


THE SLAV INVASION
AND
THE MINE WORKERS



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Thordale

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LYCOMING

Hughesville

Wyoming

Kingston

Plymouth

Nanticoke

Glen Lyon

Wanamans

Newport

Shickshinny

Freeland

Driffton

Hazleton

Eckley

Black C.

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MOUNTAIN

COLUMBIA

Susquehanna

MONTOUR

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Sunbury

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Shamokin

Locust Gap

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PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHRACITE
COAL FIELDS

SCALE OF MILES

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THE SLAV INVASION AND THE MINE WORKERS

A STUDY IN IMMIGRATION

BY

FRANK JULIAN WARNE, PH.D.



PHILADELPHIA AND LONDON
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

1904

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INTRODUCTION

THE recent change in the character of immigration to the United States, by which natives of Poland, Austria, Hungary, Russia, Italy, etc., have very largely supplanted those previously coming from Ireland, England, Wales, Germany, Scotland, etc., is having far-reaching effects upon American institutional and industrial life. This particular study in immigration points out the most important of these effects by presenting the results of a first-hand investigation of actual conditions in the anthracite coal-fields of Northeastern Pennsylvania.

This book shows how the competition of the so-called Slav races, including the Italian, for the places in and about the hard-coal mines of the English-speaking mine-workers—the Irish, English, Welsh, Germans, Scotch, etc.—has resulted in a conflict between these two distinct groups for industrial supremacy in hard-coal mining, and

how this is forcing the English-speaking nationalities out of this industry and out of that section. The strikes of 1900 and 1902 were mere surface indications of the wide-spread industrial unrest which naturally accompanies this struggle; they should be regarded as mere episodes in this great conflict of races. While emphasis is herein properly laid upon the industrial characteristics of this immigration—for immigration in the anthracite region is primarily an industrial problem—attention is also directed towards some of its educational, religious, political, and general social features.

In face of the tendency for the better citizen type of English-speaking mine-workers to leave the coal-fields, will the American communities in the anthracite-producing counties be able to assimilate the enormous influx of the Slav element? It is upon the answer to this question that so much depends. The best that can be said now is that this power of assimilation in Northeastern Pennsylvania, if not overestimated, is being weakened by the heavy task thrust upon

it, and that unless aid comes from other sources it may be questioned whether American ideals and institutions are to be equal to the work of making the Slav immigrant into an American citizen. The one bright ray of hope lighting up the uncertain future is shed from the activity in these coal-fields of the United Mine Workers of America. With this organization, to a much greater degree than most of us realize, rests the solution of many of the problems presented in the hard-coal producing communities. Its power of uniting the mine-workers of all nationalities and creeds and tongues—of bringing together the Slav and the English-speaking employees on the common ground of industrial self-interest—has only recently been demonstrated. Through this it is breaking down the strong racial ties which until its entrance into the region kept the two groups apart. In brief, this organization is socializing the heterogeneous mass. In thus indicating the task the United Mine Workers of America is performing, and must continue to perform, the writer does not lose sight of the fact

that its presence in the hard-coal fields gives rise to other and just as important problems for organized society to solve.

As for the English-speaking races engaged in hard-coal mining, it is plain that the success of the United Mine Workers of America in the strikes of 1900 and 1902 is to be only a temporary respite. Their supremacy in the anthracite mining industry is soon to be a thing of the past, as the Slav nationalities, with their great power of industrial competition, have already secured too strong a foothold.

If the writer is able to present and to indicate the tendencies of the more important industrial forces which this Slav immigration has put in operation in the anthracite region; if he has impressed the fact that the problem in the hard-coal fields, although presented there, perhaps, in a more acute form, is, nevertheless, but part of a universal problem encountered in nearly every section of the United States; if he has sufficiently indicated that intelligent and united efforts are needed to control these forces of immigration for

the welfare of society and for the preservation of our institutions; if the writer has done all this his labors will have been well repaid. If some rational action is not taken to remedy the conditions which the United States have permitted to develop in the Pennsylvania hard-coal fields, it is just as certain that organized society will reap the inevitable consequences, as it is that to-morrow's sun is to rise in the morning.

This race problem in the anthracite region was first presented to the writer during the strike of 1900, while in the fields as staff correspondent for the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, in which capacity he also served during the strike of 1902. His investigations, extending now over a period of nearly four years, have strongly confirmed these first impressions as to the underlying economic cause of the industrial unrest in that section of our country. An attempt to express its salient features was first made in *The Outlook* of August 30, 1902, in an article, "The Real Cause of the Miners' Strike." In September-October, 1903, a series of eleven articles in the Philadel-

phia *Public Ledger*, under the title, "Slav Invasion of the Anthracite Region," discussed the problem in greater detail. The reception accorded these presentations of the subject has led to the writing of this book, in which is set forth a more complete analysis of the situation.

During the preparation of this volume the writer has held the Senior Fellowship in Economics in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Pennsylvania.

F. J. W.

PHILADELPHIA, March 16, 1904.

THE SLAV INVASION AND THE MINE WORKERS

CHAPTER I

THE MINE WORKERS' EARLIER STRUGGLES

IN the recent achievements of organized labor in the anthracite coal-fields of Pennsylvania, those earlier hopeful, futile struggles of a generation ago bid fair to be forgotten. Yet the way to ultimate success for the United Mine Workers of America was paved by the Benevolent Association of the early seventies; and, dear as John Mitchell is to those whose cause he has championed, there stands in the little mining town of St. Clair, in Schuylkill County, a monument to a leader in his day no less indefatigable and beloved. The history of labors' conflict with capital in the Pennsylvania hard-coal mines pre-

vious to the coming of the Slav is, in the main, comprised in the story of John Siney and of that vigorous—yet ill-starred—organization which he promoted and led through most of its seven years of conflict.

Coal-mining was undertaken in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania as early as 1820; but until the close of the Civil War the line between operator and miner was not very distinctly drawn. It was not unusual to find the operator and miner one and the same person, and it may be held as generally true that the operator had at one time been a miner. During all this period the struggles most worthy of emphasis were those between individuals as to the quantity of coal-lands and the number of mines each should secure. Yet differences between employers and employed not unnaturally arose then, as later; and as early as 1849 these had led to the formation, particularly in the Schuylkill field, of an organization which, from the name of a local leader, was called Bates Union. But a strike for an increase of wages was unsuccessful, dissensions arose among

the members, their leader betrayed them and stole their funds, and the union died an early death.

No general movement for organizing the hard-coal mine-workers is again in evidence until about the close of the Civil War. In the late fifties the establishment among the mine-workers of the Forestville Improvement Company of an organization "for mutual protection," led to the foundation of local unions in different parts of the region. These now sprang into renewed activity; and in 1868 we have accounts of a general convention of their representatives from all three fields meeting to consider the general fall in prices and the problem of over-production of coal. Wages had already been reduced the previous year, and now other reductions were threatened.

This condition had been brought about principally by the unrestrained competition, or rather speculation, which the close of the war, with the release of capital for investment and of men for work, had brought to the industry. It was

marked by a general extension of the railroads, which were being substituted for the canals in the transportation to market of the larger part of the product of the mines. This railway construction not only opened up new markets, but it brought into operation such a large number of mines as to emphasize all the evils of over-production. The total output of the anthracite region in 1860 was 8,500,000 tons; this had nearly doubled by 1870, the production in that year exceeding 16,000,000 tons. This increase came, too, at a time when bituminous coal was coming into more general use in manufactures, thus weakening the demand for the anthracite product. The only help for the miners against such adverse conditions lay in organization and enlightened leadership, and these were forthcoming.

First as a bricklayer, and afterwards as a worker in English cotton-mills, John Siney was thoroughly trained in the successful methods of trade-unionism in the Old Country. He perhaps the first, certainly the most clearly, of all their

leaders, saw that only by regulation of production could the mine-workers hope for regular wages. Experience had taught the men that over-production meant falling prices and reduced wages. Siney showed them that it was to their best interest to control that production rather than to wait until falling prices brought decreased wages and the inevitable strike. Out of this clear conception of economic conditions came the genesis of the Workingman's Benevolent Association (afterwards known under a charter as the Miners' and Laborers' Benevolent Association), which was formed after the general convention of 1868. According to its constitution its objects were to maintain a standard of wages, to provide for sick and disabled miners, and to care for their widows and orphans.*

But the necessity for organization was not alone apparent to the miners. A year or two

* Article I. of the constitution of the Summit Hill branch stated that "the object of the society is to make such arrangements as will enable the operator and the miner to rule the coal-market."

prior to the birth of their association the operators had already formed co-operative associations in each of the three fields, and when the first great struggle came these groups of employers were united under the Anthracite Board of Trade of the Schuylkill Coal Region. It is through this board that we first find the operators treating with the mine-workers as to wages and other conditions of employment.

The first strike of the mine-employees under the Workingman's Benevolent Association was declared on July 1, 1868, ostensibly for the enforcement of the State eight-hour law, which had just then been enacted by the State Legislature through the efforts of the miners, but in reality to deplete the coal-market, which had been glutted by the preceding period of speculation and over-production. In the latter direction only had the strike any apparent success, and even this was but temporary. In May of the following year over-production was as bad as ever. The operators now proposed a reduction in wages; but the association decided upon a sus-

pension of mining, which became effective May 10. Its object was the reduction or depletion of the surplus of coal already in the market and the prevention of the enormous over-supply, which the miners feared would not only keep the price of labor down to the prices of the previous winter, but would eventually compel local suspensions, still greater reductions of wages, and, in consequence, local strikes. This was stated in the order of the Miners' and Laborers' Association of June 9, 1869, directing the miners to return to work in all the districts where they "can agree with their employers as to basis and conditions of resumption." At the same time, in reply to general criticism which the suspension had met with from the press, the order explained that "we do not nor have desired to run the coal too high in the market, but, on the contrary, we prefer the steady, healthy market, which will afford to the operators and dealers fair interest on their investment and at the same time receive for our share a fair day's wage for a fair day's work." In order to guard against future over-

production certain restrictions were placed upon the men by the association, such as requiring the miners to load one car of coal less per day than formerly.

The suspension had lasted five weeks, and resulted in the adoption of that "sliding scale" about which so many of the later battles of mine-labor were destined to be waged. The sliding scale was simply an agreement that the wages of miners in the Lehigh and Schuylkill fields* should be regulated according to the selling price of coal. At this time contract miners working on the mammoth vein were receiving fifty-seven and one-half cents a ton (forty-eight cubic feet); company miners (those working by the day) sixteen dollars a week; and inside laborers fourteen dollars a week. For the Lehigh fields these wages were to prevail when coal sold for five dollars a ton at tide-water (Elizabethport),

* The miners of the Wyoming field had not taken a very prominent part in the suspension, being induced by higher wages to continue at work, and in consequence they did not secure the sliding scale.

with an increase of fifteen per cent. for every one dollar advance above that price. In the Schuylkill field Port Carbon was the basing point and three dollars a ton the selling price of coal; for every twenty-five cents increase over this price wages were to advance five cents a ton. Wages were not to be affected if the price at either basing point fell below the basis rate. On this sliding scale arrangement the miners, during the remaining months of 1869, received twelve per cent. more than the basis wages.

Difficulties arose at once over this sliding scale. For 1870 the Board of Trade proposed that the basis in the Schuylkill field be made two dollars a ton. This meant to the miners a reduction in wages of from twenty-five to forty per cent., and the association refused to consider it. In January the Board improved somewhat their proposition, but still providing for a reduction in wages. The association insisted upon a continuance of the three dollar basis, and on April 2 the Schuylkill operators inaugurated a lockout, which lasted until August 1. The mines in the

Lehigh and Wyoming fields remained in operation. In July an agreement was reached on the old three dollar basis, but with an eight and one-quarter per cent. sliding scale for each movement of twenty-five cents in the price of coal. A still more important change was made: wages were now to be affected if the price fell below the basis just the same as when the price went above the basis. The price of coal soon fell below the basis and remained there, with the result that the miners were forced to accept reductions instead of securing increases, as in the previous year.

Out of this Schuylkill lockout came what is believed to be the first signed joint agreement in the history of coal-mining in this country. It was entered into July 29, at Pottsville, between a committee of the Workingman's Benevolent Association, representing the mine-workers, and one of the Anthracite Board of Trade, representing the operators.

On the part of the association it was agreed not to sustain a man discharged for incompetency, bad workmanship, bad conduct, or other

legitimate cause. Each man was to work regularly; and miners earning designated amounts above one hundred dollars a month, excluding expenses, were to accept a reduction in wages ranging from ten to forty per cent. On the part of the operators it was agreed not to discharge any man or officer for actions or duties imposed upon him by the Workingman's Benevolent Association. For obtaining the monthly prices of coal upon which wages were based the president of the Board of Trade and the president of the Association of Schuylkill County "shall meet (on the) twentieth day (of) each month and select five operators, who shall, on the 25th inst. following, produce a statement, sworn or affirmed to, of the prices of coal at Port Carbon for all sizes above pea coal. The five operators shall be selected from a list of those shipping over 40,000 tons annually, and none shall be selected a second time until the list is exhausted. The price of coal so obtained shall fix the rates of wages for that month." The agreement was signed by five operators and five miners.

But the agreement was made only to be broken. Following continued over-production, which kept both prices and wages low, each side began to accuse the other of breach of faith. When the working of the sliding scale in 1870 brought a decrease instead of an increase in wages, the leaders found it impossible to control the mine-workers, and they went out on a strike at the beginning of 1871, the entire anthracite region becoming involved. In the Wyoming field, where the sliding scale had never been in force, the miners struck against a proposed reduction in wages equivalent to thirty-four per cent. on contract work. Ignoring the association, the operators of the Schuylkill field attempted to treat directly with their employees, but in this they failed. Next they began the importation of new men to operate their mines, which was followed by riots and the calling out of the militia. Securing possession of the arms of the soldiers, the miners marched to every mine where work had been resumed with non-union men and compelled a suspension of operations.

On April 17, through the efforts of Eckley B. Coxe, an operator at Drifton, and President Siney, of the Workingman's Benevolent Association, a joint committee of miners and operators, representing all three fields, met at Mauch Chunk in the hope of arbitrating the questions in dispute. The most important of these dealt with wages and, of course, with the sliding scale; the attitude of the operators towards the miners' organization; the interference of the association with non-union men and the operation of the mines. No agreement could be reached by the committee on any of these points; but one month later a decision by Judge William Elwell, who had previously been agreed upon as umpire, proved satisfactory to both sides, and mining operations were resumed. In the umpire's decision the sliding scale for the Schuylkill field was to be one cent for each three cents' rise and fall in the price of coal, with a two dollar and seventy-five cent basis, but if the price of coal fell below two dollars and twenty-five cents there was to be no further fall in wages. The other

questions were to be submitted to arbitration boards in each of the three fields, to be composed of three operators and three miners, and, if necessary, there was to be an umpire for each field.

And yet again, before the end of the year, both operators and miners were disregarding the award. There were local strikes for increased wages, which demands some of the operators at once granted. At one or two collieries, when the price of coal fell below two dollars and seventy-five cents, the miners refused to accept a corresponding reduction in wages. In not a few cases the advice of the leaders, who endeavored to hold the men to their agreement, was disregarded. Despite these and other difficulties, the agreement was renewed each year until 1874, at joint meetings of committees representing the Board of Trade and the Workingman's Benevolent Association. For 1872 the basis was made two dollars and fifty cents, and wages were not to fall below the price set by it for more than two months of the year.

On the whole, prices and wages were fairly well maintained during this period by the sliding scale agreement which the Benevolent Association had brought about, and the permanent success of the association may have seemed assured. Yet already at work were the forces which were to overthrow it, with most of what it had accomplished for mine-labor in Eastern Pennsylvania.

CHAPTER II

THE DOWNFALL OF THE UNION

AMONG the many reasons for the ultimate failure of the trade-union movement in the anthracite coal-region, three causes are written so large that they may not be misread. The first was a defect inherent in nearly all such movements—the inability to control all the workers in the three fields. This alone might in time have been overcome; but beyond it lay two factors that could neither be foreseen nor reckoned with. The one was railway ownership of the mines, and the other the “Mollie Maguires.”

In every industry, in every community, is to be found the individual whose unenlightened self-interest leads him to the commission of acts which, while they seem to be for his immediate advantage, nevertheless cause injury, if not destruction, to the interests of his fellow-men. The community frames more or less effective laws to

control the acts or person of this individual and to safeguard the public welfare. But unless an expression of the united moral sentiment is effective, the industrial organization has no such controlling device. Despite the small area confining the anthracite industry, the parties to the agreements already described could not force them upon all producers of hard coal. During the attempt of 1868-76 to work out a satisfactory co-operative plan of production, only once were the mine-workers of all three districts united in a common cause—and then, as will be seen, the harmony came too late.

Nor were the operators united. While as a class they had organized the Anthracite Board of Trade, it was confined, for the most part, to the operators in the Schuylkill and Lehigh fields, not a few of the Wyoming operators being beyond its jurisdiction. These were usually the men who played havoc with the well-wrought plans of the miners' union and the operators' organization in their attempts to benefit the greater number engaged in the industry. They did this

in 1869, when the Lehigh and Schuylkill miners suspended work to deplete the over-supplied market, by temporarily advancing wages. The object, of course, was to enable them to increase their output and their profits at the expense of their fellow-operators in the lower fields. In 1870, when the Schuylkill miners again entered upon a suspension, the same thing happened—the Wyoming and Lehigh men were kept at work through a compromise with their employers. In 1871 the Wyoming operators, finding they could not pay these higher wages while all three fields were in operation, attempted a reduction. This the miners opposed by inaugurating a strike. Believing they had now an opportunity to unite the mine-workers of all three fields, the Schuylkill miners, despite the agreement they had entered into with the operators, joined the Wyoming men on strike. With the entire region idle, the self-interest of the operators in the Wyoming field led them to offer their men the old rates of wages, and, after a four-weeks' strike, they attempted to resume work.

And now there entered the second great factor in the overthrow of the Benevolent Association. The railroads, which heretofore had confined their function to the transportation of coal, began to buy coal-lands and to enter upon mining operations. The repeated strikes and suspensions and lockouts had made the transportation of coal so uncertain that the revenues of the railroads were considerably affected. The interests of the railroads,—that of the Reading in particular, which had entered the region in 1842,—as interpreted by those then at their head, pointed to the proprietorship of the mines, if they were to be certain of the product for transportation, especially as other railroads were rapidly being built into the region and were beginning to compete for the traffic.

The first indication of the changed policy of the railroads was given when the operators attempted to resume mining in 1871. Without warning, the railroads raised the freight rates on coal to figures hitherto unheard of. The rates of the Reading were trebled at one bound. The

price of coal, of course, soared with the freight rates. Anxious as were the operators to produce coal after the long period of enforced idleness, they closed at once their just reopened mines. Public excitement ran high, and a legislative committee was appointed to investigate the situation. But the railroads had the upper hand, and they knew it. The legislative committee made a favorable report as to the legality of their acts, and the results they had planned for were attained. Many of the operators were forced to sell to the railroad companies, inaugurating a period of rapid railway purchase of coal-lands which has continued down to the present day. There are to-day less than seventy-five "independent" operators in the entire region.

This direct entrance of the transportation companies into the situation brought a more determined and bitter opposition to the miners' organization, and gave it a foe much more powerful than any union of independent operators could ever be. And one of the strongest weapons put into the hands of this new enemy of the miners'

organization was furnished by mine-workers themselves.

Public sympathy with the miners' cause was greatly weakened by the wide-spread lawlessness which prevailed throughout the region at this period. Much of it necessarily accompanied the numerous strikes inaugurated by the Workingman's Benevolent Association, but to this organization was also attributed, by the railroads and by an indiscriminating public, the burning of breakers and the scores of murders committed by the "Mollie Maguires," a secret, oath-bound organization which flourished in the region from 1866 to 1876.* Although the association had no

* The "Mollie Maguires" were principally Irish immigrants, who brought the society with them from Ireland, where it had been formed as the Ancient Order of Hibernians, under Robert Emmet, for the purpose of freeing their native land from British control. None but Catholics were eligible to membership, and, despite the opposition of the Catholic Church and its priests in the anthracite region, the society continued in existence nearly ten years with the worst possible elements opposed to law and order in control. Its secret meetings, which

direct relation with the society, yet some of the members of the former belonged to the "Mollie Maguires." And when the terror which the depredations of the latter had given rise to

planned murder and incendiarism, were conducted with solemn religious rites, and its vengeance seemed to be directed mainly against mine superintendents and bosses. A number of murders of such officials was traced to the society, but in every case alibis would be sworn to in the trial by other members of the society, and convictions were rare. So daring did they become, and so atrocious were the crimes committed, that detectives were employed to ferret out the criminals. One of these was John McParlan, an Irishman and a Catholic, who in 1873 succeeded in becoming a member of the society under the name of James McKenna. He played his part so well that he continued a member for three years before his real purpose was discovered and he was forced to flee. He had gained the confidence of the leaders, however, and had become secretary of the Shenandoah branch of the society. The evidence of the operations of the society he was thus able to furnish led to the arrest of seventy members. With his mass of undisputed testimony, and through some of the prisoners turning State's evidence, twelve members of the society were convicted of murder in the first degree, four of murder in the second degree, four of being accessory to murder, and six of perjury.

was relieved by the conviction and hanging of the criminals, public indignation was skilfully directed in taking vengeance upon the miners' organization.

By this time the organization itself had become greatly weakened through dissensions among the members of the different districts. The Schuylkill miners were constantly complaining that they could put no faith in the men of the Northern field. In fact, the Schuylkill mine-workers refused to abide by the joint agreement of 1871 unless they could be assured that the mine-employees in the Wyoming and Lehigh fields would observe good faith with them. Otherwise they threatened to make their own agreements with the operators, regardless of the interests of the other mine-workers. It was at most a heterogeneous mass of non-self-governing men with which the leaders had to deal, the different races presenting complicated interests which took the ablest of men to harmonize. And when, by the election of John Siney to the presidency of the Miners' National Association in October, 1873,

the direction of the anthracite miners passed into less able hands, it needed no prophet, even at that day, to foretell the end of the Workingman's Benevolent Association. The success of previous strikes, the adoption of the sliding scale, the passage of the first mine-inspection law, and the securing of other direct advantages for the mine-employees, had led the officers—as too much sudden success among such men is likely to do—into a too arrogant use of their power. They embroiled their organization in the tempestuous seas of politics, and the welfare of the mine-workers was, in consequence, soon being antagonized by both parties playing the interests of the miners and operators against one another.

The end came in 1875. Prices and wages had been fairly well maintained through the association's efforts, until the industrial depression, which had begun in 1873, could no longer be prevented from having its effect upon the anthracite markets and industry. In 1875 the operators proposed a reduction in wages of from ten to twenty per cent. On January 1

a six-months' strike was inaugurated by the miners of the Lehigh and Schuylkill fields. The struggle was a fierce one, as both sides felt it to be a final effort. The miners lost—the strike terminated in their complete surrender upon the terms of the operators. The Workingman's Benevolent Association was completely destroyed, never to be heard of again, and it was to be many years before the anthracite mine-workers were to recover from their loss sufficiently to attempt another such organization.

This ten-year period of conflict in the anthracite coal-fields, which has been briefly traced, was a struggle towards industrial organization on the part of the English-speaking mine-workers—the Englishman, Scotchman, Irishman, Welshman, and German. We have seen how and why they failed. There followed a period of twenty-five years or more during which the contest between the railroad mining companies and the independent operators for the control of the anthracite product stands out as

the most conspicuous tendency in this great industry. Organized labor, completely crushed, was quiescent. Why the scattered fragments were not gathered together is partly to be discerned in a study of the effects of that movement of population to the United States from Poland, Austria, Russia, Hungary, and Italy, which gave to the anthracite industry a type of laborer widely different from the English-speaking nationalities.

CHAPTER III

THE COMING OF THE SLAV

ONE of the most remarkable race migrations in history is recorded in the United States immigration statistics for the last two decades of the nineteenth century. A group of people of Northern Europe that up to this time had contributed the bulk of our foreign-born population, with an almost startling suddenness yielded their place to races which, before 1880, were scarcely represented among us. Such a change in the character of our immigration must necessarily have exerted a tremendous influence upon labor conditions in the United States. Nowhere were the effects so marked as in the anthracite coal-fields of Pennsylvania.

Immigration to this country down to 1890, according to the report of the Twelfth Census,*

* Population, Part I.

was practically dominated by the natives of Germany, Ireland, Great Britain, Canada, and Newfoundland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark; these five classes combined having contributed very nearly 13,000,000 out of the total of 15,428,000 immigrants. "From 1891 to 1900, however," says the report, "they have contributed out of a total of 3,687,564 immigrants only 1,539,926, or a little more than two-fifths, as against three-fourths for the ten-year period ending in 1890, more than four-fifths for that ending in 1880, and fully nine-tenths for those ending in 1870 and 1860, respectively." The decrease in this element of our immigration has been from 88.2 per cent. in 1880 to 74.4 per cent. in 1900; immigrants from Germany decreasing from 29.4 per cent. to 25.8 per cent., from Ireland from 27.8 per cent. to 15.6 per cent., and from Great Britain from 13.7 per cent. to 11.3 per cent. The report also says that Germany, which constituted more than one-third of all the immigrants for the ten-year periods ending in 1860 and 1870, and more

than one-fourth of all the arrivals during the next two periods, has furnished barely one-seventh of the immigrants during the past ten years; while Ireland, which constituted more than two-fifths of all the immigrants from 1821 to 1850, more than one-third of those from 1851 to 1860, and very nearly one-fifth of those from 1861 to 1870, has furnished but a little more than one-tenth of the total number for the decade ending in 1900. In brief, there has been a material reduction since 1890 in the proportions of immigrants represented by natives of Germany, Ireland, and Great Britain, and but a very slight increase from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. In 1870 these constituted over nine-tenths of the entire foreign-born population; in 1900 they constituted less than three-fourths of all foreign-born persons in the United States.

In the anthracite region miners from these countries developed, before 1880, a common standard of living and a more or less common knowledge of the English language. For purposes of distinction, therefore, they have often

been grouped as "English-speaking" races, and under this rough but useful designation they will be treated of in this and the following chapters.

In striking contrast to this decreasing tide of the Teutonic races washed upon our shores is the vast wave which has rushed upon us from Southern Europe. From the report of the Twelfth Census * it is seen that during the decade ending in 1900 Austria-Hungary (including Bohemia), Russia, with what was formerly Poland, and Italy each contributed a larger proportion of all the immigrants to the United States than any of the countries from which the bulk of our immigration formerly came. This is the more impressive when it is remembered that prior to 1880 no considerable amount of immigration had been received from Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Italy. In 1850, according to the census of that year, the natives from these countries constituted less than one-third of one per cent. of

* Population, Part I.

all the foreign-born in the United States; in 1870, about two per cent.; in 1880, four per cent.; in 1890, 8.9 per cent.; while in 1900 they had increased to 18.1 per cent. Thus the proportion represented by this class of immigrants has more than doubled in the past ten years. While they represent about one-sixth of the total number of immigrants from 1881 to 1890, they form fully one-half of all for the decade ending in 1900. If each of the countries is taken separately, it is found that, with the single exception of Bohemia, there has been an increase since 1890 of much more than one hundred per cent. in the natives of these countries coming to the United States.

In discussions of labor troubles in the anthracite fields the term "Slav" has come to be applied to all these and other nationalities from Southern Europe. As an industrial class, the laborers from those countries have so many common characteristics, and are so notably different from the English-speaking mine-workers, that a single name for the group has become a necessity. The

term has some justification in the large number of real Slavs in the hard-coal region, such as the Slovaks, Croatians, Servians, and Slovenes. But the Lithuanians, who constitute a large proportion of the "foreign" element in the three anthracite coal-fields, are not Slavs. Their language, which is claimed to be the most ancient in Europe, is akin to the Sanskrit in grammatical forms, and differs from all Slavic languages. These people come from Southern Russia, their native home being along the River Nieman. The Poles come from the district along the Vistula River. Of the Slavs proper the Croatians and the Servians speak the same dialect. The leading Slav race in the anthracite region, in point of numbers, is the Slovak. Its members speak the dialect of Bohemia. The Roumanians speak a language grafted upon their own directly from the old Romans.

The accompanying language map shows the distribution in Continental Europe of the different races of which our Slav immigration is

largely composed. It is a reproduction, with some details omitted and with a number of additions supplied to answer our purpose, of



a map from a Bohemian atlas intended to indicate in particular the distribution of the Slav races in Austria-Hungary. In the northern part of the empire are the Bohemians, Slovaks, Poles, and Ruthenians, and in the southern district, along the Adriatic Sea, the Slovenes, Servians, and Croatians. The map shows how they have been separated, wedge-like, by an invasion of the

Germans from the West and of the Magyars from the East (Asia).

Let us see now what effect this remarkable change in the nationalities of our immigrants has had upon the anthracite industry of Pennsylvania.

CHAPTER IV

THE SLAV IN THE ANTHRACITE REGION

DIM traces of the entrance into the anthracite industry of the Slav races are discerned as far back as 1878. Just what year they first made their appearance is not definitely known, but it is certain that they were at work about the collieries shortly after the destruction of the Workingman's Benevolent Association in 1875. By 1880, in the Southern or Schuylkill field,* there were 1386 persons "born in Poland," according to the census of that year. In 1890 these are reported to have increased 5337. In that year, in the Schuylkill field, those born in Austria (including Bohemia) numbered 3534; in Russia, 2200; in Hungary, 3164; and in Italy, 1254. All those races designated as Slavs totalled 16,875 in the Schuylkill field at the taking of

* Carbon, Dauphin, Northumberland, and Schuylkill counties.

the census in 1890. Ten years later—by 1900—*they had nearly doubled*, their total number being 32,208. Those born in Poland had increased 5627; in Austria, 3672; in Russia, 3619; in Hungary, 1283, and those from Italy, 1132.

This notable increase of the Slav nationalities in the Schuylkill field is conveniently shown in the following table:

SLAV RACES, SCHUYLKILL FIELD, 1880-1900.

| Country of Birth. | 1880. | 1890. | 1900. |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total foreign-born | 40,953 | 54,266 | 59,422 |
| Poland | 1,386 | 6,723 | 12,350 |
| Austria | | 3,534 | 7,206 |
| Russia | | 2,200 | 5,819 |
| Hungary | | 3,164 | 4,447 |
| Italy | | 1,254 | 2,386 |
| Total | 1,386 | 16,875 | 32,208 |

In the Northern or Wyoming field, more definitely in Lackawanna County, by 1880 the Slav had barely begun to set foot, there being but a meagre eighty representatives of those races reported in that district by the census of that year.

By 1890, however, these eighty had increased to 6181, and by 1900 to 18,818. This increase is given in detail as follows:

SLAV RACES, LACKAWANNA COUNTY, 1880-1900.

| Country of Birth. | 1880. | 1890. | 1900. |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total foreign-born | 26,917 | 46,399 | 55,727 |
| Poland | 80 | 781 | 7,739 |
| Austria | .. | 1,720 | 3,742 |
| Russia | .. | 853 | 846 |
| Hungary | .. | 1,618 | 2,511 |
| Italy | .. | 1,209 | 3,980 |
| Total | 80 | 6,181 | 18,818 |

The preceding table accounts for only Lackawanna County. The Northern or Wyoming field includes also a portion of Luzerne County, and that particular portion of the population of the latter which inhabits the northern coal-district should properly be considered in tracing the increase in the number of Slavs according to fields. This is not possible, however, because the Schuylkill field (including the Lehigh field) also extends into Luzerne County; and as statistics

showing the population of this county inhabiting the separate fields it includes are not available, any attempt to measure the movement in this section of the region according to fields cannot be absolutely accurate.

Taking the population of the whole of Luzerne County by itself, however, we find the Slav races there to have increased from 449 in 1880, to 19,330 in 1890, and to nearly double the latter number—36,265—in 1900; this increase, I feel sure, being largely in that section of the county including a part of the Southern field. The increase in the number of Slavs in Luzerne County is shown in detail as follows:

SLAV RACES, LUZERNE COUNTY, 1880-1900.

| Country of Birth. | 1880. | 1890. | 1900. |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total foreign-born | 35,716 | 64,103 | 72,962 |
| Poland | 449 | 7,408 | 17,031 |
| Austria | ... | 3,792 | 6,156 |
| Russia | ... | 1,365 | 3,146 |
| Hungary | ... | 5,104 | 6,512 |
| Italy | ... | 1,661 | 3,420 |
| Total | 449 | 19,330 | 36,265 |

Taking the entire anthracite region,—Carbon, Columbia, Dauphin, Lackawanna, Luzerne, Northumberland, Schuylkill, and Susquehanna counties,—the increase in the Slav races from 1880 to 1900 is found to be as follows:

SLAV RACES, ENTIRE ANTHRACITE REGION.

| Country of Birth. | 1880. | 1890. | 1900. |
|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Total foreign-born | 108,827 | 170,582 | 193,692 |
| Poland | 1,925 | 15,142 | 37,677 |
| Austria | | 9,226 | 17,876 |
| Russia | | 4,474 | 10,283 |
| Hungary | | 9,931 | 13,534 |
| Italy | | 4,234 | 9,958 |
| Total | 1,925 | 43,007 | 89,328 |

Thus is indicated the composition of that great stream of Slav labor which for the past twenty years has been flowing into that section of Pennsylvania. Since 1880 this particular industrial group has been increased by over 87,000, an average increase of at least twelve each day during this entire period. Practically all of them have gone there to work in and about the coal-mines.

CHAPTER V

EFFECT UPON THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING RACES

DOWN to about 1880 the mining of hard coal was confined almost exclusively to native Americans, and to Canadian, English, Welsh, Irish, Scotch, and German immigrants. In 1880, according to the census of that year, the total foreign-born population in the anthracite region was 108,827, of which 102,421 were of the English-speaking races. Those from Ireland numbered 45,330; from England and Wales, 33,214; from Germany, 20,686; and from Scotland, 3191.

Taking the Schuylkill field, the total foreign-born population (the natives are not here considered, for which an explanation will be given later) in 1880 was 40,953. Of these, 37,845 were of what I have designated as English-speaking races. Those from Ireland numbered 15,932; from England and Wales, 10,983; from Germany, 10,072, and from Scotland, 858. Ten

years later the total foreign-born population of these counties had increased 13,413,—that is, to 54,266. Despite this, the total of the English-speaking races had decreased 1669. The Irish showed a decrease of 3846; while the English and Welsh increased 575, the Germans 1573, and the Scotch 29. By 1900 the total foreign-born reached 59,422, while the English-speaking races showed a decrease of 10,060,—that is, to 26,116. The Irish decreased 4480; the English and Welsh, 3055; the Germans, 2312; and the Scotch, 213.

These figures are conveniently summarized in the following table:

ENGLISH-SPEAKING RACES, SCHUYLKILL FIELD, 1880-1900.

| Country of Birth. | 1880. | 1890. | 1900. |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total foreign-born | 40,953 | 54,266 | 59,422 |
| Ireland | 15,932 | 12,086 | 7,606 |
| England) | | 6,734 | 4,970 |
| and } | 10,983 | | |
| Wales) | | 4,824 | 3,533 |
| Germany | 10,072 | 11,645 | 9,333 |
| Scotland | 858 | 887 | 674 |
| Total English-speaking. | 37,845 | 36,176 | 26,116 |

The most marked decrease, it will be observed from the accompanying table, is in the number of those born in Ireland. This is explained partly by the determined efforts of the operators, about 1875, following the reign of terror inaugurated by the "Mollie Maguires," to force the Irish in particular out of the coal-mining industry, as the members of that race were credited for the greater part with the depredations, riots, and murders of the decade from 1865 to 1875. The operators had found them to be an easily-excited race, quick to resent oppression, whether real or imaginary, and the most troublesome to the industry of all the nationalities at that time engaged in the mining of hard coal. The Irish have been the leaders, or agitators, of every labor organization in the anthracite industry ever since they entered the region. Even today they are in control, and dominate the miners' union in the three fields.

By a comparison of this table with that presented on page 48, it will be seen that the English-speaking races formed nearly 93 per cent.

and the Slav nationalities a little over 3 per cent. of the total foreign-born in the Schuylkill field in 1880. Ten years later the English-speaking races formed 67 per cent., and the Slavs over 31 per cent. By 1900 the Slavs were dominant in the Schuylkill field, forming over 54 per cent., while the English-speaking races constituted but 44 per cent.

Turning to the Northern or Wyoming field—to Lackawanna County—we find the same general tendency in the movement of the foreign-born population, although its details are less strongly marked. This movement is indicated in the census returns as follows:

ENGLISH-SPEAKING RACES, ENTIRE ANTHRACITE REGION,
1880-1900.

| Country of Birth. | 1880. | 1890. | 1900. |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total foreign-born | 26,917 | 46,399 | 55,727 |
| Ireland | 12,497 | 14,524 | 12,270 |
| England } | 8,625 | 7,547 | 8,010 |
| and } | | | |
| Wales } | | 8,511 | 7,708 |
| Germany | 4,230 | 7,242 | 6,124 |
| Scotland | 785 | 1,270 | 1,225 |
| Total English-speaking. | 26,137 | 39,094 | 35,337 |

Comparing this table with that on page 49, showing the movement among the Slav races in Lackawanna County, it is learned that in 1880 the English-speaking nationalities made up over 97 per cent. of the total foreign-born in that county and the Slavs but .3 per cent. By the following decade the former had decreased to a little over 84 per cent., while the latter increased to over 13 per cent. By 1900 the English-speaking races numbered less than 64 per cent. and the Slavs over 33 per cent.

As has already been noted, the Wyoming field also includes a portion of Luzerne County, but the change in the composition of the foreign-born English-speaking element in the latter cannot be indicated clearly according to fields, as Luzerne County also takes in a part of the Schuylkill field (the Middle or Lehigh field), and there are no statistics available which will permit the movement in Luzerne County to be traced according to the fields it includes. The best that can be done is to consider the population of Luzerne County by itself. The English-speaking

nationalities in this county increased, and then decreased, a movement somewhat similar to that which we have seen took place in Lackawanna County. If it were possible to separate the population of Luzerne County in its relation to each field, I feel sure it could be shown that the movement of the English-speaking races was from the Southern to the Northern field, and then from the anthracite industry.

The change in the composition of the foreign-born English-speaking nationalities in Luzerne County is shown in detail as follows:

ENGLISH-SPEAKING RACES, LUZERNE COUNTY, 1880-1900.

| Country of Birth. | 1880. | 1890. | 1900. |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total foreign-born | 35,716 | 64,103 | 72,962 |
| Ireland | 13,598 | 13,012 | 9,755 |
| England } | | 9,346 | 7,497 |
| and } | 12,510 | | |
| Wales } | | 10,392 | 8,578 |
| Germany | 5,806 | 8,925 | 8,137 |
| Scotland | 1,415 | 1,758 | 1,411 |
| Total English-speaking. | 33,329 | 43,433 | 35,378 |

A comparison of this table with that on page 50 shows the Slav races in the same county to

have increased from less than 2 per cent. of the total foreign-born in 1880 to over 30 per cent. in 1890, and to nearly one-half, or 50 per cent., in 1900. The English-speaking races in Luzerne County decreased from nearly 94 per cent. in 1880 to less than 68 per cent. in 1890 and to less than 49 per cent. in 1900.

For the entire anthracite region we find the movement among the foreign-born English-speaking races to be indicated by the census returns as follows:

ENGLISH-SPEAKING RACES, ENTIRE ANTHRACITE REGION.

| Country of Birth. | 1880. | 1890. | 1900. |
|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Total foreign-born | 108,827 | 170,582 | 193,692 |
| Ireland | 45,330 | 42,374 | 31,349 |
| England) | | 24,575 | 21,225 |
| and) | 33,214 | | |
| Wales) | | 24,140 | 20,220 |
| Germany | 20,686 | 28,534 | 24,086 |
| Scotland | 3,191 | 4,013 | 3,389 |
| Total English-speaking. | 102,421 | 123,636 | 100,269 |
| Total Slav | 1,925 | 43,007 | 89,328 |

In 1880 the English-speaking races composed nearly 94 per cent. of the total foreign-born in

the eight hard-coal producing counties; in 1890 they had decreased to less than 73 per cent., and by 1900 to less than 52 per cent. The Slav races, as shown in detail on page 51, formed less than 2 per cent. of the total foreign-born in the anthracite region in 1880, over 25 per cent. in 1890, and over 46 per cent. in 1900.

In the tables presented are excluded the comparatively small number of foreign-born from Canada, France, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Asia, Finland, Roumania, Turkey, Australia, China, South America, other countries not specified in the census reports, and those born at sea, who were in the anthracite region at the taking of the census. Those born in Bohemia are included among those reported as born in Austria. The native population of the counties has also been purposely omitted from the tables, for the reason that, while a small percentage of it must be considered in a discussion of the nationalities engaged in the anthracite industry, a large pro-

portion of it is made up of women and children, including not only the children of native Americans, but also those of the immigrant element. The foreign-born population, on the other hand, is composed largely of young adults, and contains but a comparatively small proportion of women and children.

While the census reports thus enable us to separate and classify the different nationalities in the anthracite-producing counties, there is no such convenient means for ascertaining accurately the relative proportion of each race engaged directly in the production of hard coal. In the report of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mines for 1901 it is stated that a total of 147,651 men and boys are employed in and about the mines. During 1900 the State Mine Inspectors in the eight anthracite districts into which the entire region was then divided made efforts to ascertain the exact number of each nationality thus employed, but with only partially successful results. Out of a total of over 375 collieries, 232 employed 96,077 mine-workers, of whom

55,426 were of the English-speaking races (Americans, Germans, Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotchmen, Welshmen, etc.), and 40,651 of the non-English-speaking or Continental races (Hungarians, Poles, Russians, Austrians, Italians, etc.). The 96,077 reported equalled about 66.8 per cent. of the total number employed.

Despite this absence of definite statistical information covering all mines in the entire region, there is sufficient evidence to show that as the Slav races increased in the hard-coal industry the English-speaking races so employed have steadily decreased. We have proof of this in statistics of the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, which employs by far the largest number of mine-workers in the Schuylkill field. These statistics show that in 1890 the number of the Slav nationalities at work in and about its mines was 5839, or 23.2 per cent., and the foreign-born English-speaking races, 14,176, or 57.3 per cent., out of a total of 24,734. By 1901 the number of the English-speaking races had decreased 13,024, or to

1152, while that of the Slavs increased 3682, or to 9521, out of a total of 26,300. That is, from 1890 to October, 1901, the English-speaking mine-workers, other than natives, in the employ of this one company, decreased at the rate of 1085 a year, while the Slavs increased at the rate of 307 for each of the twelve years.

These figures deal only with the foreign-born mine-workers of the Reading,—that is, with those groups designated as Slav and English-speaking. But at the taking of the census of its employees by this company in October, 1901, there were also employed 15,627 native Americans. These numbered 4719 in 1890. This large increase is accounted for in the fact that, though born in the United States and entitled to be classified as Americans, they are practically all of Slavish descent, and industrially they belong more largely to the Slav rather than to the English-speaking group of mine-workers, despite the fact, too, that nearly all of them can speak the English language. The accompanying table shows at a glance the change in

the nationalities of mine-employees of the Reading from 1890 to 1901.

NATIONALITIES, READING MINE-EMPLOYEES, 1890-1901.

FOREIGN-BORN ENGLISH-SPEAKING.

| Nationality. | 1890. | 1901. |
|---------------|--------|-------|
| Irish | 6,887 | 564 |
| English | 2,088 | 61 |
| Welsh | 1,282 | 197 |
| German | 3,709 | 300 |
| Scotch | 210 | 30 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Total | 14,176 | 1,152 |

FOREIGN-BORN SLAV.

| | | |
|----------------------|--------|--------|
| Polish | 4,287 | 7,311 |
| Hungarian | 1,466 | 1,979 |
| Italian | 86 | 231 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Total | 5,839 | 9,521 |
| Born in America..... | 4,719 | 15,627 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Total employees..... | 24,734 | 26,300 |

This tendency of the Slavs to enter and of the English-speaking races to leave the hard-coal mines is more clearly shown and more strongly emphasized through personal observations within the region. It is more marked in

the industry itself than would seem to be indicated by our study of the movement of population within the counties, because many of the English-speaking mine-workers, who have been and are still leaving the mines, remain within the counties, engaging in other occupations. This migration from the industry was first vividly presented by a personal study of conditions in different mining towns, and it was the impression thus gained that has led to a search for statistical proof.

CHAPTER VI

A CONFLICT OF STANDARDS OF LIVING

WE have had presented the statistical results of a marked movement of population in the anthracite coal-region. They show that the coming in of the Slav has been accompanied by the migration from the fields of the English-speaking races. Back of this is a dark and gloomy picture of a struggle between these two distinctly marked groups for industrial supremacy in hard-coal mining. Primarily and essentially this struggle was a conflict between two widely different standards of living.

The Irish, English, Welsh, Scotch, and German mine-workers, who entered the hard-coal region in large numbers before and for some time after the Civil War, had grown accustomed to a social life of some dignity and comfort by the time of the Slav's entrance into the industry. This English-speaking mine-worker wanted a

home, wife, and children. A picture of that home represented, usually, a neat two-story frame house, with a porch and yard attached. He wanted a carpet on the best room, pictures on the wall, and the house to be otherwise attractive. In that home he wanted none but his own immediate family, or very near relatives. His wife he liked to see comfortably and fairly well dressed. For his children he had ambitions which required their attendance at the little red school-house on the hill. He was a type of man whose wants were always just beyond his wages, with the tendency for these wants to increase.

It cannot be said that all the English-speaking mine-workers had exactly the same standard, but the tendency with all of them was towards one nearly uniform standard, and that a comparatively high one. This standard cannot be measured in money, because of the varying elements entering into its composition among different mine-workers, even of the same nationality. It is true that lower standards of living

were continually coming into the region; but these were brought in, for the most part, by men of the same English-speaking races, the later arrivals being quickly absorbed and soon made to conform to the higher standard through family ties, intermarriage, and imitation.

But in marked contrast to all this was the mode of life of the Slav mine-worker. Escaping, as he was, from an agricultural environment which had barely supplied food, clothing, and shelter, the Slav came single-handed, alone. Wife and children he had none, nor wished for them. Placed in the anthracite region by the force of circumstances, without either the time or the means or the knowledge, even if he had the mental quality, to look elsewhere for work, the Slav could only supply his pressing physical demands by selling his labor. Under such conditions he was satisfied to live in almost any kind of a place, to wear almost anything that would clothe his nakedness, and to eat any kind of food that would keep body and soul together.

The Slav was content to live in a one-room

hut, built by his own hands on a hill-side near the mine, of driftwood gathered at spare moments from along the highway, and roofed with tin from discarded powder-cans; or he crowded into the poorer and cheaper living sections of the large mining towns. He was not particular with whom or with how many he lived, except that he wanted them to be of his own nationality.

To-day, in a certain mining town, there are fourteen Slavs, all unmarried and with only themselves to support, who rent one large, formerly abandoned, store-room. This is taken care of by a housekeeper, who also prepares the meals for the men. Each man has his own tin plate, tin knife, fork, and cup; he has his own ham and bread and a place in which to keep them. Some things they buy in common, the distribution being made by the housekeeper. For beds the men sleep on bunks arranged along the walls and resembling shelves in a grocery store. Each has his own blanket; each carries it out-of-doors to air when he gets up in the morning and back again when he returns from his work at night.

The monthly cost of living to each of these men is not over four dollars. They spend but little on clothes the year round, contenting themselves with the cheapest kind of material and not infrequently wearing cast-off garments purchased of some second-hand dealer. For fuel they burn coal from the culm-banks or wood from along the highway, which costs them nothing but their labor in gathering it. In many cases the unmarried Slav mine-worker "boards" at a cost of from five dollars to twelve dollars a month.

With a wage of thirty dollars a month this type of laborer can save nearly twenty dollars. A Slav with a family could not save so much; but even with a wife and children the married Slav's cost of living is less than that of the English-speaking mine-worker. Dr. Peter Roberts indicates this plainly in the following interesting table from "The Anthracite Coal Industry," showing the differences in the accounts of Slav and Anglo-Saxon patrons at one of the company stores in the region for July, 1900:

| Slav Patrons. | Anglo-Saxon Patrons. |
|------------------|-------------------------|
| \$8.01 | \$63.45 |
| 7.70 | 41.97 |
| 7.32 | 43.33 |
| 4.03 | 35.79 |
| 7.70 | 72.95 |
| 7.50 | 18.38 |
| 10.97 | 33.42 |
| 7.20 | 21.98 |
| 3.47 | 20.65 |
| 2.41 | 48.08 |

Besides all this advantage, the family income of the Slav is also increased in ways the English-speaking miner would not think of. The foreign woman does manual work, such as picking coal from the culm-banks, carrying driftwood from the forest nearby, and in a score of other ways lessens the cost of living to the Slav family. In one or two cases these women have been known to work in the mines as laborers. The foreign woman goes about barefooted even on the public streets. Usually her garments are of the poorest materials. It was not the married Slav with a family, however, who became the typical competitor of the English-speaking mine-worker,

but the Slav without a family. After the Slav has been in the region eight or ten years, and has brought a wife from the Old Country, the forces about him have gradually raised him to a higher standard of living, and he then passes over into the industrial group of the English-speaking races.

It was these marked social differences which made the twenty-years' struggle for industrial race supremacy inevitable. It must now be shown how these differences worked to the disadvantage of the English-speaking mine-employee.

Of the total number of men and boys employed in the mining of hard coal and in its preparation for market about one-third work outside the mines, or above ground, and two-thirds inside, or underground. The former comprise superintendents, bookkeepers and clerks, foremen, blacksmiths, carpenters, engineers, firemen, machinists, slate-pickers, slope and shaft headmen, shaft helpers, plane headmen, car-dumpers (breaker), slate-shovelers and wheelers, men in chutes

above screen, men cutting and loading timber, oilers (machinery), loaders of big cars, ash-wheelers, blacksmiths' helpers, mule-drivers, watchmen, etc. The underground workers include foremen, fire-bosses, engineers, door- and fan-boys and helpers, drivers and runners, miners, laborers, track-layers and helpers, shaft-repair men, timbermen and helpers, shaft and slope footmen and helpers, plane- or wheel-runners, plane footmen, masons, road-cleaners, car-couplers, pumpmen, stablemen and helpers, pipemen, water-bailers, men unloading rock, etc.

All these employees form two general classes—the skilled and the unskilled. The former include the groups designated as blacksmiths, carpenters, engineers, firemen, miners, inside and outside foremen, and fire-bosses. The unskilled groups are the slate-pickers, door-boys and helpers, drivers and runners, laborers, and the great majority of the other inside and outside employees. Among the individuals composing any particular group in either class there are vary-

ing degrees of skill—some are less unskilled or more skilled than others. The most unskilled in any particular group in time become the least unskilled in that group; the least unskilled pass into some skilled group. Thus there is a constant interchange of individuals from group to group and from class to class, the general tendency being a progression from the most unskilled to the most skilled. Miners are always passing out of the latter group to become firebosses, foremen, superintendents, or into other higher occupations, both inside and outside the industry; others are killed, many end their days in the county poorhouse, while not a few are forced back into the breaker or into other unskilled groups. The once skilled miner who through accidents or disease or old age becomes incapacitated for longer filling that position, not infrequently returns to the unskilled class as a breaker “boy.”

To fill the places in the mines vacated in these and other ways the least unskilled of the laborers become miners, forming the least skilled of the

latter group. While the laborers are properly classed as unskilled, there is a point where they almost insensibly merge into the skilled class. The laborer of two or more years' experience in the mine is always on the verge of passing into the ranks of the skilled miner. The laborer entering the mine for the first time is usually the most unskilled of all in that unskilled group, while the laborer ready to become a miner is the least unskilled in that group and becomes the least skilled among the miners when he passes over the dividing line. It is the least unskilled laborer who usually competes with the least skilled miner for a place in the latter group.

While there is a difference of skill in the labor of the individuals composing any particular group, capital, as a rule, does not enter into a detailed and minute measurement of this skill. Capital roughly classifies it in the distinction it makes between the different groups. It recognizes the broad difference between skilled and unskilled labor in paying higher prices for the former. It also separates the different kinds of

skilled labor—it pays one price for blacksmith labor, another for engineer labor, and still another price for the labor of the miner. The same is true of the unskilled labor—capital pays one price for door-boy labor, another price for driver labor, and still another price for the labor of the laborer. As a rule, at any one colliery, individuals in different groups receive different wages; individuals in the same group receive the same wage. This latter is not true of all miners, although it is true of any particular sub-group in that occupation. Some are company miners and some are contract miners. Some of the latter work by the car, some by the ton, and some by the yard. For any particular sub-group the basis for determining the price of labor is the same. The difference in the wages actually received by individual miners, even in any sub-group, is due partly to the difference in skill and partly to the effect varying natural conditions have upon their expenditure of energy.

The most important of all groups, skilled as well as unskilled,—the one receiving the highest

price for its labor,—which is open to the largest number of men, is that of miner. The higher price paid in it for labor has the effect of drawing workers from nearly all the unskilled groups towards that position.* To reach the position of miner it is necessary for a worker to serve a short time as a laborer in the mines. This has the effect of emphasizing temporarily the importance of the laborers' position—of making it a training station for unskilled workmen on their way to become skilled miners.

It was this position of laborer that the Slav first attacked † shortly after his entrance into the industry. Being an unskilled workman, he was prevented from at once becoming a miner, or from entering any of the other skilled groups. With his advent a stream of unskilled labor, distinct from that heretofore drawn from among the English-speaking races, began to pour into

* Some few of the unskilled workers in time become blacksmiths, carpenters, firemen, engineers, etc.

† The Italian, as a rule, went into the unskilled occupations above ground.

the mines. The Slav was willing to work for longer hours than the English-speaking laborer, to perform heavier work, to ply his pick in more dangerous places, and stolidly to put up with inconveniences that his English-speaking competitor would not brook. But, more than all, he had a lower standard of living; he could produce his labor at a less cost and sell it at a lower rate. He was a cheap man; and it was to the interest of the mining companies—the capitalists employed in operating the mines—to secure and give employment to cheap men.

That capital is not a philanthropic or humanitarian agency is an economic commonplace. Its chief concern is its own reproduction. In the anthracite industry this takes the form of producing coal at the lowest, and selling it at the highest possible price; and as labor is one of the largest elements in this cost of production, it is the cheapest labor, other things being equal, that anthracite capital will buy. The particular work the industry demands in the laborer's position needs very little more than physical

strength; the task requires quantity rather than quality of labor. This strength the Slav can supply as readily as his English-speaking competitor, and, as has been shown, he is willing to use it to the greater advantage of his employer.

It was not only by the operators and railroad mining companies that the Slav was at first welcomed. Under the contract system in vogue in many collieries, the skilled miner was also able to draw advantages from this cheaper laborer. This self-interest of the English-speaking miner removed the only obstacle then strong enough to have prevented the Slav's entrance into the industry, and the latter rapidly spread throughout the region, especially in the Southern field. The English-speaking laborer was forced either to work more cheaply or to withdraw from the competition; and in a market usually over-supplied with mine-labor, owing, among other things, to the lack of regular employment the year round, there could be but one result. In a short while the English-speaking laborer was being forced out of that position.

The English-speaking miner before long began, though too late, to see his mistake. For, in course of time, the Slav became not a mere pair of hands but a skilled worker,—to use the terms common in the mines, not a *laborer*, but a *miner*. As he had been a cheaper laborer, so was he a cheaper miner.

Race antagonism, differences of habit, of tongue, of religion, had all tended to ostracize the Slav socially—to set him apart. Even down to the entrance of the United Mine Workers in 1898 he and the English-speaking workers had mingled but slightly. Marriages between these two races were practically unknown. As a result the Slav had assimilated very few, if any, of those ideals which the English-speaking worker had impressed upon the new-comer of his own race. The Slav still had his fewer wants, his lower cost of living, and his lower price for his labor. Moreover, he brought to his new work as a skilled miner that characteristic indifference to difficult conditions which had made him a useful laborer. He would work in poorer seams

than the English-speaking miner, and in more dangerous places; and so, as he had driven out the laborer of the older industrial group, he now began as surely to drive out the English-speaking miner.

Yet the pinch of the new conditions for the English-speaking miner lay not so much in a reduction of the wage rate paid him—for that remained practically unchanged from 1880 to 1900—as in those elements which determined his net earnings. The tendency was for these to decrease. The miner's tools grew greater in number, and their cost rose; the poorer seams, which must now be worked, yielded less coal for a given amount of powder and energy; certain allowances for what was once called extra work were withdrawn; insurance became at once more necessary and more expensive as the ignorant, daring Slav made mine-working more hazardous; the number of pounds required for a ton and the size of the mine-car gradually increased; the dockage system, under which the miner was charged for impurities in the coal he sent out

of the mine, also worked more and more to his disadvantage.

These and other difficulties should have been offset by increased wages or other compensating advantages, if the English-speaking miner was to maintain his standard of living. But the fact was that down to the strike of 1900 he found the cost of applying his labor to produce coal rapidly increasing, while, on the other side, his cheap Slav competitor kept his wage from rising.

It cannot, of course, be said that all English-speaking miners throughout the anthracite region felt the pinch to an equal degree; yet it was in general true that the real *net* wages of those of the older industrial group who remained miners were constantly being lessened. Competition among the individuals in the same group and between the different groups in the industry was greatly intensified. Not only did many voluntarily leave the industry; not only were workers being forced out of the mines, but many were compelled to lower their standard of living;

others were prevented from raising their standard, while to many the struggle to exist became a most severe battle for the necessaries of life.

The pressure on some mine-workers was so great as to force their boys of tender years into the breaker and their girl children into the silk-mill, in order that their pittance might add to the family income. This competition affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of people; it even determined the number of births in a community, as well as influenced powerfully the physical and mental qualities of those born into the world under such stress of conditions. Prior to the entrance of the United Mine Workers this competition of the Slav was the one great dominant force at work in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania, threatening and retarding communal advancement and attacking those institutions which we, as Americans, justly prize so highly, sending influences for evil deep down into the foundations of the social structure. Like all great forces, it had its beginning in small things

—in the desire of the managers of capital to secure a lower cost of production; in the ability of one group of men to live on less than another group; and, like all great forces, its effects have been so far-reaching as to be untraceable in all their manifestations.

CHAPTER VII

SLAV COMPETITION AND THE MINERS' STRIKES

THE brunt of this struggle against the Slav competition was borne largely by the English-speaking mine-worker in the Southern field, because it was in that district the Slav first entered the mines in large numbers. This English-speaking miner felt all the bitterness of defeat in this contest for industrial supremacy. In self-protection he tried the strike in 1887-88, and found it futile, largely because the miners of his industrial group in the Northern field, who had not yet felt the pressure of the Slav, refused their co-operation. Finally, the English-speaking worker in the Schuylkill field did what a grocer or a baker would do if unable to meet competition—he either went out of business or removed to a more promising district. Many of the Southern miners were thus compelled (some say they did it voluntarily) to take their labor out of the

anthracite market altogether, and these in not a few cases engaged in other occupations in the hard-coal producing counties.

But in many more cases—so many as to furnish a picture of wholesale migration hardly less striking than that of the Slav himself—the Schuylkill miner took his labor to another anthracite market. He moved North. And indeed it may be questioned whether the Southern field would have been yielded to the Slav so suddenly and completely if the English-speaking miner there had not had open to him another and, from many points of view, a better section to which he might at any time withdraw and continue to mine coal.

In this Northern field the English-speaking mine-worker was less mobile than his brother in the lower counties. He was a man attached to the soil by many ties; its fertility enabled him to carry on farming and gardening when not engaged in mining. Unlike the Southern field, which was bleak, dry, barren, and almost wholly without Nature's attractions, the

beautiful and fertile Wyoming Valley, called by some the "Switzerland of America," was bountifully blessed with those gifts of nature which add to the enjoyment of living. So great are its natural attractions that many costly summer houses have been erected in certain parts of it by wealthy coal-operators and capitalists from the Eastern cities. On the whole, life to the mine-worker in this section of the anthracite region had many attractions not easily to be abandoned. Besides, there were no other hard-coal fields to which he could migrate.

Within this stronghold of the English-speaking group the Slav, up to 1880, had hardly set foot. In that year in all the Northern region, more definitely in Lackawanna County, there were but a meagre eighty representatives of the Slav races. But as the Schuylkill miner retreated, the Slav followed him closely. By 1890 these eighty had increased to 6181, and by 1900 to 18,818. It began to look like the same story over again—the old story so familiar in the Schuylkill field. By 1900 the English-speaking races

were beginning to migrate from the Wyoming field also.

But, as it turned out, the Slav invasion of the Northern field presented another and a very different story from that of his easy triumph in the lower counties. In the Northern field the English-speaking miner had a home he would not willingly leave; and when the competition of the Slav threatening that home became too strong, the English-speaking mine-worker resorted to various methods of defense. Race prejudice, manifested in innumerable ways, was directed to keeping the Slav out of the mines. In 1889 and 1897 laws with this object in view were secured from the Pennsylvania Legislature, that of 1897 requiring one to have been a laborer in the mines of the Commonwealth for at least two years before he could become a miner, and making it necessary that one should pass an examination before a Miners' Examining Board. To do this the Slav had to possess a knowledge of the English language, which was not easy for him to acquire. Over these examining boards the

English-speaking miner secured control, making their requirements operate to his advantage and to the disadvantage of the Slav. In a score of other ways he endeavored to ward off the competition of the Continental races, his resistance to the progress of the latter growing more and more pronounced as their numbers increased.

Just at this most critical period for the English-speaking mine-worker a new and hitherto little recognized force—a force destined to do what all others had failed to accomplish in checking and controlling the competition of the Slav—began to operate in the anthracite region. It was the United Mine Workers of America. Fresh from victory in the central competitive soft-coal fields in 1897, after a long strike, this organization of bituminous coal-miners at once took deep root in the Northern hard-coal field. The English-speaking mine-workers, recognizing in it an instrument of defense against the Slav, found themselves organized within its ranks to such an extent that they inaugurated a strike in September, 1900.

That it was the English-speaking mine-worker of the Northern field who forced this strike there is no doubt. Not only did the movement culminating in that contest start in the Northern district, but practically all the demands at that time were the complaints of the miners in the upper counties. The cry against exorbitant charges for powder, the opposition to the company store and company doctor, the demand that favoritism in allotting working-places should cease, the complaint against the large ton, the demand for a check-weighman and for compliance with the semi-monthly and cash pay-day laws were all grievances confined almost exclusively to the men in the Northern field, affecting very little, if at all, the Southern mine-employees. In fact, of all the demands in the strike of 1900 those asking for an increase in wages and for the abolition of the sliding scale were the only ones seriously affecting the Schuylkill mine-workers; even these were not of very great concern to a majority of them, because, on the whole, the Slavs were satisfied with their wages and

conditions of employment. The result was that, though the entire Northern field became idle on the very first day of the strike, the men in the lower region were half-hearted in its inauguration and refused for a time to join their fellow-workers of the Wyoming field. Indeed, had it not been for the great political interests at stake the strikers, in spite of their organization, might have failed utterly. But this industrial disturbance, just at election time, alarmed the leaders of the National Republican party for the re-election of their candidate for President of the United States, and they induced the railroad presidents to grant some of the demands of the strikers, which brought the conflict to a close.

If that strike had failed, the power of the union, not yet firmly established in the anthracite region, would more than likely have been broken and the English-speaking races would have been very soon forced out of the Northern mines, as many of them had been out of the mines in the Southern field.

Neither in 1900 nor later had the organiza-

tion of the United Mine Workers of America any vital interest in the local race conflict, except so far as it had to be reckoned with as a factor in that organization's struggle to control the competitive conditions in the various coal-fields and markets of the entire country. But the successful issue of the strike in 1900 had two important effects on the Slav invasion. Not only was the movement of the English-speaking miners out of the industry checked by giving them a wage nearer to their standard of living, but the Slav, who shared in the advance, began to see his advantages in maintaining it. For the first time the two industrial groups recognized a mutual interest.

When the struggle of 1902 was precipitated, the English-speaking miner and the Slav were found working side by side for a common cause. Like the strike of 1900, that of 1902 was forced by the English-speaking miner in the Northern field. He asked not only for a direct increase in his wages, but for the abolition of numerous grievances which indirectly kept his real earnings

low. He wanted two thousand two hundred and forty pounds, and not two thousand eight hundred or more, to constitute a ton; he asked that the coal he mined be weighed; he demanded a representative to see that the weight was correct and the dockage fair; he wanted a minimum wage established for many of the different occupations in the industry; he asked for recognition of his union, in order that he might be represented in settling the many vexed questions continually arising between himself and his employer.

In formulating these demands the Slav worker was also remembered, because his support was vitally necessary to the success of the strike. The demand for a twenty per cent. increase in pay to all men working by the piece (ton, car, or yard) was supplemented by a demand for a reduction in the working-day from ten to eight hours, with no decrease in pay, for all men working by the day. As a result, the demands called for an increase in the rate of pay for all workmen in and about the mines, including the Slavs

as well as the English-speaking mine-workers. The miners' laborers, who for the most part are Slavs, were to receive their full share of the advance to be granted to the miners; and for tens of thousands of Slavs employed at day's wages the demand for a reduction in the working-day from ten to eight hours meant an increase of twenty-five per cent. in the rate of pay.

The union mine-employees of the Southern field, who at this time, as in 1900, had no grievances which otherwise would have caused them to leave their employment, actively supported the strike under the majority rule of the organization, and in this case the majority came from the Northern field. The organization, taking advantage of the habits of subordination inculcated in the Slav nationalities by military training in their native lands, placed at their head as local leaders miners of their own races who had learned English, and throughout the fight the Slav was in this manner held in line for the union demands.

After a five-months' industrial conflict, the

like of which had never before been witnessed in this country, the English-speaking mine-worker of the Northern field once more returned to his place in the mine, upon assurances that the forces which for so many years had been operating upon him with such great destruction to his industrial supremacy in hard-coal mining, as well as to his standard of living, would be controlled. This assurance has been partly fulfilled by the decision of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission appointed by President Roosevelt. By this decision wages have been advanced, hours of employment have been reduced, and in other ways forces have been put in operation which will, to a certain extent, cause the competition of the Slav to operate temporarily with less severity on the English-speaking nationalities, and, it is to be hoped, with less injurious effects to the political, social, and industrial institutions of the region than it has been doing for the past twenty years.

Before examining more closely what some of these effects have been it must be noted that the

Slav invasion is not the only factor in the gradual withdrawal of the English-speaking races from the anthracite fields. Another force, subtle, but potent, is constantly at work. This force is exerted by the native Americans within the region. It is made up of all the varied activities of communal life, and it manifests itself through the educational, religious, political, and, in general, through all the social channels. It is dominated and directed by the ideals and objects of American institutions; and, while it may be true that these institutions seem often to fail in practice, yet deep down at the foundation they are an elevating influence, and go to form an uplifting force which must be taken into consideration in any fair and honest attempt to present actual conditions among the anthracite mining communities.

The social forces operate to pull the English-speaking mine-workers out of the anthracite industry. They assume all forms and, in cases, take upon themselves many disguises; but usually they reach the mine-worker through

inspiring in him a desire for better things, either for himself or, more generally, for his children, and thus increasing his wants. He soon finds that as a mine-worker he is unable to supply his children with as good clothes as are worn by the children of his neighbors not in the mining occupation, or perhaps to send them to school, or in general to secure for them more and better opportunities. If the worker lives in a small mining town, these forces soon push him into a larger city, where greater opportunities are at hand. They force him to work for a better place in the mine—to strive to become a fire-boss or a foreman, or perhaps a superintendent. Practically all the best-paying positions about the collieries to-day are filled by English-speaking mine-workers, who have in this way been enabled to increase their wages and to meet their always growing wants. But there is only a limited number of such positions; in consequence many English-speaking mine-workers go out of the industry into business or professional callings which permit, as a general thing, a greater equality

between wants and wages. Once out of the industry, it is only a step, figuratively speaking, out of the region. The anthracite communities are thus constantly being drained of many of their best men.

As a general statement it is no longer true of the English-speaking races in the hard-coal fields that the son of a miner follows the occupation of his father. This has come to be more and more a fact, however, among the Slav nationalities.

CHAPTER VIII

SOME PRESENT-DAY TENDENCIES

YESTERDAY the Slav was a pauper immigrant; to-day he is what the English, Welsh, Irish, and German miner was a quarter of a century ago—on the way to becoming an American citizen. What sort of a citizen he may be will depend upon the influences that are brought to bear upon him. It is too early to judge him finally; certainly he should not be judged too harshly, especially as he has shown himself adaptable. But we may not blink the fact that the Slav offers at present a problem of much complexity and danger. In the communities where he has settled he has wrought nothing less than a social revolution. We have noted to some extent the influence he has had upon wages and the conditions of mine-labor; let us look now for a moment at the effect the Slav is having upon the institutions of the people among whom he lives.

To those who knew it twenty years ago nothing marks more clearly the transformation of the old Pennsylvania mining town than the changes in its churches and its religious observances. In the main it may be said that the mixed population we have called Slav is a Catholic population, although broad traces of the Reformation may be found within it. Generally the Bohemians, Slovaks, Poles, and Croatians are Roman Catholics. Not a few of the Bohemians, however, are Reformed (Presbyterian) and Lutheran; some of the Magyars are found to be Protestants, and as a general statement it can be said that the Reformation has left its imprint among all of them. The Germans (Austria) and the Italians are also usually Catholics. The Ruthenians, Russians, Roumanians, and Servians are generally Greek Orthodox.

It will be recalled that one of the serious complaints from the operators' representatives before the Strike Commission was the unnecessarily large number of holidays which the "foreigners" were observing. Most of these holidays are re-

ligious observances; and as the different churches have different holidays, falling on separate days, the total number of days' idleness these observances force upon the collieries is very large—it is estimated to be as many as twenty-eight within a year.

The effect of such an invasion upon the religious denominations formerly well established in the anthracite region has been disastrous. Facts and figures in support of this may be had in abundance for the asking. It is perhaps sufficient to state here, by way of illustration, that within the past ten or fifteen years no less than fifteen Congregational churches have been forced to withdraw from the three districts. At Shenandoah, where the inroads of the Slav appear in their most serious proportions, four once flourishing and largely attended Welsh churches are now so weak that their disbandment seems to be only a question of a very short time. Of these, two are Baptist, one Congregational, and one Presbyterian, the latter now having only eighteen members. They are but the skeleton remains

of once thriving churches. Even some of the older establishments of the Roman Catholics have suffered. The Irish Catholics, for instance, are complaining that their church has not the strength in the region it formerly boasted of. St. Patrick's Day, which used to be the celebration of the year within the region, has become of so little importance outside that nationality that an Irishman remarked not long ago, "St. Patrick's Day in the anthracite region is nowadays a very tame affair." All this is explained, of course, in the fact that as the English-speaking races migrate from the region they are taking their institutions with them.

The only Protestant denomination to offer a vigorous resistance is the Presbyterian. According to Rev. Charles E. Edwards, of Shenandoah, who has direction of the colportage work among the "foreigners," the only evangelical advantages for Italians in the anthracite region are afforded by the two Presbyterian (Italian) churches at Hazleton and Roseto. He says that "among the far more numerous Slavs, including

even nominal adherents, the only evangelical organizations are those of a few Slovak Lutherans and still fewer Slovak Reformed. The most extensive form of evangelical work has been that of colportage. The versions of the Bible commonly sold in this region among Slavs are the Bohemian, Polish, Russian (with the so-called Slavic, a peculiar type of Russian), Ruthenian, and Slovak. The Presbyterian Board of Publication, for the first time in its history, recently employed a Bohemian colporteur, and now it appeals for funds to employ twenty or more among Italians, Slavs, and like races."

But from the religious, as from the social, view-point the comparative elimination of the Protestant denominations is not more important than that with the Slav has come a large and insistent element professing atheism. The Continental Sunday is fast becoming an institution in the anthracite fields. Base-ball playing on the Sabbath is not the least indication of this. The only difference between the saloon on Sunday and on every other week-day is that the front

door is not wide open. It does not bar admittance, however, and there is very little attempt at secrecy in the towns where the Slav influence is of any political importance. Funerals, weddings, christenings, and like customs among the Slavs are, as a general thing, observed on Sunday. One explanation in defense of this is that Sunday is the only day the mine-workers have to themselves for such occurrences in their social life.

With the advancing tide of Catholicism has come its own system of education—the parochial school. Whatever the value of these schools,—and they no doubt have their own merits, which need not be discussed here,—there is strong reason for believing that the parochial school in the anthracite region does not take the place of the public school system in the making of American citizens out of Slav children. In spite of official reports to the contrary, one learns upon good authority that the two parochial schools in an important mining town teach no English to their pupils. When it is borne in mind that these Slav children are, in all probability, destined

to live in communities where English is the language of communication, it can at once be seen how grievous an injury is being done, not only to them, but to the anthracite communities, a correct knowledge of whose institutions can only be gained through the English tongue.

But all children of Slav parentage—and the Slav races are very prolific—do not attend the parochial schools. Many of them are in regular attendance at the public schools, and in general they are diligent and painstaking students. Invariably one hears good reports of them from teachers and superintendents—in fact, not a few public school teachers report the Slav children to be more proficient and in many ways more progressive in their studies than children of the English-speaking races. Under the public school system many of the Slav children are being trained into good American citizens. This educational force is, perhaps, the one bright promise lighting up the uncertain future. Unfortunately, its effects seldom reach the adult immigrant—the one type of man whose presence in the

anthracite-producing counties is so full of dark forebodings.

At first the Slav was found only in the "patch"—the small group of buildings usually located near a colliery. But to-day he is filling up and overflowing the small town, and is appearing in the principal thoroughfares of the mining cities with his saloon and his butcher shop. He is even reaching higher in the business world. Only recently a banking house has been opened in Shenandoah, conducted exclusively by Slavs. In Mahanoy City, Slavs are also largely interested in one of the banks, and its business is growing rapidly. In each of Shenandoah, Mahanoy City, and Plymouth the Slavs have a weekly newspaper. Shenandoah, with a population exceeding twenty thousand, has only one daily newspaper printed in English, two other like newspaper enterprises, one a daily and the other a weekly, having recently suspended.

In politics the Slavs are already a factor that must be reckoned with. They are becoming naturalized in an ever-increasing number. In

Schuykill County they are rushing into the naturalization courts at the rate of sixty a month. The papers cost each applicant about ten dollars. This sum is usually paid by a "sponsor," generally a local politician of either the Republican or Democratic party. In Shenandoah three of the town councilmen are Slavs; so also are two policemen. In the First Ward of Shenandoah the Slavs have seventy per cent. of the total vote. In the First Ward of Mahanoy City they control at least sixty per cent. of the vote of that ward. In Schuykill County alone the Slavs control the elections in the boroughs of Shenandoah, Mahanoy City, Gilberton, Girardville, Minersville, and New Philadelphia. In Hazle and Kline townships the Slavs are also dominant politically. Kline township, near Hazleton, has an Italian as its superintendent of public schools. In the whole of Schuykill County the Slavs are sufficiently strong politically to control the county elections.

This is what has already happened. And it is only the beginning. In the Presidential election

of 1900—an election which ordinarily polls a heavy vote—the total vote cast by the Socialist party in the six more important hard-coal-producing counties was 706, and by the Socialist-Labor party 335. Two years later, in the election for governor, when usually a lighter vote is polled than in a Presidential election, the Socialist party cast in the six counties a total of 11,952 votes and the Socialist-Labor party a total of 1620. All the other parties—the Republican, Democratic, and Prohibition—showed a marked decrease, the Republican from 81,144 to 53,620 and the Democratic from 65,222 to 58,748 votes. Luzerne County increased its vote for the Socialist party from 392 in 1900 to 4556 in 1902, Schuylkill County from 28 in 1900 to 2794 in 1902, Northumberland from 46 to 2002, Carbon from 111 to 1643, Lackawanna from 121 to 918, and Dauphin from 8 to 39. In Luzerne, Schuylkill, Carbon, and Northumberland counties this vote gives to the Socialist party a sufficient number to decide any election.

It is true that the comparison is made under

what some may claim to be abnormal conditions, the industrial disturbances of 1902 furnishing an exceptional and favorable opportunity for the spread and inculcation of Socialistic doctrines. Even with all this granted, do not the conditions teach us a warning? The material is in the anthracite region whenever the opportunity comes (and that it will come again there is no doubt) for the enforcement, through political machinery having legal sanction, of principles and policies which, to say the least, are foreign to our past.

It has been said that the Slav at present is a source of danger to his community. In Schuylkill County, with a total population of 175,000, nineteen murders were committed from April 13, 1902, to August 2, 1903, an average of about one murder every three weeks. Of these nineteen murders, the county authorities have been unable to trace the responsibility in as many as nine cases, but the names of the victims and of their assailants, so far as the latter are known, emphasize the fact that they are very largely among the Slav races, and in the districts where these

nationalities are located. Shenandoah has a larger Slav population than any other town in the county, and of the nineteen crimes mentioned, nine of them, or nearly one-half, occurred in that borough. It was in Shenandoah that the troops were first sent, following rioting, in both the strike of 1900 and that of 1902.

A prominent and trustworthy county official, whose duties make him familiar with the situation, says :

“My experience has been that crime among the foreign Slav element, from which source most of it comes, is protected by its own class. Although many murders have been perpetrated in Schuylkill County, most of them were committed in the foreign quarters, and English-speaking officers find it impossible to secure information. While many murders have been committed by individuals, the William Penn murder case, of a few years ago, developed the fact that a secret organization had brought about the same, and nine members were convicted of murder in the first degree, although upon a new trial they were all found guilty of murder in the second degree and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Twenty cases have been returned within the past two years wherein the murderers have gone

unpunished. The commissioners are now considering the advisability of offering one thousand dollars in each case of murder, and five hundred dollars in all of the felonies below the grade of murder."

This William Penn murder case, in which a man named Rutkowski was killed, is of interest here, in that it brought to the attention of the authorities the existence of two societies among the Slavs—the Zukes and the Propenokis—who indirectly were responsible for crime. They are not secret societies, like the "Mollie Maguires," organized particularly for murder, but crime is rather an indirect result. The real object is social, in itself harmless enough, but through them is preserved and not infrequently intensified the personal jealousies and hatreds bred in Continental Europe, and which now and then are given scope for exercise through the society. Usually the Zukes and Propenokis are composed of members of the same race coming to the coal-fields from the same small geographical unit or neighborhood in Europe. Not infrequently crime is traced to feuds between these societies.

In Luzerne County, with a total population of 257,000, there have been forty-five murders from January, 1901, to August, 1903. Of these only one was committed by a native American, three or four by persons born in Ireland, and all the others by members of the Slav races. The persons murdered were principally "foreigners," and the killing usually took place during a drunken brawl accompanying a wedding, christening, or other like celebration.

Both Schuylkill and Luzerne counties have relatively a large number of foreign-born. In the latter they are about equally divided between the foreign-born English-speaking races and the Slav nationalities, while in the former the Slavs exceed the English-speaking by over 3000. When we come to a consideration of Lackawanna County, we find that of the foreign-born over 35,000 are of the English-speaking and less than 19,000 of the Slav races. Lackawanna's total population exceeds that of Schuylkill County by nearly 20,000, and yet, since January, 1902, there have been only nine murders committed there, as

compared with twelve in Schuylkill County, from April of the same year. The present term (October, 1903) of Lackawanna's Criminal Court, however, shows a larger number of cases than usual among the Slavs, as the latter are increasing rapidly in that county. In the alphabetical file of cases the M's have increased to three boxes, the S's to three boxes, and the R's to two boxes, when formerly they had but one box each. These letters largely predominate among the initials of the surnames of the Slavs.

Nearly every observer of conditions among the "foreigners" in the anthracite fields, when asked as to the principal cause of crime among the Slavs, points emphatically to the large consumption of liquors by these races. This drinking habit is the first of their vices acquired after landing in this country. In Schuylkill County alone the total beer and porter production of the ten breweries within the county, for the eight months ending with September, 1903, was approximately 230,000 barrels. In addition to this, thirty agencies of breweries outside the county

sold, it is estimated, about 20,000 barrels. Practically all of this was consumed within Schuylkill County. With a total population of 175,000, this is an average of over forty-seven gallons for each man, woman, and child for the eight months. Besides, this calculation does not consider the whiskey, gin, rum, wines, and other alcoholic beverages consumed within the county, in which there is a total of 1167 liquor licenses, about one-fourth of which are held by Slavs. This is a license for every one hundred and fifty of the population. On Saturday evenings and Sundays, at weddings, christenings, funerals, and other celebrations and observances, drinking among the Slavs is carried to excess, the occasion not infrequently ending in a free-for-all fight, and sometimes in a small riot, in which participants are shot and stabbed and not infrequently killed. Many of the most serious crimes among the Slavs are invariably traced, whenever they can be traced at all, to some drunken orgy.

These are facts. As to placing the responsibility for them, we should not be too quick in

jumping to conclusions. Nearly every Slav saloon-keeper has had his license secured for him by some one or more of the brewers within the region whose product is sold over the bar. And these brewers are of the English-speaking races. Their influence extends into the ordinance-making bodies of the mining towns; they not infrequently dictate municipal and even county control of the liquor system. I was told of a case where the Mahanoy City authorities not long ago deprived five or six Slav saloon-keepers of their licenses because of the general disrepute in which the places they conducted were held. The brewer who was "backing" these saloonists put political and other "influences" to work at Pottsville, the county seat, and within a very short time these saloon-keepers were back at their old business. There seems to exist among the brewers an extensive system of exploitation of the Slav saloon-keepers, by which the latter are required to pay a certain percentage to the brewers for securing the license.

But the brewers are not the only exploiters of

the Slav races. In every county and every city and mining town within the anthracite region there are many representatives of the pettifogging, or "shyster," lawyer. Through their malign activity counter-suits by the scores are continually being brought among the foreigners. These men make use of the courts and other legal instruments at every turn to advance their own selfish ends. One prominent lawyer and official of one of the counties says that this is indeed a serious and a growing evil. Through it he accounts for more than half the cases that each term are brought before the courts—cases which are so trivial that they never should have gone beyond the magistrates, and in many cases should not have reached even that lower court.

Unfortunately, the magistrate is often an ally of the disreputable lawyer in exploiting the Slav, who is at the mercy of justices of the peace, constables, and other minor officials. In Hazleton not long ago a "foreigner," arrested for assault and battery, was fined forty-eight dollars, and when a mine superintendent advised him to ask

for a receipt, the magistrate for sole reply kicked the Slav downstairs. The sequel is instructive: When a few days later the same Slav fought again, the former victim went to the same magistrate for a warrant, because, as he explained, it was the other fellow who was to be fined this time!

All these are but mere details. Illustrations of other dangerous tendencies, just as clear and distinct, could be given by the score. Enough has been said, however, to indicate that united with other forces they are working towards inevitable injury to organized society and its institutions. Sad and depressing as is a view of the composite picture they present, it must not be forgotten that the Slav immigrants, and particularly their descendants, are impressionable and adaptable; that forces are at work which have already done much for them, and will do more. One of these, already touched upon, is the public school. Its results though sure, are slow. Unfortunately, it cannot affect the Slav immigrant who comes to the anthracite region full-grown. This individ-

ual must be brought under the influence of a yet more powerful agency, one which makes also for civilization and for Americanism in the best sense. In the anthracite region the means more nearly approaching this need is the labor organization—the United Mine Workers of America.

CHAPTER IX

THE TASK BEFORE THE UNION

WHILE the Slav invasion of the anthracite region has its social, religious, political, and educational phases it should not be forgotten that it is primarily and essentially an industrial problem. For this reason a solution must come through industrial means. If these are successful, all the other broad social questions, which are so acutely presented within the fields, will by that very success be largely supplied with a satisfactory answer. These industrial means, as has been indicated, are the United Mine Workers of America.

This organization is taking men of a score of nationalities—English-speaking and Slav—men of widely different creeds, languages, and customs, and of varying powers of industrial competition, and is welding them into an industrial brotherhood, each part of which can at least

understand of the others that they are working for one great and common end.

This bond of unionism is stronger than one can readily imagine who has not seen its mysterious workings or who has not been a victim of its members' newly-found enthusiasm. It is to-day the strongest tie than can bind together the 147,000 mine-workers and the thousands dependent upon them. It is more to them than politics, more than religion, more even than the social ties usually holding together the members of a community. It is all of this and more to the mine-workers, because it has done for them what all these others could not do. It tends to destroy enmity between men in different occupations in the industry, at different collieries, in the different fields, and even between the different nationalities. Before the organization came into the region group fought industrially against group, class against class, race against race, and district against district. Instead of this continual internal strife the union is directing their energies into the channel of co-operation one with another. Organ-

ization is teaching them the great benefit to the individual that comes from co-operation for the common good. In brief, the union is socializing the heterogeneous mass; is making it over from the individualistic and race point of view to that of the industrial group to which they, for the time being, happen to belong.

It is changing the mine-worker from a pessimist to an optimist. It has not prevented him from being discontented; it has probably made him more so, but there is as much difference between a despairing pessimism and a noble, optimistic discontent as there is between poverty and progress. The former is hopeless; the latter hopeful. The former makes for drunkenness, extravagance of small wages and all the accompanying social evils of a mining town. The latter teaches sobriety, frugality, and strengthens many of those virtues which go to make individual and social progress.

As has been indicated, prior to the strike of 1900, the dominant line of demarcation in the social and industrial life of the communities

within the region was racial. There were strong differences among men of the same nationality and between different races of the same industrial group, and these differences gave marked causes for frequent internal strife. Each race had and still retains very largely its own distinct customs and beliefs, with individual and class passions and inherited hatreds. Between the Lithuanian and the Pole, for example, an inveterate hatred seems to exist, the former considering himself deeply offended if he is called a Pole. This enmity is carried to such an extent by the Lithuanian miner that he refuses to have a Pole work with him as a laborer. Between the Magyars and the Slovaks there is also transplanted hatred and deep-seated enmity.

Now the United Mine Workers of America is breaking down these inherited forces of separation and is drawing new lines of demarcation that bind more closely the heretofore antagonistic groups and races. No longer is it of prime interest to the mine-worker to know of his fellow whether he be Pole or Welshman, Lithuanian

or Irishman; of far greater importance is the question whether he is for the cause or against it—whether he is union or non-union. In brief, the racial and religious and social forces which heretofore tended to divide the mine-workers into innumerable groups antagonistic one to the other are being bridged over by the much more powerful force of industrial self-interest. The principal at its base is best explained, perhaps, by a comparison with the forces operating upon capital in the anthracite industry which have resulted in a combination of this capital.

The spokesmen for the United Mine Workers have often pointed out that the organization is but attempting to do for mine-labor what its employers have already succeeded in doing for anthracite capital, yet the aptness of the comparison has been little understood. Was there a well recognized over-supply of labor? So was there a surplus of capital. If the English-speaking miner yielded to the lower grade Slav labor, so did capital demanding a higher return give way before a cheaper capital,—that is, before one with

lower costs of production and one satisfied with a lower interest. And the final result, in the one case as in the other, was the formation and triumph of "unionism."

During the period when the unrestrained competition of the Slav was destroying a fair wage for anthracite labor the uncontrolled competition of capital with capital in the production of hard coal wrought ruin not only to a fair rate of interest but to a large part of the capital itself invested in that industry. The high interest which capital at one time secured from anthracite mining had drawn other capital into the region to produce coal. Soon there was too much capital invested for the work to be done. Capital which could do that work for the least return—whose cost of producing coal was lowest—competed with the capital which needed a greater return in order to meet its higher cost of production. Capital generally was in the industry and could not readily go elsewhere. It had to earn an income for its owner. A low interest was to some managers of capital better than no interest.

Some of the capital demanding a higher return sought investment elsewhere, but by far the greater part of it was compelled to work for a small return, and in not a few cases for no return at all. The remuneration of capital in the anthracite industry generally was fixed by that part of it whose cost of production was lowest. Continued competition ushered in that period when capital, as represented in mining operations and transportation facilities, was forced to succumb, and bankruptcy after bankruptcy of railroads and mining companies attest to the ruinous operation of uncontrolled competition and to the fact that capital demanding a fair return for the work it performed was unable longer to work at the price set by the "cheaper" capital.

Then came the remedy—the driving out of the "cheaper" capital by the consolidation of small mine properties under large mining companies—the combination of interests through railway ownership. And so—enters the union. Henceforth anthracite capital was to be just as surely *union* or *non-union* as the man in the

mines later on came to be specifically designated. The “cheaper” or non-union capital—that which could mine coal at a lower cost of production and in consequence could sell it at a lower price—was either driven from the industry or forced to sell its commodity at the price demanded by that capital whose cost of production is greater. This price is fixed arbitrarily—it is set at the highest possible point * that will enable the working capital whose cost of production is greater to secure what is to it a fair profit. All capital producing at less cost necessarily earns a higher and higher interest as it approaches that having the lowest cost of production. Organization of capital, then, is of advantage to all capital remaining in the industry. It is a disadvantage

* There is a point beyond which it cannot go, and that is where the consumer begins to exercise his power to control price through substituting some other fuel. This is plainly seen in the prices of those sizes of anthracite used for steam purposes, with which the bituminous product competes. In these prices we see again the effect of the unrestrained competition of a lower with a higher cost of production.

to the consumer of coal in the sense that prices are higher than under unrestrained competition of capital with capital.

When the cheaper non-union labor is driven out * by union labor seeking to maintain a higher standard of living, we are touched in two tender spots—in our “humanity” and on the “pocket-book nerve,” and we cry out at once at the cruel force employed. We are shocked at the boycott, horrified at the riot. But we have no tears for the victim none the less surely done to death in the wars of capital against capital. The reason is that we cannot perceive so clearly the weapons used and their deadly effect. A railway which wishes to ruin at one blow a hundred competitors, so that it may buy their coal-lands cheap,

* In the sense here intended the cheaper labor is driven from the industry if it raises its price to that of the union labor. From the point of view of organization, non-union labor may remain in the industry if it works for union prices. Mere membership or non-membership in an organization is not the meaning I give to union and non-union labor. Usually, however, the two are identical.

uses no clubs, employs no dynamite. It simply issues a circular, as the Reading did that fateful day in 1871, when it trebled its freight rates. Competition dies, but we see no bloodshed.

The difference in the effect on the public mind is 'due to the fact that labor cannot be separated from its possessor, while capital is easily dissociated from the physical being of its owner. It is impersonal, while labor must ever be personal and human. In driving non-union capital out of the industry the person of the owner is not, so far as we can see, directly affected. But in the case of non-union labor it is necessary to attack the individual laborer. This manifests itself through boycotting and violence. The underlying forces at work in the case of both capital and labor are not, however, one whit different.

In still another important aspect are the organization of labor and the union of capital similar: both mean a higher price for the commodity than would result under unrestrained competition. In the one case the commodity is labor; in the other it is coal. In both cases the con-

sumer is affected. The consumer of mine-labor is the railroad mining company; the consumer of coal is the general public. The object of the consumer is to secure the commodity at the lowest possible price. An increase in price, then, naturally affects disadvantageously the interests of the consumer. For this reason he objects to organization to control the price of the commodity.* This explains why the railroad mining companies have steadfastly, if not stubbornly, refused to recognize the United Mine Workers of America. The anthracite-consuming public has as persistently refused to recognize the combination of railroads and consolidation of mining companies for the control of the price of hard coal. The public has even gone so far as to pass laws prohibiting this very thing. Despite these laws the combination exists and will continue to exist. This plain fact the consumers of

* The consumer feels directly the increase in cost resulting from organization, but does not see so plainly the indirect benefits flowing out of organization. He is thus inclined to oppose it.

coal should recognize; they should direct their energies to minimizing the evil workings of organization and aim to secure more and more of its benefits instead of trying to deceive themselves into the belief that that which exists does not exist.

The same can be said of the railroad mining companies in their relation to the organization of mine-labor. The forces compelling the mine-workers to unite for their common good are so powerful that the opposition of the combination of capital must ultimately prove futile. It matters not what the particular organization is called; if it is not the United Mine Workers of America the same forces will be at work under some other name. And the cost to capital in opposing the working of these forces will in the end be far greater than would result from a recognition of them and the directing of efforts towards minimizing their evil effects.

As it is, organized capital in the anthracite industry is denying to organized labor what it claims for itself: organized capital demands

for non-union labor what it refuses to grant to non-union capital. From the point of view of the public, however, if organized capital exercises the "right" to compel non-union capital to sell its coal at the rates set by the capital having the greater cost of production, then organized labor has just as much of a "right" to compel non-union labor to sell its labor at a price—to work for a wage—which will enable that part of it to support its standard of living which is at a greater cost in producing its labor. If this is true, then its opposite—that the laborer has the "right" to sell his commodity in a "free" market to whom, when, and how he chooses—is not true. It would be just the same as demanding and compelling that capital in the anthracite industry which can produce coal at the lowest possible price shall have the "right" to sell its commodity in a "free" market at whatever price the owners of that capital chose to ask. But when this question is propounded to the manager of capital invested in the railroad mining companies he at once ceases to be a consumer of mine-labor and

becomes a producer of coal. As a consumer his object is to secure the commodity labor at the lowest possible price; as a producer his purpose is to sell his commodity coal at the highest possible price. This explains the reason, but does not justify the attitude of the manager of capital who denies to non-union capital that "right" which he so persistently claims for non-union labor.

The "right" of the individual worker in the anthracite industry is not so much in a "free" market as it is in a market where a fair wage is assured. He has had a "free" market in open competition and we have seen what it has resulted in to him. Capital in the different protected industries in the United States would have the same kind of a "free" market if the tariff bars were let down and it was forced to meet the competition of cheaper products from European or other countries. Labor reared under American conditions and forced by our social and political institutions to meet a certain standard of living should not be compelled to compete with

European labor having no such demands upon it. The experience of the past twenty years in the anthracite industry teaches us that it will be forced so to compete unless labor organizes for its own protection. In this way it may not be able to control immigration through tariff laws, but it can protect its market by controlling the competition of this cheaper European labor when it enters that industry. Its aim in so doing is to secure what it believes to be a fair market, by setting a minimum price below which labor in that industry shall not be sold.

It should not be inferred from what has been said that the writer argues for the retention in the anthracite industry of the English-speaking nationalities—the native Americans and the English, Welsh, Scotch, Irish, and Germans. Their supremacy in this industry is soon to be, if it is not already, a thing of the past never to be regained. He does believe, however, that it should be possible so to control economic forces as to bring about the supplanting of the English-speaking races by the Slav with much less injury

than in the past has been done to the workers and to their communities. By all means the low standard of living of the Slav should not be permitted to dominate the industry. If the forces which each year bring greater pressure to bear on capital to secure a relatively lower cost of production are allowed to work on labor uncontrolled, it will be only a question of time when the coming supremacy of the Slav will in turn be attacked by still cheaper labor, and the struggle of the past quarter of a century will have to be fought all over again.

Whatever nationality is to dominate the industry, a standard of living conformable to American conditions should be enforced upon the workers as well as upon capital. This is possible under present conditions only through such an organization as the United Mine Workers of America.

CHAPTER X

IN STRIKE TIMES

THE effects of the Slav invasion of the anthracite coal-fields are not confined to the small area in Eastern Pennsylvania where coal is produced. We need only to review the course of events during the strike of 1902 to be convinced of their more far-reaching consequences.

When this strike was inaugurated on May 12 by the United Mine Workers of America the operators, as if by common agreement, made no effort to continue mining operations. This passive attitude of the mining companies aided in cutting off the entire production of anthracite coal in all three fields.

Convinced, as they were from the very beginning, that the industry had entered upon an indefinite period of idleness, the officials of the United Mine Workers took immediate steps to get employment outside the region for as large

a number of the men as possible. They realized that by doing so they would not only lessen the number for whom relief would have to be given when that problem became a pressing one, but the earnings thus secured would aid in postponing that time, as well as in furnishing that relief when it would have to be given. Fortunately for the union, the condition of the general labor market throughout the Eastern and Middle Western States was favorable to the absorption of a portion of the vast army of 147,000 men and boys made idle by the strike. The entire suspension of hard-coal mining increased the demand for the bituminous product, and this naturally gave work for more men in the central competitive soft-coal fields,—Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Western Pennsylvania,—into which a large number of the anthracite miners migrated.*

* The United Mine Workers instructed its members, through the assistance of the press and the pulpit, not to go into the soft-coal fields of Virginia and West Virginia, as a strike of the mine-employees in those States was then probable. It was inaugurated on June 7.

With the assistance of organized labor, which at once came to the aid of the union, others secured employment in the seaboard cities and towns, in railroad-construction work, and in the different industries where the skill of the miner made him a welcome employee. Many of the foreigners, with their hoarded earnings, sailed to their old homes in Europe. So great was the exodus of mine-workers within two months after the strike began that between 25,000 and 30,000, it is estimated, had left the region. Most of these were skilled miners. Without them very few of the other 110,000 mine-employees would be able to resume work at the collieries. Thus the *miners* held the key to the situation whenever the crisis was to come, and it was of the greatest advantage to the strike leaders to keep these particular mine-workers in employment elsewhere until the union instructed them to return.

In shutting off the supply of anthracite the strike left not a few of the railroads with practically no freight from the region; with no freight to haul, there was no need for many of

the train crews; with the cars and engines idle, or on other railroads, there was but little use for the mechanics in the local repair shops; with the roads transporting no coal to tidewater, there was a less demand for the vessels engaged in coast-wise coal-trade; with many of these vessels tied up, idleness was forced upon dockmen and crews; with no coal to sell, retail dealers in the large cities and towns soon closed their yards, laying off their employees and in other ways reducing expenses to a minimum, some of them even going so far as to retire permanently from the business; with the miners idle or out of the region, the demand for powder was greatly lessened, thus closing many of the powder-mills in the anthracite region and compelling their employees to join the already large number of idlers in the three fields. The general cutting down of expenses and husbanding of resources all along the business line by those dependent directly and indirectly upon the anthracite industry led to the temporary discharge of clerks, bookkeepers, and other employees of business concerns throughout

the cities and towns in the anthracite districts. So extensive was control exercised over expenditures that scores of saloons were closed through thousands of mine-workers taking the pledge to abstain from intoxicants during the strike. Thus indirectly the strike was responsible for thousands of workmen not engaged in mining being forced out of their ordinary employments.

Within the anthracite region, on the very first day of the strike, a sharp line of demarcation was drawn between the union and non-union worker. The latter was the man who, for various reasons, dominant among which was his self-interest, refused to become a member of the United Mine Workers. It might truthfully be said that he was the conservative type of workingman in that he believed himself to be an independent man with the "right" to say how, when, and where he should work without dictation or interference, as he called it, from the union. In brief, the non-union man was one imbued with political doctrines of liberty and independence which he endeavored to apply to economic or

industrial conditions, and his own particular necessities forced him into the belief that he was a martyr to those principles. His attitude, when carried into action, was destructive to the aims and objects of the union mine-worker who had been led to believe in the good of the whole group—in “the greatest good to the greatest number”—as opposed to the non-union man’s individualistic point of view. Better conditions of employment, the union man had been taught through experience, could come only through the organization of all for the good of all. Had not better living conditions already been secured in some measure through the efforts of the union in the strike of 1900? and had not these benefited nearly all the mine-workers? To him these questions answered themselves. He looked upon the non-union man as an enemy in league with the employers of mine-workers; towards him, as well as towards them, he directed all the weapons of the organization, even to the use of force, justifying the latter in his unshaken belief that the ends of the union were good.

The non-union mine-worker should not be confused with the "scab." The former has many industrial and social virtues; the latter possesses none. He can best be likened unto the mercenary soldier who fights under any banner for pay. A principle is as far removed from the "scab" in his work as honesty is from a thief. The man who formed the "scab" type during the strike was, as a rule, drawn from the large cities; he was not, from any point of view, let alone that of industrial efficiency, a good type of man; he was such as to be regarded with contempt not alone by the union miner, but in many cases by the non-union employee, the latter even going so far as to refuse to work alongside the "scab," not infrequently preferring to join the men on strike. Otherwise the attitude of the non-union man towards the "scab" was a passive one; that of the union man exceedingly active. The "scab" was to the union mine-worker what a red flag is to an already enraged bull; and, unfortunately for peace and order, his position as a "deputy," or not infrequently as a coal and iron policeman or

special guard, was always flaunting the “scab” in the faces of the strikers. The regular coal and iron policemen—members of a legally organized police force patrolling the anthracite districts year in and year out to preserve peace and protect property—were not of the “scab” type, but in the general confusion following the large increase in the number of coal and iron policemen the strikers directed their opposition indiscriminately against nearly all members of this legally constituted authority. As the strike progressed, all the men at work about the collieries came to be regarded by the indiscriminating public in the coal-region as “scabs.” To the union men they were all “unfair” workers.

To prevent the bringing in of men from outside the coal-region to take the places of the strikers, the officers of the union secured the assistance of organized labor in all the large Eastern cities. To provide for the cases where these efforts failed, committees of the striking employees picketed all the railroad stations within the region, using every effort, even to the extent of

paying return transportation, to induce the "imports," as the new men were sometimes called, from accepting work under the mining companies. Usually the "imports" were brought in under guard, or secretly at night, and in these cases disturbances of the peace and small-sized riots were of frequent occurrence. Once within the well-guarded grounds, the strike-breakers were generally beyond the reach of the strikers.

To keep all workers away from the collieries, even those whose employment was necessary to preserve the mines from the accumulation of water and gas, such as engineers, pumpmen, etc., the strikers had committees at work night and day. These committees met the workers along the highways or at their homes, and if persuasion failed to keep them from working, recourse was had to force, which took the form of duckings in creeks or rivers, the marching of non-union men and scabs along the public highways to their home in scanty attire, the whitewashing of some, the stoning and assaulting of others, and the visitation upon the workers of other forms of

punishment devised by the ingenuity of the mob. So great was this interference with those who continued at work that by June the mining companies had turned their collieries into armed barricades, with newly-built or repaired houses for the accommodation of the workers, the whole grounds in many cases being surrounded by a high wooden fence topped with four or five strands of barbed wire. Recourse to other means was had by the strikers to accomplish their ends: the workers were held up to public scorn and ridicule by their names being published in the "unfair list" in the local newspapers as those "unfit to associate with honorable men;" they were represented in effigies dangling from electric-light, telegraph, and telephone poles and wires in front of their homes or along the highways; they were warned of the fate awaiting them by graves being dug in their yards with their names inscribed on the boards placed above the mounds for tombstones; the sign of "the skull and cross bones" was painted on their houses; messages were sent to them threatening

them and their families with dire results if they remained more than twenty-four hours in the community.

Of all the means employed by the strikers to accomplish their ends, that of the boycott was the most effective. This boycott system received its force from public sanction, the great body of the inhabitants in the coal-region strongly favoring the cause of the men on strike. A prominent and highly respected citizen of one of the mining towns was expelled from a benevolent society which had for its object the assisting of sick members and the defraying of part of the funeral expenses of those who died, of which society he had been a member in good standing for nearly twenty-eight years; a member of twelve years' standing in a temperance society was forced to resign; the explanation of both actions was non-membership in the union. Landlords would not accommodate men brought into the districts to take the places of the strikers; servant girls in public hostelries refused to cook for or wait upon them; barbers would not shave them; merchants

and saloonists would not have them for customers; dairymen would not supply them with milk. This boycott was enforced to the extent of physicians being compelled to decline attendance upon and druggists being forced to refuse medicine to the non-union mine-workers and their families. Thus it was but a short step from boycotting the workers to persecuting their families and relatives. Children of mine-workers on strike refused to attend the school and asked for the discharge of a lady teacher whose aged father was a watchman at one of the mines; children of union mine-workers would not attend Sunday-school with their former playmates whose relatives remained at work; members of the Lace-makers' Union employed at a silk-mill refused to work alongside girls whose fathers and brothers would not go on strike; clerks were dismissed from stores because they were unfortunate enough, in this instance, to be related to non-union mine-workers; members of a church went so far as to refuse to worship by electric lights furnished by a company employing non-union

firemen; congregations were even split into factions by union members refusing to worship alongside non-union mine-workers; promises of marriage were broken because relatives of one of the contracting parties were non-union men.

Each community within the region was divided against itself, by far the greater portion ostracising all those who continued in employment at the mines. In brief, without tiring the reader with detailed illustrations, nearly all the strong social bonds usually holding together the individuals of a community were interfered with and the channel of their operation diverted by the wide-spread system of boycott which was enforced. So severe was its operation that "alliances" were formed in all the principal towns throughout the region to counteract the boycott and to punish those enforcing it by offering money rewards for the conviction of persons found guilty of specified offenses.

With such forces in action it is little to be wondered at that peace and order were frequently

disturbed. Aroused human passion and embittered class hatred were given a loose rein; public sentiment, which should have held a check on these unguided and uncontrolled enemies to organized society, seemed only to urge them on their devastating course. Despite the responses of the sheriffs to the appeals of the operators for protection; despite the large increase in the number of officers to preserve order, and despite the frequent proclaiming of the riot act and threats to call for troops, the machinery of local government in the coal-fields was interfered with and made almost useless by public sentiment, called by some the "tyranny of the majority," overwhelmingly endorsing the strikers' cause and in nearly every case openly or secretly supporting their acts, even to the violation of law and order. Thus justice frequently miscarried by juries, summoned to try offending strikers, being more often than not composed of mine-workers and their sympathizers. The sworn officers of the law, in their endeavors to perform their duties, were as dry leaves before an autumn storm. As

early as July 10 the sheriff of Carbon County had called upon the governor of Pennsylvania for troops; but this request was refused, the chief executive of the State believing that the county official had not exhausted all his powers for preserving the peace. Disorders in the various sections grew apace, and on July 29, following a riot at Shenandoah, in which one man was killed and forty or more shot, a riot precipitated by an attack upon a deputy sheriff who was escorting non-union men from one of the collieries, the Eighth and Twelfth Regiments, the Governors' Troop, and two companies of the Fourth Regiment, Pennsylvania National Guard, were stationed in Schuylkill County. A month later they were joined by the Second Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry.

With no prospects of the mine-workers voluntarily returning to their employment unless their demands were granted; with the hope of the mining officials starving the miners into submission (if they had ever entertained such a hope) being blasted by the unprecedented finan-

cial support of the public and organized labor; with consumers of coal everywhere clamoring loudly for a resumption of anthracite mining; with the public aroused to such a high pitch of justified anger at a too-long-continued state of war between operators and miners, such as it had never reached since the Civil War, the mining companies undertook, about the middle of September, to end the costly struggle by attempting to resume the mining of coal. Efforts were made by the superintendents and other officials, through personal interviews, by posting notices about the colliery grounds, in promises that "foremen will not make known the names of those applying for work," and in other ways, to induce the miners in particular to return to their old places.

This activity of the operators was accompanied by renewed efforts on the part of the strikers to keep the mines closed and all workers away from the collieries. Railroad tracks extending into the grounds were torn up, dams supplying collieries with water for steam purposes were blown up,

washeries were set on fire and in other cases badly wrecked, and armed attacks were made upon colliery guards. Non-union men were assaulted; houses sheltering the defenceless wives and children of workers were dynamited, to some the torch was applied, and in others the furnishings wantonly wrecked; deputy sheriffs escorting men to and from the mines were attacked; trains bearing non-union workmen were wrecked, jails stormed, and officers of the law resisted. Railroad bridges were dynamited or set on fire to prevent coal being shipped from the region, crews hauling non-union mined coal were stoned, and in cases attempts were even made to wreck passenger as well as coal trains.

By the beginning of October the whole anthracite region was in a state of lawlessness. Seven men had been killed in conflicts between strikers on the one side and non-union men and officers of the law on the other, three of the killed being striking mine-workers, three non-union men, and the other one an innocent third party. The issuing of sheriffs' proclamations in all the seven coun-

ties affected; the swearing in of hundreds of deputies, and even the ordering into the region of the Ninth and Thirteenth Regiments, the Sheridan Troop, and the remaining eight companies of the Fourth Regiment to assist the military force already in the fields, were not sufficient for the preservation of law and order as the struggle between the operators and miners became more and more acute. Such were the conditions in Schuylkill County that its sheriff requested of the governor that martial law be declared throughout its borders, but this request was not granted.

On October 6 all the remaining fighting strength of the entire National Guard of Pennsylvania, comprising a total of nearly ten thousand officers and men, making up one division, was ordered into the anthracite counties. In the general order Governor Stone designated the counties in which "tumults and riots frequently occur and mob law reigns," and instructed the commanding officer to "see that all men who desire to work and their families have ample protec-

tion, protect all trains and other property from unlawful interference, arrest all persons engaging in acts of violence and intimidation and hold them under guard until their release will not endanger the public peace; that threats, intimidations, assaults, and all acts of violence cease at once; the public peace and good order will be preserved upon all occasions, and that no interference whatsoever will be permitted with officers and men in the discharge of their duties."

Under the protection of the troops, who escorted workers to and from the collieries, anthracite was being mined for the first time since May. The operators claimed in October that from 17,000 to 20,000 men were at work in the mines throughout the three fields. But the total amount of coal this small force could get out was insignificant in comparison with that necessary to meet the demand of the public.

Despite the fact that the mines had been shut down during the summer months, when the need for anthracite by householders was at its minimum, industries generally were suffering greatly

for fuel by October. The general resort to the use of soft coal, making inoperative the smoke-nuisance ordinances of Eastern cities, had transferred to the bituminous coal-fields such an unusual demand for fuel as to overtax their facilities for supplying it. Besides, these were curtailed by a strike of soft-coal mine-workers in Virginia and West Virginia, inaugurated on June 7 by the United Mine Workers of America,* and by a suspension order issued by the officers of the union which limited production in the Central and Western Pennsylvania bituminous coal-fields to four days a week.† The lack

* The object of the strike in the two Virginias was to secure the adoption of a uniform scale of wages on a basis equal to that of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Western Pennsylvania. To this end an increase in wages ranging from ten to twenty per cent. was demanded. The Michigan mine-workers had been on strike since April 1 to secure an eight-hour work-day, the abolishment of specific grievances, and the continuance of the wage scale.

† This order was unsuccessful and was discontinued within ten days. The Indianapolis convention of mine-

of motive power and cars on the railroads also aided in preventing a sufficient supply of soft coal being brought to the Eastern markets.

Conditions were aggravated by the fact that there was very little anthracite on hand when the miners in the hard-coal fields suspended operations. This was due to the practical exhaustion of the hard-coal markets by the strike of 1900, to the efforts of the operators to maintain higher prices following that struggle, to the attempts of the mine-employees to spread production more evenly throughout the twelve months of the year, to the restriction of production by them in anticipation of the strike, and to the unusually severe

workers in January had adopted a resolution to the effect that in case there was a strike in the anthracite fields, and "should it develop that coal is being shipped from the bituminous districts into those markets which properly belong to the anthracite product, or that the Eastern railroads which now consume anthracite coal were being supplied with coal mined by members of our organization in the bituminous fields, the National Executive Board shall have full power to order either a sectional or a national suspension of work."

floods in the anthracite region during the winter of 1901. By May of 1902, when mining operations were entirely suspended, only 18,731,879 tons had been sent to market, being nearly 4,000,000 tons less than for the same period in 1901. By September the shortage in anthracite exceeded 12,000,000 tons. This was partly compensated for by the increased production of soft-coal and coke in this country,* and by the importation of coal from Canada and Wales,† despite the duty of seventy-six cents a ton. But all these sources of supply were not equal to the

* The Pennsylvania Railroad reported the quantity of soft coal originating on its lines east of Pittsburg and Erie for the year ending October 18, 1902, to have been 20,895,958 tons, an increase of 5,121,214 tons over the preceding year. For the same period there was a decrease of 2,088,015 tons in anthracite shipments over its controlled lines. Up to October 5 the quantity of coke shipped over the Pennsylvania had increased from 6,171,478 tons in 1891 to 7,447,303 in 1902.

† An Associated Press despatch, dated London, October 6, stated that over 200,000 tons of Welsh coal had been ordered for shipment to the United States at prices above seven dollars a ton delivered in New York.

demand, and prices rose rapidly. By July the price in New York of soft coal for steam purposes had increased from three dollars to four dollars and fifty cents a ton, the highest price, it was said, since 1871. The price of anthracite at the mines had more than doubled.

The scarcity of both anthracite and bituminous coal by October had led to the general introduction of all kinds of substitutes for fuel, including coke, gas, oil, wood, charcoal, etc. Gas-plants, which formerly sold their by-product—coke—at low prices, withdrew this commodity from the market for their own use. The demand for gas-stoves was not only beyond the ability of the companies to supply, but the increase in the use of gas taxed to the utmost the capacity of the plants, particularly of those companies using coal in its manufacture. According to the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, the United Gas Improvement Company, in that city, sold 14,000 gas-ranges in 1901, and by September, 1902, the sales exceeded 37,000. The same company reported for September, 1902, an increase of thirty per cent.

in the consumption of gas over the same period of 1901. The sale of oil-stoves, as well as the consumption of oil, had also greatly increased. The newspapers reported families using for cooking purposes asbestos bricks soaked with oil; on the East Side in New York the poor were burning cocoanut shells bought of candy manufacturers at fifteen cents a bag of sixty pounds; in Chicago, streets laid with wooden paving blocks were torn up and the material used as fuel; railroads disposed of old cross-ties to their employees; in cases manufacturing plants resorted to the use of sawdust in their furnaces. Despite the resort to such substitutes, not a few of the smaller industrial plants throughout the East were shut down,* or were running on short time;

* Special investigations by Bradstreet correspondents at fifty cities and industrial centres east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio and Potomac rivers at the beginning of October indicated that iron smelting had been seriously curtailed, brick manufacturing had suffered, and small hand laundries crippled. Including furnace-employees in Eastern Pennsylvania, brickmakers in

trolley lines changed their schedules to operate a fewer number of cars, and thousands of industries were living a hand-to-mouth existence, not knowing what hour they would be compelled to suspend operations. The lack of good fuel affected the production of pig-iron, which in turn caused delays in foundries, thus interfering with the keeping of contracts. So greatly was business interfered with that large industrial concerns began inserting delay clauses in their contracts.

Not only did the scarcity of fuel make expensive and uncertain the conduct of industries, postpone the opening of public schools, greatly handicap religious and charitable organizations in their work, but the increase in the price of all fuels soon affected the price of those commodities into which they entered as an element in their cost of production. Laundries charged higher prices, bakers raised the price of bread, restaurants and

and near Hudson Valley, and a large number of coal-handlers at tidewater docks, about twenty thousand men had been rendered idle by the strike, excluding, of course, the mine-workers.

cafés asked more money for food or reduced the quality and quantity of meals, steam-heating companies raised their rates, hotels and apartment-houses charged higher rents, and there was an advance in the price of many of the necessaries of life.

Anthracite, in domestic sizes, was selling for \$25 a ton, and in cases for as much as \$30, pea sizes \$12, and buckwheat \$6 a ton. So valuable, in fact, had anthracite become that the bottoms of rivers in the three fields and in the vicinity of coal-docks near the large cities were dredged for the fuel. Bituminous coal for domestic use was retailing at \$9 a ton. The larger industries were, of course, not affected by these high prices, having contracted for their yearly supplies at much lower prices long before the strike began. The poor on the East Side in New York were paying twenty-five cents a bucket, or seventy-five cents a bushel, and the prospect of suffering among this class for the lack of fuel was so appalling that charitable organizations held union meetings to devise some means of grappling with the pressing

problem. Special societies of public-spirited citizens were formed and unusual efforts made to secure fuel for the more needy.

According to the New York Health Commissioner, "The death-rate from pneumonia and kindred diseases is (September 29) increasing rapidly, owing to insufficient heating of dwellings and other buildings, due to a scarcity of coal." The New York correspondent of the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* stated * that

"if the coal strike continues, we are threatened in this city with a shutting off of the supply of gas and with an advance in the prices of many necessities of life. For instance, it was announced to-day that the price of rye bread had been advanced one cent a loaf on the East Side, owing to the increased cost of fuel. It is simply impossible to conceive what would be the consequences of a continued coal famine in connection with a spell of cold weather. Sickness, death, intense suffering, perhaps starvation, darkness, riots, cessation of many industries, loss of work, blockade of rapid transit, stoppage of elevators—these are some of the dire predictions that are made."

* Issue of October 8, 1902.

By the time some of the striking miners in the West Virginia and Virginia soft-coal fields resumed work in October the fuel famine was so general that the officials of the Norfolk & Western Railway, despite the statute of Virginia which prohibited the same, ordered the running of coal-trains on Sunday, "in order to expedite the shipment of coal for the relief of communities and interests suffering and imperilled for the want of fuel." Nearly all the coal-hauling railroads gave to fuels the preference of fast shipment over all other freight. The Treasury Department, on October 6, instructed the collectors at the principal ports of entry in the United States to afford every facility for the prompt delivery of the large quantity of coal which reports indicated was being imported. "So far as it may be," the instructions said, "give consignments of coal the preference over everything else, and for the present solve all reasonable doubts in favor of the coal importer." Offers of coal-lands, to be mined by the government without compensation to the donor during

the continuance of the famine, were made to President Roosevelt. In New Jersey owners of timber-lands turned them over to the citizens in need of fuel; in that and other States the public sale of growing timber, to be cut from the lands by the purchaser, were freely advertized.

Long before this state of affairs was reached, however, the public had been aroused to the perils threatening it and would have sooner forced peace between the contending parties had it possessed any recognized and definite means for making its wishes effective. The ordinary channels for expressing public sentiment through resolutions and petitions to State and Federal officials and legislative bodies were first resorted to. These were adopted in mass meetings of citizens and in regular and special sessions of debating and literary societies, labor unions, ministerial assemblages, political and reform clubs, good government organizations, and in societies generally all over the country, as far west as San Francisco. Through these appeals were made to public-spirited men—to United States

Senators, Congressmen, and others—to use their best efforts to end the costly struggle; the Civic Federation was urged to renewed efforts, and the presidents of the railroad mining companies were asked to submit all questions at issue to arbitration.

The governor of Pennsylvania was petitioned to summon the State Legislature in special session for the enactment of a compulsory arbitration law or to adopt other means to end the strike; he was called upon to take military possession of the anthracite mines and operate them in the name of the Commonwealth; to have recourse to the means for annulling the charters of the coal-carrying companies with the view of public ownership of the mines and to appoint receivers to operate the mining plants.

The Peoples' Alliance, which with the Public Alliance and the Workmans' Alliance had been organized in the different towns of the anthracite region to bring about a settlement of the strike, favored compulsory arbitration, an eight-hour work-day law, and "the enforcement of the

article of the State constitution providing that any corporation which abuses the privileges granted therein shall have its charter annulled or revoked." Thousands of letters, with the object of urging the two United States Senators from Pennsylvania to bring about a speedy settlement, were addressed to Senators Quay and Penrose by residents in the anthracite fields through the inauguration of an endless-chain system. Men prominent in public life—judges, lawyers, politicians, bishops, journalists, and business men—in speeches and writings urged upon the miners, operators, and State and Federal officials some specific action looking to an end of the conflict. The "correspondence" columns of the newspapers overflowed with communications suggesting all kinds of "patent medicine" cures for the trouble. The Pennsylvania Republican State Committee, in a resolution, provided for the appointment of a special committee of seven to bring about a settlement. A committee with a similar object was appointed by the National Association of Manufacturers.

Unable through these channels to make public opinion effective to the extent of securing peace in the anthracite industry, individuals in behalf of the public resorted to the courts of justice. Upon the application of the *New York American and Journal* the attorney-general of New York summoned representatives of the hard-coal hauling and mining companies to show cause why proceedings should not be instituted against them under the Donnelly anti-trust law of that State.* In the State Supreme Court of Massachusetts a bill in equity was filed asking for the appointment of a receiver for the coal-hauling and mining companies to carry on the business of mining and supplying coal to the public upon such terms and in such manner, and with such

* The companies replied to the effect that they were not members of any combination contrary to the New York statutes; that under the laws of Pennsylvania it is expressly authorized to any railroad company of Pennsylvania to purchase and hold the capital stock of the coal company, and that they are not members of any combination to fix prices of coal.

agents and servants, and with such rates of wages and other conditions of employment, and at such prices for goods produced and sold as the court shall from time to time adjudge proper. In Pennsylvania the attorney-general was petitioned to grant the use of the name of the Commonwealth in a suit against the Reading Railway Company to show cause why its charter should not be revoked for an alleged violation of the State constitution.* The vice-president and counsel of the Delaware & Hudson Railroad Company, in a letter to President Roose-

* The provision in question, Article XVII., Section 5, reads: "No incorporate company doing the business of a common carrier shall, directly or indirectly, prosecute or engage in mining or manufacturing articles for transportation over its works; nor shall such company, directly or indirectly, engage in any business than that of common carrier, or hold or acquire lands, freehold, or leasehold, directly or indirectly, except as shall be necessary for carrying on its business; but any mining or manufacturing company may carry the products of its mines and manufactories on its railroad or canal, not exceeding fifty miles in length."

velt, requested that the Chief Executive proceed in the courts, under the Sherman anti-trust law, against the United Mine Workers of America on the ground that it conspired to prevent interstate commerce.

With however great a degree of justice and effectiveness these appeals to the courts may have been answered finally, the necessity of the public was such that it could not wait for those decisions. The conditions were not those of ordinary times; some remedy had to be applied, and that immediately, for the intolerable state of affairs would no longer brook delay.

Mass meetings everywhere were now demanding the immediate resumption of anthracite mining, even before a settlement of the differences of the two parties to the conflict. The National Association of Manufacturers appointed a committee to devise some means whereby the manufacturers of the country might obtain enough coal to keep their plants in operation. The Common Council of Detroit called upon the mayors of cities and the governors of States

affected most severely by the fuel famine to appoint delegates to an interstate convention, to be held in Detroit on October 9, "to consider ways and means to force a resumption of the coal production either by pressure of public opinion or by government intervention, which should be demanded if other measures fail." The Peoples' Coal League was organized at Springfield, Massachusetts, with the platform, "We demand that the Federal government own the coal-mines and administer them in the interests of the whole people." The Democratic party of New York State, in its platform, advocated the national ownership of the anthracite mines.

Many efforts had been made in the meantime by individuals and organizations to bring about a settlement between the operators and the strikers, but all without avail. United States Senators Quay and Penrose attempted repeatedly to find some way out of the difficulties; Governor Stone, Attorney-General Elkins, and State Senator Flinn, of Pennsylvania, also strove in conferences with operators and officers of the miners'

union to secure a settlement. In September, Governor Odell, of New York, and United States Senator Platt, of that State, joined the two United States Senators from Pennsylvania in a conference with presidents of the hard-coal hauling roads to devise some method of settlement; but this also failed, as did similar efforts on the part of the committee appointed by the National Association of Manufacturers. The operators steadfastly refused to submit the questions at issue to arbitration, and the mine-workers, at the same time, as persistently made known their intention to remain away from the mines all winter if necessary to the remedying of their grievances and the securing of their demands. But neither had measured accurately the power of aroused public opinion nor taken sufficiently into consideration the character of the man who was to direct that power in the channels where it would prove most effective.

As early as June appeals and petitions of various kinds from all sections of the country and from all kinds of organizations began to reach

President Roosevelt, urging action on the part of the Federal government in behalf of the suffering public—"the innocent party" to the conflict in the coal-fields. The New York Board of Trade and Transportation requested of him that he appoint a commissioner to investigate the situation in the anthracite region, with a view of effecting an arbitration of the differences between operators and miners. Similar requests came from boards of trade, ministerial meetings, and different organizations in various cities. An open appeal to the President to undertake a settlement of the strike was made by the Public Alliance of the coal-fields. Not a few resolutions petitioned for the calling of a special session of Congress to take action that would bring about peace in the anthracite industry.

In response to these public appeals, President Roosevelt, on June 8, delegated Mr. Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor, to undertake an investigation of the causes of the strike and the grounds of the differences between the operators and the miners. The Commissioner

of Labor was in no sense to act as an arbitrator, —he was appointed simply as an investigator, that the President and the public might be correctly informed of the true situation. The President of the United States had absolutely no authority under the law or the constitution to interfere in any way,* what little power was formerly conferred upon him by the law of 1888 having been taken away by the repeal of that law in 1898. Mr. Wright made his report to the President on June 20, but it was not given to the public until September. It was made the basis for numerous

* President Roosevelt appointed Mr. Wright under the clauses of the Act of June 13, 1888, creating the Department of Labor, which provide that "the Commissioner of Labor is also specially charged to investigate the causes of, and the facts relating to, all controversies and disputes between employers and employees as they may occur, and which may tend to interfere with the welfare of the people of the different States, and report thereon to Congress. He is also authorized to make special reports on particular subjects whenever required to do so by the President, or either house of Congress, or when he shall think the subject in his charge requires it."

discussions at Cabinet meetings of the issues involved in the strike, and it is believed a well-defined line of action had early been mapped out by the Federal government for the time when action on its part was thought to be opportune. Certain it is that President Roosevelt had never abandoned his intention of taking action in behalf of the public welfare when that became necessary.

At the beginning of October, with failure accompanying every attempt to terminate the strike, the prospect of a fuel famine at the opening of the winter months had become so threatening as to overshadow all else in the public mind. Towards the November elections for Congressmen and those for choosing the chief executives of many of the State governments in the East there was general public apathy; returning tourists from the mountain and seashore, confronted with empty coal-bins, now added their cry to that of other consumers; industries were closing almost daily for lack of fuel; the price of all kinds of substitutes had risen beyond the

means of the poor and their suffering was beginning to be apparent in loud mutterings of discontent; churches set aside special days for prayer and fasting; socialistic and worse doctrines were spreading like wildfire in many communities; the public was being forced to that point where it was likely to justify any action, however radical or revolutionary, that would release the coal for the markets.

Such was the state of public feeling when Theodore Roosevelt, on October 1, invited representatives of the anthracite-hauling railroads and independent operators and of the United Mine Workers of America to a conference in Washington, on Friday, October 3, the purpose being "in regard to the failure of the coal supply, which has become a matter of vital concern to the whole nation." Those present at the conference were Mr. Roosevelt; Mr. P. C. Knox, United States Attorney-General; Mr. Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor; Mr. George B. Cortelyou, Secretary to President Roosevelt; Mr. George F. Baer, President of

the Reading Railway system; Mr. W. H. Truesdale, President of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company; Mr. E. B. Thomas, Chairman of the Board of Control of the Erie Railroad Company; Mr. Thomas P. Fowler, President of the New York, Ontario & Western Railway Company; Mr. David Wilcox, Vice-President and General Counsel of the Delaware & Hudson Company; Mr. John Markle, representing the independent operators; Mr. John Mitchell, President of the United Mine Workers of America; Mr. Thomas D. Nicholls, President of District 1, Mr. Thomas Duffy, President of District 7, and Mr. John Fahy, President of District 9, United Mine Workers. In explanation of his reasons for asking these men to meet with him, Mr. Roosevelt said:

“I wish to call your attention to the fact that there are three parties affected by the situation in the anthracite trade: the operators, the miners, and the general public. The questions at issue which led to the situation affect immediately the parties concerned—the operators

and the miners; but the situation itself vitally affects the public. As long as there seemed to be a reasonable hope that these matters could be adjusted between the parties, it did not seem proper to me to intervene in any way. I disclaim any right or duty to intervene in this way upon legal grounds or upon any official relation that I bear to the situation; but the urgency and the terrible nature of the catastrophe impending over a large portion of our people in the shape of a winter fuel famine impel me, after much anxious thought, to believe that my duty requires me to use whatever influence I personally can to bring to an end a situation which has become literally intolerable. I wish to emphasize the character of the situation, and to say that its gravity is such that I am constrained urgently to insist that each one of you realize the heavy burden of responsibility upon him. We are upon the threshold of winter with an already existing coal famine, the future terrors of which we can hardly yet appreciate. The evil possibilities are so far-reaching, so appalling, that it seems to me that you are not only justified in sinking, but required to sink for the time being, any tenacity as to your respective claims in the matter at issue between you. In my judgment, the situation imperatively requires that you meet upon the common plane of the necessities of the public. With all the earnestness there is in me I ask that there be an immediate resumption of operations in the coal-mines in some such way as will without a day's unnecessary delay

meet the crying needs of the people. I do not invite a discussion of your respective claims and positions. I appeal to your patriotism, to the spirit that sinks personal considerations and makes individual sacrifices for the general good."

To this appeal Mr. Mitchell replied that he was very much impressed by it as well as with the gravity of the situation, but he disclaimed the responsibility for "the terrible state of affairs." He suggested that the questions in dispute between the mine-workers and the operators be submitted to a tribunal to be appointed by the President of the United States. This proposition was later made in writing by the representatives of the mine-workers and is as follows:

"We propose that the issues culminating in this strike shall be referred to you and a tribunal of your own selection, and agree to accept your award upon all or any of the questions involved. If you will accept this responsibility and the representatives of the coal-operators will signify their willingness to have your decision incorporated in an agreement for not less than one year or more than five years, as may be mutually determined between themselves and the anthracite coal mine-workers, and will pay the scale of wages which you and the tribunal

appointed by you shall award, we will immediately call a convention and recommend a resumption of work, upon the understanding that the wages which shall be paid are to go in effect from the day upon which work is resumed."

With Mr. Roosevelt's appeal and Mr. Mitchell's proposition as a basis, each of the operators presented a written reply, some of them at considerable length. Mr. Baer, assuming "that a statement of what is going on in the coal-region will not be irrelevant," said:

"We represent the owners of coal-mines in Pennsylvania. There are from fifteen to twenty thousand men at work mining and preparing coal. They are abused, assaulted, injured, and maltreated by the United Mine Workers. They can only work under the protection of armed guards. Thousands of other workmen are deterred from working by the intimidation, violence, and crimes inaugurated by the United Mine Workers, over whom John Mitchell, whom you invited to meet you, is chief. I need not picture the daily crimes committed by the members of this organization. 'The domestic tranquillity,' which every constitution declares is the chief object of government, does not exist in the coal-regions. There is terrible reign of lawlessness and crime there. Only the lives and property of the members of the secret,

oath-bound order, which declares that the locals 'should have full power to suspend operations at collieries' until the non-union men joined their order, are safe. Every effort is made to prevent the mining of coal, and, when mined, Mitchell's men dynamite bridges and tracks, mob train-men, and by all manner of violence try to prevent its shipment to relieve the public.

"The Constitution of Pennsylvania guarantees protection to life and property. In express terms it declares the right of acquiring, possessing, and defending property 'to be inalienable.' When riot and anarchy, too great to be appeased by the civil power occur, the governor of Pennsylvania lies bound to call out the State troops to suppress it. He must fearlessly use the whole power of the State to protect life and property and to establish peace—not an armed truce, but the peace of the law which protects every man at work and going to and from work. He has sent troops to the coal-regions. Gradually the power of the law is asserting itself. Unless encouraged by false hopes, order will soon be restored, and then we can mine coal to meet the public wants. If the power of Pennsylvania is insufficient to re-establish the reign of law, the Constitution of the United States requires the President, when requested by the Legislature and the Governor, to 'suppress domestic violence.' You see there is a lawful way to secure coal for the public. The duty of the hour is not to waste time negotiating with the fomenters of this anarchy and

insolent defiance of law, but to do as was done in the War of the Rebellion—restore the majesty of the law, the only guardian of a free people, and to re-establish order and peace at any cost. The Government is a contemptible failure if it can only protect the lives and property and secure the comfort of the people by compromising with the violators of law and the instigators of violence and crime. Just now it is more important to teach ignorant men dwelling among us, misled and used as tools by citizens of other States, that at whatever and any inconvenience to the public, Pennsylvania will use the whole power of government to protect not only the man who wants to work, but his wife and children while he is at work, and to punish every man who by instigation or by overt acts attempts to deprive any man of his liberty to work.

“Under these conditions, we decline to accept Mr. Mitchell’s considerate offer to let our men work on terms he names. He has no right to come from Illinois to dictate terms on the acceptance of which anarchy and crime shall cease in Pennsylvania. He must stop his people from killing, maiming, and abusing Pennsylvania citizens and from destroying property. He must stop it because it is unlawful, and not because of any bargain with us. We will add to our offer ‘to continue the wages existing at the time of the strike, and to take up at each colliery and adjust any grievance,’ a further condition: if the employers and employees at any particular colliery

cannot reach a satisfactory adjustment of any alleged grievances, it shall be referred to the judges of the Court of Common Pleas of the district in which the colliery is situated for final determination."

The replies of the other operators were in a similar strain.* Mr. Markle said :

"I now ask you to perform the duties vested in you as President of these United States, to at once squelch the anarchistic condition of affairs existing in the anthracite coal-regions by the strong arm of the military at your command. . . . If you desire anthracite coal to be placed in the market quickly, take the necessary steps at once and put the Federal troops in the field and give to those desiring to work proper protection."

In addition to asking for protection, Mr. Truesdale requested

* Mr. Thomas said that twenty men had been killed and over forty injured since the beginning of the strike. Mr. Markle claimed that there had been twenty-one murders and a long list of brutal assaults. These charges against the United Mine Workers, President Mitchell characterized as untrue, saying that "if they will name the men, and will show that they have committed the murders, I will resign my position."

“ that the civil branch of the United States Government, taking cognizance of and following the decisions of its courts rendered in litigation growing out of previous similar conditions, at once institute proceedings against the illegal organization known as the United Mine Workers’ Association, its well-known officers, agents, and members, to enjoin and restrain permanently it and them from continuing this organization and requiring them to desist immediately from conspiring, conniving, aiding, or abetting the outlawry and intolerable conditions in the anthracite regions, for which they, and they alone, are responsible.”

All the operators at the conference refused to accept the proposition submitted by the officers of the United Mine Workers and declined to have any dealings whatsoever with them looking towards a settlement of the questions at issue. The meeting adjourned with the two sides to the conflict as far apart as ever.

But the conference was not without its good results. These were damaging to the operators’ position; they were the death-knell to their cause. The attitude they took before the Chief Executive of the Nation (in the public mind there was no distinction between Mr. Roosevelt

and President Roosevelt) was almost as intolerable to the people as was the growing coal famine. Instead of meeting Mr. Roosevelt's suggestion in the spirit in which it was given, the public had witnessed the operators undertaking to tell him what his duty was in the situation! All over the country a wave of popular indignation rolled rapidly and beat against the operators' citadel; it beat so fiercely that even the friends of the railroad presidents recognized, and many of the newspapers supporting their position openly declared, that a fatal mistake had been made in the attitude the operators took at the conference.* With public opinion now thoroughly aroused as it had not been for years, the

* Once before, in August, considerable public feeling had been aroused against the attitude of the operators by the statement of President Baer, in reply to a letter of Mr. W. F. Clark, of Wilkesbarre, that "The rights and interest of the laboring man will be protected and cared for, not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of the country, and upon the successful management of which so much depends."

failure of the Washington conference was but the successful beginning of Mr. Roosevelt's efforts to guard the general welfare. Having found a responsive channel for making its commands effective, the public, in mass meetings, appeals, petitions, and remonstrances, moved to the support of the Chief Executive of the Nation.

On October 6 Mr. Roosevelt proposed to the President of the United Mine Workers, through Mr. Carroll D. Wright, that if Mr. Mitchell secured "the immediate return to work of the miners in the anthracite regions the President will at once appoint a Commission to investigate thoroughly into all matters at issue between the operators and miners, and will do all within his power to obtain a settlement of those questions in accordance with the report of the Commission."

President Mitchell replied two days later to the effect that "we respectfully decline to advise our people to return to work simply upon the hope that the coal-operators might be induced or forced to comply with the recommendations of your Commission."

At the same time, in answer to a proclamation of the President of the United Mine Workers, requesting the anthracite employees to ballot on the question whether or not they were being prevented, owing to lawlessness, from returning to work, the locals of the union in the three hard-coal fields, through the voting machinery of the organization, decided almost unanimously to continue the strike until the operators granted some concessions.

President Roosevelt now appealed to the one man whose word was law in the anthracite industry. This man was Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan. On behalf of President Roosevelt a conference was had with Mr. Morgan, in New York, on October 11, by Mr. Elihu Root, Secretary of War. Three days later a proposition from the presidents of the railroad mining companies for a settlement of the strike was in the hands of President Roosevelt. It provided for the appointment of a Commission by the President of the United States "to whom shall be referred all questions at issue between the respective

companies * and their own employees, whether they belong to a union or not, and the decision of that Commission shall be accepted by us." The Commission was to be constituted as follows: (1) an officer of the Engineer Corps of either the military or naval service of the United States; (2) an expert mining engineer, experienced in the mining of coal and other minerals, and not in any way connected with coal-mining properties, either anthracite or bituminous; (3) one of the judges of the United States Courts of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; (4) a man of prominence, eminent as a sociologist; (5) a

* The agreement was signed by George F. Baer, President Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, Lehigh & Wilkesbarre Coal Company, Temple Iron Company; E. B. Thomas, Chairman Pennsylvania Coal Company, Hillside Coal & Iron Company; W. H. Truesdale, President Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company; T. P. Fowler, President Scranton Coal Company, Elkhill Coal & Iron Company; R. M. Olyphant, President Delaware & Hudson Company; and Alfred Walters, President Lehigh Valley Coal Company.

man who, by active participation in mining and selling coal, is familiar with the physical and commercial features of the business. Immediately upon its appointment the miners were to return to work and "cease all interference with and persecution of any non-union men who are working or shall hereafter work." The Commission was to fix the date when its findings were to be effective, and these were to govern the conditions of employment "between the respective companies and their own employees for a term of at least three years."

This plan for a settlement was communicated to the representatives of the United Mine Workers of America, and with a few alterations, including the removal of the restrictions placed upon the President in making his selection of the Commission and the addition of a sixth member representing organized labor, for which latter the leaders were particularly insistent, it was agreed to by them. On October 17 public announcement was made of the appointment by President Roosevelt of Brigadier-General John M. Wilson,

Edward W. Parker,* Judge George Gray,† Edgar E. Clark,‡ Thomas H. Watkins,§ and Bishop John L. Spaulding|| as members of the Commission, with Carroll D. Wright as recorder. Later Mr. Wright was made a member of the Commission, making a total membership of seven. A meeting of the Executive Boards of the three anthracite districts at once called a delegate convention of the mine-workers “to act on the proposition submitted by the President of the United States.” This convention met in Wilkesbarre, on Monday, October 20, with 662 delegates present authorized to cast 867 votes. The recommendation of the officers of the union “that all mine-workers now on strike return to their former positions and working-places and submit to the Commission appointed by the President of

* Statistician United States Geological Survey.

† Of the United States Circuit Court. Appointed by President McKinley, 1899.

‡ Chief of the Order of Railway Conductors.

§ Retired hard-coal operator, Scranton, Pennsylvania.

|| Roman Catholic Bishop of Peoria, Illinois.

the United States all questions at issue between the operators and mine-workers of the anthracite coal-fields" was adopted, the convention unanimously voted the strike at an end, and the men were instructed to resume their former positions on Thursday, October 23.

There was general rejoicing throughout the country when the miners returned to work; within the coal-fields the news that the strike was at an end was received by parades and demonstrations, accompanied by the ringing of bells and the blowing of whistles. In many places special services were held in churches of different denominations. The struggle had continued over five months—exactly one hundred and sixty-four days—and had subjected the institutions of organized society to a most severe strain.

The *Brooklyn Eagle* said: *

"The satisfaction that will be felt that war is to cease, and that mining is to be resumed, should not blind thoughtful men to the fact that the price paid for coal

* Editorial, October 15, 1902.

is the confessed failure of government, the palpable disappearance of law, amnesty, and forgiveness, if not condonation or coronation, for organized resistance to law, and the recourse of the nation and the people to an extemporized substitute for the operation of constitutions and institutions which have been their bulwark and boast, and were formerly the exponent of their power and the object of their pride."

The Philadelphia *Public Ledger* classified the strike among "the costliest and most dangerous conflicts that ever threatened the stability of government and the peace of the country."* "The greatest economic contest, one full of dangerous political and social possibilities, with which the nation has at any time been confronted."† Through the terms of peace "a great crisis in our history, the greatest, the most appalling of any since the surrender of rebellion at Appomattox, has passed." ‡ In commenting upon the decision of the mine-workers' convention in accepting the arbitration proposal, declaring the strike at an

* Editorial, October 17, 1902.

† Ibid., October 25.

‡ Ibid., October 17.

end, and agreeing to return to work, the *Public Ledger* said: *

“It means so much to thoughtful men who gave full weight to the ‘intolerable situation’ which obtained throughout the anthracite region; there were portents within that sphere of unrest and discontent of possible, or probable, consequences which it was feared might shake or topple to the ground the supporting pillars of the temple of organized society and the orderly supremacy of government. In the affected territory there were hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children at whose doors knocked not only hard times, but who were threatened by cold, hunger, and sickness. Outside the strike-region the very poor, and even people of better fortune, were brought face to face with a coal famine, which meant a heavy tax upon their limited resources, and to vast multitudes of industrial workers the withdrawal of work and wages. The situation was ‘intolerable’ from every point of view while the operators and miners stood in angry antagonism, and with stubborn insistency kept all apart, refusing to be reconciled. There were possibilities of peril and suffering to the country which no one could contemplate without trepidation. Men of years, experience, and knowledge perceived that all the prevailing conditions of the contest were fraught with

* Editorial, October 22.

extraordinary dangers to our social and political institutions. It was as if chaos were impending over the country.”

Apart from this aspect of the situation the money cost of the strike was enormous; the Anthracite Strike Commission estimated that it would reach \$100,000,000. This was the price to the public. When we consider the cost to the two parties engaged in the struggle, no accurate figures can of course be given, as the different elements entering into this cost are not subject to mathematical measurement in the absence of facts bearing on many of them. From the point of view of one or the other of the two parties to the contest there were compensating advantages which made the cost to each much less than would at first appear. What seemed a cost to these was in most cases merely a deferred payment.

Take the question of production, for example. While it is true that probably 20,000,000 tons of anthracite would have been mined if there had been no suspension, yet this amount of coal

was not destroyed by the strike—it was not lost to the mining companies. It remained in the ground unimpaired, to be mined later. Besides, if this amount had been mined during the summer months, it is likely that sixty per cent.* of it would have been sold to householders under the discount plan † which would have gone into effect on April 1 if there had been no strike. As events turned out, this coal, when it was sent to market, brought a much higher price per ton than it would have sold for if it had been delivered to consumers during the summer.‡ It is

* Forty per cent. of the total anthracite production is sold in “small sizes” for steam purposes at low prices in competition with soft coal.

† In recent years the anthracite railroads inaugurate on April 1 discount prices on domestic sizes,—being 50 cents a ton discount for April, 40 cents a ton for May, 30 cents for June, 20 cents for July, 10 cents for August, with regular winter prices beginning in September.

‡ The prevailing price per ton for domestic use during the winter months following the strike was \$6.75, an increase of 50 cents a ton over prices the winter before and \$1 more than for April, 1901.

also important to remember that had all this coal been mined, the companies would have had to meet the expense of storing and rehandling a portion of it before the winter needs of the consumer took it off their hands. This storage expense was greatly lessened by the coal remaining in the ground.

In other ways expenses were reduced by the suspension. Wages were not paid to the striking mine-workers, and hundreds of other employees who were forced into idleness; the payment of royalties on coal was postponed; in cases cars and engines of the hard-coal hauling roads brought in a revenue by being rented to bituminous-coal hauling roads whose freight the suspension of anthracite mining had increased beyond their usual facilities for handling it, the increase in the traffic resulting from a transfer of the demand for fuel to the bituminous product. In the case of the Pennsylvania Railroad, the cutting off of anthracite production resulted in benefit to that company, as it was able to increase its soft-coal and coke traffic more than

enough to compensate that lost to it from the closing of its anthracite mines.*

Similar difficulties are encountered if an attempt is made to calculate the damages to the mining properties as an element in the cost of the strike. That these damages, resulting from the flooding of the mines, the falling in of the roofs, the decaying of the timber, the accumulation of gas, etc., were very great in some sections there is no doubt, but all the facts for the entire region and for all the companies and individual operators are not obtainable. State Mine Inspector William Stein, of the Sixth Anthracite District, having jurisdiction over thirty-six collieries in the Schuylkill field, informed the writer that in his district alone five collieries had been permanently abandoned by reason of the strike. He estimated the loss in each case at \$300,000. I learned from a representative of the Philadel-

* Up to September 13 the Pennsylvania Railroad lines east of Pittsburg and Erie had hauled 5,000,000 tons more of soft coal and 1,000,000 tons more of coke than for the same period in 1901.

phia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, which company owned four of the collieries referred to, that some of them would soon have been abandoned any way, despite the strike, and that the coal seams which the other abandoned plants would have mined were to be worked in connection with other collieries of the same company at relatively less expense. In the Seventh Anthracite District, Mine Inspector Edward Brennan estimated for the writer that the total cost of the damages to the thirty operations within his jurisdiction would not exceed \$10,000. Even if it were possible to give an estimated cost of the damages to mine property during the suspension, the question would be in order, What percentage of this damage would have resulted if there had been no strike? with the result that no satisfactory answer could be given. Another item which cannot be estimated was the resulting damages to boilers, engines, pumps, and other expensive machinery following the employment of new and less skilled men to take the places of the striking engineers, firemen, and pumpmen. There was

also an expense to the companies in the hiring of several thousand additional guards as coal and iron policemen to protect the mining properties.

One very real and what is likely to be a permanent cost of the strike to the hard-coal mining companies is in the loss of certain anthracite markets to the bituminous product.

It is just as difficult to estimate the cost of the strike to the mine-workers as it has proven to be for the railroad mining companies. The strike was carried on during the warm summer months, when the demand for mine-labor was at its minimum, which meant that some of the men would have been idle all the time or all the men some of the time, even if there had been no suspension. For this reason, even if we estimate that nearly \$25,000,000 would have been paid in wages to the mine-workers if they had continued at work, it would not follow that this measured the cost of the strike to the mine-employees, because over 25,000 who left the region were securing wages from other sources. Besides, the men were idle during that part of the year when the cost of

living was at its minimum: there was practically no coal to buy, fewer and less costly garments supplied the need for clothing, and food was relatively cheaper, in cases the latter being secured through farming small plots of ground, by hunting and fishing, and by means of the unusually large huckleberry harvest throughout the coal-fields. While the postponing of the payment for house rent and the running of accounts at the local stores only transferred these charges to some future time when they would have to be met, yet it is also true that when that time did come the men had higher wages with which to meet them. During the strike the anthracite mine-workers were also relieved from the payment of church and society contributions and dues,* which otherwise they would have had to pay.

* The financial support of missionary pastors and others of different denominations located in the anthracite region being cut off by the strike, special offerings for them were taken up in other churches of the respective denominations outside the fields. At a meeting of the

In addition to these—we might call them compensating advantages—the strikers were the beneficiaries of a wide-spread system of relief, which was undertaken in August by the United Mine Workers of America, and which continued until after the close of the strike. This system was inaugurated among the strikers after nearly all the treasuries of the locals and districts in the anthracite region had been depleted and many of the members had spent their own bank savings, some even going to the extent of mortgaging their homes.

The first step looking towards furnishing organized relief to the strikers was taken by the special national convention of the United Mine Workers of America, held in Indianapolis the

Archdiocesan Catholic Total Abstinence Union in Philadelphia, in July, all societies in the coal-region that were in financial difficulties by reason of the strike were exempted from the payment of the percentage tax for 1901-02. Mine-employees on strike, who were members of the United Mine Workers, were relieved from the payment of regular dues and special relief assessments.

third week in July. This convention appropriated \$50,000 from the national treasury for the immediate use of the three anthracite districts, appealed to all districts, sub-districts, and local unions within the organization to donate as large sums as possible from their treasuries, levied an assessment of ten per cent. on the gross earnings of all members of locals in particular districts and of one dollar per week on all members of locals in other districts,* and assessed twenty-five per cent. of the sums paid as wages or salary to national, district, and sub-district officers and organizers. From these sources † a total of

* The assessment per working member of the union amounted to about the same under either plan.

† The assessments became effective July 16, 1902. From them alone the strike leaders expected to raise about \$240,000 a week. To support the 750,000 dependents, which number, exclusive of the mine-employees, it was estimated were left in want by the strike, the officers of the union calculated that they would need \$500,000 a week. Half of this was provided for by the assessments; the remaining half it was expected would come from the public and the trade unions.

\$2,225,370 was secured, of which \$258,344 was in voluntary contributions from districts and locals, and \$1,967,026 from special assessments.*

The special convention had also appealed to the public and the trade unions for financial assistance. This was answered by the inauguration of a general subscription movement among labor organizations all over the United States. Some levied regular weekly assessments on their members; some had weekly voluntary contributions; others set aside a specified time one day each week and all the wages of the men earned during that time (usually one hour) went to the support of the miners; and special meetings and conventions of State and national organizations voted lump sums (in cases as high as \$10,000) in addition to taking up collections among their members. These contributions came from railroad-employees, bottle-blowers, workingmen in

* Report of Secretary-Treasurer Wilson to the Fourteenth Convention.

the building trades, typographers, carpenters and joiners, garment-workers, iron-moulders, painters, upholsterers, steam and hoisting engineers, plasterers, tile and slate roofers, firemen, structural ironworkers, plumbers, longshoremen, boot- and shoemakers, seamen, marine firemen, hotel-keepers, theatrical employees, bricklayers, elevator-erectors, granite-cutters, and thousands of other workingmen identified with different trades and callings. The contributions were forwarded from points as far away as Porto Rico, Wales, Australia, etc. Most of the contributors were identified, through their own particular union, with the American Federation of Labor, which latter organization, through its Executive Council, had, on October 11, issued an appeal to the public and to organized labor for funds in aid of the miners, in addition to having previously endorsed the appeal of the United Mine Workers. The American Federation of Labor suggested in its appeal that the public form relief committees in each city and town and solicit financial and other contributions; that the hour between ten

and eleven o'clock each Monday morning be designated as "miners' hour," and the wages earned during that time by the working people of the country be contributed to the strikers; that ministers of all denominations make a special plea to their congregations each Sabbath morning for the miners and their families and that they act as relief committees among their parishioners; that the newspapers solicit contributions, and that entertainments be planned to aid the strikers.

The contributions of the general public were secured in various ways by the assistance of organized labor. One of the means employed was Sunday house-to-house canvassing by volunteers, for which purpose the large cities were divided into districts, usually corresponding to the political divisions into wards.* Another method was the distribution of glass contribution globes

* In Philadelphia this work was under the supervision of the United Trades Association, whose canvassers by October 5, as a result of six Sunday collections, had secured a total of over \$13,000.

among business houses and in public places.* The observance of Labor Day throughout the country on September 1 was made an occasion for taking contributions in behalf of the mine-workers. These were in parades,—large, outstretched American flags being used to collect the money along the line of march,—in mass meetings, and picnics.† In nearly every large city, monster demonstrations were held, at which the strike leaders made appeals for contributions. Two bands and a glee club, composed of mine-workers from the coal-fields, toured the large Eastern cities for subscriptions. Special contributions for the support of particular nationalities, such as the Poles and Lithuanians, were made by their fellow-countrymen in the United States. Subscriptions from mass meetings as far away

* The Allied Building Trades Council undertook this work in Philadelphia, as much as \$2500 being reported in one week.

† The Labor Day picnic at Philadelphia netted over \$1200, while more than \$3730 was collected in outstretched American flags in the parades in Chicago.

as Butte, Montana, and Portland, Oregon, were sent in to the national headquarters of the union. From all these sources—the trade unions and the public—the sum of \$419,954 was contributed, an amount much less than the United Mine Workers had counted upon securing from that quarter. From all sources a total of \$2,654,325 was subscribed to the relief fund, of which \$1,890,202 was distributed as aid among the anthracite mine-workers.*

Under the provisions of the resolution adopted by the special national convention authorizing the establishment of the relief fund, all contributions made from the national office to the anthracite region were “divided *pro rata* to each anthracite district in accordance with the number of miners and mine-laborers in each of them as shown by the most recent coal reports.” This gave to District 1 (the Wyoming field) fifty-three per cent., to District 7 (the Lehigh field)

* Report of Secretary-Treasurer Wilson to the Fourteenth Convention.

twelve per cent., and to District 9 (the Schuylkill field) thirty-five per cent. The system for distributing the amounts to those in need was set forth in a secret circular issued from strike headquarters in Wilkesbarre, on July 30.

Under its provisions each local union selected a relief committee, whose duty it was to ascertain the names of persons actually in need of help and whose own resources were exhausted. The number of such persons and the amount of money necessary each week to supply them with food was then reported to the district secretary-treasurer by these relief committees. In the meantime, each applicant, whether a union or a non-union mine-worker, was furnished a relief order upon a local merchant, the face of the order giving the number of the local issuing it, with place and date, the name of the grocer, as well as that of the applicant, with the latter's residence, the number in his family, and the amount for which the order was drawn. On the reverse side, blanks were arranged to insert the date, name of applicant, quantity and price of articles

secured. When goods to the face value of the order had been bought, the latter was signed by both the merchant and the person receiving the goods and then returned to the relief committee, which presented it to the district secretary-treasurer for payment. These officers received the money with which to pay the bills direct from the national office of the union. These store orders enabled the union to carry a heavy debt two or three weeks ahead of the relief that was being contributed to national headquarters. The secret circular to the locals recommended "that all persons receiving orders for supplies be advised to purchase only plain, wholesome food, as we must make the money at our disposal reach as far as possible. We trust that all those who have funds of their own, or who can pull through without help from the organization, will refrain from applying for aid."

In the Wyoming field the basis for distributing relief was two dollars and fifty cents every two weeks to a family, with fifty cents additional for each child; single men were allowed one

dollar and twenty-five cents. In the Schuylkill district the sums from the national office were apportioned among the locals according to the number of employees at the particular mine the local represented. Then the local distributed the amount it received as its members decided. In some the distribution averaged sixty cents a week for each workman at the mine; in others the money was divided equally among all members, regardless of the need for relief; in others the total amount was divided among only those in want; some locals did not receive any aid at all from the national offices, being able to take care of their own men and families. At Shamokin, in the Schuylkill field, towards the end of the strike, about twenty thousand applied regularly for relief, which induced the union to establish five commissaries or stores. The union bought the goods at wholesale by the carload lot and then distributed them among the applicants through the store-order system, at times disposing of as many as five hundred barrels of flour a week. These stores were continued by the United

Mine Workers for months after the strike was declared at an end, in order to support the large number of mine-employees who were unable to secure immediate employment until repairs had been made to the mining properties and the water had been pumped out of the mines.

All this money cost of the strike, whether counted at first as a loss to the mining companies or to the striking mine-workers, will eventually have been transferred to the people—"the innocent victim to the conflict." What has not already been paid in the cost of moving and maintaining the troops in the region,* in the expense of the Commission † appointed by President Roosevelt to arbitrate the difficulties, in the contributions to supply relief to the strikers, in the higher prices for coal and substitute fuels the people were compelled to resort to during and following the struggle, etc., will in the final analysis come from the pockets of the coal-con-

* Nearly \$1,000,000.

† Congress appropriated \$50,000, but the cost of the Commission's work will exceed that amount.

suming public in higher prices for anthracite. This great money cost of the five months' industrial war is surely an enormous charge to the public. But if the people have learned well the one great lesson the strike teaches, perhaps the cost is not any too great.

This lesson is that unrestricted immigration lacking intelligent control carries in its train evils to the individual and to organized society for which the general welfare demands rational action, in order that American institutions may more and more come to be in practice what they really are in theory.

The coming of the Slav into the hard-coal fields was the primary or fundamental cause operating within the anthracite region to produce the strikes of 1900 and 1902. The other forces which had a part in bringing about these industrial disturbances were based upon and were put into operation by this invasion. This is true despite the important part played in these struggles by the activity of the United Mine

Workers in extending its jurisdiction over the anthracite employees. For this activity to become in any way effective the self-interest of the English-speaking hard-coal workers had to be appealed to. They responded only because they saw in this organization a means for remedying the intolerable conditions of employment which the Slav invasion had brought about in the anthracite industry.

When we stop a moment to think of the enormous money cost of the conflict, of the loss in life and property, of the strain, in instances almost to the breaking-point, that was put upon the institutions intended to safeguard society and the individual, and of the far-reaching consequences, untraceable in all their manifestations, which invariably grow out of such struggles, one may well ask whether it is not high time that attention be given to this problem of unrestrained and uncontrolled immigration. This is all the more to be thoughtfully considered because the conflict which the Slav has precipitated in the anthracite region is by no means at an end. Strikes and

lockouts and general industrial unrest throughout that whole section of Pennsylvania are likely to engage our deepest concern for many years. But this is no reason for being pessimistic. Forces for good are already at work. The danger lies in our neglect of the principal that "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," for that liberty, with the institutions which established and which are intended to preserve it, as well as much that goes to make American institutions our pride and boast, is in peril.






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