

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 416

PLACE: Tokyo
DATE: 17 Nov 45

Division of Origin: Military Analysis.

Subject: Supply of Japanese Ground Armies.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Lt Col IWAKOSHI, Shinroku, who was graduated from the Military Staff College in 1938; was staff officer of 9th Division in China from February to August 1939, was staff officer attached to 6th Army in Manchuria from August 1939 to July 1940 and took part in the border incident with Russia during that time. Since July 1940 has been in GHQ as a staff officer on communications (supply).

Where interviewed: Meiji Bldg, Rm 238.

Interrogator: Col J. F. Rodenhauser

Interpreter: Mr MAKI, Itsu

Allied Officers Present: Lt Comdr W. J. McCluskey, USNR
Captain J. M. Ambrose
Lt T. T. Pinkstaff

SUMMARY

Lt Col IWAKOSHI delivered four documents which he had prepared in accordance with a request by Col Rodenhauser at a previous interrogation on Monday, 12 November 1945. The charts were explained in detail and are identified as follows:

1. Supply System to the Overseas Forces (Not included in this publication)
2. Demand and Supply of Munitions . (Appended)
3. Data for Decision of Supply quantity. (Not included in this publication)
4. Map of Southwest Pacific showing Defense Positions which the Japanese were compelled to hold. (Not included in this publication.)

To direct questioning on the failure of Japanese logistics, Col IWAKOSHI made the following statements. Japan underestimated the resourcefulness and capabilities of the United States to recover from the initial crippling blows; The Japanese thought they would have more time to develop the resources of the south and prepare for defense of that area. The Army placed too much importance and hope in psychology instead of materials for the combat troops. The Japanese supply system began to prove itself inadequate to support the war it faced when U.S. forces landed on Guadalcanal. Lack of raw materials, loss of shipping, and finally loss of industry through B-29 raids were most important in logistics failure. He further stated that he could not understand why we failed to destroy the rail transportation system in Japan proper with our B-29's raids, as any crippling of the coal supply system would have brought industry to a standstill much earlier; practically all coal moved by rail to facilities in Japan.

RESTRICTED

416-1



SUMMARY CONT'D:

To the question of what improvements in the Japanese supply system he would recommend, he stated that GHQ and the War Ministry were not very well in balance, that more power should be given to the supplying agency responsible for providing the where-with-all to fight a war. Coordination should be made better than it has been and a readjustment between the Army and Navy should be made. One head should be responsible for and run the organization from the top. The War Ministry should have more power.

I N T E R R O G A T I O N

- Q. (Referring to Document #1) What about the use of Rabaul as a supply base?
- A. Rabaul was a main supply depot or base for this area. For the Buna operations it was the main depot.
- Q. Were supplies from Manchuria used to supply this southern area?
- A. Yes, there were shipments from Manchuria to the south.
- Q. Was there shipment of supplies from the homeland (Japan) to Manchuria?
- A. Yes, there was such shipment by water to the mainland and then by rail to Nanking, the main depot.
- Q. Then supplies moved from the homeland to all of these depots, and in some cases supplies moved from Manchurian Depots to the south when they could have been shipped direct from the homeland.
- A. Yes, by order of the control depot, shipment was made to the south from Manchuria.
- Q. Did Manchuria supply considerable quantities to the south?
- A. In 1941 and 1942 most shipments were made from Manchuria, because there was a store of munitions in Manchuria which had been made ready in case of war with Russia. Therefore, a large quantity of stores were kept there in 1941 and 1942.
- Q. Explanation of Document #2; these two columns running horizontally across top of chart indicate which section or area was considered most important in the first half of any given war year and which section or area was considered most important in the second half of the year.
- Q. Is this only for munitions as the heading suggests, or is it for everything?
- A. It is for everything - food, supplies, ammunition, etc.
- Q. Does this chart show the shipments from the homeland only?
- A. Mostly shipments from the homeland, but in 1941 and 1942 most shipments were made from Manchuria.
- Q. What does he mean by "ship ton"? Does he mean weight or space?
- A. He means space. The blank space in 1943 was the same as the year before; so nothing could be given here. (Pointing to part of chart).
- Q. Explanation of Document #3: This describes the most important area for supplies. This shows the date of issuance of orders - when the order was issued - what kind of action was taken based on this operation. In October 1942 this (pointing to chart) area was most important for supplies.
- Q. In October 1942 that was considered the most important area for supplies.
- A. Yes. These dotted lines show the number of divisions - one dotted line indicates one division.
- Q. If any division moved out of an area, such movement would be indicated by a perpendicular line?
- A. Yes, black dot means division came into area, and the small open circle means division left a certain area.

- Q. If I count these dotted lines in any column, would they indicate to me how many divisions were in the field at any given time?
- A. Below this line (indicating China) these lines indicate the divisions in the various places at various times. Above "China" not much shipment, and not much importance was placed on it.

Note: At this point Colonel Rodenhauer presented a typewritten list of seven questions to Col IWAKOSHI to study and answer. The questions together with the answers and discussion are listed below.

- Q. When, from your experience, did your supply system begin to prove inadequate to support the war it faced?
- A. Since the landing of the American forces on Guadalcanal Island.
- Q. Which of the following factors account for the inadequacy of your supply system during the war?
- a. Poor initial planning by top command.
 - b. Lack of proper reserves with which to start a war of such magnitude.
 - c. Under-estimation of the resourcefulness and capabilities of the United States to recover from the initial crippling blows.
 - d. Too many islands and other points to supply.
 - e. Inefficient operation of the supply system due to inexperienced, untrained personnel.
 - f. Inadequate transportation facilities from the beginning.
 - g. Failure of industry to produce what it was called on to produce.
- A. I want to explain something in connection with this question before I answer it. To begin with, when war broke out, General Staff thought that prospective operations would be finished within a year. Then they thought that strength of forces would be readjusted and munitions would be fully prepared to meet the attack of the enemy. Within that period they thought that raw materials could be brought to the homeland from the south, for instance, rubber and oil--these materials could be brought in from the south during this period and that they would be fully prepared in a year to meet the attack of the enemy. The General Staff thought --they were confident enough--they could do that, but contrary to their expectations the counter-attack of the enemy came earlier than they expected. I think, therefore, that of these factors "c" is the most important, and next comes "a". I do not believe that "e" is pertinent because our armies were trained in China - already they had experience.
- Q. In regard to "e" I was not thinking of the fighting men but of the supply men - the men who worked in the depots handling the supplies in large quantities.
- A. These men were well trained, because they had had much experience. Toward the end of the war, efficiency became low because the skilled labor had been drafted and only unskilled labor remained.
- Q. Where do you place the last two: "f" and "g"?
- A. At the beginning of the war they did not take into consideration such a big loss from submarines, and at the end of the year they had thought that a considerable number of ships could be returned to the people. But that was their failure: their expectations. Toward the middle of 1943 failure of industry became apparent and, in addition to that, loss of vessels became great; therefore, raw materials from the south did not come in. Toward the middle of 1943 there was apparatus enough to make things but raw materials were scarce -- at that time air raids were not so great. But since air raids became great, factories and machines and all these had been destroyed. So it developed that, although we had some

raw materials, we couldn't produce because of that loss by air raids. With reference to "g", the attack from the air by B-29 was fatal. It seems strange that communication equipment was not destroyed so much as factories or machines -- very strange.

- Q. By communications do you mean railroads?
- A. Yes. If there was as much destruction of railroads as of factories failure of industry would have come earlier.
- Q. That is a very important point to bring out in this discussion.
- A. (Referring to a sketch of Japanese homeland which he drew up very hastily) This shows coal which was used in factories in the eastern area and the western area. The homeland is divided into parts like this. For the western part, factories were fed by coal from Kyushu and also coal from Manchuria to Kyushu. Factories in the northern part of the homeland received coal from Hokkaido. If these communication lines were destroyed by air raids, failure of production would have come earlier.
- Q. In other words, we didn't wipe this ferry between Hokkaido and Honshu out early enough, and you feel we should have dropped H.E. instead of fire bombs on the industrial areas?
- A. Yes, the ferry was attacked by your Naval Task Force and the loss was great. There were 21 ships (ferries) here, but on account of the attack nineteen of these were sunk leaving only two. Moji and Shimonoseki were very important ports in the south, and fortunately they were not destroyed. We attached great importance to that area. We were afraid they would be destroyed by air raids. 70% of shipping from Hokkaido is coal and from Kyushu 75% is coal. First we shipped much coal by vessel, but toward the end of the war no shipping was available; so transportation by rail became very great. If the railroad had been destroyed by air raids, losses would have been greater and failure of industry quicker.
- Q. What about the tunnel under the Shimonoseki Straits?
- A. At both ends of the tunnel were exhaust pumps. If these pumps had been destroyed the water in the tunnel could not be pumped out and we couldn't have used it. (Col IWAKOSHI drew a rough sketch of the tunnel to illustrate his points).
- Q. How much coal from Kyushu came through the tunnel as compared to water shipments?
- A. When the big boats could be easily moved through Shimonoseki Strait most of the shipments were made on water. Because of mines, big boats had been sunk, so they had to rely on small vessels of 100 tons; so shipping became very slow, and rail had to be used more and more.
- Q. How do you account for the better state of supply of the Japanese armies on Iwo Jima and Okinawa as compared to the armies in the Philippines?
- A. In October 1943 plans had been mapped out for the supply of munitions in the Philippines, and according to these plans accumulation of supplies in the Philippines would have been completed by the spring of 1944. During a six months period they thought they could accumulate expected amounts of munitions in the Philippines. This was based on our judgement of the conditions of the enemy during this period -- that is, from October 1943 to spring 1944. The enemy would land in the Philippine Islands - the direction of the attack being what we called "MAKASSAR" - from New Guinea to the Philippines. Judgement was also made on Admiral Nimitz' fleet carrying troops from the eastern islands directly to the Philippines - this was called "NIMITZ ATTACK" by us. We also thought of the possibilities of attack from Burma in the direction of the Philippines.

Based on this we figured large quantities of munitions as well as strong forces would be necessary in the Philippines to meet these attacks. We thought you would make these attacks on the Philippines in order to cut our supply lines between the South and Japan. There was also another reason for expecting your attack in the Philippines -- General MacArthur of your Army had spent much time in the Philippines; therefore, we thought that the Philippines would be the center of our decisive battles. We did not take into consideration possibilities of attack from Australia, as we didn't think much of it. We, therefore, planned how to send as much material as possible to the Philippines to build up our strength in munitions and forces to meet the expected attacks. However, due to the considerable loss of transport vessels, such plans failed -- we did not get the expected results. Actual shipment began to be made after June 1944, and your forces landed in the Philippines in October 1944. Only 60% of the planned shipping was made--too late: 60% was actually sent although we had planned more. Due to your landing, Japan had to send great strength toward that direction, and transportation of troops was heavy as compared with shipment of munitions. There was a very "hot" discussion in General Staff Headquarters over this -- it being felt that much more importance should be attached to sending munitions instead of forces.

Q. Did that discussion take place before the actual landing of U.S. troops in the Philippines?

A. Yes

Q. Since all of this equipment was sent in such a rush at the last minute, wasn't there considerable confusion when supplies reached shore as to knowing where they were and where they were needed?

A. Yes, there was much confusion. For example, in Leyte Island when munitions arrived at Ormoc, because of poor roads, they could not be sent by trucks--so although they landed munitions, they could not be sent to the field where the actual fighting was taking place.

Q. In other words you could not supply your fighting men because of a lack of transportation?

A. Yes.

Q. --Did General Yamashita ask for more equipment than had been allotted to him by GHQ.

A. There was no demand from General Yamashita, I am sure, but there was a demand from the 35th Army in Cebu. The Japanese are trained so that after there are no more munitions they continue to fight -- that was customary for the Japanese Army--so therefore, they did not demand for more munitions to be sent, but actually they were in distress.

Q. Was General Yamashita consulted by GHQ on his requirements for the defense of the Philippine Islands, or did he have to go through Field Marshall Terauchi when asking for supplies?

A. Yes, General Yamashita would have to go through channels. In emergency they could have made demand direct from that place to GHQ.

Q. Did they do it?

A. They had been instructed that way. At first they did not take that course, but later distress was great, became greater, they directly demanded supplies.

Q. When was that?

A. After November 1944.

Q. After U.S. troops had landed in the Philippines?

A. Yes

Q. Why did the Japanese fail to build the Philippines into a large base for supplies?

A. We greatly felt the need of building the Philippines into a large base of supplies, but because of the shortage of vessels we could not materialize the plan. Also this factor must be considered: in the Philippines they had no factories where they could make things. In order to produce, we would have to send machines. That was very difficult; so that was the main reason for failing to build up the Philippines.

Q. You couldn't make enough in the homeland to send supplies to the Philippines?

A. Although they had the idea of sending munitions to the Philippines, they thought the attack would be later, but in reality it came earlier than they expected. At the beginning they thought they could send back troops from the Philippines to the homeland because they had success in their operations, but after the American Army landed in Guadalcanal everything failed, you see. Their plans were betrayed.

Q. In addition to those things, was there another reason why you did not put supplies in the Philippines — because you were short of supplies and needed them elsewhere?

A. They first planned to supply plenty of materials to the southern areas and then to the Philippines. There was a change in importance in taking hold of positions. They attached much importance to this line but it was broken down and they had to retreat to this line. That line was also destroyed; so they again retreated to this line. (NOTE: Defensive positions which Japanese were to hold were indicated on Document #4 by Col IWAKOSHI as follows: #1 — Solomons (including Port Moresby on New Guinea and Guadalcanal); #2 — Admiralties, New Britain, north coast of New Guinea, Buna, etc.; #3 — Line from Truk to northwest coast of New Guinea (including Hollandia & Wewak)

Q. What items did the armies in the field continually and urgently ask for in the highest priority?

A. It varies in different localities. It is explained by the chart which I have given you.

Q. As a staff and supply officer, what do you consider as the greatest shortcomings in the Japanese supply system? What improvements would you recommend?

A. As a background for what I shall say I would like to state that the tactical idea of the Japanese Army was to blame; that is to say they attached too much importance to the psychological side as compared with the material side of war. Material side of war was neglected and only the mental side of war was stressed. That was the background of the shortcomings of the system. Coordination of the supply power and the command to be supplied — these two things were not very well balanced. As for supply power, the War Ministry is responsible for the production of things; as for the amount to be used, the General Staff always takes care of that. The General Staff office and the War Ministry are not very well in balance. We ought to give more power to the War Ministry. The War Ministry should have a voice in the method of operations.

Q. In other words, you feel that they should know the strategic plan far enough ahead of time to get the necessary materials produced?

- A. Yes, that should be corrected - that was the chief "root of evil". This is proved by the fact that First Vice-chief of the General Staff became commissary general, but toward the end of the war he was replaced by Vice Minister of War. Then the head of supply shifted from the General Staff to the War Minister -- the Vice minister became the Commissary General.
- Q. Then toward the end of the war it was organized as you would like to see it?
- A. Yes. I would say coordination should be better than it used to be. Also readjustment should be made between the Army and the Navy.
- Q. You mean you feel these should all be under one head?
- A. Yes, they should be ~~one~~. Because of these two heads, there was confusion and conflict. Supply and demand was not very well adjusted.
- Q. The Army and Navy by law, right and custom could go direct to the Emperor, couldn't they?
- A. The idea would be only one head would be there - instead of two heads going to the same place.
- Q. In your opinion which weapon of the United States caused the greatest disruption of your system of supply?
- A. In 1942 and 1943, your submarines destroyed the supply system. In 1944 towards the middle of 1944, airplanes caused great damage. In the homeland, as well as in the islands, production was starved by air raids. On the sea, submarines destroyed the transportation; so I pick these two weapons of war - submarine and airplane. Particularly on the ground the enemy fighting planes attacked the Japanese trucks and they couldn't move fast particularly in the operational area; so they had to transport at night instead of in the daytime to diminish the loss.
- Q. Which was the most important - the air attack on shipping or on industry?
- A. I cannot reply to that question in terms of quantity, but I think that the destruction of factories by air raids in the homeland was greater than the destruction of boats on the water.
- Q. Do you feel that shipping was still the more important of the two as far as stopping of the war was concerned?
- A. I believe that was also great in its effect to hasten the termination of the war -- particularly the difficulty in getting raw materials from the south -- oil, rubber, tin and bauxite. Immediately before the termination of the war, although we still had some vessels, these boats could not be operated at all on account of the shortage of oil.
- Q. When you appreciated that the homeland would be attacked by air, what efforts did you make toward dispersion of your depots?
- A. Such dispersion of materials took place because of the air raids. We started in October of 1944. Part of it was carried out at the beginning of last year.
- Q. Did that disrupt transportation of supplies?
- A. Yes, very much disruption on account of it. Trucks were mobilized so that civilian goods could not be transported at all.
- A. To what extent did that delay transportation of supplies?
- A. There was a delay in time as well as confusion. Certain things should have been sent to certain points instead of sending them here they sent them somewhere else. It was all confused. They had much difficulty in adjustment.

YEAR		1941 (Dec. Only)				
AREA, Importance of Supply	First Half					
	Latter Half					
Demand & Supply		DEMAND	SUPPLY		DEMAND	
AREA			Actual Shipment	Actual Arrival	Especially Scarce	
TOTAL					Actual Shipment	
TOTAL		199,000	650,000	650,000	5421000	4284000
CHISHIMA ISLS. (Incl. Aleutians)						280000 Provis. 40% Coal 30% Ammo 10% Other 20%
MANCHURIA & KOREA		178000	160000 Provis 50% Ammo 20% Other 30%	160000		2400000 Provis 10% Mach 20% Raw Mat 30% Other 40%
RYUKU & FORMOSA						22000 Ammo 10% Cloth 20% Oil C. 30% Other 40%
PHILIPPINES			200000 Gasol 30% Ammo 15% Prov 30% Other 25%	200000		890000 Ammo 10% Gasol 10% Prov 20% Other 60%
BURMA						110000 Ammo 20% Prov 10% Gasol 10% RR Mat 30% Other 30%
INDO-CHINA, TAI, MALAY, JAVA SUMATRA & BORNEO			270000 Gasol 30% Ammo 25% Other 45%	270000		650000 520000 Oil C. 20% Ref Oil Instr 40% Other 40%
MARSHALL, KALORIN, & MARIANNA ISLS.			10000 Prov 30% Ammo 10% Other 60%	10000		42000 52000 Prov 40% Other 60%
BISMARCK & SOLOMON ISLS						400000 450000 Prov 30% Ammo 2% Gasol. 20% Other 48%
						110000 122000 Prov 30% Ammo 2% Gasol 20% Other 48%
CHINA		21000	20000 Ammo 20% Ord 10% Cloth 10% Other 50%	20000		260000 180000 Ammo 10% Ord 20% Gasol 20% Other 50%

DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF MUNITIONS -

1942		1943						
BURMA								
ALBUJUTANS, SOLOMONS		SOLOMONS, HALMAHERA						
SUPPLY		SUPPLY						
Actual Arrivals	Especially Scarce	DEMAND	Actual Shipment	Actual Arrivals	Especially Scarce	DEMAND	Actual Shipment	
4120000		9494000	8139000	6730000		5080000	4213000	
360000	A.A. Ammo Fortification Mat Coal for Heating	1100000	900000 Prov 30% Coal 20% Ammo 20% Cem 10% Oth 20%	720000	AA Ammo Fortification (Cemt,) Timber	510000	410000 Prov 30% Ammo 20% Cem 10% Tim 15% Oth 25%	
1900000		1580000	1260000 Prov 10% Mach 30% R Mat 30% Oth 30%	1200000		840000	630000 Prov 10% Mach 30% R Mat 35% Oth 25%	
20000		44000	35000 Ammo 20% Oil 25% Oth 55%	30000		790000	710000 Prov 30% Ammo 20% Cement & Timber 15% Weapon 10% Other 25%	
560000		390000	620000 Ammo 5% Arms 20% Gasol 10% Prov 20% Other 45%	500000	Trucks Gasoline Cement Oil Can	1260000	1200000 Ammo 5% Truck 10% Cement 15% Prov 30% Other 40%	
100000		2700000	190000 Ord 5% Gasol 10% Coal 15% Ammo 10% Oth 60%	150000	RR Mater AA Ammo	240000	168000 Ord 5% Ammo 2% Gasol 10% Coal 20% Oth 63%	
500000		590000	530000 Oil 20% R Oil 40% Cemt 5% Prov 10% Oth 25%	450000	Trucks	570000	400000 Gasol 20% Cemt 5% Ammo 10% Prov 40% Oth 25%	
40000		120000	94000 Prov 40% Ammo 20% Oth 40%	80000		320000	290000 Prov 60% Ammo 10% Cemt 10% Oth 20%	
	Landing Craft Vacuum	2300000	2200000 Prov 40% Ammo 1% Gasol 15% Arms 5% Oth 39%	1800000	Oil Can Gasoline Ldg Craft Med Supl	120000	114000 Prov 70% Gasol 20% Other 10%	
100000	Ldt Craft	2300000	2100000 Prov 40% Ammo 1% Gasol 20% Oth 39%	1600000	Oil Can Gasoline Ldg Craft Med Mat erials	240000	166000 Prov 60% Gasol 20% Cemt 5% Other 15%	
180000		300000	210000 Ammo 10% Ord 15% Gasol 15% Oth 60%	200000	Gasoline	190000	125000 Ammo 5% Gasol 10% Oth 85%	

1944		1945 (To July)				REMARKS
PHILIPPINES, RYUKU MARIANNAS, FORMOSA		HOMELAND, KOREA				1. Unit of Number Ship Ton- nage
PHILIPPINES (LEYTE)						
SUPPLY		SUPPLY				2. Actual Shipment: Demand
Actual Arrivals	Epecially Scarce	DEMAND	Actual Shipment	Actual Arrival	Epecially Scarce	
2830000		920000	688,000	350000		3. <u>Actual Arrival</u> <u>Act Shipment</u> Indicates sin- ing ratio, roughly
350000	Ammo for Anti Air Anti Tank Materials					
600000	Gasoline	210000	188000 Prov 10% Mach 40% RMat 30% Other 20%	150000	Gasoline	
500000	Anti tank Materials Explosives AT Mines Sig Instr	710000	500000 Ammo 20% Prov 30% OilC 10% Oth 40%	200000	Explosives	
600000	Gasoline Food Vacuum Tubes					
100000	Explosives					
200000	Trucks					
200000	Explosives AA Amo Cement Vacuum Tubes					
80000	Gasoline Ldg Craft					
100000	Oil Can Gasoline Ldg Craft					
100000	Oil Can Gasoline					