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By: MATSUI, Iwane

The Settlement of the China Incident and the Problem of  
the United States

I.

A lukewarm argument for a compromise with the United States is being put out from a certain quarter. It is certainly difficult to comprehend when I hear that today when the hostile feeling of the United States is so acute, compromise with that country is being taken up seriously even if it may be only in one quarter. When a compromise with the United States is advocated from one quarter, its influence at once extends to CHUNGKING, NANKING, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, and casts a gloomy shadow upon our national policy. The reason why the Netherlands East Indies suddenly took a firm attitude and the Japanese-Netherlands Parley is on the brink of a breakdown, is solely due to the fact that the Netherlands East Indies received the impression that Japan would submit to the United States. The strengthening of the war attitude by CHUNGKING, the weakening of French Indo-China, the uneasiness of NANKING, are all truly the effect brought about by the lukewarm argument for a Japanese-American compromise.

In order to complete the Holy War, strengthen the peoples' spiritual unity and make the Asiatic races trustingly place their confidence in Japan, it is necessary first of all to sweep away such a servile argument for compromise with the United States.

II.

The basis of the argument for a compromise with the U.S. seems to lie mostly in the idea that by compromising with the U.S. it would be possible to stop the aid to CHUNGKING, make them cooperate in the development of the NANKING Regime, obtain American loans, and at the same time, through American cooperation secure natural resources in the Southern regions. However, this is a fantastic mistake. In the same manner that America considers England her first line of defence, she also considers CHUNGKING and BATAVIA her first line of defense.

Therefore, from the start, there is no reason for America seriously to consider a compromise with Japan. If such a hint were dropped to someone, that is a plan of the American authorities. America wants to divert the fleet at HAWAII to the Atlantic Ocean and enter the war, but if she does this, the Treaty of the Tri-partite Alliance will make itself felt. The United States has neither the preparation nor the power to wage a two-front operation. She wants to somehow skillfully hold Japan down for

awhile by utilizing the groups in Japan advocating the status-quo, the pro-Anglo-American groups, and the groups advocating dependency on the U.S. and Britain. She wants to deceive Japan skillfully and prolong matters without taking a definite step, and in the meantime make full war preparations. This is their true intention. If we are fooled by such a trick it would be disastrous. Needless to say, we will fall from a position of certain victory to that of certain defeat.

### III.

We absolutely must not come to a compromise with the U.S. when things are what they are at this time. If we do such a thing, the significance of the China Incident will be lost. The significance of the War for the construction of the New Order which aims at the ideal of one family of Asiatic Nations, rehabilitation of Asia, and the liberation of Asia, will come to nought. Not only that, but it will violate the spirit of the Tripartite Alliance for which an Imperial Rescript has already been promulgated. It would become a retrogression of Japan's world policy. The spirit of the Tripartite Alliance is the important thing, rather than the wording. Its spirit enables each nation to have its rightful place in the world. Germany in Europe, and Japan in Asia, are both respectively fighting the war for the establishment of a New Order. How can we violate this lofty aim and international faith for the purpose of a momentary profit.

As for Japan, she has work which must be performed regardless of America's attitude. They are the cutting of the route of aid to CHIANG Kai-Shek, the elimination of enemy nations together with aid to cooperating nations, and the strengthening of the Tripartite Axis.

The first is the economic development of China in accordance with the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China; joint national defense; and the exchange of culture.

The second is the economic development in accordance with the economic agreement with French Indo-China; and joint national defense.

The third is the strengthening of friendly relations with THAILAND; and positive cooperation to fulfillment of her /TN: THAILAND's/ wish to recover her lost territories.

### IV.

Persistency is a disease. If one is persistent in the idea of wanting to somehow settle the China Incident early, he becomes weak-minded already at that moment.

A good soldier forgets his enemy. As long as it was declared that CHIANG Kai-shek will be ignored, we might as well forget his existence. The best would be to take the attitude of "Are there such

things as the CHUNGKING Regime and CHIANG Kai-shek still somewhere in China?" In reality, the immediate enemies are now clearly Britain and the U.S., and the group of democratic nations. This is already common knowledge of the people. If we now come to a compromise with Britain and the U.S., and think of trying to settle the Incident through Anglo-Saxon cooperation, how can we ever face the spirits of the one hundred thousand departed heroes? Here, in the name of the one hundred thousand dead heroes, I absolutely oppose any compromise with the U.S. If in the near future, the United States declares war against Germany, our nation must also rise unhesitatingly in accordance with the obligation of the Tripartite Alliance. This is the attitude of the nation of the Imperial Way /TN: KODO/ and of the Way of the Samurai /TN: BUSHIDO/.

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事変處理と対米問題

松井石根

生温い、対米妥協論が一部から放送せられつゝある。米国の敵性愈々露骨なる今日に於て、対米妥協論の如きかたど一部に於てにもせよ、真面目に取り上げられつゝあるやに聞くと、是に心得がたいことである。対米妥協論が或る一部から放送せられるとき、この影響は直ちに、重慶にも、南京にも、泰にも、佛印にも、蘭印にも、及んで我が國策の上には暗鬱なる影を投ずるのである。蘭印が俄かに強硬態度を示して、日蘭會商が決裂の危機に瀕したのも、一に日本、米國に屈すとの印象を蘭印が受けたかうに外ならず、重慶が抗戦の態度を強化するの、佛印がグラツキ出したのも、南京が不安がるの、實に生ぬる、日米妥協論の招いた影響であるのである。

No. 1  
聖戦を完遂し、國民の精神的團結を鞏固にし、亞細亞民族をして安んじて日本に信頼させるためには、斯くの如き卑屈なる対米妥協論を先づ一掃してかゝる必要がある。

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(二)

対米妥協論の根據は、多くはアメリカと妥協することによつて、重慶援助を打切らせ、南京育成に協力させ、アメリカの借款を得ると共に、アメリカの協力によつて南方資源の確保をしようといふに在るらし、かゝるでもない間違ひだ。アメリカはイギリスをアメリカ国防の第一線と考へてゐると同様、重慶とバタビヤを矢張りアメリカ国防の第一線と考へてゐるのである。

だから本来眞剣に日本と妥協する考へなど、アメリカが有つ筈がな。若し、こんな風を口ううと誰かに洩したとしたら、それは米當局の策名である。アメリカは、ハワイの艦隊を大西洋に廻した。そして参戦した。かゝるを此は、三国同盟の條約が物と云ふ。アメリカには両面作戦の用意もなく、実力もない。何とかうまく、日本国内の現状派、親英米派、英米依存派をつかつて何とかして日本を暫く抑へておかう。味方ことを云つて日本を釣つておかう。生かさず殺さずで引はつておかう。その間に存分対戦準備をしよう。これが彼の眞意なわけである。こんな手に引かかつたら、大変である。必勝の地位から必敗の大勢に轉落することは贅論するまでもなからう。

(三)

今と存つてアメリカと妥協するなどといふ事は絶対にない。そんなことをすれば、支那事変の意義を没却してしまふ。五細五の解放、五細五の復興、五細五一家の理想を日ごとくある新秩序建設の意義が台無しになつてしまふのみならず、御詔勅ま

で拜してさる三國同盟の精神に反する。日本の世界政策の逆轉に  
なる。三國同盟は文句よりはるの精神なのである。万邦をして各々の  
知を得しむることにある。ドイツはヨーロッパに於て、日本はアジアに於  
て新秩序建設の戦を戦つてさるのである。一旦の利害によつて、どう  
してこの崇高な目的、國際信義に背くことかあまよう。

日本としては、アメリカの態度如何に關せず日本自身のヤウななくては  
ならぬ仕事がある。援蔣ルート一切の遮斷を、敵性國家の排除を、  
同時に協力國家への援助を、三國軸の強化だ。

第一に、日滿支共同宣言に則する支那の經濟開發であり、共同  
國防であり、文化交流である。

第二に、佛印との經濟協定による經濟開發である。共同國防で  
ある。

第三に、タイと親善強化と、タイの失地回復希望達成への  
積極的協力である。

(四)

No. 3

執着は一つの病である。何とかして事變を早く片づけたい、さういふ  
考に執ると、もうその瞬間に弱氣になる。

上兵は敵を忘れるにある。蔣介石を相手にせずと斷じたる以上、蔣介  
石の存在を忘れるがよい。重慶、蔣介石、こんなものかまた  
支那のどこかにゐたか、と云ふ態度をとるに限る。事實正  
面の敵は今や明かに英米であり、民主主義國家群である。

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: MATSUI, Iwane

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. The motive and object of the Japanese Government for the despatch of its troops to the southern part of Chiangsu Province in 1937.

Owing to the discord between Japan and China in North China in July 1937, an anti-Japanese movement among the Chinese army and civilians in Shanghai district grew intense day by day. The Chinese Army, disregarding the Truce Agreement concluded in 1932, persistently concentrated its troops around the Japanese settlement in Shanghai, threatened the Japanese troops and residents there, finally leading to the assassination of Sub-Lt.



Oyama on August 9, and the Japanese troops and residents were exposed to danger. Therefore, the Japanese Government, realizing the necessity of quickly reinforcing its Naval Force there in order to protect the lives and interests of Japanese residents, decided on 15 August to hurriedly dispatch to Shanghai an Expeditionary Force consisting of 3rd and 11th (one brigade less) Divisions. I was appointed the Commander-in-Chief and the troops were sent successively to Shanghai on board warships on and after 20 August of the same year.

The object and mission of the Expeditionary Force was to reinforce our Naval Force and protect the lives and property of our residents in and about Shanghai.

2. The reason why I, a reserve officer, was specially appointed Commander-in-Chief and the state of my mind at that time.

During my forty years' service in the Army; i.e. from 1894, the year in which I entered Military Preparatory School, up to 1935, the year in which I was placed on the Reserve List, I was in the following positions successively: A member of General Staff Headquarters, Chief of 2nd Section, General Staff Headquarters, Commander of 11th Division, Commander-in-Chief of the Taiwan Army, etc. During my military career, I was stationed in

North and South China for about 12 years all together and not only did I do my best during this time to bring about co-operation between Japan and China, but also, since my younger days all through my life I worked hard so that Japan and China could be on friendly terms and that Asia could be built up again. The greater part of my work in the Army was also in line with these ideals.

In 1937, the Shanghai Incident broke out and the Expeditionary Force was despatched there in haste. The Minister of War himself told me that the reason why I, who had been on the Reserve List, was appointed the Commander was because of my past experience referred to above.

My appointment was due to the fact that at that time the Japanese Government's policy towards China was to settle the Incident locally as soon as possible and to prevent the aimed conflict from spreading.

I was always firm in the belief that the strife between Japan and China was a quarrel between brothers in the so-called "household of Asia" and that it was an unavoidable expedience for Japan to rescue by force the Japanese residents in China and to protect our endangered rights and interests. It was no different from an elder brother thrashing his young and recalcitrant brother after putting up with him for so long. The action was to make China come to her senses, not out of hatred, but out of

love. Therefore, when I assumed the command of the Expeditionary Force I promised myself to settle the trouble between Japan and China on this belief and hoped to make the despatch of the Expeditionary Force not a cause of mutual enmity but something that would help to bring about friendly relations and co-operation between the two nations. So I demanded of my officers that they make every one of their men thoroughly understand the true meaning of the expedition in question. The following points were the gist of my instructions I gave to the troops upon their dispatch:

- (1) Fighting in the vicinity of Shanghai is only aimed at the subjugation of the Chinese troops challenging us, therefore, the Chinese officials and people should be pacified and protected as much as possible.
- (2) Always bear in mind not to bring troubles upon any foreign residents and troops and keep in close contact with the foreign authorities and armies in order to avoid misunderstanding.
3. The fighting situations in and about Shanghai.  
The Shanghai Expeditionary Force arrived one unit after another in Maan Islands at the mouth of the Yangtze River on and after August 22. At this juncture a report was received that the troops and residents in Shanghai were in danger. So at dawn on August 24 I tried hurriedly

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to disembark the arriving troops at Woosung and also along the bank farther up the river to establish communications with the Japanese Naval Force, by driving out the Chinese troops who were occupying the position there.

However, according to the reports received the number of the Chinese troops stationed in Shanghai and along the banks of the Yangtze River, west of Shanghai, was approximately estimated at a hundred thousand and they sought our landing troops everywhere and made violent attacks. After 15 or 16 days of bitter fighting and at a great sacrifice, the Expeditionary Force finally succeeded in securing a position along the bank. But the Chinese counter-attacks intensified more and more, and their force, being reinforced from Nanking and Hangchow areas reached more than 30 or 40 divisions. In meeting this, our Expeditionary Force was also reinforced in proportion and on November 5, 10th Army (more than 3 divisions) under Lt.-Gen. Yanagawa was landed on the coast of Chekiang Province to co-operate with the Force. Thus, the Expeditionary Force, after fighting desperately for more than two months, was barely able to drive the Chinese Army out from the vicinity of Shanghai and to occupy the city towards the end of October and the

beginning of November, giving security to the Japanese residents.

During the fighting what attracted my attention especially were as follows: The anti-Japan sentiment of the Chinese officials and people around Shanghai was very strong, and the guard unit of Chiang Kai-shek was most daring in counter attacks.

With their retreat route blocked by their supervising troops, other various units also resisted stubbornly but were finally driven back in confusion. Before their retreat, the Chinese troops adopted the so-called "Clearance Tactics" and either destroyed or burnt main transportation facilities and buildings. Some of them changed their uniforms to plain clothes, and turned guerillas, sniping at our soldiers and threatending our rear. The local people also co-operated with their troops by cutting telegraph wires or arranging signal-fires, jeopardizing our troops to no end. I was also aware of many instances where the troops and nationals of England, America, France etc., in sympathy with the Chinese troops, intentionally gave assistance to them and obstructed our military movements in many ways. Furthermore I felt keenly that the above-mentioned chinese attitude and the long and bitter fighting had estranged the Chinese Army and people in

Central China from the Japanese Army, causing a hostile feeling between the two. Meanwhile, I instructed my officers and men to give protection and be decent to the Chinese people and to have a regard for the foreign rights and interests in China. As one example of the results of this instruction the battle in Nanshi (southern district of Shanghai) ended, as I ordered, without causing any damage to the district.

4. The Organization of the Central China Army and the circumstances that lead to the decision to attack Nanking. Immediately after the 10th Army's landing at Hangchow Bay on 5 November 1937, what was the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the 10th Army were organized into the Central China Area Army. I was then appointed the Commander of this new Army. For a while I served as the Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force concurrently.

The Central China Area Army Headquarters was over the Shanghai Expeditionary Force Headquarters and the 10th Army Headquarters, and its mission was to unify the command of these two units. However, since it had only seven staff officers, its duty was limited to giving operational instructions to the two headquarters, and had no authority to dispose the entire intendance and medical matters of the army in general.

Therefore, after I was relieved from my concurrent

post on December 7; i.e. the Commandership of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, my relation with the officers and men in the field in regard to the command and supervision was entirely indirect.

The Central China Area Army, after driving the Chinese Army out of the Shanghai Area, occupied the line between Chiahsing in Chekiang Province, Soochow and Changchow in Kiangsu Province and sought to maintain peace and order in the Shanghai area.

However, the Chinese Army, with Nanking as its base, kept up with the large-scale battles which were then in progress in North China and concentrated a great number of troops from other districts to prepare for attack against Japan in Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces. The situation grew so bad that unless the Chinese base of operation around Nanking was captured, it was impossible to maintain peace and order and to protect our interests in Central China. Consequently, Japan decided to capture Nanking to restore public peace in the southern part of Chingsu province, and the Imperial Headquarters ordered our Central China Area Army to seize Nanking in cooperation with the Navy. Our army thus commenced a quick offensive operation against Nanking in spite of many difficulties.

5. Measures taken at the time of capture of Nanking and the so-called cases of plunder and outrage in Nanking.

In accordance with the standing policy of our government to localize the area of battle as much as possible, and because of my long years of idea to bring about cooperation and prosperity between Japan and China, I took in capturing Nanking every precaution not to make this campaign a cause of struggle for the entire Chinese population. As explained before, my experience in the fighting around Shanghai made me feel the necessity of this more than ever. Regarding the various precautionary measures I took at that time to maintain military discipline and moral, and my other actions to help to enforce discipline, I will not state again since the witness NAKAYAMA, Yasuto already testified thereof in detail.


Notwithstanding my scrupulous care in capturing Nanking, in the busy and unsettled condition at that time, it may have been some excited young officers and men committed unpleasant outrages, and it was to my great regret and sorrow that I, afterward, heard rumors of such misconduct. At the time of capturing Nanking I was sick in bed at Suchow, some 140 miles away, and I was unaware of any such outrages committed contrary to my orders and received no reports thereof. After entering Nanking on 17 December, I heard about it for the first time, from the Commander of the KEMPEI unit, and I, at once, ordered every unit to investigate thoroughly and to punish the guilty men.

*Testimony  
Court*



However, it is a well known fact that, in war time, the Chinese troops and some outlaws almost always commit acts of violence and looting by taking advantage of the confusion. Not a few of these crimes were committed by the Chinese troops and peoples when Nanking fell, so to hold the Japanese officers and men responsible for all the crimes is to distort the fact.

A ceremony for entering Nanking was held on 17 December, and on the following day a memorial service for the dead was quietly held at the airfield. On the 19th, I inspected through the city accompanied by 15 or 16 officers and men but fires had been already put out and the streets were calm, with many refugees returning to their homes.



We saw only about twenty dead Chinese troops lying on the streets and the order within the city was generally being restored. But the water-works, electric facilities and important governmental and municipal buildings had been destroyed by the Chinese troops before the entry of the Japanese army and there were comparatively few fires. the number of fire-destroyed houses being approximately 50 or 60.

In short, during my stay in Shanghai after the fall of Nanking until February 1938, the only thing I heard was a rumour towards the end of December 1937 to the effect

that there were some cases of illegal acts in Nanking but I had received no official report about such fact. I hereby definitely states that the U.S. Army's broadcast in Tokyo after the war's end concerning the alleged large-scale massacre and outrage as has been asserted by the Prosecution in this court was the first time that I ever heard anything about it. After I heard the broadcast I tried to investigate the activities of our army subsequent to our capture of Nanking, however, the responsible persons at that time were already dead or detained and punished overseas, while the documents concerned were destroyed by fire. It is impossible to go back ten years and investigate and study the true situation in detail.

It is possible that a great number of Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded by bombs, artillery shells and rifle bullets during the Nanking campaign, but I do believe that there is not a bit of truth in the Prosecution's charge that there were cases of planned massacre in the fight of Nanking. Nothing can be farther from the truth than the slander that the staff of the Japanese army ordered or tolerated the above deeds.

In view of the situation at that time, it is needless to say that I did everything in my power as commander

of the Central China Area Army to take measures to prevent the occurrence of such unfortunate incidents to give severe punishment to the guilty and to compensate for the damages.

However, it is to my great regret that the result was not perfect due to the hectic condition of wartime. (The contributing factors were that I was sick in bed at Suchow when Nanking was captured; that I stayed only 5 days in Nanking before leaving the city; that as the Commander of the Central China Area Army I had no direct authority over the officers and men in the field, as explained before).

6. My actions after Nanking was Captured:

Staying for five days after entering Nanking on 17th, December, I left on 20th, December for Shanghai by water because of the necessity of commanding the Army in operation in the Chikiang area and after that I stayed in Shanghai. Here I was very busy in disposing the aftermath of war, such as negotiating with the local Chinese officials with a view to the maintenance of general peace and order and taking relief measures for the people; and getting in contact with the commanders of the British and American navies and the other foreign military and civilian officials in the area to look after

whatever incidents that occurred during the campaign. This was because the Central Chinese Area Army, after the complete occupation of Nanking and after my return to Shanghai, was ordered by the central authority to concentrate its efforts in securing the entire areas south of the Yangtze and East of Nanking, especially the neighbourhood of Shanghai.

Incidentally, when I heard the rumour of outrages in Nanking after returning to Shanghai, I issued a warning again to the officers and men then staying in Nanking by despatching especially one of my subordinate staff officers at the end of 1937 and ordered a thorough investigation of the rumour and quick punishment for anybody found to be guilty. However, up to the time of my leaving the post, I received no authentic reports concerning the above matters.

Besides the maintenance of public peace and order in the abovementioned occupied areas, I felt the necessity of negotiations for a general peace movement with the Government of Chiang Kai-shek. I urged the Chinese key officials in the neighbourhood of Shanghai to make efforts in this connection and especially despatched envoys to Foochow and Canton and had them communicate with Chen yi and Sung Tzu-wen. However, simultaneously with the

reorganization of the Central Chinese Area Army in the latter part of February, I was dismissed from the post of the Army Commander and returned to the home. I am still regretting the fact that I had missed the chance of continuing my effort for attaining the above object.

7. The fact that a meeting was held among attaches, in Berlin in 1929:

When I was dismissed from the post of Chief of 2nd Section, General Staff Headquarters in December, 1928, I thought of making a trip to various countries in Asia and in Europe, and in January, 1929 I started on my tour of inspection of French Indo-China, Siam, British Malay, India and other European Countries. Just when I was passing Berlin in April, 1929, military attaches stationed in various nations in Europe, taking the opportunity of my arrival there, got together with the object of renewing friendship. It was not an official conference and there was no particular purpose.

It was presided over by Major General OMURA, Yurin, attache in Berlin, and the meeting was of social nature. It was not a conference called and sponsored by me. Moreover, as I mentioned before, at that time I had already been dismissed from the post of Chief of 2nd Section, General Staff Headquarters and, as a mere Lieutenant General, I had no official power to sponsor a

conference among the attaches of various Embassies. In short, it was only a social meeting and nothing was decided upon with regard to the problems of the time, and no particular items were on the agenda. It was merely an informal, round-table discussion at which the attaches expressed their opinions on the situations in Europe. Accordingly, no minutes were taken and I had made no report thereof to my superior after my return to Japan. At the meeting I was seated in the seat of honour only as a visitor who came to that part of the world from afar. On this point, the contents of the Prosecution Exhibit No. 733 is contradictory to the statement I made to the Prosecution. I find what seem to be mis-translations in the records of investigation prepared by the Prosecution.

3. The relation between my appointment as a member of Supreme War Council or a cabinet advisor and the foreign policies of the Government:

A supreme war councillor is mainly given a temporary mission regarding the education and training within the Army and he is not to meddle in anything at any time, especially in foreign affairs.

A cabinet advisor was appointed mainly as a consultative agency because of the political situations in Japan

and abroad in those days, and had no substantial authority. Such being the case, while I was in these positions, my opinion was never taken up concerning the China and Asiatic problems, etc., and I myself never offered my own opinion.

9. The object of the Greater Asia Association which was established by me and the account of its activities, especially the true picture of the Asia movements for which I negotiated with Mr. Chin Te-chun in Peiping:

For many years, it had been my regret to see Asia invaded by Europeans and Americans, and I had been praying for the reconstruction of Asia by the people of Asia. In view of a marked alienation between Japan and China, since the Manchurian Incident, it was my desire that the peoples of these two nations look at the whole situation instead of being sentimental about small matters and misunderstanding each other. So, in order to give impetus to the movement of the "Greater Asianism" among interested persons in Japan and China, I established the Greater Asia Association together with men of the same views in 1933. This was not a political organization but it was a kind of an organization to study social culture. Its object was to reconstruct Asia by spreading the principle of Wang-Tao -- the idea which has been

transmitted for thousands of years from generation to generation in China and Japan, by bringing about a state of co-existence and co-prosperity for the entire Asiatic people; and finally by contributing to the humanity as a whole in its peaceful development. (Def. Doc. No. 2234). The number of Japanese members of the Association had reached more than two thousand but, due to the lack of funds, it was unable to do anything special.

In 1935 and 1936 I personally saw China, travelling south and north, and endeavoured for the accomplishment of this movement, planning for a campaign with my old friends in China. But for years in China the "Greater Asianism" had already been widely advocated by Sun Wen, the former President of the Chinese Republic. So, China wanted to propagandize the "Greater Asianism" by herself. Hoping that her movement and ours in Japan would be in line with each other in reaching the common objective, I talked with the interested men in Peipin and Tsentsin in the fall of 1935, and in the Spring of 1936 there was established "the Chinese Greater Asia Association" among the learned in North China. It is true that in this regard I persuaded Mr. Chin Te-chun, then the mayor of Peipin. However, the contents of the affidavit, presented in this court the other day by Mr. China, do not agree with his words and statements at that



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time (Def. Doc. No. 2234). Besides, our claim was not necessarily to drive out Europeans and Americans from Asia. What I advocated was that the Europeans and Americans, who were our friends and wanted to cooperate with us in bringing about happiness to the Asiatic people, should join us in our idea of co-prosperity and co-existence. My statements issued in those days will verify this fact. (Def. Doc. No. 2500, No. 2501, No. 2628)

10. The object and activities of the Dai Nippon Asia Development League and the Dai Nippon Asia Development Association.

The Dai Nippon Asia Development League was established at the time of the First Konoe Cabinet, combining then numerous organizations engaged in developing Asia. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was just organized also, and the league was organized into and came under the supervision of this association in order to act in accordance with the Government's foreign policy. However, due to the frequent changes of cabinets caused by the development of our domestic and foreign policies, the Asia Development League was constantly compelled to re-organize itself and change the sphere of activities. All it could do and did was to get in contact with various cultural organizations in China and Manchukuo with a view

to asking their cooperation. Besides that nothing concrete was accomplished. The reason why I was in the position of Vice-President or Adviser of the League from the beginning of its establishment was due to my past relation with the Greater Asia Association ever since it came into existence.

As the result of the frequent changes in the organization of the above-mentioned Asia Development League, it was reorganized and changed its name as Dai Nippon Asia Development Association at the time of Koiso Cabinet in 1944. As to its organization and activities, it was placed under the supervision and guidance of the Government, but the body itself was of cultural nature, composed of interested civilians in the truest sense of the term. With the progress of the Pacific War, however, the inconvenience in communications and the acute situation at home and abroad prevented it from starting any concrete movements, and the result was that it was only able to publish its organ and give some guidance for the ~~Japanese~~ students and citizens <sup>from</sup> in various countries in Asia <sup>residing</sup> in Japan. Because of my past connection with this association, I took charge of its management, but the war came to an end before long, and I was obliged to dissolve it without making any great contribution to it.

11. The Lady Byrd Incident and other foreign affairs.

About the 12th December, 1937, I received a report that some artillery unit belonging to the 10th Army bombarded a British Gunboat in the neighborhood of Wuhu. I ordered my Chief of Staff to investigate it immediately. According to his report about the 11th of December the Chinese troops were retreating on the Yangtze River by, large and small ships, and many of their ships were deceitfully displaying foreign flags. Hereupon, Lt.-General Yanagawa, Commander of the 10th Army ordered firing upon these ships with the retreating Chinese soldiers on board. So when Colonel Hashimoto located several ships sailing with the Chinese soldiers in the morning of 12th on the fog-covered Yangtze River, he opened fire. The Lady Byrd happened to be among this group of ships.

Accordingly, I immediately ordered the Commander of the 10th Army to tender his apology to the British Naval Commander-in-Chief there. I myself returned to Shanghai from Nanking, called on Admiral Little of the British Navy without delay and apologized to him for the incident. He fully understood my intention and promised me that he would transmit my apology to his Government.

The bombing of the U.S.S. Paney was executed by a Navy plane by mistake, and the plane was not under my

command and I had nothing to do with it at that time. However, since it was an unfortunate incident caused by the Japanese forces, I went to Admiral <sup>Yarnell</sup> ~~Kane~~, the U.S. Navy Commander without delay upon my return to Shanghai and expressed my regret to him, thus obtaining his understanding about the above event.

I protected peaceful people and respected the rights and interests of foreign powers as mentioned before. After completing somehow the Shanghai and Nanking Battles, I visited Admiral Little of the British Navy and Rear-Admiral Yarnell of the U.S. Navy, and tried to promote a better understanding between them and myself. I expressed my regret to them concerning unfortunate losses suffered by England and America and their Governments and peoples. I also met the French Ambassador and the French Navy Commander-in-Chief and exchanged opinions about what to do with the French Concession and Nanshi and we reached an understanding.

I expressed my profound gratitude to Rev. Jackinough who did a great deal in giving protection to the residents in Nanshi, and contributed ten thousand yen to him for his work. In this way I tried to alleviate the bitter effect of war.

12. Casualties on both sides at the front in the Southern area of the Yangtze River, and the tribute paid to the dead.

The number of the Japanese officers and men who were killed or died from diseases during the time of the fighting at Shanghai, Nanking, etc., reached more than 21,000, and together with the sick and wounded the number of casualties amounted to more than 80,000.

I deny that there were many cases of massacre as maintained by the Chinese witnesses, but I think there were many victims of Chinese soldiers and people during that period and among them there were not a few who suffered from cholera, thyroid fever, dysentery, etc. prevailing at Shanghai and in the Chinese Army at that time. Actually the number of Japanese officers and men contracted these diseases reached several hundred and more than one hundred soldiers died of them.

To my way of thinking, when the two races of Chinese and Japanese ought <sup>to</sup> have cooperated with each other as brethren in the nature of things, it was indeed a calamity that they should have struggled against each other at the cost of a tremendous number of lives, and I cannot help but feel profound regret for this sad event.

It was my fervent hope that the incident would give an opportunity for the two races to live in harmony and that those who sacrificed their lives would serve as a corner-stone of new Asia.

After returning home I built a temple near my

Def. Doc. No. 2738

temporary abode at Mt. Izu, Atami, and enshrined the souls of those victims of the two countries and prayed for the repose of their souls. Moreover, I built the statue of Kwannon, the Goddess of Mercy, in the precincts of the temple with the soil brought from the blood-covered fields of battle in the Southern area of the Yangtze River. And with the help of her great virtues, I have been day and night offering, like other people who have faith in this Kwannon, prayers for the repose of all the souls of friends and foes, for the light of East Asia, and finally for the coming of the peace of the world.

On this 14th day of October, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ MATSUI, Iwane (seal)

I, ITO, Kiyoshi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: /s/ ITO, Kiyoshi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ MATSUI, Iwane (seal)

4 3499A *Sutton*

11-25-44

Document No. 2396

Page 1

An Excerpt from the Magazine "DAI ASIA SHUGI", January Issue, 1941, published by the Greater Asia Association at page 2.

Proposal for unification and rapid progress of various organizations for development of Asia.

By MATSUI, Iwane

The year 2600 of the Imperial Japanese Era brought faith in Imperial History and awakened the whole nation together with the determination to face the present world situation. Also the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy and the recognition by the Nanking Kuomintang Government have forced them irresistibly to go on the road to construct a New Order in Asia against a long dominance of Great Britain, America and France in Asia. Therefore, the reconstruction of the various internal organs is urgently necessary in order to meet this serious situation together with the establishment of a so-called new structure in politics, economics and in various other spheres.

Now, we have welcomed the 2601th year with great pride and pleasure in living in this sacred age of SHO'WA to promote the building of Greater Asia with such resolution and structure. However, we cannot but consider the determination and conviction of the people both in and out of power quite insufficient. Why do I say so? We must first glance at the recent administration of the national policy by the Government. The Tripartite Pact has already been concluded in accordance with the declaration made at the time of the formation of the KONOYE Cabinet and the great Imperial Rescript was issued to urge the people to make up their mind. But we feel that since then the Government has been too scrupulous in carrying out the foreign policy without firm faith to resolutely execute the national policy. Moreover, many politicians in and out of power and learned people have not, to our regret, come up to our expectation in their enthusiasm in this respect. Therefore, though the people at large are out of the so-called "Obedient to the Imperial Rescript" principle and hoping for an epoch-making decisive step to be taken by the Government, they are, to say the truth, doubtful of the attitude of the Government, which is so slow to carry out its policy. Internal situation such as this is naturally reflected on the foreign countries, east and west, and it is regrettable that not only many Asiatic countries headed by China, but also several European powers are of late, beginning to make light of our determination and foothold.

Hereupon, out of my dissatisfaction in the present situation I urge the political thought, cultural, and other bodies for the development of Asia to rise up. The wise and the learned people as well as energetic young men belonging to these bodies are certainly willing, I believe, to carry out these measures. Furthermore, the conviction and enthusiasm of these apostles of the Asiatic revival with years of culture and researches will, I am sure, be a sole guiding power for carrying out the national policy, which had been hindered by the circumstances and interests of this complicated phase of life. I now propose the unification of these Asia revival bodies with a view of their cooperation. Though these bodies have different objectives and their nature, politically and economically, are different as are their histories and organizations, their chief aims are of course the unification and rehabilitation of the Asiatic races. Yet, up to the present, as their thoughts and standpoints differed, they have not been the same at least in their measures and expectation. To the contrary, these bodies are acting independently as they please, far from answering the requirement of the so-called "present New Structure of Society." Moreover, such different organizations of these very bodies have disturbed the people's faith and ideal in the Asiatic Revival Policy, unable to meet the present situation where national solidarity is cried. Such being the case, recently we have organized the League of the Asiatic Development Bodies, exerting efforts for more than a year to unite all these bodies but with a regrettable result at present. Therefore, we want to take a drastic measure to unite and adjust all these bodies into one organization and to control and guide it by a uniform thought and faith together with starting a new collective activity by concentrating the hitherto separate and duplicated efforts of all these bodies. We hope also to correct and guide the concept of the Asiatic Revival maintained by the people in and out of the Government to unify and lead their ideals on the right path. Thus, what this organization aims at must, of course, harmonize with the Government's policy and sometimes it will advise and encourage them to assist their Asiatic Revival policy with all its might. Furthermore, its ambition is to become the nucleus of the nation's cultural idea of Asiatic Revival at home and abroad and to start an enlightenment movement for the nations, east and west, with a view to join the movement of the Imperial Rule Assistance started by the Asiatic Revival organizations.

In spite of many Asiatic Revival bodies established in the country, several new ones are now being organized as a natural expression of dissatisfaction with the old ones. Therefore, some measure to control them is urgent. Although these



old bodies have, of course, respective histories and special circumstances, their unification will not be difficult if treated with laws and it will not be so hard for it to continue the work and aims of the old ones under the consistent control. In short, in controlling, we must depend upon the effectiveness of each person and organization. Earnestly, we desire all the members of the various bodies to agree with us, and the authorities of the China Affairs Board (KOAIN), who are naturally central figures of this movement being already leaders of the League, to contemplate over this matter.

As indicated above, here we suggest the unification of all the Asiatic Revival Bodies. We desire all the conscious apostles for the cause of Asiatic Revival to rise and cooperate with one another to guide the people. After all, the present situation has become clear in its destination and does not allow us to hesitate. If we are constrained and over-cautious to act now, we shall entangle the situation thus misleading the country at the cross roads of life or death. It is, of course, necessary to listen to the voice of the nation for those who want to guide the national policy with sincerity and good faith. However we cannot approve very much of shirking responsibility under such a pretext or following an easy-going course, especially now when the decision of our national politics depends entirely upon the determination to put our national policy towards Greater Asia into effect. I feel most deeply our responsibility as apostles of the Asiatic Revival under the present situation, and this is the reason why I appeal to our comrades to rise at once.

.....

43499A

Matsui

original document  
10-8-47

25 Nov 47

Document No. 2396

An Excerpt from the Magazine "DAI ASIA SHUGI", January Issue, 1941, published by the Greater Asia Association.

Proposal for unification and rapid progress of various organizations for development of Asia.

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Now, we have welcomed the 2600th year with great pride and pleasure in living in this sacred age of SHOWA to promote the building of Greater Asia with such resolution and structure. However, we cannot but consider the determination and conviction of the people both in and out of power quite insufficient. Why do I say so? We must first glance at the recent administration of the national policy by the Government. The Tripartite Pact has already been concluded in accordance with the declaration made at the time of the formation of the KONOYE Cabinet and the great Imperial Rescript was issued to urge the people to make up their mind. But we feel that since then the Government has been too scrupulous in carrying out the foreign policy without firm faith to resolutely execute the national policy. Moreover, many politicians in and out of power and learned people have not, to our regret, come up to our expectation in their enthusiasm in this respect. Therefore, though the people at large are out of the so-called "Obedient to the Imperial Rescript" principle and hoping for an epoch-making decisive step to be taken by the Government, they are, to say the truth, doubtful of the attitude of the Government, which is so slow to carry out its policy. Internal situation such as this is naturally reflected on the foreign countries, east and west, and it is regrettable that not only many Asiatic countries headed by China, but also several European powers are of late, beginning to make light of our determination and foothold.

Hereupon, out of my dissatisfaction in the present situation I urge the political thought, cultural, and other bodies for the development of Asia to rise up. The wise and the learned people as well as energetic young men belonging to these bodies are certainly willing, I believe, to carry out these measures. Furthermore, the conviction and enthusiasm of these apostles of the Asiatic revival with years of culture and researches will, I am sure, be a sole guiding power for carrying out the national policy, which had been hindered by the circumstances and interests of this complicated phase of life. I now propose the unification of these Asia revival bodies with a view of their cooperation. Though these bodies have different objectives and their nature, politically and economically, are different as are their histories and organizations, their chief aims are of course the unification and rehabilitation of the Asiatic races. Yet, up to the present, as their thoughts and standpoints differed, they have not been the same at least in their measures and expectation. To the contrary, these bodies are acting independently as they please, far from answering the requirement of the so-called "present New Structure of Society." Moreover, such different organizations of these very bodies have disturbed the people's faith and ideal in the Asiatic Revival Policy, unable to meet the present situation where national solidarity is cried. Such being the case, recently we have organized the League of the Asiatic Development Bodies, exerting efforts for more than a year to unite all these bodies but with a regrettable result at present. Therefore, we want to take a drastic measure to unite and adjust all these bodies into one organization and to control and guide it by a uniform thought and faith together with starting a new collective activity by concentrating the hitherto separate and duplicated efforts of all these bodies. We hope also to correct and guide the concept of the Asiatic Revival maintained by the people in and out of the Government to unify and lead their ideals on the right path. Thus, what this organization aims at must, of course, harmonize with the Government's policy and sometimes it will advise and encourage them to assist their Asiatic Revival policy with all its might. Furthermore, its ambition is to become the nucleus of the nation's cultural idea of Asiatic Revival at home and abroad and to start an enlightenment movement for the nations, east and west, with a view to join the movement of the Imperial Rule Assistance started by the Asiatic Revival organizations.

In spite of many Asiatic Revival bodies established in the country, several new ones are now being organized as a natural expression of dissatisfaction with the old ones. Therefore, some measure to control them is urgent. Although these old bodies have, of course, respective histories and special circumstances, their unification will not be difficult if treated

with laws and it will not be so hard for it to continue the work and aims of the old ones under the consistent control. In short, in controlling, we must depend upon the effectiveness of each person and organization. Earnestly, we desire all the members of the various bodies to agree with us, and the authorities of the China Affairs Board (KOAIN), who are naturally central figures of this movement being already leaders of the League, to contemplate over this matter.

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.....

23 October 1947

Re: MATSUI, Iwane

MATSUI was Cabinet Counsellor from July 1938 to January 1940. Ex. 115, R. 736.

KIDO testified, R. 31,413-4 as follows:

"Q. What is the duty, very briefly, of a Cabinet Counsellor?

"A. I think, according to the government regulations concerning Cabinet Counsellors, their main function was to serve as consultants to the Prime Minister in connection with bringing about an early termination of the China Incident.

"Q. Was that Cabinet Counsellor a special position created for that precise purpose, do I understand?

"A. Yes."

Knowledge was Brought Home to MATSUI of the Atrocities Committed at Nanking.

From the interrogation of MATSUI, Ex. 257, R. 3453-65, the following excerpts are taken:

A. "Q. When did you first hear, if you did hear, that Europe and America got the idea that your troops committed many outrages in Nanking?

"A. Almost as soon as I entered Nanking.

"Q. You heard about it?

"A. Yes.

"Q. From what source did you hear about it?

"A. From Japanese diplomats.

"Q. Who was the Japanese diplomat?

- "A. It was a very small diplomatic official and I do not remember his name, the Consul at Nanking." (R. 3453-4)
- B. "Q. The charges also are made that the discipline of troops that captured Nanking was very bad.
- "A. I considered the discipline excellent, but the conduct and behavior was not.
- \* \* \* \* \*
- "A. Why do you say that it is your opinion that the behavior of the soldiers was bad? On what do you base this statement?
- "A. On account of their behavior toward the Chinese population and their acts generally." (R. 3458)
- C. "A. I entered Nanking on the 17th and after one week I returned to Shanghai." (R. 3459)
- D. "Q. You stated that you went into Nanking on the 17th. Did you see any bodies of dead civilians, women or children? Anything of that sort?
- "A. They had all been removed by this time. I saw a few dead Chinese soldiers near the west gate." (R. 3461)
- E. MATSUI upon his return to Japan in February made no report about the behavior of the troops in Nanking to the Chief of Staff, the War Minister or anyone else.
- "Q. Were you asked to make a report or questioned about this rumor concerning the behavior of troops at Nanking?
- "A. No, I was not asked to make a report. If there had been any such incidents I would naturally have made a report on my own responsibility. If you are looking for any reports, they would be in the Demobilization Bureau." (R. 3464)

F. MATSUI further testified that the only memoranda which he had concerning his activities at Nanking and Shanghai were notes in his diary concerning the court-martial of an officer and three soldiers in connection with the rape of a Chinese in Nanking. He thought the officer was executed and the soldiers imprisoned.

"A. \* \* \* This was as a result of my advocating severe punishment for offenders. I received this information when I was in Shanghai and put it in my diary there."

MATSUI further testified that the diary had been burned in the bombing of Tokyo. (R. 3464-5)

NAKAYAMA testified, Ex. 1345, R. 21,885-948, that General MATSUI's headquarters while in Nanking were at the Capital Restaurant, which was about 1-1/2 kilometers from the nearest refugee zone. (R. 21,919) As to the reports of atrocities received by General MATSUI, his testimony on cross-examination is as follows:

"Q. When did General MATSUI first receive reports that the troops under his command had committed crimes in Nanking?

"A. The first report was received immediately after the entry into Nanking.

"Q. And from whom did he receive reports that the troops had committed crimes in Nanking?

"A. I think the reports were received from the Kempei, the Military Police authorities.

"Q. What were the type and natures of the crimes which the report stated had been committed by his troops?

"A. I have no positive recollection.

"Q. Did he receive any other reports of crimes committed by his troops than those which he received from the Military Police?

"A. I think he did.

"Q. And from whom did he receive the additional reports that his troops had committed crimes in the city of Nanking?

"A. From commanders and division commanders under General MATSUI's command as well as from diplomatic organs." (R. 21,924-5)

NAKAYAMA stated in his affidavit that following the ceremony of the triumphant entry by General MATSUI into the walled city of Nanking on December 17, General MATSUI gathered together his officers and ordered them to be more strict in maintaining military discipline and morale; that this order was issued because he had received a report from the military police there regarding some crimes connected with military discipline and morale which were committed by some troops under his command. (R. 21,902)

NAKAYAMA further stated in his affidavit (R. 21,905) that the rumor to the effect that there were unlawful acts by the Japanese troops in Nanking came to the knowledge of General MATSUI after his return to Shanghai. He said that "General MATSUI came to feel quite uneasy" and directed that orders should be issued that misconduct by soldiers would be severely punished.

TSUKAMOTO testified, Ex. 2548, R. 21,559-81. In his affidavit he said:

"After the entry into Nanking, unlawful acts were committed by Japanese troops, and I remember having examined into these cases. I also remember Commander MATSUI calling all officers together and telling them of the occurrence of such cases and giving strict orders for the maintenance of military discipline with the greatest severity."

He testified on cross-examination that General MATSUI spoke of what had happened during the period between the time the troops left Shanghai and entered Nanking and said that the Japanese troops should be more careful in the future. The General said that various incidents of rape and massacre are likely to happen and therefore troops should exercise more caution. (R. 21,567)

HIDAKA, Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking and later in Shanghai, testified, Ex. 2537, R. 21,443-67. He stated in his affidavit as follows:

"Reports on anything wrong allegedly done by Japanese soldiers were submitted to the Consulate-General by foreign residents. Most of these reports were based on hearsay, however, and since the Consulate-General had not time enough to investigate each of them



the reports were sent to the Foreign Ministry, Tokyo, (I read through some of the copies in Shanghai) and to the Army in Nanking. It seemed the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo gave notice of these reports to the War Ministry." (R. 21,453)

*12/29 Review Order*

He further stated, (R. 21,448), "I met him again in Shanghai, January 1 of next year when he was sincerely grieved to find for the first time that some of his subordinates had done wrong. I was deeply impressed then to find that he had not been aware of such facts until that time." And in reply to a question from the President of the Tribunal, (R. 21,466-7) which mentioned the fact that the witness was deeply impressed on January 1, 1938 to find that MATSUI had not been aware of the misbehavior of the troops in Nanking until that time and asked when the witness heard about it and what he did hear, HIDAHA replied:

"On January 1, I went to General MATSUI's place to express felicitations on the New Year. \* \* \* We were carrying on an informal conversation \* \* \* in the course of the conversation General MATSUI said there were some among his subordinates who did something very wrong and that it was extremely regrettable and unfortunate."

DEF. DOC. #2791

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: MATSUI Iwano

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

Defence Doc. # 1077 A is my statement regarding the mission and program of the Japanese Army dispatched to Shanghai, which I proclaimed there on the 8th of October 1937 in the capacity of Commander of the said Army. Defence Doc. # 1077 B consists of the announcements which I made at Shanghai around that time as Commander of the said Army for the purpose of giving advice to the Chinese masses. I made both the above statements orally.

Ev 115  
257  
732A  
733A

Am. P.

Miss Prechner

will you please send me  
a copy of the list of Exhibits  
Brigadier Nolan will use  
in the Matsui cross-examination

D. N. Sutton

Miss Prechner:

will you please  
give Capt Barbi the list of  
Exhibits I will use with  
Matsui.

HGH

DEF. DOC. #2791

The both documents are substantial and exact representations of my statements.

Def. Doc. #22500 is showing the comment titled "Manchoukuo for the Manchurians" written by me and published in pages 2-4 of the June edition of "The Greater Asia Principle (Vol. 1. No. 2)" in 1933, which was an organ of the Greater Asia Association.

Def. Doc. # 2625 contains my lecture on "Our Greater Asia Principle" delivered in May 1936 at various places in the Kyushu and Kansai districts; and published in the July edition of "The Greater Asia Principle--Vol. 4 # 39" in 1936.

The document is a substantial and exact representation of the lecture.

On this 27 day of Oct., 1947

At \_\_\_\_\_

DEPONENT MATSUI Iwano (seal)

I, ITO Kiyoshi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At \_\_\_\_\_

Witness: (signed) ITO Kiyoshi (seal)

DEF. DOC. #2791

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the  
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ MATSUI Iwane (soal)

ask Matsui

19 Dec 1937

Did you visit the

Refugee zone

is a "refugee in the neighborhood"

w.c. Okada

P.P. 2670

ET —

19

23 October 1947

Re: MATSUI, Iwane

NAKAYAMA stated in his affidavit, R. 21,893 as follows:

"After arriving at Suchow, General MATSUI told General TSUKADA, Chief of the Staff, 'As Nanking is the capital of China, our capture of it is an international event. Careful studies must be made in this regard so as to dazzle China even more greatly with Japan's military glory and to have the Chinese people in general place a greater confidence in Japan.' This instruction was conveyed from the Chief of Staff to us staff officers. \* \* \*"

He further stated that as a result of these instructions the staff prepared and issued an order including an instruction sheet termed, "The Way of Capturing the Walled City of Nanking."

DR. WILSON testified (R. 2,531) as follows:

"Late in November, 1937, after the fall of Shanghai, when the Japanese Army was approaching Nanking, the nurses and doctors of our staff came to us with the request that they be allowed to proceed up-river and not remain in Nanking when the city was taken by the Japanese soldiers. Their reason for doing this was because of the stories that they heard about the happenings in the cities between Shanghai and Nanking. These cities were specifically Su-Chou, Wu-Hsi, Chen-Kiang, Tang-Yang, among others.

"Our staff feared for their lives and wished to leave, and we attempted to calm their fears by saying that under martial law they would have nothing to fear in Nanking after the city fell. We were unable to convince them, however, and they left to up-river, leaving the hospital with Dr. Trimmer, another American doctor, and myself, five nurses who elected to remain behind, and some of the servant class who elected to stay with us. They left the city about the first of December. All together, about twenty Chinese doctors and some forty or fifty nurses and student nurses left."

9 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lopez; Capt Robinson USN Att: Cmdr. Cole;  
Mr. Edwards; Mr. Sutton  
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - MATEUI

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

*Referent*  
MATEUI, Iwane

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

*E P M*

Incl  
(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN



General Iwane MATSUI: President of General Headquarters for New Asia Movement of Imperial Rule Assistance Association. President, Central Association of Overseas Japanese.

1878 July	Born Aichi Prefecture. Son of Takekuni Matsui. Married Fumiko, daughter of Masaharu Isohe.
1897	Graduated Military Academy
*	Company Commander in Russo-Japanese War
1905	Graduated Military Staff College
1912-18	On Staff of General Staff Headquarters
1915-18	Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
1918	Colonel
1919-22	Commander of 39th Regiment, Infantry (Himeji)
1923	Major General attached to Headquarters Kwantung Army
1924	Commander 35th Brigade, Infantry (Fukuoka)
1925-28	Chief of Second Department, General Staff Headquarters.
1927	Lieutenant General.
1929-31	Commander 11th Division (Zentsuji); Member Japanese Disarmament Commission. Geneva and London.
1932	Commander in Formosa, Supreme War Councilor
1933	General. Commander, Taiwan Army
1935	Temporarily retired.
1937-38	Recalled to active duty as Commander in Chief in Central China.
1938-39	President of Association of Great Asia
1938-40	Member Cabinet Advisory Council
1942	Vice President, East Asia Development League.
1943	Supreme Advisor to puppet Nanking Government.
1944 Jan.	Advisor IRAA Youth Corps.
1944 Aug.	Appointed President of General Headquarters for New Asia Movement of IRAA.
1945 Jan.	Appointed President of Central Association of Overseas Japanese

Address: 2708, 1-chome, Sanno, Omori-ku, Tokyo

Has been associated with Chinese affairs for nearly 40 years. Long an active proponent of the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics," became president of Pan-Asiatic Society after his retirement in 1935. He visited China seeking to interest prominent Chinese in the organization, but with little if any success. Is credited with having persuaded Premier Tanaka to call the Mukden conference of Japanese officials in 1927 for discussion of Japan's so-called positive continental policy, and there is some evidence to substantiate belief that this conference drafted the famous "Tanaka Memorial". (96.1)

General Iwane MATSUI: (cont'd)

An extreme nationalist who at one time was a dominating figure in Japanese Army with considerable influence over younger officers. As commander in chief of Japanese forces in Central China in 1937 achieved brilliant military successes from Shanghai to Nanking under difficult conditions. The outrages committed by his troops at Nanking with resulting world-wide condemnation, and his public utterances flouting foreign governments were responsible for his replacement in February 1938 by General Hata who quickly and efficiently restored discipline. General Matsui retired from the army soon afterward but continued his activities in behalf of Japanese expansion. (73)

Spent some time in France early in his career. His friendliness toward U.S. changed to distrust following American reaction to Manchurian occupation. (1, 52)

CASE NO. 61

RE: MATSUI, Iwane (General)

DATE: 15 Jan 46

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. C. W. HIGGINS:

In answer to your request to ascertain the present whereabouts of General MATSUI and whether he is physically able to undergo prison life the following information is submitted.

The Central Liaison Office advises that they are this date forwarding a letter to General MacArthur's Headquarters to the effect that General MATSUI is ill and under medical care and that he needs at least another one month's rest to recover his health. Translation of the certificate of diagnosis is as follows:

CERTIFICATE OF DIAGNOSIS

Patient: Iwane Matsui (68)  
Narusawa, Izusan, Atami, Shizuoka  
Prefecture

I hereby declare that I have medically examined the above patient and diagnose his case as follows:

Disease: Infiltration around the right bronchial tube and arteriosclerosis

Since November last the patient has had some fever due to a cold and has been under medical care. He is still conspicuously emaciated, suffering from frequent coughs and expectoration. An X-ray photo reveals infiltration around the right bronchial tube.


The sinking speed of red blood-corpuscles is 37 in an hour and 70 in two hours.

In view of the foregoing, at least one month's rest and treatment is considered to be necessary.

Jan. 5, 1946

Kinya Itokawa, Director of the Itokawa Hospital  
No. 1, Meruyama Fukuyama-cho, Hongo-ku, Tokyo  
Tel. Koishikawa (85) 2906

COPIES: 2 Mr. Higgins ✓  
3 File 61

  
JOE B. ALEXANDER  
2nd Lt., Inf.

GHQ  
SCAP  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

15 January 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. Alexander  
From: C. W. Higgins  
Subject: General Iwane MATSUI

On arrival at Sugamo prison yesterday I found that General Iwane MATSUI was not in custody.

In checking with Lt. Col. Seckett I find that on one of the lists he was reported as not in custody but that custody had been ordered. On the list given to me on January 8 for interview there was nothing to indicate that General Matsui was not in custody. Sometime in advance I had made arrangements for the interview and did not know the fact that MATSUI was not in custody until arrival at the prison.

Please ascertain where he is, why he has not been placed in custody, and if he is physically unable to undergo prison life. Who has made the decision to that effect? And whether he is available for interrogation - and where?

3 copies to Central Files

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
DOCUMENT DIVISION

7 Nov 1947

MEMO FROM: Yale Maxon  
TO : Mr. Sutton  
SUBJECT : MATSUI, Iwane, Material for possible cross  
examination of

1. The following extract from the diary of Marquis Yoshichika TOKUGAWA for 1938 (IPS Doc 2639) has been checked in the Language Division and is suitable for use in Court for rebuttal of statements on pp 10 - 11 of MATSUI's affidavit.

"8 Feb 38

..... At half past two, Mr. Koichiro ISHIHARA and Mr. Shumei OKAWA came. A report by Mr. OKAWA, who returned from Nanking yesterday. A talk sympathizing with Gen. MATSUI's position, a talk in which the necessity of reform (military) was pointed out, and so on. Deeply felt the necessity of restoration of military discipline....."

2. It may be, as MATSUI suggests on p. 10 of his affidavit, that it was the "Chinese troops and some outlaws" who were committing acts of violence and looting in Nanking, but this extract is convincing proof that even such pro-Army men as OKAWA and ISHIHARA felt that Japanese military discipline was at fault. ISHIHARA incidentally is still in Sugamo awaiting trial.

----- Y.M.  -----

cc Brig. Nolan  
TOKUGAWA case file  
OKAWA case file  
MATSUI case file

Translation of Defense Document

2791 Sandusky

Title

Sworn Deposition of MATSUI Iwane

From Section

335

31, Oct

, 1947

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

~~Following errors are noted:~~

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
		O. K.	

6 March 1946

~~to be reviewed~~ 4

Memorandum for Executive  
Committee.

The following comments are submitted in connection  
with interrogations.

MATSUO IWANE General

This man was brought to  
SUGAMO jail this morning,  
according to Captain Gaine, from  
whom a report had been requested.

In connection with his  
responsibility for Rape of Hankow,  
attention is invited to statement of  
Hallett Abens, American author of  
"My Life in China 1926-1941" that  
Lieutenant General Prince ASAKA  
YASUHIKO, <sup>as field commander</sup> was actually responsible  
for the horror of Hankow. But  
he was related to Imperial family  
and is not mentioned in  
connection with the horrors.

However Matsui was  
in command, and the

2

responsibility is his, ~~the~~  
~~of~~ He has not been  
questioned, but is now available  
for questioning. He should be on list.  
HATA SHUN ROKU. <sup>to be included</sup>

### Fred Marshall

This man was questioned  
by my Higgins and the under-  
signed at SUGAMO Prison.  
The questioning was impromptu,  
and because the man we were  
seeking, <sup>to interrogate</sup> was not available  
Hata is able, and gave an  
impression that he was candid.  
He admitted that his predecessor  
in China in 1937 and 1938,  
who was General MATSUI, was  
relieved of command, and  
himself <sup>(Hata)</sup> substituted on account  
"partly" of the MATSUI'S  
responsibility for the Rape of  
Nanking, and the ~~#~~ inferior



discipline of the Army in Central  
China, at time of Capture of  
Hanking, <sup>under</sup> and MATSUI'S  
Command of the Army during  
that time.

The Chinese Statement  
to undesignated 15 Feb 1946 is that  
Hata "allowed his force to indulge in  
atrocities in the 'Triangle' of Central  
China," that he took the lead in per-  
petuating aggressive war against  
China, and as War Minister  
opposed conciliatory demands of the  
Conservative group of the Japanese  
Government. " These statements were  
submitted by the Chinese prosecutors,  
but proof has not been forthcoming  
yet.

It will be remembered that  
Hata was Minister of War in the  
ABE + YONAI Cabinets 30 Aug 1929 until  
22 July 1940. It is my opinion that if

The statements of the Chinese prosecutors  
can be backed by convincing evidence,  
that his name should be <sup>an indictment</sup> included,  
Some evidence (~~particulars~~ of his  
career as a General in China) ~~is~~ is  
most necessary.

General Count TERAOCHI Juichi is  
reported by Butler "dying of arterio  
sclerosis in a Malaya hospital."  
He ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> a top war criminal, but I  
recommend to pass <sup>him</sup> up. We do not  
want to prosecute men with one  
foot in the grave, and he is too  
far off to bring here in time.  
I mention this because he  
was assigned to me for  
questioning.

~~Itagaki~~ ITAGAKI Seishiro  
The man was a Manchurian advent-  
urer, a cruel ~~the~~ General in the

Central Chinese War, and later an  
aggressive Minister of War. He is a  
top criminal, but should not  
be indicted unless he can be  
~~caught~~, and he is still at large.  
apprehended and brought to trial.  
~~He is still at large.~~ Last report  
states he is in Singapore

ARAKI DADEO.

The most  
serious charge against ARAKI  
relates to his Ministry of War  
13 Dec 1931 until 23 Jan 1934.  
This was ~~the~~ a time when the  
Army in Manchuria was greatly  
increased from the home land,  
and its aggressions continued.  
Later, as Minister of Education  
(May 1938 to Aug 1939) he was  
not a leading figure. Araki  
claims to have been against  
aggression, but in words he not

Bear this out. He did much to  
breed a Chauvinistic spirit in Japan  
by speeches and writings, although  
there is no record of deeds of  
aggression on his part.

In Hyderabad, Judge Bell<sup>(and)</sup> the undersigned, ~~and~~  
~~Hyderabad~~ examined Araki. He  
is unwilling to involve others, ~~and~~  
except some dead persons, and proclaims  
his own innocence.

As Minister of  
Education, he denies any partic-  
ipation in vote or discussion  
concerning the stirring events of  
aggression of that time, and states  
that matters were decided upon  
by Premier, Finance, War, Navy,  
and Foreign Ministers, without  
his concurrence or opportunity  
to object.

He should be in the  
list.

## KAWABE Shozo

This man was a general in North China Garrison Army at the time of the Marco Polo incident, which started the Sino-Japanese war. He is not on <sup>the</sup> British or Chinese list. There is no proof in record at present that he was to blame for the Marco Polo explosion, or its exploding by the Japanese.

The most important statements in his interrogatory were that he personally ordered the burning of certain <sup>Army</sup> Air Force records a couple of days after the Emperor's agreement to surrender, <sup>14 Aug 1945</sup> and burned were records a day or so later, at the instance of the <sup>Minister</sup> ~~Secretary~~ of War GEN SUGIYAMA. He said that the Minister of War order was one that was <sup>broadcast</sup> generally, and was

obeyed throughout the Army.

KAWABE however  
can not be classed as a top  
war criminal, on the present  
showing. I recommend his name  
be omitted from the list.

ARITA HACHIRO.

This man was Foreign  
Minister in three Cabinets. He  
has not been arrested. He closed  
the Anti-Comintern Pact and the  
secret treaty that accompanied  
it. I am now partly through  
his interrogation.

He is a diplomatic  
career man, but not as  
brilliant nor as dangerous  
as MATSUOKA YOSUKE

Both MATSUOKA and  
OSHIMA HIROSHI deserve  
indictment far more than

Anita. On present showing,  
and although a case could be  
made out against him because  
of official acts, it is  
recommended that he be  
omitted from the list. He  
makes a fine showing as a  
witness in his own behalf, and  
very plausibly explains his  
attitude as to Anti Communist  
Part and Secret Treaty of  
25 Nov 1936.

Matseis  
Doc. No. 625

ROUGH TRANSLATION  
CORRECT IN TEXT ONLY

Length of time to be kept - Permanent

Sanctioned by - Vice Commission

Action decided by - Kokubun

Receipt number - Army-Secret-China-Receipt, Number 979

Government department of Origin - Bureau of Military Service, Military Service Section

Subject - Concerning the instruction and control of the speeches and actions of the army units and army men returned from the China Incident Area

Minister - Vice Commission

Vice Minister of Administration

Vice Minister - Yamawaki

Councillor

High ranking adjutant - Kokubun

Chief of Competent Bureau - Yamamoto (Proxy)

Secretary - Military Service

Adjutant of Competent Bureau - Ooba

Chief of Competent Section - Yamamoto

Staff of Competent Section - Mukada

Section in Competent Bureau

Number - Military Service A22

Received

Presented - February 1, 1939

Minister's Secretariat

Received - February 1, 1939

Finished - February 15

Connection - Bureau Chief-Military Affairs-Tanaka (Vice Commission)

Section Chiefs



Military - Tanaka

Defense - /stamp/ Munitaro Yamada

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Army-China-Secret

From the Vice Minister to the Army forces concerned (Army forces in Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Manchuria)

Draft of Memorandum

Orders and notices pertaining to the instruction and control of the speeches and actions of the army units and army men returned from the China Incident Area have been issued but in a small percentage, it is not just a few who do not control their speeches and actions. Moreover, it is necessary to be careful of the commanders of the forces who lack a firm grasp of control and consequently allow laxity of discipline or to be careful of the leaders who do not pay sufficient attention to the text of the orders and notices concerning objects which army men brought back from China. And especially, not only does the improper talk of the returned officers and men after their return to the homes become the cause of rumors but also impairs the trust of the people in the army, disrupts the unity of people supporting the army, etc. The damage is extremely large. As it is believed that in the future, the returning forces will gradually increase owing to replacements, demobilization, etc. I repeat the order again to make the control of the directing even more strict and consequently glorify the meritorious deeds, raise the Japanese Army's military reputation and insure that nothing will impair the accomplishment of the object of the Holy War.

For reference in tightening the instructions the book, "The Situation of the Military Forces and Army Men Returned from the Area of Disturbance," is being forwarded to you under separate cover.

Army-Secret-China General Order No. 349  
February 6, 1939. (4,460) Miyako

Army-Secret-China Order

Draft of memorandum from the adjutant to the chief of the General Affairs Section in the General Staff Headquarters.

As the matter concerning the subject is being sent to you under separate cover it is requested that you take appropriate measures.

Army-Secret-China General Order No. 404  
February 11, 1939. Okiyama

/One more sign which is not clear/

/Paper slip pasted on/

All notices to the forces in the disturbance area will be sent in

duplicate in the name of the vice chief of staff. As the Headquarters of the General Staff has been consulted, the copies of "Central China, North China Collection" will be sent to the Headquarters of the General Staff simultaneously. The matter is to be /settled when the printing is done./

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The separate cover

Top Secret

Of Part 4460

The situation of the Military Forces and Army men Returned from the Disturbance Area.

Notice - No further publications allowed.

Handle strictly with care to prevent leakages.

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The military forces and the men returned from the disturbance area are generally <sup>well</sup> disciplined and well behaved. They are a credit to the Army, and are careful about their speeches and actions but among a fraction of them, overcome by the welcome accorded them, their feeling of victorious return, their feeling of superiority in having endured the grim army life, etc., there are not just a few who do not restrain their speeches and actions. There are some who, upon their return to their homes after being discharged, wish to boast of their honor or merits, and fabricate stories about their officers and other units, and thus abuse them, boast about the tragedies in the battlefield, allow military secrets to leak through in their attempts to appear well-informed, exaggerate the slackness of military discipline and morals for the sake of telling stories, etc. The speeches mentioned above sometimes not only become the cause of rumors but may also affect the trust of the people in the Japanese Army, impair the unity of the people at home, etc. The harm is extremely great and special care is necessary in the instructions and in the control of these matters. Moreover, it is necessary that the commanders of the returning units have a firmer grasp of the control of their Units.

1. Regarding military discipline and morals. Although, in general, the morale is high and the disciplines and morals are being maintained, there are among a few some who, excited by the spirit of victorious return, do not pay sufficient attention to the orders and instructions of the commanders, some who behave in an undignified manner in front of the welcoming people, etc., some who start fighting after getting drunk, and some who use profane language concerning military discipline.

Instances when the commanders' control was insufficient and marching discipline was terrible are given below:

(1) There are some men who leave the ranks without reason to speak to the welcoming parties.

(2) There are some men who without reason pull the callers into the ranks to converse with them.

(3) There are men who accept food and drink from the welcoming parties and eat while marching.

(4) There are men who march while holding hands with women and girls.

(5) There are men who let their wives carry their rifles and march carrying their children in their arms.

(6) There are men whose handling of the rifles and whose appearance and behavior are very bad.

The main examples where care is necessary in speeches regarding military discipline and public morals are as follows:

(1) In the unit at xx district I hear that military discipline was strict but in our unit military discipline and public morals were fortunately no problem at all.

(2) In the battlefield the commander used the term "enlist" for "requisition." Whenever we ran short of food he ordered, "Enlist some help." But really "enlist" and "requisition" amounted to the same thing. They say that the Japanese army is strict but requisition is something that sticks with war.

(3) The thing I like best during the battle is plundering. In the front lines the superiors turn a blind eye to plundering and there were some who plundered to their hearts' content.

(4) The platoon commander rose from the officers' candidates group and could not even handle the men. The officer gave orders but the men acted on their own and produced better results. Obeying the poor directions of these officers from the officers' candidate group would only result in a greater number of casualties.

(5) Discipline is strict in the peacetime army but in the battlefield it could not be so. The lazybones gain. Many conscientious workers fell early in the battlefield.

(6) At xx we captured a family of four. We played with the daughter just as we would with a harlot. But as the parents insisted that the daughter be returned to them we killed them. We played with the daughter as before until the unit's departure and then killed her.

(7) One company commander unofficially gave instructions for raping as follows: "In order that we wont have problems, either pay them money or kill them in some obscure place after you have finished."

(8) If the army men who participated in the war were investigated individually, they will probably be all guilty of murder, robbery, or rape.

(9) When we were attacked by the Chinese troops near xx in North China, there were about eight deserters.

(10) In the battlefield we think nothing of rape. There are even some men who resisted with firearms when discovered by the military police in the act.

(11) In the half a year of battle about the only things I learned are rape and burglary.

(12) In the battlefield when the superior gives the order "Advance" nobody advances if there are shells whizzing around.

(13) In the lulls between the battles gambling was popular and there are men who returned with considerable amounts of money.

(14) In the battlefield quite a number of men got souvenirs of precious stones, metals, etc., with the excuse of requisition.

(15) The Japanese Army used many Chinese spies but after they became unnecessary the army killed them.

(16) In the unit they were issuing three-yen tickets to officers, two-yen tickets to non-commissioned officers, one-yen tickets to the men for prostitutes and thus provided recreation for the soldiers.

(17) Some Japanese soldiers are quite hard. They examined the corpses of their comrades individually to extract even the gold teeth.

(18) The ones who carry the plundered goods back to Japan are not the other ranks but the officers. I saw some plundered goods being confiscated by the military police from the baggage of returning officers. Some officers are very cheeky.

(19) The military police often scolded us when they found us confiscating cows and pigs in the line of communications area but as we could not fight without eating we killed and ate the animals as soon as we came across them in the front line.

(20) The plundering by our army in the battle area is beyond imagination. Pacification is being practiced in only a small part of the occupied area.

(21) The prisoners of the Chinese army were sometimes lined up in one line and killed to test the efficiency of the machine gun.

2. The situation of the opinions of the returned officers and men. In general they have moderate thoughts and there have been no expressions of extremely violent opinions but among a few other ranks there are men who abuse the poor directing abilities of the officers, men who express dissatisfaction about promotions, men who say that the commander sacrificed many of his men for glory, etc. These speeches require attention.

Following are some examples of speeches which require attention in respect to ideas:

(1) Whether there are many dead or not depends on the ability of the commanding officer. To raise the quality of the officers and to educate them is more important than to train the men. (N.C.O.)

(2) During the present disturbance, in major battles at various places, the commanders of the forces competed to be the first to occupy any important place. For this reason the rear units such as the field train transport suffered many casualties. These casualties are really sacrifices for the commanders. (N.C.O.)

(3) Our company commander had his men dig trenches first of all and was looking from there. He was immediately injured in the foot and evacuated with the aid of two men. However, when any man was injured, he had to evacuate by himself. The lot of the men in the battlefield is certainly pitiful. (Private.)

(4) During the marches, the men became so tired that when they saw the battalion commander on his horse they openly said to one another, "The men are walking so the battalion commander should walk, too." "Pull him down from the horse," etc. (Private.)

(5) In the battlefield the difference between officers and men is not clear. I have seen at various places men scolding the N.C.O.'s and H.C.O.'s using the officers' belongings without permission. People with audacity are the ones with power. (N.C.O.)

(6) The conscripts, unlike the regulars, have no respect for the officers from the beginning. It appears that the officers themselves feel uncomfortable because they are not unreasonable. Consequently discipline increasingly became lax and plundering, etc., took place.

(7) It appears that the higher the rank becomes the more timid the man becomes. They lack the spirit to lead the men. There is no reason why the men should move in accordance with the orders of such superiors. (N.C.O.)

(8) During a lull in the battle, the platoon commander used his subordinates very hard and used very coarse words, but when in the front line, they (platoon commanders) used to go back pretending to have stomach-ache. (Privates)

(9) The officers called up from the reserve are not worthy of respect as leaders because their personality is very bad. (Private)

(10) I would not like to go to fight the war again. Those who died in the war met a very unhappy fate. (Private)

(11) Those who want to come back to their native country alive must drop behind. (Private)

3. The conditions of keeping military secrets. There are some who disclose secrets concerning the military power. The number of the army units and the strategy and action of the army units. Chief examples:

(1) A Warrant Officer disclosed the correct number of the soldiers of the force, saying, "I and ~~xxxx~~ men were relieved and returned because of our age," and so on, in his answer to the congratulations of a certain Prefectural Governor in the public welcome party.

(2) A wounded soldier told to a passenger on his way home from the front, "Many people think that our army division went over to Formosa but that is wrong, the army division which went over to Formosa was the 'so and so' army division."

(3) A Superior Private wanted to hand over a secret paper on the Unit's march to tell his cousin who welcomed him that he would not be able to see him on that day and wanted to see him the day after the next day. (In the paper, the organization of the returned army units was recorded.)

(4) There are some leaders of platoons and squads who do not return the regular army map, and some special duty personnel who keep the table of the organization of the army staffs and distribute the table of the organization of the company and comrades' table among all members of company.

(5) There was one who left the paper which is recognized to be the manuscript of the cipher key for the war strategy and the table of the name of the crews in the cabin of the commanding officer of transportation.

(6) There was one who left the table of the organization of the army units in the train.

(7) When an officer (or an N.C.O.) ordered the lunches for the army units returned, he made public the number (organization) of the units by telling the lunch maker the number of the army units according to the organization.

(8) There are some non-commissioned officers who possess the army's secret map, the table of the number of the company's weapon and the organization table.

(9) There are some who took the picture of the secret fort without the admission of the authority.

(10) There are some who told the name of his army division and commander of his army division and the organization of the division.

(11) A Lieutenant. Engineer, of the second reserve who was in the army hospital because of injury in battle, coming home on leave, made speeches in various places on the battle affairs of the China Incident as his friends requested. In his speech, he told about the organization of an expeditionary division to make the story clear, or let himself go so far as to tell of instances where the commander took action which can be allowed under the Military Penal Code 22 to maintain the military discipline, or instances where the Japanese army killed Chinese civilians in a mass. He made such a speech as would cause the people to mistrust the army or the rumors concerned with the righteousness of the Japanese Army.

/On the paper slip pasted on/

(The Military Penal Code 22 provides that: Actions which are necessary to maintain military discipline in the unit, in an emergency suppressing a rising plotted by many people in face of the enemy, shall not be punished.)

4. Concerning articles carried back by soldiers. Though the number of illegal or prohibited articles carried back by returning soldiers has decreased lately, yet there are some instances as follows, where more control is needed:

(1) Some Chiefs of Staffs or Commanding Officers, being not well-informed about the standard of the admittance of the articles to be carried back, distributed among the men license cards authorized by the stamp of the Unit Commander, and in which army men made entries freely.

(2) There are not a few N.G.O.'s who carry back cameras with them, and not a few military personnel who purchase and bring back precious jewels and furs beyond their means. The Commanders must control these matters.

5. Assiduity of the discharged soldiers in their business after returning home. Some of them do not work hard in their companies and factories, after they are discharged and come home. It is necessary to give them good instruction and training before they are discharged in order to make them change their minds so that they would be examples of good workers in their society.

(The End)