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SUCCESS OF PEACE PROCESSES AFTER THE
SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT?**

Echeverri Martinez, Julian Adolfo

Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**WHICH FACTORS EXPLAIN VARIATION IN THE
SUCCESS OF PEACE PROCESSES AFTER THE
SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT?**

by

Julian Adolfo Echeverri Martinez

December 2019

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2019	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE WHICH FACTORS EXPLAIN VARIATION IN THE SUCCESS OF PEACE PROCESSES AFTER THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT?			5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Julian Adolfo Echeverri Martinez			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily guarantee long-lasting peace. In this thesis, we explore which factors explain variations in the success of peace processes after the signing of peace agreements. Recent research has found that of the 216 peace agreements recorded between 1975 and 2011, only 125 resulted in the termination of violence for at least five years after signing the agreement. To shed light on those elements of the accords that are most relevant for the achievement of long-lasting peace, this thesis investigates differences in the degree of military implementation and political and judicial provisions as well as the involvement of the international community and economic funding. The thesis develops a comparative analysis of the accord implementation in El Salvador in 1992, Angola in 1994, and Colombia since 2016. These cases represent instances of successful, failed, and ongoing peace accord implementations, respectively. The analyses reveal that peace processes are more likely to succeed if: (1) sufficient economic funds are allocated for the implementation process, (2) an international third party is involved in the process, and (3) demobilization and disarmament programs are properly implemented, which will reduce violence drastically. In this case, political and judicial provisions play a role by complementing the process, assuring the commitment and trust between the parties allowing the process to move forward.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS peace process, implementation, provisions, military, political, judicial, international community, funding, Colombia, El Salvador, Angola			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 111
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

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**WHICH FACTORS EXPLAIN VARIATION IN THE SUCCESS OF PEACE
PROCESSES AFTER THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT?**

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requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(COMBATING TERRORISM: POLICY AND STRATEGY)**

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ABSTRACT

The signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily guarantee long-lasting peace. In this thesis, we explore which factors explain variations in the success of peace processes after the signing of peace agreements. Recent research has found that of the 216 peace agreements recorded between 1975 and 2011, only 125 resulted in the termination of violence for at least five years after signing the agreement. To shed light on those elements of the accords that are most relevant for the achievement of long-lasting peace, this thesis investigates differences in the degree of military implementation and political and judicial provisions as well as the involvement of the international community and economic funding. The thesis develops a comparative analysis of the accord implementation in El Salvador in 1992, Angola in 1994, and Colombia since 2016. These cases represent instances of successful, failed, and ongoing peace accord implementations, respectively. The analyses reveal that peace processes are more likely to succeed if: (1) sufficient economic funds are allocated for the implementation process, (2) an international third party is involved in the process, and (3) demobilization and disarmament programs are properly implemented, which will reduce violence drastically. In this case, political and judicial provisions play a role by complementing the process, assuring the commitment and trust between the parties allowing the process to move forward.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANP	Angolan National Police
ANSP	Academia Nacional de Seguridad Publica or National Public Security Academy
ARENA	Alianza Republicana Nacionalista
BDCCH	Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and the Laying down of Arms
CIVIPOL	Civilian Police observers
CMPVI	Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement
COPAZ	Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz or Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and programs for the reintegration
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional or National Liberation Army
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación or Liberation Popular Army
M19	El Movimiento 19 de Abril or the 19th of April movement,
FAES	Salvadoran Armed Forces
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces
FDR	Frente Democrático Revolucionario or Revolutionary Democratic Front
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
FNLA,	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
GAO	U.S. General Accounting Office
IED	improvised explosive devices
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MINUSAL	Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MPLA.	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MVM	Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
ONUSAL	Observer Mission in El Salvador
ONUV	United Nations Office of Verification

PCS	Partido Comunista Salvadoreña or Salvadorian Communist Party
PNC	National Civil Police
TLPN	Transitional Local Points for Normalization
TLZN	Transitional Local Zones for Normalization
UCA	Central American University
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM I	UN Angola Verification Mission I
UNAVEMII	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
UP	Union Patriótica or Patriotic Union
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and most important I want to thank God for this great opportunity and for putting the following people in my path: my parents, Henry and Amparo, who always gave their best to make me a good human being; my wife, Alicia, who with her unconditional love and permanent support helps me to overcome every challenge; my children, Gabriel and Henry, who motivate me to give my best and to be an exemplary father, just like my parents are to me; and my thesis advisors, Mariana Giusti and Cristiana Matei, whose support and dedication made this project possible. Thank you to all!

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

“We have reached an agreement that, when it is observed, is infinitely better than continuing the war that broke families, hit regions and made us suffer a horror that our children will know, fortunately, only in history books.”¹ These were the words of the president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos Calderon, when he announced that a peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* or FARC) was finally signed. Four years of negotiations in La Havana, Cuba, concluded with the signature of the accords in September 2016. Even the top representative of the FARC, Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, also known as “Timochenko,” stated that “our only weapon will be the word,”² reaffirming his commitment to peace. The agreement was similarly celebrated by the international community, with the Colombian president even receiving a Nobel peace prize in 2016 “for his resolute efforts to bring the country’s more than 50-year-long civil war to an end.”³

Yet, has Colombia achieved peace? While a very important part of the peace process—and certainly cause for significant celebration—the signing of a peace deal does not, in and of itself, guarantee long-lasting peace. A recent study found that of the 216 peace agreements recorded between 1975 and 2011, only 125 resulted in ending the violence for a minimum period of five years after signing the agreement.⁴ This statistic represents a failure rate of more than 40 percent, with 91 peace deals breaking down and

¹ “‘Hoy Podemos Decir Que Se Acabó La Guerra’: Los Detalles Del Histórico Acuerdo De Paz Entre El Gobierno De Colombia Y La Guerrilla De Las FARC [‘Today We Can Say That the War Is Over’: The Details of the Historic Peace Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC Guerrillas],” BBC News Mundo, August 24, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37179271>.

² Casa Editorial El Tiempo, “‘Miembros de las Farc, bienvenidos a la democracia’ [‘FARC Members Welcome to Democracy’],” El Tiempo, September 26, 2016, <https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/firma-del-acuerdo-final-de-paz-con-las-farc-en-cartagena-34636>.

³ “The Nobel Peace Prize 2016,” Nobel Prize, accessed August 13, 2019, <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2016/santos/facts/>.

⁴ Stina Högladh, *Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset* (Uppsala University (Sweden): Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report, 2012), 51.

conflict restarting less than five years after the signing of a peace accord. The Lusaka peace process that tried to end several years of violence in Angola is a good example of this finding. With about 54 percent of its provisions implemented, the Lusaka peace process still failed within three years after the signing.⁵ These numbers suggest that, rather than signaling the end of a conflict, the signing of the agreements is the starting point of a very difficult stage. Indeed, Jasmine Westendorf states that, “peace agreements are best seen as just one early step in the much broader and more complex process of ending violent hostilities and consolidating peace.”⁶ This thesis examines the following question: Which factors explain variation in the success of peace processes after the signing of a peace agreement?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The question that this research seeks to answer has global implications. About 70 different conflicts and crises, including civil wars, are currently active around the world.⁷ According to James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, between 1945 and 1999, approximately 3.33 million battle deaths resulted from 25 interstate wars, with the median duration of these conflicts being close to three months. In contrast, during the same period, there were about 127 civil wars, with an average duration of six years, and the number of resulting fatal casualties was calculated at 16.2 million. Furthermore, civil wars, which have involved more than a third of countries in the United Nations (UN) system, have also triggered extensive displacement of people and refugee crises.⁸ In this context, this thesis can benefit policymakers, members of institutions like the UN, and non-governmental organizations that play any role in the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Colombia and

⁵ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix,” accessed September 24, 2019, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lusaka-protocol>.

⁶ Jasmine Westendorf, “Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity After Civil War,” *Choice Reviews Online* 53, no. 08 (April 1, 2016): 8–9, <https://doi.org/10.5860/CHOICE.194645>.

⁷ “CrisisWatch,” Crisis Group, accessed August 30, 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch>.

⁸ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75.

other countries affected by conflicts, as this thesis provides new insights into post-civil-war peace processes.

For Colombia, in particular, peace is a fundamental right. As stated in the country's political Constitution, Article 22: "Peace is a right and a duty of mandatory accomplishment."⁹ But this is a right that has been violated during more than a half century of conflict. Unfortunately, this conflict was not limited to military actors. It caused civilian deaths, massive displacement, human rights violations, the breakup of families and communities, serious environmental damage, and numerous other atrocities. It also weakened the state's capacity to provide medical and educational services, and significantly affected the national economy. The findings of this thesis will help shed light on the extent to which factors necessary for long-lasting peace are being implemented in the 2016 peace deal with the FARC. In doing so, the thesis also makes the prospect of achieving the fundamental right of peace once and for all a more tangible one.¹⁰

This research will also benefit the U.S. government, which has provided security assistance and security cooperation to Colombia for decades, with the view of improving Colombia's security and democracy. A peaceful demobilization of drug-supported illegal groups can significantly reduce drug trafficking into the United States, which will, in turn, strengthen the long-term relationship between the two countries, justifying the U.S. security-democracy "investment" in Colombia over time.

⁹ Corte Constitucional, *Constitución Política De Colombia [Political Constitution of Colombia]* (Bogota, 2016), <http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/inicio/Constitucion%20politica%20de%20Colombia.pdf>.

¹⁰ Another important feature of this research question is that it will allow the Colombian government to use the findings as lessons that improve the proper implementation of possible future peace processes. In a more local environment, one can mention the peace process between the Colombian government and the ELN, which is currently in the initial stages. After the 2016 FARC deal, the ELN remains as the most important threat to Colombia's public order. Founded along with the FARC in the early 1960s, the ELN came out of a combination of groups involved in *La violencia*, mostly students and recent college graduates. The ELN favored a Cuban-style revolution in Colombia, using violence to achieve political objectives. The evolution of this group over time has been marked by its participation in drug trafficking, kidnapping, assassinations, and other violent activities, especially in the northeast part of the country. The prospects for peace in Colombia are promising with the inclusion of the ELN in a new peace process. If the peace process with the ELN gets signed, this thesis will provide an opportunity to improve the time, resources, and efforts allotted in the post-signature stage of the process. Learning from previous experiences will prevent ELN extending its violence in the long term, just like FARC did.

Finally, this investigation seeks to complement the existing post-conflict related literature. While recent studies show that peaceful settlements to civil conflicts are becoming more common,¹¹ the high failure rate highlights the fragility of the process and its highly uncertain outcome. According to Achim Wennmann's estimates, "research on conflict recurrence suggests that about one third of the 58 negotiated settlements that ended armed conflicts between 1990 and 2005 relapsed back into armed conflict within the first five years."¹² In this same vein, Audrey Cronin writes that "the vast majority of negotiations that do occur yield neither a clear resolution nor a cessation of the conflict."¹³ Thus, the signing of agreements is far from a guarantee of the end of a conflict. Understanding the conditions that facilitate or hinder long-lasting peace is therefore essential for reducing the likelihood of conflict after peace agreements are reached. Westendorf confirms that "if foundations for lasting peace are not laid in the immediate post-settlement years, it is unlikely that the underlying structures of the conflict have been addressed and the probability of sustained peace may therefore be quite low even if the cracks have not already started to show."¹⁴ By focusing on the aftermath of the peace accords—a period of great importance but one that has nonetheless received significantly less scholarly attention than the dynamics leading to the signing of the peace accords—this research aims to fill this gap.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to conduct the research that identifies the factors explaining the variation in the success of a peace process, one needs to define what success means. In this case this thesis agrees with Westendorf, who suggests "that the success of negotiated peace processes be understood and analyzed in terms of the extent to which they establish stable

¹¹ Lotta Harbom, Stina Högladh, and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 5 (September 2006): 621–24, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343306067613>.

¹² Achim Wennmann, "Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable Peacebuilding," *Négociations* 11, no. 1 (2009): 43, <https://doi.org/10.3917/neg.011.0043>.

¹³ Audrey Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 36.

¹⁴ Westendorf, "Why Peace Processes Fail," 47.

social, political, and security conditions in which political conflicts are no longer settled by means of violence.”¹⁵ In simple words, peace is the lack of violence in a stable society.

This section engages with the literature on civil wars and peacebuilding to identify relevant factors for explaining the variation in the achievement of long-lasting peace after the implementation of a peace agreement. Scholarship that has sought to identify the factors that enable long-lasting peace after a significant civil conflict can be organized around four dominant approaches. First, the type of conflict affects its duration and finally its outcome. Second, the content of the agreement defines its success. Third, the timing when the negotiations occur sets the stage for peace. And fourth, the implementation of a set of provisions will guarantee long-lasting peace.

The first of these approaches posits that the type of civil war directly affects the duration of the conflict and the likelihood that long-lasting peace will be achieved.¹⁶ According to this approach, some types of conflicts, by their very nature, tend to last longer and are more difficult to end than others. According to Fearon and Laitin, whereas civil wars emerging from coup revolutions tend to be short, those wars fought for land involving ethnic groups or peripheral insurgencies, and those financed by drug trafficking or mining resources, tend to last significantly longer. This is because more is at stake.¹⁷ An application of this approach to the peace deal implementation phase suggests that some peace processes, by their very nature, are more prone to failure than others as a result of

¹⁵ Westendorf, 41.

¹⁶ David E. Cunningham, “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010): 115–27; Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala, “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (August 2009): 544–69, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709336457>; David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009): 570–97; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 253–73, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043769>; Håvard Hegre, “The Duration and Termination of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 243–52; Karl R. de Rouen and David Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 303–20, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043771>; Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,” *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 3 (2008): 345–63; David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006): 875–92; and James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 275–301.

¹⁷ Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?,” 297–98.

the civil conflict that they are seeking to resolve. Yet, this logic offers few insights into how to actually achieve peace, much less sustain it.

Another body of literature focuses on the content of the peace agreement.¹⁸ Looking at interstate conflict, Virginia Fortna argues that particular ceasefire agreement mechanisms such as the demilitarization of zones, separation of troops, involvement of third parties, and confidence-building measures, among others, are essential for guaranteeing long-lasting peace.¹⁹ Peace agreements lacking these mechanisms are more prone to failure. Fortna's work suggests that the fate of a peace process might be sealed at the moment of signature of a peace agreement, with some agreements being significantly more conducive to long-lasting peace than others as a result of their distinct content.

Applying this model to the intra-state conflict arena, Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun identify two types of provisions that should be included in the design of any peace agreement. These are cost-increasing and fear-reducing provisions.²⁰ The first type relates to those provisions that, when enforced, will increase the costs of reengaging in war. These may include demilitarized zones and separation of troops. Fear-reducing provisions, on the other hand, deal with the idea of reducing the fear and uncertainty caused by the possible actions of the enemy. These provisions may include the involvement of third parties and power sharing agreements, and consequently can increase the prospect of peace.²¹

A well-designed peace agreement will significantly decrease the likelihood of conflict resurgence. Including provisions that aim to reduce the uncertainty and fear caused

¹⁸ Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, "Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars.," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 304–304, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433080450020810>; Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (2003): 318–32, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3186141>; Virginia Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993," *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (1995): 681–90, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2082982>; and Barbara Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 335–64, <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081897550384>.

¹⁹ Fortna, *Peace Time*, 2.

²⁰ Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun, "Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design.," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (2009): 738.

²¹ Mattes and Savun, 738.

by the possible actions of the opponents and that increase the costs of war will significantly alter actors' calculations. Yet, a well-designed peace accord is only one of the first steps of a long and fragile peace process. By focusing on the content of the accords and assuming that the process of implementation largely responds to this content, this approach overlooks important dynamics of the implementation stage.

A third scholarly approach focuses on the timing of the peace accords rather than their content. Whether peace deals are signed and long-lasting peace achieved is seen as a function of the time at which the belligerents find themselves participating in the peace negotiations.²² A central element of this approach is William Zartman's "ripeness theory," which posits that "parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so."²³ Zartman notes that, "At that ripe moment, they are more likely to grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that appear attractive only now."²⁴ The moment in which parties decide to negotiate is the result of a locked state, also called a stalemate, in which the parties realize that there is nothing else to do. A military victory seems far from possible and the pain caused by constant losses is unnecessary. According to the theory, when the time is ripe and there is no other option but to negotiate, long-lasting peace becomes more likely.²⁵ Nevertheless, this approach cannot account for why some parties that choose to agree to peace eventually choose to return to war. More significantly, this approach does not offer a broad spectrum for analysis across other stages of the process. The idea of focusing on the right moment to start negotiations is limited. It is important to know when and why peace starts, but it is more important to know when

²² Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*; Navin A. Bapat, "Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes," *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 6 (2005): 699–717; I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, Updated ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Derek Leebaert, I. William Zartman, and Maureen R. Berman, "The Practical Negotiator," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 2, no. 2 (1983): 310, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3323311>; and T. David Mason, Joseph P. Weingarten, and Patrick J. Fett, "Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars," *Political Research Quarterly* 52, no. 2 (1999): 239–68, <https://doi.org/10.2307/449218>.

²³ William Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction*, ed. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 22.

²⁴ Zartman, 22.

²⁵ Zartman, 22.

and why it ends. Or as former guerrilla commander Ana Guadalupe Martinez stated, “What obliged us to sit down at the table was the stalemate. But what obliges one to negotiate is something different.”²⁶

Despite presenting significant insights into the process of peaceful resolution of armed conflicts, these approaches nonetheless shed little light on why peace processes fail in some places and succeed in others, even after the signature of the peace agreements. Certainly, these approaches fall short in analyzing stages other than pre-negotiation and the signature stage.

The process of peace accord implementation is a highly variable one. As Marco Mezzera, Michael Pavicic, and Leontine Specker note, “peace processes can be perfectly institutionalized on paper, but eventually it is the reality of things that determine their actual relevance and evolution.”²⁷

To understand why some peace processes succeed while others fail after the signing of peace accords, a useful starting point is to consider how the degree of implementation of various accord elements ultimately influenced the outcome of the peace process. Peace accords only rarely achieve full implementation, yet an incomplete implementation does not necessarily trigger the return of conflict. Moreover, not all provisions are equally central for achieving peaceful outcomes. Understanding how the experience and degree of implementation of particular accord provisions shapes the prospects of a long-lasting peace can shed significant light on the priorities, as well as the most dangerous pitfalls, of the process of accord implementation.

A survey of the literature suggests several provision themes that seem distinctly influential in the process of peace accord implementation. These include military, political, and judicial provisions, as well as other provisions that specify the role of the international community and the economic resources available to support accord implementation. In

²⁶ Cynthia Arnson, *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 17.

²⁷ Marco Mezzera, Michael Pavicic, and Leontine Specker, “Governance Components in Peace Agreements” (Clingendael Institute, 2009), 28, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05466>.

what follows, I discuss these provisions and consider the ways in which their degree of implementation could shape peace outcomes.

1. Military Provisions

Military provisions are related to variables incorporated in the agreement to modify, control, or solve the behavior of the parties. The military factors applicable to this case can include ceasefires or disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs for former militia members and the military, if necessary. Sixty-seven percent²⁸ of all peace accords include one or more provisions described in the military category, with the most common provision being a formal ceasefire.²⁹ Ceasefires do not represent the end of an armed conflict, but they do represent an important step in the process for definitive peace. Normally oriented to strengthen peace, build confidence, and resolve disputes, these military factors should be adopted by the belligerents to show their commitment to the agreement and to reduce the uncertainty about the opponent's intentions.³⁰

The proper execution of a DDR program after the signature of a peace agreement is fundamental for a long-lasting peace. This particular provision reduces uncertainty significantly and contributes to ending the conflict definitively, preventing future human rights violations by the rearming of the parties. Focusing on the disarmament element, Jonathan Tonge highlights this point in his analysis of the Northern Ireland context, arguing that “decommissioning would provide conclusive evidence that the IRA has ‘gone away,’ and the war is over.”³¹ Similarly, Joanna Spear emphasizes that “any peace settlement that allows for the retention of arms by groups is open to charges of leaving in place the means

²⁸ Högbladh, *Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset*; Fortna, *Peace Time*; Jonathan Tonge, *Northern Ireland, Hot Spots in Global Politics* (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2006); Richard Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process: An Insider’s View,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 9, no. 2 (January 1995): 5–21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557579508400113>; and Joanna Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 141–82.

²⁹ Högbladh, *Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset*, 44.

³⁰ Fortna, *Peace Time*, 3.

³¹ Tonge, *Northern Ireland*, 191.

for future conflict.”³² The literature also suggests that, to be effective, the disarmament component of DDR provisions should include both conventional and unconventional weapons and war tools.³³

The two other elements of the DDR provision focus on demobilization—the goal of which is to bring the combatants out of the state of mobilization and abandon the insurgent group—and reintegration of the combatants into the civil society. The latter involves long-term social and economic programs in which the former guerrilla members acquire a legal status or become citizens. The new status guarantees their access to social programs, education, and health care. The first two parts of the DDR demand the commitment of the illegal group, while the reintegration demands the commitment of the government through the proper institutional changes to support these programs.³⁴

To increase the likelihood of long-lasting peace, the implementation of the DDR provisions must necessarily be implemented diligently and promptly after the signing of the accords. As Mozambique’s case shows, keeping the military actors in the assembly areas for extended periods of time threatens the peace process. In this case, the uncertainty caused by the lack of information about the near future caused outbreaks of misconduct within the population waiting to be demobilized. While this demobilization process was ultimately successful, it nonetheless highlights how, in a tense and uncertain environment, every little encounter between the actors can spark serious confrontations and threaten the peace process.³⁵ Moreover, it shows the importance of a fast disarmament and demobilization phase to ensure a peaceful implementation of the agreement.

³² Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 144.

³³ This includes war tools such as land mines or improvised explosive devices (IED) planted by guerrilla groups. As Spear describes: “The longevity of land mines makes them a menace to people and livestock and affects the ability of the society to utilize roads, arable land, and sources of water.” 144

³⁴ Gladys Chavarría, “Estrategias Utilizadas Para La Satisfacción De La Garantía De No Repetición En Desmovilizados De Grupos Armados Ilegales: Un Estudio Con Desmovilizados De Grupos Paramilitares De Las Autodefensas Unidas De Colombia. Medellín, Valle De Aburrá - Colombia, [Strategies used to satisfy the guarantee of no repetition in demobilized from ilegal armed groups: A study with demobilized from United Self Defense of Colombia]” *Revista Facultad De Derecho Y Ciencias Políticas* 42, no. 116 (2012): 226, <http://www.redalyc.org/resumen.oa?id=151424089009>.

³⁵ Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process,” 5–9.

2. Political Provisions

Political provisions focus on the regulation of conflicts with a governmental incompatibility and involve provisions for dealing with this incompatibility.³⁶ To clarify this idea, Högladh states that, “conflicts with political incompatibilities are conflicts fought over the regime type, the composition of the government or with an aim to replace the government.”³⁷ The particular political factors will vary based on the specific needs of each peace process, but some examples of these provisions include: changes in the constitution and the promise of referendum for independence or secession in Papua New Guinea,³⁸ democratic elections in Mozambique,³⁹ or the inclusion of the guerrilla group in the democratic process as a political party in the case of El Salvador.⁴⁰ Regardless of the specifics of the provision, however, guarantees along this dimension will significantly increase the chances for long-lasting peace.

The implementation of political provisions demands a major commitment from the government. Its role goes beyond that of allowing the political participation of insurgents and involves security guarantees for these sectors as they come out of hiding and begin to organize politically through legal mechanisms. Compliance with these provisions opens the space for democratization, participation, and contestation not only for the parties involved in the conflict, but also the population in general. Peace processes in which political provisions are implemented successfully reduce the likelihood of conflict resurgence by shifting the political conflict from extra-institutional to institutional channels, as well as by bringing legitimacy to the peace process. As such, their effective implementation significantly improves the prospects of a peaceful future.

³⁶ Högladh, *Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset*, 45.

³⁷ Högladh, 43.

³⁸ Anthony Regan, “Bougainville, Papua New Guinea: Lessons from a Successful Peace Process,” *The RUSI Journal* 163, no. 6 (November 2, 2018): 48, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1562020>.

³⁹ Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process,” 10.

⁴⁰ Charles Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s Transition from Civil War to Peace,” in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 383.

3. Judicial Factors

Judicial provisions focus on the measures necessary to solve the issues concerning human rights violations and other crimes committed during the conflict⁴¹ and involve certain guarantees that need to be established to make the agreement appealing to those who have operated outside the legal system during the conflict, both on the insurgent and counterinsurgency sides. Justice provisions include guarantees such as national reconciliation, the release of prisoners, amnesty, the return of the displaced population, and the proportional punishment of those who systematically and disproportionately committed human rights violations. They also often involve the creation of special justice committees that deal with the transition to legality of the newly reincorporated personnel.⁴²

Judicial provisions are not designed to bring impunity to the agreement. On the contrary, the goal is to avoid the repetition of the violations and the reengagement in violence by creating a legal framework that reduces uncertainty and increases the buy-in of the various actors involved and affected by the process.⁴³ The effective implementation of these judicial provisions after the signing of the peace accord seems crucial both for guaranteeing the support of the actors involved in the conflict and the general citizenry affected by it.

⁴¹ Högladh, *Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset*, 48.

⁴² Jose Rios and Daniel Garcia, *Building Tomorrow's Peace: A Strategy for Reconciliation*, cited in Mark Chernick, "Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia," *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*, ed. Cynthia Arson (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Press; Stanford University Press, 1999); Angélica Rettberg, ed., *Entre El Perdón Y El Paredón: Preguntas Y Dilemas De La Justicia Transicional*, 1st ed. (Bogotá D.C., Colombia : Ottawa: Universidad de Los Andes, Programa de Investigación sobre Construcción de Paz, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales : Ediciones Uniandes, Centro de Estudios Socioculturales e Internacionales ; Centro Internacional de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo, 2005); Chavarría, "Estrategias Utilizadas Para La Satisfacción De La Garantía De No Repetición En Desmovilizados De Grupos Armados Ilegales"; and Högladh, *Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset*.

⁴³ Chavarría, "Estrategias Utilizadas Para La Satisfacción De La Garantía De No Repetición En Desmovilizados De Grupos Armados Ilegales, [Strategies used to satisfy the guarantee of no repetition in demobilized from illegal armed groups: A study with demobilized from United Self Defense of Colombia]" 216.

4. The Involvement of the International Community

Another body of literature has identified that the will for negotiation and the commitment to comply with what was agreed has to exist between the parties in conflict in order for the peace process to succeed. But peace processes are built in an environment of uncertainty, mistrust, and fear, where restarting the confrontation is more likely to happen. This is why the involvement of the international community, which will perform different roles during the process of peace implementation, is indispensable.⁴⁴

The participation of the international community is defined by Marieke Kleiboer as follows: “a form of conflict management in which a third party assists two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force.”⁴⁵ The international community supports the peace process as outsider and neutral actors committed to peace implementation. The assistance provided by the international community is broad and multi-faceted. At a more abstract level, its participation as a neutral outsider force committed to peace implementation reduces uncertainty and, as a result, costs of compliance for the various actors involved. At a more practical level, the international community provides essential economic and procedural resources that, in a strong peace process, will span basically all the stages of peace implementation. For instance, the international community is oftentimes in charge of monitoring the implementation of the military provisions and verifying that the disarmament of the parties is accomplished on time according to what was established in the agreements. The international community also verifies the application of judicial provisions such as amnesties or the release of prisoners and supports political provisions such as the establishment of political parties. Thus, as Cynthia Arnson states, “The role of the international community, through such

⁴⁴ Marieke Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure in International Mediation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40, 2 (June 1996): 360–89; Arnson, *Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of Violence*; Mezzera, Pavicic, and Specker, “Governance Components in Peace Agreements”; James Shinn and James Dobbins, *Afghan Peace Talks* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1131rc>; Mattes and Savun, “Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design”; and William Stanley and David Holiday, “Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibility: Peace Implementation in Guatemala,” in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

⁴⁵ Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure in International Mediation,” 360.

institutions as the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and also through the actions of individual governments, has been essential to the conclusion of peace agreements.”⁴⁶ Without the international community’s involvement, uncertainty, fear, and distrust will tend to make the challenges of peace implementation insurmountable.

5. Economic Funding

Economic funding refers to those aspects within the peace agreement that describe how the various phases of implementation will be funded. Although much of the literature tends to ignore this as a central component of the implementation process, evidence of its significance can be found scattered throughout.⁴⁷ Establishing long-lasting peace is an expensive process. Failure to allocate the funds needed to support the implementation of the agreement can bring the process to critical moments and even cause the return of hostilities.⁴⁸

The importance of the economic factors can be easily established if one keeps in mind that every step of the implementation of the agreements requires significant monetary support, from the establishment of democratic institutions and processes to collection of testimonies for national reconciliation efforts.⁴⁹ The lack of funds for the effective implementation of these programs will significantly compromise the implementation of the peace accords. The peace process in Guatemala provides a useful example for highlighting the significance of economic provisions. As part of this peace process, the international community provided significant economic support to remediate some of the issues established in the accords. Yet, poor consensus within the government and the private

⁴⁶ Arnson, *Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of Violence*, 9.

⁴⁷ Wennmann, “Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable Peacebuilding”; James K. Boyce and Madalene O’Donnell, eds., *Peace and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar Statebuilding*, Center on International Cooperation Studies in Multilateralism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2007); Dinorah Azpuru, “Peace and Democratization in Guatemala: Two Parallel Processes,” in *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*, ed. Cynthia Arnson (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 1999); and Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process.”

⁴⁸ Wennmann, “Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable Peacebuilding,” 44.

⁴⁹ Boyce and O’Donnell, *Peace and the Public Purse*, 6.

sector about tax reforms caused other programs to be poorly implemented or not implemented at all due to the lack of resources generated through taxes.⁵⁰

Poor implementation of the peace accords, especially in the social realm, might have played an important role in sparking the social violence in Guatemala after the agreements. This violence normally involved former combatants who did not receive the aid that was promised in the agreements. The Guatemala example thus illustrates that while international sponsors help cushion the process of implementation, mechanisms must nonetheless be established to generate the necessary resources to fund the peace implementation process through its completion.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis investigates the extent to which particular provisions have significantly influenced the outcomes of peace processes after the signing of peace accords. While peace accords are often drafted to reflect comprehensive and multi-dimensional solutions to complex social conflicts, their actual implementation often falls remarkably short from the targeted goals both in breadth and depth. The literature reviewed in the previous section offers a number of hypotheses regarding the particular types of provisions that, if left unimplemented or are only implemented partially, represent the greatest risk to peace. Not all peace accord components are of equal relevance. This thesis seeks to increase our understanding of the types of provisions that are essential for long-lasting peace.

Hypothesis 1: The prompt and successful implementation of military provisions, especially DDR, will drastically reduce the levels of violence in the short term. The proper implementation of the disarmament program will reduce the violence generated by the conflict to minimum levels. Conflicts that fail to implement the agreed upon DDR programs will be significantly more likely to experience a return to conflict than those that successfully complete these programs.

Hypothesis 2: The successful implementation of political provisions established in the accords will significantly increase the likelihood of lasting peace. The proper

⁵⁰ Azpuru, "Peace and Democratization in Guatemala," 121.

implementation of political provisions will increase the sense of inclusion among ex-combatants. Allowing the former guerrilla groups to create their own political parties and their participation in elections will strengthen the democratic process and reduce the incentives for returning to conflict. Failure to implement these provisions will increase the likelihood that collective grievances will be channeled through renewed social conflict.

Hypothesis 3: A mismanaged implementation of justice provisions, either the poor or partial practice of justice, or variations in the agreements will cause the peace process to fail. The poor or partial implementation of the justice provisions will create the sense of impunity especially among the victims of the conflict. Variations on what was agreed seeking harder or softer punishment for one of the parties will reduce the legitimacy of the government and the process itself. This will make the peace process more prone to failure.

Hypothesis 4: The involvement of the international community in funding and verifying the implementation of the military, political, and justice provisions will reduce the chances of the conflict restarting. The role of the international community in funding the implementation of the agreements is a key aspect for long lasting peace. The ability to fully implement everything that was agreed will show the combatants the benefits of demobilizing and reintegration over going back to illegal activities and violence. The involvement of the international actors in verifying the implementation of the DDR programs, the fair and safe inclusion in politics of former combatants, and the implementation of fair transitional justice and its mechanisms will cause the parties to develop an environment of trust and certainty, open to moderate and flexible dialogue in case that the complexity of the process demands it to overcome any contingency. A stable environment will increase the chances of success of a peace process.

Hypothesis 5: The lack of funding for the implementation of the agreements will seriously reduce the chances for the peace process to succeed. If there is no money to accomplish what was agreed, peace will not last. If the implementation of the DDR programs do not meet the expectations for the combatants, they will not see the benefits of handing over their weapons. Political participation will be restricted and unfair, and the institutional changes necessary to bring justice after the conflict will not occur. Violence is more likely to resume.

Hypothesis 6: The proper and prompt implementation of military (DDR) provisions, the involvement of the international community in the process, and sufficient funds to sustain the implementation efforts will lay the basis for a successful peace process. The implementation of political, and judicial provisions will support the implementation effort. Long-lasting peace will result only when all of these provisions are implemented successfully after the signing of peace accords. Failure to implement any one of these provisions will significantly reduce the prospects of long-lasting peace.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design for this thesis involves in-depth comparative case studies of peace processes in El Salvador, Angola, and Colombia. These three case studies were chosen to be compared due to certain similarities and differences. Among the similarities are the inclusion of similar provisions in their peace agreements; the type of intrastate conflict that these agreements try to solve; and the fact that all of them moved on to the implementation phase. On the other side, the difference in the outcomes of the peace processes in El Salvador and Angola, as well as from previous peace processes in Colombia, is also important. The comparison of these three cases provides enough data to establish what factors were present in the successful peace processes and which were not in the failed ones. After this comparison it is possible to assess the situation of the 2016 peace process in Colombia based on these results.

This thesis draws primarily from previous studies of peace processes, the University of Notre Dame's Peace Accords Matrix, and various statistical sources on conflict resolution trends. Case studies of peace processes describe different scenarios, regions, conflicts, leaders, and other key factors that were indispensable for the outcome of peace processes. This research analyzes a variety of publications—books, reports, newspapers, and journal articles—to understand the nature of these conflicts, the content of their peace accords, and their experiences with peace implementation. The Peace Accords Matrix, for its part, offers an index of degree of peace implementation that enables me to conduct a very detailed comparison between the chosen cases, analyzing year by year, each one of the provisions included in each peace agreement.

The most representative goal of a peace process is to reduce or to completely extinguish the violence between the parties in conflict. Decreasing the number of deaths caused directly by the actors in conflict provides a sound way to measure whether peace was achieved and whether the implementation of these military factors is enough not only to change the affected population's perception of security in the short and long term. Based on the literature, a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths serves as a base for low intensity conflicts and over 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year for full-scale wars.⁵¹ Comparing this number with the numbers from pre-implementation should provide a reasonable idea about the immediate influence of the implementation of DDR programs.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is organized in five chapters as follows: the first chapter introduces the research question and identifies theoretical explanations for the variation in outcomes of peace accord implementation processes. Chapter II develops a case study of how the successful implementation of military (DDR), political, and judicial provisions, how the involvement of the international community, and how sufficient economic funding played a key role in achieving long lasting peace after the signing of the Chapultepec peace agreement in El Salvador. Chapter III turns to describe how the poor implementation of the same set of provisions caused the contrary effect resulting in the resumption of the conflict after the signing of the Lusaka accord in Angola. Using the insights of Chapters II and III as a starting point, Chapter IV then analyzes the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC to determine its prospects for success. Finally, in Chapter V, I summarize the central findings of this thesis, discuss the recommendations for conflict resolution-related Policies, the policy recommendations for Colombia, and the shortcomings drawn from the research process.

⁵¹ Therese Pettersson, "UCDP Dyadic Dataset Codebook v 19.1" (Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University), 2019, 4, <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/>.

II. CHAPULTEPEC ACCORDS: IMPLEMENTING PEACE IN EL SALVADOR

This chapter examines the implementation process of the peace agreement in El Salvador. The purpose of this examination is to evaluate the degree to which different accord provisions were implemented effectively and assess how this implementation experience shaped patterns of long-lasting peace. The Chapultepec peace accords of El Salvador are widely considered an instance of successful peace accord implementation. According to the Peace Accords Matrix, 96 percent of the provisions in the peace process in El Salvador were implemented successfully.⁵² Thus, evaluating where they were implemented fully, where implementation fell short, and what impacts resulted from these levels of implementation should shed light on the most essential elements of an effective accord implementation process.

This chapter presents the conflict's background to clarify the roots and main causes of the conflict in El Salvador. Second, this chapter describes the content of the peace accords that comprise the Chapultepec peace agreement. The aim is to highlight the provisions that the parties agreed to implement in order to address the main causes of the conflict. Third, the chapter provides a more detailed description of the implementation of the military (DDR), political, and judicial provisions, the involvement of the international community in the process, and the economic funding available for the implementation process. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing how the degree of implementation of the previous provisions influenced the successful outcome of the peace process in El Salvador.

⁵² "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix," University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2015, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement>.

A. CONFLICT BACKGROUND

The civil war in El Salvador endured for approximately 12 years, from 1980 until 1992. The conflict caused the death of an estimated 70,000 Salvadorans, displaced more than 250,000 civilians, and caused over \$2 billion in property damage.⁵³

The roots of the conflict can be traced to both structural and political factors. Structurally, Salvadoran society has been characterized by high levels of inequality and lack of opportunities, especially in the countryside. With an economy based on agriculture, the concentration of land ownership became a major problem. A study published by the Central American University (UCA) in 1983 showed that “10 percent of all coffee producers controlled 80 percent of all Salvadoran production.”⁵⁴ Another study by Tommie Sue Montgomery found that “114 family groups, comprising 1,309 individuals, dominated coffee production, processing, and export.”⁵⁵ Both studies present proof that ownership of land in El Salvador progressively moved from the hands of many to the hands of few. This caused an uneven distribution of wealth, opening the gap of social inequality and injustice.

Politically, Salvadoran society was also characterized by a lack of access to political space for those representing centrist or leftist parties, and significant polarization along ideological and class lines.⁵⁶ Family and marriage ties between the rich land owners and the political elites created a net of favoritism and bureaucratic positioning.⁵⁷ This net was strengthened by the linkage of retired military officers, who still had access to the security sector, playing an important role in containing possible opposition to the elites. The

⁵³ Diana Villiers Negroponce, *Seeking Peace in El Salvador* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012), 13, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137012081>.

⁵⁴ Cecilia De Saade and Evelyn Rivas, *La Concentración En La Producción De Café Y Las Modificaciones Inducidas Por El, De Agraria: Periodo 1970–1982*, [The Concentration in the Production of Coffee and the Modifications Induced by It, Agrarian; 1970–1982 Period,] (San Salvador: Central American University, 1983).

⁵⁵ Tommie Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution, 1st Ed.* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

⁵⁶ Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s Transition from Civil War to Peace,” 384–85.

⁵⁷ Negroponce, *Seeking Peace in El Salvador*, 18.

integration of these three groups, land owners, political elites, and the military was known as the oligarchy.⁵⁸ The oligarchy also owned the media. They controlled what was published, denying the opportunity for political expression to other possible contenders.⁵⁹ In sum, the oligarchy exercised control over the main source of the economy, the government, the media, and the military, using the latter to repress any kind of opposition. These dynamics of control limited the possibilities of implementing change through political institutions. Although periodic elections were carried out between 1948 and 1978, in 1979, military officers carried out a coup and implemented a revolutionary junta.

This authoritarian turn, characterized by violence, the lack of political opportunity, and an uneven and unjust society, triggered the consolidation of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* or FMLN), an insurgent movement that brought together five smaller insurgency groups that had formed in years prior.⁶⁰ The intensity of the conflict escalated from there, in large part as a result of an increase in FMLN membership and the tactics employed by the insurgents, which allowed them to take control of certain territories and obtain support from popular organizations.⁶¹

External actors also played an important role in the conflict; the conflict served as a proxy war during the Cold War, with the United States aligning itself with the Salvadoran government and the Soviet Union providing indirect assistance to the FMLN through Cuba and Nicaragua—likely intensifying and prolonging the conflict further.⁶² After significant bloodshed and a political stalemate, the Salvadoran civil war ended with the signature and successful implementation of the Chapultepec peace agreements in 1992.

⁵⁸ Negroponte, 18.

⁵⁹ Negroponte, 20.

⁶⁰ These included the Popular Liberation Forces (la Fuerza Popular de Liberación or FPL), the Popular Revolutionary Army (*Ejército Revolucionario Popular* or ERP), the Communist Party's Armed Forces of Liberation (*Partido Comunista de las Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación* or FAL), the National Resistance (*Resistencia Nacional* or RN), and the Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos* or PRTC).

⁶¹ Call, "Assessing El Salvador's Transition from Civil War to Peace," 385–86.

⁶² Negroponte, *Seeking Peace in El Salvador*, 1.

B. THE PEACE PROCESS

On January 16, 1992, the government of El Salvador and the FMLN sat together to sign the Chapultepec Peace Agreement. The agreement is the compilation of three different accords, which aimed to address different issues. First, the accords aimed to put a definitive end to the Salvadoran armed conflict by reforming military institutions and demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating former combatants into civilian society.⁶³ Second, “the accords intended to reform the constitution, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and reunify Salvadoran society.”⁶⁴ Third, they aimed to address social and economic problems and to establish the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (*Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz* or COPAZ). The mission of COPAZ was to facilitate necessary legislation, and to verify and oversee the implementation of the provisions in the Accords.⁶⁵

A further agreement included the reform of the judiciary in order to address issues related to human rights; the goal was to make the judiciary more independent by establishing the commission of the truth and a human rights prosecutor.⁶⁶ In a broad spectrum, the accords focused on human rights as well as political and military provisions because according to Antonio Cañas and Hector Dada, “it was electoral fraud, repressive security forces, and systematic violations of human rights that activated the latent social conflict in El Salvador and contributed to the outbreak and continuation of the war.”⁶⁷

The Chapultepec Peace Agreement in its eight chapters and various annexes describes the following:⁶⁸

⁶³ Negroponte, 131.

⁶⁴ United Nations, “Chapultepec Peace Agreement” (Security Council, 1992), 1–2, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Chapultepec_Peace_Agreement_16_January_1992.pdf.

⁶⁵ Negroponte, *Seeking Peace in El Salvador*, 131.

⁶⁶ Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, “Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador,” *Global Governance* 1, no. 2 (1995): 192.

⁶⁷ Antonio Cañas and Héctor Dada, “Political Transition and Institutionalization in El Salvador,” in *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*, ed. Cynthia Arnson (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 1999), 70.

⁶⁸ United Nations, “Chapultepec Peace Agreement,” 29–40.

- Violence-related reforms: The accords declared the cessation of the armed conflict. They included a ceasefire, the dismantlement of the military structure of the FMLN, separation of forces, and the UN's verification of all the factors previously mentioned.
- Military forces reform: This effort included changes in the military education system, the investigation and further dismissal of military officers who were found by the ad hoc commission to have committed human rights violations, and a reduction in military personnel, equipment, and budget. The reforms also included the establishment of a newly structured national police that would remain under the control of civilian leadership replacing the already existing police.
- Judicial system reforms: This component sought to guarantee the judiciary's independence from other powers and established a national counsel whose mission was to defend human rights.
- Electoral system reforms: This effort involved the creation of a special committee responsible for carrying out and verifying fair and free elections.
- Social and economic reforms: These reforms pursued sustained and more egalitarian economic development, guaranteed through agrarian loans and other measures. They sought, in the long term, to enable the reunification of Salvadoran society.
- Political reforms: This component created opportunities for the political integration of the FMLN, their organization as an official political party, and their participation in elections. To guarantee this process, it incorporated full guarantees and special security measures to protect any FMLN political leaders and granted them access to mass media. It also included measures to restore governance in conflict zones.

Finally, the Chapultepec agreement also incorporates provisions that directly describe the role of the UN in verifying the agreement, as well as a specific timetable for the implementation of each provision.

The peace accord implementation process was not easy, and the presence of active spoilers made any moderation between the parties even more difficult.⁶⁹ Balancing these extremist actors were three major domestic mediators: the Catholic Church (the Salvadoran archbishop), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the Jesuit community leadership.⁷⁰ International actors such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN mediated the peace effort,⁷¹ all of which were being supported by regional actors, particularly during the negotiations, motivated mainly to contain the conflict and keep it from reaching their borders.⁷² Within El Salvador, teachers, mayors, local NGOs, and community leaders played an important role of mediating in their small towns to allow for the conducting of daily activities.⁷³

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS

This section analyzes the implementation process for four of these provisions: military (DDR), political, judicial, and the involvement of the international community. These four provisions have been regarded as the most common provisions to be implemented in peace processes.⁷⁴ In this research economic funding is also considered an essential factor for the successful implementation of peace accords. For each of the provisions, I evaluate the experience of implementing the provision, the degree of success

⁶⁹ Negroponte, *Seeking Peace in El Salvador*, 1.

⁷⁰ Negroponte, 1.

⁷¹ Teresa Whitfield, "The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala: A Preliminary Comparison," in *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*, ed. Cynthia Arnson (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 1999), 257.

⁷² They included foreign ministers from Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela, later being replaced by Central American presidents led by the then Costa Rican president Oscar Arias Sanchez. Sanchez later received the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize for his role in resolving El Salvador and Nicaraguan conflicts.

⁷³ Jenny Pearce, "Sustainable Peace-Building in the South: Experiences from Latin America," *Development in Practice* 7, no. 4 (November 1997): 453, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614529754279>.

⁷⁴ Höglbladh, *Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset*, 44.

of this process, and the consequences of the successful or failed implementation of the provision.

1. Military Provisions (DDR)

This section evaluates the implementation of the DDR programs within the military provisions. Disarmament reduces uncertainty and the risk of the conflict restarting by taking away the main tool for war (arms) from combatants' hands. Demobilization aims to bring down the military structure of the insurgent group. Reintegration involves long-term social and economic programs like loans, education, and health care. To increase the likelihood of long-lasting peace, DDR provisions must be implemented diligently and promptly after the signing of the accords.

Chapter Seven of the Chapultepec accords established that the termination of the armed conflict should start on February 1, 1992 (D-day), and should be completed by October 31, 1992. The termination of the armed conflict comprised the cessation of armed activities, the demobilization, the dismantling of FMLN's military organization, handing over the weapons, and the reintegration of its personnel into civil society. Demobilization was to be conducted in two phases, the first one, from D-day until D-day + 5 and the second one from D-day + 6 until D-day + 30. During this time the Salvadoran Armed Forces (FAES) was to retreat to its different military facilities while the FMLN was to occupy their designated areas of concentration.⁷⁵ At the same time, ammunition, explosives, and improvised explosive devices (IED) and other war equipment was to be kept in storage awaiting its destruction. According to the agreement, weapons destruction was programmed to be held simultaneously in all concentration areas, between October 15 and 31, 1992. The UN was tasked to verify the implementation as well as to investigate any possible violation of these programs.⁷⁶

The process of demobilization started as established in Chapter Seven of the Chapultepec accords. The FAES and the FMLN were supposed to retreat progressively to

⁷⁵ United Nations, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement," 41.

⁷⁶ United Nations, 40–45.

their assigned places of concentration. But delays, especially by the FAES, meant the deadlines were not met. The intervention of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was necessary to restart the process. The FAES completed the concentration of the first group of troops on June 26, 1992. The FMLN also achieved the concentration of a percentage of its combatants according to what was agreed by June 26, 1992.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, problems transferring land titles pushed the FMLN to stop the concentration of the remaining troops until progress was made on these land transfers. In reaction to this situation, the FAES did the same and stopped its demobilization; at this point the process of demobilization stalled.⁷⁸ Again, ONUSAL intervened extending the deadline for both parties to complete the demobilization. Finally, ONUSAL announced that the process of demobilization was complete. On December 15, 1992, the conflict between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN was officially ended.⁷⁹ According to the Peace Accords Matrix, the process of demobilization in El Salvador was qualified as implemented on an intermediate scale during 1992. After 1993, the demobilization program was regarded as fully implemented.⁸⁰

The process of disarmament started in 1992 with two parallel activities; the submission of the report about the inventory of weapons in possession of the FMLN, and the disarming of FAES' civil defense units.⁸¹ The FMLN agreed to gather its armaments by the end of November and to start their further destruction on December 1, 1992. A series of delays were caused by the delivery of poorly maintained weapons by the FMLN.⁸² This

⁷⁷ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

⁷⁸ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

⁷⁹ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

⁸⁰ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

⁸¹ "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," United Nations Security Council, November 23, 1992, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement>.

⁸² "Letter Dated 11 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," United Nations Security Council, November 13, 1992, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement>.

situation triggered the dissatisfaction of ONUSAL with the FMLN's performance in the disarmament task. Finally, on November 30, 1992, the FMLN submitted the final set of weapons to ONUSAL. This time the number and the condition of weapons matched the expectations of ONUSAL, which finally authorized the destruction of the weapons.⁸³

On May 23, 1993, a large stash of armaments was found in neighboring Nicaragua. The FMLN confessed that they had not been honest about the total number of weapons they had and recognized the existence of more sites like this, both within and outside the borders of El Salvador. Despite their declaration of not having any intention to go back to hostilities, the peace process was seriously threatened. The FMLN ultimately committed to assist ONUSAL in locating and destroying a total of 114 arms caches. ONUSAL verified their total destruction on August 18, 1993. Later on, the FMLN announced that its military structure was fully disintegrated.⁸⁴ The process of disarmament went slower due to the delays previously mentioned. During 1992 and 1993 the process was in a minimum stage of implementation. After 1994 the implementation advanced into an intermediate stage that lasted until 1998. Full implementation was achieved after 1999, when the process of disarming the civilian population began.⁸⁵ The ceasefire between the FMLN and the government of El Salvador was never broken.⁸⁶

The process of reintegration of former combatants into society suffered a series of delays and difficulties. This was the slowest of the three programs. Credit deficiencies, lack of funds, and ineffective assistance programs affected mostly former FAES members. Also, a great number of family members of the victims of the conflict were denied the

⁸³ "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," United Nations Security Council, December 23, 1992, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement>.

⁸⁴ "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," United Nations Security Council, August 30, 1993, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement>.

⁸⁵ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

⁸⁶ Cañas and Dada, "Political Transition and Institutionalization in El Salvador," 73.

benefits of certain programs because the claimants lacked proper legal documentation.⁸⁷ It was not until 1997 that the program moved from minimum to full implementation. Yet, even after the reintegration program was regarded as complete, many of the former combatants from either the FAES or the FMLN remained unemployed. In this regard, Margarita Studemeister confirms that “In El Salvador, the demobilization of armed government and guerrilla forces left many combatants from both sides unemployed and maladjusted, contributing to a rise in public insecurity.”⁸⁸ This shows that, while conflict did not erupt again, the ineffective implementation of the reintegration programs nonetheless brought about a number of secondary social and economic effects that would allow for the growth of non-political social violence.

As a whole, even after delays and other difficulties, DDR programs in El Salvador were fully implemented. The retreat of legal troops in compliance with the agreements and the full demobilization, disarmament, and further reintegration of former belligerents were fundamental for the achievement of peace in el Salvador. The demobilization and concentration of the FMLN troops, the lack of access to weapons, and the possibility to receive land and other economic benefits allowed former combatants to see the benefits of re-entering society rather than returning to armed conflict. Even if the implementation of the DDR provisions moved slowly from minimum through intermediate stages to full implementation, it was, nonetheless, successful. The international community played a significant role in mediating and helping to overcome the difficulties during the implementation of DDR programs.

2. Political Provisions

Political provisions are included in peace processes to address governmental incompatibilities between armed groups whose goal is to achieve power of the state by challenging the actual government. Chapter Six of the Chapultepec agreement

⁸⁷ “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United Nations Security Council, March 24, 1995, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement>.

⁸⁸ Margarita Studemeister, “El Salvador Implementation of the Peace Accords,” *United States Institute of Peace* 31, no. 10 (2001): 5.

contemplates the creation of any legislative measure to guarantee the participation of FMLN in politics. This includes their legal transformation into a political party, guaranteed access to mass media, and special security measures, if required, by any of its members to avoid political violence.⁸⁹

On May 23, 1992 the FMLN declared itself a political party right after the Mexico City agreement was signed in April of the same year. The Mexico City agreement stated in its content that the FMLN and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (*Frente Democrático Revolucionario* or FDR) had the right to be recognized as political parties.⁹⁰ Yet the implementation of these measures should not have been put in place until their reaffirmation by the Chapultepec agreements in 1992. Within months of signing the Chapultepec agreement, the FMLN opened the space for political plurality. In this matter, Diana Negroponte informs that, “Ruben Zamora founded the Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Revolucionario or FDR) for the moderates within the movement, and Schafik Handal retained the leadership of the Salvadorian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Salvadoreña*).”⁹¹ Presidential elections were planned for March 1994, and observers from ONUSAL were requested for that event.⁹² Despite a low number of registered voters and several other difficulties, mainly logistical, the elections took place March 20, 1994, without any major inconvenience or alteration of the public order. ONUSAL’s commission considered the elections acceptable. A run-off election was held because none of the presidential candidates received a majority of votes.⁹³ Many of the problems shown during the first round were addressed, allowing the second round to be held with no major issues. Armando Calderon Sol, from the *Alianza Republicana*

⁸⁹ United Nations, “Chapultepec Peace Agreement,” 39.

⁹⁰ Negroponte, *Seeking Peace in El Salvador*, 136.

⁹¹ Negroponte, 137.

⁹² University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix.”

⁹³ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

Nacionalista (ARENA) party, was elected president after registering 68 percent of the votes.⁹⁴

Political reforms, FMLN's transformation into a political party, and its access to media helped to achieve deep changes in the political process, allowing political pluralism and free and fair elections. By 1994, political provisions in El Salvador were qualified as fully implemented.⁹⁵ This level of implementation and the fact that political violence was almost nonexistent during this stage⁹⁶ helped to appease the confrontational environment between the historical enemies, avoiding the resumption of the conflict by increasing their trust in one another and in the process itself.

3. Judicial Provisions

Chapter Three of the Chapultepec agreement stipulated reforms in the Salvadoran judicial system as well as the creation of new institutions. The main goal of these reforms was to detach the judicial system from other sectors of the government and political parties, in order to achieve independence and transparency.⁹⁷ The new system required the approval of two thirds of the legislature to approve Supreme Court members, thus reducing the opportunities for impunity.⁹⁸ The agreement also stated the creation of the new National Public Security Academy (*Academia Nacional de Seguridad Publica* or ANSP), the Truth Commission, the judicial training school, as well as the national police and its new doctrine.⁹⁹ By 1997, the reform to the national police was completed and fully implemented. The new National Civil Police (PNC) was considered to be more efficient than its predecessor.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

⁹⁵ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

⁹⁶ Cañas and Dada, "Political Transition and Institutionalization in El Salvador," 73.

⁹⁷ United Nations, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement," 29.

⁹⁸ Cañas and Dada, "Political Transition and Institutionalization in El Salvador," 72.

⁹⁹ De Soto and del Castillo, "Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador," 190.

¹⁰⁰ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

The Truth Commission was established and fully implemented by 1993. This commission made a great contribution in documenting grave violations of human rights, but despite its efforts some of its recommendations were never implemented. Right after its report became official, the government of President Alfredo Cristiani sanctioned a general amnesty benefiting both the FAES and the FMLN. This act generated a negative perception within the population towards the judiciary because the amnesty was seen as a straight hit against truth and reconciliation by promoting impunity.¹⁰¹

As previously mentioned, the judiciary training school was created. Around six percent of the state's budget was allocated to the judiciary to facilitate its efficiency, independence, and neutrality.¹⁰² But despite these positive aspects, the system remained inefficient.¹⁰³ The Truth Commission, the judicial training school, and the civil national police were fully implemented. In contrast, the reforms to the existing judicial system remained at an intermediate level of implementation and were regarded as inefficient.¹⁰⁴ This partial implementation, however, did not affect the course of the peace process. In fact, the amnesty enjoyed by the parties made the processes even more appealing to them, reassuring their judicial status, and reducing uncertainties about their legal future.

4. The Involvement of the International Community

The implementation of peace processes is typically conducted in an environment of uncertainty, mistrust, and fear, in which restarting the confrontation is more likely to happen. These factors demand the assistance and involvement of a third, external and neutral party during the whole peace process, including the implementation phase. Here, the involvement of the international community becomes indispensable in performing

¹⁰¹ Cañas and Dada, "Political Transition and Institutionalization in El Salvador," 73.

¹⁰² United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," November 23, 1992.

¹⁰³ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

¹⁰⁴ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

different roles like monitoring, observing, and mediating between parties in moments of critical tension.¹⁰⁵

Resolution 693 of May 20, 1991, opened the doors to ONUSAL. Its mission as described in the Chapultepec agreements was to verify the accomplishment and proper implementation of the agreements signed in New York, Mexico City, San Jose, and Chapultepec. Also, ONUSAL was to be the institution in charge of coordinating any other international cooperation.

ONUSAL had three main divisions: Military, Human Rights, and Police. Several direct interventions through mediation between the parties during moments of tension, and several extensions requested by the parties followed ONUSAL's involvement in El Salvador.¹⁰⁶ ONUSAL's verification was extensive; it included several different fields of action. The ONUSAL Human Rights Division conducted a series of investigations that resulted in lengthy reports about human rights violations committed by both parties.¹⁰⁷ ONUSAL's presence was also requested to monitor the elections in March 1994, as well as to provide professional assistance and guidance through its police division to the national civil police. ONUSAL's Military Division was involved in observing compliance with DDR programs, and in mediating during the stalled moments of the demobilization and disarmament. Its intervention reinforced the trust of the parties as they pulled back and handed over their weapons.¹⁰⁸

ONUSAL's observing mission was officially dissolved by the United Nations on April 30, 1995. Due to pending implementation of some provisions, ONUSAL

¹⁰⁵ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure in International Mediation"; Arnson, *Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of Violence*; Mezzera, Pavicic, and Specker, "Governance Components in Peace Agreements."; Shinn and Dobbins, *Afghan Peace Talks*; Mattes and Savun, "Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design."; and Stanley and Holiday, "Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibility: Peace Implementation in Guatemala."

¹⁰⁶ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia," December 26, 2018, <http://undocs.org/es/S/2018/1159>.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations General Assembly, "Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador," November 13, 1992, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement>.

¹⁰⁸ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

recommended the creation of the Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador (MINUSAL), which was comprised of police advisors and other professional staff members. MINUSAL was subsequently replaced by the United Nations Office of Verification (ONUV), a small group whose mission was to verify the last stages of implementation of the provisions.¹⁰⁹ In 1996, the UN withdrew its mission from El Salvador, and in June 1998 the few remaining ONUV members completed their peace accord verification.¹¹⁰

The United Nations played a very important role in El Salvador by observing, verifying, and contributing to institution building, and by mediating with great impartiality during a number of difficult moments or potential crises during the implementation of the peace accords. The UN's presence in El Salvador brought a stable environment to the process that would have not been under other conditions. That stability is very important during the implementation of peace processes due to the confrontational nature of the parties involved. Without a third party to diminish the animosity the most likely result would be the resumption of conflict.¹¹¹ The monitoring and verification mechanism provision was regarded as the quickest to be fully implemented.¹¹² The prompt deployment of the UN mission established a strong basis for the implementation of the rest of the provisions.

5. Economic Funding

Economic funding is a core aspect of any peace process. Its importance lies in the fact that every provision, program, and institutional reform needs money to be properly implemented. Establishing long-lasting peace is an expensive process¹¹³ that requires the

¹⁰⁹ United Nations General Assembly, "Office of the United Nations Verification in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General," November 25, 1996, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement>.

¹¹⁰ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

¹¹¹ Studemeister, "El Salvador Implementation of the Peace Accords," 6.

¹¹² University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

¹¹³ Wennmann, "Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable Peacebuilding," 44.

allocation of domestic and foreign funds. The proper implementation of peace agreements (some provisions being more critical than others) will result in enduring peace. In the contrast, failure to allocate the funds needed to support the implementation of an agreement can bring the process to points of crisis and even cause the return of hostilities. Unfortunately, much of the literature tends to ignore the importance of funding as a central component of the implementation process.¹¹⁴

The funding of the peace process in El Salvador was considerable. Since the peace accords were signed, El Salvador received an average of \$400 million per year in foreign aid from different sources.¹¹⁵ The United States has been the largest bilateral donor, and Germany, Japan, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands following this list. The multilateral organizations included the World Food Programme, World Health Organization, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.¹¹⁶ These resources provided military and social stabilization during the implementation of the agreements. Despite donors' efforts, some issues slowed down the process of implementation of certain programs. One of these issues was the allocation of funds itself. An estimate of needed funds totaled \$1.8 billion. The government of El Salvador committed \$408 million of its own resources to meet this need. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) pledged reported a total of \$739 million, which meant that \$682 million were still needed.¹¹⁷ Another problem involved the discrepancies between the priorities established by the government and those established by other donors. According to James Boyce while the government and the United States dedicated more than 75 percent of their money to "higher priority programs" such as the PNC, land transfer programs, democratic and judicial institutions, poverty alleviation programs, and the reintegration of

¹¹⁴ Wennmann, "Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable Peacebuilding"; Boyce and O'Donnell, *Peace and the Public Purse*; Azpuru, "Peace and Democratization in Guatemala"; and Edis, "Mozambique's Successful Peace Process."

¹¹⁵ James Boyce, "External Assistance and the Peace Process in El Salvador," *World Development* 23, no. 12 (1995): 2102.

¹¹⁶ Boyce, 2102.

¹¹⁷ Boyce, 2102.

former combatants; other donors devoted 78 percent of their funding to “lower priority programs.”¹¹⁸

The lack of funds in certain programs had a direct impact on the implementation of the agreement. For example the purchase of land was affected by the shortage of funds, especially early during the implementation. Failure to provide land or credit for tools and seed was used by the leadership of the FMLN as an excuse to slow down the demobilization of about 30,000 people.¹¹⁹ To address the land problem, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and European donors provided extra funds. Even though the money was marked for land programs, it was used for different programs. The result was that by June 1994, only 25 percent of those eligible for credit had taken possession of land. This number was not close to the goal of 47,500 beneficiaries.¹²⁰ Despite budget shortages and mismanagement, by 1995 approximately \$1.8 billion had been spent in support of the peace accords in El Salvador. An additional \$1.3 billion were promised by the international community to support the full implementation of the programs.¹²¹ By November 1996, almost 99 percent of probable recipients had received land titles, and 87 percent of those had completed the necessary documentation in the national registry.¹²²

Even when in certain moments the funds to implement the peace accords seemed short, the government of El Salvador made a great effort to provide what was available in an attempt to comply with the agreements. Also the participation of the international donors with large amounts of money reinforced the commitment to peace. In Boyce’s words “External assistance has done much to fund the costs of peace in El Salvador. In general, implementation of the programs mandated by the Peace Accords has not been seriously

¹¹⁸ Boyce, 2105.

¹¹⁹ Negroponte, *Seeking Peace in El Salvador*, 134.

¹²⁰ Negroponte, 150.

¹²¹ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix.”

¹²² United Nations General Assembly, “Office of the United Nations Verification in El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General.”

hampered by a lack of external resources.”¹²³ In general terms, the implementation of the different programs established in the peace accords was successful; the allocation of funds granted the full implementation of all the provisions included in the Chapultepec accords.

Even though social violence and insecurity in El Salvador increased after the peace process, they were not caused by direct confrontation between the government and the FMLN. Social and economic issues can be attributed as the possible main causes, although further investigation and analysis are necessary to address this situation. Table 1 shows the level of implementation of the five provisions, and the total implementation of the agreement as a whole in El Salvador.

Table 1. Percentage of peace accord programs implementation in El Salvador

Provisions	Level of Implementation
Military (DDR)	Full
Political	Full
Judicial	Intermediate
Involvement of International Community	Full
Economic Funding	Full
% of implementation	96% after 10 years

D. CONCLUSION

The El Salvador peace process presents an interesting case study in which one can observe how the provisions analyzed serve a specific purpose influencing the development of the peace process. The involvement of the international community, economic funding, and demobilization and disarming proved to be fundamental for the success of the peace process, while political and judicial provisions played a different role by reinforcing the achievements of the previous three provisions.

In El Salvador, the international community played two main roles. First, the prompt implementation of UN’s missions and the assistance provided by monitoring,

¹²³ Boyce, “External Assistance and the Peace Process in El Salvador,” 2113.

verifying, and mediating increased the trust between the FMLN and the government, reducing the uncertainty in almost every stage of the implementation. Second, the international community, through its economic funding, guaranteed the implementation of the programs established in the accords. Deficiencies in funding, on the other hand, resulted in poor implementation of the reintegration programs. Though these programs aimed to address socio-economic issues for former combatants seeking to be part of the Salvadoran society, their limited success did not affect the outcome of the peace process itself.

Implementation of the demobilization and disarming programs is fundamental for a successful peace process. Demobilizing the troops results in them abandoning their areas of dominance. It also helps to dissolve their military structure, reducing its strength and capacity to resume fighting. Disarming completes the process of demobilization, removing the weapons from the combatants' hands and, in so doing, eliminating the risk of an accidental or intentional armed confrontation. After handing over its weapons, the FMLN was obligated to seek the UN's assistance instead of resuming the conflict when the process stalled.

In the case of El Salvador, political provisions seem to have played a more supportive, rather than central, role in guaranteeing the end of the conflict. The participation of the FMLN in politics brought opportunity for representation for those who did not have that opportunity before and strengthened the trust between parties and the peace process itself.

Judicial provisions similarly played a secondary role in El Salvador. Their partial implementation and the deficiencies shown during and after the peace process did not affect the process in a critical way. The implementation of a total amnesty for the members of the FAES and FMLN reduced the uncertainty about their legal future, increasing their will to comply with the agreements.

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III. LUSAKA ACCORDS: IMPLEMENTING WAR IN ANGOLA

This chapter evaluates the implementation phase of the Lusaka Accords in Angola. The goal of this analysis is to evaluate the effects and consequences that the degree of implementation of certain provisions had on the outcome of the peace process. The resumption of conflict four years after the signature of the Lusaka accords makes this an informative case study. According to the Peace Accords Matrix, only 54 percent of the provisions were implemented, ultimately resulting in the failure of the peace process in Angola.¹²⁴ Assessing which provisions were implemented effectively, which remained unimplemented, and what challenges were encountered throughout the implementation phase should shed light on the central threats to successful peace processes. The analyses should provide a clear view of which provisions require a more detailed and prompt effort of implementation to guarantee long-lasting peace after the signature of a peace agreement.

The chapter first presents background about the conflict. This section describes why the conflict in Angola started, its social consequences, and the attempts made to end it. Second, the chapter describes the content of the Lusaka peace accords, their principal reforms, and the provisions established to solve the main incompatibilities that sparked the conflict. Third, the chapter presents a detailed analysis of the military (DDR), political, and judicial provisions, the involvement of the international community, and the economic funding allocated to the process. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing how the degree of implementation of these provisions influenced the failure of the peace process in Angola.

A. CONFLICT BACKGROUND

The Angolan armed conflict was long and complex. The conflict dates back to the country's struggle for independence, during which multiple nationalist groups waged war against the Portuguese forces.¹²⁵ By the time Portuguese rule collapsed in January 1975,

¹²⁴ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix," 2015, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lusaka-protocol>.

¹²⁵ Ian S. Spears, "Angola's Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord," *International Journal* 54, no. 4 (1999): 563, <https://doi.org/10.2307/40203416>.

three main liberation movements remained: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), whose leader Jonas Savimbi used to be part of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). After independence from Portugal, and despite their common goal of an independent nation, these three liberation movements engaged in an internal conflict for control of the new country's government.¹²⁶

Two main factors worked against these three rebel movements finding an agreement that avoided the internal conflict in Angola. First was their ethnic roots; the MPLA was mostly composed of Mbundu people. The FNLA consisted of Bakongo people who resided in northern Angola. UNITA was formed mostly by Ovimbundu citizens from the highlands of central Angola.

Second was the incompatibility of their ideologies. While UNITA and the FNLA were rural based and anti-communist groups, the MPLA was more urban-oriented and espoused a Marxist doctrine.¹²⁷ To make this mixture even more volatile, not only local groups participated in the conflict. The conflict in Angola also involved various external actors. Zaire supported the FNLA, and South Africa supported UNITA. The United States supported both UNITA and FNLA. The Soviet Union and Cuba supported the MPLA. This support became the factor that tilted the scale in favor of the MPLA. The two other insurgent groups—UNITA and FNLA—eventually joined forces against the MPLA. Finally, in 1975, the MPLA succeeded in taking over the government by military means. UNITA remained as MPLA's main opposition militarily and political opposition, prolonging the conflict for almost three decades.¹²⁸

The 27 years during which the conflict in Angola took place can be divided into three main periods: (1) from the independence of Angola from Portugal in 1975 to the signing of the Bicesse accords in 1991, (2) from the presidential elections in 1992 to the

¹²⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Angola Unravels," Section III, accessed October 10, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/Ang1998-04.htm#TopOfPage>.

¹²⁷ UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Angola," 2014, 1, https://web.archive.org/web/20141218095556/http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=4®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa.

¹²⁸ Human Rights Watch, "Angola Unravels," Section III.

signing of the Lusaka accords in 1994, and (3) from the failure of the Lusaka accords in 1998 to the assassination of Jonas Savimbi in 2002, which represented the military victory of the government over UNITA.¹²⁹ Two recent peace processes sought to resolve the conflict by peaceful means: the 1991 Bicesse accords and the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. Both of these peace accords failed and resulted in the return to conflict.¹³⁰ In early 1999, soon after the collapse of the Lusaka accords, a large humanitarian crisis was sparked: over a quarter million Angolans were displaced from their residences, and this number increased to one million in almost six months. In the central region of Angola, two cities, Kuito and Malanje, alone reported 270,000 displaced people. Violence also affected the agriculture in the region, reducing the production of food. International aid also was interrupted; organizations like CARE and the World Food Programme could not send their convoys to help the displaced Angolans.¹³¹

By the end of the conflict in 2002, more than a half million people had perished and over double that number had been displaced within Angola's territory. The conflict also brought serious consequences to Angola's economy, infrastructure, religious institutions, and public administration.¹³²

B. THE PEACE ACCORDS

The Lusaka Protocol was signed in Lusaka, Zambia on November 20, 1994, between Faustino Muteka, representing the government of Angola, and Eugénio Ngolo, on behalf of UNITA.¹³³ The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Angola, Alioune Blondin Beye, was the third signatory of the protocol. The Lusaka peace process was carried out under the auspices of the UN and those governments designated to observe it, which included the Russian Federation, Portugal, and the United States. Though its

¹²⁹ UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Angola."

¹³⁰ Spears, "Angola's Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord," 566.

¹³¹ Spears, 563.

¹³² UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Angola."

¹³³ Amnesty International, *Angola the Lusaka Protocol: What Prospect for Human Rights?*, AFR No. 12/02/96 (London: Amnesty International, 1996), 1.

signature was mistakenly regarded as the “conclusion” to Angola’s violent “Third War,”¹³⁴ the protocol brought temporary hopes to millions who had been affected by the conflict.

The Lusaka Protocol through its Annexes aimed to achieve four different goals. First, it intended to improve and to implement the provisions described in the Bicesse peace accords signed in Lisbon in 1991. Originally these accords sought to accomplish: first, the achievement of a ceasefire between both parties. Second, they aimed to ensure that UNITA’s members recognize the actual government of Angola until new elections could be held. Third, the accords paved the way for the legal participation of UNITA in politics. Fourth, they established a common agreement on constitutional changes between the parties. Fifth, they ensured free and fair presidential elections. Sixth, the accords also ensured respect for human rights. Seventh, restructuring of the National Army was set down in the protocol. And, eighth, it provided for the announcement to general public about the beginning of the ceasefire.¹³⁵

The second goal of the Lusaka Protocol was to establish and improve the electoral institutions created after the 1992 presidential elections. UNITA would accept elections and, in return, the government would guarantee UNITA’s participation in politics. Third, the protocol sought the achievement of enduring peace based on the reconciliation of the actors and the victims of the conflict. It intended to accomplish this by demobilizing and disarming UNITA’s troops and with these troops abandoning the territory under their control. Furthermore, the protocol sought the establishment of the United Nations Security Council’s mandates, allowing the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) to oversee the implementation of the accords. A different pact negotiated between the parties would allow the government of Angola and UNITA to divide Angola’s income.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Peace agreements should, importantly, not be viewed as an ‘ending’ to something rather than a ‘beginning’ in which the parties to conflict have formally agreed to address their differences in non-violent ways.

¹³⁵ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), “The Bicesse Agreement,” December 18, 2014, 18–19, https://web.archive.org/web/20141218095556/http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=4®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa.

¹³⁶ Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” 566.

The Lusaka Protocol in its ten annexes (chapters) established that the groups in conflict were committed to:¹³⁷

- *Implementation of the agenda:* The parties agreed to follow a specific agenda for the peace talks, which included the main provisions.
- *Commitment to the Protocol:* Both parties officially re-affirmed their acceptance of the main legal instruments and content of the protocol as the basis for the peace in Angola.
- *Military issues:* It included the reestablishment of the ceasefire, the retreat, concentration, and demilitarization of all UNITA troops and disarming of all the civilian population, among others.
- *The national police:* Its reorganization and the inclusion of UNITA's personnel as its members. National reconciliation that included, among others, the participation of UNITA in the different levels of the governmental administration as well as in the diplomatic missions abroad.
- *Completion of the electoral process:* It focused mostly on a second round of free and fair presidential elections, and the necessary measures to guarantee its development.
- *The United Nations mandate:* This point established the role of the observers and the joint commission within the whole process; a timetable for the implementation of the protocol; and finally other matters.

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS

This section analyzes the implementation process for four provisions: military (DDR), political, judicial, and the involvement of the international community as well as the funds available to support their implementation. For each provision individually I

¹³⁷ United Nations, "Lusaka Protocol," Security Council, 2–66, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Lusaka_Peace_Accord.pdf.

evaluate the degree of implementation and its influence in the final outcome of the peace process.

1. Military Provisions (DDR)

Annexes III and IV (Military Issues I and II) of the Lusaka Protocol included a military provision to restart the ceasefire on D-day+15, which coincided with the official signing of the Lusaka Protocol. The accord also included that the armed forces and UNITA should pull back from their areas of influence into concentration areas. There, both groups would initiate the process of reduction for the armed forces and demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration for UNITA. During this time, hostile propaganda against each other was forbidden. Also, the government would collect the weapons held by the Angolan civil population. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEMII) would verify the compliance with the agreements.¹³⁸

The demobilization program in Angola did not see a good start and certainly did not have a good end. A full year after signing the Lusaka Protocol, the UNITA troops started to demobilize. By 1995, little progress was made and only 363 UNITA members out of an approximate of 50 to 60 thousand had demobilized. Apparently, the majority of these were children with weapons in bad condition.¹³⁹ In regard to this situation, the Secretary-General stated, “It is disturbing that, more than one year after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol (which ended the war in November 1994), the quartering of UNITA troops—one of the central elements in the peace process—has not made any significant progress.”¹⁴⁰ After this point, no real demonstrations of will to comply with the agreements were made. UNITA’s few attempts to demobilize its troops were characterized by situations in which a large percentage of the personnel demobilized were not real

¹³⁸ United Nations, 8–19.

¹³⁹ United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” December 7, 1995, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lusaka-protocol>.

¹⁴⁰ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix,” 2015.

UNITA members.¹⁴¹ In some cases, these people could not even disassemble their own weapons. By the end of 1997, all 15 UNITA concentration areas and demobilization sites were closed. In a last effort to solve the situation, MONUA and the warring parties established a new final timetable for demobilization. This new timetable was supposed to be completed at the end of February 1998, but no further demobilization efforts were made. By this time, violence was common, especially in the countryside.

In 1998, MONUA's staff was removed from the territory.¹⁴² According to the Peace Accords Matrix, the demobilization program had only reached an intermediate level of implementation and, as such, ultimately failed to achieve its aim.¹⁴³ This failure to demobilize UNITA's troops had major consequences for the other components of the DDR programs (disarmament and reintegration).

The implementation of the disarmament program in Angola showed similar characteristics as that of the demobilization one. There were significant delays in the process of handing over weapons; few weapons were turned over and, in many cases, the weapons that were handed over were those in very poor condition.¹⁴⁴ In 1996, a UN report showed that 20,039 UNITA troops were concentrated in their designated areas and only 16,837 weapons were turned over.¹⁴⁵ The same year and after many delays, UNITA finally handed over a significant number of weapons (28,762 personal weapons and 3,969 heavy ones).¹⁴⁶ The constant access to weaponry allowed UNITA to conduct different armed actions that were categorized as direct violations of the Lusaka Protocol, many of those during 1995 and 1996. These included the March 1995 shooting down of a UNAVEM III

¹⁴¹ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

¹⁴² United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)," November 23, 1998, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lusaka-protocol>.

¹⁴³ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix," 2015.

¹⁴⁴ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

¹⁴⁵ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)." June 17, 1998.

¹⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)," October 4, 1996.

helicopter in Quibaxe.¹⁴⁷ By 1998, and according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “the conflict in Angola was coded as a “war,” reaching over 1000 total deaths in that year.”¹⁴⁸ According to Ian Spears, “Many believed that Savimbi retained a residual force of his best fighters and most lethal equipment as insurance against further government offensives or to launch one of his own.”¹⁴⁹

The reintegration of the former combatants depended on their previous demobilization and disarmament. The program in Angola was designed to assist the integration of demobilized soldiers into society and to provide counseling, vocational assistance, business orientation, loans and tools, as well as funds for short-term initiatives.¹⁵⁰ The humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit delivered food, medical assistance, and other social programs for demobilized UNITA troops and over 100,000 of their relatives who were also concentrated in the assigned areas.¹⁵¹ By June 1997, according to a UN Security Council report, “over 23,000 demobilized soldiers and their dependents had been transported to their areas of origin or choice and provided with basic medical care and multi-purpose reintegration kits.”¹⁵² By 1998 the number of ex-combatants increased but not significantly. It was reported that lack of funds was a main issue for all the reintegration projects.¹⁵³ Well-armed, trained, and socially excluded combatants saw in violence a more profitable way of living than the one offered by peace.

In Angola, the poor implementation of the DDR programs proved to have serious consequences in the outcome of the peace process. A large number of mobilized troops and

¹⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Angola Unravels,” Section V.

¹⁴⁸ UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, “Angola.”

¹⁴⁹ Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” 567.

¹⁵⁰ U.N. Security Council, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” June 5, 1997, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lusaka-protocol>.

¹⁵¹ United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III).”

¹⁵² U.N. Security Council, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III),” June 5, 1997, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lusaka-protocol>.

¹⁵³ United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA).” June 17, 1998.

easy access to a large number of weapons empowered UNITA to conduct violent actions basically during the whole process of implementation. Also, an apparent lack of funds condemned an already disorganized reintegration program, leaving the combatants no more choices but to go back to conflict.

2. Political Provisions

Angola's first elections as an independent nation were held in September 1992. A high number of voters were registered to attend the elections. These numbers were expected, as that was the Angolans' first chance to express their political preferences.¹⁵⁴ In this opportunity, President Dos Santos, of the MPLA, won with 49.6 percent of the vote, defeating Savimbi, of UNITA, who received 40.7 percent.¹⁵⁵ This result meant that an election runoff needed to be held. Despite the fact that UN and other foreign observers stated that this election process was free and fair,¹⁵⁶ Savimbi rejected the results of the elections and decided to return to full-scale conflict. This conflict lasted until 1994 with the signature of the Lusaka Protocol.

Annex 7 of the Lusaka Protocol established the procedures to complete the electoral process initiated during the implementation of the Bicesse accords. In order to conclude this process, a second round of presidential elections would be held. This would also open the door for the implementation of a democratic culture in Angola.¹⁵⁷

Annex 6 (National Reconciliation) in the Lusaka Protocol in Angola included the modification of the government in order to allow a power-sharing style. In this case UNITA members would occupy 17 positions in the executive and 70 seats in the parliament. Different sources suggested many of these positions for UNITA members were filled

¹⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Angola Unravels," Section III.

¹⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, Section III.

¹⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch, Section III.

¹⁵⁷ United Nations, "Lusaka Protocol," 42–43.

between 1994 and 1996, including 11 in the executive branch and some parliamentary seats.¹⁵⁸

The Lusaka Protocol also included in its political provisions that UNITA could be legalized as a political party. Yet, no election or any preparatory effort took place between 1994 and 1995.¹⁵⁹ In 1996, Savimbi called for the Angolan president to legalize UNITA as a political party and to declare an amnesty. According to Savimbi, a positive response from the government to these two requests would have been the basis for improving other military provisions; no official response from the government was released in regard to UNITA's request.¹⁶⁰ In 1998, UNITA finally became a legal political party and was headed by Savimbi. Later that year, however, the National Assembly repealed Savimbi's position in UNITA, suggesting he was unable to meet party obligations.¹⁶¹ The same year, MONUA reported that UNITA and the Angolan government were actively engaged in war against each other.¹⁶²

The implementation of political provisions in Angola was characterized by a series of delays. Four years after the signing of the protocol, almost no advances had been made in the implementation. This caused this provision to remain at its minimum level of implementation. The mediocre implementation of political provisions in Angola probably did not drive the return to conflict on its own. Poor demobilization and an abundance of weapons already had the parties on the verge of conflict. Furthermore, the lack of strong political provisions could not grow enough trust and commitment between the parties to prevent the restarting of the conflict.

¹⁵⁸ Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M Regan, "Annualized Implementation Data on Comprehensive Intrastate Peace Accords, 1989–2012," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 4 (2015): 555.

¹⁵⁹ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

¹⁶⁰ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix," 2015.

¹⁶¹ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)."

¹⁶² United Nations Security Council.

3. Judicial Provisions

The Lusaka Protocol did not specify judicial provisions per se. There were, however, provisions on police reform and national reconciliation that included unclear parameters for an amnesty. Annex 5 (Police Reform) in the Lusaka Protocol established three main reforms to be carried out. First, there was the insertion of over 6,000 UNITA troops into the already existent Angolan National Police (ANP) after the completion of the demobilization program. Second, there was the verification of the ANP activities during the implementation stage, and third, it included the demobilization of the Rapid Reaction Police Force (RRPF).¹⁶³ According to UNAVEM III (the UN Angola Verification Mission), CIVIPOL contingency (Civilian Police observers), by 1996, no single UNITA troop had been integrated into the ANP; the progress was hampered by persistent fighting. By late 1996, a mere 5,458 RRPF officers in 13 camps had been quartered. In 1997 the police reform provisions were minimally implemented. No reports were made on the selection and integration processes into ANP by 1998. CIVIPOL continued with its mandate well into late 1998, reporting human rights abuses and the conditions of Angolan prisons until the conflict restarted.¹⁶⁴

The national reconciliation provisions included that UNITA's leadership would receive private homes, governmental offices, ministries, and embassies, among others.¹⁶⁵ National reconciliation also included a section for amnesty that states in its Annex 6:

In the spirit of National Reconciliation, all Angolans should forgive and forget the offenses resulting from the Angolan conflict and face the future with tolerance and confidence. Furthermore, the competent institutions will grant an amnesty in accordance with Article 88(h) of the Constitutional Law, for illegal acts committed by anyone prior to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, in the context of the current conflict.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix," 2015.

¹⁶⁴ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

¹⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch, "Angola Unravels," Section IV.

¹⁶⁶ United Nations, "Lusaka Protocol," 27.

It is difficult to assess the real reach of the amnesty provision, especially because the amnesty article is clear about pardoning crimes committed before the signing of the Lusaka accord. Violence continued not long after the signing and the government did not make big efforts to implement the amnesty between 1994 and 1998, even after several requests by UNITA, or after both parties used it as tool for putting pressure on their counterpart. Neither the reforms to the police nor the amnesty were ultimately put in place.

4. The Involvement of the International Community

Annex 8 of the Lusaka Protocol stated that the government and UNITA would commit themselves to protect and respect the UN mission, its personnel, property, and its mandates. The protocol also provided the UN with the task of verifying, supervising, overseeing, controlling, mediating, and monitoring the parties' actions concerning the provisions in the accord.¹⁶⁷

The international effort to oversee the Lusaka Protocol was led by the UN. But it did not start with the signature of the Lusaka accords. The UN established its presence well before, with its UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), which was active from January 1989 until May 1991. The first verification mission received the task to verify the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.¹⁶⁸ After the task was completed, UNAVEM II was established, replacing UNAVEM I between June 1991 and February 1995. Its mission was to verify the compliance with the peace agreements by the Angolan government and UNITA with the Bicesse accords, which included the elections in 1992.¹⁶⁹

The result of these elections sparked a new conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA; this conflict would be eased by the signing of the Lusaka accords. UNAVEM II kept its presence in Angola until 1995. According to the UN, "On 8 February 1995, the Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAVEM III with a maximum strength of 7,000 troops and military support personnel, 350 military observers, 260 police

¹⁶⁷ United Nations, 48–54.

¹⁶⁸ United Nations, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission III," accessed October 23, 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unavem_p.htm.

¹⁶⁹ United Nations.

observers and some 420 internationally recruited civilian staff, 300 locally recruited staff and 75 United Nations Volunteers. The date envisaged by the Council for the completion of the UNAVEM III mandate was February 1997.”¹⁷⁰ The UN mission in Angola was the largest peacekeeping operation in the world, but it was not until 1996 that UNAVEM III reached its full strength,¹⁷¹ though the Lusaka Protocol was signed in 1994. The delay in the deployment of UN troops had a very negative impact on the process. In the first place, the lack of enough peacekeeping troops allowed serious violations of human rights between the parties.¹⁷² These human rights violations and the impunity that accompanied them injured the confidence of the parties in the peace process. Second, several sanctions and oil and weapons embargoes were imposed on UNITA. The lack of action from the UN to enforce these sanctions allowed UNITA to maintain its normal activities against the government. It was not until 1998 that the UN finally targeted the exports of diamonds from areas under the control of UNITA and the group’s bank accounts. The delay in applying such measures allowed UNITA to purchase guns and fuel that were used to maintain its military strength during the implementation of the accords.¹⁷³ According to Spears:

Under siege, the government accused the United Nations Observer Mission of failing to monitor effectively UNITA’s disarmament and demobilization. For the United Nations, which had committed US\$1.5 billion and 7,000 peacekeepers to the Angolan peace process, the breakdown of the Lusaka Protocol was an embarrassment.¹⁷⁴

Despite that, the Peace Accords Matrix coded the implementation of the mechanisms for verification and monitoring as fully implemented.¹⁷⁵ And despite the last efforts of the UN to control UNITA’s actions and finances, the mixture of the delay in

¹⁷⁰ United Nations.

¹⁷¹ Human Rights Watch, “Angola Unravels,” Section I.

¹⁷² Human Rights Watch, Section I.

¹⁷³ Human Rights Watch, Section I.

¹⁷⁴ Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” 569.

¹⁷⁵ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix,” 2015.

deploying UNAVEM's troops, serious human rights violations, constant impunity, and the access to natural resources, weapons, and fuel allowed UNITA to maintain its strength, posing a serious threat to the process, to the point of resuming the conflict in full scale.

5. Economic Funding

In Angola, the allocation of resources to implement the Lusaka Protocol is not very specific. But still, the data available show significant economic support, especially by international donors, including the UN, the United States, and members of the European Union. Unfortunately, the economic assistance to the Lusaka Protocol suffered a progressive reduction in response to the increasing violation of the accords and human rights. The participation of the United States in the Lusaka accords was substantial; it provided half a billion dollars for humanitarian aid and for establishing democratic institutions.¹⁷⁶ The United States also provided almost 30 percent of the UN's operation costs in Angola, and over 50 percent of the relief operations costs, among other donations provided during the implementation of the accords.¹⁷⁷ The involvement of the United States was also indirect, by providing loans and purchasing about 50 percent of Angola's oil exports. This assistance not only played a direct role in economic support to Angola, it also served as a tool to put pressure on the parties during critical moments caused by the violations of the protocol.¹⁷⁸

The European Union also contributed to the effort of implementing peace in Angola. EU funds were used in the deployment of human rights monitors, mine clearance, and support of the demobilization of ex-combatants.¹⁷⁹ As time went by the European Union realized that the situation in Angola was deteriorating. The European Union criticized UNITA's poor compliance in its demilitarization, as well as detailed information about its military forces. In 1998, right before the complete failure of the Lusaka accords,

¹⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Clinton Administration Policy And Human Rights in Africa, A Human Rights Watch Short Report" vol.10, no. 1 (1998).

¹⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Angola Unravels," Section XII.

¹⁷⁸ Human Rights Watch, Section XII.

¹⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch, Section XII.

the EU invested about \$100 million in urgent socio-economic projects.¹⁸⁰ In 1998 as well, the British government cut its economic assistance to Angola due the failure on governance and human rights matters. On July 8, the same year, the European Union reported that it had officially put in place the UN sanctions, blocking UNITA's bank accounts and cutting any transaction that involved diamonds coming from zones under the control of UNITA.¹⁸¹ These sanctions were proven to be carried out too late for the sake of the process. Table 2 shows the level of implementation of the five provisions and the total implementation of the agreement as a whole in Angola.

Table 2. Percentage of peace accord programs implementation in Angola

Provisions	Level of Implementation
Military (DDR)	Minimum
Political	Full
Judicial	Minimum*
Involvement International Community	Full
Economic Funding	Full
% of implementation	54% after 5 years

*This refers to the amnesty included in the Lusaka accords; judicial reforms were not included as provisions.

D. CONCLUSION

The case study of Angola shows how the poor implementation of the DDR provisions can have major consequences in the outcome of peace processes. Failure in the implementation of this provision created a chain of events that eventually resulted in the restarting of the conflict. In Angola UNITA failed in demobilizing most of its troops, probably with the goal of maintaining a reserve of well-trained men for further offensive or defensive actions. This tactic allowed its military structure to remain strong and ready to engage if necessary. Maintaining control over a large arsenal after handing over a small number of weapons in poor condition empowered UNITA to confront the government in moments of crisis. Probably not the lack of funds but their mismanagement resulted in the

¹⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch, Section XII.

¹⁸¹ European Union, *European Union Communiqué on the 'Situation in Angola'* (Brussels: EU, 1999).

poor implementation of reintegration programs, thus reducing the options for the combatants and making it more appealing for them to go back to fight the government than to fight poverty.

UNITA's military capacity reduced the ability of the UN to mediate and to find a peaceful solution to any crisis that might occur during the implementation process. Also, the late deployment of the UN missions, its inefficiency to denounce cases of human rights violations and to enforce economic sanctions against UNITA fueled the already existing problems of possession of weapons and violence.

At this point, the implementation of judicial or political provisions had little effect on the already condemned peace process. Trust and commitment could not grow fast enough between the parties to save it, since the main tool for waging war remained in the combatants' hands.

IV. WHAT COLOMBIA HAS DONE SO FAR

This chapter analyzes the process of implementation of the peace agreements signed in 2016 between the government of Colombia and the FARC, focusing on the two years following the signing of the accords, from November 2016 until November 2018. Specifically, the goal of this analysis is to assess the progress to date of four peace accord provisions and evaluate the economic funding available for their implementation. The progress attained during these two years is compared with the results and conclusions reached after analyzing the implementation of the agreements in El Salvador and in Angola to develop an informed idea of the prospects for peace consolidation in Colombia after the signature of a peace agreement.

The chapter first provides a concise background of the conflict in Colombia, its causes, the main incompatibilities between the various camps, and the actors involved in about half a century of armed struggle. Second, the chapter describes the structure of the peace agreements signed between the government of Colombia and the FARC. Third, it analyzes the degree of implementation and progress of the military DDR, political and judicial provisions, the involvement of the international community, and the funds available to support the implementation of the previously mentioned provisions. Finally, the chapter's conclusion provides a general idea of how the peace implementation has impacted Colombian society and considers the prospects for enduring peace given the degree of implementation of the various reforms and the insights provided by the peace processes in El Salvador and Angola.

A. CONFLICT BACKGROUND

Colombia is a country defined by its violent history, which has been largely shaped by political conflicts that have been taken to the extremes. The roots of the armed conflict in Colombia can be traced back to the harsh confrontations between the two main political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, which defined the period between 1948 and

1958 known as *La violencia*.¹⁸² *La violencia* began with the assassination of the presidential candidate for the Liberal party, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, in April 1948. Gaitán's assassination caused a violent reaction from the Liberals who blamed their counterparts for the crime. The confrontations that ensued left approximately a quarter million people dead.¹⁸³

La violencia period ended in 1958 with the signing of the National Front (Frente Nacional) agreement. This pact was an arrangement between the Liberals and Conservatives to take turns in the government every four years. The National Front certainly reduced the violence in the country but only temporarily. The exclusive power-sharing arrangement between these two parties reduced the possibility for political participation for those who did not feel represented by either of them.¹⁸⁴ In this matter Charles Tilly argues, "when channels of popular protest are denied, then a logical next step is to take up armed action."¹⁸⁵ This political exclusion plus the violence that peasants had to suffer, poor state capacity, lack of attention to marginalized regions in the country, the uneven distribution of land, and other social inequalities, sparked the emergence of various guerrilla groups.

These groups were composed mostly of poor and displaced peasants who decided to seek refuge in the marginal highlands of Colombia. One of these groups established its camp zone in an area called Marquetalia, which was occupied by approximately 50 men and their families. Marquetalia was attacked by governmental forces in 1964; after this attack, the survivors who included Manuel Marulanda Velez (also known as "Tiro Fijo") decided to reorganize and to rename their group, which by 1966 would be known as the

¹⁸² Peter Waldman, "Colombia and the FARC: Failed Attempts to Stop Violence and Terrorism in a Weak State," in *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*, ed. Robert Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 223.

¹⁸³ Norman Offstein and Carolina Aristizábal, "An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL," *Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad*, no. 52 (September 2003): 52, <https://doi.org/10.13043/dys.52.4>.

¹⁸⁴ Mark Chernick, "Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to Armed Conflicts in Colombia," in *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*, ed. Cynthia Arnson (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 1999), 162–64.

¹⁸⁵ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1978), 4–45 .

Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces. Influenced by the increasing presence of the communist ideology in the region, the FARC decided to continue its armed struggle against the government of Colombia.¹⁸⁶

The FARC is a guerrilla group founded on the extreme side of the Liberal party with self-defense roots. The FARC maintained direct contact with the Communist party of Colombia, which was denied its political participation between 1958 and 1970.¹⁸⁷ During a ceasefire negotiated with the government in 1984, the FARC created its own political party called the Patriotic Union (*Union Patriótica* or UP). The UP was violently repressed by the government, being obligated to shut down and to push FARC back to armed conflict. Different peace processes were held between the Colombian government and the FARC, the first one between 1990 and 1991, then in 1998,¹⁸⁸ and finally in 2016, the latter being the only one that was signed.¹⁸⁹

The FARC was not the only communist-oriented guerrilla group that emerged after that period of time. Since the early 1960s, four more guerrilla groups have been present in Colombia's volatile political environment.¹⁹⁰ First, the National Liberation Army (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional* or ELN) was founded in the early 1960s as a pro-Cuban Marxist based guerrilla group. In contrast with the FARC, the ELN's members were mostly

¹⁸⁶ Natalio Cosoy, "¿Por Qué Empezó Y Qué Pasó En La Guerra De Más De 50 Años Que Desangró a Colombia? [Why It Started and What Happened in the War of More Than 50 Years That Bled Colombia?," *BBC News Mundo*, August 24, 2016, sec. América Latina, <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37181413>.

¹⁸⁷ Mark Chernick, "Appendix: Colombia's Major Guerrilla Movements," in *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*, ed. Cynthia Arnson (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 1999), 196.

¹⁸⁸ The government offered these guerrillas a general amnesty and the opportunity to participate in politics; in exchange, the illegal groups were to demobilize and hand over their weapons. This simple agenda was accepted by the M-19, the Quintin Lame, the EPL, and by a small group called the PRT. The FARC and ELN were not attracted by this agenda; these groups aimed for bigger social and political changes. In 1998 the peace process failed after an unstable stage of negotiations characterized by FARC's armed actions, especially the hijacking of an airliner and the further kidnapping of senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem in 2002.

¹⁸⁹ Chernick, "Appendix: Colombia's Major Guerrilla Movements," 196.

¹⁹⁰ Whitfield, "Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of Violence."

college or religious educated; two of its top leaders were priests.¹⁹¹ The ELN participated in the peace process in 1990 and 1991 along with the FARC, but this process failed, and the ELN returned to conflict as well.¹⁹²

Second, the Liberation Popular Army (*Ejército Popular de Liberación* or EPL) had its roots in the Chinese Maoist doctrine. Its original founders were part of the student movements of the 1960s. The EPL signed the ceasefire with the government in 1984; a year later and after the assassination of its head negotiator, the EPL went back to the armed struggle.¹⁹³

Third was the 19th of April Movement (*El Movimiento 19 de abril* or M-19). The M-19 was founded after the presidential elections in 1970 were qualified as unfair. The M-19 was an urban nationalist, Marxist guerrilla group characterized by notorious actions—including stealing Simon Bolivar’s sword, seizing the embassy of the Dominican Republic, and occupying the palace of justice (which resulted in several casualties including innocent civilians).¹⁹⁴ The M-19 participated in the 1991 peace process that led to its demobilization allowing them to become a political party.

Finally, the *Quintin Lame* was founded in 1984 by indigenous people from the Cauca department of Colombia, as a result of social inequalities—especially from unequal land tenure and issues between land owners and poor indigenous peasants. Their participation in the peace process, and its demobilization in 1991, allowed Quintin Lame to participate in the constituent assembly the same year.¹⁹⁵ This assembly sought to make important changes in the national constitution—such as establishing mechanisms for popular participation, opening the door for political pluralism, creation of judicial

¹⁹¹ Chernick, “Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to Armed Conflicts in Colombia,” 180.

¹⁹² Chernick, “Appendix: Colombia’s Major Guerrilla Movements,” 197.

¹⁹³ Chernick, 197.

¹⁹⁴ Chernick, 198.

¹⁹⁵ Chernick, 199.

institutions, and recognition of minorities among others.¹⁹⁶ Quintin Lame took advantage of this opportunity to include important reform in the constitution regarding indigenous issues.

The creation of multiple guerrilla groups since the 1960s show different aspects of incompatibility with the government of the time. These incompatibilities included political restriction, social and land ownership inequalities, and even ethnic motivations to conduct armed opposition against the government. It also shows that peace is a very complex task. While the EPL, the M-19, and Quintin Lame accepted the government's offerings and demobilized in 1991, FARC and the ELN decided to continue their armed struggle. Still the implementation of the agreement for those who decided to find a peaceful end to the conflict was fundamental. None of those groups resumed the conflict and some of their leaders, like the ones from the M-19, are still part of the political scene in Colombia. The failure to resume the conflict provides an insight into the importance of the implementation of peace agreements and why it is important to analyze the current peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC.

The FARC ended up being the largest, most significant, and longest lasting threat. The armed conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government lasted more than 50 years. Throughout this time, the FARC evolved significantly; it expanded organizationally, increased its military capabilities, gathered new armaments, and recruited many new members. At its peak, the FARC's membership was estimated at approximately 16,000 to 20,000 men in arms.¹⁹⁷ Peter Waldman describes data from an official report collected by Jose Rios and Daniel Garcia who found that, in 1985, there was some form of guerrilla presence in 175 municipalities out of the 1,005 that comprised the total number

¹⁹⁶ Semana, "Los 25 años de la Constitución de 1991: cumpleaños ¿feliz? [The 25 Years of the 1991 Constitution: Happy? Birthday]," *Revista Semana*, accessed December 5, 2019, <https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/constitucion-politica-de-1991-26-aniversario-ente-logros-y-fallas/480189>.

¹⁹⁷ Peter Waldman, "Colombia and the FARC: Failed Attempts to Stop Violence and Terrorism in a Weak State," in *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*, ed. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 228.

of municipalities in the country, approximately 17.2 percent of the total.¹⁹⁸ By 1995, this presence had increased to 622 municipalities out of 1,071 that existed at the time, or 59.8 percent.¹⁹⁹ The FARC's growth and organizational survival may be attributed, at least in part, to the insurgent group's financing tactics—which included extortion, kidnapping, the imposition of revolutionary taxes, and a significant involvement in narcotics trafficking activities—as well as their fear-based campaigns.²⁰⁰

The conflict between the government of Colombia and the FARC became one of the longest lasting conflicts in the world. By the end of the conflict, approximately 260,000 people had been killed, 45,000 disappeared, 6.7 million internally displaced, and the population of 63 percent of the Colombian territory at risk by landmines, to mention just a few of the consequences.²⁰¹ In November 2016, after 52 years of armed struggle and several failed attempts at peace negotiations, the Government of Colombia and the FARC finally signed a peace agreement that put an end to the armed conflict.²⁰²

B. THE PEACE PROCESS

In November 2012 representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC began a process of negotiations to put a peaceful end to a half century of armed conflict.²⁰³ It was not until November 24, 2016, that the president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, representing the government, and Timoleón Jiménez, representing the FARC, signed the peace agreement to end the conflict in the hopes of bringing long-lasting peace to Colombia's citizens. This peace agreement is composed of a set of different documents

¹⁹⁸ Rios and Garcia, *Building Tomorrow's Peace: A Strategy for Reconciliation*, quoted in Chernick, "Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia," 167.

¹⁹⁹ Rios and Garcia, 167.

²⁰⁰ Chernick, "Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to Armed Conflicts in Colombia," 166–67.

²⁰¹ Holly Sonneland, "Weekly Chart: Colombia's Peace Process by the Numbers," AS/COA, 2016, <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/weekly-chart-colombias-peace-process-numbers>.

²⁰² "Colombia Profile," BBC, August 8, 2018, sec. Latin America & Caribbean, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19390164>.

²⁰³ BBC.

or accords—six in total—each comprising individual chapters within the final document. Besides ending the armed conflict, the peace agreement aimed to prioritize human rights, to improve socio-economic and environmental conditions, to include all of the Colombian citizenry in the process, and to improve the democratic process in the country.²⁰⁴

The peace agreement in Colombia in its six chapters covers the following topics:²⁰⁵

- *Comprehensive rural reform*: The agreement seeks to improve the quality of life in the countryside, reduce poverty, and close the economic and social gap between the rural and urban populations.
- *Political participation*: In this chapter, the peace agreement intends to improve the democratic environment in Colombia by guaranteeing political pluralism, opposition, and debate about the main issues in the Colombian agenda.
- *End of the conflict, ceasefire, and cessation of hostilities*: This chapter aims to address the armed conflict itself. It includes provisions to disarm and reintegrate FARC members into society. It also guarantees to avoid political violence and corruption by creating new police units and civilian organizations to fight these problems.
- *Solution to illegal drugs issues*: This chapter is designed to address the issues related to the production and trafficking of drugs and the crime associated with this phenomenon.
- *Victims*: Chapter Six recognizes the victims of the conflict and their reparations. It also creates judicial mechanisms to investigate and punish human rights violations in search of truth, justice, and minimum impunity.

²⁰⁴ Government of Colombia, “Negotiation Table,” in *Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace* (Bogota: Office of the High Peace Commissioner, 2017), 5–6.

²⁰⁵ Government of Colombia, 8–9.

- *Implementation and verification mechanisms:* This chapter establishes the roles of the local and international actors responsible for verifying, monitoring, promoting, and implementing the agreement. It also states the support in technical matters provided by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.
- Other Annexes and timeline.

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS

The period after the signing of a peace agreement is critical for the process as a whole. The implementation process is difficult, complex, and filled with challenges. Soon after the good news of the signing was spread, the process received a big hit, but this time it unexpectedly came from the Colombian population. In October 2016, Colombians were asked to approve the agreements in a public referendum. A tight majority (54 percent) of the population voted not to implement the agreement.²⁰⁶ The agreement was reformed; later the congress of Colombia approved its implementation. The exact reason for why a majority voted for not implementing the agreement may have various causes but what it really shows is that even in a country that suffered the lack of peace, a peaceful resolution can be challenged from any direction, sometimes from where it is least expected. The negative view of the population about the peace process also exemplifies the fact that signing the agreements does not automatically mean that peace is granted. Many other challenges are expected along the road of implementing the agreements. The importance of the implementation stage is sometimes underestimated, but for this research it is the most relevant stage, due to its complexity and because it is where the real commitment to peace is displayed. The peace agreement in Colombia is designed to address the main causes and consequences of the conflict. This section focuses on evaluating the degree of implementation of military (DDR), political, judicial, and international actor provisions to date, and to consider the funds available to support the implementation of the peace accords.

²⁰⁶ BBC, "Colombia Profile."

1. Military Provisions (DDR)

Chapter Three of the Colombian peace agreement established the guidelines and timeline to conduct the “Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and the Laying down of Arms (BDCCH).”²⁰⁷ These guidelines define the areas where demobilizing combatants would concentrate. In this regard, the government of Colombia and the FARC agreed to create 20 Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (TLZN) and seven Transitional Local Points for Normalization (TLPN). The chapter also describes the processes of laying down arms, reintegrating former combatants into society, deploying Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM), and transforming the FARC into a political party. It also described other security details such as measures to avoid incidents between the army and FARC troops, respect of the air space above the TLZNs and TLPNs, amongst other logistics.²⁰⁸

The demobilization of FARC’s combatants was conducted without major complications. The demobilization process included a total of 15 subtopics, all of which were fully implemented during the two-year period after the signing of the accords. TLZNs and TLPNs were also implemented as planned to accommodate all the demobilized people with the necessary conditions of comfort and dignity.²⁰⁹ According to the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “These zones received a total of 9.190 ex-combatants.”²¹⁰ Thus, demobilization provisions were completed at 100 percent.

Disarmament provisions have also been implemented successfully. According to the Kroc Institute, “the [disarmament] process in Colombia was more complete and faster than in the majority of peace accords, this shows FARC’s high level of commitment with the peace process.”²¹¹ In addition, the ratio of weapons delivered per combatant was very

²⁰⁷ Government of *Colombia*, 57.

²⁰⁸ Government of Colombia, 57–74.

²⁰⁹ David Cortright et al., “Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia [“Third Report About Colombia’s Peace Agreement state of Implementation]” (Bogotá: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2019), 74, https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/321729/190523_informe_3_final_final.pdf.

²¹⁰ Cortright et al., 74.

²¹¹ Cortright et al., 74.

high. The UN has collected a total of 8,994 weapons from 9,190 former combatants. The UN has also retrieved and destroyed the weapons and explosives from over 700 caches. By November 2018, six out of the eight dispositions had been implemented. This represents 75 percent of the disarmament program.²¹² Fifty-two out of the 1,100 caches reported by the FARC, however, still need to be located and destroyed. These, along with the two monuments that will be constructed using the destroyed weapons, represent the 25 percent that remains to be implemented.²¹³

The reintegration provisions of the accord have been partially implemented to date. According to the Kroc institute, “the program of reintegration is comprised by 23 dispositions. By November 2018, 10 [ten] out of those have been fully implemented, 8 [eight] are in an intermediate level of implementation, 2 [two] are in the minimum level and 3 [three] have not started to be implemented.”²¹⁴

The biggest deficiencies in the process of implementation of reintegration provisions can be observed in the commitment to deliver monthly payments to former combatants, the approval of development projects, the creation of a comprehensive health system, and the education system for the newly demobilized. By November 2018, approximately 43 percent of the socio-economic reintegration program for FARC members had been implemented.

This reintegration program also includes provisions for integrating FARC members into political life. It includes a total of 13 dispositions of which five are in the process of implementation and eight have been fully implemented. This means that 62 percent of the political integration dispositions have been implemented fully. By November 2018, the FARC was officially considered a political party and ten of its members occupied seats in government, with five in the senate and five in the chamber of representatives.²¹⁵ The reintegration program also includes other dispositions such as the reintegration of underage

²¹² Cortright et al., 74.

²¹³ Cortright et al., 68.

²¹⁴ Cortright et al., 76.

²¹⁵ Cortright et al., 75.

personnel and the control of land mines. By November 2018, these two provisions had been implemented at the rate of 67 and 50 percent, respectively.²¹⁶ The monitoring and verification mechanism to oversee the implementation of these provisions was also fully implemented, showing the commitment of the international community with this process.

In sum, during the two-year period after the signing of the peace accords, implementation of the DDR military provisions has been quite successful. One hundred percent of the demobilization program has been implemented completely; 75 percent of the disarmament program has been implemented thus far and is progressing well. As for reintegration provisions, 43 percent of the socio-economic program, 67 percent of the underage personnel reintegration program, 62 percent of the political incorporation program, 50 percent of the land mines control program, and 100 percent of the monitoring verification mechanisms have been implemented thus far.²¹⁷ The significant progress made since the signing of the peace accords and the near completion of key military provisions suggest the success of this component of the peace accords.

2. Political Provisions

As mentioned before, Chapter Three, titled “End of the Conflict,” addresses the creation of FARC’s political party. It is part of the reintegration program in the military provisions. Chapter Two of the Colombia peace agreement “Political Participation: A Democratic Opportunity to Build Peace” comprises a series of provisions to guarantee the participation in politics of previous and newly formed political parties. Chapter Two includes provisions about access to media, security measures to protect political representatives of the opposition, human rights, and social movements, guarantees for mobilization, peaceful protest, non-stigmatization political pluralism, and transparency, among others.²¹⁸ By November 2018, the participation provisions have experienced the most significant delays. Only 17 percent are at an intermediate or total level of

²¹⁶ Cortright et al., 76–77.

²¹⁷ Cortright et al., 74–77.

²¹⁸ Government of Colombia, 33.

implementation. Thirty-four percent of the provisions are at a minimum level of implementation, while 49 percent have not started to be implemented.²¹⁹

The most significant achievements within the political participation provisions include the approval of the opposition statute that provides certain guarantees for political participation, not only for FARC's political party but for others who identify themselves in opposition to the actual government. In contrast, the disposition about security to prevent political violence shows little improvement. Only one out of its ten sub-topics has been fully implemented. According to the Kroc Institute, "the little advance in this sub-topic constitutes the main alert in the implementation of the accord."²²⁰ In this matter and according to the Kroc Institute, in 2018, 178 social leaders and human rights defenders were assassinated. This was an increase of 27 percent compared to 2017, when there were 126 cases.²²¹ Former combatants and their families have been victims as well. According to a report by the UN, "85 assassinations of former combatants and their families were committed within the two years after signing the agreement."²²² It is necessary to improve the implementation of political provisions in the Colombian peace process, especially in terms of security for social leaders and human rights defenders. The fact that the FARC is officially a political party, ten seats in congress have been granted, and that guarantees for the political opposition exist cannot diminish the harm that violence can cause to the process.

3. Judicial Provisions

Chapter Five of the peace agreement, titled "Victims," describes comprehensive measures and procedures to compensate the victims of the conflict. This chapter also includes details about justice, human rights, and truth and reconciliation, among others; all

²¹⁹ Cortright et al., "Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia ["Third Report About Colombia's Peace Agreement state of Implementation]," 57.

²²⁰ Cortright et al., 46.

²²¹ Cortright et al., 104.

²²² United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia," 11.

of these components seek to build a comprehensive judicial system.²²³ The biggest achievements within the judicial provisions include the presentation of the truth commission and the Special Unit for the Search for Persons deemed as Missing in the context of and due to the armed conflict. Good progress has also been made in the establishment of seven main cases to be investigated by the peace special justice.²²⁴ On the other hand, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of these provisions seem to outnumbered by the actual achievements. In this regard, the judicial provisions have been dealing with serious delays in the establishment of the legal advisory system for the victims, budget reductions for the implementation of different programs including the reparation of victims and the truth commission, among others.²²⁵ The Kroc Institute expresses that, according to the general experience, implementing the dispositions relating to the truth and reconciliation commission takes more time than the timeline established in the agreement. Thirty-five percent of the agreements coded in the Peace Accords Matrix include these dispositions; 75 percent of these agreements did not start the implementation or did not achieve minimum levels of implementation within two years after signing the agreement. Only the peace agreement in El Salvador reached the maximum level of implementation within two years.²²⁶

Another sensitive topic is the peace special justice. This independent mechanism allows the judgment and punishment of those who participated in the conflict. The implementation of this mechanism includes a total of 38 dispositions; five have been fully implemented, six are at an intermediate level of implementation, and ten are at a minimum level while 17 have not started to be implemented.²²⁷ Modifying the judicial provisions is one of the topics that have created most disagreements between the government and the

²²³ Government of Colombia, 132.

²²⁴ Cortright et al., “Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia [“Third Report About Colombia’s Peace Agreement state of Implementation],” 132.

²²⁵ Cortright et al., 133.

²²⁶ Madhav Joshi and Jason Quinn, “Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset, V.1.5 Joshi y Jason Quinn,” *Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies*, 2015, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/research>.

²²⁷ Cortright et al., “Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia [“Third Report About Colombia’s Peace Agreement state of Implementation],” 138.

FARC, especially since the new President of Colombia, Ivan Duque, took office in August 2018. Duque's refusal to sign the peace special justice's legal framework can destabilize the process with negative consequences; in addition the process to approve this legal framework is quite long, and it could leave the peace special justice without legal support for those who already confessed their participation in human rights violations and other crimes related to the conflict.²²⁸ The legal uncertainty can push the former combatants to return to conflict. The president's decision not to sign the law generated different reactions within the parties involved in the process and the public in general.²²⁹

Chapter Five of the Colombian peace agreement has a total of 90 dispositions. By November 2018, 11 percent of the dispositions had been fully implemented, 9 percent are in an intermediate level of implementation, 38 percent are in a minimum level of implementation, and the remaining 42 percent are still pending to start the process of implementation. The results after two years since the signing of the agreement are not very positive. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the implementation of such provisions tends to span a longer period; the allocation of funds, institutional changes, and a sustained effort are necessary to improve implementation and achieve the goals of the Colombian peace agreement.

4. The Involvement of the International Community

Chapter Six of the peace agreement, titled "Implementation, verification and public Endorsement" deals with the creation of the mechanisms necessary to conduct a proper oversight of the agreement. One of the mechanisms is the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CMPVI). This commission is composed of three representatives of the Colombian government and three former combatants representing the FARC. Its international component should consist of one representative of each guarantor country, and one of each observer country would be

²²⁸ Colombia en Transición, "Que Es La Ley Estatutaria De La JEP? [What Is the Statutory Law of the JEP?]," *El Espectador*, 2019, sec. Justicia, <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/justicia/jep/que-es-la-ley-estatutaria-de-la-jep-articulo-857662>.

²²⁹ Cortright et al., "Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia ["Third Report About Colombia's Peace Agreement state of Implementation]," 88.

designated to accompany this commission during the bilateral and definitive ceasefire and the disarming process.²³⁰ This chapter also establishes the participation of the United Nations, and its role of verifying the implementation of the agreement and the roles of the international accompaniment component.²³¹ The parties also agreed to request the participation of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, whose mission is to provide technical support to record and to analyze the progress of the implementation of the agreement.²³²

The international participation in this agreement can be considered as successful. The international verification component is comprised by six dispositions that have all been fully implemented.²³³ The international accompaniment component includes 12 dispositions that have been fully implemented as well.²³⁴ The UN political mission in Colombia has also complied with its designated tasks, and its mandate has been renewed until September 2019.²³⁵ The international actors have accomplished their main tasks, either by directly participating in the processes, like disarming, reincorporation, political participation, among others, or indirectly by providing periodic reports about the progress of the implementation. Either way, the involvement of the international security element maintains a stable environment in which the actors can build up strong basis for the implementation of the peace agreement.

²³⁰ Government of Colombia, 211.

²³¹ Government of Colombia, 225.

²³² Government of Colombia, 224.

²³³ Cortright et al., “Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia [“Third Report About Colombia’s Peace Agreement state of Implementation],” 164.

²³⁴ Cortright et al., 167.

²³⁵ Cortright et al., 171.

5. Economic Funding

Different sources have calculated that implementing peace in Colombia would cost approximately \$45 billion over a period of 10 to 20 years.²³⁶ It is certainly not a cheap process due to the complexity of the social, political, and judicial reforms that the agreement aims to achieve. In this matter the international community has provided a substantial amount of money to support these reforms. The international donors include the UN fund for post-conflict, which has donated over \$85 million, the World Bank, which has donated approximately \$7.1 million, the European Union with €6.4 million (approximately \$106 million), and the Inter-American Development Bank with an estimated \$211 million, for a total \$409 million.²³⁷ The U.S. government under then-president Barack Obama also promised a sum close to \$450 million.²³⁸ For the fiscal year 2019, \$418.1 million were appropriated by the U.S. Congress to be used in support of different programs including the implementation of peace.²³⁹ The amount of money provided by international donors is no small sum, but it is likely to be insufficient to address all the programs in the peace agreement. Most of the funds would have to come from local sources. The Colombian government is planning to appropriate about \$34 billion for a period of 15 to 20 years in order to comply with the agreements.²⁴⁰

Chapter Six of the peace agreement in Colombia included one topic that establishes measurements for planning and financing the implementation of the accords. This topic

²³⁶ Nicholas Casey, “Colombia’s Peace Deal Promised a New Era. So Why Are These Rebels Rearming?,” *The New York Times*, May 17, 2019, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace-deal.html>; Sonneland, “Weekly Chart”; and Alan Fleischmann and Ian Solomon, “What It Really Costs for Colombia to Strike a Peace Deal,” *Fortune*, accessed November 17, 2019, <https://fortune.com/2016/10/06/colombia-farc-peace-deal/>.

²³⁷ Fondo Colombia en Paz, *Informe Semanal 24 de Diciembre - 28 de Diciembre de 2018 [Weekly Report December 24 - December 28 of 2018]* (Bogota: Fondo Colombia en Paz, 2018), <http://www.posconflicto.gov.co/consejeria/InformesSemanalesFCP/Informe-FCP-24-28-diciembre-2018.pdf>.

²³⁸ Fleischmann and Solomon, “What It Really Costs for Colombia to Strike a Peace Deal.”

²³⁹ June Beittel, *Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations*, CRS Report No. R43813 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019): 1, <https://crsreports.congress.gov>.

²⁴⁰ Atticus Ballesteros, “Colombia’s Peace Process Lacks Major Funding: Government Report,” *Colombia Reports*, November 1, 2017, <https://colombiareports.com/colombias-peace-process-lacks-major-funding-government-report/>.

comprises four dispositions, mainly legislative measures that are supposed to guarantee that the government include in its planning specific resources for implementing the peace in the long term. By November 2018 one of them had been fully implemented, two were in the process of implementation, and one has not yet started to be implemented.²⁴¹ Thus far, there is a lack of clarity about long-term planning, which means that the allocation of funds for the implementation of peace will have to be done annually. The problem with this type of planning is that the money for implementing peace will not be secure in its totality. Different governments with different policies will come and go, jeopardizing the investment in peace. So far, the judicial²⁴² and other programs dealing with social reintegration have been affected by the lack or prioritization of funds.

It is uncertain whether the funds will be completely sufficient for the implementation process. What is certain is that the commitment from the government is necessary to improve the legislation that allows local funds to be used in the programs described in the agreement. Failing to allocate the necessary funds for social, political, or judicial programs can seriously threaten the outcome of the peace process. Table 3 shows the general level of implementation per chapter of the peace agreement, and the total implementation of the agreement as a whole in Colombia until 2018.

Table 3. General implementation of the peace agreement in Colombia, November 2018²⁴³

Chapters	% initiated	Minimum level of implementation	Intermediate level of implementation	Fully implemented
Chapter One	38%	51%	9%	2%
Chapter Two	49%	34%	4%	13%
Chapter Three	20%	18%	18%	44%

²⁴¹ Cortright et al., “Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia [“Third Report About Colombia’s Peace Agreement state of Implementation],” 161.

²⁴² El Espectador, “El Desacuerdo De Paz: Balance De Lo Implementado a La Fecha [the Peace Disagreement: Balance of What Has Been Implemented Until the Date],” *ELESPECTADOR.COM*, February 23, 2019, sec. Pais, <https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/el-desacuerdo-de-paz-balance-de-lo-implementado-la-fecha-articulo-857677>.

²⁴³ Adapted from Cortright et al., “Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia [“Third Report About Colombia’s Peace Agreement state of Implementation].”

Chapter Four	36%	45%	17%	12%
Chapter Five	42%	38%	9%	11%
Chapter Six	12%	23%	11%	54%
Economic Funding	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Total agreement	33%	32%	12%	23%

D. CONCLUSION

By November 2018, only two years after signing the peace agreement in Colombia, it is difficult to predict its outcome. In general terms, 68 percent of the agreements are in a certain stage of implementation. Twenty-three percent are fully implemented, while 12 percent are expected to be fully implemented according to schedule.²⁴⁴ Thirty-three percent of the agreements have been barely implemented, and it is difficult to assess whether they will meet the schedule. The remaining 32 percent have not started the process of implementation.²⁴⁵ This delay can be explained, in part, by important delays in legislative reforms or because they depend on the implementation of other commitments or because some provisions are designed to be implemented in the short term while others require more time to show important progress. This being said, the information provided in this chapter of the thesis shows mixed results with a tendency to the positive side. Positive achievements in certain areas of the agreement, especially demobilization and disarming, participation of the FARC in politics, and the involvement of the international community in the process lay strong foundations for the further implementation of other programs. Deficiencies in the judicial provisions and lack of funds to implement social programs can bring negative consequences to general outcomes of the process if they are not addressed properly and promptly.

²⁴⁴ Cortright et al., 10.

²⁴⁵ Cortright et al., 181–82.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The process of peace deal implementation is fraught with challenging obstacles. More often than not, peace accords are carried out in contexts of significant distrust and resentment among parties, uncertainty about the promised outcomes, and under the constant inquiry from a demanding population. As such, the implementation of accords itself can severely undermine the possibility of a successful conflict resolution. And, it often has. According to the UCDP data set, 40 percent of signed peace accords between 1975 and 2011 failed to meet their goals and resulted in a return to conflict.²⁴⁶ Yet, we have thus far lacked a clear sense of where the biggest pitfalls are in the implementation process.

This thesis zeroed in on the experience that followed the signing of peace accords. It sought to understand what the central challenges are in the peace accord implementation process and which provisions play a critical role enabling the consolidation of peace. In particular, the thesis investigated the peace accord implementation stage through an analysis of peace processes in El Salvador, Angola, and Colombia. These three cases provide clear insights into how the implementation of specific provisions shapes the outcomes of peace processes. Whereas the case of El Salvador represents an instance of a successful peace accord implementation, the case of Angola evidences how the poor implementation of key provisions in the peace accords led to the resumption of conflict. The case of Colombia provides the opportunity to analyze an ongoing peace process during its implementation phase and evaluate the progress achieved to date.

To analyze the peace accord implementation process, this thesis has focused on five key types of accord provisions: military, judicial, political, international involvement, and economic funding. The military provisions address the armed conflict in its very basic nature and include the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants. Judicial provisions seek to reduce impunity after the conflict-related crimes and focus on amnesties, victim reparations, and reforms to the judicial institutional apparatus. Political

²⁴⁶ Högbladh, *Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset*, 51.

provisions are designed to address the challenges of creating institutional channels for the different parties involved in the conflict. They involve the creation and legalization of political parties, guarantees for the political participation of demobilized actors, and the implementation of free and fair elections, among others. Provisions related to the involvement of the international community in the peace process aim to reduce the environment of uncertainty and mistrust previously mentioned. They assign supervisory roles to the international community in order to facilitate the adoption of the various provisions by skeptical parties. Finally, economic provisions establish the costs as well as where the resources to support the peace process will come from.

While these provisions do not encompass the entirety of the peace accords, they nonetheless capture arguably the most important and difficult challenges of the peace process. Importantly, these various provisions were all present in the three peace processes studied in this thesis, which suggests that something about the implementation experience itself, rather than the content of the accords ultimately played a critical role in shaping the outcome. Further, because all three accords were signed by the various parties involved, we can assume a certain degree of satisfaction with the provisions in the agreement; otherwise, the various parties would have not signed the agreement in the first place. By evaluating whether and how the various provisions were implemented and what the implications of this were for guaranteeing long-term peace, this thesis sheds light on the challenges of peace implementation and the particular provisions that, if implemented poorly, can undermine the peace process.

The analyses implemented in this thesis reveal three central findings: (1) not all provisions are made alike, (2) timing is everything, and (3) provisions are interdependent such that failure in the implementation of one can have significant repercussions in the implementation of the others. These findings represent the factors that explain the variation in the success of peace processes after the signing of a peace agreement:

A. CORE VERSUS SUPPORTIVE PROVISIONS

Given the ultimate goal of achieving long-lasting peace, it is imperative that we differentiate between core and supportive provisions. Core provisions are those that are

essential for the consolidation of peace, provisions that, if left unimplemented, will almost certainly lead to the collapse of the peace process. Supportive provisions, on the other hand, reinforce the peace process by facilitating integration, reducing uncertainty, reinforcing the commitments, and legitimizing the peace process. On their own, supportive provisions cannot sustain peace.

The study of peace accord implementation processes in El Salvador and Angola suggests three core provisions—DDR, international community involvement, and economic funding—and two supportive provisions—political and judicial. A comparison of these implementation experiences allows us to assess progress towards long-lasting peace in the Colombian case.

1. Core Provisions

DDR provisions, international community involvement provisions, and economic funding provisions stand out as three sets of provisions that are essential for the successful resolution of conflict. DDR provisions drastically decrease the threat of conflict by dissolving the military structures of the various parties, removing the weapons from their hands, and providing feasible exit options for former combatants. DDR provisions were implemented promptly and successfully in the case of El Salvador. The demobilization program concluded in December 1992, roughly 11 months after the signature of the peace agreement. The process ended with the demobilization of over 12,000 men, including fully capable and injured FMLN combatants.²⁴⁷ The successful implementation of this particular provision resulted in the official declaration by ONUSAL that the armed conflict between the FMLN and the government had reached its end by the December 1992. In August 1993, the FMLN stated that its military organization was definitively dissolved, right after the conclusion of a successful process of disarmament.²⁴⁸ In contrast, the implementation of DDR programs in Angola suffered significant delays. Although the

²⁴⁷ United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” December 23, 1992.

²⁴⁸ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

ceasefire was active, most combatants did not demobilize and weapons were not decommissioned effectively.²⁴⁹ Ultimately, this enabled the return to conflict.

Provisions focused on the role of the international community are also critical for a successful peace accord implementation.²⁵⁰ The involvement of the UN in El Salvador started early in the process and was coded as fully implemented soon after the signing of the agreement.²⁵¹ The UN's participation in mediating during stalled moments was also substantial, especially during the demobilization and disarming process. In contrast, in Angola the participation of the UN was not as positive as in El Salvador. Despite the fact that the Lusaka accord included specific roles for the UN mission in Angola and that the UN was present in the country even before the signing of the Bicesse accord,²⁵² its participation left many doubts about its efficiency. A late deployment of its military component allowed human rights violations to be committed. Poor demobilization and disarming programs were carried out. The UN also failed in enforcing economic sanctions and embargos that allowed UNITA to buy weapons and to strengthen its military capacity, which resulted in the resumption of the conflict.²⁵³ The weakness of the international community generated uncertainties that limited the various parties' incentives to comply.

Finally, the economic provisions proved critical for the success of a peace process as they condition the capacity for implementation of accords and their management. Peace processes are very expensive to implement. Buying large amounts of land, providing health services, education, credits, tools, salaries, implementing institutional changes, creating new institutions, funding political parties and their publicity, are some of the expenses required to achieve peace. The allocation of funds in El Salvador was substantial, and even after certain shortages, the majority of provisions and programs were properly funded and

²⁴⁹ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix," 2015.

²⁵⁰ United Nations, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement," 66.

²⁵¹ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

²⁵² University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix," 2015.

²⁵³ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

therefore well implemented.²⁵⁴ In Angola the allocation of funds was not a problem for the implementation phase, but international donors seemed reluctant to provide more support due to a series of human rights violations and armed actions, eventually many donors stopped their economic aid and this dealt a final blow to the peace accords.²⁵⁵

2. Supportive Provisions

Supportive provisions were implemented to various degrees in El Salvador and Angola. Political provisions aimed to shift the conflict to the institutional arena by legalizing political parties and allowing electoral participation by the various parties in the conflict. While in El Salvador the FMLN was granted participation in politics and presidential elections were held according to the agreement,²⁵⁶ in Angola little was made to comply with political inclusion of UNITA and even less to hold elections. This was probably because of the poor progress made in the DDR programs by UNITA. When UNITA was finally recognized as a political party, the peace process was already going through a critical moment.²⁵⁷ Soon after that, the conflict restarted.

Judicial provisions, for their part, sought to guarantee the legal status of former combatants after the conflict ended. In El Salvador the agreement aimed to reform the judicial system in order to make it independent from other branches of the state. This independence will allow the investigation of human rights violations in order to avoid impunity.²⁵⁸ In March 1993, a presidential amnesty was granted to all the combatants involved in the conflict; the amnesty was not well received by the population and especially by the victims.²⁵⁹ Despite the fact that the judicial provisions did not reach the full level

²⁵⁴ Boyce, "External Assistance and the Peace Process in El Salvador," 2113.

²⁵⁵ European Union, "European Union Communiqué on the 'Situation in Angola.'"

²⁵⁶ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

²⁵⁷ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix," 2015.

²⁵⁸ Cañas and Dada, "Political Transition and Institutionalization in El Salvador," 73.

²⁵⁹ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix."

of implementation, the progress made served its purpose by reducing the uncertainty about the future for those involved in the conflict. By contrast, this provision did not serve any purpose in Angola. No amnesty or judicial reform was implemented before the conflict reached its full scale again.²⁶⁰

3. Implications for Colombia's Implementation Process

The comparison of the El Salvador and Angola experiences enables an assessment of Colombia's peace accord implementation experience to date. The analyses suggest that Colombia has made significant progress towards guaranteeing long-lasting peace after the signing of the accords. The core provisions in the Colombian peace agreement have been implemented in their majority and relatively soon after the signing of the agreement. This shows the recognition of these provisions as a fundamental part of the process.

The demobilization and disarmament programs were implemented without major challenges, and soon after the signing of the agreement.²⁶¹ In general dissolving the military structure of the FARC and ending the armed conflict has been successful. The reintegration program is still in the process of implementation mostly due to funding issues.

The international community involved in the Colombian peace agreement received detailed tasks about their role in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the agreement.²⁶² The UN took part during the implementation of core and supportive provisions as well, facilitating a stable environment and the completion of many programs throughout the process. The economic funding in Colombia has been sufficient for the implementation of the peace agreement so far. Funds from international and local sources have been promised and some have already been provided.²⁶³ Most of the money will

²⁶⁰ University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "Lusaka Protocol, Peace Accords Matrix," 2015.

²⁶¹ Cortright et al., "Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia ["Third Report About Colombia's Peace Agreement state of Implementation]," 74.

²⁶² Government of Colombia, 211.

²⁶³ Fondo Colombia en Paz, *Informe Semanal 24 de Diciembre - 28 de Diciembre de 2018* [Weekly Report December 24 - December 28 of 2018], 53.

come from internal sources. Time and reforms in legislation that secures the funds for the implementation of the agreement will determine the outcome of the process.

In the political realm, the environment of the process improved substantially when the FARC was officially recognized as a political party and the seats in congress were occupied by former FARC combatants as stated in the agreement.²⁶⁴ Delays in other sub-topics of the political section have not threatened the peace process. The participation in politics of the former combatants has been an important motivation for them to relinquish their weapons. Political participation will not be allowed unless the disarming happens first or at least is in progress. Two years after the signing of the agreement, there is still plenty of time in the intermediate and long term to improve in this field.

Judicial provisions play an important role in reinforcing the perception of impunity in people's minds, and in reducing the uncertainty about the legal future of the former combatants. An amnesty will bring the best results for the process because it releases all the parties from responsibility, reassuring their legal transition and inclusion into society without fear of severe punishment; unfortunately, amnesties may hurt the victims of the conflict directly. Also, changes in the judicial agreements can cause serious inconvenience for the parties during the implementation process, jeopardizing their trust in one another. The implementation of judicial provisions in Colombia has created disagreements between the parties since the arrival of Ivan Duque as the president of Colombia in 2018. His will to make changes in the judicial section of the agreement was not welcomed by the FARC.²⁶⁵ As well as the political provisions, the judicial issues can and must be solved. Time and probably the involvement of a mediator third party will help to achieve a negotiated solution to these issues.

The comparison of the El Salvador, Angola, and Colombia peace processes indicates that the prioritization and proper implementation of specific provisions is

²⁶⁴ Cortright et al., "Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia ["Third Report About Colombia's Peace Agreement state of Implementation]," 75.

²⁶⁵ Cortright et al., 88.

fundamental for explaining variations in the success of peace processes after the signing of a peace agreement.

4. Timing of Reform Implementation

The immediate stage after the signing of the agreement is critical for the process. Real manifestations of commitment to the implementation should be seen during this short period of time. Strong bases have to be laid in the short term. As seen in the El Salvador and Colombia cases, the demobilization and disarmament programs started and concluded as soon as possible, followed by establishment of reincorporation activities. The official troops normally allow this movement by returning to their bases, in order to avoid accidental encounters that can endanger the process. In the short term a lot has to happen due to the uncertainty that reigns in that context. The first moves by the former combatants have to be clear and occur promptly. Delays and hesitations will almost inevitably undermine the process by generating distrust in a fragile context.

5. Interdependence between Provisions

Besides highlighting the importance of core provisions, the analyses also show a relationship of interdependence between core accord provisions. Without an impartial third party committed to the process, it is likely naïve to expect that deadly enemies can overcome moments of crisis even after choosing peaceful means. A deteriorating peace agreement will reduce the will of external and local donors to invest their funds in the implementation of the peace agreement. A shortage in funds will have serious consequences in the implementation of core and supportive provisions. The lack of trust, the absence of a mediator, and funds to implement comprehensive judicial guarantees or political participation will reduce the chances for combatants to hand over their weapons. As long as parties have access to weapons, the chances to restart the confrontation are very high, and the peace process from that point is more likely to fail.

The vicious cycle associated with these three provisions can start differently but will end in the same way. Insufficiency of funds at any moment after the signing of the agreement will lead to poor implementation of some, or of most of the provisions, including DDR, and the deployment of peacekeeping monitoring and verification missions. Poor

implementation will fail to guarantee a promising future for the former combatants, who probably will not hand over their weapons. The failure to disarm parties increases the chances for accidental or intentional armed confrontation significantly. Also holding weapons will reduce the ability for peaceful remediation during stalled progress. In contrast, when the parties have been previously disarmed, the parties will feel obligated to seek a negotiated solution at any critical moment.

To avoid the negative effects of the interdependence of the core provisions, successful peace processes normally implement the DDR provisions in the short term after the signing of the agreement. The funds for their implementation are available from day one, and the international component in the process is present from the negotiations stage or in some cases even before. The inclusion of these factors early in the process of implementation also plays two roles: 1) it confirms the importance of these factors, and that special attention to them is required, and 2) their prioritization is necessary for laying down a strong basis for the implementation of other important but less critical provisions. Political and judicial provisions exemplify this position.

6. Recommendations for Conflict Resolution-related Policies

Several recommendations for conflict resolution policies arise from this investigation. The first is that timing and priorities matter. The study suggests that peace processes should not be started without guarantees of (1) a well-established and effective international component with detailed tasks regarding intermediation, verification, and monitoring, and (2) properly planned economic resources that guarantee the implementation of short- and long-term provisions. Once implementation starts, disarmament and demobilization provisions must be implemented immediately after the signing of accords and completed promptly thereafter. To the extent that international support and economic resources are scarce, the focus of all supportive actors and resources should center on successfully implementing DDR provisions. The mutually reinforcing behavior of these three core provisions—international support, economic resources, and DDR—will set the peace process on track to achieving its ultimate goal.

Supportive provisions should be well designed in the function of strengthening the efforts of the core provisions. These provisions can be part of a chronological plan of implementation that allows flexibility and a negotiation margin during stalled moments in the process.

Special attention should also be given to reintegration programs. As the case of El Salvador shows, there are inherent risks in the poor implementation of reintegration programs. In El Salvador, despite the fact that the lack of funds and low prioritization in reintegrating former combatants did not have direct repercussions in the peace process, it nonetheless opened the socio-economic gap and failed to reincorporate demobilized combatants into society. Ultimately, many former combatants returned to violence and joined criminal organizations. Thus, while the civil conflict ended, social violence continued.

7. Policy Recommendations for Colombia

Despite the progress made to date in implementing the peace agreements in Colombia, many things need to be improved in order to maintain the positive pace through the end of the process. The policy recommendations for Colombia include the following:

A detailed analysis of the progress, achievements, and limitations of the agreements should be conducted periodically. This analysis aims to adjust the road map of the implementation if necessary. It is not re-negotiating the agreement, but improving the process itself.

Although the government intends to make changes in the judicial provisions, this thesis recommends that the government maintain the original framework to avoid changes that modify sensitive topics like the legal future of former combatants. These types of modifications may cause the desertion levels to increase and reduce confidence in the peace process.

It is necessary to establish legislation that guarantees the inclusion in the national budget of the funds required to complete the implementation of the agreement. This should

be planned in the long term looking to avoid any changes caused by the normal rotation of governmental officers. Long-term planning can guarantee long-lasting peace.

8. Shortcomings

This thesis presented case studies of three different peace processes. One represented a case in which the implementation succeeded, one in which the implementation failed, and one in which the implementation is still in progress. Yet, peace processes are remarkably complicated and diverse. Reducing the study of peace processes to a certain number of provisions and their overall degree of implementation, while helpful for understanding trends of implementation, can nonetheless obscure the complex processes that take place on the ground and the mechanisms that are enabling or hindering progress toward peace. The findings of this thesis are suggestive of trends that are consistent with intuition but that nonetheless must be confirmed with more in-depth work and additional case studies.

Another limitation is the lack of specific information about the funding of the agreements. It is difficult to give an accurate assessment of the way in which the money has been invested. There is no data available about detailed expenditures discriminating between provisions. The analysis of the economic funding in this thesis was conducted on global amounts available for the process in general terms.

The limited information about funding expenditure leads me to suggest future investigation and analysis not only on the budget available for the implementation of peace agreements, but also about the inclusion of economic provisions in every peace agreement in their influence on its outcome. A well detailed plan of expenditure will be beneficial during the implementation of the agreement. And, a well conducted analysis of the post-conflict economy of the country will help to avoid social issues like the ones in post-conflict El Salvador.

Attempts to achieve the peaceful resolution of armed conflicts around the world are more common these days. The signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily mean that long-lasting peace is granted, but it means that what is included in that document should be enough to persuade the parties to stop the violence against each other. That is

why it is necessary to continue studying the factors that influence the outcome of these peace processes. By focusing on this topic, this thesis has aimed to start a necessary conversation about the challenges of peace accord implementation even after the arduous process of getting the parties to the table and convincing them to commit to peace on paper. Several important decisions are made during the implementation stage, like abandoning areas of influence either by the military or the insurgents, handing over weapons and allowing the opposition to officially participate in politics. Improving the process of implementation, especially of the core provisions, as well as supportive ones, will guarantee long-lasting peace.

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