













DISCOURSES

ON

THE SCOPE AND NATURE

OF

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

ADDRESSED TO

THE CATHOLICS OF DUBLIN.

BY

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“ATTINGIT SAPIENTIA A FINE USQUE AD FINEM FORTITER, ET DISPONIT OMNIA  
SUAVITER”.

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2321  
N46d

*Hospes eram, et collegistis Me.*

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IN GRATEFUL NEVER-DYING REMEMBRANCE  
OF HIS MANY FRIENDS AND BENEFACTORS,  
LIVING AND DEAD,  
AT HOME AND ABROAD,  
IN IRELAND, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE,  
IN BELGIUM, GERMANY, POLAND, ITALY, AND MALTA,  
IN NORTH AMERICA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES,  
WHO, BY THEIR RESOLUTE PRAYERS AND PENANCES,  
AND BY THEIR GENEROUS STUBBORN EFFORTS,  
AND BY THEIR MUNIFICENT ALMS,  
HAVE BROKEN FOR HIM THE STRESS  
OF A GREAT ANXIETY,  
THESE DISCOURSES,  
OFFERED TO OUR LADY AND ST. PHILIP ON ITS RISE,  
COMPOSED UNDER ITS PRESSURE,  
FINISHED ON THE EVE OF ITS TERMINATION,  
ARE RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED  
BY THE AUTHOR.

IN FEST. PRESENT.  
B.V.M. 1852.

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## P R E F A C E .

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THE view taken of a University in the Discourses which form this Volume, is of the following kind:—that it is a place of *teaching* universal *knowledge*. This implies that its object is, on the one hand, intellectual, not moral; and, on the other, that it is the diffusion and extension of knowledge, rather than the advancement. If its object were scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a University should have students; if religious training, I do not see how it can be the seat of philosophy and science.

Such is a University in its *essence*, and independently of its relation to the Church. But, practically speaking, it cannot fulfil its

object duly, such as I have described it, without the Church's assistance; or, to use the theological term, the Church is necessary for its *integrity*. Not that its main characters are changed by this incorporation: it still has the office of intellectual education; but the Church steadies it in the performance of that office.

Such are the main principles of the Discourses which follow; though it would be unreasonable for me to expect, that I have treated so large and important a field of thought with the fulness and precision, necessary to secure me from incidental misconceptions of my meaning on the part of the reader. It is true, there is nothing novel or singular in the argument which I have been pursuing, but this does not protect me from such misconceptions; for the very circumstance that the views I have been delineating are not original with me, may lead to false notions as to my relations of opinion towards those, from whom I happened in the first instance to learn them, and may cause me to

be interpreted by the objects or sentiments of schools, to which I should be simply opposed.

For instance, some persons may be tempted to complain, that I have servilely followed the English idea of a University, to the disparagement of that Knowledge, which I profess to be so strenuously upholding; and they may anticipate that an academical system, formed upon my model, will result in nothing better or higher than in the production of that antiquated variety of human nature and remnant of feudalism, called "a gentleman".\* Now, I have anticipated this charge in various parts of my discussion; if, however, any Catholic is found to prefer it (and to Catholics of course this volume is addressed), I would have him first of all ask himself the previous question, *what* he conceives to be the reason contemplated by the Holy See, in recommending just now to the Irish Church the establishment of a Catholic University? Has the Supreme Pontiff recommended it for the sake of the Sciences, which are to be the

\* Vid. Huber's English Universities, London, 1813, vol. ii., part 1. pp. 321, etc.

matter, or rather of the Students, who are to be the subjects of its teaching? Has he any obligation or duty at all towards secular knowledge as such? Would it become his Apostolical Ministry, and his descent from the Fisherman, to have a zeal for the Baconian or other philosophy of man for its own sake? or, on the other hand, does the Vicar of Christ contemplate such achievements of the intellect, as far as he contemplates them, solely and simply in their relation to the interests of Revealed Truth? Has he any more direct jurisdiction over the wisdom than over the civil power of this world? Is he bound by office or by vow, to be the preacher of the theory of gravitation, or a martyr for electro-magnetism? Would he be acquitting himself of the dispensation committed to him, if he were smitten with an abstract love of these matters, however true, or beautiful, or ingenious, or useful? What he does, he does for the sake of Religion; if he looks with satisfaction on strong temporal governments, which promise perpetuity, it is for the sake of Religion; and if

he encourages and patronizes art and science, it is for the sake of Religion. He rejoices in the widest and most philosophical systems of intellectual education, from an intimate conviction that Truth is his real ally, as it is his profession; and that Knowledge and Reason are sure ministers to Faith.

This being undeniable, it is plain, that, when he suggests to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a University, his first and chief and direct object is, not science, art, professional skill, literature, the discovery of knowledge, but some benefit or other, by means of literature and science, to his own children; not indeed their formation on any narrow or fantastic type, as, for instance, that of an "English Gentleman" may be called, but their exercise and growth in certain habits, moral or intellectual. Nothing short of this can be his aim, if, as becomes the Successor of the Apostles, he is to be able to say with St. Paul, "Non judicavi me scire aliquid inter vos, nisi Jesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum". Just as a commander wishes to have tall and well-

formed and vigorous soldiers, not from any abstract devotion to the military standard of height or age, but for the purposes of war, and no one thinks it anything but natural and praiseworthy in him, to be contemplating, not abstract qualities, but his own living and breathing men; so, in like manner, when the Church founds a University, she is not cherishing talent, genius, or knowledge, for their own sake, but for the sake of her children, with a view to their spiritual welfare, and their religious influence and usefulness, with the object of training them to fill their respective posts in life better, and making them more intelligent, capable, active members of society.

Nor can it justly be said that in thus acting she sacrifices Science, and perverts a University from its proper end, under a pretence of fulfilling the duties of her mission, as soon as it is taken into account, that there are other institutions, far more suited to act as instruments of stimulating philosophical inquiry and extending the boundaries of our knowledge than a



University. Such for instance, are the literary and scientific "Academies", which are so celebrated in Italy and France, and which have frequently been connected with Universities, as committees, or, as it were, congregations or delegacies subordinate to them. Thus the present Royal Society originated in Charles the Second's time, in Oxford; such just now are the Ashmolean and Architectural Societies in the same seat of learning, which have risen in our own time. Such too is the British Association, a migratory body, which at least at times is found in the halls of the Protestant Universities of the United Kingdom, and the faults of which lie, not in its exclusive devotion to science, but in graver matters which it is irrelevant here to enter upon. Such again is the Antiquarian Society, the Royal Academy for the Fine Arts, and others which might be mentioned. Such is the sort of institution, which primarily contemplates Science itself, and not students; and, in thus speaking, I am saying nothing of my own, being supported by no less an authority than Car-

dinal Gerdil. “Ce n’ est pas”, he says, “qu’ il y ait aucune véritable opposition entre l’ esprit des Académies et celui des Universités ; ce sont seulement des vues différentes. Les Universités sont établies pour *enseigner* les sciences *aux élèves* qui veulent s’y former ; les Académies se proposent *de nouvelles recherches* à faire dans la carrière des sciences. Les Universités d’ Italie ont fourni des sujets qui ont fait honneur aux Académies ; et celles-ci ont donné aux Universités des Professeurs, qui ont rempli les chaires avec la plus grande distinction”.\*

The nature of the case and the history of philosophy combine to recommend to us this “division of” intellectual “labour” between Academies and Universities. To discover and to teach are distinct functions ; they are also distinct gifts, and are not commonly found united in the same person. He too who spends his day in dispensing his existing knowledge to all comers, is unlikely to have either leisure or energy to acquire new. The

\* Opere, t. 3, p. 353.

common sense of mankind has associated the search after truth with seclusion and quiet. The greatest thinkers have been too intent on their subject to admit of interruption; they have been men of absent minds and idiosyncratic habits, and have, more or less, shunned the lecture room and the public school. Pythagoras, the light of Magna Græcia, lived for a time in a cave: Thales, the light of Ionia, lived unmarried and in private, and refused the invitations of princes. Plato withdrew from Athens to the groves of Academus. Aristotle gave twenty years to a studious discipleship under him. Friar Bacon lived in his tower upon the Isis; Newton in an intense severity of meditation which almost shook his reason. The great discoveries in chemistry and electricity were not made in Universities. Observatories are more frequently out of Universities than in them, and even when within their bounds need have no moral connexion with them. Porson had no classes; Elmsley lived good part of his life in the country. I do not say that there

are not great examples the other way, perhaps Socrates, certainly Lord Bacon; still I think it must be allowed on the whole, that, while teaching involves external engagements, the natural home for experiment and speculation is retirement.

Returning then to the consideration of the question, from which we may seem to have digressed, thus much we have made good,—that, whether or no a Catholic University should put before it, as its great object, to make its students “gentlemen”, still to make them something or other *is* its great object, and not simply to protect the interests and advance the dominion of Science. If then this may be taken for granted, as I think it may, the only point which remains to be settled is, whether I have formed a probable conception of the *sort of benefit* which the Holy See has intended to confer on Catholics who speak the English tongue, by recommending to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a University; and this I now proceed to consider.

Here then, it is natural to ask those who

are interested in the question, whether any better interpretation of the recommendation of the Holy See can be given, than that which I have suggested in this Volume. Certainly it does not seem to me rash to pronounce, that, whereas Protestants have great advantages of education in the Schools, Colleges, and Universities of the United Kingdom, our ecclesiastical rulers have it in purpose, that Catholics should enjoy the like advantages, whatever they are, to the full. I conceive they view it as prejudicial to the interests of Religion, that there should be any cultivation of mind bestowed upon Protestants, which is not given to their own youth also. As they wish their schools for the poorer and middle classes to be at least on a par with those of Protestants, they contemplate the same thing as regards that higher education which is given to comparatively the few. Protestant youths, who can spare the time, continue their studies till the age of twenty-one or twenty-two; thus they employ a time of life all-important and especially favourable to

mental culture. I conceive that our Prelates are impressed with the fact and its consequences, that a youth who ends his education at seventeen, is no match (*cæteris paribus*) for one who ends it at twenty-one.

All classes indeed of the community are impressed with a fact so obvious as this. The consequence is, that Catholics who aspire to be on a level with Protestants in discipline and refinement of intellect, have recourse to Protestant Universities to obtain what they cannot find at home. Here then is an additional reason,—assuming, that is (as the Rescripts from Propaganda allow me to do), that Protestant education is inexpedient for our youth,—why those advantages, whatever they are, which the Protestant sects dispense through the medium of Protestantism, should be accessible to Catholics in a Catholic form.

What are these advantages? I repeat, they are in one word the culture of the intellect. Insulted, robbed, oppressed, and thrust aside, Catholics in these islands have not been in a condition for centuries to

attempt the sort of education, which is necessary for the man of the world, the statesman, the great proprietor, or the opulent gentleman. Their legitimate stations, duties, employments, have been taken from them, and the qualifications withal, social and intellectual, both for reversing the forfeiture, and for doing justice to the reversal. The time is come when this moral disability must be removed. Our desideratum is, not the manners and habits of gentlemen;—these can be, and are, acquired in various other ways, by good society, by foreign travel, by the innate grace and dignity of the Catholic mind;—but the force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the flexibility of intellect, the command over our own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they pass before us, which sometimes indeed is a natural gift, but commonly is not gained without much effort and the exercise of years. This is real cultivation of mind; and I do not deny that the characteristic excellences of a gentleman are included in it. Nor need we be ashamed to admit it, since

the time the Poet wrote, that “*Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes, Emollit mores*”. Certainly a liberal education does manifest itself in a courtesy, propriety, and polish of word and action, which is beautiful in itself, and acceptable to others; but it does much more. It brings the mind into form, for the mind is like the body. Boys outgrow their shape and their strength; their limbs have to be knit together, and their constitution needs tone. Mistaking animal spirits for nerve, and over-confident in their health, ignorant what they can bear and how to manage themselves, they are immoderate and extravagant; and fall into sharp sicknesses. This is an emblem of their minds; at first they have no principles laid down within them as a foundation for the intellect to build upon; they have no discriminating convictions, and no grasp of consequences. In consequence they talk at random, if they talk much, and cannot help being flippant, or what is emphatically called “*young*”. They are merely dazzled by phenomena, instead of perceiving things.



It were well, if none remained boys all their lives; but what is more common than the sight of grown men, talking on political or moral or religious subjects, in that offhand, idle way, which we signify by the word *unreal*? “That they simply do not know what they are talking about”, is the spontaneous silent remark of any man of sense who hears them. Hence such persons have no difficulty in contradicting themselves in successive sentences, without being conscious of it. Hence others, whose defect in intellectual training is more latent, have their most unfortunate crotchets, as they are called, or hobbies, which deprive them of the influence which their estimable qualities would otherwise secure. Hence others can never look straight before them, never see the point, and have no difficulties in the most difficult subjects. Others are hopelessly obstinate and prejudiced, and return the next moment to their old opinions, after they have been driven from them, without even an attempt to explain why. Others are so intemperate and

intractable, that there is no greater calamity for a good cause than that they should get hold of it. It is very plain from the very particulars I have mentioned, that, in this delineation of intellectual infirmities, I am drawing from Protestantism and Protestants; I am referring to what meets us in every railway carriage, in every coffee-room or *table-d'hôte*, in every mixed company. Nay, it is wonderful, that, with all their advantages, so many Protestants leave the University, with so little of real liberality and refinement of mind, in consequence of the discipline to which they have been subjected. Much allowance must be made here for original nature; much, for the detestable narrowness and (I cannot find a better word) the priggishness of their religion. Catholics, on the other hand, are, compared with them, almost born gentlemen. Take the same ranks in the two Religions, and the fact is undeniable. The simplicity, courtesy, and intelligence, for instance, of the peasants in Ireland and France have often been remarked upon. Still, after all, in this

province, which is not of a distinctly religious nature, Catholicism does little more than create instincts and impulses, which it requires a steady training to mould into definite and permanent habits. They may begin well, and end ill. The want of that training, in Catholics, so far as there is a want, is a positive loss to them; and the existence of it among Protestants, as far as it exists, is to them a positive gain.

When the intellect has once been properly trained and formed to have a connected view or grasp of things, it will display itself with more or less effect according to its particular quality and measure in the individual. In the generality it is visible in good sense, sobriety of thought, reasonableness, candour, self-command, and steadiness of view. In some it will have developed habits of business, power of influencing others, and sagacity. In others it will elicit the talent of philosophical speculation, and lead the mind forward to eminence in this or that intellectual department. In all it will be a faculty

of entering with comparative ease into any subject of thought, and of taking up with aptitude any science or profession. All this it will be and do in a measure, even when the mental formation be made after a model but partially true; for, as far as effectiveness goes, even false views of things have more influence and inspire more respect than none at all. Men who fancy they see what is not are more energetic, and make their way better, than those who see nothing; and so the undoubting infidel, the fanatic, the bigot, are able to do much, while the mere hereditary Christian, who has never realized the truths which he holds, is able to do nothing. But, if consistency of view can add so much strength even to error, what may it not be expected to furnish to the dignity, the energy, and the influence of Truth!

Some one, however, will perhaps object that I am but advocating that spurious philosophy, which shows itself in what, for want of a word, I may call "viewiness", when I speak so much of the formation, and consequent

grasp, of the intellect. It may be said that the theory of University Education, which I have been delineating, if acted upon, would teach youths nothing soundly or thoroughly, and would dismiss them with nothing better than brilliant general views about all things whatever.

This indeed would be a most serious objection, if well founded, to what I have advanced in this Volume, and would deserve and would gain my immediate attention, had I any reason to think that I could not remove it at once, by a simple explanation of what I consider the true *mode* of educating, were this the place to do so. But these Discourses are directed simply to the consideration of the *aims* and *principles* of Education. Suffice it then to say here, that I hold very strongly that the first step in intellectual training is to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule and exception, of richness and harmony. This is commonly and excellently done by beginning with Grammar; nor can too

great accuracy, or minuteness and subtlety of teaching be used towards him, as his faculties expand, with this simple view. Hence it is that critical scholarship is so important a discipline for him, when he is leaving school for the University. A second science is the Mathematics: this should follow Grammar, still with the same object, viz., to give him a conception of development and arrangement from and around a common centre. Hence it is that Chronology and Geography are so necessary for him, when he reads History, which is otherwise little better than a story-book. Hence too Metrical Composition, when he reads poetry; in order to stimulate his powers into action in every practicable way, and to prevent a passive reception of images and ideas which may else pass out of the mind as soon as they have entered it. Let him once gain this habit of method, of starting from fixed points, of making his ground good as he goes, of distinguishing what he knows from what he does not, and I conceive he will be gradually initiated into

the largest and truest philosophical views, and will feel nothing but impatience and disgust at the random theories and imposing sophistries and dashing paradoxes, which carry away half-formed and superficial intellects.

Such parti-coloured ingenuities are indeed one of the chief evils of the day, and men of real talent are not slow to minister to them. An intellectual man, as the world now conceives of him, is one who is full of "views", on all subjects of philosophy, on all matters of the day. It is almost thought a disgrace not to have a view at a moment's notice on any question from the Personal Advent to the Cholera or Mesmerism. This is owing in great measure to the necessities of periodical literature, now so much in request. Every quarter of a year, every month, every day, there must be a supply, for the gratification of the public, of new and luminous theories on the subjects of religion, foreign politics, home politics, civil economy, finance, trade, agriculture, emigration, and the colonies. Slavery, the gold fields, German philoso-

phy, the French Empire, Wellington, Peel, Ireland, must all be practised on, day after day, by what are called original thinkers. As the great man's guest must produce his good stories or songs at the evening banquet, as the platform orator exhibits his telling facts at mid-day, so the journalist lies under the stern obligation of extemporising his lucid views, leading ideas, and nutshell truths for the breakfast table. The very nature of periodical literature, broken into small wholes, and demanded punctually to an hour, involves this extempore philosophy. "Almost all the *Ramblers*", says Boswell of Johnson, "were written just as they were wanted for the press; he sent a certain portion of the copy of an essay, and wrote the remainder while the former part of it was printing". Few men have the gifts of Johnson, who to great vigour and resource of intellect, when it was fairly roused, united a rare common-sense and a conscientious regard for veracity, which preserved him from flippancy or extravagance in writing. Few men are Johnsons;



yet how many men at this day are assailed by incessant demands on their mental powers, which only a productiveness like his could suitably supply! There is a demand for a reckless originality of thought, and a sparkling plausibility of argument, which he would have despised, even if he could have displayed; a demand for crude theory and unsound philosophy, rather than none at all. It is a sort of repetition of the "Quid novi?" of the Areopagus, and it must have an answer. Men must be found, who can treat, where it is necessary, like the Athenian Sophist, *de omni scibili*,

"Grammaticus, Rhetor, Geometres, Pictor, Aliptes,  
Augur, Schœnobates, Medicus, Magus, omnia novit".

I am speaking of such writers with a feeling of real sympathy for men who are under the rod of a cruel slavery. I have never been in such circumstances myself, nor in the temptations which they involve; but most men who have had to do with composition, must know the distress which at times it occasions them to have to write—a distress

sometimes so keen and so specific, that it resembles nothing else than bodily pain. That pain is the token of the wear and tear of mind; and, if works done comparatively at leisure involve such mental fatigue and exhaustion, what must be the toil of those whose intellects are to be flaunted daily before the public in full dress, and that dress ever new and varied, and spun, like the silkworm's, out of themselves! Still, whatever true sympathy we may feel for the ministers of this dearly purchased luxury, and whatever sense we may have of the great intellectual power which the literature in question displays, we cannot honestly close our eyes to the evil.

One other remark suggests itself, which is the last I shall think it necessary to make. The authority, which in former times was lodged in Universities, now resides in very great measure in that literary world, as it is called, to which I have been alluding. This is not satisfactory, if, as no one can deny, its teach-

ing be so offhand, so ambitious, so changeable. It increases the seriousness of the mischief that so very large a portion of its writers are anonymous, for irresponsible power never can be anything but a great evil; and, moreover, that even when they are known, they can give no better guarantee of the philosophical truth of their principles, than their popularity at the moment, and their happy conformity in ethical character to the age which admires them. Protestants, however, may do as they like: it is their own concern; we are not called upon to thrust upon them remonstrances which they would stigmatize as narrow-minded. But at least it concerns us, that our own literary tribunals and oracles of moral duty should bear a graver character. At least it is a matter of deep solicitude to Catholic Prelates, that their people should be taught a wisdom, safe from the excesses and vagaries of individuals, embodied in institutions, which have stood the trial and received the sanction of ages, and administered by men

who have no need to be anonymous, as being supported by their consistency with their predecessors and with each other.

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## CORRIGENDA

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Discourse 8, p. 259, *for* from among themselves, *read* for themselves.

„ 9, p. 322, *for* bouquet, *read* banquet.

# DISCOURSES

ON

## UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

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### DISCOURSE I.

#### INTRODUCTION.

IN addressing myself to the consideration of a question which has excited so much interest, and elicited so much discussion at the present day, as that of University Education, I feel some explanation is due from me for supposing, after such high ability and wide experience have been brought to bear upon it in both countries, that any field remains for the additional labours either of a disputant or of an inquirer. If, nevertheless, I still venture to ask permission to continue the discussion, already so protracted, it is because the subject of Liberal Education, and of the principles on which it must be conducted, has ever had a hold upon my mind; and because I have lived the greater part of my life in a place which has all that time been occupied in a

series of controversies among its own people and with strangers, and of measures, experimental or definitive, bearing upon it. About fifty years since, the Protestant University, of which I was so long a member, after a century of inactivity, at length was roused, at a time when (as I may say) it was giving no education at all to the youth committed to its keeping, to a sense of the responsibilities which its profession and its station involved; and it presents to us the singular example of an heterogeneous and an independent body of men, setting about a work of self-reformation, not from any pressure of public opinion, but because it was fitting and right to undertake it. Its initial efforts, begun and carried on amid many obstacles, were met from without, as often happens in such cases, by ungenerous and jealous criticisms, which were at that very moment beginning to be unjust. Controversy did but bring out more clearly to its own apprehension, the views on which its reformation was proceeding, and throw them into a philosophical form. The course of beneficial change made progress, and what was at first but the result of individual energy and an act of the academical corporation, gradually became popular, and was taken up and carried out by the separate collegiate bodies, of which the University is composed. This was the first stage of the controversy. Years passed away, and then political adversaries arose, and a political contest was waged; but still, as that



contest was conducted in great measure through the medium, not of political acts, but of treatises and pamphlets, it happened as before that the threatened dangers, in the course of their repulse, did but afford fuller development and more exact delineation to the principles of which the University was the representative.

Living then so long as a witness, though hardly as an actor, in these scenes of intellectual conflict, I am able, Gentlemen, to bear witness to views of University Education, without authority indeed in themselves, but not without value to a Catholic, and less familiar to him, as I conceive, than they deserve to be. And, while an argument originating in them may be serviceable at this season to that great cause in which we are just now so especially interested, to me personally it will afford satisfaction of a peculiar kind ; for, though it has been my lot for many years to take a prominent, sometimes a presumptuous, part in theological discussions, yet the natural turn of my mind carries me off to trains of thought like those which I am now about to open, which, important though they be for Catholic objects, and admitting of a Catholic treatment, are sheltered from the extreme delicacy and peril which attach to disputations directly bearing on the subject matter of Divine Revelation.

What must be the general character of those views of University Education to which I have alluded, and

of which I shall avail myself, can hardly be doubtful, Gentlemen, considering the circumstances under which I am addressing you. I should not propose to avail myself of a philosophy which I myself had gained from an heretical seat of learning, unless I felt that that philosophy was Catholic in its ultimate source, and befitting the mouth of one who is taking part in a great Catholic work ; nor, indeed, should I refer at all to the views of men who, however distinguished in this world, were not and are not blessed with the light of true doctrine, except for one or two special reasons, which will form, I trust, my sufficient justification in so doing. One reason is this : It would concern me, Gentlemen, were I supposed to have got up my opinions for the occasion. This, indeed, would have been no reflection on me personally, supposing I were persuaded of their truth, when at length addressing myself to the inquiry ; but it would have destroyed, of course, the force of my testimony, and deprived such arguments, as I might adduce, of that moral persuasiveness which attends on tried and sustained conviction. It would have made me seem the advocate, rather than the cordial and deliberate maintainer and witness of the doctrines which I was to support ; and while it undoubtedly exemplified the faith I reposed in the practical judgment of the Church, and the intimate concurrence of my own reason with the course she had authoritatively sanctioned, and the devotion with which I could promptly

put myself at her disposal, it would have cast suspicion on the validity of reasonings and conclusions which rested on no independent inquiry, and appealed to no past experience. In that case it might have been plausibly objected by opponents that I was the serviceable expedient of an emergency, and never could be more than ingenious and adroit in the management of an argument which was not my own, and which I was sure to forget again as readily as I had mastered it. But this is not so. The views to which I have referred have grown into my whole system of thought, and are, as it were, part of myself. Many changes has my mind gone through ; here it has known no variation or vacillation of opinion, and though this by itself is no proof of truth, it puts a seal upon conviction, and is a justification of earnestness and zeal. The principles, which I can now set forth under the sanction of the Catholic Church, were my profession at that early period of my life, when religion was to me more a matter of feeling and experience than of faith. They did but take greater hold upon me as I was introduced to the records of Christian Antiquity, and approached in sentiment and desire to Catholicism ; and my sense of their truth has been increased with the experience of every year since I have been brought within its pale.

And here I am brought to a second and more important reason for introducing what I have to say on the subject of Liberal Education with this refer-

ence to my personal testimony concerning it ; and it is as follows : In proposing to treat of so grave a matter, I have felt vividly that some apology was due from me for introducing the lucubrations of Protestants into what many men might consider almost a question of dogma, and I have said to myself about myself : “ You think it, then, worth while to come all this way, in order, from your past experience, to recommend principles which had better be left to the decision of the theological schools ! ” The force of this objection you will see more clearly by considering the answer I proceed to give to it.

Let it be observed, then, that the principles I would maintain on the subject of Liberal Education, although those as I believe of the Catholic Church, are such as may be gained by the mere experience of life. They do not simply come of theology—they imply no supernatural discernment—they have no special connection with Revelation ; they will be found to be almost self-evident when stated, and to arise out of the nature of the case ; they are dictated by that human prudence and wisdom which is attainable where grace is quite away, and recognized by simple common sense, even where self-interest is not present to sharpen it ; and, therefore, though true, and just, and good in themselves, though sanctioned and used by Catholicism, they argue nothing whatever for the sanctity or faith of those who maintain them. They may be held by Protestants as well as

by Catholics; they may, accidentally, in certain times and places, be taught by Protestants to Catholics, without any derogation from the claim which Catholics make to special spiritual illumination. This being the case, I may without offence, on the present occasion, when speaking to Catholics, appeal to the experience of Protestants; I may trace up my own distinct convictions on the subject to a time when apparently I was not even approximating to Catholicism; I may deal with the question, as I really believe it to be, as one of philosophy, practical wisdom, good sense, not of theology; and, such as I am, I may, notwithstanding, presume to treat of it in the presence of those who, in every religious sense, are my fathers and my teachers.

Nay, not only may the true philosophy of Education be held by Protestants, and at a given time, or in a given place, be taught by them to Catholics, but further than this, there is nothing strange in the idea, that here or there, at this time or that, it should be understood better, and held more firmly by Protestants than by ourselves. The very circumstance that it is founded on truths in the natural order, accounts for the possibility of its being sometimes or somewhere understood outside the Church, more accurately than within her fold. Where the sun shines bright, in the warm climate of the south, the natives of the place know little of safeguards against cold and wet. They have, indeed, bleak and

piercing blasts; they have chill and pouring rain; but only now and then, for a day or a week; they bear the inconvenience as they best may, but they have not made it an art to repel it; it is not worth their while; the science of calefaction and ventilation is reserved for the north. It is in this way that Catholics stand relatively to Protestants in the science of Education; Protestants are obliged to depend on human means solely, and they are, therefore, led to make the most of them; it is their sole resource to use what they have; "Knowledge is" their "power" and nothing else; they are the anxious cultivators of a rugged soil. It is otherwise with us; *funes ceciderunt mihi in præclaris*. We have a goodly inheritance. The Almighty Father takes care of us; He has promised to do so; His word cannot fail, and we have continual experience of its fulfilment. This is apt to make us, I will not say, rely too much on prayer, on the Divine Word and Blessing, for we cannot pray too much, or expect too much from our great Lord; but we sometimes forget that we shall please Him best, and get most from Him, when we use what we have in nature to the utmost, at the same time that we look out for what is beyond nature in the confidence of faith and hope. However, we are sometimes tempted to let things take their course, as if they would in one way or another turn up right at last for certain; and so we go on, getting into difficulties and getting out of them, succeeding

certainly on the whole, but with failure in detail which might be avoided, and with much of imperfection or inferiority in our appointments and plans, and much disappointment, discouragement, and collision of opinion in consequence. We leave God to fight our battles, and so He does; but He corrects us while He prospers us. We cultivate the innocence of the dove more than the wisdom of the serpent; and we exemplify our Lord's word and incur His rebuke, when He declared that "the children of this world were in their generation wiser than the children of light".

It is far from impossible, then, at first sight, that on the subject before us, Protestants may have discerned the true line of action, and estimated its importance aright. It is possible that they have investigated and ascertained the main principles, the necessary conditions of education, better than some among ourselves. It is possible at first sight, and it is probable in the particular case, when we consider, on the one hand, the various and opposite positions, which they enjoy relatively to each other; yet, on the other, the uniformity of the conclusions to which they arrive. The Protestant communions, I need hardly say, are respectively at a greater and a less distance from the Catholic Church, with more or with less of Catholic doctrine and of Catholic principle in them. Supposing, then, it should turn out, on a survey of their opinions and their policy, that in pro-

portion as they approach, in the genius of their religion, to Catholicism, so do they become clear in their enunciation of a certain principle in education, that very circumstance would be an argument, as far as it went, for concluding that in Catholicism itself the recognition of that principle would, in its seats of education, be distinct and absolute. Now, I conceive that this remark applies in the controversy to which I am addressing myself. I must anticipate the course of future remarks so far as to say what you have doubtless, Gentlemen, yourselves anticipated before I say it, that the main principle on which I shall have to proceed is this—that Education must not be disjoined from Religion, or that Mixed Schools, as they are called, in which teachers and scholars are of different religious creeds, none of which, of course, enter into the matter of instruction, are constructed on a false idea. Here, then, I conceive I am right in saying that every sect of Protestants, which has retained the idea of religious truth and the necessity of faith, which has any dogma to profess and any dogma to lose, makes that dogma the basis of its Education, secular as well as religious, and is jealous of those attempts to establish schools of a purely secular character, which the inconvenience of religious differences urges upon politicians of the day. This circumstance is of so striking a nature as in itself to justify me, as I consider, in my proposed appeal in this con-



troversy to arguments and testimony short of Catholic.

Now, Gentlemen, let me be clearly understood here. I know quite well that there are multitudes of Protestants who are advocates for Mixed Education to the fullest extent, even so far as to desire the introduction of Catholics themselves into their colleges and schools; but then, first, they are those for the most part who have no creed or dogma whatever to defend, to sacrifice, to surrender, to compromise, to hold back, or to "mix", when they call out for Mixed Education. There are many Protestants of benevolent tempers and business-like minds, who think that all who are called Christians do in fact agree together in essentials, though they will not allow it; and who, in consequence, call on all parties in educating their youth for the world to eliminate differences, which are certainly prejudicial, as soon as they are proved to be immaterial. It is not surprising that clear-sighted persons should fight against the maintenance and imposition of private judgment in matters of public concern. It is not surprising that statesmen, with a thousand conflicting claims and interests to satisfy, should fondly aim at a forfeited privilege of Catholic times, when they would have had at least one distraction the less in the simplicity of National Education. And next, I can conceive the most consistent men, and the most zealously attached to their own system of doctrine,

nevertheless consenting to schemes of Education from which Religion is altogether or almost excluded, from the stress of necessity, or the recommendations of expedience. Necessity has no law, and expedience is often one form of necessity. It is no principle with sensible men, of whatever cast of opinion, to do always what is abstractedly best. Where no direct duty forbids, we may be obliged to do, as being best under circumstances, what we murmur and rise against, while we do it. We see that to attempt more is to effect less ; that we must accept so much, or gain nothing ; and so perforce we reconcile ourselves to what we would have far otherwise, if we could. Thus a system of Mixed Education may, in a particular place or time, be the least of evils ; it may be of long standing ; it may be dangerous to meddle with ; it may be professedly a temporary arrangement ; it may be in an improving state ; its disadvantages may be neutralised by the persons by whom, or the provisions under which, it is administered.

Protestants then, in matter of fact, are found to be both advocates and promoters of Mixed Education ; but this, as I think will appear on inquiry, only under the conditions I have set down, first, where they have no special attachment to the dogmas which are compromised in the comprehension ; and next, when they find it impossible, much as they may desire it, to carry out their attachment to them in

practice, without prejudicial consequences greater than those which that comprehension involves. Men who profess a religion, if left to themselves, make religious and secular Education one. Where, for instance, shall we find greater diversity of opinion, greater acrimony of mutual opposition, than between the two parties, High Church and Low, which mainly constitute the Established Religion of England and Ireland? Yet those parties, differing, as they do, from each other in other points, are equally opposed to the efforts of politicians to fuse their respective systems of Education with those either of Catholics or of sectaries; and it is only the strong expedience of concord and the will of the state which reconcile them to the necessity of a fusion with each other. Again, we all know into what various persuasions the English constituency is divided—more, indeed, than it is easy to enumerate; yet, since the great majority of that constituency, amid its differences, and in its several professions, distinctly dogmatise, whether it be Anglican, Wesleyan, Calvinistic, or so called Evangelical (as is distinctly shown, if in no other way, by its violence against Catholics), the consequence is, that, in spite of serious political obstacles and of the reluctance of statesmen, it has up to this time been resolute and successful in preventing the national separation of secular and religious Education. This concurrence, then, in various instances, supposing it to exist, as I believe it does, of a dogma-

tic faith on the one hand, and an abhorrence of Mixed Education on the other, is a phenomenon which, though happening among Protestants, demands the attention of Catholics, over and above the argumentative basis, on which, in the instance of each particular sect, this abhorrence would be found to rest.

While then, I conceive that certain Protestant bodies may, under circumstances, decide, more successfully than Catholics of a certain locality or period, a point of religious philosophy or policy, and may so far give us a lesson in perspicacity or prudence, without any prejudice to our claims to the exclusive possession of Revealed Truth, I say, they are in matter of fact likely to have done so in a case like the present, in which, amid all the variety of persuasions into which Protestantism necessarily splits, they agree together in a certain practical conclusion, which each of them in turn sees to be necessary for its own particular maintenance. Nor is there surely anything startling or novel in such an admission. The Church has ever appealed and deferred to testimonies and authorities external to herself, in those matters in which she thought they had means of forming a judgment: and that on the principle *Cuique in sua arte credendum*. She has ever used unbelievers and pagans in evidence of her truth, as far as their testimony went. She avails herself of heretical scholars, critics, and antiquarians. She has worded her theo-

logical teaching in the phraseology of Aristotle; Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Origen, Eusebius, and Apollinaris, all more or less heterodox, have supplied materials for primitive exegetics. St. Cyprian called Tertullian his master; Bossuet, in modern times, complimented the labours of the Anglican Bull; the Benedictine editors of the Fathers are familiar with the labours of Fell, Ussher, Pearson, and Beveridge. Pope Benedict XIV. cites according to the occasion the works of Protestants without reserve, and the late French collection of Christian Apologists contains the writings of Locke, Burnet, Tillotson, and Paley. If then, I come forward in any degree as borrowing the views of certain Protestant schools on the point which is to be discussed, I do so, not, Gentlemen, as supposing that even in philosophy the Catholic Church herself, as represented by her theologians or her schools, has anything to learn from men or bodies of men external to her pale; but as feeling, first, that she has ever, in the plenitude of her divine illumination, made use of whatever truth or wisdom she has found in their teaching or their measures; and next, that in particular times or places some of her children are likely to profit from external suggestions or lessons which are in no sense necessary for herself.

And in thus speaking of human philosophy, I have intimated the mode in which I propose to handle my subject altogether. Observe, then, Gentlemen, I have

no intention of bringing into the argument the authority of the Church at all; but I shall consider the question simply on the grounds of human reason and human wisdom. And from this it follows that, viewing it as a matter of argument, judgment, propriety, and expedience, I am not called upon to deny that in particular cases a course has been before now advisable for Catholics in regard to the education of their youth, and has been, in fact, adopted, which was not abstractedly the best, and is no pattern and precedent for others. Thus in the early ages the Church sanctioned her children in frequenting the heathen schools for the acquisition of secular accomplishments, where, as no one can doubt, evils existed, at least as great as can attend on Mixed Education now. The gravest Fathers recommended for Christian youth the use of Pagan masters; the most saintly Bishops and most authoritative Doctors had been sent in their adolescence by Christian parents to Pagan lecture halls\*. And, not to take other instances, at this very time, and in this very country, as regards at least the poorer classes of the community, whose secular acquirements ever must be limited, it has approved itself not only to Protestant state Ecclesiastics, who cannot be supposed to be very sensitive about doctrinal truth, but, as a wise condescension,

\* Vide, M. L'Abbé Lalanne's recent work.

even to many of our most venerated Bishops, to suffer, under the circumstances, a system of Mixed Education in the schools called National.

On this part of the question, however, I have not to enter; for I confine myself to the subject of University Education. But even here it would ill have become me to pretend, simply on my own judgment, to decide on a point so emphatically practical, as regards a state of society, about which I have much to learn, on any abstract principles, however true and important. It would have been presumptuous in me so to have acted, nor am I so acting. It is my happiness in a matter of Christian duty, about which the most saintly and the most able may differ, to be guided simply by the decision and recommendation of the Holy See, the judge and finisher of all controversies. That decision indeed, I repeat, shall not enter into my argument; but it is my own reason for arguing. I am trusting my own judgment on the subject, because I find it is the judgment of him who has upon his shoulder the government and the solicitude of all the Churches. I appear before you, Gentlemen, not prior to the decision of Rome on the question of which I am to treat, but after it. My sole aspiration—and I cannot have a higher under the heavens—is to be the servant of the Vicar of Christ. He has sanctioned at this time a particular measure for his children who speak the English tongue, and the distinguished persons by whom it is

to be carried out have honoured me with a share in their work. I take things as I find them ; I know nothing of the past ; I find myself here ; I set myself to the duties I find here ; I set myself to further, by every means in my power, doctrines and views, true in themselves, recognised by all Catholics as such, familiar to my own mind ; and to do this quite apart from the consideration of questions which have been determined without me and before me. I am here the advocate and the minister of a certain great principle ; yet not merely advocate and minister, else had I not been here at all. It has been my previous keen sense and hearty reception of that principle, that has been at once the cause, as I must suppose, of my selection, and the ground of my acquiescence. I am told on authority that a principle is necessary, which I have ever felt to be true. As the royal matron in sacred history consigned the child she had made her own to the charge of its natural mother ; so truths and duties, which come of unaided reason, not of grace, which were already intimately mine by the workings of my own mind, and the philosophy of human schools, are now committed to my care, to nurse and to cherish, by her and for her who, acting on the prerogative of her divinely inspired discernment, has in this instance honoured with a royal adoption the suggestions of reason.

Happy mother, who received her offspring back by giving him up, and gained, at another's word, what



her own most jealous artifices had failed to secure at home! Gentlemen, I have not yet ended the explanations with which I must introduce myself to your notice. If I have been expressing a satisfaction that opinions, early imbibed and long cherished in my own mind, now come to me with the Church's seal upon them, do not imagine that I am indulging a subtle kind of private judgment, especially unbecoming in a Catholic. It would, I think, be unjust to me, were any one to gather, from what I have been saying, that I had so established myself in my own ideas and in my old notions, as a centre of thought, that, instead of coming to the Church to be taught, I was but availing myself of such opportunities as she gave me, to force principles on your attention which I had adopted without her. It would, indeed, be a most unworthy frame of mind, to view her sanction, however it could be got, as a sort of leave or permit, whereby the intellect obtains an outlet, which it is ever coveting, to range freely once in a way, and to enjoy itself in a welcome, because a rare holiday. Not so; human wisdom, at the very best, even in matters of religious policy, is principally but a homage, certainly no essential service to Divine Truth. Nor is the Church some stern mistress, practised only in refusal and prohibition, to be obeyed grudgingly and dexterously overreached; but a kind and watchful teacher and guide, encouraging us forward in the path of truth amid the perils which beset

it. Deeply do I feel, ever will I protest, for I can appeal to the ample testimony of history to bear me out, that, in questions of right and wrong there is nothing really strong in the whole world, nothing decisive and operative, but the voice of him, to whom have been committed the keys of the kingdom and the oversight of Christ's flock. That voice is now, as ever it has been, a real authority, infallible when it teaches, prosperous when it commands, ever taking the lead wisely and distinctly in its own province, adding certainty to what is probable, and persuasion to what is certain. Before it speaks, the most saintly may mistake; and after it has spoken, the most gifted must obey.

I have said this in explanation ; but it has an application if you will let me so say, far beyond myself. Perhaps we have all need to be reminded, in one way or another, as regards our habitual view of things, if not our formal convictions, of the greatness of authority and the intensity of power, which accompany the decisions of the Holy See. I can fancy, Gentlemen, among those who hear me there may be those who would be willing to acquit the principles of Education which I am to advocate of all fault whatever, except that of being impracticable. I can fancy them to grant to me, that those principles are most correct and most obvious, simply irresistible on paper, yet, after all, nothing more than the dreams of men who live out of the world, and who do not see

the difficulty of keeping Catholicism anyhow afloat on the bosom of this wonderful nineteenth century. Proved, indeed, those principles are to demonstration, but they will not work. Nay, it was my own admission just now, that, in a particular instance, it might easily happen that what is only second best is best practically, because what is actually best is out of the question. This, I hear you say to yourselves, is the state of things at present. You recount in detail the numberless impediments, great and small, threatening and vexatious, which at every step embarrass the attempt to carry out ever so poorly a principle in itself so true and ecclesiastical. You appeal in your defence to wise and sagacious intellects, who are far from enemies, if not to Catholicism, at least to the Irish Hierarchy, and you simply despair, or rather you absolutely disbelieve, that Education can possibly be conducted, here and now, on a theological principle, or that youths of different religions can, in matter of fact, be educated apart from each other. The more you think over the state of politics, the position of parties, the feelings of classes, and the experience of the past, the more chimerical does it seem to you to aim at anything beyond a University of Mixed Instruction. Nay, even if the attempt could accidentally succeed, would not the mischief exceed the benefits of it? How great the sacrifice, in how many ways, by which it would be preceded and followed!—how many wounds, open

and secret, would it inflict upon the body politic ! And, if it fails, which is to be expected, then a double mischief will ensue from its recognition of evils which it has been unable to remedy. These are your deep misgivings ; and, in proportion to the force with which they come to you, is the concern and anxiety which they occasion you, that there should be those whom you love, whom you revere, who from one cause or other refuse to enter into them.

This, I repeat, is what some good Catholics will say to me, and more than this. They will express themselves better than I can speak for them—with more nature and point, with more force of argument and fulness of detail ; and I will frankly and at once acknowledge, Gentlemen, that I do not mean here to give a direct answer to their objections. I do not say an answer cannot be given ; on the contrary, I may have a confident expectation that, in proportion as those objections are looked in the face, they will fade away. But, however this may be, it would not become me to argue the matter with those who understand the circumstances of the problem so much better than myself. What do I know of the state of things in Ireland that I should presume to put ideas of mine, which could not be right except by accident, by the side of theirs, who speak in the country of their birth and their home ? No, Gentlemen, you are natural judges of the difficulties which beset us, and

they are doubtless greater than I can even fancy or forebode. Let me, for the sake of argument, admit all you say against our enterprise, and a great deal more. Your proof of its intrinsic impossibility shall be to me as demonstrative as my own of its theological correctness. Why then should I be so rash and perverse as to involve myself in trouble not properly mine? Why go out of my own place? How is it that I do not know when I am well off? Why so headstrong and reckless as to lay up for myself miscarriage and disappointment, as though I had not enough of my own?

Considerations such as these might have been simply decisive in time past for the boldest and most able among us ; now, however, I have one resting point, just one, one plea which serves me in the stead of all direct argument whatever, which hardens me against censure, which encourages me against fear, and to which I shall ever come round, when I hear the question of the practicable and the expedient brought into discussion. After all, Peter has spoken. Peter is no recluse, no abstracted student, no dreamer about the past, no doter upon the dead and gone, no projector of the visionary. Peter for eighteen hundred years has lived in the world ; he has seen all fortunes, he has encountered all adversaries, he has shaped himself for all emergencies. If there ever was a power on earth who had an eye for the times, who has confined himself to the practicable, and has been happy in his an-

ticipations, whose words have been deeds, and whose commands prophecies, such is he in the history of ages who sits on from generation to generation in the Chair of the Apostles as the Vicar of Christ and Doctor of His Church.

Notions, then, taught me long ago by others, long cherished in my own mind, these are not my confidence. Their truth does not make them feasible, nor their reasonableness persuasive. Rather, I would meet the objector by an argument of his own sort. If you tell me this work will fail, I will make answer, the worker is apt to succeed, and I trust in my knowledge of the past more than in your prediction of the future. It was said by an old philosopher, who declined to reply to an emperor's arguments, "It is not safe controverting with the master of twenty legions". What Augustus had in the material order, that, and much more, has Peter in the spiritual. Peter has spoken by Pius, and when was Peter ever unequal to the occasion? When has he not risen with the crisis? What dangers have ever daunted him? What sophistry foiled him? What uncertainties misled him? When did ever any power go to war with Peter, material or moral, civilized or savage, and got the better? When did the whole world ever band together against him solitary, and not find him too many for them?

These are not the words of rhetoric, Gentlemen, but of history. All who take part with Peter are on

the winning side. The Apostle says not in order to unsay, for he has inherited that word which is with power. From the first he has looked through the wide world, of which he has the burden, and according to the need of the day, and the inspirations of his Lord, he has set himself, now to one thing, now to another, but to all in season, and to nothing in vain. He came first upon an age of refinement and luxury like our own, and in spite of the persecutor fertile in the resources of his cruelty, he soon gathered, out of all classes of society, the slave, the soldier, the high-born lady, and the sophist, to form a people for his Master's honour. The savage hordes came down in torrents from the north, hideous even to look upon; and Peter went out with holy water and with benison, and by his very eye he sobered them and backed them in full career. They turned aside, and flooded the whole earth, but only to be more surely civilized by him, and to be made ten times more his children even than the older populations they had overwhelmed. Lawless kings arose, sagacious as the Roman, passionate as the Hun, yet in him they found their match, and were shattered, and he lived on. The gates of the earth were opened to the east and west, and men poured out to take possession; and he and his went with them, swept along by zeal and charity as far as they by enterprise, covetousness, or ambition. Has he failed in his successes up to this hour? Did he, in our fathers' day,

fail in his struggle with Joseph of Germany and his confederates, with Napoleon, a greater name, and his dependent kings, that, though in another kind of fight, he should fail in ours? What grey hairs are on the head of Judah, whose youth is renewed like the eagle's, whose feet are like the feet of harts, and underneath the everlasting Arms?

In the first centuries of the Church all this was a mere point of faith, but every age as it has come has stayed up faith by sight; and shame on us if, with the accumulated witness of eighteen centuries, our eyes are too gross to see what the Saints have ever anticipated. Education, Gentlemen, involved as it is in the very idea of a religion such as ours, cannot be a strange work at any time in the hands of the Vicar of Christ. The heathen forms of religion thought it enough to amuse and quiet the populace with spectacles, and, on the other hand, to bestow a dignity and divine sanction upon the civil ruler; but Catholicism addresses itself directly to the heart and conscience of the individual. The Religion which numbers Baptism and Penance among its sacraments, cannot be neglectful of the soul's training; the Creed which opens and resolves into so majestic and so living a theology, cannot but subserve the cultivation of the intellect; the Revelation which tells us of truths otherwise utterly hid from us, cannot be justly called the enemy of knowledge; the Worship, which is so awful and so



thrilling, cannot but feed the aspirations of genius, and move the affections from their depths. The Institution, which has flourished in centuries the most famed for mental activity and cultivation, which has come into collision, to say no more, with the schools of Antioch and Alexandria, Athens and Edessa, Saracenic Seville, and Protestant Berlin, cannot be wanting in experience what to do now, and when to do it. He whom the Almighty left behind to be His representative on earth, has ever been jealous, as beseemed him, as of God's graces, so also of His gifts. He has been as tender of the welfare and interests of human science as he is loyal to the divine truth which is his peculiar charge. He has ever been the foster-father of secular knowledge, and has rejoiced in its growth, while he has pruned away its self-destructive luxuriance.

Least of all can the Catholics of two islands, which have been heretofore so singularly united in the cultivation and diffusion of Knowledge, under the auspices of the Apostolic See, we surely, Gentlemen, are not the persons to distrust its wisdom and its fortune when it sends us on a similar mission now. I cannot forget, Gentlemen, that at a time when Celt and Saxon were alike savage, it was the See of Peter that gave both of them first faith, and then civilization; and then, again, bound them together in one by the seal of that joint commission which it gave them to convert and illuminate in turn the pagan Continent. I cannot forget how it was from Rome that the

glorious St. Patrick was sent to Ireland, and did a work so great, that he may be said to have had no successor in it; the sanctity, and learning, and zeal, and charity which followed being but the result of the one impulse which he gave. I cannot forget how, in no long time, under the fostering breath of the Vicar of Christ, a country of heathen superstitions became the very wonder and asylum of all people;—the wonder by reason of its knowledge, sacred and profane; the asylum for religion, literature, and science, chased away from the Continent by barbaric invaders. I recollect its hospitality freely accorded to the pilgrim; its volumes munificently presented to the foreign student; and the prayers, and blessings, and holy rites, and solemn chants, which sanctified the while both giver and receiver. Nor can I forget how my own England had meanwhile become the solicitude of the same unwearied Eye; how Augustine was sent to us by Gregory; how he fainted in the way in terror at our barbarian name, and, but for the Pope, had returned as from an impossible expedition; how he was forced on “in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling”, until he had achieved the conquest of all England to Christ. Nor, how it came to pass that, when Augustine died and his work slackened, another Pope, unwearied still, sent three great Saints from Rome to educate and refine the people he had converted. Three holy men set out for England together, of different nations; Theodore, an Asiatic

Greek, from Tarsus ; Adrian, an African ; Bennett alone a Saxon, for Peter knows no distinction of races in his ecumenical work ; they came with theology and science in their train ; with relics, and with pictures, and with manuscripts of the Holy Fathers and the Greek classics ; and Theodore and Adrian founded schools, secular and religious, all over England, while Bennett brought to the north the large library he had collected in foreign parts, and, with plans and ornamental work from France, erected a church of stone, under the invocation of St. Peter, after the Roman fashion, “which”, says the historian,\* “he most affected”. I call to mind how St. Wilfrid, St. John of Beverly, St. Bede, and other saintly men, carried on the good work in the following generations, and how from that time forth the two islands, England and Ireland, in a dark and dreary age, were the two lights of Christendom ; and nothing passed between them, and no personal aims were theirs, save the interchange of kind offices and the rivalry of love.

O ! memorable time when St. Aidan and the Irish Monks went up to Lindisfarne and Melrose, and taught the Saxon youth, and a St. Cuthbert and a St. Eata repaid their gracious toil ! O ! blessed days of peace and confidence, when Mailduf penetrated to Malmesbury in the south, which has inherited his name, and founded there the famous school which

\* Cressy.

gave birth to the great St. Aldhelm! O! precious seal and testimony of Gospel charity, when, as Aldhelm in turn tells us, the English went to Ireland “ numerous as bees ”; when the Saxon St. Egbert and St. Willibrod, preachers to the heathen Frisons, made the voyage to Ireland to prepare themselves for their work; and when from Ireland went forth to Germany the two noble Ewalds, Saxons also, to earn the crown of martyrdom. Such a period, indeed, so rich in grace, in peace, in love, and in good works, could only last for a season; but, even when the light was to pass away, the two sister islands were destined not to forfeit, but to transfer it. The time came when a neighbouring country was in turn to hold the mission they have so long and so well fulfilled; and, when to it they made over their honourable office, faithful to the alliance of two hundred years, they did the solemn act together. High up in the north, upon the Tyne, the pupil of St. Theodore, St. Adrian, and St. Bennett, for forty years was Bede, the light of the whole western world; as happy, too, in his scholars round about him, as in his celebrity and influence in the length and breadth of Christendom. And, a generation before him, St. John of Beverly, taught by the same masters, had for thirty years been shedding the lustre of his sanctity and learning upon the Archiepiscopal school of York. Among the pupils of these celebrated men the learned Alcuin stood first; but Alcuin, not content even

with the training which Saints could give him, betook himself to the sister island, and remained a whole twelve years in the Irish schools. When Charlemagne would revive science and letters in his own France, to England he sent for masters, and to the cloisters of St. John Beverly and St. Bede; and Alcuin, the scholar both of the Saxon and the Celt, was the chief of those who went forth to supply the need of the Great Emperor. Such was the foundation of the school of Paris, from which, in the course of centuries, sprang the famous University, the glory of the middle ages.

The past never returns; the course of things, old in its texture, is ever new in its colouring and fashion. Ireland and England are not what they once were, but Rome is where it was; Peter is the same; his zeal, his charity, his mission, his gifts, are the same. He, of old time, made us one by making us joint teachers of the nations; and now, surely, he is giving us a like mission, and we shall become one again, while we zealously and lovingly fulfil it.



## DISCOURSE II.

### THEOLOGY A BRANCH OF KNOWLEDGE.

GREAT as are the secular benefits ascribed by the philosopher of the day to the present remarkable reception in so many countries of the theory of Private Judgment, it is not without its political drawbacks, which the statesman at least, whatever be his predilections for Protestantism, cannot in candour refuse to admit. If it has stimulated the activity of the intellect in those nations which have surrendered themselves to its influence, on the other hand it has provided no sufficient safeguards against that activity preying on itself. This inconvenience indeed matters comparatively little to the man of letters, who often has no end in view beyond mental activity itself, of whatever description, and has before now even laid it down, as the rule of his philosophy, that the good of man consists, not in the possession of truth, but in an interminable search after it. But it is otherwise with those who are engaged in the

business of life, who have work and responsibility, who have measures to carry through and objects to accomplish, who only see what is before them, recognize what is tangible, and reverence what succeeds. The statesman especially, who has to win, to attach, to reconcile, to secure, to govern, looks for one thing more than any thing else—how he may do his work with least trouble, how he may best persuade the wheels of the political machine to go smoothly, silently, and steadily; and with this prime *desideratum* nothing interferes so seriously as that indefinite multiplication of opinions and wills which it is the boast of Protestantism to have introduced. Amid the overwhelming difficulties of his position, the most Protestant of statesmen will be sorely tempted, in disparagement of his cherished principles, to make a passionate wish, that the people he has to govern, could have, I will not say with the imperial tyrant, one neck, but, what is equally impossible, one private judgment.

This embarrassment makes itself especially felt, when he addresses himself to the great question of National Education. He is called upon to provide for the education of the people at large; and that the more urgently, because the religious sentiments, which Private Judgment presupposes and fosters, demand it. The classes and bodies in whom political power is lodged, clamour for National Education; he prepares himself to give them satisfaction: but Edu-



education of course implies principles and views, and when he proceeds to lay down any whatever, the very same parties who pressed him forward, from their zeal for Education in the abstract, fall out with each other and with him, about every conceivable plan which is proposed to them in a substantive shape. All demand of him, what each in turn forbids; his proceedings are brought to what is familiarly called "a lock"; he can neither advance nor recede; and he loses time and toil in attempting an impossible problem. It would not be wonderful, if, in these trying difficulties, he were to envy the comparative facility of the problem of Education in purely Catholic countries, where certain fundamental principles are felt to be as sure as external facts, and where, in consequence, it is almost as easy to construct a national system of teaching, as to raise the school-houses in which it is to be administered.

Under these circumstances, he naturally looks about him for methods of eliminating from his problem its intractable conditions, which are wholly or principally religious. He sees then that all would go easy, could he but contrive to educate apart from religion, not compromising indeed his own private religious persuasion, whatever it happens to be, but excluding one and all professions of faith from the national system. And thus he is led, by extreme expedience and political necessity, to sanction the separation of secular instruction from religious, and

to favour the establishment of what are called "Mixed Schools". Such a procedure, I say, on the part of a statesman, is but a natural effort, under the circumstances of his day, to appropriate to himself a privilege, without the Church's aid, which the Church alone can bestow; and he becomes what is called a Liberal, as the very nearest approach he can make, in a Protestant country, to being a Catholic. Since his schools cannot have *one* faith, he determines, as the best choice left to him, that they shall have *none*.

Nothing surely is more intelligible than conduct like this; and the more earnest is his patriotism, the warmer his philanthropy, the more of statesmanship, the more of administrative talent he possesses, the more cordially will he adopt it. And hence it is that at the present day, when so much benevolence and practical wisdom are to be found among public men, there is a growing movement in favour of Mixed Education, whether as regards the higher or the lower classes, on the simple ground, that nothing else remains to be done. So far, I say, is intelligible; but there are higher aspects of the question than that of political utility. My business is, not with the mere statesman, but with those who profess to regulate their public conduct by principle and logic. I want to see into what principles such a policy resolves itself, when submitted to a philosophical analysis, for then we shall be better able to

determine what should be a Catholic's judgment upon it.

Now, on entering upon my subject, first of all I put aside the question of the mixed education of the lower classes, being concerned only with University Education. Having done this, I am able to bring the question to this simple issue. A University, as the name implies, is the seat of universal knowledge; it follows then at once to ask, whether this definition of a University, which can hardly be gainsaid, is compatible with the political expedient which I have been describing: whether it is philosophical or possible to profess all branches of knowledge, yet to exclude one, and that one not the lowest in the series.

But this, of course, is to assume that Theology is a science, and an important one: so I will express myself in a more general form. I say, then, that if a University be, from the nature of the case, a place of instruction, where universal knowledge is professed, and if in a certain University, so called, the subject of Religion is excluded, one of two conclusions is inevitable,—either, on the one hand, that the province of Religion is very barren of real knowledge, or, on the other, that in such University one special and important branch of knowledge is omitted. I say, the advocate of such an institution must say *this*, or must say *that*; he must own, either that little or nothing is known about the Supreme Being, or

that his seat of learning calls itself what it is not. This is the thesis which I lay down, and on which I shall insist in the Discourse which is to follow. I repeat, such a compromise between religious parties, as is involved in the establishment of a University which makes no religious profession, implies that those parties severally consider, not indeed that their own respective opinions are trifles in a moral and practical point of view—of course not; but certainly as much as this, that they are not knowledge. Did they in their hearts believe that their private views of religion, whatever they are, were absolutely and objectively true, it is inconceivable that they would so insult them as to consent to their omission in an institution which is bound, from the nature of the case—from its very idea and its name—to make a profession of all sorts of knowledge whatever.

I think this will be found to be no matter of words. I allow then fully, that, when men combine together for any common object, they are obliged, as a matter of course, in order to secure the advantages accruing from united action, to sacrifice many of their private opinions and wishes, and to drop the minor differences, as they are commonly called, which exist between man and man. No two persons perhaps are to be found, however intimate, however congenial in tastes and judgments, however eager to have one heart and one soul, but must deny themselves, for the sake of each other, much which they

like or desire, if they are to live together happily. Compromise, in a large sense of the word, is the first principle of combination; and any one who insists on enjoying his rights to the full, and his opinions without exception, and his own way in all things, will soon have all things altogether to himself, and no one to share them with him. But most true as this confessedly is, still there is an obvious limit, on the other hand, to these compromises, necessary as they are; and this is found in the *proviso*, that the differences surrendered should be *but* "minor", or that there should be no sacrifice of the main object in view, in the concessions which are mutually made. Any sacrifice which implicates that object is destructive of the principle of the combination, and no one who would be consistent, can be a party to it.

Thus, for instance, if men of various religious denominations join together for the dissemination of what are called "evangelical" tracts, it is under the belief, that the object of their uniting, recognized on all hands, being the spiritual benefit of their neighbours, no religious exhortation, whatever be its character, can essentially interfere with that benefit, which is founded upon the Lutheran doctrine of Justification. If, again, they agree together in printing and circulating the Protestant Bible, it is because they, one and all, hold to the principle, that, however serious be their differences of religious sentiment, such differences fade away before the one

great principle, which that circulation symbolizes—that the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible, is the religion of Protestants. On the contrary, if the committee of some such association inserted tracts into the copies of the said Bible which they sold, and tracts in recommendation of the Athanasian Creed or the merit of good works, I conceive any subscribing member would have a just right to complain of a proceeding, which compromised both the principle of Private Judgment, and the doctrine of Justification by faith only. These instances are sufficient to illustrate my general position, that coalitions and comprehensions for an object, have their life in the prosecution of that object, and cease to have any meaning as soon as that object is compromised or disparaged.

When, then, a number of persons come forward, not as politicians, not as diplomatists, lawyers, traders, or speculators, but with the one object of advancing Universal Knowledge, much we may allow them to sacrifice; ambition, reputation, leisure, comfort, gold; one thing they may not sacrifice—Knowledge itself. Knowledge being their object, they need not of course insist on their own private views about ancient or modern history, or national prosperity, or the balance of power; they need not of course shrink from the coöperation of those who hold the opposite views, but stipulate they must that Knowledge itself is not compromised; and those views, of whatever

kind, which they do allow to be dropped, it is plain they consider to be opinions, and nothing more, however dear, however important to themselves personally; opinions ingenious, admirable, pleasurable, beneficial, expedient, but not worthy the name of Knowledge or Science. Thus no one would insist on the Malthusian theory being a *sine quâ non* in a seat of learning, who did not think it simply ignorance not to be a Malthusian; and no one would consent to drop the Newtonian theory, who thought it to be proved true, in the same sense as the existence of the sun and moon is true. If, then, in an Institution which professes all knowledge, nothing is professed, nothing is taught about the Supreme Being, it is fair to infer that every individual of all those who advocate that Institution, supposing him consistent, distinctly holds that nothing is known for certain about the Supreme Being; nothing such as to have any claim to be regarded as an accession to the stock of general knowledge existing in the world. If on the other hand it turns out that something considerable is known about the Supreme Being, whether from Reason or Revelation, then the Institution in question professes every science, and leaves out the foremost of them. In a word, strong as may appear the assertion, I do not see how I can avoid making it, and bear with me, Gentlemen, while I do so, viz.: such an Institution cannot be what it professes, if there be a God. I do not wish to declaim; but, by

the very force of the terms, it is very plain, that God and such a University cannot coexist.

Still, however, this may seem to many an abrupt conclusion, and will not be acquiesced in: what answer, Gentlemen, will be made to it? Perhaps this:—It will be said, that there are different kinds or spheres of Knowledge, human, divine, sensible, intellectual, and the like; and that a University certainly takes in all varieties of Knowledge in its own line, but still that it has a line of its own. It contemplates, it occupies a certain order, a certain platform of Knowledge. I understand the remark; but I own to you, Gentlemen, I do not understand how it can be made to apply to the matter in hand. I cannot so construct my definition of the subject matter of University Knowledge, and so draw my boundary lines around it, to include therein the other sciences commonly studied at Universities, and to exclude the science of Religion. Are we to limit our idea of University Knowledge by the evidence of our senses? then we exclude history; by testimony? we exclude metaphysics; by abstract reasoning? we exclude physics. Is not the being of a God reported to us by testimony, handed down by history, inferred by an inductive process, brought home to us by metaphysical necessity, urged on us by the suggestions of our conscience? It is a truth in the natural order, as well as in the supernatural. So much for its origin; and, when obtained, what is it worth? Is



it a great truth or a small one? Is it a comprehensive truth? Say that no other religious idea whatever were given but it, and you have enough to fill the mind; you have at once a whole dogmatic system. The word "God" is a theology in itself, indivisibly one, inexhaustibly various, from the vastness and the simplicity of its meaning. Admit a God, and you introduce among the subjects of your knowledge, a fact encompassing, closing in upon, absorbing, every other fact conceivable. How can we investigate any part of any order of Knowledge, and stop short of that which enters into every order? All true principles run over with it, all phenomena run into it; it is truly the First and the Last. In word indeed, and in idea, it is easy enough to divide Knowledge into human and divine, secular and religious, and to lay down that we will address ourselves to the one without interfering with the other; but it is impossible in fact. Granting that divine truth differs in kind from human, so do human truths differ in kind one from another. If the knowledge of the Creator is in a different order from knowledge of the creature, so, in like manner, metaphysical science is in a different order from physical, physics from history, history from ethics. You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge, if you begin the mutilation with divine.

I have been speaking simply of Natural Theology; my argument of course is stronger when I go on to

Revelation. Let the doctrine of the Incarnation be true: is it not at once of the nature of an historical fact, and of a metaphysical? Let it be true that there are Angels: how is this not a point of knowledge in the same sense as the naturalist's asseveration, that there are myriads of living things on the point of a needle? That the Earth is to be burned by fire, is, if true, as large a fact as that huge monsters once played amid its depths; that Antichrist is to come, is as categorical a heading to a chapter of history, as that Nero or Julian was Emperor of Rome; that a divine influence moves the will, is a subject of thought not more mysterious than the effect of volition on the animal frame.

I do not see how it is possible for a philosophical mind, first, to believe these religious facts to be true; next, to consent to put them aside; and thirdly, in spite of this, to go on to profess to be teaching all the while *de omni scibili*. No; if a man thinks in his heart that these religious facts are short of truth, are not true in the sense in which the motion of the Earth is true, I understand his excluding Religion from his University, though he professes other reasons for its exclusion. In that case the varieties of religious opinions under which he shelters his conduct, are not only his apology for publicly ignoring religion, but a cause of his privately disbelieving it. He does not think that any thing is known or can be known for certain, about the origin of the world or the end of man.

This, I fear, is the conclusion to which intellects, clear, logical, and consistent, have come, or are coming, from the nature of the case; and, alas! in addition to this *primâ facie* suspicion, there are actual tendencies in the same direction in Protestantism, viewed whether in its original idea, or again in the so-called Evangelical movement in these islands during the last century. The religious world, as it is styled, holds, generally speaking, that religion consists, not in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment. The old Catholic notion, which still lingers in the Established Church, was, that Faith was an intellectual act, its object truth, and its result knowledge. Thus if you look into the Anglican Prayer Book, you will find definite *credenda*, as well as definite *agenda*; but in proportion as the Lutheran leaven spread, it became fashionable to say that Faith was but a feeling, an emotion, an affection, an appetency, not an act of the intellect; and as this view of Faith obtained, so was its connexion with Truth and Knowledge more and more either forgotten or denied. The Prayer Book, indeed, contained the Creed, among other memorials of antiquity; but a question began to be agitated whether its recital was any thing better than the confession of a dead faith, the faith of devils, formal, technical, soul-deceiving, not the guarantee at all of what was deemed to be spiritual renovation. It was objected too, that whereas there was just one doctrine which was adapted

to move the feelings, open the heart, and change corrupt nature, viz.—the Atonement, that doctrine was not to be found there. Then again, spiritual-mindedness and heavenly-mindedness consisted, according to the school in question, not, as a Catholic would say, in a straightforward acceptance of revealed truth, and an acting upon it, but in a dreamy and sickly state of soul; in an effort after religious conversation; in a facility of detailing what men called experiences; nay, I will add, in a constrained gravity of demeanour, and an unnatural tone of voice. Now many men laughed at all this, many men admired it; but whether they admired or laughed, both the one party and the other found themselves in agreement on the main point, viz.—in considering that this really was in substance Religion; that Religion was based, not on argument, but on taste and sentiment, that nothing was objective, every thing subjective, in doctrine. I say, even those who saw through the affectation in which the religious school of which I am speaking clad itself, still came to think that Religion, as such, consisted in something short of intellectual exercises, viz., in the affections, in the imagination, in inward persuasions and consolations, in pleasurable sensations, sudden changes, and sublime fancies. They learned to say, that Religion was nothing beyond a *supply* of the wants of human nature, not an external fact and a work of God. There was, it appeared, a demand for Religion, and

therefore there was a supply; human nature could not do without Religion, any more than it could do without bread; a supply was absolutely necessary, good or bad, and, as in the case of the articles of daily sustenance, an article which was really inferior was better than none at all. Thus Religion was useful, venerable, beautiful, the sanction of order, the stay of government, the curb of self-will and self-indulgence, which the laws cannot reach: but, after all, on what was it based? Why, that was a question delicate to ask, and imprudent to answer; but, if the truth must be spoken, however reluctantly, the long and the short of the matter was this, that Religion was based on custom, on prejudice, on law, on education, on habit, on loyalty, on feudalism, on enlightened expedience, on many, many things, but not at all on Reason; Reason was not in the number. It is true, *Rational* Religion is spoken of in the circles in question; but, when you carefully consider the matter, you will find this does not mean a kind of Religion which is built upon Reason, but merely a Religion which does not interfere with Reason, which does not clash with what are considered rational ideas, with rational pursuits, rational enjoyment of life, and rational views of the next world.

You see, Gentlemen, how a theory or philosophy, which began with Luther, the Puritans, and Wesley, has been taken up by that large and influential body

which goes by the name of Liberal or Latitudinarian; and how, where it prevails, it is as unreasonable of course to demand for Religion a chair in a University, as to demand one for fine feeling, sense of honour, patriotism, gratitude, maternal affection, or good companionship, proposals which would be simply unmeaning.

Now, in support of what I have been saying, I will appeal, in the first place, to a statesman, but not merely so, to no mere politician, no trader in places, or votes, or the stock market, but to a philosopher, to an orator, to one whose profession, whose aim has ever been to cultivate the fair, the noble, and the generous. I cannot forget the celebrated discourse of the celebrated man to whom I am alluding; a man who is first in his peculiar walk; whose talents have earned for him nobility at home, and a more than European name; and who, moreover (which is much to my purpose), has had a share, as much as any one alive, in effecting the public recognition in these Islands of the principle of Mixed Education. This able person, during the years in which he was exerting himself in its behalf, made a speech or discourse, on occasion of a public solemnity; and in reference to the bearing of general knowledge upon religious belief, he spoke as follows:

“As men”, he said, “will no longer suffer themselves to be led blindfold in ignorance, so will they

no more yield to the vile principle of judging and treating their fellow-creatures, not according to the intrinsic merit of their actions, but according to the accidental and involuntary coincidence of their opinions. The Great Truth has finally gone forth to all the ends of the earth", and he prints it in capital letters, "that man shall no more render account to man for his belief, over which he has himself no control. Henceforward, nothing shall prevail upon us to praise or to blame any one for that which he can no more change, than he can the hue of his skin or the height of his stature".\* You see, Gentlemen, if this philosopher is to decide the matter, religious ideas are just as far from being real, or representing an external object, are as truly imaginations, idiosyncracies, accidents of the individual, as his having the stature of a Patagonian, or the features of a Negro.

But perhaps this was the rhetoric of an excited moment. Far from it, Gentlemen, or I should not have fastened on the words of a fertile mind, uttered so long ago. What Mr. Brougham laid down as a principle in 1825, resounds on all sides of us, with ever growing confidence and success, in 1852. I open the Minutes of the Committee of Council on Education for the years 1848-50, presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of her Majesty,

\* Mr. Brougham's Glasgow Discourse.

and I find one of her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools, at p. 467 of the second volume, dividing "the topics usually embraced in the better class of primary schools" into four:— the knowledge of *signs*, as reading and writing; of *facts*, as geography and astronomy; of *relations and laws*, as mathematics; and lastly *sentiment*, such as poetry and music. Now, on first catching this division, it occurred to me to ask myself, before ascertaining the writer's own resolution of the matter, under which of these four heads fell Religion, or whether it fell under any of them. Did he put it aside as a thing too delicate and sacred to be enumerated with earthly studies? or did he distinctly contemplate it when he made his division? Any how, I could really find a place for it under the first head, or the second, or the third; for it has to do with facts, since it tells of the Self-subsisting; it has to do with relations, for it tells of the Creator; it has to do with signs, for it tells of the due manner of speaking of Him. There was just one head of the division to which I could not refer it, viz., to *sentiment*; for, I suppose, music and poetry, which are the writer's own examples of sentiment, have not much to do with Truth, which is the sole object of Religion. Judge then my surprise, Gentlemen, when I found the fourth was the very head selected by the writer of the Report in question, as the special receptacle of religious topics. "The inculcation of *sentiment*", he says, "embraces reading in its higher sense, poetry,



music, together with moral and religious education". What can be clearer than that, in this writer's idea (whom I am far from introducing for his own sake, because I have no wish to hurt the feelings of a gentleman, who is but exerting himself zealously in the discharge of anxious duties; I do but introduce him as an illustration of the wide-spreading school of thought to which he belongs); what, I say, can more clearly prove than a candid avowal like this, that, in the view of that school, Religion is not knowledge, has nothing whatever to do with knowledge, and is excluded from a University course of instruction, not simply because the exclusion cannot be helped, from political or social obstacles, but because it has no business there at all, because it is to be considered a mere taste, sentiment, opinion, and nothing more? The writer avows this conclusion himself, in the explanation into which he presently enters, in which he says: "According to the classification proposed, the *essential idea* of all religious education will consist in the direct cultivation of the *feelings*". Here is Lutheranism sublimated into philosophy; what we contemplate, what we aim at, when we give a religious education, is, not to impart any knowledge whatever, but to satisfy anyhow, desires which will arise after the Unseen in spite of us, to provide the mind with a means of self-command, to impress on it the beautiful ideas which saints and sages have struck out, to embellish it with the bright hues of a

celestial piety, to teach it the poetry of devotion, the music of well-ordered affections, and the luxury of doing good. The soul comes forth from her bower, for the adoration of the lecture-room and the saloon; like the first woman, in the poet's description,

“Grace is in all her steps, heaven in her eye,  
In every gesture dignity and love”.

As for the intellect, on the other hand, its exercise is only indirect in religious education, as being an instrument in a moral work (true or false, it matters little, or rather anything must be true, which is capable of reaching the end proposed); or again, as the unavoidable attendant on moral impressions, from the constitution of the human mind, but varying with the peculiarities of the individual.\* Something

\*“In the diverse schools”, he says, “amongst which my labours are carried on, there are some, in which the Bible is the sole basis of religious instruction; and there are others, in which catechisms, or other abstracts of doctrine, are employed. As far as my own observation extends, it has ever appeared *perfectly indifferent*, as to the results, what precise method or instrumentality may be adopted. I have seen the happiest, and I have seen the most unsatisfactory results, alike under both systems. In each case, the mere instrument of teaching is of small importance compared with the spirit which is infused into it by the teacher. The danger in each case is, that of employing the instrument simply as the basis of an intellectual exercise, and losing sight of the moral and religious sentiment it is intended to draw forth”.

like this seems to be the writer's meaning, but we need not pry into its finer issues in order to gain a distinct view of its general bearing; and taking it, as I think we fairly may take it, as a specimen of the philosophy of the day, as adopted by those who are not conscious unbelievers, or open scoffers, I consider it amply explains how it comes to pass that the day's philosophy sets up a system of universal knowledge, and teaches of plants, and earths, and creeping things, and beasts, and gases, about the crust of the Earth, and the changes of the atmosphere, about sun, moon, and stars, about man and his doings, about the history of the world, about sensation, memory, and the passions, about duty, about cause and effect, about all things imaginable, except one—and that is, about Him that made all these things, about God. I say the reason is plain, because they consider knowledge, as regards the creature, is illimitable, but impossible or hopeless as regards the Creator.

Here, however, it may be objected to me that this representation is certainly extreme, for the school in question does, in fact, lay great stress on the evidence afforded by the creation, to the Being and Attributes of the Creator. I may be referred, for instance, to the words of one of the speakers, at the solemnities which took place, at the time when the principle of Mixed Education was first formally inaugurated in the metropolis of the sister island. On the occasion

of laying the first stone of the University of London, I confess it, a learned person, since elevated to the Protestant See of Durham, which he still fills, opened the proceedings with prayer. He addressed the Deity, as the authoritative Report informs us, "the whole surrounding assembly standing uncovered in solemn silence". "Thou", he said, in the name of all the denominations present, "thou hast constructed the vast fabric of the universe in so wonderful a manner, so arranged its motions, and so formed its productions, that the contemplation and study of thy works exercise at once the mind in the pursuit of human science, and lead it onwards to *Divine Truth*". Here is apparently a distinct recognition that there is such a thing as Truth in the province of Religion; and, did the passage stand by itself, and were it the only means we possessed of ascertaining the sentiments, not of this divine himself (for I am not concerned with him personally), but of the powerful body whom he there represented, it would, as far as it goes, be satisfactory. I admit it; and I admit also the recognition of the Being and certain Attributes of the Deity, contained in the writings of the noble and gifted person whom I have already quoted, whose genius, versatile and multiform as it is, in nothing has been so constant, as in its devotion to the advancement of knowledge, scientific and literary. He then, in his "Discourse of the objects, advantages, and pleasures of science", after variously

illustrating what he terms its “gratifying treats”, crowns the catalogue with “the *highest* of *all* our gratifications in the contemplation of science”, which he proceeds to explain thus:

“We are raised by them”, he says, “to an understanding of the infinite wisdom and goodness which the Creator has displayed in all His works. Not a step can be taken in any direction”, he continues, “without perceiving the most extraordinary traces of design; and the skill, every where conspicuous, is calculated in so vast a proportion of instances to promote the happiness of living creatures, and especially of ourselves, that we can feel no hesitation in concluding, that, if we knew the whole scheme of Providence, every part would be in harmony with a plan of absolute benevolence. Independent, however, of this most consoling inference, the delight is inexpressible, of being able to follow, as it were, with our eyes, the marvellous works of the Great Architect of Nature, to trace the unbounded power and exquisite skill which are exhibited in the most minute, as well as the mightiest parts of His system. The pleasure derived from this study is unceasing, and so various, that it never tires the appetite. But it is unlike the low gratifications of sense in another respect: it elevates and refines our nature, while those hurt the health, debase the understanding, and corrupt the feelings; it teaches us to look upon all earthly objects as insignificant

and below our notice, except the pursuit of knowledge and the cultivation of virtue, that is to say, the strict performance of our duty in every relation of society; and it gives a dignity and importance to the enjoyment of life, which the frivolous and the grovelling cannot even comprehend”.

Such are the words of this prominent champion of Mixed Education. If logical inference be, as it undoubtedly is, an instrument of truth, surely, it may be answered to me, in admitting the possibility of inferring the Divine Being and Attributes *from* the phenomena of nature, he distinctly admits a basis of truth in the doctrines of Religion.

I wish, Gentlemen, to give these representations their full weight, both from the gravity of the question, and the consideration due to the persons whom I am arraigning; but, before I can feel sure I understand them, I must ask an abrupt question. When I am told, then, by the partizans of Mixed Education, that human science leads to belief in a Supreme Being, without denying, nay, as a Catholic, with full conviction of the fact,—yet I am obliged to ask what the statement means in *their* mouth, what they, the speakers, understand by the word “God”. Let me not be thought offensive, if I question, whether it means the same thing on the two sides of the controversy. With us Catholics, as with the first race of Protestants, as with Mahometans, and all Theists, the word contains, as I have already said, a

theology in itself. At the risk of anticipating what I shall have occasion to insist upon in my next Discourse, let me say that, according to the teaching of Monotheism, God is an Individual, Self-dependent, All-perfect, Unchangeable Being; intelligent, living, personal, and present; almighty, all-seeing, all-remembering; between whom and His creatures there is an infinite gulf; who had no origin, who passed an eternity by Himself; who created and upholds the universe; who will judge every one of us, at the end of time, according to that Law of right and wrong which He has written on our hearts. He is one who is sovereign over, operative amidst, independent of, the appointments which He has made; one in whose hands are all things, who has a purpose in every event, and a standard for every deed, and thus has relations of His own towards the subject matter of each particular science which the book of knowledge unfolds; who has with an adorable, never-ceasing energy mixed Himself up with all the history of creation, the constitution of nature, the course of the world, the origin of society, the fortunes of nations, the action of the human mind; and who thereby necessarily becomes the subject matter of a science, far wider and more noble than any of those which are included in the circle of secular education.

This is the doctrine which belief in a God implies: if it means any thing, it means all this, and cannot keep from meaning all this, and a great deal more;

and, though there were nothing in Protestantism, as such, to disparage dogmatic truth (and I have shown there is a great deal), still, even then, I should have difficulty in believing that a doctrine so mysterious, so peremptory, approved itself as a matter of course to educated men of this day, who gave their minds attentively to consider it. Rather, in a state of society such as ours, in which authority, prescription, tradition, habit, moral instinct, and the influences of grace go for nothing, in which patience of thought, and depth and consistency of view, are scorned as subtle and scholastic, in which free discussion and fallible judgment are prized as the birthright of each individual, I must be excused if I exercise towards this age, as regards its belief in this doctrine, some portion of that scepticism which it exercises itself towards every received but unscrutinized assertion whatever. I cannot take it for granted, I must have it brought home to me by tangible evidence, that the spirit of the age means by the Supreme Being what Catholics mean. Nay, it would be a relief to my mind to gain some ground of assurance, that the parties influenced by that spirit had, I will not say, a true apprehension of God, but even so much as the idea of what a true apprehension is.

Nothing is easier than to use the word, and mean nothing by it. The heathens used to say, "God wills", when they meant "Fate"; "God provides", when they meant "Chance"; "God acts", when they



meant "Instinct" or "Sense"; and "God is every where", when they meant "the Soul of Nature". The Almighty is something infinitely different from a principle, or a centre of action, or a quality, or a generalization of phenomena. If then, by the word, you do but mean a Being who has contrived the world and keeps it in order, who acts in it, but only in the way of general Providence, who acts towards us but only through, what are called, laws of Nature, who is more certain not to act at all, than to act independent of those laws, who is known and approached indeed, but only through the medium of those laws; such a God it is not difficult for any one to conceive, not difficult for any one to endure. If, I say, as you would revolutionize society, so you would revolutionize heaven, if you have changed the divine sovereignty into a sort of constitutional monarchy, in which the Throne has honour and ceremonial enough, but cannot issue the most ordinary command except through legal forms and precedents, and with the counter-signature of a minister, then belief in a God is no more than an acknowledgment of existing, sensible powers and phenomena, which none but an idiot can deny. If the Supreme Being is powerful or skilful, just so far forth as the telescope shows power, and the microscope shows skill, if His moral law is to be ascertained simply by the physical processes of the animal frame, or His will gathered from the immediate issues of human affairs, if His Essence is just as high

and deep and broad and long, as the universe, and no more; if this be the fact, then will I confess that there is no specific science about God, that theology is but a name, and a protest in its behalf an hypocrisy. Then, is He but coincident with the laws of the universe; then is He but a function, or correlative, or subjective reflection and mental impression of each phenomenon of the material or moral world, as it flits before us. Then, pious as it is to think of Him, while the pageant of experiment or abstract reasoning passes by, still such piety is nothing more than a poetry of thought or an ornament of language, and has not even an infinitesimal influence upon philosophy or science, of which it is rather the parasitical production. I understand, in that case, why Theology should require no specific teaching, for there is nothing to mistake about; why it is powerless against scientific conclusions, for it merely is one of them; why it is simply absurd in its denunciations of heresy, for it does but lie itself in the province of opinion. I understand, in that case, how it is that the religious sense is but a "sentiment", and its exercise a "gratifying treat", for it is like the sense of the beautiful or the sublime. I understand how the contemplation of the universe "leads onwards to *divine* truth", for divine truth is but Nature with a divine glow upon it. I understand the zeal expressed for Natural Theology, for this study is but a mode of looking at Nature, a certain view taken of

Nature, private and personal, which one man has, and another has not, which gifted minds strike out, which others see to be admirable and ingenious, and which all would be the better for adopting. It is the theology of Nature, just as we talk of the *philosophy* or the *romance* of history, or the *poetry* of childhood, or the picturesque, or the sentimental, or the humourous, or any other abstract quality, which the genius or the caprice of the individual, or the fashion of the day, or the consent of the world, recognizes in any set of objects which are subjected to its contemplation.

Such ideas of Religion seem to me short of Monotheism; I do not impute them to this or that individual who belongs to the school which gives them currency; but what I read about the "gratification" of keeping pace in our scientific researches with "the Architect of Nature"; about the said gratification "giving a dignity and importance to the enjoyment of life", and teaching us that knowledge and our duties to society are the only earthly subject worth our notice, all this, I own it, Gentlemen, frightens me; nor is Dr. Maltby's address to the Deity amid "solemn silence", sufficient to reassure me. I do not see much difference between saying that there is no God, and implying that nothing definite can for certain be known about Him; and when I find Religious Education treated as the cultivation of sentiment, and Religious Belief as the accidental hue or posture of

the mind, I am reluctantly but forcibly reminded of a very unpleasant page of *Metaphysics*, of the relations between God and Nature insinuated by such philosophers as Hume. This acute though most low-minded of speculators, in his inquiry concerning the Human Understanding, introduces, as is well known, Epicurus, that is, a teacher of atheism, delivering an harangue to the Athenian people, not in defence, but in extenuation of that opinion. His object is to show that, whereas the atheistic view is nothing else than the repudiation of theory, and an accurate representation of phenomenon and fact, it cannot be dangerous, unless phenomenon and fact be dangerous. Epicurus is made to say, that the paralogism of philosophy has ever been the arguing from Nature in behalf of something beyond Nature, greater than Nature; whereas God, as he maintains, being known only through the visible world, our knowledge of Him is absolutely commensurate with our knowledge of it, is nothing distinct from it, is but a mode of viewing it. Hence it follows that, provided we admit, as we cannot help doing, the phenomena of Nature and the world, it is only a question of words whether or not we go on to the hypothesis of a second Being, not visible but immaterial, parallel and coincident with Nature, to whom we give the name of God. "Allowing", he says, "the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe, it follows that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and

benevolence, which appears in their workmanship; but nothing farther can be proved, except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at present, appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis; much more the supposition, that, in distant periods of place and time, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes, and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues”.

Here is a reasoner, who would not hesitate to deny that there is any distinct science or philosophy possible concerning the Supreme Being; since every single thing we know of Him is this or that or the other phenomenon, material or moral, which already falls under this or that natural science. In him then it would be only consistent to drop Theology in a course of University Education; but how is it consistent in any one who shrinks from his companionship? I am glad to see that the author, several times mentioned, is in opposition to Hume, in one sentence of the quotation I have made from his Discourse upon Science, deciding, as he does, that the phenomena of the material world are insufficient for the full exhibition of the Divine Attributes, and implying that they require a supplemental process to complete and

harmonize their evidence. But is not this supplemental process a science? and if so, why not acknowledge its existence? If God is more than Nature, Theology claims a place among the sciences: but, on the other hand, if you are not sure of this, how do you differ from Hume or Epicurus?

I end then as I began: religious doctrine is Knowledge. This is the important truth, little entered into at this day, which I wish that all who have honoured me with their presence here, would allow me to beg them to take away with them. I am not catching at sharp arguments, but laying down grave principles. Religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is knowledge. Mixed Education, at least in a University, is simply unphilosophical. Theology has at least as good a right to claim a place there as astronomy. In my next Discourse it will be my object to show, that its omission from the list of recognized sciences, is not only indefensible in itself, but prejudicial to all the rest.

## DISCOURSE III.

### BEARING OF THEOLOGY ON OTHER BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE.

WHEN men of great intellect, who have long and intently and exclusively given themselves to the study or investigation of some one particular branch of secular knowledge, whose mental life is concentrated and hidden in their chosen pursuit, and who have neither eyes or ears for anything which does not immediately bear upon it, when such men are at length made to realize that there is a clamour all around them, which must be heard, for what they have been so little accustomed to place in the category of knowledge as Religion, and that they themselves are accused of disaffection to it, they are impatient at the interruption; they call the demand tyrannical, and the requisitionists bigots or fanatics. They are tempted to say, that their only wish is to be let alone; for themselves, they are not dreaming of offending any one, or interfering with any one; they are pursu-

ing their own particular line, they have never spoken a word against anyone's religion, whoever he may be, and never mean to do so. It does not follow that they deny the existence of a God, because they are not talking of it, when the topic would be utterly irrelevant. All they say is, that there are other beings in the world besides the Supreme Being; their business is with them. After all, the creation is not the Creator, nor things secular religious. Theology and human science are two things, not one, and have their respective provinces, contiguous it may be and cognate to each other, but not identical. When we are contemplating earth, we are not contemplating heaven; and when we are contemplating heaven, we are not contemplating earth. Separate subjects should be treated separately. As division of labour, so division of thought is the only means of successful application. "Let us go our own way", they say, "and you go yours. We do not pretend to lecture on Theology, and you have no claim to pronounce upon Science".

With this feeling they attempt a sort of compromise, between their opponents who claim for Theology a free introduction into the schools of science, and themselves who would exclude it altogether, and it is this: viz., that it should remain indeed excluded from the *public* schools, but that it should be permitted in *private*, wherever a sufficient number of persons is found to desire it. Such persons may have it all



their own way, when they are by themselves, so that they do not attempt to disturb a comprehensive system of instruction, acceptable and useful to all, by the intrusion of opinions peculiar to their own minds.

I am now going to attempt a philosophical answer to this view of the subject, that is, to the project of teaching secular knowledge in the University Lecture Room, and remanding religious knowledge to the parish priest, the catechism, and the parlour; and in doing so, you must pardon me, Gentlemen, if I find it necessary to sacrifice composition to logical distinctness, and trust to the subject itself to give interest to processes of thought, which I fear in themselves may be wearisome to follow:—I begin then thus:—

Truth is the object of Knowledge of whatever kind; and when we inquire what is meant by Truth, I suppose it is right to answer that Truth means facts and their relations, which stand towards each other pretty much as subjects and predicates in logic. All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another. Knowledge is the apprehension of these facts, whether in themselves, or in their mutual positions and bearings. And, as all taken together form one integral object, so there are no natural or

real limits between part and part; one is ever running into another; all, as viewed by the mind, are combined together, and possess a correlative character one with another, from the internal mysteries of the Divine Essence down to our own sensations and consciousness, from the most solemn appointments of the Lord of all down to what may be called the accident of the hour, from the most glorious seraph down to the vilest and most noxious of reptiles.

Now, it is not wonderful, that, with all its capabilities, the human mind cannot take in this whole vast fact at a single glance, or gain possession of it at once. Like a short-sighted reader, its eye pores closely, and travels slowly, over the awful volume which lies open for its inspection. Or again, as we deal with some huge structure of many parts and sides, the mind goes round about it, noting down, first one thing, then another, as it may, and viewing it under different aspects, by way of making progress towards mastering the whole. So by degrees and by circuitous advances does it rise aloft and subject to itself that universe into which it has been born.

These various partial views or abstractions, by means of which the mind looks out upon its object, are called sciences, and embrace respectively larger or smaller portions of the field of knowledge; sometimes extending far and wide, but superficially, sometimes with exactness over particular departments, sometimes occupied together on one and the same

portion, sometimes holding one part in common, and then ranging on this side or that in absolute divergence one from the other. Thus Optics has for its subject the whole visible creation, so far forth as it is simply visible; Mental Philosophy has a narrower province, but goes deeper into it; Astronomy, plane and physical, each has the same subject matter, but views it or treats it differently; lastly Geology and Comparative Anatomy have subject matters partly the same, partly distinct. Now these views or sciences, as being abstractions, have far more to do with the relations of things, than with things themselves. They tell us what things are, only or principally by telling us their relations, or assigning predicates to subjects; and therefore they never tell us all that can be said about a thing, even when they tell something, nor bring it before us, as the senses do. They arrange and classify facts; they bring separate phenomena under a common law; they trace effects to a cause. Thus they serve to transfer our knowledge from the custody of memory to the surer and more abiding protection of philosophy, thereby providing both for its spread and its advance:—for, inasmuch as sciences are forms of knowledge, they enable the intellect to master and increase it; and, inasmuch as they are instruments, to communicate it readily to others. Still, after all, they proceed on the principle of a division of labour, even though that division is an abstraction, not a literal separation

into parts; and, as the maker of a bridle or an epaulet has not, on that account, any idea of the science of tactics or strategy, so in a parallel way, it is not every science, which equally, nor any one which fully, enlightens the mind in the knowledge of things, as they are, or brings home to it the external object on which it wishes to gaze. Thus they differ in importance: and according to their importance, will be their influence, not only on the mass of knowledge to which they all converge and contribute, but on each other.

Since then sciences are the results of mental processes about one and the same subject matter, viewed under various aspects, and are true results, as far as they go, yet at the same time independent and partial, it follows that on the one hand they need external assistance, one by one, by reason of their incompleteness, and on the other that they are able to afford it to each other, by reason, first, of their distinctness in themselves, and then, of their identity in their subject matter. Viewed all together, they become the nearest approximation to a representation or subjective reflexion of the objective truth, possible to the human mind, which advances towards the accurate apprehension of that object, in proportion to the number of sciences it has mastered; and which, when certain sciences are wanting, in such a case has but a defective apprehension, in proportion to the value of the sciences which are thus wanting,

and the importance of the field on which they are employed.

Let us take, for instance, man himself as our object of contemplation; then at once we shall find we can view him in a variety of relations; and according to those relations, are the sciences of which he is the subject matter, and, according to our acquaintance with them is our possession of a true knowledge of him. We may view him in relation to the material elements of his body, or to his mental constitution, or to his household and family, or to the community in which he lives, or to the Being who made him; and in consequence we treat of him respectively as physiologists, or as moral philosophers, or as writers of economics, or of politics, or as theologians. When we think of him in all these relations together, or as the subject at once of all the sciences I have alluded to, then we may be said to reach unto and rest in the idea of man as an object or external fact, similar to that which the eye takes of his outward form. On the other hand, according as we are only physiologists, or only politicians, or only moralists, so is our idea of man more or less unreal; we do not take in the whole of him, and the defect is greater or less, in proportion as the relation is, or is not, important, which is omitted, whether his relation to God, or his king, or his children, or his own component parts. And if there be one relation, about which we know nothing at all except that it exists, then is

our knowledge of him, confessedly and to our own consciousness, deficient and partial, and that, I repeat, in proportion to the importance of the relation.

That therefore is true of sciences in general, which we are apt to think applies only to pure mathematics, though to pure mathematics it applies especially, viz., that they cannot be considered as simple representations or informants of things as they are. We are accustomed to say, and say truly, that the conclusions of pure mathematics are applied, corrected, and adapted, by mixed; but so too the conclusions of Physiology, Geology, and other sciences, are revised and completed by each other. Those conclusions do not represent whole and substantive facts, but views, true, so far as they go; and in order to ascertain how far they *do* go, that is, how far they correspond to the object, to which they belong, we must compare them with the views taken of that object by other sciences. Did we proceed upon the abstract theory of forces, we should assign a much more ample range to a projectile, than in fact the resistance of the air allows it to accomplish. Let, however, that resistance be made the subject of scientific analysis, and then we shall have a new science, assisting, and to a certain point completing, for the benefit of questions of fact, the science of projection. On the other hand, the science of projection itself, considered as belonging to impulsive forces, is not

more perfect, as such, by this supplementary investigation. And in like manner, as regards the whole circle of sciences, one corrects another for purposes of fact, and one without the other cannot dogmatize, except hypothetically and upon its own abstract principles. For instance, the Newtonian philosophy requires the admission of certain metaphysical postulates, if it is to be more than a theory or an hypothesis; as, that the true explanation of phenomena is that which assigns them to the fewest causes; and this presupposes others, as, that there is such a thing as cause and effect at all, that order implies causation, that there is any real cause but the One First Cause, that the theory of the Occasionists is false, and that what happened yesterday will happen to-morrow; moreover, that phenomena are facts, that there is such a thing as matter, that our senses are trustworthy, and so on. Now metaphysicians grant to Newton all that he asks; but, if so be, they may not prove equally accommodating to another who asks something else, and then all his most logical conclusions in the science of physics would remain hopelessly on the stocks, though finished, and never could be launched into the sphere of fact.

Again, did I know nothing about the passage of bodies, except what the theory of gravitation supplies, were I simply absorbed in that theory so as to make it measure all motion on earth and in the sky, I should indeed come to many right conclusions, I should

hit off many important facts, ascertain many existing relations, and correct many popular errors: I should scout and ridicule with great success the old notion, that light bodies flew up and heavy bodies fell down; but I should go on with equal confidence to deny the phenomenon of capillary attraction. Here I should be wrong, but only because I carried out my science irrespectively of other sciences. In like manner, did I simply give myself to the investigation of the external action of body upon body, I might scoff at the very idea of chemical affinities and combinations, and reject it as simply unintelligible. Were I a mere chemist, I should deny the influence of mind upon bodily health; and so on, as regards the devotees of any science, or family of sciences, to the exclusion of others; they necessarily become bigots and quacks, scorning all principles and reported facts, which do not belong to their own pursuit, and thinking to effect every thing without aid from any other quarter. Thus, before now, chemistry has been substituted for medicine; and again, political economy, or intellectual enlightenment, or study of the Protestant Bible, has been cried up as a panacea against vice, malevolence, and misery.

Unless I am insisting on too plain a point, I would ask you, Gentlemen, to consider how prominent a place Induction holds in modern philosophy. It is especially the instrument of physical discovery; yet it is singularly deficient in logical cogency, and its



deficiency illustrates the incompleteness of the sciences, severally, which respectively use it, for the ascertainment of particular matters of fact. Its main principle, I suppose, is this:—that what in our investigations is ever tending to be universal, may be considered universal. We assume that general proposition to be true, which is ever getting more and more like truth, the more we try it; we call that a proof, which is but a growing proof. We argue from some or many to all. Induction, thus described, is surely open to error; for, when engaged in the accumulation of instances, which are to subserve the elucidation of some particular science, it may have its path crossed any moment by the decisions of other sciences with reference to the remaining instances which it has not yet comprised in its investigation. In such a case it is of course at once interrupted and brought to a stop; and what actually takes place as regards some attempted inductions, may be of possible occurrence in many others. That is, the induction is complete for the purpose of determining the existence of a general law in the particular science which is using it; but that law is only proved to be general, not universal; inasmuch as particular instances, in which it ought to hold good, and which in fact have not been constituent elements of the induction, may after all fall under some general law of some other science also, which succeeds in modifying or changing them. For instance, supposing

Euphrates has flowed in its bed for three hundred and sixty days continuously in the current year, we may infer a general law, and expect securely that it will flow on through the five days, which, being future, are external to the induction; and so, physically speaking, it will flow; yet in matter of fact it did not flow on those remaining days at a certain historical era, for Cyrus turned it aside, and removed the question out of physics into politics and strategics. A physical lecturer would not be endured, who denied the historical fact of the anomalous course of the stream, because he would not take into account the volition and the agency of man, as foreign to his science; yet certainly he would be right in saying that, according to physics, the river ought to flow on, and on the hypothesis of physics did flow in its bed all through the five days, as it was wont. Such is the fallacy of experimental science, when narrowed to some single department, instead of expanding into all. In political arrangements the majority compels the outstanding minority; but in the philosophy of induction, as some are accustomed to apply it, the many actually deny the existence of the few.

Summing up what I have said, I lay it down that, no science is complete in itself, when viewed as an instrument of attaining the knowledge of facts; that every science, for this purpose, subserves the rest; and, in consequence, that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue, prejudices

the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that, in proportion to its importance. Not even Theology itself, though it comes from heaven, though its truths were given once for all at the first, though they are more certain than those of mathematics, not even Theology do I exclude from the law to which every mental exercise is subject, viz., from that imperfection, which ever must attend the abstract, when it would determine the concrete. Nor do I speak only of Natural Religion; for even the teaching of the Catholic Church, is variously influenced by the other sciences. Not to insist on the introduction of the Aristotelic philosophy into its phraseology, its interpretations of prophecy are directly affected by the issues of history, its comments upon Scripture by the conclusions of the astronomer and the geologist, and its casuistical decisions by the various experience, political, social, and psychological, with which times and places are ever supplying it.

What Theology gives, it has a right to take; or rather, the interests of Truth oblige it to take. If we would not be beguiled by dreams, if we would ascertain facts as they are, then, granting Theology is a real science, we cannot exclude it, and still call ourselves philosophers. I have asserted nothing as yet as to the preëminent dignity of Religious Truth; I only say, if there be Religious Truth at all, we cannot shut our eyes to it, without prejudice to truth of

every kind, physical, metaphysical, historical, and moral; for it bears upon all truth. And thus I answer the objection with which I opened this Discourse. I supposed the question put to me by a philosopher of the day, "Why cannot you go your way, and let us go ours?" I answer, in the name of Theology, "When Newton can dispense with the metaphysician, then may you dispense with us". So much at first sight; now I am going on to claim a little more for Theology, by classing it with branches of knowledge which may with greater decency be compared to it.

Let us see then, how this supercilious treatment of so momentous a science, for momentous it must be, if there be a God, runs in a somewhat parallel case. The great philosopher of antiquity, when he would enumerate the causes of the things that take place in the world, after making mention of those which he considered to be physical and material, adds, "and the mind and everthing which is by means of man".\* Certainly; it would have been a preposterous course, when he would trace the effects he saw around him to their respective sources, had he directed his exclusive attention upon some one class or order of originating principles, and ascribed to these every thing which happened any where. It would indeed have been unworthy a genius so curious, so penetrating, so fertile, so analytical as Aristotle's, to have

laid it down that every thing on the face of the earth could be accounted for by the material sciences, without the hypothesis of moral agents. It is incredible that in the investigation of physical results he could ignore so influential a being as man, or forget that, not only brute force and elemental movement, but knowledge also is power. And this, so much the more, inasmuch as moral and spiritual agents belong to another, not to say a higher, order than physical; so that the omission supposed would not have been merely an oversight in matters of detail, but a philosophical error, and a fault in division.

However, we live in an age of the world, when the career of science and literature is little affected by what was done, or would have been done, by this venerable authority; so, we will suppose, in England or Ireland, in the middle of the nineteenth century, a set of persons of name and celebrity to meet together, in spite of Aristotle, and to adopt a line of proceeding, which they conceive the circumstances of the time render imperative. We will suppose that a difficulty just now besets the enunciation and discussion of all matters of science, in consequence of the extreme sensitiveness of large classes of the community, ministers and laymen, on the subjects of necessity, responsibility, the standard of morals, and the nature of virtue. Parties run so high, that the only way of avoiding constant quarrelling in defence of this or

that side of the question, is, in the judgment of the persons I am supposing, to shut up the subject of anthropology altogether. The Privy Council issues an order to that effect. Man is to be as if he were not, in the general course of Education; the moral and mental sciences are to have no professorial chairs, and the treatment of them is to be simply as a matter of private judgment, which each individual may carry out as he will. I can just fancy such a prohibition abstractedly possible; but one thing I cannot fancy possible, viz., that the parties in question, after this sweeping act of exclusion, should forthwith send out proposals on the basis of such exclusion, for publishing an Encyclopedia, or erecting a National University. It is necessary, however, Gentlemen, for the sake of the illustration which I am setting before you, to imagine what cannot be. I say, let us imagine a project for organizing a system of scientific teaching, in which the agency of man in the material world, cannot allowably be recognized, and may allowably be denied. Physical and mechanical causes are exclusively to be treated of; volition is a forbidden subject. A Prospectus is put out, with a list of sciences, we will say, Astronomy, Optics, Hydrostatics, Galvanism, Pneumatics, Statics, Dynamics, Pure Mathematics, Geology, Botany, Physiology, Anatomy, and so forth; but not a word about the mind and its powers, except what is said in explanation of the omission. That explanation is to the

effect, that the parties concerned in the undertaking have given long and painful thought to the subject, and have been reluctantly driven to the conclusion, that it is simply impracticable to include in the list of University Lectures the Philosophy of Mind. What relieves, however, their regret is the reflection, that domestic feelings and polished manners are best cultivated in the family circle and in good society, in the observance of the sacred ties which unite father, mother, and child, in the correlative claims and duties of citizenship, in the exercise of disinterested loyalty and enlightened patriotism. With this apology, such as it is, they pass over the consideration of the human mind and its powers and works, with "heads uncovered" and "in solemn silence".

The project becomes popular; money flows in apace; a charter is obtained; professors are appointed, lectures given, examinations passed, degrees awarded:—what sort of exactness or trustworthiness, what philosophical largeness, will attach to views formed in an intellectual atmosphere thus deprived of some of the constituent elements of daylight? What judgment will foreign countries and future times pass on the labours of the most acute and accomplished of the philosophers who have been parties to so portentous an unreality? Here are professors gravely lecturing on medicine, or history, or political economy, who, so far from being bound to acknowledge, are free to scoff at the action of mind upon

matter, or of mind upon mind, or the claims of mutual justice and charity. Common sense indeed and public opinion set bounds at first to so intolerable a licence; yet, as time goes on, an omission which was originally but a matter of expedience, commends itself to the reason; and at length a Professor is found, more hardy than his brethren, still however, as he himself maintains, with sincere respect for domestic feelings and good manners, who takes on him to deny psychology *in toto*, to pronounce the influence of mind in the visible world a superstition, and to account for every effect, which is found in it, by the operation of physical causes. Hitherto life and volition were accounted real powers; the muscles act, and their action cannot be represented by any scientific expression; a stone flies out of the hand, and the propulsive force of the muscle resides in the will; but there has been a revolution, or at least a new theory in philosophy, and our Professor, I say, in a brilliant Lecture before a thronging audience, after speaking with the highest admiration of the human intellect, limits its independent action to the region of speculation, and denies that it can be a motive principle, or can exercise a special interference, in the material world. He ascribes every work, or external act, of man to the innate force or soul of the physical universe. He observes that spiritual agents are so mysterious and unintelligible, so uncertain in their laws, so vague in their operation, so sheltered



from experience, that a wise man will have nothing to say to them. They belong to a different order of causes, which he leaves to those whose profession it is to investigate them, and he confines himself to the tangible and sure. Human exploits, human devices, human deeds, human productions, all that comes under the scholastic terms of "genius" and "art", and the metaphysical ideas of "duty", "right", and "heroism", it is his office to contemplate all these merely in their place in the eternal system of physical cause and effect. What indeed is art, confessedly, but a modification and a microcosm of nature? Was not Bacon himself obliged to allow that no one overcomes Nature but by yielding to her? Warming with his subject, the Lecturer undertakes to show how the whole fabric of material civilization has arisen from the constructive powers of physical elements and physical laws. He descants upon palaces, castles, temples, exchanges, bridges, causeways, and shows that they never could have grown into the imposing dimensions which they present to us, but for the laws of gravitation and the cohesion of part with part. The pillar would come down, the loftier the more speedily, did not the centre of gravity fall within its base; and the most admired dome of Palladio or Sir Christopher would give way, were it not for the happy principle of the arch. He surveys the complicated machinery of a single day's arrangements in a private family; our dress, our furniture, our hospi-

table board; what would become of them, he asks, but for the laws of physical nature? Firm stitches have a natural power, in proportion to the toughness of the material adopted, to keep together separate portions of cloth; sofas and chairs could not turn upside down, even if they would; and it is a property of caloric to relax the fibres of animal matter, acting on water in one way, on oil in another, and this is the whole mystery of the most elaborate *cuisine*:—but I should be tedious, if I continued the illustration.

Now, Gentlemen, pray understand how it is to be here applied. I am not supposing that the principles of Theology and Psychology are the same, or arguing from the works of man to the works of God, which Paley has done, which Hume has protested against. I am not busying myself to prove the existence and attributes of God, by means of the Argument from design. I am not proving any thing at all about the Supreme Being. On the contrary, I am assuming His existence, and I do but say this:—that, man existing, no University Professor, who had suppressed in physical lectures the idea of volition, who did not take volition for granted, could escape a one-sided, a radically false view of the things, which he discussed; not indeed that his own definitions, principles, and laws would be wrong, or his abstract statements, but his considering his own study to be the key of every thing that takes place on the face of the earth, and

his passing over anthropology, here would be his error. I say, it would not be his science which was untrue, but his so-called knowledge which was unreal. He would be deciding on facts by means of theories : he would forget the Poet's maxim,

“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,  
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy”.

The various busy world, spread out before our eyes, is physical, but it is more than physical ; and, in making its actual system identical with his scientific analysis, formed on a particular aspect, such a Professor as I have imagined was betraying a want of philosophical depth, and an ignorance of what an University Education ought to be. He was no longer a teacher of liberal knowledge, but a narrow-minded bigot. While his doctrines professed to be conclusions formed upon an hypothesis, they were undeniable ; not, if they professed to give results in fact which he could grasp and take possession of. Granting indeed, that a man's arm is moved by a simple physical cause, then of course, we may dispute about the various external influences, which, when it changes its position, sway it to and fro, like a scarecrow in a garden ; but to assert that the motive cause is physical, this is an assumption in a case, when our question is about a matter of fact, not about the logical consequences of an assumed premiss. And, in like manner, if a people prays, and the wind

changes, the rain ceases, the sun shines, and the harvest is safely housed, when no one expected it, our Professor may, if he will, consult the barometer, discourse about the atmosphere, and throw what has happened into an equation, ingenious, if not true ; but, should he proceed to rest the phenomenon, in matter of fact, simply upon a physical cause, to the exclusion of a divine, and to say that the given case actually belongs to his science because other like cases do, I must tell him, *Ne sutor ultra crepidam*: he is making his particular craft usurp and occupy the universe. This then is the drift of my illustration. Our excluding volition from our range of ideas, is a denial of the soul ; and our ignoring divine agency is a virtual denial of God. Moreover, supposing man can will and act of himself in spite of physics, to shut up this great truth, though one, is to put our whole encyclopedia of knowledge out of joint ; and supposing God can will and act of Himself in this world which He has made, and we deny or slur it over, then we are throwing the circle of universal science into a like, or a far worse confusion.

Worse incomparably, for the idea of God, if there be a God, is infinitely higher than the idea of man, if there be man. If to blot out man's agency is to deface the book of knowledge, on the supposition of that agency existing, what must it be, supposing it exists, to blot out the agency of God ? See, Gentle-

men, I have now run beyond the first portion of the argument to which this Discourse is devoted. I have hitherto been engaged in showing that all the sciences come to us, to use scholastic language, *per modum unius*, that they all relate to one and the same integral subject matter, that each separately is more or less an abstraction, wholly true as an hypothesis, but not wholly trustworthy in the concrete, conversant with relations more than with facts, with principles more than with agents; needing the support and guarantee of its sister sciences, and giving in turn while it takes:—from which it follows, that none can safely be omitted, if we would obtain the exactest knowledge possible of things as they are, and that, the omission is more or less important, in proportion to the field which each covers, and the depth to which it penetrates, and the order to which it belongs; for its loss is a positive privation of an influence which exerts itself in the correction and completion of the rest. This general statement is the first branch of my argument; and now comes my second, which is its application, and will not occupy us so long. I say, the second question simply regards the Science of God, or Theology, viz., what, in matter of fact, are its pretensions, what its importance, what its influence upon other branches of knowledge, supposing there be a God, which it would not become me to set about proving. Has it vast dimensions, or does it lie in a nutshell? Will its omission be imperceptible, or will

it destroy the equilibrium of the whole system of Knowledge? This is the inquiry to which I proceed.

Now what is Theology? First, I will tell you what it is not. And here, in the first place, though of course I speak on the subject, as a Catholic, observe that, strictly speaking, I am not assuming that Catholicism is true, while I make myself the champion of Theology. Catholicism has not formally entered into my argument hitherto, nor shall I just now assume any principle peculiar to it; for reasons which will appear in the sequel, though of course I shall use Catholic language. Neither on the other hand, will I fall into the fashion of the day, of identifying Natural Theology with Physical; which said Physical Theology is a most jejune study, considered as a science, and really is no science at all, for it is ordinarily nothing more than a series of pious or polemical remarks upon the physical world viewed religiously, whereas the word "natural" really comprehends man and society, and all that is involved therein, as the great Protestant writer, Dr. Butler, shows us. Nor, in the third place, do I mean by Theology polemics of any kind; for instance, what are called "the Evidences of Religion", or "the Christian Evidences"; for, though these constitute a science supplemental to Theology and are necessary in their place, they are not Theology itself, unless an army is synonymous with the body politic. Nor, fourthly, do I mean by Theology that vague thing called "Christianity", or "our common Christianity",

or "Christianity the law of the land", if there is any man alive who can tell what it is. I discard it, for the very reason that it cannot throw itself into a proposition. Lastly, I do not understand by Theology, acquaintance with the Scriptures; for, though no person of religious feelings can read Scripture, but he will find those feelings roused, and gain various knowledge of history into the bargain, yet historical reading and religious feeling are not science. I mean none of these things by Theology, I simply mean the Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into system; just as we have a science of the stars, and call it astronomy, or of the crust of the earth, and call it geology.

For instance, I mean, for this is the main point, that, as in the human frame there is a living principle, acting upon it and through it by means of volition, so, behind the veil of the visible universe, there is an invisible, intelligent Being, acting on and through it, as and when He will. Further, I mean that this invisible Agent is in no sense a soul of the world, after the analogy of human nature, but on the contrary is absolutely distinct from the world, as being its Creator, Upholder, Governor, and Sovereign Lord. Here we are at once brought into the circle of doctrines which the idea of God embodies. I mean then by the Supreme Being, one who is simply self-dependent, and the only being who is such; moreover that He is without beginning or Eternal, and the

only Eternal; that in consequence He has lived a whole eternity by Himself; and hence that He is all-sufficient, sufficient for His own blessedness, and all-blessed, and ever-blessed. Further, I mean a Being, who having these prerogatives, has the Supreme Good, or rather is the Supreme Good, or has all the attributes of Good in infinite greatness; all wisdom, all truth, all justice, all love, all holiness, all beautifulness; who is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent; ineffably one, absolutely perfect; and such, that what we do not know and cannot even imagine of Him, is far more wonderful than what we do and can. I mean one who is sovereign over His own will and actions, though always according to the eternal Rule of right and wrong, which is Himself. I mean, moreover, that He created all things out of nothing, and preserves them every moment, and could destroy them as easily as He made them; and that, in consequence, He is separated from them by an abyss, and is incommunicable in all His attributes. And further, He has stamped upon all things, in the hour of their creation, their respective natures, and has given them their work and mission and their length of days, greater or less, in their appointed place. I mean too, that He is ever present with His works, one by one, and confronts everything He has made by His particular and most loving Providence, and manifests Himself to each according to its needs; and on rational beings has imprinted the moral law, and given



them power to obey it, imposing on them the duty of worship and service, searching and scanning them through and through with His omniscient eye, and putting before them a present trial and a judgment to come.

Such is what Theology teaches about God, a doctrine, as the very idea of its subject matter presupposes, so mysterious as in its fulness to lie beyond any system, and to seem even in parts to be irreconcilable with itself, the imagination being unable to embrace what the reason determines. It teaches of a Being infinite yet personal; all blessed yet ever operative; absolutely separate from the creature, yet in every part of the creation at every moment; above all things, yet under every thing. It teaches of a Being who, though the highest, yet in the work of creation, conservation, government, retribution, makes Himself, as it were, the minister and servant of all; who, though inhabiting eternity, allows Himself to take an interest, and to feel a sympathy, in the matters of space and time. His are all beings, visible and invisible, the noblest and the vilest of them. His are the substance, and the operation, and the results of that system of physical nature, into which we are born. His too are the powers and achievements of the intellectual essences, on which He has bestowed an independent action and the gift of origination. The laws of the universe, the principles of truth, the relation of one thing to

another, their qualities and virtues, the order and harmony of the whole, all that exists, is from Him; and, if evil is not from Him, as assuredly it is not, this is because evil has no substance of its own, but is only the defect, excess, perversion, or corruption of that which has. All we see, hear, and touch, the remote sidereal firmament, as well as our own sea and land, and the elements which compose them, and the ordinances they obey, are His. The primary atoms of matter, their properties, their mutual action, their disposition and collocation, electricity, magnetism, gravitation, light, and whatever other subtle principles or operations the wit of man is detecting or shall detect, are the works of His hands. From Him has been every movement which has convulsed and refashioned the surface of the earth. The most insignificant or unsightly insect, is from Him, and good in its kind; the ever-teeming, inexhaustible swarms of animalculæ, the myriads of living motes invisible to the naked eye, the restless everspreading vegetation which creeps like a garment over the whole earth, the lofty cedar, the umbrageous banana, are His. His are the tribes and families of birds and beasts, their graceful forms, their wild gestures, and their passionate cries.

And so in the intellectual, moral, social, and political world. Man, with his motives and works, his languages, his propagation, his diffusion, is from Him. Agriculture, medicine, and the arts of life, are His

gifts. Society, laws, government, He is their sanction. The pageant of earthly royalty has the semblance and the benediction of the Eternal King. Peace and civilization, commerce and adventure, wars when just, conquest when humane and necessary, have His coöperation, and His blessing upon them. The course of events, the revolution of Empires, the rise and fall of states, the periods and eras, the progresses and the retrogressions of the world's history, not indeed the incidental sin, over-abundant as it is, but the great outlines and the issues of human affairs, are from His disposition. The elements and types and seminal principles and constructive powers of the moral world, in ruins though it be, are to be referred to Him. He "enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world". His are the dictates of the moral sense, and the retributive reproaches of conscience. To Him must be ascribed the rich endowments of the intellect, the radiation of genius, the imagination of the poet, the sagacity of the politician, the wisdom (as Scripture calls it), which now rears and decorates the Temple, now manifests itself in proverb or in parable. The old saws of nations, the majestic precepts of philosophy, the luminous maxims of law, the oracles of individual wisdom, the traditionary rules of truth, justice, and religion, even though imbedded in the corruption, or alloyed with the pride, of the world, bespeak His original agency, and His long-suffering presence. Even where there is

habitual rebellion against Him, or profound far-spreading social depravity, still the undercurrent, or the heroic outburst, of natural virtue, as well as the yearnings of the heart after what it has not, and its presentiment of its true remedies, are to be ascribed to the Author of all good. Anticipations or reminiscences of His glory haunt the mind of the self-sufficient sage, and of the pagan devotee; His writing is upon the wall, whether of the Indian fane, or of the porticoes of Greece. He introduces Himself, He all but concurs, according to His good pleasure, and in His selected season, in the issues of unbelief, superstition, and false worship, and changes the character of acts, by His over-ruling operation. He condescends, though He gives no sanction, to the altars and shrines of imposture, and He makes His own fiat the substitute for its sorceries. He speaks amid the incantations of Balaam, raises Samuel's spirit in the witch's cavern, prophesies of the Messiah by the tongue of the Sibyl, forces Python to recognize His ministers, and baptizes by the hand of the misbeliever. He is with the heathen dramatist in his denunciations of injustice and tyranny, and his auguries of divine vengeance upon crime. Even on the unseemly legends of a popular mythology He casts His shadow, and is dimly discerned in the ode or the epic, as in troubled water or in fantastic dreams. All that is good, all that is true, all that is beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it great or small,

be it perfect or fragmentary, natural as well as supernatural, moral as well as material, comes from Him.

If this be a sketch, accurate in substance and as far as it goes, of the doctrines proper to Theology, and especially of the doctrine of a particular Providence, which is the portion of it most on a level with human sciences, I cannot understand at all how, supposing it to be true, it can fail, considered as knowledge, to exert a powerful influence on philosophy, literature, and every intellectual creation or discovery whatever. I cannot understand how it is possible, as the phrase goes, to blink the question of its truth or falsehood. It meets us with a profession and a proffer of the highest truths of which the human mind is capable; it embraces a range of subjects the most diversified and distant from each other. What science will not find one part or other of its province traversed by its path? What results of philosophic speculation are unquestionable, if they have been gained without inquiry as to what Theology had to say to them? Does it cast no light upon history? has it no influence upon the principles of ethics? is it without any sort of bearing on physics, metaphysics, and political science? Can we drop it out of the circle of knowledge, without allowing, either that that circle is thereby mutilated, or on the other hand that Theology is no science?

And this dilemma is the more inevitable, because Theology is so precise and consistent in its intellec-

tual structure. When I speak of Theism or Monotheism, I am not throwing together discordant doctrines; I am not merging belief, opinion, persuasion, of whatever kind, into a shapeless aggregate, by the help of ambiguous words, and dignifying this medley by the name of Theology. I speak of one idea unfolded in its just proportions, carried out upon an intelligible method, and issuing in necessary and immutable results; understood indeed at one time and place better than at another, held here and there with more or less of inconsistency, but still, after all, in all times and places, where it is found, the evolution, not of two ideas, but of one.

And here I am led again to direct your attention, Gentlemen, to another and most important point in the argument,—its wide reception. Theology, as I have described it, is no accident of particular minds; as are certain systems, for instance, of prophetic interpretation. It is not the sudden birth of a crisis, as the Lutheran or Wesleyan doctrine. It is not the splendid development of some uprising philosophy, as the Cartesian or Platonic. It is not the fashion of a season, as certain medical treatments may be considered. It has had a place, if not possession, in the intellectual world, from time immemorial; it has been received by minds the most various, and in systems of religion the most hostile to each other. It has *primâ facie* claims upon us, so strong, that it can only be rejected on the ground of those claims being

nothing more than imposing, that is, false. As to our own countries, it occupies our language, it meets us at every turn in our literature, it is the secret assumption, too axiomatic to be distinctly professed, of all our writers; nor can we help assuming it ourselves without the most unnatural vigilance. Whoever philosophizes, starts with it, and introduces it, when he will, without any apology. Bacon, Hooker, Taylor, Cudworth, Locke, Newton, Clarke, Berkeley, Butler, and it would be as easy to find more, as difficult to find greater names among English authors, inculcate or comment upon it. Men the most opposed, in creed or cast of mind, Addison and Johnson, Shakspeare and Milton, Lord Herbert and Baxter, herald it forth. Nor is it an English or a Protestant notion only; you track it across the continent, you pursue it into former ages. When was the world without it? have the systems of Atheism or Pantheism, as sciences, prevailed in the literature of nations, or in respect of formation or completion, to compare with that of Monotheism? We find it in old Greece, and even in Rome, as well as in Judea and the East. We find it in popular literature, in philosophy, in poetry, as a positive and settled teaching, differing not at all in the appearance it presents, whether in Protestant England, or in schismatical Russia, or in the Mahometan populations, or in the Catholic Church. If ever there was a subject of thought, which had earned by prescription to be received among the

studies of a University, and could not be rejected except on the score of convicted imposture, as astrology or alchemy ; if there be a science any where, which at least could claim not to be ignored, but to be entertained, and either distinctly accepted or distinctly reprobated, or rather, which cannot be passed over in a scheme of universal instruction, without involving a positive denial of its truth, it is this ancient, this far-spreading philosophy.

And now, Gentlemen, I may bring a somewhat tedious discussion to a close. It will not take many words to sum up what I have been urging. I say then, if the various branches of knowledge, which are the matter of teaching in a University, so hang together, that none can be neglected without prejudice to the perfection of the rest, and if Theology be a branch of knowledge, of wide reception, of philosophical structure, of unutterable importance, and of supreme influence, to what conclusion are we brought from these two premisses but this? that to withdraw Theology from the public schools, is to impair the completeness and to invalidate the trustworthiness of all that is actually taught in them.

But I have been insisting simply on Natural Theology, and that, because I wished to carry along with me those who were not Catholics, and, again, as being confident that no one can really set himself to master and to teach the doctrine of an Intelligent Creator in its fulness without going on a great deal farther than



he at present dreams. I ask again, then;—if this Science, even as human reason may attain to it, has such claims on the regard, and enters so variously into the objects, of the Professor of Universal Knowledge, how can any Catholic imagine that it is possible to cultivate Philosophy and Science with due attention to their ultimate end, which is Truth, if that system of revealed facts and principles, which constitutes the Catholic Faith, which goes so far beyond nature, and which he knows to be most true, be omitted from among the subjects of their teaching?

In a word, Religious Truth is not only a portion, but a condition of general knowledge. To blot it out, is nothing short, if I may so speak, of unravelling the web of University Education. It is, according to the Greek proverb, to take the Spring from out the year; it is to imitate the preposterous proceeding of those tragedians, who represented a drama with the omission of its principal part.



## DISCOURSE IV.

### BEARING OF OTHER BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE ON THEOLOGY.

NOTHING is more common in the world at large, than to consider the resistance, made on the part of religious men, especially Catholics, to the separation of Secular Education from Religion, as a plain token, that there is some real contrariety between human science and Revelation. It matters not to the multitude who draw this inference, whether the protesting parties are aware that it can be drawn or not; it is borne in upon the many, so to say, as self-evident, that religious men would not thus be jealous and alarmed about Science, did they not feel instinctively, though they may not recognise it, that knowledge is their born enemy, and that its progress will be certain to destroy, if it is not arrested, all that they hold venerable and dear. It looks to the world like a misgiving on our part similar to that which is imputed to our refusal to educate by means of the Bible only; why

should you dread it, men say, if it be not against you? And in like manner, why should you dread secular education, except that it is against you? Why impede the circulation of books which take religious views opposite to your own? Why forbid your children and scholars the free perusal of poems or tales or essays or other light literature which you fear would unsettle their minds? Why oblige them to know these persons and to shun those, if you think that your friends have reason on their side, as fully as your opponents? Truth is bold and unsuspecting; want of self-reliance is the mark of falsehood.

Now, as far as this objection relates to any supposed opposition between secular science and divine, which is the subject on which I am at present engaged, I made a sufficient answer to it in my foregoing Discourse. In it I said, that, in order to have possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth; that no one science, no two sciences, no one family of sciences, nay, not even all secular science, is the whole truth; that revealed truth enters to a very great extent, into the province of science, philosophy, and literature, and that to put it on one side, in compliment to secular science, is simply, under colour of a compliment, to do science a great damage. I do not say that every science will be equally affected by the omission; pure mathematics will not suffer at all; chemistry will suffer less than politics, politics than history, ethics, or metaphysics; still, that the various

branches of science are intimately connected with each other, and form one whole, which whole is impaired, and to an extent which it is difficult to limit, by any considerable omission of knowledge, of whatever kind, and that revealed knowledge is very far indeed from an inconsiderable department, this, I consider undeniable. As the written and unwritten word of God make up Revelation as a whole, and the unwritten, taken by itself, is but a part of that whole, so in turn Revelation itself may be viewed as one of the constituent parts of human knowledge, considered as a whole, and its omission is the omission of one of those constituent parts. Revealed Religion furnishes facts to the other sciences, which those sciences, left to themselves, would never reach; and it invalidates apparent facts, which, left to themselves, they would imagine. Thus, in the science of history, the preservation of our race in Noah's ark, is an historical fact, which history never would arrive at without Revelation; and, in the sciences of physiology and moral philosophy, our race's progress and perfectibility is a dream, because Revelation contradicts it, whatever may be plausibly argued in its behalf by scientific inquirers. It is not then that Catholics are afraid of human knowledge, but that they are proud of divine knowledge, and that they think the omission of any kind of knowledge whatever, human or divine, to be, as far as it goes, not knowledge, but ignorance.

Thus I anticipated the objection in question last

week : now I am going to make it the introduction to a further view of the relation of secular knowledge to divine. I observe then, that, if you drop any science out of the circle of knowledge, you cannot keep its place vacant for it; that science is forgotten; the other sciences close up, or, in other words, they exceed their proper bounds, and intrude where they have no right. For instance, I suppose if ethics were sent into banishment, its territory would soon disappear, under a treaty of partition, as it may be called, between physiology and political economy; what, again, would become of the province of experimental science, if made over to the Antiquarian Society; or of history, if surrendered out and out to Metaphysicians? The case is the same with the subject matter of Theology; it would be the prey of a dozen various sciences, if Theology were put out of possession; and not only so, but those sciences would be plainly exceeding their rights and their capacities in seizing upon it. They would be sure to teach wrongly, what they had no mission to teach at all. The enemies of Catholicism ought to be the last to deny this:—for they have never been blind to a like usurpation, as they have called it, on the part of theologians; those who accuse us of wishing, in accordance with Scripture language, to make the sun go round the earth, are not the men to deny that a science which exceeds its limits, falls into error.

I neither then am able nor care to deny, rather

I assert the fact, and to-day I am going on to account for it, that any secular science cultivated exclusively, may become dangerous to Religion; and I account for it on this broad principle, that no science whatever, however comprehensive it may be, but will fall largely into error, if it be constituted the sole exponent of all things in heaven and earth, and that, for the simple reason that it is encroaching on territory not its own, and undertaking problems which it has no instruments to solve. And I set off thus:—

One of the first acts of the human mind is to grasp or take hold of what meets the senses, and herein lies a chief distinction between man's and a brute's use of them. Brutes gaze on sights, they are arrested by sounds; and what they see and what they hear are sights and sounds only. The intellect of man, on the contrary, energizes as well as his eye or ear, and perceives in sights and sounds something beyond them. It seizes and unites what the senses present to it; it grasps and forms what need not be seen or heard except in detail. It discerns in lines and colours, or in tones, what is beautiful, and what is not. It gives them a meaning, and invests them with an idea. It gathers up a succession of notes, as it were, into a point of time, and calls it a melody; it has a keen sensibility towards angles and curves, lights and shadows, tints and contours. It assigns phenomena to a general law, qualities to a subject,

acts to a principle, and effects to a cause. In a word, it philosophises; for I suppose Science and Philosophy, in their elementary idea, are nothing else but this habit of *viewing*, as it may be called, the objects which sense conveys to the mind, of throwing them into system, and uniting and stamping them with one form.

This method is so natural to us, as I have said, as to be almost spontaneous; and we are impatient when we cannot exercise it, and in consequence we do not always wait to have the means of exercising it aright, but we often put up with insufficient or absurd views or interpretations of what we meet with, rather than have none at all. We refer the various matters which are brought home to us, material or moral, to causes which we happen to know of, or to such as are simply imaginary, sooner than refer them to nothing: and, according to the activity of our intellect, do we feel a pain and begin to fret, if we are not able to do so. Here we have an explanation of the multitude of offhand sayings, flippant judgments, and shallow generalizations, with which the world abounds. Not from self-will only, nor from malevolence, but from the irritation which suspense occasions, is the mind forced on to pronounce, without sufficient data for pronouncing. Who does not form some view or other, for instance, of any public man, or any public event, nay even so far in some cases as to reach the mental delineation



of his appearance or of its scene, yet how few have a right to form any! Hence the misconceptions of character, hence the false impressions and reports of words or deeds, which are the rule, rather than the exception, in the world at large; hence the extravagances of undisciplined talent, and the narrownesses of conceited ignorance; because, though it is no easy matter to view things correctly, yet the busy mind will ever be viewing. We cannot do without a view, and we put up with an illusion, when we cannot get a true one.

Now, observe how this impatience acts in matters of research and speculation. What happens to the ignorant and hotheaded, will take place in the case of every person, whose education or pursuits are contracted, whether they be merely professional, merely scientific, or of whatever other peculiar complexion. Men, whose life lies in the cultivation of one science, or the exercise of one method of thought, have no more right, though they have often more ambition, to generalize upon the basis of their own pursuit, yet beyond its range, than the schoolboy or the ploughman to judge of a Prime Minister. But they must have something to say on every subject; habit, fashion, the public require it of them: and, if so, they can only give sentence according to their knowledge. You might think this ought to make such a person modest in his enunciations; not so: too often it happens that, in proportion as his knowledge is narrow, is,

not his diffidence of it, but the deep hold it has upon him, his conviction of his own conclusions, and his positiveness in maintaining them. He has the obstinacy of the bigot, whom he scorns, without the bigot's apology, that he has been taught, as he thinks, his doctrine from heaven. Thus he becomes, what is commonly called, a man of one idea; which properly means a man of one science, and of the view, partly true, but subordinate, partly false, which is all that can proceed out of any thing so partial. Hence it is that we have the principles of utility, of combination, of progress, of philanthropy, or, in material sciences, comparative anatomy, phrenology, electricity, exalted into leading ideas and keys, if not of all knowledge, at least of many things more than belong to them,—principles, all of them true to a certain point, yet all degenerating into error and quackery, because they are carried to excess, at a point where they require interpretation and restraint from other quarters, and because they are employed to do what is simply too much for them, inasmuch as a little science is not deep philosophy.

Lord Bacon has set down the abuse, of which I am speaking, among the impediments to the Advancement of the Sciences, when he observes that “men have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines, with some conceits which they have most admired, or *some Sciences which they have most applied*; and give all things else a *tincture* according

to them, *utterly untrue and improper*..... So have the alchemists made a philosophy out of a few experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus, our countryman, hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a lodestone. So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of the nature of the soul, he found a musician, that held the soul was but a harmony, saith pleasantly, 'hic ab arte suâ non recessit', 'he was true to his art'. But of these conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely, when he saith, "Qui respiciunt ad pauca, de facili pronunciant", 'they who contemplate a few things have no difficulty in deciding'".

Now I have said enough to explain the inconvenience which I conceive necessarily to result from a refusal to recognize theological truth in a course of Universal Knowledge;—it is not only the loss of Theology, it is the perversion of other sciences. What it unjustly forfeits, others unjustly seize. They have their own department, and in going out of it, attempt to do what they really cannot do; and that the more mischievously, because they do teach what in its place is true, though when out of its place, perverted, or carried to excess, it is not true. And, as every man has not the capacity of separating truth from falsehood, they persuade the world of what is false by urging upon them what is true. Nor is it open enemies alone who encounter us here, sometimes it is friends, sometimes persons who, if not

friends, at least have no wish to oppose Religion, and are not conscious they are doing so; and it will carry out my meaning more fully if I give some illustrations of it.

As to friends, I may take as an instance the cultivation of the Fine Arts, Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, to which I may add Music. These high ministers of the Beautiful and the Noble, are, it is plain, special attendants and handmaids of Religion; but it is equally plain that they are apt to forget their place, and, unless restrained with a firm hand, instead of being servants, will aim at becoming principals. Here lies the advantage, in an ecclesiastical point of view, of their more rudimental state, I mean of the ancient style of architecture, of Gothic sculpture and painting, and of what is called Gregorian music, that these inchoate sciences have so little innate vigour and life, that they are in no danger of going out of their place, and giving the law to Religion. But the case is very different, when genius has breathed upon their natural elements, and has developed them into what I may call intellectual powers. When Painting, for example, grows into the fulness of its function as a simply imitative art, it at once ceases to be a dependant on the Church. It has an end of its own, and that of earth: Nature is its pattern, and the object it pursues is the beauty of Nature, even till it becomes an ideal beauty, but a natural beauty still. It cannot imitate the beauty

of Angels and Saints which it has never seen. At first indeed, by outlines and emblems it shadowed out the Invisible, and its want of skill became the instrument of reverence and modesty; but, as time went on and it attained its full dimensions as an art, it rather subjected Religion to its own ends, than ministered to the ends of Religion, and in its long galleries and stately chambers, adorable figures and sacred histories did but mingle amid the train of the earthly, not to say unseemly forms, which it created, borrowing withal a colouring and a character from that bad company. Not content with neutral ground for its development, it was attracted by the sublimity of divine subjects to ambitious and hazardous essays. Without my saying a word more, you will clearly understand, Gentlemen, that under these circumstances Religion must exert itself that the world might not gain an advantage over it. Put out of sight the severe teaching of Catholicism in the schools of painting, as men now would put them aside in their philosophical studies, and in no long time you would have had, the hierarchy of the Church, the Anchorite and Virgin-martyr, the Confessor and the Doctor, the Angelic Hosts, the Mother of God, the Crucifix, the Eternal Trinity, supplanted by a sort of pagan mythology in the guise of sacred names, by a creation indeed of high genius, of intense and dazzling and soul-absorbing beauty, in which, however, there was nothing which subserved the cause of Religion,

nothing on the other hand which did not directly or indirectly minister to corrupt nature and the powers of darkness.

The art of Painting, however, is peculiar : Music and Architecture are more ideal, and their respective archetypes, even if not supernatural, at least are abstract and unearthly; and yet what I have been observing about Painting, holds, I suppose, analogously, in the marvellous development which Musical Science has undergone in the last century. Doubtless here too the highest genius may be made subservient to Religion; here too, still more simply than in the case of Painting, the Science has a field of its own, perfectly innocent, into which Religion does not and need not enter; on the other hand here also, as well in the case of Music as Painting, it is certain, that Religion must be alive and on the defensive, for, if its servants sleep, a potent enchantment will steal over it. Music, I suppose, though this is not the place to enlarge upon it, has an object of its own; as mathematical science, it is the expression of ideas greater and more profound than any in the visible world, ideas, which centre indeed in Him whom Catholicism manifests, who is the seat of all beauty, order, and perfection whatever, still after all not those on which Revealed Religion directly and principally fixes our gaze. If then a great master in this mysterious science (if I may speak of matters which seem to lie out of my own province) throws himself on his own gift, trusts its

inspirations, and absorbs himself in those thoughts, which, though they come to him in the way of nature, belong to things above nature, it is obvious he will neglect every thing else. Rising in his strength he will break through the trammels of words, he will scatter human voices, even the sweetest, to the winds; he will be borne on upon nothing less than the fullest flood of sounds which art has enabled him to draw from mechanical contrivances; he will go forth as a giant, as far as ever his instruments can reach, starting from their secret depths fresh and fresh elements of beauty and grandeur as he goes, and pouring them together into still more marvellous and rapturous combinations;—and well indeed and lawfully, while he keeps to that line which is his own; but should he happen to be attracted, as he well may, by the sublimity, so congenial to him, of the Catholic doctrine and ritual, should he engage in sacred themes, should he resolve to do honour to the Mass, or the Divine Office,—he cannot have a more pious, a better purpose, and Religion will gracefully accept what he gracefully offers: but is it not certain, from the circumstances of the case, that he will rather use Religion than minister to it, unless Religion is strong on its own ground, and reminds him that, if he would do honour to the highest of subjects, he must make himself its scholar, humbly follow the thoughts given him, and aim at the glory, not of his own gift, but of the Great Giver?

As to Architecture, it is a remark, if I recollect aright, both of Fénélon and Berkeley, men so different, that it carries more with it even than the names of those celebrated men, that the Gothic style is not as *simple* as ecclesiastical structures demand. I understand this to be a similar judgment to that which I have been passing on the cultivation of Painting and Music. For myself, certainly I think that that style which, whatever be its origin, is called Gothic, is endowed with a profound and a commanding beauty, such as no other style possesses, with which we are acquainted, and which probably the Church will not see surpassed till it attain to the Celestial City. No other architecture, now used for sacred purposes, seems to have an idea in it, whereas the Gothic style is as harmonious and as intellectual as it is graceful. But this feeling should not blind us, rather it should awaken us, to the danger, lest what is really a divine gift, be incautiously used as an end rather than as a means. It is surely quite within the bounds of possibility, that, as the *renaissance* three centuries ago, carried away its own day, in spite of the Church, into excesses in literature and art, so a revival of an almost forgotten architecture, which is at present taking place in our own countries, in France, and in Germany, may in some way or other run away with us into this or that error, unless we keep a watch over its course. I am not speaking of Ireland; to English Catholics at least it



would be a serious evil, if it came as the emblem and advocate of a past ceremonial or an extinct nationalism. We are not living in an age of wealth and loyalty, of pomp and stateliness, of time-honoured establishments, of pilgrimage and penance, of hermitages and convents in the wild, and of fervent populations supplying the want of education by love, and apprehending in form and symbol what they cannot read in books. Our rules and our rubrics are altered for the times, and an obsolete discipline may be a present heresy.

I have been pointing out to you, Gentlemen, how the Fine Arts may prejudice Religion, by giving the law where they should be subservient. The illustration is analogous rather than strictly proper to my subject, yet I think it is to the point. If then the most loyal and dutiful children of the Church must deny themselves, and do deny themselves, when they would sanctify to a heavenly purpose sciences as sublime and as divine as any which are cultivated by fallen man, it is not wonderful, when we turn to science of a different character, of which the object is tangible and material, and the principles belong to the Reason, not the Imagination, that we should find those who are disinclined to the Catholic Faith, even against their will and intention, as may often happen, acting the part of opponents to it. Many men there are, who, devoted to one particular subject of thought, and making its principles the measure of all things,

become enemies to Revealed Religion before they know it, and, only as time proceeds, are aware of their state of mind. These, if they are writers or lecturers, while in this state of unconscious or semiconscious unbelief, scatter infidel principles under the garb and colour of Christianity; and this, simply because they have made their own science, whatever it is, Political Economy, or Geology, or Astronomy, not Theology, the centre of all truth, and view every part or the chief parts of knowledge as if developed from it, and to be tested and determined by its principles. Others, though conscious to themselves of their anti-christian opinions, have too much good feeling and good taste to wish to obtrude them upon the world. They neither wish to shock people, nor to earn for themselves a confessorship which brings with it no gain. They know the strength of prejudice, and the penalty of innovation; they wish to go through life quietly; they scorn polemics; they shrink as from a real humiliation, from being mixed up in religious controversy; they are ashamed of the very name. However, they have occasion at some time to publish on some literary or scientific subject; they wish to give no offence; but after all, to their great annoyance, they find when they least expect it, or when they have taken considerable pains to avoid it, that they have roused by their publication what they would style the bigoted and bitter hostility of a party. This misfortune is easily conceivable, and has befallen many a man. Before he knows

where he is, a cry is raised on all sides of him; and so little does he know what we may call the *lie* of the land, that his attempts at apology perhaps only make matters worse. In other words, an exclusive line of study has led him, whether he will or no, to run counter to the principles of Religion; which he has never made his land marks, and which, whatever might be their effect upon himself, at least would have warned him against practising upon the faith of others, had they been authoritatively held up before him.

Instances of this kind are far from uncommon. Men who are old enough, will remember the trouble which came upon a person, eminent as a professional man in London even at that distant day, and still more eminent since, in consequence of his publishing a book in which he so treated the subject of Comparative Anatomy, as to seem to deny the immateriality of the soul. I speak here neither as excusing nor reprobating sentiments about which I have not the means of forming a judgment; all indeed I have heard of him makes me mention him with interest and respect; any how of this I am sure, that if there be a calling which feels its position and its dignity to lie in abstaining from controversy and cultivating kindly feelings with men of all opinions, it is the medical profession, and I cannot believe that the person in question would purposely have raised the indignation and incurred the censure of the religious public.\* What

\* Since writing the above, I have found grounds for believing that

then was his fault or mistake, but that he unsuspectingly threw himself upon his own particular science, which is of a material character, and allowed it to carry him forward into a subject matter, where it had no right to give the law, that, viz., of spiritual substances, which directly belongs to the science of Theology?

Another instance occurred at a later date. A living dignitary of the Established Church wrote a History of the Jews; in which, with what I consider at least bad judgment, he took an external view of it, and hence was led to assimilate it as nearly as possible to secular history. A great sensation was the consequence among the members of his own communion, from which he still suffers. Arguing from the dislike and contempt of polemical demonstrations which that accomplished writer has ever shown, I must conclude that he was simply betrayed into a false step by the treacherous fascination of what is called the Philosophy of History, which is good in its place, but is superseded in cases where the Almighty has superseded the natural laws of society and history. From this he would have been saved, had he been a Catholic; but in the Establishment he knew of no teaching, to which he was bound to defer, which ruled that to be false which attracted him by its speciousness.

I will now take an instance from another science. Political Economy is the science, I suppose, of wealth,—the work in question had more of purpose than I had imagined. This does not affect the general argument.

a science simply lawful and useful, for it is no sin to make money, any more than it is a sin to seek honour; a science at the same time dangerous and leading to occasions of sin, as is the pursuit of honour too; and in consequence, if studied by itself, and apart from the control of Revealed Truth, sure to conduct a speculator to unchristian conclusions. Holy Scripture tells us distinctly, that "covetousness", or more literally the love of money, "is the root of all evils"; and that "they that would become rich fall into temptation"; and that "hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God"; and after drawing the picture of a wealthy and flourishing people, it adds, "They have called the people happy that hath these things; but happy is that people whose God is the Lord":—while on the other hand it says with equal distinctness, "If any will not work, neither let him eat"; and "If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel". These opposite injunctions are summed up in the wise man's prayer, who says, "Give me neither beggary nor riches, give me only the necessaries of life". With this most precise view of a Christian's duty, viz., to labour indeed, but to labour for a competency for himself and his, and to be jealous of wealth, whether personal or national, the holy Fathers are, as might be expected, in simple accordance. "Judas", says St. Chrysostom, "was

with Him who knew not where to lay His head, yet could not restrain himself; and how canst thou hope to escape the contagion without anxious effort?" "It is ridiculous", says St. Jerome, "to call it idolatry to offer to the creature the grains of incense that are due to God, and not to call it so, to offer the whole service of one's life to the creature". "There is not a trace of justice in that heart", says St. Leo, "in which the love of gain has made itself a dwelling". The same thing is emphatically taught us by the counsels of perfection, and by every holy monk and nun any where, who have ever embraced them; but it is useless to collect passages when Scripture is so clear.

Now observe, Gentlemen, my drift in setting Scripture and the Fathers over against Political Economy. Of course if there is a science of wealth, it must give rules for gaining wealth, and can do nothing more; it cannot itself declare that it is a subordinate science, that its end is not the ultimate end of all things, and that its conclusions are only hypothetical, depending on its premisses, and exposed to be overruled by a higher teaching. I do not then blame the Political Economist for any thing which follows from the very idea of his science, directly it is recognised as a science. He must of course direct his inquiries towards his end; but then at the same time it must be recollected, that so far he is not practical, but only pursues an abstract study, and is busying him-

self in establishing logical conclusions from indisputable premisses. Given that wealth is to be sought, this and that is the method of gaining it. This is the extent to which a Political Economist has a right to go; he has no right to determine that wealth is at any rate to be sought, or that it is the way to be virtuous and the price of happiness; I say this is to pass the bounds of his science, whether he be right or wrong in so determining, for he is only concerned with an hypothesis.

To take a parallel case:—a physician may tell you, that, if you are to preserve your health, you must give up your employment and retire to the country. He distinctly says “if”; that is all in which he is concerned, he is no judge whether there are objects dearer to you, more urgent upon you, than the preservation of your health; he does not enter into your circumstances, your duties, your liabilities, the persons dependent on you; he knows nothing about what is profitable or what is not; he only says “I speak *as* a physician; if you would be well, give up your profession, your trade, your office, whatever it is”. However he may wish it, it would be impertinent in him to say more, unless indeed he spoke, not as a physician, but as a friend; and it would be extravagant, if he asserted that bodily health was the *summum bonum*, and that no one could be virtuous, whose animal system was not in good order.

But now let us turn to the teaching of the Poli-

tical Economist, a fashionable philosopher just now. I will take a very favourable instance of him; he shall be represented by a gentleman of high character, whose religious views are sufficiently guaranteed to us by his being the special choice, in this department of science, of a University removed more than any other Protestant body of the day from sordid or unchristian principles on the subject of money-making. I say, if there be a place where Political Economy would be kept in order, and would not be suffered to leave the high road and ride across the pastures and the gardens dedicated to other studies, it is the University of Oxford. And if a man could any where be found who would have too much good taste to offend the religious feeling of the place, or to say any thing which he would himself allow to be inconsistent with Revelation, I conceive it is the person whose temperate and well-considered composition, as it would be generally accounted, I am going to offer to your notice. Nor did it occasion any excitement whatever on the part of the academical or the religious public, as did the instances which I have hitherto been adducing. I am representing then the science of Political Economy, in its independent or unbridled action, to great advantage, when I select, as its specimen, the Inaugural Lecture upon it, delivered in the University in question, by its first Professor, immediately on the endowment of its chair by Mr. Henry Drummond of Albury Park. Yet with all these



circumstances in its favour, you will soon see, Gentlemen, into what extravagance, for so I must call it, a grave lawyer is led in praise of his chosen science, merely from the circumstance that he has fixed his mind upon it, till he has forgotten there are subjects of thought higher and more heavenly than it. You will find beyond mistake, that it is his object to recommend the science of wealth, by claiming for it an *ethical* quality, viz., by extolling it as the road to virtue and happiness, whatever Scripture and holy men may say to the contrary.

He begins by predicting of Political Economy, that in the course of a very few years, "it will rank in public estimation among the first of *moral* sciences in interest and in utility". Then he explains most lucidly its objects and duties, considered as "the science which teaches in what wealth consists, by what agents it is produced, and according to what laws it is distributed, and what are the institutions and customs by which production may be facilitated and distribution regulated, so as to give the largest possible amount of wealth to each individual". And he dwells upon the interest which attaches to the inquiry, "whether England has run her full career of wealth and improvement, but stands safe where she is, or whether to remain stationary is impossible". After this he notices a certain objection, which I shall set before you in his own words, as they will furnish me with the illustration I propose.

This objection, he says, is, that, “as the pursuit of wealth is one of the humblest of human occupations, far inferior to the pursuit of virtue, or of knowledge, or even of reputation, and as the possession of wealth is not necessarily joined,—perhaps it will be said, is not conducive,—to happiness, a science, of which the only subject is wealth, cannot claim to rank as the first, or nearly the first, of moral sciences”.\* Certainly, to an enthusiast in behalf of any science whatever, the temptation is great to meet an objection urged against its dignity and worth; however, from the very form of it, such an objection cannot receive a satisfactory answer by means of the science itself. It is an objection external to the science, and reminds us of the truth of Lord Bacon’s remark, “no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level; neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you stand upon the level of the science, and ascend not to a higher science”.† The objection that Political Economy is inferior to the science of virtue, or does not conduce to happiness, is an ethical or a theological objection; the question of its “rank” belongs to that Architectonic Science or Philosophy, whatever it be, which is itself the arbiter of all truth, and which disposes of the claims and arranges the places of all the departments of knowledge, which man is able to master. I say, when an opponent of a particular science asserts that it does

\* See pages 11, 12.

† Advancement of Learning.

not conduce to happiness, and much more, when its champion contends in reply that it certainly does conduce to virtue, as this author proceeds to contend, the obvious question which occurs to one to ask is, what does Religion, what does Revelation say on the point? Political Economy must not be allowed to give judgment in its own favour, but must come before a higher tribunal. The objection is an appeal to the Theologian; however, the Professor does not so view the matter; he does not consider it a question for Philosophy, and if not for Political Economy, then not for science at all, but for Private Judgment,—so he answers it himself, and as follows:

“ My answer”, he says, “ is, first, that the pursuit of wealth, that is, the endeavour to accumulate the means of future subsistence and enjoyment, is, to the mass of mankind, the great source of *moral* improvement”. Now observe, Gentlemen, how exactly this bears out what I have been saying. It is just so far true, as to be able to instil what is false, far as the author was from any such design. I grant then, that beggary is not the means of moral improvement; and that the orderly habits which attend upon the hot pursuit of gain, not only may effect an external decency, but may at least shelter the soul from the temptations of vice. Moreover, these habits of good order guarantee regularity in a family or household, and thus are accidentally the means of good to those who come under their protection by leading to their education, and thus

accidentally providing the rising generation with a virtue or a truth which the present has not: but without going into these considerations, further than to allow them generally, and under circumstances, let us rather contemplate what the author's direct assertion is. "The endeavour to *accumulate*", the words should be weighed, and for what? "for *enjoyment*";—"to accumulate the means of future subsistence and enjoyment, is to the mass of mankind, *the great source*", not merely *a source*, but *the great source*, and of what? of social and political progress?—such an answer would have been more within the limits of his art,—no, but of something individual and personal, "of *moral improvement*". The soul, as regards the mass of mankind, improves in moral excellence from this more than any thing else, viz., from heaping up the means of enjoying this world in time to come! I really should on every account be sorry, Gentlemen, to exaggerate, but indeed one is taken by surprise on meeting with so very categorical a contradiction of our Lord, St. Paul, St. Chrysostom, St. Leo, and all Saints.

"No institution", he continues, "could be more beneficial to the morals of the lower orders, that is, to at least nine-tenths of the whole body of any people, than one which should increase their power and their wish to accumulate; none more mischievous than one which should diminish their motives and means to save". No institution more beneficial than one which should increase the *wish to accumulate!* then Chris-

tianity is not one of such beneficial institutions, for it expressly says, "*Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth.....for where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also*";—no institution more mischievous than one which should diminish the *motives to save!* then Christianity is one of such mischiefs, for the inspired text proceeds, "*Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither the rust nor the moth doth consume, and where thieves do not dig through, nor steal*".

But it is not enough that morals and happiness are made to depend on gain and accumulation, Religion is ascribed to these causes also, and in the following way. Wealth depends upon the pursuit of wealth; education depends upon wealth: knowledge depends on education, and Religion depends on knowledge; therefore Religion depends on the pursuit of wealth. He says, after speaking of a poor and savage people, "Such a population must be grossly ignorant. The desire of knowledge is one of the best results of refinement; it requires in general to have been implanted in the mind during childhood; and it is absurd to suppose that persons thus situated would have the power or the will to devote much to the education of their children. A farther consequence is the *absence of all real religion*; for the religion of the grossly ignorant, if they have any, scarcely ever amounts to more than a debasing superstition".\* The pursuit of gain then is the basis of virtue, religion,

\* See page 16.

happiness; it being all the while, as a Christian knows, the "root of all evils", and the "poor on the contrary blessed, for theirs is the kingdom of God".

As to the argument contained in the logical *Sorites* which I have been drawing out, I anticipated just now what I should say to it in reply. I repeat, doubtless "beggary", as the wise man says, is not desirable; doubtless, if men will not work, they should not eat; there is doubtless a sense in which it may be said that mere social or political virtue tends to moral and religious excellence; but the sense needs to be defined and the statement to be kept within bounds. This is the very point on which I am all along insisting. I am not denying, I am granting, I am assuming, that there is reason and truth in the "leading ideas", as they are called, and "large views" of scientific men; I only say, that, though they speak truth, they do not speak the whole truth; that they speak a narrow truth, and think it a broad truth; that their deductions must be compared with other truths, which are acknowledged as such, in order to verify, complete, and correct them. In short, as people speak, they say what is true with modifications; true, but requires guarding; true, but must not be ridden too hard, or made what is called a *hobby*; true, but not the measure of all things; true, but if thus inordinately, extravagantly, ruinously carried out, in spite of other sciences, in spite of Theology, sure to become but a great bubble, and to burst.

I am getting to the end of this Discourse, before I have noticed one tenth part of the instances with which I might illustrate the subject of it. Else I should have wished especially to have dwelt upon the not unfrequent perversion which occurs of antiquarian and historical research, to the prejudice of Theology. It is undeniable that the records of former ages are of primary importance in determining Religious Truth; it is undeniable also that there is a silence or a contrariety conceivable in those records, as to an alleged portion of that truth, sufficient to invalidate its claims; but it is quite as undeniable that the existing documentary evidences of Catholicism and Christianity may be so unduly exalted, as to be made the absolute measure of Revelation, as if no part of theological teaching were true, which cannot bring its express text, as it is called, from Scripture, and authorities from the Fathers or profane writers,—whereas there are numberless facts in past times, which we cannot deny, for they still are, though history is silent about them. I suppose, on this score, we ought to deny that the round towers of this country had any origin, because history does not disclose it; or that any individual came from Adam, who cannot produce the table of his ancestry. Yet Gibbon argues against the darkness at the Passion, from the accident that it is not mentioned by Pagan historians:—as well might he argue against the existence of Christianity itself in the

first century, because Seneca, Pliny, Plutarch, the Jewish Mishna, and other authorities are silent about it.\* In a parallel way, Protestants argue against Transubstantiation, and Arians against our Lord's Divinity, viz., because extant writings of certain Fathers do not witness those doctrines to their satisfaction:—as well might they say that Christianity was not spread by the Twelve Apostles, because we know so little of their labours. The evidence of History, I say, is invaluable in its place; but, if it assumes to be the sole means of gaining Religious Truth, it goes beyond its place. We are putting it to a larger office than it can undertake, if we countenance the usurpation; and we are turning a true guide and blessing into a source of inexplicable difficulty and interminable doubt.

And so of other sciences: just as Comparative Anatomy, Political Economy, the Philosophy of History, and the Science of Antiquities may be, and are turned against Religion, by being taken by themselves, as I have been showing, so a like mistake may befall any other. Grammar, for instance, at first sight does not promise to admit of a perversion; yet Horne Tooke made it the vehicle of scepticism. Law would seem to have enough to do with its own clients and their affairs; and yet Mr. Bentham made a treatise on Judicial Proofs a covert attack upon the miracles of Revelation. And in like manner Physi-

\* *Vide* the Author's work on Development of Doctrine, p. 139.



ology may deny moral evil and human responsibility; Geology may deny Moses; and Logic may deny the Holy Trinity;\* and other sciences, now rising into notice, are or will be victims of a similar abuse.

And now to sum up what I have been saying in a few words. My object, it is plain, has been—not to show that Secular Science in its various departments may take up a position hostile to Theology;—this is rather the basis of the objection with which I opened this Discourse;—but to point out the cause of an hostility to which all parties will bear witness. I have been insisting then on this, that the hostility in question, when it occurs, is coincident with an evident defection or exorbitance of Science from its proper course; and that this exorbitance is sure to take place, almost from the necessity of the case, if Theology be not present to defend its own boundaries and to hinder it. The human mind cannot keep from speculating and systematising; and if Theology is not allowed to occupy its own territory, adjacent sciences, nay, sciences which are quite foreign to Theology, will take possession of it. And it is proved to be a usurpation by this circumstance, that those sciences will assume principles as true, and act upon them, which they neither have authority to lay down themselves, nor appeal to any other higher science to lay down for them. For example, it is a mere unwarranted assumption to say with the Antiquarian, “Nothing

\* Vid. Abelard, for instance.

has ever taken place but is to be found in historical documents"; or with the Philosophic Historian, "There is nothing in Judaism different from other political institutions"; or with the Anatomist, "There is no soul beyond the brain"; or with the Political Economist, "Easy circumstances make men virtuous". These are enunciations, not of Science, but of Private Judgment; and Private Judgment infects every science which it touches with a hostility to Theology, which properly attaches to no science whatever.

If then, Gentlemen, I now resist such a course of acting as unphilosophical, what is this but to do as men of Science do when the interests of their own respective pursuits are at stake? If they certainly would resist the divine who determined the orbit of Jupiter by the Pentateuch, why am I to be accused of cowardice or illiberality, because I will not tolerate their attempt in turn to theologize by means of Science? And if experimentalists would be sure to cry out, did I attempt to install the Thomist philosophy in the schools of astronomy and medicine, why may not I, when Divine Science is ostracized, and La Place, or Buffon, or Humboldt, sits down in its chair, why may not I fairly protest against their exclusiveness, and demand the emancipation of Theology?

## DISCOURSE V.

### GENERAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED AS ONE PHILOSOPHY.

It is a prevalent notion just now, that religious opinion does not enter, as a matter of necessity, in any considerable measure, into the treatment of scientific or literary subjects. It is supposed, that, whatever a teacher's persuasion may be, whether Christian or not, or whatever kind or degree of Christianity, it need not betray itself in such lectures or publications as the duties of his office require. Whatever he holds about the Supreme Being, His attributes and His works, be it truth or error, does not make him better or worse in experiment or speculation. He can discourse upon plants, or insects, or birds, or the powers of the mind, or languages, or historical documents, or literature, or any other such matter of fact, with equal accurateness and profit, whatever he may determine about matters which are entirely distinct from them.

In answer to this representation I contended last

week, that a positive disunion takes place between Theology and Secular Science, whenever they are not actually united. Here, not to be at peace is to be at war; and for this reason: — The assemblage of Sciences, which together make up Universal Knowledge, is not an accidental or a varying heap of acquisitions, but a system, and may be said to be *in equilibrio*, as long as all its portions are secured to it. Take away one of them, and that one so important in the catalogue as Theology, and disorder and ruin at once ensue. There is no middle state between an *equilibrium* and chaotic confusion; one science is ever pressing upon another, unless kept in check; and the only guarantee of Truth is the cultivation of them all. And such is the office of a University.

Far different, of course, are the sentiments of the patrons of a divorce between Religious and Secular Knowledge. Let us see how they spoke twenty-five years ago in the defence formally put out for that formidable Institution, formidable, as far as an array of high intellects can make any paradox or paralogism formidable, which was then set up in London on the basis of such a separation. The natural, as well as the special, champion of the then University of London, and of the principle which it represented, was a celebrated Review, which stood at the time, and, I suppose, stands still, at the head of our periodical literature. In this publication, at the date of which I speak, an article was devoted to the exculpa-

tion of the Institution in question, from the charges or suspicions which it incurred in consequence of the principle on which it was founded. The Reviewer steadily contemplates the idea of a University without Religion; "From pulpits, and visitation dinners, and combination rooms innumerable, the cry", he says, "is echoed and reëchoed, An University without religion"; and then he proceeds to dispose of the protest by one or two simple illustrations.

Writing, as he does, with liveliness and wit, as well as a profession of serious argument, this Reviewer can scarcely be quoted with due regard to the gravity which befits a discussion such as the present. You must pardon me, Gentlemen, if, in my desire to do justice to him and his cause in his own words, I suffer him to interrupt the equable flow of our discussion with unseasonable mirth; and in order to avoid, as much as possible, a want of keeping between his style and my own. I will begin with the less sprightly illustration of the two. "Take the case", he says, "of a young man, a student, we will suppose, of surgery, resident in London. He wishes to become master of his profession, without neglecting other useful branches of knowledge. In the morning he attends Mr. McCulloch's Lecture on Political Economy. He then repairs to the Hospital, and hears Sir Astley Cooper explain the mode of reducing fractures. In the afternoon he joins one of the classes which Mr. Hamilton instructs in French

or German. With regard to religious observances, he acts as he himself, or those under whose care he is, may think most advisable. Is there any thing objectionable in this? is it not the most common case in the world? And in what does it differ from that of a young man at the London University? Our surgeon, it is true, will have to run over half London in search of his instructors.....Is it in the local situation that the mischief lies?"\* Such is the argument; need I point out the fallacy? Whatever may be said of Political Economy, at any rate a surgical operation is not a branch of knowledge, or a process of argument, or an inference, or an investigation, or an analysis, or an induction, or an abstraction, or other intellectual exercise: it is a grave practical matter. Again, the primer, the spelling book, the grammar, construing and parsing, are scarcely trials of reason, imagination, taste, or judgment; they can scarcely be said to have truth for their object at all; any how, they belong to the first stage of mental development, to the school, rather than to the University. Neither the reduction of fractures, nor the Hamiltonian method can be considered a branch of Philosophy; it is not more wonderful that such trials of skill or of memory can safely dispense with Theology for their perfection, than that it is unnecessary for the practice of gunnery or the art of calligraphy.

So much for one of this Reviewer's illustrations:

\* Edinburgh Review, Feb., 1826.

the other is more infelicitous still, in proportion as it is more insulting to our view of the subject. "Have none of those", he asks, "who censure the London University on this account, daughters who are educated at home, and who are attended by different teachers? The music master, a good Protestant, comes at twelve; the dancing master, a French philosopher, at two; the Italian master, a believer in the blood of St. Januarius, at three. The parents take upon themselves the office of instructing their child in religion. She hears the preachers whom they prefer, and reads the theological works which they put into her hands. Who can deny that this is the case in innumerable families? Who can point out any material difference between the situation in which this girl is placed, and that of a pupil at the new University?" I pass over the scoff at a miracle, to which the writer neither gave credence himself, nor imagined it in others; looking simply at his argument, I ask, is it not puerile to imply that music, or dancing, or lessons in Italian, have any thing to do with Philosophy? It is plain, that such writers do not rise to the very idea of a University. They consider it a sort of bazaar, or pantechnicon, in which wares of all kinds are heaped together for sale in stalls independent of each other; and that, to save the purchasers the trouble of running about from shop to shop; or an hotel or lodging house, where all professions and classes are at liberty to congregate,

varying, however, according to the season, each of them strange to each, and about its own work or pleasure; whereas, if we would rightly deem of it, a University is the home, it is the mansion-house, of the goodly family of the Sciences, sisters all, and sisterly in their mutual dispositions.

Such, I say, is the theory which recommends itself to the public mind of this age, and is the moving principle of its undertakings. And yet that very instinct of the intellect of which I spoke last week, which impels each science to extend itself as far as it can, and which leads, when indulged, to the confusion of Philosophy generally, might teach the upholders of such a theory a truer view of the subject. It seems, as I then observed, that the human mind is ever seeking to systematise its knowledge, to base it upon principle, and to find a science comprehensive of all sciences. And sooner than forego the gratification of this moral appetency, it starts with whatever knowledge or science it happens to have, and makes that knowledge serve as a rule or measure of the universe, for want of a better, preferring the completeness and precision of bigotry to a fluctuating and homeless scepticism. What a singular contrast is here between nature and theory! We see the intellect in this instance, as soon as it moves at all, moving straight against its own conceits and falsities, and upsetting them spontaneously, without effort, and at once. It witnesses to a great



truth in spite of its own professions and engagements. It had promised, in the name of the patrons of our modern Colleges and Universities, that there need not be, and that there should not be, any system or philosophy in knowledge and its transmission, but that Liberal Education henceforth should be a mere fortuitous heap of acquisitions and accomplishments; however, here, as it so often happens elsewhere, nature is too strong for art. She bursts violently and dangerously through the artificial trammels laid upon her, and exercises her just rights wrongly, since she cannot rightly. Usurpers and tyrants are the successors to legitimate rulers sent into exile. Forthwith Private Judgment moves forward with the implements of this or that science, to do a work imperative indeed, but beyond its powers. It owns the need of general principles and constituent ideas, by taking false ones, and thus is ever impeding and preventing unity, while it is ever attempting and thereby witnessing it. From the many voices crying "Order" and "Silence", noise and tumult follow. From the very multiplicity and diversity of the efforts after unity on every side, this practical age has thrown up the notion of it altogether.

What is the consequence? that the works of the age are not the development of definite principles, but accidental results of discordant and simultaneous action, of committees and boards, composed of men, each of whom has his own interests and views, and,

to gain something his own way, is obliged to sacrifice a good deal to every one else. From causes so adventitious and contradictory, who can predict the ultimate production? Hence it is that those works have so little permanent life in them, because they are not founded on principles and ideas. Ideas are the life of institutions, social, political, and literary; but the excesses of Private Judgment, in the prosecution of its multiform theories, have at length made men sick of a truth, which they recognised long after they were able to realise it. At the present day, they knock the life out of the institutions they have inherited, by their alterations and adaptations. As to their own creations, these are a sort of monster, with hands, feet, and trunk moulded respectively on distinct types. Their whole, if the word is to be used, is an accumulation from without, not the growth of a principle from within. Thus, as I said just now, their notion of a University, is a sort of bazaar or hotel, where every thing is showy, and self-sufficient, and changeable. "Motley's the only wear". The majestic vision of the Middle Age, which grew steadily to perfection in the course of centuries, the University of Paris, or Bologna, or Oxford, has almost gone out in night. A philosophical comprehensiveness, an orderly expansiveness, an elastic constructiveness, men have lost them, and cannot make out why. This is why: because they have lost the idea of unity: because they cut off the head of a

living thing, and think it is perfect, all but the head. They think the head an extra, an accomplishment, the *corona operis*, not essential to the idea of the being under their hands. They seem to copy the lower specimens of animated nature, who with their wings pulled off, or a pin run through them, or eaten out by parasitical enemies, walk about, unconscious of their state of disadvantage. They think, that, if they do but get together sufficient funds, and raise a very large building, and secure a number of able men, and arrange in one locality, as the Reviewer says, a suite of distinct lecture-rooms, they have at once founded a University. An idea, a view, an indivisible object, which does not admit of more or less, a form, which cannot coalesce with any thing else, an intellectual principle, expanding into a consistent harmonious whole,—in short, Mind, in the true sense of the word,—they are, forsooth, too practical to lose time in such reveries!

Our way, Gentlemen, is very different. We adopt a method, founded in man's nature and the necessity of things, exemplified in all great moral works whatever, instinctively used by all men in the course of daily life, though they may not recognise it, discarded by our opponents only because they have lost the true key to exercise it withal. We start with an idea, we educate upon a type; we make use, as nature prompts us, of the faculty, which I have called an intellectual grasp of things, or an inward sense, and

which I shall hereafter show is really meant by the word "Philosophy". Science itself is a specimen of its exercise; for its very essence is this mental formation. A science is not mere knowledge, it is knowledge which has undergone a process of intellectual digestion. It is the grasp of many things brought together in one, and hence is its power; for, properly speaking, it is Science that is power, not Knowledge. Well then, this is how Catholics act towards the Sciences taken all together; we view them as one and give them an idea; what is this but an extension and perfection, in an age which prides itself upon its scientific genius, of that very process by which science exists at all? Imagine a science of sciences, and you have attained the true notion of the scope of a University. We consider that all things mount up to a whole, that there is an order and precedence and harmony in the branches of knowledge one with another as well as one by one, and that to destroy that structure is as unphilosophical in a course of education, as it is unscientific in the separate portions of it. We form and fix the Sciences in a circle and system, and give them a centre and an aim, instead of letting them wander up and down in a sort of hopeless confusion. In other words, to use scholastic language, we give the various pursuits and objects, on which the intellect is employed, a *form*; for it is the peculiarity of a form, that it gathers up in one, and draws off from

every thing else, the materials on which it is impressed.

Now here, Gentlemen, I seem in danger of a double inconvenience, viz., of enlarging on what, as a point of scholasticism, is too abstruse, and, as put into familiar language, is too obvious, for an accomplished and philosophical auditory, which claims of me what is neither rudimental on the one hand nor technical on the other. And yet I will rather ask your indulgence to allow me in a very familiar illustration of a very scholastic term, than incur the chance, which might otherwise fall out, of being deficient in my exposition of the subject for which I adduce it.

For instance, we all understand how Worship is one idea, and how it is made up of many things, some being essential to it, and all subservient. Its essence is the lifting up of the heart to God; if it be no more than this, still this is enough, and nothing more is necessary. But view it as brought out in some solemn rite or public ceremonial; the essence is the same, and it is there on the occasion I am supposing;—we will say it is Benediction of the Most Holy Sacrament, or a devotion in honour of some Saint;—it is there still, but, first, it is the lifting up, not of one heart, but of many all at once; next, it is the devotion, not of hearts only, but of bodies too; not of eyes only, or hands only, or voices only, or knees only, but of the whole man; and next, the devotion passes on to more than soul and body; there

are vestments there, rich and radiant, symbolical of the rite, and odorous flowers, and a flood of light, and a cloud of incense, and music joyous and solemn, of instruments, as well as voices, till all the senses overflow with the idea of devotion. Is the music devotion? as the Protestant inquires; is the incense devotion? are candles devotion? are flowers? are vestments? or words spoken? or genuflections? Not any one of them. And what have candles to do with flowers? or flowers with vestments? or vestments with music? Nothing whatever; each is distinct in itself, and independent of the rest. The flowers are the work of nature, and are elaborated in the garden; the candles come of the soft wax, which the "Apis Mater" (as the Church beautifully sings), which the teeming bee fashions; the vestments have been wrought in the looms of Lyons or Vienna or Naples, and have been brought over sea at great cost; the music is the present and momentary vibration of the air, acted upon by tube or string; and still for all this, are they not one whole? are they not blended together indivisibly, and sealed with the image of unity, by reason of the one idea of worship, in which they live and to which they minister? Take away that idea, and what are they worth? the whole pageant becomes a mummery. The worship made them one; but supposing no one in that assemblage, however large, to believe, or to love, or to pray, or to give thanks, supposing the musicians did but play and

sing, and the sacristan thought of nothing but his flowers, lights, and incense, and the priest in cope and stole, and his attendant ministers, had no heart, nor lot in what they were outwardly acting, let the flowers be sweetest, and the lights brightest, and the vestments costliest, still who would call it an act of worship at all? Would it not be a show, a make-belief, an hypocrisy? Why? Because the one idea was away, which gave life, and force, and an harmonious understanding, and an individuality, to many things at once, distinct each of them in itself, and in its own nature independent of that idea.

Such is the virtue of a "form": the lifting up of the heart to God is the living principle of this solemnity; yet it does not sacrifice any of its constituent parts, rather it imparts to each a dignity by giving it a meaning; it moulds, inspires, individualizes a whole. It stands towards the separate elements which it uses as the soul is to the body. It is the presence of the soul which gives unity to the various materials which make up the human frame. Why do we not consider hand and foot, head and heart, separate things? Because a living principle within them makes them one whole, because the living soul gives them personality. It brings under the idea of personality all that they are, whatever they are; it appropriates them all to itself; it makes them absolutely distinct from every thing else, though they are the same

naturally, so that in it they are not what they are out of it; it dwells in them, though with a greater manifestation and intensity in some of them than in others, yet in all in sufficient measure; in our look, our voice, our gait, our very handwriting. But as soon as it goes, the unity goes too, and not by portions or degrees. Every part of the animal frame is absolutely changed at once; it is at once but a corpse that remains, and an aggregate of matter, accidentally holding together, soon to be dissolved. What were its parts, have lost their constituting principle, and rebel against it. It was life, it is death.

Thus a form or idea, as it may be called, collects together into one, separates utterly from every thing else, the elements on which it is impressed. They are grafted into it. Henceforth they have an intercommunion and influence over one another, which is special; they are present in each other; they belong to each other even in their minutest portions, and cannot belong to any other whole, even though some of those portions might at first sight seem to admit of it. You may smash and demolish the whole, but you cannot otherwise find a way to appropriate the parts. A human skeleton may resemble that of some species of brutes, but the presence of the soul in man makes him differ from those animals, not in degree, but in kind. A monkey or an ape is not merely a little less than human nature, and in the way to become a man.



It could not be developed into a man, or is at present a man, as far as it goes; such a mode of speech would be simply unmeaning. It is one whole, and man is another; and the likeness between them, though real, is superficial, and the result of a mental abstraction.

Here I am reminded of a doctrine laid down by the Angelical Doctor, which illustrates what has been said. He says that no action is indifferent; what does he mean? surely there are many actions which are quite indifferent; to speak, to stop speaking, to eat and drink, to go hither and thither. Yes, they are indifferent indeed in themselves; but they are not at all indifferent, as referrible to this or that whole in which they occur, as done by this or that person. They are not indifferent in the individual: they are indifferent in the abstract, not in the concrete. Eating, sleeping, talking, walking, may be neither good nor bad, viewed in their bare idea; but it is a very different thing to say that this man, at this time, at this place, being what he is, is neither right nor wrong in eating or walking. And further, the very same action, done by two persons, is utterly different in character and effect, good in one, bad in another. This, Gentlemen, is what is meant by saying that the actions of saints are not always patterns for us. They are right in them, they would be wrong in others, because an ordinary Christian fulfils one idea, and a saint fulfils another. Hence it is

that we bear things from some people, which we should resent, if done by others; as for other reasons, so especially for this, that they do not mean the same thing in these and in those. Sometimes the very sight of a person disarms us, who has offended us before we knew him; as, for instance, when we had fancied him a gentleman in rank and education, and find him to be not so. Each man has his own way of expressing satisfaction or annoyance, favour or dislike; each individual is a whole, and his actions are incommunicable. Hence it is so difficult, just at this time, when so many men are apparently drawing near the Church, rightly to conjecture who will eventually join it and who will not; it being impossible for any but the nearest friends, and often even for them, to determine how much words are worth in each severally, which are used by all in common. And hence again it happens that particulars which seem to be but accidents of certain subjects, are really necessary to them; for though they may look like accidents, viewed in themselves, they are not accidents, but essentials, in the connexion in which they occur. Thus, when man is defined to be a laughing animal, every one feels the definition to be unworthy of its subject, but it is, I suppose, adequate to its purpose. I might go on to speak of the singular connexion, which sometimes exists, between certain characteristics in individuals or bodies; a connexion, which at first sight would be called

accidental, were it not invariable in its occurrence, and reducible to the operation of some principle. Thus it has been said, rightly or wrongly, that Whig writers are always Latitudinarians, and Tory writers often infidels.

But I must put an end to these illustrations:— coming at last to the point, for the sake of which I have been pursuing them, I observe that the very same subjects of teaching, the Evidences of Christianity, the Classics, and much more Experimental Science, Modern History, and Biography, may be right in their proper place, as portions of one system of knowledge, suspicious, when detached or in bad company; desirable in one place of education, dangerous or inexpedient in another; because they come differently, in a different connexion, at a different time, with a different drift, from a different spirit, in the one and the other. And hence two Universities, so called, may almost concur in the lecture-papers they put out and their prospectus for the year, that is, in their skeleton, as man and certain brute creatures resemble one another, and yet, viewed as living and working institutions, not as preparations in an anatomical school, may be simply antagonistic.

Thus, then, Gentlemen, I answer the objection with which I opened this Discourse. I supposed it to be asked me, how it could matter to the pupil, who it was taught him such indifferent subjects as logic, antiquities, or poetry, so that they be taught him.

I answer that no subject of teaching is really indifferent in fact, though it may be in itself; because it takes a colour from the whole system to which it belongs, and has one character when viewed in that system, and another viewed out of it. According then as a teacher is under the influence, or in the service, of this system or that, so does the drift, or at least the practical effect of his teaching vary; Arcesilas would not teach logic as Aristotle, or Aristotle poetry as Plato, though logic has its fixed principles, and poetry its acknowledged classics; and in saying this, it will be observed I am claiming for Theology nothing singular or special, or which is not partaken by other sciences in their measure. As far as I have spoken of them, they all go to make up one whole, differing only according to their relative importance. Far indeed am I from having intended to convey the notion, in the illustrations I have been using, that Theology stands to other knowledge as the soul to the body; or that other sciences are but its instruments and appendages, just as the whole ceremonial of worship is but the expression of inward devotion. This would be, I conceive, to commit the very error, in the instance of Theology, which I am charging other sciences, at the present day, of committing against it. On the contrary, Theology is one branch of knowledge, and Secular Sciences are other branches. Theology is the highest indeed, and widest, but it does not interfere with the real freedom of any secular

science in its own particular department.\* This will be clearer as I proceed; at present I have been only pointing out the internal sympathy which exists between all branches of knowledge whatever, and the danger resulting to knowledge itself by a disunion between them, and the object in consequence to which a University is dedicated. Not Science only, not Literature only, not Theology only, neither abstract knowledge simply nor experimental, neither moral nor material, neither metaphysical nor historical, but all knowledge whatever, is taken into account in a University, as being the special seat of that large Philosophy, which embraces and locates truth of every kind, and every method of attaining it.

However, much as lies before me to clear up, ere I can be said to have done justice to the great subject on which I am engaged, there is one prevalent misconception, which what I have been to-day saying will set right at once; and, though it is scarcely more than another form of the fallacy which I have been exposing, it may be useful, even for the further elucidation of the principles on which I have exposed it, to devote what remains of this Discourse to its consideration. It is this:—As there are many

\* It would be plausible to call Theology the *external* form of the philosophical system, as charity has been said to be of living faith, vid. Bellarm. *de Justif.*, but then, though it would not *interfere* with the other sciences, it could not have been *one* of them.

persons to be found who maintain that Religion should not be introduced at all into a course of Education, so there are many too, who think a compromise may be effected between such as would and such as would not introduce it, viz.: by introducing a certain portion, and nothing beyond it; and by a certain portion they mean just as much as they suppose Catholics and Protestants to hold in common. In this way they hope, on the one hand to avoid the odium of not teaching religion at all, while on the other they equally avoid any show of contrariety between contrary systems of religion, and any unseemly controversy between parties who, however they may differ, will gain nothing by disputing. Now I respect the motives of such persons too much not to give my best attention to the expedient which they propose: whether men advocate the introduction of no religion at all in education, or this "general religion", as they call it, in either case peace and charity, which are the objects they profess, are of too heavenly a nature not to give a sort of dignity even to those who pursue them by impossible roads; still I think it very plain that the same considerations which are decisive against the exclusion of Religion from Education, are decisive also against its generalization or mutilation, for the words have practically the same meaning. General Religion is in fact no Religion at all. Let not the conclusion be thought harsh, to which I am carried on by the principles I

have been laying down in the former part of this Discourse; but thus it stands, I think, beyond dispute, that, those principles being presupposed, Catholics and Protestants, viewed as bodies, hold nothing in common in religion, however they may seem to do so.

This is the answer I shall give to the proposition of teaching "general religion". I might indeed challenge any one to set down for me in detail the precise articles of the Catholic Faith held by Protestants "in general"; or I might call attention to the number of Catholic truths which any how must be sacrificed, however wide the range of doctrines which Protestantism shall be made to embrace; but I will not go to questions of mere fact and detail: I prefer to rest the question upon the basis of a principle, and I assert that, as all branches of knowledge are one whole, so, much more, is each particular branch a whole in itself; that each is one science, as all are one philosophy, and that to teach half of any whole is really to teach no part of it. Men understand this in matters of the world, it is only when Religion is in question, that they forget it. Why do not Whigs and Tories form some common politics, and a ministry of coalition upon its basis? does not common sense, as well as party interest, keep them asunder? It is quite true that "general" tenets could be produced in which both bodies would agree; both Whigs and Tories are loyal and patriotic, both defend the reasonable prerogatives of the Throne, and

the just rights of the people; on paper they agree admirably, but who does not know that loyalty and patriotism have one meaning in the mouth of a Tory, and another in that of a Whig? Loyalty and patriotism, neither quality is what it is abstractedly, when it is grafted either on Whig or Tory. The case is the same with Religion; the Establishment, for instance, accepts from the Catholic Church the doctrine of the Incarnation; but at the same time denies that Christ is in the Blessed Sacrament and that Mary is the Mother of God; who in consequence will venture to affirm that such of its members as hold the Incarnation, hold it by virtue of their membership? the Establishment cannot really hold a Catholic doctrine, a portion and a concomitant of which it puts on one side. The Incarnation has not the same meaning to one who holds and to one who denies these two attendant verities. Hence, whatever he may profess about the Incarnation, the mere Protestant has no real hold, no grasp of the doctrine; you cannot be sure of him; any moment he may be found startled and wondering, as at a novelty, at statements implied in it, or uttering sentiments simply inconsistent with its idea. Catholicism is one whole, and Protestantism has no part in it. In like manner Catholicism and Mahometanism are each individual and distinct from each other; yet they have many points in common on paper, as the unity of God, Providence, the power of prayer, and



future judgment, to say nothing of the mission of Moses and Christ. These common doctrines we may if we please, call "Natural Religion", or "General Religion"; and so they are in the abstract; and no one can doubt that, were Mahometans or Jews numerous in these countries, so as to make it expedient, the Government of the day would so absolutely take this view, as to aim at establishing National Colleges on the basis of such common doctrines; yet, in fact, though they are common doctrines, as far as the words go, they are not the same, as living and breathing facts, for the very same words have a different drift and spirit when proceeding respectively from a Jewish, or a Mahometan, or a Catholic mouth. They are grafted on different ideas.

Now this, I fear, will seem a hard doctrine to some of us. There are those, whom it is impossible not to respect and love, of amiable minds and charitable feelings, who do not like to think unfavourably of any one. And, when they find another differ from them in religious matters, they cannot bear the thought that he differs from them in principle, or that he moves on a line, on which did he progress for centuries, he would but be carried further from them, instead of catching them up. Their delight is to think that he holds what they hold, only not enough; and that he is right as far as he goes. Such persons are very slow to believe that a scheme of general education, which puts Religion more or

less aside, does *ipso facto* part company with Religion; but they try to think, as far as they can, that its only fault is the accident that it is not so religious as it might be. In short they are of that school of thought, which will not admit that half a truth is an error, and nine-tenths of a truth no better; that the most frightful discord is close upon harmony; and that intellectual principles combine, not by a process of physical accumulation, but in unity of idea.

However, there is no misconception perhaps, but has something or other true about it, and has something to say for itself. Perhaps it will reconcile the persons in question to the doctrine I am propounding, if I state how far I can go along with them; for in a certain sense what they say is true and is supported by facts. It is true too, that youths can be educated at Mixed Colleges of the kind I am supposing, nay at Protestant Colleges, and yet may come out of them as good Catholics as they went in. Also it is true, that Protestants are to be found, who, as far as they profess Catholic doctrine, do truly hold it, in the same sense as that in which a Catholic holds it. I grant all this, but I maintain at the same time, that such cases are exceptional; the case of individuals is one thing, of bodies or institutions another; it is not safe to argue from individuals to institutions. A few words will explain my meaning.

There are then doubtless such phenomena as what may be called inchoate truths, beliefs, and philoso-

phies. It would be both unreasonable and shallow to deny it. Men doubtless may grow into an idea by degrees, and then at the end they are moving on the same line, as they were at the beginning, not a different one, though they may during the progress have changed their external profession. Thus one school or party comes out of another; truth out of error, error out of truth; water, according to the proverb, chokes, and good comes from Nazareth. Thus, eternally distinct as orthodoxy is from heresy, the most Catholic Fathers and the worst of heresiarchs belong to the same teaching, or the same ecclesiastical party. St. Chrysostom comes of that Syrian theology, which is more properly represented by the heterodox Diodorus and Theodore. Eutyches, Dioscorus, and their faction, are closely connected in history with St. Cyril of Alexandria. The whole history of thought and of genius, is that of one idea being born and growing out of another, though ideas are individual. Some of the greatest names in many various departments of excellence, metaphysical, political, or imaginative, have come out of schools of a very different character from their own. Thus, Aristotle is a pupil of the Academy, and the Master of the Sentences is a hearer of Peter Abelard. In like manner, to take a very different science:—I have read that the earlier musical compositions of that great master, Beethoven, are written on the type of Haydn, and that not until a certain date did he

compose in the style emphatically his own. The case is the same with public men; they are called inconsistent, when they are but unlearning their first education. In such circumstances, as in the instance of the lamented Sir Robert Peel, a time must elapse before the mind is able to discriminate for itself between what is really its own and what it has merely inherited.

Now what is its state, whatever be the subject-matter on which it is employed, in the course of this process of change? For a time perhaps the mind remains contented in the home of its youth, where originally it found itself, till in due season the special idea, however it came by it, which is ultimately to form and rule it, begins to stir; and gradually energising more and more, and growing and expanding, it suddenly bursts the bonds of that external profession, which, though its first, was never really its proper habitation. During this interval it uses the language which it has inherited, and thinks it certainly true; yet all the while its own genuine thoughts and modes of thinking are germinating and ramifying and penetrating into the old teaching which only in name belongs to it; till its external manifestations are plainly inconsistent with each other, though sooner in the apprehension of others than in its own, nay perhaps for a season it maintains what it has received by education the more vehemently, by way of keeping in check or guarding the new views,

which are opening upon it, and which startle it by their strangeness. What happens in Science, Philosophy, Politics, or the Arts, may happen, I say, in Religion too; there is such a thing as an inchoate faith or incomplete creed, which is not yet fully Catholic, yet is Catholic as far as it goes, tends to Catholicism, and is in the way to reach it, whether in the event it actually is happy enough to reach it or not. And from the beginning such a creed, such a theology was, I grant, the work of a supernatural principle, which, exercising itself first in the rudiments of truth, finished in its perfection. Man cannot determine in what instances that principle of grace is present and in what not, except by the event; but wherever it is, whether it can be ascertained by man or not, whether it reaches its destination, which is Catholicity, or whether it is ultimately frustrated and fails, still in every case the Church claims that work as her own; because it tends to her, because it is recognised by all men, even enemies, to belong to her, because it comes of that divine power, which is given to her in fulness, and because it anticipates portions of that divine creed which is committed to her infallibility as an everlasting deposit. And in this sense it is perfectly true that a Protestant may hold and teach one doctrine of Catholicism without holding or teaching another; but then, as I have said, he is in the way to hold others, in the way to profess all, and he is

inconsistent if he does not, and till he does. Nay, he is already reaching forward to the whole truth, from the very circumstance of his really grasping any part of it. So strongly do I feel this, that I account it no paradox to say, that, let a man but master the one doctrine with which I began these Discourses, the Being of a God, let him really and truly, and not in words only, or by inherited profession, or in the conclusions of reason, but by a direct apprehension, be a Monotheist, and he is already three-fourths of the way towards Catholicism.

I allow all this as regards individuals; but I have not to do with individual teachers in this Discourse, but with systems, institutions, bodies of men. There are doubtless individual Protestants, who, so far from making their Catholic pupils Protestant, lead on their Protestant pupils to Catholicism; but we cannot legislate for exceptions, nor can we tell for certain before the event where those exceptional cases are to be found. As to bodies of men, political or religious, we may safely say that they are what they profess to be, perhaps worse, certainly not better; and, if we would be safe, we must look to their principles, not to this or that individual, whom they can put forward for an occasion. Half the evil that happens in public affairs arises from the mistake of measuring parties, not by their history and by their position, but by their accidental manifestations of the moment, the place, or the person. Who would say, for

instance, that the Evangelical Church of Prussia had any real affinities to Catholicism; and yet how many fine words do certain of its supporters use, and how favourably disposed to the Church do they seem, till they are cross-examined and their radical heterodoxy brought to view! It is not so many years since, that by means of their "common doctrines", as they would call them, they persuaded an ecclesiastical body, as different from them, as any Protestant body which could be named, I mean the ruling party in the Establishment, to join with them in the foundation of an episcopal see at Jerusalem, a project, as absurd, as it was odious, when viewed in a religious aspect. Such too are the persevering attempts, which excellent men in the Anglican Church have made, to bring about a better understanding between the Greeks or Russians and their own communion, as if the Oriental Church were not formed on one type, and the Protestant Establishment on another, or the process of joining them were any thing short of the impossible exploit of fusing two individuals into one. And the case is the same as regards the so-called approaches of heterodox bodies or institutions towards Catholicism. Men may have glowing imaginations, warm feelings, or benevolent tempers; they may be very little aware themselves how far they are removed from Catholicism; they may even style themselves its friends, and be disappointed it does not recognise them; they may admire

its doctrines, they may think it uncharitable in us not to meet them half way. All the while, they may have nothing whatever of that form, idea, type of Catholicism, even in its inchoate condition, which I have allowed to some individuals among them. Such are the liberal politicians, and liberal philosophers and writers, who are considered by the multitude to be one with us, when, alas! they have neither part nor lot with the Catholic Church. Many a poet, many a brilliant writer, of this or the past generation, has taken upon himself to admire, or has been thought to understand, the Mother of Saints, on no better ground than this superficial survey of some portion of her lineaments. This is why some persons have been so taken by surprise at the late outburst against us in England, because they fancied men would be better than their systems. This is why we have to lament, in times past and present, the resolute holding off from us of learned men in the Establishment, who seemed or seem to come nearest to us. Pearson, or Bull, or Beveridge, almost touches the gates of the Divine City, yet he gropes for them in vain; for such men are formed on a different type from the Catholic, and the most Catholic of their doctrines are not Catholic in them. In vain are the most ecclesiastical thoughts, the most ample concessions, the most promising aspirations, nay, the most fraternal sentiments, if they are not an integral part of that intellectual and moral form,



which is ultimately from divine grace, and of which faith, not carnal wisdom, is the characteristic. The event shows this, as in the case of those many, who, as time goes on, after appearing to approach the Church, recede from her. In other cases the event is not necessary for their detection, to Catholics who happen to be near them. These are conscious in them of something or other, different from Catholicism, a bearing, or an aspect, or a tone, which they cannot indeed analyze or account for, but which they cannot mistake. They may not be able to put their finger on a single definite error; but, in proportion to the clearness of their spiritual discernment or the exactness of their theology, do they recognise, either the incipient heresiarch within the Church's pale, or the unhopeful inquirer outside of it. Whichever he be, he has made a wrong start; and however long the road has been, he has to go back and begin again. So it is with the bodies, institutions, and systems of which he is the specimen; they may die, they cannot be reformed.

And now, Gentlemen, I have arrived at the end of my subject. It has come before us so prominently during the course of the discussion, that to sum up is scarcely more than to repeat what has been said many times already. The Catholic Creed is one whole, and Philosophy again is one whole; each may be compared to an individual, to which nothing can be added, from which nothing can be taken away.

They may be professed, they may not be professed, but there is no middle ground between professing and not professing. A University, so called, which refuses to profess the Catholic Creed, is, from the nature of the case, hostile both to the Church and to Philosophy.

## DISCOURSE VI.

### PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE ITS OWN END.

It must not be supposed, that, in the remarks I have made in my foregoing Discourse on the organic character (if I may use so strong a word in want of a better) of the various branches of Knowledge, viewed together, that I have been merely pointing out a peculiarity, which we may recognise or not at our pleasure; and that, on the ground, for instance, that a System of knowledge is more beautiful intellectually, or more serviceable in practice, true though this may be, than a confused litter of facts, or a heap of observations or rules. On the contrary, I assumed the fact of a System, and went on to point out some of the consequences which it involved. I assume, not only as incontrovertible, but as more or less confessed by all men, that the various sciences, which occupy the field of Knowledge, have, not mutual relations only, but run towards and into each other, and converge and approximate to a philoso-

phical whole, whether we will or no:—so active is the sympathy which exists between them, so ready is the human mind to recognise, nay so impatient to anticipate, the Principle of System in all matters whatever, even at the risk of investing with laws and moulding into one, materials too scanty or too detached to sustain the process. Nor is it any unmixed compliment to the intellect thus to speak of its love of systematising; it is obliged to view its various creations all together from their very incompleteness separately. As well may we expect the various trades of a political community to be founded on a logical principle of division, and to expose nothing for sale in their respective windows, which has a place in the stores of their neighbours, as that the finite intellect of man should comprehend and duly parcel out the vast universe which envelopes it, or should achieve more than a series of partial and fitful successes in ascertaining the object of its investigation. Thus System is but the resource of beings, who know for the most part, not by intuition, but by reasoning; and that large philosophical survey of things, which I have set down as the scope of University Education, is necessary to us, as well as beautiful, and a monument, not only of our power, but of our poverty.

Here however, cautious and practical thinkers will consider themselves entitled to ask a question. They will inquire of me, what, after all, is the gain

of this Philosophy, of which I make such account, and from which I promise so much. Even supposing it to enable us to repose the degree of confidence exactly due to every science respectively, and to estimate precisely the value of every truth which is anywhere to be found, how are we the better for this master view of things, which I have been extolling? Does it not reverse the principle of the division of labour? will practical objects be obtained better or worse by its cultivation? to what then does it lead? where does it end? what does it do? how does it profit? what does it promise? Particular sciences are respectively the basis of definite arts, which carry on to results tangible and beneficial, the truths which are the objects of the knowledge attained; what is the Art of this science of sciences? what is the fruit of such a philosophy? Or, in other words, on the supposition that the case stands as I have represented it, what are we proposing to effect, what inducements do we hold out to the Catholic community, when we set about the enterprise of founding a University?

This is a very natural and appropriate, and to me not unwelcome, question; I even wish to consider it. I agree with the objectors, that the representatives of a great interest cannot reasonably resolve, cannot be invited, to join together in the prosecution of an object, which involves odium, anxiety, trouble, and expence, without having an end set before them,

definite in itself, and commensurate with their exertions. I own, I have done very little till I have answered the question; and it admits a clear answer, yet it will be somewhat a long one. I shall not finish it to-day, nor in my next Discourse, but I trust, Gentlemen, that from the first and at once I shall be able to say what will justify me in your eyes in taxing your patience to hear me on, till I fairly come to my conclusion.

However, I will not delay frankly to tell you what that conclusion is to be. When then I am asked what is the end of a Liberal or University Education, and of the Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive it to impart, I answer, that it has a very tangible, real, and sufficient end, but that the end cannot be divided from that knowledge itself. Knowledge is capable of being its own end. Such is the constitution of the human mind, that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward. And if this is true of all knowledge, it is true of that special Philosophy, which I have made to consist in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values. What the worth of such an acquirement is, compared with other objects which we seek,—wealth or power or honour or the conveniences and comforts of life, I do not profess here to discuss; but I would maintain, and mean to show, that it is an object, in its own nature

so really and undeniably good, as to be the compensation of a great deal of thought in compassing, and a great deal of trouble in attaining.

Now, when I say that Knowledge is, not merely a means to something beyond it, or the preliminary of certain arts into which it naturally resolves, but an end sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake, surely I am uttering no paradox, for I am stating what is both intelligible in itself, and has ever been the common judgment of philosophers and the ordinary feeling of mankind. I am saying what at least the public opinion of this day ought to be slow to deny, considering how much we have heard of late years, in opposition to Religion, of entertaining, curious, and various knowledge. I am but saying what whole volumes have been written to illustrate, by a "selection from the records of Philosophy, Literature, and Art, in all ages and countries, of a body of examples, to show how the most unpropitious circumstances have been unable to conquer an ardent desire for the acquisition of knowledge".\* That further advantages accrue to us and redound to others, by its possession, over and above what it is in itself, I am very far indeed from denying; but, independent of these, we are satisfying a direct need of our nature in its very acquisition; and, whereas our nature, unlike that of the inferior creation, does not at once reach its perfection, but depends in order

\* Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties. Introd.

to it on a number of external aids and appliances, Knowledge, as one of those principal gifts or accessories, by which it is completed, is valuable for what its very presence in us does for us by a sort of *opus operatum*, even though it be turned to no further account, nor subserve any direct end.

Hence it is that Cicero, in enumerating the various heads of mental excellence, lays down the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, as the first of them. "This pertains most of all to human nature", he says, "for we are all of us drawn to the pursuit of knowledge; in which to excel we consider excellent, whereas to mistake, to err, to be ignorant, to be deceived, is both an evil and a disgrace".\* And he considers Knowledge the very first object to which we are attracted, after the supply of our physical wants. After the calls and duties of our animal existence, as they may be termed, as regards ourselves, our family, and our neighbours, follows, he tells us, "the search after truth. Accordingly, as soon as we escape from the pressure of necessary cares, forthwith we desire to see, to hear, to learn; and consider the knowledge of what is hidden or is wonderful a condition of our happiness".

This passage, though it is but one of many similar passages in a multitude of authors, I take for the very reason that it is so familiarly known to us; and I wish you to observe, Gentlemen, how distinctly it

\* Cicer. Offic. init.



separates the pursuit of Knowledge from those ulterior objects to which certainly it can be made to conduce, and which are, I suppose, solely contemplated by the persons who would ask of me the use of a University or Liberal Education. So far from dreaming of the cultivation of Knowledge directly and mainly in order to our physical comfort and enjoyment, for the sake of life and person, of health, of the conjugal and family union, of the social tie and civil security, the great Orator implies, that it is only after our physical and political needs are supplied, and when we are "free from necessary duties and cares", that we are in a condition for "desiring to see, to hear, and to learn". Nor does he contemplate in the least degree the reflex or subsequent action of Knowledge, when acquired, upon those material goods which we set out by securing before we seek it; on the contrary, he expressly denies its bearing upon social life altogether, strange as such a procedure is to those who live after the rise of the Baconian philosophy, and he cautions us against such a cultivation of it as will interfere with our duties to our fellow creatures. "All these methods", he says, "are engaged in the investigation of truth; by the pursuit of which to be carried off from public occupations is a transgression of duty. For the praise of virtue lies altogether in action; yet intermissions often occur, and then we recur to such pursuits; not to say that the incessant activity of the mind is vigorous

enough to carry us on in the pursuit of knowledge, even without any exertion of our own". The idea of benefiting society by means of "the pursuits of science and knowledge" did not enter at all into the motives which he would assign for their cultivation.

This was the ground of the opposition, which the elder Cato made to the introduction of Greek Philosophy among his countrymen, when Carneades and his companions, on occasion of their embassy, were charming the Roman youth with their eloquent expositions of it. A fit representative of a practical people, he estimated everything by what it produced; whereas the Pursuit of Knowledge promised nothing beyond Knowledge itself. It was as fatal, he considered, to attempt to measure the advantages of Philosophy by a Utilitarian standard, as to estimate a point of taste by a barometer, or to trace out an emotion by an equation. Cato knew at the time as little of what is meant by refinement or enlargement of mind, as the busy every-day world now knows of the operations of grace. He despised what he had never felt.

Things, which can bear to be cut off from everything else and yet persist in living, must have life in themselves; pursuits, which issue in nothing, and still maintain their ground for ages, which are regarded as admirable, though they have not as yet proved themselves to be useful, must have their sufficient end in themselves, whatever it turn out to be. And we are brought to the same conclusion by considering the

force of the epithet, by which the knowledge under consideration is popularly designated. It is common to speak of "*liberal* knowledge", of the "*liberal* arts and studies", and of a "*liberal* education", as the especial characteristic or property of a University and of a gentleman; what is meant by the word? Now, first, in its grammatical sense it is opposed to *servile*; and by "servile work" is understood, as our catechisms inform us, bodily labour, mechanical employment, and the like, in which the mind has little or no part. Parallel to such works are the arts, if they deserve the name, of which the poet speaks,\* which owe their origin and their method to chance, not to skill; as, for instance, the practice and operations of a quack. As far as this contrast may be considered as a guide into the meaning of the word, liberal knowledge and liberal pursuits are such as belong to the mind, not to the body.

But we want something more for its explanation, for there are bodily exercises which are liberal, and mental exercises which are not so. For instance, in ancient times the practitioners in medicine were commonly slaves; yet it was an art as intellectual in its nature, in spite of the low magic or empiricism with which it might then, as now, be debased, as it was heavenly in its aim. And so in like manner, we contrast a liberal education with a commercial edu-

\* Τέχνη τυχῆν ἰστέριζι καὶ τυχῆ τέχνην.

Vid. Arist. Nic. Ethic. vi.

eration or a professional; yet no one can deny that commerce and the professions afford scope for the highest and most diversified powers of mind. There is then a great variety of intellectual exercises, which are not technically called "liberal"; on the other hand, I say, there are exercises of the body which do receive that appellation. Such, for instance, was the palæstra, in ancient times; such the Olympic games, in which strength and dexterity of body as well as of mind gained the prize. In Xenophon we read of the young Persian nobility being taught to ride on horseback and to speak the truth; both being among the accomplishments of a gentleman. War, too, however rough a profession, has ever been accounted liberal, unless in cases when it becomes heroic, which would introduce us to another subject.

Now comparing these instances together, we shall have no difficulty in determining the principle of this apparent variation in the application of the term which I am examining. Manly games, or games of skill, or military prowess, though bodily, are, it seems, accounted liberal; on the other hand, what is merely professional, though highly intellectual, nay, though liberal in comparison of trade and manual labour, is not simply called liberal, and mercantile occupations are not liberal at all. Why this distinction? because that alone is liberal knowledge, which stands on its own pretensions, which is independent of sequel, expects no complement, refuses to be

*informed* (as it is called) by any end, or absorbed into any art, in order duly to present itself to our contemplation. The most ordinary pursuits have this specific character, if they are self-sufficient and complete; the highest lose it, when they minister to something beyond them. It is absurd to balance a treatise on reducing fractures with a game of cricket or a fox-chase; yet of the two the bodily exercise has that quality which we call "liberal", and the intellectual has it not. And so of the learned professions altogether, considered merely as professions; though the one of them be the most popularly beneficial, and another the most politically important, and the third the most intimately divine of all human pursuits, yet the very greatness of their end, the health of the body, or of the commonwealth, or of the soul, diminishes, not increases, their claim to the appellation in question, and that still more, if they are cut down to the strict exigencies of that end. If, for instance, Theology, instead of being cultivated as a contemplation, be limited to the purposes of the pulpit or be represented by the catechism, it loses, not its usefulness, not its divine character, not its meritoriousness (rather it increases it by such charitable condescension), but the particular attribute which I am illustrating; just as a face worn by tears and fasting loses its beauty, or a labourer's hand loses its delicateness;—for Theology thus exercised is not simple knowledge, but rather is an art or a

business making use of Theology. And thus it appears that even what is supernatural need not be liberal, nor need a hero be a gentleman, for the plain reason that one idea is not another idea. And in like manner the Baconian Philosophy, by using its physical sciences for the purpose of fruit, does thereby transfer them from the order of Liberal Pursuits to, I do not say the inferior, but the distinct class of the Useful. And, to take a different instance, hence again, as is evident, whenever the motive of gain is introduced, still more does it change the character of a given pursuit; thus racing, which was a liberal exercise in Greece, forfeits its rank in times like these, so far as it is made the occasion of gambling.

All that I have been now saying is summed up in a few characteristic words of the great Philosopher. "Of possessions", he says, "those rather are useful, which bear fruit; those *liberal, which tend to enjoyment*. By fruitful, I mean, which yield revenue; by enjoyable, where *nothing accrues of consequence beyond the use*".\*

Do not suppose, Gentlemen, that, in thus appealing to the ancients, I am throwing back the world two thousand years, and fettering Philosophy with the reasonings of paganism. While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth. When I hear people ridiculing Catholics, as they sometimes do, for

\* Aristot. Rhet. i. 5.

deferring to the schools of Greece, I am reminded of the man who thought it strange or hard, that he should have been talking prose all his life, without knowing it. As prose is but a name for our ordinary style of conversation, so, while we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyse the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it. He was most wonderfully raised up, as for other reasons, so especially to be minister to a Divine Revelation, of which personally he knew nothing; and it is both true wisdom and mere thankfulness to accept the gift provided for us, for the purposes which it answers. Now, as to the particular instance before us, the word "liberal" as applied to Knowledge and Education, expresses a specific idea, which ever has been, and ever will be, while the nature of man is the same, just as the idea of the Beautiful is specific, or the Sublime, or the Ridiculous, or the Sordid. It is in the world now, it was in the world then; and, as in the case of the dogmas of faith, it is illustrated by a continuous historical tradition, and never was out of the world, from the time it came into it. There have indeed been differences of opinion from time to time, as to what

pursuits and what arts came under that idea, but such differences are but an additional evidence of its reality. That idea must have a substance in it, which has maintained its ground amid these conflicts and changes, which has ever served as a standard to measure things withal, which has passed from mind to mind unchanged, when there was so much to colour, so much to influence any notion or thought whatever, which was not founded in our very nature. Were it a mere generalisation, it would have varied with the subjects from which it was generalised; but though its subjects vary with the age, it varies not itself. The palaestra may seem a liberal exercise to Lyeurgus, and illiberal to Seneca; coach-driving and prize-fighting may be recognised in Elis, and be condemned in England; music may be despicable in the eyes of certain moderns, and be in the highest place with Aristotle and Plato,—(and the case is the same in the particular application of the idea of Beauty, or of Goodness, or of Moral Virtue, there is a difference of tastes, a difference of judgments)—still these variations imply, instead of discrediting, the archetypal idea, which is but a previous hypothesis or condition, by means of which issue is joined between contending opinions, and without which there would be nothing to dispute about.

I consider then, that I am chargeable with no paradox, when I speak of a Knowledge which is its own end, when I call it liberal knowledge, or a gentleman's



knowledge, when I educate for it, and make it the scope of a University. And still less am I incurring such a charge, when I make this acquisition consist, not in Knowledge in a vague and ordinary sense, but in that knowledge which I have especially called Philosophy or, in an extended sense of the word, Science; for whatever claims Knowledge has to be considered as a good, these it has in a higher degree when it is viewed not vaguely, not popularly, but precisely and transcendently as Philosophy. Knowledge, I say, is especially liberal, or needs no end beside itself, when and so far as it is philosophical; and this I proceed to show.

You may recollect, Gentlemen, that, in my foregoing Discourse, I said that systematising, or taking general views of all departments of thought, or what I called Philosophy, was but a modification of the mental condition which we designate by the name of science, or was a Science of sciences; now bear with me, if what I am about to say, has at first sight a fanciful appearance. Philosophy then or Science is related to Knowledge in this way:—Knowledge is called by the name of Science or Philosophy, when it is acted upon, informed, or, if I may use a strong figure, impregnated by Reason. Reason is the principle of that intrinsic fecundity of Knowledge, which, to those who possess it, is its especial value, and which dispenses with the necessity of their looking abroad for any end to rest upon external to itself.

Knowledge indeed, when thus exalted into a scientific form, is also power; not only is it excellent in itself, but whatever such excellence may be, it is something more, it has a result beyond itself. Doubtless; but that is a further consideration, with which I am not concerned. I only say that, prior to its being a power, it is a good; that it is, not only an instrument, but an end. I know well it may resolve itself into an art, and terminate in a mechanical process, and in tangible fruit; but it also may fall back upon reason, and resolve itself into philosophy. In the one case it is called Useful Knowledge, in the other Liberal. The same person may cultivate it in both ways at once; but this again is a matter foreign to my subject; here I do but say that there are two ways of using Knowledge, and in matter of fact those who use it in one way are not likely to use it in the other, or at least in a very limited measure. You see then, Gentlemen, here are two methods of Education; the one aspires to be philosophical, the other to be mechanical; the one rises towards ideas, the other is exhausted upon what is particular and external. Let me not be thought to deny the necessity, or to decry the benefit, of such attention to what is particular and practical, of the useful or mechanical arts; life could not go on without them; we owe our daily welfare to them; their exercise is the duty of the many, and we owe to the many a debt of gratitude for fulfilling it. I only say that Knowledge, in proportion as it tends more

and more to be particular, ceases to be Knowledge. It is a question whether Knowledge can in any proper sense be predicated of the brute creation; without pretending to metaphysical exactness of phraseology, which would be unsuitable to an occasion like this, I say, it seems to me improper to call that passive sensation, or perception of things, which brutes seem to possess, by the name of Knowledge. When I speak of Knowledge, I mean something intellectual, something which grasps what it perceives through the senses; something which takes a view of things; which sees more than the senses convey; which reasons upon what it sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an idea. It expresses itself, not in a mere enunciation, but by an enthymeme: it is of the nature of science from the first, and in this consists its dignity. The principle of real dignity in Knowledge, its worth, its desirableness, considered irrespectively of its results, is this germ within it of a scientific or a philosophical process. This is how it comes to be an end in itself; this is why it is called Liberal. Not to know the relative disposition of things is the state of slaves or children; to have mapped out the Universe is the boast of Philosophy.

*Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,  
Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum  
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.*

You may ask me, Gentlemen, how all this is

consistent with the dignity of Christianity, with the merit of faith. You will say that faith is confident, that obedience is prompt, yet without knowing why; that ignorance is the very condition both of the one and the other. Though we cannot verify by reason, yet we take upon us, on God's word, the very truth to be believed, the very work to be done; this is the beginning surely of all supernatural excellence. Here we are upon a new subject, yet I am not unwilling to say a word upon it by way of illustrating the point I am making good. In the first place, then, I deny that Faith is a mere unreasoning act; on the contrary, it has an intellectual nature. It is no brute or necessary sensation or perception; it has in it, as divines have noticed, a discursive process. We believe what is revealed to us from belief in the Revealer. But again, even though a state of mind were imposed upon us by Christianity, less elevated, less noble, than we should choose for ourselves, if the choice were ours, I suppose it must not be left out of consideration, that our race once was in a higher state and has forfeited it. Ignorance was not always our natural portion, nor slavery our birthright. When the Divine Voice quickens us from the dust in which we lie, it is to call us to a dignity higher even than that which was ours in the beginning; but it restores us by degrees. At first, we emerge from the state of slaves into that of children and of children only, and not yet of men. We are exercised by faith;

it is our education. And in like manner children are exercised at school; they are taught the rudiments of knowledge upon faith; they do not begin with philosophy. But, as in the natural order, we mount up to philosophical largeness of mind from lessons learned by rote and the schoolmaster's rod, so too in the order supernatural, even in this life, and far more truly in the life to come, we pass on from faith and penance to contemplation. Such is the loving-kindness of the Everlasting Father, "*suscitans à terrâ inopem, et de stercore erigens pauperem*". To those who have begun with faith, He adds, in course of time, a higher gift, the gift of Wisdom, which, not superseding, but presupposing Faith, gives us so broad and deep a view of things revealed, that their very consistency is an evidence of their Author, and, like the visible world, persuades us to adore His Majesty. This endowment the Apostle speaks of, when addressing the educated Corinthians. First he makes mention of that liberal knowledge or philosophy in the natural order, which is my present subject, and which in the absence of theology had been sublimated into an empty worthless speculation, and had become a mere "worldly wisdom". After warning his converts against this perversion, he proceeds to say, by way of contrast, "We speak a wisdom among the perfect, yet not the wisdom of this world, but the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom, which is hidden wisdom". Such a wisdom

is the whole series of Christian Evidences, the cumulative proof of the Being of a God, of the divinity of Judaism, and of the mission of the Apostles; such the course of the Divine Dispensations, the structure of Scripture Prophecy, the analogy between the systems of nature and grace; such the notes of the Church, the history of miracles, the philosophy and phenomena of the heroic life, the neverending conflict between Christ and the world, the harmony of Catholic doctrine, and the process of its evolution. These and many other subjects of thought form a multitude, or rather a system and philosophy of divine sciences, which, rising out of Faith, tend nevertheless towards that eternal state of illumination, when Faith shall yield to sight. It is the gift of Wisdom; and of this our Lord seems to speak, and almost designates it as the liberal knowledge of His favoured ones, by contrasting it with the servile condition of mind in which we act without being able to give an account of our actions. "I will not now call you servants", He says, "for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doth; but I have called you friends, because all things, whatsoever I have heard from my Father, I have made known to you".

Parallel then to this Divine Wisdom, but in the natural order, even though it takes cognisance of supernatural subjects, is that philosophical view or grasp of all matters of thought, in which I have considered Liberal Knowledge to consist, and which is

desirable for its own sake, though it brought with it nothing beyond. Such knowledge is not a mere extrinsic or accidental advantage, which is ours to-day and another's to-morrow, which may be got up from a book, and easily forgotten again, which we can command or communicate at our pleasure, which we can borrow for the occasion, carry about in our hand, and take into the market; it is an acquired illumination, it is a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment. And this is the reason, why it is more correct, as well as more usual, to speak of a University as a place of education, than of instruction, though, when knowledge is concerned, instruction would at first sight have seemed the more appropriate word. We are instructed, for instance, in manual exercises, in the fine and useful arts, in trades, and in ways of business; for these are methods, which have little or no effect upon the mind itself, are contained in rules committed to memory, tradition, or use, and bear upon an end external to themselves. But Education is a higher word; it implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a character; it is something individual and permanent, and is commonly spoken of in connexion with religion and virtue. When then we speak of the communication of Knowledge as being Education, we thereby really imply that that Knowledge is a state or condition of mind; and since cultivation of mind is surely worth seeking for its own

sake, we are thus brought once more to the conclusion, which the word "Liberal" and the word "Philosophy" have already suggested, that there is a Knowledge, which is desirable, though nothing come of it, as being of itself a treasure, and a sufficient remuneration of years of labour.

This then is the answer which I am prepared to give to the question with which I opened this Discourse. Before going on to speak of the object of the Church in taking up Philosophy, and the uses to which she puts it, I am prepared to maintain that Philosophy is its own end, and to-day, as I conceive, I have begun proving it. I am prepared to maintain that, there is a knowledge worth possessing for what it is, and not merely for what it does. This important principle is the issue, if it be not the drift, of all that I have been saying in my preceding Discourses; I hope it will not seem paradoxical or unreal; for some time to come I shall employ myself upon it; and what minutes remain to me to-day I shall devote to the removal of some portion of the indistinctness and confusion with which it may in some minds be surrounded.

It may be objected then, that, when we profess to seek Knowledge for some end or other beyond, whatever it be, we speak intelligibly; but, that, whatever men may have said, however obstinately the idea may have kept its ground from age to age, still it is simply unmeaning to say that we seek Knowledge for its own sake, and for nothing else; for that it ever leads



to something beyond itself, which therefore is its end, and the cause why it is desirable;—moreover, that this end is two-fold, either of this world or of the next; that all knowledge is cultivated either for secular objects or for eternal; that, if it is directed to secular objects, it is called Useful Knowledge, if to eternal, Religious or Christian Knowledge;—in consequence, that if, as I have allowed, this Liberal Knowledge does not benefit the body or estate, it ought to benefit the soul; but if the fact be really so, that it is neither a physical or secular good on the one hand, nor a moral good on the other, it cannot be a good at all, and is not worth the trouble which is necessary for its acquisition.

And then I may be reminded that the professors of this Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge have themselves, in every age recognised this exposition of the matter, and have submitted to the issue in which it terminates; for they have ever been attempting to make men virtuous; or, if not, at least have assumed that refinement of mind was virtue, and that they themselves were the virtuous portion of mankind. This they have professed on the one hand; and on the other, they have utterly failed in their professions, so as ever to make themselves a proverb among men, and a laughing stock both to grave and dissipated, in consequence of them. Thus they have furnished against themselves both the ground and the means of their own exposure, without any trouble

at all to any one else. In a word, from the time that Athens was the University of the world, what has Philosophy taught men, but to promise without practising, and to aspire without attaining? What has the deep and lofty thought of its disciples ended in but eloquent words? Nay, what has its teaching ever meditated, when it was boldest in its remedies for human ill, beyond charming us to sleep by its lessons, that we might feel nothing at all? like some melodious air, or rather like those strong and transporting perfumes, which at first spread their sweetness over every thing they touch, but in a little while do but offend in proportion as they once pleased us. Did Philosophy support Cicero under the disfavor of the fickle populace, or nerve Seneca to oppose an imperial tyrant? It abandoned Brutus, as he sorrowfully confessed, in his greatest need, and it forced Cato, as his panegyrist strangely boasts, into the false position of defying heaven. How many can be counted among its professors, who, like Polemo, were thereby converted from a profligate course, or like Anaxagoras, thought the world well lost, in exchange for its possession? The philosopher in Rasselas taught a superhuman doctrine, and then succumbed without an effort to a trial of human affection.

“He discoursed”, we are told, “with great energy on the government of the passions. His look was venerable, his action graceful, his pronunciation

clear, and his diction elegant. He showed, with great strength of sentiment and variety of illustration, that human nature is degraded and debased, when the lower faculties predominate over the higher. He communicated the various precepts given, from time to time, for the conquest of passion, and displayed the happiness of those who had obtained the important victory, after which man is no longer the slave of fear, nor the fool of hope..... He enumerated many examples of heroes immoveable by pain or pleasure, who looked with indifference on those modes or accidents, to which the vulgar give the names of good and evil".

Rasselas in a few days found the philosopher in a room half darkened, with his eyes misty, and his face pale. "Sir", said he, "you have come at a time when all human friendship is useless; what I suffer cannot be remedied, what I have lost cannot be supplied. My daughter, my only daughter, from whose tenderness I expected all the comforts of my age, died last night of a fever". "Sir", said the prince, "mortality is an event by which a wise man can never be surprised; we know that death is always near, and it should therefore always be expected". "Young man", answered the philosopher, "you speak like one who has never felt the pangs of separation". "Have you then forgot the precept", said Rasselas, "which you so powerfully enforced?...

consider, that external things are naturally variable, but truth and reason are always the same". "What comfort", said the mourner, "can truth and reason afford me? Of what effect are they now, but to tell me, that my daughter will not be restored?"

Better, far better, to make no professions, than to cheat others with what we are not, and to scandalize them with what we are. The sensualist, or the man of the world, at any rate is not the victim of fine words, but pursues a reality and gains it. The Philosophy of Utility, you will say, Gentlemen, has at least done its work; it aimed low, but it has fulfilled its aim. If that man of great intellect who has been its Prophet, in the conduct of life played false to his own professions, he was not bound by his philosophy to be true to his friend or faithful in his trust. Moral virtue was not the line in which he undertook to instruct men; and though, as the poet calls him, he were the "meanest" of mankind, he was so in what may be called his private capacity and without any prejudice to the theory of induction. He had a right to be so, if he chose, for anything the Idols of the den or the theatre had to say to the contrary. His mission was the increase of physical enjoyment and social comfort;\* and most wonderfully, most awfully has he fulfilled his conception and his design.

\* It will be seen that on the whole I agree with Mr. Macaulay in his Essay on Bacon's Philosophy. I do not know whether he would agree with me.

Almost day by day have we fresh and fresh shoots, and buds, and blossoms, which are to ripen into fruit, on that magical tree of Knowledge which he planted, and to which none of us perhaps, except the very poor, but owes, if not his present life, at least his daily food, his health, and general wellbeing. He was the divinely provided minister of temporal benefits to all of us so great, that, whatever I am forced to think of him as a man, I have not the heart, from mere gratitude, to speak of him severely. And, in spite of the tendencies of his philosophy, which are, as we see at this day, to depreciate, or to trample on Theology, he has himself, in his writings, gone out of his way, as if with a prophetic misgiving of those tendencies, to insist on it as the instrument of that beneficent Father,\* who, when He came on earth in visible form, took on Him first and most prominently the office of assuaging the bodily wounds of human nature. And truly, like the old mediciner in the Tale, he “sat diligently at his work, and hummed,

\* De Augment, iv. 2, vid. Mr. Macaulay's Essay; Also “In principio operis ad Deum Patrem, Deum Verbum, Deum Spiritum, preces fundimus humillimas et ardentissimas, ut humani generis ærumnarum memores, et peregrinationis istius vitæ, in quâ dies paucos et malos terimus, *novis suis cleemosynis, per manus nostras, familiam humanam dotare dignentur.* Atque illud insuper supplices rogamus, ne *humana divinis officiant*; neve *ex reseratione viarum sensus, et accensione majore luminis naturalis, aliquid incredulitatis et noctis, animis nostris erga divina mysteria oboriatur, etc.* Pref. Instaur. Magn.

with cheerful countenance, a pious song"; and then in turn "went out singing into the meadows so gaily, that those who had seen him from afar might well have thought it was a youth gathering flowers for his beloved, instead of an old physician gathering healing herbs in the morning dew".\*

Alas, that men are not in the action of life or in their heart of hearts, what they seem to be in their moments of excitement, or in their trances or intoxications of genius,—so good, so noble, so serene! Alas, that Bacon too† in his own way should after all be but the fellow of those heathen philosophers who in their disadvantages had some excuse for their inconsistency, and who surprise us rather in what they did say than in what they did not do. Alas, that he too, like Socrates or Seneca, must be stripped of his holy-day coat, which looks so fair, and should be but a mockery amid his most majestic gravity of phrase, and for all his vast abilities, should, in the littleness of his own moral being, but typify the intellectual narrowness of his school. However, granting all this, heroism after all was not his philosophy; I cannot deny he has abundantly achieved what he proposed. His is simply a Method whereby bodily discomforts and temporal wants are to be most effectually removed from the greatest number; and already, before it has shown any

\* Fouqué's Unknown Patient.

† Te maris et terræ, etc. Hor. Od. i. 28.

signs of exhaustion, the gifts of nature, in their most artificial shapes and luxurious profusion and diversity, from all quarters of the earth, are, it is undeniable, brought even to our doors, and we rejoice in them.

Useful Knowledge then certainly has done its work; and Liberal Knowledge as certainly has not done its work: supposing, that is, as the objectors assume, its direct end, like Religious Knowledge, is to make men better; but this I will not for an instant allow. For all its friends, or its enemies, may say, I insist upon it, that it is as real a mistake to implicate it with virtue or religion, as with the arts. Its direct business is not to steel the soul against temptation or to console it in affliction, any more than to set the loom in motion, or to direct the steam carriage; be it ever so much, the means or the condition of both material and moral advancement, still, taken by and in itself, it as little mends our hearts, as it improves our temporal circumstances. And if its eulogists claim for it such a power, they commit the very same kind of encroachment on a province not their own, as the political economist who should maintain that his science educated him for casuistry or diplomacy. Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another; good sense is not conscience, refinement is not humility, nor is largeness and justness of view faith. Philosophy, however enlightened, however profound, gives no command over the passions, no influential

motives, no vivifying principles. Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman. It is well to be a gentleman, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life;—these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge; they are the objects of a University; I am advocating, I shall illustrate and insist upon them; but still, I repeat, they are no guarantee for sanctity or even for conscientiousness, they may attach to the man of the world, to the profligate, to the heartless,—pleasant, alas, and attractive as he seems when decked out in them. Taken by themselves, they do but seem to be what they are not; they look like virtue at a distance, but they are detected by close observers, and on the long run; and hence it is that they are popularly accused of pretence and hypocrisy, not, I repeat, from their own fault, but because their professors and their admirers persist in taking them for what they are not, and are officious in arrogating for them a praise to which they have no claim. Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of man.

Surely we are not driven to theories of this kind, in order to vindicate the value and dignity of



Liberal Knowledge. Surely the real grounds on which its pretensions rest, are not so very subtle or abstruse, so very strange or improbable. Surely it is very intelligible to say, and that is what I say here, that Liberal Education, viewed in itself, is simply the cultivation of the intellect, as such, and its object is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence. Every thing has its own perfection, be it higher or lower in the scale of things; and the perfection of one is not the perfection of another. Things animate, inanimate, visible, invisible, all are good in their kind, and have a *best* of themselves, which is an object of pursuit. Why do you take such pains with your garden or your park? You see to your walks and turf and shrubberies; to your trees and drives; not as if you meant to make an orchard of the one, or corn or pasture land of the other, but because there is a special beauty in all that is goodly in wood, water, plain, and slope, brought all together by art into one shape, and grouped into one whole. Your cities are beautiful, your palaces, your public buildings, your territorial mansions, your churches; and their beauty leads to nothing beyond itself. There is a physical beauty and a moral: there is a beauty of person, there is a beauty of our moral being, which is natural virtue; and in like manner there is a beauty, there is a perfection, of the intellect. There is an ideal perfection in these various subject matters, towards

which individual instances are seen to rise, and which are the standards for all instances whatever. The Greek divinities and demigods, as the statuary has moulded them, with their symmetry of figure, and their high forehead and their regular features, are the perfection of physical beauty. The heroes, of whom history tells, Alexander, or Cæsar, or Scipio, or Saladin, are the representatives of that magnanimity or self mastery which is the greatness of human nature. Christianity too has its heroes, and in the supernatural order, and we call them Saints. The artist puts before him beauty of feature and form; the poet, beauty of mind; the preacher, the beauty of grace: then intellect too, I repeat, has its beauty, and it has those who aim at it. To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, to give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address, eloquent expression, is an object as intelligible (for here we are inquiring, not what the object of a Liberal Education is worth, nor what use the Church makes of it, but what it is in itself,) I say, an object as intelligible as the cultivation of virtue, while, at the same time it is absolutely distinct from it.

This indeed is but a temporal object, and a transitory possession; but so are other things in themselves which we make much of and pursue. The moralist

will tell us, that man, in all his functions, is but a flower which blossoms and fades, except so far as a higher principle breathes upon him, and makes him and what he is, immortal. Body and mind are carried on into an eternal world by the gifts of Divine Munificence; but at first they do but fail in a failing world; and, if the powers of intellect decay, the powers of the body have decayed before them, and, if an Hospital or an Almshouse, though its end be secular, may be sanctified to the service of Religion, so surely may an University, were it nothing more than I have as yet described it. We attain to heaven by using this world well, though it is to pass away; we perfect our nature, not by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more than nature, and directing it towards aims higher than its own.







## DISCOURSE VII.

### PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO MENTAL ACQUIREMENTS.

It were well, if the English, like the Greek language, possessed some definite word to express simply and generally, intellectual proficiency or perfection, such as "health", as used with reference to the animal frame, and "virtue", with reference to our moral nature. I am not able to find such a term;—talent, ability, genius, belong distinctly to the raw material, which is the subject-matter, not to the excellence which is the result, of exercise and training. When we turn, indeed, to the particular kinds of intellectual perfection, words are forthcoming for our purpose as, for instance, judgment, taste, and skill; yet even these belong, for the most part, to powers or habits bearing upon practice or upon art, and not to any perfect condition of the intellect, considered in itself. Wisdom, again, which is a more comprehensive word than any other, certainly has a direct rela-

tion to conduct, and to human life. Knowledge, indeed, and Science express purely intellectual ideas, but still not a state or habit of the intellect; for knowledge, in its ordinary sense, is but one of its circumstances, denoting a possession or influence; and science has been appropriated to the subject matter of the intellect, instead of belonging at present, as it ought to do, to the intellect itself. The consequence is, that, on an occasion like this, many words are necessary, in order, first, to bring out and convey, what surely is no difficult idea in itself,—that of the cultivation of the intellect as an end; next, in order to recommend what surely is no unreasonable object; and lastly, to describe and realize to the mind the particular perfection in which that object consists. Every one knows practically what are the constituents of health or of virtue; and every one recognises health and virtue as ends to be pursued; it is otherwise with intellectual excellence, and this must be my excuse, if I seem to any one to be bestowing a good deal of labour on a preliminary matter.

In default of a recognized term, I have called the perfection or virtue of the intellect by the name of philosophy, philosophical knowledge, enlargement of mind, or illumination; terms which are not uncommonly given to it by writers of this day: but, whatever name we bestow on it, it is, I believe, as a matter of history, the business of a University to make this



intellectual culture its direct scope, or to employ itself in the education of the intellect,—just as the work of a Hospital lies in healing the sick or wounded, of a Riding or Fencing School, or a Gymnasium, in exercising the limbs, of an Almshouse, in aiding and solacing the old, of an Orphanage, in protecting innocence, of a Penitentiary, in restoring the guilty. I say, a University, taken in its bare idea, and before we view it as an instrument of the Church, has this object and this mission; it contemplates neither moral impression nor mechanical production; it professes to exercise neither in art nor in duty; its function is intellectual culture; here it may leave its scholars, and it has done its work, when it has done as much as this. It educates the mind, to reason well in all matters, to reach out to truth, and to grasp it.

This, I said in my foregoing Discourse, was the object of a University, viewed in itself, and apart from the Catholic Church, or from the State, or from any other power which may use it; and I illustrated it in various ways. I said, that the intellect must have an excellence of its own, for there was nothing which had not its specific good; that the word “educate” would not be used of intellectual training, as it is, had not that training had an end of its own; that, had it not such an end, there would be no meaning in calling certain intellectual exercises “liberal”, in contrast to “useful”, as is commonly done; that the very notion of a philosophical spirit

implied it, for it threw us back upon research and system as ends in themselves, distinct from effects and works of any kind; that a philosophical scheme of knowledge, or system of sciences, could not, from the nature of the case, issue in any one definite art or pursuit, as its end; and that, on the other hand, the discovery and contemplation of truth, to which research and systematizing led, were surely sufficient ends, though nothing beyond them were added, and that they had ever been accounted sufficient by mankind.

Here then I take up the subject; and, having determined that the cultivation of the intellect is an end distinct and sufficient in itself, and that, so far as words go, it is an enlargement or illumination, I proceed to inquire what this mental breadth, or power, or light, or philosophy consists in. A Hospital heals a broken limb or cures a fever: what does an Institution effect, which professes the health, not of the body, not of the soul, but of the intellect? What is this good, which, in former times, as well as our own, has been found worth the notice, the appropriation, of the Catholic Church?

I have then to investigate, in the Discourses which follow, those qualities and characteristics of the intellect, in which its cultivation issues or rather consists; and, with a view of assisting myself in this undertaking, I shall recur to certain questions which were started in the course of the discussion immediately preceding the present. These questions were

three; viz. the relation of intellectual culture, first, to *mere* or *material* knowledge; secondly, to *professional* knowledge; and thirdly, to *religious* knowledge. In other words, are *acquirements* and *attainments* the scope of a University Education? or *expertness in particular arts and pursuits*? or *moral and religious proficiency*? or something besides these three? These questions I shall examine in succession, with the purpose I have mentioned; and I hope to be excused, if, in this anxious undertaking, I am led to repeat what, either in these Discourses or elsewhere,\* I have already put upon paper. And first, of *Material Knowledge*, or *Acquirements*, and their connection with intellectual illumination or Philosophy.

I suppose the *primâ facie* view which the public at large would take of a University, considered as a place of Education, is nothing more or less than a place for acquiring a great deal of knowledge on a great many subjects. Memory is one of the first developed of the mental faculties; a boy's business, when he goes to school, is to learn, that is, to store up things in his memory. For some years his intellect is little more than an instrument for taking in facts, or a receptacle for storing them; he welcomes them as fast as they come to him; he lives on what is without; he has his eyes ever about him; he has a lively susceptibility of impressions; he imbibes information of every kind; and little does he make his

\* Vid. the Author's University (Oxford) Sermons.

own in a true sense of the word, living rather upon his neighbours all around him. He has opinions, religious, political, and literary, and, for a boy, is very positive in them and sure about them; but he gets them from his schoolfellows, or his masters, or his parents, as the case may be. Such as he is in his other relations, such also is he in his school exercises; his mind is observant, sharp, ready, retentive; he is almost passive in the acquisition of knowledge. I say this in no disparagement of the idea of a clever boy. Geography, chronology, history, language, natural history, he heaps up the matter of these studies as treasures for a future day. It is the seven years of plenty with him: he gathers in by handfuls, like the Egyptians, without counting; and though, as time goes on, there is exercise for his argumentative powers in the Elements of Mathematics, and for his taste in the Poets and Orators, still, while at school, or at least, till quite the last years of his time, he acquires, and little more; and when he is leaving for the University, he is mainly the creature of foreign influences and circumstances, and made up of accidents, homogeneous or not, as the case may be. Moreover, the moral habits, which are a boy's praise, encourage and assist this result; that is, diligence, assiduity, regularity, despatch, persevering application; for these are the direct conditions of acquisition, and naturally lead to it. Acquirements, again,

are emphatically producible, and at a moment; they are a something to show, for both master and scholar; an audience, even though ignorant themselves of the subjects of an examination, can comprehend when questions are answered and when they are not. Here again is a reason, why mental culture should in the minds of men be identified with the acquisition of knowledge.

The same notion possesses the public mind, when it passes on from the thought of a school to that of a University: and with the best of reasons so far as this, that there is no true culture without acquirements, and that philosophy presupposes knowledge. It requires a great deal of reading, or a wide range of information, to warrant us in putting forth our opinions on any serious subject; and without such learning, the most original mind may be able indeed to dazzle, to amuse, to refute, to perplex, but not to come to any useful result or any trustworthy conclusion. There are indeed persons who profess a different view of the matter, and even act upon it. Every now and then you will find a person of vigorous or fertile mind, who relies upon his own resources, despises all former authors, and gives the world, with the utmost fearlessness, his views upon religion, or history, or any other popular subject. And his works may sell for a while; he may get a name in his day; but this will be all. His readers are sure to find on the long run that his doctrines

are mere theories, and not the expression of facts, that they are chaff instead of bread, and then his popularity drops as suddenly as it rose.

Knowledge then is the indispensable condition of expansion of mind, and the instrument of attaining to it; this cannot be denied, it is ever to be insisted on; I begin with it as a first principle; however, the very truth of it carries men too far, and confirms to them the notion that it is the whole of it. A narrow mind is thought to be that which contains little knowledge; and an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal; and what seems to put the matter beyond dispute, is, the fact of the number of studies which are pursued in a University, by its very profession. Lectures are given on every kind of subject; examinations are held; prizes awarded. There are moral, metaphysical, physical Professors; Professors of languages, of history, of mathematics, of experimental science. Lists of questions are published, wonderful for their range and depth, variety and difficulty; treatises are written, which carry upon their very face the evidence of extensive reading or multifarious information; what then is wanted for mental culture to a person of large reading and scientific attainments? what is grasp of mind but acquirement? where shall philosophical repose be found, but in the consciousness and enjoyment of large intellectual possessions?

And yet this notion is, I conceive, a mistake, and

my present business is to show that it is one, and that the end of a Liberal Education is not mere or material knowledge; and I shall best attain my object, by actually setting down some cases, which will be generally granted to be instances of the process of enlightenment or enlargement of mind, and others which are not, and thus, by the comparison, you will be able to judge for yourselves, Gentlemen, whether Knowledge, that is, acquirement, is after all the real principle of the enlargement, or whether that principle is not rather something beyond it.

For instance, let a person, whose experience has hitherto been confined to the calm and unpretending scenery of these islands, whether here or in England, go for the first time into parts, where physical nature puts on her wilder and more awful forms, whether at home or abroad, as into mountainous districts; or let one, who has ever lived in a quiet village, go for the first time to a great metropolis,—then I suppose he will have a sensation, which perhaps he never had before. He has a feeling not in addition or increase of former feelings, but of something different in kind. He will perhaps be borne forward, and find for a time that he has lost his bearings. He has made a certain progress, and he has a consciousness of mental enlargement; he does not stand where he did, he has a new centre, and a range of thoughts to which he was before a stranger.

Again, the view of the heavens, which the telescope opens upon us, if allowed to fill and possess the mind, may almost whirl it round and make it dizzy. It brings in a flood of ideas, and is rightly called an intellectual enlargement, whatever is meant by the term.

And so again, the sight of beasts of prey and other foreign animals, their strangeness, the originality (if I may use the term) of their forms and gestures and habits, and their variety and independence of each other, throw us out of ourselves into another creation, and as if under another Creator, if I may so express the temptation which may come on the mind. We seem to have new faculties, or a new exercise for our faculties, by this addition to our knowledge; like a prisoner, who, having been accustomed to wear manacles or fetters, suddenly finds his arms and legs free.

Hence Physical Science generally, in all its departments, as bringing before us the exuberant riches and resources, yet the orderly course, of the Universe, elevates and excites the student, and at first, I may say, almost takes away his breath, while in time it exercises a tranquillizing influence upon him.

Again, the study of history is said to enlarge and enlighten the mind, and why? because, as I conceive, it gives it a power of judging of passing events and



of all events, and a conscious superiority over them, which before it did not possess.

And in like manner, what is called seeing the world, entering into active life, going into society, travelling, gaining acquaintance with the various classes of the community, coming into contact with the principles and modes of thought of various parties, interests, and races, their views, aims, habits, and manners, their religious creeds and forms of worship, gaining experience how various yet how alike men are, how low minded, how bad, how opposite, yet how confident, in their opinions; all this exerts a perceptible influence upon the mind, which it is impossible to mistake, be it good or be it bad, and is popularly called its enlargement.

And then again, the first time the mind comes across the arguments and speculations of unbelievers, and feels what a novel light they cast upon what he has hitherto accounted sacred; and still more, if it gives into them and embraces them, and throws off as so much prejudice what it has hitherto held, and, as if waking from a dream, begins to realize to its imagination that there is now no such thing as law and the transgression of law, that sin is a phantom, and punishment a bugbear, that it is free to sin, free to enjoy the world and the flesh; and still further, when it does enjoy them, and reflects that it may think and hold just what it will, that "the world is

all before it where to choose", and what system to build up as its own private persuasion, when this torrent of bad thoughts rushes over and inundates it, who will deny that the fruit of the tree of knowledge, or what the mind takes for knowledge, has made it one of the gods, with a sense of expansion and elevation—an intoxication in reality, still, so far as the subjective state of the mind goes, an illumination. Hence the fanaticism of individuals or nations, who suddenly cast off their Maker. Their eyes are opened; and, like the judgment-stricken king in the Tragedy, they see two suns, and a magic universe, out of which they look back upon their former state of faith and innocence with a sort of contempt and indignation, as if they were then but fools, and the dupes of imposture.

On the other hand Religion has its own enlargement, and an enlargement, not of tumult, but of peace. It is often remarked of uneducated persons, who have hitherto thought little of the unseen world, that, on their turning to God, looking into themselves, regulating their hearts, reforming their conduct, and meditating on death and judgment, heaven and hell, they seem to become, in point of intellect, different beings from what they were. Before, they took things as they came, and thought no more of one thing than another. But now every event has a meaning; they have their own estimate of whatever happens to them; they are mindful of times and

seasons, and compare the present with the past; and the world, no longer dull, monotonous, unprofitable, and hopeless, is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an object and an awful moral.

Now from these instances, to which many more might be added, it is plain, first, that the communication of knowledge certainly is either a condition or the means of that sense of enlargement or enlightenment, which is at this day considered the end of mental culture: so much cannot be denied; but next, it is equally plain, that such communication is not the whole of the process. The Enlargement consists, not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or, to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought; and without this no enlargement is said to follow. There is no enlargement, unless there be a comparison of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding *then*, when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already. It is not a mere addition to our know-

ledge, which is illumination; but the locomotion, the movement onwards, of that moral centre, to which both what we know, and what we are learning, the accumulating mass of our acquirements, gravitate. And therefore a truly great intellect, and recognised to be such by the common opinion of mankind, such as the intellect of Aristotle, or of St. Thomas, or of Newton, or of Goethe, (I purposely take instances within and without the Catholic pale, when I would speak of the intellect as such), is one which takes a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these one on another; without which there is no whole, and no centre. It possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but also of their mutual and true relations; knowledge, not merely considered as acquirement, but as philosophy.

Accordingly, when this analytical, distributive, harmonising process is away, the mind experiences no enlargement, and is not reckoned as enlightened or comprehensive, whatever it may add to its knowledge. For instance, a great memory, as I have already said, does not make a philosopher, any more than a dictionary can be called a grammar. There are men who embrace in their minds a vast multitude of ideas, but with little sensibility about their real relations towards each other. These may be antiquarians, annalists, naturalists; they may be learned in the law; they may be versed in statistics;

they are most useful in their own place; I should shrink from speaking disrespectfully of them: still, there is nothing in such attainments to guarantee the absence of narrowness of mind. If they are nothing more than well read men, or men of information, they have not what specially deserves the name of culture of mind, or fulfils the type of Liberal Education.

In like manner, we sometimes fall in with persons who have seen much of the world, and of the men who, in their day, have played a conspicuous part in it, but who generalize nothing, and have no observation, in the true sense of the word. They abound in information in detail, curious and entertaining, about men and things; and, having lived under the influence of no very clear or settled principles, religious or political, they speak of every one and every thing, only as so many phenomena, which are complete in themselves, and lead to nothing, not discussing them, or teaching any truth, or instructing the hearer, but simply talking. No one would say, that these persons, well informed as they are, had attained to any great culture of intellect or to philosophy.

The case is the same still more strikingly, where the persons in question are beyond dispute men of inferior powers and deficient education. Perhaps they have been much in foreign countries, and they receive, in a passive, otiose, unfruitful way, the various facts which are forced upon them there.

Seafaring men, for example, range from one end of the earth to the other; but the multiplicity of external objects, which they have encountered, forms no symmetrical and consistent picture upon their imagination; they see the tapestry of human life, as it were, on the wrong side, and it tells no story. They sleep, and they rise up, and they find themselves, now in Europe, now in Asia; they see visions of great cities and wild regions; they are in the marts of commerce, or amid the islands of the South; they gaze on Pompey's Pillar, or on the Andes; and nothing, which meets them, carries them forward or backward, to any idea beyond itself. Nothing has a drift or relation; nothing has a history or a promise. Every thing stands by itself, and comes and goes in its turn, like the shifting scenes of a show, which leave the spectator where he was. Perhaps you are near him on a particular occasion, and expect him to be shocked or perplexed at something which occurs; but one thing is much the same to him as another, or, if he is perplexed, it is as not knowing what to say, whether it is right to admire, or to ridicule, or to disapprove, while conscious that some expression of opinion is expected from him; for in fact he has no standard of judgment at all, and no landmarks to guide him to a conclusion. Such is mere acquisition, and, I repeat, no one would dream of calling it philosophy.

Instances, such as these, confirm, by the contrast,

the conclusion we have already drawn from those which preceded them. That only is true enlargement of mind, which is the power of viewing many things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence. Thus is that form of Universal Knowledge, of which I have on a former occasion spoken, set up in the individual intellect, and constitutes its perfection. Possessed of this real illumination, the mind never views any part of the extended subject-matter of Knowledge, without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. It makes every thing in some sort lead to every thing else; it would communicate the image of the whole to every separate portion, till the whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, every where pervading and penetrating its component parts, and giving them one definite meaning. Just as our bodily organs, when mentioned, recall their function in the body, as the word "creation" suggests the Creator, and "subjects" a sovereign, so, in the mind of the Philosopher, as we are abstractedly conceiving of him, the elements of the physical and moral world, sciences, arts, pursuits, ranks, offices, events, opinions, individualities, are all viewed as one with correlative functions, and as gradually by successive combinations converging, one and all, to the true centre.

To have even a portion of this illuminative reason and true philosophy, is the highest state to which nature can aspire, in the way of intellect; it puts the mind above the influences of chance and necessity, above anxiety, suspense, tumult, and superstition, which are the portion of the many. Men, whose minds are possessed with some one object, take exaggerated views of its importance, are feverish in the pursuit of it, make it the measure of things which are utterly foreign to it, and are startled and despond, if it happens to fail them. They are ever in alarm or in transport. Those on the other hand who have no object or principle whatever to hold by, lose their way, every step they take. They are thrown out and do not know what to think or say, at every fresh juncture; they have no view of persons, or occurrences, or facts, which come suddenly upon them, and they hang upon the opinion of others, for want of internal resources. But the intellect, which has been disciplined to the perfection of its powers, which knows, and thinks while it knows, which has learned to leaven the dense mass of facts and events with the elastic force of reason, such an intellect cannot be partial, cannot be exclusive, cannot be impetuous, cannot be at a loss, cannot but be patient, collected, and majestically calm, because it discerns the end in every beginning, the origin in every end, the law in every interruption, the limit in each



delay; because it ever knows where it stands, and how its path lies from one point to another. It is the *τετράγωνος* of the Peripatetic, and has the "nil admirari" of the Stoic. There are men, who, when in difficulties, originate at the moment vast ideas or dazzling projects; who, under the influence of excitement, are able to cast a light, almost as if from inspiration, on a subject or course of action which comes before them; who have a sudden presence of mind equal to any emergency, rising with the occasion, and an undaunted heroic bearing, and an energy and keenness, which is but made intense by opposition. This is genius, this is heroism; it is the exhibition of a natural gift, which no culture can teach, at which no Institution can aim; here, on the contrary, we are concerned, not with mere nature, but with training and teaching. That perfection of the Intellect, which is the result of Education, and its *beau idéal*, to be imparted to individuals in their respective measures, is the clear, calm, accurate vision and comprehension of all things, as far as the finite mind can embrace them, each in its place, and with its own characteristics upon it. It is almost prophetic from its knowledge of history; it is almost heart-searching from its knowledge of human nature; it has almost supernatural charity from its freedom from littleness and prejudice; it has almost the repose of faith, because nothing can startle it; it has

almost the beauty and harmony of heavenly contemplation, so intimate is it with the eternal order of things and the music of the spheres.

And now I have said more than enough, as I conceive, in confutation of the notion, that the true and adequate end of intellectual training and of a University is Acquirement; rather, it is Thought or Reason exercised upon Knowledge, or what may be called Philosophy. Henceforth, then, I shall take so much for granted; and I shall apply it, without any hesitation, to the exposure of various mistakes which at the present day, from ignorance or forgetfulness, beset the subject of University Education.

I say then, if we would improve the intellect, first of all, we must ascend: we cannot gain real knowledge on a level; we must generalize, we must reduce to method, we must have a grasp of principles, and group and shape our acquisitions by them. It matters not whether our field of operation be wide or limited; in every case, to command it, is to mount above it. Who has not felt the irritation of mind and impatience created by a deep, rich country, visited for the first time, with winding lanes, and high hedges, and green steeps, and tangled woods, and every thing smiling, but in a maze? The same feeling comes upon us in a strange city, when we have no map of its streets. Hence you hear of practised travellers, when they first come into a place, mounting some high hill or church tower, by

way of reconnoitering its neighbourhood. In like manner, you must be above your knowledge, Gentlemen, not under it, or it will oppress you; and the more you have of it, the greater will be the load. The learning of a Salmasius or a Burman, unless you are its master, will be your tyrant. “*Imperat aut servit*”; if you can wield it with a strong arm, it is a great weapon; otherwise,

*Vis consili expers  
Mole ruit suâ.*

You will be overwhelmed, like Tarpeia, by the heavy wealth which you have exacted from tributary generations.

Instances abound; there are authors, who are as pointless as they are inexhaustible, in their literary resources. They measure knowledge by bulk, as it lies in the rude block, without symmetry, without design. How many commentators are there on the Classics, how many on Holy Scripture, from whom we rise up, wondering at the learning which has passed before us, and wondering why it passed! How many writers are there of Ecclesiastical History, such as Mosheim or Du Pin, who, breaking up their subject into details, destroy its life, and defraud us of the whole by their anxiety about the parts! The Sermons, again, of Protestant Divines in the seventeenth century, how often are they mere repositories of miscellaneous and officious learning! Take

those of Jeremy Taylor, for instance, and what an array of quotations, anecdotes, similies, and good sayings, strung upon how weak a thread of thought! Turn, for example, to his "House of Feasting"; which sets about proving nothing short of this, that "plenty and pleasures of the world are not proper instruments of felicity", and that "intemperance is its enemy". One might have thought it difficult either to dispute or to defend so plain a proposition; but Taylor contrives to expend upon it twenty closely printed pages, not of theology or metaphysics, but of practical exhortation. After quoting Seneca upon the spare diet of Epicurus and Metrodorus, and a Greek poet, he demonstrates that plenty and pleasure are not natural or suitable to us, by the help of Horace, Epicurus, Seneca, Maximus Tyrius, Socrates, Juvenal, Lucian, and two or three authors besides. Next he maintains that intemperance is the enemy of felicity; and for this purpose he appeals to St. Austin, Juvenal many times, Persius, Menander, Xenophon, Euripides, Plutarch, Horace, Pliny, Socrates, St. Chrysostom, Epicurus, Timotheus, Apuleius, Aristophanes, Diogenes, Plotinus, Porphyry, Prudentius, Clement of Alexandria, Homer, Plato, Pythagoras, Jamblichus, Alcæus, and Theophrastus. Having taken these means to settle the point, he proceeds to the important practical task of "describing the *measures* of our eating and drinking", between "intemperance" and "scruples". I

am almost ashamed to trespass on your indulgence, Gentlemen, with a fresh catalogue of names; yet I should not do justice to the marvellous availableness of this writer's erudition for enforcing truisms and proving proverbs, unless I told you that to this new subject he devotes near a dozen pages more, using for his purpose, not any common-sense principles or clear broad rules, but Juvenal, St. Chrysostom, Antidamus, (?) Terence, St. Ambrose, Martial, Dio, Seneca, Homer, Aristotle, Horace, Boethius, and others, leaving the subject pretty much as he found it.

Such is learning, when used, not as a means, but as an end, less dignified even than the "sonitus spinarum ardentium sub ollâ", of Ecclesiastes, "the crackling of thorns under a pot", for they at least make the water boil, but nothing comes of pedantry. How could divines of a school such as this, ever hope to emerge from words into things, or give birth to any religious doctrine, which savoured of philosophy or moral earnestness? Is it wonderful that they are neither consistent in their teaching, nor fair in their controversy, considering that they have read so much more than they have reflected? Is it wonderful that they can neither state what their adversaries really hold, nor know well what they hold themselves, when they have so little sense of what may be called the structure of knowledge, how one proposition is self-evident and another requires

proof, how this idea grows out of that, and is nearer to it than to others out of which it does not grow, and how to say *a* and *b* is, as even the poor child saw clearly, the direct road to *c*? This, I conceive, to be the true explanation, as far as the intellect has been in fault, of that psychological wonder, which Anglicanism has ever presented, of divines, able, erudite, grave, and respectable, content to be suspended between a premiss and its conclusion, describing three-fourths of a circle and refusing to finish it, deliberately commenting on verses and words, yet blind to the teaching of the chapter. It is the consequence of reading for reading's sake. It is acquirement without philosophy.

Do not suppose, Gentlemen, that I am wantonly going out of my way for the poor satisfaction of exposing a weakness of Protestantism; I allude to it merely as affording an illustration, more apposite than is elsewhere to be found, of the intellectual character of mere acquisition. Catholics also may read without thinking, but it is impossible they should similarly expose themselves in religion, safe, as they are, from the excesses of private judgment. However, in their case equally as with Protestants, it holds good, that that knowledge of theirs is unworthy of the name, which they have not thought through, and thought out. Otherwise, they are only possessed by it, not possessed of it; nay, in matter of fact they are often even carried away by it, without any

volition of their own. Thus I may charitably account for the various extravagancies of the Protestant author I have been quoting. Recollect, the Memory can tyrannize, as well as the Imagination. Derangement, I believe, has been considered as a loss of control over the sequence of ideas. The mind, once set in motion, is henceforth deprived of the power of initiation, and becomes the victim of a train of associations, one thought suggesting another, in the way of cause and effect, as if by a mechanical process, or some physical necessity. No one, who has had experience of men of studious habits, but must recognize the existence of a parallel phenomenon in the case of those who have over-stimulated the Memory. In such persons Reason acts as feebly and as impotently as in the madman; once fairly started on any subject whatever, they have no power of self-control; they passively endure the succession of impulses which are evolved out of the original excitement; they are passed on from one idea to another, and go steadily forward, plodding along one line of thought in spite of the amplest concessions of the hearer, or wandering from it in endless digression in spite of his remonstrances. Now, if, as is very certain, no one would envy the madman the glow and originality of his conceptions, why must we extol the cultivation of that intellect, which is the prey, not indeed of barren fancies, but of barren facts, of random intrusions from without, though

not of morbid imaginations within? And in thus speaking, I am not denying that a strong and ready memory is in itself a real treasure; I am not disparaging a well-stored mind, though it be nothing beyond, so that it be sober, any more than I would despise a bookseller's shop:—it is of great value to others, even when not to the owner. Nor am I banishing, far from it, the possessors of deep and multifarious learning from my ideal University; they adorn it in the eyes of men; I do but say that they constitute no type of the results at which it aims; that it is no great gain to the intellect to have enlarged the memory, at the expense of faculties which are indisputably higher.

Nor indeed am I supposing that there is any great danger, at least in this day, of over-education; the danger is on the other side. I will tell you, Gentlemen, what has been the practical error of the last twenty years, not to load the memory of the student with a mass of undigested knowledge, but to attempt so much that nothing has been really effected, to teach so many things, that nothing has properly been learned at all. It has been the error of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study was not shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement; of considering an acquaintance with the learned names of things and persons, and the possession of clever duodecimos, and attendance on eloquent lecturers, and membership



with scientific institutions, and the sight of the experiments of a platform and the specimens of a museum, that all this was not dissipation of mind, but progress. All things are to be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing. There is to be nothing individual in it; and this forsooth is the wonder of the age. What the steam engine does with matter, the printing press is to do with mind; it is to act mechanically, and the population is to be passively, almost unconsciously enlightened, by the mere multiplication and dissemination of volumes. Whether it be the school boy, or the school girl, or the youth at college, or the mechanic in the town, or the politician in the senate, all have been the victims in one way or other of this most preposterous and pernicious of delusions. Wise men have lifted up their voice in vain; and at length, lest their own institutions should be outshone and should disappear in the folly of the hour, they have been obliged, as far as was conscientiously possible, to humour a spirit which they could not withstand, and make temporizing concessions at which they could not but inwardly smile.

Let us listen to one of the prophets of this fantastic doctrine, not in order to refute his sentiments, but to justify the foregoing account of them. "In looking at our age", says Dr. Channing in one of his works, "I am

struck inwardly with one commanding characteristic, and that is, the tendency in all its movements to expansion, to diffusion, to universality. This tendency is directly opposed to the spirit of exclusiveness, restriction, narrowness, monopoly, which has prevailed in past ages..... All goods, advantages, helps, are more open to all....once we heard of the few, now of the many; once of the prerogatives of a part, now of the rights of all.... The grand idea of Humanity, of the importance of man as man, is spreading silently but surely..... If we look at the various movements of our age, we shall see in them this tendency to universality and diffusion. Look at science and literature. Where is science now? Locked up in a few Colleges, or Royal Societies, or inaccessible volumes? are its experiments mysteries for a few privileged eyes? are its portals guarded by a dark phraseology, which to the multitude is a foreign tongue? No; Science has now left her retreats, her shades, her selected company of votaries, and with familiar tone begun the work of instructing the race. Through the Press, discoveries and theories, once the monopoly of philosophers, have become the property of the multitude. Its professors, heard not long ago in the University or some narrow School, now speak in the Mechanics' Institute..... Science, once the greatest of distinctions, is becoming popular. A lady gives us conversations on chemistry, revealing to the minds of our youth vast laws of the

universe, which, fifty years ago, had not dawned on the greatest minds. The school books of our children contain grand views of the Creation. There are parts of our country in which lyceums spring up in almost every village, for the purpose of mutual aid to the study of natural science. The characteristic of our age, then, is not the improvement of science, so much as its extension to all men.....

“What is true of science, is still more true of literature. Books are now placed within the reach of all. Works, once too costly except for the opulent, are now to be found on the labourer’s shelf. Genius sends her light into cottages. The great names of literature are become household words among the crowd. Every party, religious or political, scatters its sheets on all the winds..... Men grow tired at length even of amusements. Works of fiction cease to interest them, and they turn from novels to books, which, having their origin in deep principles of our nature, retain their hold of the human mind for ages.....

“The remarks now made on literature, might be extended to the fine arts. In these too we see the tendency to universality. It is said that the spirit of the great artists has died out; but the taste for their works is spreading. By the improvements of engraving, or the invention of casts, the genius of the great masters is going abroad. Their conceptions are no longer pent up in galleries, open to but few,

but must be in our homes, and are the household pleasures of millions.....

“Education is becoming the work of nations. Even in the despotic governments of Europe, schools are open for every child without distinction; and not only the elements of reading and writing, but music and drawing, are taught, and a foundation is laid for future progress in history, geography, and physical science. The greatest minds are at work on popular education”.\*

Now, in calling your attention, Gentlemen, to sentiments such as these, I must guard against any possible misconception of my meaning. Let me frankly declare then, that I have no fear at all of the education of the people: the more education they have, the better, so that it is really education. Next, as to the cheap publication of scientific and literary works, which is now in vogue, I consider it a great advantage, convenience, and gain; that is, to those to whom education has given a capacity for using them. Further, I consider such innocent recreations, as science and literature are able to furnish, will be a very fit occupation of the thoughts and the leisure of young persons, and may be made the means of keeping them from bad employments and bad companions. Moreover, as to that superficial acquaintance with chemistry and geology and astronomy and political economy and modern history and biography and

\* Vid. Knight's Half Hours, 1850. However, the author writes, or attempts to write, better in his Self-culture.

other branches of knowledge, which periodical literature and occasional lectures and scientific institutions diffuse through the community, I think it a graceful accomplishment, and a suitable, nay in this day a necessary accomplishment, in the case of educated men. Nor, lastly, am I disparaging or discouraging the thorough acquisition of any one of these studies, or denying that, as far as it goes, such thorough acquisition is a real education of the mind. All I say is, call things by their right names, and do not confuse together ideas which are essentially different. A thorough knowledge of one science and a superficial acquaintance with many, are not the same thing; a smattering of a hundred things or a memory for detail, is not a philosophical or comprehensive view. Recreations are not education; accomplishments are not education. Do not say, the people must be educated, when, after all, you only mean, amused, refreshed, soothed, put into good spirits and good humour, or kept from vicious excesses. I do not say that such amusements, such occupations of mind, are not a great gain; but they are not education. You may as well call drawing and fencing education, as a knowledge of botany or conchology. Stuffing birds or playing stringed instruments is an elegant pastime, and a resource to the idle, but they are not education; they do not form or cultivate the intellect. Jeremy Taylor could quote Plutarch and Plotinus and Pythagoras, yet

they could not keep him from veering about in religion, till no one can tell to this day what he held and what he did not; nor shall we be kept steady in any truths or principles whatever, merely by having seen a Red Indian or Caffir, or having measured a palæotherion. Education is a high word; it is nothing less than a formation of the mind; it is the preparation for knowledge, and it is the imparting of knowledge in proportion to that preparation. We require intellectual eyes to know withal, as bodily eyes for sight. We need both objects and organs intellectual; we cannot gain them without setting about it; we cannot gain them in our sleep, or by hap-hazard. The best telescope does not dispense with eyes; the printing press or the lecture room will assist us greatly, but we must be true to ourselves, we must be parties in the work. A University is, according to the usual designation, an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill.

I protest to you, Gentlemen, that if I had to choose between a so-called University, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a University which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years and then sent them away, as the University of Oxford is said to have done some sixty years since, if

I were asked which of these two methods was the better discipline of the intellect,—mind I do not say which is *morally* the better, for it is plain that compulsory study must be a good and idleness an intolerable mischief,—but if I must determine which of the two courses was the more successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men the more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, men of the world, men whose names would descend to posterity, I have no hesitation in giving the preference to that University which did nothing, over that which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun. And, paradox as this may seem, still if results be the test of systems, the influence of the public schools and colleges of England, in the course of the last century, at least will bear out one side of the contrast, as I have drawn it. What would come, on the other hand, of the ideal systems of education which fascinate the imagination of this age, could they ever take effect, and whether they would not produce a generation languid, frivolous, resourceless, and imbecile, remains to be seen; but so far is certain, that the Universities and scholastic establishments, to which I refer, and which did little more than bring together first boys and then youths in large numbers, these institutions, with miserable deformities on the side of morals, with a virtual unbelief, and a hollow profession of Christianity, and a heathen code of

ethics,—God forbid I should defend in the concrete what I am only speaking of in that particular point of view which falls under my present subject,—I say, at least they can boast of a succession of heroes and statesmen, of literary men and philosophers, of men conspicuous for great natural virtues, for habits of business, for knowledge of life, for practical judgment, for cultivated tastes, for accomplishments, who have made England what it is,—able to subdue the earth, able to tyrannize over Catholics.

How is this to be explained? I suppose as follows:—When a multitude of young persons, keen, open-hearted, sympathetic, and observant, as young persons are, come together and freely mix with each other, they are sure to learn one from another, even if there be no one to teach them; the conversation of all is a series of lectures to each, and they gain for themselves new ideas and views, fresh matter of thought, and distinct principles for judging and acting, day by day. An infant has to learn the meaning of the information which its senses convey to it, and this seems to be its employment. It fancies all that the eye presents to it to be close to it, till it actually learns the contrary, and thus by practice does it ascertain the relations and uses of those first elements of knowledge which are necessary for its animal existence. A parallel teaching is necessary for our social being, and it is secured by a large school or a college; and this effect may be fairly called in its



own department an enlargement of mind. It is seeing the world on a small field with little trouble; for the pupils or students come from very different places, and with widely different notions, and there is much to generalize, much to adjust, much to eliminate, there are inter-relations to be defined, and conventional rules to be established, in the process, by which the whole assemblage is moulded together, and gains one tone and one character. Let it be clearly understood, I repeat it, that I am not taking into account moral or religious considerations; I am not dreaming of anything especially exalted, anything truly Christian, anything of supernatural excellence, as animating that youthful community; but still they will constitute a whole, they will embody a specific idea, they will represent a doctrine, they will administer a code of conduct, and they will furnish principles of thought and action. They will give birth to a living teaching, which in course of time will take the shape of a self-perpetuating tradition, or a *genius loci*, as it is sometimes called; which haunts the home where it has been born, and which imbues and forms, more or less, and one by one, every individual who is successively brought under its shadow. Thus it is, that, independent of direct instruction on the part of Superiors, there is a sort of self-education in the academic institutions of Protestant England; a characteristic tone of thought, a recognized standard of judgment is found in them,

which, as developed in the individual who is submitted to it, becomes a twofold source of strength to him, both from the distinct stamp it impresses on his mind, and from the bond of union which it creates between him and others,—effects, which are shared by the authorities of the place, for they themselves have been educated in it, and at all times are exposed to the influence of its moral atmosphere. Here then is a real teaching, whatever be its standards and principles, true or false; and it at least tends towards cultivation of the intellect; it at least recognizes that knowledge is something more than a sort of passive reception of scraps and details; it is a something, and it does a something, which never will issue from the most strenuous efforts of a set of teachers, with no mutual sympathies and no inter-communion, of a set of examiners with no opinions they dare profess, and with no common principles, who are teaching or questioning a set of youths who do not know them, and do not know each other, on a large set of subjects, different in kind, and connected by no wide philosophy, three times a week, or three times a year, or once in three years, in chill lecture rooms or on a pompous anniversary. } Were I not afraid of offending by a lightness of style for which this is not the place, I would remind you, Gentlemen, of the parallel which such a University affords to the mistake of the English Ambassador at a foreign court, who, wishing to recommend to the corps diplomatique a dish peculiar to his country, by

the omission of the principle of unity, simply deprived it of its consistency and form, and of its national pretensions.

Nay, self-education in any shape, in the most restricted sense, is preferable to a system of teaching, which, professing so much, really does so little for the mind. Shut your College gates against the votary of knowledge, throw him back upon the searchings and the struggles of his own mind; he will gain by being spared an entrance into your Babel. Few indeed there are, who can dispense with the stimulus and support of instructors, or will do any thing at all, if left to themselves. And fewer still (though such great minds are to be found), who will not, from such unassisted efforts, contract a self-reliance and a self-esteem, which are not only moral evils, but serious hindrances to the attainment of truth. And next to none perhaps, or none, who will not be reminded from time to time of the disadvantage under which they lie, by their imperfect grounding, by the breaks, deficiencies, and irregularities of their knowledge, by the eccentricity of opinion and the confusion of principle which they exhibit. They will be too often ignorant of what every one knows and takes for granted, of that multitude of small truths, which fall upon the mind like dust, impalpable and ever accumulating; they may be unable to converse, they may argue perversely, they may pride themselves on their worst paradoxes or their grossest truisms,

they may be full of their own mode of viewing things, unwilling to be put out of their way, slow to enter into the minds of others;—but, with these and whatever other liabilities upon their heads, they are likely to have more thought, more mind, more philosophy, more true enlargement, than those earnest but ill-used persons, who are forced to load their minds with a score of subjects against an examination, who have too much in their hands to indulge themselves in thinking or investigation, who devour premiss and conclusion together with indiscriminate greediness, who hold whole sciences on faith, and commit demonstrations to memory, and who too often, as might be expected, when their period of education is passed, throw up all they have learned in disgust, having gained nothing really by their anxious labours, except perhaps the habit of application.

Yet such is the better specimen of the fruit of that ambitious system, which has of late years been making way among us: but its result on ordinary minds, and on the common run of students, is less satisfactory still; they leave their place of education simply dissipated and relaxed by the multiplicity of subjects, which they have never really mastered, and so shallow as not even to know their shallowness. How much better, I say, is it for the active and thoughtful intellect, where such is to be found, to eschew the College and the University altogether, than to submit to a drudgery so ignoble, a mockery

so contumelious! How much more profitable for the independent mind, after the mere rudiments of education, to range through a library at random, taking down books as they meet him, and pursuing the trains of thought which his mother wit suggests! How much healthier to wander into the fields, and there with the exiled Princee to find “tongues in the trees, books in the running brooks”! How much more genuine an education is that of the poor boy in the Poem\*—a Poem, whether in conception or in execution, one of the most touching in our language—who, not in the wide world, but ranging day by day around his widowed mother’s home, “a dexterous gleaner” in a narrow field, and with only such slender outfit

“as the village school and books a few  
Supplied”,

contrived from the beach, and the quay, and the fisher’s boat, and the inn’s fireside, and the tradesman’s shop, and the shepherd’s walk, and the smuggler’s hut, and the mossy moor, and the screaming gulls, and the restless waves, to fashion for himself a philosophy and a poetry of his own!

\* Crabbe’s Tales of the Hall. This Poem, let me say, I read on its first publication, above thirty years ago, with extreme delight, and have never lost my love of it; and, on taking it up lately, found I was even more touched by it than heretofore. A work, which can please in youth and age, seems to fulfil (in logical language) the *accidental definition* of a Classic.

But in a large subject, I am exceeding my necessary limits. Gentlemen, I must conclude abruptly; and postpone any summing up of my argument, should it be necessary, to another day.

## DISCOURSE VIII.

### PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO PROFESSIONAL.

I HAVE been insisting, in my two preceding Discourses, first, on the cultivation of the intellect as an end which may reasonably be pursued for its own sake; and next, on the nature of that cultivation, or what that cultivation consists in. Truth of whatever kind is the proper object of the intellect; its cultivation then lies in fitting it to apprehend and contemplate truth. Now the intellect in its present state, with exceptions which need not here be specified, does not discern truth intuitively, or as a whole. We know, not by a direct and simple vision, not at a glance, but, as it were, by piecemeal and accumulation, by a mental process, by going round an object, by the comparison, the combination, the mutual correction, the continual adaptation, of many partial notions, by the joint application and concentration upon it of many faculties and exercises of mind. Such a union and concert of the intellectual powers,

such an enlargement and developement, such a comprehensiveness, is necessarily a matter of training. And again, such a training is a matter of rule; it is not mere application, however exemplary, which introduces the mind to truth, nor the reading many books, nor the getting up many subjects, nor the witnessing many experiments, nor the attending many lectures. All this is short of enough; a man may have done it all, yet be lingering in the vestibule of knowledge:—he may not realize what his mouth utters; he may not see with his mental eye what confronts him; he may have no grasp of things as they are; or at least he may have no power at all of advancing one step forward of himself, in consequence of what he has already acquired, no power of discriminating between truth and falsehood, of sifting out the grains of truth from the mass, of arranging things according to their real value, and, if I may use the phrase, of building up ideas. Such a power is the result of a scientific formation of mind; it is an acquired faculty of judgment, of clear-sightedness, of sagacity, of wisdom, of philosophical reach of mind, and of intellectual self-possession and repose, qualities which do not come of mere acquirement. The bodily eye, the organ for apprehending material objects, is provided by nature; the eye of the mind, of which the object is truth, is the work of discipline and habit.

This process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some parti-



cular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture, is called Liberal Education; and though there is no one in whom it is carried as far as is conceivable, or whose intellect would be a pattern of what intellects should be made, yet there is scarcely any one but may gain an idea of what real training is, and at least look towards it, and make its true scope and result, and not something else, his standard of excellence; and numbers there are who may submit themselves to it, and realize it in themselves in good measure. And to set forth the right standard, and to train according to it, and to help forward all students towards it according to their various capacities, this I conceive to be the business of a University.

Now this is what some great men are very slow to allow; they insist that Education should be confined to some particular and narrow end, and should issue in some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. They argue as if every thing, as well as every person, had its price; and that where there has been a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind. This they call making Education and Instruction "useful", and "Utility" becomes their watchword. With a fundamental principle of this nature, they very naturally go on to ask, what there is to show for the expense of a University;

what is the real worth in the market, of the article called "a Liberal Education", on the supposition that it does not teach us definitely how to advance our manufactures, or to improve our lands, or to better our civil economy; or again, if it does not at once make this man a lawyer, that an engineer, and that a surgeon; or at least if it does not lead to discoveries in chemistry, astronomy, geology, magnetism, and science of every kind.

These views are sanctioned by the authority of no less a name than that of Locke. He condemns the ordinary subjects in which boys are instructed at school, on the ground that they are not needed by them in after life. "'Tis matter of astonishment", he says in his work on Education, "that men of quality and parts should suffer themselves to be so far misled by custom and implicit faith. Reason, if consulted with, would advise, that their children's time should be spent in acquiring what might be *useful* to them, when they come to be men, rather than that their heads should be stuffed with a deal of trash, a great part whereof they usually never do ('t is certain they never need to) think on again as long as they live; and so much of it as does stick by them, they are only the worse for".

And so again, speaking of verse-making, he says: "I know not what reason a father can have to wish his son a poet, who does not desire him to *bid defiance to all other callings and business*; which is not

yet the worst of the case; for, if he proves a successful rhymmer, and gets once the reputation of a wit, I desire it to be considered, what company and places he is likely to spend his time in, nay and estate too; for it is very seldom seen, that any one discovers *mines of gold and silver in Parnassus*. 'Tis a pleasant air, but a barren soil".

In another passage he distinctly limits utility in education to its bearing on the future profession or trade of the pupil, that is, he scorns the idea of any education of the intellect, as such. "Can there be any thing more ridiculous", he asks, "than that a father should waste his own money, and his son's time, in setting him to *learn the Roman language*, when, at the same time, he *designs him for a trade*, wherein he, having no use of Latin, fails not to forget that little which he brought from school, and which 'tis ten to one he abhors for the ill-usage it procured him? Could it be believed, unless we have every where amongst us examples of it, that a child should be forced to learn the rudiments of a language, which *he is never to use in the course of life that he is designed to*, and neglect all the while the writing a good hand, and casting accounts, which are of great advantage in all conditions of life, and to most trades indispensably necessary?" Nothing of course can be more absurd than to neglect in education those matters which are necessary for a boy's future calling; but the tone of Locke's remarks

evidently implies more than this, and is condemnatory of any teaching which tends to the general cultivation of the mind, as distinct from the professional.

The question, started in these passages of Locke, has been keenly debated in the present age, and formed one main subject of the controversy, to which I referred in the Introduction to the present Discourses, as having been sustained in the first decade of this century by a celebrated Northern Review on the one hand, and defenders of the University of Oxford on the other. Hardly had the authorities of that seat of learning, waking from their long neglect, set on foot a plan for the education of the youth committed to them, than the representatives of science and literature in that city, which has sometimes been called the Northern Athens, remonstrated, with their gravest arguments and their most brilliant satire, against the direction and shape which the reform was taking. The study of the Classics had been made the basis of the Oxford education, and the Edinburgh Reviewers protested that no good could come of a system which was not based upon the principle of Utility.

“Classical Literature”, they said, “is the great object at Oxford. Many minds, so employed, have produced many works and much fame in that department; but if all liberal arts and sciences, *useful to human life*, had been taught there, if *some* had dedicated themselves to *chemistry*, *some* to *mathe-*

*matics*, some to *experimental philosophy*, and if every attainment had been honoured in the mixt ratio of its difficulty and *utility*, the system of such a University would have been much more valuable, but the splendour of its name something less".

In this passage something more is laid down than the principle of Utility as the basis of University Education. You will here observe, Gentlemen, the immediate and unavoidable consequence of that principle, viz., that there must be a number of unconnected and independent educations going on at the same time in the same place, some pupils being "dedicated" to one study, others to another. And again, from this will naturally follow a third principle, viz., that the young men who come for education are not the supreme and real end of a University, but the advancement of science,—that being "useful", which is useful, not to them, but to mankind at large. This is brought into view in the sentences which follow.

"When a University has been doing *useless* things for a long time, it appears at first degrading to them to be *useful*. A set of Lectures on Political Economy would be discouraged in Oxford, probably despised, probably not permitted. To discuss the inclosure of commons, and to dwell upon imports and exports, *to come so near to common life*, would seem to be undignified and contemptible. In the same manner, the Parr or the Bentley of the day would be scandalized, in a University, to be put on a

level with the *discoverer* of a neutral salt; and yet, *what other measure is there of dignity in intellectual labour but usefulness?* And what ought the term University to mean, but a place where every science is taught which is liberal, and at the same time useful to mankind? Nothing would so much tend to bring classical literature within proper bounds as *a steady and invariable appeal to utility* in our appreciation of all human knowledge.....*Looking always to real utility as our guide*, we should see, with equal pleasure, a studious and inquisitive mind, arranging the productions of nature, investigating the qualities of bodies, or mastering the difficulties of the learned languages. We should not care whether he was chemist, naturalist, or scholar, because we know it to be as *necessary* that matter should be studied and subdued *to the use of man*, as that taste should be gratified, and imagination inflamed”.

These passages occur in the course of the Review of a work on Professional Education by the well-known Mr. Edgeworth; a work which, whatever be its merits, I shall not be wrong in saying carries out the theory of the Reviewers to lengths which they themselves must consider extreme; since he seems to be content with nothing short of the absolute devotion and surrender of a child, on the part of his parents, “as early as possible”, to some one

profession or pursuit as his destiny, to the exclusion of every other.

Such then is the enunciation, as far as words go, of the theory of Utility in Education. I say, "as far as words go", because I do not profess to understand the writer or writers of the above passages very clearly. They contrast, yet unite, the Useful and the Liberal; for instance, they talk of "all *liberal* arts and sciences, *useful* to human life". I conclude from these words, that some liberal sciences *are* useful to human life, and some are *not*; how are we to distinguish them? what is meant by "liberal"? We indeed, Gentlemen, have been led to consider, that every science may be cultivated liberally, and again cultivated usefully, yet, that the liberal cultivation is ever simply distinct from the useful cultivation, and cannot be made one with it, any more than a physiologist is a physician, or a physician a physiologist, though the same person may be both. But these Reviewers seem unwilling to give up the word "liberal", in connexion with the education they advocate, yet without distinctly knowing what it means.

Then again, they wish one student of a University to "dedicate" himself to chemistry, and another to "mathematics". Now, if half a dozen systems of education are to go on on the same spot, unity of place is but an accident, and I do not see what is

the use of a University at all. What is the merit of bringing together youths from the four corners of a country, if they are to be kept apart from each other in separate schools and separate in processes of training, according to the destination of each? There is in that case no such thing as a University; it becomes nothing better than a rendezvous of sciences, pretty much what a bazaar is for tradesmen, and a cattle-fair for farmers; and such indeed is just the notion entertained of it by the same Reviewers twenty years later, as I showed you in a preceding Discourse. Well then, if so, the question arises, what does unity of place bestow in compensation for so great an effort, as the formation and the establishment of a central Body, which is to bring young men together from a thousand homes; for the original outlay, for the perpetual expense incurred by both parent and Institution, for the anxious risks to which it exposes the pupil? And this is generally felt, as it well may be; and so it is decided that residence is not necessary for him; that attendance merely for the examinations will suffice; nay, that it may be even better to make the University perambulate, and hold its visitations here and there in turn. And thus we have arrived at a *reductio ad absurdum* of this theory of Utility, as applied to a University. A common home implies a common education, and a common education implies mental culture as such; without which a University becomes



a board, not a body, a government bureau, not a living power, and is only in name the same as that great and noble creation of the Church, which once was found on the banks of the Seine and of the Isis.

All this, I say, seems to be a simple *reductio ad absurdum* of the peculiar views and reasonings of which the Edinburgh School has been so steady an advocate; but still, I allow, it does not directly answer the question which Locke has raised. It certainly is specious to contend, that nothing is worth pursuing but what is useful; and that life is not long enough to expend upon interesting, or curious, or brilliant trifles. Nay, I will grant it is more than specious, it is true; but, if so, how do I propose directly to meet the objection? Why, Gentlemen, I have met it already, viz., in laying down, that intellectual culture is its own end; for what has its end in itself, has its use in itself also. I say, if a Liberal Education consists in the culture of the intellect, and if that culture be in itself a good, here, without going further, is an answer to Locke's question; for if a healthy body is a good in itself, why is not a healthy intellect? and if a College of Physicians is a useful institution, because it contemplates bodily health, why is not an Academical Body, though it were simply and solely engaged in imparting vigour and beauty and grasp to the intellectual portion of our nature? And the Reviewers I am quoting seem to allow this in their better moments,

in a passage which, putting aside the question of its justice in fact, is sound and true in the principles to which it appeals:—

“The present state of classical education”, they say, “cultivates the *imagination* a great deal too much, and other *habits of mind* a great deal too little, and trains up many young men in a style of elegant imbecility, utterly unworthy of the talents with which nature has endowed them....The matter of fact is, that a classical scholar of twenty-three or twenty-four is a man principally conversant with works of imagination. His feelings are quick, his fancy lively, and his taste good. Talents for *speculation* and *original inquiry* he has none, nor has he formed the invaluable *habit of pushing things up to their first principles*, or of collecting dry and unamusing facts as the materials for reasoning. All the solid and masculine parts of his *understanding* are left wholly without *cultivation*; he hates the pain of thinking, and suspects every man whose boldness and originality call upon him to defend his opinions and prove his assertions”.

Now, I am not at present concerned with the specific question of classical education; else, I might reasonably question the justice of calling an intellectual discipline, which embraces the study of Aristotle, Thucydides, and Tacitus, which involves Scholarship and Antiquities, *imaginative*; still so far I readily grant, that the cultivation of the “under-

standing", of a "talent for speculation and original inquiry", and of "the habit of pushing things up to their first principles", is a principal portion of a *good* or *liberal* education. If then the Reviewers consider it the characteristic of a *useful* education, as they seem to do in the foregoing passage, it follows, that, what they mean by "useful" is just what I mean by "good" or "liberal": and Locke's question becomes a verbal one. Whether youths are to be taught Latin or verse-making, will depend on the *fact*, whether these studies tend to mental culture; but, however this is determined, so far is clear, that in that mental culture consists what I have called a liberal or non-professional, and what the Reviewers call a useful education.

This is the obvious answer which may be made to those who urge upon us the claims of Utility in our plans of Education; but I am not going to leave the subject here: I mean to take a wider view of it. Let us take "useful", as Locke takes it, in its proper and popular sense, and then we enter upon a large field of thought, to which I cannot do justice in one Discourse, though to-day's is all the space I can give to it. I say, let us take "useful" to mean, not what is simply good, but what *tends* to good, or is the *instrument* of good; and in this sense also, Gentlemen, I will show you how a liberal education is truly and fully a useful, though it be not a professional education. "Good" indeed means one thing, and

“useful” means another; but I lay it down as a principle, which will save us a great deal of anxiety, that, though the useful is not always good, the good is always useful. Good is not only good, but reproductive of good; this is one of its attributes; nothing is excellent, beautiful, perfect, desirable for its own sake, but it overflows, and spreads the likeness of itself all around itself. Good is prolific; it is not only good to the eye, but to the taste; it not only attracts us, but it communicates itself; it excites first our admiration and love, then our desire and our gratitude, and that, in proportion to its intenseness and fulness in particular instances. A great good will impart great good. If then the intellect is so excellent a portion of us, and its cultivation so excellent, it is not only beautiful, perfect, admirable, and noble in itself, but in a true and high sense it must be useful to the possessor and to all around him; not useful in any low, mechanical, mercantile sense, but as diffusing good, or as a blessing, or a gift, or power, or a treasure, first to the owner, then through him to the world. I say then, if a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too.

You will see what I mean by the parallel of bodily health. Health is a good in itself, though nothing came of it, and is especially worth seeking and cherishing; yet, after all, the blessings which attend its presence are so great, while they are so close to it and redound back upon it and encircle it, that we

never think of it except as useful as well as good, and praise and prize it for what it does, as well as for what it is, though at the same time we cannot point out any definite and distinct work or production which it can be said to effect. And so as regards intellectual culture, I am far from denying utility in this large sense as the end of education, when I lay it down that the culture of the intellect is a good in itself and its own end; I do not exclude from the idea of intellectual culture what it cannot but be, from the very nature of things; I only deny that we must be able to point out, before we have any right to call it useful, some art, or business, or profession, or trade, or thing, as resulting from it, and as its real and complete end. The parallel is exact:—As the body may be sacrificed to some manual or other toil, whether moderate or oppressive, so may the intellect be devoted to some specific profession; and I do not call *this* the culture of the intellect. Again, as some member or organ of the body may be inordinately used and developed, so may memory, or imagination, or the reasoning faculty; and *this* again is not intellectual culture. On the other hand, as the body may be tended, cherished, and exercised with a simple view to its general health, so may the intellect also be generally exercised in order to its perfect state; and *this is* its cultivation.

Again, as health ought to precede labour of the body, and as a man in health can do what an

unhealthy man cannot do, and as of this health the properties are vigour, energy, agility, graceful carriage and action, manual dexterity, and endurance of fatigue, so in like manner general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study, and educated men can do what illiterate cannot; and the man who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyse, who has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, will not indeed at once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or a statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or a man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or a chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings I have referred to or any other, with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger. In this sense then, and as yet I have said but a very few words on a large subject, mental culture is emphatically *useful*.

If then I am arguing, and shall argue, against Professional or Scientific knowledge as the sufficient end of a University Education, let me not be supposed, Gentlemen, to be disrespectful towards particular studies, or arts, or vocations, and those who are engaged in them. In saying that Law or Medicine is not the end of a University course, I do not mean to imply that the University does not

teach Law or Medicine. What indeed can it teach at all, if it does not teach something particular? It teaches *all* knowledge by teaching all *branches* of knowledge, and in no other way. I do but say that there will be this distinction as regards a Professor of Law, or of Medicine, or of Geology, or of Political Economy, in a University and out of it, that out of a University he is in danger of being absorbed and narrowed by his pursuit, and of giving Lectures which are the Lectures of nothing more than a lawyer, physician, geologist, or political economist; whereas in a University he will just know where he and his science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has taken a survey of all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance by the very rivalry of other studies, he has gained from them a special illumination and largeness of mind and freedom and self-possession, and he treats his own in consequence with a philosophy and a resource, which belongs, not to the study itself, but to his liberal education.

This then is how I should solve the fallacy, for so I must call it, by which Locke and his disciples would frighten us from cultivating the intellect, under the notion that no education is useful which does not teach us some temporal calling, or some mechanical art, or some physical secret. I say that a cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself, adds a power and a grace to every exercise and occupation which it undertakes. And having thus

opened the subject, I proceed to show you, Gentlemen, how it was actually taken in hand, at the time to which I have alluded, by the combatants on the opposite side. And this I think you will allow me to do at some length, though at first it will lead me into what may seem like a digression.

The assault on the University of Oxford, of which I have been speaking, was met by two men of great name and influence in their day, of very different minds, but united, as by Collegiate ties, so in the clearsighted and philosophical view which they took of the whole subject of Liberal Education. In the heart of Oxford, there is a small plot of ground, hemmed in by public thoroughfares, which has been the possession and the home of one Society for above five hundred years. In the old time of Boniface the Eighth and John the Twenty-second, in the age of Scotus and Occam and Dante, before Wiclif or Huss had kindled those miserable fires which were to be the ruin of souls innumerable down to this day, an unfortunate king of England, Edward the Second, flying from the field of Bannockburn, is said to have made a vow to the Blessed Virgin to found a religious house in her honour, if he got back in safety. Prompted and aided by his Almoner, he decided on placing this house in the city of Alfred; and the Image of our Lady, which is opposite its entrance, is the token of the vow and its fulfilment to this day.



King and almoner have long been in the dust, and strangers have entered into their inheritance, and their creed has been forgotten, and their holy rites disowned; but day by day a memento is still made in the Holy Sacrifice by at least one Catholic Priest, once a member of that College, for the souls of those Catholic benefactors who fed him there for so many years. The visitor, whose curiosity has been excited by its present fame, gazes with disappointment on a collection of buildings, which have with them so few of the circumstances of dignity or wealth. Broad quadrangles, high halls and chambers, ornamented cloisters, stately walks, or unbrazeous gardens, a throng of students, ample revenues, or a glorious history, none of these things were the portion of that old Catholic foundation; nothing in short which to the common eye sixty years ago would have given tokens of what it was to be. But it had at that time a spirit working within it, which enabled its inmates to do, amid its seeming insignificance, what no other body in the place could equal; not a very abstruse gift or extraordinary boast, but a rare one, the honest purpose to administer the trust committed to them in such a way as their conscience pointed out as best. So, whereas the Colleges of Oxford are self-electing bodies, the fellows in each perpetually filling up from among themselves the vacancies which occur in their number, the members of this foundation determined, at a time

when, either from evil custom or from ancient statute, such a thing was not known elsewhere, to throw open their fellowships to the competition of all comers, and, in the choice of associates henceforth, to cast to the winds every personal motive and feeling, family connexion, and friendship, and patronage, and political interest, and local claim, and prejudice, and party jealousy, and to elect solely on public and patriotic grounds. Nay, with a remarkable independence of mind, they resolved that even the table of honours, awarded to literary merit by the University in its new system of examination for degrees, should not fetter their judgment as electors; but that at all risks, and whatever criticism it might cause, and whatever odium they might incur, they would select the men, whoever they were, to be children of their Founder, whom they thought in their consciences to be most likely from their intellectual and moral qualities to please him, if (as they expressed it) he were still upon earth, most likely to do honour to his College, most likely to promote the objects which they believed he had at heart. Such persons did not promise to be the disciples of a low Utilitarianism; and consequently, as their collegiate reform synchronized with that reform of the Academical body, in which they bore a principal part, it was not unnatural, that, when the storm broke upon the University from the North, their Alma Mater, whom

they loved, should have found her first defenders within the walls of that small College, which had first put herself into a condition to be her champion.

These defenders, Gentlemen, I have said, were two, of whom the more distinguished was the late Dr. Copleston, then a Fellow of the College, successively its Provost, and Protestant Bishop of Llandaff. In that Society, which owes so much to him, his name lives, and ever will live, for the distinction which his talents bestowed on it, for the academical importance to which he raised it, for the generosity of spirit, the liberality of sentiment, and the kindness of heart, with which he adorned it, and which even those who had least sympathy with some aspects of his mind and character, could not but admire and love. Men come to their meridian at various periods of their lives; the last years of the eminent person I am speaking of were given to duties, which, I am told, have been the means of endearing him to numbers, but which afforded no scope for that peculiar vigour and keenness of mind, which enabled him, when a young man, single-handed, with easy gallantry, to encounter and overthrow the charge of three giants of the North combined against him. I believe I am right in saying, that, in the progress of the controversy, the most scientific, the most critical, and the most witty, of that literary company, all of them now, as he himself, removed from this visible scene, Professor Playfair, Lord Jeffrey, and the

Rev. Sydney Smith, threw together their several efforts into one article of their Review, in order to crush and pound to dust the audacious controversialist, who had come out against them in defence of his own Institutions. To have even contended with such men, was a sufficient voucher for his ability, even before we open his pamphlets, and have actual evidence of the good sense, the spirit, the scholarlike taste, and the purity of style, by which they are distinguished. As might be expected, however, under the circumstances, his matter is various and heterogeneous, and his line of argument is discursive; he is not led to analyse his views on Education to their first principles, and in some places he adopts a more secular tone, than, even putting aside questions of religious doctrine, I would willingly use myself. Still it is not perhaps without its advantage to be presented with sentiments, which are in substance the same, under the different exterior which different minds throw around them; it is like meeting with two witnesses, who, each in his own way, depose to the same general representation.

His mode then of answering the objection, that a Liberal Education is not *useful*, will be found to fall in with that which I have adopted myself. It is true indeed that he speaks of Literature, whereas I have spoken of Philosophy; this, however, is immaterial in the question, as it lies before us, for in either case an intellectual culture is advocated,

which is desirable for its own sake,—which is the education of the man, not of the lawyer, antiquarian, or chemist,—and which saves him from narrowness, and pedantry, both in society and amid the duties of his profession. Speaking then principally of classical studies, he maintains that the knowledge useful to an individual, and the knowledge useful to a community, are, not only not the same, but are directly contrary to each other; that division of intellectual labour, which in fact the Reviewers advocate, is useful to a community, but is hurtful to the individual member of it; and that the end of direct Liberal Education is the good of the individual, and not that of the community.

“It is sometimes asked”, he observes, “with an air of triumph, What is the *utility* of these studies? and *utility* is vauntingly pronounced to be the sole standard, by which all systems of education must be tried. If in turn we were to ask what *utility* is, we should, I believe, have many answers not quite consistent with each other. And the best of them perhaps would only give us other words equally loose and indefinite; such as *wiser, better, happier*; none of which can serve to untie a knotty question, and all of which lead us into a wider field of doubt and inquiry, than the subject which originally produced them. Before I attempt to show what the *utility* of classical learning is, in my own sense of the word, let it be permitted me to explain what it is

not; and to take up the inquiry a little further back than writers on this subject commonly go. }

“It is an undisputed maxim in Political Economy, that the separation of professions and the division of labour tend to the perfection of every art, to the wealth of nations, to the general comfort and well-being of the community. This principle of division is in some instances pursued so far, as to excite the wonder of people to whose notice it is for the first time pointed out. There is no saying to what extent it may not be carried; and the more the powers of each individual are concentrated in one employment, the greater skill and quickness will he naturally display in performing it. But, while he thus contributes more effectually to the accumulation of national wealth, he becomes himself more and more degraded as a rational being. In proportion as his sphere of action is narrowed, his mental powers and habits become contracted; and he resembles a subordinate part of some powerful machinery, useful in its place, but insignificant and worthless out of it. . . .

“If indeed”, he continues, “national wealth were the *sole* object of national institutions, there can be no doubt but that the method demonstrated by [the great and enlightened Adam] Smith, being the surest means of attaining that end, would be the *great leading principle* of political philosophy. In his own work it *is* the great and sole end of his inquiry; and no one can blame him for confining himself to

that single consideration. His undertaking required no more, and he has performed his part well. But, in truth, national wealth is *not* the ultimatum of human society; and, although we must forbear entering on the boundless inquiry, what is the chief good? yet all reflecting minds will admit that it is not wealth. If it be necessary, as it is beyond all question necessary, that society should be split into divisions and subdivisions, in order that its several duties may be well performed, yet we must be careful not to yield up ourselves wholly and exclusively to the guidance of this system; we must observe what its evils are, and we should modify and restrain it, by bringing into action other principles, which may serve as a check and counterpoise to the main force. . . . .

“There can be no doubt that every art is improved by confining the professor of it to that single study. There are emergencies, which call for his whole mind and faculties to be absorbed in it, which require him to forget every other relation of life, however sacred or natural, except that artificial one in which he is then placed. Times will occur when a surgeon or a general must dismiss the common feelings of human nature, and, in order to do his task well, must look upon himself as engaged in working out one problem, and upon all around him as instruments subservient merely to the acquisition of some one distinct purpose, without regard to their

bearings on any thing besides. But, *although the art itself is advanced by this concentration of mind in its service, the individual who is confined to it goes back.* The advantage of the community is nearly in an inverse ratio with his own. . . . .

“When the emergency is past, society itself requires some other contribution from each individual, besides the particular duties of his profession. And, if no such liberal intercourse be established, it is the common failing of human nature, to be engrossed with petty views and interests, to underrate the importance of all in which we are not concerned, and to carry our partial notions into cases where they are inapplicable, to act, in short, as so many unconnected units, displacing and repelling one another.

“In the cultivation of literature is found that common link, which, among the higher and middling departments of life, unites the jarring sects and subdivisions into one interest, which supplies common topics, and kindles common feelings, unmixed with those narrow prejudices, with which all professions are more or less infected. The knowledge, too, which is thus acquired, expands and enlarges the mind, excites its faculties, and calls those limbs and muscles into freer exercise, which, by too constant use in one direction, not only acquire an illiberal air, but are apt also to lose somewhat of their native play and energy. And thus, without directly qualifying a man for any of the employments of life, it



enriches and ennobles all. Without teaching him the peculiar business of any one office or calling, it enables him to act his part in each of them with better grace and more elevated carriage; and, if happily planned and conducted, is a main ingredient in that complete and generous education, which fits a man 'to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war'".\*

The same subject is treated, on the same general principles, but with greater care and distinctness, and, I will add, with greater force and beauty and perfection, both of thought and of language, by the other distinguished writer, to whom I have already referred, Mr. Davison; who, though not so well known to the world in his day, has left more behind him than the Provost of Oriel, to make his name remembered by posterity. This thoughtful man, who was the admired and intimate friend of a very remarkable person, whom, whether he wish it or not, numbers revere and love as the first author of the subsequent movement in the Protestant Church towards Catholicism,† (as on the other hand, Dr. Copleston, was the master and head of that opposite school of thinkers, which numbers among its members Dr. Whately,) this grave and philosophical

\* Vid. Milton on Education.

† Mr. Keble, Vicar of Hursley, late Fellow of Oriel, and Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford.

writer, whose works I can never look into without sighing that such a man was lost to the Catholic Church, as Dr. Butler before him, by some early bias or some fault of self-education—he, in a review of Mr. Edgeworth's work on Professional Education, already noticed, goes leisurely over the same ground, which had already been rapidly traversed by Dr. Copleston, and requires, I fear, to be quoted in larger extracts than are becoming on an occasion, when I ought not to delegate the burden of discussion to another. Moreover, it may be considered hardly fair, to produce a writer of extreme opinions, such as Mr. Edgeworth, as the man of straw, on whom an able writer is to exercise his powers. Yet Mr. Davison's remarks are so suggestive of general principles, and so apposite to my subject, that the circumstance that they are directed to the exposure of a particular theorist, can hardly be considered an adequate reason for my avoiding to use them.

In the Essay then to which I have referred, Mr. Davison claims the word "useful" for Liberal Education in its larger sense, as Dr. Copleston had disclaimed it in its more restricted. Instead of arguing that the Utility of knowledge to the individual varies inversely with its Utility to the public, he chiefly employs himself on two propositions. He shows, first, that a Liberal Education is something far higher, even in the scale of Utility, than what is commonly called a Useful Education, and next, that

it is necessary or useful for the purposes even of that Professional Education, which commonly engrosses the title of useful. The former of these two theses he recommends to us in the following luminous and comprehensive passages:—

“In a series of essays”, he says, “Mr. Edgeworth has traced different plans of Education, calculated for the wants of the several professions. His plans begin at a very early period, and undertake to regulate the habits, studies, and sometimes the amusements, of the boy, in almost every particular, with a view to his civil employment in future life. The advantage to be secured by this concentration of his tastes and studies, is the enabling him to fill his station well, and enlarge his attainments, as applicable to it . . . . .

“And here he labours under a strong suspicion, in our mind, of pursuing a partial and unsatisfactory end. We think there is too much professional policy in such aims; and that it is to take a very contracted view of life, to think with great anxiety how persons may be educated to superior skill in their department, comparatively neglecting or excluding the more liberal and enlarged cultivation. In his system, the value of every attainment is to be measured by its subserviency to a calling. The specific duties of that calling are exalted at the cost of those free and independent tastes and virtues which come in to sustain the common relations of

society, and raise the individual in them. In short, a man is to be usurped by his profession. He is to be clothed in its garb from head to foot. His virtues, his science, and his ideas are all to be put into a gown or uniform, and the whole man to be shaped, pressed, and stiffened, in the exact mould of his technical character. Any interloping accomplishments, or a faculty which cannot be taken into public pay, if they are to be indulged in him at all, must creep along under the cloak of his more serviceable privileged merits. Such is the state of perfection to which the spirit and general tendency of this system would lead us. . . . .

“But the professional character is not the only one which a person engaged in a profession has to support. He is not always upon duty. There are services he owes, which are neither parochial, nor forensic, nor military, nor to be described by any such epithet of civil regulation, and yet are in no wise inferior to those that bear these authoritative titles; inferior neither in their intrinsic value, nor their moral import, nor their impression upon society. As a friend, as a companion, as a citizen at large; in the connexions of domestic life; in the improvement and embellishment of his leisure; he has a sphere of action, revolving, if you please, within the sphere of his profession, but not clashing with it; in which if he can show none of the advantages of an improved understanding, whatever may

be his skill or proficiency in the other, he is no more than an ill-educated man. (When we recollect also, that the leading professions, owing to causes which will always continue in force, in our country at least, are constantly so far overstocked in numbers that the necessary practice and study of them will not fully employ even that portion of their time and thoughts, which their respective members might well afford to give them, we must perceive that there will be a still larger surplus of the intellect of these professional men, to be carried to the fund for general purposes, and to seek its occupation in some spontaneous way.

“On this subject it is impossible to forget an evil incidental to the professions, or disregard the increase of it with which we should be threatened by a system of education dedicated exclusively or chiefly to them. The evil is one which is known by the hard name of pedantry, but which is commonly reckoned a disagreeable, rather than a mischievous thing. It escapes with this easy censure, we suppose, because men look at the fault of another as it affects themselves, more than as it injures him; and therefore the offensive, distasteful part of it is the most noticed. But the mischiefs of this contracted habit of mind to which we allude are so considerable; it runs so much into prejudice, conceit, and ignoble antipathies; it hinders so effectually, not the enlargement alone, but the justness and rectitude of the un-

derstanding, that we do not hesitate to regard a system as radically wrong, which lays a plan of education and study that must prove nothing less than a hot-bed to this pernicious pest of all mental cultivation.

“The predominant love and esteem of one’s own profession is not to be blamed. It is a strong stimulant. Like other stimulants, it may do infinite good or harm, just as it is tempered and applied: but when it is to be made the spring of all youthful exertion, and wrought into the blood as soon as the blood begins to circulate; whether this be a treatment which any constitution can bear well, and whether it will produce, upon the whole, a healthy enthusiasm of spirit, or diseased and decrepid idiosyncracies, is not very hard to determine. We believe, that out of any given number upon whom it might be tried, many more would retain the narrow, unsocial, and vitiated temper of thought produced by it, than even the principle itself, managed as it will be in the hands of ordinary men.

“There is a certain faculty in which all nations of any refinement are great practitioners. It is not taught at school or college as a distinct science; though it deserves that what is taught there should be made to have some reference to it; nor is it endowed at all by the public; every body being obliged to exercise it for himself in person, which he does to the best of his skill. But in nothing is there a greater difference than in the manner of doing it.

The advocates of professional learning will smile when we tell them that this same faculty which we would have encouraged, is simply that of speaking good sense in English, without fee or reward, in common conversation. They will smile when we lay some stress upon it; but in reality it is no such trifle as they imagine. Look into the huts of savages, and see, for there is nothing to listen to, the dismal blank of their stupid hours of silence; their professional avocations of war and hunting are over; and, having nothing to do, they have nothing to say. Turn to improved life, and you find conversation in all its forms the medium of something more than an idle pleasure; indeed a very active agent in circulating and forming the opinions, tastes, and feelings of a whole people. It makes of itself a considerable affair. Its topics are the most promiscuous—all those which do not belong to any particular province. As for its power and influence, we may fairly say that it is of just the same consequence to a man's immediate society, how he talks, as how he acts. Now of all those who furnish their share to rational conversation, a mere adept in his own art is universally admitted to be the worst. The sterility and unconstructiveness of such a person's social hours are quite proverbial. Or if he escape being dull, it is only by launching into ill-timed, learned loquacity. We do not desire of him lectures or speeches; and he has nothing else to give. Among benches he may be

powerful; but seated on a chair he is quite another person. On the other hand, we may affirm, that one of the best companions, is a man who, to the accuracy and research of a profession has joined a free excursive acquaintance with various learning, and caught from it the spirit of general observation. The tincture of a little professional taste will aid variety of remark, and give novel views to the subject of conversation; but much of it cuts off all sympathy and confidence, and extinguishes the intercourse of thought at once. If then those who are to shine at the bar or in the church may also be exceedingly useful if they can give light, unofficially, in other places, we cannot hail a scheme of education as promising well for them or for the cause of society as it stands at present, of which the aim is to collect all their lustre into a few points, with the loss of many essential utilities which it might serve in a more diffused state. It is to merge their education as men wholly in that which is necessary for them as members of a corps. It is to sacrifice the great scheme itself to an accident, an important accident; but which ought not in reason to engross our sole paramount attention”.

Having thus shown that a liberal education is a real benefit to the subjects of it, as members of society, in the various duties and circumstances and accidents of life, he goes on, in the next place, to show that, over and above these direct services,



which might fairly be expected of it, it actually subserves the discharge of these particular functions, and the pursuit of those particular advantages, which are connected with professional exertion, and to which Professional Education is directed.

“We admit”, he observes, “that when a person makes a business of one pursuit, he is in the right way to eminence in it; and that divided attention will rarely give excellence in many. But our assent will go no further. For, to think that the way to prepare a person for excelling in any one pursuit (and that is the only point in hand), is to fetter his early studies, and cramp the first developement of his mind, by a reference to the exigencies of that pursuit barely, is a very different notion, and one which, we apprehend, deserves to be exploded rather than received. Possibly a few of the abstract, insulated kinds of learning might be approached in that way. The exceptions to be made are very few, and need not be recited. But for the acquisition of professional and practical ability, such maxims are death to it. The main ingredients of that ability are requisite knowledge and cultivated faculties; but, of the two, the latter is by far the chief. A man of well improved faculties has the command of another’s knowledge. A man without them, has not the command of his own. The difference between knowledge and faculties is a thing of which Mr. Edgeworth has a very steady conviction. We wish he had fallen

upon a better method of reasoning, expanding, and strengthening those faculties, upon which he feels that all must ultimately depend.

“Of the intellectual powers, the judgment is that which takes the foremost lead in life. How to form it to the two habits it ought to possess, of exactness and vigour, is the problem. It would be ignorant presumption so much as to hint at any routine of method by which these qualities may with certainty be imparted to every or any understanding. Still, however, we may safely lay it down that they are not to be got by a “gatherer of simples”, but are the combined essence and extracts of many different things, drawn from much varied reading and discipline, first, and observation afterwards. For if there be a single intelligible point on this head, it is that a man who has been trained to think upon one subject or for one subject only, will never be a good judge even in that one: whereas the enlargement of his circle gives him increased knowledge and power in a rapidly increasing ratio. So much do ideas act, not as solitary units, but by grouping and combination; and so clearly do all the things that fall within the proper province of the same faculty of the mind, intertwine with and support each other! Judgment lives as it were by comparison and discrimination. Can it be doubted, then, whether the range and extent of that assemblage of things upon which it is practised in its first essays, are of use to its power?

“To open our way a little further on this matter, we will define what we mean by the power of judgment; and then try to ascertain among what kind of studies the improvement of it may be expected at all.

“Judgment does not stand here for a certain homely, useful quality of intellect, that guards a person from committing mistakes to the injury of his fortunes or common reputation; but for that master-principle of business, literature, and talent, which gives him strength in any subject he chooses to grapple with, and enables him to *seize the strong point* in it. Whether this definition be metaphysically correct or not, it comes home to the substance of our inquiry. It describes the power that every one desires to possess when he comes to act in a profession, or elsewhere; and corresponds with our best idea of a cultivated mind.

“Next, it will not be denied, that in order to do any good to the judgment, the mind must be employed upon such subjects as come within the cognizance of that faculty, and give some real exercise to its perceptions. Here we have a rule of selection by which the different parts of learning may be classed for our purpose. Those which belong to the province of the judgment are religion (in its evidences and interpretation),\* ethics, history, eloquence,

\*It is remarkable Mr. Davison does not notice *doctrine*. He seems to have included it in “interpretation” of Scripture. Thus, in *his sense* the passage cannot be admitted by a Catholic, for

poetry, theories of general speculation, the fine arts and works of wit. Great as the variety of these large divisions of learning may appear, they are all held in union by two capital principles of connexion. First, they are all quarried out of one and the same great subject of man's moral, social, and feeling nature. And, secondly, they are all under the control (more or less strict) of the same power of moral reason. "Probability is the test of decision in all. There is a better and a worse in the execution of them. There is a balancing, an option, and a doubt in judging of them".

If these studies, he continues, "be such as give a direct play and exercise to the faculty of the judgment, then they are the true basis of education for the active and inventive powers, whether destined for a profession or any other use. Poetry, which makes one article in that list, has been objected to as teaching men to imagine and not to reason. It does both. Its essence is impassioned, imaginative reason, and the higher kinds of it, which alone deserve to be regarded in education, are to an apprehensive capacity some of the most masterly and profound lessons of severe thought. What comparison can there be between Homer and Euclid for teaching to think and argue on any subject whatever, geometry excepted? One or two of the articles besides, as the the judgment has no jurisdiction over doctrine; but its *letter* seems unexceptionable.

fine arts, and works of wit, might perhaps be dispensed with and referred to the study of riper age; but the general circle comprehending the chief of them, will not endure to be much further retrenched. Miscellaneous as the assemblage may appear, of history, eloquence, poetry, ethics, etc., blended together, they will all conspire in an union of effect. They are necessary mutually to explain and interpret each other. The knowledge derived from them all will amalgamate, and the habits of a mind versed and practised in them by turns will join to produce a richer vein of thought and of more general and practical application than could be obtained of any single one, as the fusion of the metals into Corinthian brass, gave the artist his most ductile and perfect material. Might we venture to imitate an author (whom indeed it is much safer to take as an authority than to attempt to copy), Lord Bacon, in some of his concise illustrations of the comparative utility of the different studies, we should say that history would give fulness, moral philosophy strength, and poetry elevation to the understanding. Such in reality is the natural force and tendency of the studies; but there are few minds susceptible enough to derive from them any sort of virtue adequate to those high expressions. We must be contented therefore to lower our panegyric to this, that a person cannot avoid receiving some infusion and tincture, at least of those several qualities, from that course

of diversified reading. One thing is unquestionable, that the elements of general reason are not to be found fully and truly expressed in any one kind of study; and that he who would wish to know her idiom, must read it in many books.

“ If different studies are useful for aiding, they are still more useful for correcting each other; for as they have their particular merits severally, so they have their defects, and the most extensive acquaintance with one can produce only an intellect either too flashy or too jejune, or infected with some other fault of confined reading. History, for example, shows things as they are, that is, the morals and interests of men disfigured and perverted by all their imperfections of passion, folly, and ambition; philosophy strips the picture too much; poetry adorns it too much: the concentrated lights of the three correct the false peculiar colouring of each, and show us the truth. It is always dangerous to risk a single instance in support of any doctrine, unless it be candidly weighed and improved upon as a hint by the reader himself. In the present case, however, we shall be tempted to the imprudence of appealing to a solitary but splendid example. It may be of as much consequence to a man to know what to think of the word *liberty*, as any on which he can exercise his thoughts; where will you send him for information? to Roman or English history? In the history

of his own times it is the subject of dispute; that history therefore will not compose his doubts. In more ancient history liberty is only seen as it has been perverted, oppressed, or misunderstood. Will you send him to the romantic pages of poetry in Lucan, Corneille, or our English Cato? There indeed he may catch the love of it; but that love will degenerate into extravagance, and his notions of the practical form of it can be none at all. Will you recommend him then to study the plan and sections of it in Montesquieu? His theory now may be more correct, but it will be too rigidly correct for use. The right mode of thinking upon it is to be had from them taken all together, as every one must know, who has seen their united contributions of thought and feeling expressed in the masculine sentiment of our immortal statesman, Mr. Burke, whose eloquence is inferior only to his more admirable wisdom. If any mind improved like his, is to be our instructor, we must go to the fountain head of things as he did, and study not his works but his method; by the one we may become feeble imitators, by the other arrive at some ability of our own. But, as all biography assures us, he, and every other able thinker, has been formed, not by a parsimonious admeasurement of studies to some definite future object (which is Mr. Edgeworth's maxim), but by taking a wide and liberal compass, and thinking a great deal on many

subjects with no better end in view, than because the exercise was one which made them more rational and intelligent beings.

“There is a trite maxim which tells us that nothing is more pernicious than reading a little of many different things. The maxim is perfectly just, as to a little idle and superficial reading, or in such things as do not naturally unite together. . A cento of chemistry, languages, and English history, might be of this description; but a variety of strenuous and penetrating application to such subjects as are in harmony with each other, must escape this censure, till it can be shown that accumulating ideas and conspiring energies of mind are a mischief”.

Lastly, with these manifest benefits to man, as such, which what I have called Liberal Education bestows, he contrasts the absurd beings which would be reared and exhibited in the busy scenes of life, under the influence of Mr. Edgeworth’s training:—

“Instead of making well educated men, the object of his system is to make pleading, and prescribing, and” preaching “machines. So far does he carry the subdivision of his relative aims, that the knowledge of the first and plainest truths of religion is made to belong to a particular profession. The little uncassocked clergyman of six years old, is to be made acquainted with the being of a God, in a proper philosophical way. But his lay brothers have no



such regular instruction provided for them. It is no part of their business. They must recollect that they are not designed for the church, and follow their proper profane studies. Who knows but they may live to hear their brother in the pulpit, and get some religion from him there!

“The lawyer is to have his appropriate management as soon as he begins to speak. A nurse of good accent is to be procured for him, to modulate his first babblings to the right tone of the bar. He is to prattle for a fee. He is afterwards to be encouraged to a little ill bred disputatiousness for the same worthy purpose. Mr. Edgeworth quotes a trite passage of Roman history, to show that the Romans bestowed much care upon the elocution of their children, and repeats over again the tale of Cornelia and the Gracchi.’ The Romans thought it a grace in their children to speak their own language well. So thinks every one. The peculiarity of Mr. Edgeworth’s mind, consists in making it exclusively a lawyer’s accomplishment.

“The physician that is to be, as soon as he can wield a spade, is to have his garden, in imitation of the great Sir Charles Linnæus, and vex the ground with his botanical arrangements. The culture of opium and rhubarb will be his first step to the prescription of them.

“The infant soldier is to be made a hero as soon as possible. Indeed no time is to be lost with him; for

Mr. Edgeworth recommends that he be accustomed to the presence of domestic animals without terror, 'and be taken to the exhibitions of wild beasts, that he may be familiarized to their forms and cries'. His nurse too must be chosen for her aptitude to the duties of rearing a great captain. When the defender of his country is grown up to a boy, his sports should be of the military cast. Without making too much parade, he should begin to work upon some fortification in the corner of a shrubbery. He must be trained also to a sense of honour, and abhor the disgrace of corporal punishment, as a soldier ought.

“Such is the grand scheme of partition to be made among the professional aspirants according to their destinations of future life. Religion, a good elocution, gardening, and other amusements, a manly constitution of body and mind, and a tenderness of honour, we have always thought to be good for boys, as sensitive, rational beings, capable of instruction, health, and pleasure. To make cunning sport for them, and defraud them of the natural right of amusing themselves in their own way, does not agree with our feelings of kindness for them. It sophisticates them in the very point where they should be most free and natural. But to delegate the moral qualities, such as a just impression of religion, and a right sense of honour, to a station or title, or a piece of cloth, or to make the slightest difference in these respects, is to confound the essence of morality, and

run deliberately insane upon a spurious conceited wisdom".

The last sentences go beyond my present subject, which is the intellectual, not the moral bearings of Liberal Education. To-day I have confined myself to saying, that that training of the intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best enables him to discharge his duties to society. The Philosopher, indeed, and the man of the world differ in their very notion, but the methods, by which they are respectively formed, are pretty much the same. The Philosopher has the same command of matters of thought, which the true citizen and gentleman has of matters of business and conduct. If then a practical end must be assigned to a University course, I say it is that of training good members of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is fitness for the world. It neither confines its views to particular professions on the one hand, nor creates heroes or inspires genius on the other. Works indeed of genius, fall under no art; heroic minds come under no rule; a University is not a birthplace of poets or of immortal authors, of founders of schools, leaders of colonies, or conquerors of nations. It does not promise a generation of Aristotles or Newtons, of Napoleons or Washingtons, of Raphaels or Shakespeares, though such miracles of nature it has before now contained within its precincts. Nor is it content on the other hand with forming the critic or the experimentalist,

the economist or the engineer, though such too it includes within its scope. But a University training is the great ordinary means to a great but ordinary end; it aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the intercourse of private life. It is the education which gives a man a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post with credit, and to master any subject with facility. It shows him how to accommodate himself to others, how to throw himself into their state of mind, how to bring before them his own, how to influence them, how to come to an understanding with them, how to bear with them. He is at home in any society, he has common ground with every class; he knows when to speak and when to be silent; he is able to converse, he is able to listen; he can ask a question pertinently, and gain a lesson seasonably, when he has nothing to impart himself; he is ever ready, yet never in the way; he is a pleasant companion, and a comrade you

can depend upon; he knows when to be serious and when to trifle, and he has a sure tact which enables him to trifle with gracefulness and to be serious with effect. He has the repose of a mind, which lives in itself, while it lives in the world, and which has resources for its happiness at home when it cannot go abroad. He has a gift which serves him in public, and supports him in retirement, without which good fortune is but vulgar, and with which failure and disappointment have a charm. The art which tends to make a man all this, is in its idea as useful as the art of wealth or the art of health, though it is less susceptible of method, and less tangible, less certain, less complete in its result.



## DISCOURSE IX.

### PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO RELIGION.

WE shall be brought, Gentlemen, to-day, to the termination of the investigation, which I commenced three Discourses back, and which, I was well aware, from its length, if for no other reason, would make demands upon the patience even of indulgent hearers.

First I employed myself in establishing the principle, that Knowledge is its own reward; and that, when considered in this light, it is called Liberal Knowledge, and is the scope of Academical Institutions.

Next, I examined what is meant by Knowledge, when it is said to be pursued for its own sake; and I showed, that in order satisfactorily to fulfil this idea, Philosophy must be its *form*, or, in other words, that its matter must not be admitted into the mind passively, as so much acquirement, but must be

mastered and appropriated as a system consisting of parts, related one to the other, and interpretative of one another, in the unity of a whole.

Further, I showed that, such a philosophical contemplation of the field of knowledge as a whole, leading, as it did, to an understanding of its separate departments, and an appreciation of them respectively, might in consequence be rightly called an illumination; also, it was rightly called an enlargement of mind, because it was a distinct location of things one with another, as if in space; while it was moreover its proper cultivation and its best condition, both because it secured to the intellect the sight of things as they are, or of truth, in opposition to fancy, opinion, and theory, and again because it presupposed and involved the perfection of its various powers.

Such, I said, was that Knowledge, which deserves to be sought for its own sake, even though it promised no ulterior advantage. But, when I had got as far as this, I went further, and observed, that, from the nature of the case, what was so good in itself, could not but have a number of external uses, though it did not promise them, simply because it *was* good; and that it was necessarily the source of benefits to society, great and diversified in proportion to its own intrinsic excellence. Just as in morals, honesty is the best policy, as being profitable in a secular aspect, though such profit is not the measure



of its worth, so too as regards what may be called the virtues of the Intellect, their very possession indeed is a substantial good, and is enough, yet still that substance has a shadow, inseparable from it, viz., its social and political usefulness. And this was the subject to which I devoted the preceding Discourse.

One portion of the subject remains:—this intellectual culture, which is so exalted in itself, not only has a bearing upon social and active duties, but upon Religion also. The educated mind may be said to be in a certain sense religious; that is, it has what may be considered a religion of its own, independent of Catholicism, partly co-operating with it, partly thwarting it, at once a defence yet a disturbance to the Church in Catholic countries, and in countries beyond her pale, at one time in open warfare with her, at another in defensive alliance. The history of Schools and Academies, and of Literature and Science generally, will, I think, justify me in thus speaking. Since, then, my one aim in these Discourses has been to ascertain the function and the action of a University, viewed in itself, as preparatory to the consideration of the use to which the Church puts it, my survey of it would not be complete, unless I attempted, as I now propose to do, to exhibit its general bearings upon Religion.

Now, when I name the Religion of the Intellect or of Philosophy, and contrast it with Catholicism, you

must not understand me, Gentlemen, as implying that Catholicism is opposed to our Reason. So far from it, I have just spoken of this intellectual Religion as existing in Catholic countries, and among Catholics; and in my earlier Discourses you may recollect I spoke of Catholic Theology as one main portion of the truths, which must be received and contemplated by Philosophy, if it deserve the name. Certainly this religious theory or spirit, to which cultivation of the Intellect gives rise, may be found among good Catholics, may influence, for the better and for the worse, hearts which have true faith and a good hope of salvation. I am not concerned here at all with the question of the Reasonableness of Christianity, or with the Evidences as they are called, or with the Notes of the Church, or with the solution of objections which are brought against Revelation. I am supposing Catholicism taken for granted; even though it be, the exercise of Reason is not at an end; it has other offices and aims besides that of proof. Though it admit Catholicism, it does not go to sleep; it has an action and development of its own, as the passions have, or the moral sentiments, or the principle of self-interest. Grace does not supersede nature; nor is nature at once brought into simple concurrence and coalition with grace. It pursues its course, now coincident with that of grace, now parallel to it, now across, now divergent, now counter, in proportion to its own imperfection and to the attrac-

tion and influence which grace exerts over it. And what takes place as regards other principles of our nature and their developments, is found also as regards the Reason. There is a Religion of enthusiasm, of superstitious ignorance, of state-craft; and each has that in it which resembles Catholicism, and that again which contradicts Catholicism. There is the Religion of a warlike people, and of a pastoral people; there is a Religion of rude times, and in like manner there is a Religion of civilized times, of the cultivated intellect, of the philosopher, scholar, and gentleman. Viewed in itself, however near it comes to Catholicism, it is of course simply distinct from it; for Catholicism is one whole, and admits of no compromise or modification. Yet this is to view it in the abstract; in matter of fact, and in reference to individuals, we can have no difficulty in conceiving its presence in a Catholic country, as a spirit influencing men to a certain extent, for good or for bad or for both,—a spirit of the age, which, again may be found, as among Catholics, so with still greater sway and success in a country not Catholic, yet specifically the same as it exists in a Catholic community. The problem then before us to-day, is to set down some portions of the outline, if we can ascertain them, of the Religion of Civilization, and to determine how they lie relatively to those principles, doctrines, and rules, which Heaven has given us in the Catholic Church.

And here again, when I speak of Revealed Truth, it is scarcely necessary to say that I am not referring to the main articles and prominent points of faith, as contained in the Creed, any more than to the Evidences. As before, so I repeat here, had I undertaken to delineate a philosophy, which directly interfered with the Creed, I could not have spoken of it as compatible with the profession of Catholicism. The philosophy I speak of, whether it be viewed within or outside the Church, does not at once take cognizance of the Creed. Where the country is Catholic, the educated mind takes its articles for granted; where it is not, it simply ignores them and the whole subject-matter to which they relate, as not affecting social and political interests. Truths about God's Nature, Providence, dealings towards the human race, about the Economy of Redemption,—in the one case it humbly accepts them, and passes on; in the other, it passes them over, as matters of simple opinion, which never can be decided, and which can have no power over us to make us morally better or worse. I am not then speaking of the Creed of Catholicism, when I speak of Religion, but I am contemplating Catholicism as a system of pastoral instruction and moral duty; and I have to do with its doctrines only as they are subservient to its direction of the conscience and the conduct. I speak of it, for instance, as teaching the ruined state of man; his utter inability to gain Heaven by any thing he can

do; the moral certainty of his meriting eternal punishment if left to himself; the simple absence of all rights and claims on the part of the creature in the presence of the Creator; the illimitable claims of the Creator on the service of the creature; the imperative and obligatory force of the voice of conscience; and the inconceivable evil of sensuality. I speak of it as teaching, that no one gains Heaven except by the free grace of God, or without a regeneration of nature; that no one can please Him without faith; that the heart is the seat both of sin and of obedience; that charity is the fulfilling of the Law; and that incorporation into the Catholic Church is the ordinary instrument of salvation. These are the lessons which distinguish Catholicism as a popular religion, and these are the subjects to which the cultivated intellect will practically be turned:—I have to compare and contrast, not the doctrinal, but the moral and social teaching of philosophy on the one hand, and Catholicism on the other.

Now, on opening the subject, we see at once a momentous benefit which the philosopher is likely to confer on the pastors of the Church. It is obvious that the first step which they have to effect in the conversion of man and the renovation of his nature, is its rescue from that fearful subjection to sense which is its ordinary state. To be able to break through the meshes of that thralldom, and to disentangle and to disengage its ten thousand holds upon

the heart, is to bring it, I might almost say, half way to Heaven. Here, even divine grace, to speak of things according to their appearances, is ordinarily baffled, and retires, without expedient or resource, before this giant fascination. Religion seems too high and unearthly to be able to exert a continued influence upon us: its effort to rouse the soul, and the soul's effort to co-operate, are too violent to last. It is like holding out the arm at full length, or supporting some great weight, which we manage to do for a time, but soon are exhausted and succumb. Nothing can act beyond its own nature; when then we are called to what is supernatural, though those extraordinary aids from Heaven are given us, with which obedience becomes possible, yet even with them it is of transcendent difficulty. We are drawn down to earth every moment with the ease and certainty of a natural gravitation, and it is only by sudden impulses and (as it were) forcible plunges that we attempt to mount upwards. Religion indeed enlightens, terrifies, subdues; it gives faith, it inflicts remorse, it inspires resolutions, it draws tears, it inflames devotion, but only for the occasion. The sinful spirit repents, and protests it will never sin again, and for a while is protected by disgust and abhorrence from the malice of its foe. But that foe knows too well, that such seasons of repentance are wont to have their end: he patiently waits, till nature faints with the effort of resistance, and lies passive and

hopeless under the next access of temptation. What we need then is some expedient or instrument, which at least will obstruct and stave off the approach of our spiritual enemy, and which is sufficiently congenial and level with our nature to maintain as firm a hold upon us as the inducements of sensual gratification. It will be our wisdom to employ nature against itself. Thus sorrow, sickness, and care are providential antagonists to our inward disorders; they come upon us as years pass on, and generally produce their effects on us, in proportion as we are subjected to their influence. These, however, are God's instruments, not ours; we need a similar remedy, which we can make our own, the object of some legitimate faculty, or the aim of some natural affection, which is capable of resting on the mind, and taking up its familiar lodging with it, and engrossing it, and which thus becomes a match for the besetting power of sensuality, and a sort of homeopathic medicine for the disease. Here then I think is the important aid, which intellectual cultivation furnishes to us in rescuing the victims of passion and self-will. It does not supply religious motives; it is not the cause or proper antecedent of any thing supernatural; it is not meritorious of Heavenly aid or reward; but it does a work, at least *materially* good (as theologians speak), whatever be its real and formal character. It expels the excitements of sense by the introduction of those of the intellect.

This then is the *prima facie* advantage of the pursuit of Knowledge; it is the drawing the mind off from things which will harm it to subjects which are worthy a rational being; and, though it does not raise it above nature, nor has any tendency to make us pleasing to our Maker, yet is it nothing to substitute what is in itself harmless for what is, to say the least, inexpressibly dangerous? is it a little thing to exchange a circle of ideas which are certainly sinful, for others which are certainly not so? You will say, perhaps, in the words of the Apostle, "Knowledge puffeth up": and doubtless this mental cultivation, even when it is successful for the purpose for which I am applying it, may be from the first nothing more than the substitution of pride for sensuality. I grant it, I think I shall have something to say on this point presently; but this is not a necessary result, it is but an incidental evil, a danger which may be realized or may be averted, whereas we may in most cases predicate guilt, and guilt of a heinous kind, where the mind is suffered to run wild and indulge its thoughts without training or law of any kind; and surely to turn away a soul from mortal sin, is a good and a gain so far, whatever comes of it. And therefore, if a friend in need is twice a friend, I conceive, that intellectual employments, though they do no more than occupy the mind with objects naturally noble or innocent, have a special claim upon our consideration and gratitude.



Nor is this all: Knowledge, the discipline by which it is gained, and the tastes which it forms, have a natural tendency to refine the mind, and to give it an indisposition, simply natural, yet real, nay more than this, a disgust and abhorrence, towards excesses and enormities of evil, which are often or ordinarily reached at length by those who do not from the first set themselves against what is vicious and criminal. It generates within the mind a fastidiousness, analogous to the delicacy or daintiness which good nurture or a sickly habit induces in respect of food; and this fastidiousness, though arguing no high principle, though no protection in the case of violent temptation, nor sure in its operation, yet will often or generally be lively enough to create an absolute loathing of offences, or a detestation and scorn of them as ungentlemanlike, to which ruder natures, nay such as have far more of real religion in them, are tempted, or are even betrayed. Scarcely can we exaggerate the value, in its place, of a safeguard such as this, as regards those multitudes who are thrown upon the open field of the world, or are withdrawn from its eye and from the restraint of public opinion. In many cases, where it is secured, sins familiar to those who are otherwise circumstanced, will not even occur to the mind: in others, the sense of shame and the quickened apprehension of detection, will act as a sufficient obstacle to them, when they do present themselves before it. Then again,

the fastidiousness I am speaking of will create a simple hatred of that miserable tone of conversation, which, obtaining 'as it does in the world, is a constant fuel of evil, heaped up round about the soul: moreover, it will create an irresolution and indecision in doing wrong, which will act as a *remora* till the danger is past away. And though it has no tendency, I repeat, to mend the heart, or to secure it from the dominion in other shapes of that very evil which it repels in those particular manifestations in which it prevails over others, yet cases may occur when it gives birth, after sins have been committed, to so keen a remorse and so intense a self-hatred, as are even sufficient to cure the moral disorder altogether, and to induce sobriety ever afterwards;—as the spendthrift in the story, who, after gazing on his lost acres from the summit of an eminence, came down a miser, and remained a miser to the end of his days.

And all this holds good in a special way, in an age such as ours, when, rife as is pain of body and mind as heretofore, yet other counteractions of evil, of a penal character, which at other times are present, are away. In rude and semi-barbarous periods, at least in a climate such as our own, it is the habitual occupation of the senses to convey little more than feelings of discomfort to the mind, as far as they convey feelings at all. Exposure to the elements, social disorder and lawlessness, the tyranny of the powerful, and the inroads of enemies, are a stern

discipline, allowing brief intervals, or awarding a sharp penance, to sloth and sensuality. The rude food, the scanty clothing, the violent exercise, the vagrant life, the military constraint, the imperfect pharmacy, which now are attendants only on particular classes of the community, were once the lot more or less of all. In the deep woods or the wild solitudes of the medieval era, feelings of religion or superstition were naturally present to the population, which in various ways co-operated with the missionary or pastor, in retaining it in a noble simplicity of manners. But, when in the advancement of society men congregate in towns, and multiply in contracted spaces, and law gives them security, and art gives them comforts, and good government robs them of courage and manliness, and monotony of life throws them back upon themselves, who does not see, that resource or protection against evil they have none, that vice is the mere reaction of unhealthy toil, and sensual excess the holyday of the vacant mind? This is so well understood by the practical benevolence of the day, that it has especially busied itself in plans for supplying the masses of our town population with intellectual and honourable recreations. Cheap literature, libraries of useful and entertaining knowledge, scientific lectureships, museums, zoological collections, buildings and gardens to please the eye and to give repose to the feelings, external objects of whatever kind, which may take

the mind off itself, and expand and elevate it in liberal contemplations, these are the human means, wisely suggested, and good as far as they go, for at least parrying the assaults of moral evil, and keeping at bay the enemies, not only of the soul, but of the social fabric.

Such are the instruments, by which an age of advanced civilization combats moral disorders, which Reason as well as Revelation denounces; and I have not been backward to express my sense of their serviceableness to Religion. Moreover, they are but the foremost of a series of influences, which intellectual culture exerts upon our moral nature, and all upon the type of Christianity, manifesting themselves in veracity, probity, equity, fairness, gentleness, benevolence, and amiableness; so much so, that a character more noble to look at, more beautiful, more winning, in the various relations of life and in personal duties, is hardly conceivable, than may, or might be, its result, when that culture is bestowed upon a soil naturally adapted to virtue. If you would obtain a picture for contemplation which may seem to fulfil the ideal, which the inspired Teacher has delineated in several of his Epistles, under the name of charity, in its sweetness and harmony, its generosity, its courtesy to others, and its depreciation of self, you could not have recourse to a better furnished *studio* than that of Philosophy, or to the specimens of it, which with greater or less exactness are

scattered through society in a civilized age. It is enough, to refer you, Gentlemen, to the various Biographies and Remains of contemporaries and others, which from time to time issue from the press, to see how striking is the action of our intellectual upon our moral nature, where the moral material is rich, and the intellectual cast is perfect. Individuals will occur to all of us, who deservedly attract our love and admiration, and whom the world almost worships as the work of its own hands. Religious principle indeed,—that is, faith,—is, to all appearance, simply away; the work is as certainly not supernatural, as it is certainly noble and beautiful. This must be insisted on, that the Intellect may have its due; but it also must be insisted on for the sake of conclusions to which I wish to conduct our investigation. The radical difference indeed of this mental culture from genuine religion, in spite of its seeming relationship, is the very cardinal point on which my present discussion turns; yet on the other hand it may readily be assigned to a Christian origin by hasty or distant observers, or those who view it in a particular light. And as this is the case, I think it advisable, before proceeding with the delineation of its characteristic features, to point out to you distinctly the elementary principles, on which its morality is based.

You will bear in mind then, Gentlemen, that I spoke just now of the scorn and hatred which a cultivated mind feels for some kinds of vice, and the

utter disgust and profound humiliation which may come over it, if it should happen in any degree to be betrayed into them. Now this feeling may have its root in faith and love, but it may not; there is nothing really religious in it, considered by itself. Conscience indeed is implanted in the breast by nature, but it inflicts upon us fear as well as shame; when the mind is simply angry with itself and nothing more, surely the true import of the voice of nature and the depth of its intimations have been forgotten, and a false philosophy has misinterpreted emotions which ought to lead to God. Fear implies the transgression of a law, and a law implies a law-giver and judge; but the tendency of intellectual culture is to swallow up the fear in the self-reproach, and self-reproach is directed and limited to our mere sense of what is fitting and becoming. Fear carries us out of ourselves, shame confines us within the round of our own ideas. Such, I say, is the danger which awaits a civilized age; such is its besetting sin (not inevitable, God forbid! or we must abandon the use of God's own gifts), but still the ordinary sin of the Intellect; conscience becomes what is called a moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin is not an offence against God, but against human nature.

The less amiable specimens of this spurious religion are those, which we meet every day in Protestant England. We find men possessed of many vir-

tues, but proud, bashful, fastidious, and reserved. Why is this? it is because they think and act, as if there were really such a thing as what theologians call the philosophical sin; it is because conscience to them is not the word of a lawgiver, as it ought to be, but the dictate of their own minds and nothing more; it is because they do not look out of themselves, because they do not look through and beyond their own minds to their Maker, but are engrossed in notions of what is due to themselves, to their own dignity and their own consistency. Their conscience has become a mere self-respect. Instead of doing one thing and then another, as each is called for, in faith and obedience, careless of what may be called the *keeping* of deed with deed, and leaving Him who gives the command to blend the portions of their conduct into a whole, their one object, however unconscious to themselves, is to paint a smooth and perfect surface, and to be able to say to themselves that they have done their duty. When they do wrong, they feel, not contrition, of which God is the object, but remorse, and a sense of degradation. They call themselves fools, not sinners; they are angry and impatient, not humble. They shut themselves up in themselves; it is misery to them to think or to speak of their own feelings; it is misery to suppose that others see them, and their shyness and sensitiveness often become morbid. As to confession, which is so natural to the Catholic, to them it is im-

possible, unless indeed, in cases where they have been guilty, an apology is due to their own character, is expected of them, and will be satisfactory to look back upon. They are victims of an intense self-contemplation.

There are, however, far more pleasing and interesting forms of this moral malady than that which I have been depicting: I have spoken of the effect of intellectual culture on proud natures; but it will show to greater advantage, yet with as little approximation to religious faith, in amiable and unaffected minds. Observe, Gentlemen, the heresy, as it may be called, of which I speak, is the substitution of a moral sense or taste for conscience in the true sense of the word; now this error may be the foundation of a character of far more elasticity and grace than ever adorned the haughty English Protestant. It is especially congenial to men of an imaginative and poetical cast of mind, who will readily accept the notion that virtue is nothing more than the graceful in conduct. Such persons, far from tolerating fear, as a principle, in their apprehension of religious and moral truth, will not be slow to call it simply gloom and superstition. Rather a philosopher's, a gentleman's religion, is of a liberal and generous character; it is based upon honour; vice is evil, because it is unworthy, base, and odious. This was the quarrel of the ancient heathen with Christianity, that, instead of simply fixing the mind on the fair and the pleasant,



it intermingled other ideas with them of a sad and painful nature; that it spoke of tears before joy, a cross before a crown; that it laid the foundation of heroism in penance; that it made the soul tremble with the news of Purgatory and Hell; that it insisted on views and a worship of the Deity, which to their minds was nothing else than mean, servile, and cowardly. The notion of an Allperfect, Everpresent God, in whose sight we are less than atoms, and who, while He deigns to visit us, can punish as well as bless, was abhorrent to them; they made their own minds their sanctuary, their own ideas their oracle, and conscience in morals was but parallel to genius in art, and wisdom in philosophy.

Had I room for all that might be said upon the subject, I might illustrate this intellectual religion from the history of the Emperor Julian, the apostate from Christian Truth, the foe of Christian education. He, in whom every Catholic sees the shadow of the future Anti-Christ, was all but the pattern-man of philosophical virtue. Weak points in his character he had, it is true, even in a merely poetical standard; but, take him all in all, and we shall recognize in him a specious beauty and nobleness of moral deportment, which combines in it the rude greatness of Fabricius or Regulus with the accomplishments of Pliny or Antoninus. His simplicity of manners, his frugality, his austerity of life, his singular disdain of sensual pleasure, his military heroism, his application

to business, his literary diligence, his modesty, his clemency, his accomplishments, go to make him one of the most eminent specimens of pagan virtue, which the world has ever seen. His last hours form a *unique* passage in history, both as illustrating his character under its critical trial, and as being reported to us on the evidence of an eye-witness. "He employed the awful moments", says a writer, well fitted, both from his literary tastes and from his hatred of Christianity, to be his panegyrist, "he employed the awful moments with the firm temper of a hero and a sage; the philosophers who had accompanied him in this fatal expedition, compared the tent of Julian with the prison of Socrates; and the spectators, whom duty, or friendship, or curiosity, had assembled round his couch, listened with respectful grief to the funeral oration of their dying Emperor. 'Friends and fellow-soldiers, the seasonable period of my departure is now arrived, and I discharge, with the cheerfulness of a ready debtor, the demands of nature. I have learned from philosophy, how much the soul is more excellent than the body; and that the separation of the worthless substance should be the subject of joy rather than of affliction. I have learned from religion, that an early death has often been the reward of piety; and I accept, as a favour of the gods, the mortal stroke that secures me from the danger of disgracing a character, which has hitherto been supported by virtue and fortitude. I die

without remorse, as I have lived without guilt. I am pleased to reflect on the innocence of my private life; and I can affirm with confidence, that the supreme authority, that emanation of the divine Power, has been preserved in my hands pure and immaculate . . . I now offer my tribute of gratitude to the Eternal Being, who has not suffered me to perish by the cruelty of a tyrant, by the secret dagger of conspiracy, or by the slow tortures of lingering disease. He has given me, in the midst of an honourable career, a splendid and glorious departure from this world, and I hold it equally absurd, equally base, to solicit, or to decline, the stroke of fate' . . .

“After this discourse, which Julian pronounced in a firm and gentle tone of voice, he distributed, by a military testament, the remains of his private fortune; and making some inquiry why Anatolius was not present, he understood from the answer of Sallust, that Anatolius was killed, and bewailed with amiable inconsistency the loss of his friend. At the same time, he reproved the immoderate grief of the spectators, and conjured them not to disgrace, by unmanly tears, the fate of a prince, who in a few moments would be united with Heaven and with the stars. The spectators were silent; and Julian entered into a metaphysical argument with the philosophers Priscus and Maximus on the nature of the soul. The efforts which he made, of mind as

well as body, most probably hastened his death. His wound began to bleed with great violence; his respiration was embarrassed by the swelling of the veins; he called for a draught of cold water, and as soon as he had drunk it, expired without pain about the hour of midnight".\* A memorable deathbed indeed! in the insensibility of conscience, in the ignorance of the very idea of sin, in the contemplation of his own moral consistency, in the simple absence of fear, in the cloudless self-confidence, in the serene self-possession, in the cold self-satisfaction, we recognize the Philosopher.

Gibbon paints with pleasure, what, conformably with the sentiments of a godless intellectualism, was an historical fulfilment of his own idea of moral perfection; Lord Shaftesbury had already drawn out that idea in a theoretical form, in his celebrated collection of Treatises which he has called "Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, views". In this work one of his first attacks is directed against the doctrine of reward and punishment, as if it introduced a notion into religion, inconsistent with the true apprehension of the beauty of virtue, and with the liberality and nobleness of spirit in which it should be pursued. "Men have not been content", he says, "to show the natural advantages of honesty and virtue. They have rather lessened these, the better, as they thought, to advance another founda-

\* Gibbon, Hist., ch. 24.

tion. They have made virtue so mercenary a thing, and have talked so much of its rewards, that one can hardly tell what there is in it, after all, which can be worth rewarding. For to be *bribed* only or *terrified* into an honest practice, bespeaks little of real honesty or worth". "If", he says elsewhere, insinuating what he dare not speak out, "if through hope merely of reward, or fear of punishment, the creature be inclined to do the good he hates, or restrained from doing the ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse, there is in this case no virtue or goodness whatever. There is no more of rectitude, piety, or sanctity, in a creature thus reformed, than there is meekness or gentleness in a tiger strongly chained, or innocence and sobriety in a monkey under the discipline of the whip . . . . While the will is neither gained, nor the inclination wrought upon, but awe alone prevails and forces obedience, the obedience is servile, and all which is done through it merely servile". That is, he says that Christianity is the enemy of moral virtue, as influencing the mind by fear of God, not by love of good.

The motives then of hope and fear being, to say the least, put far into the back ground, and nothing being morally good but what springs simply or mainly from a love of virtue for its own sake, this love-inspiring quality in virtue is its beauty, while a bad conscience is not much more than the sort of feeling which makes us shrink from an instrument

out of tune. "Some by mere nature", he says, "others by art and practice, are masters of an ear in music, an eye in painting, a fancy in the ordinary things of ornament and grace, a judgment in proportions of all kinds, and a general good taste in most of those subjects which make the amusement and delight of the ingenious people of the world. Let such gentlemen as these be as extravagant as they please, or as irregular in their morals, they must at the same time discover their *inconsistency*, live at *variance* with themselves, and in *contradiction* to that principle, on which they ground their highest pleasure and entertainment. Of all other *beauties* which virtuosos pursue, poets celebrate, musicians sing, and architects or artists of whatever kind describe or form, the most delightful, the most engaging and pathetic, is that which is drawn from real life and from the passions. Nothing affects the heart like that which is purely from itself, and of its own nature: such as the beauty of sentiments, the grace of actions, the turn of characters, and the *proportions and features* of a human mind. This lesson of philosophy, even a romance, a poem, or a play may teach us . . . . Let poets or the men of harmony deny, if they can, this force of nature, or withstand this *moral magic* . . . . Every one is a virtuoso of a higher or lower degree; every one pursues a grace...of one kind or other. The *venustum*, the *honestum*, the *decorum* of things will force

its way . . . . The most natural beauty in the world is honesty and moral truth; for all beauty is truth".

Accordingly, virtue being only one kind of beauty, the principle which determines what is virtuous is, not conscience, but *taste*. "Could we once convince ourselves", he says, "of what is in itself so evident, viz., that in the very nature of things there must of necessity be the foundation of a right and wrong *taste*, as well in respect of inward character of features, as of outward person, behaviour, and action, we should be far more ashamed of ignorance and wrong judgment in the former than in the latter of these subjects . . . . One who aspires to the character of a man of breeding and politeness, is careful to form his judgment of arts and sciences upon right models of perfection . . . . He takes particular care to turn his eye from every thing which is gaudy, luscious, and of false taste. Nor is he less careful to turn his ear from every sort of music, besides that which is of the best manner and truest harmony. 'T were to be wished we had the same regard to a *right taste in life and manners* . . . . If civility and humanity be a taste; if brutality, insolence, riot, be in the same manner a taste,....who would not endeavour to force nature as well in this respect, as in what relates to a taste or judgment in other arts and sciences?"

Sometimes he distinctly contrasts this taste with principle and conscience, and gives it the preference

over them. "After all", he says, "*t is not merely what we call principle, but a taste, which governs men. They may think for certain, 'This is right', or 'that wrong'; they may believe 'this is a virtue', or 'that a sin'; 'this is punishable by man', or 'that by God'; yet if the savour of things lies cross to honesty, if the fancy be florid, and the appetite high towards the subaltern beauties and lower orders of worldly symmetries and proportions, the conduct will infallibly turn this latter way". Thus, somewhat like a Jansenist, he makes the superior pleasure infallibly conquer, and implies that, neglecting principle, we have but to train the taste to a kind of beauty higher than sensual. He adds: "*Even conscience, I fear, such as is owing to religious discipline, will make but a slight figure, when this taste is set amiss*".*

And hence the well known doctrine of this author, that ridicule is the test of truth; for truth and virtue being beauty, and falsehood and vice deformity, and the feeling inspired by deformity being that of derision, as that inspired by beauty is admiration, it follows that vice is not a thing to weep about, but to laugh at. "Nothing is ridiculous", he says, "but what is deformed; nor is any thing proof against raillery but what is handsome and just. And therefore 't is the hardest thing in the world to deny fair honesty the use of this weapon, which can never bear an edge against herself, and bears against every thing contrary".



And hence again, conscience, which intimates a Lawgiver, being superseded by a moral taste or sentiment, which has no sanction beyond the constitution of our nature, it follows that our great rule is to contemplate ourselves, if we would gain a standard of life and morals. Thus he has entitled one of his Treatises, a "Soliloquy", with the motto, "Nec te quæsiveris extra"; and he observes, "The chief interest of ambition, avarice, corruption, and every sly insinuating vice, is to prevent this interview and familiarity of discourse, which is consequent upon close retirement and inward recess. 'T is the grand artifice of villainy and lewdness, *as well as of superstition and bigotry*, to put us upon terms of greater distance and formality with ourselves, and evade our *proving* method of soliloquy . . . . A passionate lover, whatever solitude he may affect, can never be truly by himself . . . . 'Tis the same reason, which keeps the imaginary saint or mystic from being capable of this entertainment. Instead of looking narrowly into his own nature and mind, that he may be no longer a mystery to himself, he is taken up with *the contemplation of other mysterious natures*, which he never can explain or comprehend".

Taking these passages as specimens of what I call the Religion of Philosophy, it is obvious to observe, that there is no doctrine contained in them which is not in a certain sense true; yet, on the other hand, that almost every statement is perverted and made

false, because it is not the whole truth. They are exhibitions of truth under one aspect, and therefore insufficient; conscience is most certainly a moral sense, but it is more; vice, again, is a deformity, but it is worse. Lord Shaftesbury may insist, if he will, that simple and solitary fear cannot effect a moral conversion, and we are not concerned to answer him; but he will have a difficulty in proving that any real conversion follows from a doctrine which makes virtue a mere point of good taste, and vice vulgar and ungentlemanlike.

Such a doctrine is essentially superficial, and such will be its effects. It has no better measure of right and wrong than that of visible beauty and tangible fitness. Conscience indeed inflicts an acute pang, but that pang, forsooth, is irrational, and to reverence it is an illiberal superstition. But, if we will make light of what is deepest within us, nothing is left but to pay homage to what is more upon the surface. To *seem* becomes to *be*; what looks fair will be good, what causes offence will be evil; virtue will be what pleases, vice what pains. As well may we measure virtue by utility, as by such a rule. Nor is this an imaginary apprehension; we all must recollect the celebrated sentiment into which a great and wise man was betrayed, in the glowing eloquence of his valediction to the spirit of chivalry. "It is gone", he cried; "that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound; which

inspired courage, while it mitigated ferocity; which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which *vice lost half its evil by losing all its grossness*". In the last clause of this beautiful sentence, we have an apt illustration of the ethical temperament of a civilized age. It is detection, not the sin, which is the crime; private life is sacred, and inquiry into it is intolerable; and decency is virtue. Scandals, vulgarities, whatever shocks, whatever disgusts, are offences of the first order. Drinking and swearing, squalid poverty, improvidence, laziness, slovenly disorder, make up the idea of profligacy: poets may say any thing, however wicked, with impunity; works of genius may be read without danger or shame, whatever their principles; fashion, celebrity, the beautiful, the heroic, will suffice to force any evil upon the community. The splendours of a court, and the charms of good society, wit, imagination, taste, and high breeding, the *prestige* of rank, and the resources of wealth, are a screen, an instrument, and an apology for vice and irreligion. And thus at length we find, surprising as the change may be, that that very refinement of Philosophy, which began by repelling sensuality, ends by excusing it. Under the shadow indeed of the Church, and in its due development, it does service to the cause of morality; but, when it is strong enough to have a will of its own, and is lifted up with an idea of its own importance, and attempts to form a theory, and to lay down a

principle, and to carry out a system of ethics, and undertakes the moral education of the man, then it does but abet evils to which at first it seemed instinctively opposed. True Religion is slow in growth, and, when once planted, is difficult of dislodgment; but its intellectual counterfeit has no root in itself: it springs up suddenly, it suddenly withers. It appeals to what is in nature, and it falls under the dominion of the old Adam. Then, like dethroned princes, it keeps up a state and majesty, when it has lost the power. Deformity is its abhorrence; therefore, since it cannot dissuade men from vice, to escape the sight of its deformity, it embellishes it. It "skins and films the ulcerous place", which it cannot probe or heal,

"Whiles rank corruption, mining all within,  
Infects unseen".

And now, taking up the thread of our remarks where we dropt it, we are, alas! by this time in a better condition to form a true estimate of the religious value of those intellectual influences, which at first sight give such promise of service to the cause of Catholicism. No word indeed of praise or satisfaction which I have ventured to bestow on them has to be withdrawn; nay, much upon other scores has to be added. But so far is undeniable, that they have a dark side, as well as a bright one, and that their very points of excellence may blind or

bribe us into a closer alliance with them, than Christian duty can approve. When I interrupted my favourable account of them, I had just made an allusion to the ethical precepts of St. Paul, and to the fulfilment which they seemed to receive at the hand of the pattern characters of this day. An attentive consideration of this correspondence, which at first sight tells for the latter, will but corroborate the contrast which I have since been drawing between Philosophy and the Gospel. The Apostle gives us a pattern of evangelical perfection; he draws the Christian character in its most graceful form, and its most beautiful hues. He discourses of that charity, which is patient and meek, humble and singleminded, disinterested, contented, and persevering. He tells us to prefer each other before ourselves, to give way to each other, to abstain from rude words and evil speech, to avoid self-conceit, to be calm and grave, to be cheerful and happy, to observe peace with all men, truth and justice, courtesy and gentleness, all that is modest, amiable, virtuous, and of good repute. Such is St. Paul's exemplar of the Christian in his external relations; and, I grant, it is remarkable that men of the world should be able to imitate it so closely; it is more remarkable still that they should be able, without any striking, overwhelming extravagance, to boast, as they do, that they imitate it even more exactly than those, who belong to the communion and inherit the traditions of the Apostle himself. This

indeed they seem habitually to assume; they appropriate to themselves a property of the Church; all that is beautiful in mind belongs to the gentleman, while Catholics are the representatives of primeval times, and a barbarous condition of society.

I do not wish to say anything in disparagement of the beneficial influence of Civilization, where it is not directly to my point; else, I might draw attention to the fact, that, whether or not it can create what it now calls "the gentleman", since Christianity has come, it had little conception of such a character before its appearance. In ancient times at least there was no such thing as a "pagan gentleman". It is an observation of Hume's, an unexceptionable witness here, that, "the arts of conversation", and we may take the word in its largest sense, "were not brought so near to perfection among" the ancients, "as the arts of writing and composition. The scurrility", he continues, "of the ancient orators, in many instances, is quite shocking, and exceeds all belief. Vanity too is often not a little offensive in authors of that age, as well as the common licentiousness and immodesty of their style . . . . I shall also be bold to affirm, that among the ancients there was not much delicacy of breeding, or that polite deference and respect, which civility obliges us either to express or counterfeit towards persons with whom we converse".\* The modern idea then of "a gentle-

\* Essays.

man" which Lord Shaftesbury would claim, was unknown to Cicero, and introduced by St. Paul. It may be a logical result of Philosophy, but, in the western world at least, it is an historical offspring of Christianity. Gradually only, and in the course of centuries, did that idea take possession of the world's intellect, and imbue its moral sense, and become one of the recognized elements of its standard of perfection; the more wonderful then, if Catholicism, as is often assumed, should at this day, have abandoned that ethical delicacy and grace, which it was itself the means of introducing to the world.

But, in truth, the real state of the case is but a fit illustration of the relative positions of the Church and the world. The Church ever begins with the beginning; and, as regards the multitude of her children, is never able to get beyond the beginning, but is continually employed in laying the foundation. She is engaged with what is essential, as previous and as introductory, to the ornamental and the attractive. She is curing and keeping men clear of mortal sin; she is "treating of justice and chastity, and the judgment to come": she is insisting on faith and hope, and devotion, and honesty, and the elements of charity; and has so much to do with precept, that she almost leaves it to inspirations from Heaven to suggest what is of counsel and perfection. She aims at what is necessary, rather than at what is desirable. She is for the many as well as

for the few. She is putting souls in the way of salvation, that they may then be in a condition, if they shall be called upon, to aspire to the heroic, and to attain the substance, as well as the semblance, of the beautiful. Such is the method, or the policy (so to call it), of the Church: but Philosophy looks at the matter from a very different point of view; what have Philosophers to do with the terror of judgment or the saving of the soul? Lord Shaftesbury calls the former a sort of "panic fear". Of the latter he scoffingly complains that "the saving of souls is now the heroic passion of exalted spirits". Of course he is at liberty, on his principles, to pick and choose out of Christianity what he will; he discards the theological, the mysterious, the spiritual; he makes selection of the morally or esthetically beautiful. To him it matters not at all, that he begins his teaching where he should end it; it matters not that, instead of planting the tree, he merely crops its flowers for his bouquet; he only aims at this life, his philosophy dies with him; if his flowers do but last to the end of his revel, he has nothing more to seek. When night comes, the withered leaves may be mingled with his own ashes; he and they will have done their work, he and they will be no more. Certainly, it costs little to make men virtuous on conditions such as these; it is like teaching them a language or an accomplishment, to write Latin or to play on an instrument,—the profession of an artist, not the commission of an apostle.



This embellishment of the exterior is the beginning and the end of philosophical morality. It is the reason why it aims at being modest, rather than humble, and can be proud while it is unassuming. To humility indeed it does not even aspire; humility is one of the most difficult of virtues both to attain and to ascertain. It lies close upon the heart itself, and its tests are exceedingly delicate and subtle. Its counterfeits abound; however, we are little concerned with them here, for, I repeat, it is hardly professed even by name in the code of ethics which we are reviewing. As has been often observed, ancient civilization had not the idea, and had no word to express it: or rather, it had the idea, and considered it a defect of mind, not a virtue; as to the modern world, you may gather its ignorance of it, by its perversion of the somewhat parallel term "condescension". Humility or condescension, viewed as a virtue of conduct, may be said to consist, as in other things, so in our placing ourselves in our thoughts on a level with our inferiors; it is not only a voluntary relinquishment of the privileges of our own station, but an actual participation or assumption of their condition to whom we stoop. This is true humility, to feel and to behave as if we were low, not to cherish a notion of our importance, while we affect a low position. Such was St. Paul's humility, when he called himself "the least of the saints"; such the humility of those many holy men, who have considered themselves the

greatest of sinners. It is an abdication, as far as their own thoughts are concerned, of those prerogatives or privileges to which others deem them entitled. Now it is not a little instructive to contrast with this idea, Gentlemen,—with this Latin, this theological meaning of the word “condescension”,—its proper English sense; put them in juxta-position, and you will at once see the difference between the world’s humility and the humility of the Gospel. As the world uses the word, “condescension” is a stooping indeed of the person, but a bending forward, unattended with any the slightest effort to leave by a single inch the seat in which it is so firmly established. It is the act of a superior, who protests to himself, while he commits it, that he is superior still, and that he is doing nothing else but an act of grace towards those on whose level he is, by his theory, placing himself. And this is the nearest idea which the philosopher can form of the virtue of self-abasement; to do more than this is a meanness or an hypocrisy, and at once excites his suspicion and disgust. What the world is, such it has ever been; we know the contempt which the educated pagans had for the martyrs and confessors of the Church; and it is shared by the anti-Catholic bodies of this day.

Such are the ethics of Philosophy, when faithfully represented; but, an age like this, not pagan, but professedly Christian, cannot venture to reprobate humility in set terms, or to make a boast of pride.

Accordingly it looks out for some expedient by which it may blind itself to the real state of the case. Humility, with its grave and self-denying attributes, it cannot love; but what is more beautiful, what more winning, than modesty? what virtue, at first sight, simulates humility so well? though what in fact is more radically distinct from it? In truth, great as is its charm, modesty is not the deepest or the most religious of virtues. Rather it is the advanced guard or sentinel of the soul militant, and watches continually over its nascent intercourse with the world about it. It goes the round of the senses; it mounts up into the countenance; it protects the eye and ear; it reigns in the voice and gesture. Its province is the outward deportment, as other virtues have relation to matters theological, others to society, and others to the mind itself. And being more superficial than other virtues, it is more easily disjoined from their company; it admits of being associated with principles or qualities naturally foreign to it, and is often made the cloak of feelings or ends for which it was never created. So little is it the necessary index of humility, that it is even compatible with pride. The better for the purpose of philosophy; humble it cannot be, so forthwith modesty becomes its humility.

Pride, under such training, instead of running to waste, is turned to account; it gets a new name; it is called self-respect; and ceases to be the disagreeable, uncompanionable quality which it is in

itself. Though it be the motive principle of the soul, it seldom comes to view; and, when it shows itself, then delicacy and gentleness are its attire, and good sense and sense of honour direct its motions. It is no longer a restless agent, without definite aim; it has a large field of exertion assigned to it, and it subserves those social interests which it would naturally trouble. It is directed into the channel of industry, frugality, honesty, and obedience; and it becomes the very staple of the religion and morality held in honour in a day like our own. It becomes the safeguard of chastity, the guarantee of veracity, in high and low; it is the very household god of the Protestant, inspiring neatness and decency in the servant girl, propriety of carriage and refined manners in her mistress, uprightness, manliness, and generosity, in the head of the family. It diffuses a light over town and country; it covers the soil with handsome edifices and smiling gardens; it tills the field, it stocks and embellishes the shop. It is the stimulating principle of providence on the one hand, and of free expenditure on the other; of an honourable ambition, and of elegant enjoyment. It breathes upon the face of society, and the hollow sepulchre is forthwith beautiful to look upon.

Refined by the civilization which has brought it into activity, this self-respect infuses into the mind an intense horror of exposure, and a keen sensitive-

ness of notoriety and ridicule. It becomes the enemy of extravagances of any kind; it shrinks from what are called scenes; it has no mercy on the mock-heroic, on pretence or egotism, on verbosity in language or what is called prosiness in manner. It detests gross adulation; not that it tends at all to the eradication of the appetite to which the flatterer ministers, but it sees the absurdity of indulging it, it understands the annoyance thereby given to others, and if a tribute must be paid to the wealthy or the powerful, it demands greater subtlety and art in the preparation. Thus vanity is changed into a more dangerous self-conceit, as being checked in its natural eruption. It teaches men to suppress their feelings, and to control their tempers, and to mitigate both the severity and the tone of their judgments. As Lord Shaftesbury would desire, it prefers playful wit and satire, in putting down what is objectionable, as a more refined and good-natured, as well as a more effectual method, than the expedient which is natural to uneducated minds. It is from this impatience of the tragic and the bombastic, that it is now quietly but energetically opposing itself to the unchristian practice of duelling, which it brands as simply out of taste and as the remnant of a barbarous age; and certainly it seems likely to effect what Religion has aimed at abolishing in vain.

Hence it is that it is almost a definition of a gentleman, to say he is one who never inflicts pain.

This description is both refined, and, as far as it goes, accurate; for certainly he may be represented as one who, while he abounds in services and civilities to others, aims (so to say) at others obtaining without his giving, at offering without obtruding, and at being felt without being seen. He is mainly occupied in merely removing the obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those about him; and he concurs with their movements rather than takes the initiative himself. His benefits may be considered as parallel to what are called comforts or conveniences in arrangements of a personal nature: like an easy chair or a good fire, which do their part in dispelling cold and fatigue, though nature provides both means of rest and animal heat without them. The true gentleman in like manner carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast;—all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment; his great concern being to make every one at their ease and at home. He has his eyes on all his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conversation, and never wearisome. He makes light of favours while he does them, and seems to be receiving when he is conferring. He never speaks of

himself except when compelled, never defends himself by a mere retort, he has no ears for slander or gossip, is scrupulous in imputing motives to those who interfere with him, and interprets everything for the best. He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments, or insinuates evil which he dare not say out. From a long-sighted prudence, he observes the maxim of the ancient sage, that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our enemy, as if he were one day to be our friend. He has too much good sense to be affronted at insult, he is too busy to remember injuries, and too indolent to bear malice. He is patient, forbearing, and resigned, on philosophical principles; he submits to pain, because it is inevitable, to bereavement, because it is irreparable, and to death, because it is his destiny. If he engages in controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the blundering discourtesy of better, though less educated minds; who, like blunt weapons, tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mistake the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, misconceive their adversary, and leave the question more involved than they find it. He may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too clear-headed to be unjust; he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief as he is decisive. Nowhere shall we find greater candour, consideration, indulgence: he throws himself into the

minds of his opponents, he accounts for their mistakes. He knows the weakness of human reason as well as its strength, its province and its limits. If he be a unbeliever, he will be too profound and large-minded to ridicule religion or to act against it; he is too wise to be a dogmatist or fanatic in his infidelity. He respects piety and devotion; he even supports institutions as venerable, beautiful, or useful, to which he does not assent; he honours the ministers of religion, and he is contented with declining its mysteries without assailing or denouncing them. He is a friend of religious toleration, and that, not only because his philosophy has taught him to look on all forms of faith with an impartial eye, but also from the gentleness and effeminacy of feeling which is the attendant on civilization.

Not that he may not hold a religion too, in his own way, even when he is not a Christian. In that case his religion is one of imagination and sentiment; it is the embodiment of those ideas of the sublime, majestic, and beautiful, without which there can be no large philosophy. Sometimes he acknowledges the being of God, sometimes he invests an unknown principle or quality with the attributes of perfection. And this deduction of his reason, or creation of his fancy, he makes the occasion of such excellent thoughts, and the starting point of so varied and systematic a teaching, that he even seems like a disciple of Christianity itself. From the very



accuracy and steadiness of his logical powers, he is able to see what sentiments are consistent in those who hold any religious doctrine at all, and he appears to others to feel and to hold a whole circle of theological truths, which exist in his mind no otherwise than as a number of deductions.

Such are some of the lineaments of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle. They are seen within the pale of the Church and without it; they form the *beau-ideal* of the world; they partly assist and partly distort the development of the Catholic. They may subserve the education of a St. Francis de Sales or a Cardinal Pole; they may be the limits of the virtue of a Shaftesbury or a Gibbon. Basil and Julian were fellow-students at the schools of Athens; and one became the Saint and Doctor of the Church, the other her scoffing and relentless foe.



## DISCOURSE X.

### DUTIES OF THE CHURCH TOWARDS PHILOSOPHY.

I HAVE to congratulate myself, Gentlemen, that at length I have accomplished, with whatever success, the difficult and anxious undertaking to which I have been immediately addressing myself. Difficult and anxious it has been in truth, though the main subject of University Education has been so often and so ably discussed already; for I have attempted to follow out a line of thought, more familiar to Protestants just now than to Catholics, upon Catholic grounds. I declared my intention, when I opened the subject, of treating it as a philosophical and practical, rather than as a theological question, with an appeal to common-sense, not to ecclesiastical rules; and for this very reason, while my argument has been less ambitious, it has been deprived of the lights and supports which another mode of handling it would have secured.

No anxiety, no effort is more severe in its way,

than are demanded of him who would investigate without error and instruct without obscurity; and, if the past discussion has at any time tried the patience of the kind persons who have given it their attention, I can assure them that on no one can it have inflicted so great labour and fatigue as on myself. Happy they, who are engaged in provinces of thought, so familiarly traversed and so thoroughly explored, that they see every where the footprints, the paths, the landmarks, and the remains of former travellers, and can never step wrong; but for myself, Gentlemen, I have been not unlike a navigator on a strange sea, who is out of sight of land, is surprised by night, and has to trust mainly to the rules and instruments of his science for reaching the port. The everlasting mountains, the high majestic cliffs, of the opposite coast, radiant in the sunlight, which are our ordinary guides, fail us in an excursion such as this; the lessons of antiquity, the determinations of authority, are here rather the needle, chart, and plummet, than great objects, with distinct and continuous outline and completed details, which stand up and confront and occupy our gaze, and relieve us from the tension and suspense of our personal observation. And thus, in spite of the pains we may take to consult others and avoid mistakes, it is not till the morning comes, and the shore greets us, and we see our vessel making straight for harbour, that we relax our jealous watch, and consider anxiety irra-

tional. Such in a measure has been my feeling in the foregoing inquiry; in which indeed I have been in want neither of authoritative principles nor distinct precedents, but of treatises *in extenso* on the subject on which I have written,—the finished work of writers, who, by their acknowledged judgment and erudition, might furnish me for my private guidance with a running instruction on each point, which successively came under review.

I have spoken of the arduousness of my "*immediate*" undertaking, both because the questions I have hitherto treated are but a portion of those which enter into the general subject of University Education, and also because those which are to come are, as I think, more frequently discussed and in themselves more easily settled. My inquiry has borne a preliminary character, not as to the duties of the Church towards a University, nor the characteristics of a University which is Catholic, but as to what a University is, what is its aim, what its nature, what its bearings. I have accordingly laid down first, that all branches of knowledge are, at least implicitly, its subject matter; that these branches are not isolated and independent one of another, but form together a whole or system; that they run into each other and complete each other, and that, in proportion to our knowledge of them as a whole, is the exactness and trustworthiness of our knowledge of them separately; that the process of imparting

knowledge to the intellect in this philosophical way, is its true culture; that this culture is a good in itself; that that knowledge which is both its instrument and result, is called Liberal Knowledge; that such culture and such knowledge may fitly be sought for their own sake; that they are, however, in addition, of great secular utility, as constituting the best and highest formation of the intellect for social and political life; and lastly, that, considered in a religious aspect, they concur with Christianity a certain way, and then diverge from it; and consequently prove in the event, sometimes its serviceable ally, sometimes from their very resemblance to it, an insidious and dangerous foe.

Though, however, these Discourses have only professed to be preliminary, being directed to the investigation of the object and subject-matter of the Education which a University professes to impart; at the same time I conceive they have laid the ground for deciding much more than what they have professed, even if they have not already advanced some way in the proof. I observed in my Introductory Discourse, that "the main principle on which I should have to proceed in the controversy to which I was addressing myself, was this, that Education must not be disjoined from Religion, or that Mixed Schools are constructed on a false idea". Here, of course, the first step to determine was, "what is meant by University Education"; and to that inquiry

I have confined myself; but its very process and result have recommended generally, and opened views for proving in detail, the fundamental principle of which I have undertaken the custody. Those further proofs in detail will form the subject of future discussions, should I ever have the opportunity of entering upon them; meanwhile, even as far as I have already gone, I consider I have said what may convince any one who is earnestly and seriously a Catholic (for I am here concerned with Catholics alone),—any one who thinks that the doctrines of Revelation are true in the same sense that scientific principles and historical facts are true,—that the idea of a University in fact external to the Catholic Church is both unphilosophical and impracticable, supposing, that is, by University is meant a place of education in general knowledge.

A reason for calling such an idea unphilosophical was drawn out in the former half of these Discourses; and a reason for calling it impracticable has been suggested in the latter. In the former, this broad and obvious consideration was established, that, all knowledge being connected together, to omit in education any important department of it was more or less to invalidate the rest; on the other hand, that whereas the separate provinces of Knowledge have a tendency to encroach upon each other to the detriment of all, and severally require protectors and representatives of their respective interests, while

political expedience, social utility, the tastes and dispositions which nature furnishes, constitute a sufficient guarantee that the claims of secular knowledge will be satisfied; theological knowledge requires on its part, and cannot safely dispense with, the vigilant presence of its own proper defender; and that that defender is the Church.

Such was the course of thought pursued in my first five Discourses; the view of the subject suggested in those which have followed has been less obvious indeed, but deeper and more serious than the former. I have been showing in them that, even though the case could be so, that the whole system of Catholicism was recognized and professed, without the direct presence of the Church, still this would not at once make a University a Catholic Institution, nor be sufficient to secure the due weight of theological truth in its philosophical studies. For it may easily happen, that a particular bias or drift may characterize an Institution, which no rules can reach, nor officers remedy, nor professions or promises counteract. We have an instance of such a case in the Spanish Inquisition;—here was a purely Catholic establishment, devoted to the maintenance, or rather the ascendancy of Catholicism, keenly zealous for theological truth, the stern foe of every anti-Catholic idea, and administered by Catholic theologians; yet it in no proper sense belonged to the Church. It was simply and entirely a state institution, it was an



expression of that very Church - and - King spirit, which has prevailed in these islands, nay, it was an instrument of the state, according to the confession of the acutest Protestant historians, in its warfare against the Holy See. Considered "*materially*", it was nothing but Catholic; but its spirit and form were earthly and secular, in spite of whatever faith and zeal and sanctity and charity were to be found in the individuals who from time to time had a share in its administration. And in like manner it is no sufficient security for the Catholicity of a University, even that the whole of Catholic theology should be professed in it, unless the Church breathes her own pure and unearthly spirit into it, and fashions and moulds its organization, and watches over its teaching, and knits together its pupils, and superintends its action. The Spanish Inquisition came into collision with the supreme Catholic authority, from the circumstance that its immediate end was of a secular character; and for the same reason, whereas Academical Institutions (as I have been so long engaged in showing) are in their very nature directed to social, national, temporal objects in the first instance, and since they are living and energizing bodies, if they deserve the name of University at all, and of necessity have some one formal and definite ethical character, good or bad, and do of a certainty imprint that character on the individuals who direct and who frequent them, it cannot but be, that, if left to

themselves, they will, in spite of their profession of Catholic Truth, work out results more or less prejudicial to its interests.

Nor is this all: such Institutions may be perverted into hostility to Revealed Truth, in consequence of the character of their teaching as well as of their end. They are employed in the pursuit of Liberal Knowledge, and Liberal Knowledge has a special tendency, not necessary or rightful, but a tendency in fact, when cultivated by beings such as we are, to impress us with a mere philosophical theory of life and conduct, in the place of Revelation. I have said much on this subject already. Truth has two attributes—beauty and power; and while Useful Knowledge is the possession of truth as powerful, Liberal Knowledge is the apprehension of it as beautiful. Pursue it, either as beauty or as power, to its furthest extent and its true limit, and you are led by either road to the Eternal and Infinite, to the intimations of conscience and the announcements of the Church. Satisfy yourself with what is only visibly or intelligibly excellent, as you are likely to do, and you will make present utility and natural beauty the practical test of truth, and the sufficient object of the intellect. It is not that you will at once reject Catholicism, but you will measure and proportion it by an earthly standard. You will throw its highest and most momentous disclosures into the background, you will deny its principles, explain away

its doctrines, re-arrange its precepts, and make light of its practices, even while you profess it. Knowledge, viewed as knowledge, exerts a subtle influence in throwing us back on ourselves, and making us our own centre, and our minds the measure of all things. This then is the tendency of that Liberal Education, of which a University is the school, viz., to view Revealed Religion from an aspect of its own,—to fuse and recast it,—to tune it, as it were, to a different key, and to reset its harmonies,—to circumscribe it by a circle which unwarrantably amputates here, and unduly develops there; and all under the notion, conscious or unconscious, that the human intellect, self-educated and self-supported, is more true and perfect in its ideas and judgments, than that of Prophets and Apostles, to whom the sights and sounds of Heaven were immediately conveyed. A sense of propriety, order, consistency, and completeness gives birth to a rebellious stirring against miracle and mystery, against the severe and the terrible.

First and chiefly, this Intellectualism comes into collision with precept, then with doctrine, then with the very principle of dogmatism. A perception of the Beautiful becomes the substitute for faith. External to the Church, it at once runs into scepticism or infidelity; but even within it, and with the most unqualified profession of her Creed, it acts, if left to itself, as an element of corruption and debility. Catholicism, as it has come down to us from the first,

seems to be mean and illiberal; it is a mere popular religion; it is the religion of illiterate ages or servile populations or barbarian warriors; it must be treated with discrimination and delicacy, corrected, softened, improved, if it is to satisfy an enlightened generation. It must be stereotyped as the patron of arts, or the pupil of speculation, or the protégé of science; it must play the literary academician, or the empirical philanthropist, or the political partizan; it must keep up with the age; some or other expedient it must devise, in order to explain away, or to hide, tenets under which the intellect labours and of which it is ashamed—its doctrine, for instance, of grace, its mystery of the Godhead, its preaching of the Cross, its devotion to Mary, or its loyalty to Peter. Let this spirit be freely evolved out of that philosophical condition of mind, which in former Discourses I have so highly, so justly extolled, and it is impossible but, first indifference, then laxity of belief, then heresy, then an explicit suppression of Catholic theology, will be the successive results. But this is only the beginning of evils: there is no medium between truth and error, and the ultimate event of the struggle will show it. The University which does not profess the Faith, must in consistency denounce it. It becomes the prey and the organ of avowed infidelity, as bitter a foe to the interests of Revealed Truth, as it might have been a defence.

Here then are two injuries, which Revelation is

likely to sustain at the hands of the Masters of human reason, unless the Church, as in duty bound, protects the sacred treasure which is in jeopardy. The first is a simple ignoring of Theological Truth altogether, under the pretence of not recognizing differences of religious opinion;—which can only take place in countries or under governments which have abjured Catholicism. The second, which is of a more subtle character, is a recognition indeed of Catholicism, but (as if in pretended mercy to it) an adulteration of its spirit. These two have successively constituted the subject of these Discourses; and now, at the risk of anticipating what may come before us in future discussions, I will proceed to show the dangers I speak of more distinctly, by a reference to the general subject-matter of instruction, which a University undertakes.

There are three great subjects, on which Human Reason employs itself:—God, Nature, and Man: and the province of theology being, as the present argument supposes, for the time withdrawn, the physical and social worlds remain. These, when respectively subjected to Human Reason, form two books: the book of nature is called Science, the book of man is called Literature. Literature and Science, thus considered, nearly constitute the subject matter of Liberal Education; and, while Science is made to subserve the former of the two injuries, which Revealed Truth sustains,—its exclusion, Literature subserves the

latter,—its corruption. Let us consider the influence of each upon Religion separately.

1. As to Physical Science, of course there can be no real collision between it and Catholicism. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation, come from the same Divine Author, whose works cannot contradict each other. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied, that, in matter of fact, there always has been a sort of jealousy and hostility between Religion and physical philosophers. The name of Galileo reminds us of it at once. Not content with investigating and reasoning in his own province, he went out of his way directly to insult the received interpretation of Scripture; theologians repelled an attack which was wanton and arrogant; and Science, insulted in her minister, has taken its full revenge upon Theology since. A vast multitude of its teachers, I fear it must be said, have been either unbelievers, or sceptics, or at least have denied to Christianity any teaching, distinctive or special, over the Religion of Nature. There have indeed been most illustrious exceptions; some men protected by their greatness of mind, some by their religious profession, some by the fear of public opinion; but I suppose the run of experimentalists, external to the Catholic Church, have more or less inherited the positive or negative unbelief of Laplace, Buffon, Franklin, Priestley, Cuvier, and Humboldt. I do not of course mean to say that there need be in every case a resentful and virulent

opposition made to Religion on the part of scientific men; but their emphatic silence or phlegmatic inadvocence as to its claims, have implied more eloquently than any words, that in their opinion it had no voice at all in the subject-matter which they had appropriated to themselves. The same antagonism shows itself in the middle ages. Friar Bacon was popularly regarded with suspicion as a dealer in unlawful arts; Pope Sylvester the Second has been accused of magic for his knowledge of natural secrets; and the geographical ideas of St. Virgil, Bishop of Saltzburg, were regarded with anxiety by the great St. Boniface, the glory of England, the Martyr-Apostle of Germany. I suppose, in matter of fact, magical superstition and physical knowledge did commonly go together in those ages: however, the hostility between experimental science and theology is far older than Christianity. Lord Bacon traces it to an era prior to Socrates; he tells us that, among the Greeks, the atheistic was the philosophy most favourable to physical discoveries, and he does not hesitate to imply that the rise of the religious schools was the ruin of science.\*

Now, if we would investigate the reason of this opposition between Theology and Physics, I suppose we must first take into account Lord Bacon's own explanation of it. It is common in judicial inqui-

\* Vid. Hallam's *Literature of Europe*, Macaulay's *Essay*, and the Author's *Oxford University Sermons*, IX.

ries, to caution the parties on whom the verdict depends, to put out of their minds whatever they have heard out of court on the subject to which their attention is to be directed. They are to judge by the evidence; and this is a rule which holds in other investigations as far as this, that nothing of an adventitious nature ought to be introduced into the process. Take the well-known instance of the Homilies of the Established Church: when, in enjoining the ordinance of fasting, after appealing to Leviticus, the prophet Zachary, St. Luke, and the Council of Chalcedon, they go on to speak of abstinences “upon policy”, “in consideration of maintaining fisher towns bordering upon the sea, and for the increase of fishermen, of whom do spring mariners to go upon the sea, to the furnishing of the navy of the same”, we feel at once the incongruity of mixing religion and statute law. In like manner, from religious investigations, as such, physics must be excluded, and from physical, as such, religion; and if we mix them, we shall spoil both. The theologian, speaking of Divine Omnipotence, for the time simply ignores the laws of nature as restraints upon it; and the physical philosopher, on the other hand, in his experiments upon natural phenomena, is simply ascertaining those laws, prescindingly (to use the technical word) that Omnipotence. If the theologian, in tracing the ways of Providence, were stopped with objections grounded on the impossibility of physical miracles, he would



justly protest against the interruption; and were the philosopher, who was determining the motion of the heavenly bodies, to be questioned about their final or their First Cause, he too would suffer an illogical interruption. The latter asks the cause of volcanoes, and is impatient at being told it is "the will of God"; the former asks the cause of the overthrow of the guilty cities, and is preposterously referred to the volcanic action still visible in their neighbourhood. The inquiry into final causes for the moment passes over the existence of nature; the inquiry into physical, passes over for the moment the existence of God. In other words, physical science is in a certain sense atheistic, for the very reason it is not theology.

This is Lord Bacon's justification, and an intelligible one, for considering that the fall of atheistic philosophy in ancient times was a blight upon the hopes of physical science. "Aristotle", he says, "Galen, and others frequently introduce such causes as these:—the hairs of the eyelids are for a fence to the sight; the bones for pillars whence to build the bodies of animals; the leaves of trees are to defend the fruit from the sun and wind; the clouds are designed for watering the earth. All which are properly alleged in metaphysics; but, in physics, are impertinent, and as *remoras* to the ship, that hinder the sciences from holding on their course of improvement, and introducing a neglect of searching after physical causes".\*

\* In Augment., 5.

Here then is one reason for the prejudice of physical philosophers against Theology:—on the one hand, their deep satisfaction in the laws of nature indisposes them towards the thought of a Moral Governor, and makes them sceptical of His interposition; on the other hand, the occasional interference of religious writers in a province not religious, has made them sore, suspicious, and resentful.

Another reason of a kindred nature is to be found in the difference of method, by which truths are gained in theology and in physical science. Induction is the instrument of Physics, and deduction only is the instrument of Theology. There the simple question is, What is revealed? all doctrinal knowledge flows from one fountain-head. If we are able to enlarge our view and multiply our propositions, it must be merely by the comparison and adjustment of existing truths; if we would solve new questions, it must be by consulting old answers. The notion of doctrinal knowledge absolutely novel, and of simple addition from without, is intolerable to Catholic ears, and never was entertained by any one who was even approaching to an understanding of our creed. Revelation is all in all in doctrine; the Apostles its sole depositary, the inferential method its sole instrument, and ecclesiastical authority its sole sanction. The Divine Voice has spoken once for all, and the only question is about its meaning. Now this process, as far as it was reasoning, was the very mode of

reasoning, which, as regards physical knowledge, the school of Bacon has superseded by the inductive method:—no wonder, then, that that school should be irritated and indignant to find that a subject-matter remains still, in which their favourite instrument has no office; no wonder that they rise up against this memorial of an antiquated system, as an eyesore and an insult; and no wonder that the very force and dazzling success of their own method in its own department should sway or bias unduly the religious sentiments of any persons who come under its influence. They assert that no new truth can be gained by deduction; Catholics assent, but add that, as regards religious truth, they have not to seek at all, for they have it already. Christian Truth is purely of revelation, that revelation we can but explain, we cannot increase, except relatively to our own apprehensions; without it we should have known nothing of its contents, with it we know just as much as its contents and nothing more. And, as it was a divine act independent of man, so will it remain in spite of man. Niebuhr may revolutionize history, Lavoisier chemistry, Newton astronomy; but God Himself is the author as well as the subject of theology. When Truth can change, its Revelation can change; when human reason can out-reason the Omniscient, then may it supersede His work.

Avowals such as these fall strange upon the ear of men, whose first principle is the search after truth,

and whose starting points of search are things material and sensible. They scorn any process of inquiry not founded on experiment; the Mathematics indeed they endure, because that science deals with ideas, not with facts, and leads to conclusions hypothetical rather than real; "Metaphysics" they even use as a bye-word of reproach; and Ethics they admit only on condition that it gives up conscience as its scientific ground, and bases itself on tangible utility: but as to Theology, they cannot deal with it, they cannot master it, and so they simply outlaw it and ignore it. Catholicism, forsooth, "confines the intellect", because it holds that God's intellect is greater than theirs, and what He has done, man cannot improve. And what in some sort justifies them to themselves in this extravagance, is the circumstance that there is a religion close at their doors which, discarding so severe a tone, has actually adopted their own principle of inquiry. Protestantism treats Scripture, just as they deal with Nature; it takes the sacred text as a large collection of phenomena, from which, by an inductive process, each individual Christian may arrive at just those religious conclusions which approve themselves to his own judgment. It considers faith a mere modification of reason, as being an acquiescence in certain probable conclusions till better are found. Sympathy then, if no other reason, throws experimental philosophers into alliance with the enemies of Catholicism.

I have another consideration to add, not less important than any I have hitherto adduced. The physical sciences, Astronomy, Chemistry, and the rest, are doubtless engaged upon divine works, and cannot issue in untrue religious conclusions. But at the same time it must be recollected that Revelation has reference to circumstances which did not arise till after the Heavens and the Earth were made. They were made before the introduction of moral evil into the world: whereas the Catholic Church is the instrument of a remedial dispensation to meet that introduction. No wonder then that her teaching is simply distinct, though not divergent, from the theology which Physical Science suggests to its followers. She sets before us a number of attributes and acts on the part of the Divine Being, for which the material and animal creation gives no scope; power, wisdom, goodness are the burden of the physical world, but it does not and could not speak of mercy, longsuffering, and the economy of human redemption, and but partially of the moral law and moral goodness. "Sacred theology", says Lord Bacon, "must be drawn from the words and the oracles of God: not from the light of nature or the dictates of reason. It is written, that 'the Heavens declare the glory of God'; but we nowhere find it, that the Heavens declare the will of God; which is pronounced a law and a testimony, that men should do according to it. Nor does this hold only in the

great mysteries of the Godhead, of the creation, of the redemption. . . . We cannot doubt that a large part of the moral law is too sublime to be attained by the light of nature; though it is still certain, that men, even with the light and law of nature, have some notions of virtue, vice, justice, wrong, good, and evil".\* That the new and further manifestations of the Almighty, made by Revelation, are in perfect harmony with the teaching of the natural world, forms indeed one subject of the profound work of the Protestant Bishop Butler; but they cannot in any sense be gathered from nature, and the silence of nature concerning them may easily seduce the imagination, though it has no force to persuade the reason, to revolt from doctrines which have not been authenticated by facts, but are enforced by authority. In a scientific age, then, there will naturally be a parade of what is called Natural Theology, a wide-spread profession of the Unitarian creed, an impatience of mystery, and a scepticism about miracles.

And to all this must be added the ample opportunity which physical science gives to the indulgence of those sentiments of beauty, order, and congruity, of which I have said so much as the ensigns and colours (as they may be called) of a civilized age in its warfare against Catholicism.

It being considered, then, that Catholicism differs from physical science, in drift, in method of proof,

\* De Augm., § 28.

and in subject-matter, how can it fail to meet with unfair usage from the philosophers of any Institution in which there is no one to take its part? That Physical Science itself will be ultimately the loser by such ill treatment of Theology, I have insisted on at great length in the first part of these Discourses: for to depress unduly, to encroach upon any science, and much more on an important one, is to do an injury to all. However, this is not the concern of the Church; the Church has no call to watch over and protect Science: but towards Theology she has a distinct duty: it is one of the special trusts committed to her keeping. Where Theology is, there she must be; and if a University cannot fulfil its name and office without the recognition of Revealed Truth, she must be there to see that it is a *bonâ fide* recognition, sincerely made and consistently acted on.

2. And if the interposition of the Church is necessary in the Schools of Science, still more imperatively is it demanded in the other main constituent portion of the subject-matter of Liberal Education—Literature. Literature stands related to Man, as Science stands to Nature; it is his history. Man is composed of body and soul; he thinks and he acts; he has appetites, passions, affections, motives, designs; he has within him the lifelong struggle of duty with inclination; he has an intellect fertile and capacious; he is formed for society, and society multiplies and diversifies in endless combinations

his personal characteristics, moral and intellectual. All this constitutes his life; of all this Literature is the expression; so that Literature is in some sort to him what autobiography is to the individual; it is his Life and Remains. Moreover, he is this sentient, intelligent, creative, and operative being, quite independent of any extraordinary aid from Heaven, or any definite religious belief; and, *as* such, as he is in himself, does Literature represent him; it is the Life and Remains of the *natural* man, or man in *purâ naturâ*. I do not mean to say that it is impossible in its very notion that Literature should be tinged by a religious spirit; Hebrew Literature, as far as it can be called Literature, certainly is simply theological, and has a character imprinted on it which is above nature; but I am speaking of what is to be expected without any extraordinary dispensation; and I say that, in matter of fact, as Science is the reflection of Nature, so is Literature also—the one, of Nature physical, the other, of Nature moral and social. Circumstances, such as locality, period, language, seem to make little or no difference in the character of Literature, as such; on the whole, all Literatures are one; they are the voices of the natural man.

I wish this were all that had to be said to the disadvantage of Literature; but while Nature physical remains fixed in its own laws, Nature moral and social, has a will of its own, is self-governed,



and never remains any long while in that state from which it started into action. Man will never continue in a mere state of innocence; he is sure to sin, and his literature will be the expression of his sin, and this whether he be heathen or Christian. Christianity has thrown gleams of light on him and his literature; but, as it has not converted him, but only certain choice specimens of him, so it has not changed the characters of his mind or his history; his literature is either what it was, or worse than what it was, in proportion as there has been an abuse of knowledge granted and a rejection of truth. On the whole, then, I think it will be found, and ever found, as a matter of course, that Literature, as such, no matter of what nation, is the science or history, partly and at best of the natural man, partly of man fallen.

Here then, I say, you are involved in a difficulty greater than that which besets the cultivation of Science; for, if Physical Science be dangerous, I have said it is dangerous, because it necessarily ignores the idea of moral evil; but Literature is open to the more grievous imputation of recognizing and understanding it too well. Some one will say to me perhaps: "Our youth shall not be corrupted. We will dispense with all general or national Literature whatever, if it be so exceptionable; we will have a Christian Literature of our own, as pure, as true, as the Jewish". You cannot have it:—I do not say you cannot form a select literature for the young, or for

the middle or lower classes; this is another matter altogether: I am speaking of University Education, which implies an extended range of reading, which has to deal with standard works of genius, or what are called the *classics* of a language: and I say, from the nature of the case, if Literature is to be made a study of human nature, you cannot have a Christian Literature. It is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Literature of sinful man. You may gather together something very great and high, something higher than any literature ever was; and when you have done so, you will find that it is not Literature at all. You will have simply left the delineation of man, as such, and have substituted for it, as far as you have had any thing to substitute, that of man, as he is or might be, under certain special advantages. Give up the study of man, as such, if so it must be; but say you do so. Do not say you are studying him, his history, his mind and his heart, when you are studying something else. Man is a being of genius, passion, intellect, conscience, power. He exercises these various gifts in various ways, in great deeds, in great thoughts, in heroic acts, in hateful crimes. He founds states, he fights battles, he builds cities, he ploughs the forest, he subdues the elements, he rules his kind. He creates great ideas, and influences many generations. He takes a thousand shapes, and undergoes a thousand fortunes. Literature records them all to the life,

Quicquid agunt homines, votum, timor, ira, voluptas,  
Gaudia, discursus.

He pours out his fervid soul in poetry; he sways to and fro, he soars, he dives, in his restless speculations; his lips drop eloquence; he touches the canvass, and it glows with beauty; he sweeps the strings, and they thrill with an ecstatic meaning. He looks back into himself, and he reads his own thoughts, and notes them down; he looks out into the universe, and tells over the elements and principles, of which it is the product.

Such is man: put him aside, keep him before you; but, whatever you do, do not take him for what he is not, for something more divine and sacred, man regenerate. Nay, beware of showing grace and its work at such disadvantage, as to make the few whom it has thoroughly influenced compete in intellect with the vast multitude who either have it not, or use it not. The elect are few to choose out of, and the world is inexhaustible. From the first, Jabel and Tubalcain, Nimrod, "the stout hunter", the learning of the Pharaohs, and the wisdom of the East country, are of the world. Every now and then they are rivalled by a Solomon or a Beseleel, but the *habitat* of natural gifts is the natural man. The Church may use them, she cannot at her will originate them. Not till the whole human race is regenerate, will its literature be pure and true. Possible of course it is in idea, for nature, inspired by grace, to exhibit

itself on a large scale, in an originality of thought or action, even far beyond what the world's literature has recorded or exemplified; but, if you would in fact have a literature of saints, first of all have a nation of them.

What is a clearer proof of the truth of all this, than the structure of the Inspired Word itself? It is undeniably *not* the reflection or picture of the many, but of the few; it is no picture of life, but an anticipation of death and judgment. Human Literature is about all things, grave or gay, painful or pleasant; but the Inspired Word views them only in one aspect, and as they tend to one scope. It gives us little insight into the fertile developments of mind; it has no terms in its vocabulary to express with exactness the intellect and its separate faculties: it knows nothing of genius, fancy, wit, invention, presence of mind, resource. It does not discourse of empire, commerce, enterprise, learning, philosophy, or the fine arts. Slightly too does it touch on the simple and innocent courses of nature and their reward. Little does it say\* of those temporal blessings which rest upon our worldly occupations, and make them easy; of the blessings which we derive from the sunshine day and the serene night, from the succession of seasons, and the produce of the Earth. Little about our recreations and our daily domestic comforts; little about the ordinary occasions of festivity

\* Vid. the Author's Oxford Sermons, vol. I.

and mirth, which sweeten human life; and nothing at all about various pursuits or amusements, which it would be going too much into detail to mention. We read indeed of the feast when Isaac was weaned, and of Jacob's courtship, and of the religious merry-makings of holy Job; but exceptions, such as these, do but remind us what might be in Scripture, and is not. If then by Literature is meant the manifestation of human nature in language, you will seek for it in vain except in the world. Put up with it, as it is, or do not pretend to cultivate it; take things as they are, not as you could wish them.

Nay, I am obliged to go further still; even if we could, still we should be shrinking from our plain duty, Gentlemen, did we leave out Literature from Education. For why do we educate, except to prepare for the world? Why do we cultivate the intellect of the many beyond the first elements of knowledge, except for this world? Will it be much matter in the world to come, whether our bodily health or whether our intellectual strength was more or less, except of course as this world is in all its circumstances a trial for the next? If then a University is a direct preparation for this world, let it be what it professes. It is not a Convent, it is not a Seminary; it is a place to fit men of the world for the world. We cannot possibly keep them from plunging into the world, with all its ways and principles and maxims, when their time comes; but we can prepare them against what is

inevitable; and it is not the way to learn to swim in troubled waters, never to have gone into them. Proscribe (I do not merely say particular authors, particular works, particular passages) but Secular Literature as such; cut out from your class books all broad manifestations of the natural man; and those manifestations are waiting, for your pupil's benefit, at the very doors of your lecture room in living and breathing substance. They will meet him there in all the charm of novelty, and all the fascination of genius or of amiableness. To-day a pupil, to-morrow a member of the great world: to-day confined to the Lives of the Saints, to-morrow thrown upon Babel; —thrown on Babel, without the honest indulgence of wit and humour and imagination ever opened to him, without any fastidiousness of taste wrought into him, without any rule given him for discriminating “the precious from the vile”, beauty from sin, the truth from the sophistry of nature, what is innocent from what is poison. You have refused him the masters of human thought, who would in some sense have educated him, because of their incidental corruption: you have shut up from him those, whose thoughts strike home to us, whose words are proverbs, whose names are indigenious to all the world, the standard of their own mother tongue, and the pride and boast of their countrymen, Homer, Ariosto, Cervantes, Shakespeare, because the old Adam smelt rank in them; and for what have you reserved him?

You have given him "a liberty unto" the multitudinous blasphemy of his day; you have made him free of its newspapers, its reviews, its magazines, its novels, its controversial pamphlets, of its Parliamentary debates, its law proceedings, its platform speeches, its songs, its drama, its theatre, of its enveloping stifling atmosphere of death. You have succeeded but in this,—in making the world his University.

Difficult then as the question may be, and much as it may try the judgments and even divide the opinions of zealous and religious Catholics, I cannot feel any doubt myself, Gentlemen, that the Church's true policy, is not to contemplate the exclusion of Literature from Secular Schools, but her own admission into them. Let her do for Literature in one way, what she does for Science in another; each has its imperfection, and she supplies it for each. She fears no knowledge, but she purifies all; she represses no element of our nature, but cultivates the whole. Science is grave, methodical, logical; with science then she argues, and offers reason to reason. Literature does not argue, but declaims and insinuates; it is multiform and versatile: it persuades instead of convincing, it seduces, it carries captive; it appeals to the sense of honour, or to the imagination, or to the stimulus of curiosity; it makes its way by means of gaiety, satire, romance, the beautiful, the pleasurable. Is it wonderful that, with an agent like this, the Church should claim to deal with a vigour

corresponding to its restlessness, to interfere in its proceedings with a higher hand, and to wield an authority in the choice of its studies and of its books, which would be tyrannical, if reason and fact were the only instruments of its conclusions? But, any how, her principle is one and the same throughout: not to prohibit truth of any kind, but to see that no doctrines pass under the name of Truth but those which claim it rightfully.

Such at least is the lesson which I am taught by all the thought which I have been able to bestow upon the subject; such is the lesson which I have gained from the history of my own special Father and Patron, St. Philip Neri. He lived in an age as traitorous to the interests of Catholicism as any that preceded it, or can follow it. He lived at a time when pride mounted high, and the senses held rule: a time when kings and nobles never had more of state and homage, and never less of personal responsibility and peril: when medieval winter was receding, and the summer sun of civilization was bringing into leaf and flower a thousand forms of luxurious enjoyment; when a new world of thought and beauty had opened upon the human mind, by the discovery of the treasures of classic literature and art. He saw the great and the gifted, dazzled by the Enchantress, and drinking in the magic of her song; he saw the high and the wise, the student and the artist, painting, and poetry, and sculpture, and music, and architecture,



drawn within her range, and circling round the abyss: he saw heathen forms mounting thence, and forming in the thick air:—all this he saw, and he perceived that the mischief was to be met, not with argument, not with science, not with protests and warnings, not by the recluse or the preacher, but by means of the great counter-fascination of purity and truth. He was raised up to do a work almost peculiar in the Church, not to be a Jerome Savonarola, though Philip had a true devotion towards him and a tender memory of his Florentine house: not to be a St. Carlo, though in his beaming countenance Philip had recognized the aureol of a saint; not to be a St. Ignatius, wrestling with the foe, though Philip was termed the Society's bell of call, so many subjects did he send to it; not to be a St. Francis Xavier, though Philip had longed to shed his blood for Christ in India with him; not to be a St. Caietan, or hunter of souls, for Philip preferred, as he expressed it, tranquilly to cast in his net to gain them; he preferred to yield to the stream, and direct the current, which he could not stop, of science, literature, art, and fashion, and to sweeten and to sanctify what God had made very good and man had spoilt.

And so he contemplated as the idea of his mission, not the propagation of the faith, nor the exposition of doctrine, nor the catechetical schools; whatever was exact and systematic pleased him not; he put from him monastic rule and authoritative speech, as David

refused the armour of his king. No; he would be but an ordinary individual priest as others: and his weapons should be but unaffected humility and unpretending love. All he did was to be done by the light, and fervour, and convincing eloquence, of his personal character and his easy conversation. He came to the Eternal City and he sat himself down there, and his home and his family gradually grew up around him, by the spontaneous accession of materials from without. He did not so much seek his own, as draw them to him. He sat in his small room, and they in their gay worldly dresses, the rich and the wellborn, as well as the simple and the illiterate, crowded into it. In the mid heats of summer, in the frosts of winter, still was he in that low and narrow cell at Saint Girolamo, reading the hearts of those who came to him, and curing their souls' maladies by the very touch of his hand. It was a vision of the Magi worshipping the infant Saviour, so pure and innocent, so sweet and beautiful was he; and so loyal and so dear to the gracious Virgin Mother. And they who came, remained gazing and listening, till at length, first one and then another threw off their bravery, and took his poor cassock and girdle instead: or, if they kept it, it was to put haircloth under it, and to carry off his light yoke upon their shoulders.

In the words of his biographer, "he was all things to all men. He suited himself to noble and ignoble,

young and old, subjects and prelates, learned and ignorant; and received those who were strangers to him with singular benignity, and embraced them with as much love and charity, as if he had been a long while expecting them. When he was called upon to be merry he was so; if there was a demand upon his sympathy he was equally ready. He gave the same welcome to all: caressing the poor equally with the rich, and wearying himself to assist all to the utmost limits of his power. In consequence of his being so accessible and willing to receive all comers, many went to him every day, and some continued for the space of thirty, nay forty years, to visit him very often both morning and evening, so that his room went by the agreeable nickname of the Home of Christian mirth. Nay, people came to him, not only from all parts of Italy, but from France, Spain, Germany, and all Christendom; and even the infidels and Jews, who had ever any communication with him, revered him as a holy man.\* The first nobles of Rome, the Massimi, the Aldobrandini, the Colonna, the Altieri, the Vitelleschi, were his friends and his penitents. Nobles of Poland, Grandees of Spain, Knights of Malta, could not leave Rome without coming to him. Cardinals, Archbishops, and Bishops were his intimates; Federigo Boromeo haunted his room and got the name of "Father Philip's soul". The Cardinal-Archbishops

\* Bacci, vol. I., p. 192, II., p. 98.

of Verona and Bologna wrote books in his honour. Pope Pius the Fourth died in his arms. Lawyers, painters, musicians, physicians, it was the same too with them. Baronius, Zazzara, and Ricci, left the law at his bidding, and joined his congregation, to do its work, to write the annals of the Church, and to die in the odour of sanctity. Palestrina had Father Philip's ministrations in his last moments. Animuccia hung about him during life, sent him a message after death, and was conducted by him through Purgatory to Heaven. And who was he, I say, all the while, but an humble priest, a stranger in Rome, with no distinction of family or letters, no claim of station or of office, great simply in the attraction with which a Divine Power had gifted him? and yet thus humble, thus unennobled, thus emptyhanded, he has achieved the glorious title of Apostle of Rome.

Well were it for his clients and children, Gentlemen, if they could promise themselves the very shadow of his special power, or could hope to do a miserable fraction of the sort of work in which he was pre-eminently skilled. But so far at least they may attempt,—to take his position, and to use his method, and to cultivate the arts of which he was so bright a pattern. For me, if it be God's blessed will, that in the years now coming I am to have a share in the great undertaking, which has been the occasion and the subject of these discourses, so far I can say for certain, that whether or not I can do any thing

at all in St. Philip's way, at least I can do nothing in any other. Neither by my habits of life, nor by vigour of age, am I fitted for the task of authority, or rule, or initiation. I do but aspire, if strength is given me, to be your minister in a work which must employ younger minds and stronger lives than mine. I am but fit to bear my witness, to proffer my suggestions, to express my sentiments, as has in fact been my occupation in these discussions; to throw such light upon general questions, upon the choice of objects, upon the import of principles, upon the tendency of measures, as past reflection and experience enable me to contribute. I shall have to make appeals to your consideration, your friendliness, your confidence, of which I have had so many instances, on which I so tranquilly repose; and after all, neither you nor I must ever be surprised, should it so happen that the Hand of Him, with whom are the springs of life and death, weighs heavy on me, and makes me unequal to anticipations in which you have been too kind, and to hopes in which I may have been too sanguine.



## A P P E N D I X .

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I AM very sensible of the meagreness of the following illustrations of the main principles laid down in the foregoing Discourses; but, as I am so situated that I cannot give the time or labour necessary for satisfying my own sense of what they ought to be, I avail myself of such as happen to be at hand or on my memory.

### § 1. *Knowledge is the direct end of University Education.*

I HARDLY know what steps to take in order to establish this position, which has been startling to some persons, viz., that the education of the intellect, or the diffusion of knowledge, is the direct scope of a University. It seems a truth, or rather an historical fact, which it is impossible to dispute, and therefore hardly possible to prove. What would be the popular description of a University? A place for *learned* and *scientific* men, a *learned* body, a large corporation, with *professors of art and science*, with faculties in *theology, law, and medicine*, with *logical disputations*, with examinations in *intellectual* proficiency, with degrees in token of that proficiency attained. I do not say that, over and above this account of it, the notions will never suggest themselves of Religious Festivals, Solemnities, and Sermons, of discipline, of Proctors, of

ecclesiastical jurisdiction, delegates to Councils, etc.; but the question before us is as to the idea on the whole, or the formal conception, of a University in the minds of the generality of men; and I cannot doubt it would be pronounced at once to be a seat of science and letters, or that its end is knowledge.

Its recognized titles correspond: it is a "Studium Generale"; a "Universitas Litteraria"; a "Schola"; and an "Academy"; while, if we would know what an Academy is, we learn from Horace, that youths were sent to Athens,

Inter sylvas Academi quærere *verum*.

And the whole tenor of any work upon Universities implies this. Huber's learned Treatise implies it from beginning to end, and for that very reason scarcely ever says it categorically.

He observes, for instance, "Before the time of Charlemagne, monastic and cathedral schools existed in Italy and in England; after his time, they were established on the Continent, north of the Alps. These schools were intended for *the cultivation of the higher learning*. . . Indeed, under Charlemagne and Alfred, and even in Germany under the Othos, the Church manifested an *intellectual* spirit much more similar than is generally admitted, to the spirit of the Reformation and of the period of revived classical learning. . . In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, the Schools continued to rise and to extend their organization, parallel to the general progress of *intelligence*. Speculation, Theology, and Philosophy were growing out of the narrow Logic and Rhetoric of the ancient Trivium and Quadrivium, and two new sources of *knowledge*—Roman Law and Græco-Arabian Natural History—were opened".\*

Again, he says of Oxford: "As early as the end of the ninth century, Oxford was the seat of a school of the *highest intellectual cultivation* then existing. By the end of the eleventh, it had as good a title to be called a University, as had that of Paris: whether

\* Huber's English Universities: F. Newman's Ed.: vol. i., pp. 3-4.



as regards the quality of its studies, or its inward organization. . . It is well known how England was desolated by the struggles of Saxon chiefs, and by inroads of the Sea Kings of the North. Meanwhile *learning* was so trampled under foot, that no traces of it were to be found, except in Ireland, and in the North and West of England, where Alfred appeared for his people's rescue. From the less distracted parts of his own kingdom he collected pious and learned men, and brought over others from the Continent. . . The will and example of the king gave a vast impulse to *learning*, and his youth flocked to the newly opened schools".\* It is true that learning *includes* theology and *protects* religion; but the simple question is, not what learning does or is, but whether the object contemplated by a University is or is not learning.

Polydore Virgil, centuries ago, had said the same thing: "Neotum imprimis, monasticæ professionis virum sanctissimum, ob eximiam eruditionem miro amore complexus est (Alfredus); quo hortante Oxonii gymnasium instituit, proposita mercede omnibus, *quæ publicè bonas artes profiterentur*. Quo multi *doctrinâ clari* confluerunt docendi gratia". Polyd. Virg., Hist. v., fin.

And an Oxford writer of the generation now passing away, even while resisting the modern schemes of education, has borne a similar testimony: speaking of Universities, he says—

"The composition and the early state of these bodies appears to have been nearly the same all over Europe, and, except in the instance of the two English Universities, has not undergone any material change . . . . The object was in the main the same then as it is now; to provide for the three great professions of theology, law, and physic, not only the best *instruction* in those departments, but that common basis of *liberal information*, which might exercise and enlarge the mind, before its attention was confined to the particular business of those several callings: and at the same time to afford ingenious men an opportunity of displaying their talents in

\* Ibid., p. 45.

teaching or improving the several arts and sciences which comprehended all that was thought most important in *human knowledge*. In this Encyclopedia were usually included ethics, physics, and metaphysics (to which three heads the title of philosophy was especially given), and as a preparatory discipline, grammar, logic, rhetoric, geometry, astronomy, and history, to which the study of the Greek language was, as early as the latter part of the fifteenth century, commonly added". Copleston in *Quarterly Review*, Dec. 1825.

Charlemagne's design was the same as Alfred's; viz., by means of the intellectual culture, which Universities or Academies contemplate and impart, to promote the glory of God and the wellbeing of the Church. "Donnus Rex Carolus", says a writer of his life, "à Roma artis grammaticæ et computatoriæ magistros secum adduxit Franciam, et ubique *studium litterarum* expandere jussit. Ante ipsum enim domnum Carolum Regem in Galliâ nullum fuerat *studium Liberalium Artium*.\*

In like manner, but more fully in his own Epistle to the Abbot of Fulda. "Notum sit Deo placitæ devotioni vestræ, quia nos unâ cum fidelibus nostris consideravimus utile esse, ut Episcopia et monasteria, nobis, Christo propitio, ad gubernandum commissa, *præter* regularis vitæ ordinem atque sanctæ religionis conversationem, *etiam in litterarum meditationibus*, eis, qui donante Domino discere possunt, secundum uniuscujusque capacitatem, docendi studium debeant impendere; qualiter sicut regularis norma *honestatem morum*, ita quoque docendi et discendi instantia *ordinet et ornet seriem verborum*, et qui Deo placere appetunt rectè vivendi, ei placere non negligant rectè loquendo".†

Here two points are clear; first, that Religion is not the immediate end of Charlemagne's schools, but of the existing monasteries; and on the other hand, that science or literature as such, was not the end, but, as I have said above, the culture of the intellect.

\* Apud. Launoi., *l.* 4, *p.* 1, *p.* 2.

† Ibid.

Those who learned to live well from monastic teaching, were to learn to speak well from collegiate or academic. He proceeds : “ Quamvis enim melius sit bene facere, quam nosse, prius tamen est nosse quam facere”. He wished then his schools to *impart* knowledge, and that *for the sake* of practice. Hence he goes on in the same letter to notice the benefit for learning for a better understanding of Holy Scripture.

I think it abundantly evident then that intellectual, and not moral education is the direct end of a University; and the formation of its members into particular Societies, and the institution of separate bodies within its jurisdiction, is an additional evidence of it. These were established to supply a want, to give that which the University, from the nature of the case, could not give, though it might and would attempt it,—protection and security to its children against the temptations of a great city, or at least against the disorders necessary to a mixed multitude of students. Such would be Seminaries for the secular clergy; such would be monastic communities, as Durham and Gloucester Colleges in Oxford for the Benedictines; such Inns, Halls, and Chambers. These bodies did not set themselves to teach any thing which *could* not be taught in the University; for the University taught theology in all its parts; but they protected morals, and formed religious habits in those who otherwise would have been exposed to the evils under which the German Universities are said to lie in this day. I do not mean to say, that, in the absence of the institution of the theological faculty here or there, a Seminary or a College might not fulfil accidentally this function of the University; but I am speaking here of the normal state of a University or College. And in saying this it is evident, I am making no admission to those who, as in the Queen’s Colleges among us, would banish theology from the public teaching and confine it to the private Society; for though there were Universities in the middle ages, without the theological faculty, yet *theological truth was always professed and assumed as true in the secular teaching which was actually given*, it entered as truth into the subject

matter of all the knowledge which was actually taught there, and thus was ever implicitly present, and absent only accidentally. Vid. what I have said § 2, *infr.*

I set down the following extracts from Papal bulls or letters, not in proof of what I think cannot be doubted, but simply as an historical record. According to them Universities are "institutions for the promotion of letters and the sciences, tending to the defence of the faith and the welfare of society".

Boniface the Eighth, of Rome: "Ferventi non immerito desiderio ducimur, quod eadem urbs, quam divina bonitas tot gratiarum dotibus insignivit, scientiarum etiam fiat fœcunda muneribus, ut viros producat consilii maturitate conspicuos, virtutum redimitos ornatibus, ac diversarum facultatum dogmatibus eruditos, sitque ibi fons scientiarum irriguus, de ejus plenitudine hauriant universi liberalibus cupientes imbui documentis". Caraf. De Gymnas. Rom., p. 573.

And Innocent the Seventh: "Cum litterarum studia et bonarum artium doctrinæ, præter summam et manifestissimam utilitatem, quam privatim atque publicè afferunt, maximum ornamentum ac dignitatem illis civitatibus et locis, in quibus ipsa vigent, præbere videantur, et cum pace ac tranquillitate, cujus nos esse cupidissimos profitemur, maximè sint conjuncta, decrevimus, Deo auctore, hujusmodi studia per longissima spatia hactenus intermissa, in hoc tempore Pontificatus ad hanc urbem reducere, et omni fomento ea rursus excitare, ut homines per eruditionem veritatem veram agnoscant, et Deo atque legibus parem addiscant". Vid. Caraf. De Gymnas. Rom., p. 168.

Again, Benedict the Fourteenth: "Quanta reipublicæ commoda obveniant ex publicis studiorum Universitatibus, in quibus bonarum artium ac scientiarum documenta ingenuæ juventuti traduntur, omnium judicio et felici experienciâ evidentissimè constat; dum per homines maximè liberalibus disciplinis excultos atque expolitos, totius civitatis mores ad æquitatis et justitiæ rationem conformare solent, et necessaria in civilibus societatibus judicio recte et laudabiliter

exerceri, pluraque hominum usibus proficua inveniri passim conspiciuntur, ut reliquæ omnes privata et publicæ res prudenter utiliter que administrari". Ibid., p. 636.

In like manner, Nicholas the Third, of Paris: "Dum attentæ considerationis indagine perscrutamur, quod per litterarum studia... viri efficiantur scientiis eruditi, per quos Scripturarum veritas explicatur, erudiuntur rudes, proveci ad altiora concresecunt, et fides Catholica invalescit", etc. Launoi. *Supr.*

Urban the Fifth, of Vienna: "Commissæ vobis speculationis aciem extendentes, fidelibus ipsis ad quærenda litterarum studia, per quæ divini nominis, suæque fidei catholicæ cultus protenditur, justitia colitur, tam publica, quam privata res geritur utiliter, omnisque prosperitas humanæ conditionis augetur, libenter favores gratiosos impendimus", etc. "Cum itaque ipse Dux [Rodolphus] ad solum et utilitatem et prosperitatem hujusmodi reipublicæ, et incolarum ducatus sui Austriæ, sed etiam aliarum partium vicimarum laudabiliter intendens, in Villâ sua Wiennensi plurimum desideret fieri et ordinari per sedem apostolicam Studium Generale in qualibet facultate, ut ibidem fides ipsa dilatetur, erudiantur simplices, æquitas servetur, judicii crescat ratio, et intellectus hominum angeatur; nos etc. ferventi desiderio ducimur, quod Ducatus et Villa prædicta scientiarum muneribus amplientur, ut viros producant consilii maturitate conspicuos, virtutem redimitos ornatibus, ac diversarum facultatum dogmatibus eruditos, sitque ibi scientiarum fons irriguus, de cujus plenitudine hauriant universi, literarum cupientes imbui documentis". Kollar. *Analect I.*, p. 53.

Martin the Fifth, of Louvain: "Nuper exhibita petitio continebat, quod in Ducatu Brabantia etc. . . . nullus locus esse noscitur, in quo saltem Generale vigeat Studium Literarum, unde partium illarum plerique vel hujusmodi litterarum imperitiæ subjacent, vel in remotis partibus degere habent, scientiæ hujusmodi in eis sectantes incrementum . . . . Quod inter cetera virtutum opera, illa divinæ majestati grata plurimum nullatenus ambiguntur, per quæ ad suscipiendum singulare virtutum diadema illis qui scientiarum

earundem sitiunt acquirere margaritam, opportunis remediis et auxiliariis commodis, subventionis præsidium efficaciter impertitur, Generale literarum Studium ordinati desiderant, ut inibi disciplinæ atque sapientiæ se studiis exercentes, sibi et aliis meliores effici valeant, et partiam illarum prosperitatis auctore Domino facilius incrementum sequatur nos pium eorumdem desiderium, per quod scientiarum fons, ex quo ad Dei laudem et gloriam haurire possint singuli viri consilii maturitate perspicui, virtutum et dogmatum ornatibus redimiti succedant, plurimum commendantes”, etc. Privil. Acad. Louvan. 1728.

Clement the Sixth, of Prague: “. . . fidelibus ipsis ad quærenda literarum studia, per quæ divini nominis suæque catholicæ fidei cultus protenditur, justitia colitur, tam publica quam privata res geritur utiliter omnisque prosperitas humanæ conditionis angetur, gratiosos libentur favores impendimus”. Vid. Monument. Hist. Univers. Carolo-Ferdin.

Eugenius the Fourth, of Caen: “Dnm pensamus quantum litterarum studia ad profugandas ignorantia tenebras commoditatis, tam publicæ quam privatæ, spiritnalis ac temporalis, mundo conferant universo, ex quibus adversus hæreses confirmatur fides, Dei cultus augetur, animarum consulitur saluti, pax et tranquillitas inter homines procuratur, dispensantur bonis præmia, mali suppliciis puiuntur, humanæ conditionis ampliatur prosperitas, colitur regina virtutum justitia, Ecclesia militans ex earum uberrimis fructibus spiritualiter et temporaliter confovetur”, etc. Dacher. Spiceleg. t. 3, p. 762.

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§ 2. *All branches of knowledge are subject matter of University Education.*

THOUGH I have spoken of a University as a place for cultivating all knowledge, yet this does not imply that in matter of fact a particular University might not be deficient in this or that branch, or

that it might not give especial attention to one branch over the rest ; but only that all branches of knowledge were presupposed or implied, and none omitted on principle. Universities would naturally commence with Arts, and might, at least for a time, have no Professor or Teacher of Theology ; but the *truths* of Theology would from the first be taken for granted and used, whenever they naturally entered into the subject of the Lectures which were given in Philosophy or (if so be) the Languages. Or this or that University might be a special school for Law or for Medicine ; still it would be on the same type as other Universities, being by accidental circumstances drawn aside in one particular direction. Just as any church or cathedral implies chancel, nave, aisles, etc., yet need not be built in all its parts at once, yet would from the first presuppose and make provision for all those parts ; or even when finished, might be remarkable for the length of its chancel or nave, or its height, or for its Lady Chapel ; and again, as a church never might be finished, or might be made in parts of bad materials, or might gradually become dilapidated, or be virtually demolished in whole or part ; in like manner we may find much irregularity or inconsistency in the studies or in the annals of a given University, yet this without any prejudice to the ideal upon which it is constructed, and which it professes and binds itself to fulfil.

Universities, which fell under these various suppositions, would still be the same in kind, one with another ; and they would be specifically different from an Academical Institution which began by putting aside Theology, as a science which was not to be recognised. Accordingly we need not be surprised to find that Law was especially cultivated at Bologna, and Medicine at Salerno ; nay that other Italian Universities, from the circumstance of their civil origin, instead of being simple schools of Liberal Knowledge, were, as Huber tells us, “eminently practical”. The same author says, on the other hand, “So surpassing was the pre-eminence of Arts, embracing, as it did, all the other sciences and the new philosophy, that it is even questionable whether the term *Facultas* is strictly

applicable to the Masters of Arts, who are properly the *Universitas*. The studies of Law and Medicine grew up by the side of Arts, but never gained strength to compete with the last; nor has the principle ever been attacked, that the University has its foundation in Arts".\* He observes too, that, "had not the coming in of Canonical Law evolved new materials, Theology might perhaps not even have constituted a separate Faculty"; for, "as a science, it had unfolded itself entirely out of the old studies, and could not be severed from them".† Again, we have, according to Antony à Wood, as referred to by Keuffel, a curious state of scholastic disorder at Oxford in the middle of the twelfth century, on the first introduction of lectures on Roman Law. Highborn and lowborn flocked to the new Professor who came from Lombardy and Bec; and Arts began to be neglected and to decline. The change of studies was mischievously promoted by the lucrative character of the new science. Thereby too the very idea of a University was impaired, for there ceased to be a course or circle of studies. "This *saltus*, or skipping from one science to another", says à Wood, "before they have hardly made an entry, caused much abruptness in literature, and a great displeasure in critical and knowing men that lived in those times; and especially for this cause, that they, who had spent many years in Arts, and had therefore gained great respect, were now with their doctrine neglected by upstarts".‡ Roger Bacon (cent. xiii.), as might be supposed, was opposed to the change. The students were now considered to fall under three classes, which had their names given them: "the Shallow" who did not study Arts at all; the "Ragged" or "Patchy," who crammed up, as we should now say, from abstracts or formulas; and the "Solid", who, after laying a deep foundation, went on to build upon it. As time went on, this state movement, for so it seems to have been, excited the alarm of the Holy See, and Pope Innocent

\* F. Newman's Edition, vol. i., p. 34. † *Ib.*, p. 33.

‡ Vol. i., p. 2, p. 169.



published a Constitution, prohibiting the admission of Lawyers to ecclesiastical dignities in France, England, Scotland, Spain, and Hungary. The words of Matthew Paris, speaking of the middle of the thirteenth century, are remarkable: “Et jam fere omnes scholares, intactis grammatices rudimentis, auctoribus et philosophis, ad Leges properant audiendas, quas constat non esse de numero Artium Liberalium; *Artes enim Liberales propter se appetuntur, Leges autem ut salaria acquirantur*”.

That a University was really, in its idea, the seat of all learning is plain from its very name: in saying which I am not taking my stand upon the *derivation* of the word, but upon its recognised meaning, however it came to mean it. “Academiae institutæ sunt”, says Morinus (Ordin. iii. 13 fin.), “ad quas, velut ad studiorum et scientiarum emporia, undique concursus est; in quibus doctrina Christiana perfectius, diligentius, et splendidius, quam in Collegiis et Seminariis clericorum tradita est”. As to the meaning of the word, authors are divided in opinion; some explaining it of a universality of studies, others of students. As, however, it is the variety of its schools which brings students from all parts, and the variety of its members which demands so many subjects of teaching, it does not matter much how we settle the derivation of the word. Any how, it is certain that the word must soon have acquired the sense of universality of students, from the use of the word *Universitas*, in the civil law.

I shall set down here some definitions or descriptions of the word, as I have found them.

1. Receptissima est vox Universitatis aut Studii Generalis vel Universalis: etsi nec id satis constet, qui Universitatis vox huc tracta sit. Conring. *de Antiqu. Acad. Suppl.*, i. 7.

2. “In his etsi universa doctrina et rerum humanarum divinarumque scientia proponitur, nam in illum finem sunt institutæ, ac Universitatum nomen sunt adeptæ, parum tamen hactenus in rerum naturalium studiis et mathematicis effectum est”—Morhof. *Polyhistor* i. 14, 11.

3. “Hæ scholæ (academiæ) dictæ fuerunt publicæ, quòd passim omnes artes et scientiæ in illis traderentur; nec tantum clericis, aut ad clerum assumendis, prout scholæ Episcopales, sed omnibus indifferenter adolescentibus paterent: atque inde paulatim Universitates, id est, scholæ universales, dici cœperunt”—Van Espen, vol. i. p. 549.

4. Denominationes Studii Generalis et Universitatis, inde scholis de quibus nunc ago, attributæ [sunt], quod scientiæ universæ in illis, proponebantur, cum contrà in scholis cathedralibus, monasticis, et quæ præterea antehac excitatæ erant, quædam tantum doctrinæ juventuti traderentur. Aliam tamen notionem vocabulo Universitatis assignat Haberus (de jure civ., ii. § 3. 2) existimans, titulum hunc academiis competere, quatenus jurisdictionem habent, et certo constant regimine: sed monet Thomasius ad illum locum, non respici ad hunc significatum, sed ad universitatem studiorum—Keuffel, *Histor. Origin. et Progress. Schol.*, p. 319.

5. Vocantur scholæ publicæ celebres *Universitates*, vel nomenclatione desumptâ ab universis scientiis, quæ in eis edocentur; vel si non omnes scientiæ legantur, ab universis tamen audiendæ et ad discendæ aliquæ traduntur.—Mendo, *de jure Academico*, init.

6. “Université:—école ou collège dans lequel on enseigne toutes les sciences”—*Encyclop. Méthodique*.

7. “On appela le composé ‘Université des études’; et enfin simplement ‘Université’, pour marquer qu’ en une seule ville on enseignait tout ce qu’ il était utile de savoir”—Fleury, *Choix des Etudes*, 8.

8. “University:—a school, where all arts and faculties are studied”.—Johnson.

9. “A University, such as Oxford was made, is a joining together, and an incorporation under one government, of many public schools in one or the same town or city. ’Tis a place for the reception of all people that desire to learn; representing the whole kingdom wherein it is, nay the whole world, as Gerson saith, inasmuch as any person thereof may come to it, and acquire doctrine and wisdom”.—A Wood’s *Oxford*, vol. i. p. 2.

10. "In these public schools or academies, which were founded at Padua, Modena, Naples, Capua, Toulouse, Salamanca, Lyons, Cologne, and in other places, the whole circle of the sciences then known was not taught, but only certain parts of it, or some particular sciences. That at Paris, which exceeded all others in various respects, as well as in the number both of teachers and students, was the first to embrace all the arts and sciences; and therefore first became a University, or, as it was expressed, *Stadium Universale*".—Mosheim, *Eccl. Hist.*, vol. ii. p. 529. London, 1841.

11. "Hitherto the public studies had been limited to certain branches of learning: but, as the views or desires of men were enlarged, the whole circle of sciences, as far as the allotted period of time would allow, did not appear to be an object beyond the comprehension of youthful minds. Schools then, which professed to embrace all the sciences within their walls, and to appoint masters to each, were properly denominated Universities".—Berrington's *Middle Ages*, p. 354.

12. "Hitherto only the Trivium and Quadrivium had been taught in these schools, but the newly awakened zeal for philosophical theology now led distinguished men to establish courses of lectures on this subject apart from the cathedral and conventual schools, though in a certain degree connected with them. To these were added, one after another, lectures on canon law, on medicine, and the arts, and in this way the first University was formed by a congregating together of these various teachers".—Gieseler, *Text. Book*, vol. ii. p. 313, ed. 1836.

13. "The most celebrated was that of Paris. It was adorned more than any other by the multitude, the rank, and the diligence of its students, and by the abilities and various acquirements of its professors; and since, while other academies confined their instructions to particular branches of science, that of Paris alone pretended to embrace the entire range, it was the first which took the title of University".—Waddington's *Ch. Hist.*, p. 469.

§ 3. *Mere acquirement is not real knowledge.*

I DO not know that it is worth while to say in the words of others what is so evident when stated by any one; but as I am engaged in referring to authors who have gone before me, I will set down two passages on this subject.

“Much we are told from day to day”, says Dr. Copleston, “of the folly of pedantry. The folly is indeed ridiculous, and it is seldom spared. But the pedant in chemistry, or in physics, is at least as disagreeable an animal as the pedant in classical learning; and the pedant in political economy is not disagreeable only, but dangerous. . . Never, while the world lasts, will it be wholly disabused of that specious error, that the more there is crammed into a young man’s mind, whether it stays there or not, whether it is digested or not, still the wiser he is. . . A half-educated father hears that Lectures are read in Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, etc., etc., at one place, and his son is learning nothing of this sort at school. Incapable of judging how mental powers are improved by continual exercise, and how the moral character is in a great measure formed by the study of good authors, he fancies that when the grammar of a language is learned, all further attention to that language is lost time, and then there is nothing new gained, because there is no new name. If the boy is captivated by the novelty and variety of the studies which is presented to him, he seldom returns with any relish to philological pursuits. He may become a skilful agriculturist, an improver of manufactures, an useful inspector of roads, mines, and canals; but all that distinguishing grace which a liberal education imparts, he foregoes for ever. It cannot be acquired in a late period of life, if the morning of his days have been occupied with other cares, or the intellectual habits already settled in different forms and postures. If, as too often happens, these matters are received into the ear, but take no possession of the mind, there is not only a moral blank, but an intellectual barrenness, a poverty of fancy

and invention, a dearth of historical and poetical illustration, a void of all those ideas which decorate and enliven truth, which enable us to view over again the times that are past, to combine the produce of widely-distant ages, and to multiply into one another the component parts of each. The experiment is a correct one. I have seen it tried; and have witnessed the melancholy and irreparable result".—*Reply to the Edinburgh Review.*

An interesting Essay on University Education has lately been published by Dr. Tappan of New York. As, however, is to be expected in a work of his school, there are many opinions expressed in it, which a Catholic will think not only false, but extravagant and unreal; but still passages may be found there, which I gladly would quote in illustration of the views I have been maintaining, and the more readily, because they are the result of experience in national experiments in education. He has a keen sense, for instance, of the evils of which I am at present speaking. "We have destroyed the charm of study", he says, speaking of his own country, "by hurry and unnatural pressure, and we have rendered our scholarship vague and superficial. We have not fed thought by natural supplies of knowledge. We have not disciplined mind by guiding it to a calm and profound activity; but we have stimulated acquisition to preternatural exertions, and have learned, as it were, from an Encyclopedia the mere names of sciences, without gaining the sciences themselves. . . . The highest institutions will set the tone of education. And this we see realized in schools of every grade for both sexes. Our schools for boys, our schools for girls, present on the prospectus a formidable curriculum of studies, and immature beings of sixteen or seventeen are carried through the mathematics, the natural sciences, general history, the philosophy of history, belles-lettres, and metaphysics, together with two or three languages, and various polite accomplishments. These higher branches too, are often taught in lectures adapted rather to Universities than to elementary schools. The popular growth of education is not the orderly and gradual growth of mind according to its own innate

laws fixed by God himself, but an immense and voracious deglutition of knowledge, where the mental digestion is estimated according to the rapidity with which these subjects are disposed of. The more masters, the more books, the more branches of knowledge in a given time, the faster the process goes on . . . . We forget, that, although we can quicken the labours of our hands, and increase the power and scope of our machinery, we may not overlay the organic power of nature; and that, as trees have their time to grow, and harvests their time to ripen, so the mind of man must grow from infancy to childhood, from childhood to youth"—&c., pp. 51, 54.

This evil is of long standing in America. I had occasion myself to remark on it nearly thirty years ago in a review of a book of Travels, in which just a similar mode of education, if it can so be called, was praised. "We find that, in the space of four years, the student, whose age need not exceed fourteen, in addition to a long and varied list of books, attends lectures in chemistry, mineralogy, geology, natural philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and theology, engages in forensic disputations, and is moreover expected to be connected with one or other of 'three literary societies', established among them. A range of literature and science of this nature is not only unfavourable to the acquisition of classical learning, but detrimental to application of any kind. Mr. Duncan indeed is of opinion, that, although Yale College, in the United States, may not 'produce many writers in mathematics to surpass those of Cambridge, or giants in Greek literature to wrest the palm from those of Oxford, it is very probable that it will send forth a greater proportion of men, whose minds are *steadily trained to order* and activity, and stored with those elements of knowledge, which are available in almost every situation, and which may be said to insure to their possessor a *reasonable degree of success in any train of thinking or research* to which, by his inclination or the exigencies of his future life, he may be led'. To us, however, such a course seems likely rather to confuse the youthful mind by its variety, than to enrich it with its abundance. Those who aim at too much often end in

doing nothing. To enforce quickness in investigation and patience in research, to give the power of grappling with difficulties, accuracy of thought, and clearness of reasoning, to form the judgment, to refine the taste, to instil delicacy of feeling and a quick perception of poetical beauty,—objects such as these have surely range enough to fill the most capacious mind, and magnificence enough to satisfy the most exalted spirit, even if the student left the scene of study with little besides the accidental knowledge, which discipline of this nature could not fail to impart”.

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§ 4. *The Branches of Knowledge form one whole.*

It is curious how negligent English writers seem to be just now of the necessity of comprehensiveness and harmony of view, in their pursuit of truth in detail. The very word Encyclopædia ought to suggest it to them; but the alphabetical order has assimilated the great undertaking so designated to a sort of Dictionary of portions and departments of knowledge. Coleridge indeed, a man of philosophical mind, has felt the evil, and planned the Encyclopædia with which he was connected, on a truer idea; but if I have a right to judge by such specimens as I have met with, he is an exception. Since beginning these Discourses I took down an Encyclopædia of name, hoping it would give me light on the subject I was considering. I turned out the word “Philosophy”,—there was no article on it, but a reference, “see Natural”, “see Moral”. I turned out Science, and found instead a notice to the effect that, whereas *each* science will be found discussed under its own name, there is here a vacant place for enumerating some entertaining problems or curiosities, etc., in science; and then followed some such as “the Invisible Girl”, ventriloquism, sugar from old rags, etc., etc. I turned out

various other words, but I could learn nothing about "truth", "knowledge", etc., the subjects of which I was in search. I had recourse to the article on Metaphysics, but even that did not supply the desideratum.

Really wise persons, whatever their religious feelings, have felt its importance. Hugo de St. Victore has a *Treatise de Studio Legendi*, in which he treats of philosophy and its parts. He says that philosophy is "*Studium sapientiæ*" (i. 3), and sapientia is "*comprehensio rerum prout sunt*" (vi. 14.); or more largely, "*disciplina omnium rerum humanarum atque divinarum rationes plenè investigans*". Consequently there are as many parts of philosophy as there are "*rerum diversitates*" (i. 5). For this reason "*Philosophia est ars artium, et disciplina disciplinarum*" (ii. 1), and "*omnes artes ad unum Philosophiæ tendunt terminum*" (ii. 18). After dividing off and enumerating the arts and sciences, he continues (iii. 3, etc.):

"*Ex his omnibus scientiis septem specialiter decreverant antiqui in studiis suis, ad opus erudiendorum, in quibus tantam utilitatem esse præ cæteris omnibus perspexerunt, ut quisquis harum disciplinam firmiter percepisset, ad aliarum notitiam postea inquirendo magis et exercendo, quam audiendo perveniret. Sunt enim quasi optima quædam instrumenta et rudimenta, quibus via paratur animo ad plenam philosophicæ veritatis notitiam. Hinc trivium et quadrivium nomen accepit, eo quòd iis quasi quibusdam viis vivax animus ad secreta sophiæ introeat. . . . Hinc profecto accidit eo tempore [Pythagoræ] tot fuisse sapientes, ut plura ipsi scriberent quam nos legere possimus. Scholastici autem nostri aut volunt aut nesciunt modum congruum in discendo servare, et idcirco multos studentes, paucos sapientes invenimus. . . . Mihi videtur primum opera danda esse artibus, ubi fundamenta sunt omnium, et pura simplexque veritas aperitur, maximè his septem quas prædixi, quæ totius philosophiæ instrumenta sunt. . . . Hæc quidem ita sibi cohærent, et alternis vicissim rationibus indigent, ut, si una defuerit, cæteræ philosophum facere non possint; unde mihi errare videntur, qui non*



attendentes talem in artibus cohærentiam, quasdam sibi ex ipsis eligunt, et, cæteris intactis, his se posse fieri perfectos putant. . . . Sunt quidem, qui, licet ex iis quæ legenda sunt, nihil prætermittant, nulli tamen arti quod summum est tribuere norunt; sed singulis legunt omnia. In grammaticâ de syllogismorum ratione disputant, etc., etc. . . . Cum legeris artes, et quod unius cujusque sit proprium agnoveris disputando et conferendo, tunc demum rationes singularum invicem conferre licebit, et ex alterna consideratione vicissim quæ minus prius intellexeras investigari. Noli multiplicare diverticula, quoadusque semitas didiceris. Securus discures, cum errare non timueris"—iii. 3—6.

He brings in Literature thus:—"Duo sunt genera scripturarum. Primum genus est earum quæ propriè Artes appellantur; secundum est earum, quæ sunt appendentia Artium. Artes sunt quæ Philosophiæ supponuntur, id est, quæ aliquam certam et determinatam Philosophiæ materiam habent, ut est grammatica, dialectica, et cætera hujusmodi. Appendentia Artium sunt, quæ tantum ad Philosophiam spectant, id est, quæ in aliqua extra Philosophiam materia versantur, aliquando tamen quædam ab Artibus discerpta sparsim et confusè attingunt, vel si simplex narratio est, viam ad Philosophiam præparant. Hujusmodi sunt omnia *poetarum* carmina, ut sunt tragiæ, comediæ, satyræ, heroica quoque et lyrica, et iambica et didascalica quædam; fabulæ quoque et historiæ", etc.—iii. 4.

Again, an eloquent writer in the Dublin Review gives the following account of a Tract of St. Bonaventura's: "From God, the Fountal Light, all illumination descends to man. The Divine Light, from which, as from its source, all human science emanates, is of four kinds: the inferior light, the exterior light, the interior light, and the superior light. The inferior light, that of sensitive knowledge, illuminates in respect of the natural forms of corporeal objects, which are manifested to us by the five senses. Its range does not extend beyond the knowledge of sensible things. The second, or external light of mechanical art, illuminates in respect of artificial

forms. It embraces the whole circle of those arts which aim at protecting man from the weather, clothing, feeding, healing him when sick, and the theatrical arts directed to his recreation. Thus it includes all productions of the needle and the loom, all works in iron and other metals, stone, and wood; all products and all preparations of food; all navigation and commerce, which superintend the transit or the exchange of these; medicine in its widest sense, and music with the arts belonging to it. Manifold as are the objects of this light, it is all concerned with artificial productions; it touches only one side of human nature; it deals with man almost exclusively as an animal; it is directed to supply his bodily needs and console his bodily infirmities. The third, or interior light, is that of philosophical knowledge; its object is intelligible truth. It is threefold, for we may distinguish three sorts of verities, truth of language, truth of things, and truth of morals. . . . Lastly, the fourth, or superior light, is that of grace and of the Holy Scripture, which illuminates in respect of saving truth. . . . Thus the fourfold light, descending from above, has yet six differences, which set forth so many degrees of human knowledge and science. There is the light of sensitive knowledge, the light of the mechanical arts, the light of rational philosophy, the light of natural philosophy, the light of moral philosophy, and the light of grace and Holy Scripture. ‘And so’, adds the saint, ‘there are six illuminations in this life of ours, and they have a setting, because all this knowledge shall be destroyed. And therefore there succeedeth to them the seventh day of rest, which has no setting, and that is the illumination of glory’, etc.—*Dublin Review*, Dec. 1851.

“Ea est ratio”, says the Sacred Congregation, de Studiis moderandis, under Leo the Twelfth, “rerum et cogitationum, quæ nobis naturaliter insculpta est, ut ordinis ideam nobis patefaciat. Hinc S. Augustinus, ‘Ut igitur breviter æternæ Legis notionem, quæ impressa nobis est, quantum valeo, vobis explicem, ea est, qua justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima; ordo autem, sive parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio’, non patitur

res incondite vagari: sed unamquamque inter suos fines constituit. Hinc est quod in Physicis, in Metaphysicis, ac Moralibus, immo in toto scientiarum regno pulcherrima dispositio enitet, quæ oculos mentemque mirum in modum perstringit. De scientiarum itaque atque Artium præcellenti harmonia pauca delibare fas erit, ut Adolescentium animos erigere, et in eis Sapientiæ amorem valeamus excitare”, etc.—Card. Bartazzolii Parænesis, *apud Collect. Leg. de rect. Stud. rat.* Rom. 1828.

“Amongst so many great foundations of Colleges in Europe”, says Lord Bacon, “I find it strange that they are all dedicated to professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at large. For, if men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient fable, in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest: so, if any man think Philosophy and Universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because these Fundamental Knowledges have been studied but in passage”—*Advancement of Learning.*

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§ 5. *And are complements of each other.*

“NULLUS est cujusdam artis adeo mediocriꝝ aut humilis quoque, ac vilis professor, qui, si sit superbus, non illam aut præcipuam omnium censeat, aut non certè existimari petat, ac contendat; illudque adeo moribus est receptum, ut efferre quemque artem suam

et laudibus cœlo æquare, etiam aliis omnibus anteponere, licere ac pium esse arbitrentur. Grammaticus se unum putat sapere, desperare plurimos: Philosophus reliquos miseretur ut pecudes; Jurisconsultus alios omnes deridet; Theologus despicit; non quòd se cæteras artes ignorare dicant, aut præ se ferant, immò nihil cunctantur confirmare suâ illâ unâ disciplinâ reliquas universas præstantius claudi ac contineri, quàm in libris eorum qui de illis nominatim tradiderunt.

“L. Crassus apud Ciceronem omne disciplinarum atque artium genus cognitione juris contineri asseverat; et quidem, si diis placet, libello xii. tabularum; hoc idem nostri Jurisconsulti habent persuasissimum. Grammaticus totam philosophiam, quàm late se diffundit, historicorum et poetarum libris contineri autumat; quos quum habeat in manibus, nihil sit quod Aristotele aut Platone indigeat. Quam artem rite percipient ac tradent, qui eam alienissimis in locis habitare censent, et illinc esse petendam, ubi vix illius sit vestigium ullum invenire? Idcirco videas falsissima atque absurdissima in omnibus artibus asseverari ab iis, qui illas violenter expriment ab auctoribus, qui aliquid eorum obiter et quasi aliud agentes attigerunt. Quot absurda in philosophiâ dogmata ab Homero traxerunt originem, quum multi veterum non illum ut ingeniosum Poetam legerent, sed ut philosophum doctissimum et gravissimum?”—Ludov. de Vives, *de Causis Corrupt. Art.*, i. 3.

“The strength of all sciences is, as the strength of the old man’s faggot, in the band. For the harmony of a science, supporting each part the other, is, and ought to be, the true and brief confutation and suppression of all the smaller sorts of objections; but, on the other side, if you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by one, you may quarrel with them, and bend them and break them at your pleasure. . . For were it not better for a man in a fair room, to set up one great light, or branching candlestick of lights, than to go about with a small watch candle into every corner?”—Bacon: *Adv. of Learning*, l. i.

There is a paper in the sixteenth volume of the *Histoire de l’*

*Académie des Inscriptions*, very much to our purpose here, though it is too long to present before the reader except in extracts. It is entitled “*Reflexions Générales sur l’Utilité des Belles-Lettres, et sur les Inconvéniens du goût exclusif, qui paraît s’ établir en faveur des Mathématiques et de la Physique*”.

It was occasioned by the same circumstances which led to Gibbon’s *Essay on the Study of Literature*. The writer is tracing the history of modern literature, and observes :

“De la Grammaire naquit la Critique. Celle-ci entreprit d’abord de purger les anciens textes, des fautes que l’ignorance ou l’inattention des copists y avaient introduites, etc. . . . Peu à peu elle s’ éleva jusqu’ à chercher dans les ouvrages des Grecs et des Romains, les modèles du beau et les règles du goût.

“A mesure que les connaissances s’ entendaient, les objets d’étude se multipliaient ; la curiosité croissait. L’ Histoire, considérée depuis l’ origine du monde, offrit un champ immense, et fournit la matière d’ un nombre infini de recherches. Religion, Loix, Contumes, successions d’ Empires, suites de Princes, migration de Peuples, fondations de Villes, naissance des Arts, progrès des Sciences ; tous ces points furent approfondis ; le critique discuta les faits, le Géographe détermina la position des lieux où ils s’ étaient passés ; le Chronologiste en fixa la date ; l’ Antiquaire trouva sur le marbre et sur l’ airain, de quoi les éclaircir.

. . . “L’ ordre naturel de leurs études, dont le plan général embrassait l’ histoire et les monumens de tous les temps, les rapprocha, par degrés, de celui qu’ on nomme le *Moyen age* ; nouvelle carrière, d’ autant plus intéressante que chacun d’ eux croyait y voir le germe du gouvernement auquel il était soumis, et le berceau de la langue qu’ il parlait”, etc.

Here the author speaks of the use of the Mathematics in France, and of the exact sciences ; and of the jealousy which it occasioned among the men of letters : and he proceeds to remark upon a Discourse of the Abbé du Resnel, who “se plaint dans son *Memoire* non que les *Sciences-Exactes* soient devenues florissantes parmi

nous, mais que les letters aient cessé de l' être ; non qu' un nouvel empire se soit élevé, mais qu' il ne s' élève que sur les ruines d' un autre. En effet, les neuf Muses sont sœurs : à ce titre, elles sont en droit de prétendre que la faveur public, qui fait la portion la plus précieuse de leur dot, soit partagée entre elles avec égalité”.

After remarking that the various branches of Science are not so closely connected with each other, as those of Literature, he proceeds to illustrate the mutual relation and influence of the latter. “ Il n' en est pas de même d' l' Erudition ; ses différentes branches composent un tout presque indivisible ; la plupart, au moins, sont si fort dépendantes les unes des autres, qu' on ne saurait en détacher précisément une, pour la cultiver seule. Tel, par exemple, est né avec du gout pour la science de Médailles et voudrait s' y distinguer : il faut qu' à la connaissance des langues, qui, prise séparément, constitue le grammairien, il joigne la connaissance des temps, qui constitue le Chronologiste : celle des lieux, qui constitue le Géographe : la discussion des facts, qui constitue le critique ; l' expérience du métal, qui constitue le connoisseur : et toute fois nous n' aurons qu' un Antiquaire. Disons tout en un mot ; chaque branch de l' Erudition exige le même fond d' étude ; à peu de chose près, la même étendue de savoir, peut-être les mêmes talens ; pour épuiser un genre, il faut les embrasser tous”. Etc.

The remainder of the paper is principally on the subject of the utility of literature : the following passage, which I quote, is on the subject of philosophy, and the danger of mistaking a narrow *ex parte* scientific view of things for it :—

“ On dit souvent, pour relever l' excellence des sciences-exactes, que ce sont elles qui ont introduit das le monde l' Esprit Philosophique, ce flambeau précieux, à la faveur duquel nous savons douter et croire à propos. Mais ce qu' on attribue aux sciences, exclusivement pourrait bien être l' ouvrage de la critique, et, par consequent, appartenir aux lettres. Car enfin, l' esprit philosophe peut se définir, ‘ la Raison éclairée sur les vrais principes des choses, de

quelque nature qu'elles soient'; c'est à dire, tant de celles qui sont soumises aux sens, que de celles qui sont du ressort de l'esprit, considéré dans ses diverses facultés. Or cette supériorité de raison est le résultat des réflexions que les hommes ont faites, à mesure qu'ils ont accru le nombre de leurs idées, en acquérant de nouvelles connaissances par la voie de l'étude. . . . Puisque l'esprit philosophique s'étend, sans exception, à tous les objets de nos connaissances, suivant ce mot d'un ancien, 'La Philosophie est nécessaire, lors même qu'on ne traite pas de la Philosophie, il faut bien se garder de se confondre avec l'esprit de calcul, qui de sa nature est renfermé dans un cercle, au delà duquel on ne doit pas lui permettre d's'étendre. Nous ne dissimulerons pas que notre siècle commence à perdre de vûe cette distinction : et qu'à force de se piquer d'être Géomètre, ou plutôt de vouloir tout ramener au calcul, d'en appliquer par-tout la méthode, de l'ériger un instrument universel, il cesse presque d'être Philosophe. Nous trouverions chez les étrangers et chez nous plus d'un exemple de cet excès, qui, dans le fond, n'est pas nouveau ; les scholastiques du xiii. siècle avaient déjà transporté dans la Theologie la méthode et la style des Géomètres".

In another Essay (t. xiii.), "Des Rapports que les Belles-Lettres et les Sciences ont entr'elles", the author, the Abbé Nauze, observes : "L'Esprit Philosophique est un talent acquis par le travail, et par l'habitude, pour juger sainement de toutes les choses du monde. C'est une intelligence à qui rien n'échappe, une force de raisonnemens que rien ne peut ébranler, un goût sûr et réfléchi de tout ce qu'il y a de bon ou de vicieux dans la nature. C'est la règle unique du vrai et du beau. Il n'y a donc rien de parfait dans les différens ouvrages qui sortent de la main des hommes, que ce qui est animé de cet esprit. De lui dépend en particulier la gloire des Belles-Lettres ; cependant comme il est le fruit d'une science consommée, et le partage de bien peu de savants, il n'est ni possible ni nécessaire pour le succès des Lettres, qu'un talent si rare se trouve dans tous ceux qui les cultivent. Il suffit à une

nation que certains grands génies le possèdent, et que la supériorité de leurs lumières les rende les arbitres du goût, les oracles de la critique, les dispensateurs de la gloire littéraire. L'esprit philosophique résidera proprement dans ce petit nombre ; mais il répandra, pour ainsi dire, ses influences sur tout le corps de l'Etat, sur tous les arts, sur toutes les professions, sur tous les ouvrages de l'esprit ou de la main, et principalement sur ceux de Littérature".

"The more deeply the sciences are investigated", says Gibbon, "the more clearly is it seen that they are all connected. They resemble a vast forest, every tree of which appears, at first sight, to be isolated and separate, but, on digging beneath the surface, their roots are found to be all interlaced with each other. There is no branch of study so insignificant and unimportant, as not sometimes to afford facts, disclosures, or objections, to the most sublime and exalted sciences. I like to dwell on the reflection, that it is highly necessary to show different professions and nations their mutual wants. Point out to the English the advantages they may derive from the French ; acquaint a natural philosopher with the assistance he may obtain from Literature ; and self-love will perform the office of sound reasoning. Thus philosophy is extended, and human nature benefited. Before, men were rivals ; now, they are brethren. All sciences are founded upon reasoning and facts. Without the latter, our studies would be chimerical : deprived of the former, they would be blind. Thus it is that the different branches of Literature are united : and all the various ramifications of the study of nature, which under an apparent meanness often hide a real magnificence, are connected together in a similar manner".—*Essay on Literature*.

The following instructions of Cardinal Gerdil for the establishment of an Academy of Science, strikingly illustrate what I have insisted on in the text, as to the indivisibility of the various branches of knowledge.

1. "Les Mathématiques dans toute leur étendue ; la physique générale et particulière avec toutes ses dépendances ; l'étude de la



nature, les rapports qui lient les Êtres entr'eux ; les loix et les moyens de leur action réciproque, les phénomènes qui en résultent ; l'application de ces phénomènes aux besoins de la vie ; tels sont les objets dont il paraît que l' Académie doit principalement s'occuper.

2. “ Toute découverte réelle dans l' ordre de la nature ne peut qu' être suivie d' une utilité réelle ou immédiate dans l' ordre de la société. Mais c' est moins à l' utilité en elle même, qu' à la source de l' utilité, qu' une Compagnie savante doit s' attacher. Elle doit se proposer de s' étendre la sphère des connaissances réelles, bien assurée d' en voir découler tôt ou tard des avantages précieux pour l' humanité.

3. “ L' Académie ne fera donc pas des arts l' objet de son travail. On a observé judicieusement (dans une note marginale) que le pas qu' il faut faire pour appliquer à la pratique de l' art une expérience ou un principe calculé, est ordinairement très facile, et que les observations minutieuses qui règlent la pratique des arts, nuiraient à cet essor plus relevé, qu' on est en droit d' attendre d' une Académie.

4. “ Ce n' est qu' il n' y ait dans la pratique des arts, des règles ou des résultats dignes de toute l' attention d' une Académie ; mais dans ce cas même, elle ne s' en occupe qu' autant que le procédé de l' art rentre dans la classe des expériences ou observations de Physique ou de Histoire naturelle, ou bien qu' il fournit matière ou à la résolution de quelque problème, ou à l' éclaircissement de quelque théorie mathématique. Eu un mot, les arts seront traités dans l' Académie scientifiquement, et non à la façon des artistes.

5. “ Ou a proposé d' admettre dans l' Académie l' Etude de l' Antiquité, en dirigeant cette étude à la recherche des sciences et des arts chez les anciens. . . . Des ouvrages de cette nature exigent nécessairement un concours de lumières pour être portés au point de perfection, donc ils sont susceptibles. Néanmoins, avant que de songer à établir une classe d' antiquité, il convient de s' assurer d' un nombre de sujets propres à cette sorte de travail et qui veuillent s' y employer.

6. “Cet exemple peut déjà servir à expliquer en quel sens on a dit dans l’écrit cité cy-dessus, qu’il serait à propos qu’une Académie se proposât quelque plan de recherches, qu’on peut regarder comme l’ouvrage du corps, et non simplement comme le travail isolé des différents membres de l’association. Un travail commun peut être conçu de deux manières, on en tant que plusieurs co-opèrent au même travail sur un même sujet, on en tant que les travaux distincts de plusieurs se rapportent et concourent à un même objet. Que deux ou trois artistes entreprennent de peindre en commun une figure; que l’un s’applique à peindre la tête, l’autre les mains, ou que se relevant tour à tour chacun passe son coup de pinceau sur les mêmes traits, ce serait là un travail commun sur un même sujet. J’avoue qu’une telle méthode serait peu propre à donner à un ouvrage cette unité de caractère, qui en doit faire le principal mérite. . . . Mais qu’il faille étaler un spectacle sur la scène; le Poète, le Musicien, l’Architecte, le Peintre, le Machiniste, le Danseur, grand nombre d’autres artistes doivent nécessairement concourir au succès de la représentation. Voilà l’idée d’un travail commun dans le second sens; je veux dire, le résultat des différents travaux très différents en eux mêmes, mais que se rapportent pourtant à un même objet. Une société savante peut former, pour l’avancement des connaissances humaines, des projets, dont l’exécution exige différentes sortes de recherches, et par conséquent le concours des différents membres qui la composent. Dans ce cas, chaque associé s’occupe de sa partie; mais ces différents travaux, réunis par leur rapport à un même objet, forment un tout et un ensemble, qu’on peut regarder comme l’ouvrage de la société”, etc.

I add a passage of a writer already quoted, who is speaking of Religion: “Religious knowledge is not merely a code of *agenda* or *credenda*, a summary of articles, or a manual of devotion. It is intimately connected with the whole course of ancient history, with philosophy and criticism, with the study of the learned languages, with moral and metaphysical philosophy. It runs parallel with the progress of the human mind in every liberal pursuit. The peasant

may be as wise as his condition requires him to be, without the light of learning or philosophy ; but the information which is sufficient for the peasant is beneath the claims which such a subject has upon the scholar and the gentleman. If indeed the mind be carefully instructed in every other branch of liberal knowledge, without a corresponding acquaintance with that which is the most momentous of all, an undue bias must be given to the judgment ; the topic which is not expanded in proportion to the rest, will virtually shrink into insignificance, and be despised ; its track will be forsaken, its treasures undiscovered, its domain uncultivated. We cannot, therefore, too earnestly insist upon the incompleteness of any system of education in which this main ingredient is wanting". —Copleston in *Quarterly Review*, December, 1825.

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§ 6. *Knowledge under this aspect is Philosophy or Liberal Knowledge.*

“ADDUXIT ad tractandas atque excolendas artes magnitudo rei, et opus unum excellentiâ mentis nostræ longe dignissimum, cupiditas veri inveniendi, quâ nihil est præclarius, nec quod magis deceat hominem, sicut ignorari, falli, decipi, turpe ac miserum judicamus : quæ ut evitarent, philosophatos esse priscos illos, nec alia causa, aut in alium usum, Aristoteles perhibet gravis in primis auctor.

“Admiratio hujus tanti operis ingentes illos animos ad studium et inquisitionem causarum compulit ; hinc si quid se putarent novum et aliis inauditum invenisse, incredibilis sequebatur delectatio, tanquam parta victoria, et tantis difficultatibus superatis, ea delectatio detenebat eos in curâ et labore, quam illi delectationem opibus, dignitatibus, et aliis omnibus vitæ commodis proponebant : ergo expedierunt se varia hominum ingenia, ut in verum hoc quasi de-

fodiendum ac eruendum prorsus incumberent, alia, spe præmii inducta, alia, ut fruereutur iis oblectamentis, quæ ex spectatione theatri hujus naturæ maximè capiuntur, varia subinde ac diuturna. Praestantia ingenia ex sublimi illâ et generosâ notâ huc venerunt, quod, quum se tantâ pectoris luce illo vigore mentis præditos reputarent ac instructos, nullâ in re aliâ consumi tanta bona oportere censuerunt, quàm ut rem pulcherrimam scruterentur ac complecterentur, et, quatenus liceret, quam plurimis prodessent”, etc. Vives, *de Caus. Corr. Art.*, i. 2.

“Galenus medicus hac utitur sectione artium, ut ‘alias’ dicat ‘contemptibiles vilesque, quæ corporis laboribus et manibus exercentur’, quas Græci χειρουργικὰς vocarunt, ‘alias honestas et homine libero dignas’, de quo genere primam facit Medicinam. Hoc condonandum amori professionis, et tanquam pietati in nutricem bene meritam : addit Rhetoricam, Musicam, Geometriam, Astronomiam, Arithmeticam, Dialecticam, Grammaticam, Legum prudentiam. Nec repugnat, si quis volet huic numero adscribere eas, quæ fingimus pingimusque, quod hæ, tametsi citra manuum operam non obeantur, tamen non videntur egere robore illo et lacertis juvenilibus; Seneca vero non adducitur, ut in numerum liberalium artium pictorem recipiat, non magis quam statuarios, aut marmorarios aut cæteros luxuriæ ministros. Æquè luctatores et totam oleo ac luto constantem scientiam expellit, quod ei convenit cum Galeno; nec liberalia studia sunt, sententiâ Senecæ, exercitationes rei militaris; venationem quoque a liberalibus Sallustius excludit. Possidonius Stoicus artes hunc in modum partiebatur, ut alias vulgares et sordidas nominaret, quæ manu constarent et essent ad instruendam vitam occupatæ, expertes decori atque honesti; alias ludieras, quæ ad voluptatem tenderent oculorum atque aurium: pueriles sunt, et aliquid habentes liberalibus simile, quas ἐλευθερίας Græci vocant, quæ non perducunt animum ad virtutem, sed expediunt; liberales vero, immo, ut inquit, solæ liberæ sunt, quibus est curæ virtus.

“Recepta opinio est, septem esse liberales artes, tres de sermo-

ne, quatuor de quantitate. Has ingenuas cognominarunt, quasi has solas ingenui discerent ac exercerent. Nemo enim fere in liberis civitatibus ingenuus manuariis artibus operam accommodabat; sed puer hisce erat artibus deditus, juvenis verò militiæ, campo, gymnasio, aut publicis negotiis, administrandæ reipublicæ, causis actandis, et ejusmodi exercitamentis, quæ sola censebant illi digna homine libero, unde illud in Comœdiâ, ‘Fac periculum in litteris, fac in palæstrâ, in musicis, quæ liberum scire æquum est’. Illæ enim artes maximè existimabantur ingenuis hominibus ad vitæ cultum et ad rempublicam gerendam congruere, ut sermo esset emundatus et purus, etc., etc. . . . Miror prætermittas ab illis Architecturam et Perspectivam ad multa utilem. . . . In nostris scholis hæc quoque fundamenta sunt trium ædificiorum, Medicinæ, Theologiæ, et peritiæ Juris, quas supremas artes disciplinasque nominamus, et usui quotidiano cum primis serviunt. Philosophiam moralem adjunximus, quæ multum Theologiæ adminiculatur; et ex quâ jus esse ortum existimant Sacrum et Profanum; tam cognitionem Naturæ rerum, sine quâ Medicina manca est prorsus”, etc.—  
Vives: *de Caus. Corr. Art.*, i. 2.

“Sequitur post actionem quies; ratio est velut scrutatio, judicium electio, contemplatio autem inspectio quieta et tuta omnium, quæ à ratione sunt collecta et exculpta, à judicio autem recepta atque approbata. Non est in eâ ratiocinatio ulla, in quâ omnia sunt certa jam atque exposita. Et quando delectatio omnis nascitur ex proportione quâdam congruentiâque objecti cum facultate, nihilque est menti congruentius quàm veritas, fit ut in contemplatione magnæ sint delectationes. In quo tamen spectantur veritas et ingenium, nam veritates tam sunt gratissimæ quàm certissimæ maximeque defæcatæ, prolatae simul cum suis originibus primisque causis; id vero si non concedatur, secundum est ut ad veritatem quàm proximè accedant simillimæque sint. Nemo est tam torpenti et abjecto in terram animo, quòd non excitetur ad hanc vocem, ‘Ego tibi hujusce rei causam patefaciam’”. Vives *de Animâ*, ii. 10.

“Neque enim ita in arctum confingendus est animus ut intra unam

aliquam artem subsistat. Qui enim illud faciunt, iniqui profecto iudices, non perspiciunt, quantum natura humani ingenii valeat; quæ ita agilis est et velox, ut ne possit quidem aliquid agere tantum unum, si Fabium audimus. Non audiendi sunt homines imperiti qui humano ingenio majorem, vel inutilem et rebus gerendis adversam, *πολυμάθειαν* criminantur. Est igitur quædam scientiarum cognatio et conciliatio, unde et *ἐγκυκλοπαιδείαν* vocant græci, ut in unâ perfectus dici nequeat, qui cæteras non attigerit. Sellularium, vilium, et sordidarum artium alia ratio est, quibus nulla inter se est conjunctio; ex quarum ingenio liberales illæ censendæ non sunt. Fabrilia qui tractat, impune ignorare sutoriam potest; at in liberalibus illis conspirant omnes manusque jungunt. In architecto quid requirat Vitruvius, novimus. Nulla pœnè disciplina est, quam ille non attingi velit. In Oratoribus et Poetis, perfectis scilicet, ea omnia quæ in architecto suo Vitruvius, requirunt earum disciplinarum Magistri. Et has quidem scientias artesque omnes ita congerendas in Philosophum suum judicarunt Stoici, ut nec mechanicarum artium rudem esse voluerint, ac indignum eo crediderint, si aliorum ministeriis ad vitæ civilis necessitates uteretur. Veniamus ad disciplinas elegantiores: ad quas junctim excolendas naturâ duce incitatur, ut extremo viris pudori sit, in unâ aliquâ consenescere. Non dubium est, mediocribus etiam ingeniis hic licere esse felicibus; Inest scilicet illis *ὀρμηὴ πρὸς πάντα μαθήματα*, qualis ingenio magno convenit, et qualem nobis Plato describit. Est animorum nostrorum, si ita loqui liceat, *ἔψος*, quo illi vel per naturam vel assuefactionem apti sunt multa simul complecti, abstrahere a singularibus, seque ab illo humili statu in sublimem perducere. Itaque se exerit in illo, quod *ἀρχιτεκτονικὸν* appellare possumus, aut, ex Stoicorum disciplinâ, *το ἡγεμονικὸν*, regio quasi spiritu, et fulminis instar omnia penetrans, et suâ quâdam luce omnia perlustrans. . . . . Qui distinctas rerum ideas animo tenent, modo sibi subordinatas nec confusas, illis non imminui, sed augeri *τὸ κριτικὸν*, necesse est, quod ex conciliatione omnium partium resultat. Major enim profecto *ἀκρισίας* metus est ab illis, qui circa *ὀρισμένον μάθημα* ver-

santur, qui plerumque ex illius indole, etsi cæterarum rudes sint, omnia alia metiantur . . . . Neque tamen id volo, ut qui omni incubuit disciplinarum generi, in illis omnibus simul habitet; nam et tempore et negotiis, aliisque impedimentis excludimur, ut fieri à nobis non possit. Quare occupabimus quidem totum hunc fundum animo, affectu, impetu; sed convenientissimam ejus partem quasi limitibus quibusdam circumscribemus, quam excolamus, et in quâ industriam nostram exerceamus. Excludit ipse scientiarum vastitas hospites suos; qui nunquam habitabunt, nusquam domi erunt, si ubique habitare volent, aut levi tantum percursatione plurima attinent". Morbof. *Polyhistor.*, i. 1. I have left out sentences here and there for the sake of brevity.

"It is an assured truth which is contained in the verses, 'Scilicet ingenua didicisse fideliter', etc. It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men's minds; but indeed the accent had need be on *fideliter*; for altogether superficial learning doth rather work a contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both sides, and to turn back the first offers and conceits of the mind, and to accept of nothing but examined and tried. It taketh away vain admiration of any thing, which is the root of all weakness: for all things are admired, either because they are new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly, but will find that printed in his heart, 'Nil novi super terram'. Neither can any man marvel at the play of puppets that goeth behind the curtain, and adviseth well of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the Great, after that he was used to great armies, and the great conquests of the spacious provinces in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, of some fights and services there, which were commonly for a passage, or a fort, or some walled town at the most, he said, 'It seemed to him, that he was advertised of the battle of the frogs and mice, that the old tales went of'. So certainly, if man meditate upon the universal.

frame of nature, the Earth with men upon it, the divineness of souls excepted, will not seem much other than an ant hill, where some ants carry corn, and some carry their young, and some go empty, and all to and fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of death, or adverse fortune; which is one of the greatest impediments of virtue, and imperfections of manners. . . . And therefore Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of causes, and the conquest of all fears together, as *concomitantia*; ‘Felix qui potuit’, etc. Bacon, *Adv. of Learning*, vol. i. p. 60, ed. 1824.

In quoting Gibbon, it is generally necessary to apologize for his irreligious tone. “With some [the philosophical talent] consists in tracing out new paths and ridiculing every prevailing opinion, merely because it is prevalent. With others it is identified with geometry, that imperious queen, who, not content with reigning, proscribes her sisters, and declares all reasoning unworthy of the name, which turns not upon lines and numbers. . . . The philosophical talent consists in the power of going back to simple ideas, of seizing and combining first principles. The glance of its possessor is correct, but it is at the same time extensive. Placed upon an eminence, he takes in a wide range of vision, of which he forms to himself one simple and connected idea, while other minds, as correct in apprehension, but more limited in extent, see only some portion or other of it. He may be a geometrician, or an antiquary, or a musician, but still he is a philosopher; and by dint of penetrating into the first principles of his art, he becomes superior to it. He has a place among that small number of geniuses, who, at distant intervals, cultivate that chief science to which, were it perfected, all others must submit. Taken in this view, the talent is extremely rare. There are plenty of minds capable of correctly apprehending particular ideas; but there are very few who can collect into one abstract idea a numerous assemblage of others of a less general nature. What study can confer this talent? None that I know of.



It is a gift conferred by Heaven; the majority of mankind are ignorant of, and despise it; it is wished for by the wise; has been given to few; has been acquired by none; but I think that the study of Literature, that habit of alternately becoming a Greek or a Roman, a disciple of Zeno or of Epicurus, is admirably adapted to develop and exercise it. Throughout all these infinitely diversified minds, may be observed a general conformity between those who, by the similarity of their times, countries, and religions, have acquired very nearly the same manner of looking at objects. Those minds which are least imbued with prejudice, cannot be entirely free from it. Their ideas have a paradoxical appearance; and, even when breaking their fetters, you perceive that those ideas were once shackled by them. Among the Greeks I look for favourers of democracy; among the Romans for enthusiastic lovers of their country; among the subjects of a Commodus, a Severus, or a Caracalla, for apologists for despotic power; and among the ancient Epicureans, for inveighers against the religion of the times. How striking a spectacle for a truly philosophic mind, to see the most absurd opinions received among the most enlightened people; barbarians attaining to the knowledge of the most sublime truths; legitimate but incorrect consequences drawn from most erroneous premisses; admirable principles continually approaching nearer to truth without ever quite reaching it; language formed by ideas, and ideas corrected by language; the sources of morality always the same; the opinions of the quarrelsome metaphysician always varying, generally extravagant, clear only while they are superficial, and subtle, obscure, and uncertain whenever they pretend to be profound. [In History] the philosophic mind sees a system, connexions, and consequences, where others can discern only the caprices of fortune. It considers this science as one of causes and effects; and it well deserves an attempt to lay down some particular rules, not to enable genius to bud forth, but to guard it from mistakes. Perhaps, if this had always been well weighed, cunning

would not so often have been mistaken for penetration, obscurity for depth, and an air of paradox for a creative genius". *Essay on the Study of Literature*.

To enter into the opinions of others, and to be sceptical about the truth of any, are not, as Gibbon supposes, synonymous. For surely it is no paradox to say, "I understand you, but I think the contrary of your opinion true". Here it will save me trouble, if I express my meaning in my own words on a former occasion.

"There are many men of one idea in the world; your un-intellectual machine, who eats, drinks, and sleeps, is a man of one idea. Such, too, is your man of genius, who strikes out some new, or revives some old view in science or in art, and would apply it as a sort of specific or interpretation to all possible subjects, and will not let the world alone, but loads it with bad names, if it will not run after him and his darling fancy. . . . Such again are the benevolent persons, who, with right intentions, but yet, I think, narrow views, wish to introduce the British constitution and British ideas into every nation and tribe upon Earth; differing, how much, from the wise man in the Greek epic, whose characteristic was that he was 'versatile', for he had known 'the cities and the mind of many men'. History and travel expand our views of man and of society; they teach us that distinct principles rule in different countries and in distant periods; and though they do *not* teach us that all principles are equally true, or, what is the same thing, that none are either true or false, yet they do teach us that all are to be regarded with attention and examined with patience, which have prevailed to any great extent among mankind. Such is the temper of a man of the world, of a philosopher. He may hold certain principles to be false and dangerous, but he will try to enter into them, to enter into the minds of those who hold them; he will consider in what their strength lies, and what can be said for them; he will do his best to analyze and dissect them; he will compare them with others; and he will apply himself to the task of exposing and disproving them. He will not ignore them"; etc.

It is not to be supposed that any Catholic can endure Sharon Turner, though he was after all fairer than his generation ; but still it is pleasant to find him, after a contemptuous mention of the Trivium and Quadrivium, give utterance to the following just sentiment :—“The classical minds whom we are accustomed to venerate, were not formed merely from the literature which preceded them, but from the general intellect, business, conversation, and pursuits of their day. It is a mistake to imagine that a man of great intellectual eminence is made only from his library ; he is the creature of the improvement of society about him, reflecting upon him the rays of a thousand minds, and pouring into him information from a thousand quarters. Every hour his understanding, if it has the capacity, is insensibly directed, enriched, and exercised, by the knowledge and talent that is everywhere breathing, acting, and conferring around him. His mind expands, without his own consciousness of its enlargement ; his ideas multiply independently of his will ; his judgment rectifies, his moral and political wisdom increases with his experience ; and he at last becomes a model imperceptibly benefiting others, as he has been benefited himself”. *Middle Ages*, vol. iv. p. 241.

From an exceedingly able article in the *British Critic* for January, 1841, on “Utilitarian Moral Philosophy”, I select the following passage, as having an immediate bearing on our subject : “[Comprehensiveness of view] is the power of embracing without confounding a variety of facts, past, present, and to come, of holding in the mind a number of ideas, each perfect in itself, yet each with relation to the rest, of uniting an indefinite number of objects in one view as a whole. This power is to a certain extent exercised in any, the commonest case of comparison, every time we assert any kind of likeness or unlikeness, preference or relation ; at the same time, it is perhaps in this more than any other exercise of the intellect, that we are able to feel distinctly how far our natural ability falls short of our capacities. Illustrations may be taken from any quarter. In music, we are first able to distinguish a

pleasing from an unpleasing sound, and that is all; shortly we become able to remember the sounds which led to it, and to view each present note coloured by those which we hold still in our memory, to understand, that is, a simple air; next, we detect simultaneous sounds and melodies as they combine to form one harmony; and so on, till the accomplished musician is enabled to embrace in one grasp, as it were, a whole musical movement, with all the history and relations of the various threads of melody, which appear and disappear, are echoed, varied, entangled, and disentangled, enforced and overwhelmed through the whole composition. Thus, too, in examining a piece of mechanism, after we have mastered one by one the various ingenious contrivances by which minor difficulties are obviated, and the forces applied to their different destinations, we stop and try to see them for a moment all at once, to embrace in one glance all the complicated movements of the parts, as subordinate and ministering to the common purpose of the whole. By such an effort we seem to gain a kind of double power of dividing and concentrating our mind, so that even while we direct our main attention to any one part, we yet do so with a kind of active and real, though perhaps unconscious, recollection of a variety of other objects, to which it has or may have reference. The same might be said of our mode of feeling the composition of a picture or poem; but with even more weight and truth, of history and philosophy; and here it is that we may most truly feel what we may have done for our own minds, and how very much remains to do, when, after having run through a line of history, a philosophical system, or even a train of argument, we try so to fix our attention on the whole, as, without dropping the particulars, to grasp and unite them all in one view, in one course or group. In such an effort we ordinarily succeed a little, and fail a great deal; and while in our mode of failure we seem to feel very clearly where it is that we fail, so our success, such as it is, seems to teach us how much our nature might be made capable of, by the mere extension of its present faculties. We seem to have some clue given us to a

conception of those powers, which it is not impossible may some day be given to man, of embracing in one sweeping and piercing glance the real living truth of all those vast dispensations which he has wondered at in history, embracing them as well in their vastness as in their minute details, from their relation to each other, and effects on the course of human history, down to the capricious human passions, as we call them, and paltry accidents, which were the instruments of their accomplishment. And this indeed is but a small part of what is conceivable. There is plainly no limit to the extent, to which the mere faculties, which we now have in a weak imperfect state, may be exalted and extended. There is no contradiction in supposing our present faculties so strengthened as to enable mere man to grasp without conscious effort the whole system of the universe, and to carry it about with him, colouring aright all the particulars on which he fixes his attention, as easily and naturally as music, which we hear without recognizing, may give life to what we are reading, or as a purpose quickens our interest in what surrounds us, even when we are least distinctly aware of its presence. At the same time, it is but conceivable; for, as we cannot confine, so we cannot presume to push forward to any assumed limit, the degree to which creatures may be allowed to partake of those vast attributes of divinity, which are now granted us only in such measure as to help us in conceiving them.

“ It is by mimicking this power to which it should subserve, that Science is apt to make itself ridiculous; when, not content with its own legitimate power of laying out materials for thought, it claims for its abstractions a reality which they do not and cannot possess; proud of a kind of second-rate comprehensiveness, a comprehensiveness obtained not by enlarging our powers, but by paring out to a portable form the subject-matter which we would grasp, embracing a great many objects by neglecting all in which they differ, and then perhaps, as if conscious of the meagreness, which is the necessary result of casting away so much of the essence of each subject which it contemplates, trying to regain its lost reality by a

multitude of arbitrary subdivisions; each, it is true, adding something to the original bare idea, but at the same time not founded on the real mass of complicated relations which subsist between thing and thing", etc., etc.

I have eagerly looked for exact information and instruction on the subject, in the works of the learned and well-principled writer, from whom the following short passages are extracted: "The object of a Liberal Education is to develop the whole mental system of man, and thus to bring it into consistency with itself, to make his speculative inferences coincide with his practical convictions, to enable him to render a reason for the belief that is in him, and not to leave him in the condition of Solomon's sluggard, who is wiser in his own conceit, than seven men that *can* give a reason".—Whewell on *English University Education*, p. 139.

"All exact knowledge supposes the mind to be able to apply, steadily and clearly, not only the processes of reasoning, but also certain fundamental ideas; and it is one main office of a Liberal Education to fix and develop these ideas".—*Ibid.*, p. 173.

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§ 7. *Liberal Knowledge acts partly on the side of Christianity, partly against it.*

I AM led here to quote a passage on the subject of the ethical aspect of ancient philosophy, which occurs in a sketch I wrote many years ago of the writings of Cicero. "Some writers, as Lyttleton, have considered it an aggravation of Cicero's inconsistencies, that he was so perfectly aware of what was philosophically upright and correct. It might be sufficient to reply, that there is a wide difference between calmly deciding on an abstract point, and acting on that decision in the hurry of real life; that Cicero in fact

was apt to fancy (as all will fancy when assisted by interest or passion) that the circumstances of his case constituted it an exception to the broad principles of duty. . . . But the argument of the objection proceeds on an entire misconception of the design and purpose with which the ancients prosecuted philosophical studies. The motives and principles of morals were not so seriously acknowledged as to tend to a practical application of them to the conduct of life. Even when they proposed them in the form of precept, they still regarded the perfectly virtuous man as the creature of their imagination, rather than a model for imitation, an idea which it was a mental recreation rather than a duty to contemplate; and if an individual here or there, as Scipio or Cato, attempted to conform his life to his philosophical conceptions of virtue, he was sure to be ridiculed for singularity and affectation.

“Even among the Athenians, by whom philosophy was, in many cases, cultivated to the exclusion of every active profession, intellectual amusement, not the discovery of Truth, was the principal object of their discussions. That we must thus account for the ensnaring questions and sophistical reasonings, of which their disputations consisted, has been noticed in our article on Logic; and it was their extension of this system to the case of morals, which brought upon their sophists the irony of Socrates, and the sterner rebuke of Aristotle. But, if this took place in a state of society in which the love of speculation pervaded all ranks, much more was it to be expected among the Romans, who, busied as they were in political enterprises, and deficient in philosophical acuteness, had neither time nor inclination for abstruse investigations, and who considered philosophy simply as one of the many fashions introduced from Greece, ‘a sort of table furniture’, as Warburton well expresses it, a mere refinement in the arts of social enjoyment. This character is borne both among friends and enemies. Hence the popularity which attended the three Athenian philosophers, who had come to Rome on an embassy from their native city; and hence the inflexible determination with which Cato procured their

dismissal, through fear, as Plutarch tells us, lest their arts of disputation should corrupt the Roman youth. And when at length, by the authority of Scipio, the literary treasures of Sylla, and the patronage of Lucullus, philosophical studies had gradually received the countenance of the higher classes of their countrymen, we still find them, in consistency with the principle above laid down, determined in the adoption of this or that system, not so much by the harmony of its parts, or by the plausibility of its reasonings, as by its suitableness to the profession and political station to which they respectively belonged. Thus, because the Stoics were more minute than other sects in inculcating the moral and social duties, we find the Jurisconsults professing themselves followers of Zeno; the Orators, on the contrary, adopted the disputatious system of the late Academies; while Epicurus was the master of the idle and the wealthy. Hence too, they confined the profession of philosophical science to Greek teachers; considering them the sole proprietors, as it were, of a foreign and expensive luxury, which the vanquished might have the trouble of furnishing, but which the conquerors could well afford to purchase".—*Art. Cicero, Encycl. Metropol.*, 1824.

The learned Dissertation on medieval society with which Mr. Hallam concludes his "Middle Ages", supplies us another illustration of literary or philosophical ethics as distinct from Christian; an illustration contained partly in the historical facts he puts before us, and partly in his own personal sentiments about them. He considers the ethics of Catholicism simply defective and incomplete, when suffered to prevail without restraint, almost ruinous of true morality, but admitting and commonly receiving correction from the true morality of literature, philosophy, romance, heresy, and gentlemanlike feeling. He cautiously observes that "whether the superstition of" the dark ages "had actually *passed* that point, where it becomes *more* injurious to public morals and the welfare of society than the *entire* absence of all religious notions, is a very complex



question, upon which I would by no means pronounce an affirmative decision". Vol. iii., p. 249. Then he is candid enough to state the favourable side of the question, telling us that ecclesiastical ethics, indeed, did not make much account of "justice and veracity", yet they were characterised by precepts of meekness, self-denial, and charity, which could never be wholly effaced, and especially by the eleemosynary spirit (as indeed was Mohammedism) and the still higher praise of championship of the oppressed. On the whole, however, "religion lost almost every quality which renders it conducive to the *good order* of society": though "there are a few great land-marks of moral distinctions so deeply fixed in human nature, that no degree of rudeness can destroy, nor even any superstition remove them". Now, that the state of society and of morals in the middle ages was lamentably low, I have no need here to deny; I am not denying that it is to be traced, as far as found, to the "rudeness of semi-barbarous populations"; what I do deny, and what I am saying that the author affirms, is, that it was owing to the "superstition" of Catholicism.

Such then being the poverty, to use a mild word, of ecclesiastical ethics, let us see what it is that Mr. Hallam considers their historical restoration. Not the teaching of the Catholic Church, but first the abolition of slavery, and the enforcement of fixed laws and a system of police; and next, the rise and spread of the Manichees, Catharists, Albigenses, and other heretical sects, whose belief, though "certainly a compound of strange errors with truth, was attended by qualities of a far superior lustre to orthodoxy, by a sincerity, a piety, and a self-devotion, that almost purified the age in which they lived". Thirdly, he attributes much to the influence of the institution of chivalry; and it is to this part of his Dissertation I would direct particular attention, for we shall find that that institution did both service and disservice to the ethical teaching of Catholicism, of the same kind as, in Discourse IX., is attributed to literature, civilization, and philosophy.

He says then, that "the *best* school of moral discipline", that is,

in contradistinction to Catholicism, "which the middle ages afforded, was the institution of chivalry. There are, if I may so say, three powerful spirits, which have from time to time moved over the face of the waters, and given a predominant impulse to the *moral sentiments and energies* of mankind. These are the spirits of liberty, of religion, and of honour. It was the principal business of chivalry to animate and cherish the last of these three. And, whatever high magnanimous energy the love of liberty or *religious zeal* has ever imparted, was equalled by the exquisite sense of honour which this institution preserved".

Now let us see the mingled character, partly protective, partly destructive, of Christian morality, which marks this creation of the natural man. We shall see, in the course of his account of it, that the author parallels it, and justly, as a principle of influence, to the sentiments found existing in the religion of Homer, Mahomet, and the Red Indians.

"The soul of chivalry was individual honour, coveted in so entire and absolute a perfection, that it must not be shared with an army or a nation. Most of the virtues it inspired were what we may call independent, or opposed to those which are founded upon social relations. The knights-errant of romance perform their best exploits from the love of woman, or from a sort of abstract sense of justice, rather than from any solicitude to promote the happiness of mankind. If these springs of action are less generally beneficial, they are, however, more connected with elevation of character, than the systematic prudence of men accustomed to social life. This solitary and independent spirit of chivalry, dwelling, as it were, upon a rock, and disdaining injustice or falsehood from a consciousness of internal dignity, without any calculation of their consequences, is not unlike what we sometimes read of Arabian chiefs or the North American Indians. These nations, so widely remote from each other, seem to partake of that moral energy which, among European nations, far remote from both of them, was excited by the spirit of chivalry. But the most beautiful picture that was ever pour-

trayed of this character, is the Achilles of Homer, the representative of chivalry in its most general form, with all its sincerity and unyielding rectitude, all its courtesies and munificence. Calmly indifferent to the cause in which he is engaged, and contemplating with a serious and unshaken look the premature death that awaits him, his heart only beats for glory and friendship”.

Then, after alluding to the spirit of devotion and of gallantry, which were the animating principles of chivalry, and observing that the latter, so far from conducing to the moral improvement of society, actually debased it, he goes on to mention the special virtues of a knight,—loyalty, courtesy, and munificence.

1. “The first of these, in its original sense, may be defined, fidelity to engagements; whether actual promises, or such tacit obligations as bound a vassal to his lord, and a subject to his prince. It was applied also, and in the utmost strictness, to the fidelity of a lover towards the lady he served. Breach of faith, and especially of an express promise, was held a disgrace that no valour could redeem. False, perjured, disloyal, recreant, were the epithets which he must be compelled to endure, who had swerved from a plighted engagement, even towards an enemy. This is one of the most striking changes produced by chivalry. Treachery, the usual vice of savage, as well as corrupt nations, became infamous during the rigour of that discipline. As personal rather than national feelings actuated its heroes, they never felt that hatred, much less that fear of their enemies, which blind men to the heinousness of ill faith. . . .

2. “A knight was unfit to remain a member of the order, if he violated his faith; he was ill acquainted with its duties, if he proved wanting in courtesy. This word expressed the most highly refined good breeding, founded less upon a knowledge of ceremonious politeness, though this was not to be omitted, than on the spontaneous modesty, self-denial, and respect for others, which ought to spring from his heart. Besides the grace which this beautiful virtue threw over the habits of social life, it softened down the

natural roughness of war, and gradually introduced that indulgent treatment of prisoners which was almost unknown to antiquity. . . . After the battle of Poitiers, 'the English and Gascon knights', says Froissart, 'having entertained their prisoners, went home each of them with the knights or squires he had taken; whom he then questioned upon their honour, what ransom they could pay without inconvenience, and easily gave them credit; and it was common for men to say, that they would not straiten any knight or squire, so that he should not live well, and keep up his honour'.

3. "Liberality indeed, and disdain of money, might be mentioned, as I have said, among the essential virtues of chivalry. All the romances inculcate the duty of scattering this wealth with profusion, especially towards minstrels, pilgrims, and the poorer members of their own order. . . .

"Valour, loyalty, courtesy, munificence, formed collectively the character of an accomplished knight, so far as was displayed in the ordinary tenor of his life, reflecting these virtues as an unsullied mirror. Yet something more was required for the perfect idea of chivalry, and enjoined by its principles; an active sense of justice, an ardent indignation against wrong, a determination of courage to its last end, the prevention or redress of injury. It grew up as a salutary antidote in the midst of poisons, whilst scarce any law but that of the strongest obtained regard, and the rights of territorial property, which are only right as they conduce to general good, became the means of general oppression. . . .

"The characteristic virtues of chivalry bear so much resemblance to those which eastern writers of the same period extol, that I am a little disposed to suspect Europe of having derived some improvement from imitation of Asia. Though the Crusades began in horror of infidels, the sentiment wore off in some degree before their cessation; and the regular intercourse of commerce, sometimes of alliance between the Christians of Palestine and the Saracens, must have removed part of the prejudice, while experience of their energies, courage, and generosity in war, would with these gallant

knights serve to lighten the remainder. . . . Certainly, excepting that romantic gallantry towards women, which their customs would not admit, the Mahomedan chieftains were, for the most part, abundantly qualified to fulfil the duties of European chivalry. . . .

“I have already mentioned the dissoluteness which almost unavoidably resulted from the prevailing tone of gallantry. . . . An undue thirst for military renown was another fault that chivalry must have nourished; and the love of war, sufficiently pernicious in any shape, was more founded as I have observed, on personal feelings of honour, and less on public opinion, than in the citizens of free states. A third reproach may be added to the character of knighthood, that it widened the separation between the different classes of society, and confirmed that aristocratical spirit of high birth, by which the larger mass of mankind were kept in unjust degradation. . . .

“Tournaments may be considered to have arisen about the middle of the eleventh century. . . . The Church uttered her excommunication in vain against so wanton an exposure to peril; but it was more easy for her to excite, than to restrain that martial enthusiasm”.

Writers of the nineteenth look back upon the deeds of six or seven centuries before them, and are able to trace the points distinctly, in which their deeds and their principles were agreeable or contrary to right reason, and (whether they are Catholics or not) to Catholicism. In like manner the world, some centuries hence, if it lasts so long, will dispassionately contemplate the theories and measures of this day, and pass judgment upon its commercial, its gentlemanlike, and its selfish ethics, both according to the standard of common sense and Christianity. The author I have quoted proceeded to run the chivalrous into the gentlemanlike spirit, and there he leaves it.

“The spirit of chivalry left behind it a more valuable successor. The character of knight gradually subsided into that of gentleman; and the one distinguished European society in the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries, as much as the other did in the preceding age. A jealous sense of honour, less romantic, but equally elevated, a ceremonious gallantry and politeness, a strictness in devotional observances, an high pride of birth, and feeling of independence upon a sovereign for the dignity it gave, a sympathy for martial honour, though now subdued by civil habits, are the lineaments which prove an indisputable descent. The cavaliers of Charles the First were genuine successors of Edward's knights; and the resemblance is much more striking if we ascend to the civil wars of the League".

The following are extracts from a very able article which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*, in 1829. The writer is a disciple of what may be called (generically and *mutatis mutandis*) the Shaftesbury School, in contrast with the School of Locke or Bentham. Here is the theory of Beauty denouncing the theory of Utility. I need not observe that every Catholic will pronounce his theory indefinitely higher than the theory he exposes; still (as I have said in the text), Beauty and Utility easily lose themselves in each other, and (without entering into a metaphysical argument, in which accuracy of thought is not to be struck off *currente calamo*), when the author places hope of reward and fear of punishment (*i. e.* the sense of a moral Lawgiver) in what he calls the "Mechanics", and not the "Dynamics" of our moral nature, he seems to inherit the errors as well as the excellences of Shaftesbury.

After characterising "this age of ours, as not an heroic, devotional, philosophical, or moral, but above all others, the Mechanical Age", and showing this to be true, not only as regards its material works, but as regards education, ecclesiastical matters, the fine arts, literature, science, and politics, the writer continues :

"To speak a little pedantically, there is a science of *Dynamics* in man's fortunes and nature, as well as of *Mechanics*. There is a science, which treats of, and practically addresses, the primary, unmodified forces and energies of man, the mysterious springs of

Love, and Fear, and Wonder, of Euthusiasm, Poetry, Religion, all which have a truly vital and infinite character; as well as a science which practically addresses the finite, modified developments of these, when they take the shape of immediate motives, as hope of reward and fear of punishment.

“Now it is certain, that in former times the wise men, the enlightened lovers of their kind, who appeared as moralists, poets, or priests, did, without neglecting the Mechanical province, deal chiefly with the Dynamical; applying themselves chiefly to regulate, increase, and purify the inward primary powers of man; and fancying herein lay the chief difficulty, and the best service they could undertake. But a wide difference is manifest in our age. For the wise men, who now appear as Political Philosophers, deal exclusively with the Mechanical province; and occupying themselves in counting up and estimating men’s motives, strive, by curious checking and balancing and other adjustments of Profit and Loss, to guide them to their true advantage; while, unfortunately, these same ‘motives’ are so innumerable, and so variable in every individual, that no really useful conclusion can ever be drawn from their enumeration. But though Mechanism, wisely contrived, has done much for man, in a social and moral point of view, we cannot be persuaded that it has ever been the chief source of his worth or happiness. Consider the great elements of human enjoyment, the attainments and possessions that exalt man’s life to its present height, and see what part of these he owes to institutions, to Mechanism of any kind; and what to this instinctive, unbounded force, which Nature herself lent him, and still continues to him. Shall we say, for example, that Science and Art are indebted principally to the founders of Schools and Universities? Did not Science originate rather, and gain advancement, in the obscure closets of the Roger Bacons, Keplers, Newtons: etc., etc.? . . . or to take an infinitely higher instance, that of the Christian Religion, . . . how did Christianity arise and spread abroad among men? was it by the institutions and establishments, and well-arranged systems of Mechanism? Not so;

. . . . man's highest attainment was accomplished, dynamically, not mechanically. Nay, we will venture to say that no high attainment, not even any far-extending movement among man, was ever accomplished otherwise. . . . The Crusades took their rise in Religion ; their visible object was, commercially speaking, worth nothing. It was the boundless, invisible world that was laid bare in the imaginations of those men ; and in its burning light, the visible shrunk as a scroll. . . . No dining at Freemasons' Tavern . . . . only the passionate voice of one man, etc., etc. . . . The Reformation had an invisible, mystic, and ideal aim : . . . . our English Revolution, too, originated in Religion ; men did battle, even in those days, not for purse sake, but for conscience sake. . . . The French Revolution itself had something higher in it than the cheap bread and *Habeas Corpus* act. Here too was an idea ; a dynamic, not a mechanical force, etc., etc. . . .

“ Thus does man, in every age, vindicate, consciously or unconsciously, his celestial birth-right. Thus does Nature hold on her wondrous unquestioned course. . . . When we can drain the Ocean into our mill ponds, and bottle up the force of Gravity, to be sold by retail, in our gas jars, then may we hope to comprehend the infinitude of man's soul under formulas of Profit and Loss ; and rule over this too, as over a patent engine, by checks, and valves, and balances.

“ Nay, even with regard to Government itself, can it be necessary to remind any one that Freedom, without which indeed all spiritual life is impossible, depends on infinitely more complex influences than either the extension or the contractment of the democratic interest ? . . . Institutions are much ; but they are not all. The first and highest spirits of the world have been often found under strange outward circumstances ; St. Paul and his brother apostles were politically slaves ; Epictetus was personally one, etc. . . .

“ To define the limits of these two departments of man's activity, which work into each other, and by means of one another, so intricately and inseparably, were, by its nature, an impossible



attempt. . . . It seems clear enough that, only in the right co-ordination of the two, and the vigorous forwarding of both, does our true line of action lie. Undue cultivation of the inward or dynamical province leads to idle, visionary, unpractical courses; and especially, in rude ages, to Superstition and Fanaticism, with their long train of baleful and well-known evils. Undue cultivation of the outward, again, though less immediately prejudicial, and even for the time productive of many palpable benefits, must, in the long run, by destroying moral force, which is the parent of all other force, prove not less certainly, and still more hopelessly pernicious.

“We shall find this faith in Mechanism has now struck its roots deep into men’s most intimate, primary sources of conviction; and is thence sending up, over his whole life and activity, innumerable stems, fruit-bearing and poison-bearing. The truth is, men have lost their belief in the Invisible, and believe, and hope, and work only in the Visible; or to speak it in other words, this is not a Religious Age. Only the material, the immediately practical, not the divine and spiritual, is important to us. The infinite, absolute character of Virtue has passed into a finite, conditional one; it is no longer a worship of the Beautiful and Good; but a calculation of the Profitable. Worship, indeed, in any sense is not recognized among us, or is mechanically explained into the fear of pain or hope of pleasure. Our true Deity is mechanism. It has subdued external Nature for us, and, we think, it will do all other things. We are Giants in physical power; in a deeper than a metaphorical sense, we are Titans, that strive, by heaping mountain on mountain, to conquer Heaven also. . . .

“‘Cause and effect’ is almost the only category under which we look at, and work with, all Nature. Our first question with regard to any object is not, ‘What it is?’ but ‘How it is?’ We are no longer instinctively driven to apprehend and lay to heart what is Good and Lovely, but rather to inquire, as on-lookers, how it is produced, whence it comes, whither it goes? . . . A Euphuist of our day differs much from his pleasant predecessors. An intellectual

dapperling of these times boasts chiefly of his irresistible perspicacy, his 'dwelling in the daylight of truth', and so forth. . . . Wonder, indeed, is on all hands dying out; it is the sign of uncultivation to wonder. . . . It is the force of circumstances that does every thing; the force of one man can do nothing. . . . Religion, in most countries, more or less in every country, is no longer what it was and should be, a thousand-voiced psalm from the heart of man to his Invisible Father, the Fountain of all Goodness, Beauty, Truth, and revealed in every revelation of these; but for the most part a wise prudential policy grounded on mere calculation; a matter, as all others now are, of expediency and utility, whereby some smaller quantum of earthly enjoyment may be exchanged for a far larger quantum of celestial enjoyment. Thus Religion too is Profit; a working for wages: not Reverence, but vulgar Hope and Fear. . . . Let us look at the higher regions of Literature, where, if any where, the pure melodies of Poetry and Wisdom should be heard...what is the song they sing? Is it a tone of the Memnon statue, breathing music as the high priest touches it? a 'liquid wisdom', disclosing to our sense the deep, infinite harmonies of Nature and man's soul? alas! no. It is not a matin or vesper hymn to the Spirit of all Beauty, but a fierce clashing of symbols and shouting of multitudes, as children pass through the fire to Moloch. Poetry itself has no eye for the Invisible. Beauty is no longer the god it worships, but some brute image of strength, which we may well call an idol, for true strength is one and the same with Beauty, and its worship also is a hymn. . . .

"Again, with respect to our moral condition; here also he who runs may read that the same physical, mechanical influences are every where busy. For the 'superior morality' of which we hear so much, we too would desire to be thankful; at the same time, it were but blindness to deny that this 'superior morality' is properly rather an 'inferior criminality', produced, not by greater love of virtue, but by greater perfection of Police; and of that far subtler and stronger Police, called Public Opinion. This last watches over us

with its Argus eyes more keenly than ever; but the inward eye seems heavy with sleep. Of any belief in invisible, divine things, we find as few traces in our morality as elsewhere. It is by tangible, material considerations, that we are guided, not by inward and spiritual. Self-denial, the parent of all virtue, in any true sense of that word, has perhaps seldom been rarer; so rare is it, that the most, even in their abstract speculations, regard its existence as a chimera. Virtue is pleasure, is profit: no celestial but an earthly thing. Virtuous men, philanthropists, martyrs, are happy accidents; their 'taste' lies the right way. In all cases, we worship and follow after Power, which may be called a physical pursuit. No man now loves Truth, as Truth must be loved, with an infinite love; but only with a finite love, and as it were *par amours*. Nay, properly speaking, he does not believe and know it, but only 'thinks' it, and that 'there is every probability'. He preaches it aloud, and rushes courageously forth with it, if there is a multitude huzzaing at his back; yet ever keeps looking over his shoulder, and the instant the huzzaing languishes, he too stops short". Etc., etc. . . . .

This brilliant essay illustrates what I have said in Discourse IX. on the ambiguous position of the Religion of Philosophy relatively to Catholicism. I have not a suspicion who the author is, nor am I presuming to judge what was the real state of mind under which he wrote; but, in spite of all he says so well and truly, it is impossible from his language to tell whether he was a believer in Christianity.

In order to illustrate further the Philosophical character in its contrast to the Christian, I will make some extracts, in the order in which they meet the reader, from the "Characteristics of Goethe" (London, 1833), from the German of Falk and Von Müller.

"His *Metamorphosis of Plants*, his *Doctrine of Colours*, are beautiful monuments of his calm spirit of investigation: they are, so to speak, filled with the inspired glimpses of the seer, reaching

deep into hidden ages, and into the hidden domains of science; while, on the other hand, his biographical delineations of two characters so utterly different from his own as those of Wieland and J. H. Voss, sufficiently manifest, not so much his literary skill, as his own beautiful nature, which could take in every object in all its genuineness and purity, and reflect it back like a clear, spotless mirror. . . . As this lofty talent of Goethe has been universally acknowledged, so, on the other hand, has he been as loudly reproached with the lukewarmness of his moral sentiments, as far as these can be inferred from his writings. . . . It appears to me that the disputants on both sides overlooked a main point throughout the whole discussion. A mind like that of Goethe, in which a calm observation of all things was an innate and characteristic quality, could by no possibility fall into that moral enthusiasm which the age exacted, and which it was too much inclined to consider as the highest possible prerogative of human nature. Goethe was born to identify himself with things, not things with himself. From the moment in which the public enters the lists with passion against real or supposed evil, it cares little to examine the good sides which this very evil, if considered with perfect calmness, might perhaps present to the eye of the observer". Vol. i., p. 14.

"In society he would rather talk of one of Boccaccio's tales, than of matters on which the welfare of Europe was thought to depend. Many attributed this way of thinking to cold, unsympathizing indifference of temper; assuredly with injustice. To be other than he was, to share the universal ardour and struggle for a new order of things, . . . Goethe must have ceased to be himself, and have suddenly and utterly renounced the many-sided observation with which he was wont to regard, and the mature deliberation with which he was wont to weigh, all things, and consequently this historical phenomenon among the rest. Certainly, the tranquil observer of all the events of this moving and chequered life, and the actual participant, whether doer or sufferer, in the strife and

tumult, are characters essentially distinct and incompatible. The latter can by no possibility form an accurate and impartial estimate of his own situation. There is no point of neutral ground on which he can gain a footing. It would be absurd to ask the dove to write the natural history of the eagle; it must be one-sided. There is wanted some third nature, elevated far above both; truly god-like; which receives both into its bosom, and discriminates their respective excellencies and deficiencies; acknowledges the former, and, if it cannot love the latter, at least strives to bear and even to excuse them. It is only by taking a firm stand on this elevated and commanding point whence the low game of human life, with all its contradictions, is seen to roll up beneath our feet, (like the many-coloured curtain of a theatre), that we can either form an idea of the soul which animates Goethe's works, or acquire the least right to form a judgment of our own on so extraordinary and unique a man". *Ibid.*, p. 19.

“Goethe, by his very nature, cannot, must not, will not, set a single step which may compel him to quit the territory of experience, on which he has so firmly and so happily planted his foot and taken root, for more than half a century. All conclusions, observations, doctrines, opinions, articles of faith, have value in his eyes, only in so far as they connect themselves with this territory, which he has so fortunately conquered. The blue horizon beyond it, which man is wont to paint to himself in such beautiful colours, troubled him little; indeed he shunned it, knowing, as he did, that it is the abode of all brain-woven fantasies, and that all the phantoms of dim and gloomy superstition, which he hated, held their throne there. . . .

“Even virtue, laboriously and painfully acquired, was distasteful to him. I might almost affirm that a faulty but vigorous character, if it had any real native qualities as its basis, was regarded by him with more indulgence and respect than one which at no moment of its existence is genuine; which is incessantly under the most un-

miable constraint, and consequently imposes a painful constraint on others. 'Oh', said he sighing, on such occasions, 'if they had but the heart to commit some absurdity!'" etc., p. 27.

"With questions concerning time, space, mind, matter, God, immortality, and the like, Goethe occupied himself little. Not that he denied the existence of beings superior to ourselves. By no means; they were foreign to his pursuits, only because they lay out of the region of experience, to which, upon system, he exclusively devoted himself. Repugnance to the super-sensual was an inherent part of his mind". P. 30.

"Our scientific men', he said, 'are rather too fond of details. They count out to us the whole consistency of the Earth in separate lots, and are so happy as to have a different name for every lot. This is argil, that is quartz; but what am I the better, if I am ever so perfect in all their names? . . . Every thing in science is become too much divided into compartments. In our professors' chairs, the several provinces are violently and arbitrarily severed, and allotted out into half-yearly courses of lectures, according to fixed plans". P. 36.

"He laid down the proposition, that Nature, accidentally, and as it were against her will, became the tell-tale of her own secrets. That everything was told, at least once; only not in the time and place at which we looked for, or suspected it; we must collect it here and there, in all the nooks and corners in which she had let it drop. Hence the Mysterious, the Sybiline, the Incoherent, in our observations of Nature. That she was a book of the vastest, strangest contents; from which, however, we might gather, that many of its leaves lay scattered around in Jupiter, Uranus, and other planets. To come at the whole would be difficult, if not utterly impossible. On this difficulty, therefore, must all systems suffer shipwreck". P. 64.

"On the day of Wieland's funeral, I remarked such a solemn tone in Goethe's whole manner, as we were seldom accustomed to see in him. . . . For the super-sensual Goethe commonly showed a

repugnance, if not a contempt ; completely on principle, as it appears to me ; for it was more consonant with his natural disposition rather to confine himself to the Present, and to all agreeable and beautiful objects which Nature and Art offer to the eye and the observation, in paths accessible to us. . . . I asked him . . . ‘ And what do you think is at this moment the occupation of Wieland’s soul ? ’ ‘ Nothing petty, nothing unworthy, nothing out of keeping with that moral greatness which he all his life sustained’, was the reply. . . . ‘ It is something to have passed a life of eighty years in unblemished dignity and honour ; it is something to have attained to that pitch of refined wit, of tender, elegant thought, which predominated so delightfully in Wieland’s soul : it is something to have possessed that industry, that iron persistency and perseverance, in which he surpassed us all. . . . Wieland’s soul is one of Nature’s treasures : a perfect jewel. . . . I should be little surprised, inasmuch as I shall find it entirely agreeable to my views of the subject, if, a thousand years hence, I were to meet the same Wieland as the *monas* of a world ; as a star of the first magnitude ; even to see him, and be witness how he quickened and cheered everything that approached him by his beautiful light. To fashion the misty substance of some comet into light and clearness, that were truly a welcome, gladsome task for the *monas* of our Wieland ; as indeed, speaking generally, if we suppose the eternity of the actual state of the world, we can admit no other distinction for *monades*, than, as blessed co-operating powers, to share eternally in the immortal joys of gods. The work of creation is intrusted to them. Called or uncalled, they flock together of themselves ; on every way, from all mountains, out of all seas, from all stars,—who may stop them ? I am certain, as you here see me, that I have been there a thousand times already, and hope to return thither a thousand times again”. Pp. 66—82.

After speaking of certain philosophies, he went on to say, “ Of popular philosophy I am just as little an admirer. There are mysteries in philosophy, as well as in religion. The people ought to be spared all discussions on such points ; at least, they ought by no

means to be forcibly dragged into them. Epicurus somewhere says, 'This is right, precisely because the people are displeased at it'. It is difficult to foresee the end of those unprofitable and unpleasing mental vagaries which have arisen among us since the Reformation ; from the time that the mysteries of Religion were handed over to the people to be pulled about, and set up as a work for the quibbling and cavilling of all sorts of one-sided judgments. The measure of the understandings of common men is really not so great, that one needs set them such gigantic problems to solve, or choose them as judges in the last resort of such questions. The mysteries, and more especially the dogmas, of the Christian Religion, are allied to subjects of the deeper and more intricate philosophy ; and it is only the positive dress with which it is invested that distinguishes the former from the latter. . . . The multitude, however, are never so well satisfied as when they can repeat, in a still louder tone, the loud declamations of some few who give the cry. By this process the strangest scenes are produced, and there is no end to the exhibition of presumption and absurdity. A half educated, 'enlightened' man, often, in his shallowness and ignorance, jests on a subject before which a Jacobi, a Kant, the admitted ornaments of our country, would bow in reverential awe.

"The results of philosophy, politics, and religion, ought certainly to be brought home to the people : but we ought not to attempt to exalt the mass into philosophers, priests, or politicians. It is of no avail. If Protestants sought to define more clearly what ought to be loved, done, and taught ; if they imposed an inviolable, reverential silence on the Mysteries of Religion, without compelling any man to assent to dogmas, tortured with afflicting presumption into a conformity to this or that rule ; if they carefully refrained from degrading it in the eyes of the many by ill-timed ridicule, or from bringing it into danger by indiscreet denial, I should myself be the first to visit the Church of my brethren in religion, with sincere heart, and to submit myself with willing edification to the general,



practical confession of a faith, which connected itself so immediately with action". P. 100.

"In Goethe, all ideas became forms. He would have liked to renounce the imperfect medium of language, to speak, like Nature, in symbols, and to throw his whole imagination, with the vividness and reality of sense, into the existence of a flower or a star. To him, as to Nature, it sufficed to revel in uninterrupted solitude, and to pass from one agreeable state of existence to another, through all forms and modes of life. At such moments, he disliked even the mention of Herder, whose northern severity led him to insist on overshadowing those gay, delightful visions of art and imagination, with the thunderclouds and mists of politics and of actual life. These, as Goethe truly remarked, were two totally different and widely-severed spheres; it was absolutely necessary to keep them quite distinct, and to let every man take care of himself, and God of us all. Thus what seemed to Goethe narrow and partial, Herder called noble and philanthropic; while, on the contrary, what Herder admired as the infinitude of a great idea, revealing itself to man, in various godlike emanations, in the valour of the hero, the wisdom of the legislator, the inspiration of the poet, or the events of a world, this sort of elevation moved Goethe so little, that such characters as Luther and Calvin excited in him a sort of uncomfortable feeling, which could be satisfactorily explained only on the hypothesis that their nature stood in a mysterious sort of opposition with his. Goethe's genius and disposition were for the Beautiful, Herder's for the Sublime". Vol. ii., p. 36.

"The mind that wrought so powerfully on mine", said Goethe, "and had so powerful an influence on the whole frame of my opinions, was Spinoza's. After I had looked around the world in vain, for means of shaping my strange moral being, I fell at length on the Ethics of this man. What I read in this work, what I thought I read in it, I can give no account of; enough, that I found there a calm to my passions; it seemed to open to me a wide

and free view over the sensual and the moral world. But what peculiarly riveted me, was the boundless disinterestedness that beamed forth from every sentence. Those wondrous words, 'He who loves God aright, must not require that God should love him in return', with all the principles on which they rest, with all the consequences with which they teem, filled my whole mind. To be disinterested in all, most of all, in love and in friendship, was my highest desire, my passion, my task; so that those daring words which follow, 'If I love you, what is that to you?' were the true language of my heart", etc. P. 194.

"His intimacy with Herder first led him to penetrate into the lofty sentiment of the Italian school of art, and to become acquainted with poetry under a totally new aspect, and one much more in harmony with his character. . . . During his first era, he had inclined to the Flemish school of art, to which indeed he never ceased to do justice; but Italy opened his eyes to the full perception of high art; his rich, fertile spirit, which embraced at once the Lofty and the Child-like and the Lovely; his delicate, and at the same time profound, taste for nature and for art, now turned with love to the Noble and the Elevated. In the place of his former principle of naturalness or reality, now arose that of ideality; but that pure ideality which transports nature into the region of Ideas and of pure Beauty". Vol. iii., pp. 227—233.

"By means of his passionless, serene, objective way of looking upon the world and upon life, a view of human things had been opened to him equally removed from traditional one-sided narrowness, and from preconceived theories; this led him to regard everything as fitted to its place; to see the Individual in its connexion and co-operation with the Whole; and, in human life, effort and action as the main duty and happiness. Of necessity, this threw a milder light on that dark point at which the threads of human existence are knit to a dim and fathomless destiny. This at length raised him to the idea of a *Theodicea*", etc. Vol. iii., p. 234.

"'The greatest genius', he said, 'will never be worth much, if

he pretends to draw exclusively from his own resources. What is genius, but the faculty of seizing and turning to account every thing that strikes us; of co-ordinating and breathing life into all the materials that present themselves; of taking here marble, there brass, and building a lasting monument with them? . . . The most original young painter, who thinks he owes every thing to his invention, cannot, if he really has genius, come into the room in which we are now sitting, and look round at the drawings with which it is hung, without going out a different man from what he came in, and with a new supply of ideas. What should I be, what would remain to me, if this art of appropriation were considered as derogatory to genius? What have I done? I have collected and turned to account all that I have seen, heard, observed; I have put in requisition the works of nature and of men. Every one of my writings has been furnished to me by a thousand different persons, a thousand different things, the learned and the ignorant, the wise and the foolish, infancy and age, have come in turn, generally without having the least suspicion of it, to bring me the offering of their thoughts, their faculties, their experience; often they have sowed the harvest I have reaped; my work is that of an aggregation of beings taken from the whole of nature; it bears the name of Goethe''". Vol. iii., p. 75.

“He held fast to order and obedience to law as to the main pillars of the public weal. Whatever threatened to retard or to trouble the progress of moral and intellectual improvement, and the methodical application and employment of the power of nature, or to abandon all that is best and highest in existence to the wild freaks of unbridled passion and the domination of rude and violent men, was to him the true tyranny, the mortal foe of freedom, the utterly insufferable evil. This was the persuasion which dictated all his endeavours to influence the minds of others by conversation or by writing; to suggest, to instruct, to encourage, to restrain; to represent the False, the Distorted, the Vulgar, in all their nothingness”, etc. P. 284.

“‘You young people’, he used to say, ‘easily recover when any tragical explosion gives you a transient wound; but we old gentlemen have all possible reasons for guarding ourselves against impressions which produce a violent effect upon us, and interrupt the course of steady employment to no purpose’. When his mind was filled with any great thought, or any new work, he would sometimes refuse to hear a word read from newspapers or public prints”. P. 288.

“Around him all must acquire life, form, motion; all must lend itself to energetic action. The Symmetrical must be sought out and brought home, must be thoroughly apprehended, must be modelled anew into fresh forms. Without assuming the pedagogue or the pedant, he impressed a peculiar stamp on all who surrounded or assisted him; he knew how to keep every man within the limits of his own appropriate sphere; but, within that, to urge him on to excellence and to productiveness; to engraft in his mind invariable maxims of order, steadiness, and consistency, out of which the germs of a higher culture might gradually and spontaneously unfold themselves”. P. 291.

“Every thing that was sent out in writing, the smallest note of invitation, must be written, folded, and sealed with the greatest possible care, neatness, and elegance. Every thing unsymmetrical, the slightest blot or scratch, was intolerable to him. His enjoyment from the sight of the most beautiful engraving was disturbed, if he saw it awkwardly handled, or at all crumpled; for all that surrounded him, and all that proceeded from him, must be in unison with the symmetry and clearness of his inner perceptions, and nothing must be allowed to trouble the harmony of the impression”. P. 298.

“‘In the hundreds of things which interest me’, says he, ‘one always places itself in the centre, as chief pleasure, and the remaining *quodlibet* of my life revolves around it in various moon-like shapes, until at length one or other of them succeeds in working itself into the centre in its turn’. Not always, however, could he

obtain this instantaneous self-concentration; and fully conscious of his vehement susceptibility and irritability, he then seized on the extremest means, and suddenly and inexorably, as if in a state of siege, cut off all communication from without. Scarcely, however, had solitude delivered him of the full torrent of crowding thoughts, than he declared himself free again, and accessible to new objects of interest; carefully knit up the threads he had let drop, and floated and bathed in the fresh element of widely extended Being and Acting; till a new irresistible crisis of inward metamorphosis transformed him once more into a hermit". P. 300.

"He took great and manifold interest in the missionary reports from Halle, as he did indeed in all endeavours to diffuse higher feelings of morality by religious means; and if his nearest friends were sometimes surprised at finding him engaged in the theological writings of Daub, Kreutzer, Paulus, Marheineke, Röhr, or even poring over the folios of the fathers of the Church, his admirers will perhaps be still more so, when they learn, that at the time of the jubilee of the Reformation, he was most intensely busied on an historical cantata on Luther and the Reformation, a complete sketch of which, in all its parts, was found among his papers". P. 306.

"One of his greatest and most peculiar enjoyments was the weekly visit which both the deceased Grand Duchess Louisa and the reigning Grand Duchess and Grand Princess Maria, constantly paid him on a fixed day and hour. . . . If ever some inevitable obstacle to the wonted visit occurred, he seemed to feel a chasm in his existence; for it was exactly the constancy, the punctual recurrence of those days and hours, which to him gave them their peculiar charm; which had the most animated effect on him through the whole week. Amid the vast variety of external impressions and internal workings, he found in the steadiness of this beautiful, pure, and noble connexion, not only a cheering object, but a beneficial resting place, whence his mind rose refreshed, to devote itself with more varied powers to the tranquil observation of all things.

“For it was an absolute want of his nature to gain a clear conception of every subject, however heterogeneous; and the incredible readiness with which he could transform every incident, every personal state or situation, into an *Idea*, must be regarded as the main foundation of his practical wisdom and good sense; and certainly contributed, more than any other quality, to preserve a man by nature so passionate, so easily and so deeply excitable, in secure equanimity amid all the catastrophes of life. As he invariably referred every passing and particular incident to some higher and universal standard, and sought to bring it under some exhaustive formula, he could strip it of all that was startling or repulsive, and could then calmly regard it as an example of conformity to the general rules of nature, or neutralize it as a simply historical fact, an addition to his stock of ideas. How often have I heard him say, ‘That may now turn out as it will; the conception of it I have got fast hold of: it is a strange complicated affair, but it is perfectly clear to me now’ ”. P. 309.

“When Goethe had to bear the death of his only son, he wrote to Zelter thus:—‘Here the mighty conception of duty alone holds us erect. I have no other care than to keep myself in equipoise. The body *must*, the spirit *will*; and he who sees a necessary path prescribed to his will, has no need to ponder much’. Thus did he shut up the deepest grief within his breast, and hastily seized upon a long postponed labour, ‘in order entirely to lose himself in it’. In a fortnight, he had nearly completed the fourth volume of his life, when nature avenged herself for the violence he had done her; the bursting of a bloodvessel brought him to the brink of the grave”. P. 314.

“‘I feel myself surrounded, nay, besieged, by all the spirits I ever conjured up’, he was heard to say. As a relaxation, he had Plutarch read aloud to him quite through. He would try his judgment too upon the present state of the world, and took up the modern French literature, that ‘literature of despair’, as he called it, with as much patience and ardour as if he had had still many lustres in

which to look on at the motley game of life. . . . Then did the silent, peaceful genius [Death] unexpectedly draw near, and in the midst of the most cheerful industry, of the most zealous and benevolent schemes and actions we saw him summoned to that higher and more perfect sphere of activity, where that grand solving word, which he uttered to his friends a year before, shall be fulfilled,

‘Es gilt am Ende, doch nur vorwärts’.

Vol ii., p. 318.

“The year 1827 inflicted upon Goethe the heaviest blows he was doomed to feel; the Grand Duke ended his long and beneficent life in the course of a journey. . . . He was so overpowered by this irreparable loss that, contrary to his custom and to the rules he had laid down to himself, he yielded to his grief, and even gave vent to it in his correspondence. These rules were not the offspring of selfishness, but the result of observation and of a great force of will. Susceptible to a high degree, he would have obeyed every impulse, he would have been the sport of passions which would have poisoned and shortened his life, had he not early acquired the habit of opposing labour and study to affliction and regret; only, as we have already remarked, his labour changed its nature. Goethe ceased to create,—a thing impossible in the hour of real suffering,—but he resumed the task of observation and inquiry, and sought the consolation he needed in the contemplation of the works of nature”.  
Vol iii., p. 47.

“It has been truly remarked that he avoided conversation on painful or agitating subjects; but this did not arise from feebleness or pusillanimity; it was the result of reflection and of the highest degree of self-knowledge. Intensely susceptible, as we have remarked, to all impressions, subjugated by any new and striking ideas, he had above any man to dread those which might have turned him aside from his track, and given up his warm imagination to uncurbed wanderings. Nor did he like people to dwell in his presence on gloomy thoughts or lamentable occurrences, unless some practical end was to be answered by such conversation. It was for

this reason that he avoided the common gossip of society; and that those around him took care not to fatigue his ears with sinister rumours of political troubles, cholera, or other disasters. But we heard him question M. Walter, physician, etc. . . . In this case he was sure of being rewarded by valuable information, etc. . . . It was the same with the thought of death: he never forgot his age, nor the necessity of yielding to the universal law; he only calculated the chances which still remained to him of life and enjoyment, and the means he might employ for increasing them; among the foremost of which he placed care in keeping at a distance all gloomy thoughts, all exaggerated anxiety; as well as constant exercise of the intellectual faculties to preserve them from torpor and decay. When an irreparable calamity overtook him, he compelled himself to neutralize the pernicious effects of long regrets by zealous application to study. There were moments when, to a superficial observer, he might have appeared insensible, whilst the most painful conflict agitated his soul. In such a case you might be certain to guess what was passing within, by taking the very contrary of his conversation: thus he related one anecdote after another with excessive vivacity, at a time when all his thoughts were concentrated on one point.

. . . . "He spoke to his friends several times of his death, and of the means of warding it off to a remote age. 'Yes', said he, 'we can make head against him for sometime as yet; as long as one creates there is no room for dying; but yet, the night, the great night, will come, in which no man shall work'. He used to call that solemn hour 'the undetermined hour'. Vol. iii., p. 82.

"All his conversation showed, that, if he thought himself dying, he did not fear death. Faithful to his principles, he constantly occupied himself, that he might not give the thinking faculty time to grow dull and inactive. Even when he had lost the power of speaking, his hand preserved the character of his life; his voice was mute, but he traced characters in the air; and when his hand sank slowly on his knee, the radiant star sunk beneath our horizon". Vol. iii., p. 92.



“Goethe died the most blessed death that man can die, conscious, cheerful to the last breath, perfectly painless. It was an universal gentle sinking and going out of the flame of life; harmonious, without struggle. ‘Light’ was his last request. Half an hour before the end he said, ‘Open the shutters that more light may come into the room’”. P. 93.

One of the most miserable, yet natural, characteristics of this love of the Beautiful, is its connexion with sensuality. This will most obviously take place through the medium of the Fine Arts. It is often invested with an odious affectation of philosophy, as in Dryden’s *Cymon and Iphigenia*. On this Lord Chesterfield remarks, “Mr. Dryden, who knew human nature, perhaps as well as any man who ever studied it, has given us a just picture of the force of female charms in the story of Cymon and Iphigenia. Boccacio, from whom he took it, had adorned it with all the tinsel finery an Italian composition is capable of. The English poet, like most English travellers, gave sterling silver in exchange for that superficial gilding; and bestowed a *moral*, where he found a tale. He paints in Cymon, a soul buried in a confusion of ideas, inflamed with so little fire, as scarce to struggle under the load, or afford any glimmerings of sense. In this condition he represents him struck with the rays of Iphigenia’s beauty; kindled by them, his mind asserts its powers, its intellectual faculties seem to awake, and that uncouth ferocity of manners, by which he had hitherto been distinguished, gave way to an obliging behaviour, the natural effects of love”. *Polite Philosopher*. I am sorry to say, Dryden was a Catholic, when he published this poem.

Again, take the following passage from a tale of Tieck’s: “She stumbled, and quickly as he sprang forward, he could not hinder but that for a moment she, in the most charming posture, lay kneeling at his feet. He raised her, etc. . . . He followed her into the Church, and saw only the image as she knelt before him, and, etc. . . . His existence was hallowed; his heart floated for ever in the fairest emotion. Nature was now friendly to him, and,

her beauty revealed to his meditation, he felt himself no longer a stranger to devotion and religion; and now he trod this threshold, the mysterious dimness of the temple, with far other feelings than in those days of levity. . . . He held towards her the holy water; her white fingers trembled as they touched his; she bowed graciously. He followed her and knelt near her. His whole heart melted away in melancholy and love. It seemed to him as if, from the wounds of longing, his existence was bleeding away in ardent prayers. Every word of the priest thrilled through him; every tone of the music gushed devotion into his bosom; his lips quivered, as the fair one pressed the Crucifix of her rosary to her ruby mouth. How had he not been able to comprehend this faith and this love before? The priest raised the Host, and the bell sounded. She bowed herself more humbly, and crossed her breast. Like lightning it struck through all his powers and feelings; and the altar-picture seemed alive; the coloured dimness of the windows as a light of Paradise. Tears streamed profusely from his eyes, and allayed the inward burning of his breast. Divine service was ended. He again offered her the holy font", etc.—*Romantic Fiction*, London, 1843. Which is the object of worship here—the true Incarnate Lord, or the dust and ashes?

In the following passage religious fear is represented simply as a corruption of Christianity; and heathen security and indifference is held up to imitation as the healthy state of mind.

“‘Euthanasia! Euthanasia! an easy death!’ was the exclamation of Augustus; it was what Antoninus Pius enjoyed; and it is that for which every wise man will pray, said Lord Orrery, when perhaps he was contemplating the close of a Swift’s life.

“The Ancients contemplated death without terror, and met it with indifference. . . . Though they did not court the presence of death in any shape, they acknowledged its tranquillity; in the beautiful fables of their allegorical religion, Death was the daughter of Night, and the sister of Sleep; and was the friend of the unhappy. To the eternal sleep of death they dedicated their sepulchral

monuments,—*Eternali Somno*. If the full light of revelation had not yet broken on them, it can hardly be denied that they had some glimpses and a dawn of the life to come, from the many allegorical inventions which describe the transmigration of the soul, a butterfly, etc., etc. . . . They did not pollute their imagination with the contents of a charnel house. . . .

“It would seem that the Romans had even an aversion to mention death in express terms, for they disguised its very name by some periphrasis, such as ‘*discessit è vitâ*’.

“The ancient Artists have so rarely attempted to personify death, that we have not discovered a single revolting image of this nature in all the works of antiquity. To conceal its deformity to the eye, as well as to elude its suggestion to the mind, seems to have been a universal feeling, and it accorded with a fundamental principle of ancient art. . . . Catullus ventured to personify the Sister-Destinies as three crones; ‘but in general’, Winkelmann observes, ‘they are represented as beautiful virgins’, etc. . . . Death was a nonentity to the ancient artist. Could he exhibit what represents nothing? Could he animate into action that which lies in a state of eternal tranquillity? Elegant images of repose and tender sorrow were all he could invent, to indicate the still of death. . . .

“When the Christian Religion spread over Europe, the world changed. The certainty of a future state of existence, by the artifice of wicked worldly men, terrified instead of consoling human nature; and, in the Resurrection, the ignorant multitude seemed rather to have dreaded retribution, than to have hoped for remuneration. The Founder of Christianity everywhere breathes the blessedness of social feelings. It is ‘Our Father’, whom He addresses. . . . Amid this general gloom of Europe, their troubled imaginations were frequently predicting the end of the world. It was at this period that they first beheld the grave yawn, and Death, in the Gothic form of a gaunt anatomy, parading through the universe. The people were frightened, as they viewed everywhere hung before their eyes, in the twilight of their Cathedrals, and their ‘pale cloisters’, the most revolting emblems of death. . . .

Their barbarous taste perceived no absurdity in giving action to a heap of bones, which could only keep together in a state of immovability and repose ; nor that it was burlesquing the awful idea of the Resurrection, by exhibiting the incorruptible spirit under the unnatural and ludicrous figure of mortality drawn out of the corruption of the grave". Disraeli's *Curiosities of Literature*.

Sentiments such as these suggest to us the possibility of the "elegant mythology of the Greeks", as paganism has been called, commending itself to educated minds in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Hume and Gibbon have both shown a kind feeling towards it; so, it is scarcely necessary to say, did many of their French contemporaries. This subject has been touched upon in one of my *Tracts for the Times*.

"Will Antichrist profess any religion at all? Neither true God, nor false God, will he worship; so far is clear, and yet something more, and that obscure, is told us. Indeed, as far as the prophetic accounts go, they seem at first sight incompatible with each other. Antichrist is to 'exalt himself over all that is called God or worshipped'. He will set himself forcibly against idols and idolatry, as the early teachers agree in declaring. Yet in the book of *Daniel*\* we read, 'In his estate shall he honour the god of forces; and a god whom his fathers knew not shall he honour with gold and silver, and with precious stones and pleasant things. Thus shall he do in the most strong holds with a strange god, whom he will acknowledge and increase in glory'. What is meant by the words translated 'god of forces', and afterwards called 'a strange god', is quite hidden from us, and probably will be so till the event; but any how some sort of false worship is predicted as the mark of Antichrist, with this prediction the contrary way, that he shall set himself against *all idols*, as well as against the true God. Now it is not at all extraordinary that there should be this contrariety in the prediction, for we know generally that infidelity leads to supersti-

\* Not the Vulgate.

tion, and that the men most reckless in their blasphemy are cowards also. They cannot be consistent, if they would. But let me notice here again a remarkable coincidence, which is contained in the history of the last fifty years", [the Tract is dated 1838] "a coincidence between actual events and prophecy sufficient to show us that the apparent contradiction in the latter may easily be reconciled, though beforehand we may not see how; sufficient to remind us that the all-watchful Eye, and the all-ordaining Hand of God is still over the world, and that the seeds sown in prophecy above two thousand years since, are not dead, but from time to time, by blade and tender shoot, give earnest of the future harvest. Surely the world is impregnated with unearthly elements, which ever and anon, in unhealthy seasons, give lowering and muttering tokens of the wrath to come!

"In that great and famous Nation which is near us, once great for its love of Christ's Church, since memorable for deeds of blasphemy, (which leads me to mention it,) in the capital of that powerful and celebrated Nation, there took place, as we all well know, within the last fifty years, an open apostasy from Christianity; nor from Christianity only, but from every kind of worship which might retain any semblance or pretence of the great truths of religion. Atheism was absolutely professed;—yet in spite of this (it seems a contradiction in terms to say it), a certain sort of Worship, and that, as the prophet expresses it, 'a strange worship', was introduced. Observe what this was.

"I say, they avowed, on the one hand, Atheism. They prevailed upon an unhappy man, whom their proceedings had forced upon the Church as an Archbishop, to come before the public, and declare that there was no God, and that what he had hitherto taught was a fable. They wrote up over the burial places, that death was an eternal sleep. They closed the churches, they seized and desecrated the gold and silver plate belonging to them, turning those sacred instruments, like Belshazzar, to the use of their revellings; they formed mock processions, clad in priestly garments, and singing prophane hymns. They annulled the divine ordinance of marriage.

resolving it into a mere civil contract to be made and dissolved at pleasure. These things are but a part of their enormities.

“On the other hand, after having broken away from all restraint of God and man, they gave a name to the reprobate state itself into which they had thrown themselves, and exalted it, that very negation of religion, or rather that real and living blasphemy, into a kind of god. They called it Liberty, and they literally worshipped it as a divinity. It would almost be incredible, that men, who had flung off all religion, should be at the pains to assume a new and senseless worship of their own devising, whether in superstition or in mockery, were not events so recent and so notorious. After abjuring our Lord and Saviour, and blasphemously declaring Him to be an impostor, they proceeded to decree, in the public assembly of the nation, the adoration of Liberty and Equality as divinities; and they appointed festivals besides, in honour of Reason, the Country, the Constitution, and the Virtues. Further, they determined that tutelary gods might be worshipped; and they enrolled in the number of those some of the most notorious infidels and profligates of the last century. The remains of the two principal of these were brought in solemn procession into one of their churches, and placed upon the holy altar itself; incense was offered to them, and the assembled multitude bowed down in worship before one of them, before what remained on Earth of an inveterate enemy of Christ. . . .

“Further, let it be remarked, that there was a tendency to introduce the old Roman democratic worship, as if further to show us that Rome, the fourth monster of the Prophet’s vision, is not dead. They even went so far as to restore the worship of one of the Roman divinities (Ceres) by name, raised a statue to her, and appointed a festival in her honour. . . . Still further, it is startling to observe, that the former apostate in the early times, the Emperor Julian, he too was engaged in bringing back Roman Paganism. Further still, let it be observed that Antiochus too, the Antichrist before Christ, the persecutor of the Jews, he too signa-

lized himself in forcing the Pagan worship upon them, introducing it even into the Temple.”—*Tracts for the Times*, No. 83.

I am induced to add some extracts from a Protestant sermon of my own, written just twenty years ago, both for its special connexion with the above extracts, and also as a sort of illustration of what I have said above, in Discourse I., concerning the long hold which the class of opinions, which I have here been advocating, have had upon my mind.

“In every age of Christianity since it was first preached, there has been what may be called a Religion of the world, which so far imitates the one true religion, as to deceive the unstable and the unwary. The world does not oppose Religion *as such*. I may say, it never has opposed it. In particular, it has, in all ages, acknowledged in one sense or other the Gospel of Christ, fastened on one or other of its characteristics, and professed to embody this one in its practice; while, by neglecting the other parts of the holy doctrine, it has, in fact, disturbed and corrupted even that portion of it, which it has exclusively put forward, and so has contrived to explain away the whole; for he who cultivates only one precept of the Gospel to the exclusion of the rest, in reality attends to no part at all. Our duties *balance* each other; and, though we are too sinful to perform them all perfectly, yet we may in some measure be performing them all, and preserving the balance on the whole; whereas, to give ourselves only to this or that commandment is to incline our minds in a wrong direction, and at length to pull them down to the earth, which is the aim of our adversary the Devil.

“It is his very aim to break our strength; to force us down to the earth, to bind us there. The world is his instrument for this purpose; he is too wise to set it in open opposition to the word of God. No! he affects to be a prophet like the prophets of God. He calls his servants also prophets; and they mix with the scattered remnant of the true Church, with the solitary Michaiahs who were left upon the Earth, and speak in the Name of the Lord. And in

one sense they speak the truth ; but it is not the whole truth ; and we know even from the common experience of life, that half the truth is often the most gross and mischievous of falsehoods'.

Then I allude, first, to the Neo-platonists, to Ammonius, his connexion with Origen and the school of Alexandria, to Julian, etc.

“Even in the first ages of the Church, while persecution still raged, he set up a counter-religion among the philosophers of the day, partly like Christianity, but in truth a bitter foe to it ; and it deceived and shipwrecked the faith of those who had not the love of God in their hearts”.

Next I allude to the superstitions of the middle ages, as ordeals, the savage feudalism, the fanaticism of chivalry, the wild excesses of the era of the Crusades, the Flagellants, and the cruel and bloody persecutions of Jews and heretics, all of which a Catholic condemns, though here I ignorantly implicate the Church in them.

“Time went on, and he devised a second idol of the True Christ, and it remained in the temple of God for many a year. The age was rude and fierce. Satan took the darker side of the Gospel ; its awful mysteriousness, its fearful glory, its sovereign inflexible justice ; and here *his* picture of the truth ended. ‘God is a consuming fire’ ; we know it. But we know more, viz., that God is love also ; but Satan did not add this to his religion, which became one of *fear*. The religion of the world was then a fearful religion. Superstitions abounded, and cruelties. The noble firmness, the graceful austerity of the true Christian were superseded by forbidding spectres, harsh of eye, and haughty of brow ; and these were the patterns or the tyrants of a beguiled people”.

Then I come to the Religion of Civilization, which is the subject of the Ninth Discourse in this volume.

“What is Satan’s device in this day ? a far different one ; but perhaps a more pernicious. . . . What is the world’s Religion now ? It has taken the brighter side of the Gospel, its tidings of comfort, its precepts of love ; all darker, deeper views of man’s condition and prospects being comparatively forgotten. This is the religion natural to a civilized age, and well has Satan dressed and



completed it into an idol of the Truth. As the reason is cultivated, the taste formed, the affections and sentiments refined, a general decency and grace will of course spread over the face of society, quite independently of the influence of Revelation. That beauty and delicacy of thought, which is so attractive in books, extends to the conduct of life, to all we have, all we do, all we are. Our manners are courteous; we avoid giving pain or offence; our words become correct; our relative duties are carefully performed. Our sense of propriety shows itself even in our domestic arrangements, in the embellishment of our houses, in our amusements, and so also in our religious profession. Vice now becomes unseemly and hideous to the imagination; or, as it is sometimes familiarly said, 'out of taste'. Thus elegance is gradually made the test and standard of virtue, which is no longer thought to possess intrinsic claims on our hearts, or to exist further than it leads to the quiet and comfort of others. Conscience is no longer recognized as an independent arbiter of actions; its authority is explained away;—partly it is superseded in the minds of men by the so-called moral sense, which is regarded merely as the love of the beautiful; partly by the rule of expediency, which is forthwith substituted for it in the details of conduct. Now conscience is a stern gloomy principle; it tells of guilt and of prospective punishment. Accordingly, when its terrors disappear, then disappear also, in the creed of the day, those fearful images of divine wrath with which the Scriptures abound. They are explained away. Every thing is bright and cheerful. Religion is pleasant and easy; benevolence is the chief virtue; intolerance, bigotry, excess of zeal, are the first of sins. Austerity is an absurdity;—even firmness is looked on with an unfriendly suspicious eye. On the other hand, all open profligacy is discountenanced; drunkenness is accounted a disgrace; cursing and swearing are vulgarities. Moreover, to a cultivated mind, which recreates itself in the varieties of literature and knowledge, and is interested in the ever accumulating discoveries of science, and the ever-fresh accessions of information, political or other, from foreign countries, Religion will commonly seem to be dull, from want of

novelty. Human excitements are easily sought out and rewarded. New objects in religion, new systems and plans, new doctrines, new preachers, are necessary to satisfy that craving, which the so-called spread of knowledge has created. The mind becomes morbidly sensitive and fastidious; dissatisfied with things as they are, and desirous of a change as such, as if alteration must of itself be a relief.

“Now, I would have you put Christianity for an instant out of your thoughts; and consider whether such a state of refinement, as I have attempted to describe, is not that to which men might be brought quite independent of religion, by the mere influence of education and civilization; and then again, whether, nevertheless, this mere refinement of mind is not more or less all that is called religion at this day. In other words, is it not the case, that Satan has so composed and dressed out what is the mere natural produce of the human heart under certain circumstances, as to serve his purposes as the counterfeit of the Truth? I do not at all deny that this spirit of the world uses words and makes professions, which it would not adopt except for the suggestions of Scripture; nor do I deny that it takes a general colouring from Christianity, so as really to be modified by it, nay, in a measure enlightened and exalted by it. Again, I fully grant, that many persons, in whom this bad spirit shows itself, are but partially infected by it, and at bottom good Christians, though imperfect. Still, after all, here is an existing system, only partially evangelical, built upon worldly principle, yet pretending to be the Gospel, dropping one whole side of it, viz., its austere character, and considering it enough to be benevolent, courteous, candid, correct in conduct, delicate,—though it has no true fear of God, no fervent zeal for His honour, no deep hatred of sin, no horror at the sight of sinners, no indignation and compassion at the blasphemies of heretics, no jealous adherence to doctrinal truth, no especial sensitiveness about the particular means of gaining ends, provided the ends be good, no loyalty to the Holy Apostolic Church of which the Creed speaks, no sense of the authority of Religion as external to the mind; in a word, no

seriousness, and therefore is neither hot nor cold, but (in Scripture language) *lukewarm*. Thus the present age is the very contrary to what are commonly called the Dark Ages; and together with the faults of those ages, we have lost their virtues. I say their virtues; for even the errors then prevalent—a persecuting spirit, for instance,—fear of religious inquiry,—bigotry,—these were, after all, but perversions and excesses of real virtues, such as zeal and reverence; and we, instead of limiting and purifying them, have taken them away, root and branch. Why? because we have not acted from a love of the Truth, but from the influence of the Age. The old generation has passed, and its character with it; a new order of things has arisen. Human society has a new framework, and fosters and develops a new character of mind; and this new character is made by the Enemy of our souls to resemble Christian obedience, as near as it may, its likeness all the time being but accidental. Meanwhile, the Holy Church of God, as from the beginning, continues its course heavenward; despised by the world, yet influencing it, partly correcting it, partly restraining it, and in some happy cases reclaiming its victims, and fixing them firmly and for ever within the lines of the faithful host militant here on Earth, which journeys towards the City of the Great King”.

After speaking of the reception of this counterfeit Christianity by the Puritan or Wesleyan party of the day, I proceed to describe its acceptableness to the so-called Liberal.

“The form of doctrine, which I have called the Religion of the Day, is especially adapted to please men of sceptical minds, who have never been careful to obey their conscience, who cultivate the intellect without disciplining the heart, and who allow themselves to speculate freely about what Religion *ought* to be, without going to Scripture to discover what it really is. Some persons of this character almost consider Religion itself to be an obstacle in the advance of our social and political well-being. But they know that human nature requires it; therefore they select the most rational form of Religion (so they call it) which they can devise. Others are far more seriously disposed, but are corrupted by bad example

or other cause. But they all discard what they call gloomy views in religion: they all trust themselves more than God's word; and thus may be classed together; and are ready to embrace the pleasant, consoling religion, natural to a polished age. They lay much stress on works on Natural Theology, and think that all religion is contained in these; whereas, in truth, there is no greater fallacy than to suppose such works in themselves, in any true sense, to be religious at all. Religion, it has been well observed, is something relative to us; a system of commands and promises from God towards us. But how are we concerned with the sun, moon, and stars? or with the laws of the universe? how will they teach us our *duty*? how will they speak to *sinner*s? They do not speak to sinners at all. They were created *before* Adam's fall. They 'declare the glory of God', but not His *will*. They are all-perfect, all-harmonious; but that brightness and excellence which they exhibit in their own creation, and the divine benevolence therein seen, are of little moment to fallen man. We see nothing there of God's *wrath*, of which the conscience of the sinner loudly speaks. So that there cannot be a more dangerous, though a common device of Satan, than to carry us off from our secret thoughts, to make us forget our hearts, which tell us of a God of justice and holiness, and to fix our attention merely on the God who made the heavens; who is *our* God indeed, but not God as manifested to us sinners, but as He shines forth to His angels, and to the elect hereafter.

"When a man has so far deceived himself as to trust his destiny to what the heavens tell him of it, instead of consulting and obeying his conscience, what is the consequence? that at once he misinterprets and perverts the whole text of Scripture. . . . We are expressly told that 'strait is the gate and narrow the way that leads to life, and few there be that find it'; that we must 'strive', or struggle, 'to enter in at the strait gate', for that 'many shall *seek* to enter in', but that is not enough; they merely seek, and do not find it; and further, that they who do not obtain everlasting life, 'shall go into everlasting punishment'. This is the dark side of religion; and

the men I have been describing cannot bear to think of it. They shrink from it as too terrible. They easily get themselves to believe that those strong declarations of Scripture do not belong to the present day, or that they are figurative. They have no language within their heart responding to them. Conscience has been silenced. The only information they have received concerning God has been from Natural Theology, and that speaks only of benevolence and harmony; so they will not credit the plain words of Scripture. They seize on such parts of Scripture as seem to countenance their own opinions; they insist on its being commanded us to 'rejoice evermore', and they argue that it is our duty to solace ourselves now (in moderation, of course) with the goods of this life; that we have only to be thankful while we use them; that we need not alarm ourselves; that God is a merciful God; that repentance is quite sufficient to atone for our offences; that, though we have been irregular in our youth, yet that is a thing gone by; that we forget it, and therefore God forgets it; that the world is, on the whole, very well disposed towards Religion; that we should avoid enthusiasm; that we should not be over-serious; that we should have enlarged views on the subject of human nature; and that we should love all men. This indeed is the creed of shallow men, in every age, who reason a little, and feel not at all, and who think themselves enlightened and philosophical. Part of what they say is false, part is true, but misapplied; but why I have noticed it here, is to show how exactly it fits in with what I have already described as the peculiar religion of a civilized age;—it fits in with it equally well as does that of the so-called religious world, which is the opposite extreme”.

THE END.

## WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR:—

1. THE ARIANS OF THE FOURTH CENTURY (NEW EDITION IN PREPARATION).
2. THE CHURCH OF THE FATHERS.  
Rivingtons, London, 1840.
3. ST. ATHANASIUS'S TREATISES AGAINST THE ARIANS, TRANSLATED WITH NOTES.  
Parker, Oxford, 1842.
4. ESSAY ON ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES, PREFIXED TO THE TRANSLATION OF FLEURY'S HISTORY.  
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5. SERMONS PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.  
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7. DISSERTATIUNCULÆ QUÆDAM CRITICO-THEOLOGICÆ.  
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8. DISCOURSES ADDRESSED TO MIXED CONGREGATIONS.  
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9. LECTURES ON CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES FELT BY ANGLICANS IN SUBMITTING TO THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.  
Burns and Lambert, London, 1850.
10. LECTURES ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF CATHOLICS IN ENGLAND, ADDRESSED TO THE BROTHERS OF THE ORATORY.  
Burns and Lambert, London, 1851.

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Some of the works which come first in the above list, being published when the Author was a Protestant, are hereby submitted by him in all respects to the judgment of the Catholic Church.

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