

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

hll

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Mr. Keefe: I heard that before.

Colonel Clausen: You heard it because I said it.

I think it is a good analogy. It is exactly what I did.

I was like an FBI agent working for Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Keefe: The Army Board had made a finding against General Marshall based upon Colonel Bratton's testimony, that these 13 parts were delivered that night, the 6th of December.

Now, as the result of your investigation, what did you recommend to the Secretary of War as to what the facts were? Could you determine from your investigation what the facts were, as to whether the 14 parts were or were not delivered?

Colonel Clausen: You will find, Mr. Keefe, in the volume there of my report, that there are two additional critiques by General Cramer.

You will also find that there is in that volume the final report of the Secretary of War, and those men decided the facts.

Mr. Keefe: Well, did you discuss this particular incident with them when you came back, after you got the affidavits?

Colonel Clausen: Oh, yes, I discussed it periodically, Mr. Keefe, with Mr. Bundy and with General Cramer. I discussed the results of my investigations, what the affidavits showed,

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

hl2

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

and I showed them the affidavits.

You see, I was working for the Secretary of War.

Mr. Keefe: Oh, I understand that.

Colonel Clausen: Well, you asked the question, did I discuss it, and I said I showed the affidavits.

Mr. Keefe: Did you state to the Secretary, or to General Cramer, the conclusions that you, as this special investigator desired to draw from the affidavits that you had taken with respect to the delivery of this first 13-part message?

Colonel Clausen: I did not do more than to state the facts, Mr. Keefe, and make those periodic written reports.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

AL  
fls

Shack (12) am  
follows  
Hook  
AL-1

12,011

1 Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: What facts did you state with reference  
3 to this particular matter?

4 Colonel Clausen: The fact that the men had given the  
5 affidavits, and I gave them the affidavits to read.

6 Mr. Keefe: In other words, you said, "I have taken  
7 an affidavit from Dusenbury and in the affidavit it says  
8 so and so", "I have taken an affidavit from Bratton. Here  
9 is Bratton's affidavit. It says so and so. Now you fellows  
10 make up your mind as to what the fact is."

11 Is that the way I understand the situation?

12 Colonel Clausen: No, that is not the way it operated  
13 at all. I say from time to time the progress of my investi-  
14 gation was given to these men in the form of affidavits,  
15 and the periodic reports, and then from the picture as a  
16 whole you would find that the facts sometimes, of course,  
17 would be in conflict. Well, now, if I said one thing or  
18 another thing I cannot recall at this time, but the affidavits  
19 were the best proof of what the witnesses themselves said.

20 Mr. Keefe: You said this volume was indexed. Can  
21 you put your hands on the affidavit of Colonel Bratton?

22 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe. I find some difficulty in looking for it.  
24 I have to paw all through it to find it.

25 Colonel Clausen: There is an index. Colonel Rufus S.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 Bratton is No. 42, so you just go to 42.

2 Mr. Keefe: That is all.

3 The Vice Chairman: Any further questions?

4 (No response)

5 The Vice Chairman: Like other witnesses who appeared,  
6 Colonel, I will ask you, do you know of any other information  
7 that you think would be helpful to this investigation, that  
8 has not been called for by questions asked you?

9 Colonel Clausen: I do not know of any other information,  
10 sir, except I would like to say that I did not know the  
11 Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War, and I met them  
12 only in the course of the Board's work here. I think I  
13 have already mentioned the fact that certainly I acted  
14 with the utmost fairness, in my own mind, to get accurate,  
15 impartial testimony. Since the questions have arisen, I  
16 thought, in fairness to myself, and especially in line  
17 with what Senator Lucas asked me this morning, it is only  
18 fair to myself to make a part of the record of these  
19 proceedings a letter that I received from General Grunert commend-  
20 ing me for my work on the Board, and the fact that I was  
21 a free agent, which is certainly indicated by the letters  
22 of commendation I have had from the then Chairman of the  
23 Truman Committee, the then counsel for the Truman Committee.  
24 I think it is only fair to myself to make these part  
25

Witness Clausen

of the record at this time.

The Vice Chairman: Without objection, they will be received.

(The letters referred to are as follows:)

(COMMITTEE INSERT)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

The Vice Chairman: Are there any further questions?

Senator Brewster: I would like to ask a question.

The Vice Chairman: I asked twice if there were any other questions.

Senator Brewster: There was some commotion going on to my left about matters that I will not mention that made it impossible for me to ask for the opportunity to ask any further questions.

I have not been here through all the testimony, but I have been here this morning. You yourself recognize after the completion of your inquiries, that the situation was not an entirely satisfactory one, from the standpoint of reconciling the various affidavits?

Colonel Clausen: You want my opinion? If you want my opinion I certainly believe, Mr. Brewster, that it was sufficient for the decision of the Secretary of War.

Senator Brewster: I was not asking you that. You indicated to Mr. Keefe that you thought it would be a good idea to get these witnesses all together in a room, to see if they could not straighten these stories out, from which I take it you yourself was not satisfied with what you were able to do.

Colonel Clausen: I was satisfied, so far as I was personally concerned, that my work was sufficient for the

(13)

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1 Secretary. The essential discrepancies were all mentioned.  
2 If you will read, Mr. Brewster, the critiques prepared by  
3 the Judge Advocate General I think you will find that those  
4 discrepancies are mentioned in there.

5 Senator Brewster: As I understand, you were going out  
6 to conduct the inquiry, and, as you know, after all of  
7 the investigations and reports it was the considered opinion  
8 of the Congress, without dissent, a unanimous opinion of  
9 Congress that the matter did require a very much further  
10 exploration, in which we have been engaged ourselves for  
11 some three months here.

12 Colonel Clausen: I always felt, Mr. Brewster, that  
13 the Congress could do a far better job than anybody else.

14 Senator Brewster: You felt it certainly was not a  
15 waste of time to try to get all the information available  
16 on this matter?

17 Colonel Clausen: You mean this proceeding?

18 Senator Brewster: Yes.

19 Colonel Clausen: I think it is a very, very fine thing.  
20 I also think that the basic recommendation that can come  
21 from this committee is a very fine one if you make it that  
22 never again shall magic, this information, be monopolized  
23 by one service or the other service, but have it distributed  
24 by one agency on an over-all basis.  
25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1           Senator Brewster: The Army Pearl Harbor Board had  
2 criticised General Marshall and some other high officials  
3 rather vigorously, had they not?

4           Colonel Clausen: Yes. The Board's proceedings show  
5 what they said.

6           Senator Brewster: Yes.

7           Colonel Clausen: The actual reading of it would be  
8 a matter of opinion.

9           Senator Brewster: The net result of your unilateral  
10 investigation was to considerably modify the conclusions  
11 of the Secretary of War, as far as the Army Pearl Harbor  
12 Board was concerned? Is that a fair statement?

13           Colonel Clausen: I do not think so. In the first  
14 place, I do not think my investigation was unilateral. It  
15 was more supplementary. In the second place --

16           Senator Brewster: Just a moment.

17           Colonel Clausen: -- the Judge Advocate General --

18           Senator Brewster: Just a moment.

19           The Vice Chairman: Let the witness answer, Senator.  
20 He has a right to answer.

21           Senator Brewster: It is a divided question. He said  
22 it was not unilateral. I would like to know why he does  
23 not consider it unilateral.

24           Colonel Clausen: As I was starting to finish my answer,  
25



Witness Clausen Questions by: Senator Brewster

1 I think you will find, Mr. Brewster, that the net result,  
2 as stated by the Secretary in his opinion, was that he did  
3 not change his opinion. So mine was more supplementary.  
4

5 Senator Brewster: You are through answering?

6 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Brewster: Why would you not call your inquiry  
8 a unilateral inquiry? Nobody accompanied you, did they?

9 Colonel Clausen: If you mean I was the sole man, no.

10 Senator Brewster: Yes.

11 Colonel Clausen: That is the point I make, Mr. Brewster.  
12 You are making a mistake if you think it was only mine,  
13 because I was assisting the Secretary of War.

14 Senator Brewster: You were representing the Secretary,  
15 and you took what documents and what notes you thought were  
16 useful, and you went to these various men and showed them  
17 to them and then you got an affidavit. Certainly an attorney  
18 would not consider that an inquiry in which anyone else  
19 who might have been blamed was in any way concerned. There  
20 was no representative of General Short present.

21 Can you answer that question?

22 Colonel Clausen: You mean along with me or at the  
23 Board proceedings?

24 Senator Brewster: With you.

25 Colonel Clausen: I did not have any representative of

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 General Short, but let me answer further, I at no time,  
3 Mr. Brewster, was asked by General Short, or his counsel,  
4 who was my superior, Brigadier General Thomas Greene, to  
5 accompany me.

6 Senator Brewster: Were they fully advised of the  
7 circumstances?

8 Colonel Clausen: I do not know.

9 Senator Brewster: You do not know about that?

10 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

11 Senator Brewster: Now you have this morning repeatedly  
12 placed great stress on the fact that the primary purpose  
13 of your inquiry was because the Army Pearl Harbor Board  
14 did not have the material in magic. You said that several  
15 times, is that correct?

16 Colonel Clausen: Yes, that is correct.

17 Senator Brewster: The implication being that that  
18 particularly required further exploration.

19 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Brewster: I find a little difficulty reconciling  
21 that with this affidavit taken by you from General George  
22 C. Marshall, in which he says:

23 "On my second appearance before the Army Pearl Harbor  
24 Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board at  
25 length the general problem concerning the method of including

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

'magic' in the report of the Board and also the availability to the Board of any officers concerned for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret 'Magic' phases of the investigation. I informed the Board, for example, as indicated on pages 18 and 37, of the top secret transcript mentioned, that Colonel Bratton was available in Washington for that purpose."

How do you reconcile that with your repeated statement that the Army Pearl Harbor Board did not have information or did not have the means of information available, so far as they thought it advisable and desirable, regarding magic?

Colonel Clausen: You are making a mistake. You are assuming that this refers to the Pearl Harbor Board proceedings except in the last week.

Senator Brewster: I do not care when it was.

Colonel Clausen: Well, it was in the last week.

Senator Brewster: Well, that is all right, it was the last week, but the Army Pearl Harbor Board had either the information or the full means of information offered them by General Marshall that they considered material for the purpose.

Colonel Clausen: You were not here when I testified before, but that same point was brought up. These are the facts on that: At about the last week of the Board's

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

proceedings General Marshall testified, as he indicated there, and I recall very distinctly he said what he refers to there about Colonel Bratton. That is how we got him. The top secret report shows all that.

But the Board had a 90-day limit, Mr. Brewster, and this limit might even have expired by then, or been very close to the edge, so the 90 days was the limitation in the order of appointment.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Brewster

Shack(15)

hl  
fls  
AL

1 Senator Brewster: I think, from what I heard here this  
2 morning, you were hanging your most extraordinary procedure  
3 upon a very slender peg.

4 Colonel Clausen: I do not agree with you at all.

5 In the first place, it is not an extraordinary pro-  
6 cedure, and it is not hanging on a very slender peg. You  
7 are wrong.

8 Senator Brewster: That is all.

9 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one  
10 statement.

11 The Vice Chairman: Are you through, Senator Brewster?

12 Senator Brewster: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Maine has  
14 just said the witness is hanging his conclusions on an extra-  
15 ordinary peg, as I understand it.

16 Senator Brewster: His procedure, I said, his most extra-  
17 ordinary procedure upon a very slender peg.

18 Mr. Murphy: Speaking about a slender peg, I see where  
19 the Senator from Maine, in an interview in Chicago, said --  
20 and I am reading from the Chicago Tribune of Saturday,  
21 February 9 --

22 "Senator Brewster said yesterday that much of the  
23 responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster must rest upon  
24 the late President Roosevelt, and figures in his administra-  
25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Brewster

h2

1 tion who sought strenuously to fasten the blame exclusive-  
2 ly on Admiral Kimmel and General Short."

3 I would say that is based upon an extremely slender  
4 peg, because there is not one word of evidence in this  
5 record to justify it.

6 Senator Brewster: Since the interview has been  
7 brought into the matter, I should just like to have it cor-  
8 rected to this extent:

9 What I actually said was that very much more of the  
10 responsibility for Pearl Harbor rested upon the people in  
11 Washington in the upper echelon, than had certainly been  
12 indicated in any of the four preceding years. I did not  
13 name individuals, but I think that statement I made is a  
14 very fair one.

15 If the paper to interpret it as President Roosevelt,  
16 that will all have to be considered when the time comes  
17 for an opinion.

18 Mr. Gearhart: At least the Senator from Maine has not  
19 foreclosed himself.

20 Senator Ferguson: I have another question from the wit-  
21 ness.

22 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

23 Senator Ferguson: Now, Colonel Clausen, this is a  
24 fair conclusion, is it not, that the person responsible for  
25

h3 1 Witness Clausen Questions by: Senator Ferguson  
2 keeping magic from the Board was the Chief of Staff's  
3 office, either the Chief of Staff, General Marshall himself,  
4 of General McNarney, his Deputy Chief?

5 Colonel Clausen: I think that is a fair statement  
6 Senator.

7 Senator Ferguson: That is a fair statement?

8 Colonel Clausen: Yes, for the reasons given by the  
9 witnesses.

10 Senator Ferguson: But here was an order from the Congress  
11 to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary had appointed  
12 a Board to look into this matter fully.

13 Then his Chief of Staff was responsible for blocking  
14 the testimony going to that board, which would have given  
15 the board fuller information. That is a fair statement, is  
16 it not?

17 Colonel Clausen: I do not like the use of the word  
18 blocking, Senator.

19 Senator Ferguson: Well, they could not do it without  
20 the magic, and they were not allowed to get the magic  
21 because the Chief of Staff's office would not give it to  
22 them?

23 Colonel Clausen: Under the policy set up at the time,  
24 there is no doubt that the Board did not get the magic until  
25 the last week.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Senator Ferguson: And that required the Secretary of War to take the recorder, the Assistant Recorder on that Board and send him out personally and alone, without any representative of General Short, Admiral Kimmel, or anyone else, to take ex parte affidavits? Isn't that a fair statement?

Colonel Clausen: No, sir, it did not require him to do that. The Secretary could have done his investigation in any manner he chose. If he wanted to, he could have called another board; he could have had myself; he could have gotten an assistant of another kind, or he could have conducted it himself in some manner.

Senator Ferguson: But he actually did do that. He sent you out to get ex parte affidavits?

Colonel Clausen: Senator, he sent me out to do what I said I had done.

Senator Ferguson: Now, will you tell us whether your affidavits disclosed when the 13 parts were delivered to the Secretary of State, it being the duty of the Army to deliver to the Secretary of State?

Colonel Clausen: The night of 6 December, Colonel Bratton says in his affidavit, he took the 13 parts to the Secretary of State, and I believe the reason he made that statement was that it was, in his opinion, a primary



Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h5

1 diplomatic or State Department matter, and for that reason  
2 his main interest that night with respect to the 13 parts  
3 was to bring them to the attention of the Secretary of State.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, how do you reconcile that with  
5 the evidence that you have brought in here in the affidavit,  
6 that Bratton went home before the 13 parts were drawn up?  
7 How did Bratton get the 13 parts to take them to the Secre-  
8 tary of State?

9 Colonel Clausen: He must have had the 13 parts to  
10 bring to the Secretary of State, Senator. So that the recol-  
11 lection of Colonel Dusenbury in that regard, if it indicates  
12 the contrary, is probably mistaken.

13 In any event, it is one of the things I ran up against,  
14 just what you are mentioning.

15 Senator Ferguson: What time did Dusenbury say in his  
16 affidavit that Bratton went home?

17 Colonel Clausen: I think Mr. Keefe read that and said  
18 about 9 o'clock.

19 Senator Ferguson: About nine o'clock. Did not he say  
20 he went home before the 13 parts were completed?

21 Colonel Clausen: I think he said when about one-half  
22 had come in.

23 Senator Ferguson: Does not he say "Thereupon he left  
24 for home," or "went home about 9 p.m. I stayed so he could  
25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1 go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder."

2 Did not he also say the 14th part of the message was  
3 received at 12 o'clock that night? However, I am now talking  
4 about the 13 parts.

5 How do you account for the fact that Bratton said he  
6 took the 13 parts? I will read it again:

7 "Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the  
8 message coming in and he remained until about half of it  
9 had been received."

10 That is certainly not 13 parts out of the 14 parts.

11 Colonel Clausen: I say, Senator, that is one of the  
12 things, one of the conflixtions in the case.

13 Now, by that information, and by all the other information  
14 maybe you people can resolve this.

15 Senator Ferguson: You did not find any facts that made  
16 it impossible for this man to take it over to the Secretary  
17 of State, the 13 parts by 9 o'clock, and did not also take  
18 it to Bedell Smith or someone in his office?

19 Colonel Clausen: Senator, he said he did not do it.  
20 I mean Colonel Bratton is the one who said he took it to  
21 the Secretary of State. Then he also said that he did not  
22 take it to Colonel Bedell Smith, that he did not take it to  
23 Colonel Gailey, that he did not take it to these other  
24 people.  
25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Senator Ferguson: I am talking about his testimony before the Board. He swore absolutely that he took it to Bedell Smith.

Colonel Clausen: Senator, he corrected himself.

Senator Ferguson: Did you try to find out who was in charge of the Chief of Staff's office on the night of the 6th?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, I did.

Senator Ferguson: Who was in charge of it.

Colonel Clausen: I tried to find out. I remember that I asked Lieutenant General Bedell Smith, and he gave me the name. That is what you run up against. He said he was pretty sure it was General Deane, whereas General Deane was in Moscow.

Senator Ferguson: He never said --

Colonel Clausen: Senator, if you will let me conclude. When I was in Berlin, I found out that General Deane was over at the Peace Conference, so I went over there, and got an affidavit from him.

Senator Ferguson: Did he say he was in charge?

Colonel Clausen: His affidavit is not in accordance with the thought that was in the mind of General Smith, and that is the situation you run up against. In other words these men were trying to recollect, and you could not get, on

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h8

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

these points, on some of these points, you could not get a reconciled answer from all the witnesses.

Senator Ferguson: Then you never did find out, you never followed it up to find out who was in charge of that office that night, and go and see that person to find out as to whether or not he got the 13 parts that night, did you?

Colonel Clausen: I did run the information down, I did follow it up.

Senator Ferguson: Answer that question.

Colonel Clausen: Senator, General Bedell Smith thought he made a memorandum which he thought was very helpful, and I could not find that. He said he thought it was in the office of the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson: I am trying to make this question specific, so we will get a short answer.

Did you find out who was in charge of the Chief of Staff's office that night?

Colonel Clausen: I cannot recall, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Don't you think that is a very important question? Would not you remember that, if you did find out who was in charge?

Colonel Clausen: Senator, I cannot recall, I am sorry.

Senator Ferguson: Did you take an affidavit from any

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h9

1

person who was in charge of that office, who swore that

2

Bratton did not deliver at that office the 13 parts that

3

night?

4

Colonel Clausen: I think General Deane. This is a  
pure recollection.

5

6

Senator Ferguson: I don't want any guesses on it.

7

Colonel Clausen: You want me to do some recollecting.

8

General Deane, as I said, recalled that he did not get any  
pouch such as contained the 13 parts.

9

10

Senator Ferguson: General Deane said he was not in  
charge of the office that night?

11

12

Colonel Clausen: Did he?

13

Senator Ferguson: You just told me he did.

14

Colonel Clausen: I say the affidavit is the best proof  
of what General Deane said.

15

16

Senator Ferguson: Then get it. Let us find out what he  
said. I understood you to say from his affidavit he was not  
in charge on that night.

17

18

19

Colonel Clausen: What I told you, Senator, was when I  
talked with General Smith he at that time said he thought  
General Deane would be able to give me some information.

20

21

22

Senator Ferguson: That is not in Smith's affidavit,  
is it?

23

24

Colonel Clausen: In Smith's?

25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h10

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Colonel Clausen: I do not know if it is in there.

Senator Ferguson: He does not mention Deane.

Colonel Clausen: Lots of times, Senator, these people that I talked with would give me leads themselves, as to people that might be able to shed some light on the subject.

Senator Ferguson: Get the affidavit.

Colonel Clausen: I do not have it. Mr. Keefe is looking at it.

Senator Ferguson: When you get the affidavit, will you give us the page number in that exhibit?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. It has got an index. Affidavit No. 41.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I see it is past the hour.

The Vice Chairman: I would like to finish with this witness.

Colonel Clausen: Page 205. It says:

"During the month of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the War Department, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Secretary, General Staff.

"On 6 December, 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p.m., and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch

c18

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

hll<sup>1</sup> for the Chief of Staff."

2 Senator Ferguson: Then he specifically says he was not  
3 on duty that night?

4 Colonel Clausen: That is right.

5 Senator Ferguson: And Bedell Smith says he was not on  
6 duty?

7 Colonel Clausen: General Smith, as I recall, said he  
8 did not think he was there after ten o'clock, that he might  
9 have been up there up to ten o'clock.

10 Senator Ferguson: Who was in charge of the office that  
11 night? Did you ever find out?

12 Colonel Clausen: General Smith was there. He was the  
13 head man. In other words, General Smith was the Secretary  
14 of the General Staff.

15 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you indicated General  
16 Greene, who was then Colonel Greene, was counsel for Short.

17 Colonel Clausen: He was Brigadier General then.

18 Senator Ferguson: He was Brigadier General?

19 Colonel Clausen: Yes.

20 Senator Ferguson: Did he ever discuss with you these  
21 affidavits, as far as Short was concerned?

22 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Or anything in relation to your in-  
24 vestigation?

25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h12

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

Colonel Clausen: Well, he got some papers in once, that he sent over to me.

Senator Ferguson: Do you have any of the memoranda that you had when you saw Colonel Bratton?

Colonel Clausen: In connection with your previous question, we conferred concerning some corrections that General Short wanted to make in his testimony before the Board.

Shel  
fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, but that was before you started out on your tour.

Colonel Clausen: I cannot recall when that was. I think it extended on quite some time because I wanted to put the corrections at the pages in the transcript so that the corrections would be noted.

Senator Ferguson: But you do not claim that he was representing Short and, therefore, working with you in getting all the affidavits?

Colonel Clausen: No, sir, Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Colonel Clausen: Senator Ferguson, we don't do that in the Army.

Senator Ferguson: That answers that. So you don't do that either, do you, in the Army?

Colonel Clausen: I say in the Army you have court-martial proceedings and you might be a defense lawyer and you might be a prosecutor. You are supposed to do your duty. The mere fact that you are assigned to do a certain job does not draw any inference from that that you are going to slant anything.

Senator Ferguson: Have you any of the memorandums that you have spoken about that you took from any of these witnesses outside of what you have delivered here?

1 Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson  
Mr. Keefe

2 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: All right, that is all.

4 Mr. Keefe: Now, there is one question, Mr. Chairman.

5 In reading the Army Pearl Harbor Board testimony, Colonel  
6 Clausen, I was impressed with the fact that right here at the  
7 beginning of General Marshall's testimony there appeared to  
8 be a lapse when the Board went into a sort of executive ses-  
9 sion and General Marshall testified or made a statement for  
10 about an hour, according to the proceedings of the Board, in  
11 which he made a statement off the record.

12 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: Were you present at that time?

14 Colonel Clausen: No, that is the period, Mr. Keefe, I  
15 referred to as off the record proceeding when he conferred on-  
16 ly with the general officers.

17 Mr. Keefe: Now, in his affidavit General Marshall says  
18 this, and that is why I have been wondering if the testimony  
19 that you have given here all along to the effect that this  
20 Board did not have any information about magic until the last  
21 two weeks is correct, - General Marshall in his affidavit  
22 states this:

23 "I did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or  
24 Colonel Sadtler, officers of G-2 and the Signal Corps,  
25 who were some of the officers concerned with 'Magic',

3  
332

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

prior to or after their testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I personally and secretly informed the voting members of the Board of the existence and important part played by 'Magic', it was not until it developed that the 'Magic' papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the Army officers concerned were authorized to go into all the details regarding 'Magic' before the Army Pearl Harbor Board."

Colonel Clausen: That is right.

Mr. Keefe: Now, as a matter of fact, in that off the record talk right at the beginning of his statement General Marshall took an hour out of his testimony according to the report of the Board, they gave the specific time limit when the recess came and when they reconvened and during that period of time he discussed with the voting members of the Board this subject of magic.

Colonel Clausen: Well, I don't think you should assume, Mr. Keefe, that the only thing he talked about during that time was magic. I don't know.

Mr. Keefe: He did not say that but I am reading his affidavit in which he says that he did.

Colonel Clausen: That is what I testified, Mr. Keefe. I testified very clearly on the fact that in the first meeting of the Grunert Board that we were not there but I found

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 out later that he then at that time in general told them about  
3 magic and it was only when the Navy, you see -- while we are  
4 in Hawaii the Navy released this magic to the Navy Court of  
5 Inquiry and when we came back then the Army gave it to us.

6 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, you sort of gave me the impression  
7 that the findings of this Board were made without particular  
8 reference to or knowledge of magic. Now, General Marshall  
9 states this in his affidavit: (Reading)

10 "Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor  
11 Board, I wish to add that, as indicated on page 6 of the  
12 Secret Transcript of Proceedings before the Army Pearl  
13 Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising the voting  
14 members of that Board, namely, Lt. General George Brunert,  
15 Major General Henry D. Russell and Major General Walter  
16 H. Frank, participated in a closed session with me from  
17 11:10 A.M. to 12:07 P.M. on 7 August 1944. As indicated  
18 on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the  
19 Proceedings, during this closed session I informed the  
20 General Officers mentioned the character of information  
21 which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top  
22 Secret sources then called 'Magic'. I told them, among  
23 other things, that the source of this information in-  
24 cluded intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages  
25 which were decrypted, decoded and translated under the

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2

supervision of the Signal Corps and G-2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source thereof should be made public because it would result in at least temporarily, if not permanently, extinguishing that source."

3

4

5

6

7

Colonel Clausen: That is what I said.

8

9

Mr. Keefe: Now, as a matter of fact, he gave them the information about magic in the record?

10

11

12

13

Colonel Clausen: Not all -- not the information. If you mean by that the information that you have or that I got, - as I understand he gave them in general the information that there was magic and the important part it played in the war.

14

15

16

17

Mr. Keefe: Well, you were not there, were you?

Colonel Clausen: No, that is what I say.

Mr. Keefe: You are just guessing at it, but here is his affidavit.

18

19

20

21

Colonel Clausen: No, I am not guessing; I mean his affidavit. What I have read is in his affidavit, that he said the magic was opened up to the three General Officers in general.

22

23

24

25

Mr. Keefe: Well, you don't want to give the impression that this subject of magic was not before this Board, do you? It was before the Board but not all those specific telegrams and all that sort of thing.

Witness Clausen

1

2

Colonel Clausen: Just what I said before.

3

Mr. Keefe: All right.

4

5

Colonel Clausen: It certainly was not known to myself,  
as I say.

6

Mr. Keefe: All right, that is all.

7

8

9

10

The Vice Chairman: We thank you for your appearance,  
Colonel, and the information you have given the committee and  
your apparent desire to be helpful in every way you could.  
You may be excused.

11

(Witness excused.)

12

13

The Vice Chairman: Counsel, please call the next wit-  
ness.

14

Mr. Kaufman: Colonel Bratton.

15

16

The Vice Chairman: Colonel Bra tton, will you please be  
sworn?

17

18

(Colonel Bratton was thereupon sworn by the vice-  
chairman.)

19

20

The Vice Chairman: The committee will now stand in re-  
cess until 1:45.

21

22

(Whereupon, at 12:40 P.M., a recess was taken  
until 1:45 P.M. of the same day.)

23

- - -

24

25

AFTERNOON SESSION

1:45 P.M.

1  
2 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.  
3 Colonel Bratton has been sworn as a witness before we recessed  
4 at noon. Counsel will please proceed.

## TESTIMONY OF COLONEL RUFUS S. BRATTON

5  
6 Mr. Kaufman: What is your full name?

7 Colonel Bratton: Rufus S. Bratton, Colonel of Infantry,  
8 United States Army.

9 Mr. Kaufman: Will you state for the record your exper-  
10 ience in the Army?

11 Colonel Bratton: I was graduated from the United States  
12 Military Academy in 1914. From 1914 to 1917 I performed the  
13 usual duties of a Lieutenant of Infantry with the First Regi-  
14 ment of Infantry on Oahu. From 1917 to 1919 I performed the  
15 usual garrison and field duties of my grade in the continental  
16 limits of the United States.

17 In 1919 I was detailed as an instructor at the Military  
18 Academy at West Point, New York. From 1921 to 1922 I served  
19 as a student at the Infantry School at Fort Benning. From  
20 1922 to 1924 I was a student officer of Japanese in Tokyo.  
21 From 1924 to 1926 I was Assistant Military Attache in Tokyo.

22 From 1926 to 1929 I commanded a battalion of Philippine  
23 Scouts in the Forty-fifth Infantry in the Philippines. From  
24 1929 to 1931 I was a student at the command and General Staff  
25 School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. From 1931 to 1932 I was a

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1  
2 student at the Japanese General Staff College in Tokyo. From  
3 1932 to 1934 I was Military Attache at the American embassy in  
4 Tokyo. From 1935 to 1936 I commanded a battalion of the  
5 Seventh Infantry at Vancouver Barracks, Washington.

6 For six months in 1936 I was Professor of Military Sci-  
7 ence and Tactics at the University of Idaho. In the fall  
8 of 1936 I was ordered to Washington, to the War Department  
9 General Staff. From 1936 to 1937 I was assistant to the  
10 Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Divi-  
11 sion, War Department General Staff. From 1937 to 1943 I was  
12 the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence  
13 Division, War Department General Staff.

14 In 1943 I went to the Third Army, which was then in Texas.  
15 I accompanied the headquarters of the Third Army to Europe  
16 and stayed with General Patton's headquarters until the head-  
17 quarters reached Luxemburg, where I was detached and made G-2  
18 of a planning group which under the auspices of SHAEF was  
19 planning the occupation of Berlin.

20 I went into Berlin as G-2 of the U.S. District Headquart-  
21 ers. I returned from Berlin in September of 1945 on transfer  
22 orders to the Western Pacific. I was about to take off for  
23 my new station when I was notified that I would remain in  
24 Washington waiting the pleasure of this committee and I have  
25 been here since.



Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Mr.Kaufman

1

2

Mr. Kaufman: Will you tell us in greater detail your assignment during the month of December 1941 and what your duties were at that time?

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. At that time I was Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff. As such I supervised the general work of the Far Eastern Section and was the custodian and processor of the material known as magic from the time it reached the Intelligence Division on.

Mr. Kaufman: And you were the opposite number to Captain McCollum in the Navy?

Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: And you combined the duties of both Captain McCollum and Captain Kramer, did you not?

Colonel Bra tton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: And in connection with the delivery or the dissemination of magic did you do it all yourself or did you have assistants?

Colonel Bratton: Toward the latter part of 1941 this material had increased so much in volume and so much time was taken up in putting it into pouches and delivering the pouches to the various recipients that I found it necessary to have help, so with the knowledge and approval of my chief, General Miles, I did utilize two or three selected officer assistants

Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2 of mine in processing this material.

3

Mr. Kaufman: Now, let us direct your attention to the 6th  
4 of December 1941.

5

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

6

Mr. Kaufman: And I will direct your attention to exhibit  
7 1, page 238, to the so-called pilot message that is printed  
8 on that page. Do you recall when that first came to your at-  
9 tention?

10

Colonel Bratton: Some time around about two o'clock on  
11 the afternoon of Saturday, 6 December 1941.

12

Mr. Kaufman: Now, you heard Captain Kramer testify here  
13 and he testified, as I recall it, that his attention, - or he  
14 did not receive the so-called pilot message until later on  
15 Saturday night.

16

Colonel Bratton: I recall that statement, sir.

17

Mr. Kaufman: But so far as you are concerned you did re-  
18 ceive it at about two o'clock on Saturday, December 6th?

19

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

20

Mr. Kaufman: Now, coming to the thirteen part message--

21

Mr. Keefe: Counsel, would you inquire at that point from  
22 whom he received it and where he got it?

23

Mr. Kaufman: Yes, sir.

24

From whom did you get the so-called pilot message?

25

Colonel Bratton: It came over from the Signal Intelli -

Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1  
2 gence Service with the usual envelope full of assorted mater-  
3 ial.

4 Mr. Kaufman: And that pilot message was translated by  
5 the Army?

6 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Kaufman: Do you know where that message was inter-  
8 cepted according to the records of the War Department?

9 Colonel Bratton: It was intercepted by the Navy at  
10 Bainbridge Island at 7:20 A.M. 6 December 1941 Washington  
11 time. The teletyped copy intercept was delivered to the SIS,  
12 that is Army Signal Intelligence Service, at 12:05 P.M. 6  
13 December Washington time. It was translated by the SIS,  
14 typed and delivered to me the same date at about two o'clock.

15 Mr. Kaufman: Does that answer the Congressman's inquiry?

16 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

17 Mr. Kaufman: Turning now to the first thirteen parts of  
18 the message, do you recall when they commenced to come in?

19 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. Now, before answering your  
20 question I would like to state that this is the fifth time  
21 I have appeared as a witness in this Pearl Harbor investiga-  
22 tion, I hope it will be the last time, but it is also the  
23 first time that I have had an opportunity to examine files,  
24 records and documents in the War Department to refresh my  
25 memory as to the details of various events and it is the first

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1  
2 time that I have had an opportunity to talk to the people that  
3 I worked for and with at that time. In consequence my memory  
4 as to the details of certain events have been greatly improved.  
5 As to the details of certain other events it is foggier than  
6 ever for the reason that I have heard and seen so many con-  
7 flicting arguments and statements here and elsewhere since  
8 my return to Washington.

9 Mr. Kaufman: Well, now, for the record will you state  
10 the times when and the places where you have testified in  
11 connection with the Pearl Harbor matter?

12 Colonel Bratton: I appeared as a witness with General  
13 Miles before the Roberts committee.

14 Mr. Kaufman: Did you personally testify?

15 Colonel Bratton: I do not recall having testify. I  
16 was more or less in the nature of a paper carrier for General  
17 Marshall.

18 Mr. Kaufman: And that was only in connection with in-  
19 forming the Board as to so-called magic?

20 Colonel Bratton: Correct, sir. I should have said Gen-  
21 eral Miles instead of General Marshall.

22 Mr. Kaufman: According to the record as I have examined  
23 it it is not recorded that you ever testified before that  
24 Board.

25 Colonel Bratton: And I do not recall having actually

Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2

testified, sir.

3

Mr. Kaufman: And that was in December of 1941?

4

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

5

6

Mr. Kaufman: When was the next time that you testified with respect to Pearl Harbor?

7

8

9

10

11

Colonel Bratton: The next time was in the fall of 1944 before the so-called Clarke Board. I had been flown back from the advance command post of the Third Army some fifty miles east of Verdun on a first priority order to report to the A. C. of S. of G-2, War Department, Washington.

12

13

Mr. Kaufman: And that is the first time that you testified before any Board regarding Pearl Harbor?

14

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

15

16

Mr. Kaufman: And that was nearly three years after the happening of the event?

17

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

18

19

Mr. Kaufman: And at the time that you were sent for you had been on duty with the Third Army in Europe?

20

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

21

22

23

Mr. Kaufman: And you were flown back to this country and did you have an opportunity at that time to examine any of the papers or records?

24

25

Colonel Bratton: I did not, sir. As I remember it, I arrived here on a Wednesday afternoon tired, cold and dirty

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

Witness Bratton

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

and started testifying early the following morning.

Mr. Kaufman: And how long did your testimony continue?

Colonel Bratton: I appeared before the Clarke Board several times covering a period of from five to ten days.

From there I went to appear as a witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, known as the Grunert Board.

Mr. Kaufman: And that was in what month, do you recall,

Colonel?

Colonel Bratton: September 1944, September and October.

Mr. Kaufman: And then did you go back to Europe after you had completed testifying before the Grunert Board?

Colonel Bratton: I did, sir. My Commanding General had paid me the compliment of saying that he wanted me to come back as soon as I got released from duties in Washington and as soon as I was so released I caught the next plane that could accommodate me and returned to the Third Army Headquarters. I did not have time to review the testimony that I gave before the Grunert Board, not that the right was denied me at all. I simply did not have time to do it.

Mr. Kaufman: And we have it also that not only did you not read the testimony that you gave before the Clarke Board but that you did not have an opportunity of examining any of the papers or records in connection with what happened in December of 1941?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2

Colonel Bratton: I did have an opportunity to read the evidence that I gave before the Clarke Board.

3

4

Mr. Kaufman: But you did have no opportunity to examine the papers or the records of the Department?

5

6

Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

7

8

Mr. Kaufman: Now, what was the next time that you gave any testimony respecting Pearl Harbor?

9

10

Colonel Bratton: The next time was in August, I believe, of last year when Colonel Clausen reported to me in Berlin.

11

12

Mr. Kaufman: And you heard Colonel Clausen testify here during the last few days?

13

14

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

15

16

Mr. Kaufman: And at that time you did not have any of the papers or records from the War Department to refresh your recollection again?

17

18

Colonel Bratton: I was thousands of miles away from them.

19

Mr. Kaufman: And this is the fourth time that you are actually called to testify?

20

21

Colonel Bratton: The fifth time.

22

Mr. Kaufman: You include the Roberts Commission as the first time?

23

24

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

25

Mr. Kaufman: But we have it that at the Roberts Commission you did not give any testimony, according to the record.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2

Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

3

4

5

Mr. Kaufman: Now, waiting to be called as a witness here have you read the testimony of other witnesses before this committee and in other proceedings?

6

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, in great volume.

7

8

Mr. Kaufman: And do you believe now that your memory has been refreshed as to many of the details?

9

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

10

11

12

13

Mr. Kaufman: Let us come now to the first thirteen parts of the message of December 6th. I asked you before as to what time that day, according to your best recollection, did that message begin to come in?

14

15

The Vice Chairman: That begins on page 239 of exhibit 1, does it?

16

17

18

19

Mr. Kaufman: That is correct, sir.

Colonel Bratton: That message began to come into my office in the late afternoon or early evening of Saturday 6, December.

20

21

22

Mr. Kaufman: Do you recall which part came in first?

Colonel Bratton: I do not, sir. They were all mixed up; they did not come in in any numerical sequence.

23

24

25

Mr. Kaufman: You recall Captain Kramer testified that his recollection was that part 8 was the first part of the message that he received. Does that refresh your recollection as



Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2

to which part of the thirteen parts you received first?

3

Colonel Bratton: No, sir, I do not remember.

4

5

Mr. Kaufman: Will you tell us to the best of your recollection what time of the day the last of the thirteen parts came in?

6

7

8

9

Colonel Bratton: The last of the thirteen parts came into my office some time between nine and ten that night. I was there at the time when the last part came in.

10

11

Mr. Kaufman: Let us go back a moment, Colonel, to the pilot message.

12

13

14

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: You testified that that came to you about two o'clock in the afternoon?

15

16

17

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: And that was before any one of the thirteen parts had arrived?

18

19

20

21

Colonel Bratton: That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman: Will you tell the committee whether you made distribution of that so-called pilot message and when you did so?

22

23

24

25

Colonel Bratton: Distribution of the so-called pilot message was made that afternoon about three o'clock. I do not now recall whether I did it in person or whether one of my assistants did it, but I do recall discussing the subject both

1 Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 with General Miles and General Gerow Saturday afternoon.

3 Mr. Kaufman: Then we have it that the so-called pilot  
4 message was disseminated around three o'clock that day?

5 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Kaufman: Now, will you give us the list of the per-  
7 sons to whom that pilot message was disseminated?

8 Colonel Bratton: Secretary of State, Secretary of War,  
9 Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans Division, G-2 and my own  
10 section.

11 Mr. Kaufman: Did you deliver to the White House?

12 Colonel Bratton: No, I was not delivering to the White  
13 House during this period.

14 Mr. Kaufman: Who was delivering to the White House?

15 Colonel Bratton: Captain Kramer.

16 Mr. Kaufman: So that as between Captain Kramer and  
17 your department you took the State Department and he took the  
18 White House?

19 Colonel Bra tton: That is correct, sir.

20 Mr. Kaufman: Now, you say that you recall having talked  
21 to General Gerow and General Miles about the pilot message  
22 some time on the afternoon of December 6th?

23 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Kaufman: Will you tell us your conversation with  
25 General Miles first and then later your conversation with

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2

General Gerow?

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Colonel Bratton: Unfortunately, I cannot remember it in any great detail. It was to the effect that here was an indication that a reply to the State Department's note to the Japanese government was on its way. There was at that time no indication as to when we would receive that reply but I wanted them to know that we could expect this message at some time in the near future and that as soon as it started coming in I would acquaint them with its contents. That, in general, was the substance of my conversation both with General Miles and General Gerow.

Now, I have discussed this matter with both of these officers since that time, recently. They have no recollection of my conversation with them or, if they have, it is very vague.

Mr. Kaufman: Your recollection is that you did talk to both of them?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Now come back to the thirteen parts of the message and you began to tell us before that it was completed some time between nine and ten o'clock.

Colonel Bratton: Thirteen parts of the message had arrived by that time, yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: And what did you do with that message, the thirteen parts?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Colonel Bratton: There are several details as to what I did during the remainder of that evening that stand out very clearly in my memory; others do not. I will recount those that I remember very clearly first, if you will allow me to do so.

First I called up the SIS, got the officer who was on duty there that evening, to ask him if there was any likelihood of the fourteen part coming in later that night.

Mr. Kaufman: Do you recall who that officer was?

Colonel Bratton: I don't remember who the officer was, no, sir.

After some discussion in the SIS this officer returned to the phone and he said, "No, there is very little likelihood of that part coming in this evening. We think we have gotten all of that message that we are going to get tonight."

I did not ask him why or discuss the matter with him at all. I accepted his statement. So I, realizing that the Secretary of State was primarily interested in this message, it being a diplomatic one and it being a reply to a message that he had sent to the Japanese government, gathered up his folder, put it in the pouch, locked the pouch and personally delivered it to the night duty officer in the State Department some time after ten o'clock that night. I told the night duty officer whose name I have forgotten that this was a

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

highly important message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned and that I would like to have it sent out to his quarters. He assured me that he would do so. I left it with him, securing from him a receipt for what I had given him.

I then returned to my quarters and as I remember it now about eleven o'clock called up General Miles to report to him about leaving a part of the message and what I had done with it. My recollection is that someone answered the phone in General Miles' home, said that he was out at dinner but that he was expected back any moment. I left word that I would like to have him call me when he came in, which he did.

I described in guarded terms to General Miles the context of this message, told him that the fourteenth part, the most important part, had not been received, told him that I had delivered the first thirteen parts to the Secretary of State. I remember his saying yes, that he had seen the thirteen parts where he was a dinner guest.

Mr. Kaufman: Did he tell you where he was a dinner guest?

Colonel Bratton: I don't remember that he did, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Did he tell you he was at Admiral Wilkinson's home?

Colonel Bratton: I must have known that that is where he was because it was our practice at that time to tell each

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

other where we could be found on the phone.

The next point that sticks out in my memory that I am positive is that when I found General Marshall in his office at 11:25 Sunday morning, the 7th of December 1941, he had in front of him on his desk in a folder similar to this not only the thirteen parts of this message but all fourteen of them. I had not put it there.

Mr. Kaufman: Well, now, let us go back to the night of December 6th. You told us that you delivered the thirteen parts to the Secretary of State's office.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: You have told us that you talked with General Miles on the telephone.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Did you ask General Miles as to whether or not delivery of that should be made to the Chief of Staff that night?

Colonel Bratton: I don't remember, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Did General Miles instruct you at that time that it was unnecessary to deliver the thirteen parts to the Chief of Staff that night?

Colonel Bratton: I do not recall that he did, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: I direct your attention to the testimony of General Miles at page 4118 of the record where he testified

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2 regarding the thirteen parts of the mess age as follows:

3

4 "I had a conversation on my return from Admiral  
5 Wilkinson's house, as I testified, with Colonel Bratton.  
6 I take full responsibility for that thirteen part message  
7 not going to the Chief of Staff that night."

7

8 Does that refresh your recollection as to whether or not  
9 you were instructed by General Miles not to make delivery of  
10 that to the Chief of Staff that night?

10

11 Colonel Bra tton: No, sir, I remember no instructions of  
12 that nature from General Miles and I would like to say fur-  
13 ther at this point that if there was any error of omission or  
14 commission with respect to the delivery of the thirteen parts  
15 of that message Saturday night the 6th of December 1941 to  
16 Army personnel the error was mine and I accept full responsi-  
17 bility for it. That was my error.

17

18 Mr. Kaufman: Who were the persons in the Army who cus-  
19 tomarily were to receive this information, this magic?

19

20 Colonel Bratton: The Chief of Staff, the Chief of the  
21 War Plans Division and the Chief of the Military Intelligence  
22 Division.

22

23 Mr. Kaufman: And do we have it now that no delivery  
24 was made to any of those persons other than to the Secreta ry  
25 of State and excepting General Miles who had already seen it  
at Admiral Wilkinson's house?

Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2 Colonel Bratton: This is the point at which my memory  
3 begins to go bad on me. I cannot state positively whether  
4 there was any delivery made that night or not at this time.

5 I testified before the Grunert Board that I had made de-  
6 livery to the Secretary of the General Staff, to the night duty  
7 officer or to General Gerow and to General Miles. That was  
8 my normal procedure. I tried to make simultaneous delivery to  
9 all of these people.

10 Since making that statement before the Grunert Board --  
11 I withdraw that statement.

12 At the time when I made the statement to the Grunert Board  
13 I had not remembered or I did not remember that Colonel Dusen-  
14 bury was working with me in the office that night. Now, since  
15 making this statement to the Grunert Board I have been shown  
16 a number of affidavits by various officers, General Smith,  
17 Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, General Galley, General  
18 Gerow and others, to the effect that they did not receive the  
19 thirteen parts of this message from me or from anybody else  
20 Saturday night.

21 Now, I know all these men. I do not doubt the honesty  
22 and integrity of any one of them and if they say that I did  
23 not deliver these pouches to them that night then my memory  
24 must have been at fault.

25 Mr. Kaufman: And to that extent you want to correct the



Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1

2 testimony that you have given before the Grunert Board?

3 Colonel Bratton: I would prefer to put it this way:  
4 Starting from the point which I explained to you are quite  
5 clear in my memory, any other statement that I now make would  
6 be a reconstruction of events based upon my knowledge of what  
7 was standard operating procedure in my office under various  
8 sets of circumstances.

9 Mr. Kaufman: Have you any explanation at this time as to  
10 why the standard operating procedure was not followed on  
11 this occasion on December 6th?

12 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, except that at this time and  
13 when I testified before the Grunert Board I was convinced that  
14 undue emphasis was being placed upon two messages. One the  
15 so-called winds message; the other the thirteen parts of the  
16 fourteen part message.

17 Upon my second appearance before the Grunert Board I  
18 tried to explain to them why I considered these two messages  
19 were being given undue importance by the Board and we got  
20 lost in the ramifications of the winds message and I never  
21 did get to explain to them why I considered the presence of  
22 the thirteen parts in Washington relatively unimportant  
23 militarily that evening.

24 I did so consider it upon their receipt and I still con-  
25 sider it now. They contributed no information, they contri-

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

buted no additional information to the matters that we already had from magic and other sources as to the impending crisis with Japan.

The message was incomplete. It ended on the note, in the thirteenth part:

"Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation."

This was primarily of interest, immediate interest to the Secretary of State, not to the Secretary of War or the Chief of the General Staff for it was not an ultimatum, it was not a declaration of war, nor was it a severance of diplomatic relations.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON  
Sher--  
Shack  
fls<sup>c</sup>

AL-1  
follows  
Shefner 2:30  
1

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 Mr. Kaufman: You knew, of course, there was another  
3 part to come, did you not?

4 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Kaufman: And you couldn't anticipate by seeing  
6 the first 13 parts what the 14th part would contain, could  
7 you?

8 Colonel Bratton: Quite the contrary, sir. As a  
9 matter of fact there was a possibility that the 14th part  
10 might have contained another proposal from the Japanese  
11 Government.

12 Mr. Kaufman: And it might well have ended with a  
13 break in diplomatic relations or a declaration of war?

14 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Kaufman: Didn't you think that that was of suffi-  
16 cient interest to point out to General Miles and General  
17 Gerow, the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, that  
18 night?

19 Colonel Bratton: I don't think it was necessary to  
20 point that out to those gentlemen. They were capable of  
21 arriving at their own conclusions on their own.

22 Mr. Kaufman: So that we have it now, Colonel, that  
23 on December 6 you delivered to the Secretary of State,  
24 you talked to General Miles who had seen the message, and  
25 you made no delivery either to the Secretary of War, the

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1 Chief of Staff, or the Chief of War Plans?

2 Colonel Bratton: As far as I know now that is correct,  
3 sir.

4 Mr. Kaufman: When did you return to duty on the morn-  
5 ing of December 7?

6 Colonel Bratton: I got to my office on Sunday morning  
7 the 7th of December sometime between 7:00 and 8:00 o'clock,  
8 sir, in the morning.

9 Mr. Kaufman: And at that time did you get the 14th  
10 part of the message?

11 Colonel Bratton: No. The 14th part of the message  
12 was not delivered to me until between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock;  
13 around 8:15 or 8:30. Now, that message was delivered immedi-  
14 ately to the State Department. Whether I took it or not  
15 I don't know. It is entirely possible that I may have  
16 gotten a car and rushed over there with the 14 parts so  
17 that the Secretary of State's book would be complete. On  
18 the other hand, I may have given it to Colonel Dusenbury to  
19 deliver. All I know now is that the Secretary of State  
20 had all 14 of my parts before 10:00 o'clock that morning.

21 Mr. Kaufman: About the time that you met Captain  
22 Kramer there about 10:00 o'clock on the morning of December 7?

23 Colonel Bratton: I couldn't possibly have met Captain  
24 Kramer at the State Department at around 10:00 o'clock. The  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1  
2 only time he could have seen me there would have been  
3 between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. that morning, for from that  
4 time on I was busily engaged in something else in the War  
5 Department.

6 Mr. Kaufman: What time did you return to your office  
7 at the War Department after making this delivery to the  
8 Secretary of State?

9 Colonel Bratton: If I made the delivery to the Secretary  
10 of State I was back in my office before 9:00 o'clock.

11 Mr. Kaufman: And when did you deliver the 14 parts  
12 of the message, together with any other traffic, to the  
13 other persons entitled to receive it?

14 Colonel Bratton: As I remember it now, sir, I believe  
15 that all those deliveries within the War Department that  
16 morning were made by my assistant Colonel Dusenbury. And I  
17 can give you the reason.

18 Mr. Kaufman: Will you give us the reason.

19 Colonel Bratton: For the reason that at about 9:00  
20 o'clock or shortly before 9:00 o'clock there was placed in  
21 my hands the so-called 1:00 p.m. delivery message. This  
22 immediately stunned me into frenzied activity because of  
23 its implications and from that time on I was busily engaged  
24 trying to locate various officers of the general staff and  
25 conferring with them on the exclusive subject of this



Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1 He went in through the door that opens off the hall and  
2 I went in through the door that opens off the secretary's  
3 office.

4 Mr. Kaufman: Was General Gerow there?

5 Colonel Bratton: Not at that time but he and Colonel  
6 Bundy joined us a few minutes thereafter.

7 Mr. Kaufman: Was it at that time that General Marshall  
8 proceeded to write out a message to be sent to Hawaii?

9 Colonel Bratton: Not immediately. As I have stated  
10 he had this 14th part message arranged in a book in front  
11 of him. When General Miles and I walked into the room he  
12 was reading the 14 parts. I had the 1:00 p.m. delivery  
13 message in my hand. General Miles and I attempted to  
14 interrupt General Marshall to get him to read this 1:00  
15 p.m. message but were unsuccessful and he didn't read it  
16 until after he had gone all the way through the 14-part  
17 message.

18 Mr. Kaufman: And then after he had read the 14-parts  
19 you gave him the 1:00 o'clock message?

20 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Kaufman: And then what happened?

22 Colonel Bratton: He read it and asked General Miles  
23 and myself what we thought it meant. General Miles and  
24 I both said that we were convinced it meant Japanese hostile  
25

(2)

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1 action against some American installation in the Pacific  
2 at or shortly after 1:00 o'clock that afternoon. At about  
3 this time General Gerow and General Bundy came into the  
4 room and there was some discussion of the 14 parts, which  
5 were then regarded in the light of an ultimatum, and of  
6 the 1:00 p.m. delivery message.  
7

8 General Marshall asked us each in turn starting with  
9 General Miles for an evaluation of the situation. We  
10 all concurred in reiterating the statement that General  
11 Miles and I had previously given him to the effect that  
12 it was our belief that the Japanese intended to attack us  
13 somewhere in the Pacific at or shortly after 1:00 p.m.  
14 that afternoon.

15 Mr. Kaufman: Was there any discussion that 1:00 p.m.  
16 meant 7:30 Hawaiian time?

17 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

18 Mr. Kaufman: Was it at that point that General Marshall  
19 began to write a message to be sent to Hawaii?

20 Colonel Bratton: It was at that point, after we had  
21 all concurred in urging that our outlying possessions be  
22 given an additional alert at once by the fastest possible  
23 means, General Marshall drew a piece of scratch paper toward  
24 him and picked up a pencil and wrote out in longhand a  
25 message to be sent to our overseas commanders. When he reached



Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1 the bottom of the page he picked up the telephone and  
2 called the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. I  
3 couldn't hear the other end of the conversation at all,  
4 but General Marshall, in a guarded way, told Admiral Stark  
5 what he had in front of him and what he proposed to do,  
6 in effect that he was going to send a warning to Hawaii,  
7 Panama, the Philippines and so on.  
8

9 After some conversation with the Chief of Naval  
10 Operations he put down the phone and said, "Admiral Stark  
11 doesn't think that any additional warning is necessary."  
12 There was some few minutes discussion on that point. The  
13 telephone rang again and it was apparent that it was Admiral  
14 Stark calling because General Marshall, when he put the  
15 receiver down, said "Admiral Stark requests that we add  
16 to our message 'Inform the Navy'." So he added a short  
17 sentence at the bottom of his penciled message, gave it  
18 to me and told me to take it to the Message Center and see  
19 that it was dispatched at once by the fastest safe means.

20 As I went out the door there was some discussion as  
21 to priority and General Gerow called out to me as I was  
22 leaving the Chief of Staff's office, "If there is any  
23 question of priority give the Philippines first priority."

24 I went into the Army Message Center, which was down  
25 the hall from us, found the Chief, Colonel French, handed

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

hl  
fls  
AL1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Mr. Kaufman: Did you know at that time that the message was going to be relayed to San Francisco, and then over the RCA lines?

Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Did you know whether the Army had direct communication with Hawaii?

Colonel Bratton: By what means?

Mr. Kaufman: By radio or telegraph?

Colonel Bratton: I didn't know it. I assumed that we always had had up until that moment.

Mr. Kaufman: When did you find out for the first time that this message went by Western Union to San Francisco and then by RCA to Honolulu?

Colonel Bratton: Several days after the attack took place.

Mr. Kaufman: Now, Colonel, let us go back to the so-called winds message. You are familiar with the --

The Vice Chairman: Will counsel permit an interruption?

Mr. Kaufman: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: It would be helpful to go back to the so-called one o'clock message and find out what the Colonel did with that. If it has been covered, I didn't catch it.

Mr. Kaufman: I think that that has been covered, but,

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman  
The Vice Chairman

h2

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

sir, we will do it again.

Colonel Bratton: That is the message that I have been talking about, Mr. Cooper. The one that I handed in person to General Marshall in his office.

The Vice Chairman: I understood that, but how about other recipients of magic; what was done with respect to them as to the one o'clock message, if anything?

Colonel Bratton: All the other recipients were right there at the time, except the Secretary of War, who had an adjacent office to the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of State.

I personally called up one of the Assistants to the Secretary of State by telephone prior to my meeting with General Marshall to tell him about this 1 p.m. delivery thing. He said that he would inform the Secretary of State right away.

I don't know whether the Secretary of War was in town that morning or not. I didn't see him all day long.

The Vice Chairman: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Kaufman: Now, let us go back to the so-called winds message. You are familiar with Circular 2353 and --

Colonel Bratton: What page is that?

Mr. Murphy: 154.

Mr. Kaufman: Pages 154 and 155, Japanese circulars

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

h3

1  
2353 and 2354.

2  
3  
4  
Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, I am familiar with those  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
messages.

Mr. Kaufman: Will you tell us, if you know, what was  
done by the Army to get any implement to these two codes?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Upon receipt of 2353 on the 28th of November, I made  
arrangements through Colonel Sadtler of the Signal Corps  
to have the FCC monitor this broadcast for us through their  
station on the West Coast, and through Colonel Sadtler I  
got in contact with a Mr. Sterling, I believe his name was,  
of the FCC, gave him my office telephone number, my home  
telephone number and those of my assistants, Colonel Dusenbury,  
and arranged with him to have me called on the telephone  
at once upon the receipt of any implementation of this code.

Colonel Sadtler, I believe, explained to him in detail  
what it was we were looking for.

During the period 28 November and the first week in  
December, we got from the FCC a number of false alarms on  
this thing. Incidentally, I told the Navy what I had done,  
and they told me what they had done. We agreed to pool our  
results.

Mr. Kaufman: When you say you told the Navy, who did  
you tell it to?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

h4

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Colonel Bratton: Captain McCollum and Captain Kramer.

So that ONI and G-2 were working hand in glove trying to pick this thing up from whatever sources were available.

I know that the Navy got a number of false alarms too, from conversations with Captain McCollum and Captain Kramer.

I received three or four. I was waked at all hours of the night on several occasions by the FCC who repeated what they had picked up, believing it to be a part of the implementing message.

Mr. Kaufman: Do you recall on the 5th of December whether or not Colonel Sadtler communicated with you and told you that Admiral Noyes had told him that the winds implement message was in?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: Will you tell us about the circumstances and the talk that you had with Colonel Sadtler at that time?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Sometime around 9 or 10 o'clock on the morning of the 5th, I was called to General Miles' office where Colonel Sadtler and General Miles and his Executive Officer, Colonel Roderick were discussing some matter, and General Miles turned to Colonel Sadtler, and said, "Tell Bratton what you

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

h5

1 have just told me."

2 He said, "Well, Noyes has just called me up to say  
3 that it is in." The winds execute message.

4 I said, "Well, what does it say, in English or Japanese?"

5 He said, "Well, I don't know, he didn't tell me."

6 So General Miles, at my suggestion, requested Colonel  
7 Sadtler to go back, or to go to Admiral Noyes, and get a  
8 copy, either of the Japanese text or of the English transla-  
9 tion, so we could look at it to determine whether or not  
10 it was what we were waiting for, or another false alarm.

11 So Colonel Sadtler took off and some while later came  
12 back and reported to General Miles and myself that he  
13 couldn't get access to Admiral Noyes, that he was in a  
14 board meeting, something of that sort. We requested  
15 Colonel Sadtler to go back and keep on the trail of Admiral  
16 Noyes, or talk to one of his assistants, or get somebody  
17 from over there who knew what they were talking about a  
18 copy of what they had received, so we could satisfy our-  
19 selves that this was really the execute message and not a  
20 false alarm.

21 Colonel Sadtler went off and I never saw him again  
22 that day, to my recollection, or in connection with this  
23 matter.

24 I called up the Navy upon my return to my office and  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

h6

1 got either Captain McCollum or Captain Kramer on the  
2 phone, I don't remember which at the moment, to ask them  
3 if they had gotten in the winds execute message and they  
4 said "no."

5 I said, "Please let me know if you have one anywhere  
6 in the Navy."

7 They said they would.

8 I then called up the SIS and asked them if they knew  
9 anything about the arrival anywhere in Washington of an  
10 execute message of the winds code, and they said "no,"  
11 they knew nothing about it, and I repeated my request to  
12 them, if anything came in to please let me know, and then  
13 I put the matter out of my mind.

14 Senator Lucas: Who did you call in the SIS?

15 Mr. Kaufman: Who did you call in the SIS?

16 Colonel Bratton: I don't remember now, sir. It was  
17 either Major Doud or Captain Schukraft, or one of the other  
18 officers on duty there.

19 Mr. Kaufman: Now, you began to tell us before that you  
20 felt that the winds code message was expanded all out of  
21 proportion to its real value.

22 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Kaufman: I asked you to tell us about it when we  
24 got to the winds code situation. Will you tell us what  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Krufman

h7

1 statement you want to make about it now?

2 Colonel Bratton: Even if we had received an execute  
3 message of the winds code after the third of December, it  
4 would only have contributed or confirmed information that  
5 we already had. It is perfectly obvious from an examina-  
6 tion of this code and the messages in connection therewith  
7 that it was a device figured out by the Japanese for in-  
8 forming their diplomatic agents around the world of danger  
9 in the breach of diplomatic relations with certain powers  
10 of other means of communication failed.

11 Well, it never failed in Washington right up to the  
12 last minute. They could always communicate with their  
13 ambassador here.

14 On the 3rd of December we intercepted a direct order  
15 given to the Japanese ambassador to start burning his codes.  
16 That was the purpose of the whole thing. That was it.

17 Any winds execute message received after that would  
18 simply just be another straw in the wind confirming what  
19 we already knew.

20 Mr. Krufman: And by the 5th of December you had already  
21 received intercepted messages from consuls in various parts  
22 of the world advising Tokyo by the word "Haruna" that they  
23 had complied with the request to burn the codes?

24 Colonel Bratton: I remember seeing a number of those  
25



Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

h8

1

messages, yes, sir.

2

Mr. Kaufman: And they are in the record in this proceeding?

3

4

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

5

6

Mr. Kaufman: After the date when Colonel Sadtler told you that Admiral Noyes had advised him that the winds message was in, did you continue to monitor for winds execute messages?

7

8

9

Colonel Bratton: Oh, yes, sir, we continued to monitor for the winds execute message and a variation of it was delivered to my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury on the afternoon of the 7th or 8th after the attack when it was utterly immaterial and useless.

10

11

12

13

14

Mr. Kaufman: When Colonel Sadtler made this report to you, did you communicate with the Federal Communications Commission?

15

16

17

Colonel Bratton: No, sir, I don't remember that I did.

18

19

20

Mr. Kaufman: You have talked about a message delivered to your assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, on the 7th or the 8th. Is that the message in Exhibit 142, page 3(a)?

21

22

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, I believe that is the message.

23

24

Mr. Kaufman: I direct your attention to Exhibit No. 142A, the record of the Federal Communications Commission

25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

h9

1 that they telephoned you at 7:50 on the night of December  
2 5, and that you were advised -- you stated:

3 "Results still negative but am pleased to receive  
4 the negative results as it means that we have that much  
5 more time."

6 Do you recall that conversation?

7 Colonel Bratton: Not in that detail, but it is in  
8 the nature of similar conversations I had with those people  
9 during that period.

10 Mr. Kaufman: I ask you to look at a record given to  
11 us by the FCC which records the substance of a conversa-  
12 tion that you had on the 5th of December at 7:50 that  
13 night, and ask you whether that refreshes your recollection  
14 as to the conversation that you had with the Federal Com-  
15 munications Commission on that day?

16 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, I remember that.

17 Mr. Kaufman: Well, will you tell us as nearly as you  
18 can the conversation that you had with the Federal Communica-  
19 tions Commission on the 5th of December, after using this  
20 memorandum to refresh your recollection?

21 Colonel Bratton : As nearly as I can remember, it  
22 was to the effect as stated in that document.

23 Senator Lucas: Will counsel read that?

24 Mr. Kaufman: The memorandum from the Federal Communica-  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Krufman

h10

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

tions Commission, which is part of 142-A, is as follows:

"Phoned Colonel Bratton and gave him the message at 7:50 p. m.

"Remarks by Colonel Bratton:

"Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked if I should communicate the information to Portland concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.)"

Colonel Bratton: That latter part is a bit garbled, according to my present recollection. I don't remember making any such statement as is contained in that last sentence.

Mr. Kaufman: You wouldn't say that you didn't make it?

Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: It goes on to say:

"No. I will have a conference with Lieutenant Colonel Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard."

With regard to communicating with Portland.

Colonel Bratton: I don't recall making that statement,

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman  
The Vice Chairman

h11

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

but it is quite possible that I did, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: This is a record made by the Federal Communications Commission at the time.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman: It is part of their diary records, apparently.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Colonel Bratton, about what was the difference in time of the receipt of the 14th part of the 14-part message and the so-called one o'clock message?

Colonel Bratton: About a half-hour, as I remember it, sir.

The Vice Chairman: About a half-hour?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You received the 14th part of the 14-part message --

Colonel Bratton: First.

The Vice Chairman: First.

Colonel Bratton: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: About what time?

Colonel Bratton: Sometime between 8:30 and 9 o'clock as I recall it, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Then about 30 minutes later, you received the one o'clock message?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h12

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: That would put both of them into your hands at about what time?

Colonel Bratton: Between 8:30 and 9 o'clock that morning, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Well, did you do anything during that 30 minutes between the receipt of the 14th part and the one o'clock message about getting word to any of these recipients of magic?

Colonel Bratton: Word of the receipt of the 14th part you mean, sir?

The Vice Chairman: Yes, sir.

Colonel Bratton: I don't remember that I did, sir, for the reason that I took the 14th part, assembled it with the remaining 13 parts, and started reading the whole thing off to see just exactly what it meant.

While I was doing that, the one p.m. delivery message was placed in my hands.

The Vice Chairman: And I believe you stated that after receipt of the one o'clock message you then became very much concerned?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. I washed my hands of all other matters, turning them over to my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and proceeded to take steps with the one p.m.

c6

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h13

1 delivery message.

2 The Vice Chairman: About what time was the one p.m.  
3 delivery message ready in your hands for distribution?

4 Colonel Bratton: I made no distribution of it except  
5 to the Chief of Staff. I kept his copy in my hands until  
6 I gave it to him in his office. Any other distribution  
7 that was made that morning must have been made by my assistant  
8 Colonel Dusenbury.

9 The Vice Chairman: Then what did you do in the way of  
10 trying to contact the Chief of Staff from the time you had  
11 the one o'clock message ready to deliver and the time you  
12 actually saw him?

13 Colonel Bratton: I discovered that neither the Chief  
14 of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, or G-2, were in their  
15 offices, so I immediately put in a phone call for General  
16 Marshall at his quarters at Fort Myer. One of his orderlies  
17 answered the telephone and informed me that the General had  
18 gone horseback riding.

19 I said, "Well, you know generally where he has gone.  
20 You know where you can get ahold of him?"

21 He said, "Yes, I think I can find him."

22 I said, "Please go out at once, get assistance if neces-  
23 sary, and find General Marshall, ask him to -- tell him who  
24 I am and tell him to go to the nearest telephone, that it  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

hl4

1 is vitally important that I communicate with him at the  
2 earliest practicable moment."

3 The orderly said he would do so.

4 Then I called General Miles at his home, and told him  
5 what I had done and urged that he come down to the office  
6 at once, because I felt that General Marshall would want to  
7 see him and talk with him.

8 There was some discussion between General Miles and  
9 myself as to who was to call General Gerow. I don't remember  
10 whether I called him or whether General Miles called him  
11 but he was summoned to his office by telephone by one of  
12 us.

13 The Vice Chairman: Allow me to interrupt for a moment,  
14 Colonel. Just what was the time that you delivered this  
15 message to General Marshall's orderly?

16 Colonel Bratton: Shortly after nine o'clock. That  
17 is, shortly after my reading the message. The message  
18 was placed in my hands at about nine o'clock. As soon as  
19 I had read it and realized its import, I immediately started  
20 calling General Marshall. That was sometime between 9 and  
21 9:15.

22 The Vice Chairman: So it was between 9 and 9:15 that  
23 you talked to his orderly at his home.

24 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h15

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

The Vice Chairman: And urged him to get shold of General Marshall and ask him to contact you as promptly as possible?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And you did not get any call from General Marshall then?

Colonel Bratton: Not until sometime after ten o'clock.

The Vice Chairman: After ten o'clock?

Colonel Bratton: General Marshall called me in person sometime between 10 and 10:30. I explained to him that I had a most important message that he must see at once, and that if he would stay where he was, I would get a car and bring it to him.

He said, "No, don't bother to do that. I am coming down to my office. You can give it to me then."

The Vice Chairman: That, you think, was about 10:30?

Colonel Bratton: Between 10 and 10:30; sometime closer to the half-hour.

The Vice Chairman: Between 10 and 10:30.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: So, naturally, you followed his instructions and waited until he got to the office?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: That was 11:25?



Witness Bratton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h16

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Colonel Bratton: That was 11:25 when I reached him in his office.

Prior to talking to General Marshall in his office, however, I did discuss this whole business with General Miles in his office, who in the meantime had reached the War Department. So that General Miles was thoroughly conversant with the entire matter before he and I went together into General Marshall's office.

The Vice Chairman: How soon did you get to talk to General Miles and acquaint him with what you had?

Colonel Bratton: I called General Miles immediately after talking to General Marshall's orderly, and requested him to come down to the office, that I had some very important matters to discuss with him, and that I felt that the Chief of Staff would want to see him too.

The Vice Chairman: I believe you stated General Miles arrived at his office at about 10 o'clock?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You showed it to him promptly then?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You were about to say something about General Gerow, when I broke in.

Colonel Bratton: I don't remember seeing General Gerow

c7

Witness Bratton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman  
Senator George

h17

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

that morning until he joined us in General Marshall's office.

The Vice Chairman: And that was at 11:25; the 11:25 meeting?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

Senator George.

Senator George: Colonel Bratton, you are familiar with the September 24 message? I believe it is the one that divided Pearl Harbor into areas.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, I am familiar with that message.

Senator George: Did that come to you also, or was it handled entirely by the Navy?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, that came to me, and my record shows that I delivered it to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division.

Senator George: To whom? I didn't quite get it. Delivered it to whom?

Colonel Bratton: The Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division.

Senator George: The Chief of the War Plans Division was General Gerow?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator George

hl8

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Senator George: Did you also handle the messages beginning December 3 relating to the burning of codes, destruction of papers?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator George: Did you get those messages?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator George: Your duty was to distribute the information?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator George: Did you have any further duty to perform with regard to any of those messages, say the code burning messages?

In other words, did you issue any orders on them?

Colonel Bratton: Well, upon receipt of the intercept directing the Japanese ambassador to start burning his codes and ciphers, I requested the Signal Corps to prepare a message which G-2 could send to its attaches and observers in the Far East directing them to burn certain of their codes and ciphers.

I took these messages when prepared up to General Miles, secured his o.k. for sending them out.

Senator George: Those messages regarding the burning of codes went to General Short at Hawaii and --

Colonel Bratton: Not from my office, sir, and not, as

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator George

h19

1 far as I know, from G-2, because we were informed that the  
2 Navy was transmitting that information to the Naval Commander  
3 in Hawaii, the Philippines and elsewhere, and that they  
4 would pass this information on to their Army opposite numbers.

5 I accepted that as being sufficient because, as you  
6 know, it is inadvisable to send the same message in two  
7 different codes when it can be avoided.

8 Senator George: What knowledge did you have of the  
9 facilities and means available in the Hawaiian Islands to  
10 intercept and decode and translate these messages?

11 Colonel Bratton: I knew that they were capable of  
12 breaking in Hawaii, certain low grade diplomatic messages.  
13 I knew that they did not have the purple machine, but through  
14 my contact with my opposite number in the Naval Intelligence,  
15 I knew that extracts from the more important magic messages  
16 were being sent to the Navy in Hawaii, and that by mutual  
17 understanding, that is, what ONI thought was an understanding,  
18 the substance of those messages was available to the proper  
19 officials in the Army.

20 Senator George: Colonel, I understood you to say that  
21 as you now recall, or as you now recollect, you are not  
22 able to say to whom you did make delivery of the first 13  
23 parts of the 14-part message on the evening of December  
24 6, beyond the point where your recollection was positive;  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator George

h20

1

is that correct?

2

Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Senator George: Do I understand that you simply do not recollect whether you made delivery, or whether you, according to your usual course of operations, you assume that you may have made the delivery? In other words, are we to understand you have no positive recollection on that at this time?

Colonel Bratton: I have no positive recollection at this time, Senator.

When I testified before the Grunert Board, I didn't realize that Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant, was working with me in the office that evening.

Now, when I processed this material alone, I did it a certain way. When he and I worked together we did it another way. We had a standard operating procedure, so to speak.

Now, if I had remembered when I was testifying before the Grunert Board that Dusenbury was with me there that evening, I would probably have said he and I made the normal distribution that evening. That is when I went to the Secretary of State, he delivered to the War Department officials because that was our standard operating procedure.

We had done it over, and over, and over again that way.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator George

h21

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

On numerous occasions when I went to deliver pouches to the Secretary of State late at night, he would stop off at General Marshall's quarters on his way home to see that General Marshall got copies of these messages that were of sufficient importance to deliver late at night.

Senator George: Colonel, as I understand it, you considered the 14-part message when it had been completed as a message of supreme importance, of very great importance? That is, with the 14th part in hand?

Colonel Bratton: It was an important message, yes, sir, but if I may go back to the so-called pilot message and discuss it for a moment, and my reaction to it, the gist of it was that the Japanese ambassador was to take this 14 part message and without the aid of a stenographer, and in great secrecy put it in nice shape, preparatory to delivery, lock it up in his safe and keep it there pending further instructions.

This, if anything, meant that we probably had a little bit more time before the shooting war started.

After the receipt of this pilot message, the vital factor in my mind was the date and hour of delivery of the 14-part message. Its physical presence in Washington had little significance.

Senator George: And as soon as you saw the one o'clock

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator George

h22

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

message, the message directing delivery, you realized then the importance of the message?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, because it was peculiarly worded, and the implication was inescapable that it was of vital importance.

Senator George: And you shortly thereafter undertook to locate General Marshall?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator George: You did locate him over the phone as you told the committee, but you actually saw him at 11:25 on the morning of December 6?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: December 7.

Senator George: December 7. And at the time you saw him, all others to whom you were obligated to make distribution were present except the State Department, and you have already described that the 14th part and the one o'clock message had gone to the State Department, I believe?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

All concerned in the War Department were present except the Secretary of War.

Senator George: All except the Secretary of War.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator George: In the War Department?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator George

h23

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator George: Colonel, is your recollection positive with respect to the so-called winds execute message? That is, positive that you never saw such message?

Colonel Bratton: It is most positive.

Senator George: That is, until after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

I can state most positively that no execute of the winds code was ever received by me prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I find it hard to believe that any such execute message could get into the war department without passing over my desk.

It is inconceivable to me. I might have missed it but I had some assistants who were on the watch for it, and there were some people in the Army SIS who were also on the watch for it. They couldn't all have missed it. It is simply inconceivable to me that such a message should have been in the War Department without some one of us knowing about it or seeing it.

Senator George: Your recollection is that you never handled such message, never saw it?

Colonel Bratton: No, sir; most positive.

Senator George: If it came?



Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator George  
Mr. Clark

h24

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Colonel Bratton: Most positive.

Senator George: No further questions.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark of North Carolina will  
inquire.

Mr. Clark: I want to ask you, Colonel, one or two  
brief questions.

You mentioned taking a receipt when you delivered the  
13 parts to the Secretary of State's office.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: Did you keep that receipt or was it destroyed  
shortly thereafter?

Colonel Bratton: It was my practice during this time,  
sir, as far as the State Department was concerned, to take  
a receipt by serial number, that is, by the SIS number  
at the bottom of the page, from the Confidential Secretary  
of the Secretary of State.

I would take the bag over to him, unlock it, and we  
would thumb through these things bound in a book like  
this, check the numbers at the bottom of the page, and he  
would give me a receipt, a signed receipt, for SIS number  
so and so, to number so and so. I kept that receipt in  
my possession until after all of these flimsies were re-  
turned to me from the State Department, generally within  
a day or so.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h25

1 Mr. Clark: You had no further occasion to keep the  
2 receipt after that?

3 Colonel Bratton: I then destroyed the receipt and  
4 the intercept itself.

5 Mr. Clark: I believe you said you have been reading  
6 this record we made here, and I have not, but is there any  
7 controversy about the fact that you delivered the 13 parts  
8 to the Secretary of State at that time?

9 Colonel Bratton: I don't see how there could be.

10 Mr. Clark: There has not been any conflict of testi-  
11 mony here that you recall?

12 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, none that I know or or have  
13 heard of.

14 Mr. Clark: Taking the 13 parts along, was there any-  
15 thing in that upon which military action of any kind could  
16 be based?

17 Colonel Bratton: Not as I interpreted it, sir. As  
18 I look at it, I see nothing in it which would have prompted  
19 General Marshall or General Gerow to take any action on  
20 the night of Saturday the 6th of December, 1941. And I  
21 would like to remind you, sir, if I may, that all the high  
22 officials of the Navy Department saw those 13 parts on  
23 the night of Saturday the 6th of December, 1941, and they  
24 took no action other than to decide to have a conference  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h26

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

at ten o'clock the following morning.

I don't think that General Marshall or General Gerow would have done otherwise under the circumstances even if they had had these 13 parts. Their first reaction would have been to call up General Miles and ask his advice. General Miles saw nothing alarming from a military point of view in these 13 parts, and I think he so would have stated to General Marshall or General Gerow on that night.

Mr. Clark: The contents of the 13 parts that had come in, as I understand you, really didn't change the existing situation any?

Colonel Bratton: I don't believe I understand, sir.

Mr. Clark: I mean, was the situation or the intelligence that you had, or the action you would take, any different after you received the 13 parts than it was before?

Colonel Bratton: No, sir. We had known for some time that this message was coming. We surmised its contents, and we knew that the ambassador had been told to polish it up, put it in his safe, and wait further instructions. That didn't alter the picture that we had.

Mr. Clark: So there was nothing significant about that message until the 14th part came in?

Colonel Bratton: There was nothing even after the arrival of the 14th part; there was no military significance

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h27

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

to its presence in Washington as long as the Japanese Ambassador kept it locked up in his safe.

Mr. Clark: Did you see the reply of General Short to the message that you spoke of General Marshall sending?

Colonel Bratton: Not until after the attack, sir.

Mr. Clark: I was referring to General Marshall's message of the 27th.

Colonel Bratton: I understand, sir.

There is no reason why I should have seen it. I was on a lower echelon in the Intelligence Division. This was an operational matter, and a matter of counter-sabotage which was another division of intelligence. I was in the intelligence branch.

The counter-intelligence branch would have been the one to see that, if anybody in G-2 had seen it upon its arrival in Washington.

Mr. Clark: Well, I was prompted to ask you that question because you and so many others were present and intensely interested in what General Marshall was doing. That message was sent out on the 27th.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, but I didn't see the message until after the attack.

Mr. Clark: Did it occur to you to look up the reply to that message?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h28

1

Colonel Bratton: These things were being handled on a higher level than my own, Mr. Congressman.

2

3

Mr. Clark: Well, that isn't exactly what I asked you, Colonel, quite.

4

5

Colonel Bratton: Well, I must say that I was quite perturbed and anxious and very much alerted all during this period, and I, of course, was anxious to find out what was going on, what was being done.

6

7

8

9

We were feeding all this intelligence up to higher echelons, and I naturally wanted to know what was being done with it.

10

11

12

I was told that a warning message had been sent out by the Navy on the 24th and another warning message by the Army on the 27th, and a warning against sabotage also.

13

14

15

16

I knew that those messages had gone out, but I didn't read them at that time. I knew only in a general way what their contents were.

17

18

Now, General Miles has testified that he did not see General Short's reply.

19

20

Mr. Clark: Who?

21

Colonel Bratton: General Miles.

22

Mr. Clark: Yes.

23

Colonel Bratton: Has testified, and it is in evidence here that he himself did not see that reply when it came in,

24

25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h29

1 and if he had seen it, he would have taken immediate ac-  
2 tion to point out that it was not a reply to General Marshall's  
3 message.

4 Well, if General Miles never saw it, I certainly  
5 wouldn't have seen it either because the only way I could  
6 have seen it would be through him.

7 Mr. Clark: Well, it just seems a little strange to  
8 me, as a layman, as far as military affairs are concerned,  
9 that the intelligence set-up you had down there wouldn't  
10 have been checking to see the response from General  
11 MacArthur and General Short and from Panama and the West  
12 Coast to this most important message of the 27th.

13 Now, you are saying that it was not your duty or in  
14 your line of duty, and that you did not check on it.

15 Colonel Bratton: They were not given to me to read,  
16 sir. I was told that they had been sent, and I was told  
17 their general contents.

18 Mr. Clark: Would you have been permitted to look  
19 up the replies if you had wished to do so?

20 Colonel Bratton: I think I could have gotten access  
21 to them.

22 Mr. Clark: Then why didn't you look to see what had  
23 come in in response to this message of the 27th from the  
24 Chief of Staff?  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h30

1

Colonel Bratton: Well, I had confidence that my Chief, General Miles, was handling that situation adequately.

2

3

4

5

Mr. Clark: If you had seen the reply of General Short at that time, what do you think your reaction would have been?

6

7

Colonel Bratton: I could only speak from hindsight.

8

9

10

Mr. Clark: No, let's not do that. Let's go back to the day that message came into the War Department saying that he was on a sabotage alert. What would have occurred to you about that?

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Colonel Bratton: Well, I think my reaction would have been the same as General Miles has testified. I would have noticed, I think, that it was not a reply to General Marshall's message, because he quoted the number of General Marshall's message, said "in reply to your No. so-and-so," and it wasn't a reply to General Marshall's No. so-and-so at all; he was talking only about sabotage.

18

19

Mr. Clark: I see.

20

21

Colonel Bratton: I think I would have checked that discrepancy. I can't say with any degree of positiveness.

22

23

24

25

Mr. Clark: Do you think it is a little strange, Colonel, that with all the money we have spent and the precautions we have taken in the Hawaiian Islands to make it a strong outpost, and with this crucial situation developing,

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h31

1 that no one in the War Department should discover the reply  
2 of General Short showed completely that he hadn't appre-  
3 ciated the gravity of the situation?

Shack  
fls  
3:30

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25



Shack (1) p.m.  
follows  
Shefner  
AL01

12,098

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Colonel Bratton: Well, I think it is most deplorable.

Mr. Clark: Well, where does the fault lie?

Colonel Bratton: I understood that was the duty of this committee.

Mr. Clark: I am afraid you are right. I am not really trying to get you to pass on the conduct of some fellow officer, or something of that kind. You say the fault in this case does not lie in the G-2 Department, is that right?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: The fault did not rest in the G-2 Department?

Colonel Bratton: Definitely not, sir.

Mr. Clark: Or the War Plans Division?

Colonel Bratton: I think General Gerow has already accepted full responsibility for that error.

Mr. Clark: Is that where it belongs, as a military matter?

Colonel Bratton: Will you repeat that, sir?

Mr. Clark: I say as a military matter, is that where the responsibility belongs, in the War Plans Division?

Colonel Bratton: Are you asking for an expression of my opinion, sir?

Mr. Clark: Here is what I am asking for, sir: It has been almost conceded that the reply of General Short to

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 this important message was admittedly inadequate, and  
2 that if that had been discovered additional action would  
3 have been taken.

4 Now what I am asking you, as a military man, who under-  
5 stands all the ins and outs of this procedure and this  
6 organization, where does the responsibility rest for not  
7 having discovered the inadequacy of the Short reply to  
8 General Marshall's message of the 27th?

9 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, might I just suggest,  
10 it strikes me as being rather improper to ask this witness  
11 to make an answer which constitutes a direct criticism of  
12 another branch of the service of which he was not a part.

13 Colonel Bratton: Not only that, but it involves my  
14 making a criticism of officers who are far superior to me  
15 in rank and experience. It does not lie within my province to  
16 fix the responsibility for this blunder.

17 Mr. Clark: This what?

18 Colonel Bratton: It does not lie within my province,  
19 and I am unable to fix the responsibility for this blunder.  
20 General Gerow has already assumed full responsibility for  
21 that error.

22 Mr. Keefe: So has General Marshall in his testimony.

23 Mr. Clark: I will try to get around to my point this  
24 way: Was it the duty or responsibility of anybody below the  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 Chief of Staff in the War Plans Division to have examined  
2 the replies to General Marshall's message of the 27th of  
3 November?

4 Colonel Bratton: That was the duty of the War Plans  
5 Division.

6 Mr. Clark: That is what I am trying to get at. I am  
7 not trying to get you to reflect on your superiors.

8 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Clark: I appreciate your position.

10 Colonel Bratton: Yes, but I want to emphasize the fact  
11 it was not the duty of the Intelligence Division. This was  
12 an operational order.

13 Mr. Clark: Of course not knowing all about those things  
14 I did not know but what the Intelligence Division should  
15 have examined these messages from time to time and seen  
16 what was going on.

17 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, that was an operational order  
18 which implemented a war plan.

19 Mr. Clark: And it belonged in the War Plans Division?

20 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Clark: I want to make it very clear to you that  
22 I have no disposition whatever to embarrass you in any  
23 way.

24 Colonel Bratton: I understand, sir.  
25

AL-4

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Clark  
Senator Lucas

1 Mr. Clark: I have admiration for your record and  
2 your apparent frankness before this committee.

3 That is all I have.

4 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire.

5 Senator Lucas: Was General Miles present when the  
6 message was prepared by General Marshall that went out to  
7 General Short originally?

8 Colonel Bratton: You mean the message of the 27th of  
9 November?

10 Senator Lucas: The message of the 27th of November.

11 Colonel Bratton: I have no first-hand knowledge of  
12 that, sir.

13 Senator Lucas: I have forgotten whether he testified  
14 that you were present at that meeting or not. Anyhow, you  
15 made very clear to this committee that there is a distinction  
16 between an operational order and one that comes through the  
17 Intelligence Division, where it is merely an evaluation of  
18 information that has been received from time to time.

19 Colonel Bratton: Very, very different functions, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Yes. And you told the committee that  
21 in this inverse chain of events, where Stimson saw the  
22 message, Marshall saw the message and General Gerow saw  
23 the message, that under the war regulations General Miles  
24 would not see that message.  
25

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(2)

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 Colonel Bratton: I think, in view of the fact that  
3 the reply dealt with sabotage measures, a copy of the  
4 message should have been routed to General Miles. We know  
5 from his testimony that it was not. Now sabotage and  
6 counter-sabotage are all definitely in the province of the  
7 Intelligence Division. Now a mistake was made -- by whom  
8 I do not know -- in the routing of this message. It clearly  
9 stated in the message that it was a reply to a certain  
10 numbered message from General Marshall. It obviously was  
11 not, if you read the body of the thing. The body of the  
12 thing dealt with something that was an Intelligence matter.  
13 For that reason the message, or a copy of it, should have  
14 gone to General Miles.

15 Senator Lucas: When General Miles sent his sabotage  
16 message on November 28, I presume he did so without knowing  
17 anything about Short's reply.

18 Colonel Bratton: I presume so, sir. I am not the  
19 best witness on that.

20 Senator Lucas: I thought perhaps you had something to  
21 do with the preparation of that message and knew about it.

22 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

23 Senator Lucas: Did you know anything about the message  
24 that General Arnold had sent out?

25 Colonel Bratton: Not until after the attack, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1           Mr. Keefe: Will the Senator yield, to clear the record  
2 here?

3           Senator Lucas: Yes, I will yield.

4           Mr. Keefe: So we will not get confused. My recollection  
5 of the testimony is that the message which was sent by  
6 General Miles to General Short was sent on the 27th and not  
7 the 28th.

8           Senator Lucas: I think perhaps the Congressman may be  
9 correct.

10           Mr. Keefe: And there was a question, as you recall,  
11 Senator, that came up as to whether or not General Short  
12 got the Miles message before he had replied to the Marshall  
13 message. My recollection of the testimony is he said it  
14 came in shortly after he had sent his reply to the Marshall  
15 message, on the same day, November 27.

16           Senator Lucas: The Congressman is correct on that.  
17 General Short testified that he sent the reply to Marshall's  
18 message about 30 minutes after it was received, and a short  
19 time after the sabotage message came in.

20           Mr. Keefe: The Senator will recall the message that  
21 was sent by the Adjutant General and the message by General  
22 Arnold. They went out on the 28th.

23           Colonel Bratton: They went out on the 28th, and General  
24 Miles' message went out on the 27th.  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 Senator Lucas: I stand corrected.

2 Now one question further with respect to the magic  
3 that came in dividing Pearl Harbor into five different sections.  
4 You told Senator George that you were familiar with that,  
5 as I recall.

6 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: Did Miles ask you for your opinion as  
8 to what you believed that sort of a message meant?

9 Colonel Bratton: No, but I was prepared to give it  
10 to him if he had, because I had discussed this message and  
11 similar messages with my opposite number in the Navy at  
12 some length on numerous occasions.

13 I would like to explain that "enemy order of battle".

14 Senator Lucas: The what?

15 Colonel Bratton: The "enemy order of battle". I  
16 will explain the term, sir. This information about the  
17 strength, disposition, location, commanders of major units  
18 of the Japanese Army and of the Army Air Force, Intelligence  
19 along those lines, and counter-measures, that is measures  
20 that we would take to prevent the Japanese from securing  
21 similar intelligence as to our ground and air forces, were  
22 a function of the Intelligence Division of the Army, and,  
23 by the same token, information about enemy fleet movements  
24 and counter-measures are a function of Naval Intelligence.  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 I felt that the Japanese were showing unusual interest  
2 in the port at Honolulu, and discussed this matter with  
3 my opposite numbers in the Navy on several occasions. They  
4 were securing information in as great detail as possible  
5 on the Japanese Navy. They had a great big map up on the  
6 wall that showed the location of every battleship in the  
7 Japanese Navy, as far as they could find out. All Intelligence  
8 units had that sort of thing.

9 Senator Lucas: They traced the fleet, as best they  
10 could, from day to day on this map?

11 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. Now this business about  
12 dividing up Pearl Harbor was explained to me by my opposite  
13 numbers first as a device to reduce the volume of radio  
14 traffic, they had a code, to reduce the volume of the thing  
15 in making these reports.

16 Mr. Richardson: How would they do that, Colonel?

17 Colonel Bratton: By substituting numbers or letters  
18 for entire sentences.

19 Next, that it might be a plan for sabotage of such  
20 ships as were in Pearl Harbor, or it might be a plan for  
21 a submarine attack, or it might be a plan for an air attack.  
22 But -- and I was assured of this on numerous occasions --  
23 when the emergency arises the fleet is not going to be  
24 there, so this is a waste of time and effort on the part of  
25



Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 the Japanese Consul. Nobody in ONI, nobody in G-2, knew  
2 that any major element of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor on  
3 Sunday morning the 7th of December. We had all thought  
4 they had gone to sea.

5 Senator Lucas: Why did you think that?

6 Colonel Bratton: Because that was part of the war  
7 plan, and they had been given a war warning.

8 Sena'or Lucas: Colonel, who in the Intelligence Branch  
9 of the Army here in Washington had the custody of these  
10 files of magic?

11 Colonel Bratton: I did, sir. That is, as far as any  
12 existed outside of the SIS.

13 Senator Lucas: Yes. Well, there have been a number  
14 of messages that have been introduced in evidence, and  
15 contained in one of these exhibits, which show the amount  
16 of traffic that came from Tokyo to Hawaii and from Hawaii  
17 to Tokyo.

18 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: You recall I examined General Miles  
20 at some length with respect to the number of messages that  
21 went direct from Honolulu to Tokyo.

22 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Lucas: As I recall, it was some 22 or 23  
24 messages between the early spring and around September 23,  
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 and then for the first time in September a message came  
2 from Tokyo to Honolulu. As I recall, some 5 messages came  
3 after that from Tokyo to Honolulu.  
4

5 Now you were familiar with all of these messages that  
6 came, I take it?

7 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Lucas: Did that make any different impression  
9 upon you, the fact that Tokyo started sending messages to  
10 Honolulu in September, 1941, when for months before that they  
11 had been silent, as far as sending any messages to that  
12 point is concerned?

13 Colonel Bratton: I do not recall that it made any  
14 impression on me at the time, sir.

15 Senator Lucas: How long did you stay in G-2 after  
16 December 7, 1941?

17 Colonel Bratton: Until the fall of 1943.

18 Senator Lucas: Then where did you go?

19 Colonel Bratton: Headquarters of the Third Army at  
20 Fort Sam Houston.

21 Senator Lucas: And from there?

22 Colonel Bratton: To Europe.

23 Senator Lucas: You were in Europe when Colonel Clausen  
24 took your affidavit?

25 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

(4)

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Senator Lucas: Well, there has been some question about what Colonel Clausen did or did not do over there in Europe. Were you ever mistreated by Clausen in the way of being browbeaten into signing the affidavit?

Colonel Bratton: Not in any manner whatsoever, sir. My relations with Colonel Clausen were cordial in every respect.

Senator Lucas: Did he seek, at any time while he was there, to have you change your testimony from what it was in previous hearings?

Colonel Bratton: No. He asked me to comment on certain papers that he had brought with him to Europe, most of which were in the form of affidavits from various officers bearing on certain parts of magic and their delivery.

Senator Lucas: How long was it after Pearl Harbor that you first testified before any Board?

Colonel Bratton: Three years.

Senator Lucas: Three years. And did you know at any time during that three years that you might be called to testify before any Board of Inquiry?

Colonel Bratton: I supposed that I would be, if they ever had one.

Senator Lucas: Did you immediately following Pearl Harbor make any memorandum or notes of your activities around

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 the 5th or 6th of December?

2  
3 Colonel Bratton: The one that has already been intro-  
4 duced by General Miles in evidence as a memorandum of the  
5 events of the morning of the 7th of December 1941. I read  
6 over what he had written and offered a number of suggestions  
7 and recommended a number of changes based upon my recollection  
8 of what had happened, and we got together in the preparation  
9 of the thing. That is the only memorandum that either he  
10 or I made at the time, that I can remember now.

(5) 11 Senator Lucas: And then it was some three years before  
12 you were again called upon to testify?

13 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Lucas: Where were you at that time?

15 Colonel Bratton: What time, sir?

16 Senator Lucas: When you testified before the Grunert  
17 Board.

18 Colonel Bratton: I was at the advance headquarters  
19 of the Third Army, 50 miles east of Verdun, in the midst  
20 of a campaign.

21 Senator Lucas: You were in battle?

22 Colonel Bratton: Well, I was on the Commanding General's  
23 staff.

24 Senator Lucas: I say you were up there fighting the  
25 Nazis. I think that is all.