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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

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DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

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JAN - 9 1948

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FROM: Moscow
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 47, January 9, 6 p.m.

Control 2321 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd January 9, 1948
1:50 p.m.

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 9 1948
DIRECTOR
Department of State

Today's IZVESTIYA article entitled "Fruits MacArthur's Policy" is third on Japanese Soviet press past two days. Author's thesis is that US encouraged economic collapse Japan in order secure pretext suppress democratic movement and carry out American expansionist policy converting Japan into US advance post Far East. America deliberately keeping Japs' food supply to level one-half that of Americans on "fascist race theory", that Japanese smaller therefore consume less, Japan being financially enslaved by US and denied opportunity economic independence. Socialists in control present government have completely surrendered to "reactionary democrats" and lost all support masses.

Although this line not new indicates intensified efforts Soviet propagandists exploit to maximum economic difficulties food shortages Japan trying place all blame directly on US and thereby win supporters among discontented Japanese public. By plugging line US ignores FEC and ACJ, Soviets absolve selves all responsibility.

SMITH

LMS:EJF

FEB 3 1948

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894.00/1-948



THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED JAN 27 1948 American Embassy London, January 12 1948 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIR MAIL

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 75

Subject: Transmitting Times Editorial on Japan

23 MAR 9 1948 DIVISION OF GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

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JAN 21 PM 3 21

The Honorable Secretary of State, Washington

Sir:

In reference to paragraph numbered (8) of Thames Cable No. 320, January 2, 1948, transmitting significant excerpts from a Times editorial of January 2, 1948, on the subject "New and Old Japan", I have the honor to enclose a clipping of the entire editorial for the information and records of the Department.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:

Signature of Everett F. Drumright, First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: Clipping, as stated

- Original and 4 copies to the Department
- Copy to U.S. Political Adviser, SCAP, Tokyo
- Copy to Embassy, Moscow
- Copy to Embassy, Nanking

EFDrumright/wg

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FEB 25 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 30 1948

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 3 1948 OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION

A school chapel. A fund has also been created.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 75 of Jan 12, 1948
from the Embassy at London, England.

PAPER: THE TIMES.

NUMBER:

CITY: LONDON

DATE:

JAN - 2 1948

NEW AND OLD JAPAN

The passage of the economic decentralization Bill through the Japanese Diet marks an important stage in the achievement of GENERAL MACARTHUR'S plans for freeing the economic as well as the political structure of Japanese society from the grip of reactionary elements. The Bill is intended to break the power concentrated in the hands of the Zaibatsu. As a message from our Tokyo Correspondent shows, it was opposed from widely differing motives by several Japanese political groups who resisted it with as much strength as they have dared to show against any measure pressed upon the Cabinet by the Supreme Allied Command. An unexpected complication was caused by the leakage in Washington of the confidential policy document known as F.E.C. 230 upon which the Bill was based. That document suggested that the break-up of great industrial combines might be followed by the sale of their constituent enterprises to trade unions, among other possible recipients, and this started a scare in the United States that GENERAL MACARTHUR was aiming at the socialization of Japanese industry and playing into the hands of the small Communist Party now firmly entrenched in certain Japanese trade unions.

This was a complete misrepresentation of the policy of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER—F.E.C. 230 was, in fact, prepared by the State Department, which has no sympathy with Communists—but the hubbub in Washington, which led to the temporary withdrawal of F.E.C. 230, caused GENERAL MACARTHUR to order the Bill to be held up in the committee stage of the Japanese House of Councilors until he had received further instructions. Moreover, the opposition of Japanese big business interests, as well as of the political parties, was greatly encouraged. Fortunately the Government of the United States realized the importance of the issues at stake, and before the end of the first parliamentary session held under the new Japanese constitution GENERAL MACARTHUR received official authorization to proceed with the Bill with insignificant amendments. It has now passed into law.

The political and economic measures, of which GENERAL MACARTHUR is the principal author, are heartily disliked by the classes accustomed to monopolize power in Japan. Much evidence has recently come to light showing that they are waiting patiently for a chance of regaining their old authority. A "top secret" document clandestinely obtained from the Japanese Foreign Ministry and published in the United States clearly reveals the plans of the governing classes for making light of any restrictions upon Japanese sovereignty imposed by the peace treaty. GENERAL TOJO'S obstinate defence of Japanese aggression before the War Crimes Tribunal as simple national self-defence shows that the ruling clique in Japan is unrepentant. But the new Bill

is a formidable blow at the economic power of certain families which have hitherto furnished funds for the manipulation and corruption of Japanese political life. Conservative elements in Japan have relied upon these funds to build up an "invisible Government" pledged to overthrow democratic institutions when the allied occupation ends. Now they will find themselves much handicapped by lack of financial support, and the economic life of the country will be freed from the stranglehold of monopolies. Although the Japanese Government may be expected to pursue its usual tactics of overt obedience and covert obstruction, it will be powerless to prevent the allied liquidation commission from destroying the influence of one of the main forces now striving to restore the domination of "Old Japan." The result may be a lasting change in the structure of Japanese economy.

All this is particularly important in view of the growing disposition of the allies to make a definitive peace with Japan. As the Canberra conference showed the nations of the Commonwealth agree with the United States that the interests of the allies, as well as of Japan herself, will be best served by bringing the allied occupation to an end as soon as possible. Now that commercial intercourse between Japan and the outside world, including the sterling area, has begun again the indefinite continuation of allied supervision in its present form might hinder rather than help economic recovery. The progressive elements which the new democratic institutions are bringing into prominence in Japan will suffer in popularity if they are indefinitely identified in the eyes of the people with the presence of foreign occupation forces.

This does not mean that reaction will be allowed a free hand when peace is made. The design for a peace treaty foreshadowed at Canberra—a design which GENERAL MACARTHUR is known to endorse—contemplates a dual procedure for ensuring that democracy strikes root in Japanese soil. In the first place, the treaty would bind the Japanese Government to accept in perpetuity not only the general provisions for the restraint of future aggression laid down at Potsdam but also the specific measures of political and economic reform introduced in the course of the allied occupation. Thus the maintenance of the democratic framework now set up will be among the specific obligations of the Japanese Government. Secondly, there will have to be some allied machinery for supervising the fulfilment of these obligations for at least a generation. This machinery could most conveniently be provided by the Ambassadors of the eleven nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission. The Commission's

secretariat might be transferred to Japan as the instrument of the new allied control. The duration of the system beyond the initial period of two or three decades would depend entirely upon the progress made by the Japanese people towards real democracy and a peaceful outlook. No Japanese Government should exercise unrestricted control over national affairs so long as there is any prospect of the old reactionary force regaining influence. A peace settlement upon these lines should have the support of all the allies, but the allies are not agreed on the procedure to be adopted in making the peace. The Soviet Government still insists that the first steps should be taken by the Foreign Ministers' Council, while the countries of the Commonwealth and the United States prefer a conference of all the nations concerned. Certainly recent experience in London does not suggest that the urgent need for a settlement can be met by the Russian proposal.

INCOMING AIRGRAM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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AIRGRAM

File JAN 28 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM: American Embassy
Moscow, U. S. S. R.

Date of Mailing: January 16, 1948

Rec'd: Jan 27. 1948

9:44 AM

UNCLASSIFIED

Secretary of State,

Washington.

A-66, January 16, 1948

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 28 1948
DIRECTOR
Department of State

Soviet press recently carried following articles on Japan:

Red Fleet, January 6, "American Policy in Japan," avers that U.S. has partially abandoned original policy of issuing directives intended to pay formal obeisance to provisions of Potsdam declaration in favor of policy of protecting reactionary policy of Japanese authorities themselves. Claiming that CP numbers more than 100,000 members and wields great influence in trade unions, article asserts that "the upsurge of the democratic movement . . . caused fear not only among the Japanese exploiting classes . . . but also among the American occupation authorities."

Attempting to eat the cake and have it, too, article claims that the victory of the Socialist Party in April 1947 "reflected the significant trend to the Left" and yet "the coming to power of a government headed by the Right-Wing Socialist Katayama changed nothing."

Article further complains that U.S. has consolidated the monarchist regime, has admitted that militarists and leading government figures, etc., who had been purged are continuing to take part in government life behind the scenes, that thousands of other war criminals are occupying government posts and that "not one representative of the big monopolies has been brought to justice." Repeating the familiar charges that land reform has been sabotaged and that American authorities are conniving with Japanese

capitalists

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Moscow, U. S. S. R.
January 16, 1948
A-66

capitalists in economic sabotage, the article boldly concludes:

"The American imperialists are trying in every way to realize the plans of establishing their world domination. Japan occupies a prominent place in these plans. The Americans have converted Japan into their colony, into a patrimony of American monopolist capital. This allows them to build without hindrance places d'armes on the Japanese islands against the Soviet Union and those countries of Asia which have risen to fight for liberty and independence against the forces of imperialism and reaction.

"American policy in Japan is causing great anxiety in the democratic and anti-imperialist camp. This policy will lead to the conversion of Japan into a new cockpit of reaction and military danger in the Far East. In this lies a serious threat to world peace and security of peoples."

Pravda, January 7, "Fascions of Japanese Parliamentarians," ridicules efforts of Japanese to imitate Western democratic practices, alleging that they are successful only in adapting themselves to the Western methods of gangsterism and bribery. Article complains further that "130,000 Japanese police supported by American armored cars are preserving 'democratic liberties,' . . . Katayama forgetting the fight with inflation has plunged into an anti-Communist campaign" and that while people are dying from hunger, swindlers and speculators are multiplying.

Isvestia, January 9, elaborates same themes in a lengthy article entitled "The 'Fruits' of MacArthur's Policy" and emphasizes the inflation and economic chaos in Japan, concluding: "Events have shown, however, that the reactionary policy of MacArthur, which seeks to turn the history of Japan backward, inevitably bears rotten fruit both in economics and in politics."

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

JAN 28 1948
American Embassy
London, January 16, 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIR MAIL

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No. 113

Subject: Transmitting Third Article from Daily Telegraph on Japan

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 23 AM 9 27
1948

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The Honorable
Secretary of State,
Washington

Sir:

1. In reference to the Embassy's despatches Nos. 2956, December 23, 1947, and 2990, December 30, 1947; transmitting articles from the Daily Telegraph on Japan, I have the honor now to transmit a third and concluding article on the subject.

2. In the present article Mr. Muggeridge discusses the position of the Emperor in relation to the war and the occupation.

3. Mr. Muggeridge concludes from his observations that "it is probable that most Japanese still regard the Emperor as a god to be worshipped rather than a man to be obeyed."

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:

Everett F. Drumright
Everett F. Drumright
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: *att*
Copy of article, as stated

(Original and hectograph to the Department)
Copy to U.S. Political Adviser, SCAP, Tokyo
Copy to Embassy, Nanking
Copy to Embassy, Moscow

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 113 dated January 16, 1948,
from American Embassy, London, England.

Source: Daily Telegraph

January 15, 1948

WITH THE EMPEROR IN THE RUINS OF HIROSHIMA

Malcolm Muggeridge

HIROSHIMA (delayed)

When American bombers began to go over Tokyo they deliberately refrained from attacking the Imperial Palace. The consequence was that at the time of Japan's defeat the Emperor's residence stood intact in the midst of a largely ruined capital.

Hardly true

Its pleasant gardens and shady groves were unscarred by the war which had just ended so disastrously for Japan. The Emperor himself and his household could await the conqueror's coming without physical discomfort, whatever agonies of spirit they may have suffered.

This represented, of course, a deliberate policy, decided on by the Allies before Japan's surrender, of maintaining the monarchy and thereby preventing the total administrative breakdown which was otherwise to be expected.

As long as the Emperor remained, it was felt, orders would continue to be obeyed. Discipline in the armed forces and Civil Service would be maintained, and it would be possible to refashion the Japanese State without totally disrupting it.

MILLION ALLIED LIVES WERE SAVED

No aspect of Gen. MacArthur's policy has been more criticised than the decision to keep the Emperor on his throne, though with greatly reduced status and with his powers those of a constitutional Sovereign.

As the former supreme head of the Japanese State, in whose name Japan prepared for and ruthlessly pursued a policy of military aggression, it is argued, his place is in the dock with the other war criminals rather than in the palace of his ancestors. In allotting responsibility for war crimes, how is it possible to avoid implicating the Emperor on whose behalf, at any rate ostensibly, they were committed?

When I asked Gen. Robertson, the energetic and exceedingly competent Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan, what he thought about the decision to treat with the Emperor, thereby

recognising/

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Page 2.

recognising him as spokesman of the Japanese people, he said that probably as many as a million Allied lives were at stake.

At the time of the armistice, he pointed out, there were 46 Japanese divisions actually in Japan to defend the country against invasion, and subsequent surveys had shown beyond a shadow of doubt that to achieve landings in accordance with Allied invasion plans would have proved appallingly costly in life.

SYMBOL THE JAPANESE MISCONSTRUED

It was only because the order to cease fire came from the Emperor that it was obeyed and that Allied forces were able to land in Japan practically without bloodshed.

Thus on two counts, both weighty, the decision to maintain the Emperor on his throne can be justified-- that otherwise there would have been heavy Allied losses in effecting a landing in Japan and a total administrative breakdown after one had been effected.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that it is difficult to discredit a régime when its titular head, its very symbol in the eyes of the Japanese population, continues to be accorded recognition by the occupying forces.

Moreover, the Japanese are prone, somewhat ominously, to claim that, since they did not surrender unconditionally, they cannot be said to have been defeated in battle.

Their surrender, they say, was contingent on the Allies accepting the Emperor as head and mouthpiece of the nation, who could not be held responsible for the deeds of mere Governments, even though their authority was derived from him. It is not difficult to see how such a concept could easily lend itself to the kind of myth which provided the mystique for German rearmament and revenge after the 1914-18 war.

ACCLAIMING THE ROYAL TOURIST

If the Emperor still remains on his throne his situation is vastly different from what it was before Gen. MacArthur came to Tokyo. From being a god upon whom his subjects were not even permitted under pain of death to cast their eyes he has become a man whose voice and features are increasingly familiar to the Japanese people.

Awed and silent adoration has given place to popular applause. He has emerged from the seclusion of the Imperial Palace, if not to mix with the populace, at any rate to be seen and heard by them.

From time/

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Page 3.

From time to time now he goes on tour, travelling in a special train with a retinue of court officials, all attired in black cut-away coats and wearing tiny chrysanthemums, symbol of the Royal House, in their button-holes.

Wherever the Emperor goes he is enthusiastically acclaimed. For hours before the Royal train is due his subjects line the railway track along which it will pass.

Peasants are as eager as officials to get a glimpse of their Sovereign; schoolchildren shout "Banzai!" and jump and clap their hands at his approach. Buildings which he visits are frenziedly cleaned and restored, and whole districts receive a spring cleaning in preparation for his coming.

WHERE THE ATOM BOMB HAD FALLEN

I have been one of the onlookers during a visit the Emperor has just been paying to Hiroshima. He arrived by launch at a point about 25 miles from the city and drove into it between dense crowds all the way. I was in a car immediately behind his own.

Shouts greeted him invariably, and some as they saw him wept, but the whole effect has been strange rather than exciting. It might have been a curiously conceived ballet rather than a popular demonstration.

The Emperor's day was meticulously planned. A printed schedule had indicated that two minutes were to be allowed for him to "step out to greet orphans of Hiroshima War Orphanage," and five minutes to "receiving citizens' hail." Later, three minutes were spared for "inspection on the way of ploughing by cow," and another three minutes for "inspecting rural life."

At Hiroshima itself, once a city with a population of about 400,000, a wooden platform had been erected as near as possible to the actual point on which the atom bomb fell little short of two-and-a-half years ago, and here at least 20,000 people had collected. They gave the Emperor a great ovation and sang the Japanese national song, "Kimigayo," apparently with deep feeling.

He told them in a speech read from a scrap of paper he pulled awkwardly from his pocket that he regretted the sacrifices they had been called on to make, but that he confidently expected they would work hard in order that these sacrifices should not have been made in vain.

The Emperor was then conducted to the roof of the partially restored town hall, almost the only building in Hiroshima of more than one storey which was left standing after the atom bomb explosion. From this eminence he was shown the extent of the damage and what had been done towards restoring it.

On the/

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Page 4.

On the ground it is difficult to realise how vast was the destruction wrought because of the many wooden buildings which have been run up since the war ended, but from above it is still apparent that the atom bomb did indeed lay waste the whole city. Deaths from the bomb are now estimated to have been around 80,000.

Among the faces of those who turned out to welcome the Emperor were some disfigured by terrible burns, but these were rare. The worst cases are still being treated in Hiroshima Red Cross Hospital. Perhaps significantly this institution has not been included in the Emperor's itinerary.

NERVOUS MAN WHO LOVES SECLUSION

In all the ceremonies and demonstrations connected with the Emperor's visit one has detected no tendency in any quarter to reproach or blame him for the city's dreadful fate. It would have been the easiest thing in the world to stage a counter-demonstration or even an assassination.

On the contrary, the unanimity of feeling among the people has been striking. They seemed to derive immense satisfaction from the Emperor's mere presence among them, and have surged round him not with the idea of touching him but to sense his physical proximity.

He is a short, nervous man whose features frequently twitch and whose eyelids lower from time to time as though the effort of holding them open for long at a stretch is beyond his powers. Though the war has been over long enough for him to have grown accustomed to leaving the divine seclusion in which he had hitherto spent his days, he still gives an impression of being deafened by the noise and blinded by the light of the everyday world.

He seems always to be shrinking into himself, and probably returns to his palace with relief, there to devote himself quietly to marine biology, which is his single absorbing interest.

STILL REGARDED AS A DEITY

Despite S.C.A.P. directives and Diet resolutions it is probable that most Japanese still regard the Emperor as a god to be worshipped rather than a man to be obeyed. Divinity, being intangible, is more difficult to shed than earthly authority, and though to the outward eye he is only a nervous little man in a black suit who, on all public appearances, repeatedly raises his homburg hat, his subjects see in him a deity particularly concerned with their welfare.

As such he focuses national aspirations at a moment of humiliation and defeat; as such he could doubtless again stimulate fanatical endeavour on the part of the 80,000,000 enigmatic but immensely competent Japanese over whom he continues to rule and who continue to multiply to the extent of increasing by 2,000,000 yearly.



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, Japan, February 21, 1948. DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

FEB 18 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 46

CONFIDENTIAL - DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY

Handwritten notes and signatures:
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RECEIVED
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1948 FEB 21 4 00 PM '48

Subject: Appeal by ex-Ambassador Kurusu against Disqualification from Office.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Foreign Activity Coordination
JUN 18 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

894.00/1-2148

I have the honor to forward herewith, in Japanese and in English translation, copy of an undated "Appeal for Examination of Qualification for Public Offices" submitted to Prime Minister KATAYAMA Tetsu by former Japanese Ambassador KURUSU Saburo. It is felt that this document may be of value to future historians concerned with the personalities involved in the Nomura-Kurusu phase of Japanese-American relations prior to the outbreak of war.

This document has been handed in confidence to an officer of this Mission by Mr. Kurusu, who has approved the English translation. Although under established procedure, the Central Screening Committee of the Japanese Government presumably passes final judgment in purge cases, Mr. Kurusu has stated that he feels his chances of clearance are being blocked by the failure of the Japanese Government to refer a copy of his appeal to General Headquarters for guidance.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald
W. J. Sebald
Acting Political Adviser

CS/1A

Enclosures:

1. Appeal for Examination of Qualification for Public Offices - Saburo KURUSU (in Japanese; single copy only).
2. Translation of enclosure 1.

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In triplicate to the Department

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JUN 29 1948

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 46 dated January 21, 1948 from the Office of the Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject, Appeal by ex-Ambassador Kurusu against Disqualification from Office".

(COPY)

(Translation)

APPEAL

FOR

EXAMINATION OF QUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC OFFICES

SABURO KURUSU

His excellency, The Prime Minister,

Mr. Tetsu Katayama,

RE/ EXAMINATION OF QUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC OFFICES

Sir:

By the "Notice of Provisional Designation", No. G 046, dated September 3, 1947, I was advised, in the name of the Prime Minister that, under the provision of Paragraph 1 of Article 7-2 of the Imperial Ordinance No. 1, of January 4, 1947, I was provisionally designated as a person to be "purged". The reason specifically given is that I,

"was in the position of Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Germany during the period between July 7, 1937, and September 2, 1945."

On September 30, I presented a petition for reexamination of my case. But the petition was not accepted and I am now definitely designated as a "purged". Furthermore, I am made to understand, by competent authorities of the Central Liaison Office, that my case belongs to a category which is commonly called, "Mandatory Cases", by routine officials concerned, and that persons thus designated, are to be automatically and summarily excluded from public positions. The explanation given is that "Ambassadors to Germany and Italy" being an item specifically enumerated in Paragraph 1 of "The Criteria for Examination and Decision of Paragraph G Cases", the "purge" designation against me is willy-nilly final and no recourse to further examination is to be permitted.

The "purge" is an extremely severe measure of suspending an important part of a man's civic rights for an indefinite period. Under the Japanese Constitution, both new and old, it could only be enforced by a law duly legislated by the Diet. The only case in which such a measure can be enforced by the Imperial Ordinance is when the said ordinance is strictly in accord with the SCAP directive based upon the Potsdam Declaration. The Imperial Ordinance No. 1, of July 4, 1947, which was invoked against me is an ordinance issued by the Japanese Government for the enforcement of an order given to them

by SCAP

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure No. 2 to
Tokyo's Despatch No. 46,
dated January 21, 1948.

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

by SCAP in GHQ Directive of January 4, 1946 (APO 500 AG91.1.GS). The Ordinance, therefore, should be looked upon as a detailed regulation for enforcement of the original GHQ Directive. Such being its nature, it should be indisputably assumed that the Ordinance must never be allowed to overstep the boundary or stretch the objective set by the SCAP Order in question.

From this viewpoint, let us examine the aforesaid GHQ Directive of January 4, 1946. First we find that Paragraph 1, quotes a passage of the Potsdam Declaration which reads in part as follows;

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people in Japan into embarking on world conquest"

The fundamental objective of the GHQ Directive is thus clearly defined.

Second, the same Directive orders in its Paragraph 2, that the Japanese Government must remove and exclude from public and governmental positions all persons who fall under the following categories:

- a. Active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression.
 - b. Influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates;
- or,
- c. Influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, or the Political Association of Great Japan.

And Appendix A of the Directive which is provided in its Paragraph 9 enumerates the categories of persons to be "purged". The boundary for application of the Directive is thus distinctly set.

Now let us first consider which one of those basic provisions my case should fall under.

Among the items enumerated, a.b.c. in Paragraph 2 of the Directive, thorough investigation will show that I had nothing to do with political organizations mentioned in items "b" and "c". Besides the "Notice of Provisional Designation" I received, does not mention any such political affiliation as the reason of my "designation". Therefore, so far as

Paragraph 2

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Enclosure No. 2 to
Tokyo's Despatch No. 46,
dated January 21, 1948

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CONFIDENTIAL

Paragraph 2 is concerned, the only point to be clarified is whether my case corresponds to item "a". In other words, it first must be determined whether I am an "exponent of militaristic nationalism and aggression".

The next point which should be raised is to which one of the categories enumerated in Appendix A of the Directive is applicable to my case. But as was already stated, the authorities concerned explain that my case is to be considered under the "Criteria for Examination and Decision of Paragraph G Cases". It should therefore be concluded that the Paragraph G of Appendix A is the only one upon which we must concentrate our investigation.

It is to be noted here that Paragraph G itself is divided into three items but neither item 1, which refers to persons who "denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of militaristic regime", nor item 2, which provides for a person "who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime" can be brought up against me. This simple process of elimination will thus leave item 3 as the only point to be investigated. The fact to be established then is whether I correspond to item 3 which reads:

"A person who played an active and predominant part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action, has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

It is quite true that the "Criteria for Examination and Decision of Paragraph G Cases", which I referred to elsewhere, provides in its first passage "those persons who occupied the following Governmental Offices during the period between July 7, 1947, and September 2, 1945", and mentions immediately thereunder "Ambassadors Plenipotentiary to Germany or Italy" as the last item of those governmental positions thereafter enumerated.

Should it, however, be irrefutably construed that the above mentioned provision of the "Criteria" signifies that a person who occupied the position of Ambassador to Germany during the period therein specified, must be automatically and summarily condemned as a person who has played an "active and prominent part in the Japanese program of aggression" or as an "exponent of militant nationalism and aggression"?

In this connection, it must be first taken into consideration that the great majority of Japanese Ambassadors are career diplomats. While many of their American Colleagues are political appointees, Japanese Ambassadors are usually men promoted to their positions after many years of service both at home and abroad under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are men in Civil Service of the Japanese Government. While they are officials of "Shinnin" rank equally with

Ministers

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Enclosure No. 2 to
Tokyo's Despatch No. 46,
dated January 21, 1948.

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Ministers of State, their political significance in the Government is entirely different from the latter. State Ministers and other high political appointees generally change when the Cabinet changes, but Ambassadors usually stay on. They are under the discipline and control of the Home Government and especially of the Ministry of External Affairs.

Everyone knows that the variations in international relations cannot be judged solely from the ideological viewpoint. As an American writer recently pointed out:

"During the Thirty Years War, in an age, where chief ideological conflict was religious, Catholic France went to the aid of Sweden and the German Protestants in their conflict with Catholic Austria..... In more recent times, Tsarist Russia has been allied with Republican France, democratic Britain, oligarchic Japan, democratic America, democratic Britain with Communistic Russia and Communistic Russia with Nazi Germany. National interests make strange bed-fellow; in the face of a threat to the balance of power, nations will make alliances with ideological devils".
(Ideology or Balance of Power? by William G. Carlton, The Yale Review, Summer, 1947. p.p. 592-3).

So long as the diplomatic relations among nations are such complicated affairs, it must be extremely difficult to judge the personal ideology of a diplomat simply by the country to which he is accredited. For instance, it must be illogical to conclude that any American Ambassador is a communist only because he was stationed in the U.S.S.R. and endeavored to maintain and develop friendly relations between his country and Russia.

After considering all these points, it must be fair to presume that the cases against "Ambassadors to Germany or Italy", in the application of Paragraph G, should be construed as prima-facie cases, and those who are provisionally designated should be allowed to defend their individual cases. In regard to this point, it must be duly noted that the "criteria" provides in its first paragraph as follows:

"Whether a person will fall under paragraph G titled, "Additional Militarists and ultra-nationalists" will be determined by inquiry into his past records. However, general Criteria for such decision shall be as follows".

Yet the officials directly in charge claim that the underlined passage of the provision is not applicable to the case of an "Ambassador to Germany". To say the least, it is strongly doubtful whether such interpretation on the part of Japanese Authorities concerned are truly and exactly in accord with the letter and spirit of the original Directive, and for that matter, with any innate sense of justice.

On October 25th,

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On October 25th, 1939, while still at my post in Belgium, I was appointed as Ambassador to Germany. Prior to this date of appointment, when approached from Tokyo on the subject of this Portfolio, I twice refused by cablegram but my objections were overruled and I was finally obliged to accept by the persistent request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. All the circumstances which brought about my assignment to Berlin, must still remain both in the memory of Foreign Office officials concerned at the time and in the records kept in the files of the Gaimusho. It was at the time when the Abe Cabinet was just organized after the resignation of the Hiranuma Cabinet. This change of Cabinets was generally attributed to the political repercussion of the Germano-Sovietic Non-Aggression Pact which Germany entered into without any previous intimation to Japan in spite of a very close relationship which then existed between this country and Germany. It can be easily understood that the diplomatic relation with Germany in those days was not so amicable as it had been hitherto. The early part of my Ambassadorship in Berlin was a period which can hardly be called active or exciting. Our relations with Germany then having much cooled off, my principal duty was to see to it that this propensity of estrangement between the two countries should not go to an unnecessary extreme. Little or no activity on my part was necessary. But in May of the next year, Germany started the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands and completed the Military occupation of those two countries in a short space of time. Immediately thereafter, the German army defeated the combined forces of Great Britain and France and entered the capital of the French Republic in June. It is superfluous to mention that this violent change in the military situation caused a tremendous reaction in every direction in the diplomatic relationship of the world.

In the case of Japan, a certain group who persistently maintained the necessity of closer cooperation with the Axis powers suddenly regained their influence and started a powerful campaign for their cause. Secondly, even those who did not share such a viewpoint became exceedingly concerned about our rights and interests in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies, these colonies having lost their Mother Countries in Europe under the military occupation of their enemy. Under such circumstances, we had much to deal with Germany concerning the protection of our interests in those regions, especially because our government had not established any diplomatic relations with the so-called refugee governments of France or the Netherlands. However, in spite of the strong campaign of pro-axis elements in Japan, the policy of the Japanese Government then in power, remained practically the same and no such idea as to strengthen our relation with Germany into a military alliance was entertained in any responsible quarter yet. The attitude of non-committal which was hitherto maintained was continued without any variation and manifestation of our policy towards Germany always confined itself to the vague desire of unspecified cooperation. The instruction given to Ambassador Naotake Sato, Special Envoy to Italy, who visited Berlin just about this time, clearly demonstrated the outline of the policy of Tokyo in those days. Accordingly my

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activities as Ambassador to Germany was also kept within the boundary of this general policy of non-commitment.

However, just before the departure of Ambassador Sato from Berlin, the second Konoe Cabinet was organized and Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka assumed the Portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Thereupon, through press despatches and other channels of publicity, strong clamours began to be heard from Japan about "a great reorientation of foreign policy" or about "reinforcement of friendship with the Axis Powers". Apparently encouraged by such demonstrations, the German Foreign Minister repeatedly asked me what would be the policy of the new Cabinet towards Japanese-German cooperation. This repeated questioning necessitated my inquiries to the new Foreign Minister on several occasions as to his (the Foreign Minister's) future policy toward the country to which I was accredited, and at the same time expressing my views personally of the policy Japan should take in the prevailing world situation. My opinion was principally based on three points:

1. The landing of German forces on the British Isles, which was held imminent in certain quarters in Japan, is an operation, which if successful, would be so in one chance to a thousand, and even if it should succeed and attain its objective, it would certainly entail the struggle for the final supremacy between the United States and Germany. In such eventuality, the position of Japan placed between the two contestants would certainly become important and advantageous.
2. If the Japanese Government precipitates the decision of concluding a military alliance with Germany and Italy without first exhausting every possible means of reestablishing the friendly relations with the USA, it will be hardly possible to attain an unqualified approval of our public opinion and the united support of the Japanese people behind it.
3. Japan and the United States being the only principal powers left out of the European war, it should be taken as a joint responsibility of the two countries to prevent the disaster from spreading to the Pacific and to prepare, if possible for the common effort of bringing the European conflict to the earliest possible termination.

The Foreign Minister however, failed to answer any of my inquiries or to comment at all on my personal presentations. On the contrary, the German side without any preliminary notification to me, sent Mr. Stahmer over my head as a Special Envoy to Japan. My first intimation of this mission I had when he called to take leave of me immediately before his departure. On this occasion I asked him if his going

to Tokyo

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to Tokyo had any particular significance. He assured me that his trip to Japan had not a motive other than to renew the friendships he had made there on a former visit, but that the suggestion to go was made by his Foreign Minister. Subsequent events proved this to be merely a camouflage. A few days after the departure of Mr. Stahmer for Moscow by plane on his way to Japan, I had an interview, by appointment, with the German Minister at his summer villa at Fuschlsee in a suburb of Salzburg, Austria. At this interview I asked him directly about the trip of Mr. Stahmer to Japan. He replied with the same reason and explanation that Mr. Stahmer had given me. When our conversation came to the topic of the general cooperation of Germany and Japan I said that if he thought of entering into any military alliance with Japan, I could not agree with any such idea because, no matter how we explained it, the United States would most certainly take the alliance as one directed against her. Thereupon the Minister responded that he thought it a most important point and one which calls for very careful consideration. He thereafter carefully avoided the subject. By his request, and according to his program, the talks were to have been continued in the afternoon but shortly I was told that an urgent message had come from Mr. Hitler demanding his presence at the German General Headquarters, and so there was no further opportunity for discussion of any kind. My belief has always been that the German Foreign Minister, being aware that I could not agree with his opinions concerning the Alliance, and that I could get no instructions from my own Foreign Minister on the subject, concluded that it was useless to continue discussions with me on a matter concerning which their own minds were already made up. Of this I have of course no documentary proof but the accumulation of such incidents during my short tenure of office at Berlin strengthened this feeling in me. Now all the facts are known to the world which brought about the conclusion of the Alliance. But at the time of these negotiations between Germany and Japan, the utmost secrecy was maintained, and the Japanese Embassy at Berlin was completely ignorant of any of the preliminary arrangements leading up to the Tripartite Pact. When the details were completed between Mr. Stahmer and Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Tokyo, I, as Ambassador was simply instructed at the eleventh hour by cable to sign it. On the twenty-eighth of September, the day after the signing of the Pact, I cabled my resignation to the Foreign Minister. My resignation was accepted tentatively but I was instructed to remain at my post until a successor would be appointed. On December 20th, 1940, I was relieved of my duties but could not leave Berlin until February 10th, 1941, when I returned to Japan via the United States.

When I arrived at Tokyo, Mr. Matsuoka was absent being on his way back from his European tour. But soon after his return to Tokyo, I had an interview with him. It was on that occasion that the Minister finally agreed with my desire to resign. He even asked me to arrange necessary formalities with the Vice Minister, and I subsequently followed his advice. Notwithstanding this arrangement, the Minister approached me a little later on the subject of negotiating an economic arrangement with a Mr. Wohltat, the head of the German Economic Mission in Japan. I declined and Dr. Ryoe Saito, was subsequently assigned to that work. It is, therefore, quite clear that I had nothing to do

whatsoever

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whatsoever with any commercial or economic agreement arranged or entered into by the two countries.

As to any other phase of my official activities in Berlin, I refer to all cablegrams, correspondence and any other documents exchanged between the Gaimusho and the Embassy at Berlin during my tenure of office. Furthermore, to prove whether my activities in Berlin or my personal integrity fall under item "a" of Paragraph 2 of the GHQ Directive, inquiries should be made through the proper channel to any of my foreign Colleagues in Germany at the time such as, ... Mr. Heath, the American Charge d'Affaires and the Ambassadors of Brazil and the Argentine. Recently I was much gratified to find the following passage about me in a letter written by H.E. Ambassador Fred Morris Dearing to the "American Foreign Service Journal" under date of October 6th, 1946..

"And it was in Peru that I had for my Colleague Saburo Kurusu. No one can make me believe that he was not misused and betrayed by his own Government or that he practiced deliberate duplicity with my own". (The American Foreign Service Journal, November 1946, p.p. 33).

If further evidence is deemed necessary for establishing the fact that I am not a person who has "deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking into world conquest" as per Paragraph 1 of GHQ Directive of January 4, 1946, inquiries may be made of any of my foreign colleagues and associates with whom I came in contact through thirty-five years of sincere diplomatic service for Japan, in many countries of the world.

Upon the strength of the foregoing reasons and facts, I respectfully request that an unbiased examination of my case will be made and that the "purge" designation against me will be removed accordingly.

SABURO KURUSU

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, January 21, 1948.

No. 46

CONFIDENTIAL - DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY

Subject: Appeal by ex-Ambassador Kurusu against Disqualification
from Office.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward herewith, in Japanese and in English translation, copy of an undated "Appeal for Examination of Qualification for Public Offices" submitted to Prime Minister KATAYAMA Tetsu by former Japanese Ambassador KURUSU Saburo. It is felt that this document may be of value to future historians concerned with the personalities involved in the Nomura-Kurusu phase of Japanese-American relations prior to the outbreak of war.

This document has been handed in confidence to an officer of this Mission by Mr. Kurusu, who has approved the English translation. Although under established procedure, the Central Screening Committee of the Japanese Government presumably passes final judgment in purge cases, Mr. Kurusu has stated that he feels his chances of clearance are being blocked by the failure of the Japanese Government to refer a copy of his appeal to General Headquarters for guidance.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald
Acting Political Adviser

Enclosures:

1. Appeal for Examination of
Qualification for Public
Offices - Saburo KURUSU
(in Japanese; single copy only).
2. Translation of enclosure 1.

In triplicate to the Department

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JWBurnett:lh

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 46 dated January 21, 1948 from the Office of the Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject, Appeal by ex-Ambassador Kurusu against Disqualification from Office".

(COPY)

(Translation)

APPEAL

FOR

EXAMINATION OF QUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC OFFICES

SABURO KURUSU

His excellency, The Prime Minister,

Mr. Tetsu Katayama,

RE/ EXAMINATION OF QUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC OFFICES

Sir:

By the "Notice of Provisional Designation", No. G 046, dated September 3, 1947, I was advised, in the name of the Prime Minister that, under the provision of Paragraph 1 of Article 7-2 of the Imperial Ordinance No. 1, of January 4, 1947, I was provisionally designated as a person to be "purged". The reason specifically given is that I,

"was in the position of Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Germany during the period between July 7, 1937, and September 2, 1945."

On September 30, I presented a petition for reexamination of my case. But the petition was not accepted and I am now definitely designated as a "purged". Furthermore, I am made to understand, by competent authorities of the Central Liaison Office, that my case belongs to a category which is commonly called, "Mandatory Cases", by routine officials concerned, and that persons thus designated, are to be automatically and summarily excluded from public positions. The explanation given is that "Ambassadors to Germany and Italy" being an item specifically enumerated in Paragraph 1 of "The Criteria for Examination and Decision of Paragraph G Cases", the "purge" designation against me is willy-nilly final and no recourse to further examination is to be permitted.

The "purge" is an extremely severe measure of suspending an important part of a man's civic rights for an indefinite period. Under the Japanese Constitution, both new and old, it could only be enforced by a law duly legislated by the Diet. The only case in which such a measure can be enforced by the Imperial Ordinance is when the said ordinance is strictly in accord with the SCAP directive based upon the Potsdam Declaration. The Imperial Ordinance No. 1, of July 4, 1947, which was invoked against me is an ordinance issued by the Japanese Government for the enforcement of an order given to them

by SCAP

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by SCAP in GHQ Directive of January 4, 1946 (APO 500 AG91.1.GS). The Ordinance, therefore, should be looked upon as a detailed regulation for enforcement of the original GHQ Directive. Such being its nature, it should be indisputably assumed that the Ordinance must never be allowed to overstep the boundary or stretch the objective set by the SCAP Order in question.

From this viewpoint, let us examine the aforesaid GHQ Directive of January 4, 1946. First we find that Paragraph 1, quotes a passage of the Potsdam Declaration which reads in part as follows;

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people in Japan into embarking on world conquest"

The fundamental objective of the GHQ Directive is thus clearly defined.

Second, the same Directive orders in its Paragraph 2, that the Japanese Government must remove and exclude from public and governmental positions all persons who fall under the following categories:

- a. Active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression.
 - b. Influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates;
- or,
- c. Influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, or the Political Association of Great Japan.

And Appendix A of the Directive which is provided in its Paragraph 9 enumerates the categories of persons to be "purged". The boundary for application of the Directive is thus distinctly set.

Now let us first consider which one of those basic provisions my case should fall under.

Among the items enumerated, a.b.c. in Paragraph 2 of the Directive, thorough investigation will show that I had nothing to do with political organizations mentioned in items "b" and "c". Besides the "Notice of Provisional Designation" I received, does not mention any such political affiliation as the reason of my "designation". Therefore, so far as

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Paragraph 2 is concerned, the only point to be clarified is whether my case corresponds to item "a". In other words, it first must be determined whether I am an "exponent of militaristic nationalism and aggression".

The next point which should be raised is to which one of the categories enumerated in Appendix A of the Directive is applicable to my case. But as was already stated, the authorities concerned explain that my case is to be considered under the "Criteria for Examination and Decision of Paragraph G Cases". It should therefore be concluded that the Paragraph G of Appendix A is the only one upon which we must concentrate our investigation.

It is to be noted here that Paragraph G itself is divided into three items but neither item 1, which refers to persons who "denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of militaristic regime", nor item 2, which provides for a person "who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime" can be brought up against me. This simple process of elimination will thus leave item 3 as the only point to be investigated. The fact to be established then is whether I correspond to item 3 which reads:

"A person who played an active and predominant part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action, has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

It is quite true that the "Criteria for Examination and Decision of Paragraph G Cases", which I referred to elsewhere, provides in its first passage "those persons who occupied the following Governmental Offices during the period between July 7, 1947, and September 2, 1945", and mentions immediately thereunder "Ambassadors Plenipotentiary to Germany or Italy" as the last item of those governmental positions thereafter enumerated.

Should it, however, be irrefutably construed that the above mentioned provision of the "Criteria" signifies that a person who occupied the position of Ambassador to Germany during the period therein specified, must be automatically and summarily condemned as a person who has played an "active and prominent part in the Japanese program of aggression" or as an "exponent of militant nationalism and aggression"?

In this connection, it must be first taken into consideration that the great majority of Japanese Ambassadors are career diplomats. While many of their American Colleagues are political appointees, Japanese Ambassadors are usually men promoted to their positions after many years of service both at home and abroad under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are men in Civil Service of the Japanese Government. While they are officials of "Shinnin" rank equally with

Ministers

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Ministers of State, their political significance in the Government is entirely different from the latter. State Ministers and other high political appointees generally change when the Cabinet changes, but Ambassadors usually stay on. They are under the discipline and control of the Home Government and especially of the Ministry of External Affairs.

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"During the Thirty Years War, in an age, where chief ideological conflict was religious, Catholic France went to the aid of Sweden and the German Protestants in their conflict with Catholic Austria..... In more recent times, Tsarist Russia has been allied with Republican France, democratic Britain, oligarchic Japan, democratic America, democratic Britain with Communistic Russia and Communistic Russia with Nazi Germany. National interests make strange bed-fellow; in the face of a threat to the balance of power, nations will make alliances with ideological devils".
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However, just before the departure of Ambassador Sato from Berlin, the second Kono Cabinet was organized and Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka assumed the Portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Thereupon, through press despatches and other channels of publicity, strong clamours began to be heard from Japan about "a great reorientation of foreign policy" or about "reinforcement of friendship with the Axis Powers". Apparently encouraged by such demonstrations, the German Foreign Minister repeatedly asked me what would be the policy of the new Cabinet towards Japanese-German cooperation. This repeated questioning necessitated my inquiries to the new Foreign Minister on several occasions as to his (the Foreign Minister's) future policy toward the country to which I was accredited, and at the same time expressing my views personally of the policy Japan should take in the prevailing world situation. My opinion was principally based on three points:

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When I arrived at Tokyo, Mr. Matsuoka was absent being on his way back from his European tour. But soon after his return to Tokyo, I had an interview with him. It was on that occasion that the Minister finally agreed with my desire to resign. He even asked me to arrange necessary formalities with the Vice Minister, and I subsequently followed his advice. Notwithstanding this arrangement, the Minister approached me a little later on the subject of negotiating an economic arrangement with a Mr. Wohltat, the head of the German Economic Mission in Japan. I declined and Dr. Ryoe Saito, was subsequently assigned to that work. It is, therefore, quite clear that I had nothing to do

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Upon the strength of the foregoing reasons and facts, I respectfully request that an unbiased examination of my case will be made and that the "purge" designation against me will be removed accordingly.

SABURO KURUSU

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 46 dated January 21, 1948 from the Office of the Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject, Appeal by ex-Ambassador Kurusu against Disqualification from Office".

(COPY)

(Translation)

APPEAL

FOR

EXAMINATION OF QUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC OFFICES

SABURO KURUSU

His excellency, The Prime Minister,

Mr. Tetsu Katayama,

RE/ EXAMINATION OF QUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC OFFICES

Sir:

By the "Notice of Provisional Designation", No. G 046, dated September 3, 1947, I was advised, in the name of the Prime Minister that, under the provision of Paragraph 1 of Article 7-2 of the Imperial Ordinance No. 1, of January 4, 1947, I was provisionally designated as a person to be "purged". The reason specifically given is that I,

"was in the position of Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Germany during the period between July 7, 1937, and September 2, 1945."

On September 30, I presented a petition for reexamination of my case. But the petition was not accepted and I am now definitely designated as a "purged". Furthermore, I am made to understand, by competent authorities of the Central Liaison Office, that my case belongs to a category which is commonly called, "Mandatory Cases", by routine officials concerned, and that persons thus designated, are to be automatically and summarily excluded from public positions. The explanation given is that "Ambassadors to Germany and Italy" being an item specifically enumerated in Paragraph 1 of "The Criteria for Examination and Decision of Paragraph G Cases", the "purge" designation against me is willy-nilly final and no recourse to further examination is to be permitted.

The "purge" is an extremely severe measure of suspending an important part of a man's civic rights for an indefinite period. Under the Japanese Constitution, both new and old, it could only be enforced by a law duly legislated by the Diet. The only case in which such a measure can be enforced by the Imperial Ordinance is when the said ordinance is strictly in accord with the SCAP directive based upon the Potsdam Declaration. The Imperial Ordinance No. 1, of July 4, 1947, which was invoked against me is an ordinance issued by the Japanese Government for the enforcement of an order given to them

by SCAP

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by SCAP in GHQ Directive of January 4, 1946 (APO 500 AG91.1.GS). The Ordinance, therefore, should be looked upon as a detailed regulation for enforcement of the original GHQ Directive. Such being its nature, it should be indisputably assumed that the Ordinance must never be allowed to overstep the boundary or stretch the objective set by the SCAP Order in question.

From this viewpoint, let us examine the aforesaid GHQ Directive of January 4, 1946. First we find that Paragraph 1, quotes a passage of the Potsdam Declaration which reads in part as follows:

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people in Japan into embarking on world conquest".

The fundamental objective of the GHQ Directive is thus clearly defined.

Second, the same Directive orders in its Paragraph 2, that the Japanese Government must remove and exclude from public and governmental positions all persons who fall under the following categories:

- a. Active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression.
 - b. Influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates;
- or,
- c. Influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, or the Political Association of Great Japan.

And Appendix A of the Directive which is provided in its Paragraph 9 enumerates the categories of persons to be "purged". The boundary for application of the Directive is thus distinctly set.

Now let us first consider which one of those basic provisions my case should fall under.

Among the items enumerated, a.b.c. in Paragraph 2 of the Directive, thorough investigation will show that I had nothing to do with political organizations mentioned in items "b" and "c". Besides the "Notice of Provisional Designation" I received, does not mention any such political affiliation as the reason of my "designation". Therefore, so far as

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Paragraph 2 is concerned, the only point to be clarified is whether my case corresponds to item "a". In other words, it first must be determined whether I am an "exponent of militaristic nationalism and aggression".

The next point which should be raised is to which one of the categories enumerated in Appendix A of the Directive is applicable to my case. But as was already stated, the authorities concerned explain that my case is to be considered under the "Criteria for Examination and Decision of Paragraph G Cases". It should therefore be concluded that the Paragraph G of Appendix A is the only one upon which we must concentrate our investigation.

It is to be noted here that Paragraph G itself is divided into three items but neither item 1, which refers to persons who "denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of militaristic regime", nor item 2, which provides for a person "who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime" can be brought up against me. This simple process of elimination will thus leave item 3 as the only point to be investigated. The fact to be established then is whether I correspond to item 3 which reads:

"A person who played an active and pre-dominant part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action, has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

It is quite true that the "Criteria for Examination and Decision of Paragraph G Cases", which I referred to elsewhere, provides in its first passage "those persons who occupied the following Governmental Offices during the period between July 7, 1947, and September 2, 1945", and mentions immediately thereunder "Ambassadors Plenipotentiary to Germany or Italy" as the last item of those governmental positions thereafter enumerated.

Should it, however, be irrefutably construed that the above mentioned provision of the "Criteria" signifies that a person who occupied the position of Ambassador to Germany during the period therein specified, must be automatically and summarily condemned as a person who has played an "active and prominent part in the Japanese program of aggression" or as an "exponent of militant nationalism and aggression"?

In this connection, it must be first taken into consideration that the great majority of Japanese Ambassadors are career diplomats. While many of their American Colleagues are political appointees, Japanese Ambassadors are usually men promoted to their positions after many years of service both at home and abroad under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are men in Civil Service of the Japanese Government. While they are officials of "Shinnin" rank equally with

Ministers

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Ministers of State, their political significance in the Government is entirely different from the latter. State Ministers and other high political appointees generally change when the Cabinet changes, but Ambassadors usually stay on. They are under the discipline and control of the Home Government and especially of the Ministry of External Affairs.

Everyone knows that the variations in international relations cannot be judged solely from the ideological viewpoint. As an American writer recently pointed out:

"During the Thirty Years War, in an age, where chief ideological conflict was religious, Catholic France went to the aid of Sweden and the German Protestants in their conflict with Catholic Austria..... In more recent times, Tsarist Russia has been allied with Republican France, democratic Britain, oligarchic Japan, democratic America, democratic Britain with Communistic Russia and Communistic Russia with Nazi Germany. National interests make strange bed-fellow; in the face of a threat to the balance of power, nations will make alliances with ideological devils".
(Ideology or Balance of Power? by William G. Carlton, The Yale Review, Summer, 1947. p.p. 592-3).

So long as the diplomatic relations among nations are such complicated affairs, it must be extremely difficult to judge the personal ideology of a diplomat simply by the country to which he is accredited. For instance, it must be illogical to conclude that any American Ambassador is a communist only because he was stationed in the U.S.S.R. and endeavored to maintain and develop friendly relations between his country and Russia.

After considering all these points, it must be fair to presume that the cases against "Ambassadors to Germany or Italy", in the application of Paragraph G, should be construed as prima-facie cases, and those who are provisionally designated should be allowed to defend their individual cases. In regard to this point, it must be duly noted that the "criteria" provides in its first paragraph as follows:

"Whether a person will fall under paragraph G titled, "Additional Militarists and ultra-nationalists" will be determined by inquiry into his past records. However, general Criteria for such decision shall be as follows".

Yet the officials directly in charge claim that the underlined passage of the provision is not applicable to the case of an "Ambassador to Germany". To say the least, it is strongly doubtful whether such interpretation on the part of Japanese Authorities concerned are truly and exactly in accord with the letter and spirit of the original Directive, and for that matter, with any innate sense of justice.

On October 25th.

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On October 25th, 1939, while still at my post in Belgium, I was appointed as Ambassador to Germany. Prior to this date of appointment, when approached from Tokyo on the subject of this Portfolio, I twice refused by cablegram but my objections were overruled and I was finally obliged to accept by the persistent request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. All the circumstances which brought about my assignment to Berlin, must still remain both in the memory of Foreign Office officials concerned at the time and in the records kept in the files of the Gaimusho. It was at the time when the Abe Cabinet was just organized after the resignation of the Hiranuma Cabinet. This change of Cabinets was generally attributed to the political repercussion of the Germano-Sovietic Non-Aggression Pact which Germany entered into without any previous intimation to Japan in spite of a very close relationship which then existed between this country and Germany. It can be easily understood that the diplomatic relation with Germany in those days was not so amicable as it had been hitherto. The early part of my Ambassadorship in Berlin was a period which can hardly be called active or exciting. Our relations with Germany then having much cooled off, my principal duty was to see to it that this propensity of estrangement between the two countries should not go to an unnecessary extreme. Little or no activity on my part was necessary. But in May of the next year, Germany started the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands and completed the Military occupation of those two countries in a short space of time. Immediately thereafter, the German army defeated the combined forces of Great Britain and France and entered the capital of the French Republic in June. It is superfluous to mention that this violent change in the military situation caused a tremendous reaction in every direction in the diplomatic relationship of the world.

In the case of Japan, a certain group who persistently maintained the necessity of closer cooperation with the Axis powers suddenly regained their influence and started a powerful campaign for their cause. Secondly, even those who did not share such a viewpoint became exceedingly concerned about our rights and interests in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies, these colonies having lost their Mother Countries in Europe under the military occupation of their enemy. Under such circumstances, we had much to deal with Germany concerning the protection of our interests in those regions, especially because our government had not established any diplomatic relations with the so-called refugee governments of France or the Netherlands. However, in spite of the strong campaign of pro-axis elements in Japan, the policy of the Japanese Government then in power, remained practically the same and no such idea as to strengthen our relation with Germany into a military alliance was entertained in any responsible quarter yet. The attitude of non-committal which was hitherto maintained was continued without any variation and manifestation of our policy towards Germany always confined itself to the vague desire of unspecified cooperation. The instruction given to Ambassador Naotake Sato, Special Envoy to Italy, who visited Berlin just about this time, clearly demonstrated the outline of the policy of Tokyo in those days. Accordingly my

activities

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activities as Ambassador to Germany was also kept within the boundary of this general policy of non-commitment.

However, just before the departure of Ambassador Sato from Berlin, the second Kono Cabinet was organized and Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka assumed the Portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Thereupon, through press despatches and other channels of publicity, strong clamours began to be heard from Japan about "a great reorientation of foreign policy" or about "reinforcement of friendship with the Axis Powers". Apparently encouraged by such demonstrations, the German Foreign Minister repeatedly asked me what would be the policy of the new Cabinet towards Japanese-German cooperation. This repeated questioning necessitated my inquiries to the new Foreign Minister on several occasions as to his (the Foreign Minister's) future policy toward the country to which I was accredited, and at the same time expressing my views personally of the policy Japan should take in the prevailing world situation. My opinion was principally based on three points:

1. The landing of German forces on the British Isles, which was held imminent in certain quarters in Japan, is an operation, which if successful, would be so in one chance to a thousand, and even if it should succeed and attain its objective, it would certainly entail the struggle for the final supremacy between the United States and Germany. In such eventuality, the position of Japan placed between the two contestants would certainly become important and advantageous.
2. If the Japanese Government precipitates the decision of concluding a military alliance with Germany and Italy without first exhausting every possible means of reestablishing the friendly relations with the USA, it will be hardly possible to attain an unqualified approval of our public opinion and the united support of the Japanese people behind it.
3. Japan and the United States being the only principal powers left out of the European war, it should be taken as a joint responsibility of the two countries to prevent the disaster from spreading to the Pacific and to prepare, if possible for the common effort of bringing the European conflict to the earliest possible termination.

The Foreign Minister however, failed to answer any of my inquiries or to comment at all on my personal presentations. On the contrary, the German side without any preliminary notification to me, sent Mr. Stahmer over my head as a Special Envoy to Japan. My first intimation of this mission I had when he called to take leave of me immediately before his departure. On this occasion I asked him if his going

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to Tokyo had any particular significance. He assured me that his trip to Japan had not a motive other than to renew the friendships he had made there on a former visit, but that the suggestion to go was made by his Foreign Minister. Subsequent events proved this to be merely a camouflage. A few days after the departure of Mr. Stahmer for Moscow by plane on his way to Japan, I had an interview, by appointment, with the German Minister at his summer villa at Fuschlsee in a suburb of Salzburg, Austria. At this interview I asked him directly about the trip of Mr. Stahmer to Japan. He replied with the same reason and explanation that Mr. Stahmer had given me. When our conversation came to the topic of the general cooperation of Germany and Japan I said that if he thought of entering into any military alliance with Japan, I could not agree with any such idea because, no matter how we explained it, the United States would most certainly take the alliance as one directed against her. Thereupon the Minister responded that he thought it a most important point and one which calls for very careful consideration. He thereafter carefully avoided the subject. By his request, and according to his program, the talks were to have been continued in the afternoon but shortly I was told that an urgent message had come from Mr. Hitler demanding his presence at the German General Headquarters, and so there was no further opportunity for discussion of any kind. My belief has always been that the German Foreign Minister, being aware that I could not agree with his opinions concerning the Alliance, and that I could get no instructions from my own Foreign Minister on the subject, concluded that it was useless to continue discussions with me on a matter concerning which their own minds were already made up. Of this I have of course no documentary proof but the accumulation of such incidents during my short tenure of office at Berlin strengthened this feeling in me. Now all the facts are known to the world which brought about the conclusion of the Alliance. But at the time of these negotiations between Germany and Japan, the utmost secrecy was maintained, and the Japanese Embassy at Berlin was completely ignorant of any of the preliminary arrangements leading up to the Tripartite Pact. When the details were completed between Mr. Stahmer and Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Tokyo, I, as Ambassador was simply instructed at the eleventh hour by cable to sign it. On the twenty-eighth of September, the day after the signing of the Pact, I cabled my resignation to the Foreign Minister. My resignation was accepted tentatively but I was instructed to remain at my post until a successor would be appointed. On December 20th, 1940, I was relieved of my duties but could not leave Berlin until February 10th, 1941, when I returned to Japan via the United States.

When I arrived at Tokyo, Mr. Matsuoka was absent being on his way back from his European tour. But soon after his return to Tokyo, I had an interview with him. It was on that occasion that the Minister finally agreed with my desire to resign. He even asked me to arrange necessary formalities with the Vice Minister, and I subsequently followed his advice. Notwithstanding this arrangement, the Minister approached me a little later on the subject of negotiating an economic arrangement with a Mr. Wohltat, the head of the German Economic Mission in Japan. I declined and Dr. Ryoe Saito, was subsequently assigned to that work. It is, therefore, quite clear that I had nothing to do

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whatsoever

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whatsoever with any commercial or economic agreement arranged or entered into by the two countries.

As to any other phase of my official activities in Berlin, I refer to all cablegrams, correspondence and any other documents exchanged between the Gaimusho and the Embassy at Berlin during my tenure of office. Furthermore, to prove whether my activities in Berlin or my personal integrity fall under item "a" of Paragraph 2 of the GHQ Directive, inquiries should be made through the proper channel to any of my foreign colleagues in Germany at the time such as, ... Mr. Heath, the American Charge d'Affaires and the Ambassadors of Brazil and the Argentine. Recently I was much gratified to find the following passage about me in a letter written by H.E. Ambassador Fred Morris Dearing to the "American Foreign Service Journal" under date of October 6th, 1946..

"And it was in Peru that I had for my Colleague Saburo Kurusu. No one can make me believe that he was not misused and betrayed by his own Government or that he practiced deliberate duplicity with my own". (The American Foreign Service Journal, November 1946, p.p. 33).

If further evidence is deemed necessary for establishing the fact that I am not a person who has "deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking into world conquest" as per Paragraph 1 of GHQ Directive of January 4, 1946, inquiries may be made of any of my foreign colleagues and associates with whom I came in contact through thirty-five years of sincere diplomatic service for Japan, in many countries of the world.

Upon the strength of the foregoing reasons and facts, I respectfully request that an unbiased examination of my case will be made and that the "purge" designation against me will be removed accordingly.

SABURO KURUSU

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Enclosure No. 1 to Tokyo's Despatch No. 46; dated January 21, 1948,
on the subject "Appeal by ex-Ambassador Kurusu against Disqualification
from Office".

昭和二十二年 月 日

公 報 通 白 貨 物 賣 買 所 規 章

來 函 三 封

昭和二十二年 月 日

長野赤北佐久郡桂井八町一五八〇

米 田 三 郎

内閣總理大臣 片 山 哲 閣下

公債適合負債資金新編書

自分以昭和二十二年九月三日付「公債適合」第廿四頁をもち
つて自分か昭和二十二年一月四日勅令第一号第七條の二の第一項
に基づいていわゆる「追放」の公債指定を受けた趣を内閣總理大臣の
名において通知されました。

その理由として特に掲げられた所は自分が

「昭和二十二年七月七日と昭和二十年九月二日との間に在任命令
全權大使の職に在つた」

と云うのであります。そこで、本年九月二十日付をもつて丹波重
を申請しましたが受理せられず、遂に十月二十二日の旨照をもつ
て本相定を交くるに至りました。

なお終戦後の中火争動員三局百の説明によりますと、自分の物
言は争動員三局の間に首魁「マンブー・トリー・ケース」と称せらるる部
員に属するものであるから、自動的且つ即次の「退版」せらる
るものである。即ち十一月四日の「中火争動員三局百」
の第一項に列挙された目録の一つである在任大佐の任に任つたの
であるから自分に対する「退版」の決定は有無を云わせぬ決定的
のものであつて、丹波重等は許されない事になつていると云うこ
とでありました。

本来「退版」は人の公権の重要なる一部を不特定期間停止する
重大な処分でありますから、旧憲法の下においても新憲法の下に
おいても、当然法律によるべきものであると考えます。ただこれを

命令によつて廃止し得るのは、その命令の内容が「ボツダム宣言を
基礎とした連合國軍總司令部の指令と完全に合致する場合にのみ
限られなければならない。」

即ち昭和二十二年一月四日の命令第一号は日本政府が連合國
軍總司令部から昭和二十一年一月四日の連合國軍總司令部指令（

AP0500AG91/GS）による命令を受けこれを天施するため制
定した命令でありまして、従て本来上述の總司令部指令の施行細
則と見るべきものであります。故にその当然の性質として總司令
部指令の定められた範囲を超越し又はその趣旨を加入すべきものでは
ありません。

今この見地から昭和二十一年一月四日の總司令部指令を撤回し
て元ますと、指令第一号は元々「ボツダム宣言の一部を摘引

「日本國民を欺瞞し世亦世敵の手に出でしめたる者の権力及び
勢力は水へに流すべきであるべからず」

というております。總司令部指令の根本目的はこれによつて明白に定概されております。

次に指令はその第二項をもつて日本政府に対し

a. 半國主義的國家主義及び侵略の道はつなる主張者

り、一切の極端なる國家主義的団体又は秘密愛國団体及びその

機關又は團體の有力者

。大政翼賛會、大政翼賛會又は大日本政友會の活動における

有力分子

等を公職より罷免し且つ良職より排除する事を命令し、更に指令第九項に従つて右罷免排除を文くべき者の種類を附屬A表に列挙してあります。即ち總司令部指令の適用範圍はこれによつて明確に定められておるのであります。

ここで、先ず自分の場合は根本においてこの指令の何れの條項に該当するといふのかを考へて見ますと、先ず指令第二項に掲げ

た、D、Cの合戦の中で、自分は、Cに捕られた諸國に
には全然関係ないことは充分な調査によつて明らかでありまし
う。現に今日自分の受けた「取指書」もかくの如き趣出を捕り
ておりません。従つてこの取指書第二項の因する故り、たまたま
Cに取
つするか否か問題となる故であります。換言すれば自分がC
のいわゆる「半國主義的」日本主義及び侵略の主張者一なりや否
が第一に決定されるべきであります。

次に來る問題は總司令部指令第九項に定められた附屬A表中の何れの項目か自分に適用があるかと云う事でありましたが、既に前述の如く当局者も自分の場合は「G項審査判定基準」によるものだと説明して居るので、只G項だけが問題となる訳であります。

更に其G項自体も三項目に分れて居りますが、其の第一項目即ち「軍國主義的政權反对者を非難し又は其逮捕に寄與したる者」とか、第二項目の「軍國主義政權反对者に対する暴力行爲を指唆し又は実行せる者」等は何れも自分の場合に適用する事は出来ません、依て唯一つ第三項目だけが残るのであります、即ち「日本の侵略計画に關し政府に於て活潑且つ重要なる役割を演じたるか、又は言論著作若は行動により好意的國家主義及び侵略の活潑なる主唱者たることを明にしたる者」に該当するや否やのみが検討される訳と考えます。

成程前述の「G項審査判定基準」の第一項は「昭和十二年七月七日より昭和二十年九月二日に至る迄の間に左の官職にあつた者」として其次に列挙した官職の最後の項に「独逸國伊太利國駐劄特命全權大使」を掲げて居ります。然し「G項審査判定基準」の前述の規定はこの特定期間内に駐独大使であつたものは自動的且つ即決的に「日本の侵略計画に重要活潑な役割を演じた」とか又は「好戰的國家主義及び侵略の活潑なる主唱者」であると断定したものと解釈すべきものでありまじようか。

この点に就て先づ考慮すべきことは、日本の駐外大使の大部分は、多くの米國大使とは異なつて職歴（*Career*）外交官であることと云うことであります。即ち多数の米國大使は政治的任命によるのに反して日本の大使の大多数は外務省の吏員として多年内外の勤務を経た末に其地位に昇任せしめられたものであります。彼等は日本政府の「シビル・サービス」に屬するもので、其官等こそ國務

大臣と同等に親任官であるが、政府内における政治上の重要度は國務大臣とは異なつて居ります。國務大臣や其他の政治的任命による高官は内閣の更迭に従つて變動しますが、大使は其儘留任するものが常であります。要するに日本の大使は名実共に本國政府殊に外務省の指揮監督を受けて居たのであります。

抑も國家間の外交關係の變化が、單に「イデオロギ」の観点からのみ律することの出来ないのは何人も承知して居る所でありまして、最近米國の一学者が指摘して居ます様

「三十年戦争においては、当時における「イデオロギ」の衝突が主として宗教的であつたに拘らず、旧教國佛蘭西は瑞典及び独逸の新教徒を扶けて同じ旧教國たる奧太利と戦い、中略一更に近時においても帝制露西亞は共和制佛蘭西と、民主的英國は寡頭政治的日本と、民主的米國及民主的英國は共産主義露西亞と共産主義露西亞は更に「ナチス」独逸と夫れ夫れ結んだことがあつた。即ち國

家的利害關係は不忠儀な相手と同床異夢の關係を結ばせるものであつて、一旦勢力均衡の關係が脅かされる様な場面に直面すると各國家はイデオロギ上の悪魔とでも同盟を敢てする。『エイリヤ』、『エー』、『カールトン』氏論文『イデオロギーか勢力均衡か』、『エー』、『ル』評論一九四七年夏季号、第五九二頁第五九三頁』と云う有様であります。

既に國家間の關係が斯の如く複雑である以上、或外交官の簡人的「イデオロギー」を其任國によつて單的に判断する事は至難であつて、例えば或米國大使がソ連邦に在勤し米ソ友好關係の維持増進に努めたことのみによつて其大使を直ちに共產主義者なりと断定する事は甚だ非論理的であると云はなければなりません。此点から見ましても、G項の適用上、駐独伊大臣の場合の如きは、先づプリマ、フアシー、ケースとして該当仮指定者に反証を挙げる機会を興えるのが公平であると云はなければなりません。

此点に関連して注意すべきことは前述の「G項審査判定基準」か其一項で

「その他の軍國主義者及び極端なる國家主義者」の項の該当者の判定は簡人審査に俟つが其判定の基準は概ね次の通りである」と規定してあることであります。然るに事務当局は此傍線の部分は駐独大使等には適用がないと主張するのであります。

然し斯の如き日本政府当局の解釈が果して総司令部指令の條文及び精神に眞実且つ正確に適合するものでありませうか、更に又本質的な正義の觀念に合致するものでありませうか、其点強い疑念を抱かざるを得ません。

自分は昭和十四年（一九三九年）十月二十五日、白耳義大使在勤中に駐独大使に任命せられたのであります。然し任命に先立て本國政府から内意を求められた際、二回に涉つて辞退したのであります。自分の異議は聽許せられず、外務大臣から繰返し懇請に接しましたので、遂に受諾の已むなきに至つたのであります。此経緯は当時の外務省関係当局の記憶及び往復電信等の記録に残つて居る筈であります。

自分の駐独大使任命は丁度平沼内閣総辭職の後を承けて阿部内閣が成立した当時であります。此内閣の更迭は一般に独逸が当時日独間に存在した緊密な友好關係にも拘らず日本には無断で独ソ

不可侵條約を締結した結果と認められて居ました。従て当時の日独關係は從來の如く友好的でなく、自分の伯林在勤の初期においては特に活潑な且つ目覚ましい仕事もありませんでした。自分の主たる任務は要するに日独關係の冷却が不必要な極端に迄走らない様に注意すると云う事、取立てて自分の外交活動を必要とする程のことでもなかつたのであります。

然るに翌年即ち昭和十五年（一九四〇年）五月に至り独逸は和蘭白耳義に侵入を開始し極めて短時日の間に兩國の軍事占領を了り、次に英佛連合軍を破つて六月には遂に巴里に入城するに至りました。斯の如き急激なる軍事上の情勢變化が世界の外交關係の上に凡有ゆる方向で烈しい反動を興えた事は申迄もありません。日本におきましても從來から日独伊同盟の必要を主張して來た人々の勢力が急に再ひ盛んになり、又斯の如き意見に賛同せざる向においても、独逸の佛蘭西の和蘭占領の結果、佛領印度支那及

び蘭領東印度と云う二大殖民地か俄かに其本國を失つた爲に此等の地域における我國の權益を如何に擁護すべきやが問題となり、これに対し多大の関心を抱くに至つたのであります。殊に我國としては此等諸國の「亡命」政府と外交關係を持ちませんでしたので、此二大殖民地における權益の問題で自然独逸と種々交渉の必要も起つて來ました。

然し当時の日本政府の方針は我國の一部に盛んに行はれた対枢軸關係強化論にも拘らず、従前の通りで、日独關係を軍事同盟にまで進展させる様を考は責任ある方面では未だ取上げられず、引き続き不即不離の態度が続けられ独逸に対する我國國策の表明は依然漠とした協力關係維持の希望を述べるに止まつて居ました。此事實は恰かも其当時独逸を訪問した、佐藤対伊特派使節に対する日本政府の訓令によつても明瞭であります。従て自分の駐独大使としての活動も此不即不離政策の範囲内に限局されて居りました。

此佐藤特派使節の旧林田宛直前に第二次近衛内閣が成立し松岡外務大臣の就任を見るに及びまして、日本から「外交政策大轉換」とか「対枢軸關係強化」とかいう声か盛んに聞えて來ました。独乙外務大臣は此等の報道に勢を得たものと見えまして、繰返し自分に対し新内閣の日独協力に關する方針を尋ねますので、自分としても、そのままにして置く訳に行かず、新外務大臣に対し対独方針の暗示を水めますと同時に、世界の現局において日本のとるべき政策についての自分の意見を具申致しました。當時の自分の意見は大體次の三点を基礎としたものであります。即ち

- (1) 当時我が國において今にも実現されるかに喧傳されて居た独乙軍の英本土上陸作戦は至難であるが、假令万々一これが実現し且つ成功を収めた場合にも結局米獨の争 的対立となつて、その間に介在する我が國の地位は重要且つ有利となる事
- (2) 日米國交調整に対し更に一段の努力を試みずして一足飛びに

三國同盟を締結するようなことは我が國論の一致した首肯と
支援とを得る所以でないこと

(5) 戦禍の太平洋波及を防止し更に出来得れば進んで欧州戦争の
可成速かなる終結を計るのは欧州大戦の局外に残されたる日
米の共同責任であること

等でありました。

然し外務大臣からは遂に大臣自身の対独方針の回示も、自分の
意見具申に対する批判もなかつたのであります。それのみならず
独乙側は自分に対し事前に何等の話もなく突然自分の頂上を越え
てスターマー氏を日本に特派するに至りました。自分が始めてこ
のを知つたのは同氏が暇乞の爲に來訪した時でありますか、
その時自分が同氏の東京訪問は何か特別の意義があるかと訊ねた
のに対し、同氏は単に独乙外相の命令によつて、前回日本訪問の
際得た友人等と親交を新たにすることに外ならないと説明しました。

然しその後の出来事によつてこれは單に一片の辞令に過ぎなかつたことが分つたのであります。

「スターマー」氏が訪日の爲空路「モスコ」に出発した数日後自分は予め時日を打合せた上「ザルツブルク」の郊外「フッセルゼ」の別墅に独乙外相を訪問したのであります。

此の会見におきまして、独乙外相は先づ自分の質問に答えて「スターマー」氏の日本訪問の使命につきス氏と同様な説明を致しました。更に話題が進んで日独協力問題に及びました際、自分は独乙外相が若し日本と軍事同盟の締結を考えて居るのなら、自分はこれに賛成することは出来ないと申述べ、若しかくの如き同盟を作れば吾等が如何に説明を試みても米國は必ずこれを自國を目標とした同盟と解するであろうと述べました所が、独乙外相はその点が最重要であつて、慎重なる考慮を要する所だと答えたのみで敢てそれ以上意見を述べようと致しませんでした。本來此の日の会

見は取初先方の希望に基いて午後にも継続するはずであつたのであります。その内に「ヒットラー」總統から外相に至急大本営出頭を求めて来たという話で、午後の会談は打切りとなつてしまいました。従つて更にこの問題について独乙外相の意見を聞く機会は失われて了つたのであります。自分が今日まで信じている所では、独乙外相は当時波等の心中既に抱懐して居た同盟の計画に自分が賛成せず且つ自分が日本の外務大臣から日独關係につき列段の訓令も受取つて居ないことが明かとなつたので、更に会談を続けることを無用と考へたものだろうと察せられます。

勿論此の点について文書等による証拠はありませんが比較的思ひがかつた自分の伯林在任中に起こつたその後の諸事情を綜合した結果自分のこの感じは爾後益々強められたのであります。

既に今日においては三國同盟締結に關する諸事情は世界に周知
さるゝに至つたのであります。當時この交渉に關しては極度に秘
密が守られ、在独日本大使館はこの交渉に關しその下相談から最
後の條約締結に至るまで、全く何事も知らされなかつたのであり
まして、「スターマー」氏と外務大臣との間において總ての細目
が決定され自分は單に最後の段階に至つて單に在独大使として、
電信を以つて條約に調印を命ぜられたのであります。

この條約調印の翌日自分は電信を以つて辭表を提出し外務大臣
は一應これを受理しましたか、後任者の任命まで引継ぎ任地に留
る事を求められ昭和十五年十二月二十日に至つて帰朝を命ぜられ
ましたか、後任者の來任を俟つ國休等て遅れて結局翌年二月伯林
出發米國経田帰朝したのであります。

自分が東京に到着した當時、松岡外務大臣は歐州訪問の帰途に
あつて不在でありましたか、同大臣は帰朝後自分と会談の際改め
て自分の辭意を容れ手續については外務次官と相談する事を求め

ましたので自分はこれに従いました、然るにその後暫くして大臣は自分に対し、独逸経済使節團長ソールタート氏と日独経済協定に関する交渉を求めました。自分はこれを断り結局齋藤良衛氏はその任に当ることとなり、自分は独逸との通商経済に関する協定にも關係を持つに至らなかつたのであります。

なお自分の独逸在任中のその他の仕事に関しては自分が在任当時の在独大使館と外務省との間に交換された電信、公信その他の文書を参照して頂きたいと存じます。又自分の在独大使当時の一般行動又は個人としての徳性が総司令官指令第二項Aに該当するが如きものであつたか否かに關しては適當な経路をへて当時伯林に在勤した米國代理大使 *death* 氏、ブルジル、アルゼンチン商館大使等につき御調査を願います。自分は最近一九四六年十月六日附で前米國大使フレッド・モリス、アヤリング閣下がアメリカン・フオーレン・サービス、ジャイアル誌に於てた書簡の一部に自分に

関する次の一節であるのを見て、内大使の知己に感して居ます。即ち

「來栖三郎を同僚として持つたのは秘露においてとあつた。自分は何人が何をいつても彼が彼自身の政府によつて誤用されたか又は裏切られたかしたものとしか信する事は出来ない、又彼がわれ等の政府に対し表裏のある欺瞞を用いたという事とも信する事は出来ない」(アメリカン・フォーレン・サーピスジャーナル一九四六年十一月第二十三頁)という一節であります。更に進んで自分が一九四六年一月四日の總司令部指令第一項にある如き「日本國民を欺瞞し世界征服の奉に出づる過誤を犯さしめたる者」と懸釈する、か如き人間でないという事實を立証するためにこの上一層多くの証拠が必要である場合には自分の三十五年に渉る日本外交官としての勤務中世界各国で接触した外國人の同僚その他種々交渉を持つた人々につき聞き合わされば、それ

それ証言を得られる事と考えます

以上述べました事由と事実に立脚して自分は隨て自分の場合に
ついて公平なる審査が行われこれに依つて「自分に対する追放」の
指定が解除せられんことを要請致します。

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

FEB - 4 1948

Tokyo, JAPAN FEB 23 1948

No. 50

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: Conversation with KATAYAMA Tetsu, Prime Minister.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report observations made by KATAYAMA Tetsu, Prime Minister and President of the Social Democratic Party, at a luncheon given by W. Henry Lawrence, Jr., Second Secretary of this Mission, on January 17, 1948 at his residence. The luncheon was attended by Mr. John M. Allison, Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs; Mr. Cabot Coville, First Secretary of this Mission; and Mr. Rolland Bushner, Third Secretary. Mr. TAKEUCHI Harumi, an officer of the Japanese Foreign Service on loan to the Prime Minister from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and serving in the capacity of secretary, accompanied the Prime Minister and acted as interpreter.

Mr. Katayama, who had absented himself from the Social Democratic Convention in order to attend the luncheon, stated that Japanese newspapers were crediting the leftists in the Social Democratic Party with the preponderance of power. He expressed certainty that most of the strength lies with the rightists of the party. He stated he would advocate abiding by the four-party agreement between the Social Democratic, Democratic, Peoples' Cooperative, and Liberal Parties, even though the Liberals had already withdrawn. He thinks it is wise for the three remaining parties to continue cooperation and seemed confident that they would do so unless one of the parties or a section of one of the parties took a stand which would be contrary to the agreement. He cited the possibility that if too strong a stand were taken by the leftists of the Social Democratic Party the agreement might be upset.

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The major reason for leftist desire for abrogation of the four-party agreement, according to Mr. Katayama, was the desire on the part of the leftists to discontinue interest on war bonds and to place a second tax on assets and property. He felt that the leftists will give in on the property tax, but will be adamant on the question of discontinuance of interest on war bonds. One argument advanced against such discontinuance, Mr. Katayama said, is that war bonds are no longer in possession of the people but are in banks, so that cancellation of interest payments would affect the ability of the banks to pay interest on other deposits. However, the leftists maintain that the money which could be saved by cancellation of interest could be used for other purposes which now have to be financed by taxes on the masses.

As the Department is aware, on January 19 (two days after the luncheon) the Social Democratic Party, by a vote of three hundred sixty-six to three hundred forty-five, abrogated the four-party agreement. This decision would appear to indicate that the leftists had greater power in the Social Democratic Party than Mr. Katayama had expected and arouses speculation as to whether abrogation of the agreement may eventually lead to collapse of the Katayama Cabinet. However, the re-election of Mr. Katayama as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee and the election of Mr. ASANUMA Inajiro as the Party's Chief Secretary implies that the rightists still have majority strength from an administrative point of view and so may be able to work out new agreements with the People's Cooperative Party and the Democratic Party. The strength of the rightists has been further evidenced at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee on January 21, at which twenty-nine members of the committee were chosen, leaving one to be determined later. Of these, seventeen were members of the right wing and twelve of the left. Five copies of a list of these members, published in the Nippon Times of January 22, are enclosed.

Centrists and Rightists

(Katayama, The Leftists hold 5 out of the 20 seats on the C.E.C.)

In discussing labor unions, Mr. Katayama said that government workers are constantly demanding increases in wages. He feels that workers apparently consider that the only objective of unions is to obtain wage increases. He inquired about the right of government workers in the United States to strike, and when told of the non-strike agreement signed by this class of workers, indicated that only certain categories of Japanese government workers were prohibited from striking (article no. 38 of the Labor Relations Adjustment Law). When queried on the activities of the Communists in unions, he stated that communists are most active in transportation and communication unions.

When asked whether the Social Democratic members of the Cabinet would be bound by a platform that would be decided upon at the current Social Democratic Party

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Convention, he indicated that ministers in the Cabinet from the party would not be completely bound by the platform, but must strive to put it into effect. He said that the Social Democratic Cabinet members must necessarily take a practical point of view, otherwise, in a coalition cabinet such as the present one the cabinet would be unable to function.

In answer to a question as to whether the four-party agreement barred leftist Social Democrats from the Cabinet, Mr. Katayama said that the agreement did not specifically include such a provision. However, he stated that leftists were not made members of the Cabinet because such inclusion would interfere with cooperation with other parties.

Following a discussion of the mechanics of voting in the United States, for example, whether the names of candidates are always written in on ballots, Mr. Katayama said the next session of the Diet would consider legislation designed to prevent buying votes. He pointed out that payment for votes is unfortunately customary in the Far East. He emphasized that only by overcoming this great difficulty could new leaders emerge as representatives of the people.

Mr. Katayama, in describing difficulties facing the Cabinet, emphasized economic problems. He stressed that, in the next year, more strenuous efforts must be made to fight inflation, to place finances on a sound basis, to streamline the government by efficiency of administration and by reduction of the number of employees, and to achieve stabilization of wages and prices. His administrative address given five days later to the Second session of the Diet was largely devoted to the urgency of the economic situation and the intentions of the government to devise means of improving it. Copies of the address together with a summary are being forwarded by despatch No. 52, January 23.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald
W. J. Sebald
Acting Political Adviser

Enclosure: *ATT*

List of members Central Executive
Committee, Nippon Times, January 22,
1948.

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WHLawrence, Jr.:hp

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NIPPON TIMES:

Jan 22, 1948

**29-MAN EXECUTIVE BODY
ELECTED BY SOCIALISTS****Right-Wingers Win 17 Seats as
Against 12 Left-Wing Members**

The right-wing faction of the Social Democratic Party managed late Tuesday night to elect 17 members to the party's powerful Central Executive Committee as against 12 left-wing representatives. One seat was left vacant to be filled later.

Left-wingers fought vigorously to increase their strength in the CEC, but agreed to a compromise after hours of heated debates.

The new CEC members are:

Right Wing: Kiyoshi Masaki (Hokkaido), Michio Hosono (Akita), Kanemitsu Yoshikawa (Chiba), Eiji Tomiyoshi (Kagoshima), Naosaku Doi (Kanagawa), Junzo Matsumoto (Shimane), Ryoza Kato (Gifu), Ushiro Ito (Fukuoka), Daisaku Hayashi (Aichi), Tadao Kikukawa (Tokyo), Suehiro Nishio (Osaka), Chozaburo Mizutani (Kyoto), Tatsuo Morito (Hiroshima), Mitsusuke Yonekubo (Hyogo), Yoshio Suzuki (Fuku-shima), Eiichi Nishimura (Osaka), Tsune Akamatsu (House of Councillors).

Left Wing: Mosaburo Suzuki (Tokyo), Kanju Kato (Aichi), Katsuzo Arahata (Tokyo), Masaru Nomizo (Nagano), Toshio Kuroda (Okayama), Hyo Hara (Tokyo), Junzo Inamura (Niigata), Kaichi Yasuhira (Ehime), Shogetsu Tanaka (Fukuoka), Yoshiharu Oshima (Gumma), Seiichi Suzuki (House of Councillors), Makoto Horii (House of Councillors).



DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
FEB 27 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

American Embassy
London, January 29, 1948

AIR MAIL

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 236

Subject: Transmitting Extracts from Foreign Policy
Debate in Commons on Japan

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The Honorable
Secretary of State,
Washington

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Sir:

1. For purposes of convenience, I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of extracts from Hansard covering important references to Japan in the notable debate on foreign policy which took place in the House of Commons on January 22 and 23, 1948.

2. Generally speaking, the debate impinged but little on Far Eastern problems. Indeed the speakers devoted themselves almost exclusively to European problems and particularly to relations with Soviet Russia, which, as the terms of the debate plainly indicate, are being seen in a new and revealing light in this country.

3. Mr. Bevin was the only speaker on the Government side to refer to Far Eastern issues. In this relation, he took the occasion to make it clear that the British Government had no liking for the Soviet proposals respecting the convocation of a Japanese peace conference. Instead, he stressed the British desire for a multi-power peace conference.

4. Messrs. Teeling and Paton, both members of the Parliamentary Mission to Japan, were the only non-Government speakers to dwell at any length on Japanese issues. Both speakers praised the achievements of the occupation authorities, though Mr. Paton had doubts as to the efficacy of the economic policies being pursued in Japan. Mr. Teeling sought enlightenment with respect to certain aspects of British policy in Japan, but he was unrewarded for his efforts in this direction, since Mr. Attlee, the last speaker for the Government, made no

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
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Despatch No. 236
January 29, 1948
from London

reference of any kind to the Far East.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:


Everett F. Drumright
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: *att*

Extracts from Hansard, as stated

(Original and hectograph to the Department)
Copy to U.S. Political Adviser, SCAP, Tokyo
Copy to Embassy, Nanking
Copy to Embassy, Moscow

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 236 dated January 29, 1948,
from American Embassy, London, England.

Source: Hansard, Vol. 446, No. 47 January 22, 1948

Mr. Bevin (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs):
". . . One other matter I must mention in passing is
Japan. There is a conflict again because it is desired
by the Soviet that we should refer the Peace Treaty to
the Council of Foreign Ministers; not a very encouraging
prospect. Really, it is very difficult to agree to it.
Here are Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Burma
and the Netherlands, who were all in the Japanese War
from the very day of Pearl Harbour, and while I am ready
to admit that the maintenance of great Russian armies in
the Maritime Provinces probably had an effect before they
came into the war, the actual time that Russia was in the
Japanese War was but a few days. Yet I am asked to agree
that they should take a predominant position over the
Allies who fought in the Japanese War all the way through.
Really, we cannot expect people to accept that. What we
propose is that the 13 or 14 countries which were involved
should form the Peace Conference. In that way I think we
are more likely to clear up the Far Eastern position, and
I hope the Soviet Government will see their way clear to
accept that, and let us get on with the business of at
least making one good peace treaty. That, of course,
includes the United States, Canada and other countries . . ."

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 236 dated January 29, 1948,
from American Embassy, London, England.

Source: Hansard, Vol. 446, No. 47 January 22, 1948

Mr. G. Lang (Labor M.P. for Stalybridge and Hyde):
". . . I know nothing personally of America in that way,
but I have seen America at work in Japan for two suc-
cessive years, and I am bound to say that I have seen no
evidence there at all that America is desirous of
crushing democracy. . ."

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 236 dated January 29, 1948,
from American Embassy, London, England.

Source: Hansard, Vol. 446, No. 48 January 23, 1948

Mr. William Teeling (Conservative M.P. for Brighton):
"I shall not attempt to follow the hon. Member for East
Coventry (Mr. Crossman) in what he has been saying
especially as I have only just returned from Germany
myself. But I know there are many others who wish to
speak, and I feel that unless we turn for a few moments
to the Far East we are going to give an extremely wrong
impression throughout the world. Well over six months
have elapsed since the last Foreign Affairs Debate and
one would have thought that the Foreign Secretary would,
as a result, have had time to say a little more about our
position with regard to Japan and the Far East generally.
Looking at the length of time he gave to discussing such
points as tourist travel abroad, we cannot help but think
that he could have spared a little longer for the Far
East.

"Probably the answer is that for some reason this
Government does not wish this country to know too much
about what is going on in the Far East. I am inclined
to think that we have no policy with regard to Far Eastern
matters at all. I believe that the situation in Japan
and the situation in the Far East is far from satisfactory
from the British point of view, and that the Americans
are not at all happy with regard to our attitude and our
behaviour on many points. When it is considered what
that can mean to Yorkshire and Lancashire and to the
whole export drive of this country, it seems rather
alarming that we should concentrate so entirely upon the
German trouble and what is happening there without com-
paring it with the situation in Japan as well.

"As hon. Members will know, five of us went out a
few months ago to Japan and were there during October
and November. We went, I believe, because General
MacArthur and the whole American set-up in Japan was
anxious that this country should know a little more about
what is being done there and about the problems there.
I would like to take the opportunity of saying how grateful
we all were at the wonderful way we were received, and
the marvellous efforts that were made by everybody to
see that we got what information we wanted. We were
allowed to see Japanese and Americans on almost any point
we wanted to discuss.

"I believe democracy is one of the subjects en-
deavouring to be taught at the present moment to both
Germany and Japan, and therefore, perhaps, it will be a
lesson in democracy to the Japanese to realise that
Members of this House can go out to Japan at the expense
of the Government--and when in Japan, I believe, at the

expense/

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Encl. 3 to Despatch 236, January 29, 1948, from London

expense of America--and still be able to get up on their return and criticise those hosts who sent them out, and also the kind American hosts who looked after them there. I believe the Americans will not take it amiss, and nor do I think our own Government should.

"I cannot make out why we should pretend there is a different programme--or is there a different programme?--for our attitude with regard to Germany and Japan, the two great menaces of two, three, or four years ago. In Germany we are trying to go in for decartelisation of big firms. That may happen in two quite different ways in the American and British zones. The attitude in the British zone is to go slowly at the present moment, because it is not entirely fair on everybody in the zone that they should be sold out until it is absolutely certain that they had some connection with Nazism.

"On the other hand, in Japan, what is our policy in regard to decartelisation. There they have the 'Zaibatsus,' as they are called--'family concerns.' Many exaggerated things have been said about them recently. If anybody thinks that in America there is a united policy on the way that the Zaibatsu are being got rid of, he is making a very great mistake. Only last week a speech was made in the United States by the Army Secretary, Mr. Kenneth C. Royall, who was replying to General MacArthur on this subject. He then said:

'The dissolution of the Zaibatsu may present in itself no serious economic problem, but at some stage extreme deconcentration of industry, while further impairing the ability to make war, may at the same time impair manufacturing efficiency and reduce the overall production and the exportable surplus of Japanese industry--may, therefore, postpone the day when Japan can become self-supporting.'

Later he said:

'Our decisions will be made with realism and with a firm determination of doing all possible to prevent Japan from again waging unprovoked and aggressive and cruel war against any other nation. We hold to an equally definite purpose of building in Japan a self-sufficient democracy, strong enough and stable enough to support itself and at the same time to serve as a deterrent against any other totalitarian war threats which might hereafter arise in the Far East.'

Now we are very seriously studying our export drive. We hope, not only in this year but in the years to come, to be able to sell that which we are begging our workpeople in this country to work harder to produce. What is the

attitude/

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Encl. 3 to Despatch 236, January 29, 1948, from London

attitude of our Government to this policy in Japan? Let us not forget that the population of Japan before the war was increasing at the rate of one million a year. Today it is increasing at the rate of 1,300,000 a year. We should not forget that today Japan is only half the size of what it was before the war and that six million more Japanese have been brought back to the country since the end of the war.

"Yet, according to some, and to the speech I have quoted, it is the American policy that the country shall be self-sufficing. We all know that that means that the country shall be able to sell and export abroad. Equally, we know that in the textile industry, so far as cotton piece goods are concerned, Japan sold more in the last quarter in the Far East than the total exports anywhere of Lancashire and Yorkshire during that period. What is the policy of our Government with regard to the breaking up of these Zaibatsu firms. Before this statement in the United States, the policy was to get rid of everybody who could be linked up in any way with the head of a firm which might have helped in the war effort. Presumably we agreed to this, and the result, as we saw it, when we were out there, was that firms were being left in the hands of the Government eventually to be sold to persons unknown. As far as one could see, the people to whom they would have to be sold would be either black marketeers or people closely connected either with Communist trade unionism, as it has developed in Japan, or people linked up with firms in the United States. The same thing is happening in Germany, and we have the following happening. In connection with the auction of eight mines in Stuttgart, it has not yet been decided who is to get them, but one of the bids likely to be accepted was made by Siemen's, of New York. What is our policy on that subject?

"In connection with de-Nazification in Germany, we know that in our zone we are not pressing it to quite the same extent as are the Americans in their zone. Indeed, there will be complications about that in Bizonia in the next few weeks or months. What is our attitude with regard to the purging that is going on in Japan? Do we realise that people who are found to be connected with the war effort--heads of firms, some of whom, like the Mitsuis, are not even being tried--are being purged even to the third degree of their relationship? Their grandchildren, even, are not allowed to take any part or interest not only in the firm with which they may have been connected but also in any concern or business that might be in any way like the one in which the family was concerned before. Does that not savour of something just a little like what was done to the Jews not very long ago? Is it not wrong? What is our attitude? As Americans themselves have been pointing out, many Japanese who are pro-American and pro-British are being included in

the purge/

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the purge without any great reason as far as one can see. What is our policy?

"Also, we must not forget the question of Korea and the danger that is coming from that part of the world. It is a danger which may come very soon. Large numbers of Americans have a certain view of our policy and I would like to ask the Government for a statement on this matter. Why is it that we are removing the 2,000 odd troops who are at present in Japan? It is said quite definitely by some people in America that the reason why we are doing this is because there is a possibility of war in that area, in Korea, or connected with Korea, and we want to be out of it and not in it. That is why I say that it is not fair for the Foreign Secretary to give the impression that nothing is wrong in Japan. The Americans are worried about our attitude. These 2,000 troops were included in what is considered the minimum required for the defence of Japan. I ask the Government whether they are acting with the full approval of the Australians, whether we consulted them? I would like to know the real reason for the withdrawal. I hope that it will not be said that it is in order to economise and to bring people back to this country so that they may work for the export market. That would be a typical short-sighted Treasury point of view.

"If we are really short of people, why is it that we have 17,000 civilians working in the British zone of Germany whereas there are only 4,000 in the American zone? Eleven thousand Americans are able to carry on the whole of the Japanese Empire. In both cases, I do not take into account the Armed Forces. These 2,000 troops in Japan could easily have been taken away from another part of the world, possibly from civilians in Germany, if it is export workers who are wanted. Then we would at least have been left with a token force in Japan. Many Americans say that by taking away these troops we are waiving any claim for any interest in the future development of Japan. They say of that if we are not willing to pull our weight out there, why should we try to press what I contend are our legitimate claims in regard to trade, and so on? If these 2,000 men come back they may produce more goods, but we lost the right to bargain and to see that the Japanese cotton and other textile products do not compete too seriously with our own in the Far East and that we have some division of markets. I would like a definite answer on this point.

"I think that we are from the Treasury point of view--it is more their fault than that of the Foreign Office--cheeseparing far too much on small things. From small things very often one can get greater results. In the case of our Ambassador in Japan and the whole of the Embassy organisation, they are left--other than the

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British money they use amongst themselves--with the vast sum of four dollars a month which they are allowed to spend in order to keep on friendly terms with the Americans and to meet them in American places. Because one general happens to be a particularly good golfer he is able to make a little extra money on the golf links, and in that way a few more people are able to get about. In Frankfurt, as 'The Times' pointed out, not only were the chief British delegates allowed only one dollar for all their stay, but the most important of our Civil Service officials was allowed only 50 cents because it only costs 30 cents for breakfast on the train. These pettifogging things are doing a considerable amount of harm. We could spend a little more money and get far more in contact with the Americans, and point out our own point of view.

"I do not think people realise in what an inferior and appallingly humiliating position our people in Japan are at the moment. Do they realise, for instance, that our Ambassador, though he is not officially called that, has not yet met the Prime Minister of Japan, who has been Prime Minister since last February, or had not when I left in November. Why that is, I do not know, except, possibly, that for some policy point of view it may not be desired that he should do so. We are not allowed to interfere in any way, and yet I do know that vast numbers of Americans are working on wonderful schemes of development in a wonderful way in Japan at the moment, and I think that we should be working in with them and I believe they want us to do so. Instead of that, they receive the news that our 2,000 men are going away, and they feel that we are not helping them, because, if things go wrong, we are leaving all the responsibility to them, and, on the other hand, if things go right, they would gladly have us working with them. I have seen what General MacArthur has done in sending coal to Hong-Kong, when it was badly needed in Japan, and also how he wants to cooperate with us in Japan. He has asked B.O.A.C. to come out but so far London has refused.

"Japan, after all, is not only the country of the people who committed all the tortures and atrocities in the war. I think we will find that the worst segments only came from agricultural areas. I have seen the new kind of Japan both in the agricultural districts and the industrial areas, which are just as large. In the industrial areas, nearly all the people are descended from the Liberals and liberal-minded people who were running Japan in the early '20's, and we should not forget that we were the first white allies of Japan in the old days. We should not forget, either, that there are large numbers of people in Japan who are more than anxious that we should go back and work with them. The vast majority of Americans also want us to work with them. Nobody in Japan today knows very much about the British. They know they

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beat us out of Singapore and Hong-Kong, but little else; they do not seem to have heard of Burma; and there is no publicity or newspapers from Britain; and we are doing nothing now in the way of presenting our case in that country. We have been asked to send out BOAC, but for some reason they are not allowed to go. People here have wanted to go out to extend our trade there, but the Treasury will not allow them enough money. We need quicker means of transport and communications. All the time both the Americans and the Japanese would like us to do that. The young business man now coming along in Japan does not know anything about us, or that we once had a great trade with Japan, mainly Empire. On one occasion, when we went about the country, I found that people had never even heard of the British. All these are things we must remember.

"I came back from Japan with this message. We must remember that we have lost many thousands of people in the fighting in Malaya, Burma and elsewhere, and, here are whole areas in which we can combine with the Japanese and the Americans; if we lose our opportunity now, we will have no justification for putting in a claim in the peace treaty that might save us from being hampered in other parts of the world. I therefore ask the Government what is their policy with regard to the withdrawal of troops in Japan, and with regard to meeting the undoubted coming competition from Japan in the years to come? If it is true that Japan is to receive a 750 million dollar loan from the United States, as has been reported from Moscow, if it is possible that the peace treaty may not, after all, be signed in the next few months, and if the Americans are then going to remain in Japan, what is the position going to be with regard to our traders going out there and in regard to reparations generally, and is there any policy that might save Yorkshire and Lancashire? For the absence of a policy on this we shall have much regret in years to come while we still want to export."

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Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 236 dated January 29, 1948,
from American Embassy, London, England.

Source: Hansard, Vol. 446, No. 48 January 23, 1948

Mr. John Paton (Labor M.P. for Norwich): "I am very glad to have been given this opportunity to intervene in this Debate, and, particularly, that I have been called immediately after the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Teeling), who has introduced a subject which ought to be given far more opportunities in this House for effective discussion than it has hitherto had in this Parliament. It is true that, inevitably, in present circumstances, the great problems of Central Europe must tend to overshadow the enormous and important problems that emerge for us, 10,000 miles away on the other side of the world. It is my view that the Japanese problem, while it may not be so complex of solution as the German one, is, nevertheless, of quite equal importance to the peace of the world, and it is more than time that this House got down to a really effective Debate with adequate time in which we might examine all the difficulties that face us in that area.

"Like the hon. Member for Brighton, I was privileged to be one of the Members of the Parliamentary Delegation which went to Japan and Korea as the guests of General MacArthur, and I think it would be better if, instead of trying today, in quite inadequate time, to investigate the problems of that vast area, I should give the House one or two broad impressions of what I saw there and the conclusions to which I came. May I endorse every word which the hon. Member for Brighton said with regard to the generous hospitality extended to us by the Americans during the whole of our tour over these great areas of Japan? I cannot myself find words to express all I feel about it, from General MacArthur himself right down to his humblest subordinate, because, in every part of our journey throughout Japan we received always, on every occasion, the greatest kindness, abundant hospitality and a real warmth of friendship which left in the minds of all of us, I am sure, the most enduring memories of gratitude, and I am very glad today to have this opportunity to say publicly that which I expressed privately while I was still in Japan.

"The House is now familiar with the important features of the political revolution which has taken place in Japan since the cessation of hostilities, and I think that most people know that there is now in Japan a popularly elected Government, and a democratic, written constitution, which expresses the basic principles of democracy in the way in which we accept and have proved them in all the most advanced democracies of the world. There is also on the Statute Book of Japan a Bill of Rights which gives expression to all the popular freedoms upon which the advance of democracy in all Western nations

has been/

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Encl. 4 to Despatch 236, January 29, 1948, from London

has been founded and based. There has been placed on the Statute Book a great measure of agrarian reform, and more measures are in contemplation for completely re-organising the educational system. A vast mass of most valuable enactments has already gone on to the Statute Book, and many more are in contemplation, which constitute a complete political revolution in that country and which give this Oriental country for the first time the whole apparatus of an effective and sound democratic system.

"I do not want to give way, because I am keeping to a timetable. There has been some cynicism expressed by critics both in this country and Japan about the permanent value of all this great apparatus of democracy which has been installed there. It is said, and truly, that these developments have come about through the wishes of General MacArthur and the American occupation forces, but I think that that view forgets the fact that these enactments have been brought into being in Japan by a popularly elected Government. It would be an injustice to leaders of the Japanese Government to suggest that they did not believe in the political instrument which they were bringing into being and it would be a gross injustice to suggest that the present Coalition Government under the leadership of the Socialist Prime Minister, Mr. Katayama, is not a Government which believes wholeheartedly in democratic principles and is working most steadfastly to bring them into being.

"While we agree that the American influence has been strong, nevertheless, it is my considered view that these enactments and this new system have been brought in with the will and the support of the Japanese themselves and of the popularly elected Government which is there now. But the cynics say this cannot possibly have any permanence because it runs counter to the mental concepts, all the traditions and all the habits which the Japanese have formed over thousands of years. True no one can dogmatise about this. It may be that this democratic system will not be a permanent one. One cannot say; time, alone will test it. At the same time, many of those who are cynical about this great development are most unjust to the aspirations and the goodwill that have formed it. While no one can afford to be dogmatic about the permanence of the new system in Japan, I can say most definitely that everyone of us is satisfied that the aims and the objects which inspired the Americans in helping in the formation of that new system are worthy aims and objects which ought to be wholeheartedly supported by every democrat in the western spheres of the world. There ought to be no cavilling, and while it is not in man to command success, at least as democrats we can express goodwill towards the system and extend our best wishes that it should have every success.

When we/

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Encl. 4 to Despatch 236, January 29, 1948, from London

"When we come to the economic side of the picture-- and I want to conclude by saying in a very compressed form some of the things I have wanted to say--the verdict is bound to be much less favourable than that on the political side, where one sees clear-cut decisions, clear aims and a policy successfully worked out. When one contemplates the economic side everything is fuzzy, obscure and there are no decisions. In fact, there is irresolution, indecision, false starts, policies formulated and withdrawn and nobody seems to know exactly and precisely where they want to go. I know, of course, that there are tremendous differences between the kind of problems that they face politically and the economic problems. Politically they were able to start with a clean sheet--a sheet that had been wiped clean as far as the former political system of Japan was concerned by the impact of war and defeat.

"In the economic field the situation is far different. They are up against intractable economic problems that cannot be so easily waved aside. I suggest that one main factor lies at the root of the confusion of thought--the lack of clarity in aim and object which distinguishes the Japanese scene just as it distinguishes the German scene. I take the view that the Ruhr, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) said yesterday, 'must be allowed to live,' but also I believe it ought to live decently and sufficiently. That idea has an application also to Japan. The rehabilitation of Western Germany and the proper utilisation of its industrial power is essential not only for Germany, but for all Europe. Similarly, I believe the same thing holds true about Japan.

"I never will believe that it is possible to write into peace treaties a prohibition which can condemn permanently great and able peoples to a condition of half-life with a pulse feebly beating, and reducing the body politic to a state of persistent anaemia. For that reason I have always been opposed to the central doctrine of the Potsdam Declaration. I want to see something else done. These policies of forced limitations are not capable of achievement in the long run, as the Versailles Treaty amply demonstrated to the world, but they are the very negation of statesmanship, and they are on the level of the imbecile applying a torch to set alight the haystack of the farmer.

"The real task of statesmanship is to find a solution for the problem of reconciling all the essential factors for security with full development of the industrial potential, using for that end all the productive forces and resources of the defeated peoples. It is a problem which is not easy. The nihilistic way of

destruction/

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Encl. 4 to Despatch 236, January 29, 1948, from London

destruction is neither statesmanship nor policy. So my final word is that I hope our Foreign Office and the able minds that are in it as well as our Foreign Secretary will apply themselves to this problem. No one in recent years has been more insistent in this House on the overwhelming importance of economic reconstruction and economic improvement than my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I hope that the Foreign Office will look at this problem, and that they will bring those able minds that exist there into contact with it in order to find how it is possible to make not only Western Germany and the Ruhr, but Japan also, fit into the future system of world peace, while at the same time giving the peoples of those lands a sufficient need of life. I can assure the House quite definitely of one thing, there can be no stable peace in Japan and no permanence for the new system of political democracy there unless there is at the same time a sufficient Japanese economy that will sustain the people in full and decent life."

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Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 236, dated January 29, 1948,
from American Embassy, London, England.

Source: Hansard, Vol. 446, No. 48 January 23, 1948

Mr. Wingfield Digby (Conservative M.P. for Dorset, Western): ". . . When we came to look at the traditional aims of Russian foreign policy, we are amazed at the extent to which they have been realised. The set-back of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 has been fully restored, and Russia has a zone of influence in Northern Korea as well. Outer Mongolia has come fully under the Soviet sphere of influence. It is true that Manchuria is now controlled by the Chinese Communists, who, I think it would be wrong to assume, as one at least of the hon. Members opposite has done, are the same thing as Russian Communists. . . ."

FORM DS-322
7-18-46

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Washington

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AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI, (CHINA).

227
Reurtel 239 / Feb 3 rptd. Nanking as 181.

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1. ~~DEPT unable understand assertion CONTEL 239 Feb 3 rptd by~~
~~Shanghai to Nanking as 181 that QUOTE no material has been received.~~

^{DEPT}UNQUOTE. ^{DEPT}INP has been sending Shanghai regularly via Wireless Bulletin and Signal Corps all useful news reports from Japan appearing in the 56 US daily newspapers monitored by ^{DEPT}INP, excepting UP and AP reports which unuseable by DEPT. DEPT estimates these 56 papers carry over 90 percent of useable reports on Japan in US press. Also been radioing editorial roundups on Japan and magazine material from Army weekly digest of press opinion on occupied areas. This complete digest mailed USIS Shanghai regularly. DEPT will continue efforts to improve press and magazine coverage.

XR
511,20200(D)

2. SCAP publicity prepared primarily for US public and Congress.

Charges in Chinese ~~and Philippine~~ press that US economic policies in Japan constitute threat to their national interests have not generally been considered newsworthy by US press. Hence US reporters in Japan have ignored these charges.

DISTRIBUTION
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3. In absence press material of type needed DEPT renewing effort *provides*
~~obtain from SCAP, FEU and DEPTS of War, Defense and State~~ interpretations

of US

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FORM DS-322
7-18-46

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Department of State

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Washington

-2-

of US policies in Japan attributable to responsible officials and helpful meeting specific criticisms in Far Eastern press. *To this end*

Consideration being given to possible
~~Discussions now progressing on substantial~~ statement by DEPT

official as speech or press release describing US policies toward Japan and effect on neighboring countries. ~~This statement intended as basic information policy in meeting Chinese and Philippine criticisms.~~

*xR
124.94*

45. DEPT asking POLAD for recommendation regarding assignment officer Tokyo who would send Washington and other points for distribution by USIS any facts and interpretations of US policies attributable to SCAP and helping meet specific criticisms in Far Eastern countries.

*xR
593.91294*

56. Do Consulate and EMB consider advisable that DEPT suggest to *ARMY* ~~with Defense Dept~~ that party of Chinese ~~and Philippine~~ editors be invited by SCAP to visit Japan ~~at US expense~~ and observe occupation progress?

Sent Shanghai 227; rptd Nanking 203 for info; Tokyo 37 for info.

*Marshall
(R4B)*

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CODE ROOM: Please repeat to AMEMBASSY Nanking 203 for info; USPOLAD Tokyo 37 for info.

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Mr. Rice*

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1948 FEB 6 PM 8 25

MESSAGE CENTER SECTION
*Cleared with
Mr. [unclear]*

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DCT:MG

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Control 2779

Rec'd February 10, 1948
7:03 a.m.

FROM: Nanking
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 269, February 10, 3 p.m.

For some time we have been getting a very bad press on our policy in Japan. TA KUNG PAO has been one of the principal offenders. Unless we have something to hide in respect of our policies in Japan, we strongly recommend, as suggested in DEPTTEL 227, February 6, 8 p.m., to Shanghai, repeated Nanking as 203, that it would be highly desirable that party of Chinese editors be invited by SCAP to visit Japan at US expense to observe occupation progress. We see where much good and no harm could result from such a visit by influential editors.

Sent Department 269, Amconsul Shanghai 120.

STUART

JMS:ME

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FEB 26 1948

894.00/2-1048

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DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
**UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN**
FEB 24 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Tokyo, Japan, February 11, 1948.

JA
Good despatch
by Lawrence and
Bushner. Suggest
reading in full if
you have time.
Adequately summarized
if you don't.

(Department Use Only)

(with Japanese Minister of Communications.

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to enclose copy of a memorandum of conversation
with Japanese Minister of Communications, Mr. MATSUMOTO
Takizo, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. SUZUKI
Kyoichi, Vice Minister of Communications, and two officers of this
Mission on a number of current political subjects. The major points
of interest were:

1. Cabinet enthusiasm at the announcement made by the United States member to the Far Eastern Commission concerning aid to Japan for achieving self-support (section I).
2. Urgent need for a political party with a platform suitable to the times and excluding the extreme right and left (section III).
3. Impossibility of merger of Liberals and Democrats (section VI).
4. Communist activity in the Communication Workers' Union (Zenkoku Teishin Jugyoin Kumiai) and Central Labor Relations Committee (sections IX and X).
5. Need for defining "strike" in Labor Adjustment Law (section XI).

A summary of the subjects covered is included at the beginning of the memorandum of conversation.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

W. J. Sebald
Acting Political Adviser

Enclosure:
Memorandum of conversation.

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

FEB 24 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Tokyo, Japan, February 11, 1948.

No. 85

CONFIDENTIAL (For Department Use Only)

Subject: Conversation with Japanese Minister of Communications.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

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Sir: I have the honor to enclose copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. MIKI Takeo, Minister of Communications, Mr. MATSUMOTO Takizo, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. SUZUKI Kyoichi, Vice Minister of Communications, and two officers of this Mission on a number of current political subjects. The major points of interest were:

1. Cabinet enthusiasm at the announcement made by the United States member to the Far Eastern Commission concerning aid to Japan for achieving self-support (section I).
2. Urgent need for a political party with a platform suitable to the times and excluding the extreme right and left (section III).
3. Impossibility of merger of Liberals and Democrats (section VI).
4. Communist activity in the Communication Workers' Union (Zenkoku Teishin Jugyoin Kumiai) and Central Labor Relations Committee (sections IX and X).
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Acting Political Adviser

Enclosure: *HH*
Memorandum of conversation.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 85, dated February 11, 1948, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Conversation with Japanese Minister of Communications".

(COPY)

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECTS: United States Announcement Concerning Aid to Japan for achieving self-support; Public Reaction to Prime Minister's Administrative Address; Need for New Political Party; Influential Position of People's Cooperative Party; Arrest of Diet Member; Impossibility of Merger Between Liberals and Democrats; Japanese National Attending Meeting of Provisional Frequency Board; Personnel of Communications Ministry; Comments on Communication Workers' Union and Central Labor Relations Committee; Cabinet Dissatisfaction with Central Liaison Office; Need for Amending Labor Adjustment Law.

PARTICIPANTS: MIKI Takeo, Minister of Communications;
SUZUKI Kyoichi, Vice Minister of Communications;
MATSUMOTO Takizo, Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs;
W. Henry LAWRENCE, Jr., Second Secretary of Mission;
Rolland H. EUSHNER, Third Secretary of Mission.

PLACE: Dinner given at the residence of Foreign Service Officers Lawrence and Bushner, Tokyo, January 29, 1948.

Summary. Minister Miki stated that the announcement made by the United States member to the Far Eastern Commission concerning aid to Japan for achieving self-support had been received with enthusiasm by the Cabinet and that the latter is now considering a five-year plan of rehabilitation. He said that the Prime Minister's administrative address was considered disappointing by most people.

Minister Miki asserted there is urgent need for a political party with a platform suitable to the present times. Both the Minister and Mr. Matsumoto indicated that they are convinced that the People's Cooperative Party occupies an influential position and that the rightists of the Social Democratic Party are more closely allied in aims with this party and the Democratic Party than with the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party.

Mr. Matsumoto stated that the People's Cooperative Party had at first sided with the Liberal Party in disagreeing as to the procedure adopted to bring about the arrest of Mr. Hara, a Liberal Diet Member, who is alleged to be involved in a hoarded goods scandal. Mr. Matsumoto is convinced that there is no possibility of a merger of the Liberal and Democratic Parties at the present time because of personal antagonism between

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Encl. to
Tokyo's 85,
February 11, 1948.

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between the leaders of the two parties.

Minister Miki described attendance of a Japanese national at meetings of the Provisional Frequency Board in Geneva as a forward step for Japan. Mr. Suzuki declared the Ministry is authorized 415,000 positions, but only 5,000 of these are unfilled. However, it has 100,000 more employees than before the war, which he defended on the grounds of increased needs due to lack of equipment plus requirements for maintenance of old and decrepit equipment.

Minister Miki said that the Communists are active in the Communication Workers' Union and are members of the Central Labor Relations Committee. He mentioned the difficulty of getting employers to serve on the Committee and the dissatisfaction of the Cabinet with the Committee for such actions as approving the demand of electrical workers for an average monthly wage of 5,860 yen and a sliding scale of cost of living wage increases. Minister Miki believes the Labor Adjustment Law should be amended to define a strike. End of Summary.

I. Cabinet Reaction to United States
Announcement Concerning Aid
to Japan

has now
Minister MIKI stated that the announcement made by Major General Frank R. McCoy, American Representative to the Far Eastern Commission, regarding the extension of aid to help make Japan self-supporting, had been received with great enthusiasm by the Cabinet. He believes that the fortuitous appearance of the statement in the press in Japan on the same day as the publication of the Prime Minister's Administrative Address has given encouragement that the goals outlined by the Prime Minister will be achieved. The Cabinet has under consideration at this time a plan for economic rehabilitation which involves a fund of two billion dollars over a period of five years. The plan, however, has not as yet been submitted to General Headquarters.

Minister Miki said that members of the Cabinet and other people with whom he has come into contact are gratified at the confidence in Japan which must be felt in America in order to permit such an announcement to be made to the Far Eastern Commission, particularly as Japan has so recently been an enemy country. Minister Miki feels that despite opposition on the part of certain members of the Far Eastern Commission, the United States will find a means of carrying out its announced plan. Minister Miki mentioned China and the Philippines as undoubtedly opposed to the reconstruction of Japan on the scale advocated by the United States; he declared that the Cabinet interprets the announcement as indicating a trend in the United States toward including Japan within the framework of the Marshall Plan, with Japan filling a position in the Far East similar to that of Western Germany in Western Europe.

II. Public Reaction to the Prime Minister's Address

In referring to the Prime Minister's Administrative Address before the Second Session of the Diet (this Mission's despatch No. 52, of January 23, 1948), Minister Miki said that it was well received by thoughtful intelligent people, but was considered disappointing by many members of the Diet and by the people at large. He pointed out that the public had placed great hope in the Katayama Cabinet when it came into power, but considers its achievements to date small. As a result, the popularity of the Cabinet is at a low ebb.

III. Need

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III. Need for New Political Party

In discussing the present political situation, Minister Miki agreed that all political parties are in ferment, being uncertain as to their aims and policies. Members, he asserted, are selfish in placing parties and individuals above the country as a whole. Minister Miki stressed the urgent need for a political party with a platform taking into consideration what is proper for Japan at this particular time in its history. He cited the impracticality of the Liberals in advocating a "laissez-faire" economy and the Social Democrats in advocating socialism. He described the Democratic Party's espousal of "revised capitalism" as enthusiasm for a hollow phrase and an example of an attempt to reach a popular compromise ideology. He implied that Japanese politicians are not motivated by any strong conviction as to basic policies and hence find it easy to shift in practically any direction, depending upon the most expedient means of extending power by forming the most effective vote-getting combination.

IV. Influential Position of People's Cooperative Party

Both Minister Miki and Mr. Matsumoto appeared convinced that the People's Cooperative Party, of which they are both members, occupies an influential position. They indicated that the importance of their Party is evidenced by the endeavors of the major parties to enlist its support. In this connection, Mr. Matsumoto said that he thought it would be a good thing for Japan should there be a split among the Social Democrats. He asserted that the aims of rightists in the Social Democratic Party are much more closely allied with those of the Democratic Party and the People's Cooperative Party than with those of the left-wing Social Democratic Party.

V. Arrest of Diet Member

Mr. Matsumoto said that the Government Section of this Headquarters expressed surprise that the People's Cooperative Party had sided with the Liberals on the question of the Prime Minister's request for permission to effect the arrest of HARA Susumu, Liberal Party Diet Member, who is allegedly involved in a hoarded goods scandal. Mr. Matsumoto stated that he had pointed out to Government Section that the People's Cooperative Party had not sided with the Liberals in an effort to protect Mr. Hara, but because the Party feels that the procedure used in seeking his arrest was incorrect. The original position of the People's Cooperative Party was that the request for arrest should have come from the Attorney-General rather than from the Prime Minister. To a man, Mr. Matsumoto said, the People's Cooperative Party would have voted for the arrest of Mr. Hara, because they are convinced of his guilt. The People's Cooperative Party later reversed its stand on procedure and voted with members of the Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party for approving the Prime Minister's request. The resignation of Mr. Hara and acceptance thereof by the House of Representatives on January 30 made it unnecessary to arrest him in his status of Diet member.

VI. Impossibility of Merger of Democratic and Liberal Parties

Mr. Matsumoto appeared convinced that there is no possibility of a merger between the Liberal and Democratic Parties at the present time because of the deep personal antagonism which exists between Dr. ASHIDA Hitoshi, President of the Democratic Party, and Mr. YOSHIDA

Shigeru,

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Shigeru, President of the Liberal Party. He said that the same personal antagonism exists between Dr. Ashida and Mr. SHIDEHARA Kijuro, who has recently split from the Democratic Party. On the other hand, according to Mr. Matsumoto, Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Shidehara are referred to as the "Siamese twins" of Japanese politics.

VII. Japanese National at Meetings of Provisional
Frequency Board

Mr. SUZUKI said that the Ministry of Communications had been given free rein in the selection of a Japanese national to accompany a representative of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the capacity of technical adviser to the meetings of the Provisional Frequency Board in Geneva (this Mission's despatch No. 71 of February 2, 1948). Mr. HASE Shinichi, the Japanese national designated, was selected for four reasons: (1) his technical knowledge; (2) the fact that he had been working in this field since before the war and has continued since the war; (3) because his rank is high enough to enable him to gain acceptance of his ideas upon his return to Japan; and (4) because he speaks English.

Minister Miki feels that the attendance of a Japanese national at meetings of the Provisional Frequency Board is a forward step for Japan, but expressed disappointment at the censorship of the news of Mr. Hase's departure. He mentioned that photographs had been taken and news articles written, but that only a small notice of the departure was permitted by censors to appear in the press. He agreed, however, that a large amount of publicity might have aroused antagonism on the part of those countries who object to Japanese leaving Japan until after the signing of a Peace Treaty.

VIII. Personnel Strength of Communications
Ministry

Mr. Suzuki declared that the Ministry of Communications is authorized to employ 415,000 employees, but that only 5,000 of these positions are unfilled. Therefore, the Ministry of Communications is facing considerable difficulty, as contrasted with other governmental agencies having a larger proportion of unfilled positions, in preparing for the mandatory cut in the number of government employees, which has been described in this Mission's despatch No. 78 of February 7, 1948, recording a conversation with officials of the Ministry of Labor.

(However, while most government agencies will be required to cut twenty-five per cent of the 1947 fiscal year budget personnel, the number of workers in certain agencies, including the Communications Ministry, will not be arbitrarily reduced, but only after a consideration of the number of individuals essential for the proper functioning of the Ministry. Copy of an article translated from the Nihon Keizai of February 1, 1948 regarding the government's decision to reduce personnel is enclosed.)

The number of authorized positions in the Ministry is approximately 100,000 above the number of people employed prior to the war. Mr. Suzuki defended the need for this additional number on the ground that people had to be used instead of mechanical

equipment

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equipment because of the insufficiency of such equipment, and on the ground that much of the equipment is so old and decrepit that it requires large maintenance crews. As an example, he estimated that the Ministry had 80,000 bicycles before the war, but even though it now has a priority second only to export products, the Ministry has only 60,000 bicycles.

IX. Communists in Communications Workers' Union

Minister Miki said that the communists were active in the Communications Workers' Union (Zenkoku Teishin Jugyoin Kumiai), citing the piling up of mail at Christmas time as one of the instances of sabotage instigated by the communists. When asked if he had ever seen orders in writing of the communist party concerning sabotage, he stated that in so far as he knows, orders are passed by word of mouth.

X. Central Labor Relations Committee

In discussing the Central Labor Relations Committee, Mr. Miki expressed conviction that there are communists among the labor representatives who sit on the committee. He estimated that ordinarily two out of three members of the commission are members of the communist party. According to Minister Miki, the Chairman of the Central Labor Relations Committee has great difficulty in finding employers who will serve on the commission because of the loud and violent tactics of the communists (many of whom sit in the audience) and the fact that no employer wishes to antagonize labor. He indicated dissatisfaction in the Cabinet with the Central Labor Relations Committee. As an example of the reason for such dissatisfaction, he described the demand of the electrical workers for an average monthly wage of 5,860 yen and a sliding scale of increase for the future, both of which had been approved by the Central Labor Relations Committee and presented to the Cabinet on January 29. The decision of the committee to allow a sliding wage index for electrical workers has been previously described by Mr. TSURU Shigeto, Deputy Director of the Economic Stabilization Board, as one of the indications that inflation may get out of hand and lead to a collapse of the entire Japanese economy (this Mission's despatch No. 1486 of December 30, 1947, reporting a conversation with Mr. Tsuru).

XI. Need for Amending Labor Adjustment Law

Minister Miki was of the definite opinion that the Labor Adjustment Law must be amended specifically to define a strike. At present, the definition is so vague, he claims, that no one among the Ministers wishes to take the risk of discharging persons for disciplinary purposes in circumstances which even remotely resemble a strike because of the danger that the situation might later be designated as a strike. Such an event would obviously place any Minister so deciding in a disadvantageous position politically and also would make him liable to a lawsuit.

/s/ W. Henry Lawrence, Jr.

Enclosure:
Article from Nihon Keizai,
February 1, 1948.

/s/ R. H. Bushner

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Tokyo's 85,
February 11, 1948.

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Article from Nihon Keizai, February 1, 1948
(Translation)

GOVERNMENT RELEASES ADJUSTMENT PLAN

The Government, at a recent Cabinet meeting, decided to make a 25 percent horizontal reduction in the number of budget personnel in consideration of the expected administrative readjustment, which is a necessary condition for the compilation of the 1948 fiscal year budget estimates. Since then, the Government has been working on a definite plan. It informally decided upon the plan at a special cabinet meeting held on 27 January and published it yesterday.

According to this new plan, in the general and special accounts 25 percent of the 1947 fiscal year budget personnel, namely 101,000 persons, will be affected by the coming readjustment. However, the number of persons actually affected will be 23,000. The major government offices expected to be readjusted are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, former Home Affairs, Justice, Education, Welfare, Commerce-Industry, and Transportation (only in the general account). In conformity with this plan, these ministries will present their concrete readjustment plans respectively to the Cabinet by 15 February, and the final plan will be decided by the Cabinet by the end of February.

Concerning outdoor employees working in the Transportation Ministry, Communications Ministry, the three bureaus of the Finance Ministry (Monopoly Bureau, Printing Bureau, and Mint), Commerce-Industry Ministry (production of alcohol), and the Agriculture-Forestry Ministry (forest administration alone), another plan will be made on the basis of calculated efficiency and the number of persons needed. This will be discussed by the ministries concerned.

Those who are dismissed will be employed as temporary employees until the end of July, and those who retire from office at once will be paid salaries from their retirement date to the end of July. In this respect, the Finance Ministry will take proper steps in the budget to raise funds for retirement allowances.

The afore-mentioned plan aims at only temporary administrative readjustment and reorganization of government offices necessary for the compilation of the next fiscal budget. The fundamental reform of the administrative organization will be taken up by the Administrative Organization Reform Committee to be established in the Cabinet. The organization of the committee will be decided at the next cabinet meeting, and the committee will begin functioning in February. This administrative readjustment plan is based upon the data as of 1 January. Therefore, in case that government offices are newly established, they will be able to employ necessary personnel irrespective of this basis.

Government to Be Reorganized by Remaining Employees

The Government's announcement: In view of the change of administrative affairs and the complication of the government organization after the surrender, the Government will execute the readjustment of administrative affairs and the simplification of the government organization according to the following plan in order to secure maximum administrative efficiency and to promote sound development of general enterprises.

(1) Keeping

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February 11, 1948.

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(1) Keeping pace with the change in the situation after the surrender, the Government will abolish unnecessary and nonvital administrative offices and rationalize the administrative organization by re-examining administrative affairs under the jurisdiction of each ministry.

(2) The Government will as far as possible remove duplications among departments or boards, secure unity in administrative affairs, and realize clarification of responsibility.

(3) In conformity with the principle of local autonomy, powers of the Central Government will be transferred to local self-governments to the greatest possible extent. At the same time, existing local agencies of the Central Government will undergo a thorough readjustment and will be confined with local bodies as much as possible.

(4) In order to reduce personnel in conformity with the preceding items and to realize the principle of maximum efficiency with a minimum number, the ministries and offices will reduce their staffs, both budgetary and organizational, with 25 percent of the budget personnel as of 1 Jan 49 as a general standard. As for government enterprises such as railways and communications, the degree of reduction will be separately decided on the basis of economy and efficiency. The ministries and offices will reorganize their structures with their remaining staffs.

(5) The measure under the preceding item will not be applied to policemen, firemen, public procurators, judiciary officials, and school teachers.

(6) Officials who will be dismissed under the preceding items will be retained as extras until the end of July. During this period, however, actual dismissals will gradually be realized, while filling of new vacancies and reassignment will be effected with these to-be-discharged officials. If necessary, they may be employed in other offices as extras.

(7) The ministries and offices will formulate their respective plans for reorganization and personnel reduction and will submit them to the Cabinet before 15 February.

(8) A special committee will be set up within the Cabinet to study fundamental reform of the administrative structure.

Remarks: (1) Until a reorganization plan in conformity with the preceding items is finally decided, the measures for preventing increased strengths of government staffs and for checking the filling of vacancies will have continued effect: (2) Public corporations and other organizations acting for the Government, personnel expenses of which are paid from the National Treasury, will be dealt with under the preceding items.

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AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China, February 11, 1948.

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

MAY 18 1948

DC/R

Subject: "Re-Education of Japan Seen a Failure"

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THE HONORABLE
J. LEIGHTON STUART,
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR,
NANKING.

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
FEB 27 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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I have the honor to enclose a transcript of a section of the Central News Agency English Service of January 30, 1948, entitled "Re-Education of Japan Seen a Failure".

This article is considered as having a particular importance since it was composed by a staff member of the official Kuomintang Central News Agency and formed a part of the press handout of that agency. It can thus be regarded as the reflection of the attitude of at least a section of the Chinese Government and as an invitation to the press to carry criticism of our policy in Japan.

The Shanghai Office of USIS reports that it is not being well supplied with American material to combat this anti-American attitude.

Respectfully yours,

John M. Cabot

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Enclosure:

1/ Transcript of Section of Central News Agency English Service, January 30, 1948, entitled "Re-Education of Japan Seen a Failure".

File No. 800
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Original and copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Hectograph and copy to Department.
Copy to Political Adviser, SCAP.

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A true copy of the signed original.

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FEB 13 1948

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 18
dated February 11, 1948, from the
American Consulate General, Shanghai.

CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY
ENGLISH SERVICE

SHANGHAI,
JAN. 30, 1948.

RE-EDUCATION OF JAPAN SEEN A FAILURE
BY JAMES SHEN
(STAFF MEMBER OF CENTRAL NEWS TOKYO BUREAU NOW ON LEAVE)

Hanking, Jan. 30 (Central): Whoever have visited postwar Japan, will agree that despite their political unrest, the Japanese are purposeful and forging ahead. They are "scrambling up" all right, irrepressible as yeast.

And occupation is favorable to the situation. Under occupation, the yeast seethes and ferments.

One may well ask where all this will lead to. The "King Way" or the "Bully Way"? The establishment of a peace-loving democratic nation or the comeback of the sabre-and-stirrup clique?

The answer depends preponderately upon the re-education of the Japanese people.

One may well ask whether General MacArthur has done a successful job, whether his policy has won the hearts of the Japanese people or has alienated them.

If one looks only for surface results, one would say he has done an "excellent" job.

Today Japan enjoys a peace and an order that exist in few other asiatic countries. Well may Japan claim to be one of the few "oases" in Asia -- "thanks to the magnanimous assistance of our American friends."

The occupation authorities have mapped out one plan after another, launched one program after another and introduced one reform after another, in their efforts to "democratize" Japan.

For all this, the Japanese papers are offering a bravura peal of thanks to the American, and are praising General MacArthur - so extravagantly perhaps as they have never done to Emperor Hirohito.

But the Japanese somehow scrape and bow too much. They smile too often. What lies behind the mask of politeness and sauvity which most Americans are finding so charming and tickling?

My experience during the past few months in Japan showed that the Japanese people are past-masters in turning verbal somersaults. They will tell one thing to the Americans and sing quite another tune to the Chinese.

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Thus they would sit at the feet of an American, listening to democratic principles with a beatific face, and at the next moment, would confide to their Chinese "friend" their secret scorn and contempt of the American and harp on the necessity of Sino-Japanese "cooperation".

Their attitude toward the American is one of saccharine adulation and cringing syncopation while their attitude towards the Chinese is one of slimy cordiality not untouched with condescension.

The Japanese certainly know what they want. They are playing ball with the American. They know this is the only way to get what they want.

Thus is juxtaposition with their te-deums to General MacArthur, the Japanese papers from day to day emphasize in lurid colors the various problems facing Japan - its food problem, coal shortage and unemployment question. The "tear-jerkers" they dish out remind one of the crude Domei methods of exaggeration and propaganda.

Thus whichever party assumes the reins of the Government, its guiding principle is one and the same to please the American in order to get as much as possible from them.

The "docility" of the Japanese people, their "readiness to cooperate," their diligence and the strategic importance of Japan-all these have conspired to sway the American authorities in favor of giving defeated Japan a peace treaty more lenient than any other Allied nation advocates.

Perhaps few Allied nations want to treat a defeated nation too harshly. But in being lenient, one at least wants some sort of assurance that that nation will not rise to molest and plunder other nations again.

Now does the U.S. Japan policy contain such an assurance? What kind of long-term results could the occupation policy expect to achieve in Japan?

The answer to these questions pivots upon the re-education of the Japanese people and the leadership they are going to have.

Yet if the occupation authorities have so far failed in one thing, that is in re-education.

As regards Japanese schools, the Americans have changed the educational system but all the weeds and tares of imperialistic hue are still found in text books. And the majority of teachers are men who have been spoon-fed on the "fungus crop" spawned in the miasmatic atmosphere of imperialism and militarism.

-3-

Regarding adult education, there seems to be none, at least, I did not notice any during my six months' stay in Japan. Most Japanese I met are still living in the past. Mentally they have not changed much. All the talks about democracy seem to have left them untouched. One well-educated Japanese said to me bitterly, "Democracy, democracy, all this is nonsense! So far as I know, it has only corrupted the Japanese womanhood, turned wives against husbands!"

One American-returned people's Cooperative Party member in an interview called the Americans "devils who will be kicked out summarily one of these days," putting as much hatred as he could in his voice.

The tragic part is that these people are by no means isolated cases. I have met a lot of them all intellectuals, all in their thirties, some government officials and some possible future leaders. And these are the last people that can be expected to foster the seeds of democracy that the occupation authorities are trying so hard to sow in Japan.

Let us take a look at the postwar Japanese government. They have been largely composed of men whose records are by no means clean. About one-third of the present Diet may be branded as war crime suspects. Most members deeply drenched in the imperialistic way of thinking are still expounding their pet theories about "over population" and the necessity for more elbow room, shutting their eyes to the possibilities of Honshu and Hokkaido, and forgetting that peaceful international trade may solve more problems for Japan than forceful expansion.

So under occupation, Japan has a leadership which may properly be described as the "hangover" of the Empire days. It is not inspired, but intensely nationalistic and like the common people, still attaches itself closely to the Emperor. A leadership which still secretly believes in manifest destiny and at any convenient moment may throw off its mask and show its true color.

To re-educate these people and the millions of repatriates and purgees and to train a new leadership is admittedly a gigantic task which cannot be carried out overnight.

But the fact remains that a dynamic and positive re-education program is urgently called for. And in such a program, men of real understanding, not pretenders and inexperienced neseis (American Japanese) with their fluent English but abysmal ignorance of Japan, are needed. More practical work should be done.

The American's attempt to romanize the Japanese language may be mentioned as one of those jobs which while taken seriously by the Americans, are simply amusing or irritating to the Japanese. To a Chinese, such an attempt is inexplicable.

-4-

Is it necessary to temper with a nation's language which holds rich associations to its own people? A language is like the Ark of Covenant too sacred for any outsider to touch.

Even if the Japanese were romanized, so what? A romanized Japanese language would no more resemble the English than the Chinese to the Greek, and would bring the two peoples no nearer in spirit. Why not channel all this energy into the all important task of changing their ideas?

Unless their mind and heart are changed, militarism would certainly reassert itself at the earliest convenient moment, utilizing the throne as the rally point.

With the exception of the Communist Party, all Japanese parties may be said to be mere hollow shells containing few ideas and less ideals. The difference is in badges, catchwords and shibboleths rather than in anything else. The struggle among them is a struggle for personal power.

But they are one and the same in their determination to save every scrap from the ruins of war and speed up Japan's recovery.

A stroll in the Ginza area in Tokyo will show you why Japan is "scrambling up". In all the shop windows, not one single U.S.-made luxury can be found. All are homemade goods. They said to the American, "We want only food and essential goods." It is these they get.

For years to come, the Japan problem will not be whether Japan will go red.

Japan's comparative peace, the people's intense nationalism, their traditional dislike for Russia and their very petty bourgeois social structure make communism extremely unpopular.

The Communist Party which was granted legal status only after war, reached its summit of power when it threatened a nationwide labor strike last January. General MacArthur nipped the movement in the bud. Since then, especially after the U.S. Government launched its nationwide movement against Un-American activities, the Communist Party has rapidly gone downhill. Its power has been rapidly edged out of trade unions.

For years to come, the Japan problem will be whether Japan will find a proper leadership so that there will not be a resurgence of militarism.

To prevent this, prolonged occupation and high-pressure methods are not sufficient - they would lead only to widespread discontent and finally to explosion. The solution lies only in an enlightened re-education program.

A true copy of
the signed original.

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NOTE: MISTAKES IN ENGLISH IN THE ABOVE TEXT ARE TRANSCRIBED LITERALLY FROM THE ORIGINAL.

NWA

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF ACTION COPY NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

FEB 13 1948

Noted - no action required
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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- Action: FE
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PLAIN

Control 3755

Rec'd February 12, 1948
3:27 p.m.

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 280, February 12.

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 13 1948
DIRECTOR
Department of State

PRAVDA February 10, "Jap right-wing Socialists in service USA" states Katayama Cabinet has taken place among lackeys USA capital. Basis policy betrays and rejects socialism. Cringing of Socialists before Jap "Democrats" caused Ashida to state Democrats had tamed Socialists in order halt workers offensive. This policy appeals to American bosses, but aroused anger masses. Abolition four-part agreement was maneuver raised Socialist authorities with workers. Inflation has reached catastrophic proportions but government does not combat it. Campaign against Communists is most treacherous act which attempts conceal bankruptcy Socialists. Communist leader Nosaka stated Socialists degenerated to level Liberals and Democrats, consistent betrayal of national interest by right Socialists has one result: undermining demilitarization democratization Japan.

Department pass Tokyo as Moscow's 20.

SMITH

Note: Repeated Tokyo 2/12/48, 5:30 p.m. (FMH)

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FEB 24 1948

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

No. 90

UNCLASSIFIED

Tokyo, February 12, 1948.
**DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS**
FEB 25 1948

DC/R

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Preliminary Study of the Neighborhood Associations of Japan.

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose five copies of a report dated January 23, 1948 prepared by the Civil Information and Education Section of this Headquarters concerning the background, wartime activity, and postwar abolition of the neighborhood associations of Japan.

The study is primarily an analysis of structure and functioning of the tonarigumi, or neighborhood associations. The report states that the abolition of the wartime system of neighborhood groups was virtually complete by June 1947 and that the working of the new system has been sufficiently smooth to satisfy Home Ministry officials, who earlier had expressed the fear that the abolition of neighborhood organizations would disrupt severely the economic life of the nation.

Enclosure:

Study of Neighborhood Associations, January 23, 1948, prepared by the Civil Information and Education Section, GHQ, SCAP. (Five copies).

R Finn:cgf

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DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MAR - 4 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
American Embassy
London, February 17, 1948

AIR MAIL

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 418

Subject: Transmitting Editorial from Times on
Japanese Political Parties

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1948 FEB 25 PM 12 03

The Honorable
Secretary of State,
Washington

Sir:

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1948 FEB 19 1948
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COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION

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1. As of possible interest to the Department,
I have the honor to transmit a clipping of an editorial
from the February 16, 1948, issue of The Times on the
subject "Parties in Japan".

2. The editorial was prompted by the recent
resignation of Mr. Katayama as Japanese Prime Minister,
an event which received only minor attention in the
British press. The editorial explains the diffi-
culties under which Mr. Katayama labored, and lists
various factors which may have contributed to his
downfall, not the least of which appears to have been
the withdrawal from Mr. Katayama of the support
hitherto accorded him by the Socialist Wing of the
Socialist Democratic Party.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:

Everett F. Drumright
Everett F. Drumright
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:
Clipping, as stated

(Original and three copies to the Department)
Copy to U.S. Political Adviser, SCAP, Tokyo

EFDrumright/wg

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MAR 16 1948

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OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
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