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Vol. 28

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Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

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December 19, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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WARD & PAUL

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 28

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Wednesday, December 19, 1945

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Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster,  
and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
of counsel, for the joint committee.

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1  
2 The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

3 Does counsel have anything at this time?

4 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

5 Yesterday we had up an inquiry made of counsel by  
6 Senator Ferguson, I think, under date of November 16, in  
7 which he said, "Please obtain for me all information that  
8 any of the services or the Government had that Japan knew  
9 we had broken their code."

10 There was a response from me immediately on the 17th,  
11 which said:

12 "With reference to your letter of November 16 requesting  
13 'all information that any of the services or the Government  
14 had that Japan knew we had broken their code,' there is no  
15 indication that Japan ever knew it. All information would  
16 indicate the contrary."

17 Now, yesterday I made the mistake without checking up  
18 on the fact, of saying or thinking that I had submitted  
19 that request to the Navy or the Army, and they had reported  
20 and it was on the basis of their report that I made that  
21 statement, and as the result of that there were some imputa-  
22 tions made on the good faith of the Army and Navy in not  
23 producing what we asked for.

24 I want to say that imputation is not justified because  
25 I now find I never did ask for that material, and that this

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1  
2 answer that I made was made based on my own impression of  
3 what they were asking, and what the evidence was at that  
4 time. I am quite willing to be open to criticism for not  
5 having followed it up, although at that time we were pretty  
6 busy just getting started, and possibly I might be forgiven  
7 for that.

8 The Vice Chairman: I am sure we all recognize that.

9 Mr. Mitchell: At any rate, we had the inquiry made.  
10 Bear in mind that this inquiry, as I interpret it, I am  
11 quite sure referred to what the Japs knew about our break-  
12 ing the code prior to Pearl Harbor.

13 I was not thinking of any information about that in  
14 1944 when Marshall wrote his letter, because we had not  
15 asked that they produce any of these intercepts at that  
16 day, so I was referring to what the conditions were prior  
17 to Pearl Harbor, and I also feel quite sure, although the  
18 request is not limited to that --

19 Senator Ferguson: That is all I was referring to,  
20 Mr. Mitchell. There is no misunderstanding about that.

21 Mr. Mitchell: There is no misunderstanding about that.

22 I also want to say at that time this was in the  
23 singular, and I was thinking of the diplomatic code, the  
24 magic or the purple stuff, so I wrote and told him I did  
25 not know of any evidence of that kind. I should have asked

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1  
2 the departments for it, but I am glad to make it clear or  
3 to get straightened out on it.

4 Senator Brewster: I think I had some correspondence  
5 also. Did you check that?

6 Mr. Mitchell: Our file clerk was not able to get in  
7 from Virginia this morning. She has been ill for a week.  
8 She went away yesterday. We will have to let that go,  
9 a little.

10 The Vice Chairman: We will take judicial knowledge  
11 of the weather conditions today. All of us had a hard time  
12 getting here.

13 Mr. Mitchell: There is a communication from you, I am  
14 quite.

15 Senator Brewster: Yes, along the same line.

16 Mr. Mitchell: I have not heard from the Navy this  
17 morning on this, but the Army comes in, having worked hard  
18 on this subject with a number of intercepts during the  
19 months of April and May, 1941, intercepts of Jap messages  
20 between Berlin and Tokyo, Tokyo and Washington is one of  
21 them, two, three, four of them. They all indicate a suspi-  
22 cion on the part of Japan that we were cracking one or  
23 more of their codes.

24 Senator Brewster: Can we have those read into the  
25 record?



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(2)

Mr. Mitchell: I will be glad to read them. It is not always clear what code they are talking about. There are a number of them. The first one is from Tokyo to Berlin.

The Vice Chairman: Pardon me a minute. Senator Brewster and Senator Ferguson had requested some information about whether Japan had suspected or knew we were breaking their code, and had requested some information from counsel, and counsel is giving a report on that now.

The Chairman: I see.

Mr. Mitchell: At the request of counsel, a search was made with reference to the intercepts prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. We have not made any attempt to find out what they suspected later on. It was Marshall's letter. They say they were still cracking. I suppose that is all I know about that.

This message is as follows:

"From: Tokyo (Konoe)

"To: Berlin

"April 16, 1941

Purple

"#329 Secret.

"Re your #407<sup>a</sup>.

"We suspect that the several codes I<sup>b</sup>, 80<sup>c</sup> and

h6

1  
2 OITE<sup>d</sup> are being cryptanalyzed by foreign powers and today we  
3 have none too many code books to spare. Therefore, when it  
4 is necessary to send a message, and at the same time insure  
5 its secrecy, please dispatch them by machine or by TSU<sup>e</sup>  
6 code. In case revelation of the contents are made to  
7 foreign powers, take care to paraphrase them from beginning  
8 to end. I want you to use OITE<sup>d</sup> for messages of relatively  
9 slight importance.

10 "Relay to Italy and Turkey.

11 "a - S.I.S. #16312 - Berlin tells Tokyo that intelligence  
12 wires emanating from Japanese offices in the Near East  
13 and Egypt to offices in Germany and Italy should be  
14 appropriately paraphrased before transmitting their  
15 contents to the Germans and Italians in order to  
16 avoid giving them clues in decoding Japanese codes.  
17 Berlin recommends use of certain codes in this con-  
18 nection.

19 "b - An auxiliary code.

20 "c - P-1

21 "d - PA-K2

22 "e - J series codes (J18-K7 now under study)

23 "ARMY 16407

Trans 4/19/41 (5)"

LaCharity (1) am  
follows  
Shack 10:15  
AL-1

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The next dispatch is from Berlin to Tokyo, May 3, 1941,  
marked "Purple No. 482".

"From: Berlin (Oshima)

"To: Tokyo (Matsuoka

"3 May 1941

"(Purple-CA)

"#482

STAHMER

"STAAMAA called on me this day (evening?)

and stating that this request was to be kept strictly  
secret, he said that Germany maintains a fairly reliable  
intelligence organization abroad (or-'in the U.S.'?), and  
according to information obtained from the above mentioned  
organization it is quite (or-'fairly'?) reliably established  
that the U.S. government is reading Ambassador Nomura's  
code messages, and then asked that drastic steps should  
be taken regarding this matter.

There are at least two circumstances  
substantiating the above (suspicion)., One circumstance  
is that Germany is reading our code messages - - - - .  
Regarding this, during my previous residency here, they  
were known to have a large scale cryptanalytic organization -

--

(unfinished - last two-thirds not available)

JD-1 2369

(M-A) Navy trans. 6 May 1941"

1  
2 Senator Brewster: Mr. Counsel, you spoke of two cir-  
3 cumstances. Did they give two?

4 Mr. Mitchell: No. It is a garbled message and there  
5 are some dashes after the words "two circumstances", so we  
6 don't know what it was; and then the message breaks off en-  
7 tirely. They didn't seem to get it all.

8 The next one is from Tokyo to Berlin, May 5, 1941:

9 "From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

10 "To : Berlin (Oshima)

11 "5 May 1941

12 "(Purple-CA)

13 "#370

14 "Please express our appreciation to  
15 STAHER  
16 STAMMAA for the information in question and ask him if it  
17 is not possible to give us the authority for the statement  
18 that it has been fairly reliably established that the  
19 U.S. government is reading our c e messages, so that we  
20 might take appropriate action.

"Reply requested.

21 "JD-1: 2368

(M\*A) Navy trans. 6 May 1941"

22 The next one is from Tokyo to Washington, May 5, 1941,

23 #192;

24 "From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister).

25 "To : Washington (Koshi).

"5 May, 1941

"(Purple)

"#192

"According to a fairly reliable source of information it appears almost certain that the United States government is reading your code messages.

"Please let me know whether you have any suspicion of the above.

"JD-1: 2346

(A) Navy Trans. 5-5-41 (S-TT)"

The next is from Washington to Tokyo, May 5, 1941,  
#267:

"From: Washington (Nomura).

"To : Tokyo (Gaimudaijin).

"5 May, 1941

"(Purple)

"#267

"(Most guarded secrecy).

"(Foreign Office secret).

"Re your #192\*.

"For our part, the most stringent precautions are taken by all custodians of codes and ciphers, as well as of other documents.

"On this particular matter I have nothing in mind, but pending investigation please wire back any concrete instances or details which may turn up.

"\*JD-1: 2346

(M) Navy Trans. 5-6-41 (7)"

"JD-1: 2367

1 The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941:

2 "From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

3 "To : Washington (Nomura)

4 "7 May 1941

5 "(Purple - CA)

6 "#198 Regarding your #267:\*

7 "This matter was told very confidentially  
8 to Ambassador Oshima\*\* by the Germans as having been  
9 reported to them by a fairly reliable intelligence  
10 medium; but to our inquiry they are said to have  
11 refused to divulge the basis on which they deemed it  
12 to be practically certain.

13 "JD-1:2367 Nomura requests further details of the  
14 basis for the report that his code msgs  
15 are being read by the U.S. government.

16 "\*\*General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin.

17 "JD\*-1:2388 (F) Navy trans. 7 May 1941 (S-TT)"

18 The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941,  
19 #1015:

20 "From: Tokyo.

21 "To : Washington, Bangkok, Rome.

22 "7 May, 1941

23 "(Purple)

24 "#1015 (Circular)

25 "Immediately upon receipt of this message,

use 1941 regulations for A and B code machines until further notice.

"16974

"JD-1: 2372 (A) Navy Trans. 5-7-41 (S-TT)"

I think that refers expressly to the machine type.

The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 8, 1941, no number.

"From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)

"To : Washington

"May 8, 1941

"Purple (CA)

"No number.

"From Vice Chief OHASI to Minister WAKASUGI.

"I want you to leave the custody of the government code in the hands of IGUCHI. No matter how long the communications are or how hurriedly the code must be used, there should be no occasion to call upon the services of telegraphic clerks. Please impress upon all of your secretaries that this is a special regulation.

"In view of the importance of the details of our recent exchange of wires, please (burn?) them immediately.

"ARMY 2446 Trans. 5/9/41 (S)"

Then there is one from Washington to Tokyo, May 9, 1941, unnumbered:

1 "From: Washington (Nomura)

2 "To : Tokyo (Matsuoka)

3 "9 May 1941

4 "(Purple-CA)

5 "Unnumbered

6 "To the Vice Minister\*, from Wakasugi.\*\*

7 "I respectfully acknowledge receipt of  
8 your telegram.\*\*\*

9 "Because of various duties at this office  
10 it requires a long time for a secretary alone to handle long  
11 messages and the increased volume of traffic in connection  
12 with this matter.\*\*\*\*

13 "(My message #272\*\*\*\*\* required 6 men  
14 working for 6 hours.)

15 "With the opening of negotiations, the  
16 volume of telegraphic traffic is bound to increase tremendously.  
17 As time is at a premium in handling these communications, you  
18 can well appreciate the inadvisability of having only the  
19 secretary handle this work. Furthermore, it goes without  
20 saying that the increased traffic will interfere greatly with  
21 other duties of this office.

22 "However, fortunately, our communication  
23 clerks have been constantly reminded of the necessity of  
24 maintaining security, and they have faithfully adhered to  
25 this policy in their work.



"Although I appreciate the intent of your telegram \*\*\* from the standpoint of security, I, nevertheless request your authorization to enlist the aid of Horiuchi, Hori, and Kazuware to handle communication duties under strict supervision.

"Also please authorize me to have Kawabata of Chicago come here temporarily to assist us in our communication work. (Bring all codes and do his work in this office).

"\*Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ohashi.

"\*\* Japanese Minister to Washington, under Ambassador Nomura.

"\*\*\* See JD-1: 2446, unnumbered, dated 8 May (Purple-CA), in which Tokyo issues Washington special regulations for custody of the Chief of Mission private code (CA).

"\*\*\*\* Japanese-American negotiations, being conducted in great secrecy.

"JD-1: 2494 (A-M) Navy Trans. 12 May 1941 (7)"

The next one is from Washington to Tokyo, May 20, 1941, #327:

"From: Washington (Nomura)

"To: Tokyo

"May 20, 1941

"Purple (CA)

"#327.

"INTELLIGENCE:

"Though I do not know which ones, I have

7 discovered that the United States is reading some of our  
8 codes.

9 "As for how I got the intelligence, I will  
10 inform you by courier or another safe way.

11 "ARMY Trans. 5/21/41 (7)"

12 The next is from Tokyo to all Japanese merchant vessels:

13 "From: Tokyo.

14 "To: All Japanese Merchant Vessels.

15 "30 May 1941

16 "(NL

17 "#1

18 "The Navy "S" code was seized from one of our  
19 merchant ships in a certain foreign port, together with other  
20 secret documents in custody of the captain.

21 "The use of the Navy "S" code shall be dis-  
22 continued except when absolutely necessary for training  
23 purposes.

24 "And, as previously instructed, when there is  
25 a possibility that official inspection may be made, all  
secret documents should be promptly burned.

26 "JN-1: 69 (C) Navy Trans. 5-31-41 (M)

That is the last one. The Army reports that they are  
continuing their search and the Navy reports that it has  
found some messages which are now being photostated. Whether  
they are the same or others I do not know yet.

The Vice Chairman: Is that all, Mr. Counsel?

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Mr. Mitchell: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: Very well.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON  
(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman: Admiral, do you have any statement you want to make before you resume your testimony?

Admiral Wilkinson: With regard to some of the inquiries made of me yesterday to bring information when available:

Counsel has just read the dispatches which I was requested to look up, the second one of which referred particularly to the one I spoke of where Berlin had advised Tokyo that they had information as to breaking the codes.

With respect to the personnel in the District Intelligence Office in Honolulu at Pearl Harbor time, the nearest date for which we have figures is December 16, at which time there were 41 officers, 60 enlisted men, and 3 civilian agents in that office.

Inquiries are being made as to the surveillance, screening and general security of the civilian laborers and workmen in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, as requested by Senator Brewster. I have not the answer on that at present.

The Vice Chairman: Is that all?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Yesterday, Admiral Wilkinson, I was asking you about the knowledge that was given to you at the time you went in in relation to diplomatic negotiations with Japan and also the military and naval knowledge, because you went into the department on the 15th of October.

Now, can you recall that you were briefed on the military situation as far as our forces were concerned, and their forces, so that you would be able to take the knowledge that you were getting and analyze it, so it would be of value to those that you were to give it to?

Admiral Wilkinson: I had general information of our own forces from my previous work at sea and I had a professional interest in where they were acquired before I took over and afterward from the ship movements office and from the War Plans as to the disposition of our forces. I was not formally briefed nor formally informed as to it, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When Admiral Ingersoll talked to you -- as I understand it he did talk to you, told you that your duties would be varied from those that were in writing?

Admiral Wilkinson: I asked him to confirm that specific point only, sir, that I mentioned.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, did he give you any reasons why there was to be a change?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. He said that was a naval

AL-11

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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practice as opposed to the Army practice, that the Army practice was that the so-called G-2 office, which was not only the Military Intelligence Division but also an Assistant Chief of Staff, that that office was charged with preparing the enemy side of the Estimate of the Situation, so-called, which is to say, what can the enemy do, what will he do, and what are his possibilities, that that was assigned to the Army G-2, but that that was not a part of the duties or within the scope of the activities of the Naval Intelligence, that that Estimate of the Situation, both the enemy side and our own side was prepared in War Plans.

That was the only point I asked him about, sir, and that was how he explained it.

Hook follows

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: And he explained it in that way?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You asked him because the instructions in the manual were direct that you had other duties than what you were then performing?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I don't think the instructions in the manual conflicted directly. They said I should get all the facts and information bearing on the enemy's intentions. They did not tell me to estimate them, and the instructions in the manual said "Disseminate information as desirable," and "desirable" would be such instructions, or otherwise, as I might receive.

I thought, in other words, that his word to me was consistent with the manual.

Senator Ferguson: And it made a direct limitation?

Admiral Wilkinson: A direct limitation and an order from an officer, a responsible officer in the chain of command.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know or did you hear after you came in that there had been a chance in the sending of messages to Admiral Kimmel in August of that year?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall that I did, sir. I was informed as to the present status and continued that. I don't know that I was informed of a prior status

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h2 2 which had been changed.

3 Senator Ferguson: You just had the present status?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I didn't go into the  
5 history of it.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know that Admiral Hart had his own means on the Philippines of getting his information in the CINCAP?

Admiral Wilkinson: I knew that both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel had agencies wherein they could get the radio intelligence with regard to the movement of the enemy ships. I knew both of them had agencies which had some facilities, however slight, for attacking codes. I do not know that I knew that Admiral Hart was able actually to solve the purple code.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you know that Admiral Hart did have means of getting diplomatic messages?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall that I did, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that Admiral Kimmel did not have any such means at all?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I do not recall that I did.

Senator Ferguson: You do not recall that you knew that?

Admiral Wilkinson: No. I knew that they both had certain facilities but the extent of them I did not know.

Senator Ferguson: Did Ambassador Grew's messages come to you?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Then you did not know --

3 Admiral Wilkinson: My error, sir. The messages he sent  
4 to the State Department during my tenure of office, my liaison  
5 officer over there picked those up, but not the -- I thought  
6 for the moment you were speaking of the first message of Janu-  
7 ary.

8 Senator Ferguson: No.

9 Admiral Wilkinson: The more recent messages did, yes.

10 Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with his message on  
11 the third where he said that the Japanese might strike with  
12 dramatic suddenness?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: The message of what date, sir?

14 Senator Ferguson: November the 3rd.

15 Admiral Wilkinson: I think I probably saw it, sir. I  
16 think I did see it because my liaison officer obtained these  
17 messages from the State Department.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did that change your thinking at that  
19 time as to whether or not war was near or not near?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes and no, sir. It checked so close-  
21 ly with the movements that they were making into the South  
22 China Sea, which were already beginning then and were intensi-  
23 fied later, that it probably directed my attention there  
24 rather than the possibility of their making a sudden strike  
25 against the United States at some other place.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Now, when you were before the Roberts  
3 Committee was there a stenographer present?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection is there was, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: There was?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection is there was, yes,  
7 sir, and I had expected to see it and, in fact, when I came  
8 here I looked for that record and found there was no record,  
9 only a summary.

10 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether he took stenogra-  
11 phic notes of what you said?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: I thought so.

13 Senator Ferguson: You thought so at the time?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: And you do not know why, then, they  
16 were not transcribed?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: You never heard?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: I never heard.

20 Senator Ferguson: This paper --

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I found a precis but not a brief,  
22 not a transcription.

23 Senator Ferguson: You did not prepare this paper then  
24 that you brought in yesterday?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: I prepared that as a memorandum to

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Admiral Stark after the event of what my testimony had been according to my recollection, but it was in no sense a stenographic record of my testimony. It was just for Admiral Stark's information of what they had asked me and what I had said.

Senator Ferguson: Did the Roberts Committee draw up an instrument similar to this?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my knowledge. That was my memorandum to Admiral Stark. It was entirely within the office and had no connection with the Commission. Now, the Commission may have made, and I thought they did, an actual transcript by a stenographer, but when their report came in it was only what they called a precis of testimony of those witnesses they heard before they left Washington to go to Pearl Harbor, among them myself, and the precis with respect to my testimony was about two paragraphs long as I recall.

Senator Ferguson: Has counsel got that copy of those two paragraphs?

Mr. Mitchell: I think Senator Brewster has that. I would not be able to check it without looking at our files.

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: I think in the Roberts' report itself you will find a discussion of the procedure they followed. They

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 did not take notes, apparently, in this country on that part  
3 of their hearings and later on they went on into a stenogra-  
4 phic record, but there is the discussion you want in the re-  
5 port itself.

6 Senator Ferguson: I just wanted to clear this up this  
7 morning as to what took place in that hearing.

8 Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection was that they had a  
9 confidential secretary or ship's clerk or someone present  
10 taking notes but it may be that he was only taking an ab-  
11 stract rather than taking stenographic notes.

12 Senator Ferguson: I am going to try and take you back  
13 to the morning of the 6th.

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: About a certain meeting with Admiral  
16 Turner and there was also a meeting with, as I understand it,  
17 McCollum and Bratton. Do you recall that meeting?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I have seen some mention  
19 of it. I do not recall it. I saw McCollum constantly and  
20 occasionally Bratton; not so often Bratton.

21 Senator Ferguson: Well, on page 998 of the Navy Top  
22 Secret Admiral Turner talks about the meeting; at least it  
23 relates to the instrument that was drawn.

24 Do you remember a long document, some five hundred words,  
25 being drawn up?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 Admiral Wilkinson: By whom, sir?

2 Senator Ferguson: By McCollum.

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Not as of that date. I remember a  
4  
5 December the 1st memorandum.

6 Senator Ferguson: Let me read this. I will change it.  
7 It was not on the morning of the 6th as I see here. There  
8 is another meeting that I had in mind on that.

9 Question No. 48 on page 998 (Reading):

10 "There is evidence before this court that Commander  
11 McCollum in the Office of the Director of Naval Intelli-  
12 gence prepared a summary of information on the Japanese-  
13 United States relationship over a period some time pre-  
14 ceding the third or fourth of December 1941 which was  
15 for the information of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific  
16 Fleet. Did you have any knowledge of the preparation of  
17 such a dispatch?

18 "Answer: Yes. We had discussed the advisability  
19 of making such a summary and I had personally discussed  
20 with Commander McCollum the details of the various points  
21 and the detail of the relationship and their negotiations  
22 and so on. We had spent a great deal of time talking  
23 the thing over. Then Commander McCollum, - I will say  
24 we found ourselves in very close agreement -- prepared  
25 the dispatch, I have forgotten its terms, and brought

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 it to me to check over it, which I did, and found myself  
3 in general agreement with it and made suggestions on a  
4 few comparatively minor changes. Now, I do not remember  
5 just what happened with the dispatch.

6 "Question: Can you recall what happened to the  
7 dispatch? Was it ever transmitted to the Commander-in-  
8 Chief, Pacific Fleet?

9 "Answer: I do not know. We do not know at this  
10 time.

11 "Question: To your knowledge did it ever reach the  
12 Chief of Naval Operations?

13 "Answer: I do not know. I think I initialed it and  
14 gave it back to McCollum so that the dispatch could be  
15 presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Office  
16 of Naval Intelligence with my own concurrence. That is  
17 my memory of it. It was presented to the Chief of Naval  
18 Operations by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral  
19 Wilkinson."

20 Admiral Wilkinson: Is that Colonel Bratton's testimony  
21 or whose, sir?

22 Senator Ferguson: That is Admiral Turner's testimony  
23 in the Top Secret of the Navy. I read the direct quote. Have  
24 you got it?

25 Mr. Gesell: No. That is our only copy.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Have you seen it?

Mr. Gesell: I haven't checked that testimony. You are quite right, it is in the Top Secret but I did not recall at this time that that was the testimony.

Senator Ferguson: Extracted testimony of Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S. Navy, pages 994 to 1008, inclusive.

Admiral Wilkinson: And that is reported as of December 6th, sir?

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, he has not given the date there but he has got in the dates over a period some time preceding the third or fourth of December.

Admiral Wilkinson: Preceding the third or fourth?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, over a period some time preceding the third or fourth of December, which was for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, do you recall that message?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall that as of the morning of the 6th, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, any other time?

Admiral Wilkinson: Or the messages there preceding the third or the fourth. At one time in that interval between the first and the seventh Captain McCollum came to me with a message and I went to see Admiral Turner with him. Now, more

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by : Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 recently we have discussed that to endeavor to clear our  
3 mutual recollections and the latest recollection which re-  
4 sulted from that discussion that I recall is that Captain  
5 McCollum took the message to Admiral Turner and Admiral  
6 Turner referred back to the war warning message and discussed  
7 with McCollum whether that of itself was not sufficient or  
8 whether it was necessary to send any further message, and  
9 the result, as I now recall, as I say, of their discussion  
10 through this mutual recollection and mutual endeavor to clear  
11 our memories, was that Turner and McCollum agreed that it  
12 was not necessary to send further information of that sort  
13 because it had been covered by the war warning message, but  
14 I would like very much, of course, to have Admiral Turner  
15 testify to that as well and he, I believe, will be a witness  
16 shortly, but I do not believe that there was any such message  
17 actually sent. The message may have been in our thought,  
18 the message may have been one that we were contemplating with  
19 respect to the winds message when there was a false interpre-  
20 tation but that was proved to be false before anything was  
21 sent out.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, whether or not the message was  
23 sent, - let us pass that for the moment --

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- you recall the dis-



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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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discussion of getting further information to Kimmel. That is what they are talking about in this, are they not?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you remember that?

Admiral Wilkinson: I remember McCollum discussing with me whether there was anything further that should be sent out on the basis of the information which we had discussed up to the date of the 1st of December with regard to the South China Sea incidents.

Senator Ferguson: Well, it would certainly be after the 27th?

Admiral Wilkinson: It was after the 27th.

Senator Ferguson: So it was information received after the 27th that you had discussed with McCollum?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you discussed as to whether or not that should be sent to the CINCPAC?

Admiral Wilkinson: To the Fleet as a whole.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, to the Fleet as a whole.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Which would go to the Commander-in-Chief.

Admiral Wilkinson: And as I recall that discussion it was factual evidence that we had of the further movements in

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 the South China Sea.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now, can you give us, as near as you  
4 can, the substance of what this message was that you now re-  
5 call was taken up with Admiral Turner, that you say was not  
6 sent?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection is very hazy but I  
8 think it was information with respect to the further develop-  
9 ments that had actually been discovered in the South China  
10 Sea which were brought up to date by the 1st of December  
11 memorandum which is in evidence and which may have occurred  
12 in the two or three days since the 1st of December memorandum  
13 and the time we were discussing that message. It wasn't any-  
14 thing to do with a threatened attack on Hawaii because we had  
15 no intimation of that whatsoever.

16 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever talk to Admiral Turner  
17 as to whether or not he thought of an attack upon Hawaii?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: But at least you had no thought of an  
20 attack upon Hawaii?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: And that continued on until after the  
23 attack?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you recall a meeting with any-

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

one, particularly with Colonel Bratton, on Saturday morning about further information to be sent to the Army or the Navy at Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You have no recollection at all of that?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. As I say, Captain McCollum was in my office frequently all the time I was on duty there and as the relations became strained and the movements of the Japanese forces to the south were more and more apparent, he was in my office I would say three and four times a day, sometimes, but rarely, Colonel Bratton would be with him and I recall from time to time in that way seeing Colonel Bratton but I do not recall specifically seeing him on the morning of the 6th. I do recall seeing Captain McCollum several times that morning. It may well be he brought Colonel Bratton in with him.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall any conversation with officers in the Army and/or the Navy in relation to trying to get more information to Hawaii? Would that refresh your memory, whether it was with Bratton specifically on a specific date or just a general conversation with him, or information from him or any of the other officers?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, not specifically, except

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 the 1st of December in Admiral Stark's office we were dis-  
3 cussing the general movements of the Japanese, the prepara-  
4 tion of this message I just mentioned. The information as to  
5 the movements of the Japanese Fleet was being picked up and  
6 in fact more or less originated in Pearl Harbor and in Corregi-  
7 dor and was known to both of them. Except for information of  
8 an attack on Pearl Harbor, which I did not have, there was  
9 nothing particularly for me to send to the Fleet.

10 Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with the message  
11 of -- if you will take exhibit 37, page 32. Counsel, could  
12 you give the Admiral exhibit 37?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: I qualify my last reports, of course,  
14 Senator, with respect to the sending of the code messages.  
15 I did confer with Admiral Ingersoll about that, - first with  
16 Captain McCollum and then with Admiral Ingersoll and sent the  
17 code message.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, on the code message, were you  
19 familiar with the message being sent to Tokyo to destroy our  
20 code?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I originated, in fact, a message to  
22 Tokyo and several other naval attaches' offices to destroy  
23 our codes, yes, sir. I think it was Tokyo as well.

24 Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with the one that  
25 went to Tokyo?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Admiral Wilkinson: As I recall, it was the same one that went to the other agencies. I was familiar with that and, in fact, originated it.

Senator Ferguson: Now, can you tell us just what caused you to send that message to destroy the code?

Admiral Wilkinson: Because the Japanese had issued instructions to their offices to destroy codes and we feared that if they anticipated that conditions would be such that their offices would be raided, that certainly they themselves would not hesitate to raid our offices, war or no war, and we did not want to be in a position to have our codes seized by a raid.

Senator Ferguson: Did you believe that war was imminent?

Admiral Wilkinson: Imminent but not inevitable.

Senator Ferguson: Now, the message on page 32, November 24th; do you have that before you?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Were you consulted at all about the sending of that message or its wording?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then your only knowledge came after it had been sent?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And would you say how long after it

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 had been sent?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say a day or two, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: And then did you get any instruc-  
5 tions on it as to its meaning or effect or why it was sent?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: No, except I was familiar with the  
7 negotiations in process by reason of the broken codes so that  
8 I knew the obvious reason for it; similarly with the message  
9 of the 27th.

10 Senator Ferguson: Were you in any way informed that that  
11 message was to take care of a surprise attack? For instance,  
12 I will read you question 40 on page 996 of Admiral Turner's  
13 testimony before the Top Secret. It may refresh your memory.

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I understand that refer-  
15 ence now. I did not understand before what you were reading  
16 from.

17 Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

18 "This dispatch, exhibit 15, states 'a surprise  
19 aggressive movement in any direction is indicated."  
20 And that exhibit 15 is this same message that I am reading to  
21 you.

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Except the text of the message reads,  
23 "is a possibility."

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes. (Reading)

25 "This language is omitted from the dispatch of the

1916

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

27th of November, three days later, wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this omission from the dispatch of November 27th done intentionally?"

This is the answer of Admiral Turner:

"I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dispatches. In the one of the 24th it says 'a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is indicated.' Now, that 'in any direction' could be by naval force, air force, amphibious force or anything else. In this other dispatch we said, 'an amphibious expedition is en route.'"

That is the one of the 27th. I am inserting that in my own language.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Now, to quote further:

"It was moving down the China Sea. Now, those two are quite different. They do not cover the same kind of a subject and they were intended not to cover it. That was information. We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That was a fact. Now, the other was deduction as covering generally not only the movement of an amphibious force but the movement of any force."

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Now, does that refresh your memory?

Admiral Wilkinson: As to what, sir?

Senator Ferguson: As to these two messages, what you were told about.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, I am familiar with both of the messages.

Senator Ferguson: Was that your understanding of the messages that I just read you, what Admiral Turner said about them?

Admiral Wilkinson: Why, I do not know that I developed any particular understanding. My understanding of the first message was a statement that the negotiations were breaking down and that anything might happen anywhere. My understanding of the second message was, so far as I was interested in it, - I was not directly affected by it, the second message, - that it was a war warning sent to both the Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet stating, "Look out; negotiations have ceased; an aggressive movement by Japan is expected and here is what has been indicated: We know they are going to do that."

My understanding was, certainly, that that would not be the only thing that might have happened, such as Admiral Turner has said, but that was certainly the one thing that was very evident and, of course, did occur.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you have any knowledge that



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

there was a movement that would cause an amphibious landing?

Admiral Wilkinson: Oh, yes. I think the basic information under the conditions that existed had been prepared and received in various detail by my office and furnished to him. There were ships and transports and landing boats and men-of-war streaming down the South China Sea.

Senator Ferguson: What was the earliest you remember coming to the conclusion that there would be an amphibious landing?

Admiral Wilkinson: I would say certainly by December 1st.

Senator Ferguson: Now, where would this amphibious landing in your opinion be made, would you say?

Admiral Wilkinson: I did not know, of course. There was a possibility they might be getting around to make an advance base in Indo-China, they might be going down to go into Thailand -- Siam at that time -- and from then to expand their influence into that free country, or they might be making a direct assault on the British territories in the Malay Peninsula.

It integrated with my conception, as I have said earlier, that I felt that they might well be feeling their way southward and by the infiltration method to gain all the ground and solidify their position as far as they could before they made any definite act which would antagonize the British into

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 the war, including certain nations, just as they had done  
3 for some years past. If they followed that course they would  
4 limit their activities to Indo-China and perhaps Siam. If  
5 they wanted to make a direct attack, they would go, as in fact  
6 they did go, into the Malay Peninsula.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, if they went into the Malay  
8 Peninsula how would that involve us in war from the knowledge  
9 you had?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: I know that if there was an attack  
11 on British possessions, I knew it would involve England in  
12 war. I knew that the relations between England and the United  
13 States were close, the actual details I did not know, but I  
14 knew that we would be concerned and I thought it probable that  
15 the Congress would be sufficiently concerned to consider  
16 whether it was a cause of war. As far as I knew there were  
17 no binding commitments. I did know that there had been the  
18 geographical lines set up, the passage of which would be a  
19 cause for concern on the part of this country and that the  
20 Malay Peninsula was beyond those lines.

21 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall the three men-of-war  
22 memorandum here?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: I recall it now. I did not see it  
24 at that time.

25 Senator Ferguson: You did not see it prior to the 7th?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Admiral Wilkinson: I am quite sure I did not. It was quite new to me.

Senator Ferguson: Pardon me?

Admiral Wilkinson: It was quite new to me when I saw it here. I am quite sure I did not see it.

Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know whether or not you ever got any information from those three men-of-war or any one of them?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't think so, sir. I don't think it ever got out of the station. I do know with the aerial patrol that was so. That was established and we got information from it but I doubt if the men-of-war were ever stationed.

Senator Ferguson: Were you getting information from the aerial patrol at the Philippines?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, via the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Did you get any from the aerial patrol at Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Were you using the aerial patrol at the Philippines as a source of information?

Admiral Wilkinson: I was not using it. I was looking for it.

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Well, that is what I mean.

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I did not order it.

4 Senator Ferguson: It was being used by your office?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did you know when Singapore actually  
7 went on alert?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: no, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: You did not know that it had gone on  
10 alert on the 6th, their 6th?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: It would be on our 5th.

13 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I may have seen the dispatches  
14 but at what precise moment I did I do not know, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not the purple  
16 code was used for that wind message or was that a minor code  
17 that was used on that wind message?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Setting it up?

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

20 Admiral Wilkinson: To set it up was a code. To imple-  
21 ment it was in the middle of a weather broadcast as I remember.  
22 There is no code that set it up. It might be evident on the  
23 face of the dispatch. I would not ordinarily know, particular-  
24 ly what code any message came in because they came to me af-  
25 ter translation.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: And the name on the code as a rule was not on the translation?

Admiral Wilkinson: Exactly.

Senator Ferguson: When would you say your office was alerted to war, for real war?

Admiral Wilkinson: My office was alerted to the Far Eastern crisis about ten days or two weeks before the 7th of December and my office was not alerted to war as war until it actually occurred, but we were in a crisis condition and standing watches and twenty-four hour service and responsible officers on call outside of their own office hours.

Senator Ferguson: How much effort did you put in Saturday evening trying to reach Admiral Stark after they delivered those thirteen parts to you at your office, or at the moment?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think I called him up, sir, and failed to get him. I don't think I put much more effort into it because I thought at the time, and I was in agreement with the people I had been discussing it with, Captain McCollum, General Miles and Captain Beardall, that it was a diplomatic paper, a justification of the position of Japan, a so-called white paper such as governments frequently issue in connection with negotiations which they are conducting. I did not consider it a military paper and it was not until the fourteenth

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 part came in that I considered it was a final paper. We had  
3 sent dispatches of almost that same character, I think, in-  
4 dicating that propositions made by the Japanese were not  
5 satisfactory to us and this was one being made by them that  
6 our propositions were not satisfactory to them.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you knew about the mess age  
8 of the 26th having been sent?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: And you knew that we had considered  
11 their message of the 20th of November as an ultimatum?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I did not know that because  
13 one does not reply to an ultimatum. I would have considered  
14 their message of the 20th, and I do consider it, as a step  
15 in the negotiations and ours of the 26th as a further step,  
16 although I did not think that they would accept ours of the  
17 20th.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, why did you want to reach  
19 Admiral Stark then that evening if this was only an ordinary  
20 white paper diplomatic message?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Just to tell him that we had it.  
22 He had seen the pilot message. To tell him that we had it  
23 and as far as we read it there was nothing particularly alarm-  
24 ing in those parts and I would show it to him in the morning.

25 Senator Ferguson: That pilot message said that they were

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 to get another message as to when it was to be delivered.

2 Was that very significant to you, the placing of a zero time  
3 for delivery?  
4

5 Admiral Wilkinson: The pilot message said two things,  
6 sir. It said, "We are going to give you an answer and it is  
7 going to be in fourteen parts. We will tell you when to de-  
8 liver that note." The second thing was, "You are going to  
9 receive it and you are to dress it up in good language and  
10 we will tell you when to deliver it." The fact that there  
11 was a certain time for the delivery was not significant to me.  
12 Perhaps it should have been. I was not familiar with diplo-  
13 matic language, that the time of presentation is characteris-  
14 tic of an ultimatum rather than an ordinary note, which would  
15 not ordinarily be presented at some certain time. I did not  
16 appreciate it if that is the case. In other words, the time  
17 element, the fact that they they were to deliver it at a cer-  
18 tain time, it didn't mean any more to me than as being a time  
19 with respect to negotiations and here they said to them to  
20 "dress it up and then we will tell you when to present it."

21 Senator Ferguson: Would you say that was because of  
22 or caused by your lack of knowledge of diplomatic procedure?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Or my general lack of intelligence or  
24 appreciation, sir, I don't know which. I certainly did not  
25 appreciate it.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, Admiral Beardall was at  
2 your office that night?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: He was the President's military aide?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Naval aide.

6 Senator Ferguson: Pardon me, - naval aide.

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: And had been familiar with the magic?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: So you could properly discuss and  
11 freely discuss with Admiral Beardall and General Miles, who  
12 was also familiar with magic this question?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, and my recollection is we  
14 all agreed that it was a diplomatic justification of their  
15 position.

16 Senator Ferguson: Normally Admiral Beardall would have  
17 been the man to receive it for the President, would he not?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: And Kramer, who had delivered it to  
20 you, he delivered it at the White House ?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: He saw that as he was at the White  
22 House, - he delivered it at the White house.

23 Senator Ferguson: He advised you of it?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: It was not necessary for Beardall to  
25



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 take it there.

3 Senator Ferguson: You were advised of that fact?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether he had any dis-  
6 cussion with Kramer about it?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Whether Beardall had?

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

9 Admiral Wilkinson: No. Kramer was there with all  
10 three of us. I don't remember any particular discussion be-  
11 tween those two. Kramer was there during our talk and sat  
12 in there with us.

13 Senator Ferguson: Did he advise you of his conversa-  
14 tion with the Secretary of the Navy?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: At least that the Secretary of the  
17 Navy was going to have a meeting with the Secretary of State  
18 and War on the following morning at ten?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, for two reasons: First,  
20 because they were to discuss this diplomatic message; and,  
21 second, on the presumption that the fourteenth part would be  
22 available by then, as in fact it was. In fact, I thought  
23 that message was primarily of concern to the State Depart-  
24 ment rather than the Navy and the Army.

25 Senator Ferguson: And did you put on any special effort

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 to decode the fourteenth message which you were intercepting,  
2 which would have been the one o'clock message?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: I did not myself because that was  
4 under Communications but I knew from Kramer that Communica-  
5 tions was on the look-out for it.  
6

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, you knew that America was not  
8 bluffing in this negotiation?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. We were going to adhere  
10 to our principles.

11 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

12 Admiral Wilkinson: But I also knew that we were making  
13 an effort to delay the break-off of the negotiations and any  
14 actual conflict until we got our positions in the Philippines  
15 sufficiently garrisoned.

16 Senator Ferguson: From the Intelligence did you think  
17 that the Japanese were bluffing or not, from the Intelligence  
18 that came through your hands?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I did not think they were  
20 bluffing but I did not think they would strike America. I  
21 thought, as I have said, that they would confine their ef-  
22 forts to working to the south and possibly appreciating that  
23 we did not want to precipitate anything in the temper of  
24 our country, that they would try to consolidate their posi-  
25 tion and gain all they could before they did have to risk a

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

war.

Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand that you believed prior to the 7th because of the movement of the troops and the intelligence you had that there was going to be war with Britain but you did not believe that there was going to be war with the United States? Is that a fair summary?

Admiral Wilkinson: I believed there would be war with Britain if the Japs went into the Malay Peninsula. I was not sure they would go there. If there was in that case a war with Britain, I thought there was a possibility that the United States would come into the war but I did not think there would be any certainty of it. I did not think that the Japs would attack the United States direct.

Senator Ferguson: Now, Saturday morning a message came from Admiralty that they were going across the Gulf of Siam, fourteen hours, I think, was the message, from the Kra Peninsula, and the message from our Ambassador Winant to the same effect, which came in at 10:40 Saturday morning. Do I understand that you did or did not get that information?

Admiral Wilkinson: I got it, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When did you get it?

Admiral Wilkinson: And my recollection, without checking it, is that that course that they were on was a westerly course, which would be a clear possibility of attacking Siam,

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

which was one of the alternatives I spoke of. I would like to see that dispatch to check that course.

Senator Ferguson: Could you show it to him, both the Winant and the Admiralty message?

While he is looking for it, did you get that Saturday, Admiral, on the 6th?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So when you got the thirteen --

Admiral Wilkinson: That is just long range, I am not certain, but I think I did.

Here is one message, sir, again from Cadogan.

"Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties" -- which is the Japanese force -- "is Kra or Bangkok." Bangkok, of course, was Thailand and Kra was the Malay Peninsula.

The message they referred to was the 3 A.M. this morning and "the parties seen off Cambodia Point sailing slowly westward toward Kra fourteen hours distant in time."

In that same dispatch from the Admiralty -- or from Mr. Winant, I find that:

"British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

British have opportunity to guarantee support."

In other words, the British also were in doubt as to whether the attack were to be made on Thai or the Kra Peninsula or not.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson  
Senator Brewster

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Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, you did not even come to the conclusion Saturday that they would attack in such a way that Britain would come into the war?

Admiral Wilkinson: I did not come to the firm conclusion, no, sir. I thought they might be working their way to Siam, rather than challenge England immediately. I thought it probable, and almost certain, that Britain would shortly be drawn into the war, but in support of Siam rather than as against a direct attack on them.

Senator Brewster : Mr. Chairman, would Senator Ferguson yield to a question?

Senator Ferguson: I will yield to my colleague.

Senator Brewster: It is in connection with this; you reiterated it is your firm opinion that they were likely to move south instead of coming to Hawaii, to attack us. Whether or not the fact that the United States Fleet in the Pacific even at Hawaii was inferior in strength to the Japanese, would not be calculated to incline the Japanese to the opinion that they could move south without any immediate danger of serious interruption from the United States?

Admiral Wilkinson: I did not quite understand you. I got the first part.

Senator Brewster: Will the reporter read it?

1 Witness Wilkinson Questions by: Senator Brewster

h2 2 (The question referred to, as recorded above, was read  
3 by the reporter.)

4 Senator Brewster: Without any immediate danger of  
5 serious interruption from the United States, because of the  
6 fact that the Fleet, as presumably they knew, was not sent  
7 to the Western Pacific or moving to the Philippines and  
8 striking.

9 Admiral Wilkinson: They could move southward without  
10 immediate danger. There was a risk. The further they  
11 extended their lines southward, the more possible a threat  
12 from Hawaii would be, because they were more exposed to  
13 us. But they could, and did, move south along the China  
14 Coast, and into Indochina, with comparative freedom.

15 Senator Brewster: I assume that probably was one  
16 factor in your consideration of the situation, your knowledge  
17 of the relative strengths of the fleet.

18 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know that I went into the  
19 strategic consideration, so much, sir. The very evident  
20 factors were the known presence of the ships moving down  
21 there, and then there was, as a background, the knowledge  
22 that you have just stated, that the lines of communication  
23 were short; they had air fields and harbors and bases on  
24 Formosa which they could use in the protection of those  
25 lines, and it was, in fact, a Japanese sea, and it would

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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be very difficult for us to interfere with it.

Senator Brewster: If the United States Pacific Fleet had been twice as powerful as the Japanese Fleet, with adequate supply trains, to move promptly to the Philippines, your estimate of the likelihood of the Japanese moving south, rather than moving in our direction might have been materially altered? Would that be a fair statement?

Admiral Wilkinson: Certainly they would have been more reluctant to move in the open sea to the south. They might have moved along the Coast. Certainly they would have anticipated our fleet would come into the Philippines and establish its base there and then it would be in a position to cut the water transport, so they would have to work over-land.

Senator Brewster: And so they would have materially altered the strategic concept on both sides if that situation had prevailed?

Admiral Wilkinson: Certainly.

Senator Brewster: You did, of course, take all of those factors into account in forming your opinions as to the situation, I assume?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think I naturally would, sir, even without formally estimating them. They would influence



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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me by virtue of my familiarity with naval matters.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral, that brings up the question about these lost Japanese carriers. You were quite sure from the intelligence that you received, that these six carriers that were lost could not have been used in the movement south, because you had that covered and had the information on that; isn't that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson: There could not have been any movement of those carriers through the China Sea, or we would have detected it. There might well have been a movement south into the Carolines, the Palaus, Saipan and Guam; there might have been a movement into the Marshalls, and in fact we had some information from the Radio Intelligence at Pearl Harbor that they thought there was a force of carriers and submarines into the Marshalls, which would have accounted for them, although Corregidor did not believe it.

Senator Ferguson: Then we find this situation, that at least these six lost carriers could not be used in the movement south in the China Sea, and the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral Wilkinson: They were not there at that time. They might have been home getting ready to start there.

Senator Ferguson: If they were in the Carolines then there was a possibility that they could attack Guam?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 Admiral Wilkinson: If they were where, sir?

3 Senator Ferguson: If they were in the Carolines,  
4 they could have attacked Guam?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Then were we, from your evidence,  
7 anticipating an attack, an air attack from these six lost  
8 carriers at Guam?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: There was a possibility, if Japan  
10 was determined upon war, that they would attack anywhere,  
11 if Japan was determined upon opening the war against us.  
12 The probabilities, we felt, were most probable, the Philip-  
13 pines, next Guam, next Wake, next Midway, and last Hawaii,  
14 because of the distance and the extension of the line,  
15 the increased risk of interception by our forces, and the  
16 greater boldness required.

17 Senator Ferguson: When the message was sent on the  
18 27th, the war warning message to the Navy, that was, as  
19 I understand it, because of this movement to the south  
20 that you knew about?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I think everything boiled into  
22 that. I did not prepare the message or was not consulted  
23 in preparing it, but my assumption would be not only the  
24 movement to the south, but also the diplomatic messages  
25 and preparation of the fleet. We knew the fleet was getting

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Admiral Wilkinson: If they were where, sir?

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24 movement to the south, but also the diplomatic messages  
25 and preparation of the fleet. We knew the fleet was getting

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

2 ready for almost anything.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now, on page 22 of Exhibit 2,  
4 there is a message that I want to speak to you about. Do  
(5) 5 you have the book before you?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: The yellow book, sir?

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes. That is the one in relation  
8 to the lights and want ads and radio.

9 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: When did that first come to your  
11 attention?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Some three or four days after Pearl  
13 Harbor. I note it was translated on the 11th. Whether  
14 this was intercepted or not I do not know. It was, however,  
15 picked up in code form on the 8th from the cable station  
16 in Hawaii, and turned over to the Navy then. I am not  
17 sure whether it had been earlier intercepted by an intercept  
18 station or not.

19 Senator Ferguson: Do you know, or did you ever hear  
20 that it was intercepted here at Fort Hunt in Virginia?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I would not know it,  
22 since that was a matter of Communications.

23 Senator Ferguson: What do you mean by a code being  
24 translated in the rough, or a message being translated in  
25 the rough?

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7 2

Admiral Wilkinson: In the rough?

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

4 Admiral Wilkinson: I suppose it is the first draft  
5 before they went over it and removed inconsistencies and  
6 dug out some of the things that might have puzzled them  
7 the first time.

8 Senator Ferguson: Do you know Dorothy Edgers?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Did you know she was a translator  
11 in the ONI, the Naval Intelligence?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: If this message had been translated  
14 in the rough, and put on Kramer's desk -- was it Commander  
15 Kramer at that time, or Captain Kramer?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Commander then.

17 Senator Ferguson: -- Commander Kramer's desk on the  
18 afternoon of the 6th, completed in the early afternoon of  
19 the 6th of December, 1941, and was brought to the attention  
20 of Captain Kramer, I would like to ask why that would not  
21 be called to your attention, if your office was alerted on  
22 that day? Was it because of this 14-part message?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: I would have every idea that it  
24 would be, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Are you familiar with the Hewitt

Witness Wilkinson                      Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1  
2 testimony, Admiral Hewitt's testimony?

3            Admiral Wilkinson: His personal testimony, or the  
4 testimony he collected?

5            Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

6            Admiral Wilkinson: His personal testimony, or the testi-  
7 mony he collected?

8            Senator Ferguson: Not his testimony.

9            Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I am only familiar with  
10 my testimony. I read none of the others.

11            Senator Ferguson: You are not familiar with the Dorothy  
12 Edgers testimony?

13            Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I did not know she had  
14 testified.

15            Senator Ferguson: How was that?

16            Admiral Wilkinson: I did not know she had testified.

17            Senator Ferguson: So, if this was translated in the  
18 rough and put on Commander Kramer's desk, it should have  
19 reached you then on the 6th, even though it was in the  
20 rough?

21            Admiral Wilkinson: If the translation was sufficiently  
22 intelligible, yes, sir.

23            Senator Ferguson: Will you look at that message and  
24 see whether you see any significance to it in relation to  
25 an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h9 2

3 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say certainly it was an  
4 indication to vessels lying off Pearl Harbor, presumably  
5 submarines, as to the movement of the ships within Pearl  
6 Harbor.

7 I would say probably, without hindsight now, that it  
8 would be a substitute for more rapid means of communica-  
9 tion, such as radio and cable, if they had been broken,  
10 and that this was a last minute or last resort, rather,  
11 method of communication where, if they had no other means,  
12 they would hang a light in the window, just as we were  
13 told Paul Revere did, burning a light in the window to  
14 show that ships had left, or by day they could have made  
15 some other signal.

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Then this message, even though it had been laid on your desk on the 6th, would not have meant anything to you in relation to an attack, a warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson: It would have indicated a further interest in the movements in and out of Pearl Harbor, but it would not have meant that an attack was imminent, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you would not have seen, as the Intelligence Officer, any need, having that message, to send any more information to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson: I doubt if I would, except to tell them that the last resort signals were being arranged to take the place of the radio and cable communications, which they had been having theretofore. You know the meaning of these signals is just an indication of what the movements of ships were. It did not give any information as to ships present, only ships that had left. It did not give information as to the locations of ships other than whether they had left or not.

Senator Ferguson: Could I ask counsel whether this has actually been put in the record, this exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: That particular one?

Mr. Gesell: This whole book is Exhibit 2, I think.



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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Gesell: This whole book is Exhibit 2, I think.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson  
Mr. Keefe

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2 Senator Ferguson: It was not printed; it is just an  
3 exhibit?

4 Mr. Gesell: I think that is all. It is not in the  
5 transcript.

6 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

7 The Chairman: Is that all, Senator?

8 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

9 The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

10 Mr. Keefe: Admiral Wilkinson, I understand from your  
11 testimony, or I want to ask you whether it is a fair assumption  
12 on my part from your testimony that at no time during your  
13 service as Chief of Naval Intelligence, from October 15 down  
14 to the 7th day of December, 1941, did you have any idea or  
15 form any conclusion yourself that the Japs intended to attack  
16 Pearl Harbor?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: That is correct, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: It was your impression, from the intelligence  
19 that you had, that they intended to continue their movement  
20 down into the South China Sea, but your personal impression  
21 was that they would not attack what you were pleased to call  
22 the Angle-Saxon nations, is that right?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: That is correct, sir. "Angle-Saxon"  
24 is the common term. I thought England and America were  
25 generally understood by that term.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: You meant England and America when you used that term?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. That was purely a personal impression, and of course was erroneous.

Mr. Keefe: It was your personal impression?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, personal impression, and obviously erroneous.

Mr. Keefe: And you came to that conclusion as the result of your review of all the naval intelligence that came to your attention as the Chief of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, plus the history of the Japanese opportunistic moves in China and Manchuria in the past few days, plus their negotiations which they had endeavored to stay, that they were going into China and they could not get out of China itself, there was nothing to force an issue there.

Mr. Keefe: You of course were familiar with the entire world situation and the rapidly moving events that were taking place?

Admiral Wilkinson: Roughly, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: During that period and that which had taken place prior thereto?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So that your personal opinion was arrived at

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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as the result of a survey of the entire situation?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: When you concluded that they would not attack Britain and the United States?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That is correct, is it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now I assume that, as a Naval Officer of 40 years' standing, and having been to sea with the Fleet for years, and having served in Honolulu, or in Hawaii, as well as in the Far East, that you thoroughly understood that Pearl Harbor was developed as a bastion for defensive and offensive operations in the Pacific area?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. Primarily as a base for the Fleet, and secondarily as a means for the protection of our territory in the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. Keefe: It was the cornerstone of our defenses, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: In the Pacific, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: In the Pacific?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And for years maneuvers had been held and plans had been drawn contemplating the possibility that Pearl Harbor might be attacked?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And Japan was the enemy against whom we were preparing all these years, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you thoroughly understood that?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. In connection with those maneuvers, there had, of course, been countermaneuvers by our Fleet, wherein they had obtained contacts, and so on, of Japanese movements.

(8) Mr. Keefe: Did you agree with the general sentiment that appeared to have been expressed by Mr. Hull and others who have testified here, that the possibility of an attack on the Hawaiian area envisioned fundamentally and primarily an air attack, secondly a submarine attack, as being the most possible means of attack?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, and probably both.

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson: I thought perhaps a submarine attack was the most probable, because submarines could get there unnoticed and without risk.

Mr. Keefe: So in your thinking in the years before you became Chief of Naval Intelligence you never ruled out the possibility of attack on Pearl Harbor and Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. While I was there, of course,

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 we were concerned with that possibility and had maneuvers,  
3 as you say, to that effect.

4 Mr. Keefe: But you did not consider it probable, although  
5 it might have been possible, in 1941?

6  
7 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, for a double reason. I  
8 thought, in the first place, that the Japanese would be loath  
9 to encounter the hazard of sending a sufficient force into  
10 such dangerous waters, and, in the second place, I anticipated  
11 such a force would be detected before it arrived at any  
12 threatening position.

13 Mr. Keefe: Now you were out there with the Fleet in  
14 1940, were you not?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: 1939-1941, yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: Then you were there in 1940?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: And you were familiar with the operations  
19 of the Fleet in 1940?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: I was in them, in fact.

21 Mr. Keefe: And you were familiar with the liaison that  
22 existed between the Fleet and the Army in that period?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: Do you recall that the Army was alerted at  
25 Pearl Harbor on the 17th of June, 1940?

Admiral Wilkinson: I remember it was that summer. I do

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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not remember the date particularly.

Mr. Keefe: You remember there was an all-out alert in June, 1940?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I was quite close to General Herron, because I was the Chief of Staff of Admiral Andrews, who had been his colleague, until the Fleet arrived there in the spring of 1940.

Mr. Keefe: You are familiar with the fact that the Army was alerted in Panama at that time, are you not?

Admiral Wilkinson: I did not know Panama had been alerted at that time. I now know.

Mr. Keefe: Now do you know of any other time prior to that that the Island garrison at Oahu had ever been alerted?

Admiral Wilkinson: I did not know specifically, but I know that drills and maneuvers were occurring quite frequently, and partial or full alerts took place in connection with them, just as on a similar occasion, I think, when the Fleet came out in 1934, and I believe I came there with the Fleet, and the Army was alerted at that time as part of the maneuvers.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: I mean other than mere maneuvers.

3 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I do not know of my  
4 own knowledge of any time that the Army was alerted against  
5 an enemy threat.

6 Mr. Keefe: Now, this alert in 1940, in June, was a  
7 real alert, wasn't it?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: So far as the Army was concerned?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: They were alerted against a possible trans-  
12 Pacific attack by air?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: That meant Japan, did it not?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: So that according to the developments of  
17 that particular period, the growing tension and strains  
18 were such that the Chief of Staff here in Washington, in  
19 consultation with his advisors, decided that the Army  
20 ought to go on an all-out alert against possible attack,  
21 as early as the 17th of June, 1940?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. Japan was, of course,  
23 not preoccupied with any other movements at that time.

24 Mr. Keefe: I did not ask you that, Admiral.

25 Admiral Wilkinson: It seemed to be a diplomatic situa-

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 tion that would favor her taking such a step.

3 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman  
4 yield at that point?

5 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

6  
7 Senator Brewster: In connection with this alert  
8 matter, I call your attention to your own report to the  
9 Chief of Naval Operations that you put in the record yester-  
10 day, on the testimony of General Herron, wherein you make  
11 the following statement:

12 "After my testimony, Lieutenant General C. D. Herron,  
13 who relinquished command in early February in Hawaii,  
14 testified mainly about his preparations and his general  
15 practice as to alert stations. He said that last winter"  
16 -- I assume that was the winter of 1941 -- "he had had  
17 them in the field for six weeks on the alert, but had  
18 subsequently modified that in some degree, although he  
19 had maintained guns at their field stations."

20 Does that recall to you the matter of the alert during  
21 that period?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: I think it does, sir. Of course,  
23 it was not the winter alert that Mr. Keefe was speaking  
24 of. It was the summer alert. I might have misquoted it,  
25 or it might have been mistyped, or General Herron himself  
might have misstated his recollection by saying winter

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 instead of summer. I think that is the summer alert.

3 Senator Brewster: That is the summer alert?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Brewster: I call your attention to the fact  
6 that this was given within a very few days after General  
7 Herron testified, so I think your recollection would un-  
8 doubtedly be accurate. This was on December 19, 1941,  
9 which must have been within three or four days of the  
10 events.

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. As I say, it might  
12 have been that I dictated it wrong, or the stenographer  
13 might have written it wrong, and General Herron himself  
14 might have said it wrong. I left in May, 1941, and I do  
15 not think that there was any alert in the winter there  
16 of 1940-1941, that I knew of, at least.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster  
Mr. Keefe

2 Senator Brewster: Was General Herron's testimony  
3 taken down, or was that off the record?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: That was in the same status  
5 as mine. I think it preceded me. General Herron was  
6 relieved, in fact, on the 7th of February, I think, so that  
7 to have the six-week alert in the winter, it would have  
8 been very early in the winter.

9 Mr. Keefe: May I suggest that the evidence is already  
10 in in the form of the order for the alert and all of the  
11 reports in reference to it, and it is quite conclusively  
12 shown that the alert took place on the 17th of June, 1941.  
13 We have all that proof here.

14 Senator Brewster: I am not questioning that. What  
15 I am questioning is whether there was another alert during  
16 the winter as Admiral Wilkinson reported General Herron  
17 as testifying. That is why I thought it was pertinent  
18 in connection with your question.

19 Mr. Keefe: I may say I think I have gone into it  
20 quite carefully and I think the evidence is quite conclusive  
21 there was not an all out alert during that period, and he  
22 must have been mistaken as to the time, and that the actual  
23 alert took place in June, 1940.

24 Admiral, you, as an officer with the Navy at that time,  
25 knew that so far as the Army was concerned, in June, 1940,

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 they considered the possibility of an air attack upon  
3 Hawaii to the extent that an alert was ordered to prepare  
4 against it?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, we didn't know why it was  
6 ordered.

7 Mr. Keefe: You mean the Navy didn't know?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: I personally didn't know, and I  
9 don't think Admiral Andrews knew, and I think that some  
10 of the evidence I have seen indicates that Admiral Richardson  
11 was not informed and had to ask the Department about it.

12 Mr. Keefe: I am not talking about the Navy side.

13 Admiral Wilkinson: I thought you were. Excuse me.

14 Mr. Keefe: You did not know, and you did not know  
15 that the Navy was even alerted so far as you were concerned,  
16 did you?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. The Navy was not alerted.  
18 We made a maneuver toward the southeastward for several  
19 days, but we were not alerted for any defense of Panama.

20 Mr. Keefe: But your connections with General Herron  
21 were such that you knew the Army was alerted?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: I knew the Army was alerted, but  
23 I didn't know why.

24 Mr. Keefe: You saw the Operations order, did you not?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. It might well have been

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 a maneuver alert.

3 Mr. Keefe: Did you know that it was a serious alert?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: No, I did not know.

5 Mr. Keefe: Then you didn't know whether it was a real  
6 alert or a maneuver alert?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

8 Mr. Keefe: Well, the evidence before us now is that  
9 it was a real alert.

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Mr. Keefe, and you so understand  
11 that?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: I do, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: You saw the evidences of it out there,  
14 did you?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: Can you describe what took place under that  
17 alert so far as the Army was concerned?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Such evidence as came to my notice  
19 was that they manned the coast defense guns, moved their  
20 anti-aircraft artillery to prepared positions, they had  
21 searchlight battery exercises. In fact, I think I went  
22 to witness a searchlight battery exercise wherein they  
23 flew a plane into the searchlight for test purposes, and  
24 I recall I was interested in the working of the mechanical  
25 ears in connection with it. They had, in other words,

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 the defense stations manned both against air and against  
3 landing expeditions.

4 Mr. Keefe: At that time did it impress you that in  
5 1940, there must have been some situation developed that  
6 indicated the possibility of an attack on Oahu?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I thought it was an  
8 excellent maneuver. I thought it was a practice maneuver,  
9 and well done.

10 Mr. Keefe: What was that a swer?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: I thought it was a practice maneuver.  
12 I thought it was an excellent maneuver, and well done.

13 Mr. Keefe: So that as far as the Navy was concerned  
14 and speaking for yourself as an individual officer in the  
15 Navy, you just thought that it was an excellent practice  
16 maneuver.

17 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: You didn't know that it was a real alert?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

20 Mr. Keefe: Now, Mr. Chairman, may I say to counsel,  
21 you will recall that I asked General Marshall when he was  
22 on the stand for a statement of the reasons for that alert  
23 of June 17, 1940, and upon a number of occasions he refer-  
24 red to the fact that it would be taken up with General  
25 Strong, who was Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Plans

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 Division at that time, and that General Strong was pre-  
3 paring a statement of the reasons for the 1940 alert, and  
4 on the 18th of December, just yesterday, I was furnished  
5 with this statement from General Strong, and I believe,  
6 Mr. Counsel, that it would be a suitable and proper place,  
7 in view of the questions asked of the Admiral, to offer  
8 it in evidence, so that it will be a part of the record.

9 Mr. Gesell: You have the only copy we have, so we  
10 will have to put yours in.

11 Mr. Keefe: I shall turn it over to you.

12 And I would like to read this, if I may, Mr. Chairman,  
13 into the record, without all the supporting affidavits,  
14 because to me it is rather illuminating.

15 This is dated December 15, 1945: (reading)

16 "MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

17 "SUBJECT: Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on  
18 17 June 1940.

19 "1. In connection with your testimony before the  
20 Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor  
21 Attack, you were asked repeatedly for the reasons which  
22 prompted you to alert the Panama and Hawaiian Departments  
23 on 17 June, 1940. As your Assistant Chief of Staff, War  
24 Plans Division at that time, I was responsible for advising  
25 the action you took, and I feel that it may complete the

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 story (in case it is not self-evident to the committee  
3 from a review of contemporaneous historical events) if I  
4 summarize the situation leading to the alert which I recom-  
5 mended and you approved.

6  
7 "2. You will recall that Axis ascendancy in May and  
8 early June of 1940 gave us cause for gravest concern. The  
9 British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, and on the 17th  
10 Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms. Germany  
11 had a good chance of acquiring the French Fleet intact.  
12 Russia appeared to be cooperating with the Axis; on 12 June  
13 she moved in on Lithuania; on 16 June she demanded a change  
14 of government in Esthonia and Latvia. On 10 June Russia  
15 and Japan signed a treaty fixing the Manchukuo-Outer-  
16 Mongolia border, and the inference was that these two had  
17 composed their differences with a view to negotiating a  
18 neutrality pact. The Japanese Navy would then be free for  
19 any adventure. Japanese land forces were concentrating in  
20 Hainan, Formosa, and Kyushu, apparently for further ag-  
21 gressive action.

22 "3. You may remember a conference held in your office  
23 at 0830 on 17 June 1940, at which I was present, along  
24 with General Andrews and General Moore. We believed at  
25 that time that German control of the French Fleet would  
create a very serious situation in the South Atlantic.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h7

1  
2 Should Great Britain fall, a hostile move toward South  
3 America was far from unlikely. Anticipating a desperate  
4 need for troops in Brazil, and Uruguay, General Andrews  
5 and I recommended at this meeting that the National Guard  
6 be ordered into Federal Service. That was our frame of  
7 mind on 17 June 1940. At the conclusion of the conference,  
8 you directed us to consider the questions which had been  
9 raised.

10 "4. In looking to our own security I apprehended the  
11 most immediate threat to be a raid or major sabotage ef-  
12 fort which would effectively close the Panama Canal. Evi-  
13 dence of sabotage plans existed; certain specific evidence  
14 is mentioned below. In the event of a raid, a diversionary  
15 attack in the Hawaiian area could not be ruled out, since  
16 a large part of our fleet was based on Pearl Harbor. Ac-  
17 cordingly on 17 June, 1940, I recommended placing these  
18 two departments on an alert status. The documents directly  
19 bearing on my decision do not tell the story nearly so well  
20 as does a vivid recollection of Axis capabilities and  
21 American weakness at that time when the collapse of France  
22 was imminent, and the fall of Britain by no means impossible.  
23 However, I cite and summarize below a few significant  
24 papers which reflect those times, and give some indication  
25 of what was in our minds during those late spring days of

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h8

1940."

Then follows, which I won't take the time to read, a series of messages from Ambassador Grew, two in number, as a matter of fact; some information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese crew of the Argentina Maru that the Jap ships were to be sabotaged in the canal if they went through and sunk; some information taken from a drunken German sailor out in Eureka, California; and an unused draft of a letter prepared, giving the Commanding General of the Panama Department, the reasons and the background for the alert.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 The Vice Chairman: Would you yield for a question?

3 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

4 The Vice Chairman: I probably misunderstood you but in  
5 the first part of your reading there I understood you to read  
6 that the fall of "Bataan" was evident. Is that right?

7 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, I caught that too.

8 Mr. Keefe: The fall of Bataan? No. Petain.

9 The Vice Chairman: General Petain.

10 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Maybe I mispronounced it.

11 The Vice Chairman: I understood you to read that as  
12 "the fall of Bataan was evident".

13 Mr. Keefe: No. "The British had evacuated Dunkirk by  
14 4 June, and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for  
15 surrender terms."

16 The Vice Chairman: I thought if Bataan was about to fall  
17 then that is something we want to learn about.

18 (The balance of the memorandum above read is as follows:)

19 "a. State Department 793,94119/640, dated 25 May, 1940.  
20 Mr. Grew discusses 'a flurry of official activity' in Tokyo.  
21 Although he sees no reason to attack on the Netherlands East  
22 Indies he acknowledges that preparations for such an attack  
23 'would presumably be guarded with utmost secrecy'. (This, to  
24 our minds, did not exclude, but rather drew our attention  
25 to, the possibilities of attack or raids elsewhere.)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

"b. State Department 711. 94/1518, dated 3 June 1940. In surveying the Japanese situation Mr. Grew states in diplomatic terms that 'a complacent view of the future would no longer be warranted.' He cites the opinion of Japanese militarists that their fleet had nothing to fear from the use of force and expresses his own belief that Japan 'may be tempted to resort to desperate courses'.

"c. State Department 811 F. 812 PROTECTION/165, dated 10 June 1940. The Navy furnishes information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese crew of ARGENTINA MARU that all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in the Panama Canal when the United States 'declares mobilization'.

"d. War Department WPD 3730-18, undated. Information from a Navy source describes how a German sailor, under influence of liquor, revealed to an American petty officer on 1 May 1940 at Eureka, California, some specific and detailed plans to blow up the Panama Canal if our entry into the war 'became imminent'.

"e. War Department WPD 4326, undated. In an unused draft of a letter prepared for your signature at your request, the Commanding General, Panama Department, was informed that 'the background of the instructions (for the alert of 17 June) has doubtless been made clear from matters that have appeared in the public press', and that 'the increasing

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 tension and uncertainty in the world situation, as affecting  
3 Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a continuous  
4 and vigilant alert basis for some time to come.' (This letter  
5 remained unsent on my recommendation, largely because I  
6 considered the reasons for the alert to be obvious, as indeed  
7 they were.)

8 "5. I can think of no more conclusive way to summarize  
9 the situation as of 17 June 1940 than to point out that the  
10 factors which guided my decision in recommending alerting  
11 these overseas bases were essentially those which made it  
12 necessary for the President of the United States to issue  
13 his Confirmation of 27 June 1940 (F.R.Doc. 40-2639), which  
14 extended the scope of the national emergency proclaimed  
15 8 September 1939 and gave additional and exceptional authority  
16 in regard to safeguarding the Panama Canal."

17 (Signed) George V. Strong.

18 Major General, U.S.A. (Retired).

(4)  
follows

19 Mr. Keefe: I have called your attention to this  
20 communication, Admiral Wilkinson, because it summarizes what  
21 was in the minds of the Army and General Strong, who was  
22 Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Plans Division at that  
23 time.

24 Based upon those facts, which involved world conditions,  
25 they thought that the possibility of an air attack upon Hawaii

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 was so probable that they ordered an all-out alert on the  
3 17th of June 1940.

4 Now, I ask you again, as Chief of Naval Intelligence,  
5 with all of the subsequent information which was obtained by  
6 you as Chief of Naval Intelligence, you, down to the 7th of  
7 December 1940, did not believe that an attack --

8 The Vice Chairman: 1941.

9 Mr. Keefe: 1941. You did not believe that an attack on  
10 the Hawaiian area was probable?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: I believed it was possible. I did  
12 not believe it was probable. I don't think that one awaits  
13 for an attack to be probable before an alert is ordered. An  
14 alert is ordered on a possibility of an attack.

15 You note that General Strong said that a diversionary  
16 attack on Pearl Harbor could not be ruled out. That is a  
17 very slight phraseology but even on such a slight possibility  
18 he ordered an alert.

19 Now, similarly, on November 27 both the Army and the Navy  
20 ordered an alert at Pearl Harbor, again on the possibility  
21 of an attack. I contended I was quite convinced there was  
22 a possibility of an attack, yes, sir, but I did not believe  
23 that there was a probability. I certainly agreed in the  
24 desirability of an alert. I agreed in the desirability of  
25 full defensive measures. But I did not believe from my own

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 conclusions that there would be -- that there was a probability  
3 of an attack.

4 Mr. Keefe: I call your attention to the fact, in view  
5 that you have quoted part of this communication, to the fact  
6 that --

7 Admiral Wilkinson: As I understood it.

8 Mr. Keefe: What Strong released was:

9 "In the event of a raid, a diversionary attack in the  
10 Hawaiian area could not be ruled out, since a large part of  
11 our Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor."

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: Now, I call your attention to the fact that  
14 as I recall General Marshall's testimony, and that of other  
15 witnesses that have testified here, it was their opinion that  
16 Japan would not go on with its movement to the south and  
17 leave its flank exposed by the presence of our Fleet at Pearl  
18 Harbor.

19 Did you believe that in the summer and fall of 1941?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: I did not believe that they would  
21 attack Pearl Harbor up to the moment they did. I believed  
22 that their preoccupation in South China would engage them  
23 in a military way and I believed that their political progress  
24 would be headed toward, be directed toward making the greatest  
25 advance, consolidating their positions to the greatest degree,

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 before they were involved in a war with England and America.

3 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I say that I have asked  
4 for the log of the ENTERPRISE and I have not had a chance to  
5 see it as yet, but I might want to ask Admiral Wilkinson  
6 a couple of questions in reference to that, and also a couple  
7 of questions with reference to the LEXINGTON, and I understand  
8 it will be here at 2:00 o'clock.

9 Mr. Gesell: That is correct.

10 May I ask, Congressman Keefe, if it was your intention  
11 that all of the papers relating to this alert from which you  
12 read be spread upon the record?

13 Mr. Keefe: No, just the letter itself from General  
14 Strong to General Marshall.

15 The Vice Chairman: What you read into the record?

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, the whole letter.

17 Mr. Gesell: There is part of the letter you didn't  
18 read so we will spread it all on the record.

19 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

20 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the rest of  
21 the documents be made an exhibit.

22 Mr. Gesell: This document can be designated Exhibit 87.

23 Mr. Keefe: May I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania  
24 that the documents attached are referred to in the letter and  
25 that is the reason I didn't suggest putting them in.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Senator Brewster: Would that be too extensive to put in the record?

Mr. Keefe: I don't think it is necessary to spread them on the record because they have been condensed in General Strong's report and he simply attaches the photostat copies of the originals.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 87.)

The Chairman: The Chair wishes to advise the members of the committee that immediately upon the recessing of the committee at 4:00 o'clock the Chair wishes to have an Executive Session here for the consideration of two or three matters that the committee should consider.

Mr. Keefe: Where will that be, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Right here. We will remain here after the recess after the rest of the people leave.

We will recess now until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

Mr. Keefe from Wisconsin will resume his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON

(Resumed)

Mr. Keefe: I have just one or two questions, Admiral.

Am I correct in my understanding that prior to your assumption of your responsibilities as Chief of Naval Intelligence on the 15th of October, 1941, you had had no previous experience or tour of duty in that particular field?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir; only attendance at two sessions of the conferences on the limitation of armaments.

Mr. Keefe: You had no previous experience in the field of intelligence, had you, prior to that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not specifically under the Office of Naval Intelligence. As Chief of Staff, and again as Fleet Gunnery Officer in a preceding tour of duty at sea I had been concerned with the intelligence at sea, but I had not been under the Office of Naval Intelligence or in it before.

Mr. Keefe: You had been essentially a line officer at sea?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Most of your experience has been in that connection?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe  
Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. Such shore duties as I  
3 had done were not connected with Intelligence.

4 Mr. Keefe: When did you leave your duties as Chief of  
5 Naval Intelligence?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: The 20th of July, 1942.

7 Mr. Keefe: So you had an experience in that office  
8 which lasted from the 15th of October 1941 to the 15th of  
9 July, did you say?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: 20th of July.

11 Mr. Keefe: 20th of July, 1942.

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir; a little over nine months.

13 Mr. Keefe: And you went back to sea?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Went back to sea immediately, and  
15 I have just returned therefrom.

16 Mr. Keefe: That is all.

17 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

18 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will  
19 inquire.

20 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, when you did begin as head of  
21 Naval Intelligence, was there any change in the staff or the  
22 subordinates who were under you?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: No general change, sir. There are  
24 always recurring changes as one officer after another is  
25 relieved, but I brought no one in with me and no one left.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: Substantially the same organization as it  
3 existed under your predecessors remained under you, except  
4 there was a new Chief, isn't that right?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Exactly.

6 Mr. Murphy: When you did go there you brought to that  
7 office a good many years' experience in the Navy -- 36, wasn't  
8 it?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: 36, yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: 36 years. Now I would like to direct  
11 your attention, Admiral, to page 430 of the Narrative Statement  
12 of Evidence at the Pearl Harbor Investigation, Volume 2, and  
13 I note there the following -- do you have a copy of it  
14 available for the Admiral?

15 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

16 Mr. Murphy: As a preliminary to that, Admiral Wilkinson,  
17 will you state for the record the full name of Admiral Newton?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Admiral John Henry Newton.

19 Mr. Murphy: I notice there the following:

(2)  
20 "Admiral Newton, as stated infra page 578, left Pearl  
21 Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a powerful task force including  
22 the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON, two cruisers, U.S.S. CHICAGO  
23 and U.S.S. PORTLAND, and five destroyers, on a mission to  
24 Midway Island where he was to fly off a squadron of airplanes.  
25 Even up to and at the time of his sailing and thereafter he

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 remained in ignorance of the existence of the war warning  
3 message of 27 November 1941, as well as the similar warning  
4 messages of 24 November and 16 October, 1941."

5 That states that it was taken from the Hart Inquiry at  
6 pages 316 and 318.

7 Do you, Admiral, know of any reason in the world why  
8 Admiral Kimmel would not have told Admiral Newton, who was  
9 going in the direction of Japan, after he had received a war  
10 warning, of the fact that such messages had been sent to him?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: I know of no reason, sir, but of  
12 course I am not a judge.

13 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, if you were Admiral  
14 Newton and you were going in the direction of Japan, you would  
15 certainly have liked to have had that kind of information,  
16 would you not?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: Now one other question, Admiral.

19 In Exhibit 8-A, which was introduced in evidence yesterday,  
20 and which, for identification, is headed "General Headquarters  
21 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers", and dated 4 December  
22 1945 -- will you make that available to the witness, please?

23 Mr. Gesell: He has it.

24 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to the page  
25 numbered 2, which is actually the third page in the exhibit,

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 under the heading "A", and preliminarily, as I understand it,  
3 this was a statement as explained on page 1:

4 "Since the staff officer connected with the document  
5 reporting the above facts has died and the various records  
6 have been burned, the foregoing is the conjecture of Commander  
7 Tachibana, Tomo who worked in the same department at that time."

8 Now on page 2 --

9 Admiral Wilkinson: And who I imagine, Mr. Congressman,  
10 is the same gentleman we arrested on the West Coast a few  
11 months before. I am not sure, but I think so.

12 Mr. Murphy: You think he was the same?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: I think he was the same. He was  
14 in intelligence work, and of the same name.

15 Mr. Murphy: Someone of the same name was arrested on  
16 the West Coast of the United States some months prior to  
17 Pearl Harbor?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, for espionage on the West  
19 Coast. I just know it was Commander Tachibana, Tomo.

(3) 20 Mr. Murphy: I noticed the following:

21 "American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December  
22 1941) (American time).

23 "The United States broadcasts of the number of battleships,  
24 cruisers, destroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in  
25 Pearl Harbor was overheard."

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2           Admiral, so far as any messages that were sent from  
3 the United States by the Navy are concerned, they would  
4 certainly be in code, would they not, if they were sent to  
5 Pearl Harbor?

6           Admiral Wilkinson: Unquestionably, sir. I see no reason  
7 why they would report on the number of battleships, cruisers,  
8 and so forth, entering Pearl Harbor. Any message back from  
9 Pearl Harbor would certainly be in code.

10           Mr. Murphy: So far as naval messages are concerned in  
11 and out of Pearl Harbor, they would be in code, would they  
12 not?

13           Admiral Wilkinson: On a subject such as this I should  
14 be almost certain of it.

15           Mr. Murphy: Do you have any idea as to what, if any,  
16 kind of broadcasts might be referred to there, Admiral  
17 Wilkinson?

18           Admiral Wilkinson: Possibly some local news broadcast  
19 speaking of a unit of the Fleet coming in for the benefit  
20 of the local Hawaiian population. I know there was no censor-  
21 ship going on there. I think they had been requested not to  
22 comment on the ships, but there was no formal censorship.  
23 Possibly some amateur radio people talking together.

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1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: But so far as you know, Admiral, was  
3 there any official broadcast by the American Government,  
4 by the United States Army, or by the United States Navy  
5 that would contain that kind of information at that parti-  
6 cular time?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I suggest that we make  
8 an inquiry, and if the committee so pleases, I will initiate  
9 it, of our district intelligence officer out there to see  
10 if he knows anything about it.

11 Mr. Murphy: I would appreciate it if you would take  
12 the necessary steps to put such action into motion.

13 The Chairman: Mr. Clark.

14 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I have been provided with the  
15 original log of the Enterprise, and I not having had a chance  
16 to see it before, I may have a question of Admiral Wilkinson.

17 The Chairman: All right. In the meantime Congressman  
18 Clark --

19 Mr. Keefe: I have no questions otherwise until I get  
20 a chance to go through this.

21 The Chairman: All right. Mr. Clark.

22 Mr. Clark: Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday Senator Lucas,  
23 I think, inquired of you as to when you graduated from the  
24 Naval Academy. I should like to ask you when you went on  
25 active sea duty in this last war?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
h2 2 Admiral Wilkinson: I think the 15 of August of 1942.

3 Mr. Clark: 1942?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Clark: Would you state, please, for the record,  
6 briefly, your services from then until the close of the war,  
7 and also state whether you received any recognition of any  
8 kind in connection with your services?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: From the 15th of August until  
10 early January of the following year, 1943, I was commander  
11 of Battleship Division 2, comprising three battleships,  
12 and operating in Hawaiian waters, and in the West Coast  
13 waters of the United States.

14 In early January I was detached and directed to proceed  
15 by air, which, of course, I did, to Noumea to report to  
16 Admiral Halsey as his Deputy Commander. I arrived there  
17 in late January and remained as his Deputy Commander until  
18 the end of June, when I reported as understudy to Admiral  
19 Turner, in command of the Amphibious Forces of the South  
20 Pacific.

21 I joined him in time to participate in the attack on  
22 New Georgia and relieved him in the later stages of that  
23 campaign on the 15th of July, 1943.

24 From then until the 15th of November of this year,  
25 1945, I was in command of the South Pacific Amphibious

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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1  
2 Force which subsequently was entitled the Third Amphibious  
3 Force, and remained in command of the Third Amphibious  
4 Force when it shifted its operations from the South Pacific  
5 into the Western Pacific as a whole.

6  
7 During this time I was engaged in the South Pacific  
8 campaign with the amphibious operations in connection with  
9 the later stages of the New Georgia campaign, with the seizure  
10 of Vella Lavella, the capture of the Treasury Islands, and  
11 the landing and capture of a portion of Bougainville in  
12 November of 1943.

13 Then in 1944, with the seizure of Green Island and  
14 the capture and occupation of Emirau Island, in, respectively  
15 February and March.

16 In June the South Pacific campaign was over and I was  
17 transferred to the Pacific as a whole and operated with  
18 Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet in the capture of the two  
19 islands in the Palau Islands, Peleliu and Angaur, in  
20 September, 1944, and in the capture and occupation of the  
21 Ulithi atoll.

22 Immediately after that I was transferred to the 7th  
23 Fleet under Admiral Kincaid for duty with his fleet and  
24 General MacArthur's single command as a whole in the Philip-  
25 pine campaign.

I was in command of one of the two amphibious forces

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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2 which landed at Leyte on the 20th of October, and was  
3 present there, although not actively commanding any combat  
4 forces, during the sea battles for Leyte of October 20th.

5 Again I was in command of one of the two amphibious  
6 forces which landed at Luzon in Lingayen Gulf on January  
7 9, and initiated the campaign that resulted in the capture  
8 of the entire Philippines.

9 After leaving there, I was -- I wasn't relieved of  
10 duty, but most of my ships were then assigned to the 5th  
11 Amphibious Force under the command of Admiral Turner, who  
12 then proceeded with his force to the capture of Iwo and  
13 Okinawa. I was not concerned in either of those operations  
14 except for a visit I made to Okinawa, but was engaged in  
15 the planning for subsequent operations under Admiral Halsey.

16 During the development of the Okinawa campaign, these  
17 particular operations which we were planning for were  
18 abandoned, and I then fell in with the general plan and  
19 began to work up the invasion of Japan with Admiral Turner  
20 in command of all the amphibious forces consisting of my  
21 own, Vice Admiral Hill's, and Vice Admiral Barbey.

22 Upon the surrender of Japan my duties in the invasion were,  
23 of course, automatically cancelled, and I became an amphibious  
24 commander to bring in the 8th Army under General Eichelberger  
25 into Japan from Tokyo, including Tokyo Bay and a short area to  
the south of it, throughout northern Honshu, and Hokkaido and  
all of northern Japan, from that line I have spoken of to the  
southward of Tokyo.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by:Mr. Clark

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2 I brought in the first of the major installments of  
3 troops on surrender day, the 2nd of November, some 25,000  
4 troops of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 112th Cavalry  
5 Regimental Combat Team, and I supervised the arrival of  
6 other Divisions in northern Honshu and in Hokkaido, and re-  
7 mained there in Yokohama in general command of reinforcement  
8 and supply operations for the 8th Army until I left there  
9 on the 8th of November.

10 That, I think, sir, is the narrative.

11 As to any awards, I have been honored by the Distinguished  
12 Service Medal of the Navy for the capture of Bougainville, by  
13 a second Distinguished Service Medal for the Palau campaign,  
14 and by a third for the Philippines campaign.

15 Mr. Clark: Admiral, this committee, as you understand,  
16 is sitting on this inquiry, the ultimate purpose of which is  
17 the finding of the facts in regard to the Pearl Harbor incident.  
18 Do you know of any other fact or circumstance relating to  
19 that or bearing upon it that you have not related that might  
20 be helpful to this committee in that connection?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

22 Mr. Clark: That is all.

23 The Chairman: Are there any further questions?

24 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

25 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman --