



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330113

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

13 January 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000178DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Tariq Ali Abdallah Ahmad Ba'Awadha
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Tariq Ali Abdallah Ahmad Ba Awdah, Abu Ziad, Ziyad al-Yemeni
- Place of Birth: Shabwah, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1978
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000178DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 9 January 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist and possible member of al-Qaida. Detainee served as a fighter in Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade, and participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in UBL's Tora Bora Mountain complex where he probably manned a mortar position. Detainee is reported as being an important man with close ties to senior al-Qaida members including UBL. Detainee admitted using the Jama'at al-Tablighi as a cover for international travel to Afghanistan (AF) to receive militant training to fight jihad. Detainee acknowledged

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330113

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receiving basic militant training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp and is assessed to have received advanced artillery training. Detainee occupied al-Qaida guesthouses in Afghanistan. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation.

- Updated assessment indicating detainee was a member of UBL's 55th Arab Brigade and possibly a member of al-Qaida

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: When detainee was two years old, his family moved from Shabwah, YM to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (SA), where his family currently resides. Detainee completed three years of secondary school at the al-Faysal Madrassa, but did not graduate.¹ After leaving school, detainee worked for a firm named the Manara Company in Jeddah handing out product samples.² Detainee had no prior military experience and no prior weapons training. At the age of 20, detainee obtained a Yemeni passport issued from the Yemen Embassy in Saudi Arabia. Detainee traveled back to Yemen for one month to preach with members of al-Dawa, an Islamic preaching group.³ In Yemen, detainee traveled to al-Hudaydah, Taiz, Aden, Sanaa, and Shabwah. During his trip, detainee visited his sister and members of his tribe. This trip occurred after the 12 October 2000 bombing of the USS COLE, which detainee learned about on television.⁴

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Television programs commonly reported on jihadist training camps in Afghanistan due to the Soviet invasion of that country. In June 2001, after detainee watched videos about the plight of Muslims in Chechnya, detainee planned to travel

¹ 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), Analyst Note: Detainee noted he was arrested twice: once for assault (he struck the son of the director of al-Faysal), and another for running a red light.

² 000178 KB 12-FEB-2002, TD-314/00296-02, Analyst Note: Manara Company produced milk.

³ Analyst Note: In TD-314/00296-02, paragraph L, detainee alternately identified Tablighi Centers. In TD-314/00296-02, detainee's Yemeni passport, number 0929422, was issued 19 April 1998, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This date confirms detainee statement that he was issued a passport at age 20.

⁴ IIR 6 034 0747 02, 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2)

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to Afghanistan for two months training and then to Chechnya for jihad, and saved approximately 3,000 Saudi riyals from work. Detainee asked his parents for their permission to travel to Afghanistan for training but they refused. Afterwards, detainee told his parents he was going to Jordan (JO) with the al-Dawa group, and his parents agreed. Three days before detainee departed, he obtained a visa from the Pakistani embassy in Jeddah.⁵ Detainee took a bus to Amman, JO and stayed for a week with the al-Dawa group to proselytize Wahabi Islam.⁶ Detainee then purchased an airline ticket to Karachi, Pakistan (PK), where he stayed for two weeks.⁷ In Karachi or Quetta, PK, detainee met Hamman al-Taifi, who assisted detainee in crossing the border into Afghanistan and on to a guesthouse in Kandahar, AF. The guesthouse housed approximately sixteen Arabs. A Yemeni named Abu Maath operated the house assisted by another named Abu Khalid.⁸ Abu Maath and Abu-Khalid arranged for buses to transport up to sixty fighters to the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq Training Camp.⁹

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: In August 2001, detainee and about sixty others boarded two large buses and traveled three hours to the al-Faruq Training Camp outside of Kandahar. At the camp, detainee received training on the AK-47 assault rifle and a pistol.¹⁰ Juhaynah and a Saudi named Awais were the firearms instructors.¹¹ After a month of training, everyone at al-Faruq was suddenly told the training was being stopped and they were all to return to a guesthouse. Detainee heard about the 11 September 2001 attacks on the radio and heard the US blamed UBL for the attacks.¹² Everyone at the camp left because they believed the camp would be bombed in retaliation.¹³ Detainee tried to leave Afghanistan and go home but was told the borders to Afghanistan were closed and he would be arrested if he tried to cross. Detainee traveled with a group from the guesthouse to Kabul. The group was sent to the front lines, without weapons, to a place called Omar Sayf, which

⁵ IIR 6 034 0747 02, 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2)

⁶ TD-314/00296-02

⁷ IIR 6 034 0747 02, 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), Analyst Note: Detainee's overall travel timeline is supported by entrance and exit stamps found in his passport. See 000178 Passport (08 of 12) 09-AUG-2002, 000178 Passport (07 of 12) 09-AUG-2002, and 000178 Passport (05 of 12) 09-AUG-2002

⁸ IIR 6 034 0026 02, 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02, Analyst Note: Variants of Taifi include Tayfe and Tayiffi. Abu Maath, variant (Moad), is possibly Abu Muath al-Yemeni, a known al-Qaida recruiter operating in Yemen who frequented guesthouses with his recruits. Walid Said Bin Said Zaid, US9YM-000550DP (YM-550) identified Abu Khalid as possibly Khalid Abu Hafis, an associate of Saqr Abu al-Feda aka (Saqr al-Jihad) who ran the al-Nibras Guesthouse.

⁹ IIR 6 034 0026 02

¹⁰ 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02

¹¹ 000178 KB 12-FEB-2002, 000178 INITIAL SCREENING 01-JAN-2002, IIR 2 340 6167 02, 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02, Analyst Note: Variants of Awais include Uways, Oueiss, and al-Wayseen. Variants of Juhaynah include Juhaynah, Jahenah and Juhena.

¹² 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02

¹³ IIR 2 340 6167 02

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was the third defensive line against the Northern Alliance.¹⁴ While at Omar Sayf, detainee learned the front lines had been overrun when he saw the Afghans retreating in trucks. Detainee and some others fled to Jalalabad, AF, where he met Saudi national Abu Muhjin al-Taifi at the market.¹⁵ Detainee's group followed al-Taifi to UBL's Tora Bora Mountain complex, where they stayed for approximately one month during Ramadan near Sanzur Mountain.¹⁶ Detainee and his group armed themselves with AK-47s that were issued in Jalalabad and procured additional AK-47's that were left behind by others who had been there prior to detainee's arrival.¹⁷

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee's account of events indicates he fled Afghanistan with a large group of al-Qaida and Taliban fighters led by UBL appointed military commander in Tora Bora, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212). The group crossed the Afghani-Pakistani border in the Nangarhar region in mid-December 2001.¹⁸ Detainee claimed after approximately one month in the defensive positions at Tora Bora, he and his group followed other unidentified people to Pakistan. They walked for one day in the snow toward the border where they all dropped their weapons before crossing. When they crossed the border, the Pakistani Army was waiting to arrest them. The Pakistani authorities separated detainee from the group and took him to a clinic for a foot injury, possibly frostbite, and then moved him to a prison where he stayed for approximately six weeks. After six weeks, detainee was transported to the Kandahar prison operated by US forces.¹⁹ Pakistani forces transferred detainee from Kohat, PK, to US custody at the Kandahar Detention Facility on 31 December 2001.²⁰

b. (S) Property Held:

- One \$100 US note
- Yemeni passport

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 9 February 2002

¹⁴ Analyst Note: The Omar Sayf *Markez* (center, position, camp), variant (Saif), was a unit of UBL's 55th Arab Brigade.

¹⁵ Analyst Note: Variants of Muhjin include Mahjin, Mahjan and Muhjan. See TD 314/33185-03, IIR 6 034 0564 03, and IIR 2 340 6340 02.

¹⁶ Analyst Note: Ramadan occurred 17 November to 16 December 2001.

¹⁷ 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02, IIR 2 340 6110 02

¹⁸ Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis, DAB Association of Names to 195 Detainees 29-Dec-2006

¹⁹ 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02

²⁰ TD-314/00845-02

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d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Air defense equipment at Mt. Saznur in Tora Bora
- Training at al-Faruq camp in Kandahar
- Al-Qaida recruiting efforts in Saudi Arabia

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's account parallels that of many young Yemeni men who traveled to Afghanistan for jihad. Detainee's passport seems to corroborate his timeline up to his arrival in Pakistan, but it also is assessed to have been falsified to some extent. Initially, detainee was somewhat forthcoming with his reasons for travel and training in Afghanistan, as well as his activities on the front lines, but has since withheld information of intelligence value. Detainee has also provided inconsistencies such as being born in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Another example is detainee's stay at a guesthouse with only 16 other Arabs, yet the management of the guesthouse arranged for busses to take up to 60 fighters to the training camps from the guesthouse. Detainee acknowledges receiving limited basic training, but is assessed to possess advanced militant skills and has been associated with senior al-Qaida members.²¹

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist and possible member of al-Qaida. Detainee has close ties to high-level al-Qaida members predating his mid-2001 Afghanistan travels. Detainee acknowledged receiving basic militant training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp and is assessed to have received advanced artillery training. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces as a fighter in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade at Bagram and as an al-Qaida fighter in Tora Bora probably assigned to a mortar position. Detainee occupied al-Qaida guesthouses in Afghanistan and has unexplored associations with other extremists.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist and possible member of al-Qaida with close ties to senior al-Qaida members including UBL.
 - (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged using the JT as a cover for his international travels. Detainee stated he visited JT centers in Hudaydah and Taiz, YM. Detainee

²¹ TD-314/30454-02, IIR 6 034 0026 02, Analyst Note: When captured, both detainee and ISN 184 provided the same cover story and personal name. This was possibly due to an administrative error, though an extended association between the two can not be ruled out.

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- admitted he traveled to Afghanistan to receive training and participate in jihad.²² (Analyst Note: Affiliation with the JT, a proselytizing organization, has been identified as an al-Qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members. Detainee's exact relationship with al-Qaida is undetermined. Detainee's travel through Jordan is consistent with other Yemeni detainees who acknowledge an association with the JT in Hudaydah, YM.)²³
- (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), identified detainee as an important man who was very loyal to UBL and had met with UBL on numerous occasions.
 - (S//NF) Affixed to the back cover of detainee's passport was a sticker for the M. Bin Laden Company. Such stickers indicate the passport holder is a foreign guest worker employed by the company in Saudi Arabia. The company normally holds employee's passport when the employee is not traveling. (Analyst Note: YM-252 did not specify if detainee met UBL in Afghanistan or through possible employment activities with the company.)
 - (S//NF) YM-252 stated detainee was close to Bin Attash who provided detainee with money and supplies enabling him to travel to Afghanistan.²⁴ (Analyst Note: Bin Attash is most probably senior UBL lieutenant Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014). YM-252's statements indicate detainee had a relationship with YM-10014 preceding his travel to Afghanistan.)
 - (S//NF) YM-252 stated detainee was accompanied by his two cousins, Ali al-Kazimi and Muhammad Ba Awdah, in Afghanistan.²⁵ (Analyst Note: Ali al-Kazimi is assessed to be admitted al-Qaida member and UBL bodyguard Sanad Ali Yislam al-Kazimi, aka (Abu Ali al-Kazimi), ISN US9YM-001453DP.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted receiving militant training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp and is assessed to have received advanced training.
 - (S//NF) Detainee trained on small arms, including the AK-47 and an unidentified pistol.²⁶ Detainee's trainers at al-Faruq were two Saudis named Awas and Ali Mahmoud.²⁷ Detainee also had a Yemeni trainer named Juhaynah.²⁸

²² IIR 6 034 0747 02, 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), TD-314/00296-02, Analyst Note: The JT is a NIPF Priority 2A Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs have demonstrated the intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide willing operational support to Priority 2A terrorist groups.

²³ For additional information see: IIR 2 227 0131 03, Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 20051228, JITFCT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh, AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tabligh 27-OCT-2004, Jamaat Al Tabligh (JT) Members - TRRS-04-03-1083 10-MAR-2004

²⁴ 000252 SIR 14-Oct-2004

²⁵ 000252 SIR 14-OCT-2004, 000252 SIR 19-OCT-2004, IIR 6 034 0138 02, Analyst Note: A variant of Kazimi is Qassimi.

²⁶ 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02

²⁷ 000178 INITIAL SCREENING 01-JAN-2002, TD-314/00296-02

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- (S//NF) Other JTF-GTMO detainee's have corroborated aspects of detainee's account including identification of Saudi National Awais al-Karni as a trainer at al-Faruq and a leader for the group of trainees after al-Faruq was evacuated.²⁹
- (S//NF) Other JTF-GTMO detainees have identified Juhaynah, aka (Abu Ayoub al-Emirati), aka (Saba al-Lail), was a Yemeni trainer at al-Faruq who was also in charge of the rear echelon of the Arab defenders in Tora Bora where he died.³⁰
- (S//NF) YM-252 stated detainee was an important fighter with knowledge in the use of anti-aircraft weaponry and 120mm howitzers.³¹ (Analyst Note: Anti-aircraft training was considered an advanced militant training course. Detainee only admits to one month of training in 2001 on light weapons and physical training. Detainee's passport shows a gap of approximately five months from the time detainee departed Yemen in January 2001 until 9 May 2001, when there is a re-entry stamp to Saudi Arabia. Detainee probably received initial basic training during this timeframe, and then he returned home before returning to Afghanistan in July 2001. Additionally, the first six pages of detainee's passport were removed and replaced with the pages currently found in it.³²)
- (S//NF) Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces as a fighter in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade at Bagram and as an al-Qaida fighter in Tora Bora probably assigned to a mortar position.³³
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted occupying the Omar Sayf Center on the front lines near Kabul following the 11 September 2001 attacks, until withdrawing to Jalalabad in November 2001.³⁴
 - (S//NF) Detainee also admitted occupying a position on Saznur Mountain at Tora Bora. Detainee was part of a group of 12 Arabs which occupied these positions between November and December 2001. Detainee stated the group was armed with AK-47s which they had been issued in Jalalabad.³⁵ Detainee accompanied al-Qaida

²⁸ 000178 KB 12-FEB-2002, IIR 2 340 6167 02, 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02, IIR 6 034 0131 02, TD-314/00296-02

²⁹ IIR 6 034 1067 04, TD-314/00296-02

³⁰ IIR 6 034 0508 03, TD-314/00296-02, IIR 6 034 0142 02, IIR 6 034 1300 03, IIR 6 034 1361 03

³¹ 000252 SIR 14-OCT-2004

³² >CIR 316/06079-05

³³ The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBL's primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. Nashwan Abd Al-Razzaq Abd Al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), had primary operational command of the 55th Arab Brigade, serving as UBL's military commander in the field

³⁴ IIR 6 034 0913 03, IIR 6 034 0747 02, 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2)

³⁵ IIR 2 340 6110 02

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- operative Abu Muhjin al-Taifi to the Tora Bora Mountains.³⁶ Detainee also reported Abu Yahya al-Masri was one of detainee's commanders in Tora Bora.³⁷
- (S//NF) According to al-Qaida lieutenant Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016 (GZ-10016), Abu Yahya al-Masri, aka (Abu Yahya al-Hawn), aka (The Mortar), was a Khaldan Camp specialist in the use of mortars.³⁸ (Analyst Note: Detainee's advanced training in 120mm howitzers and anti-aircraft weaponry, coupled with the fact that detainee's commander was a mortar specialist, indicates detainee's unit was probably a mortar squad located at the Abu Yahya al-Masri Center, aka (Muthanna Sector), in Tora Bora.)
 - (S//NF) Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Awn al-Shamrani, ISN US9SA-000195DP (SA-195), stated Abu Yahya al-Masri was an excellent field commander who received large numbers of incoming calls on his ICOM radio, including calls from UBL.³⁹
 - (S//NF) Other detainees probably assigned to the Abu Yahya al-Masri Center include Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Abid al-Haythani al-Qurash, ISN US9SA-000214DP,⁴⁰ and Fahd Salih Sulayman al-Jutayli, ISN US9SA-000177DP (transferred).⁴¹
 - (S//NF) YM-252 recognized detainee as a Yemeni from Saudi Arabia who was at Tora Bora and Bagram, AF.⁴²
 - (S//NF) Detainee stayed at al-Qaida sponsored guesthouses.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted staying at the Arab guesthouse in Kandahar and stated it was run by Abu Khalid. (Analyst Note: Abu Khalid is assessed to be Abu Khalid al-Yemeni, aka (Ibrahim Muhammad Abd al-Razzaq Ba Alawi). The Arab guesthouse is assessed to be the al-Qaida al-Ansar Guesthouse.⁴³ This guesthouse was utilized as a stopover for Arabs before and after training at al-Faruq.⁴⁴)
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted he stayed at two other guesthouses. After detainee and his group departed the first guesthouse from al-Faruq, they moved to another unidentified guesthouse and stayed for one to two days. The group traveled to Kabul, where they stayed for an additional two days at another unidentified guesthouse.⁴⁵ (Analyst Note: Due to similarities in stories with Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah, ISN

³⁶ TD-314/00296-02, 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02, IIR 5 391 0001 02

³⁷ TD-314/00296-02

³⁸ TD-314/46587-02, TD-314/57927-04

³⁹ TD-314/27852-02

⁴⁰ 000252 FM40 15-MAR-2005, IIR 2 340 6110 02

⁴¹ 000177 302 14-APR-2002

⁴² IIR 6 034 1014 03

⁴³ 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2), IIR 6 034 0747 02, IIR 6 034 0026 02, 001457 FM40 15-JUN-2004

⁴⁴ IIR 2 340 6317 02

⁴⁵ 000178 302 19-APR-2002 (Part 2)

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US9YM-000837DP (YM-837), it is possible the guesthouse in Kabul is the Dar al-Aman guesthouse. Dar al-Aman was a waypoint for trained mujahideen en-route to the front lines.)

- (S//NF) Analyst Note: Despite acknowledging occupying al-Qaida guesthouses at approximately the same time as other detainees, detainee's name is not included on al-Qaida guesthouse rosters indicating the use of another as of yet undisclosed alias.
- (S//NF) Detainee identified Shaykh Hamoud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi as a recruiter for al-Qaida.⁴⁶ (Analyst Note: Shaykh Hamoud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi and his fatwas were instrumental in the recruitment of numerous JTF-GTMO detainees. Al-Shuaibi is now deceased. Detainee can probably provide additional information on al-Qaida recruitment.)
- (S//NF) Abd al-Rahman Maadha Dhafir al-Hilala al-Umari's, ISN US9SA-000199DP (SA-199), pocket litter contained detainee's name, associated with the phone number 0096626743604.⁴⁷ (Analyst Note: The relationship between detainee and SA-199 is not known at this time, and warrants further investigation)
- (S//NF) Abu Ziad (possibly detainee) met Abdallah Muhammad Abd al-Aziz, ISN US9SA-000206 (SA-206, transferred), at a guesthouse in Kabul prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks. Abu Ziad drove SA-206 to a training camp just outside of Kabul and then introduced SA-206 to Abd al-Salam.⁴⁸ (Analyst Note: Abd al-Salam is assessed to be deceased Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami, a sub-commander for IZ-10026. The training camp is assessed to be the Malik Camp which provided anti-aircraft training and was located 20 minutes north of Kabul.)

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been noncompliant and hostile towards the guard force and staff. He currently has 81 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 13 November 2007, when he sprayed a mixture of feces, urine, and water from his water bottle out of his cell. He has 27 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 19 September 2007, when he spit on a guard. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, threatening guards, provoking words and gestures, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to government property, unauthorized communications and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. He is currently in voluntary total fast status since 07 January 2007, refusing 1,065 consecutive meals. In 2006, he had a total of nine Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and fourteen in 2007.

⁴⁶ 000178 KB 12-FEB-2002

⁴⁷ IIR 6 034 0353 06

⁴⁸ 000206 302 06-APR-2002, See IIR 6 034 0913 03 and IIR 2 340 6400 02 for more information.

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8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 11 October 2007.

b. (S/NF) Placement and Access: Detainee is reportedly associated with multiple al-Qaida members, to include a familial tie. Detainee has knowledge of several high-ranking al-Qaida members and has traveled with several UBL bodyguards. Detainee is assessed to have obtained advanced training in anti-aircraft weaponry and mortars, and participated as a fighter in a mortar squad. Detainee's passport and other sources confirm his placement in al-Faruq a month prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee spent time at the Omar Sayf Center outside of Kabul before Coalition bombing spurred a mass exodus of Arab fighters to Tora Bora.


c. (S/NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee can provide information on the JT. Detainee can probably provide information on the recruitment of members into UBL's bodyguard force. Detainee should be able to provide information on the front lines, training camps, and guesthouses.

d. (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida recruitment, training camps and courses, personnel, missions, and logistics
- JT and extremist facilitation in Saudi Arabia and Yemen
- Other JTF-GTMO detainees, activities, and associates
- False travel documents
- Terrorist biographical/psychological information
- Terrorist operations in CENTCOM AOR

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 5 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

v/12,



MARK H. BUZBY
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.