating Powers.

II. FUNCTIONS

A. The Far Eastern Advisory Commission shall be responsible for making recommendations to the participating Governments:

1. On the formulation of policies, principles and standards by which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the instrument of surrender may be determined;
2. On the steps necessary and on the machinery required to ensure the strict compliance by Japan with the provisions of the instrument of surrender;
3. On such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement of the participating Governments.

B. The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations nor with regard to territorial adjustments.

III. OTHER METHODS OF CONSULTATION

The establishment of the Commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of consultation on Far Eastern issues by the participating Governments.

IV. COMPOSITION

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission shall consist of one representative of each of the states party to this



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agreement. The membership of the Commission may be increased, as conditions warrant, by the addition of representatives of other United Nations in the Far East or having territories therein. Such United Nations as are not members of the Commission shall be invited to sit with the Commission when matters deemed by the Commission primarily to affect the interests of such nations are under consideration. In addition, the Commission shall provide for full and adequate consultations, as occasion may require, with representatives of the United Nations not members of the Commission, in regard to matters before the Commission which are of particular concern to such nations.

V. LOCATION AND ORGANIZATION

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission shall have its headquarters in Washington. It may meet at other places as the occasion requires.

Each representative of the Commission may be accompanied by an appropriate staff comprising both civilian and military representation.

The Commission shall organize its secretariat, appoint such committees as may be deemed advisable, and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.

VI. TERMINATION

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission shall cease to function upon notification by one of the Four Allied Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union, of its desire to terminate the agreement creating the Commission. Prior to such termination, the Commission shall transfer to any interim or permanent security organization of which the participating Governments are members, those functions which may appropriately be transferred.



FEAC 5COPY NO. 3624 October 1945Page 1FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONAUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSNote by the Secretary

The enclosure, the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, is circulated for the information of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

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Message Number 1

1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force.

3. The statement of intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect. It will not be given effect, however, because we consider ourselves bound in a contractual relationship with Japan as a result of that document. It will be respected and given effect because the Potsdam Declaration forms a part of our policy stated in good faith with relation to Japan and with relation to peace and security in the Far East.



**TOP SECRET**COPY NO. 36TOP SECRETFEAC 624 October 1945Pages 1 - 7, incl.FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONDISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND DISPOSITION  
OF ENEMY ARMS, AMMUNITION AND IMPLEMENTS OF WARNote by the Secretary

1. The enclosure, a United States Statement of Policy on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Disposition of Enemy Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War, is circulated for the information of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

2. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

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THE POST-SURRENDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON  
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND DISPOSITION  
OF ENEMY ARMS, AMMUNITION AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR

- I. Definitions.
- II. Disarmament.
- III. Demobilization.
- IV. Disposition of enemy equipment.
  - A. General policies.
  - B. Special instructions pertaining to aircraft, aeronautical equipment and facilities.
  - C. Special instructions pertaining to naval craft, naval equipment and facilities.

I. DEFINITIONS

1. For the purpose of this paper, "Japanese armed forces" are defined to be all Japanese land, sea and air forces; Japanese military and para-military organizations, formations and units; and their organized Japanese auxiliaries (not including Japanese civilians having only a tenuous military relationship). Japanese-controlled forces of other than Japanese nationality, and the Japanese civil police force, are not defined as Japanese armed forces for the purpose of this paper.

2. "Enemy equipment" is defined as:

a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and any equipment or other property whatsoever belonging to, used by, or intended for use by Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled armed forces or any members thereof in connection with their operations.



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b. Naval combatant and auxiliary vessels and craft of all kinds, both surface and submarine, including those under repair, alteration or construction.

c. All aircraft, both military and civilian, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices.

d. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, naval bases; military research establishments, military storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.

## II. DISARMAMENT

3. All Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled armed forces will be completely disarmed immediately following Japan's collapse or unconditional surrender. All forces will be rendered incapable of further effective military resistance prior to the movement of any unit or organization incident to its demobilization. Military establishments of all kinds will be seized and disarmed.

4. The delivery of all arms, ammunition and implements of war in the possession of the Japanese civilian population to designated commanders will be required.

5. The development, manufacture, importation and exportation of arms, ammunition and implements of war will be prohibited.

## III. DEMOBILIZATION

6. All Japanese armed forces personnel will be returned as promptly as shipping priorities will permit, to Japan Proper from the following areas:

a. Occupied areas in China (including Manchuria, and Kwantung Leased Territory and Kwangchowan).

b. Karafuto (southern part of Sakhalin).



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- c. Korea (Chosen).
- d. Kurile Islands (Chishima).
- e. Formosa (Taiwan) and Pescadores (Hoko or Boko).
- f. Hong Kong.
- g. French Indo-China.
- h. Thailand.
- i. Burma.
- j. British Malaya.
- k. Netherlands East Indies.
- l. Philippine Islands.
- m. Marianas, Marshalls, and Caroline Islands and

all other land and water areas not mentioned above, south of the thirtieth degree of north latitude.

7. In all territories listed in the preceding paragraph, the designated commander shall prohibit and prevent:

- a. the forced evacuation of any non-Japanese inhabitant.
- b. the harming of the inhabitants or the damaging of their property.
- c. the removal of animals, stores of food, forage, fuel or other provisions or commodities.
- d. pillaging, looting or unauthorized damage of any kind.

8. a. Japanese armed forces in Japan will be demobilized as soon after surrender as is practicable.

b. Repatriated Japanese armed forces will be demobilized as soon as practicable after their arrival in Japan. However, shipping problems may prevent the accomplishment of the repatriation of substantial numbers of Japanese prisoners to Japan until a considerable time after the cessation of hostilities. Any Japanese prisoners in United States custody still awaiting repatriation from territories reverting to Chinese sovereignty shall be turned



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over to the Chinese at the same time as the United States relinquishes control of the military government of such territory.

c. Demobilization of Japanese-controlled puppet forces shall be responsibility of the local military government.

d. Agreements must be reached with the Allied governments concerned before any natives of Korea, Formosa, Karafuto or the Kurile Islands, taken as Japanese prisoners outside their own homelands, are returned to their homelands. Natives of these places taken prisoners in their own homelands should not be removed to Japan if only for demobilization and subsequent reshipment to their homelands.

9. The Japanese military supply services will be required to continue to function in order to provide the minimum supply requirements of the surrendered Japanese forces pending the total demobilization of such forces and for other prescribed military purposes.

10. The Japanese Imperial High Command shall be abolished at the earliest practicable date as a means of preventing the reestablishment of Japanese military power. However, in order to facilitate the rapid demilitarization and disposal of the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled armed forces, the designated commander is authorized to operate through this agency and to retain temporarily such parts thereof as are considered essential to the effective control and administration of the Japanese armed forces during the period of demobilization.

11. Pending return to Japan, such elements of the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled armed forces as the designated commander may elect may be retained in any areas including those listed in paragraph 6 above for such purposes as he may direct, including among others, the following:



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- a. Destruction of fortifications, military installations, and enemy equipment;
- b. Reconstruction and rehabilitation within areas which have been overrun or damaged as a result of war;
- c. Safe-guarding and maintenance of Japanese armament and equipment pending its final disposition;
- d. Manning and maintenance of naval and merchant craft and equipment;
- e. Explanation and demonstration of research and development projects and new or unique items of equipment;
- f. Repair, operation and maintenance of military transportation and communication facilities;
- g. Removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air.

12. The Japanese people are to be impressed with the fact of the complete defeat of their armed forces. To this end, the personnel of such forces will in no case be permitted to return to their homes in military formations, with bands playing, or with a display of flags, banners or emblems of distinction. They will be permitted to take with them nothing but approved personal effects and such equipment, supplies and currency as are essential for the journey.

13. Those members of the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled armed forces who are charged with war crimes will be held in custody and will not be demobilized.

IV. DISPOSITION OF ENEMY EQUIPMENTA. General Policies

14. Enemy equipment which is essentially or exclusively for use in war or warlike exercises and which is not suitable for peacetime civilian uses will be promptly destroyed or scrapped. The following specific exemptions to this general



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policy of destruction will be made in the cases of:

a. Unique and new development items desired for examination or research.

b. Enemy equipment which may be required by the designated commander for his operational needs.

15. Enemy equipment, which is not essentially or exclusively for use in war or warlike exercises and which is suitable for peacetime civilian uses will be retained. This equipment may be drawn upon for:

a. The maintenance and subsistence of the occupational forces, prisoners of war, and displaced persons of the United Nations;

b. The relief of the local civil population to the extent necessary to prevent or alleviate epidemic or serious disease and serious unrest or disorder which would endanger the occupying forces and the objectives of occupation.

16. Unless otherwise specifically directed, the designated commander will make no distribution of enemy equipment to any of the United Nations.

17. The designated commander will maintain a record of the location, type, quantity, condition and disposition of all enemy equipment.

a. Seized and retained, and

b. Seized and destroyed.

B. Special Instructions Pertaining to Aircraft, Aeronautical Equipment and Facilities

18. All practicable measures will be taken to prevent the use of aircraft as a means of escape of individuals or evacuation of property.

19. All military and civil aircraft, and aircraft replacement parts, components and equipment including armament, bombs and missiles will be destroyed except those which the designated commander believes merit special examination and which he orders secured and held for such examination.



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20. Control will be taken of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled aircraft communications; signal, warning and detection systems; radar and radio direction and range finding systems; and, in general, any other systems relating or accessory to the operation of aircraft. These systems and their equipment will be destroyed except those which the designated commander orders secured and held for special examination or for use by the forces of occupation.

C. Special Instructions Pertaining to Naval Craft,  
Naval Equipment and Facilities

21. All former United Nations naval craft, equipment and facilities found in Japanese possession will be safeguarded pending further instructions.

22. All Japanese mine-sweepers will be disarmed. The Japanese Imperial High Command will be required to maintain such complements and equipment as may be necessary for sweeping navigational channels and such other waters as may be prescribed. Other naval craft and equipment considered particularly useful for removing, rendering safe, or clearly marking other obstacles to safe navigation and for reinstating aids to navigation may be retained if directed by the designated commander.

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**TOP SECRET**TOP SECRETCOPY NO. 36FEAC 724 October 1945Pages 1 - 6, incl.FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONAPPREHENSION AND PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS IN THE FAR EASTNote by the Secretary

1. The enclosure, the Policy of the United States in regard to the Apprehension and Punishment of War Criminals in the Far East, is circulated for the information of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

2. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

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POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD TO THE APPREHENSION  
AND PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS IN THE FAR EAST

1. The term "war crimes" as used herein, includes:

A. Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

B. Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include but not be limited to murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of, or in, occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, or elsewhere improper treatment of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity.

C. Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war or prosecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

2. The offense need not have been committed after a particular date to render the responsible party or parties subject to arrest but, in general, should have been committed since, or in the period immediately preceding the Mukden incident of September 18, 1931. The preponderance of cases may be expected to relate to the years since the Lukouchiao incident of July 7, 1937.

3. All practicable measures should be taken to identify, investigate, apprehend, and detain all persons suspected of having committed war crimes as defined in paragraph 1 above and



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all persons whom any one of the United Nations or Italy charges with such crimes.

4. Suspected war criminals should be held in close confinement, without access to the press or other media of public information, and without distinction as to rank or position, as befits ordinary criminals.

5. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should have power (a) to appoint special international military courts (which term should be held to include tribunals of any type) composed of military or naval officers or civilians of two or more of the United Nations, for the trial, under any applicable law, domestic or international, including the laws and customs of war, of Far Eastern war criminals where the alleged offenders are, in the Supreme Commander's opinion, appropriately to be tried by an international court; and (b) to prescribe or approve rules of procedure for such courts. The appointment of any such international court should be discussed by the Supreme Commander or his designated representative in advance with the appropriate local officers or representatives of each nation to be represented upon such a court and fair arrangements should be made for appropriate representation of each such nation upon the court. No such officer or civilian should be appointed to serve upon such a court without the approval of the local commander of the forces of his nation or such other official as any nation may prescribe to give such approval for its own nationals. In the appointment of any such international court and in all trials before it, the international character of the court and of the authority by which it is appointed should be properly recognized and emphasized, particularly in dealings with the Japanese people. For the trial of persons charged with offenses of the type described in paragraph 1 A any international court appointed by the Supreme Commander should be selected by him from persons nominated by the appropriate military commanders of the several nations to be represented upon such court. Before appointing



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an international court for the trial of such persons, the Supreme Commander should report for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff his plans for the appointment of such court, the particular offenses and alleged offenders to be tried there, it, and the nature of the coordination of the plan effected by him on a military level with the representatives of the nations to be represented upon the court. Any such plan should provide for the use of rules of procedure and the application of principles in accord with those adopted for use by the International Military Tribunal for Europe established by the Agreement executed 8 August 1945, except where change is necessitated by differing circumstances in the Far East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should arrange through the State Department for coordinating the plan with each nation to be represented on the proposed court so far as such coordination has not been effected on a military level. This power of the Supreme Commander to appoint such international courts, should prove adequate to provide for the trial of all of the several type of offenders mentioned in paragraph 1 above. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should have (a) the responsibility for carrying out the judgments of any international courts appointed by him or created by such special agreements, and (b) the power to approve, reduce or otherwise alter any sentence imposed by such a court but not to increase the severity thereof.

6. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (a) should promptly establish an agency, acting under his Command to investigate reports of war crimes, to collect and analyze evidence, to arrange for the apprehension and prompt trial of suspects, to prepare, supervise and conduct the prosecution of individuals and organizations before international military courts or tribunals, and to recommend to the Supreme Commander which individuals and organizations should be prosecuted, before what courts they should be tried and what persons should be secured as witnesses, and (b) should provide, after discussion with the



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local representatives of the nations involved, and in a manner consistent with efficient administration, for equitable inclusion in the membership of such agency of suitable representatives of the United States, China, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and of other United Nations. This agency should advise the Supreme Commander and other Military commanders for the Allies on matters relating to war criminals. This agency should attach importance to the investigation of the evidence that offenses of the type described in paragraph 1 A above have been committed, should collect and analyze the evidence of such offenses and should recommend to the Supreme Commander a plan as indicated in paragraph 5 above for the appointment of an international court for the trial of such offenses and the charges to be preferred. This agency should also maintain a central record and information office of Japanese war criminals and war crimes, the records and files of which should be available to any interested United Nation.

7. The military command of any nation (including the United States) participating in the occupation of areas previously dominated by Japan may upon the authorization of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers establish special national military courts to deal with war criminals not held or requested by the Supreme Commander for trial by an international military court or tribunal of the types referred to in paragraph 6 above. Such courts should be separate from courts which may be set up to deal with current offenses against the occupation or infractions of military discipline.

8. Military commanders of forces of occupation in the Far East should promptly comply with a request by the government of any one of the United Nations or Italy for the delivery to it of any person who is stated in such request to be charged with a war crime, subject to the following exceptions:

(1) Persons who have held high political, civil or military positions in the Japanese Empire or in one of its allies, co-belligerents or satellites, should not be



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delivered, pending decision whether such person should be tried before an international military court or tribunal. Suspected war criminals desired for trial before such a court or tribunal or persons desired as witnesses at such trials will not be turned over to the nation requesting them so long as their presence is desired in connection with such trials.

(2) Where persons are requested by more than one of the Governments above mentioned for trial of a war crime, the military commanders concerned should make their determinations based on all the circumstances, including the relative seriousness of the respective charges against such a person and the national interests involved, and should deliver the requested person to a particular United Nation or Italy accordingly.

9. Compliance with any request for the delivery of a suspected war criminal should not be delayed on the ground that other requests for the same person are anticipated.

10. Delivery of a suspected war criminal to a requesting government should be subject to the condition that if such person is not brought to trial, tried and convicted within six months from the date he is so delivered, he will be returned to the authority who made delivery if he has been requested for trial by any of the other United Nations or Italy.

11. Military commanders should take under their control, pending subsequent decisions as to its eventual disposition, property, real and personal, found in areas of their respective jurisdiction and owned or controlled by persons taken into custody pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 above.

12. Such measures as are deemed necessary should be taken to insure that witnesses to war crimes will be available when required.



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13. The execution of death sentences should be deferred if there is reason to believe that the testimony of those convicted would be of value in the trial of other war criminals.

14. Any national of any United Nation who may be requested, or who there is reason to believe may be desired, by his government as a renegade or quisling, should be arrested. Such persons should normally be turned over as soon as practicable to their government.

15. Military commanders having custody of alleged offenders requested under paragraphs 8 and 14 above, if in doubt as to whether such persons should be turned over to the demanding nation for trial, should consult their government and, in appropriate cases, leave the matter to be dealt with through diplomatic channels. Within the main islands of Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will have custody of such alleged offenders and should consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff in cases of doubt.



TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET**COPY NO. 36FEAC 824 October 1945Pages 1 - 6, incl.FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONIDENTIFICATION, APPREHENSION AND TRIAL OF  
PERSONS SUSPECTED OF WAR CRIMESNote by the Secretary

1. The enclosure, a Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on the Identification, Apprehension and Trial of Persons Suspected of War Crimes, is circulated for the information of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

2. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

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DIRECTIVE ON THE IDENTIFICATION, APPREHENSION  
AND TRIAL OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF WAR CRIMES

This directive is issued to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

1. The term "war crimes" as used herein, includes:

A. Planning, preparation, initiation of waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

B. Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include but not be limited to murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of, or in, occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees or persons on the seas or elsewhere, improper treatment of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity.

C. Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

2. The offense need not have been committed after a particular date to render the responsible party or parties subject to arrest, but, in general, should have been committed since, or in the period immediately preceding the Mukden in-



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cident of September 18, 1931. The preponderance of cases may be expected to relate to the years since the Lukouchiao incident of July 7, 1937.

3. You will, in the areas subject to your jurisdiction, take all practicable measures to identify, investigate, apprehend and detain all persons whom you suspect of having committed war crimes as defined in paragraph 1, subparagraphs B and C above, and all persons whom any one of the United Nations or Italy notifies to you as being charged with such crimes. You will similarly apprehend and detain the persons deemed to be liable under paragraph 1 A above, who are named in any list which may be sent you by the United States National War Crimes Office and such other persons against whom you have probable cause for charging under paragraph 1 A upon the basis of evidence available to you. In executing these tasks you will require from the Japanese such assistance as you deem necessary.

4. You will hold suspected war criminals in close confinement, without access to the press or other media of public information, and without distinction as to rank or position, as befits ordinary criminals.

5. As Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, you have power (a) to appoint special international military courts (which term shall be held to mean tribunals of any kind), composed of military or naval officers or civilians of two or more of the United Nations, for the trial, under any applicable law, domestic or international, including the laws and customs of war, of Far Eastern war criminals where the alleged offenders are, in the Supreme Commander's opinion, appropriately to be tried by an international court; and (b) to prescribe or approve rules of procedure for such tribunals. The appointment of any such international court will be discussed by the Supreme Commander or his designated representative in advance with the appropriate local officers or representatives of each nation to be represented upon such a court and fair arrangements will be made for



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appropriate representation of each such nation upon the court. No such officer or civilian will be appointed to serve upon such a court without the approval of the local commander of the forces of his nation or such other official as any nation may prescribe to give such approval for its own nationals. In the appointment of any such international court and in all trials before it, the international character of the court and of the authority by which it is appointed should be properly recognized and emphasized, particularly in dealings with the Japanese people. Until further authorization by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no international court for the trial of persons charged with offenses of the type described in paragraph 1 A above will be established by the Supreme Commander. In submitting any plan for the appointment of such a court, you should specify the particular offenses and alleged offenders to be tried before the court and the nature of the coordination of the plan effected by you on a military level with representatives of the nations to be represented upon the court.

6. You will have (a) the responsibility for carrying out the judgements of any international courts or tribunals and (b) the power to approve, reduce or otherwise alter any sentence imposed by such a court or tribunal, but not to increase the severity thereof.

7. You may authorize the military command of any nation participating in the occupation of Japan, including the United States, to establish special military courts to deal with war criminals not held or requested by you for trial before an international court or tribunal. Such courts should be separate from courts which may be set up to deal with current offenses against the occupation or infractions of military discipline.

8. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 16, you will promptly comply with a request by the Government of any one of the United Nations or Italy for the delivery to it of any person who is stated in such request to be charged with a war



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crime, subject to the following exceptions:

(1) Persons who have held high political, civil or military positions in the Japanese Empire or in one of its allies, co-belligerents or satellites, will not be delivered, pending decision whether such persons should be tried before an international military court or tribunal. Suspected war criminals desired for trial before such tribunal, or persons desired as witnesses at trials before the tribunal, will not be turned over to the nation requesting them so long as their presence is desired in connection with such trials.

(2) Where persons are requested by more than one of the Governments above mentioned for trial of a war crime, you will make your own determination based on all the circumstances, including the relative seriousness of the respective charges against such a person and the national interests involved, and will deliver the requested person to a particular United Nation or Italy accordingly.

9. Compliance with any request for the delivery of a suspected war criminal should not be delayed on the ground that other requests for the same person are anticipated.

10. Delivery of a suspected war criminal to a requesting government shall be subject to the condition that if such person is not brought to trial, tried and convicted within six months from the date he is so delivered, he will be returned to you if requested for trial by any of the other United Nations or Italy.

11. You will take under your control, pending decision by higher authorities as to its eventual disposition, property, real and personal, found in areas subject to your jurisdiction and owned or controlled by persons taken into custody pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 above.



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12. You will take such measures as you deem necessary to insure that witnesses to war crimes will be available when required.

13. The execution of death sentences should be deferred when you have reason to believe that the testimony of those convicted would be of value in the trial of other war criminals.

14. You will arrest any national of a United Nation who is requested, or whom you believe may be desired, by his government as a renegade or quisling. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 16, such persons should normally be turned over as soon as practicable to their government.

15. You should (a) promptly establish an agency, acting under your command, to investigate reports on war crimes and to collect and analyze evidence, to arrange for the apprehension and prompt trial of suspects, to prepare, supervise and conduct the prosecution of individuals and organizations before appropriate international military courts or tribunals, and to recommend to you which individuals and organizations should be prosecuted, before what courts they should be tried and what persons should be secured as witnesses, and (b) should provide, after discussion with the local representatives of the nations involved and in a manner consistent with efficient administration, for equitable inclusion in the membership of such agency of suitable representatives of the United States, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union and of other appropriate United Nations. This agency should advise the Supreme Commander and other military commanders for the Allies on matters relating to war criminals. This agency should attach importance to the investigation of the evidence that offenses of the type described in paragraph 1 A above have been committed, should collect and analyze the evidence with respect to such offenses and should recommend to you a plan for the trial of such offenses and the charges to be preferred. Any such plan should provide for the use of rules of procedure and



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the application of principles in accord with those adopted for use by the International Military Tribunal for Europe established by the agreement executed 8 August 1945, except where change is necessitated by differing circumstances in the Far East. Such plan should also provide that, for the trial of persons charged with offenses of the type described in paragraph 1 A any international court appointed by the Supreme Commander should be selected by him from persons nominated by the appropriate military commanders of the several nations to be represented upon such court. This agency should also maintain a central record and information office of Japanese war criminals and war crimes, the records and files of which should be available to any interested United Nation.

16. Military commanders having custody of alleged offenders requested for trial under the provisions of paragraphs 8 and 14 above, if in doubt as to whether such persons should be turned over to the requesting nation for trial, may consult their government and in appropriate cases leave the matter to be dealt with through diplomatic channels. Within the main islands of Japan, you as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will have custody of such alleged offenders and will consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff in cases of doubt.

17. You will take no action against the Emperor as a war criminal pending receipt of a special directive concerning his treatment.



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COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

1 November 1945Pages 1 - 7, incl.FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE  
FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONNote by the Temporary Secretary

The enclosed is a suggested organization of a working Secretariat, solely administrative in character. The assignment of personnel to such a Secretariat by the several representatives on the Commission would be welcome.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Temporary Secretary


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1 November 1945

ENCLOSURE "A"






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1 November 1945

Enclosure "A"

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FEAC 9





ENCLOSURE "B"ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE  
FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONFunctions of Secretariat Officers

The United States Government, as host to the Commission, has assumed the responsibility for organizing the Secretariat, which will perform the usual technical, documentary and service functions. The personnel of the Secretariat will be provided by the United States Government, together with such staff as may be made available by other participating Governments. The Secretariat is organized and will function as described below.

I. THE SECRETARY GENERAL

1. The Secretary General will supervise the Commission Secretariat, receive formal proposals for submission to the Commission, serve as Secretary of the meetings of the full Commission, and communicate the actions of the Commission as directed.

II. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL

1. The Deputy Secretary General will perform jointly with the Secretary General the functions of that office, act in the Secretary General's place during his absence and serve as Assistant Secretary of the meetings of the full Commission.

2. He will also provide liaison between the Secretary General, the Chairman of the Commission, and the U.S. Department of State.

III. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL

1. The Assistant Secretary General will advise the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General, aid them in organizing and facilitating the work of the Secretariat and perform such special duties as they may assign.



2. The Assistant Secretary General, in particular, will be responsible for the following functions: Liaison with delegations, credentials of representatives, press relations, protocol, visual presentation, photography, information service to representatives and admissions to meetings.

#### IV. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

1. The Executive Secretary will generally assist the Secretary General in the technical work of the Secretariat: coordination of the work of the Commission and its committees, supervision of documentation and technical services, direction of the preparation of reports and minutes, and advice to the Commission on questions pertaining to its work.

2. As immediate assistants he will have a Documents Officer, a Recording Secretary, an Executive Assistant (Administration), and an Executive Assistant (Procedure).

#### V. THE DOCUMENTS OFFICER

1. The Documents Officer will supervise, under the direction of the Executive Secretary, the processing of all official documents for use in the Commission or for the general information of the Commission and the Secretariat. He will direct the Secretariat's staff in translating, recording, typing and duplicating documents; in indexing, filing, and distributing documents for Commission use; and in maintaining a numbering system for documents. Furthermore, he will supervise security precautions against the unauthorized disclosure of papers.

2. He will maintain a complete and current index of all Commission documents, including a topical heading and brief identifying analysis of subject matter covered, and provide a reference service on all Commission documents for members and for the Secretariat.

3. He will maintain a complete record of the Commission, including the original copies of all Commission documents, files



of the minutes of Commission meetings, press releases, official correspondence and working materials of the committees of the Commission.

4. He will also provide distribution of Commission documents to authorized officials, and maintain a basic reserve file of every document processed, as well as a stencil file for additional reproduction as required.

#### VI. RECORDING SECRETARY

1. The Recording Secretary will be responsible, under the direction of the Executive Secretary, for the minutes of all meetings of the Commission and its committees and for the proper editing for form, style and general appearance of all Commission documents prior to their duplication and use.

2. He will assist in providing interpreters and translators for the representatives and their staffs and officials of the Secretariat in order to facilitate the conduct of Commission meetings; and, together with the Documents Officer, have such Commission documents translated as may be required from time to time.

3. He will maintain a pool of stenographic personnel to provide secretarial assistance for the Commission and for the Secretariat.

#### VII. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT (ADMINISTRATION)

1. The Executive Assistant (Administration) will supervise under the direction of the Executive Secretary, the Secretariat's administrative services: space, equipment, transportation, communications, courier and mail service, personnel, medical and health services, financial transactions, including per diem and traveling allowances of the Secretariat, keep the financial records of the Commission, and prepare a financial report to the Secretary General, for submission to the Secretary of State.



2. In collaboration with the staff of the Executive Secretary, he will be responsible for informing the Commission and the Secretariat of meetings in connection with the Commission and for providing proper physical arrangements for all scheduled meetings.

#### VIII. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT (PROCEDURE)

1. The Executive Assistant (Procedure) will assist the Executive Secretary, giving his principal attention to the work of the committees of the Commission and the drafting of reports and papers.

2. He will be responsible for technical matters of interpretation of parliamentary procedure and of the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.

3. He will arrange for such library facilities as the Commission may desire, including arrangements with local libraries for loan of books and other reference service.

4. He will assist the Chairman of the Commission and the Chairmen of its committees in preparing for and conducting meetings, advise and assist representatives with respect to the introduction of documents, advise representatives and Secretariat on Commission procedure, provide liaison with the documentary, recording and administrative services of the Secretariat, and serve as the channel through which the various technical services of the Commission are made fully available to the Commission, its committees and their members.



ENCLOSURE "C"SECRETARIAT STAFF, 1 NOVEMBER 1945

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>CLERICAL</u>
Secretary General	1
Deputy Secretary General	1
Assistant Secretary General	1
Executive Secretary	1
Documents Officer	3
Recording Secretary	2
Executive Assistant (Administration)	2
Executive Assistant (Procedure)	1

TOTAL OFFICERS: 8

TOTAL CLERICAL: 12



ENCLOSURE "D"ANTICIPATED SECRETARIAT STAFF, AS OF 1 JANUARY 1946

(Expansion to be upon the recommendation of the Executive Secretary to the Secretary General in accordance with the needs of the Commission. Additions to the initial staff of officers are underlined. All clericals listed here are in addition to those on 1 November list.)

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Additional Clericals</u>
Documents Officer	
<u>Assistant Documents Officer</u>	3
<u>Distribution Officer</u>	2
Recording Secretary	
<u>Assistant Recording Secretary</u>	2
Executive Assistant (A)	
<u>Personnel and Finance</u>	1
<u>Supplies and Equipment</u>	1
Executive Assistant (P)	
<u>Assistant</u>	1
Anticipated total of additional officers by 1 January 1946:	6
Additional Clericals:	10

Anticipated total of Secretariat on 1 January 1946:

Officers: 14  
Clericals: 22



372  
FEAC 10

COPY NO. 451 November 1945Pages 1 and 2FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONLONG TERM AGENDA OF THE COMMISSIONNote by the Temporary Secretary

1. There is enclosed a tentative and partial list of subjects prepared by the Temporary Secretary that might be used as the basis for the long term agenda of the Commission.
2. It is requested that each representative will either submit to the Secretary, prior to or at the next meeting, a suggested agenda of his own or be prepared to amend this list of subjects.
3. It is further requested that the Commission indicate the priority in which it desires to take up the subjects which may be listed on the agenda after its approval.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Temporary Secretary

FEAC 10

FEAC-10



E N C L O S U R EFAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONA G E N D A

Tentative and Partial List of Subjects for Consideration  
by the Commission.

1. Basic policies and objectives of the United Nations in regard to Japan.
2. Measures to abolish militarism and strengthen democratic processes.
  - a. Positive policy for the reorientation of the Japanese.
  - b. The educational system.
  - c. Control of public information, the press and radio.
  - d. Workers' organizations.
3. Measures necessary for the reduction and control of Japan's war industry.
  - a. Armament production.
  - b. Heavy industry.
  - c. Aeronautical industry.
  - d. Merchant shipping.
  - e. Long-range control of rearmament.
  - f. Shipbuilding.
  - g. Control of organization of industry.
4. Restitution and Reparation.
  - a. Seizure and disposition of Japan's overseas property and investments.
  - b. Reparations in kind: goods and materials, merchant ships, factory installations.
5. Social and economic problems.
  - a. Extent of regulation of Japanese foreign commerce.
  - b. Control of agriculture.
  - c. Control of fishing and aquatic industries.
  - d. Adjustment in system of land tenure.
  - e. Control or elimination of civilian aviation.



6. Relief problems.
7. Financial problems.
8. Constitutional reform.
9. Apprehension and punishment of war criminals.
10. Displaced persons.
11. Disposal of enemy nationals other than Japanese within the Japanese Empire.



FEAC 10/1

6 November 1945

Pages 3 - 5, Incl.

*alt Feacly*  
COPY NO. 10

FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSION

AUSTRALIAN SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING LONG TERM AGENDA

Reference: a. FEAC 10

Note by the Secretary General

The enclosure, presented by the Australian Member, is circulated for consideration by the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

FEAC 10/1

1/01



E N C L O S U R EFAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONAUSTRALIAN SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING LONG TERM AGENDA

(Suggested re-arrangement. New points underlined.)

1. Basic policies and objectives of United Nations in regard to Japan.
2. Strengthening of democratic processes.
  - (a) Positive policy in the reorientation of the Japanese
  - (b) Educational system
  - (c) Control of public information - the Press and Radio
  - (d) Workers' and peasants' organizations
  - (e) Civil liberties
  - (f) Purging of militarist and totalitarian elements
  - (g) Dissolution of secret and other undesirable societies
  - (h) Reform of policing system
  - (i) Improving the status and role of women
  - (j) Religion
3. Social and Economic Problems
  - (a) Composition of Japanese production
  - (b) Regulation of Japanese foreign commerce
  - (c) Prevention of mass unemployment
  - (d) Control of agriculture
  - (e) Control of fishing and aquatic industries
  - (f) Adjustment of system of land tenure
  - (g) Control or elimination of civil aviation
  - (h) Ownership and control of Japanese industries
4. Reduction and control of Japanese War Industry
  - (a) Armament production
  - (b) Heavy industry
  - (c) Aeronautical industry
  - (d) Merchant shipping
  - (e) Shipbuilding
  - (f) Reconversion of other wartime industry to peace-time purposes



- (g) Control of organization of industry
  - (h) Long-range control of rearmament
5. Disarmament and demobilization
- (a) Processes of disarming and demobilizing
  - (b) Disposal of arms
  - (c) Policing and inspection of disarming
  - (d) Repatriation of Japanese service men from overseas territories
  - (e) Disposal of Japanese fleet
  - (f) Disposal of Japanese aircraft, air fields, etc.
  - (g) Employment of discharged Japanese service men
  - (h) Disposal of Japanese ex-officers
6. Restitution and Reparation
- (a) Seizure and disposition of Japanese overseas property and investments
  - (b) Reparations in kind: goods and materials, merchant ships, factory installations
  - (c) Use of Japanese labour by Allies
7. Relief problems in Japan
8. Financial problems
9. Constitutional reform
- (a) Emperor
  - (b) Diet
  - (c) Cabinet
  - (d) Local Government
  - (e) Political parties
  - (f) Civil liberties
  - (g) Machinery for drafting new constitution
10. War Criminals
11. Aliens in Japan
- (a) Enemy nationals other than Japanese
  - (b) Koreans
  - (c) Formosans



- (d) Allied persons desiring repatriation
  - (e) Allied persons who have collaborated with the Japanese
  - (f) Neutral nationals
  - (g) Relation of non-Japanese civilians to Japanese authorities
12. Organization of Allied control and Military Government in Japan
13. Other matters raised by Member Governments



10/2  
10/3

November 9, 1945

COPY NO. 35

FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSION

Note by the Secretary General

1. There is enclosed an amended tentative and partial list of subjects prepared at a meeting of the principals *advisers* of the representatives of the Commission during two meetings, (FEAC 10/2).

2. There is enclosed a suggested work program for ad hoc committees (FEAC 10/3).

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

10/2  
Agenda



FEAC 10/2COPY NO. 359 November 1945Pages 6 - 8, incl.FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONLONG TERM AGENDA FOR THE COMMISSION

1. Basic Policies and Objectives in regard to Japan.
2. Social and Economic Problems.
  - (a) Extent and character of Japanese industry, commerce and agriculture necessary for a viable economy in Japan.
  - (b) Measures necessary to establish such an economy.
    - (1) Regulation of Japanese foreign commerce.
    - (2) Control of agriculture.
    - (3) Control of fishing and aquatic industries.
    - (4) Control of transportation and communication.
    - (5) Control of industry.
  - (c) Adjustment of system of land tenure.
  - (d) Ownership and Japanese industry, finance and commerce.
3. Reduction and Control of Japanese War Industry.
  - (a) Armament production.
  - (b) Heavy industry.
  - (c) Aeronautical industry.
  - (d) Merchant shipping.
  - (e) Shipbuilding.
  - (f) Reconversion of other wartime industry to peacetime purposes.
  - (g) Long range control of rearmament.
  - (h) Control of scientific and industrial research.
4. Restitution and Reparation.
  - (a) Seizure and disposition of Japanese overseas property and investments.
  - (b) Reparations: goods and materials, merchant ships, factory installations, Japanese patents, and scientific processes.



- (c) Use of Japanese labour by Allies.
- (d) Measures necessary to safeguard the interests of the United Nations and foreign assets in Japan.
- (e) Restitution of looted property, including objects of historical, cultural and artistic value.

5. Constitutional Reform.

- (a) Emperor.
- (b) Diet.
- (c) Cabinet.
- (d) Local government.
- (e) Political parties.
- (f) Civil liberties.
- (g) Machinery for drafting new constitution.

6. War Criminals.

7. Aliens in Japan.

- (a) Enemy nationals other than Japanese.
- (b) Koreans.
- (c) Allied persons desiring repatriation.
- (d) Allied persons who have collaborated with the Japanese.
- (e) Neutral nations.
- (f) Relation of non-Japanese civilians to Japanese authorities.

8. Strengthening of Democratic Processes.

- (a) Positive policy in the reorientation of the Japanese.
- (b) Educational system.
- (c) Control of public information - the press and radio.
- (d) Workers' and peasants' organizations.
- (e) Civil liberties.
- (f) Purging of militarist and totalitarian elements.
- (g) Dissolution of secret and other undesirable societies.
- (h) Reform of police system.
- (i) Improving the status and role of women.
- (j) State Shinto.



## 9. Disarmament and Demobilization.

- (a) Processes of disarming and demobilizing.
- (b) Disposal of arms.
- (c) Policing and inspection of disarming.
- (d) Disposal of Japanese fleet.
- (e) Disposal of Japanese aircraft, air fields, etc.
- (f) Employment of discharged Japanese service men.
- (g) Treatment of Japanese ex-officers.

## 10. Relief Problems in Japan.

- (a) Prevention of mass unemployment.
- (b) Public health.
- (c) Food.
- (d) Housing.
- (e) Repatriation of Japanese from overseas territories.

## 11. Financial Problems.

## 12. Organization of Allied Control and Military Government in Japan.

## 13. Conditions under which Japan May Be Admitted to Membership in the United Nations Organization.

## 14. Other Matters Raised by Member Governments.

- - -



FEAC 10/3

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

9 November 1945Pages 9 - 10, incl.FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONSUGGESTED WORK PROGRAM FOR AD HOC COMMITTEES

A. At its second meeting on November 6, 1945, the Far Eastern Advisory Commission directed the Secretary General to call a meeting of the principal advisers of its representatives to study FEAC 10, to consider various amendments thereto, and to recommend to the Commission a work program for ad hoc committees. The principal advisers of the representatives met on the afternoon of November 7th and again on the afternoon of November 8th and recommend to the Commission as a work program for ad hoc committees the following subjects from the long term agenda, (FEAC 10/2):

1. A working party to be appointed by the Commission to study item 1 of the agenda, namely "Basic Policies and Objectives in Regard to Japan" by, in the first instance, a review of existing Directives and their implementation.
2. A working party to be appointed by the Commission to study item 2 of the agenda, (a) and (b); item 3 of the agenda, (b) and (d); and item of the agenda.
3. A working party to be appointed by the Commission to study item 8 of the agenda, (a), (b), and (c).
4. A working party to be appointed by the Commission to study item 5 of the agenda, "Constitutional Reform".
5. A working party to be appointed by the Commission to study item 6 of the agenda, "War Criminals".
6. A working party to be appointed by the Commission to study item 7 of the agenda, "Aliens in Japan".



B. The meeting of the principal advisers suggest, if the above program of subjects for working parties is accepted by the Commission, that representatives of the Commission be invited to nominate representatives for each of the working parties.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General



*W. H. H. Farley*FEAC 10/4COPY NO. 1713 November 1945FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONFEAC WORKING COMMITTEES

Reference: FEAC 10/3

Memorandum by the Secretary General

The Secretary General would welcome from each delegation a list of those each wishes to sit on the several working committees discussed at the last meeting of the Commission.

Working Committee 1, discussing Basic Policies and Objectives, is now organized and sitting.

The Secretary General wishes the names of those nominated to sit on the following working committees:

- Committee 2, Economic Problems and Reparations;
- Committee 3, Strengthening of Democratic Processes;
- Committee 4, Constitutional Reform;
- Committee 5, War Criminals;
- Committee 6, Aliens in Japan.

The Secretary General has already received a list of those nominated for these working committees by China's representative on the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, and he awaits nominations from Australia, Canada, France, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippine Islands, United Kingdom, and the United States, before arranging for each working committee to meet.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

FEAC 10/4



FEAC 10/5

COPY NO. 27

20 November 1945

Pages 11 - 16, incl.

FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSION

FEAC WORKING COMMITTEES

Reference: FEAC 10/4

Note by the Secretary General

The enclosed is a roster of members of the several working committees of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

FEAC 10/5



E N C L O S U R ECOMMITTEE IBasic Policies and ObjectivesAUSTRALIA

Dr. H. V. Evatt (Chairman)  
Mr. W. D. Forsyth  
Maj. J. Plimsoll

CANADA

Mr. R. E. Collins

CHINA

Dr. Liu Shih-Shun  
Lt. Gen. Chu Shih-ming  
Dr. Timothy Tien-tseh Mar

FRANCE

Mr. Francis Lacoste  
Mr. Francois Charles-Roux  
Mr. Paul Guerin  
Mr. Pierre Sauvageot

INDIA

Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan

NETHERLANDS

Mr. J. O. Reuchlin

NEW ZEALAND

Mr. J. S. Reid

PHILIPPINES

Mr. Manuel A. Adeva  
Dr. Jose F. Imperial

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir George Sansom  
Mr. B. Cockram  
Col. W. A. Howkins  
Mr. F. C. Everson

UNITED STATES

Dr. George H. Blakeslee



COMMITTEE IIEconomic Problems and ReparationsAUSTRALIA

Major J. Plimsoll

CANADA

R. E. Collins  
A. E. Ritchie  
G. G. Morrow

CHINA

Dr. Wang Shou-chin  
Mr. Yang Yun-chu  
Major General Wang Pei-chen

FRANCE

Mr. Christian Valensi  
*Chair* Mr. Ernest Castan  
Mr. Kaplan

INDIA

*General*  
Mr. S. K. Kirpalani  
(India Government Trade Commissioner,  
630 Fifth Avenue, N. Y.)

NETHERLANDSNEW ZEALAND

Mr. J. S. Reid

PHILIPPINES

Dr. Jose F. Imperial  
Mr. Manuel A. Adeva

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir George Sansom  
Mr. B. Cockram  
Col. W. A. Howkins  
Mr. F. C. Everson

UNITED STATES

Mr. Erle R. Dickover  
Mr. B. M. English (Alternate)



COMMITTEE IIIStrengthening of Democratic ProcessesAUSTRALIA

Sir Frederic Eggleston  
Mr. W. D. Forsyth

CANADACHINA

Dr. Hollington K. Tong  
Dr. Ching-lin Hsia  
Dr. Timothy Tien-tseh Mar  
Dr. Lin Mousheng

FRANCE

Col. Victor Morizon  
Ct. Holley Williams  
Ct. Benedictus  
Mr. Christian Valensi  
Mr. Jean-Camille Baube

INDIA

Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai  
Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan (Alternate)

NETHERLANDSNEW ZEALAND

Mr. J. S. Reid

PHILIPPINES

Dr. Jose F. Imperial  
Mr. Manuel A. Adeva

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir George Sansom  
Mr. B. Cockram  
Col. W. A. Howkins  
Mr. F. C. Everson

UNITED STATES

Mr. Gordon F. Bowles  
Mr. John M. Begg (Alternate)



COMMITTEE IVConstitutional ReformAUSTRALIA

Sir Frederic Eggleston  
Mr. W. D. Forsyth

CANADACHINA

Dr. Ching-lin Hsia  
Dr. Liu Shih-shun  
Dr. Lin Mousheng

FRANCE

Mr. Francis Lacoste  
Mr. Francois Charles-Roux  
Mr. Paul Guerin

INDIA

Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai  
Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan (Alternate)

NETHERLANDSNEW ZEALAND

Col. W. N. Pharazyn

PHILIPPINES

Mr. Manuel A. Adeva  
Dr. Jose F. Imperial

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir George Sansom  
Mr. B. Cockram  
Col. W. A. Howkins  
Mr. F. C. Everson

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hugh Borton



COMMITTEE VWar CriminalsAUSTRALIA

Mr. John Oldham

CANADA

Mr. P. Tremblay

CHINA

Lt. Gen. Chu Shih-ming  
Mr. Yang Yun-chu  
Maj. Gen. Wang Pei-chen

FRANCE

Mr. Francis Lacoste  
Mr. Francois Charles-Roux  
Mr. Paul Guerin

INDIA

Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai  
Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan (Alternate)

NETHERLANDSNEW ZEALAND

Air Commodore J. L. Findlay

PHILIPPINES

Mr. Manuel A. Adeva  
Dr. Jose F. Imperial

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir George Sansom  
Mr. B. Cockram  
Col. W. A. Howkins  
Mr. F. C. Everson

UNITED STATES

Mr. Albert H. Garretson



COMMITTEE VIAliens in JapanAUSTRALIA

Mr. W. D. Forsyth

CANADACHINA

Dr. Timothy Tien-tseh Mar  
Dr. Ching-lin Hsia  
Dr. Lin Mousheng

FRANCE

Mr. Francis Lacoste  
Mr. Francois Charles-Roux  
Mr. Paul Guerin

INDIA

Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai  
Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan (Alternate)

NETHERLANDSNEW ZEALAND

Air Commodore J. L. Findlay

PHILIPPINES

Dr. Jose F. Imperial  
Mr. Manuel A. Adeva

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir George Sansom  
Mr. B. Cockram  
Col. W. A. Howkins  
Mr. F. C. Everson

UNITED STATES

Mr. William W. Bishop, Jr.  
Mr. Albert H. Garretson (Alternate)



S E C R E T

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FEAC 118 November 1945Pages 1 - 2, incl.FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONPOLICY WITH RESPECT TO  
FISHING AND AQUATIC INDUSTRIES IN JAPANNote by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a statement of United States policy with respect to fishing and aquatic industries in Japan, is circulated for the information of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

2. The United States Government has dispatched the policy to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for his guidance.

3. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

FEAC 11



SECRETENCLOSURESTATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY  
WITH RESPECT TO FISHING AND AQUATIC INDUSTRIES IN JAPAN

During the period of occupation, the Supreme Commander should be guided, subject to military considerations, by the following general principles:

a. In order to meet domestic consumption requirements, the Supreme Commander should:

(1) Insist that appropriate available vessels, facilities, gear, equipment and supplies in Japanese hands be put to use;

(2) Take such steps as he may deem practical and necessary to provide sufficient fuel for allocation to fishing boats;

(3) Require the Japanese Government to rehabilitate the production facilities of the fishing, fish fertilizer and seafood processing industries, and facilities for distribution of their products; and

(4) Furnish such other assistance, subject to general policies governing aid to Japanese industry, as he deems necessary.

b. The coastal fisheries and fish culture should be utilized as the primary sources for domestic consumption. To the extent that fish culture and coastal fisheries are unable to meet the minimum domestic requirements, deep sea fisheries and other fisheries in water open to Japanese operation may be utilized where security and political considerations permit. Deep sea fishing in areas near United States territory or near United States island responsibilities should not be authorized. Japanese fishing should not be permitted near areas under Allied jurisdiction without prior permission from the country concerned. These prohibitions should continue until international agreements are negotiated permitting Japanese fishing in these areas.



S E C R E T

c. In order to determine (1) the effect on Japanese food supply of restrictive measures enforced for security or other reasons, and (2) the extent to which the United States and other nations should be permitted to exploit fisheries previously exploited by the Japanese, the Supreme Commander should immediately obtain from the Japanese Government available surveys and other data concerning the resources of all Pacific fishing areas previously exploited by the Japanese.

d. Japanese fishing operations should conform strictly to:

(1) The provisions of agreements relating to whaling to which the United States is a party;

(2) The provisions of other agreements relating to conservation to which the United States is a party;

(3) The policies or rules governing specific fisheries announced by the United States, or by other governments in conformity with policies announced by the United States with respect to coastal fisheries;

(4) The Japanese national and local regulations for the conservation of fisheries.

e. Such fishery products may be exported as can be produced by vessels, facilities, gear, equipment and supplies not suitable for or convertible to use in providing for domestic consumption, and which are needed (1) to supply United Nations needs for animal proteins and oils or (2) to secure foreign exchange for essential imports.

f. In the establishment of local security regulations consideration should be given to ensuring the maximum production of seafood products consistent with security requirements.



RESTRICTED

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FEAC 129 November 1945Pages 1 and 2FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONCONTROL OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN JAPANNote by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a statement of United States policy with respect to control of food and agriculture in Japan, is circulated for the information of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

2. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits dissemination of the information therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

FEAC 12



RESTRICTED

ENCLOSURE

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY  
WITH RESPECT TO CONTROL OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN JAPAN

1. The responsibility with respect to formulating and executing food and agriculture programs should be placed on the appropriate Japanese authorities subject to the approval of the Supreme Commander.

2. Production of food crops should be maximized. However, tea and mulberry plantations should not be converted to food crops except for those areas whose trees or bushes are over age or for other reasons non-producing, and except for those areas which would be especially productive for food.

3. Supplies of fertilizers should be made available, particularly for this winter's crops. Night soil is an important source of fertilizer and its use should be continued. Surveys should be instituted of facilities and raw materials available for the production of fertilizer in Japan. The importation of fertilizer and of essential spare parts and raw materials for fertilizer plants is authorized to the extent required to meet deficiencies in local supply. Imports should be procured as far as possible from sources in proximity to Japan.

4. The production of farm tools and implements in short supply should be encouraged.

5. To the extent practicable, stock from the army remount depots should be distributed to areas most dependent on animal power.

6. Steps should be taken to insure an equitable distribution of farm produce. Such measures should include price control, rationing, control of black markets and such other measures as are directed toward full employment of resources,



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including labor. Attention should be given to the production and sale of such incentive goods as are in demand by food producers and can be produced locally.

7. The production of synthetic vitamins should be encouraged to supplement the probable inadequacies of diet during 1945-46, especially for the ill and for children and expectant and nursing mothers.



SECRET

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FEAC 139 November 1945Pages 1 - 11, incl.FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONUNITED KINGDOM PAPER ON IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF  
THE JAPANESE FOOD SUPPLYNote by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, presented by the United Kingdom member, is circulated for discussion.
  
2. It was the thought of the United Kingdom member that this paper would be useful as a basis for discussion by the Working Party concerned with Economic and Social Problems.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

FEAC 13



SECRETE N C L O S U R ETHE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF THE JAPANESE FOOD SUPPLYPreamble

1. If Japan's agricultural position in the near future proves inadequate to maintain a minimum dietetic standard, her economic system may be so disorganised as to preclude any payment of reparation, and an increased burden may be placed on the United Nations to furnish the Japanese population with relief supplies at a time when we are faced with heavy relief commitments in other parts of the world. Furthermore, should conditions of famine appear, this might give rise to unrest which would be of considerable embarrassment to the Allies.

Conclusions

2. It has, therefore, been thought necessary to study the immediate prospects of the food supply. The examination of the problem in the body of the paper and the calculations shown in the Appendices lead to the following conclusions:-
- (a) That for a population of 77 million people (that is the estimated present population before the return of Japanese nationals from overseas) the calorific value of the Japanese diet that can be supplied from 1945/1946 home production is 1,437 calories per head per day.
  - (b) That for a population of 80 millions (that is after the return of Japanese nationals from overseas, say by the end of 1946) the corresponding value is 1,376 calories per head per day.
  - (c) That the estimated home food supply on which the above values are calculated depends on an adequate supply of fertilisers; and that any falling off in the supply of fertilisers during the next few months would jeopardise still further the ability of the Japanese to feed themselves.



SECRET

- (d) That because of the conditions governing the Japanese food supply it will be extremely difficult to secure an equal distribution of food between rural and urban populations, and that a failure of the administration in this respect may reduce the diet of the townspeople well below the levels mentioned in (a) and (b) above.

Recommendations

3. The world food position, especially in the case of cereals, is such that Japan cannot be allowed to import food unless local surpluses develop which cannot be transported to other deficiency areas. In order, therefore, to maintain Japanese home production of foodstuffs we recommend that:-

- (a) Until final decisions are reached about the future of the synthetic ammonia industry, that industry should be maintained and encouraged to work at full capacity in order that it may make the maximum contribution to the Japanese, and thereby to the world food supply. This implies that proposals for the destruction or dismantling of the plant are to be resisted for the time being, and without prejudice to the decisions that may be made about the ultimate fate of this plant, and that a policy of transferring it to say China or India should not be adopted without careful consideration.
- (b) International agreement should be sought for a policy which, subject to priority claims, would enable Japan to import from Korea and Manchuria supplies of sulphate of ammonia, soya beans and bean cake formerly obtained by her from those sources.
- (c) Japan should be permitted, subject to priority claims, to import her requirements of rock phosphate from Korea.



SECRET

- (d) If there should arise local surpluses of foodstuffs, especially soya beans, sugar, and oils which are not otherwise disposable to meet priority claims, Japan should have access to them. This would alleviate the serious lack of proteins and fats in the Japanese diet, of which the calculated calorific value quoted above gives too favourable an impression.
- (e) Existing controls in Japan should be maintained and rigidly enforced, in order to prevent hoarding and to ensure proper distribution in urban areas, and it should be clearly indicated to the Japanese that if local deficiencies arise through the ineffectiveness of their administration of the food controls, United Nations authorities would not accept responsibility for supplying those deficiencies.
- (f) No handicaps should be placed on the Japanese coastal fishing industry so that it may make the largest possible contribution to the food supply, and every encouragement should be given to the Japanese to employ their fishing industry to the full.

Considerations on which the preceding  
conclusions and recommendations are based

Population to be fed

4. Japan Proper, with an area about one-fifth larger than that of the British Isles, has to support a population which, after the return of Japanese nationals from overseas by about the end of 1946, will amount to about 80 millions. This is about 10 millions more than her population in 1936.

Resources available

5. Only 15% of the total area of Japan can be cultivated. Both before the war and during the war years, when Japan never had to feed more than 73 millions in Japan Proper, she



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imported both foodstuffs and fertilisers to supplement her own resources. In pre-war years she depended on imported rice (mainly from Korea and Formosa) to satisfy between 15 and 20% of her annual requirements; and she depended on Formosa for her sugar imports, and on Manchuria for a high proportion of the soya beans she consumed. Efforts were made during the last years of the war to attain self-sufficiency in cereals, but this was never achieved in spite of severe rationing and heavy adulteration of the rice ration with cereals, beans and potatoes. Consequently, during the war years Japan continued, despite shipping difficulties, to import foodstuffs. As these difficulties increased she had to abandon imports, first from South East Asia, then from Formosa; and in the latter months of the war her remaining imports from Korea and Manchuria of rice, other cereals and soya beans were greatly reduced.

6. Past efforts to increase production in Japan were handicapped by shortage of agricultural labour and lack of fertilisers. Potatoes are the only crop that has been appreciably increased during the war years. The rice crop harvested in November 1944 was moderate, and the 1945 wheat and barley crops poor. The cumulative effect of three years' shortages of fertilisers is being felt. Any stocks of rice built up during the earlier war years must now be discounted because, in addition to destruction by bombing, they have had to be used during the last three months when imports of cereals have been practically at a standstill.

7. Finally, it is reported that the prospects of the current rice harvest are 10% below the average of the last five years.

Present food position and diet level

8. Figures given in Appendices "A" and "B" enable a comparison to be made of the pre-war, wartime, and immediate post-war diet available to the Japanese. Salient points to be considered are:-



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- (a) In the 1936 diet, taken as an example of pre-war standards, the nutritional value was very delicately balanced. Owing to its excessive carbohydrate and starch content, fish, soya beans and vegetable oils, which provided the proteins and fats, were of disproportionate importance in food value in relation to their bulk.
- (b) During the war the quantitative daily consumption dropped by 11% and the calorific value by 14%. The wartime diet, with its increased potato starch content at the expense of rice, and its ever greater dependence on soya beans to make up for the reduced fish supply, is not far from a level usually regarded as leading to malnutrition. Moreover, in July this year a 10% cut was made in the basic "staple food" ration (that is, rice and rice substitutes of other cereals, soya beans and potatoes) so that the rations now in force give a more stringent diet than is shown for the 1944/45 average.
- (c) The diet shown in Appendix "B" for the immediate future is based on no imports of foodstuffs at all and assumes increased potato and fish consumption. It should be noted that a diet of 1,437 calories (based on a population of 77 million) or 1,376 calories (based on a population of 80 million) is extremely low by normally accepted standards and represents conditions of extreme hardship. It may be compared, for example, with the far higher levels which normally apply to heavy workers in European countries. Moreover Japan will not be able to maintain even these low levels unless the recommendations made in this paper are adopted. On the other hand, precedents are not lacking for such low levels in Oriental countries.



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Even the precarious level shown in Appendix "B" might not be maintained if the distributional difficulties, which caused so much trouble during the war years, were to become intensified. Hoarding of supplies by the producers or small rural landlords may result in urban areas experiencing famine conditions. It should be realised that the administrative problem of ensuring an equitable distribution of foodstuffs in a time of great scarcity is much more difficult to solve in a country which produces the bulk of its own foodstuffs, especially by means of small scale peasant agriculture, than it is in the case of a country which imports a large part of its supply. Should the administrative system break down in Japan supplies of food may be requested from external sources for relief purposes.

9. It will be seen that in Japan the supply position will be very tight for cereals, soya beans and sugar. Surpluses of rice exist in Formosa, and in Korea (if Manchurian cereals are provided for replacement) of cereals and soya beans in Manchuria; and of sugar in Formosa. Although no claim can be made for Japan until priority claims have been met, it is possible that transport difficulties might make it impracticable to remove all these surpluses to more distant deficiency areas. If this should happen, it is suggested that Japan should have access to such local surpluses and that China and the U.S.S.R. should be approached on this subject.

Fertiliser position

10. Japanese agriculture should be encouraged in every possible way to produce the maximum amounts of foodstuffs which can be grown in Japan in order to avoid malnutrition, disease and unrest in the country in the immediate future. Unless home production of fertilisers is maintained now, and prospects of imports exist, no increase in the yields of the 1946 grain crops, and the 1946 rice crop for consumption in 1946/47, can be expected. At the same time fishing should



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be encouraged as much as possible to remedy the wartime diet deficiencies of this important foodstuff; to lessen the dependence on soya beans; and to produce supplies of fish manures. The necessary fertilisers are derived from the following sources:-

- (a) Self-supply manures which, with the plentiful labour now available in Japan, can be produced in quantities equivalent to pre-war levels, and may even be increased in Japan Proper. This source of supply provides some 75% of the potash and nearly 50% of the phosphates and nitrogen required.
- (b) Commercial organic fertilisers which are derived chiefly from soya bean cake. Japan is only able to produce a part of her total requirements, and it is recommended that, subject to priority claims, she be given access to Manchurian sources of supply.
- (c) Artificial fertilisers, which in Japan are principally sulphate of ammonia, superphosphates and potash.
  - (i) Sulphate of ammonia. Japan has a large synthetic ammonia industry which, if operated to its present maximum operational (as opposed to installed) capacity, could provide some 73% of pre-war requirements at the cost of importing small quantities of coking coal. It is unlikely that Japan could manage to pay for imports of all her requirements of sulphate of ammonia. It is recommended, therefore, that until final decisions are reached about the future of the synthetic ammonia industry she be encouraged to operate this industry at full capacity. In the unlikely event that the whole of Japanese production of sulphate of ammonia cannot, owing to shortage of other balancing fertilisers, be usefully employed in Japan, any surplus would be



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urgently wanted in other countries. It is realised that this policy may conflict with longer-term policy for Japan, based on considerations of economic security, but the immediate effect on the food supply position would be serious if the production of synthetic ammonia were interfered with and it is therefore recommended that there should be no such interference at present. It is suggested that this policy be given urgent consideration so that any proposals for destruction or dismantling of the plant be prevented. Transfer of the plants to say China or India should not be made without careful consideration. In addition to encouraging the present operation of the synthetic ammonia plants in Japan Proper, it is recommended that subject to priority claims, Japan be permitted to import sulphate of ammonia, soya beans and bean cake from Korea or Manchuria, provided that surpluses can be supplied from those areas, and that approaches be made to the Chinese and Russians to ascertain the immediate prospects of obtaining such supplies for Japan and other countries.

- (ii) Superphosphates and potash. Japan has no indigenous rock phosphates or mineral potash. It is not thought possible that any rock phosphates from the South (Palau, Ocean, Nauru and Christmas Islands) will be available for Japan for some time. Supplies exist in Korea and it is suggested that if available she should obtain some from this source. No supply of potash is thought possible.

11. Estimated home production, compared with requirements, is shown in Appendix "C", for all types of fertiliser.

23rd October, 1945.



S E C R E TAPPENDIX "A"ESTIMATES OF THE JAPANESE PRE-WAR AND WARTIME DIET

(Imports of foodstuffs and fertilisers maintained)

	1936 Level		1944/45 Level	
	Per Capita Per Day (Grams)	Per Capita Per Day (Calories)	Per Capita Per Day (Grams)	Per Capita Per Day (Calories)
Rice	303*	1,069	298**	1,052
Wheat, barley & other cereals	86	307	88	314
Potatoes (sweet & Irish)	130	138	149	158
Soya beans	21	74	29	102
Sugar	37	147	3	11
Fish and shellfish	42*	55	23	30
Oils and fats	3	27	3	27
Other pulses	15	52	14	49
Daikon	92	12	84	11
Other roots and tubers	30	104	-	-
Green vegetables	100	45	102	46
Fruits and nuts	35	15	32	14
Seaweed	15	1	14	1
Meat & Poultry	5	10	4	8
Eggs	7	11	4	6
Milk & dairy produce	12	11	6	5
Alcoholic liquor	31	31	5	5
Miscellaneous	-	30	-	6
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>964</b>	<b>2,139</b>	<b>858</b>	<b>1,845</b>

\* American estimates place these at 324 and 70 respectively and give total figures of 1,034 grams per day and 2,162 calories.

\*\* This is an average figure. For many civilians the rice ration was as low as 120 grams a day with a higher allowance of other cereals or potatoes and beans. The Armed Forces' and heavy workers' rice ration was as high as 700 grams a day.

NOTE: The extent to which, during the war years, potatoes were increased to replace rice, and soya beans to replace the fish deficiency are shown.



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APPENDIX "B"  
ESTIMATES OF THE JAPANESE DIET THAT CAN BE SUPPLIED FROM HOME FOODS  
ASSUMING FERTILISER SUPPLY MAINTAINED

Foodstuff	Prepared Food Available* (Million tons per annum)	Per Capita Per Day (Grams)	Per capita Per Day (Calories)	Pe P ( 80
		77 million fed	77 million fed	
Rice	6.8	242	855	
Wheat, Barley and other cereals	1.6	57	203	
Potatoes (sweet and Irish)	4.8	172	182	
Soya beans	.2	7	29	
Sugar	.06	2	7	
Fish and shellfish	.7	25	33	
Oils and fats	.04	1	9	
Other pulses	.36	12	39	
Daikon	2.2	78	10	
Vegetables	2.7	96	43	
Fruits and nuts	.8	23	12	
Seaweed	.3	10	-	
Meat and Poultry	.1	3	6	
Eggs	.1	3	4	
Milk and dairy produce	.1	3	2	
Alcoholic liquor	.1	3	3	
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>20.96</b>	<b>742</b>	<b>1,437</b>	

\* These figures are expressed in terms of prepared foodstuffs, and only allow for such supplies in Japan Proper during 1946, with no imports of foodstuffs. The estimates may be on the continued shortage of fertilisers.



APPENDIX "B"

DIET THAT CAN BE SUPPLIED FROM HOME FOOD PRODUCTION ONLY,  
WITH FERTILISER SUPPLY MAINTAINED

Per capita Per Day (Calories) 77 million fed	Per capita Per Day (Grams) 80 million fed	Per capita Per day (Calories) 80 million fed
855	233	815
203	55	199
182	164	173
29	6	25
7	2	7
33	24	32
9	1	9
39	12	39
10	75	9
43	92	41
12	27	12
-	10	-
6	3	6
4	3	4
2	3	2
3	3	3
1,437	713	1,376

Appendix "B"

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foodstuffs, and only allow for such supplies as might be produced  
foodstuffs. The estimates may be on the high side if there is a

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SECRETAPPENDIX "C"JAPANESE REQUIREMENTS OF FERTILISERS

(Unit = metric tons)

Fertiliser	Normal Domestic Production	Total Requirements	Imports Required
<u>Self-supply fertilisers</u>			
Compost or heap manure	39,100,000	Equal to Domestic Production	-
Green manure	6,000,000		-
Night soil	16,100,000		-
Others	9,800,000		-
Total	71,000,000	-	Nil
<u>Commercial organic fertilisers</u>			
Fish manures and oilseeds cakes	Fish manures adequate. Supplies of oilseed cake deficient	Nitrogen (N) 74,000. Phosphates (P <sub>2</sub> O <sub>5</sub> ) 22,500 Potash (K <sub>2</sub> O) 20,000	650,000 bean cake
<u>Artificial fertilisers</u>			
Sulphate of ammonia*	1,375,000	1,860,000	485,000
Cyanamide	300,000	300,000	Nil
Superphosphates	1,250,000	1,250,000	675,000/ 1,000,000 rock phosphate.
Coking Coal	-	-	80,000 for use in making fertilisers
* Industry working at 80% capacity.			



S E C R E TCOPY NO. 2319 November 1945FAR EASTERN ADVISORY COMMISSIONCORRIGENDUM TO FEAC 13UNITED KINGDOM PAPER ON IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF  
THE JAPANESE FOOD SUPPLYNote by the Secretary General

Holders of FEAC 13, dated 9 November 1945, are requested to change the last two lines of paragraph 3 (f), (page 3) to read "Japanese to employ their coastal fishing industry for this purpose".

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

*Corrigendum  
FEAC 13*



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