JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

Ministry of Finance

LO 335 6 March 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Use of National Defence Contributions For Relief and Welfare Services.

1. Reference is made to the following memoranda:

(1) Our Memorandum dated 5 January 1946, subject: "Endowments from the National Defence Contributions and other similar Contributions to create an institution for scientific research". (C.L.O. 43 (2.1)

(2) Memorandum of your Headquarters dated January 1946, subject: "Disposition of Defence Contribution Funds" (AG 120 (21 Jan 46) ESS/FI)

2. As we have stated to your Headquarters in the reference memorandum (1), 757 million yen of the National Defence Contributions which were voluntarily given to the armed forces during the war still remained on hand when the war terminated in August of last year. (Exact figures for the former army and navy are given in the Inclosure 1 attached hereto.) However, the armed forces having been totally dissolved and the original purpose for which the contributions were made having disappeared. This large amount of funds must be disposed of by the Government in some equitable way that will not only satisfy the contributors but will also benefit the nation at large. The use of these funds for an endowment to create a research institution was disapproved in the reference memorandum (2) and the Government after much deliberation, has come to the following decision.

We propose to appropriate 200 million yen of these contributions for expenses necessary to carry out urgent relief measures for the needy, as a provisional step to realize the relief andwelfare plan which our Government has already submitted to your Headquarters in the memorandum of the Central Liaison Office, dated 31 December 1945, subject: "Relief and Welfare Plans", pursuant to your memorandum of your Headquarters, dated 8 December 1945 subject: "Relief and Welfare Plan" (AG 044 (8 Dec 45) GD.).

With regard to the urgent relief measures of the needy, the Government decided a plan on December 15, 1945 which we propose to follow in the use of these funds. Details of this plan are given in the inclosure 2 attached hereto.

3. We believe that the appropriations of 200 million yen for these purposes will be in perfect agreement with the wishes of the contributors, so that we believe this step is one of the most desirable ways to use the remaining funds of these contributions.

4. As for the 557 million yen which will still remain on hand after the appropriation has been made, we are contemplating to use it for some equally appropriate purpose which we will submit for your approval at a future date.

5. Your approval of our plan is requested.

FOR THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE

N. Kiuchi, Councillor.

Inclosure 1.

JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

INCLOSURE 1

RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARMED FORCES SINCE THE CHINA INCIDENT

ITEMS	Receipts	Disbursements	Remainder
(1) Army:	¥1,188,154,958	¥657,600,341 9*	¥530,554,617/66
(2) Navy:	1,024,404,134 2/6	738,287,638	227,116,493/6
TOTAL	2,215,559,092	1,455,887,979	757,671,117

Note

1. National Defence Contributions of the Army includes ¥ 37,932,107 of miscellaneous contributions of which ¥ 8,532,371 has been disbursed, leaving a balance of ¥ 29,399,733 on hand.

2. For further explanation of the nature of these contributions, reference is made to the reference memorandum (1).

3. These contributions are now under the custody and jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.

* Given in previous report.

JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

Enclosure No. 2

OUTLINE OF THE URGENCY MEASURES FOR THE RELIEF OF

NEEDY PERSONS

(Decided on by the Cabinet Council,
Dec. 15, 1945)

In view of the postwar conditions in the country, for those who are especially in needy circumstances, urgency relief measures will be taken as follows to meet the immediate needs of situation:

1. The present relief shall be extended to the needy persons in general and those who are included in the following categories and are in needy conditions.

1. Unemployed
2. War sufferers
3. Repatriates
4. Families whose heads are abroad
5. Wounded and disabled ex-servicemen and their families and bereaved families.

2. The relief will be administered in the following ways according to the actual living conditions of those in need of relief.

1. Expansion of facilities for lodging, food supply, and medical aids.
2. Supplying of clothing, bedding, and daily necessaries.
3. Supplying of foodstuffs
4. Vocational guidance
5. Supply or loan of materials for the productions of consumers goods for home consumption.

3. The relief shall be administered by the mayors of cities, the chiefs of towns, villages, or wards on the programme made by each prefectural government, with the cooperation on the chief of town council, the community council, social welfare commissioners and social welfare organizations.

4. Relief expenditure

The fund already in existence will be appropriated in accordance with the provisions of the present decision, and additional expenditure will be paid from other sources specially to be instituted.

Remarks.

(1) In the execution of the provisions of the present decision as is will be laid, for the present, on the six big cities and localities where large numbers of repatriates are residing.

(2) In the execution of the provisions of the decision, social welfare commissioners throughout the country will be especially instructed to give their full and positive co-operation, in order to see their object effectively carried out.

Inclosure 1.

JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

Enclosure

AN OUTLINE OF DETAILS OF RELIEF AND WELFARE PLANS

1. Relief is to be given, as a rule, at the home of a family requiring relief, but, in the case of a person who required accommodation and protection, he will be given access to a housing establishment run by a social welfare enterprise or to other institutions intended for such accommodation.

2. To person requiring additional supplies of food, substitute food and such subsidiary food as fresh fish and vegetables, will be provided free of charge or at reduced prices, with a view to ensuring to them the calories necessary for maintaining the minimum standard of living.

This supplementary distribution of food is to be made at places of work by way of encouraging work, as well as at homes.

3. With regard to persons who require the provision of cooked food, those who dine at eating-houses by dint of "dining-out tickets" will be enabled to dine free of charge or at reduced prices. Steps will also be taken to encourage communal feeding at the places where persons requiring relief live in a body and at the employment houses or similar institutions maintained for the sake of such persons.

4. Persons requiring relief in the form of clothing, bedding, cooking utensils and other articles necessary for living will be provided with them free of charge or at reduced prices. Such articles are to be obtained by purchasing on the general market or in the locality concerned. In the dispensation of the relief, priority will be given to the more needy of repatriated and war victims.

5. Persons requiring housing accommodation will be accommodated in public housing establishments or similar institutions. In the case of persons who require monetary aid in regard to house rent, such will be given within the limits of a reasonable house rent.

6. Persons requiring medical treatment (including maternity care) will be given the benefit of hospitals, medical practitioners, pharmaceutists, mid-wives, etc., and travelling clinics will be made available to them, so that they may obtain medical treatment free of charge or at reduced cost. Arrangements will also be speedily made for the distribution of home-use medicines.

7. In order to enable persons requiring relief to engage in work, the following steps will be taken:

(1) In the case of persons suitable for engagement in agriculture, coal digging, public works, etc., the necessary funds and articles will be given, so that they may be enabled either single or in a body to engage in work.

(2) To persons requiring aid in the procurement of vocational tools and instruments, minor capital funds, etc., such will be given or lent.

(3) In addition to the above, efforts will be made to utilize and increase establishments for giving vocational guidance, employment houses, co-operative workships, etc. Sidework at home will also be encouraged.

8. In the case of persons with mental or physical incapacity, there will be established vocational-guidance institutions, employment houses, co-operative workshops, etc. of a special character, and special protection will be afforded them in regard to their engagement in work.

9. Monetary grants will be made to supply the deficit when the measures mentioned under the preceding paragraphs are not sufficient to meet the required cost of living.

Inclosure 1.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 091.4 (27 Feb 46) PH/GS/GA/GD
(SCAPIN - 775)

APO 500
27 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Public Assistance.

1. With reference to C.L.O. Memorandum 1484(1.1), dated 31 December 1945, subject: "Relief and Welfare Plans", there is no objection to the Imperial Japanese Government proceeding with the proposed plan altered to conform to the following conditions:

a. The Imperial Japanese Government to establish a single National Governmental agency which through Prefectural and local governmental channels will provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care equally to all indigent persons without discrimination or preferential treatment.

b. Not later than 30 April 1946 financial support and operational responsibility for this program to be assumed by the Imperial Japanese Government and thereafter not to be rendered or delegated to any private or quasi-official agency.

c. Within the amount necessary to prevent hardship, no limitation to be placed on the amount of relief furnished.

2. The Imperial Japanese Government will submit the following reports to this Headquarters:

a. Copies of all legislation and instructions issued by the Imperial Japanese Government to accomplish the terms of this directive.

b. Commencing with the period March 1946, a monthly report delivered by the 25th day of the following month stating the number of families and individuals granted assistance and the amount of funds expended by Prefecture.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

B. M. FITCH,
Brigadier General, AGD
Adjutant General.

Inclosure 2.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500

AG 091.4 ( ) ESS/FI

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Defense Contribution Fund for Relief and Welfare Works

1. Reference is made to memorandum from the Imperial Japanese Government, CLO No. 1203 (2.1), dated 14 March 1946, subject: "Use of National Defense Contributions for Relief and Welfare Works (L0335)," and attached memorandum from Ministry of Finance, dated 6 March 1946, same subject.

2. The proposal to appropriate ¥ 200,000,000 from the remaining balance of war-time contributions for national defense relief measures is approved. Expenditure of these funds will be made in accordance with provisions of memorandum, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for Imperial Japanese Government, AG 091.4 (27 Feb 46) PH/GS/GA/GD, dated 27 February 1946, subject: "Public Assistance," with particular reference to paragraph 1 a which states generally that aid will be furnished to all indigent persons without discrimination or preferential treatment.

3. It is understood that the remaining balance of the above mentioned fund after the transfer of ¥200,000,000 is ¥655,763,697 which consists of contributions of ¥7,517,546 for scientific research, ¥91,575,038 for servicemen's welfare and ¥556,671,113 remaining in the National defense fund proper. There will be no objection to transferring the above balance to the General Account of the Government, using it for relief purposes and reporting the transfer.

4. In event the Imperial Japanese Government desires to use the remaining balance of these funds for purposes other than relief, a plan for such expenditure will be forwarded for approval as indicated in paragraph 4 of the memorandum from the Ministry of Finance referred to in paragraph 1 above.

Inclosure 3.

Extract from Minutes of Meeting of
Allied Council for Japan,
April 19, 1946

(Remarks of Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, Chief, Government Section, SCAP)

CHAIRMAN: General Whitney has a view on this matter that I will ask him to present to the Council.

GENERAL WHITNEY: From the standpoint of the American Member I should like to say that the acceptance of Mr. Ball's proposition that information must be submitted in written form would depend to a large extent on the manner in which the question is presented in the Agenda. If the statement contained in The Agenda is in such form that it makes public criticism of the Supreme Commander or of the manner in which the occupation is being conducted, there is no reason why the Supreme Commander should confine his reply to a written instrument. There is no reason why he should not have a representative appear before the Council to answer such criticism in such manner as to present his views or the true facts in unmistakable terms before the public. The Supreme Commander in his opening address appealed for these proceedings on this Council to be conducted in a spirit of good will, mutual understanding and broad tolerance. Never was he more sincere than in that desire. Nothing would he more deeply regret than to have this Council fail to become oriented to constructive, joint effort. Nothing would he desire more than to have the Members of the Council roll up their sleeves with him and get down to assisting him constructively in working out the immense job with which he is confronted. He has the most sincere desire for these things. But the Supreme Commander is an American, a distinguished American, who firmly believes in the simple proposition that international good will and understanding lie only down a road of two-way traffic, that when America gives its good will and understanding to another nation, America expects in return no less good will and understanding from that other nation. He feels that it is not a matter for unilateral observance alone. The Supreme Commander will reserve the right to send representatives before this Council at any time. He has opened the offices of the General Headquarters to Members of the Council who earnestly desire to learn the facts, to assist in constructive effort. When he sends representa-

tives to appear before this Council, whether they are invited here, or he wants them to come to express the views of SCAP, be they generals or be they privates, they come as representatives of the Supreme Commander -- not as witnesses, not to appear before an inquisitorial board for cross-examination. They are sent here to assist the Council in constructive effort and they are entitled to full consideration as such by the Council. The Council is not set up for the purpose of prying into SCAP affairs, attempting to find some weak point in SCAP's armor, or to probe for something by which to create international sensationalism. The Council is here for the purpose of constructive assistance only. That is the spirit you will find in SCAP, so long as you extend that spirit to SCAP. If these questions on the Agenda are put there merely for the purpose of publicly criticizing SCAP, or of making official the propaganda of the press of any country ---

MR. BALL: Excuse me.

GENERAL WHITNEY: I don't say that it is, but if the Council's agenda is going to be made into a sounding board for such practices, SCAP will of course be compelled to resist it.

MR. BALL: On a point, Mr. Chairman -- may I interrupt please. Mr. Chairman, didn't I understand that we were going to confine ourselves to procedural questions this morning?

GENERAL WHITNEY: This is a procedural question. I am not in agreement that answers to propositions placed in the Agenda must be submitted in written form. I say that the Supreme Commander, when criticism is publicly leveled at his administration, is entitled to come himself or to send representatives before this Council and just as publicly meet the attack and give the answer.

END OF EXTRACT

18 April 1946

Article: Allied Council for Japan refuses Soviet request"

Name of Publication and Date: Mainichi Shimbun, 18 Apr 46

Full Translation: The 2nd session of the Council took place on the 17th in General MacArthur's absence. On the agenda was a Soviet request saying that all orders issued by SCAP should be laid before the Council one week before issuance. In a memorandum to the Council General MacArthur had declined to comply with this request, saying that no arbitrary interference should be tolerated tending to obstruct speedy methods of administration according to established rules. The Soviet request to submit specified material relating to orders issued by SCAP as well as by the Japanese government was likewise turned down, because according to the same memorandum, sufficient material and information was being made available to the Council. SCAP further stated that the tasks of the Council were of an advisory nature and did not extend to the investigation of measures hitherto undertaken. The Soviet representative General Derevyanko, pointed out that General MacArthur's decision would create doubts as to the value of the work taken over by the Council and asked for reconsideration of the stand taken. The Soviets further requested that Imperial Edicts and other official matter be submitted to the Council 10 days before issuance by the Japanese Government. This was likewise turned down on the ground of triviality. Thereupon the chairman Maj. Gen. Marquat asked Brig. Gen. Whitney to state his opinions on the fact that the Soviet note contained a passage regarding the "purge from public office of undesirable persons".

Therewith proceedings took on a new aspect. Maj. Gen. Whitney commenced by stating that he spoke as the representative of Gen. MacArthur. The Soviet note implied, Gen. Whitney continued, that in Japan undesirable persons still remain in public office in spite of the execution of the purge directives of 4 January; this implied a criticism of the occupation policy. He was ready to explain time and again with the assistance of his colleagues, whatever related to the execution of the purge orders, and ~~xx~~ if there were doubtful points he would make them intelligible "even if it takes all summer", the Brig. Gen. said. He continued as follows: "As far as I know, neither the Soviet representative nor the other representatives on the Council board have a correct conception as to the extent of Japanese compliance with the purge directives, chiefly because neither the Soviet nor the other representatives have asked for information as to the truth. I doubt whether Mr. Derevyanko would have been so quick in bringing up for discussion the actions taken by the Japanese as endangering the true process of democratization, had he well observed the responsiveness displayed by them so far. The Japanese people have finally ousted the power-wielding group, changing the relations between government and people conspicuously for the better. The Japanese people have elected 39 women into the Diet, giving preference to men and women with little or no political experience and disregarding professional politicians. The elections were truly free, honest and orderly, and of such quality that even Western European democracies are not in a position to look down on them. This is democracy in name and substance. Whoever fails to understand that

Japanese democratization is on the march, or goes so far as to think that it is jeopardized here, really either fails to understand what the term "democracy" means or has his view jaundiced by prejudice. It is true, the road lying before Japanese democratization is still a long one, but we must give the Japanese credit for what they have achieved so far. Confidence must also be placed in the policy of the Allied Powers for it's aiming at the break-up of the shell of century-old traditions and a thorough change in the life and thought of the nation." Answering a question by Gen. Derevyanko concerning the purge of members of the House of Peers, Gen. Whitney replied that the Japanese government had so far purged 59 persons, to be followed by 106 others. Questioned by Lt. Gen. Chou as to whether Hatoyama was falling under the purge directive, the SCAP representative replied, adding: "We will be ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ through by the end of June; by that time the purge order will have been carried out to the full with all those falling under it purged. The purge is carried forward by degrees, if enforced at once and in toto, the Japanese government would break down and cease to function. The question as to which persons are affected is still an object of investigation; the number of affected persons may finally reach 185,000. Hereafter the Soviet representative stated to the following effect: "I was wrong in saying that the way the purge order is carried out constituted an obstacle to democratization in Japan," to which the American representative replied that the Supreme Commander would be pleased to hear that.

1.

Article "Allied Council for JAPAN refuses SOVIET request"

Name of Publication and Date MAINICHI SHIMBUN 18 4 46

~~Summary, Extracts or~~ Full Translation The 2nd Session of The

Council took place on the 16th in General MAC

ARTHUR's absence. On the agenda was a SOVIET

request saying that all orders issued by SCAP

should be laid before the Council one week before

issuance. In a memorandum to the Council

General MAC ARTHUR had declined to comply

with this request, saying that no arbitrary inter-

ference should be tolerated tending to obstruct

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speedy methods of administration according to established rules. The SOVIET request to submit specified material relating to orders issued by SCAP as well as by the Japanese government was likewise denied, because according to the same memorandum, sufficient ~~was being~~ material and information ~~had been~~ made available to the Council. SCAP further stated that the tasks of the Council were of an advisory nature and did not extend to the investigation of measures hitherto undertaken.

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The SOVIET representative, General DEREVYANKO, pointed out that General MACARTHUR's decision would create doubts as to the value of the work taken over by the Council and asked for reconsideration of the stand taken. The SOVIETS further requested that Imperial Edicts and other official matters be submitted to the Council 10 days before issuance by the Japanese Government. This was likewise turned down on the ground of triviality. Thereupon the chairman,

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Doc. No. Maj. Jen. MARQUAT asked Brig. Jen.

WHITNEY to state his opinions on the fact

That the SOVIET note contained a passage

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Doc. No. The execution of the purge directives of

4 January. This implied a criticism of the

occupation policy. He was ready to explain, Time and again

with the assistance of his colleagues, whatever

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the SOVIET representative nor the others

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(Confidence)

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Gen. DEREVYANKO concerning the "purge
of members of the House of Peers, Gen.
WHITNEY replied that the Japanese Gov-
ernment had so far purged 59 persons,
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by Lt. Gen CHOU as to ~~the~~ whether

Doc. No.

HATOYAMA was falling under the
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replied, adding: "We will be through by
the end of June; by that time ~~we will~~ I do
~~have~~ Purge order will have been carried out
to the full with all those falling under
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Doc. No.

is still an object of investigation. The number of affected persons may finally reach 185.000.₿ Hereafter the SOVIET representative stated to the following effect: "~~There is a misunderstanding~~ I was wrong in ~~I did not say~~ that the way the purge is carried out constituted an obstacle to democratization in JAPAN," to which the American representative replied that the Supreme Commander would be pleased to hear that.

YOMIURI 18 APRIL

MACARTHUR REPLIES TO FOUR POWER ALLIED COUNCIL
UNCOMPARABLE SUCCESS IN ELECTION REVEALED

In reply to the Soviet recommendation that consideration be given to a re-election in the event that the majority party, as a result of the General Election, be ~~the~~ reactionary ~~element~~, Brig. General Whitney of the Government Section of GHQ, representing General MacArthur, avoided ~~to~~ a direct statement ~~expressed his answer~~ at the second meeting of the Four Power Allied Council by stating that it was unwise for the Supreme Commander to express his views, as there was fear that each party may interpret it as they saw fit.

At the initial meeting, the Russian representative stated that the purge directive was incomplete and that persons who should be purged still remain in office and obstruct the path of the establishment of democracy in Japan.

In his reply, General Whitney expressed his personal belief that the democratization of Japan was progressing smoothly. The recent election, he said, was most free and orderly and last ~~best~~ corrupt of any election, even among those held in the western nations, and truly exemplified the spirit of democracy. He further revealed that 73% of the voters went to the poll, 39 women succeded in gaining seats, and lauded the democratic platforms of all the political parties and expressed satisfaction over the election.

General Whitney's statements in brief were as follows:

(1) Although it was indicated at the first meeting of the Four Power Allied Coundil by the Soviet delegate, that the purge directive was incomplete and some persons who should be on the list still remain in office, the Russian delegation to date, has not submitted any suggestions for the democratization of Japan.

(2) The Four Power Allied Council undoubtedly does not know how the Japanese Government is executing the purge directive and no one has attempted to inquire. At this time, I hope to clarify this matter. If the Four Power Allied Council

insists, I shall here give the full details.

(3) The Russian delegates stated that the essentials of the purge direcitve are hindrances to the democratization of Japan. The following clarifies the fact that this opinion is not justifiable.

(a) 73% of all voters marched to the polls during the election, this is the best proof that democray is getting a foothold in Japan.

(b) The fact that 39 women were able to gain seats in the Diet competing against professional statesmen is a clear sign of democratization.

(c) This unrestricted, impartial and orderly election is unequalled even in western nations election history. It was truly an admirable election. This is proof that the Japanese have really grasped the meaning of democracy.

(d) The Japanese political parties are refered to as left wing, right wing and conservatives but actually all are in accord with the spirit of democracy.

(e) Democratization whould take many years and it is far from complete today, but commendation must be given where due. In the recent election, rather than take extreme leftist or rightist ideals or aggressive Imperialism, Japan selected a path based on a philosophical tenet.

To state that the purge directive in its incompleteness is a menace to the democratization of Japan is a biased outlook.

4. The Japanese Governmnt is enforcing the Purge directive in an orderly manner. Moreover, it's essentials are in complete compliance with the GHQ policy. In order to teach democracy to the Japanese people, the Occupation forces are permiting the Japanese Government to operate its own nation and thus show the makings of democracy through its own government. This is due to the confidence in Japanese Government and people by the Supreme Commander and they have been worthy of the trust.

5. To immediately remove members of the present Cabinet who would come under the purge directive whould destroy the Government policy aimed at democratizing Japan.

We must be fully aware that the Government policy is being conducted on the premise that the democratization of Japan will require a long period.

2nd MEETING OF THE FOUR POWER ALLIED COUNCIL

2ND meeting of the Four Power Allied Council held on 17th April at 10 am. was attended by Major General Marquat representing the United States. Lt. General Ball of Great Britain, and Lt. General Chang of China and Lt. General Derevyanko of Russia.

The following matters, at the initial meeting, were discussed and decided.

(1) The Council Secretariat will have a Chief Secretary (US) with three deputy-secretaries, one from each nation.

(2) Records of the meeting of the Four Powered Allied Council although difficulat to prepare daily from "office work" standpoint, will be prepared for each nation's representative as soon as possible.

(3) All proposals to the Council must be submitted to the Council Secretariat by 10 am, 5 days before the meeting of the Council.

In reply to four recommendations submitted by the Russian delegation at the initial meeting of the Four Power Allied Council, General Marquat read General MacArthur's decisions-

Recommendation;

(1)/ Desire a re-election incase the result of the general election should find the reactionary element in the majority party.

Reply: The House of Representatives elected in the General election have all been investigated for qualifications, but it would be unwise for the Supreme Commander to give his opinions regarding the election results because there is fear that each party may interpret it to their benefit.

(2) Recommendation; Desire that peplies of the Japanese Government to all GHQ directives issued since the landing of the Occupation forces be submitted to the Four Power Allied Council

Reply: Actually this is impossible. It is suggested that the monthly GHQ reports be examined.

(3)(3) Recommendation: Desires that all directives issued to the Japanese Government be submitted to the Four Power Allied Council, 48 hours before they are issued.

Reply: Actually, it is awkward and from the standpoint of administration it is difficult.

(4) Recommendation: Desires that all Japanese Government Imperial Rescropts and Ministerial Ordinances issued in the future be submitted to the Four Power Allied Council 10 days prior to proclamation.

Reply: Such requests infringe upon the administrative authority of the Japanese Government and hinder the administrative official business and actually would be difficult.

Following the above, the matter of "purge of officials in Office who would come under the directive" was discussed. General MacArthur's opinions were read by General Whitney and this was followed by his frank opinions on the general election. General Whitney went on to explain how the purge directive was executed and read, its complete text.

The session was recessed at 1225. The session resumed at 1400 hours. China's delegate asserted that there were officials in the Education Ministry who were recognized as men with militaristic breeding. General Whitney replied that all Education Ministry Administrators had been investigated. The Russian representative inquired about the purge of members of the House of Peers. Whitney replied that to date, 59 members had been purged and that 106 more would soon be dismissed. The Chinese representative asked whether Ichiro Hatoyama would be on the purge list. General Whitney replied that purge would probably not be complete until the end of June. If alll persons coming under the purge were to be dismissed immediately, it would not* destroy the functioning of the Government. In all, it was explained, that the total purge list would total 185,000 persons. Meeting adjourned, 1635 hours.

* TN, (Obviously an error, but was taken in direct translation from the newspaper)

Copy for General Whitney

Council

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

[redacted]

Tokyo, Japan, April 17, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Supreme Commander

Study of the Moscow communique pursuant to your request reveals no language in the terms of reference for the Allied Council, nor to my mind any implication, that members of the Council as such have any but an advisory and consultative voice in regard to "a change in the Japanese Government as a whole" except under certain circumstances. I think this is a fact which is clearly manifest from the text and it is also clear what these circumstances are. Under paragraph 6 there must be, first of all, a policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission. Secondly, there must be a draft order by the Supreme Commander to provide a basis for objection on the part of the dissenting member. (In the absence of these two circumstances the recourse which the dissenting member has would be to communicate his objections to his government for possible reference to the Far Eastern Commission, leaving it to the Far Eastern Commission to take the matter under consideration if it so wishes in the light of whatever need the Commission may consider to exist for a general policy decision.) It should go without saying that there is a third and very important circumstance which members of the Council should take into consideration. Suspension of the formation of a Cabinet would be a very drastic step which might involve breakdown of the administrative machinery of the Government and would be difficult to justify in any but extreme circumstances.

It is believed, moreover, that in connection with any such question there should be kept always in mind the reference in the Potsdam Declaration to the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

George Atcheson, Jr.

Copies to General Marquat
General Whitney

9

17 April 1946

Statement of Brigadier General Courtney Whitney,
Chief, Government Section, SCAP

at Second Meeting of Allied Council for Japan in reference to Item II, 2, of Agenda: "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel From Public Office."

I take this opportunity to appear before you in behalf of the Supreme Commander to clarify any misconceptions which may exist in the minds of any member with regard to the scope and application of the Supreme Commander's purge directives of January 4th. My appearance is responsive to the statement placed in the agenda by the member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reading as follows:

"According to the available information, undesirable persons, falling under the directive dated 4 January 1946, in many cases have not been yet removed from the leading positions they hold. Since this fact endangers normal progress of democratization of Japan and may negatively affect loyal realization by the Japanese authorities of all directive instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, it is desirable that the Allied Council be informed on this matter as fully as possible by the appropriate representative of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."

I wish to make it quite clear that the information referred to by the member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, while more than faintly reminiscent of matter which has recently appeared in the Soviet press, was not obtained from General Headquarters, SCAP, nor has any attempt been made from that source to verify the accuracy thereof, any explanation therefor or the effect, if any, upon the "normal progress of democratization of Japan" or the "loyal realization by the Japanese authorities of all directive instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."

Furthermore, as far as I know, neither the member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics nor any other members of this council have any accurate knowledge whatsoever of the manner and degree of Japanese compliance with the Purge directive of the Supreme Commander

of January 4th, as neither he nor any other member has sought information from General Headquarters on this point.

As the matter now stands, therefore, there is on the record a statement as to the manner of compliance by the Japanese Government with this directive and the adverse effect thereby brought to bear upon success of the occupation. The situation therefore leaves me with no other recourse than to proceed to give a complete detailed picture of the development of the directive in question and its compliance by the Japanese Government - to comply with General Derevyanko's desire "that the Allied Council be informed on this matter as fully as possible." To do so will obviously be long and tedious but, with the assistance of my aids, I expect to accomplish the task if, to borrow the words of a distinguished American "it takes all summer."

For a comprehensive understanding of any seeming slowness in compliance with these directives, it is necessary that a full understanding be had of their historical development, and the underlying occupational purposes sought thereby to be served. I shall ask you, therefore, to bear with me while I trace this matter through the course of its evolution - after which I shall be pleased to answer any questions to the full extent of my ability.

The immediate question here raised by the rember of the Council for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics charges that the manner in which these directives have been complied with by the Japanese Government "endangers normal progress of the democratization of Japan." Apart from the fact that compliance with them is under the close observation of SCAP and its timetable meets with SCAP's full approval, I note that General Derevyanko's charge was made before results of the recent election were known. I doubt that, had he envisaged the manner in which the Japanese people would respond to their first real opportunity for democratic expression in their history, he would have been so quick to hold up for example any move theretofore made in the administration of Japan as endangering, in slightest degree, the normal progress of its democratization.

Ponder well these facts:- Over 27,000,000 people, or 73% of the entire electorate, cast their votes despite the handicap of transportation difficulties in present day Japan - Consider this against the

previous all time high of eleven and a quarter million people -- Did the voting constitute a free expression of the people's will? - It ousted the party long entrenched in political power, apparently not so much for what it presently stands for as for what it, or the group who composed it, formerly stood for, and moved sharply toward a more liberal concept in the relationship between government and people - It seated 38 women in the National Diet despite the first occasion on which women have had the right of vote, much less to run for political office - it ignored the professional politicians in favor of representatives from all walks of private life - resting the political future of the Japanese people in the hands of men and women with little or no political experience but of the people's own free and unrestricted choice - It demonstrated to the world a free and honest and orderly election such as few, if any, of the Western democracies can boast in more complete degree - It demonstrated democracy both in its form and in its substance.

The Independence underlying the action of the electorate is probably best reflected in the results themselves where no party has received anything like a majority vote. This is probably due to the fact that, contrary to misconceptions in some quarters in the use of the words "democratic", "reactionary", "conservative", "right wing," "left wing", as applied to Japanese politics, strong elements of all of the major political parties espouse doctrines consistent with the development of democracy, and advocate programs embodying democratic principles for political, social, financial and economic reforms of far reaching significance and scope.

Grant that the Japanese people in their democratization yet have a long way to go, but give them credit where they are due credit. And give Allied policy and the execution of policy the credit for reshaping the lives and the aspirations and the thoughts of a whole people away from the tradition and the prejudice of the ages to an enlightenment which would permit, in seven months and ten days, that demonstration of democracy at work which you witnessed on April 10th - a demonstration indeed of the free expression of a people's will -

demonstration of a people who, given the opportunity to regulate their own political destiny, rejected the philosophy of the extreme right, exponents of which had led them into the disaster of war, and no less firmly rejected the philosophy of the extreme left -- selecting instead a cross section of the intervening shades of political philosophy, thus making possible the realization of a social system within which the powers of government and the rights of man are in balance. Therein lies the challenge which confronts the elected members of the new National Diet -- a challenge to further the gains already made in democratic process.

It thus does not mean that the democratization of Japan is complete -- not by any means. But it does mean -- and unmistakably mean -- that the Supreme Commander in policy and action is oriented to the course which leads to success in this unprecedented undertaking -- that the leadership of which he spoke to you the other day is bearing the fruit which, after the neutralization of Japan's war making potential, more than all else is the objective sought within the framework of Allied policy.

He who fails to see in that election an eloquent demonstration of democracy on the march -- who sees it in the slightest support for the fear that the normal progress of Japan's democratization is being endangered -- either fails to understand the meaning of the word "democracy", or is blinded, by prejudice, to fact.

Turning now more specifically to the allegation made by the member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the bare fact that persons subject to dismissal under the terms of the Purge directives are still in office is of little significance. The important fact is that the Japanese Government has and is complying with the directives. Their plans have been presented to SCAP and their actions have been taken with the full knowledge of SCAP. Their rate of progress is entirely consistent with occupation purposes and policy.

(more)

In every field of occupation activity, it has been the consistent aim of the Supreme Commander to operate within the existing framework of the Japanese Government. He has felt that from the very beginning there was no better way of training the Japanese people in democracy than to encourage them to use their own governmental machinery, making their own changes and improvements. He has frequently made it clear that he had full faith and confidence in the ability of the Japanese people and the Japanese Government to accomplish their own salvation under the guidance of the Allied Powers.

The directive of 4 January laid the basis for the comprehensive action now being taken to destroy the influence of militarism and ultra-nationalism in Japan, not only by removing and excluding individuals falling into specific categories from public office, but also by excluding undesirable persons from the new Diet and infusing new blood into that institution. The order is definite in its requirements. It provides for the collection of records of the political background of Japanese officials and those desiring to enter the government service, as well as candidates for the Diet. All action taken by the Japanese government is recorded in order that the Supreme Commander may have an adequate and simple check on compliance.

Under the directive the Japanese government has been required to institute a program of removal of officials of the national and prefectural governments and to exclude from all government service, including the Diet, anyone who falls within the category of undesirables defined in the directive itself, and further elaborated in the Japanese program which has been prepared pursuant to the directive. Because of the many thousands of persons affected by the directive, it is obviously impossible to attempt to determine whether a particular individual is in fact an active exponent of militant nationalism. This would take endless time, involve the Supreme Commander in attempting to analyze the intentions and motive of individuals, and, in all respects, would have been wholly unrealistic. As I have indicated, it was, therefore, determined that all persons who held certain positions of responsibility and influence in public life, or certain enterprises or organizations of nationalistic and expansionistic character, or were affiliated with the Army, Navy, Special Police, or intelligence agencies would automatically be excluded from public office.

The draft is not a punitive instrument but is intended to eliminate from public life those who had participated actively in bringing Japan to her present pass; hence, the directive was intentionally made flexible and it so provides (in Par. 18) that "This Headquarters had made and may make more restrictive requirements respecting employment of certain classes of individuals in all levels in special fields." It is susceptible to expansion or contraction as circumstances may require.

Merely to enumerate the categories of persons who are excluded from government service under the directive demonstrates the sweeping nature of its provisions. This list embodies the categories enumerated in the directive of 4 January as applied and interpreted under the Cabinet and Home Ministry ordinances and regulations for the enforcement of Imperial ordinance No. 542 of 1946, which constitutes the present purge program. The following constitute the removal and exclusion categories:

a. Category "A" includes any person arrested as a suspected war criminal unless released or acquitted.

b. Category "B" includes any person who has at any time been a member of:

(1) Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals
Supreme Military Council
Imperial General Headquarters
Army and Navy General Staffs
Supreme Council for Direction of the War; or

(2) Who at any time was commissioned active service officer (including official of the officer rank under the former system) under the regular appointment provisions of Rikungun Hoju Rei (the Army Replacement Regulation) or other old similar ordinances and regulations and who thereafter served on active service under Rikugun Bukan Fukueki Rei (the Army Soldiers Service Ordinance), Rikugun Fukueki Jorei (the Army Service Regulations) or other old similar ordinances and regulations; or

(3) Any person who, having finished the courses of Kambu

Kohosei (Reserve Officer's Cadet), Soju Kohosei (Reserve Pilot Cadet), was appointed Reserve Service Officer (Yobieki Shoko), and who volunterred to serve on active service under the Imperial Ordniance No. 731 of 1939; or

(4) Any person who was commissioned active service officer or active service special duty officer (Geneki Tokumu Shikan) under the regular appointment provisions (including Imperial Ordinances No. 500 of 1942 and No. 146 of 1944) of Kaigun Bukan Ninyorei (The Naval Officers Appointment Ordinance), Kaigun Koto Bukan Hoju Jorei (The Naval Officers Appointment Regulations) or other old similar ordinances or regulations, and who served thereafter on active list under Kaigun Bukan Fukueki Rei (The Naval Officers Service Ordinance), Kaigun Tokumu Shikan Fukueki Rei (The Naval Special Duty Officers Service Ordinance), Kaigun Koto Bukan Junshikan Fukueki Rei (The Naval Officers and Warrant Officers Service Ordinance) or other old similar ordinances and regulations; or

(5) Any reserve officer who after having been called up, was transferred to active service upon his application under Kaigun Bukan Ninyo To Tokurei (The Special Regulations for the appointment of Naval Officers from Naval Reserve and Other Matters) or Imperial Ordinance No. 173 of 1934, or any officer or special duty officer on reserve list who, after having been called up, volunteered for active service under the provisions of Article 2 of Kaigun Bukan Fukueki Rinji Tokurei (The Naval Officers Service Provisional Special Ordinance); or

(6) Commissioned or non-commissioned officer, enlisted man or civilian employee who served in or with the Military Police

(more)

(Kempei-Tai), the Tokumu Kikan, Kaigun Tokumu Bu, or other special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organizations; or

(7) Any person who held any of the following offices in the Ministries of War or Navy (unless appointed after 2 September 1945):

Minister
Permanent Vice-Minister
Parliamentary Vice-Minister
Parliamentary Councillor
Chief Secretary

Any civilian official of the Civil Service rank of chokunin or above, or who occupied a position normally held by a person of such rank.

c. Category "C" includes all influential members of unltranationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic societies. It covers any person who has at any time:

(1) Been a founder, officer, or director of; of

(2) Occupied any post of authority in; or

(3) Been an editor of any publication or organ of; or

(4) Made substantial voluntary contributions (a sum or property the value of which is large in itself or large in proportion to the means of the individual in question) to

to any group of the following organizations:

(The names of 122 organizations were listed at this point in the text of the statement)

d. Category "D" includes all persons who were influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Society, and the Political Rule Association of Great Japan. Influential person has been defined as any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:

(Lists of positions in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, its affiliates, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Policical Society, The Political Association of Great Japan and the Council for Establishing the Rule Assistance Political Structure were given at this point in the text of the statement.

(more)

e. Category "E" includes officers of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansionism. This has been defined to bar from government service any person who has at any time between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 occupied the position of Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President, Director, Advisor, or Auditor of any of the following or, in territory occupied by the Japanese armed forces since 7 July 1937, manager of a branch of:

(A list of 31 companies is given at this point in the statement.)

Any other bank, development company or institution whose fore most purpose has been the financing of colonization and development activities in colonial and Japanese-occupied territory, or the financing of war production by the mobilization or control of the financial resources of colonial or Japanese-occupied territories.

Any person who has held the position of the manager of a branch or agency, or representative in the territory occupied by the Japanese armed forces, of the Bank of Japan at any time between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945.

f. Category "F" includes Japanese officials who have held specified positions in occupied territories. This has been defined to cover all of the following:

(List of positions in 13 countries was given at this point in the statement)

g. The final category of undesirable personnel listed in the directive of 4 January 1946 is Category "G" -- "additional militarists and ultra-nationalists." This is the scoop-net clause which catches within its broad sweeping terminology all active exponents of militant nationalism who may not fall within Categories "A" to "F" of the directive. Category "G" was devised for the specific purpose of making assurance doubly sure that there would be eliminated, in the words of the Potsdam Declaration, "for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking upon world conquest."

In order that the significance of Category "G" may be fully grasped, let me quote it to you. It reads as follows:

(1) Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

(2) "Any person who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

(3) "Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

The general terms used in Category "G" of the directive to make it definite and certain that advocates of irresponsible militaris and expansionism would be excluded from government service required the establishment of additional standards of a more detailed and explicit nature. In consultation with representatives of the Supreme Commander, and with their approval, the Japanese government developed sub-categories. They define as active exponents of militant nationalism under Category "G" the following:

(1) "Any person who held between July 7, 1937 and Septembe

2, 1945 one of the following positions:

a. Minister of State
b. Lord Keeper of Privy Seal
c. President of the Privy Council
d. Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
e. Director-General of the Board of Legislation
f. President of the Board of Information
g. President of the Board of Planning
h. President, Vice President of the Asia Development Board
i. President of the Board of Manchurian Affairs (including those who held the position prior to July 1937)
j. Public Prosecutor General.

(2) "Any person who held between July 7, 1937 and Septembe

2, 1945 one of the following positions and about whom there has been conspicuous evidence as a person fallin under the provisions of Paragraph C.

A. Government Offices

a. Cabinet Councillor
b. Cabinet Adviser
c. Vice President of the Privy Council
d. Board of Information
   Vice President or Director of a Division
e. Board of Planning
   Vice President or Director of a Division

f. Asia Development Board
Director General of General Affairs, Director of a Division or Director General of a Liaison Office.

g. Board of Manchurian Affairs
Vice President

h. Any Ministry
Vice Minister, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Parliamentary Councillor, Director-General of a General Board, or Director of a Bureau

i. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Germany, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Italy

j. Governor General of a local Government-General Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police Board

B. Others

a. President or Vice President of the Bank of Japan

b. Manager of a branch or agency or representative within the territories occupied by the Japanese armed forces of any of the banks, corporations and other organizations listed below

Any special bank other than those falling under the provisions of Paragraph E.

Any ordinary bank, trust company, savings bank, insurance company or any other financial institution, whose main office is located in Japan proper.

Any national policy company

Any Eidan

Any control association

Any control company

Any corporation in which the government or its agency, a special bank or national policy company is the largest stockholder.

c. Japanese adviser, representative or executive employee of:

Banque de l' Indo-China

Banque Franco-Japanaise

d. Any person who held a position of Adviser to a foreign government including its local organs

within the territories occupied by the Japanese Armed forces other than those persons falling under the provisions of Paragraph F.

3. "Any person who has once been an official engaged in "thought prosecution", "protection and surveillance" preventive detention or penal administration, and who is to fall under the provisions of Paragraph G of Appendix "A" of the Memorandum because of the part which he played in any important "thought" case while in office, any fact of trampling upon individual rights, his term of office, and his position while in office, etc.

4. "Any person who has once been in special higher police service, and who is to fall under the provisions of Paragraph G because of the part he played in any important case of arrest, his term of office and his position while in office, etc."

These last two sub-categories have in turn required further definite and specific implementation in order to eliminate from government service persons in the judiciary and the police deemed undesirable from the standpoint of training, past record, or association with the Japanese program of aggression, suppression of the opposition of the militaristic regime or other ultra-nationalistic activities. These sub-categories are being applied to cover the following:

> "Any person who during service with the Special Higher police or 'thought' Prosecution played an important role in the disposals of the following major 'thought criminal' cases:"
> (A list of 11 cases follows at this point in the text of the statment)

(b) "Any person who during the tenure of office with the Judiciary or Police Service has committed cruel or oppressive acts against any individual.

(c) "Special Higher Police

Any person who has a service record of over 4 years since March 1941 or over 8 years with the Special Higher Police, and who occupied the position of Police Inspector or above during such period.

(d) "Thought" Prosecution

Any person who has a service record of over 4 years since March 1941 or over 8 years with the "Thought" Prosecution, and who occupied the position of Public Procurator or above during such period.

(e) "Protection and Surveillance

Any person who has a service record of over 4 years since March 1941 or over 8 years as the Chief of a Protection and Surveillance Station or as a Guidance Officer thereof.

(f) "Preventive Detention

Any person who has a record of over 4 years since May 1941 as the Chief of a Preventive Detention Station or as a Guidance Officer thereof."

But this is not all. To block any possible loop-hole in the application of the directive of 4 January, Category "G" is being applied to any person participating in any of the activities described under the category who was a government official, other than those I have mentioned in the Judiciary and the Police, who was a member of the House of Peers or of the House of Representatives, or a man of letters or an artist, or the owner of any publishing enterprise, or the publisher or editor of any newspaper, magazine or other publication, or any other businessman, including specifically any person who held between July 7, 1937 and September 2, 1945 a position of Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President or Standing Director of any of influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms, or producing iron or steel.

Category "G" has also been defined to include any Representative or highest executive officer or Ultra-Nationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies other than those specified in the provisions of Category "C".

Perhaps the most all-embracing application of Category "G" from the standpoint of the national election just held was the making ineligible for re-election to the Diet any person who was "recommended" by the government in the general election of 1942. Although in some instances this may have resulted in excluding from the new Diet some persons who in fact may not have actively supported the policy of Tojo and the military and economic cliques, nevertheless the barring from re-election of any candidate sponsored by Tojo and his government was

deemed wise in the interest of affording the people of Japan the opportunity of putting new faces and new leaders in their parliament.

With a view to the establishment of standards which were susceptible of no misunderstanding in their equitable application, the phrase, "conspicuous evidence as a person falling under the provisions of Paragraph G," has been defined to mean the following:

(1) Facts that a person in question played an important part in the conclusion of:

Japanese-Manchurian Protocol
Tripartite Alliance
Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty
Japanese Thai Alliance Pact

or in the stationing of Japanese forces in French Indo-China or in starting the Greater East Asia War.

(2) Facts that a person in question played an important role in the suppression of opponents of militarism.

(3) Facts that a person in question played an important role in concluding economic agreements with, or in extending credits to countries in the sphere occupied by the Japanese armed forces.

(4) Facts that a person in question played an important part in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

You will note that I have constantly used the words "government service." This means, under the directive, not only all positions in the central Japanese and prefectural governments and all their local agencies and local branches, bureaus (including regional administrative bureaus), but, also, all offices and all positions in corporations, associations and other organizations in which the central and the prefectural governments, or any of their agencies, have a financial interest representing actual or working control. In other words, officers of corporations, associations and other organizations such as the President, Vice-President, Directors, Auditors and officers of similar positions are considered to be in the government service if they hold office in any corporation in which the largest stockholder is the government or any of its sub-divisions, agencies or branches, or any

national policy company or Lidan, or any special bank. In addition to any of those corporations, service in the capacity of President, Vice-President, Director, Auditor, or comparable position in any of the following corporations, associations or organizations is considered "government service" within the meaning of the directive of 4 January:

> (A list of 49 corporations, control associations and banks is given at this point in the text).
>
> Any Control Company under a Control Company Ordinance, the main activities of which cover the whole homeland:
>
> (A list of 65 control companies follows at this point in the text).

It should be obvious to anyone that the preparation of questionnaires and their distribution, collection, review, classification, filing, and the taking of action on the basis of information contained in those questionnaires is a task of great magnitude. Unless, however, one understands what has been accomplished, he cannot understand what has not been accomplished, therefore, let us see what has been and is being done. In accordance with the directive the Japanese government, in consultation with representatives of the Supreme Commander, prepared a program for the screening of the personnel affected by the directive. Because of the eminence of the election the screening of the qualifications of candidates for membership in the House of Representatives was given top priority and 3,384 persons were screened to determine whether or not they came within any categories of the purge directive which I have discussed. Of these 474 were disqualified, and 159 withdrew their applications while investigation thereof was in progress. The screening of these candidates for the House of Representatives required the determination, among other things, as to whether or not they were influential members of secret, patriotic or ultra-nationalistic organizations and this, in turn, required an analysis of the history and activities of numerous societies and associations. This resulted in the listing of 911 influential members in 173 organizations of the character required to be dissolved under the Political Society directive which was also issued on 4 January 1946.

Detailed investigation of the records of all persons in the government service with previous careers in the Special Higher Police and

Thought Prosecution, and career officers and other personnel of the Kempei-Tai, Secret Service (Tokumu-Kikan), and other Secret Police is now in progress. These investigations will be completed by 30 April. In this connection it may be noted in passing that 5,999 police officers and Ministry of Justice officials have been removed from police and protective surveillance stations by the Japanese government pursuant to the directive regarding the removal of restrictions on political, civilian, and religious liberties.

The screening process will be handled in the following manner:

(1) Screening of the persons who have resigned from government service.

a. Investigations will be conducted on all the persons who have resigned from "public office" since January 4, by calling for questionnaires regardless of whether they have voluntarily resigned or have resigned in anticipation of removal under the directive.

Those who were made Chokunin officials by way of honorary promotion on the occasion of their resignation will be excluded from the scope of screening. However, all those who are liable to fall under the criteria of Paragraph G, such as the Special Higher Police or Thought Prosecution, will be subjected to screening, including those of Sonin rank who have left government positions.

b. Investigations will be conducted first on persons who are at present in government service and then on those who have already quitted it.

c. The investigations will be conducted, by separating those who resigned under administrative personnel readjustment from those who resigned for other reasons.

d. In order to facilitate investigation each ministry is compiling a list of the persons who are in or have resigned from "government service," and who are likely to come under the January 4 Memorandum. As for those who have resigned from government service, those on these lists will be

screened first, and other will be screened later.

(2) Screening of the House of Peers.

Investigations on the members of the House of Peers are in progress. The necessary steps are being taken under the following plan.

A list of the names of those who are liable to fall under the January 4 Memorandum has been compiled, and the initial investigations are being made.

Questionnaires have been distributed to all the members of the House. After these have been returned, investigations will be made according to the screening plan as scheduled.

(3) Screening of new appointees after January 4.

Questionnaires will be demanded of all persons to be newly appointed to government positions or to be promoted to Chokunin posts, and also of those who have been appointed or promoted since January 4. They will be examined by the Cabinet in the case of Sonin or higher officials, and by the heads of the respective government offices in the case of Hannin or lower officials. As regards those who are found to fall under the provisions of the January 4 Memorandum, appointment orders, if issued, will be cancelled.

The program for investigation of general government offices will be handled in the following sequence:

From April 5-20 the following personnel are being screened:

Minister of State
President, Vice-President and member of the Privy Council
Person of the Civil Service Rank of Shinnin
Member of the House of Peers

From April 20-30 the following personnel are being screened:

Vice-Minister and Director of a Bureau of each Ministry.

From April 30-May 10 the following personnel are being screened:

Local Governor
President and Director of a Division of the Supreme Court
President and Director of a Division of a Court of Appeal
Chief of a District Court
Public Procurator General
Chief Procurator of a Court of Appeal

Chief Procurator of a District Court

From May 31 to June 10 the following personnel are being screened:

Staff officer of Bank of Japan and other special bank
Staff officer of a Kinko (Cash Office) and an Eidan
Staff officer of a control association
Staff officer of a control company
Staff officer of any other company mentioned in Appendix II to cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1

From June 10-20 the following personnel are being screened:

Director of a local bureau or office under the jurisdiction of a ministry
President, Dean and Principal of a university, college and school under the direct control of the Educational Ministry officials other than mentioned above

In short, screening of all holders of public office should be substantially finished by the end of June. In addition all those who have resigned from public office since the 4 January directive will be screened in order to determine whether they fall under the purge directive and consequently are ineligible under the directive for pensions or benefits. By the terms of this purge directive the exercise of any authority or influence of 185,386 persons over the people of Japan has already been prevented.

By this purge directive, timed and tempered to avoid unnecessary disruption in the normal processes of government, the Supreme Commander moved directly and inexorably to drive from their entrenched positions in government and society those groups and individuals who, while not so culpable as to be proceeded against as war criminals, wielded a profound and evil influence upon the people and contributed immeasurably toward the program which plunged Japan into a war of world aggression. If full compliance therewith be completed within the six months period heretofore planned, its purpose will have been most adequately and speedily achieved.

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17 April 46 20

Cedric Foster Broadcast
April 17, 1946
Mutual - WNAC

This is Cedric Foster reporting to you from Boston.

In the most understandable kind of English...in which no words werewasted and in which every word had the punch and power of a pile driver...Douglas MacArthur today answered the Russian criticism of his occupational policies in Japan. At the same time, the general informed the four-power allied council, "Your responsibility is exclusively advisory and consultative and it does not involve a review of action heretofore taken in the administration of Japan."

General MacArthur presented to that council today, at its regularly scheduled meeting, a statement in which he dealt with the Russian representative's requests of about ten days ago. Through his military government officer, Brigadier General Courtney Whitney/ who amplified the statement/ MacArthur struck so hard and so fearlessly against Soviet criticism that the Russian delegate made haste to explain that MacArthur might possibly have misunderstood why the Russians had asked that certain matters be placed on the council's agenda.

General Whitney stood before the council to declare that the questioning of the allied occupational policy in Japan by the Soviet Union, "whether in good faith or not, is a warning thath the success of the occupation is threatened."

This prompted Lt.Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko to state..."Not a word on our part could be interpreted as a threat to the success of the operational policies and the occupation." I have no doubt," the Russian officer continued, "that there is some success in the progress of the democratization of Japan." General Derevyanko then explained that theSoviet government had inquired "to what extent was the January 4 purge directive being carried out? " In view of General MacArthur's and General Whitney's replies, it was the opinion of the Soviet delegate that there"has been some misunderstanding." Immediately after this statement by Derevyanko, General Whitney replied: "I am sure that the supreme commander, General MacArthur, will be glad to hear that the representative of the USSR did not state what is implied in the agenda."

It was not until after the council adjourned that the agenda question which had been submitted to council by the Russians, was released to the press. I now quote to you the text of the Russian query: "According to available information, undesirable persons, falling under the directive dated January 4 in many cases have not been removed from the leading positions which they occupy. Since this fact endangers the normal progress of democratization of Japan/ and may negatively affect loyal realization by Japanese authorities of all directive instructions of the supreme commander/ and allied headquarters in general...it is desirable that the allied council be informed on this matter as fully as possible by the appropriate representative of general headquarters."

That is the question which the Russians said, through General Derevyanko, could not be interpreted as meaning there was a threat of any kind to the success of the occupation. That is the question which the Russians said had been misunderstood and that is the question which Courtney Whitney answered for Douglas MacArthur in a blunt, straightforward manner at the council meeting today.

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Courtney Whitney today told the council that the Japanese were complying with the purge directives as fast as was consistent with occupational policies. To the Russiandemand that a new election be held in Japan/ if those persons elected to the Diet were considered as "undesirable"/ MacArthur said in his statement: "It is essential that the supreme commander issue no statement and that he avoid any action which might seem to bring pressure for or against any particular party or group."

MacArthur also refused to grant the Russian demand that the drafts of all imperial or ministerial orders be submitted at least ten days in advance of their issuance for approval of the occupational authorities. "To require such a delay of the Japanese government," he said, "would but cause a practical suspension of its administrative policies and functions."

It remained for Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, however, to declare in the most brusque kind of language just how General MacArthur felt about the Russian charge that undesirable" persons may have been elected to the Japanese Diet in the election of last week. It remained for Courtney Whitney to take up and to dispose of the Russian charge that undesirable persons in Japan had not been removed from office.

"So far as I know," General Whitney declared, "neither the member from the Soviet Union, or any others, have any knowledge of the manner of Japanese compliance with the purge directive. They have not sought this information from allied headquarters." Whitney then plunged into a discussion of occupational policies with a dissertation on the election itself. He said that seventy-three per cent of the eligible voters cast their ballots in the election. The result of the election, he said, was "to oust the partyin political power and to move sharply toward a more liberal concept of the relationship between government and the people. Continuing to strike fearlessly, Courtney Whitney let his words fall where they might...and they certainly could brook no misinterpretation... "Anyone who fails to see in this election, he told the council, "a demonstration of democracy on the march, either fails to understand the meaning of the word 'democracy' or he is blinded by prejudice."

After he had delivered himself of that statement, General Whitney proceeded to take up the council's request that it be furnished with a copy of all directives and communications which had passed between supreme allied headquarters and the Japanese government. He told the members that they already had sufficient material which, if digested, "should bring them fully abreast withthe present situation." Then...dealing specifically with the Russian demand in this connection, Courtney Whitney said that he would furnish the Soviet Union's delegate with every bit of information he asked... that he would furnish that information to him, "even if it took all summer." As a matter of fact, he started right out to furnish that information by entering into a discussion/ a review possibly would be a better way to phrase it/ a review of thebackground and reasons for and the results of...the purge.

When the council came together for its afternoon meeting, the Russian and also the British delegate intimated they would just as soon have Whitney discontinue this review. General Chu, however, who is the Chinese delegate, said it was only a matter of courtesy to allow Whitney to continue. So the general went on to the end. And when he had finished, that for which the Russians asked, had been given to them.

The news of the four-power conference in Tokio today is reassuring news. Douglas MacArthur may have his faults/ as he's only a human being he's subjected to many of the failings of his fellow-men/ he may have his faults, but inability to express himself, fear to speak his mind, or refusal to make decisions...all of which are prerequisites to real leadership...these are not among them...In Courtney Whitney the supreme commander has an able assistant...entirely capable of holding his own in any discussion.

MacArthur's statement to the allied council today in Japan and Whitney's amplification of that statement, was delivered in just the sort of language which anyone can understand. It was language which took into consideration the facts of the case. It did not dodge the issues. It showed in a crystal clear manner that the allied commander in Japan was sure, in his own mind, of the ground upon which he stood. But above all, it revealed his willingness to walk on that ground with his head held high and with his eyes to the front, respectful to all but afraid of none.

In Washington today the House of Representatives voted to limit the extension of the Office of Price Administration to nine months, instead of the one year which was asked by President Truman. As this balloting was going /and the final vote was 171 to 144/ Mr. Truman was explaining to a White House news conference why he had let out a blast against what he believed to be lobbying tactics of the United States Navy against the merger of the armed forces. He said it was an admiral in Hawaii who stirred him up and he added that he did not believe that Admiral Nimitz or Secretary Forrestal had done any lobbying. The President though the admiral's name was Melville and that he was in charge of the Hawaiian station. He said this admiral got into print in an interview and the interview really stirred him up. After today's news conference, Mr. Truman's press secretary, Charles Ross, said the admiral in question was Rear Admiral A. S. Merrill, commandant of the 8th Naval District at New Orleans. Mr. Ross declared that no one in Hawaii was involved. The thing that upset the President, according to Ross, was a speech made by Admiral Merrill last Thursday in Dallas Texas... one which the admiral made just before the President's news conference. This speech touched off the fuse which lit the fire in the President's eye and which caused him to denounce naval officers for lobbying tactics.

When he was reminded that Senator Robertson of Wyoming had questioned the lobbying tactics of the United States Army, Mr. Truman said, he, personally didn't believe in lobbying. He said that men should express their views before Congressional committees and then let the committees decide.

The President also discussed the matter of food. He said Americans eat too much and it would be a good idea if, for two days a week, they reduced their food consumption to the low standards of Europe. The President said/ and this was in line, incidentally, with which George Mardikian of San Francisco pointed out in Boston yesterday as he toured the country in behalf of the Secretary of Agriculture/ the President said Americans, every day, waste enough food to provide the starving people of the world with ample sustenance.

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Mr Ball's statement on the election —

Japanese election results quote should not be judged on election returns but on way new Diet applies itself to problems that confront it unquote said W. MacMahon Ball British Commonwealth member Allied Four-power Council.

Ball added quote at moment I have to resist temptation to use European standards in assessing figures stop this situation different from European politics; it even different from prewar Japanese politics stop I would be unwise to attempt to form conclusion after week in Japan unquote

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN: 9 April 46

I have given careful consideration to the minutes of the initial meeting of the Allied Council held on 5 April with particular reference to the several suggestions therein contained, and on which I hereunder note my views and action:

> First suggestion: That the Supreme Commander issue a special public warning that the election would be considered a test of the capability of Japan to create a responsible and democratic government and that he reserves the right to pass upon the qualifications of all members elected to the Diet and require a new election if the majority thereof are determined to be unsuitable.

In substance this action has already been taken. The matter is believed to be fully understood, both by the Government and by the Japanese electorate. It is essential that the Supreme Commander issue no statement and avoid any action which might seem to bring pressure for or against any particular party or group.

> Second suggestion: That the members of the Allied Council be provided with: (a) Copies of all orders, instructions and memoranda issued by the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government from the beginning of the occupation of Japan up to the date when the Allied Council for Japan begins its work. (b) Copies of all documents, reports, statements, written explanation, information papers, etc., received by the General Headquarters from the Japanese Government in accordance with the order or in compliance with the memoranda of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. (c) Translations in English of all those ordinances, regulations and orders issued by the Japanese Government and Ministries on the basis of and in compliance with the memoranda of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. (d) Copies of all documents to be received by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander from the Japanese Government, including reports, statements, written explanations, and information materials. (e) Materials compiled, or to be compiled by the General Headquarters in regard to the disarmament of the Japanese land and naval forces, the destruction of

weapons, military equipment and fortifications, demilitarization of industry, liquidation of officers' corps and registration of its former members, as well as all materials which characterize the general trend of the political and economic situation in Japan and the degree of its democratization.

It is the underlying purpose of the Supreme Commander to insure that the members of the Council are fully acquainted with all pertinent documentation. To attempt, however, to make available or to reassemble in specific form all of the administrative work which has transpired since the beginning of the occupation and prior to the convening of the Council would involve a monumental clerical effort for which facilities do not exist. The Council members already have been furnished monthly reports of progress with a great mass of additional data which if digested should bring them fully abreast of the present situation. If, in addition, any specific data is required, the same will be furnished if available. The responsibility of the Council being exclusively advisory and consultative, it does not involve a review of action heretofore taken in the administration of Japan, nor will the Supreme Commander burden it with matters concerning past issues.

Third suggestion: That members of the Council be furnished with directives of the Supreme Commander seven (7) days prior to their issuance to the Japanese Government.

Such directives on matters of substance will be made available to members of the Council for concurrence or comment forty-eight (48) hours prior to their issuance. It would create a prejudicial time lag in the functioning of government, however, to allow the longer period suggested for such purpose. The great majority of such directives could be commented upon with little or no delay, and a method of procedure to such end should be evolved. No arbitrariness of procedure must be allowed to interfere with the prompt and orderly process of government administration.

Fourth suggestion: That members of the Council be furnished with drafts of Imperial Rescripts, Legislative Acts of the Japanese Government and Orders of Ministers and Ministries not later than ten (10) days prior to their issuance or publication.

To require such delay of the Japanese Government would but cause practical suspension of its administrative functions. The Supreme Commander himself does not attempt a prior check upon the myriad of administrative details which flow through the various channels of the Japanese Government, but rather confines himself to careful scrutiny of the broader picture of governmental process and such individual matters of substance as have direct

bearing upon the occupational purposes. The members of the Council will be furnished with copies of the Official Gazette, and may call up for discussion any specific acts of the Japanese Government they desire. This, coupled with the right of each member to call for a special meeting at any time to discuss any subject, should give ample assurance of the full recording and consideration of individual views.

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

"I welcome you with utmost cordiality in the earnest anticipation that, in keeping with the friendship which has long existed among the several peoples represented here, your deliberations throughout shall be governed by goodwill, mutual understanding and broad tolerance."

Thus as Supreme Commander did Douglas MacArthur convene the Allied Council for Japan, an international body injection of which in the administration of Japan he had vigorously opposed but accepted as a soldier once the decision went against him, and pledged his best effort to "try to make it work".

Never was there greater sincerity of purpose than lay behind that simple appeal to the best that was in the representatives of the allied powers -- an appeal with a ringing challenge directed to those present to assist him to make work this strange and unprecedented relationship concocted at Moscow.

There it was decreed that this council be set up as an advisory and consultative body to the Supreme Commander in the administration of Japan, with the final decision on all questions save three, not now likely to arise, resting with the Supreme Commander. Thus it did not, nor was it intended to, place a limitation upon his authority to act nor to weaken the sovereign power over the government and people of Japan with which he had been vested.

That is as it should be, if such a council be constituted at all, in this land of a people where long tradition had left a deeply rooted reverence for and blind subservience to the will of absolute authority. In its exercise alone could a peaceful occupation of Japan prove successful.

It was early to be seen that there existed among those who were to implement the terms of the Moscow Agreement, through membership on the Allied Council, a tendency to read in provisions which found support in neither the letter nor the spirit of the agreement — a tendency by artifice to fashion for the Council a role of authority in the administration of Japan, neither given nor intended — and a tendency to make of the Council a sounding board for doctrine alien to the principles enunciated at Potsdam and forming no part in the philosophy underlying occupational purposes.

Such tendencies, of necessity, had to be met, and met directly and vigorously, if any possibility of constructive results from the Moscow Agreement were to be salvaged. General MacArthur, in his realistic evaluation of this situation, moved promptly and decisively.

The issue involved far greater stakes than the preservation inviolate of the authority and power of the Supreme Commander in the administration of Japan. It involved the firm protection of the gains made by the United States alone in the occupation during the early months in which she shared none of the risks, none of the hazards, and none of the costs with any other nation — protection against the sabotage of those gains merely to serve the will of any who oppose the extension of American influence and the elevation of American prestige among the peoples of the Far East.

General MacArthur, since accepting the surrender of the Japanese government on the quarter-deck of the battleship "Missouri" in Tokyo Bay, while recognising that as Supreme Commander he served the common interests of the Allied Powers, has carried the heavy burden of that office in response to what he considered was a call from the American people that he do so — and has, from the start, resolutely determined that he would continue to carry it so long as the American people desired him so to do. Such was the answer, in unmistakable terms, given to those of us who urged that he withdraw to rest from the rigors of the military campaigns which finally had established his headquarters in the city of Tokyo — heart of the enemy's Empire. He has never deviated from that purpose — nor for one minute relinquished his firm hold on the throttle of this enterprise in sovereignty without precedent in history.

Why? Because he sees in the successful application of American policy in the occupation and administration of Japan lasting gains toward the peace of the world under the aegis of American leadership. He firmly believes that, if left to their decision, the masses of the people of the world will have none of war, but to bring to bear the influence of such masses upon the issue of war or peace, it is necessary first that men be elevated to the station which will permit them a voice dictated by individual conscience. This is only possible through the universal application of those high principles controlling human relationship, fundamentally American, which characterize existing policy in the remolding of the Japanese nation and people. Progress toward the ultimate goal is unmistakably seen in the results of the recent election where, when the

Japanese people were given the unrestricted right to free expression, they moved overwhelmingly to break through long standing tradition and prejudice to the enlightened stand of free men. This is in the pattern which General MacArthur has envisaged since he was first notified that he would be charged with the task — a pattern under which he has sought not to subjugate a defeated enemy but to reorient a thoroughly confused and misled people to useful future service in the family of free nations.

This result is impossible should he permit Tokyo, in the official atmosphere of an allied agency, to become the scene of international confusion and intrigue — should he permit in Japan the undermining of his authority and prestige as Supreme Commander through the arbitrary, destructive and unjustifiable criticism of policy and action — or should he yield to attempts by any international body unlawfully to interfere with the exercise of authority with which the Supreme Commander alone is vested.

There is the issue involved — an issue which thoughtful men who understand the psychology of the Orient will recognize as fundamental to the success of the occupation. Only by decisively meeting this issue, if as and when it arise, may General MacArthur insure that the broad Allied aims enunciated at Potsdam be realized in their entirety. Only thereby may the full moral influence and prestige of the United States, firmly entrenched in the Orient through her leadership in democracy, be brought to bear against the spread of doctrine embodying that same philosophy leading to the suppression of the fundamental human rights against which we fought in the war just won.

The Allied Council for Japan, in its field of advice and consultation, yet may serve a useful purpose in the occupation -- but only if it is guided by the spirit intended by its creators at Moscow, with the zeal and firm purpose to build rather than to destroy.

In the circumstances, one can only be hopeful that, from the clash precipitated at its initial sessions, members of the Council will become better oriented to the part that body, under the agreement of Moscow, is intended to play in the occupation. Indeed, there are strong indications that such will prove the case.

But as he earnestly pleads and hopes and strives for goodwill and understanding and tolerance in the relations between its several members, General MacArthur is not unmindful of the fact that those qualities of human relationship between individuals and nations must exist bi-laterally -- or not at all.

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN.

The following agreement was also reached, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of an Allied Council for Japan:

1. There shall be established an Allied Council with its seat in Tokyo under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (or his deputy) for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the terms of surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and of directives supplementary thereto; and for the purpose of exercising the control authority herein granted.

2. The membership of the Allied Council shall consist of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy) who shall be chairman and United States member; a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics member; a Chinese member; and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

3. Each member shall be entitled to have an appropriate staff consisting of military and civilian advisers.

4. The Allied Council shall meet not less often than once every two weeks.

5. The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the terms of surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and directives supplementary thereto. In all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander who is the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan. He will consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decisions upon these matters shall be controlling.

6. If, regarding the implementation of policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission on questions concerning a change in the regime of control, fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure, and a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, a member of the Council disagrees with the Supreme Commander (or his deputy), the Supreme Commander will withhold the issuance of orders on these questions pending agreement thereon in the Far Eastern Commission.

7. In cases of necessity the Supreme Commander may take decisions concerning the change of individual Ministers of the Japanese Government, or concerning the filling of vacancies created by the resignation of individual Cabinet members, after appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the other Allied Powers on the Allied Council.

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CONFIDENTIAL

File
Personal Gen Mac's
CWJ

C. W. C-in-C 13 Jan 46

1. Based upon the short outline you gave me some time ago in re your policy with respect to the Allied Council for Japan, I have prepared the attached to form a basis for your opening remarks.

2. I have considered:

a. American official and public opinion.

b. Japanese opinion.

c. The Council.

3. I have felt that in view of the publicity given to the fact that you were not in accord with the agreement when it was referred for your comment, what you say upon convening the Council will be closely scrutinized by both the American and Japanese people. Your remarks should accordingly be drafted with that in mind.

4. Attached draft may assist in the development of your ideas when you get around to it.

C.W.

1 Incl:
Proposed opening remarks.

CONFIDENTIAL

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DRAFT

This Allied Council for Japan is convened pursuant to agreement by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entered into in the City of Moscow, on 26 December 1945, with the concurrence of the Republic of China.

I welcome you to this headquarters in the earnest hope that in keeping with the friendship which has long existed between the several peoples here represented -- a friendship re-consecrated in the blood and carnage of battle in common cause -- your deliberations throughout shall be governed by good will, all dedicated as one to the same high purpose we here seek in unity to serve.

As the functions of the Council will be advisory rather than executory in character, it will not share in the responsibility of the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan. Rather, is it an instrument constituted for the purpose of making available to the Supreme Commander, as the necessity arises, the several view-points of its members on major questions of non-military policy and action.

The initial phase of the occupation has been completed. During this phase, Japanese forces on the home islands have been disarmed, demobilized, and returned to their homes, and in other respects the Japanese war machine has been neutralized. Dispositions have been taken to eliminate for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest and to establish in Japan a new order of peace, security, and justice; to secure for the Japanese people freedom of speech, religion and of thought and respect for the fundamental human rights; to remove all obstacles to the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people; and to readjust the Japanese industrial economy in such manner as to permit the exaction of just reparations in kind,

and to permit the Japanese people an equitable standard of life, but to deny Japan the industrial basis that would permit her the opportunity to re-arm for war. All of these dispositions in implementation of principles outlined in the Potsdam Declaration, have been taken.

While the Japanese constitution has not as yet formally been revised -- action which under the Moscow agreement has now become a policy-making responsibility of the Far Eastern Commission -- revisions in the governmental structure and procedure and socialogical changes in the Japanese way of life directed by the Supreme Commander during this initial phase of occupation have in effect been constitutional reforms, in that in many respects existing provisions have been supplanted and the corresponding constitutional concept vitiated. From these reforms already made to democratize Japanese life, no difficulty should be experienced in formalising the desired constitutional revision.

We now enter the second phase of the occupation in which it will be incumbent upon us to weigh the effect of changes already made and ensure their absorption by all agencies of government and by the people.

I shall leave the council free to adopt its own rules of procedure other than that I desire that regular meetings thereof be held semi-monthly as required by the Moscow agreement and, for the convenience of the Supreme Commander, that the agenda covering all topics to be discussed at each regular or special meeting be submitted to him not less than three days in advance thereof.

Instructions have been given that copies of all directives issued to the Japanese Government shall promptly be furnished the Council together with such background information as may be appropriate to permit a full understanding thereof or the Council may specifically desire. Such advice as the Council shall believe would be helpful to the Supreme Commander will be both welcome and given thoughtful consideration.

As my duties as Supreme Commander will not afford me the time regularly to sit with the Council, I have designated Major General William F. Marquat, U. S. Army, as my deputy to sit as Chairman thereof during my absences from its meetings. I have further designated Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, U. S. Army, to act as its secretary.

My policy in the administration of Japan for the Allied Powers, in implementation of the Potsdam Declaration and the surrender terms, as you know has been to act through existing instrumentalities of government. I have sought, while destroying Japan's war potential and exacting just penalties for past wrongs, to build a future for the people of Japan based upon considerations of sound policy and realism. Without yielding firmness, it has been my purpose to avoid oppressive or arbitrary action and to infuse into the hearts and minds of the Japanese people heretofore unknown principles of liberty and justice. This, as success of the allied occupational purposes is dependent upon leadership as well as upon direction -- as only through the firm application of those noble principles which we ourselves defended on the battlefield may we as victors become architects of a new Japan -- a Japan re-oriented to peace, security and justice. This policy shall continue to be the credo to my administration and must guide the Council throughout its deliberations.