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MISSION # 18 MUSASHINO " ENKINDLE 2"
9 January 1945

3-5289-100

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CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

~~MISSION NUMBER 18~~
FIELD ORDER NUMBER 37
9 JANUARY 1945

XXI Bomber Command.
Mission No 18.

HEADQUARTERS
73RD BOMBARDMENT WING
APO #237, % POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

001-43239-2

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Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Mission No. 18
Field Order No. 37
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

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Headquarters
XXI Bomber Com'd

Mission #18

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Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing
APO #237, % Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Mission Number 18
Field Order No. 37
Date of Mission
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

TACTICAL NARRATIVE

1. The Target

The 73rd Bombardment Wing directed that each of its four Groups supply two 9-A/C Squadrons to bomb the Nakajima Aircraft Company (Musashino Plant) near Tokyo (Target 90.17-357). The urban area of Tokyo was designated as a last resort target.

In addition to the principal force, the Field Order further directed that a diversionary force of three A/C be supplied to dispense rope as a counter-radar measure, obtain photographs of target 90.25-1547, and bomb the city of Osaka.

2. Take-off

Seventy-two (72) B-29's were airborne. The first left Saipan at 082146Z and the last at 082223Z.

3. Bomb Loading

Each plane in the principal force carried 10 x 500-lb GP bombs fused 0.10 sec nose and 0.025 sec tail. Each A/C in the diversionary force carried 6 x 500-lb GP bombs fused in the same manner.

4. Route Out

The principal force was directed to assemble over Saipan, to proceed in Squadron column to Kofu, the IP, and to bomb the target on an axis of 85° T.

The extremely bad weather conditions existing throughout the entire trip made formation flying difficult to impossible. Most of the A/C were unsuccessful in their efforts to assemble into Squadrons. For the most part, individual routes were flown to the IP where some A/C proceeded singly to and over the target, and others found occasional breaks in the overcast of sufficient magnitude to permit them to assemble in groups of two or more.

Nineteen A/C returned early, and one ditched before reaching landfall.

The diversionary force was directed to assemble over Saipan, fly to the IP, the NE tip of Shodo Island, and proceed to the target on an axis of 80°T. The flight was made without incident, except that during the climb cloud layers were encountered causing light to moderate icing.

5. Bombing Data

Of the 72 airborne A/C, one ditched enroute to target. Eighteen of the planes dropped 168 bombs on the primary target, 32 A/C dropped 314 bombs on targets of opportunity, and one plane released its load on the urban area of Tokyo. Seventeen A/C jettisoned and two returned bombs to base.

The first bombs fell on the primary target at 090513Z and the last at 090535Z.

The diversionary force was believed to have distracted enemy aircraft from the principal force. When the rope was dispensed, it hit and dented the radar dome, causing the radar to cease functioning. Target 1547 could not be photographed because of complete undercast. Unable to attack Osaka because of weather, the three A/C attempted to bomb the airfield at Tokushima, but external ice on nose prevented use of bomb sight and bombs landed in water.

6. Enemy Opposition

Approximately 150 separate E/A were encountered, the most common being TOJOs, IRVINGs, TONYs, ZEKEs, OSCARs, NICKs, and ZEKE 32's. One hundred and twenty-nine (129) of the 200 attacks reported were experienced over the target. The remaining attacks came during the bomb run and on the departure course after bombs away. The 98 high attacks came predominantly from the nose sector; the 56 low and 46 level attacks were about evenly distributed from all quarters.

7. Enemy Attack Data

Fire from the enemy fighters was generally inaccurate. No unusual tactics were reported, though attacks were more highly coordinated than on previous missions. Our A/C opened fire at shorter range than usual because of the large number of attacks in proportion to the size of the formations.

8. Antiaircraft Fire

Antiaircraft fire was encountered by the formations from the time they reached Japan until they left. Over the target, both continuously-pointed and barrage type, moderate and inaccurate, was reported. A/C over targets of opportunity in the Empire report generally meager, inaccurate fire, continuously-pointed in type.

9. Route Back and Landing Data

The A/C, greatly impeded by persistently bad weather, followed individual routes from Japan to base. The first A/C landed at 181043Z and the last at 181313Z.

10. Damage Assessment

Photographs, varying in quality from poor to excellent, were obtained from but three planes over the primary target. Two hits were observed in the Musashino Plant. Twenty-eight (28) scattered hits were seen in the area around the plant.

11. Our Losses

Six of our planes were lost -- two to E/A, three to unknown causes, and one to other causes.

Eleven A/C received battle damage -- five from E/A, two from E/A and flak, one from self-inflicted damage, and three from other causes.

Three men were slightly injured, and 67 are missing.

12. Weather

The weather impeded this mission from the start. Cumulus clouds of 3 to 8/10 coverage, intermittent showers, and high winds characterized the route to target. Tokyo had 2/10 alto-cumulus at 15,000 feet and dense, persistent contrails above 27,000 feet. There was little change in the weather on the route back.

Kenneth P. Bergquist

KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Colonel, Air Corps
DC/S, Opns and Trng

Field Order 37
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CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

VERTICAL CHART

ALTITUDE OVER TARGET - 29500 FT. TO 34400 FT
6 OUR A/C DOWN APPROXIMATELY AS SHOWN
NOTE - FLIGHT LINE IS APPROXIMATE AVERAGE

ALT. 40000 30000 20000 10000 0

200 E/A ATTACKS
13 DESTROYED
3 PROBABLY DESTROYED
12 DAMAGED

5/10 CI
5/10 CI 8/10 CS
8/10 CS 5/10 CI
5/10 CI
10/10 AS & AC
10/10 AS & AC
ICING
6/10 ST CU
8/10 ST CU
8/10 ST CU
6/10 ST CU
8/10 ST
5/10 CU
3/10 CU
7/10 CU
7/10 CU
3/10 CU
5/10 CU
8/10 ST
8/10 CU

MILES 270 540 810 1080 1350 1370 1640 1910 2080 2350 2700 MILES

TIME 082146Z - 082223Z | 090513Z - 090535Z | 091043Z - 091313Z TIME

BASE ISELY NO. 1 | TARGET MUSASHINO A/C PLANT - TOKYO | BASE ISELY NO. 1

Y E/A ATTACKS - OUR A/C DOWN

A. A.

CLOUD COVER

73rd Bomb Wing
20 January 1945
Capt J.T.Davis

-3-

S E C R E T

Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Mission No. 18
Field Order No. 37
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

BASIC DATA

In this section of the report, no attempt has been made to report data by squadrons. No squadron formation was accomplished.

1. TIME OF TAKE OFF:

Gp No	Place	Runway	First A/C	Last A/C	No of A/C
498	Saipan, Isely Field	A	082146Z	082206Z	18
497	Saipan, Isely Field	A	082207Z	082223Z	17
500	Saipan, Isely Field	B	082146Z	082205Z	18
499	Saipan, Isely Field	B	082206Z	082223Z	16
497 (Diversionary)	Saipan, Isely Field		082154Z	082156Z	3
Overall			082146Z	082223Z	72

2. TIME OF LANDING:*

Gp No	Place	First A/C	Last A/C	No of A/C
498	Saipan, Isely Field	091043Z	091246Z	10
497	Saipan, Isely Field	091112Z	091231Z	13
500	Saipan, Isely Field	091059Z	091313Z	11
499	Saipan, Isely Field	091047Z	091207Z	10
497 (Diversionary)	Saipan, Isely Field	091115Z	091130Z	3
Overall				47

3. SQUADRON ASSEMBLY:

498th Group - Because of bad flying weather, there was no squadron assembly.

497th Group - No assembly was effected at the assembly point because of low ceiling and rain showers. The first squadron never did assemble and the second squadron assembled 7 a/c plus 1 a/c from the 499th Group between the IP and the target.

500th Group - As a result of bad weather, assembly of squadrons was not accomplished according to plan. Some a/c did not find their respective squadrons until several hours out from Base. Other a/c joined planes from other Groups until they could join their own squadrons.

499th Group - Nine a/c of the 1st squadron of the Group assembled at 15°05'N-145°40'E at 800', departing at 082230Z. Six a/c of the 2nd squadron of the Group never assembled.

4. GROUP ASSEMBLY:

None ordered.

5. WING ASSEMBLY:

None ordered.

6. AIRCRAFT RETURNING EARLY:#

Gp No	A/C No.	Time	Reason
497	A51(5231)*	090755Z	Excessive fuel consumption during climb.
498	T 6(4695)*	090440Z	#4 engine blew cylinder. #2 prop stuck at 2400 RPM.
498	T 7(4777)*	082243Z	#2 prop stuck at 2700 RPM.
498	T 9(4629)**	090856Z	Fuel transfer system inoperative.
498	T24(4625)*	090001Z	Lost #4 engine - backfiring and smoking.
498	T27(4646)***	091129Z	Bomb bay door malfunction.
498	T50(4607)*	090226Z	Upper forward turret cable burned out.
498	T32(4749)****	090839Z	Co-pilot suffered severe pains at altitude because of sinus trouble.
498	T51(3475)**	090430Z	Ran low on fuel.
499	V24(3491)*	090357Z	Right blister cracked.
499	V28(3465)*	090112Z	Carburetor malfunction.
499	V30(4754)*	082355Z	#1 generator pulled 300 amp. all fuses blown - battery burned out.
499	V46(4677)*	091022Z	Excessive oil leak #3 engine.
500	Z 2(4792)*	082222Z	#2 engine blew a push rod housing on hose.
500	Z 3(5249)*	090013Z	Fuel transfer pumps inoperative - carbon vanes sheared in pumps.
500	Z21(4652)*	090030Z	Pilot's window cracked.
500	Z25(4785)*	090634Z	Oil leak #1 engine.
500	Z22(3875)*	090411Z	Pilot error - lost formation
500	Z51(4761)*	091313Z	Damaged by e/a shortly after making land-fall.

Total Returning Early: -- 19

*A/C jettisoning bombs
#All a/c returning early landed at Saipan.
**A/C returning bombs.
***A/C jettisoned six bombs and returned four to Base.
****A/C dropped 8 bombs on Nishi-No-Shima (27°16'N,140°51'E) and jettisoned two bombs.

7. ROUTE OUT:

The route to the target prescribed in the Field Order is as follows:

From: Base - Assembly
To: 17°00'N,144°00'E
To: 26°30'N,137°00'E
To: 34°15'N,136°55'E
To: IP - 35°40'N,138°34'E (Kofu)

Route as flown:

497th Group:

The a/c belonging to the first squadron of this Group never assembled. The a/c flew individual routes to the target

The a/c belonging to the second squadron of this Group flew individual routes from Base to IP. Between this point and the target, 7 a/c of the squadron and 1 a/c of the 499th Group assembled and bombed in formation.

497th Group Diversionary Force:

The mission of this diversionary force was three fold: (1) to divert attention from the main striking force by the use of "rope," a counter radar measure, (2) to photograph target 90.25.1547, (3) to bomb the city of Osaka.

Until shortly after starting climb, the flight was without incident. During the climb, however, cloud layers were encountered causing light to moderate icing.

Results of mission:

a. In the case of each a/c when the "rope" was dispersed, it hit and dented the radar dome causing the radar to cease to function.

b. Target 90.25.1547 could not be photographed because of undercast.

c. The bombing target, Osaka, was completely overcast and could not be attacked because radar equipment was inoperative. The A/F at Tokushiwa was attacked but icing conditions prevented use of the bomb sight.

The three a/c returned to Base without incident.

498th Group:

Neither squadron of this Group ever assembled because of poor flying weather. Two a/c of Squadron 2, this Group, sighted each other just prior to IP and joined for a run over the target. All a/c of 498th Group flew individual routes to the target.

499th Group:

Nine a/c belonging to the first squadron of this Group departed the Assembly Point (see section 3, Basic Data). Three hundred miles from Base, a small opening was found in the clouds revealing that five a/c were still in the formation. Nine hundred miles from Base at 25,000' another opening in the clouds permitted re-grouping of the three remaining a/c (including one a/c of the 497th Group picked up at some unknown position along the route). During the next climb, this 497th a/c was lost and one a/c of the 500th Group was added. This formation of three a/c bombed primary target.

Six a/c of the second squadron, this Group, never made assembly. Two a/c aborted and the remaining four flew individual routes to Japan.

500th Group:

Assembly as planned was never accomplished. Some hours out from Base, four planes of the nine airborne broke out of the overcast together, four a/c having returned early. One other a/c flew its individual route to Japan and bombed a target of opportunity.

The four a/c formation reached landfall at Hikisahoso Bay, a point well to the right of the briefed landfall. The formation missed the IP, flying beyond it to a point NE of Tokyo. The turn back to the target was made at approximately 36°05'N,140°15'E, in the vicinity of Kasumiga Inlet. After the turn back toward Tokyo, the primary target was picked up visually by the fact that the Japanese had started somke pots to obscure the target. The smoke aided in locating the target.

The nine a/c of the second squadron, this Group, were unable to assemble properly or to maintain any partial formation because of the series of fronts which had to be penetrated throughout the entire route. Two a/c returned early because of mechanical malfunctions. Five a/c lost their formation during the frontal penetrations and bombed targets of opportunity on the Islands of Japan. One a/c joined a formation from 499th Group and bombed primary target. The last a/c reached the coastline by itself. It encountered enemy fighters which damaged the B-29 severely enough to force it to turn back.

Basic Data, Page 4

8. ROUTE BACK:

As ordered --

From: Target
To: 34°00'N,141°15'E
To: 27°00'N,143°30'E
To: Base

All a/c followed individual routes from target to Base, the first arriving at 091043Z and the last at 091313Z.

9. INITIAL POINTS:* As ordered Kofu (35°40'N,138°34'E)

497th Group:

5 a/c - 35°40'N,138°34'E - 090522Z - 30,500'

498th Group:

A/C T34 - 35°05'N,135°40'E - 090435Z - 33,500'
A/C T5, T2 - 35°40'N,138°34'E - 090524Z - 32,000'
A/C T47 - Point 15 miles N of Shizuoka - 090440Z - 29,600'
A/C T49 - 34°33'N,137°40'E - 090430Z - 30,000'

499th Group:

2 a/c - 35°40'N,138°33'E - 090510Z - 33,300'

500th Group:

4 a/c - 36°05'N,140°15'E - 090510Z - 30,400'

*Other a/c report no IP.

10. TARGETS ATTACK DATA:

a. No. of a/c attacking target:

Gp	Primary Target (90.17.357)	Last Resort Target (Urban Area, Tokyo)
497	10	0
498	2	0
499	2	1
500	4	0
Total	18	1

Targets of Opportunity

No. A/C	Target	Time	Altitude	Heading (Deg)
497TH GROUP:				
1	Hamamatsu	090512Z	28,400'	145
1	Toyohashi	090517Z	30,100'	39
1	Suga Island	090510Z	30,000'	180
1	Cape Omae	090503Z	29,200'	30
1	Ito Harbor	090500Z	29,100'	150
1	Cape Mazura	090505Z	29,680'	186
3*	Tokushima A/F	090500Z	29,500' to 29,700'	

Basic Data, Page 5
Par 10, Cont'd

498TH BOMB GROUP:				
2	Hamamatsu	090439Z to 090445Z	30,000' to 33,500'	254 to 325
1	A/F (34°47'N,137°05'E)	090437Z	31,400'	277
1	Okayama	090533Z	33,000'	250
1	Wakayama	090524Z	32,000'	273
1	Futamata	090445Z	32,000'	315
1	near Hamamatsu	090437Z	32,000'	254
1	Numazu	090435Z	23,000'	91
1**	Chichi Jima	Information not available. A/C also bombed primary target.		
499TH BOMB GROUP:				
1	Numazu	090539Z	31,000'	310
2	Toba	090519Z to 090520Z	31,000' to 32,000'	190 to 85
1	Hamamatsu	090519Z	31,500'	92
2	Amori	090509Z to 090509Z	32,000' 33,500'	330
1	Shingu	090500Z	31,700'	240
1	Ujiymada	090511Z	31,000'	278
1	unknown - A/C ditched enroute to Base			
500TH BOMB GROUP:				
1	Nagoya	090520Z	31,040'	54
1	Shizuoka	090500Z	30,100'	104
1	Hamamatsu	090503Z	30,000'	137
1	Otsudo	090528Z	29,950'	85
1	Shingu	090458Z	28,500'	114
1	Kamimisaki	090433Z	30,600'	30

TOTALS: 32 aircraft**

*3 diversionary a/c

**Total excludes 1 a/c (498th Group) which bombed Chichi Jima after dropping part of its bombs on primary target.

b. Times over Target:

	Primary Target		Last Resort Target	
Gp	First A/C	Last A/C	First A/C	Last A/C
497	090513Z	090528Z	none	none
498	090535Z	090535Z	none	none
499	090519Z	090519Z	090521	none
500	090518Z	090518Z	none	none

For information on a/c bombing targets of opportunity, see Section 10 a.

c. Heading and Altitude from IP to Target:

Gp	A/C	Heading (in Degrees)	Altitude	Target
497	5	90	31,000'	Primary
498	2	93	32,100	Primary
	T34	76	33,500'	Opportunity
	T47	114	Unknown	Opportunity
	T49	6	30,000'	Opportunity
499	2	85	33,000'	Primary
500	4	240	30,000'	Primary

Basic Data, Page 6
Par 10, cont'd

d. Heading and Altitude over Target:

Gp	Primary Heading (Deg)	Primary Altitude	Last Resort Heading (Deg)	Last Resort Altitude
497	80 - 102	29,500' - 34,400'	none	none
498	87	32,100'	none	none
499*	85	33,000'	122	33,200'
500	85 - 240	30,000' to 34,000'	none	none

For information on Targets of Opportunity, see Section 10 a.
*Information available for only 1 a/c bombing primary target. The other a/c ditched en route to Base.

e. Breakaway:

497 - A/C bombing primary target broke away with a slight turn to the left, then on course to Base with the exception of two a/c which turned right directly after bombs away because of difficulty on the part of one a/c.

498 - Right turn off the target and took heading of 170°.

499 - Sharp right turn to 180°.

500 - A/C bombing primary target made left turn at 29,000' except one a/c which made right turn at 33,000'.

f. Rally Point:

None ordered

g. Extra Runs over Target:

None

h. Reasons for Failure to Attack:

A/C T5(4614) dropped 1 bomb on primary target but was unable to release remaining bombs because of rack malfunction. Dropped 7 bombs on Chichi Jima

A/C Z30(3487) failed to attack because of rack failure. Jettisoned bombs.

11. ESCORT DATA:

No escort ordered

S E C R E T

Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Mission Number 18
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CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

LOSS AND DAMAGE

12. CASUALTIES - PERSONNEL

See Consolidated Statistical Report, Table XII, Casualties.

13. AIRCRAFT LOST

1. A-5(4598), 497th Group: This A/C was seen to fall back, shortly after bombs away, to protect A-46 which had been damaged by E/A. A-5 was last seen at 090537Z at 34°25'N-137°50'E on a heading of 185° in no apparent difficulty. At 090602Z, A-5 radioed that it was ditching at approximately 32° 47'N, 137°44'E. No further word has been received, and subsequent search was negative.

2. A-46(4655), 497th Group: Over the target, an E/A (TOJO) came in at 12 o'clock, was so damaged by our fire that the pilot lost control, crashed into #2 engine of A-46, bounced off and exploded. A-46 started losing altitude and was attacked by approximately 15 E/A. At this time, A-5 (see par 1 above) went to its assistance. A-46 was last seen heading southwest over Tokyo Bay with A-5 following.

3. A-14(4772), 497th Group: This A/C was on bomb run with one other A/C (A-13) when a shot from a TOJO set fire to its #1 engine. A-14 was last seen going into a cloud or haze in the target area.

4. Z-45(4657), 500th Group: Wing Ground Station and several planes in the air received a message from Z-45 at 090410Z giving his position as 26° 00'N-138°15'E followed by the number 148 which was presumed to be his course. He then sent a series of QUG's ("I am forced to land"). Ground Station later received a long dash from this plane, indicating the radio operator had screwed his key down. This signal ended at 090436Z. No further word was received from Z-45. The bombs were jettisoned.

5. V-3(4658), 499th Group: Last direct radio contact gave estimated position as 25°30'N-146°30'E at 090908Z. No further information has been received.

6. V-7(4684), 499th Group: Last heard from at 090548Z, 300 miles from Suna Saki Point on a bearing of 170°.

14. AIRCRAFT MISSING

See section 13.

15. TOTAL AIRCRAFT FAILING TO RETURN

See section 13. 497 Gp - 3 498 Gp - 0
499 Gp - 2 500 Gp - 1

16. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

See Report of Battle Damage (following page).

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT OF BATTLE DAMAGE

MISSION #18
9 Jan. 1944

SERIAL NO.	TO BE READY FOR COMBAT WITHIN	DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE
	497TH BOMB GROUP	
42-24596	3 days	#4 engine and cowling shot up; radar dome shot up; half moon above bomb compartment shot up.
42-24623	2 days	Radar dome broken off.
42-24616	2 days	Radar dome broken off.
42-24619	Indef.	Holes in radar dome; large hole in right elevator and stabilizer; holes in empennage assembly.
42-63412	2 days	Radar dome broken off.
42-24604	2 days	Hole in radar dome.
42-24648	1 day	Bullet hole in left horizontal stabilizer.

Total Damaged - 497th Bomb Group: 7 Aircraft: 1 within 1 day
4 within 2 days
1 within 3 days
1 indefinite

498TH BOMB GROUP

Negative — Negative

499TH BOMB GROUP

42-24673	Indef.	One three-foot flak hole in trailing edge of right wing flap and wing. One flak hole in leading edge of right outer wing near inner wing junction, complete damage unknown. One bullet in right leading edge of horizontal stabilizer.

Total Damaged - 499th Bomb Group: 1 Aircraft: 1 indefinite

500TH BOMB GROUP

42-63494	4 days	Bullet hole in left wing tip.
42-63487	4 days	Flak and fighter damage to fuselage- wing - vertical and horizontal stabilizers.

S-E-C-R-E-T

42-24761	6 days	Oxygen system between bomb bay shot out. Radar dome and spinner shot out. Vacuum oil separators drain shot out. Forward fuel transfer motor shot out. Forward pressurized cabin shot, bombardier's position. Nose wheel well cover shot up Forward bomb bay doors shot up Fuselage skin torn by opening of rear doors Hole in right rear section of fuselage, Unpressurized-Left horizontal stabilizer shot at root. #3 engine has shell hole bottom right #3 nacelle has shell hole in bottom. First aid kit opened.

Total Damaged - 500th Bomb Group: 3 Aircraft: 2 within 4 days
1 within 6 days

TOTAL DAMAGED - 73RD BOMB WING: 11 Aircraft: 1 within 1 day
4 within 2 days
1 within 3 days
2 within 4 days
1 within 6 days
2 indefinite.

73rd Wing Stat

Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Mission Number 18
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CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

AA AND AIR-TO-AIR BOMBING

17. ENEMY ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE

Over the primary target, antiaircraft fire was reported as moderate and inaccurate to accurate against formations flying at 30,000 to 32,100 feet. Two B-29's known to have been damaged from this fire. Both continuously-pointed and barrage type fire were observed.

Antiaircraft fire was also reported at the following places:

Hamamatsu - Fire was meager to moderate, inaccurate to accurate. It was mostly below the aircraft, ahead and behind. Scatterd barrage type and continuously-pointed fire observed.

Nagoya - Meager barrage type fire of moderate intensity.

Hikisahoso Bay - Meager, continuously-pointed and inaccurate AA fire.

Yokohama
Yokosuka - Continuously-pointed fire from ship was meager and inaccurate.

18. EVASIVE TACTICS

Some weaving in irregular turns. A slight turn and loss of altitude after bombs away.

19. AIR-TO-AIR BOMBING AND ROCKETS

One crew reported two large balls of red fire at 30,000 feet, apparently attached together, floating down together.

Rockets may have been used by one E/A as two balls of flame were seen leaving the trailing edge of the enemy aircraft which was 1500 to 2000 yards to right of observing aircraft at 33,000 feet.

Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing
APO #237, % Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Mission Number 18
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9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

COMBAT DATA

20. ANALYSIS OF ATTACKS BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT

LEGEND

ATTACKS
Level ———
From Above ------
From Below ·····

ENEMY A/C
Destr'd X
Prob Dest'd △
Damaged □



TOTALS 200

ATTACKS

Level	46
From Above	98
High	
From Below	56
Low	
E/A Dest'd	13
E/A Prob Dest'd	3
E/A Damaged	12

NOTE: The number of E/A attacking is shown at the outside end of each line. Attacks made by twin-engine enemy aircraft are indicated by "o" interruption in attack line, and when more than one T/E attack is made, the total is shown inside the "o".

21. YARDS AT WHICH E/A OPENED FIRE

Yards	100	200	300	400	500	600	700	800	900	1000 or more
No. A/C Firing		2	5	15	22	54	11	42	4	45

Combat Data (page 2)

21. (Contd)

COMMENTS:

The average distances at which enemy aircraft are estimated to have opened fire from the various directions and angles of attack are given below.

10:30 to 1:30	Above	750 (yds)
	Level	550
	Below	625
1:30 to 4:30	Above	850
	Level	550
	Below	600
4:30 to 7:30	Above	550
	Level	650
	Below	700
7:30 to 10:30	Above	550
	Level	700
	Below	720

22. TYPES OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT ATTACKING

It is estimated that approximately 150 separate enemy aircraft were encountered on this mission. The 200 attacks are listed below according to location, altitude, and number of attacks by enemy aircraft.

Location	Altitude	No. and Type E/A Attacking
At IP (Kofu)	33,000'	4 TOJO
Bomb run to primary target	30,000'	2 TOJO, 9 TONY, 2 IRVING
	30,000'	8 ZEKE, 2 Unident S/e
Primary target area	29,000'	6 TONY, 4 TOJO, 5 ZEKE
	30,000'	6 TONY, 3 IRVING, 2 TOJO
	30,000'	6 ZEKE, 3 OSCAR
	31,000'	26 TONY, 21 TOJO, 24 NICK
	31,000'	7 ZEKE, 1 JACK, 1 OSCAR
	31,000'	1 ZEKE (32)
	33,000'	1 TOJO, 1 JACK
	34,000'	1 JACK, 1 TONY, 6 TOJO
	34,000'	2 ZEKE (32)
Leaving target (W and SW of Tokyo)	30,000'	14 TONY, 3 TOJO, 3 OSCAR
	30,000'	8 ZEKE, 1 IRVING
15 mi SW of Kofu	32,000'	2 TONY
Between Kofu and coast	30,000'	4 TONY
10 mi SE of Nagoya	34,000'	2 TONY
Over Nagoya	31,000'	2 TONY, 1 TOJO
Btwn Nagoya & coast	27,000'	2 TONY, 1 TOJO,
	27,000'	1 Unident T/E
	27,000'	1 Unident T/E in-line

Combat Data (page 3)

22. (Contd)

Enemy aircraft observed, but which are not known to have attacked, include one S/E fighter with a long nose, resembling the American P-40. It was observed at an altitude of 30,000 feet over the target area. The observing crew was closely interrogated but could provide no information as to estimated length, width, or other characteristics of the aircraft.

23. TYPE AND ACCURACY OF ENEMY FIRE AND TYPE PROJECTILE

Fire from enemy aircraft was limited to the 7.7-mm, 12.7-mm machine guns, and the 20-mm cannon. As on previous missions, accuracy was regarded as generally poor. Armament arrangements were reported in connection with the following aircraft:

IRVING	- One 20-mm cannon on each side of fuselage in wing roots, and two machine guns in each wing.
ZEKEs (2)	- Two machine guns in nose and one in each wing.
TOJO	- Two machine guns firing from nose through propeller.
TONY	- Three wing guns on each side.
TONYs (3)	- Firing 20-mm cannon.
OSCAR (1)	- Appeared to be firing 12.7 and 7.7-mm MG.

Shown below are the average distances in yards to which E/A are estimated to have pressed home their attacks, coordinated with direction and angle.

10:30 to 1:30	Above	280 (yds)
	Level	230
	Below	410
1:30 to 4:30	Above	500
	Level	410
	Below	270
4:30 to 7:30	Above	500
	Level	475
	Below	475
7:30 to 10:30	Above	210
	Level	200
	Below	400

24. ENEMY AIRCRAFT MARKINGS

Enemy fighters continued to display, as on all previous missions, a variety of colorings, with the darker shades predominating. There were no special or unusual markings reported. Listed below are those aircraft observed and identified with respect to color.

NICK (12)	- Very dark coloring
NICK (4)	- Black with red roundels; 3 white stripes passing through roundels
NICK	- Olive drab with red roundels and yellow cowling
TOJO (4)	- Black with yellow band around wing near cat-walk
TOJO (3)	- Dark green with red roundels

24. (Contd)

TOJO (2)	- Olive drab with red roundels
TOJO (2)	- Tan with stripe running diagonally from cockpit to tail
TOJO	- Silver with green band around fuselage back of pilot's cockpit
IRVING (2)	- Black with red roundels
IRVING	- Olive drab with diagonal orange stripe on fuselage at wing root
IRVING	- All grey
IRVING	- All silver
ZEKE (3)	- All yellow
ZEKE (2)	- Yellow fuselage with red roundels
ZEKE (2)	- Silver with red nose
ZEKE	- All grey
TONY (10)	- Dark green or black
TONY (6)	- All black
TONY (3)	- Silver with red roundel
TONY	- Dark grey
TONY	- Greenish yellow with red roundels
TONY	- Yellow cowling with red nose
JACK	- Brown with yellow roundels and yellow stripe across wings
JACK	- Tan with red roundels
OSCAR (3)	- Black with red roundels
OSCAR	- Dark green
Unident T/E in-line	- All black

25. ENEMY TACTICS

a. Our B-29's, due to weather difficulties, were unable to assemble properly, and therefore did not fly in Squadron formation as planned. The first of our A/C to reach landfall did not encounter any opposition until reaching the IP. From Kofu (IP) and along the bomb run, several teams of two enemy fighters consisting of TONYs and TOJOs attacked. At this point, a group of approximately 25 unidentified fighters was observed circling about at 25,000 feet, but was apparently unable to reach our formation which was then flying at 32,000 feet. It was at the primary target that enemy fighters launched attacks of maximum intensity, from above, against our B-29's.

b. There did not appear to be any fighter tactics employed that were outstanding or unusually different from previous missions. The coordinated attack, however, seems to have been stressed more highly. It is also possible that our crews were more observant of the coordinated attack than on prior missions. A total of 11 such attacks was encountered with the remainder confined to single attacks. A description of some of the typical attacks experienced on this mission follows:

(1) Two TONYs came in abreast, from 5 and 7 o'clock, at 27,000 feet, approximately 5 miles south of Nagoya; closed to 800 yards, and then broke sharply to the right.

(2) Two TOJOs came in from 6 o'clock low; at 30,000 feet, attacking the lead aircraft of the 2nd Squadron over the PT. These fighters closed to 400 yards and broke off with a peel to the right.

25. (Contd)

(3) Two OSCARs came in from 2 o'clock level, at 30,000 feet, also attacking the same lead aircraft, closed to 300 yards, and broke away to the left and down.

(4) On the bomb run, one ZEKE and one TONY coordinated, with the former faking a pass while the TONY came in from 11 o'clock low. The ZEKE then attacked from 10 o'clock above, closing to 150 yards. Both fighters broke to the right and down.

(5) Three TONYs came in from 4 o'clock above, over SW Tokyo, at 29,000 feet. The TONYs closed to 400, 600, and 600 yards respectively, on a pursuit curve breaking off at 6 o'clock down.

(6) Five TONYs, line-astern, over the target area, made an attack at 12 o'clock, above, opening fire at 900 yards, but broke off at 800 yards by going down under our formation.

c. Other attacks, not necessarily coordinated, but rather in keeping with known Jap tactics of concentrating on an A/C in difficulty, are illustrated below.

(1) Over the target, one of our B-29's was attacked by a TOJO, at an approach from 12 o'clock. As a result of damage by gunfire from our B-29, this fighter is believed to have lost control and crashed into the #2 engine of our aircraft, bounced off and exploded. The B-29 lost altitude and was then attacked by approximately 15 unidentified enemy fighters. Another of our B-29's went to the assistance. The B-29 under attack was last seen heading southwest over Tokyo Bay.

(2) While on the bomb run, one of our B-29's was attacked by a TOJO, from an unobserved direction, which set fire to the #1 engine. This aircraft was last seen going into a cloud in the target area.

(3) There were approximately 24 attacks without any apparent breakaways, the aircraft involved making their attacks and then continuing under our formation. The usual breakaway maneuvers of Split-S's, peel-offs, dives, and climbing turns were observed.

26. ENEMY FORMATIONS

There were no formations of E/A reported other than those listed in paragraph 25.

27. OUR TACTICS AND FIREPOWER VS ENEMY A/C

Atmospheric conditions proved a serious barrier to the maintenance of formation flying. Two Squadrons received the brunt of enemy fighter attacks on this mission. The first of these Squadrons over the target reports having opened fire against E/A at approximately 800 to 1000 yards. However, the other Squadron is reported not to have opened fire until the attacking planes had closed to 500-600 yards. The explanation for this shorter than usual range of opening fire was attributed to the large number of attacking fighters in proportion to the size of our formation, making it impossible for the gunners to keep pace with these attacks.

Combat Data, page 6

28. RESULTS OF HITS ON ENEMY AIRCRAFT

TOJO (3)	- Aircraft exploded in air
TOJO	- Pilot's canopy shattered
ZEKE (2)	- Aircraft exploded in air
ZEKE	- Pieces seen flying off plane
ZEKE	- Tracers seen to hit fuselage
ZEKE	- Parts of cowling flew off; smoking
ZEKE	- Parts of cowling flew off; out of control
NICK	- Flaming
NICK	- Tracers seen to enter fuselage; smoking
JACK	- Tracers seen to enter fuselage; smoking
JACK	- Wing shot off
ZEKE (M32)	- Wing shot off
OSCAR	- Aircraft exploded in air
TONY (2)	- Aircraft exploded in air
TONY	- Pieces seen to fly off plane
TONY	- Pilot's canopy shattered
TONY (2)	- Flaming and smoking
TONY	- Smoking heavily; probably out of control
TONY	- Hit cockpit with 20-mm; A/C went into spin
TONY	- Hit in nose and fuselage; went into spin
TONY	- Wing blown off
TONY (4)	- Pieces of A/C blown off all 4 fighters as a result of single raking by our A/C

28A. CLAIMS BY GUN POSITION AND TYPE ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Claim	Gun Position	Type E/A
Destroyed	TG	ZEKE (32)
"	Bomb	TOJO
"	Bomb	TOJO
"	TG	ZEKE
"	RG	TONY
"	Bomb	ZEKE
"	RG	OSCAR
"	TG	TONY
"	TG	TONY
"	RSG	JACK
"	Bomb	ZEKE
"	RSG	TOJO
"	RG	TONY
Probable	RG	NICK
"	Bomb	TONY
"	RG	TONY
Damaged	LG	JACK
"	RSG	ZEKE
"	RG	NICK
"	RSG	TONY
"	RSG	TOJO
"	TG	ZEKE
"	RG	5 TONYs
"	TG	TONY

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Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 37
Mission No. 18
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

BOMBING DATA

39. Bombing Data: See Consolidated Statistical Report.

40. Target Attack Data: See Consolidated Statistical Report.

41. Conditions over the Target: Conditions over the target were ideal for bombing. Neither clouds nor visibility hampered the bombing. The wind was approximately 105 K from 265°, resulting in a small drift angle on briefed axis of attack. Practically no AA was encountered until after bomb release line (over target and after target AA was reported as moderate to heavy and inaccurate to accurate). Position of the sun caused no trouble. The smoke screen intended to cover target was completely ineffective and assisted greatly in target identification. Fighter opposition was moderate and pressing against some of the smaller formations. Difficulties encountered due to bad weather enroute were not overcome by the time the aircraft arrived in the vicinity of the IP. Very few aircraft were within visual sight of each other as they had no opportunity to assemble due to instrument conditions just after take-off and enroute. The few aircraft that were in sight of each other were in poor formation and were still trying to get in formation on the bombing run in the case of the largest (8 A/C) squadron over the target. A great deal of ice was deposited enroute on the bombardiers sighting window which made the bombsight useless in many cases. The temperature as briefed compared favorably with the temperature indicated on this mission during the time the aircraft were flying in the overcast.

42. IP and AP: The AP was easily identified due to good photo coverage. The IP was well chosen but no photographic coverage was available. The small turn required to pass over the IP was a great advantage and should be standard planning procedure whenever possible. The photo strips requested from the Third Photo Reconnaisance covering the route from the IP to the target would be of inestimable value and should be given high priority. The nine primary targets and many of the targets are known for this organization. Two or three of the best possible plans of attack should be drawn up for each of these targets and placed on file at Wing Headquarters so that when a Bomber Command Field Order designates a target, it can just designate plan A, B or C which has already been well thought out. Complete mosaic strips from landfall through IP to target should be provided for each of these plans and should be made available for study by the combat crews a minimum of 48 hours prior to a mission. 35 MM motion pictures should be taken from landfall through IP to target and shown several times to combat crews prior to mission. The area from landfall through IP to target should be prepared as a plate for the A-6 bomb trainer so as to provide bombardiers the opportunity of making the run repeatedly on the trainer prior to the combat run.

43. Reasons for failure to Bomb:

1 A/C failed to release and bombs due to rack malfunction.
1 A/C failed to release three of its bombs due to personnel error on the part of the bombardier. (He failed to note one shackle on backwards during his preflight inspection).
1 A/C failed to release 3 bombs due to intervalometer malfunction.
1 A/C failed to release 2 bombs due to faulty A-2 release.

SECRET

44. Results of Bombing Observed: Only 2 impacts are observed on the primary target, from the strike photographs.

45. Possible Sources of Error in Bombing: The leader of one 8 ship formation had part of his bombs on the target; if the formation had been satisfactory the majority of its bombs would have been on the target. As it was, most of them hit to the right. Late changing of leaders due to ice on bombardiers window and radar malfunction resulted in a formation of four missing. It is believed that failure to use C-1 Automatic Pilot and evasive action taken by pilot, and use of guns by lead bombardier on bomb run resulted in a formation of three aircraft missing the target.

46. Use of Radar and Efficiency: Radar operation was generally unsatisfactory as evidenced by necessity to change leaders, lack of good radar wings, and the large number of malfunctions reported.

47. Comments and Suggestions:

a. The gunsight location in the nose of the airplane should be altered sufficiently to permit another crew member to use the gunsight on the bombing run so that the bombardier will not have any opportunity of using guns on a bombing run. This was found necessary in the B-17, B-24, B-25, and B-26 airplanes and they have been modified accordingly. This error in design has not been corrected in the B-29.

b. More adequate photo coverage from landfall through IP to target.

c. Some means, either chemical of mechanical must be provided to prevent the bombardier's window from icing up externally.

d. Extensive tests should be conducted by Eglin Field to ascertain if conducted heat from the cabin, or heat from the sun affect the temperature reading of the C-13 thermometer.

e. The Norden bombsight needs a satisfactory automatic errection system for the bombsight gyro.

f. Automatic Radio Releases should be provided for wing aircraft to enable automatic release on the leader in spite of rack malfunction in leaders aircraft. Tests should be conducted by Eglin or Orlando to determine if any change in leaders aiming point is necessary when radio release is used.

S E C R E T

Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Mission Number 18
Field Order No. 37
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

BOMB IMPACT DATA

Paragraphs 48 through 51

No. A/C over target:	18 A/C bombed primary target; 1 A/C bombed last resort target (urban area of Tokyo); 32 A/C bombed targets of opportunity (see Consolidated Statistical Report, Table IV).
Bomb load:	10 x 500-lb GP
Direction of attack:	Varied from 85° T to 240° T. For additional information see Basic Data, pars 1 - 11.
Aiming point:	Center of plant area.
Photographic coverage and quality:	Photographs varying in quality from poor to excellent were obtained from but three A/C over primary target.

SUMMARY

In target area, 2 hits are visible, 1 hitting the engine assembly building of the Musashino Plant, and one hitting the impellers section . 1 hit is observed on the building immediately east of the target area. 20 hits are scattered approximately 3000 feet east of the AP, hitting in open fields and small residential areas. 8 hits are observed 17,000 feet northeast of the AP near Narimasu Airfield. 7,500 feet west of the AP, 16 hits are visible and 8 hits are seen 13,500'west of the AP. 12 hits are visible in water east of Tokushima on Awaji Island.

CONCLUSION

As only 2 bombs, or 1.19% of the total bombs dropped, hit the target, bombing results are considered unsatisfactory.

S E C R E T

N

20,000'
19,000'
18,000'
17,000'
16,000'
15,000'
14,000'
13,000'
12,000'
11,000'
10,000'
9,000'
8,000'
7,000'
6,000'

20,000'
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6,000'



14,000'
13,000'
12,000'
11,000'
10,000'
9,000'
8,000'
7,000'
6,000'
5,000'
4,000'
3,000'
2,000'

BOMB
TARGET
MUSA



BOMB PLOT - MISSION*18
TARGET INTELLIGENCE SECTION
73 RD BOMB WING
MUSASHINO A/C PLANT-TOKYO
9 JANUARY 1945



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Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 37
Mission No. 18
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

NAVIGATOR

1. Take-off, assembly, and navigation to the target was executed through very poor weather. Some squadrons did not assemble: these aircraft proceeded to the target area individually and bombed targets of opportunity.

2. Long range navigation was a difficult problem due to weather conditions encountered. Navigation was accomplished with the use of metro information, occasionally checked by visual drift and sun observation.

3. Target area navigation can not be considered on this mission since most aircraft bombed targets of opportunity due to the lack of formation protection.

4. Radar (AN/APQ-13) was used to a great advantage in the target area for orientation and wind determination.

5. Loran was used extensively as a navigational aid to and from the target. This equipment was 90% operational.

6. Long range navigation can be considered excellent, considering the weather hazards that were encountered.

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Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 37
Mission No. 18
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

BOMBARDIER

See Par. 39 through 47.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 73rd BOMBARDMENT WING
CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

17 January 1945
JGH
WEATHER SUMMARY :

FO # 37
MISSION # 28
9 Jan 1945

Takeoff was delayed one hour in hope of improved terminal conditions but as only slight improvement occurred it was delayed no longer. Frequent moderate showers from 8/10 cumulus lowered the visibility to ½ mile but averaged two miles. Ceilings varied from 300 to 1000 ft.

Immediately after takeoff the ships were on instruments periodically so that assembly was very difficult and impossible in some cases.

Moderate intermittent showers with ceilings varying from zero to 500 ft continued to 18°N where the clouds gradually broke up. From 21°to 26° the cloud cover was 3/10 cumulus bases 1200 ft tops 5000 ft.

Beyond 26°N frontal conditions were again encountered with many layers of middle cloud with very little separation and much haze. Moderate rime was picked up in these clouds between 15 and 24000 ft. Dense persistent contrails above 27000 ft existed over the target and leaving the target until below this level on return.

Tokyo had 2/10 altocu at 15000ft with excellent visibility.

Kobe the diversionary target had 8/10 altostratus and cirrus above.

A few planes that were over Nagoya reported 8/10 cirrostratus at 31000 and created dense persistent contrails at 32000 ft.

There was no change in the weather on the route back to 20°N. At 19.5°N a line of broken cumulonimbus oriented E-W was observed. From here to base the clouds were 4/10 cumulus at 1500 ft with good visibility.

Broken clouds clearing to scattered at the base on return.

Due to the poor flying weather reliable wind reports are few but all are unanimous in that they were much more southerly than forecast.(see cross sections) At higher levels and over the target wind velocities were much higher than forecast.

The poor flying weather which was not forecast both near the base and in the front south of the Empire hindered formation flying and navigation to such an extent that no coordinated attack on the target was possible.



FORECAST 9 January '45

Return Similar
Base on Return

30						3/10Ci
25		7/10Ci	6/10Cs			
20						
15	0°C	Light Rime in Clouds	4/10Ns	3/10Fc		4/10 Fc-Ns
10		7/10Cu				
05	4/10 Sc	3/10Cu	8/10Sc	6/10Sc	4/10 Sc	
Sfc						4/10Cu
Zones	Base	20°N	25°N Front	30°N	Target	Base
Altim	29.86"	30.00"	30.00"	30.00"	30.24"	29.90"
Turb	Nil	Nil	Moderate	Light	Nil	Light
Vis	14mi	15mi	6-14mi	15mi	18mi	2mi in ♢
35				290° 135K -59°	300° 115K-62°	
30				290 115 -48	300 100 -51	
25	300° 15K -21°	260° 40K -22°	280° 65K -26°	290 95 -36	300 80-40	Same as
20	340 10 -10	250 35 -11	280 50 -15	290 75 -25	300 60 -29	Base-18°N
15	050 15 -01	250 30 -02	240 40 -05	290 55 -14	300 45 -19	
10	080 20 09	250 25 08	300 30 04	280 40 -05	300 25-09	
05	080 25 16	200 20 14	330 20 10	240 20 00	340 15-05	
02	080 20 22	120 20 20	020 20 16	140 20 04	040 10 00	
Sfc	080 16 26	090 14 24	030 15 20	100 15 09	090 10 04	

-30-

Observed Cross Section 9 Jan 46



	Base	20°N	25°N	30°N	Target
Altim					
Turb	Moderate	Light	Light	Moderate	Light	None
Vis	0-1 mile	15 mi	10 mi	0-½ mi	0-½ mi	20 mi
35						
30					290°-145K	290°-145K
25				290°-100K		
20						
15			220°-20K	250°-50K	290°-95K	
10			210°-15K	240°-50K		
05			200°-15K	240°-40K		
02				240°-30K		
Sfc	120°-30K		180°-20K	240°-40K		

73bw Form 62

SECRET

Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 37
Mission No. 18
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

CFC GUNNERY

1. Mission No. 18 due to operational difficulty (see narrative report of mission) encountered relatively little fighter opposition. Again attacks were concentrated in the nose quarter, 11 thru 1 o'clocks, and E/A effectiveness was relatively nil.

2. Equipment operation was as follows:

a.	Cal. 50 ammunition expended (all types)	43,424
b.	20 mm ammunition expended (all types)	1,145
c.	Used complete system, operative (no total failures)	100%
d.	Used individual turrets, operative	98.9%
e.	Used Cal. 50 machine guns, operative	96%
f.	Used 20 mm cannon, operative	94%

SECRET

S E C R E T

Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 37
Mission No. 18
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

FLIGHT ENGINEER

A. Malfunction of Engineering Equipment.

		TOTAL
1.	Power Plant	
	a. Cylinder head blown	1
	b. Short stacks	1
	c. Exhaust collector ring	1
	d. Internal failure	1
	e. Carburation	3
	f. Engine running rough and backfiring	6
	g. Engine running hot	2
2.	Oil System	
	a. Oil cooler regulator	7
	b. Oil pressure (not within limits)	3
	c. Oil leaks	6
3.	Propeller	
	a. Governor	8
	b. Governor switch	1
4.	Supercharger	
	a. Surging at altitude	3
	b. Failling to maintain boost	1
5.	Fuel System	
	a. Fuel transfer pump failure	0
	b. Failure to transfer	0
	c. Bomb bay shut off valve	1
	d. Booster Pumps	1
6.	Electrical	
	a. Generator failure	2
	b. Voltage regulator	4
	c. Inverter	1
7.	Instruments	
	a. Cylinder head temperature	4
	b. Flight indicator	3
	c. Carburater air temperature	4
	d. Tachometer	1
	e. Oil pressure	2
	f. Airspeed indicator	1
	g. Fuel gages	2

S E C R E T

6. Miscellaneous

	TOTAL
a. Bomb bay doors	2
b. Oxygen system	
Leaks	2
Regulator failure	1
c. Sighting blister blown	3
d. Vacumn pressure	1
e. Defrosting	4
f. Cabin air regulators	1

B. Battle Damage
Refer to Par 16 Consolidated Statistical Report.

C. Due to extremely poor weather conditions it was impossible for airplanes to remain in formation. The flight plan was not followed because weather at altitudes planned made operation impossible. The analsis was made on basis of individual flights. Large variations existed due to the many targets which were bombed.

D. Analysis of Cruise Control

a. Fuel aboard 8000 gals.
b. Ammunition 6000 rds. Cal. 50 100 rds. 20 mm.
c. Bomb load 5000 lbs.
d. App. gross weight 137,500 lbs.
e. Fuel consumption (Refer to table XIII of Consolidated Statistical Report.
f. Average time of flight 13 hrs. 43 min.

E. Analysis
Average to Target.

a. Fuel 4504 gals.
b. Time 7 hrs. 16 min.

ALTITUDE	CAS	POWER	PERCENT OF PLANES USING POWER	TIME
1000'	200	2100-33	14 percent	4:23
		2150-34	44 "	
		2175-34	14 "	
		2200-35	28 "	
Climb Bombing Alt 195		2350-41	43 "	2:21
		2375-41	14 "	
		2400-43	43 "	
Cruise Bombing Alt 195		2200-35	28 "	:32
		2350-39	28 "	
		2400-43	44 "	

F. Average Return

a. Average time 6:27
b. Average fuel 2314
c. Average airspeed 187 MPH.

G. Inter Communication
Refer to Section A.

SECRET
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Wing ~~Group~~	73BW
Date	19 Jan 45
By	Wg Photo O

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

PHOTOGRAPHIC

F. O. No.	37
Mission No.	18
Date of Mission	9 January 1945

1.

		K-18	K-19	K-20	K-22	K-24	K-35	Total
a.	Cameras installed	13	0	31	23	1	28	96
b.	Cameras in aborting A/C	2	0	6	9	1	4	22
c.	Cameras in lost A/C	2	0	3	1	0	4	10
d.	Camera in A/C not lost but not returning.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
e.	Cameras with malfunctions	2	0	0	2	0	0	4
f.	Cameras in operating condition not taking photos	4	0	14	9	0	9	36
g.	Camera taking photos	3	0	8	2	0	11	24

2. Breakdown of cameras taking photos by A/C Number:

A/C No.	Vertical camera				Number of photos taken					
	f.stop	shutter	interval	altitude	K-18	K-19	K-20	K-22	K-35	K-
4616	8	1/150	7	29500	1					
4673	6	1/150	7	33000	26				6	
4771					6				15	
4596							1			
4641							1			
5210	16	1/250					22			
4767	8	1/250					5			
4646	8	1/250					7			
4755	8	1/250					12			
4749	16	1/250					4			
4648							2		27	
3501								4		
4604	8	1/150	5	31500				12	4	
4808									18	
4727									4	
4614									3	
4650									25	
4647									14	
5222									3	
4676									24	

Incl 8

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3. Breakdown of cameras not taking photos by cause:

	Cause	No. of Cameras	Explanation
a.	Mechanical failure	4	Curtain Doors not open-Lever Stud
b.	Installation error		Pin broken. - Shutter Pin
c.	Processing error		sheared.
d.	Camera doors not open	1	Doors not locked open.
e.	M/Switch not on		
f.	Vacuum failure		
g.	Power failure	5	Radar Scope out.
h.	Light failure(Target)	5	Heavy Undercast.
i.	Enemy action	1	Bombardier wounded.
j.	Others	11	Subjects of no Intell. value.
k.		4	Photos do not show strikes.
l.		9	Not used.
m.			
n.			
o.	Total	40	

4. Remarks and suggestions:

5. Instructions for preparing this form:

a. This report will be prepared by Photo Lab Commander and certified by Group S-3:

b. Items:

1a, b, c, d, are self explanatory.

1e - The number of malfunctions due to installation or processing.

1f - Number of non-effective cameras due to camera m/switch not turned on, failure of vacuum to the extent of rendering pictures void, Intervalometer or camera fuze blown, tampering with intervalometer or camera, light conditions over target, enemy action, etc.

1g. g is equal to a minus b, c, d, e, and f.

Item 2 - The f. stop, shutter speed, interval between exposures, altitude will be given for only the vertical cameras by A/C number.

Item 3 - Give a definite explanation of the reason for any malfunction.

Certified by _____
Group S-3

_____
Rank

Prepared by _____
Photo Lab Commander

_____
Rank

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Headquarters
73d Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 37
Mission No. 18
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Strike Reports: Ground Station received nine (9) bombs away reports and sixteen (16) amplified strike reports. All reports were received without difficulty.

2. Fox Transmissions: Weather encoded in Ucopac and time ticks were transmitted on the half hour and hour respectively. On receipt of the first primary target bombs away report, the Ground Station retransmitted it as a "Fox" transmission on all frequencies for the information of all aircraft on the mission.

3. Frequencies: All strike reports were received on 11080 KC with the exception of two (2) amplified strike reports which were received on 3145 KC. Heavy interference was experienced on 7275 KC from two broadcast stations straddling the frequency during final hours of the mission. This made it very difficult for the D/F Station to obtain bearings. Slight interference was noticed on 11080 KC, but Ground Station operators were able to read aircraft signals through it. It is estimated that forty-nine (49) per cent of the total traffic was carried out on 3145 KC, thirty-seven (37) per cent on 11080 KC and sixteen (16) per cent on 7275 KC.

4. Navigational Aids: The Ground Station received forty-four (44) requests for bearings; of these thirty-seven (37) were obtained. The difference between bearings obtained and bearings requested was due to weak signals from aircraft, interference and inability of D/F Station to get accurate bearings in certain instances. In a breakdown of all bearings, twenty-one (21) were obtained on 3145 KC, seven (7) on 7275 KC and eleven (11) on 11080 KC. Majority of all aircraft utilized the Radio Range. However, slight use was made of Homer due to weak signals from it. Several aircraft used the CWI Broadcasting Station located here as a homer and reported good results. Condor Base received nine (9) requests for VHF bearings; all bearings were obtained.

5. Net Discipline and Security: The net discipline during this mission illustrated the improvement of the aerial operators. There were no incidents of interference from our own aircraft recorded by the Wing Radio Station. One aircraft violated security by transmitting a message to the Ground Station in clear text. Steps to investigate this incident have been initiated.

6. Enemy Transmissions: Aircraft operators report the following: jamming of 4475 KC by Jap R/T over the target; CW jamming at 0907324 on 11080 KC; CW jamming on 11080 KC at 0906354; voice broadcast on 7275 KC near Iwo Jima; voice transmissions on 11080 KC from 1000Z to 1200Z; CW and voice transmission on 3145 KC near target: Wing Radio Station reports the following: 3145 KC very good during entire mission; CW interference on 11080 KC during

latter part of mission; voice broadcasting station on 7275 KC jammed frequency during final part of mission.

7. Distress: Ground Station received two (2) ditching and two (2) SOS messages. Position and bearing were obtained in all cases. Aircraft requested fourteen (14) urgent bearings during return leg of mission; twelve (12) of these were obtained. Aircraft weak signals prevented D/F from obtaining the other two (2) bearings

8. Equipment Malfunctions:

SET	MALFUNCTION	497	498	499	500
AN/ART-13	Trailing antenna inoperative		5		1
	Fixed antenna broken			1	
	Trailing antenna would not reel out			4	
	Trailing wire broke off			1	
AN/ARN-7	Excessive hunting	2	1		
	Tuning shaft broken				1
	Tuning cable broken				1
BC-348	Off calibration	1			
SCR-522 (VHF)	Inoperative	1			
	Circuit breaker kicked out			1	
RC-36 (Interphone)	Call position open in R.O. position			1	
	Interphone amplifier burned out due to bad voltage regulator				
	Weak				1
	Mike switch shorted				1
	Right gunner's mike switch inoperative				1

Decrease in equipment malfunctions indicates the emphasis being placed on maintenance and better preflighting of equipment. At a meeting of Groupd and Squadron communication officers, suggestions and recommendations were discussed in order to eliminate some of the more predominant equipment failures.

SECRET

Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 37
Mission No. 18
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

RADAR EMPLOYMENT AND RADAR EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE

1. Employment

a. AN/APQ-13 (Blind Bombing)

The radar equipment was used at the primary aid to navigation in the target area. In general, radar approaches were made to visual bomb releases. Some A/C seperated from formations, bombed targets of opportunity by radar. Instances of radar employment to maintain contact between A/C while flying on instruments were reported.

b. SCR-718 (Altimeter)
Employment was normal.

c. SCR-695 (IFF)
Employment was normal.

2. Equipment Performance

a. AN/APQ-13

A downward trend in AN/APQ-13 performance continued on this mission, due to increasing difficulty in obtaining adequate sensitivity at high altitude. Wear and tear from normal operation and maintenance is beginning to bring out weak points in equipment design and installation. A complete review of the antenna and RF unit installation with respect to domes, pressurization seals, and temperature effects is recommended.

(1) 63 A/C were radar equipped.
(2) 16 A/C operated radar equipment in the target area.
(3) 42 A/C reported equipment performance satisfactory for bombing.
(4) 67% of the radar equipment were operational in the target area.

b. SCR-718
One (1) SCR-718 Altimeter failure was reported.

c. SCR-695
One (1) SCR-695 IFF equipment failure was reported.

SECRET

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Headquarters
73rd Bombardment Wing

Field Order No. 37
Mission No. 18
9 January 1945

CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

RCM REPORT

1. Number of Radar Observers participating 4.

2. Number of Radar Observers completed mission 4.

3. Equipment employed:

Sets	Av	Hours On	Malfunctions
AN/APR4	4	18:15	End connector on antenna cable broken. Temporarily repaired in air.
AN/APR5A	1	8:30	
AN/APR5	3	18:15	
AN/APAGX	4	18:15	
AN/ANQ-2	3	7:30	

4. Signals logged:

A-60-85	45	846	39.3 u sec.
B-85-120	46	880	45.3 u sec.
C-120-170	13	705	15.3 u sec.
D-170-220	12	1421	10.2 u sec.
E-220-300	3	1030	1.5 u sec.
F-300-1000	1	CW	----------
Above, spec-27-60 ify Frequency	13	----	----------

5. Remarks:

a. Only one VHF signal was heard over the target area. Too weak to record.

b. Two signals were logged near 30°00'N, 138°00'E, apparently were shipborne radar. It is probable a radar equipped naval vessel has been stationed in that area to report passage of aircraft.

c. The diversioary force reports no fighter attacks.

d. The diversioary force flew the briefed course dispensing CHR-2, twelve units per minute over the area specified. An extremely dense undercast existed in this area visible on the APQ-13. Some question exists as to the effectiveness of rope under such conditions.

e. The main attacking force flew from South of Nagoya to Kofu to Tokyo and East to the coast. They experienced fighter attacks in the following areas:

(1) IP Kofu (few moderate)
(2) Bomb-run Kofu to Tokyo (moderate)
(3) Withdrawal, Tokyo-East Coast (heavy pressing)
(4) Observation plan from South of Nagoya to IP.

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

CONSOLIDATED OVERLAY
ENEMY RADAR

FIELD ORDER 37
MISSION NO 18
DATE FLOWN 9 JAN 45
NO. OF OBSERVERS 4

S-E-C-R-E-T

73RD BOMB WING

FIELD ORDER NO. 37

MISSION NO. 18

9 January 45

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Primary Target MUSASHINO AIRCRAFT PLANT, TOKYO, JAPAN

Table I Aircraft Participating

	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT				
	TOTAL WING	GROUP			
		497	498	499	500
A/C Scheduled to Take-off	78	21	18	19	20
A/C Failing to Take-off	6	1 a	0	3 e	2 h
A/C Airborne	72	20	18	16	18
A/C Airborne Failing to Bomb Designated Targets	50	7 b	16	13	14
% Of Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Designated Targets	69%	41% b	89%	81%	78%
A/C Bombing Primary Target	18	10	2	2	4
% of Airborne A/C Bombing Primary Target	25%	69% b	11%	13%	22%
A/C Failing to Return to Home Base	6	3 c	0	2 f	1 i
Time of Take-off:	8 Jan	8 Jan	8 Jan	8 Jan	8 Jan
Earliest	2146Z	2207Z d	2146Z	2206Z	2146Z
Latest	2223Z	2223Z	2206Z	2223Z g	2205Z
Time of Return:	9 Jan	9 Jan	9 Jan	9 Jan	9 Jan
Earliest	1043Z	1112Z	1043Z	1047Z	1059Z
Latest	1313Z	1231Z	1246Z	1207Z	1313Z

a A/C 423 - flux gate compass inoperative
b excludes 3 a/c whose primary mission was to drop RCM "ROPE"
c A/C 598 - ditched - A/C 772 damaged over target, missing - A/C 655 damaged over target, missing.
d excludes 3 diversionary a/c taking off at 2155 - 2157Z.
e A/C 453 - emergency electrical system out.
A/C 682 - insufficient ammunition loaded.
A/C 483 - several plugs fouled.
f A/C 658 - ditched, A/C 665 - ditched.
g late a/c took off at 2233Z
h A/C 497 carburetor malfunction.
A/C 251 mag. drop
i A/C 657 ditched.

S-E-C-R-E-T

73RD BOMB WING

FIELD ORDER NO. 37

MISSION NO. 18
9 January 45

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table II Breakdown of Aborting Aircraft by Cause

A/C Failing to Bomb Designated Targets

CAUSE	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT				
	TOTAL WING	497	498	499	500
Mechanical Failure	19	2 a	6 c	4 f	7 h
Personnel Failure	2		1 d		1 i
Flight Conditions	28	5 b	9 e	9 g	5 j
Enemy Action	1				1 k
Unknown					
Other					
Total	50	7	16	13	14

a A/C 627 Bombsight failure. Bombed Ito Harbor.
A/C 231 Excessive fuel consumption during climb

b 5 A/C failed to bomb designated targets due to weather preventing formation assembly.
A/C 463 Bombed Cape Mazuru
A/C 641 Bombed Suga Island
A/C 246 Bombed Toyo Hashi
A/C 427 Bombed Cape Omae
A/C 808 Bombed Hamamatsu

c A/C 695 #4 engine blew cylinder #2 prop stuck at 2400 RPM
A/C 777 #2 Prop stuck at 2700 RPM
A/C 629 Fuel transfer system failure
A/C 625 Lost #4 engine - backfiring and smoking
A/C 646 Bomb bay door malfunction
A/C 607 Upper forward turret cable burned out

d A/C 749 Co-pilot suffered severe pains at altitude because of Sinus Trouble

e 9 A/C failed to bomb designated targets due to weather preventing formation assembly
A/C 210 Bombed Airfield 34 47N 137 0E
A/C 763 Bombed Hamamatsu
A/C 478 Bombed Wakayama
A/C 416 Bombed Futamata
A/C 611 Bombed Okyama
A/C 544 Bombed Hamamatsu
A/C 624 Bombed near Hamamatsu
A/C 771 Bombed Numazu
A/C 475 Ran low on fuel and jettisoned bombs
A/C 614 Bombed primary target but because of Rack Malfunction was able to release only 1 bomb. 7 other bombs dropped on Chichi Jima

f A/C 491 Right blister cracked
A/C 465 Carburetor malfunction
A/C 754 #1 Generator pulled 300 amp. All fuses blown - battery burned out
A/C 677 Excessive oil leak #3 engine.

g 9 A/C Failed to bomb designated targets due to weather preventing formation assembly

A/C 650 Bombed Numazu
A/C 493 and 644 Bombed Toba
A/C 222 Bombed Shingu
A/C 665 Bombed unidentified T. O.
A/C 647 Bombed Hamamatsu
A/C 669 and 442 Bombed Amori
A/C 753 Bombed Ujiymada

h A/C 792 #2 Engine blew a push rod housing on hose
A/C 249 Fuel transfer pumps inoperative - Carbon vanes sheared in pumps
A/C 652 Pilots window cracked
A/C 785 Oil leak #1 engine
A/C 487 Bomb rack malfunction
A/D 657 Ditched enroute to target - Engine trouble
A/C 671 Oil leak #4 engine. Bombed Shingu

i A/C 875 Pilot error - Lost formation

j 5 A/C failed to bomb designated targets due to weather preventing formation assembly
A/C 672 Bombed Nagoya
A/C 675 Bombed Hammatsu
A/C 721 Bombed Otsudo
A/C 219 Bombed Shizuoka
A/C 436 Bombed Kamimisaki

k A/C 761 Battle damage from enemy fighters

S E C R E T

73RD BOMB WING

FIELD ORDER NO. 37

MISSION NO. 18

9 January 45

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table III Breakdown of Aircraft Failing to Bomb Primary Target

A/C Bombing Secondary or Last Resort Targets

CAUSE	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT				
	TOTAL WING	497	498	499	500
Mechanical Failure	1			1 b	
Personnel Failure					
Flight Conditions					
Enemy Action					
Unknown					
Other					
Total	1	0 a		1	

a A/C 623, 616 and 412 on Diversionary RCM Mission were unable to Bomb Osaka, designated target because 10/10 overcast prevented visual bombing and Radar Domes of A/C had been damaged by throwing out RCM "Rope" - A/C considered as effective. BOMBED TOKUSHIMA AIRPORT.

b A/C 661 Bomb door malfunction over primary tar get. BOMBED URBAN AREA OF TOKYO.

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

73RD BOMB WING — Consolidated Statistical Summary — FIELD ORDER NO. 37

9 January 45 — Table IV Bombing Run — MISSION NO. 18

GROUP	TARGET NUMBER	NO. A/C REACHING TARGET	A/C DROPPING BOMBS			TIME OF RELEASE		ALTITUDE OF RELEASE		VISUAL BOMBING A/C SIGHTING FOR:			RADAR BOMBING		A/C OPERATED BY:	
			IN FORMATION	INDIVIDUAL	TOTAL	EARLIEST	LATEST	LOWEST	HIGHEST	R & D	RANGE	DROP ON LEADER	A/C SIGHTING	A/C DROPPING ON LEADER	C-1	MANUAL
497	1	10	7	3	10	0513Z	0528Z	29500	34400	4		6			1	9
	3	1		1	1	0512Z		28400		1						1
	4	1		1	1	0517Z		30100					1			1
	5	1		1	1	0510Z		30000					1			1
	6	1		1	1	0503Z		29200		1						1
	7	1		1	1	0500Z		29100		1						1
	8	1		1	1	0505Z		29680					1			1
	9	3	3		3	0500Z		29500	29700	1 a		2			1	3
498	1	2	2		2	0535Z	0535Z	32100	32100	1	1				1	1
	3	2		2	2	0439Z	0445Z	30000	33500	2					1	1
	10	1		1	1	0437Z		31400		1					1	
	11	1		1	1	0533Z		33000		1					1	
	12	1		1	1	0524Z		32000		1						1
	13	1		1	1	0445Z		32000		1					1	
	14	1		1	1	0437Z		32000		1					1	
	15	1		1	1	0435Z		23000		1					1	
	16	1		1	1	data not available - A/C also bombed primary target.										

a Radar out, bombardier's window iced. Dropped by estimation.

Target Numbers: 1. Musashino A/C Plant; 2 Urban Area of Tokyo; 3 Hamamatsu; 4 Toyo Hashi; 5. Suga Island; 6. Cape Omae; 7. Ito Harbor; 8. Cape Mazuru; 9. Tokushima Airport; 10. Airfield 34 47N137 08E; 11. Okyama; 12. Wakayama; 13. Futamata; 14. Nr Hamamatsu; 15. Numazu; 16. Chichi Jima; 17. Toba; 18. Amori; 19. Shingu; 20. Ujiymada; 21. Nagoya; 22. Shizuoka; 23. Otsudo; 24. Kamimisaki

S-E-C-R-E-T

73RD BOMB WING
9 January 1945

Consolidated Statistical Summary
Table IV Bombing Run

FIELD ORDER NO. 37
MISSION NO. 18

GROUP	TARGET NUMBER	NO. A/C REACHING TARGET	A/C DROPPING BOMBS			TIME OF RELEASE		ALTITUDE OF RELEASE		VISUAL BOMBING A/C SIGHTING FOR:			RADAR BOMBING		A/C OPERATED BY:	
			IN FORMATION	INDIVIDUAL	TOTAL	EARLIEST	LATEST	LOWEST	HIGHEST	R & D	RANGE	DROP ON LEADER	A/C SIGHTING	A/C DROPPING ON LEADER	C-1	MANUAL
499	1	3	2 a		2	0519Z	0519Z	33000	33000	1					1	
	2	1		1	1	0521Z		33200		1						1
	15	1		1	1	0539Z		31000					1		1	
	17	2		2	2	0519Z	0520Z	31000	32000	1			1		1	1
	3	1		1	1	0519Z		31500					1		1	
	18	2	2		2	0509Z	0509Z	32000	33500	1		1			2	
	19	1		1	1	0500Z		31700		1					1	
	20	1		1	1	0511Z		31000		1					1	
	Unknown	1		1	1	No Data available - A/C Ditched										
500	1	5	4		4	0518Z	1518Z	30000	34000	1		3			1	3
	21	1		1	1	0530Z		31000		1					1	
	22	1		1	1	0500Z		30100		1					1	
	3	1		1	1	0503Z		30000		1						1
	23	1		1	1	0528Z		29950					1		1	
	19	1		1	1	0458Z		28500					1			1
	24	1		1	1	0433Z		30600		1					1	
Wing	1	20	15 a	3	18	0513Z	0535Z	29500	34400	7	1	9			4	13

a Further data on 1 A/C not available - A/C Ditched

Target Numbers:
1. Musashino A/C Plant
2. Urban Area of Tokyo
3. Hamamatsu
4. Toyo Hashi
5. Suga Island
6. Cape Omae
7. Ito Harbor
8. Cape Mazuru
9. Tokushima Airport
10. Airfield 34 47N137 OE
11. Okyama
12. Wakayama
13. Futamata
14. Nr Hamamatsu
15. Numazu
16. Chici Jima
17. Toba
18. Amori
19. Shingu
20. Ujiymada
21. Nagoya
22. Shizuoka
23. Otsudo
24. Kamimisaki

S-E-C-R-E-T

73RD BOMB WING — Consolidated Statistical Summary — FIELD ORDER NO. 37

9 January 1945 — Table V Loading & Disposal of Bombs — MISSION NO. 18

GROUP	TYPE & WEIGHT OF BOMBS	FUSE SETTING		LOADED				RELEASED ON TARGET						JETTISONED		UNKNOWN		RETURNED		PER CENT OF BOMBS RELEASED ON TARGET
		NOSE	TAIL	ON ALL AIRCRAFT		ON AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT		MUSASHINO A/C PLANT		URBAN AREA TOKYO		OPPORTUNITY								
				No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	
497	500 lb GP AN-M64	.1	.025	202	50.5	188	47	97	24.25			75	18.75	16	4					52%
498	500 lb GP AN-M64	.1	.025	200	50	180	45	11	2.75			95	23.75	49	12.25			25	6.25	6%
499	500 lb GP AN-M64	.1	.025	190	47.5	160	40	20	5	10	2.5	84	21	40	10			6.	1.5	19%
500	500 lb GP AN-M64	.1	.025	200	50	180	45	40	10			60	15	80	20					22%
WING	500 lb GP AN-M64	.1	.025	792	198	708	177	168	42	10	2.5	314	78.5	185	46.25			31	7.75	25%

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

73RD BOMB WING

FIELD ORDER NO. 37

MISSION NO. 18

9 January 45

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table VI Bombing Accuracy

Target MUSASHINO AIRCRAFT PLANT, TOKYO, JAPAN

GROUP	BOMBS RELEASED ON TARGET		NUMBER OF HITS AND DISTANCE FROM AIMING POINT									
			0-500'		500'-1000'		1000'-2000'		2000'-3000'		TOTAL	
	No.	Tons	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No	%
497	97	24.25	1	1%	1	1%	4	4%	6	6%	12	12%
498	11	2.75	0		0		0		0		0	
499	20	5.0	0		0		0		0		0	
500	40	10.0	0		0		0		0		0	
WING	168	42	1	1%	1	1%	4	2%	6	4%	12	7%

Table VII Number of Hits on Target

GROUP	NO. OF HITS ON TARGET	% OF BOMBS RELEASED HITTING TARGET
497	2	2%
498	0	0
499	0	0
500	0	0
TOTAL	2	1%

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

73RD BOMB WING

FIELD ORDER NO. 37

MISSION NO. 18

9 January 45

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table VIII Attacks & Passes by Enemy Aircraft

DIRECTION	ALTITUDE																
	HIGH				LEVEL				LOW				TOTAL				
	497	498	499	500	497	498	499	500	497	498	499	500	497	498	499	500	Total Wing
0100	14			3				5	2			2	16			10	26
0200	11			2	1			4				4	12			10	22
0300	3			3	3			5	3			5	9			13	22
0400				6				2			1	5			1	13	14
0500					1			2	2			1	3			3	6
0600								1	5			2	5			3	8
0700				2				2	2			6	2			10	12
0800				1					1			4	1			5	6
0900	4			2				1				1	4			4	8
1000				2			1		2				2		1	2	5
1100	33			6	8			4				3	41			13	54
1200	6				2		4		3			2	11		4	2	17
TOTAL	71			27	15		5	26	20		1	35	106	0	6	88	200

Table IX Enemy Aircraft Destroyed & Damaged

GROUP	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
497	12	1	3
498	0	0	0
499	0	0	0
500	1	2	9
TOTAL WING	13	3	12

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

73RD BOMB WING

FIELD ORDER NO. 37

MISSION NO. 18

9 January 45

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table X Aircraft Lost and Damaged

CAUSE	AIRCRAFT LOST					AIRCRAFT DAMAGED				
	TOTAL WING	497	498	499	500	TOTAL WING	497	498	499	500
ENEMY A/C	2	2 a				5	3			2
ENEMY FLAK										
ENEMY A/C & FLAK						2			1	1
ACCIDENT										
SELF-INFLICTED						1	1			
UNKNOWN	3	1		2 b						
OTHER	1				1 c	3	3			
TOTAL	6	3	0	2	1	11	7	0	1	3

a A/C 772 - #1 engine shot out by fighter over target. A/C was seen to lose 3000 ft then regain control & disappear into cloud.
A/C 655 - A/C collided with enemy fighter, losing #2 engine. Approximately 15 enemy fighters attack A/C near coast.
b A/C 658 & A/C 665 - Ditched - reason unknown.
c A/C 657 - Ditched - A/C was returning early, reported engine trouble.

Table XI Repair of Damaged Aircraft

AIRCRAFT TO BE REPAIRED BY:	497	498	499	500	TOTAL
TACTICAL GROUP	6	0	1	2	9
SERVICE GROUP	1	0	0	1	2
DEPOT GROUP	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	7	0	1	3	11
NOT REPARABLE	0	0	0	0	0

S-E-C-R-E-T

73RD BOMB WING

FIELD ORDER NO. 37

MISSION NO. 18

9 January 45

Consolidated Statistical Summary

TABLE XII Casualties

	Total	P	CP	NB	BN	FE	ROM	RO	UFC	LG	BG	TG	Other
Killed:													
497th													
498th													
499th													
500th													
Total Wing													
Missing:													
497th	33	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
498th													
499th	23	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
500th	11	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Total Wing	67	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	1
Seriously Injured:													
497th													
498th													
499th													
500th													
Total Wing													
Slightly Injured:													
497th	1				1								
498th													
499th													
500th	2				1						1		
Total Wing	3				2						1		
Total Casualties:													
497th	34	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
498th													
499th	23	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
500th	13	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	
Total Wing	70	6	6	6	8	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	1
No. Participating													
497th	222	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	2
498th	202	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	4
499th	180	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	4
500th	202	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	4
Total Wing	806	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	72	14

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

73RD BOMB WING FIELD ORDER NO. 37

MISSION NO. 18

9 January 45

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table XIII Fuel Consumption Data

	TOTAL WING	GROUP			
		497 a	498 b	499 c	500 d
Average Fuel Aboard	7992	7960	7985	8050	8000
Average Flying Time	13:43	13:40	13:44	13:25	14:01
Average Distance - Nautical Air Miles	2835	2864	2817	2829	2834
Fuel Used:					
Average	6818	6625	6948	6712	7052
Median	6872	6659	7049	6705	7074
Maximum	7597	7174	7597	6917	7546
Minimum	6000	6000	6509	6443	6418
Fuel Remaining:					
Average	1174	1334	1037	1327	948
Median	1111	1237	936	1345	926
Maximum	1750	1750	1476	1622	1582
Minimum	388	829	388	1078	454
Av Gallons per Hour	497	476	506	499	504
Av Gallons per Mile	2.40	2.31	2.47	2.32	2.49
Total Gasoline Consumed & Lost	411,032	110,553	98,897	95,810	105,772

a based on 16 a/c
b based on 11 a/c
c based on 10 a/c
d based on 12 a/c

APPROXIMATE GROSS WEIGHT AT TAKE-OFF: 137,000 lbs.

Times at Various Altitudes:

497 - 1000 ft 5:00, 20,000 ft :15, 31,000 ft :20
498 - 1000 ft 4:30, 30,000 ft :22
499 - 1000 ft 4:45, 32,500 ft :50
500 - 1000 ft 3:54, 15,000 ft :47, 30,500 ft :40

SECRET

S_E_C_R_E_T

73RD BOMB WING

FIELD ORDER NO. 37

MISSION NO. 18

9 January 45

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Table XIV Ammunition Consumption Data

AMMUNITION EXPENDED PER GROUP					
	497th	498th	499th	500th	TOTAL
20 MM.					
Fired	270	31	0	379	680
On Lost A/C	345	0	0	120	465
Total	615	31	0	499	1145
.50 Cal.					
Fired	25,640	2,796	2,860	12,128	43,424
On Lost A/C	18,000	0	12,000	6,000	36,000
Total	43,640	2,796	14,860	18,128	79,424

AMMUNITION EXPENDED PER PLANE					
	497th	498th	499th	500th	TOTAL WING
Upper front	400	52	300	398	288
Lower front	340	26	168	200	184
Upper rear	190	26	149	215	145
Lower rear	320	26	163	162	168
.50 Cal. Tail	260	25	150	345	195
Total .50 Cal.	1510	155	930	1320	980
20 MM Tail	16	2	0	54	18

S_E_C_R_E_T

SECRET

FROM 73RD BOMB WG 061041Z

TO CODCINCP 497, CODCINCP 498, CODCINCP 499, CODCINCP 500, ATTN S-3

INFO BOMCON 21 ATTN CONTROLLER

73D BOMB WG 0539 SAIPAN 6 JAN 45 061000Z

FO 37

MAPS: LONG RANGE NAVIGATIONAL CHARTS JAPAN AND CAROLINE ISLANDS 1:9,000,000

1. A. (1) NV MODERATE ACCURATE AAA IN OSAKA, KOBE, NAGOYA, TOKYO, YOKOHAMA AREA.

(2) MORE THAN 200 FIGHTERS ARE CAPABLE OF INTERCEPTION.

B. (1) LIFEGUARD SUBMARINES AND DESTROYERS TO FOLLOW.

(2) DUMBO TO FOLLOW.

2. 73D WG ATKS JAPAN WITH TWO FORCES, A PRINCIPAL FORCE AND A DIVERSIONARY FORCE. THE PRINCIPAL FORCE WILL BOMB IN THE AREA COVERED BY TARGET FOLDER 90.17. THE DIVERSIONARY FORCE WILL MAKE LANDFALL TEN MINUTES AFTER LEAD SQUADRON OF PRINCIPAL FORCE, DISPERSE ROPE (ANNEX 1), OBTAIN PHOTOGRAPHS WITH K-7C CAMERA OF 90.25 - 1547 AND BOMB OSAKA CITY.

PRIMARY TARGET: 90.17 - 357.

LAST RESORT TARGET: URBAN AREA TOKYO.

TARGET FOR DIVERSIONARY FORCE: URBAN AREA OSAKA.

FORMATION: SQ COLUMN.

METHOD OF BOMBING: SQ PATTERN - RADAR ASSIST IN BOMBING RUN. BOMB PRIMARY TARGET VISUALLY, BOMB LAST RESORT TARGET BY RADAR AND OR VISUALLY.

AP: PRIMARY - CENTER OF TARGET.

LAST RESORT - VISUAL: ANY INDUSTRIAL TARGET.

RADAR: CENTER OF SOUTH HALF OF BUILT UP AREA BETWEEN AREA AND SUMIDA RIVERS.

DIVERSIONARY : VISUAL: CENTER OF OSAKA. RADAR: CENTER OF OSAKA.

ROUTES: PRINCIPAL FORCE

BASE - ASSEMBLY

(17 00N - 144 00E)

(26 30N - 137 00E)

(34 15N - 136 55E)

IP - (35 40N - 136 34E) HOFU

AXIS OF ATK: 85 DEGREES T.

TARGET

MANEUVER AFTER ATK: TURN TO DEPARTURE

(36 00N - 141 15E) - (34 00N - 141 15E)

(34 00N - 141 15E)

(27 00N - 149 30E)

BASE

DIVERSIONARY FORCE:

BASE - ASHEDIY

(17 00N- 144 00E)

(26 30N - 137 00 E)

(33 50N - 134 40 E)

IP - (NORTHEAST TIP HONDO ISLAND (34 34N - 134 20E)

AXIS OF ATK: 80 DEGREES T.

90.25 - 1547

OSAKA

MANEUVER AFTER ATK: RIGHT TURN.

BASE.

3. A. 498TH GP FLIES TWO 9 A/C TAKES OFF ZERO HR ON RUNWAY ABLE BOMBS AT 29,000 FT AND 29,500 FT. THREE A/C OF 497TH GP WILL TAKE OFF BETWEEN THE TWO SQS.

B. 499TH GP FLIES TWO 9 A/C SQ TAKES OFF ZERO HR PLUS 10 MIN ON RUNWAY BAKER BOMBS AT 31,000 FT AND 31,500 FT.

C. 500TH GP FLIES TWO 9 A/C SQ TAKES OFF ZERO HR ON RUNWAY BAKER BOMBS AT 30,000 FT AND 30,500 FT.

D. 497TH GP FLIES TWO 9 A/C SQ TAKES OFF ZERO HR PLUS 21 MIN ON RUNWAY ABLE BOMBS AT 30,000 FT AND 30,500 FT. 497TH GP FLIES A THREE A/C FLIGHT AS THE DIVERSIONARY FORCE TAKES OFF ZERO PLUS 9 MIN ON RUNWAY ABLE BOMBS AT 31,000 FT. ASSEMBLE THREE A/C FLIGHT IN MINIMUM LENGTH TIME.

4. (1) ZERO HR: D DAY AND ZERO HR TO FOLLOW.

(2) GASOLINE LOAD: 8,000 GALS.

(3) BOMB LOAD: PRINCIPAL FORCE - 10 X 500 GP FUSED .10 SEC NOSE .025 SEC TAIL DIVERSIONARY FORCE - 9 X M-18 IB CLUSTERS FUSED TO OPEN AT 5000 FT.

(4) INTERVALOMETER SETTING: 150 FT.

SECRET

#2-

(5) AMMUNITION: 6,000 RDS .50 CAL 100 RDS 20 MM.

4. NO CHANGE.

5. A. (1) TAC SOP 30-3 DTD 5 JAN 45.

(2) SOP COMM XXI BC DTD 15 NOV 44.

B. NO CHANGE

O'DONNELL CG BW 73

SECRET

FROM BW 73 062302Z

TO COBOMGR 497 ATTN S-3
COBOMGR 498 ATTN S-3
COBOMGR 499 ATTN S-3
COBOMGR 500 ATTN S-3

INFO BOMCOM 21 ATTN: CONTROLLER

BW 73 0 0349

AMENDMENT NO ONE TO FO 37.

1. CHANGE PAR 1. B. TO READ:

1. B. (1) LIFEGUARD SUB POSITIONS

A. (34 00 N - 141 12 E)

B. (32 00 N - 142 00 E)

C. (29 00 N - 143 00 E)

RESCUE DESTROYER POSITIONS:

A. (20 00 N - 144 45 E) DURING RETURN FLIGHT

B. (16 55 N - 145 40 E) DURING ENTIRE FLIGHT

1. B. (2) ONE DUMBO WILL BE IN VICINITY OF 22 00 N - 140 25 E) FROM 0025Z TO LIMIT OF ENDURANCE.

2. CHANGE PARE 3.X. (1) TO READ:

3. X. (1) ZERO HR AND D DAY 2045Z 7 JAN 45.

O'DONNELL CG 73BW

SECRET

SECRET

FROM BW 73 080649Z

TO CCBOMCP 498 S-3
CCBOMCP 499 S-3
CCBOMCP 500 S-3

INFO TO: BOMCOM 21 ATTN: CONTROLLER

BT

0429

AMENDMENT NO 2 TO FO 37

1. NO BOMBS WILL BE CARRIED BY DIVERSIONARY FORCE.

2. CHANGE PAR 3. X (1) TO READ:

3. X. (1) ZERO HR AND D DAY 2045Z 8 JAN 45.

O'DONNELL CG BW73

SECRET

SECRET

FROM BW 73

TO COMBOMGP 497 ATTN S-3
COMBOMGP 498 ATTN S-3
COMBOMGP 499 ATTN S-3
COMBOMGP 500 ATTN S-3

INFO TO: BOMBOM 21 ATTN: CONTROLLER

BT

BW 73 0 0451

AMENDMENT NO 3 TO FO NO. 37

1. PAR 1 AMENDMENT NO 2 TO FO 37 RESCINDED

2. CHANGE PAR 3. X . (3) TO READ

DIVERSIONARY FORCE 6 X 500 GP FUSED .10 SEC NOSE .025 SEC TAIL

O'DONNELL CG BW 73

SECRET