

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 active operations or orders?

3 General Gerow: Yes, sir. The responsibilities of War  
4 Plans Division were confined to operational messages. The  
5 sending of purely information was the responsibility of the  
6 G-2 Intelligence section, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: So the reason that you were brought into  
8 this warning message was because it had something in it that  
9 directed some deployments or action on the part of the ad-  
10 dressee, was that it?

11 General Gerow: Yes, sir. It would require operations  
12 on the part of the commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-  
13 ment, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Have you your memorandum of November 27,  
15 1941 to the Chief of Staff about that? Do you have a copy of  
16 it?

17 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have a photostat copy of it.

18 Mr. Mitchell: We will mark that exhibit 45. It has not  
19 yet been introduced. I offer it.

20 The Vice Chairman: It has been distributed?

21 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Gesell: It was distributed yesterday, Congressman  
23 Cooper.

24 (THEREUPON THE DOCUMENT ABOVE REFERRED TO  
25 WAS MARKED EXHIBIT NO. 45)



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Will you please read that memorandum that  
3 you wrote to the Chief of Staff? Read all the notes at the  
4 top of it as well.

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir. (Reading)

6 "War Department

7 War Department General Staff

8 War Plans Division

9 Washington

10 WPD 4544-13."

11 Mr. Mitchell: How does the first sentence start out so  
12 I can be sure I have the same thing?

13 General Gerow: "The Secretary of War sent for me."

14 Mr. Mitchell: That is it. Well, you read the photostat  
15 then.

16 General Gerow: Very well, sir.

17 Dated 11/27/41. Initials "C.A.G." Dated November 27,  
18 1941. There is a number "4544-13." Under that, "November  
19 the 28th, 1941. Noted: Chief of Staff" with initials that  
20 I cannot decipher. Also "Noted: Deputy Chief of Staff",  
21 with the same initials which I cannot decipher. (Reading)

22 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

23 "Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

24 "1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30  
25 a.m., November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present.



Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have  
3 been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed.  
4 I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message  
5 sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft  
6 message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He  
7 told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the Presi-  
8 dent this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations  
9 had been terminated with the barest possibility of re-  
10 sumption. The President wanted a warning message sent  
11 to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral  
12 Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

13 "2. Later in the morning, I attended a conference  
14 with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Ad-  
15 miral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy  
16 Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint  
17 message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was ap-  
18 proved (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed  
19 of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark di-  
20 rected be prepared for the President. The Secretary of  
21 War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be  
22 construed as a recommendation to the President that he  
23 request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was re-  
24 assured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum  
25 would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.



Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 "3. Both the message and the memorandum were  
3 shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor  
4 changes in the memorandum. There were made (copy at-  
5 tached).

6 (Signed) L. T. GEROW

7 Brigadier General,

8 Acting Chief of Staff."

9 Then there is a notation, "Filed in O.C.S." "2 Incls:

10 Memo. for President, 11-27-41

11 Memo. for TAG, 11-27-41."

12 And then written in: "Copy in General Gerow's book" and  
13 initials which I cannot decipher. The figures "11-28."  
14 Other figures "--11-27-41."

15 Then "Memorandum for TAG, 11-27-41." Then written in,  
16 "File in OAS record room." Then at the bottom lower right  
17 hand corner, "OCS-18" -- it appears to be "36-125." Two  
18 letters there which I cannot decipher. Then "11-28-41."

19 The Vice Chairman: Is this exhibit 45?

20 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

21 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of coun-  
22 sel if that does correctly represent the copy furnished the  
23 committee?

24 Mr. Mitchell: No. The only difference is these dif-  
25 ferent routings and notations on the bottom of it.



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Senator Ferguson: But it does show who received it on  
3 the photostatic copy but not on the other?

4 Mr. Mitchell: The mimeographed copy contains these no-  
5 tations: "Noted: Chief of Staff, November 28th" and "Noted:  
6 Deputy Chief of Staff" with the same date. The only differ-  
7 ence is some of these routings or dates that are immaterial.  
8 The notations of who received it are on the mimeograph.

9 Senator Ferguson: All right.

10 Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, at this meeting that you  
11 spoke about where the Secretary of War sent for you, was  
12 there considered at that meeting a draft of a proposed mes-  
13 sage to Hawaii, Panama and other places, or only at that time  
14 the MacArthur message? Do you remember about that?

15 General Gerow: The conference was directed primarily to  
16 the message to the Philippines and the commanding General  
17 of the Far East, but the other messages as I recall were dis-  
18 cussed and I referred in my memorandum to that fact. There  
19 were various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to  
20 Mr. Sayre were discussed.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Can you tell in your own way, independently  
22 of this memoranda, just what happened at that meeting, or  
23 can you add anything to the memoranda?

24 General Gerow: I believe now, sir, that I was in the  
25 office at the time that the Secretary of War telephoned to the



28 14

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Secretary of State. I believe that I heard one end of the conversation.

Mr. Mitchell: That is, you were in the Secretary's office?

General Gerow: In the Secretary of War's office, yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: And you heard him telephone the Secretary of State?

General Gerow: That is my recollection, yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: And you heard one end of the conversation?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: And then what did the Secretary of War report that you remember as to what the other end of the telephone had said?

General Gerow: The Secretary after he completed this conversation stated to me that it is too abrupt to say the negotiations shall terminate, that the Secretary of State won't quite go along with that. "He says to all intents and purposes", I recall, "with the barest possibilities of their being resumed" and based on that I cannot recall whether I noted the exact wording in the message that was sent, or whether the Secretary wrote it down in his own handwriting. I cannot recall at this time, sir.



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you are speaking now of the mes-  
3 sage to the Philippines?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir, the message to the Philip-  
5 pines, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you used that same phrase in your  
7 message later to Hawaii, didn't you?

8 General Gerow: Yes, sir. The Philippines message,  
9 which was, I know, definitely approved by the Secretary of  
10 War, formed a basis for the preparation of the other messages  
11 to the other three commanders in the Pacific area.

12 Mr. Mitchell: In other words, the War Plans Division  
13 took upon itself the task of drafting in its own way the mes-  
14 sages to the other commanders on the basis of the one that  
15 had been agreed upon for the Philippines, was that what had  
16 happened?

17 General Gerow: Yes, sir, but I cannot recall whether  
18 all of them were presented to the Secretary of War later on  
19 for approval or not; I cannot recall at this time, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I notice that so far as concerns  
21 the dispatch to General Short and the one from the Navy to  
22 Admiral Kimmel, the Navy did not put any qualification about  
23 negotiations might be resumed, did they?

24 General Gerow: I cannot remember exactly what happened  
25 about that Navy message that was sent. I believe it was



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 written earlier, prior to the conversation that I had with  
3 the Secretary of War,,and I believe that it might have been  
4 sent prior to the dispatch of the message that was sent by  
5 War Plans Division.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Well, the Navy was not present then when  
7 this conversation between the Secretary of War with Secretary  
8 Hull over the telephone took place, is that your recollec-  
9 tion?

10 General Gerow: No, sir, I believe that the Secretary of  
11 Navy and Admiral Stark were both there at the time of that  
12 conversation, but I cannot be sure, sir. I cannot accurately  
13 state whether that was my first conference that I had with  
14 the Secretary of War when he called up or the second one, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I will call your attention to  
16 this: The message which you drafted for General Marshall,  
17 to go over General Marshall's name to the commanding General  
18 of the Hawaiian Department says:

19 "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated  
20 to all practical purposes, with only the barest pos-  
21 sibilities that the Japanese government might come back  
22 and offer to continue."

23 That was put in there at the suggestion of Secretary  
24 Stimson after talking with Mr. Hull over the telephone, as I  
25 understand it.



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Now, the Navy message of the same date  
4 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief  
5 of the Pacific Fleet says this:

6 "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.  
7 Stop. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabiliz-  
8 tion of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and ag-  
9 gressive move by Japan is expected within the next few  
10 days."

11 Now, there is a difference between those and it is  
12 evident, I think, that the Navy dispatch did not know any-  
13 thing about the conversation with Mr. Hull, or the man who  
14 wrote the Navy dispatch. So are you sure that the Navy was  
15 present at this conference that you spoke about, which you  
16 and General Bryden attended with the Secretary of War?

17 General Gerow: I am sure that the Navy was not present  
18 at the first conference. I am positive that Secretary Knox  
19 and Admiral Stark were present at the second conference.

20 Mr. Mitchell: You say:

21 "Later in the morning I attended a conference with  
22 Secretary of War and Navy and Admiral Stark."

23 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember whether at that second  
25 conference at which the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Stark were present their attention was called to the fact  
3 that Mr. Hull wanted to water down the statement that it was  
4 a complete breach or termination of negotiations with Japan?  
5 Do you have any recollection about that?

6 General Gerow: Well, the entire message was discussed.  
7 I cannot recall now whether there was any particular refer-  
8 ence to that particular sentence.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Well, do you remember anything further  
10 about the discussion other than what you have stated in your  
11 memoranda here of November 27, 1941? Does anything come back  
12 to you that I haven't asked you about?

13 General Gerow: No, sir, I cannot remember anything else,  
14 sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Now, the original draft of the message  
16 that was prepared to send to the commanding General of the  
17 Hawaiian Department contained, I understand, some phrase about  
18 sabotage, did it not?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Have you seen exhibit 36, the photostat  
21 copy of the original draft?

22 General Gerow: I have a photostat copy, sir. I imagine  
23 it is the same one that you have, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: That is it. I call your attention to the  
25 fact that in this draft dated November 27th, which was a memo-



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 ran for the Adjutant General through the Secretary of the  
3 General Staff and says:

4 "The Secretary of War directs that the following,  
5 considered as a priority message, be dispatched by  
6 cable, radio or telegraph to each of the following:  
7 Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department; Command-  
8 ing General of the Caribbean Defense Command."  
9 Then there is a line; "also to the Commanding General  
10 of the Western Defense Command" and that seems to be  
11 stricken out.

12 Do you see that?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: And then at the bottom of that page in  
15 the draft are these words:

16 "Needed measures for protection against subversive  
17 activities should be taken immediately."

18 A line is drawn through those words and the initials  
19 "L.T.G." there. Did you cause both those deletions to be  
20 made? The upper one does not seem to be your deletion.

21 General Gerow: No, sir, the upper one is not my initials,  
22 I do not know who made that, sir, but I do positively recall  
23 making the deletion which referred to subversive activities,  
24 sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: How did that, or at whose instance did







1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 want any specific danger to be mentioned. What is your re-  
3 collection about that?

4 General Gerow: Well, I wanted to be sure that this mes-  
5 sage would cover only, - that this message could be inter-  
6 preted only as warning the commanding General in Hawaii  
7 against an attack from without.

8 Mr. Mitchell: So it was stricken out at your sugges-  
9 tion?

10 General Gerow: At a conference held that afternoon in  
11 the office of General Bryden, attended by General Miles and  
12 Colonel Bundy and myself, there was quite a considerable dis-  
13 cussion. It was finally agreed that the phrase should be  
14 stricken out and it was also agreed that General Miles would  
15 send a message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department with regard  
16 to being on guard against subversive activities.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Well, can you remember anything more  
18 about the discussion relating to striking out those two lines?

19 General Gerow: No, sir, except the fact that I did not  
20 feel it to be appropriate to include a reference to subver-  
21 sive activities in this War Plans Division operational mes-  
22 sage.

23 Mr. Mitchell: You made that point at the conference you  
24 mean?

25 General Gerow: Yes, sir.



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: And who urged the other view, if anybody  
3 did, that the subversive activities be mentioned in the main  
4 dispatch? Do you have any recollection about that?

5 General Gerow: General Miles felt very strongly, as I  
6 recall, sir, that some reference to subversive activities, pro-  
7 tection against subversive activities should be transmitted  
8 to the commanding General in Hawaii.

9 Mr. Mitchell: And it was settled that it should not be  
10 in the main warning but would take the form of another sabo-  
11 tage dispatch from the G-2 in Washington to the G-2 officer  
12 on General Short's staff?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Did you know at the time of the sending  
15 of the second subversive and sabotage message over General  
16 Adams' signature and the other one over General Arnold's, at  
17 his request? Did you know about those?

18 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I attended a conference with  
19 regard to that message, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Who was the conference with?

21 General Gerow: As I recall --

22 Mr. Mitchell: There are two messages I am referring to,  
23 one over Adams' name and the other one over the Chief of  
24 the Air Corps signature.

25 General Gerow: I do not recall the one over the signa-







1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 eral of the Hawaiian Department?

3 General Gerow: No, sir, I do not recall that message.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Under date of November 28th. It was  
5 sent over General Adams' signature, but the last two words  
6 are, "Signed - Arnold." That would be an Air Corps message?

7 General Gerow: Yes, sir. I do not recall being in on  
8 the preparation of that message, sir.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Did you have referred to you for exam-  
10 ination the reports of the various commanders to whom these  
11 warning messages had been sent, the Army commanders?

12 General Gerow: Yes, sir. Those reports came over my  
13 desk, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: You saw the report from General Short on  
15 November 28, 1941, 5:57 A.M.? Would that be Honolulu time?

16 General Gerow: May I find the report, sir?

17 Mr. Mitchell: It is on page 12 of exhibit 32, the pink  
18 book covering telegraph messages between the War Department  
19 and Hawaii. Do you have it?

20 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: 5:57 A.M. That means Honolulu time as  
22 you understand it?

23 General Gerow: I do not know, sir. That is put on by  
24 the Signal Corps and I do not know, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: I see. That report reads this way:



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 "Report Department alerted to prevent Sabotage  
3 Period Liaison with Navy REURAD Four Seven Two Twenty  
4 Seventh. SHORT."

5 Now, I will ask you to look at the one from MacArthur  
6 on the previous page, page 11, which reads:

7 "PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR RADIO  
8 SIX TWO FOUR AIR RECONNAISSANCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED AND  
9 INTENSIFIED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NAVY STOP GROUND  
10 SECURITY MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN STOP WITHIN THE  
11 LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY PRESENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF  
12 THIS THEATRE OF OPERATIONS EVERYTHING IS IN READINESS  
13 FOR THE CONDUCT OF A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE STOP INTIMATE  
14 LIAISON AND COOPERATION AND CORDIAL RELATIONS EXIST  
15 BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY."

16 You got also a telegram from General Andrews. Is that  
17 Frank M. Andrews in the Caribbean area?

18 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Under date of November 29th, on page 16  
20 of exhibit 32. His answer is:

21 "REURAD FOUR SIX ONE NOVEMBER TWENTY SEVEN SIGNED  
22 MARSHALL REPORT REQUESTED BEING FORWARDED AIR MAIL."

23 And on page 18, 18-A and 18-B of this exhibit 32 we  
24 find General Andrews' report that came in by air mail in re-  
25 sponse to the message you sent him. He says:



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 "Naval Measures. At the present time, it is be-  
3 lieved that the defensive measures for the Caribbean  
4 Defense Command center largely around the Panama Canal;  
5 however, a plan for furnishing Army support to the Navy  
6 has been worked out and coordinated with the various  
7 Naval commanders in the Caribbean Theater. In the  
8 Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval Di-  
9 strict is conducting continuous surface patrol of the  
10 area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supple-  
11 mented, within the limits of the aircraft at his dis-  
12 posal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant  
13 of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient  
14 aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate re-  
15 connaissance."

16 Did you see that report from General Andrews?

17 General Gerow: I believe that I did, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Did you see also the one from General  
19 Dewitt on page 15, which goes at length into the measures he  
20 had taken?

21 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I believe that I did.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Was General Marshall out of the city on  
23 the 27th when the warning message was sent over his name?

24 General Gerow: To the best of my recollection and be-  
25 lief he was, sir.



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Do you know whether he had anything to do  
3 with the draft of it before he left?

4 General Gerow: There was some discussion of a message,  
5 informal discussion, at the Joint Board meeting. I do not  
6 recall the details of that discussion, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: That was a meeting at which General Mar-  
8 shall was in attendance?

9 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: How long before the 27th?

11 General Gerow: That was the day preceding, sir; the  
12 26th.

13 Mr. Mitchell: On the 26th?

14 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: At the time you received Short's reply  
16 was your attention directed to the brevity of it as compared  
17 with the other reports, the reports that you had received from  
18 other commanding officers?

19 General Gerow: No, sir, it was not. The procedure in  
20 the War Plans Division at that time was for the executive  
21 officer to bring to my desk for information copies of im-  
22 portant messages and letters. This document came to my desk  
23 and was initialed by me. It was then routed to the proper  
24 section of War Plans Division, which in this instance would  
25 be the Plans group, headed by Colonel Bunley who is now dead.  
I did not see this message from General Short again prior to  
December the 7th. I stated in my ---

Shel--  
Shack fls



Shack  
fls  
Shf  
hl

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: Just a minute. I show you a photostat  
3 of General MacArthur's report of action taken of November  
4 28, to which is attached a photostat of General Short's  
5 report, and attached to that is a routing sheet, and I  
6 will ask you, have you that before you?

7 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have that.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Would the routing sheet show whether  
9 those two reports were attached together as they were routed  
10 through the department. Could you tell? The routing sheet  
11 shows two message numbers, doesn't it?

12 General Gerow: Yes, sir. I am trying to identify  
13 those numbers.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Look at the lower righthand corner of  
15 each of the two messages, and you get the number as shown  
16 on the routing sheet, do you not?

17 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: So it is quite obvious, is it not, from  
19 these documents that MacArthur's report and Short's report  
20 were fastened together with a single routing sheet as they  
21 came to your hand? I notice, "Noted W.P.D." with your  
22 initials on it on the first message. That is right, isn't  
23 it?

24 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: And the same thing on the second message?







Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 report on the next photostat page.

3 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Mitchell: I notice at the top of MacArthur's  
5 message on the right, the words "To Secretary of War,  
6 G.C.M." Is that in General Marshall's handwriting?

7 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: That means that General Marshall pro-  
9 bably saw it before Secretary Stimson saw it, does it not?  
10 He was directing it to be forwarded to the Secretary of  
11 War?

12 General Gerow: It would indicate that, yes, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: I notice General Marshall's initials  
14 do not appear on the next page, which is the Short report,  
15 but only on the first one. Is that correct?

16 General Gerow: His initials do not appear on the Short  
17 message.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

19 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire where  
20 General Marshall's initials are on the photostat?

21 Mr. Mitchell: On the righthand corner.

22 Senator Ferguson: Up at the top of the page?

23 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

24 The Chairman: The Chairman might also note that the  
25 "Noted Stimson" looks like there are three initials there,



Witness Gerow

1  
2 instead of "H.S."

3 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, his middle initial, "H.L.S."

4 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, does the original  
5 have on the bottom of it "Noted, Chief of Staff," and no  
6 initials under that? Both of them have "Noted, Chief of  
7 Staff," and then one has a special note up at the top  
8 of the initials. What does this stamp mean? Does counsel  
9 know?

10 Mr. Mitchell: I suppose it was stamped on there  
11 for the Chief of Staff to initial. He did not do it, but  
12 instead of that he noted up at the top "To Secretary of  
13 War G.C.M."

14 Senator Ferguson: What is the "O-4-c"?

15 Mr. Mitchell: I will have to ask the witness about  
16 that. I am not in a position to guess about it.

17 The first question, General, is on the first message,  
18 the first page being the MacArthur report, a photostat of  
19 it. Above the words "Noted W.P.D." and your initials,  
20 "L.T.G." are the stamped words, printed with a stamp, "Noted  
21 Chief of Staff," and under it there are no initials to the  
22 effect that General Marshall noted it. Now, can you under-  
23 stand why that stamp would be put on there? Would it be  
24 in preparation of a signature, or what? When the thing came  
25 to you, were the words "Noted W.P.D." stamped on there?

h4



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

h5

General Gerow: Yes, sir, they would be stamped thereon by my office. The "Noted Chief of Staff" would be stamped by the Office of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Mitchell: I see. Before it was shown to him?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: By the way, it was stamped "Noted W.P.D." before it was shown to you?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: So you infer instead of noting his initials down there, the General put the message up at the top, "To Secretary of War G.C.M."?

General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

May I bring up, sir, the question of this routing slip?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, anything you think of that we ought to know, General.

General Gerow: You will note that the routing slip is a routing slip from the Office of the Secretary, General Staff. That would normally come down to the War Plans Division, as is indicated here with those two papers attached. My executive may or may not have kept the routing slip on there. He may have removed it, or put the War Plans Division slip on it. What they did I do not know, sir, but it is necessarily true that that routing slip appeared on these



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 messages when they were brought to me, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: This is the way the record stands in  
4 the War Department, that it was put on there at some time?

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: You mean after you saw it.

7 General Gerow: No, sir. When these messages went  
8 into the Office of the Chief of Staff, for example, sir,  
9 the Secretary of the General Staff would put his routing  
10 slip on it to sent it to the War Plans Division, attaching  
11 the two messages, and the messenger would bring it down to  
12 my executive and my executive would receipt for it,-- and  
13 then that paper may or may not continue to keep the same  
14 routing slip.

15 Mr. Mitchell: What would be your conclusion from that?  
16 I do not quite get the drift.

17 General Gerow: No conclusion, sir, except I understood  
18 a minute ago you asked me if that routing slip was on it  
19 when it came to my desk. That was my understanding of the  
20 question, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Well, is that correct? You know that  
22 these two documents came together, do you?

23 General Gerow: I cannot testify to that fact. I do not  
24 recall that now, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: It is only because there is a routing



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 slip, with both numbers on the same routing slip that you  
3 infer they did come together?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I think we would like to be sure  
6 about that.

7 Is it your conclusion that the routing slip does not  
8 show that they were together when they were presented to  
9 you, or that it does?

10 General Gerow: They show that they were together  
11 when they were presented -- handed to my Executive Officer  
12 because he initialed it. Whether it continued on there  
13 I cannot testify at this time. I think it is rather im-  
14 material as to whether it did or not, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

h7  
AL  
fls

15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



Check (6)  
follows  
Book  
A-1

2711

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

2

Mr. Mitchell: Well, where did your Executive Officer  
initial it?

3

4

General Gerow: He initialed, if you notice, on the  
routing slip, sir. You see "A.C. of S., WPD, noted WPD, CAG".  
That was Colonel Galey, those initials, my Executive Officer.

5

6

7

Mr. Mitchell: This Assistant Secretary, or Assistant  
Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, Noted and those initials,  
are your Secretary?

8

9

10

General Gerow: My Executive, sir.

11

Mr. Mitchell: Your Executive?

12

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

13

14

Mr. Mitchell: Well, he initialed the routing slip cover-  
ing both messages?

15

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

16

17

Mr. Mitchell: So the routing slip must have been on  
there when it got to your office.

18

19

General Gerow: When it reached the War Plans Division,  
yes, sir.

20

21

Mr. Mitchell: Why do you think it would be detached  
when it was handed to you?

22

23

24

25

General Gerow: It might have been detached, sir, since  
that was the routing slip from the office of the Chief of  
Staff. Whether my Executive might have put on other papers  
afterwards to route it to a Division, section within the War



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Plans Division, I cannot state at this time, sir, but we had  
3 certain routing slips within the War Plans Division itself,  
4 just as the office of the Chief of Staff had a routing slip.

5 Mr. Mitchell: You say you saw both messages?

6 General Gerow: I saw both of those messages, yes, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: You are in doubt whether you saw them  
8 both attached together at the same time?

9 General Gerow: I am in doubt, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Well, it is certain that they both came  
11 together to your Executive, did they not?

12 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: And where was your Executive's office?

14 General Gerow: His office was adjacent to mine, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Then is it your theory that after the two  
16 papers with the routing slip came to your Executive, he de-  
17 tached the routing slip before he handed it to you for  
18 initialing?

19 General Gerow: I do not remember his exact procedure.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Why should he take the routing slip off?  
21 If the two messages came in with the routing slip and he  
22 initialed the routing slip showing both messages were there  
23 and then he brought it into your office to show it to you,  
24 why would he take the routing slip off?

25 General Gerow: Well, you see, sir, the routing slip is



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 a routing from the office of the Chief of Staff to the office  
3 of the War Plans Division.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

5 General Gerow: Now the War Plans Division itself had  
6 routing slips if the Executive routed the paper from the  
7 Executive Office to the Chief of Plans group, for example, or  
8 the Chief of Projects group.

9 Mr. Mitchell: You mean the routing slip was prepared in  
10 your War Plans Division then?

11 General Gerow: No, sir. This routing slip was apparently  
12 the routing slip that was prepared, as you notice, by the office  
13 of the Secretary, General Staff.

14 Mr. Mitchell: It got to your office with both these  
15 messages attached to it?

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Then your theory is it may have been taken  
18 off before you saw it?

19 General Gerow: The messages may have been separated by  
20 the Executive Officer in War Plans Division for routing to  
21 the section of the War Plans Division which would handle that  
22 message.

23 Mr. Mitchell: After you saw it?

24 General Gerow: I do not know, sir, whether it was before  
25 or after, but I saw both the messages, sir.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: You may have a chance later to clear that  
3 up. I do not believe I quite get the result.

4 When you saw the Short message did you then know about  
5 the joint arrangement required under which the Navy would con-  
6 duct long distance air reconnaissance and that the Army would  
7 supply to the Navy for that purpose such heavy bombers as it  
8 had available for that work?

9 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I knew of the agreement in  
10 Hawaii, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: When you saw General Short's reply I wish  
12 you would state, in your own way, General, just what your  
13 reaction was to it and what you thought about it.

14 General Gerow: Well, sir, as I testified before the  
15 Roberts Commission, I assumed when that message came through  
16 that it was an answer to the G-2 message that was sent out  
17 by General Miles to the Hawaiian Department the evening before.  
18 I was probably led to that assumption by the fact that the  
19 question of sabotage had been discussed quite at length after  
20 that conference on the evening before.

21 I do not remember now, at this late date, what my reaction  
22 was to the message.

23 The message was then sent out, as I stated before, to  
24 the Plans group, which was headed by Colonel Bandy, who is now  
25 dead. I do not know what Colonel Bandy's reactions were to



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 that message. I don't remember ever discussing it with him.  
3 It is reasonable to assume that he may possibly have inter-  
4 preted the message to mean, or that part of the message which  
5 said "liaison with the Navy", that the Commanding General out  
6 there had instituted protective measures against sabotage and  
7 was working with the Navy to arrange for other defensive  
8 measures, including reconnaissance.

9 I do not know that that was Colonel Bandy's thought, but  
10 it was a reasonable assumption from the way the message was  
11 worded. I did not see the message after it was sent to Colonel  
12 Bandy prior to December 7.

13 The message contained two short sentences: One, "Alerted  
14 against sabotage", and the other stating "liaison with the  
15 Navy". It also contained a reference to a number 472, as I  
16 recall. That message meant nothing to me at that time.

17 Mr. Mitchell: You mean the number meant nothing?

18 General Gerow: The number meant nothing to me, sir,  
19 because that number was put on by the Signal Corps and it was  
20 not the number assigned to that particular document by the  
21 War Plans Division.

22 Mr. Mitchell: You mean you had to go to the Signal Corps  
23 office to find out what the dispatch was that was numbered 472,  
24 is that it?

25 General Gerow: Yes, sir. Insofar as I know, sir, no



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

inquiry with regard to that message was sent to General Short. In the light of subsequent events, I feel now that it might have been desirable to send such an inquiry, and had such inquiry been sent it would probably have developed the fact that the Commanding General in Hawaii was not at that time carrying out the directive in the message signed "Marshall".

If that had been done, there would have been an opportunity to correct the situation, but I do not believe that the message could necessarily be interpreted as meaning that sabotage measures only were being taken.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, there was nothing there to suggest that there was anything else but sabotage measures, except the words "liaison with the Navy"?

General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: And what interpretation did you place then, if you know, on the words "liaison with the Navy"?

General Gerow: As I testified, sir, I had assumed that the message was in answer to the G-2 message and it was then routed to a section of War Plans Division. I did not see that message again, so I did not have an opportunity at that time, or did not make any assumption regarding what the phrase "liaison with the Navy" meant. I think my Executive Officer, or the Chief of my Plans group, might possibly have interpreted the message that way, and that is why it was not brought back



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 to me and my attention invited to the fact that it did not  
3 explicitly cover the operation.

(8) 4 Mr. Mitchell: Now if you interpreted this message as an  
5 answer to G-2, or Adams, as a sabotage message, then you were  
6 left in the position of having no report at all from Short  
7 about the main warning message that you sent over Marshall's  
8 signature?

9 General Gerow: That is correct.

10 Mr. Mitchell: To strengthen that position?

11 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Did it occur to you to wonder why Short  
13 did not respond to the main warning message?

14 General Gerow: Well, sir, I was handling a great many  
15 papers at that time and it was the responsibility of the  
16 officers in my Division to check the messages and correspondence  
17 and bring to my attention anything of importance that required  
18 action on my part, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Even if your staff had the responsibility  
20 of following up on these things, the comparison between the  
21 two-lines dispatch from Short and the elaborate report from  
22 MacArthur and Andrews, and the Western Base Command was rather  
23 sharp, was it not, General?

24 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: The message that you helped draft on



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 November 27, number 472, was not a mere transfer of informa-  
3 tion, it was a command, was it not, involving an order or  
4 directive?

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Let me read it again. We all know it.

7 It says:

8 "NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED  
9 TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSI-  
10 BILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK  
11 AND OFFER TO CONTINUE PERIOD JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION  
12 UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT  
13 PERIOD IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED  
14 THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST  
15 OVERT ACT PERIOD THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE  
16 CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION  
17 THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE PERIOD PRIOR TO  
18 HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE  
19 SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM  
20 NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO  
21 AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE  
22 INTENT PERIOD REPORT MEASURES TAKEN PERIOD A SEPARATE  
23 MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G DASH TWO NINTH CORPS AREA  
24 RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN UNITED STATES PERIOD SHOULD  
25 HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN PERIOD  
3 LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION  
4 TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS."

5 Now there is a direct order there, is there not? It  
6 says, "You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and  
7 other measures as you deem necessary."

8 Now did that mean if you did not deem it necessary you  
9 were not going to take any reconnaissance or other measures?

10 General Gerow: No, sir. The intent of that message was  
11 to invite his attention to the necessity of conducting re-  
12 connaissance.

13 Mr. Mitchell: You mean he was supposed to take some  
14 measures, but the extent of them and the nature of them you  
15 left to the discretion of the local Commander, is that it?

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: You had given him an order then and you  
18 got a report that, as you interpret the order, this message  
19 of Short's had been a response, or you thought it was a response  
20 to 472, and it would be a report by Short that he failed to  
21 carry out your instructions, would not it?

22 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Is that why you thought it was a report  
24 about the sabotage messages?

25 General Gerow: Well, it never occurred to me, sir, that



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

General Short would not take some reconnaissance and other defensive measures after the receipt of this message. He was an experienced commander and it never entered my mind that he would not take such action.

LaCharity follows.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I have been following this  
3 testimony very closely, and I would like to ask counsel  
4 at this time if he can, to pin down this one thing: This  
5 message is directed from Fort Shafter to the Chief of  
6 Staff. Short's message is directed to the Chief of Staff.

7 Now, if it had been a reply to the G-2 message, to  
8 whom would the reply to the G-2 message normally be directed.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Will you answer that question, General?

10 You say you thought it might have been a report of  
11 Short 's about the sabotage message. Now, one of those  
12 was Adams' wasn't it; that is, Adjutant General?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: The other was Adams over the signature  
15 of the Army Air Forces man.

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: The third one was signed Miles.

18 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Of G-2.

20 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Now, the Congressman would like to  
22 know, and so would the committee, the reply to any one of  
23 those three, when it was addressed to the Chief of Staff,  
24 wouldn't Short have wired back to the man who sent the  
25 message he was reporting about?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: So that right on the face of it, it  
4 showed that it was a report on your message 472.

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: That is, if you stop to think the  
7 other messages weren't signed "Marshall."

8 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel right  
10 there, because I would like to get this pinned down while  
11 we are going through it, do I understand the witness to  
12 testify now that upon further recollection and consideration  
13 of this message, the reply of General Short to the message  
14 that went to him from Marshall, the fact that the message  
15 is directed to the Chief of Staff is in itself proof that  
16 it was a direct reply to the Marshall message and not a  
17 reply to any message sent by G-2 or anyone else?

18 Mr. Mitchell: He has just stated that. Is that  
19 correct?

20 General Gerow: Yes. In my mind, the message in ques-  
21 tion was a reply to the message from General Marshall.

22 Mr. Mitchell: It is a little more than that. It is  
23 clear that it was, apparently, but I am asking you whether  
24 on the face of the message that ought not to have been clear  
25 to you when you saw it?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2           General Gerow: I didn't notice that fact, sir, when  
3 the message came over my desk.

4           Mr. Mitchell: Assuming that you thought it was not a  
5 reply to your main instruction to take reconnaissance and  
6 other measures, on that theory you never got a report from  
7 Short about your 472 message, although you asked him to  
8 report measures taken; isn't that correct?

9           General Gerow: Yes, sir.

10          Mr. Mitchell: So far as you know there was no follow-  
11 up by you or any member of your staff to elicit from  
12 General Short a more complete report or further information  
13 or any word as to what he had done, no follow-up prior to  
14 December 7?

15          General Gerow: No, sir, there was no follow-up sent  
16 to the best of my knowledge and belief.

17          Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest  
18 that counsel follow what Congressman Keefe had in mind. The  
19 message from General Short was routed to Secretary Stimson's  
20 office also by the Chief of Staff. Whether that would make  
21 any difference as to whether it was a reply to the Miles or  
22 the other message when the Chief of Staff routed it to the  
23 Secretary of War.

24          Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an inquiry.  
25 I understand the anxiety of the distinguished Senator



**Witness Gerow**

h4

1  
2 from Michigan, and I understand the anxiety of the dis-  
3 tinguished Congressman. But there is an order of procedure  
4 here. I have a lot of questions I would like to ask too.

5 I realize they are anxious to get information, but  
6 the rule was to be that counsel would conduct the examina-  
7 tion and then the witness would be turned over to each of  
8 us to dissect his testimony. If we are going to have sugges-  
9 tions, I have four or five to make too.

10 The Chairman: The Chair would like to state that the  
11 rule which we adopted doesn't seem necessarily to preclude  
12 the members of the committee from asking counsel to clear  
13 up a point that he is inquiring about at the time.

14 The rule applied to the examination of the witness by  
15 members of the committee by rotation after the counsel had  
16 concluded.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Within reasonable limits, it doesn't  
18 bother me.

19 Mr. Murphy: I want to say that I agree that the  
20 suggestion of the Senator from Michigan and of the Congressman  
21 are excellent suggestions, in view of the fact that we are  
22 going to have General Marshall here in the morning.

23 The Chairman: Let's go ahead.

24 Senator Ferguson: That was the reason I suggested  
25 counsel asking that question, because General Marshall will



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h5

1  
2 be here in the morning.

3 The Chairman: The Chair has ruled.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I don't want to ignore the  
5 suggestions anyway.

6 I am going to ask the General whether he knows from  
7 from this routing slip, or the notations on it, whether  
8 when it came to him, it had the notation by General Marshall  
9 to send it to the Secretary of War, and whether it had  
10 Mr. Stimson's handwriting, the word in Mr. Stimson's hand-  
11 writing "Noted." Could you tell us about that?

12 General Gerow: I can't recall now, sir, whether it  
13 was on at the time it came to me.

14 Mr. Mitchell: In the ordinary course of procedure,  
15 would it have reached you before it went to the Chief of  
16 Staff? What was the practice with a message like this?  
17 Would it go directly to the Chief of Staff and then to you?

18 General Gerow: I would say that in this particular case  
19 it would go to the Chief of Staff first. Messages did come  
20 both ways. There were messages coming to me that I would  
21 send up to the Chief of Staff. This, I believe would have  
22 gone to the Chief of Staff first.

23 I think the way the initials are shown on there, we  
24 could presume that it had gone through that channel.

25 Mr. Mitchell: So your inference is that it went to



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h6

1  
2 General Marshal first, when to the Secretary of War next,  
3 and then came down to you; is that right?

4 General Gerow: I would presume that, yes, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: So that at that stage of the game,  
6 you knew that the report had gone directly to General  
7 Marshall, being in answer to a message that had gone out  
8 over his signature?

9 General Gerow: I didn't understand.

10 Mr. Mitchell: You knew from the face of it that it  
11 had gone, the Short report, had come first to General  
12 Marshall, because it was an answer to the message sent over  
13 General Marshall's signature.

14 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: If General Marshall signed a telegram  
16 and his name was appended to it, and the answer came in,  
17 it was the practice to send it to him first, was it, or did  
18 it come to you first?

19 General Gerow: I believe the practice would be it  
20 would go to him first, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Did you know at the time you saw General  
22 Short's report that he had established locally what he  
23 called Alert No. 1, which said "Look out for sabotage with  
24 no threat from without"? Did you know about that?

25 I think maybe I asked you that this morning. Did I?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 General Gerow: No, sir, you didn't ask me that.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I did ask you if you had prior to  
4 December 7 seen the local order of General Short establish-  
5 ing what he called Alert No. 1, and you said it didn't  
6 come in until the following year sometime.

7 General Gerow: That is correct. It came in sometime,  
8 I think, in March, 1942, sir.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Would you have had any way of knowing  
10 what his Alert No. 1 was, if you didn't have that order  
11 before you?

12 General Gerow: No, sir, I would not have known what  
13 Alert No. 1 was.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember after the Short report  
15 was received that you had any discussion with anybody, with  
16 General Marshall or anybody in the War Plans Division about  
17 the Short report, or the question of its sufficiency, or the  
18 question of whether it ought to be supplemented, or a further  
19 report should be asked for?

20 General Gerow: I do not recall any such discussion,  
21 sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, I am going to read to  
23 you a paragraph in Secretary Stimson's report on the Pearl  
24 Harbor incident, in which he says this:

25 "Again, as I have pointed out, General Short, in

h7



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h8

1  
2 response to a message which had been sent out containing  
3 a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report  
4 of actions, had sent a message to the War Department which  
5 was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the  
6 alert against sabotage only, and not on the alert against  
7 an air raid or other hostile action.

8 "While this interpretation was not necessarily to be  
9 had from the wording of his message, nevertheless, a keener  
10 sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the  
11 messages exchanged, would have invited further inquiry by  
12 the War Plans Division of General Short and his failure to  
13 go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered.

14 "The Chief of this division and certain of his subordi-  
15 nates knew that a report of the measures taken by General  
16 Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought  
17 to the attention of the Chief of the division. A clear and  
18 satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not  
19 done, and a more efficient functioning of the division would  
20 have demanded that careful inquiry as to the meaning of  
21 General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity  
22 permitted."

23 Do you think that is a fair statement of the situation?

24 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I do, and if there was any  
25 responsibility to be attached to the War Department for any



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h9

1  
2 responsibility to be attached to the War Department for  
3 any failure to send an inquiry to General Short, the respon-  
4 sibility must rest on War Plans Division, and I accept that  
5 responsibility as Chief of War Plans Division.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Well, we find that the Short report  
7 and an opportunity to compare it with the MacArthur report  
8 went up higher than you. It went to the Chief of Staff,  
9 the Secretary of War. It wasn't their function to follow  
10 up things like this?

11 General Gerow: No, sir. I was a staff adviser to  
12 the Chief of Staff, and I had a group of 48 officers to  
13 assist me. It was my responsibility to see that those  
14 messages were checked, and if an inquiry was necessary,  
15 the War Plans Division should have drafted such an inquiry  
16 and presented it to the Chief of Staff for approval.

17 As I said, I was chief of that division, and it was  
18 my responsibility.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, I am wondering whether  
20 the committee would be willing to sit a little longer tonight.

21 I have some other matters that we ought to go into  
22 before General Marshall is called.

23 The Chairman: The Senate is not in session. It has  
24 already adjourned for the day. Is it agreeable to the  
25 committee to sit a little while longer?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h10

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Without objection that will be done.

Senator George: Let me ask how long.

The Chairman: About how long, Senator George asks.

Mr. Mitchell: It is hard for me to estimate. I will keep going until you think I ought to stop.

The Chairman: All right.

The Vice Chairman: Might I offer one brief suggestion to counsel. General Marshall initialed this top paper, which is the MacArthur message. I think it would be helpful to find out whether this Short message was also attached to that and whether it would be reasonable to assume that those initials of General Marshall applied to both of these.

Mr. Mitchell: I have done all I can with the General about that. Those two were brought in together. The two documents were attached, and he saw them both together.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

Mr. Murphy: May I suggest that General Marshall has already testified on his impressions on that very thing and will do so tomorrow.

The Chairman: Let's get going and get to him.

Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, I show you four intercepted Japanese messages concerning military installations and ship movements, that I found at pages 12, 13, 14, and 15. in Exhibit 2, which is entitled "Japanese Messages Con-



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

cerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, Etc."

We turn first to the one on page 12. You have examined that message, have you not?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: That is the message from Toyko to Honolulu dated September 24, 1941, and translated October 9, which directs the spies, or somebody in Honolulu, Jap spies to divide the harbor area, the Pearl Harbor waters, into five different areas, and calls for specific information not merely as to ship movements, but as to location of the vessels specifically in each one of those areas.

Then on page 13 is a message from Honolulu to Washington. The message states:

"The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels."

This is dated September 29, translated October 10.

It is suggested repair dock in Navy Yard will be called KS.

Navy Dock in the Navy Yard, KT.

Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island, FV.

And the east and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.

Then there is one in the same series on page 14 which is a report from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18,



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h12

1  
2 translated December 6. That is rather late, but I will  
3 refer to it. It is a report of battleships and other  
4 vessels in specified areas.

5 Finally, there is one on page 15, Tokyo to Honolulu,  
6 November 18, translated December 5, and one dated November  
7 29, translated December 5, which reads;

8 "We have been receiving reports from you on ship move-  
9 ments but in future will you also report even when there  
10 are no movements."

11 I have called your attention to those messages before,  
12 have I not, and their possible significance?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Did they come to your attention at or  
15 about the time they were translated?

16 General Gerow: I believe they did, sir. Most of  
17 those important intercepted messages were brought to my  
18 attention, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Have you any personal recollection of  
20 their having been received by you?

21 General Gerow: Not of these particular messages, no,  
22 sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Would there be any record in the War  
24 Department by which it could be told whether they were shown  
25 to you or not?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h13

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1  
2 General Gerow; No, sir. These messages were brought  
3 to me in a locked dispatch case by an officer. He unlocked  
4 the dispatch case and stood there while I read the messages.  
5 Sometimes there would only be one message, and other times  
6 ten or fifteen. I kept no record and I believe he kept  
7 none of the ones I actually saw.

8 Mr. Mitchell: And after you saw them, the officer  
9 would go out with the messages?

10 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: They were not left with you for evalua-  
12 tion?

13 General Gerow: No, sir, they were not.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Unless something was shown you that was  
15 so apparent that you saw it instantly, and made an evaluation  
16 of it, you wouldn't do any evaluation work on it, would you?

17 General Gerow: No, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Would you have been allowed to keep  
19 these dispatches in your possession for some time for  
20 the purpose of studying them if you wanted to?

21 General Gerow: No, sir. Under the instructions I  
22 had received, they were to be returned immediately to the  
23 officer presenting them to me.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Where would they go for evaluation?

25 General Gerow: G-2, sir.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h14

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: And I suppose you don't know, not being  
3 in the Signal Corps, what the explanation may be for the  
4 delay between the actual interception of some of these  
5 Japanese messages and the time when they were actually  
6 translated?

7 General Gerow: No, sir. That was a Signal Corps  
8 responsibility, and I never had occasion to inquire into it.  
9 I did at one time ask a Signal Corps officer how it was  
10 done and he told me that he had positive orders not to  
11 divulge that except on order of the Chief of Staff.

12 Mr. Mitchell: You don't mean as to the delay?

13 General Gerow: No, sir, not the delay.

14 Mr. Mitchell: You never noticed that?

15 General Gerow: No, sir.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Suppose a message came in and was shown  
17 to you that was of a character that when evaluated would  
18 call for action by War Plans Division, not merely transmis-  
19 sion of warning, or information, but a directive, such as  
20 the message you sent to General Short on November 27. As  
21 I understand it, the War Plans only interfered in these  
22 messages when there was an operational directive involved?  
23 Is that right?

24 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Do you depend on G-2 for evaluation of

c4

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h15

1  
2 messages intercepted which might lead to directional  
3 orders by you?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I depended on G-2 for  
5 the evaluation of all enemy intelligence.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Why were they shown to you?

7 General Gerow: For information, sir, and to keep me  
8 abreast of the general situation.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Well, is there any doubt in your mind  
10 about the respective responsibilities of G-2 and the War  
11 Plans Division for evaluating messages about the military  
12 installation?

13 General Gerow: There is no question in my mind at all  
14 sir. That is a responsibility of G-2.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Well, to put it bluntly, suppose one  
16 of these messages intercepted from the Japanese was brought  
17 in to your office in a pouch and that message had stated  
18 boldly "Be all ready on December 7. That is the date we  
19 are going to attack." Would you have any responsibility to  
20 do anything with that message?

21 General Gerow: I certainly would have had, yes, sir.

22 I would have taken it and prepared at once the warning  
23 message for the approval of the Chief of Staff and submitted  
24 it to him as quickly as possible.

25 Mr. Mitchell: That would be a message directing him



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h16

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

to take measures to meet the attack?

General Gerow: Yes, sir. That would have been an operational message.

Mr. Mitchell: So, if the evaluation of the message was obvious then you were supposed to make an evaluation of it.

General Gerow: Yes, sir. If the message obviously indicated operations were necessary on the part of our Army forces, I would take action, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: The question was asked General Miles:

"Then, in other words, while you weren't as a matter of fact or procedure sending the text of the messages or the gist of them or a summary of them to the theatres, it was, even in the face of these security considerations, always open to the Chief of Staff to send specific instructions or directions to the Commander at Hawaii or the Philippines, or elsewhere, based on the information which had been obtained from intercepts?"

"General Miles; That is true, and at this point I think I should like to go further and point out that from early August, I think the 5 of August, 1941, we discontinued, by direction of the Chief of Staff, presenting magic in evaluated form. So the Chief of Staff and the Chief of War Plans Division, Secretary of War, were from then on



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 doing their own evaluating of the raw material that we  
3 were presenting to them in the form of magic."

4 Do you remember anything about that?

5 General Gerow: I am sure I was never informed that  
6 G-2 had discontinued evaluating magic.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Do you know whether there was any  
8 direction of the Chief of Staff that you should make your  
9 own evaluations?

10 General Gerow: I do not. There was no such direction  
11 issued to me, sir.

12 Mr. Mitchell: I would like to have you refer to your  
13 memorandum of November 3 to the Chief of Staff on the Far  
14 Eastern situation, Exhibit 16. It is one of the documents  
15 in Exhibit 16. Have you that before you?

16 General Gerow: I have it, yes, sir. That is the  
17 memorandum of November 3, sir.

18 The Chairman: The Chair asks that the committee be  
19 in order. There is a good deal of confusion -- conversation.

20 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, before we get into another  
21 subject, it is my understanding that General Miles' testi-  
22 mony was that he was ordered in August to pass on the raw  
23 material, but there was nothing in General Miles testimony,  
24 as I understand, that he was to discontinue acting as G-2 in  
25 evaluating in addition to supplying the raw material.

h17



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h18

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: I guess you are right, because the  
3 next question on this page, that I could have read to  
4 the General, was this:

5 "Mr. Gesell: You mean that from August on G-2 had  
6 no responsibility to evaluate the intercepted material?

7 "General Miles: No, sir, I do not mean that, but I,  
8 do mean that our responsibility in that respect was some-  
9 what lessened by the direction of the Chief of Staff that  
10 he wanted not only the evaluation of the Military Intelli-  
11 gence Division, but he wanted to see the material itself,  
12 the raw material itself, presented to him."

13 That seems to clear the matter up, doesn't it?

14 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: From that time did you still continue  
16 to get evaluations from G-2?

17 General Gerow: I received from G-2 estimates.

18 Mr. Mitchell: And you had also the opportunity, under  
19 this pouch delivery system and inspection, a chance to at  
20 least read over the raw material, did you?

21 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Your memorandum of the 3rd of November,  
23 1941 to the Chief of Staff, part of Exhibit 16, speaks of  
24 a conference held at the State Department on the morning of  
25 November 1st. Do you want to add anything to the incident

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

c5



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h19

1  
2 that isn't contained in your memorandum?

3 General Gerow: I don't believe there is anything I  
4 can add at this time from memory, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: In that memorandum you speak of the  
6 policy derived in the American-British Staff conferences.  
7 Does that include the Singapore conference, preliminary  
8 conference -- on page 2 of the memorandum?

9 General Gerow: That would apply to both the ABC con-  
10 ference held in Washington, and the Singapore conferences  
11 as well.

12 Mr. Mitchell: You speak there of the fact that one  
13 of the recommendations is that the movement of counteraction  
14 against Japan should be considered only in case of any of  
15 the following actions by Japan, and one of those is the  
16 movement of Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to  
17 the west of 100 degrees east or south of 10 degrees north,  
18 meaning there a recommendation that had been made by the  
19 Singapore conference?

20 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: I will offer now, Mr. Chairman, as  
22 Exhibit 47, some supplementary documents that are underlying  
23 documents for this memorandum or report of General Gerow  
24 on November 3, which is contained in Exhibit 16.

25 This document I am now offering contains a telegram



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h20

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1  
2 from Chungking to the Secretary of State in Washington,  
3 signed by Mr. Gauss. I think he was the State Department  
4 man out there. Dated November 3. Another one of the same  
5 date from Chungking to Washington, signed by Chiang Kai-Shek

6 The Chairman: Are they both included in Exhibit 47?

7 Mr. Mitchell: They are both included.

8 There is also another one in Exhibit 47. This is  
9 Navy Department, office of the Chief of Naval Operations,  
10 Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, memorandum for  
11 the Director, dated November 1, 1941, signed by R. A. Boone  
12 for A. H. McCollum.

13 And a telegram from Alusna. That means the Chungking  
14 naval attache.

15 The Chairman: The documents will be filed as Exhibit  
16 No. 47.

17 (The document referred to was  
18 marked Exhibit No. 47.)

19 Mr. Mitchell: I will not stop to read them now.

20 General Gerow, you remember that there is in the record  
21 what we call a 14-part message and a 1 p.m. message, which  
22 was the Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to their  
23 ambassadors in Washington which came in on the 6th and 7th  
24 of December, 1941.

25 General Gerow: Yes, sir.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h21

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Mr. Mitchell: We offered this morning in evidence as Exhibit 41, a summary of the movements of that message and the date of its interception, and when it was received in Washington, and when it was decoded and so on, and so far as the documentary proof shows, eliminating matters that have to be established by witnesses -- I am just reminding you what the message was so that I can ask you questions about it.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Did you have anything to do with that message or know if its receipt on the 6th or any part of it?

General Gerow: No, sir. I did not know of the existence of the message, and I did not see it on the 6th of December. I understand there has been some testimony in previous investigations to the effect that it was presented to the War Plans Division. It was never presented to the War Plans Division on the 6th of December.

Mr. Mitchell: The message, according to this record, which we will assume is correct for the present, 13 parts of it, if I may remind you, consisted of a long discussion by the Japanese about their diplomatic position and about ours.

The 14th part of that 14-part message was the clause



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h22

1  
2 that said they were through, that they thought negotiations  
3 were no longer necessary.

4 The record here shows that that 14th part, the breaking  
5 off. was translated at least after midnight December 6,  
6 because it bears the translation date of December 7. Then  
7 there followed what we call a 1 p.m. message, which was  
8 a supplementary message directing the ambassadors at  
9 Washington to present that final message to the Secretary  
10 of State at 1 p.m., on Sunday, December 7.

11 That, according to this record, was translated on  
12 the 7th, which was sometime after midnight.

13 Does that refresh your recollection any on it at all  
14 as to the message, that is, as to any of the incidents  
15 connected with it?

Shf  
fls

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



S hefner  
fls LaChar  
4:15PM  
351

2743

Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2           General Gerow: Well, the first time the fourteen point  
3 message or the one P.M. message was in the office of the Chief  
4 of Staff on the morning of December the 7th was about 11:30  
5 o'clock.

6           Mr. Mitchell: Can you remember what you were doing on  
7 the evening of December the 6th?

8           General Gerow: No, sir, I cannot recall at this time.

9           Mr. Mitchell: Would you have any record? Do you keep  
10 a diary?

11           General Gerow: No, sir.

12           Senator Lucas: That is a great contribution to this  
13 cause.

14           Mr. Mitchell: You cannot recall what you were doing.  
15 You had a good many things since December 7th to engage you,  
16 including such little things as the Omaha Beach attack,  
17 haven't you?

18           General Gerow: Yes, sir.

19           Mr. Mitchell: And you tried to cast your memory back to  
20 those events as far as you could?

21           General Gerow: Yes, sir, and I cannot recall what I  
22 was doing.

23           Mr. Mitchell: What you were doing on the night of De-  
24 cember 6th?

25           General Gerow: What I was doing on the night of De-



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 cember 6th, no, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: You do not remember whether you were at  
4 your office or at your quarters or what not?

5 General Gerow: No, sir, I cannot recall. If there was  
6 a large volume of work I probably worked down at the office  
7 until six or seven or eight o'clock. If there was not I  
8 probably was home. I do not recall being out to dinner on  
9 that particular evening.

10 Mr. Mitchell: But you are confident that you never  
11 saw that fourteen part message, or any part of it, or the one  
12 P.M. message until you got into General Marshall's office  
13 around 11:30 on the morning of the 7th?

14 General Gerow: I am positive, yes, sir, of that fact.

15 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I suggest one thing? As  
16 I understand it he did not see the thirteen parts either.

17 Mr. Mitchell: What is it?

18 Mr. Murphy: As I understand it his testimony is that  
19 he did not see any part of the fourteen parts, either one.

20 Mr. Mitchell: That is what he said.

21 The Chairman: That is what he says now.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Have you seen lately this memorandum  
23 from you that is already in exhibit 39 in evidence, dated  
24 December 15, 1941, called a "Memorandum for Record" and  
25 signed by you, recording the events of the morning of De-



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 cember 7th? Have you examined that lately?

3 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I read it recently, sir.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Suppose you take a look at it.

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: That memorandum states that about De-  
7 cember -- I suppose that this document is a more reliable re-  
8 cord of what had occurred because it was made December 15,  
9 1941 than your present recollection would be?

10 General Gerow: It will be, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: You will have to depend on this, will you  
12 not?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: That states that:

15 "About 11:30 A.M. on Sunday, December 7, 1941,  
16 General Marshall called me to his office."

17 That was the occasion for your going to his office?

18 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Does that mean that you were in your of-  
20 fice?

21 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: And called to his. (Reading)

23 "General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present.  
24 General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese  
25 Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 State Department at 1 P.M., December 7, 1941. He felt  
3 that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the  
4 note at an exact hour and time might have great signi-  
5 ficance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to  
6 be sent at once to CG, U.S. Army Forces in Far East;  
7 CG Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department;  
8 and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall  
9 and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was  
10 directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to  
11 the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the  
12 most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a  
13 few minutes and informed General Marshall that the mes-  
14 sage had been turned over to the Message Center and would  
15 reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pen-  
16 cilled draft was typed later during the day and formal-  
17 ly made of record."

18 Do you remember anything more about that meeting in  
19 General Marshall's office on the morning of December 7, 1941  
20 than is stated here in this memo?

21 General Gerow: No, sir, I do not.

22 Mr. Mitchell: This message was one which was obviously  
23 important, especially when it got down to part fourteen and  
24 the one P.M. part of it. Is that a message which in the or-  
25 dinary course of practice in the War Department somebody with



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 a pouch would probably have brought it into your office in  
3 the Department?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Had that been done prior to your going  
6 to General Marshall's office?

7 General Gerow: No, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Did you ever make any inquiry as to why  
9 it had not been delivered to your office before 11:30, when  
10 it had been translated at an earlier hour?

11 General Gerow: No, sir, I did not.

12 Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, have you a memorandum of  
13 November 17, 1941 that you presented to General Marshall re-  
14 garding efforts of the Army and Navy to arrange a unity of  
15 command in Hawaii and at other points?

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have here a copy of such a  
17 memorandum, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: What is the date of that, Mr. Mitchell?

19 Mr. Mitchell: This is November 17, 1941.

20 Your memorandum to the Chief of Staff, dated November  
21 17, 1941, "Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in  
22 Coastal Frontiers", is a short one and a longer one on the  
23 same date.

24 Were they both presented at the same time? I have two  
25 memoranda for the Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941,



Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 signed by you, both of which relate to the method of coordin-  
3 ation of command in coastal frontiers. Have you both of  
4 them before you?

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I have both copies.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Both documents?

7 General Gerow: Both documents, yes, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: I would like to number as exhibit 48 and  
9 now offer in evidence three documents, all in one exhibit:  
10 November 17, 1941, memorandum from General Gerow to the Chief  
11 of Staff about the method of coordination of command in  
12 Coastal Frontiers; another one memorandum of the same date on  
13 the same subject from General Gerow; and a letter which clears  
14 up the story, dated December 20, 1941, "Personal and Confi-  
15 dential", addressed to "My dear Emmons." That is General  
16 Emmons who succeeded to the command of the Hawaiian Depart-  
17 ment about that time?

18 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: This memo or letter is signed by "G. C.  
20 Marshall."

21 Senator Lucas: Was this memorandum dated December 20th  
22 issued after the Pearl Harbor attack?

23 Mr. Mitchell: No, that is November 17th.

24 Senator Lucas: Oh, I see, November 17th.

25 Mr. Mitchell: The letter of General Marshall directed



1 Witness Gerow: Questions by Mr. Mitchell  
2 to General Emmons and dated December 20, 1941 was after the  
3 attack on Pearl Harbor. That letter was directed to General  
4 Emmons, who succeeded General Short. The two letters of  
5 General Gerow are dated November 17th.

6 Senator Lucas: I see.

7 Mr. Mitchell: They both relate to coordination of com-  
8 mands in Coastal Frontiers and, among other things, do they  
9 include Hawaii?

10 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: Will you tell in your own way, General,  
12 just how --

13 The Chairman: Those documents will be filed under the  
14 title of exhibit 48.

15 (THE DOCUMENTS ABOVE REFERRED TO WERE MARKED  
16 EXHIBIT NO. 48)

17 Mr. Mitchell: Will you just state in your own language  
18 how this subject happened to come up for consideration and  
19 who considered it and what the proposal was?

20 General Gerow: I just saw these papers yesterday, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: I see. Would you rather have me read  
22 them first?

23 General Gerow: I can read them, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Well, read them into the record. They  
25 are somewhat important.



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Mitchell: And I think the committee would like to  
4 hear them. Read the short ones first.

5 General Gerow: The short one of November 17th first.

6 Mr. Mitchell: That is the memorandum from you to the  
7 Chief of Staff?

8 General Gerow: Yes, sir. (Reading)

9 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

10 Subject: Method of Coordination of Command  
11 in Coastal Frontiers.

12 "1. The attached Joint Board case has been before  
13 the Joint Planning Committee since last February. At a  
14 recent meeting of The Joint Board, Admiral Stark sug-  
15 gested that the Army take action on the Navy proposal.

16 "2. The case is divisible into two main subjects--  
17 Changes in Coastal Frontiers and the assignment of Com-  
18 mand in the Caribbean, Panama, Hawaii and Philippine  
19 Coastal Frontiers. The Army and Navy sections of The  
20 Joint Planning Committee have reached an agreement with  
21 regard to changes in Coastal Frontiers. They disagree,  
22 however, as to the service that should exercise Unity of  
23 Command in the Coastal Frontiers.

24 "3. The proposals of the Army and Navy Sections on  
25 command are outlined in the attached Memorandum to you.



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 The Memorandum also embodies my views on the question of  
3 unity command in the Caribbean Area, Hawaii, and the  
4 Philippines.

5 "4. If the Joint Board desires definite action on  
6 this case, I recommend that you approve the attached  
7 Memorandum. I believe the Navy will agree with the  
8 solution proposed, which simply means that we will con-  
9 tinue to operate by mutual cooperation. If you do not  
10 wish to raise the question of command at this time I  
11 can hold the case in suspense for the time being.

12 (Signed) L. T. GEROW

13 Brigadier General,

14 Acting Assistant Chief of Staff."

15 The second and longer memorandum reads as follows:

16 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

17 Subject: Method of Coordination of Command  
18 in Coastal Frontiers.

19 "I. Discussion.

20 "1. Joint Board case (J.B. No. 350, Serial 678)  
21 prescribing coordination of command is now before the  
22 Joint Planning Committee.

23 "2. The Navy section proposes changes in command  
24 relations in the following coastal frontiers:

25 "a. Caribbean.



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 "Coordination by the method of unity of command,  
3 command being vested in the Commandant of the 10th Naval  
4 District.

5 "b. Panama.

6 "Coordination by unity of command, command being  
7 vested in the Commanding General, Panama Canal Depart-  
8 ment except when major naval forces are based in the  
9 frontier for general strategic naval operations in either  
10 the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific Ocean. In this contin-  
11 gency command would be vested in the Commandant of the  
12 15th Naval District.

13 "c. Hawaii.

14 "Coordination by unity of command as follows:

15 "(1) Command vested in Commanding General, Hawaiian  
16 Department when the most important strategic problem is  
17 one of territorial defense of the Hawaiian Islands and  
18 when major naval forces have been withdrawn and not based  
19 in the frontier for general strategic naval operations  
20 either in the vicinity or at a distance.

21 "(2) Command vested in the Commandant of the 14th  
22 Naval District when major naval forces are based in the  
23 frontier for general strategic naval operations either  
24 in the vicinity or at a distance.

25 "3. The Army section proposes the following, appli-



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 cable to all coastal frontiers:

3 "a. Unity of command over forces assigned to the  
4 defense of a coastal frontier is vested in the Army, ex-  
5 cept when the United States Atlantic or Pacific Fleet  
6 or the major portion thereof is operating against com-  
7 parable hostile forces within the radius of possible  
8 support by Army aviation operating from bases within  
9 the coastal frontier. In the excepted case, unity of  
10 command is vested in the Navy.

11 "b. In a specific operation, unity of command in  
12 coastal frontiers may be transferred from the Army to  
13 the Navy and vice versa, when the senior Army and Navy  
14 commanders concerned agree that such change is necessary  
15 and further agree as to the service that shall exercise  
16 such command.

17 "c. Unity of command does not authorize the ser-  
18 vice in which it is vested to assign missions that will  
19 require the forces of the other service to operate from  
20 bases outside the coastal frontier.

21 "4. The Army and Navy sections of the Joint Planning  
22 Committee have been unable to reach an agreement on a  
23 compromise solution of the problem of unity of command.  
24 The Army section does not believe that unity of command  
25 in coastal frontiers is essential. It is believed that



1 Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 the Navy section will agree to a continuation of coordin-  
3 ation by mutual cooperation.

4 "5. The vesting in a single individual of full re-  
5 sponsibility for a military operation is a generally  
6 accepted principle for the accomplishment of effective  
7 military action. In theory at least, no amount of per-  
8 sonal willingness to cooperate can eliminate the objec-  
9 tions inherent in the committee system of control of  
10 military forces. The most frequently cited recent ex-  
11 ample of the effect of such divided responsibility is  
12 that of failure of the defense of Crete as contrasted  
13 with the successful attack on that island in which the  
14 attacking force presumably was commanded by a single in-  
15 dividual.

16 "6. Unity of command is the accepted method of co-  
17 ordination within the Army and within the Navy, them-  
18 selves. However, the many practical difficulties en-  
19 countered in the application of that principle as applied  
20 to joint operations of the Army and Navy have usually led  
21 to the adoption of the method of coordination by mutual  
22 cooperation except when specific tasks are planned.

23 "7. The difficulty of determining the service in  
24 which unity of command should vest in the defense of a  
25 coastal frontier lies in the inability to determine in



Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 advance when hostilities will begin and the nature and  
3 the extent of the operations. For that reason it is  
4 difficult to foresee which service will play the major  
5 part in the defense and will have primary interest. The  
6 major responsibility may well pass from one service to  
7 the other during defensive operations. On the other  
8 hand, overseas landing expeditions or land operations re-  
9 quiring support from Naval forces, such as those in  
10 Libya, present problems in which the service having pre-  
11 ponderance of responsibility can readily be determined.  
12 The time such an operation should begin, as well as ter-  
13minate, and its nature and extent can be forecast and the  
14 service having the preponderance of responsibility  
15 definitely agreed upon between the two services, thereby  
16 indicating the service in which unity of command should  
17 vest. In such operations the preponderance of respon-  
18 sibility will not fluctuate from one service to the other  
19 as might be the case in defense of coastal frontiers.

20 "8. A fact frequently lost sight of in considera-  
21 tion of the method of coordination under the principle  
22 of mutual cooperation is that, although the major opera-  
23 tion is being conducted under that principle, joint opera-  
24 tions subordinate thereto may still be conducted under  
25 the principle of unity of command if so agreed to by the



Witness Gerow:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Army and Navy commanders concerned. This method is particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat characteristics, such as the air forces of the two services.

"II. Action recommended.

"That coordination of joint operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is approved, such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the Joint Planning Committee."

Shef--  
Shack  
fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Mitchell: Now that report states the fact that the Army and Navy representatives on the Joint Planning Committee were in direct disagreement about this question of unity of command in Hawaii and other coastal frontiers?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: And your statement there is that the Army does not think the unity of command is essential. Was the Army making any effort to secure unity of command at that time?

General Gerow: I think that statement means essential under the conditions which we had at that time. I think the only way you can have effective unity of command is for the tops of the services to say, "So and so is in command, and he is in command from now on." You cannot vary that command from day to day depending on what the operation is. One man must be responsible for preparing that place for operation, and he must be responsible for commanding it after he has prepared it.

Mr. Mitchell: This report of yours would indicate that the people in that conference of the Planning Board wanted a scheme by which that command would shift back and forth from the Army to the Navy and from the Navy to the Army depending on the nature of attack or defense?

General Gerow: That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell: You did not believe in that?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

General Gerow: No, sir.

2

3

Mr. Mitchell: The result was, because of these differences between the Army and Navy you came in and recommended the only thing you can do is to get mutual cooperation?

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Mitchell: That somebody at the top had to knock their heads together and tell them what to do?

General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: You remember that in the local plans -- I call them "plans" but it may not be the right word -- arranged between General Short and Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor there was a provision there that they had agreed, if they did agree to it, there would be unity of command if the two got together and fixed on one of them for the Commandant, do you remember that provision?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, they do have authority, the commanders on the ground out there, to agree to such unity of command and who would exercise it.

Mr. Mitchell: But you had no information on that, as to



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 whatever was attempted by the Commander prior to December 7?

3 General Gerow: I have no information that such an agree-  
4 ment was entered into.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Now I will read this letter from General  
6 Marshall to General Emmons on December 20, 1941:

7 "My dear Emmons:

8 "Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a  
9 few days ago assigning unity of command to the Navy in  
10 Hawaii. At the same time unity of command was assigned  
11 to the Army in Panama.

12 "For your confidential information, this action was  
13 taken in the following circumstances: In the first  
14 place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the  
15 Navy were determined that there should be no question  
16 of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the  
17 efforts I have been making for more than a year to  
18 secure unity of command in various critical regions  
19 had been unavailing. All sorts of Naval details, such  
20 as the operations of ships and submarines, the co-  
21 ordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives,  
22 and similar matters had been raised in objection to  
23 Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say  
24 at the same time that some of the Army staff brought  
25 up somewhat similar objections to Naval control. Both



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until  
3 this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed,  
4 at least under peacetime conditions, almost insur-  
5 mountable. However, the two decisions I have just  
6 referred to have been made and further ones are in  
7 process of being made, all of which I feel will add  
8 immeasurably to our security, whatever the local  
9 embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely  
10 stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our  
11 relations with Allies.

12 "I am giving you this information in order that  
13 you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore,  
14 be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work  
15 with Nimitz in complete understanding.

16 "Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be  
17 adjusted locally, should be brought to our attention  
18 here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself.  
19 These days are too perilous for personal feelings in  
20 any way to affect efficiency.

21 "This is a very hasty note, but I want General  
22 McCoy to take it off with him this morning.

23 "You have my complete confidence and I will do  
24 everything possible to support you.  
25



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

"Faithfully yours,

"(Sgt) G. C. Marshall

"General Delos C. Emmons,

"Commanding Hawaiian Department

"Honolulu, T. H."

Now, if the committee please, I have not finished entirely with General Gerow, but I feel I have finished everything that I can do tonight which will help in the Marshall examination.

The Chairman: Under those conditions we will recess until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow.

General Gerow, you will come on later after General Marshall.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed until 10:00 o'clock a.m., Thursday, December 6, 1945.)

- - - - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.