

Doc. 2502 Evid.

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(16)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

Wt 1123

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東洋
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拔
萃
千九百四十六年(昭和二十一年)二月十三日
RETURN TO ROOM 361

問 千九百四十一年(昭和十六年)ニ於テ何日最初

ノ御前會議ガ開カレシカ。

答 其レハ七月デアツタト思ヒマス。私ハ正確ニハ

覺エテ居リマセン。

問 千九百四十一年(昭和十六年)七月ノ御前會議

ハ如何ナル根本的理由ニ依ルカ。

答 根本的理由ハ南部印度支那ニ軍隊ヲ派遣センガ

爲メデアツタト思ヒマス。

問 此ノ問題ニ關シ誰ノ計畫ガ考慮サレシカ。

答 私ハ正確ニハ記憶シテ居リマセンガ然シ性質上

多分陸軍大臣ノ案デアツタト思ヒマス。御前會

議ノ前ニ連絡會議ガアリマシテ其所デ大体問題

ハ解決サレテ居リマシタ。此ノ會議ニハ總理大

臣、關係各大臣及ビ參謀總長並ニ軍令部總長ガ

出席致シマシタ。

問 關係大臣ハ誰々ナリシヤ、

答 私ハ明確ニハ覺ヘテ居リマセンガ、首相、外務

大臣、陸海軍大臣ガ含まレテ居リマシタ。企畫

院總裁ガ出席セシカ否カハ確信ガアリマセン、

參謀總長及ビ軍令部總長モ亦出席致シマシタ。

其レガ連絡會議デアリマス。

問 印度支那ノ安定ニ付キ如何ナル問題ガ千九百四
十一年（昭和十六年）七月ニ御前會議ヲ招集ス
ル必要ヲ生ゼシカ

答 當時支那事變ガ進行中デアリ日本ハ其ヲ成功裡
ニ終ラント凡ユル勢力ヲ拂ツテ居リマシタ。
南方ニ於ケル如何ナル不穩ナル地域ト雖事變ノ
解決ニ好マシカラザル影響ヲ與ヘル恐レガアリ
マシタ。加フルニ東亞ノ安定ヲ維持セントイフ
コトハ此ノ事件ヨリヅツト長キ以前ヨリノ日本
人ノ理想デアリマシタ。

第三ノ理由ハ若シ佛印ニ於ケル狀勢ガ不安デア
ルナラバ佛印カラ輸入サレル食糧、主トシテ米
ガ得ラレナクナルト云フ事デアリマス。是等ノ
食糧品ハ日本ニ取り必要缺クベカラザルモノデ
アリマス。

問 佛印ガ支那事變ニ關聯シテ軍事上有要デアルダ
ロウト云フ事ハ陸軍大臣トシテノ貴君ニ依リ考
ヘラレタ事デアリシヤ。

答 勿論私ガソウ考ヘマシタ。勿論軍事上ノ見地カ
ラ北部佛印ニ關スル限リ實際上關係ガアリマス。
佛印ヨリ北ニ向ケテノ供給路ハ中華人ニ取り大
ナル援助デアリマシタ。加フルニ軍事上ノ見地
地カラ緬甸「ルート」ヲ遮斷スル爲メニ北部佛

問

印ニ飛行基地ヲ建設スル事ヲ欲シマシタ。
然シ歐洲ニ於ケル狀勢ノ結果トシテ佛蘭西ノ勢
力ガ劣ヘタ爲メニ安定維持ノ必要上單ニ北部佛印
ノミナラズ中部及南部ニモ軍隊ヲ駐屯セシムル
必要ガ生ジマシタ。

答

其等、軍隊ハ今述べタ國々ニ對シ開戦ノ場合之
ヲ攻撃スルニ大ニ役ニ立ツタノデセウ。
是ハ好ク了解シテ貰ハナケレバ非常ニ重大ナル
結果ニナル問題デアリマス。千九百四十一年（
昭和十六年）十二月一日開戦ニ決定シタ後初メ
テ攻撃的軍事行動ガ行ハレマシタ。即チ、軍事
行動ノ性質ガ改變サレ攻撃的トナリマシタ。然
シ其レ迄ハ軍事行動ノ性質ハ防禦的デアリマシ
タ。

「佛印ニ於ケル軍隊ノ駐屯ニ關シ」

EX 1123

Doc. No. 2502A

Page 1

Extract from

Interrogation of Hideki TOJO
13 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #57, pp. 5.

"Q. When was the first Imperial Conference called in 1941?

"A. It was in July, I believe. I do not remember definitely.

"Q. What was the basic reason for the Imperial Conference of July 1941?

"A. I think that the basic reason was the problem of dispatching troops to south Indo-China.

"Q. Whose plan was considered in reference to this problem?

"A. I don't remember definitely, but essentially I think it was probably the War Minister's plan. Before the Imperial Conference, there had been a Liaison Conference which had practically settled the matter. This was attended by the Prime Minister, the Ministers involved and the Chiefs of Staff.

"Q. What Ministers were involved?

"A. I don't remember clearly, but the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and the Army and Navy Ministers were involved. I am not sure whether the President of the Planning Board was there or not. The two Chiefs of Staff were also present. That was the conference."

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Extract from

Interrogation of Hideki TOJO
13 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #57, pp. 9

"Q. What was there about the stability of Indo-China that necessitated calling an Imperial Conference in July 1941?

"A. The China Incident was in progress and Japan was exerting every effort to successfully conclude it. Any disturbed area to the south would have an unfavorable effect on the solution of the incident. Moreover, it had been a Japanese idea for a very long time before this to maintain the stability of East Asia. A third reason is that foodstuffs, principally rice, which were imported from French Indo-China, would be unavailable if conditions were unsettled in French Indo-China. These foodstuffs were very necessary for Japan.

"Q. Was it considered by you, as War Minister, that French Indo-China would be militarily useful in connection with the China Incident?

"A. Of course, I thought of it. Of course, from the military point of view, there was a practical relation as far as northern French Indo-China was concerned. The supply route north from French Indo-China was of assistance to the Chinese and, furthermore, we wanted, from the military point of view, to establish air bases in northern French Indo-China so as to be able to cut off the route from Burma. However, the fact that French power had declined, as a result of conditions in Europe, necessitated the stationing of troops not only in northern Indo-China but also in the central and southern parts for the maintenance of stability."

Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki TOJO
13 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #57, pp. 13.

- "Q Those same troops [referring to stationing of troops in French Indo-China] would also be of offensive assistance in case of war against those countries named [England, America and Holland]?
- "A This is a matter which will be very serious if not understood. After the decision for war on the 1st of December 1941, offensive operations were taken. The character of the operations changed and they became offensive. However, at this time, operations were defensive in character.

EX. 1110-A

東條英機ニ対スル訊問ヨリノ抜萃

一九四六年二月十三日

「カハ一頁」

2502B

問 誰が昭和十六年七月ノ此ノ席前會議ノ奏請ヲ言ヒタシタノデ

スカ

答 弗領印度支那ノ南部ニ軍隊ヲ進駐サセル問題が主要ナ問

題デアリマシタカラ陸軍大臣デアツタラウト思ヒマス

問 貴方が此ノ會議ノ奏請ヲ云ヒ出シタカドウカトイフコトハ思ヒ出セマセナカ

貴方が陸軍大臣デアツタノデス。

答 實際ノ處カ私言ヒ出シタノダト思ヒマス。然シ普通ニ事ハ連

絡會議デ始ト此ノ同意ニヨリ決定セラレクノデス。貴方ハ此ノ會議ハ

誰が言ヒ出シタカト私ニ詰リテ答ヘテリマシタガ私ハ返事ヲ致シテ謝リマス。何

故ナラバ普通ノ場合陸軍大臣、海軍大臣、外務大臣、内務大臣、文部大臣、逓信大臣

が集マツテ問題ヲ決定シタカラデアリマス。ソレカラ其ノ案ノ實際ノ

起草ハ之迄ノ會見ノ時ニ申上ゲタ三人ノ長官ニ任セマシタ。夫カ其ノ案

ハ連絡會議ニ提出セラレ其連絡會議デ席前會議ノ奏請ノ決定ガ

出テルカモ知レナカツタデアリマス。只今貴方ハ甚ダ嚴重ナ表トシテ

誰ガ此ノ會議ノ奏請ヲ云ヒ出シタカノ所質問ヲ私ニ為サイマシタ

ニ申上ゲテ順序デアサレタムデアリマス。然シ南部印度支那ノ

軍隊ノ移動ニ関スル責任ハ陸軍大臣トシテノ私ノ責任ナラナ

マシタ。責任ヲ回避シ様トスルコトハ私ハ不愉快ナトシテ

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Ex. 1110-A

Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki TOJO
13 February 1946
p. 8-9

- Q. Who requested this Imperial Conference of July 1941?
- A. Since the problem of stationing troops in southern French Indo-China was the principal problem, it may have been the War Minister, I believe.
- Q. Do you not recall whether or not you called this meeting? You were War Minister.
- A. Actually, I think I probably requested it. However, things were decided usually at the Liaison Conferences where they were decided practically by common consent. You asked me who requested this conference and I cannot answer because usually the War Minister, the Navy Minister, Foreign Minister, and the Premier got together and agreed on a subject. Then the actual drafting of the plan was left to the three secretaries, to whom I have referred in previous interviews. The plan was then presented to the Liaison Conference from which the decision to request an Imperial Conference might come. Just now you looked very solemn when you asked me the question of who called the conference. It was called by the process I have described, but the responsibility in connection with the movement of troops into southern Indo-China was my responsibility as War Minister. It is distasteful to me to try to avoid responsibility.

FILE COPY
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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. Nos. 2500-2515, inclusive

25 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Records of Interrogations of General TOJO, Hideki

Date: Feb-Mar 46 Original Copy Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOJO, Hideki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparation for War, Military; Conspiracy for aggressive warfare; Relations with USA.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Interrogations on dates shown below given document numbers as follows:

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date</u>
2500	8 Feb 1946	2508	1 Mar 1946
2501	11 Feb 1946	2509	11 Mar 1946
2502	13 Feb 1946	2510	12 Mar 1946
2503	18 Feb 1946	2511	14 Mar 1946
2504	19 Feb 1946	2512	15 Mar 1946
2505	20 Feb 1946	2513	18 Mar 1946
2506	21 Feb 1946	2514	25 Mar 1946
2507	23 Feb 1946	2515	26 Mar 1946

Analyst: W.H.Wagner

Doc. Nos. 2500-2515, incl

Exh 1123

July 2nd Imp Conf

Some on Stability of East Asia & Fr. Ind. China

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Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
13 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #57, pp. 5

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- "Q What ministers were involved?
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Feb. 13

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Interrogation of Hideki TOJO
13 February 1946
p. 8-9

DOCUMENT NO. 2502

B

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Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
13 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #57, pp. 13

see foot note

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/Referring to stationing of troops in French Indo-China./

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5/11/46

Arthur #1123

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