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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 8, 1946

No. 182

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 24 1946
DIRECTOR
Department of State

Subject: Japanese Amnesty of October 17, 1945.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to a memorandum dated December 18, 1945, from Mr. Charles B. Fahs, Chief of the Far East Division, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, to this Mission requesting information concerning the Japanese Imperial amnesty of October 17, 1945, and to forward in reply a memorandum on that subject prepared by a member of the staff of this Mission.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att + w*

Memorandum dated January 8, 1946: "Japanese Amnesty of October 17, 1945".

Original and hectograph to Department.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 182 dated January 8, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject: Japanese Amnesty of October 17, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

January 8, 1946.

SUBJECT: Japanese Amnesty of 17 October, 1945.

The amnesty, ordered on the occasion of Kanname-Sai (Harvest Festival), was the third effected under the amnesty ordinance promulgated September 26, 1912, the earlier two having been ordered at the time of the funerals of the Emperors Meiji and Taisho in 1912 and 1927, respectively. Previous to the promulgation of the amnesty ordinance general pardons had been decreed on the occasions of the Emperor Meiji's attaining his majority in 1869, at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889, and on the occasion of the death of the Empress Dowager Eisho in 1897. The Imperial Rescript ordering the amnesty last October follows:

"We, in the face of unprecedented emergency place Our confidence in the support of and collaboration of the public in general and are seriously anxious that the whole nation do their best to overcome the crisis. We hereby especially order the officers concerned to effect an amnesty. Ye, the officials and public in general, take to heart Our Wishes."

The terms of the amnesty, as drawn up by the Justice Ministry and approved by the Emperor, are summarized below:

I. PERSONS AFFECTED

Almost one million violators of the following laws:

1. Criminal Law (including lese majeste, insurrection, sedition, disturbance of the peace, etc.)
2. Election Law
3. Peace Preservation Law
4. National Defense Law (including insubordination, aiding the enemy, etc.)
5. Law for the Control of Thought, Speech and Press
6. Army and Navy Criminal Law (including release of secret information, entrance of forbidden areas, etc.)
7. Conscription



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7. Conscription Law

II. FORMS OF AMNESTY GRANTED

- A. Complete Pardon (320,000 persons, of whom 2,000 were in prison; the rest were under various forms of restriction)

Those in this category were freed, if they were in prison, had their civil rights restored and their criminal records destroyed.

- B. Commutation (37,000 persons)

- a) Death penalties changed to life imprisonment
- b) Life imprisonments changed to 20-year terms (life sentences of persons over 70 or under 16 on Sept. 2, 1945 shortened to 15 years)
- c) Term imprisonments changed as follows:
1. Term reduced by $\frac{1}{4}$ for those whose sentences had not commenced
 2. For those whose sentences had commenced, the remaining period was reduced by $\frac{1}{2}$, except that those who had served less than half of their terms had their time reduced by only $\frac{1}{4}$
 3. Terms of those over 70 or under 16 on Sept. 2, 1945 reduced by $\frac{1}{3}$

No commutations were permitted for those charged with:

1. High treason
2. Sedition
3. Incendiarism
4. Counterfeiting
5. Bodily injury to superiors
6. Aiding the enemy
7. Crimes against the laws of Korea, Formosa, Kwantung and the South Seas Islands

- C. Restoration of Civil Rights (600,000 persons)

- a) Those who had lost their civil rights or had them suspended for crimes for which they completed prison sentences at least 5 years prior to Sept. 2, 1945
- b) Those who had lost their civil rights or had them suspended for crimes for which

they



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they completed punishment not involving prison sentences between Feb. 18, 1942 and Sept. 2, 1954, or who were conscripted for military service

- c) Those who had lost their civil rights or who had them suspended whose crimes were committed when they were 18 or less and who completed their sentences or were exempted before Sept. 2, 1945, unless their sentences called for death or life imprisonment.

Lists of those affected by the amnesty have not been published and it is doubtful, in view of the large numbers involved, whether such lists would be of value for the interpretation of future political activity. To the best of our knowledge, few if any political prisoners liberated in accordance with the SCAP directive of October 4, 1945, recently ordered reinstated as citizens in full right, are taking an active part in politics except the Communists, the more important of whose names are doubtless already familiar to the Department.

R.A.F.

RAFearey:dm





THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 11, 1946.

NO. 190

SUBJECT: Transmitting Two Copies of a Translation of the "Memoirs of Prince KONOYE Fumimaro."

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

LEGAL ADVISER
APR 16 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
JAN 24 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1 copy
returned
by J.A. H.

JA
D.C.R.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit as accompaniments two copies of a translation made by the Okuyama Service of a series of newspaper articles appearing in the Asahi newspaper as the "Memoirs of Prince KONOYE Fumimaro."

This translation has already been made available to the Department through the regular transmission of the daily Okuyama Service, beginning with the issue for December 20 and ending with that of December 31, 1945. The original Japanese text is, of course, available to the Department from the copies of the Asahi newspaper for the above dates already forwarded to the Department.

It is believed that interested officers in the Department will wish to read these "memoirs" in full. As they are of historical rather than current interest, no effort has been made to prepare a summary. They are obviously written to present KONOYE's position in a favorable light. Emphasis is placed upon his desire for a meeting with former President Roosevelt as the only means of solving the impasse at that time.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *Not attached*
Two copies of memoirs.

In triplicate to Department.

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THE
MEMOIRES OF PRINCE
FUMIMARO KONOYE

Translated From the Asahi Shimbun
Dec. 20 - 31, 1945

OKUYAMA SERVICE

Preface

The American-Japanese Negotiations during the Konoye Cabinet were conducted over a long period of from April, 1941 to October the same year. The talks at first were pushed under utter secrecy, but as the talks leaked out, various conjectures were indulged in, and on the basis of such conjectures all sorts of attacks and criticisms were concentrated on the Government. I did not give up hope up to the last moment and concentrated my efforts on it. It was because there were reasons for which an American-Japanese conflict had to be avoided. First, the outbreak of the Reich-Soviet War. Second, the views of the Naval leaders. Third, the matter of materials.

The Tripartite Alliance was concluded on the premise of the German-Soviet-Japanese linking relation. But when the Reich-Soviet War broke out, this premise was overturned. The Soviet Union ran to the Anglo-American camps and our country was placed in the worst situation, a situation where this country might be compelled to regard the United States and the Soviet Union as our enemies. About this matter, I should like to refer you to the separate article on "Tripartite Alliance."

Admiral Oikawa
Approves Alliance

The second issue which concerns the views of the Navy. As regards the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty, at first I thought that the Navy would not easily approve the pact. This attitude of the Navy could easily be supposed judging from the Navy's attitude thereon since the days of the Hiranuma Cabinet.

Navy Minister Zengo Yoshida at the time of the Cabinet organization agreed to the idea of strengthening the tripartite Axis, but when the talk developed and the Tripartite Alliance with stipulations on military aid was proposed, it became a big issue for the Navy. Navy Minister Yoshida seems to have become much worried. His heart trouble became worse and he was forced to resign.

When Admiral Oikawa became the Navy Minister, the Navy at once approved the Tripartite Alliance. I became suspicious of the abrupt manner in which the Navy approved the alliance and inviting the then Navy Vice-Minister Toyoda, inquired into the circumstances. Vice-Minister Toyoda said:

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"To speak the truth, the Navy at heart is opposed to the Tripartite Pact, but since the domestic political conditions no longer permit further opposition on the part of the Navy, the Navy unavoidably approves it. The Navy approves it for a political reason. From the military standpoint, the Navy has no such confidence as to fight the United States."

I said:

"This is something which is unexpected to me. Politics is something which we statesmen deal with and the Navy need not have a concern in it. The Navy should examine the matter purely from the military standpoint, and if it has no confidence, it should oppose it to the last. Isn't it the way to be loyal to the country?"

Vice-Minister Toyoda said:

"Now that the situation has come to such a pass, please have understanding for the position of the Navy. There is no longer any other way except that of preventing the rise of the obligation for military assistance in the Tripartite Pact by means of diplomatic negotiations."

Shortly afterward, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, came up to Tokyo and I saw him. The Admiral was strongly opposed to the Tripartite Alliance. The obstinate opposition of the then Navy Minister Yonai to the Tripartite Alliance in Hiranuma Cabinet days seemed to have been strongly due to the assistance of the then Vice-Minister of the Navy Yamamoto. When I mentioned to the Admiral that Vice-Minister Toyoda told me such and such things, the Admiral said:

"If I am told to fight regardless of consequence, I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second and third year. The Tripartite Pact has been concluded and we cannot help it. Now that the situation has come to this pass, I hope you will endeavor for avoidance of an American-Japanese war."

Thus, the mind of the Navy could be ascertained. If the mind of the Navy was such, I considered the actual application of the Tripartite Pact had to be done with considerable care and circumspection. Even if the Soviet Union took sides with the Allies, since the view of the Navy was such, an American-Japanese conflict had to be avoided as much as circumstances permitted.

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Naval Leaders Still Cautious

When the American-Japanese Negotiations were opened, both the Army and Navy enthusiastically hoped for the successful conclusion of the talks. But when the month of August came the Army's enthusiasm began cooling. The views of the naval leaders, however, remained unchanged. I heard that naval officers in the lower ranks began to raise strong views, but when I asked the naval leaders about it, they always replied unconcernedly, "We shall control such blind movements."

At a liaison conference, the Chief of the Naval General Staff made a clear declaration:

"If the other party is the United States alone, we have some confidence in fighting it, but if the Soviet Union comes in and if we have to conduct operations both in the North and in the South, we have no confidence."

When October came and my Cabinet was on the verge of resignation, the naval leaders were still in favor of continuing the American-Japanese negotiations. But in view of their relations to the Army and of the internal relations of the Navy, they did not state it on the surface. They merely entrusted the matter to the Prime Minister.

The third issues concern materials. Our dependence on the United States and Britain in regard to materials, especially munitions, was a serious vulnerable point for this country. In regard to the possibility of our country getting rid of this vulnerability, I ordered the Planning Board since the first Konye Cabinet to conduct investigations several times. The result invariably was "impossible."

The return to normal of American-Japanese trade and the economic activities in the Southwest Pacific which constituted one item in the American-Japanese Negotiations can be said as having been aimed at the acquisition of these materials.

In the course of the negotiations, however, the United States invoked the asset-freezing act with the result that the acquisition and replenishment of these materials became utterly impossible. As a result, the issue became acute. If the condition was allowed to continue as it was, the goods in storage would gradually decrease. It was what we called "jariki" (general impoverishment).

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Severance of Economic Relations
Means Gradual Impoverishment, Tojo Asserts

It was the fundamental reason in the insistences of the war advocates that war with the United States should be commenced as early as possible. To prevent the war materials from becoming exhausted by degrees, there were only two means: to make it possible to obtain materials freely through a successful conclusion of the American-Japanese Negotiations, or to meet the military demands by promoting the domestic production capacity. Herein is seen one of the major reasons for the Government's concentration of efforts on a successful conclusion of the U.S.-Japan negotiations.

Replenishment of Munitions
and Petroleum

When the American-Japanese Negotiations reached a critical stage, the Government again ordered the then President of the Planning Board to conduct investigations into war materials'. Upon investigation, he gave the following report:

"Only petroleum forms the most difficult problem to settle, and it is considered possible to obtain the other materials. Even with regard to petroleum, it is considered possible to acquire 500,000 tons towards the end of 1943 and 4,000,000 tons in the course of the year 1944, provided the artificial petroleum industry is extended with the capital of ¥2,000,000,000.

"Even if the Dutch East Indies is captured by force, the enemy will destroy its oil facilities without fail. Besides, it is necessary to consider the matter of transportation. Therefore, in the first year we cannot expect to have more than 300,000 tons of oil and more than 1,500,000 tons in the second year. It must be considered to take five or six years before we can obtain 5,000,000 tons."

That is to say, the foregoing report made it known that it would not be possible to get our required amount of petroleum even by use of armed force but that the aim of preventing the war materials from becoming exhausted by degrees would be attained to some extent by the extension of the artificial petroleum industry.

According to a decision made at the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941, "There shall be immediately made a determination to declare war on the United States (Britain and Holland)" in case it cannot be considered likely as late as early in October to have our demands gratified in the American-Japanese Negotiations. But there was no objection

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to hesitation in the war declaration on the ground that there was a possibility of the negotiations being brought to a successful conclusion. Even if the negotiations turned out unsuccessful, the decision at the Imperial Conference did not say "We should open War." It merely said that we should determine to open war. Therefore, there was the means of going without war with only economic relations cut off. In fact, the Government considered the second course in case of inevitability.

"It's Domestic Politics That Commences War"

On the other hand, the war advocates obstinately claimed the commencement of the war on the ground that otherwise the war materials would become exhausted by degrees. I said to Planning Board President Suzuki:

"If it is possible to prevent petroleum and other war materials from becoming exhausted by fostering the domestic production capacity, the manufacturing facilities within the country should be extended even at the cost of many billions. Isn't it too stupid to obtain these materials at the great cost of war with the United States and Britain?"

Suzuki replied:

"Yes, it is as you say, but it is domestic politics that opens the war."

In due course, the Cabinet resigned en bloc, and all things became helpless. Later on, at a conference of senior statesmen on November 29, 1941, shortly before the Tojo Cabinet plunged Japan into the War, I questioned Premier Tojo:

"Isn't it possible to prevent the war materials from getting exhausted gradually through an increase in the domestic production? And, if it is possible, Japan need not absolutely initiate war against the United States, Britain and Holland. How do you think of the policy of going without resort to war with only the economic relations kept in a state of rupture so as to devise a fitting measure to cope with the situation?"

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Premier Tojo replied:

"Since the inception of the Cabinet, our efforts were concentrated on this issue, but since we have reached the conclusion that we shall sink into a state of gradual impoverishment if we go on without recourse to war with only economic relations cut off, we have at last decided to open war."

Premier Tojo said gradual impoverishment was unavoidable, and President Suzuki of the Planning Board said the gradual impoverishment was preventable. Therefore, one of the two was lying. President Suzuki's remark, "It's domestic politics that opens war," must be said to have been very significant.

As is stated above, I endured criticisms and other trials for some six months and continued the American-Japanese Negotiations obstinately for the foregoing three reasons. Below I shall give a brief description of the progress and circumstances of the negotiations.

Pros and Cons on 7-Point American Proposal

Since about December, 1940, talks began to be made between Bishop Walsh of the highest Catholic school in the United States "Maryknoll," Mr. Draft, chief secretary of the same school, Postmaster General Walker and Colonel Iwahata of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Office and Mr. Tadao Ikawa regarding the adjustment of American-Japanese relations. When the month of April, 1941, came, the two governments of Japan and the United States got into the mood to take the matter up. What should be remembered in this connection is that the American President and Secretary of State Hull on the American side and Ambassador Nomura and the military and naval attaches of the Japanese Embassy in Washington on the Japanese side established contact confidentially and had full knowledge of the talks that were going on between the civilians of the two countries.

On April 8 the first test plan was put forward by the American side. The Japanese side revised it and submitted the second test plan. On April 14 and 16 Secretary of State Hull invited Ambassador Nomura and held the initial talks with him.

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Mr. Hull then declared that the cililian talks might now be shifted to unofficial talks between himself and Ambassador Nomura and the talks might be continued. As the first step, he said, the Japanese Ambassador was requested to ask for instructions from the Japanese Government.

Ambassador Nomura's cable containing the important offer and the contents of the basis of the negotiations reached the Foreign Office here from the afternoon of April 17 to the morning of April 18. At that time Foreign Minister Matsuoka was in Siberia on his way back from a visit to Europe. Vice-Minister Chuichi Ohashi of the Foreign Office at 11 o'clock on the morning of April 18 gave me the first report while I was sitting in the Cabinet council meeting. At 4:30 o'clock the same afternoon he again called on me, accompanied by Director Terazaki of the American Bureau. Below I shall give the full text of the plan.

Items of American-Japanese Understanding

"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States hereby accept joint responsibility for the purpose of negotiating and concluding a general agreement aiming at restoration of the relations of traditional friendship between the two countries.

"The two Governments of the two countries hope from the bottom of their heart for prevention of repetition of the incidents which have aggravated the friendly feelings between the peoples of the two countries and for checking of their unexpected happening, without discussing specially the causes of the recent estrangement to the relations of the two countries.

"The two Governments acutely hope that peace will be established on the basis of morality in the Pacific by joint endeavors of the two countries. That the menace of deplorable disturbances calculated to destroy culture will be dispelled by early completion of intimate and friendly understanding between the two countries, and that should such be found impossible, further extension thereof will be prevented.

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"If the following points are clarified or improved, the American-Japanese relations will be considerably adjusted:

- "1. The international idea and State idea as entertained by the two countries of Japan and the United States.
- "2. The attitude of the two governments toward the European War.
- "3. The relations between the two governments regarding the China Affair.
- "4. The relations of the naval strength, air strength and shipping in the Pacific.
- "5. Trade and financial collaboration between the two countries.
- "6. The economic activities of the two countries in the Southwest Pacific area.
- "7. The policy of the two governments concerning the political stabilization of the Pacific.

"By the foregoing considerations the following understanding has been reached. The understanding shall be subject to the final and formal decision of the Japanese Government after passing through the revision of the American Government.

- "1. The international idea and State idea as entertained by the two countries of Japan and the United States.

"The two Governments of Japan and the United States mutually recognize that these two Powers are equal and independent countries and neighboring Pacific Powers. The two Governments propose to clarify their unity in that the two Governments desire for establishment of lasting peace and for bringing about of a new era of trust and cooperation based on mutual respect.

"The two Governments state their traditional confidence that the various countries and various races enjoy their rights, that their mutual interests are to be adjusted by peaceful means, that their spiritual and material welfare be pursued and be protected and that the two Governments recognize the responsibility not to destroy such welfare.

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"The two Governments have a strong determination to maintain their own traditional State idea and social order and the moral principles which are the basis of their national life and not to allow the rampancy of foreign ideas opposed to them.

"2. The attitude of the two governments regarding the European War. --- The Japanese Government hereby clarifies that the purpose of the Axis Alliance is defensive and endeavors to prevent the extension of the relation of military linking to the states not taking part in the European War. It is hereby declared that the military obligation based on the Axis Alliance shall be invoked only when Germany is positively attacked by a state or states now not taking part in the European War.

"3. The relations of the two governments concerning the China Affair:--- The American President recognizes the following conditions, and moreover, in case the Japanese Government guarantees them, the American President shall advise peace to the Chiang regime on the basis thereof:

"a) The independence of China. b) The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory based on an agreement to be entered into between Japan and China. c) Non-annexation of China. d) Non-reparations. e) Restoration of the policy of the Open Door. f) Amalgamation of the Chiang regime and the Wang Government. g) Self-restraint of large-scale or collective emigration of Japanese to Chinese territory. h) Recognition of Manchoukuo.

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"In case the Chiang regime responds to the advice of the American President, the Japanese Government shall at once open peace negotiations directly with the Chinese Government to be newly unified or the elements which are to compose the Chinese Government.

"The Japanese Government shall submit to the Chinese side directly concrete peace terms within the scope of the foregoing conditions and on the basis of the good neighbor friendship and joint defense against Communism and the principles of economic cooperation.

"4. The naval strength, air strength and shipping relations in the Pacific.

"a) Desiring as they do for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, the two countries of Japan and the United States shall not make any such disposition of naval and air force as to menace the other. Concrete details thereof shall be submitted to talks between Japan and the United States.

"b) In concluding the agreement Japan and the United States shall mutually dispatch their fleets for courtesy calls and make it a sign of the arrival of peace in the Pacific.

"c) In case of solution of the China Affair the Japanese Government in response to the desire of the American Government shall consent to make its good offices for placing chiefly in the Pacific of such vessels of its own country as may be liberated from service. But its tonnage and other details shall be determined at American-Japanese talks.

"5. Trade and financing cooperation between the two countries. In case the present agreement materializes and the two Governments recognize it, the two countries of Japan and the United States, in case one party has goods and materials found necessary by the other, shall be given protection for sure acquisition thereof. The Governments of the two countries shall take proper means for the return to such legitimate trade relations as existed during the operation of the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty. Moreover, in case the two Governments desire the conclusion of a new commercial treaty, the matter shall be studied in American-Japanese Negotiations and it shall be concluded in accordance with usual customs. For the purpose of expediting

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the economic cooperation between the two countries the United States shall offer Japan gold credits sufficient to realize the development of commerce and industry and American-Japanese economic cooperation aiming at improvement of the economic conditions in East Asia.

"6. Economic activities of the two countries in the Southwest Pacific area. In view of the guarantee that the development of Japan in the Southwest Pacific area will be by recourse to pacific means without resort to armed force, Japan shall obtain American cooperation and support regarding the production and acquisition of materials such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, etc. in the areas as desired by Japan.

"7. The policy of the two countries regarding the political stabilization of the Pacific. a) The two countries of Japan and the United States shall not recognize European countries to obtain territorial cession or annexation of territories in East Asia or in the Southwest Pacific in future.

"b) The two Governments of Japan and the United States shall offer joint guarantee for the independence of the Philippines and give consideration to the method of assistance in case an unprovoked attack by a third country.

"8. Japanese emigration to the United States and the Southwest Pacific shall be given friendly consideration and be given equal treatment with the nationals of other countries.

"American-Japanese Negotiations.

"a) The talks between the representatives of the two Governments shall take place at Honolulu. The talks shall be opened between President Roosevelt representing the United States and Prime Minister Kono representing Japan. The number of the representatives shall not exceed five for each side. Of course, the number does not include technical experts and secretaries.

"b) No 'observer' of third countries shall be allowed to participate in the talks.

"c) The talks shall be held as soon as the present understanding materializes (May this year).

"d) In the talks the matters which were included in the present understanding shall not be re-discussed. Endeavors shall be made for discussion on the agenda as previously arranged between the two Governments and for writing the present

understanding in documentary form. The concrete agenda shall be agreed to between the two Governments.

"Supplementary Rules

"The items of understanding hereby agreed to shall be written in a confidential memorandum. As for the scope, nature and period of announcement concerning the present understanding shall be subject to agreement between the two Governments."

Liaison Conference
Immediately Held

In view of the importance of the issue, I called a liaison conference between the Government and the Supreme Command at 8 o'clock. The Government was represented by the Prime Minister, Home Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Supreme Command was represented by the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. The military affairs bureau and naval affairs bureau chiefs and the Chief of Secretary of the Cabinet were also present. When the American proposal was made the subject of talk, the following views prevailed:

1. Acceptance of this American plan would be the greatest short-cut to the disposal of the China Affair. The establishment of the Wang Government failed to achieve anything and direct negotiations with Chungking has become exceedingly difficult. Since Chungking is now entirely dependent on the United States, no direct negotiations with Chungking would accomplish anything unless the United States is placed in the position of intermediary. In view of this fact, the foregoing point is clear.

2. To respond to this proposal and seek rapprochement of Japan and the United States would offer an excellent opportunity for avoidance of an American-Japanese war. Moreover, it will prevent the extension of the European War to the dimension of a world war and may become the prelude to the bringing about of world peace.

3. The national power of Japan today has been considerably consumed. The China Affair, therefore, must be solved as soon as possible, and efforts must be made to restore and rear the national power. The idea of southward advance which is being insisted on in some sections is impracticable. Even the Supreme Command says it has no confidence nor preparations for it. Even from the standpoint of rearing the national power, it is necessary for this country to shake hands with the United States at this time and seek to promote the replenishment of materials for the future.

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Thus, the majority were in favor of acceptance. As the conditions to acceptance, however, the following views were expressed:

1. Clarification must be made that the American-Japanese agreement does not violate the Tripartite Alliance.

2. Further clarification should be made to the purpose of contributing toward world peace through American-Japanese collaboration. If as the result of the agreement, the United States can have its hands off in the Pacific and strength its aid to Britain, it will constitute a lack of faith on Japan's part toward Germany. Accordingly, the American-Japanese collaboration is desired to be so developed as to offer mediation between Britain and Germany.

3. The contents of the present proposal are too complex.

4. The original wording gives one the sense of a return to the old order. Therefore, the positive side of the construction of a new order should be more clarified.

5. Unless things are done in haste, there will be a fear of the information leaking out. Accordingly, the return of the Foreign Minister to Tokyo should be urged.

Whether or not this matter should be communicated to Germany, the following two views were expressed:

Such an important issue cannot but be communicated to Germany from the standpoint of faith. At least, before a reply is sent to the United States, a notification should be sent to Germany.

If Germany is notified beforehand, the country may raise objections to it. Accordingly, what will materialize may not materialize. It is better, therefore, to push the talks without Germany being notified.

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American Plan Secretly
Communicated to Germany

The following is a summary of a history of the American-Japanese Negotiations written by the late Prince Fumimaro Konoye in the spring of 1942 after the outbreak of the War. The earlier article captioned "The Circumstances Attending the American-Japanese Negotiations in the 2nd and 3rd Konoye Cabinets" forms a supplement to the following article. Ed., Asahi.

Matsuoka Proposes
Revised Plan

Irrespective of his outward speech and action, it was undeniable that Foreign Minister Matsuoka was secretly concerned over the treatment of the American-Japanese issues. Even on his sick-bed he carefully examined the revised plan prepared by the authorities of the Army, Navy and the Foreign Office as well as the original American plan and gave large-scale revision to it. Thus, on May 3 arrangements were made for the convocation of the third liaison conference. The conference in the main approved the revised plan as prepared by the Foreign Minister.

The main points of the revision were: The fourth clause of the matters of understanding, "the relations of the naval and air forces and shipping in the Pacific" was erased. A new article should be inserted regarding peace mediation between Britain and Germany at the hands of Japan and the United States in the clause, "The Attitude of the two Governments Regarding the European War. The obligation as stipulated in the Tripartite Pact should be more clarified, and a public announcement of the terms of peace for the settlement of the China Affair should be withheld." The assurance of Japan that Japan would never make a southward advance by recourse to force should be eliminated, and the arrangements regarding the American-Japanese talks should be eliminated, etc.

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Matsuoka Proposes Neutrality Pact

While the majority put forward their view that the revised plan should be communicated to the American side at once, Foreign Minister Matsuoka considered otherwise, and insisted that as the first step, a new proposal for the conclusion of a neutrality pact should be made to the United States. As he would not yield in his assertion, the majority at last decided to follow his idea.

The next issue raised was the question of whether or not the present issue should be communicated to Germany. The Foreign Minister strongly insisted that he should be trusted for his diplomatic ability in this regard. And decision was made to entrust him with this matter.

Following the liaison conference the Foreign Minister dispatched two instructions to Ambassador Nomura. One was an interim reply to the United States, and it took the form of an oral statement addressed to Secretary of State Hull from the Foreign Minister. The contents of the statement said that the Italian and German leaders were confident of their victory and argued that American participation in the European War would merely prolong the war and bring about destruction of civilization, stressing that Japan cannot injure the position of her allies, Germany and Italy, even to the slightest extent.

The other instruction requested Ambassador Nomura to propose the conclusion of an American-Japanese neutrality pact, simple and clear, as an impromptu idea of the Ambassador. On the following day May 4 the Foreign Minister went to Western Japan to worship at the Grand Shrine of Ise to report his return to Japan to the spirits of the Imperial Ancestors. In his absence from Tokyo he dispatched Director Sakamoto of the European-Asiatic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office to the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo and made to them an interim report, stating that the United States made a secret proposal for the adjustment of American-Japanese relations, adding that this was a matter of absolute secrecy.

On May 6 after his return to Tokyo, when he received a visit from the German Ambassador, Foreign Minister Matsuoka said to the German Ambassador that if Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had any view to offer in this connection, he desired to have it.

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At that time Matsuoka said to the German Ambassador, "To make a counter-use of the evil intention of the United States and solve the Sino-Japanese Affair would also be an advantage to Germany after all."

U.S. Turns Down
Neutrality Pact

In Washington, while Ambassador Nomura and his staff were seriously concerned over the long delay of the Japanese reply, the interim instructions reached the Embassy from Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador on May 7 met Secretary of State Hull and sounded him regarding the possibility of a neutral pact. As the proposal was made, Secretary of State Hull refused to take it up in earnest. Later, the Ambassador conducted a confidential investigation into the views of the American Government leaders, and it was ascertained that the neutrality pact might not be a bad idea after the plan under discussion materialized but was utterly unthinkable at the prevailing stage.

Ambassador Nomura failed to hand over a copy of the oral statement to Mr. Hull for fear that the latter's feeling would be injured. He even refrained from reading the statement in entirety. On the occasion of the talk Mr. Hull is said to have urged the opening of the negotiations themselves as early as possible in a very strong tone, an unusual phenomenon.

Thus, Foreign Minister Matsuoka's test plan failed to take any effect whatsoever. The situation in the United States became more difficult at a quick tempo chiefly through the enforcement of the national defense law and the merchantmen convoying issue. From Ambassador Nomura came repeated requests demanding a reply. The offices of the Japanese military and naval attaches in Washington communicated to their home country an atmosphere of considerably unreserved opposition to Matsuoka, charging him with conducting what may be called gesture diplomacy. The military attache in Berlin, on the other hand, sent a telegram to the War Minister, saying, "According to a report from reliable sources, the Government is negotiating with the United States. We are utterly opposed to such talks. In case it warrants our action, we are prepared to make a general withdrawal."

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This incident may be regarded as a ripple caused by the communication to Germany and Italy.

**Matsuoka Urges Throne
to Support Axis**

As the situation became more complex and confused, the activities of the Cabinet Ministers concerned also became brisk. On May 8 Foreign Minister Matsuoka on the occasion he was received in audience by the Emperor, told the Throne:

"In case of American participation in war, Japan naturally would have to rise in support of the Italo-German side. In such a case the adjustment of American-Japanese relations would totally collapse. In any case, if Japan is to be unfaithful to Germany and Italy in her excessive endeavors for issues with the United States, I shall have to resign."

This report was communicated to me by the Foreign Minister himself on the following day, that is, May 9. On the same night I secretly called the War and Navy Ministers to my home and conferred with them regarding measures to be taken for the attitude of the Foreign Minister. I made arrangements with them also for the calling of another liaison conference concerning the attitude to be taken by our country in case of American war participation and the method of action in case Germany expressed opposition or revision.

**Emperor Seriously
concerned**

On May 10, that is, the following day I was received in audience by His Majesty. The Emperor with a very seriously concerned look told me the contents of the Foreign Minister's report to the Throne. His Majesty stated:

"In case the United States goes into war, Japan will have to attack Singapore. And if the United States comes in, the war will be a protracted affair. As a result, there may be the danger of a Reich-Soviet conflict. In such a case Japan will have to abandon the Neutrality Pact, and taking sides with Germany, must go as far as Irkutsk. Such was Matsuoka's statement."

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I told His Majesty that the Foreign Minister's report represented nothing but a mere idea to provide against the worst case. Even if it was the Foreign Minister's idea, the High Command and the Cabinet Council must approve it before decision is taken thereon. I then implored His Majesty to feel at ease.

I took the opportunity for telling his Majesty to the following effect: For the purpose of disposing of the China Affair, the first issue for the immediate present, there is no method of action except that of utilizing the United States. The present American proposal offers the ideal chance and we desire to push it. However, I reported on the conflict of views likely to arise within the Cabinet in case Germany raised objections to American-Japanese understanding, in case of America's second revision of the already revised plan, and in case of American war participation after the materialization of American-Japanese understanding. Not only the conflict of views within the Cabinet but also I explained in detail the possible split of public opinions. I further stated that I shall push things as smoothly as possible but in case such is found impossible, I may be called upon to have recourse to emergency measures. Thus, I expressed my determination.

His Majesty gave His assent to every point of my remarks and told me to go ahead along that line. Then, I had a talk with Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido and the latter told me that Matsuo had become too positive in his views since his return from Europe and he had lost the confidence of His Majesty. Following Matsuo's departure from the Palace, His Majesty sought advice from Lord Keeper Kido on the matter of replacing the Foreign Minister with somebody else, so Kido revealed.

Americans Suspicious Aroused
by Our Revision Plan

The reply from Germany in question failed to come. In the meantime, the submission of the revised plan as decided on May 3, to the United States was postponed in spite of repeated requests from the Army and Navy side, but at last in view of the necessity of forwarding the plan to the American side before the scheduled speech of the American President on May 14, the Foreign Minister at noon on May 12 issued instructions to Ambassador Nemura permitting him to open negotiations thereon though no reply had come from the German side.

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Acting on the instructions, Ambassador Nomura on two days, that is, May 11 (May 12, Japan time) and May 12 called on Secretary of State Hull and submitted to him the Japanese revised plan. On May 13 Foreign Minister Matsuoka sent another message to Secretary of State Hull, stressing the two points as the premise:

1. The United States do not take part in the European War.
2. The United States advise Chiang Kai-shek to open negotiations with Japan for peace.

Secretary of State Hull urged Ambassador Nomura:

"The American-Japanese talks now in progress are not negotiations being carried on on a certain basis as yet but are informal and free talks. So let's talk unreservedly from the bottom of our heart."

Concerning the Japanese revised plan which was handed over to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Nomura, the American diplomat showed not a small amount of suspicion concerning the omission of the clause pertaining to the guarantee that the Japanese side do not make an armed advance into the southern regions. As regards the China Affair items, he also showed a special concern and asked many questions. He also made a noteworthy remark that the Secretary must get Britain in contact on the China Affair issue.

Hull also explained that the domestic circumstances in the United States were not of a nature to render the American-Japanese talks easy, and he maintained a considerably cautious attitude. The scheduled speech of the President for May 14 was postponed until May 29. The convoy issue raised a serious controversy, and there were indications that the United States, influenced by the domestic and foreign situations, found it difficult to make a decision. In any case, contrary to the Japanese expectations, a reply from the United States would not come.

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Germany Protests
Against Negotiations

Foreign Minister Matsuoka caused delay after delay to our reply to the United States, because he wanted to have the German reply beforehand. He endeavored but in vain, and he was forced to send instructions to Ambassador Nomura on May 12 asking him to make a reply to the American side. Soon after the reply was sent to the United States, Germany sent to Japan her reply.

The German reply said that the real intention of the United States in seeking a compromise with Japan is to push the matter of participation in the European War, and the German side requested the Japanese Government to clarify the fact that the protection and convoying which the United States is carrying on is recognized as an action purposely inciting war, and accordingly, it will be bound to cause Japan to take part in the war, and also clarify the fact that if the United States refrains from such action, Japan will be prepared to study and weigh the American proposal.

Also in view of the effect the present matter would cause to the Tripartite Pact, the final reply should be shown to the German side before it was sent to the United States, the reply from Germany concluded.

The Italian Government sent a representation to the Japanese Government, asking Japan to accept the German reply as Italy's reply, too.

On May 19, Ambassador Ott, as expected, came and expressed the dissatisfaction of his home government that the Japanese Government made a reply to the American side before receiving the German reply. He said that a treaty which is concluded by one of the Tripartite Powers with another country weakened the Tripartite Pact Powers front, indirectly expressing Germany's basic objections to the American-Japanese negotiations. Ott requested to clarify at least the "obligation of the United States Government not to intervene in the war between Britain and the Axis Powers" and the "obligation of Japan born of the Tripartite Pact", and in conclusion, Ott declared in a high-handed manner:

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"The German Government cannot but insist on its hope that the German Government will be allowed to have full participation in the American-Japanese negotiations and have immediate information on Japan's reply to the United States. If the Japanese Government listens to the representation of the United States without having understanding previously with the German Government on all important issues, and defines her future position, it will not be fitting to the Tripartite Relations."

From Ambassador Oshima in Berlin also came a telegram, reporting that the German leaders entertained serious antipathy against the American-Japanese negotiations and expressing serious opposition on his own part to the talks.

Matsuoka Holds On

In Tokyo liaison conferences were held on May 15 and 22, but nothing concrete was decided beyond the exchange of information and views. It was observable that there was an effect of the frequent representations from the German Government and Ambassador Oshima on the attitude of Foreign Minister ~~Matsuoka~~ Matsuoka. The vague attitude of the Foreign Minister became more vague. While the other Cabinet Ministers were full of hope, Mr. Matsuoka alone was opposed to them. On the occasion of the conference of May 22 Director Oka of the Naval Affairs Bureau told Chief Secretary of the Cabinet Tomita:

"If the Foreign Minister is opposed to our views, in case an agreement materializes, there will be a fear of a split of views within the Cabinet."

The Foreign Minister talked with me on May 23, stating:

"It seems to me that the leaders of the Army and Navy are endeavoring to have American-Japanese understanding materialize even if it may impair our friendship with Germany and Italy, but what can we do with such a weak-kneed attitude?"

As regards the interpretation of Article Three of the Tripartite Pact, he would not cede in his strong view that even though the German side attacked an American convoy, Japan would be under the obligation to take part in the war and assist Germany, as the convoy itself was regarded as attack.

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This point was repeatedly stressed to the American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew. Foreign Minister Matsuoka also said that by so doing the participation of the United States in the war might be prevented.

According to the Foreign Minister's view, the American President was determined in favor of war participation. In the case of war participation, American-Japanese understanding would be cast to the wind. On such an occasion the Japanese people would not consent to such an attitude of the Army and Navy and may start a riot. In any case, Japan would be compelled to clarify her attitude in favor of Britain and the United States or Germany and Italy. He also added that he was determined to insist on concerted action with Germany and Italy.

In conclusion, Matsuoka said:

"As for the idea of His Majesty, I as a subject of His Majesty will have to follow it."

Thus, he made a declaration hinting that he will resign as Foreign Minister in a certain warranted case.

Foreign Minister's Attitude Strange

There was the suspicion that during his stay in Europe he made a certain important commitment, as his speech and action gave us such a hint. But as for the contents of the talks he made in Europe, there was no way except to believe his own reports. According to his own reports, Hitler and Ribbentrop urged Japan's attack on Singapore but he made no commitment whatever. But a telegram from Ambassador Oshima said:

"Foreign Minister Ribbentrop considers that Mr. Matsuoka has entirely revised his view that he would have an attack made on Singapore, a view learned as a private view of his during Mr. Matsuoka's visit to Europe."

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Seeing this information, the question arises as to which was the truth. At any rate, the real intention of the Foreign Minister then sandwiched between the American issue and the Italo-German obligation were hard to understand. From about that time Matsuoka began openly expressing his dissatisfaction and antipathy with Ambassador Nomura. In the course of his talk with me on May 23, he expressed his anger

"The present proposal was not made by the American side but I have found that it was Ambassador Nomura who made the proposal."

I explained that it was due to his misunderstanding, but the Foreign Minister continued accusing the Ambassador of having overstepped the bounds of his duty. At least when he found that the proposal was not born of his own talk with Steinhardt, Matsuoka began feeling a serious dissatisfaction.

According to a report which the Navy picked up as sent to the British Government from Ambassador Halifax, Ambassador Nomura stated to the Secretary of State Hull that while His Majesty and the army and navy leaders were hoping the materialization of the American-Japanese talks, Foreign Minister Matsuoka alone was opposed to the talks.

At this report the Foreign Minister was much indignant and cabled instructions to Ambassador Nomura ordering him to remove the misunderstanding of the Secretary of State. Ambassador Nomura sent a reply, stating:

"I am utterly surprised at your report. There is absolutely no foundation whatsoever in the rumor."

The reply was accompanied by the explanation that the Ambassador made a statement to the effect that in Japan the foreign policy cannot be determined by the Foreign Minister alone.

To this Matsuoka sent another telegram:

"If the report is baseless, that is all right, but if any one be found giving such an impression in your place, it is desirable that proper control should be made on it."

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Thus, Matsuoka expressed his antipathy against men close to the Ambassador inside from the members of the Embassy staff. The issue was settled then and there but the conflict between the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador and his lieutenants came to the surface.

Nomura-Hull Talks Slow

Ambassador Nomura on May 5, 14, 16, 20, 21 and 28 continued talks amid a friendly atmosphere. Each time it was off-the-record talks lasting from one to three hours. The issues handled concerned an agreement on the Pacific area, the Tripartite Pact and the China issue but there were no signs of fast development. According to the tone of the Secretary of State's talks and confidential investigations, it seems to be true that the American Government was dubious of Japan having any sincere intention of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion and especially the United States was fully guarding against the strong views of Foreign Minister Matsuoka and others.

The American President's fireside chat was delivered on May 27 amid the full attention of the world, but it made no direct reference to Japan and as for China, it slightly touched on it. There was a report that special attention was paid to relations with Japan, which was taken as a sign of America's cautious attitude. Some of the American press, however, said that the President, prior to his fireside chat, invited Congressional leaders to a conference and expressed his policy to take a less vigorous policy toward Japan and engaged in the matter of fighting Germany. On that occasion the American President was credited with the statement:

"In Japan the opposition of financial circles against the Army's policy has become influential and this is bound to develop to a point where the Tripartite Pact will be virtually nullified."

In Tokyo this piece of news was banned, but Foreign Minister expressed the view that the ban was lifted immediately. He on May 30 issued a public statement stating that the Axis diplomacy was absolutely immutable and that there is a limit to the policy of peaceful southern advance.

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Reich-Soviet War Opens

On June 13 I went to Western Japan and returned to Tokyo on June 16. On the following day, that is, June 17, Wang Ching-wei of the National Government came to Tokyo and was to stay in Tokyo until June 25. On that account much of my time was reserved. In the meantime an urgent report came to my hand from Europe on the opening of a Reich-Soviet War. It was on the morning of June 22.

Strange to say, the American reply had been received one day before the astounding news of the Reich-Soviet war was received. It was handed over to Ambassador Nomura under date of June 21 and was cabled to Tokyo on June 24. The Cabinet found it unavoidable to concentrate every nerve on the development of this serious situation. Upon receipt of the news, Foreign Minister Matsuoka proceeded to the Imperial Palace and was received in audience, when he made a report to the Throne to the following effect:

"Now that war has been opened between Germany and the Soviet Union, Japan should cooperate with Germany and attack the Soviet Union. For this purpose, Japan should refrain from taking action for the time being. Sooner or later we must fight. In the end Japan will have to fight the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain as our enemies."

Of course, the Foreign Minister did not consult any member of the Cabinet. He took the action single-handed.

His Majesty, seriously surprised at Matsuoka's talk, summoned me at once for consultation. At the same time, through the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis Kido, His Majesty had the contents of Matsuoka's talk communicated to me. Matsuoka, by order of His Majesty, called on me at my home at about 10 o'clock at night. What he said was not much clear but it seemed to me that he told His Majesty his prediction on the basis of the worst case. On the following day, that is, June 23 when I was received in audience by the Emperor, I told His Majesty to feel at ease. I was in the dark as to whether Matsuoka's "strong views" represented his mere prediction or his insistence. Apprehensive of complications, I telephoned to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet from the Imperial Palace and ordered the scheduled liaison conference for that day to be cancelled on account of the Reich-Soviet war.

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The Foreign Minister, in addition to His Majesty, also told similar things to Lord Keeper Kido and the people in general, and caused troubles here and there. What I and Lord Keeper Kido ascertained was that Matsuoka insisted "First of all, attack the Soviet Union. War with the United States should be avoided, but in case of American participation in the war, Japan will have to fight the country also."

Although the Foreign Minister held such a view, I in order to have the attitude of the Government determined had talks and conferences with the Ministers of the Navy and of War, and also held liaison conferences on June 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 and July 1 in succession. On July 2 an Imperial Conference was held and the decision was made not to take action against the Soviet Union for the time being.

On the occasion of the Imperial Conference on July 2 Foreign Minister Matsuoka expressed very positive views. The Army had concentrated military strength in Manchuria and was ready for taking up war against the Soviet Union. It was the chief purpose to check the action of the Army. As a result, somewhat in the sense of compensation, the advance into French Indo-China was recognized.

The prevailing situation was such that to check the action of the Army and refuse the demand of the Army in entirety was calculated to merely invite a frontal clash with the Army and not to contribute to solution of the issues. Moreover, in the American-Japanese negotiations then in progress, there was a full prospect for compromise on the question of the advance into French Indo-China. In other words, we were confident of fully preventing the danger of war.

Matsuoka-Hull Duel

The United States attached importance to the attitude of Japan toward the Reich-Soviet war. The American President ordered the Secretary of State to send a message directly to me under date of July 4, stating:

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"There is a report that Japan will make military action against the Soviet Union. Can't you give us assurances that this report is contrary to the truth?"

The message was communicated to me through Ambassador Joseph C. Grew on July 6. This is something which was contrary to usual custom. It gives proof of how the United States Government disliked Matsuoka. I consulted the Foreign Minister and had the Foreign Minister give Ambassador Grew on July 8 copy of a message Foreign Minister Matsuoka handed to Ambassador Smetanin on July 2, as a reply to the American President's message. The occasion was seized for asking the United States if the latter had really the intention of taking part in the European War. The American side sent in its reply on July 16, the day on which the Cabinet resigned en bloc. The American reply said:

"Invocation of the right of self-defense against Germany is but natural."

The American reply was ironical in saying, "A country which forces the United States to remain idle will be regarded as belonging to the factions of the countries bent on armed aggression."

Matsuoka then closed the wrangling by expressing opposition to unrestricted abuse of the right of self-defense. Matsuoka showed his unpleasant feeling at the fact that a direct message was sent to me confidentially. Ambassador Grew, on the other hand, evinced his serious disappointment that his direct talk with me was closed. The estrangement in the relations between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew went from bad to worse.

**Kenoye Sends Note to Foreign Minister
on American-Japanese Relations Adjustment**

After the settlement of issues which arose with the commencement of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, no further delay to the American issues could be tolerated, nor could the vague attitude of the Foreign Minister himself be let go as it was. Accordingly, I on July 4 communicated my views to the Foreign Minister, especially in the form of a letter. The views expressed therein were to the following effect:

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1. Not until the Northern issue has been settled, should recourse to arms be made toward the South. And efforts to adjust relations with the United States should be made. The fact that it would be difficult and virtually impossible for this country to have both the United States and the Soviet Union as enemies at the same time is declared by the leaders of the Army and Navy. From this standpoint, the advance into French Indo-China should be stopped if such is possible.

2. As a result of the adjustment of relations with the United States, it may be impossible for us to give satisfaction to Germany's demand and on that account a cold feeling may temporarily be caused to German-Japanese relations, but such cannot be helped.

3. Adjustment of relations with the United States is necessary from the following standpoints:

a) Increase of national power by acquiring goods and materials from overseas areas.

b) Prevention of Soviet-American rapprochement.

c) Rapid promotion of peace-making work with Chungking.

4. From the foregoing standpoints, the present negotiations with the United States should be continued. Moreover, from the broader standpoint of national policy prosecution, a quick agreement should be sought.

In conclusion, I added a passage to the following effect:

"According to Your Excellency's far-sighted view, American-Japanese compromise may be impossible, but I as a man shouldering the heavy responsibility of assisting the Throne cannot but make my best efforts. Especially is it so as His Majesty is seriously concerned over the matter. At this juncture we should do our best and seek to have the negotiations materialize even allowing a concession."

Foreign Minister Matsuoka on that night telephoned his message to me stating that he was inspired by my letter. On the following day he paid a visit to me at my official residence and made the following declaration:

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"In principle, I am of the same view with the Prime Minister. Irrespective of public comment, I consider myself more enthusiastic than any one else over solution of the American issues. It is absolutely not true that I am having a regard for Germany's feelings. But if the Tripartite Pact is to get a crack on that account, I shall be opposed to it. Beginning today, I shall consider the American issues in all seriousness.

"And if I am found an obstacle, I shall resign at any time."

Matsuoka made such an important statement.

Re-Examination of Plan for American-Japanese Understanding

Thus, the discussion on the plan for American-Japanese understanding was decided to be taken up. On July 10 and 12 the liaison conferences were held to discuss the June 21 plan of the United States. The special features of the foregoing plan were:

1. In the item pertaining to the attitude of the two governments of Japan and the United States toward the European War, the portion stating that Japan and the United States are to cooperate for attaining peace as proposed by Japan was struck off. It was hinted at that the United States would push the drive to overthrow Germany.
2. In the relations pertaining to the tripartite relations, it was to be clarified that Japan is to contribute to prevention of extension of the European War due to non-provocation."

Making such a proposal, the United States was seen endeavoring to obtain a commitment from Japan that Japan would not rise to arms in case the United States took part in the war as a result of "provocation" from Germany.

3. In regard to the China issue, the distinction between the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Nanking Government as in the first plan was nullified but it was simply stated that the United States would urge the "Chinese Government" for peace with Japan. The Konoye Formula was mentioned but of this, only the portion pertaining

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to goodneighbor friendship alone was mentioned. Neither economic cooperation nor joint efforts for prevention of Communism was mentioned. It was seen that the United States, apprehensive of the criticism of public opinion, changed the terms to the disadvantage of this country.

4. The conditions of peace between Japan and China, which the Japanese side once erased, were restored as an annex, and it was stated that a satisfactory agreement of views should be reached thereon.

5. Whereas Japan proposed an American-Japanese economic agreement with the "Southwest" Pacific as the area for covering, the United States revised it as an agreement governing the entire Pacific area.

Moreover, this plan was accompanied by an oral statement. The statement said that the United States was ardently hoping for the materialization of the American-Japanese understanding, and the United States desired to have it confirmed more definitely that the Japanese Government was hoping for its materialization. Thus, the oral statement endeavored to sound the real intentions of Japan. In one passage it was stated:

"Among the leaders of Japan who are in the influential positions of the Japanese Government we find a man who has made an irrevocable commitment regarding the support of Totalitarian Germany and its policy of conquest."

The American statement further stated that this fact was ascertained by information the American Government obtained, and if this is the case, the understanding of the two countries now under consideration would prove "illusory" after all. This passage hinted at the criticism of Matsuoka. Suspicion was also expressed regarding the stationing of Japanese troops in China.

Arrangements were made to have this June 21 plan discussed at the liaison conference of July 10.

My pains were almost entirely neglected, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka became more uncompromising. His views became distinct that he was inclined to be opposed to American-Japanese negotiations. On the occasion of the liaison conference of

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July 10 he demanded the presence of Dr. Yoshie Saito, adviser to the Foreign Office and one of his henchmen, and Matsuoka and Saito expressed virtually wholesale opposition to the American-Japanese negotiations. The purpose of their views was made known to those present by means of printed matter previously prepared for the occasion. The views expressed, in short, said that the proposal of the United States was inspired by a wicked motive of either conquering Japan or throwing Japan into utter confusion. Especially, the oral statement attached to the American plan should be returned to the United States at once. And the American-Japanese negotiations should be disrupted. Only the method and time remained as the issue, they asserted.

**Fighting Services Even
Angered by Matsuoka**

Seriously concerned over such a strong attitude of the Foreign Minister, I secretly held a conference with the three Ministers of Home Affairs, War and Navy on the same night. On the occasion of the liaison conference which was held on July 12, the joint views of the Army and Navy were expressed. The views expressed were of a different purpose in contrast to those of Mr. Matsuoka, and proposed:

1. The attitude of Japan toward the European War shall be determined by treaty obligations and self-defense.
2. As regards the China issue, the United States is to advise on truce and peace on the basis of the Three Principles of Prince Konoye but the United States is not to intervene in the matter of peace conditions.
3. In case of need in the Pacific, the Empire reserves the exercise of armed power.

These three points, the Army and Navy said, should be clarified for the future, but as for the rest, no objections were necessary for the American plan. They added that even if rupture was to come, it should be postponed until after Japan's advance into French Indo-China.

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After all, Foreign Minister Matsuoka agreed to the preparation of our counter-plan on the basis of the views of the Army and Navy. And following the end of the parley on July 12 discussion was made among Director Muto of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Office, Director Oka of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy, Director Terasaki of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, Chief Secretary Tomita of the Cabinet and Adviser Saito of the Foreign Office, and the so-called final plan was drafted.

The only question that remained to be settled was to obtain the consent of the Foreign Minister for the draft plan. In spite of urgently repeated requests from the Army and Navy, Matsuoka refused to see the plan on the pretext of illness. But in the meantime, it was found Matsuoka saw the German Ambassador and others, and thereby caused a serious indignation to the Army and Navy side. On July 14 the explanation of Adviser Saito was listened to, and the final plan with the revision views of the Foreign Minister interwoven was completed.

The time it took was only a matter of one or two days, but the atmosphere prevailing in Government circles was of a very threatening character, and the political situation became very tense.

The counter-proposal plan as drafted by the Japanese side due to the revision of the Foreign Minister differed from the June 21 plan of the United States in the following points:

1. The item pertaining to the common efforts of Japan and the United States for an early conclusion of the European War was restored with the condition attached: "when a proper time comes," so that this matter might be acceptable to the American side.
2. The portion concerning the Tripartite Pact relations was revised, "in case of extension of the European War, the Japanese Government will determine its attitude only by the consideration of its treaty obligations and of the defense of the safety and welfare of its own country."
3. In the item pertaining to the China issue the Konoye Principles were lauded, and the name of "the Nanking Government" to which the United States was averse, was avoided. It was clearly stated that the United States was to advise the Chinese regime on peace.

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4. The terms of Sino-Japanese peace was again erased.

5. On the ground that American-Japanese economic cooperation was needed especially in the Southwest Pacific, the entire area of the Pacific was again revised to "Southwest Pacific."

Foreign Minister
Again Acts Wilfully

Now that this plan was completed after such pains, every one thought that the plan would be dispatched to the United States at once. But the Foreign Minister, it proved, was of the opinion that as the first step, instructions should be cabled to Washington for refusing to accept the oral statement. Branding the oral statement as a rude and improper document, the instructions said that unless the American Government withdrew it, Japan was in no position to further discuss American-Japanese understanding. I and the Army and Navy feared that if these instructions alone were sent, it would only serve to injure the feelings of the American side and might lead to rupture. We strongly insisted that both the instructions and the Japanese plan should be sent together.

The Foreign Minister ignored the arrangement made between myself and him through Adviser Saito and had the instructions regarding the refusal of the oral statement cabled at 11:30 o'clock on the night of July 14 (In fact, Secretary of State Hull was surprised at the manner in which his oral statement was received and interpreted in Japan and on July 17 he withdrew it for the purpose of dispelling misunderstanding). On the following day, July 15, the Foreign Minister ordered Director Sakamoto of the European-Asiatic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office to confidentially show the final plan of Japan to the German side, a plan which had not been communicated to the United States as yet.

Shift of Foreign Minister
Abandoned

Now that things have come to such a pass, not only I but other Cabinet Ministers came to entertain the feeling that no longer it was possible to dispose of an important diplomatic issue under the prevailing condition. In the course of the Cabinet meeting on July 15 at which the Foreign Minister was absent, I discussed the situation with the Home, War and Navy Ministers. The War Minister said:

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"It would cause bad effects to dismiss the Foreign Minister, and we have continued our endeavors to cooperate with him but now that things have come to such a pass, it is no longer possible. We shall have to either dismiss the Foreign Minister or resign en bloc."

On this point the four Ministers agreed. If the Foreign Minister alone was to be dismissed, serious ripples might be caused from the standpoint that the Foreign Minister strongly said: "The oral statement of the United States is an attempt to force the reorganization of the Japanese Cabinet." The view was then put forward that aside from the question of the Foreign Minister or the American issue, the general resignation should be made from the standpoint of strengthening the war structure. The meeting adjourned with the decision that the matter should be discussed again on the following day.

I went to the Hayama Detached Palace at 2 o'clock in the afternoon and reported to the Throne on the matter. His Majesty put an inquiry to me, saying: "Isn't it possible to let go Matsuoka alone?" I replied that I should make the best of the situation after pondering over the issue, but that under the present condition further existence of the Cabinet was impossible. Then, I met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and stated to him the reasons for which we had to resign en bloc. I then said, "Home Minister Hiranuma should be the next Premier." The Lord Keeper said neither yes nor no, but said that I should hasten to take action.

Cabinet Resigns en Bloc

In accordance with the arrangements made on the previous day, the Premier, Home Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister and the President of the Planning Board on July 16 met at the detached house at Mejiro at noon confidentially and as a result of a conference, decided to resign en bloc. After proper arrangements made through the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, I suddenly called an extraordinary session of the Cabinet and collected the resignation papers of the Cabinet Ministers for submission to the Throne. Matsuoka happened to be absent due to illness and the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet went to his home and got Matsuoka's resignation paper. The news of the decision in favor of general resignation seemed to be a distinct surprise to Matsuoka and the latter showed an air of serious dissatisfaction. But he could not resist the general decision and

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he entrusted his seal-impression to the Chief Secretary. I went to Hayama again at 8:50 o'clock in the evening and submitted the resignation of the Cabinet. Returning to Tokyo at 11 o'clock, I made a report to the Cabinet Ministers and thus the life of the second Konoye Cabinet ended.

Imperial Order for
Reorganization of Cabinet

At 5:10 o'clock on the afternoon of July 17 I was commanded by His Majesty to the Imperial Palace and received the Imperial order to form another Cabinet. I completed the organization of the Cabinet by 5:30 o'clock on the afternoon of July 18 and presented the list of Cabinet Ministers to the Throne at 7 o'clock. At 8:50 o'clock we were installed. Thus, the third Konoye Cabinet was formed and at 9:45 o'clock the first Cabinet meeting was held. The special characteristic of the new Cabinet was the inclusion of Admiral Teijiro Toyoda as Foreign Minister.

I recommended Admiral Toyoda for the foreign portfolio because of my ardent desire to have the American-Japanese negotiations materialize in some way. Admiral Toyoda had served as Vice-Minister of the Navy and not only was he versed in affairs of the Navy but more recently he served as Minister of Commerce and Industry and handled various issues pertaining to goods and materials. He was one of those who supported the view that an American-Japanese conflict should be avoided as much as circumstances permitted.

Such a clear significance of the political change was not clear to the Japanese Ambassador Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura at Washington. Because the Ambassador and his staff failed to understand the significance of the Cabinet change, nothing was done for the matter of communicating the significance of the Cabinet change to the American side. The organization of the new Cabinet, the Tokyo Government hoped, would give the United States favorable impressions and the negotiations would be speeded up with the vague atmosphere lifted, but the fact that was proved was a distinct disappointment and regret. In spite of the fact that the Japanese counter-proposal plan against the June 21

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plan of the United States was prepared with much labor and pains, it was not shown to the American side though instructions to this effect were cabled on July 15. The failure to submit the plan to the American side was due to two reasons. One was due to the Cabinet change and the other was the fear that the Japanese plan would prove unacceptable to the United States. The non-submission of the plan became clear when we read the telegram dated July 22 from Ambassador Nomura. Not only that, Ambassador Nomura on July 23 displayed his ignorance by requesting instructions, stating, "American policy of new cabinet desired to be shown in haste."

Things Go Against My Will

As is seen in the foregoing, the Japanese Cabinet's enthusiasm in handling the U.S.-Japan negotiations was not conveyed to the American side at all, while the time for the Japanese advance into French Indo-China, as decided in the Cabinet meeting some time before, approached. As military movements in the South Pacific became active, the American Government's watch and suspicion grew too glaring to conceal. And as reported by Ambassador Nomura's telegram reaching Tokyo on July 24, the opinion had gained ground in the United States that Japan gave the explanation to the Axis Powers that the task of adjusting American-Japanese relations was a scheme to be played until the completion of the preparations for her advance into the Southern areas.

In Japan, on the other hand, words "the encirclement line against Japan" came to be used frequently. The press, on the whole, carried articles of anti-American views admittedly contrary to the will of the Cabinet.

On July 21, Undersecretary of State Welles, in the place of Secretary of State Hull who was ill then, sent for Minister Kaname Wakasugi as a representative of Ambassador Nomura and warned the latter in the following words:

"According to information, there are indications that Japan intends to capture French Indo-China. Should such be the case, the negotiations pushed to date would become of no use."

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In his conference with Ambassador Nomura on July 23 Undersecretary of State Welles filed an important representation as follows:

"Heretofore, the United States has been engaged in negotiations with Japan with the greatest possible perseverance, but now there is lost all the foundation for the negotiations."

On the following day, Ambassador Nomura had a talk with President Roosevelt informally, when the latter pointed out the Indo-China issue to be an important question and made the following important proposal:

1. On the condition that the Japanese troops withdraw from French Indo-China (if Japanese troops have already moved into French Indo-China)
2. Joint guarantee for the neutralization of Indo-China by Japan, U.S.A., Britain, Holland and China.
3. Guarantee of acquisition of materials from French Indo-China.

Thus, on July 26 the Tokyo Government's announcement of the Japanese advance into Indo-China and the U.S. Government's announcement of the Japanese assets freezing decree came, the one following the other. In view of the aggravation of the situation, I sent for the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board on the same night and ordered him to have a guard maintained around the American Embassy.

America Fails to Agree to Our Re-Proposition

For 10 days from the time before or after the political change to the advance of Japanese troops into French Indo-China, there were seen many points to be desired in bringing Washington and Tokyo to a mutual good understanding. And things gave the impression that the U.S.-Japan peace talk had ended in a complete failure. But the Cabinet didn't give up its hope to the last, but made efforts to have the negotiations resumed, taking advantage of President Roosevelt's proposal relating to French Indo-China

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as was made on July 24. Extending this proposal, Undersecretary of State Welles on July 31 handed over the Japanese side an additional proposal advocating the neutralization of Thailand.

In Tokyo there were held liaison conferences successively on July 29 and 30 and on August 2 and 4. I talked with Navy and Finance Ministers on July 31 and with the War Minister on August 1. And also conversing with Mitsuru Toyama, etc., I also sought an understanding with the rightwing elements. By such means, I put forth all conceivable efforts to cope with the situation.

Thus, at a liaison conference on August 4, it was decided to approach the United States with a proposal. The same proposal was in the form of a reply to President Roosevelt's proposal, but it was designed to serve as a key for resuming the U.S.-Japan negotiations then at a deadlock. Its principle was:

1. Japan has no intention of advancing her troops beyond French Indo-China, and she shall withdraw her troops from Indo-China after the settlement of the China Affair.
2. The neutrality of the Philippines shall be guaranteed.
3. The United States shall disarm herself in the Southwest Pacific areas.
4. The United States shall help Japan obtain resources in Dutch East Indies.
5. The United States shall render its good offices for direct negotiations to be held between the Republic of China and Japan, and additionally she shall recognize Japan's special position in French Indo-China even after the latter's withdrawal of troops from Indo-China.

The foregoing instructions were dispatched to Ambassador Nomura on August 5, and the Ambassador handed the instructions to the Secretary of State Hull on August 6. However, Hull failed to show any interest in our proposal, but emphasized that there was no room for the resumption of the U.S.-Japan negotiations, unless Japan gave up her sabre-rattling policy.

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Ambassador Nomura reported to the effect that according to indications, the United States was prepared to cope with any eventuality. Two days after, or on August 8, Mr. Hull handed America's reply to Nomura. In this reply, however, the American side failed to touch on the contents of the Japanese proposal, but pointed out that the Japanese proposal, as a reply to the President's proposal, was not to the point. Hull was so indifferent as to repeat the President's proposal with only one or two words.

Determines to See President

Racking my brains for removing the deadlock caused to American-Japanese relations, I finally determined to see the American President. On the evening of August 4 I for the first time revealed my intention to the War and Navy Ministers. I talked in this way:

1. The United States even says (deleted), and I consider it our duty to do the best under the circumstances. Up to date, there have been various misunderstandings behind the American-Japanese negotiations conducted so far, and there are indications that the true intentions of one party have not been thoroughly communicated to the other and vice versa. Should the present state of affairs be allowed to follow its own course unchecked and should we plunge into war, we as statesmen should have no apology to offer not only to His Majesty who is so much concerned over world peace, especially the American-Japanese relations but also the people in general.

If we do our best and yet war begins, we cannot help it. In that case, we can have a strong determination, and the determination of the people will also be firm. Prior to the outbreak of the European War, Chamberlain went to the Continent several times to see Hitler, and although the result was that he was deceived by Hitler, I consider his visits had the effect of inducing the British people to make a determination.

2. The present is really a touch-and-go crisis. Negotiations through Ambassador Nomura will be calculated to close time. Rather should the Prime Minister see the President and acquaint him with the true intentions of the Empire boldly and daringly.

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In that case if the President doesn't understand us, the Prime Minister, of course, will desert the place of the meeting. If the direct talk fails, the people will understand that an American-Japanese war was inevitable and they will be induced to have a firmer determination than otherwise. To the outside world it will be shown that Japan was not bent on aggression but displayed sincerity for the maintenance of peace of the Pacific to such an extent. This will probably have the effect of relieving to a certain extent the aggravation of the public opinions of the world.

3. The President's visit to Honolulu is not necessarily considered impossible of realization, inasmuch as this was mentioned in the original plan for understanding. Moreover, it is not necessary that hope should be abandoned from the outset. The United States maintains its stand on the basis of the Nine-Power Pact and the views of the two parties do not agree, but the United States says, "The United States is prepared to be consulted at any time regarding revision of the Nine-Power Pact by a reasonable and legitimate method."

4. This talk needs haste, because the prospects of the Reich-Soviet War are that the war will reach its peak some time in September. If the war gets deadlocked as a section of the people predicts, the future of Germany will permit no optimism. In such a case the United States will come to maintain a stronger attitude and will not trouble itself with a talk from Japan. Even if the Reich-Soviet War develops to the advantage of Germany, it will not bring about any big disadvantage to Japan. There may be a fear that German feeling toward Japan may cool down but Germany's world hegemony or complete German victory over Britain and the United States is unthinkable, and there will be ways to adjust German-Japanese relations.

Accordingly, there is no need for us to be concerned too much about a development of the Reich-Soviet War to the advantage of Germany. Rather should we give full consideration to the case of a disadvantage to Germany and reach some understanding with the United States at this time.

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5. However, this does not mean that any arrangement with the United States would be acceptable. Of course, we should not curry favor with the United States or yield to it in our haste to have some understanding or arrangement. In short, it is to do all what is available for us. It is necessary both domestically and externally to do the best under the circumstances.

Navy Supports and Army
Supports Conditionally

The War and Navy Ministers listened to me with looks which betrayed their tension. They could not reply on the spot, but the naval side expressed its wholesale approval of my proposal within the day, adding that the Navy was looking forward to the conference with anticipations. The reply of the War Minister came in the form of a document. It said:

"The Prime Minister's interview with the American President is calculated to inevitably weaken the present diplomacy of the Empire based on the Tripartite Alliance and is considered likely to cause considerable ripples domestically. Accordingly, such an interview as is proposed is considered improper. However, under the present pressing situation the Prime Minister personally proposes to endeavor for removing the deadlock, and to this determination of his the Army pays high respects. And if the Prime Minister means to attend the conference by adhering to the fundamental policy of the Japanese revised plan and desert the meeting place with the determination to wage war on the United States in case the American President fails to understand the real intentions of this country and means to carry out the present policy, the Army will have no objections to the Prime Minister's direct talk with the President."

The Army's document was accompanied by the following annex:

"If the forthcoming meeting is to be arranged between our Prime Minister and Secretary of State Hull or any other official excepting President Roosevelt, the Army will be opposed to it. It is necessary that in case of failure of the conference the Prime Minister should not resign on the ground of the failure of the conference but rather should stiffen his determination and take the initiative for an American-Japan war."

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The War Minister also was of the opinion that there was a greater possibility of failure than of success in regard to the conference. After all was said and done, the conclusion was reached that the matter should be expedited.

On the morning of August 6, immediately after the liaison conference, I was received in audience by the Emperor, when I revealed my intention and determination to the Throne. On the afternoon of the following day I was summoned to the Imperial Palace and was urged by His Majesty to make haste for my proposal, saying:

"We have heard from the navy side concerning the total prohibition of American oil exports to Japan, and your interview with the President should be done without any loss of time."

Instructions in this regard were sent to Ambassador Nomura on the afternoon of August 7. The initial impression given the American side was disappointing exceedingly. The President happened to be absent in Washington for his interview with Premier Churchill. Ambassador Nomura on August 8 met Secretary of State Hull and communicated the proposal to him; Hull said that so long as there was no change in Japan's policy, he had no confidence of introducing the latest proposal from Japan to the President. Ambassador Nomura said nothing further, and cabled that Ambassador Grew should be approached in Tokyo.

In the United States a joint statement was issued by President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill, and very cutting comments thereon printed by some of the Tokyo press were cabled. Moreover, the attempt made on the life of State Minister Hiranuma on August 14 was reported in a sensational way. On August 13 Secretary of State Hull handed Ambassador Nomura a protest mentioning items of alleged violations of American rights and interests in China, true to the tradition of American diplomacy that what should be done should be done irrespective of occasion. The American Cabinet

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Ministers with whom Ambassador Nomura dealt were full of the pessimistic feeling that the United States should not consent to having a leaders' meeting the success of which is uncertain. Sensing the pressing situation, Ambassador Nomura prior to the return of the President to the White House following his mid-oceanic talk met Secretary of State Hull again and endeavored to explain the true intentions of our side. Hull as usual simply repeated his opposition to "military domination". As regards the proposed interview between the Prime Minister and the President, he somewhat softened his attitude and replied:

"If you have full confidence of success, I shall introduce the plan to the White House."

President in Good Humor

Suddenly on August 17 President Roosevelt immediately after his mid-ocean talk invited Ambassador Nomura in spite of it having been Sunday, and made two representations to him. One was a warning against a further armed advance of Japan. The other was a reply to the proposal for the two countries' leaders to meet. According to his talk, the American Government appreciated the idea of myself and of the Japanese Government, and expressed approval of the idea in principle, saying:

"If the Japanese Government halts its expansion activities and has the hope of coming forward for a program of peace concerning the Pacific as well as a program and principles which the United States has pledged and promised, the United States will be prepared to re-open the unofficial negotiations which were interrupted in July. Moreover, the United States will endeavor to exchange views with Japan gladly and also fix the time and place for such a meeting." At the end the American President required that a clear-cut statement be submitted for that purpose.

By the program of peace was meant economic opportunity and the application of the principle of equality in treatment all over the Pacific area, the voluntary and peaceful cooperation of the peoples inhabiting the area, assistance

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to the people subjected to menace and removal of military or political control or monopolistic or priority economic rights.

Throughout the Roosevelt-Nomura talk, the American President was in good humor, and even said: "As the meeting place, Hawaii is geographically improper and Juar (spelling?) in Alaska will be fitting. What do you say to having the talk in mid-October?"

It was also learned from one of the Cabinet Ministers whom Ambassador Nomura met (Walker?) that President Roosevelt took the issue from the routine officials's hands and intended to seek solution from the broader standpoint. Ambassador Nomura cabled to Tokyo stating that the present opportunity should not be missed and that daring responses should be made. As a reference he cabled to us his own private plan as a reply to President Roosevelt.

On August 18 Foreign Minister Toyoda invited Ambassador Grew and dwelt on the reasons for which the interview between the two leaders was necessary and requested him to exert his influence for realization of the project.

Hull's Attitude Pessimistic

Our reply to the American representation as handed over to Ambassador Nomura by President Roosevelt on August 17 was determined at the liaison conference of August 26. Together with the reply, the conference also adopted a message I prepared for presentation to the American President. This message of mine stated in a clear-cut manner my real intentions for having proposed the conference with President Roosevelt for the purpose of discussing American-Japanese affairs from the broader standpoint without adhering to routine discussions and thus coping with the rapidly-changing situation.

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These two documents were handed over to the American President on August 28 by Ambassador Nomura. The President, after praising my message as "splendid," said, "I should like to have a talk with Prince Konoye for about three days." Although he did not indicate the period of the meeting, he showed a great interest in the proposal. Perhaps this was the time when Japan and the United States were the nearest to rapprochement.

In contrast to the President who was very much interested in the proposed conference, Secretary of State Hull was extremely cautious. The Secretary, who was with the President when the Ambassador called, on the same night invited the Ambassador to a talk and made it clear that his views fundamentally differed from the idea of the Japanese side, only repeating the American insistence, "The leaders' meeting should be made in the form of ratification of a talk previously materialized."

Ambassador Nomura's report on the optimistic atmosphere in which the President received our documents and on the pessimistic Hull were received here on August 29 and 30. The report gave us a very important suggestion regarding the manner of removing the deadlock. The observations of the Japanese Government were divided into the optimistic and pessimistic. However, in order to cope with the conference proposed, both the Army and Navy began choosing their representatives for the parley. The Foreign Office was more or less optimistic having anticipations in the "political" solution of the President to the neglect of the traditional reasoning diplomacy of the State Department. Foreign Minister Toyoda at the liaison conference of August 30 was extremely inclined toward optimism.

President's Attitude Changes

On September 3 President Roosevelt confidentially invited Ambassador Nomura and handed him a message in reply to the "Konoye Message." Although couched in courteous language, the President's reply evaded a clear-cut expression in regard to his agreement to the proposed conference.

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Moreover, it stated the necessity for obtaining Japan's agreement regarding the fundamental principles as the pre-condition. Here it was made clear that the views of the State Department have come to control the situation.

Separate Proposal
to U.S.A.

On the day the Nomura-Roosevelt talk took place on September 3, in Tokyo a separate proposal to the United States was being discussed at the liaison conference. The plan was drafted by the Foreign Office. It was a simplification of the plan for understanding which was discussed between Nomura and Hull under a different premise. The plan proposed:

1. Japan shall not advance troops beyond French Indo-China.
2. Japan's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact shall be done autonomously.
3. Japan shall withdraw troops from China in accordance with the terms of the Sino-Japanese Pact.
4. The economic activities of the United States in China shall not be restricted so long as they are conducted on a fair basis.
5. The principle of equal treatment in commerce and trade in the Southwest Pacific shall be established.
6. Steps shall be taken for restoration of legitimate trade and commercial relations between Japan and the United States.

The Foreign Office entertained a great deal of hope in this plan. It was communicated to Ambassador Grew from Foreign Minister Toyoda and to Secretary of State Hull from Ambassador Nomura. The plan did not represent any new proposal, but the aim was to deal with concrete issues which were considered urgent at that time and make them the basis of the leaders' talks. Contrary to the unusual anticipation

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of the Foreign Office, the September 4 plan simply invited unnecessary misunderstanding and chaos.

The United States was not unreasonable in entertaining the misunderstanding, for the June 21 plan which the United States submitted to Japan had remained unanswered, though our reply was sent to Washington on July 15. Due to the political change and other reasons Ambassador Nomura failed to deliver our reply to the plan of the United States which was offered as the final one. So far as the United States was concerned, the country received the September 4 plan without receiving a reply to its June 21 plan. This, I consider, was the major reason for which the American misunderstanding was responsible.

While such complex and un-ending diplomatic negotiations were being conducted between Tokyo and Washington, a serious issue had arisen in our Government circles in Tokyo. The issue was: To what extent should we continue the negotiations with the United States? Or should we give it up? Not only that, should we give up hope and fight the United States?

Secret Negotiations
Leak Out

The American-Japanese talks were made known only to the Government leaders. Among the leaders only Foreign Minister Matsuoka was opposed to the talks. And out of fear for opposition from the lower strata, the talks were kept confidential to the others, but they began leaking out. With Matsuoka's confidential showing of the talks to the Italo-German side as the turning point, the public came to have a vague outline of the talks. Opposition arose from the lower strata and also from the Army. At that time the Japanese people were shocked to learn of the commencement of the Reich-Soviet War. The Government leaders controlled the views in favor of immediate opening of war against the Soviet Union, but had to adopt the Cabinet decision in favor of an advance into French Indo-China as a sort of compensation.

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The advance of troops into French Indo-China had immediate and strong effects. The United States carried out the severance of economic relations with Japan and announced that its traditional policy alone was a peaceful policy. As the time approached the end of August, the "national policy" of plunging into war with Britain and the United States was being discussed/liaison and other conferences.

Basic Principles of Prosecution
of National Policy Determined

On September 6 an Imperial Conference was held at which the "basic principles of the prosecution of the national policy of the Empire" were determined as follows:

In view of the present pressing situation, the offensives of the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, etc. toward Japan and the flexibility of the national power of the Empire, the enforcement of measures regarding the Southern regions shall be made as follows:

1. The Empire shall complete war preparations with the last decade of October as the aim under the determination not to mind war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands) for the purpose of guaranteeing its self-existence and self-defense.

2. In parallel to it, the Empire shall have recourse to diplomatic means in dealing with the United States and Britain and endeavor to have its demands attained.

3. In case there is found no way still for attainment of our demands even in the first decade of October, the Empire shall at once determine to open war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands). Policies other than the Southern policy shall remain unchanged and endeavors shall be made to prevent American-Soviet understanding or joint front from being accomplished.

His Majesty Insists
on Peace

One day prior to the Imperial Conference, I proceeded to the Imperial Palace and submitted a report to the Throne regarding the basic principles of national policy. His Majesty said:

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"Seeing this report, I am impressed by the fact that the report puts first importance on war preparations and diplomacy is calculated to let one think that diplomacy is subservient to armed power. About these points I shall question the two Chiefs of the General Staff and Naval General Staff at tomorrow's meeting."

I replied to His Majesty:

"The order of A and B does not mean any degree of importance. The Government intends to conduct diplomatic negotiations to the last, and in case the negotiations do not materialize, we shall have to make war preparations."

I further said:

"It may be improper for Your Majesty to make such a question at tomorrow's Imperial Conference. If Your Majesty desires to put a question to members of the Supreme Command, Your Majesty should summon them at once."

His Majesty ordered that the Chiefs of the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff be summoned at once. His Majesty also ordered me to be present. When General Gen Sugiyama, Chief of the Army General Staff, and Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, came, His Majesty asked Sugiyama:

"In case of an American-Japanese conflict, how many months does the Army consider with confidence it will take to dispose of the matter?"

Sugiyama replied:

"So far as the Southern area was concerned, we intend to settle things during the first three months."

His Majesty further asked Sugiyama:

"At the time of the outbreak of the China Affair you were the War Minister, and in that capacity I remember you said 'The Affair will be settled within a month or so.' And yet the Affair has lasted four years and yet has not been settled."

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Sugiyama, awe-struck, explained that China had a large area in the hinterland and offered various explanations at length. His Majesty then addressed to Sugiyama thus:

"If you say China has a wide hinterland, the Pacific Ocean is larger, isn't it? With what confidence do you say it will take three months?"

Sugiyama lowered his head and failed to reply. Here Chief Nagano of the Naval General Staff came to Sugiyama's rescue:

"Representing the High Command, I shall offer an explanation from the broader standpoint. If American-Japanese relations are likened to a patient, the patient now stands at the cross-roads of whether he should undergo an operation or not. If left alone, the patient may sink into gradual weakening, but if he undergoes an operation, though there will be a serious danger, there may be hope for recovery. The High Command hopes that solution will be attained through diplomatic means but in case of failure an operation will have to be conducted. In this sense, we approve the proposal."

His Majesty was emphatic in asking:

"I understand the High Command today puts major importance on diplomacy. Is that true?"

Both Chiefs of the High Command replied His Majesty was right.

On the occasion of the 2 Imperial Conference which was held at 10 o'clock on the morning of the following day, that is, September 6, Baron Dr. Yoshimichi Hara, President of the Privy Council, asked:

"I am impressed by the fact that in the proposed plan importance is placed on war rather than on diplomacy. I wish to have a clarification of the views of the Government and the High Command." The Navy Minister representing the Government spoke but no members of the High Command spoke.

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His Majesty, suddenly addressed the gathering thus:

"The question now put by President Hara of the Privy Council is quite reasonable, and I exceedingly regret that no reply whatever has been made by the High Command."

Here His Majesty took out from His pocket a piece of paper on which the following poem composed by the Emperor Meiji (the ruler's grandfather) was written:

"Though I consider the surrounding seas as my brothers, why is it that the waves should rise so high?"

Reading this poem aloud, His Majesty said:

"I always read and appreciate this poem and am endeavoring to live up to the spirit of the Great Emperor who was so fond of peace."

What a consistent logic! For some minutes no one dared to speak. Then, Chief Nagano of the Naval General Staff rose and spoke:

"I am filled with awe at the censure Your Majesty has given to the High Command. I thought when the Navy Minister replied, he represented both the Government and the High Command. The High Command, as the Navy Minister replied, places major importance on diplomatic negotiations and would appeal to arms only in an unavoidable case."

Thus, the Imperial Conference adjourned amid an unprecedentedly tense atmosphere.

Secret Talk
With Grew

The American-Japanese negotiations for understanding at one time appeared to be progressing fast but at another they seemed to be blocked. The proposal for the meeting of the leaders interested the American President and yet it failed to materialize just before its materialization. This state of affairs, I thought, was due to the failure of the real intentions of the Japanese side to be made known to the American side through the cabled instructions to Ambassador Nomura alone. Then, I determined to see Ambassador Grew personally and see what I could accomplish thereby.

On September 6, the day on which the foregoing "basic principles of national polity" were determined, I with the understanding of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers conferred with the American Ambassador in utter secrecy. With Counsellor Douman as the interpreter, we dined together and talked. I stressed the point that my Cabinet with the Army and Navy united was hoping for the success of the negotiations and that there would come no better opportunity hereafter. Then, I made a very significant declaration:

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"If we miss the present chance, the chance will not come again during our lifetime."

I also revealed that the Army, Navy and Foreign Office had virtually completed the selection of their delegations, and dwelt on the necessity of myself seeing the President as soon as circumstances permitted and exchanging views with him on the fundamental issues. Ambassador Grew ascertained my views in regard to the four basic principles of Secretary of State Hull and I said:

"Basically, they are all right, but in the case of actual operation various issues will arise and for the solution of such issues themselves our interview with the President becomes necessary."

Following a heart-to-heart talk lasting an hour and a half, Ambassador Grew promised to report the contents of the day's interview as his direct message to the President. The American Ambassador was strongly impressed by the import of my message and remarked:

"This report will become the most important cable I ever file with my home government since I began my diplomat's career."

Question of Stationing Troops
Hard Nut to Crack

Although I made my best endeavors for the success of the negotiations, the important national policy which was determined at the Imperial Conference of September 6 gave a time-limit to the negotiations. And the impression was strongly felt that the final stage came at last.

By that time the difficult points of the negotiations were virtually grasped and the intentions of the American Government were also generally fathomed. Basically, the United States adhered to the "four principles", and concretely, the country raised the question of troop stationing, the question of economy and equal opportunity and the Tripartite Pact.

The American side interpreted that Japan has no objections to the four principles, and I also declared to the American Ambassador that "in principle" they are acceptable. Thus, no special issue appeared to be unlikely to arise, but strong views opposing even in principle did not die out in the Army and a section of the Foreign Office. There was even the argument that since the United States interpreted the

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the representation of Japan of August 28 in the foregoing sense due to Ambassador Nomura's mis-translation, a representation should be made for retraction or the Ambassador should be recalled. If denial was to be made at this time even for the four basic principles, the American-Japanese negotiations would be sure to be totally wrecked. I, therefore, gave serious consideration to the method of treating the issue.

Regarding the economic principles, Japan was already determined to recognize equal opportunity in China. There was an optimistic view that since the United States must be fully conscious of Japan's special geographical relation to China, little trouble would be encountered. As for the Tripartite Pact issue, it was thought that although any promise could not be documented, if I met the President, some agreement would not be impossible of attainment.

In regard to the matter of stationing troops in China, the Army one day said that the name or form would not matter, but the next day this moderate view would be replaced by one that the Army's position is absolutely immutable. Even within the Japanese Government the impression was strong that the biggest issue lay in this matter of stationing troops.

Because of the serious bearing of the operation of the basic national policy as determined by the Imperial Conference of September 6 on the progress of the American-Japanese negotiations, the Government leaders continued to undergo special mental pains. Many days I stopped overnight at the Japanese room of my official residence. On September 24 and 25 I continued lengthy conferences with the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers and the President of the Planning Board.

From September 27 to October 1, I rested at Kamakura but in the meantime I invited Navy Minister Oikawa to a talk and listened to him regarding the views prevailing in the Navy. On October 4 I proceeded to the Imperial Palace and was received in audience by His Majesty. Later, I ordered bureau chiefs to desert me and I held a liaison conference with the Cabinet Ministers and the leaders of the High Command. On the evening of October 5 I invited the War Minister to my home at Ogikubo and expressed my determination to continue my negotiations with the United States to the last.

Late on the night of October 7 the War Minister called on me at the Japanese room of the Official Residence, and made the following strong stand:

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"In regard to the question of stationing troops, the Army absolutely is unable to accept such a formula as to make total withdrawal basically and then station troops."

In view of this strong attitude of the Army and also of the Navy, I had individual talks with the Navy Minister and the Foreign Minister twice on October 6 and 8 and discussed the matter of staving off the crisis. The Foreign Minister called on me twice on October 10 and conferred with me in regard to the continuation of the talks with the United States. Another liaison conference was opened on October 11. In the meantime, the activities of the Big Three secretaries of the Cabinet, especially President Suzuki of the Planning Board, became an object of attention.

Navy Entrusts Matter of War or Peace
to Prime Minister

On October 12, marking my 50th birthday, in spite of it being Sunday, I invited the three Ministers of the War, Navy and Foreign Affairs and also President Suzuki of the Planning Board to my private home at Ogikubo and held what was virtually the last conference on peace or war. Prior to the conference, the following report was made to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet from the Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Office:

"The Navy does not desire to have the American-Japanese negotiations disrupted. The Navy desires to avoid war as much as circumstances permit. But the Navy cannot say it openly. At today's conference the Navy Minister will propose 'entrusting to the Prime Minister the matter of deciding either for peace or war.' Please understand this point."

As expected, the Navy Minister spoke first at the outset of the conference as outlined in the foregoing lines. He said:

"Now the time has come for us to decide either for war or peace. We should like to entrust the matter to the Prime Minister. If peace is to be maintained, peace should be maintained throughout. In other words, even by making a concession to some extent, we should let the negotiations materialize. If the negotiations are to be continued for two or three months, and then after their failure, if war is decided, the Navy will be troubled. If war is to be resorted to, we should make the decision at once. Now is the time for us to decide for either way. If war is to be avoided, we wish to have you continue the negotiations with the principle that the negotiations shall attain success."

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In reply to the Navy Minister's statement, I said:

"If decision is to be taken today, I decide in favor of continuation of the negotiations."

The War Minister, then, said:

"That conclusion of the Prime Minister is premature. It would be serious if we continued the hopeless negotiations and thus miss the chance. Does the Foreign Minister have any confidence of success in the negotiations?"

The Foreign Minister replied:

"That depends on the conditions. The greatest difficulty now confronting us, I think, is the question of stationing troops in China. If the Army is averse to making the slightest concession, the negotiations have no hope of success. If the Army doesn't mind a concession on that issue, I can't say there is absolutely no hope for success in the negotiations."

The War Minister said:

"The question of stationing troops is the very life of the Army and absolutely the Army cannot give any concession."

I said:

"If we give up form and take substance, it will be all right. In other words, if we follow the form as insisted on by the United States, but in substance attain results similar to stationing troops, it will be all right, won't it?"

The War Minister would not consent to this proposal of mine. The conference lasted from 2 to 6 o'clock but adjourned without reaching a conclusion.

War Minister Unyielding

On the following day, October 13, I went to the Imperial Palace and reported to His Majesty the critical situation confronting the Cabinet. I also conferred with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and at 9 o'clock on the morning of October 14 I called the War Minister to my official residence prior to the Cabinet meeting, and requested him to reconsider the matter of stationing troops.

I said to him:

"I have a serious responsibility for the China Affair. The Affair has lasted four years and yet has not been concluded."

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as yet. I cannot agree to plunging into a great war whose future outcome is uncertain. At this juncture we should yield temporarily to the United States and let the country have its form of troop withdrawal and stave off the danger of an American-Japanese war. I also consider it necessary on this occasion to bring the China Affair to a conclusion and thus contribute to the national power of this country. Development of national fortunes is desirable, but in order to attain a great expansion, it is often necessary to yield to others and rear the national power."

The War Minister would not subscribe to my view, insisting:

"If we yield to the United States at this time, the latter will become more arrogant and more overbearing. Regarding the question of troop withdrawal, you say the name shall be abandoned and the substance be taken, but I cannot agree to this view from the standpoint of maintaining the morale."

The talk with the War Minister was productive of no favorable result. And when the Cabinet conference was opened, the War Minister dwelt on the reasons for which the American-Japanese Negotiations could no longer be permitted to be continued, and he did so with an excited attitude.

Reckless Staking of All

During the talks I had with the War Minister, the following conversation took place:

"Once in a while it is necessary for one to close one's eyes and jump from the stage of the Kiyomizu Temple, (meaning doing a daring thing. Translator)"

As an individual, such a thing may come once or twice in a lifetime. But when consideration is given to the 2,600-year-old national polity and the 100,000,000 people, no such thing can be done by any one in a responsible position."

There had been many references to such expressions as "staking all" or "staking the national fortunes."

Foreign Minister Matsuoka frequently used such expressions, but as for me, every time I heard such expressions, I felt unpleasant. The use of such expressions may be exhilarating, but when one takes into consideration the unstained national polity 2,600 years old, one cannot lightly plunge into a war whose outcome is uncertain. This is entirely different from an individual's case. People may call me

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hesitant or temporising but I cannot undertake such a reckless adventure. Whatever a roundabout way it may be, I have the confidence that the course to be followed must be 100 per cent safe and that war must be avoided.

Some of the soldiers say such a thing:

"Japan had no 100-per cent victory chance in the Sino-Japanese War or Russo-Japanese War."

In the course of my talk with the War Minister I referred to the foregoing statement by some soldiers and said:

"I think Ito and Yamagata had a full confidence in undertaking the Russo-Japanese War. If they undertook the war without any confidence in victory, it is a very outrageous thing. Prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Emperor Meiji could not reach his decision. When Premier Katsura desired to have the Emperor's decision, Prince Ito stopped him and asked him to allow one more day for him to think it over. The next morning the Emperor summoned Prince Ito and asked him if the latter had any confidence of victory. In reply thereto, the Prince said that at least the Russians would not be able to set a single step into Korea and we shall be able to keep the Russian troops beyond the Yalu River at least for a year. While this stand is being maintained for a year or so, mediation by a third Power or Powers may be expected. Of the third Powers, Britain is our ally and France and Germany are on the Russian side. We can only depend on the United States. About this, if we take action, we are confident of results. To this effect the Throne was advised. The Emperor was relieved of his anxiety and His Majesty handed down the decision in favor of war at the Imperial Conference which was held the same day. But this time there will be no third Powers. No one will be in a position to mediate and we are utterly uncertain about the future. We must be very cautious about plunging into such an uncertain war."

At the time I had the last talk on the morning of October 14 at my official residence, the War Minister said:

"The views of the Prime Minister, I think, are too pessimistic. Because you know too well our vulnerability. Isn't it true that the United States has its own vulnerability?"

The talk of that day resulted in what one may call a frontal clash regarding the question of troop withdrawal. The War Minister at the end of the talk said impressively: "This is a matter of difference in character."

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The utterance of the War Minister at the Cabinet meeting of October 14 was too sudden and not a single Cabinet Minister spoke in response to it. The Cabinet meeting discussed some other items on the agenda and adjourned without touching on Tojo's remarks.

Tojo Advises
General Resignation

On the same afternoon Director Muto of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Office came to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and told him:

"It seems to us that the Prime Minister remains indecisive because the Navy doesn't make up its mind. If the Navy doesn't desire war really, the Army must consider it. But the Navy doesn't say such a thing on the surface but says it has entrusted the matter to the Prime Minister. The decision of the Prime Minister alone would fail to control the men in the Army. But if the Navy says to the Army officially 'The Navy at this time doesn't desire to have war,' the Army will find it easy to control the men in the Army. Can't the Cabinet take action so as to induce the Navy to say such a thing?"

The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet told this to Director Oka of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Office, and the latter replied:

"The Navy is not in a position to say it doesn't desire war in a formal way. All the Navy can say is that 'It has entrusted the matter to the Prime Minister.'"

On the same night President Suzuki of the Planning Board called on me at my private home as the War Minister's messenger and brought the latter's message which follows:

"Our later investigation has shown that the Navy doesn't desire war. Then, why doesn't the Navy Minister say so? If the Navy Minister says it plainly, I must consider it, but the Navy Minister has virtually entrusted the matter to the Prime Minister. This is much regrettable. If the Navy is really indecisive, the decision made at the Imperial Conference of September 6 is fundamentally affected. In other words, this means that the Prime Minister, the War and Navy Ministers and the Chief of the Supreme Command who attended the Imperial conference did not discharge the duties fully in their responsibility to assist the Emperor. Accordingly, we have to/
resign

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en bloc and return to a clean-slate position and new plans will have to be made all over again. Among the people there is in sight no one who would control the Army and Navy and make a new plan, but I consider the only means left open to adoption is to induce a member of the Imperial Family to head the next Cabinet. For this post Prince Higashikuni is considered the most fitting candidate. I don't like to ask the Prime Minister to resign, but now that things have come to such a pass, I hope the Throne will be petitioned to allow the appointment of Prince Higashikuni next Premier."

On the following day, that is, October 15, when I was received in audience by His Majesty, I reported to the Throne:

"Last night Tojo sent in his word that Prince Higashikuni should be chosen to head the next Cabinet."

When I thus sounded the views of His Majesty, His Majesty said:

"I thought Prince Higashikuni would become an ideal Chief of the General Staff, but full caution must be exercised in regard to a member of the Imperial Family actually having a hand in politics. In peacetime it may be all right, but in view of the possibility of war, I consider it all the more improper for a member of the Imperial Family to come out. Its effect on the Imperial Family must be considered."

But the Emperor was not totally opposed to Prince Higashikuni's appointment. On my way back home I met Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido and mentioned the name of Prince Higashikuni. Kido did not seem interested in this project.

On the same night I paid a secret visit to Prince Higashikuni and communicated to His Highness the views of the War Minister. His Highness, when urged to rise to the occasion, replied:

"The matter is too serious. Give me two or three days to think it over."

But the prevailing situation was such that even a single day could not be wasted. I summoned all the Cabinet Ministers to the Japanese room of the official residence and in individual talks with them I stated the reasons for which the Cabinet had to resign en bloc. I obtained their understanding and collecting their resignation papers, I proceeded to the Imperial Palace toward evening.

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War Minister Tojo
Given Imperial Command

Thus, the Konoye Cabinet resigned en bloc. The following day a conference of the senior statesmen was held and the Imperial Command to organize the next Cabinet fell on War Minister Tojo. It seems to me that it was due to the proposal of Lord Keeper Kido that War Minister Tojo was recommended to the Throne. But it doesn't seem to me that by picking up Tojo the Lord Keeper intended to invite war between Japan and the United States. It seems to have been the view of the Lord Keeper that since Tojo maintains everything must return to a clean-slate position because the Navy's view looks clearer, even if the Imperial Command fell on Tojo, he will not plunge into war at once. Especially, if at the time the Command falls on him the Emperor says a word or two about the matter, the War Minister will adopt a more cautious attitude. Such seemed to be the view of the Lord Keeper.

The circumstances leading up to the Cabinet change were as stated above. On the surface disunity was caused to the Cabinet as a conflict of views between the Prime Minister bent on continuing the American-Japanese negotiations and the War Minister intending to disrupt them and as a result, the general resignation followed. Accordingly, the fall of the Imperial Command on the War Minister was calculated to be interpreted as abandonment of the American-Japanese negotiations and opening of an American-Japanese War. But the fall of the Imperial Command on Tojo did not mean war at once because of the foregoing circumstances. Questions on this point were raised at the conference of senior statesmen. The senior statesmen felt relieved when they were told by Lord Keeper Kido that the fall of the Imperial Command on Tojo would never signify immediate war between Japan and the United States and after obtaining such assurances, they recommended the War Minister to the Throne for premiership. This is what I heard later. I, therefore, sent a letter to Ambassador Grew after my resignation and told him that my resignation is not a result of the decision to open war between Japan and the United States but that there is still left full room for further American-Japanese negotiations.

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In the United States the news of the general resignation of the Konoye Cabinet gave a distinct shock. According to Ambassador Nomura who told me this upon his return to Japan, when the Cabinet was shifted to War Minister Tojo, the American Government thought there was no more any hope of the American-Japanese negotiations materializing. Captain Turner who maintained friendship with the Ambassador, the same officer whose vessel carried the remains of the late Ambassador Saito to Japan, called on the Ambassador and said:

"The Konoye Cabinet must have resigned because Premier Konoye abandoned his hope for the American-Japanese negotiations since the President would not respond favorably to his proposal for interviewing the President. But the President did not reject the proposal outright. He merely wanted to make sure about two or three things beforehand. If the assurances were made, he wanted very much to see Premier Konoye gladly. The decision was made to dispatch a personal message of the President to the Emperor to this effect and the procedure was already taken." But a few days later the same Captain came and said: "Objections were raised to the matter of dispatching a personal message to the Emperor because it would constitute interference with the domestic politics of Japan. After all, the idea was dropped."

Emperor Reserved Toward
Supreme Command

Recalling the hard sailing of the American-Japanese negotiations, I am strongly impressed by the lack of unity between the Supreme Command and the Administration. The independence of military affairs from the administrative matters had been a source of trouble to each succeeding cabinet. In the case of the American-Japanese negotiations, while we were absorbed in the negotiations, the fighting services were fully engaged in preparations to cope with the rupture of the negotiations. What preparations were being made I could not know. Diplomacy as a result could not keep the pace with the military. They moved or mobilized the ships and the United States found it out and came to have suspicion about the sincerity of our diplomacy. The lack of unity between diplomacy and military affairs was the source of trouble to me.

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At the time hot arguments were made as to whether or not Japan should fight the United States since September last year, Prince Higashikuni, one of those advising caution in the matter, once declared that the Emperor alone would be able to save the situation. His Majesty said to me as well as Prince Higashikuni that His Majesty was troubled by the action of the military several times. His Highness Prince Higashikuni said to His Majesty that it was inadvisable for His Majesty to remain in the role of a commentator. If His Majesty thought anything inadvisable, His Majesty should say so. Prince Higashikuni is said to have told His Majesty.

Thus, the Emperor seldom expresses His own views out of reserve. Prince Saionji and Count Makino had taught His Majesty not to take the initiative in adherence to the British-style constitution, but the Japanese Constitution exists on the premise of the Emperor's personal administration. It is fundamentally different from the British Constitution. Especially in regard to the matter of Supreme Command, the Government has no voice whatever. It is the Emperor alone who can control both the Government and the Supreme Command.

It is said all right in peacetime that the Emperor should be passive, but when the country stands at the cross-roads of rise or fall, trouble is likely to occur. If the Emperor merely gives encouragement or advice as in England, military affairs and political diplomacy cannot advance in unison. This point was strongly felt in the course of the latest American-Japanese negotiations.

In conclusion, I should like to say one thing:

Although the attitude of His Majesty as the constitutional monarch was passive thus, His Majesty's concern always lay in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. His Majesty endeavored to avoid a plunge into such an uncertain great war and was seriously concerned over the maintenance of the 2,600-year-old national polity unspelled. It was very painful for me to see His Majesty so much concerned over the matter.

THE END

Far East

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: March 2, 1946

TO :U - Mr. Acheson

FROM :FE - Mr. Vincent


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SUBJECT :

Here is a memorandum that Owen Lattimore produced for me at my request. I think you will be interested in the first two pages on Japan and you may want to read his interesting observations on China and Mongolia.

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
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Memorandum

5 February 1946

DCR file

To: Mr. J. C. Vincent
From: O. Lattimore
Subject: Recent Observations in Japan and China.

The following notes are based on impressions formed while I was with Ambassador Pauley's Reparations Mission, and I have jotted them down for your possible interest because they have nothing to do with the problem of reparations, but may have some bearing on overall trends in Asia.

1. Second Phase in Japan.

The first phase of occupation in Japan has been ably carried out by General MacArthur and his staff. The Japanese are disarmed. There is no military danger latent in Japan. This first phase may be concisely described as the process of making the Japanese powerless to do what we don't want them to do.

A second phase now opens, presenting the problem of how to make the Japanese do what we do want them to do. In this phase, the Japanese have considerable resources of resistance, evasion, and even political and psychological counterattack.

The essential fabric of the old structure of power and rule in Japan remains intact. Those who enjoyed power and rule will maneuver tenaciously to avoid letting their privileges pass into other hands. It is true that they are now the ruling class of a defeated and much weaker country; but within that country their relative power, far from being diminished, is greater than it ever was. Therefore it is logical for them to think in terms of rebuilding, from the still intact foundations, as much as they can of the shaken superstructure, maintaining and reaffirming as far as possible the old proportions and relative values.


For America, and for the United Nations, the overall problem of the second phase is how to encourage the remaking of Japan into a country in which there is a reasonable prospect of evolving an economic order of free enterprise, to replace the old highly cartelized economy, and a political order of representative democracy. And the problem is not only to initiate free enterprise and political democracy, but to make sure that they have as much survival value as possible.

Directives

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Directives aimed at bringing about the desired changes will necessarily bear unequally on different sections of the population. To some they will mean the curtailing of old special advantages. To others they will mean the opening of new opportunities. Those who are hurt will cry out; but will those who are benefited, or potentially benefited, rejoice audibly? Not necessarily. Long repression has left many people politically timid. Even though a SCAP ordinance may be welcomed by them, they will, in their present mood, hesitate to take up promptly the advantages offered to them. The most prevalent fears which inhibit them are: How far will SCAP eventually go with the directives it is issuing, and how long will SCAP stay in Japan? If SCAP does not go far enough, before leaving, or if SCAP leaves too soon, they fear that the old order may resume full sway in Japan and take revenge on those who acted too hastily on what seemed to be the implications or suggestions of the SCAP directives.

The logical approach would appear to be to issue directives which, when they necessarily curtail the interests of a group capable of vocal protest and political evasion or resistance, also elicit active enthusiasm and support, instead of mere passive wait-and-see assent, from some other group. If a directive opens up unmistakable opportunities to a new group interest, that group is likely to feel the need to organize politically in order to protect and extend its newly acquired interest. Only on some such basis as this can we expect a healthy political life to develop in Japan. Until the political "reform" parties are likely to represent little more than pious formulae. A workable democratic system requires competitive group interests represented by competing parties and competitive programs.

2. The Meiji Rescript on Education.

The following is not intended as criticism of General MacArthur's program. He has an excellent staff section working on the problems of education. I believe, however, that it would be to the general good if the Department of State were independently to advise action on these problems.

The Meiji Rescript on Education has been as much a fountainhead of authoritarianism in Japan as the privileged position of the Army and Navy. Even if the present high degree of centralization in Japanese education were to be amended by measures of decentralization (and I myself do not believe decentralization to be of primary importance) Japanese education will remain vulnerable to authoritarian thought-control unless the Rescript on education is repealed.

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The initiative in repealing the Rescript on education should come, and come openly, from American policy. Otherwise there is the danger either that a Japanese-worded repeal would not clearly enough condemn use of the imperial aura to justify authoritarian thought-control, or that the rank and file of teachers and professors would not get up the courage to teach and practice freedom of thought in education.

3. Some Brief Notes on China.

In foreseeing the end of the war in Asia and the Pacific the Japanese out-guessed us in one important respect. We undertook great preparations to make coastal China a major theater of military action in the final phase of the war. The Japanese, knowing that they would probably succeed in ending the war by a relatively dignified surrender, concentrated on making China a major theater of future, post-war political operations.

The Japanese won, to the following extent:

They kept up production, especially in the Shanghai area, enough to prevent critical industrial unemployment. They managed to keep up relatively good distribution of goods -- better than in Free China. They enforced a relatively efficient control of prices.

When surrender came -- as a result of negotiations in distant Japan, not of visible defeat in the field in China -- the Chinese Government victory bandwagon rolled into Shanghai, Peiping, and Tientsin, with an overflowing load of Kuomintang party stalwarts. Industrial production ceased. Distribution was paralyzed. The Party stalwarts assembled the Chambers of Commerce and assessed them for cash levies. Then they turned the merchants loose on the public, with permission to get their money back.

Result: The high-sounding words "Victory" and "Liberation" have acquired, in Shanghai and elsewhere, the connotations of stagnant production, unemployment, skyrocketing prices, and new taxes and impositions. These connotations are derogatory to the National Government and to the Americans as the most conspicuous Allies of the National Government.

4. A New Crisis in Inner Mongolia.

In Peiping, I had a long conversation with Teh Wang, who was at one time the most important Mongol nationalist leader in Inner Mongolia. Later he was made conspicuous

as

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as the most important figurehead of Japanese control of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia. He has now been listed by the Chinese Communists as a war criminal -- a kind of Pétain.

It is my belief, however, that Teh Wang was never a willing collaborator of the Japanese. He was always on good terms with Chiang Kai-shek. The failure, in the 1930's, to set up an Inner Mongolian autonomy that could serve as a back-fire against Japanese propaganda is attributable primarily to the inability of Chiang Kai-shek to control the Chinese provincial generals who had a vested interest in exploiting the Mongols -- especially by expropriating their pasture lands. As a result of the local pressure of the Chinese on the Mongols, the Mongols were thrown into the arms of the Japanese. Teh Wang did not lead the Mongols of Inner Mongolia over to the side of the Japanese. He merely went with them, when there was no where else to go.

Teh Wang's behavior at the time of Japan's collapse, and Teh Wang's views at the present time, should therefore be of particular interest.

When Japan surrendered, Teh Wang was in Kalgan. His return to his own territory in Inner Mongolia was apparently barred by the military situation. He may well have been equally unwilling to fall into Russian or Outer Mongolian hands, by trying to get to his home in Inner Mongolia, or into Chinese Communist hands, by staying in Kalgan. At any rate, he escaped to Peiping. From there he was flown to Chungking, where he saw President Chiang. Because of all this, Teh Wang has been put on the "wanted" list of war criminals by the Chinese Communists.

Teh Wang is in a situation in which he might easily be seized and suddenly killed not only by the Chinese Communists, or by one or another group of Mongol revolutionaries, but by the Chinese Government, or one of its agencies, because in spite of his good personal relations with President Chiang, he still stands for a kind of Mongol nationalism which is opposed and feared by many Chinese. At the same time, Teh Wang still has bargaining power, and might yet come to the fore again as a figure acceptable, under some kind of compromise agreement, to the Chinese Government, the Chinese Communists, the Outer Mongolian Government, and the Russians.

The following is a concise recapitulation of what Teh Wang had to say:

a) He

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a) He believes that his son and heir (now nearing the age of 30, I believe) may have escaped into Outer Mongolia. If so, Teh Wang may be able to present a case to the Outer Mongolian Government.

b) Teh Wang is certain that there will be an Inner Mongolian movement for secession from China and, eventually for union with Outer Mongolia. Such a movement would be popular in his own part of Inner Mongolia (northern fringes of Suiyuan and Chahar) and, he believes, even more popular in Eastern or Manchurian Inner Mongolia (northern Jehol; western fringes of Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang).

c) Such a Mongol movement would obviously create a situation favorable to Russia; but in Teh Wang's positive opinion the genesis of the movement will be local and Mongol, not Russian.

d) The Mongol hereditary aristocracy, to which Teh Wang himself belongs, has always been hostile to Outer Mongolia, but will not oppose this new movement. Teh Wang said in so many words that there is no political hope in any movement which aims to preserve Mongol feudalism.

e) The only way to forestall the kind of pan-Mongol movement predicted by Teh Wang is, in his opinion, to throw together all Mongol-inhabited areas in Chahar, Suiyuan, Jehol, and Western Manchuria and make them into one province, with a great deal of autonomy ("like Canada").

The difficulty in carrying through such a measure is that it would be opposed by the Chinese provincial authorities and provincial militarists, who still stubbornly insist that the way to deal with the Mongols of Inner Mongolia is to keep them broken up into "reservations", each one isolated in a corner of some Chinese province.

In view of the importance of the foregoing -- which is capable of ramifying far beyond the area immediately affected -- I venture some specific suggestions.

a) Assign an American to familiarize himself immediately with Inner Mongolian problems and personalities. Colonel William Mayer, at present I believe G2 to General Wedemeyer, has suitable background experience.

b) Reestablish as soon as possible American consular representation in Manchuria and at such cities as Kalgan; establish new consulates at Kueisui (Suiyuan), Chihfeng (Jehol), Taonan (Liaoning) and Hailar (Heilungkiang).

c) Take

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c) Take advantage of the recognition of Outer Mongolian independence by China to extend American recognition to Outer Mongolia. Establish consular representation, or preferably diplomatic representation, at Ulan Bator.

It is not suggested that the foregoing measures would solve the problems which we may confidently expect to arise along the Mongolian frontiers; but it is urged that we should have listening posts, we should know what is going on, and we should be in a position to extend among the Mongol peoples the prestige which we already have as the most important nation in the international relations of Russia and China.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, March 19, 1946.

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DC/R

No. 312

SUBJECT: Candidates for Japanese Diet.

The Officer in Charge has the honor to transmit copies in triplicate of the Tokyo newspaper Asahi of March 18, 1946, which contains a complete list of announced candidates for the forthcoming election to the Japanese Diet. The length of this list and shortage of staff at this Office has made translation impracticable. It is believed this list will be of interest to IRIS and JA.

894.00/3-1946

Enclosure: *aww*

Newspaper Asahi of
March 18, 1946 (in triplicate)

In triplicate to Department.

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No. 312

SUBJECT: Candidates for Japanese Diet.

The Officer in Charge has the honor to transmit copies in triplicate of the Tokyo newspaper Asahi of March 18, 1946, which contains a complete list of announced candidates for the forthcoming election to the Japanese Diet. The length of this list and shortage of staff at this Office has made translation impracticable. It is believed this list will be of interest to IRIS and JA.

Enclosure:

Newspaper Asahi of
March 18, 1946 (in triplicate)

In triplicate to Department.

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, March 28, 1946

No. 338

DC/R

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1946 APR 6 AM 47
SUBJECT: Chart of Japanese Ultra-Nationalistic Societies

DC/K
RECORDS BRANCH

The Officer in Charge has the honor to transmit under separate cover three copies of a chart prepared by the Office of the Chief Counter-Intelligence Officer, United States Army, Pacific, showing the principal Japanese ultra-nationalistic societies, their leadership, and affiliations.

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Enclosure:

Three copies of chart, as stated. (Under separate cover)

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, March 28, 1946

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR GERMANY

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Frankfurt, Germany
APR 15 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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RESTRICTED

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN
AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
S. H. Lee
APR 23 1946

NO. 81

SUBJECT: Transmitting Statement by Dr. Wilhelm Classen.

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 15 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
H. H. *guth*

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

DIV OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION
APR 24 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
HC *guth*

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith as of possible interest to the Division of Japanese Affairs a statement by Dr. Wilhelm Classen, which has been received by United States Forces, European Theater, from a British source.

Respectfully yours,

For the Political Adviser:

C. Coffie
C. Coffie
Political Officer

894.00/3-2946

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Enclosure: *attm*
Statement (single copy).

File No. 820.02a

Coffie/des

In Triplicate to Department
(Single Copy of Enclosure)
Copy to CE - Mr. Riddleberger.

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Frankfurt, 29 March 1946

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Washington, D. C.

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For the Political Adviser:

C. Coffie
Political Officer

Enclosure:

Statement (single copy).

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File No. 820.02a

Coffie/des

In Triplicate to Department
(Single Copy of Enclosure);
Copy to CE - Mr. Riddleberger.

STATEMENT BY DR. WILHELM CLASSEN.

In the event of the British Authorities - in particular the Far Eastern Department of the Secret Service - wishing to open up a new information section embracing Far Eastern Questions and which would deal with relevant material which has been gathered by German observation and experience, the following personalities should be considered for possible collaboration owing to their specialist knowledge and their experience in making Intelligence reports.

1. Legationsrat Dr. K.O. BRAUN, hitherto Referent for Far Eastern Questions and in charge of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. One can probably contact him by means of the Restsekretariat of the Foreign Office in Berlin. It is possible that he is in American hands at the moment, as towards the end of the war, he was staying in BAD GASTEIN where he looked after the Japanese Embassy. BRAUN kept clear of national socialism. He is a person of great character with a particularly good knowledge of his subjects. If necessary the undersigned can get in touch with him.
2. Herr Karl ZAHL. ZAHL was for a few years general Secretary to the German-Japanese Society in Berlin and "Assistant" or Secretary to Admiral FOERSTER who was president of that Society. ZAHL had been previously to Japan as an exchange student and after his return studied "Japanology". He was due for promotion at the beginning of the war. In Spring 1940 he and the undersigned were ordered by the foreign office to go to Japan as part of the German delegation whose object was to popularise the idea of the Tripartite Pact within the intellectual circles in Japan. ZAHL speaks and writes Japanese fluently and is also very well informed regarding the political development in Japan. He knows a great number of people in Japan, many of whom could be used as able "V-Leute". ZAHL was finally a Leutnant with an armoured Unit in the East where he was wounded in January of this year. When the war finished he was in a reserve hospital in SCHILTACH OBERBAYERN and is also therefore presumably in American hands, if he has not been released as a casualty. In this case he should still be found in SCHILTACH where he had evacuated his family and put up with his brother-in-law who is a Doctor in that town.
3. Herr Joern LEO. LEO was an RSHA Referent on Japanese questions. He is possibly the only German who graduated at a Japanese University as a Japanese Doctor. He speaks perfect Japanese and has always kept himself informed on political developments in Japan. He has considerable connections with leading Japanese politicians and must be regarded as one of the best experts on Japan.
4. Professor Dr. Wilhelm CLASSEN - University HEIDELBERG.

(Signed) Wilhelm CLASSEN.

Incl.

2 Nov. 45.

Ambassador Oshima and his Staff.1. OSHIMA

Because of his previous background OSHIMA was no diplomat, but a soldier and at heart never overcame this past. He only thought in military consideration and had little interest or understanding for the bigger and more intricate problems of foreign policy. Like most officers of the Japanese Army, OSHIMA was convinced that it was war which was the decisive influence in politics. To me he has repeatedly expressed the opinion that the only driving force of Japanese history in modern times and the only really decisive factor in the Japanese rise (in home and external spheres) since 1858 was the Japanese Army. He does not acknowledge that Japanese industry played any part in the rise of Japan since the middle of the last century. In discussions he was always of the opinion that the Japanese ascent was due to the successful wars of the period. Only in support of these wars were industry and culture able to participate in the reconstruction and development of modern Japan and then they certainly were of valuable help; but the decisive factors were only the Army and the wars.

This fundamental attitude of OSHIMA's may also help to explain why he showed such a remarkably favourable disposition towards National Socialism in the Third Reich. No doubt OSHIMA's conviction of the great value of National Socialism was quite genuine, because he defended it with energy against all sceptics who were fairly strongly represented in his Embassy. He was literally fascinated by personalities such as HITLER, GOERING and HIMMLER and his attitude towards them was one devoid of criticism. He often went to the Fuehrer's Headquarters with the firm intention of putting before the Fuehrer, on the orders of his Government, some criticisms by the Japanese Government regarding certain questions of the communal war effort and to explain these to him. As a rule the interview with the Fuehrer took the course that he interrupted OSHIMA abruptly and then gave him a long lecture during which the German attitude was presented as the only correct one and the Japanese attitude as incorrect. In all these cases OSHIMA returned from the Fuehrer's Headquarters as a "convert". This was often related to me, not only by OSHIMA's first secretary but also by his first Botschaftsrat. The leading officials of the Japanese Embassy were extremely disconcerted by OSHIMA's lack of discrimination and by his servility towards the Fuehrer and Fuehrer's Headquarters, and never hesitated to voice their anxiety. Within the Embassy they called OSHIMA in a jocular manner "Pg Otto". Even in April the attache Oga told me "OSHIMA will still believe in a German victory even when the Russian tanks are standing in front of the Embassy in the Tiergarten". The result of OSHIMA's unqualified support of National Socialism and its leading personalities was a certain estrangement from his Embassy Staff. The majority of the latter were experienced diplomatic officials who were at least somewhat more reserved in their judgement about National Socialism owing to their numerous observations and comparisons in other countries. Therefore they did not share OSHIMA's unbounded admiration.

Somehow the Japanese foreign Office had realized comparatively early (during the time of preparation for the Tripartite pact) that OSHIMA's reports about the position in Germany were unreliable in their contents and especially not critical enough. The Foreign Office secured, therefore, information about the internal position in Germany through other channels - during the last few years (until October 1944) - by means of a particularly clever and experienced professional diplomat who was sent to Berlin with a faked special mission and who was included in the Embassy Staff, although he was officially not under OSHIMA's orders - his direct communication with Tokio not being controlled by OSHIMA. The last "special emissary" of this kind was SAKUMA who was recalled to TOKIO in October or November of last year to report, but was held up in Stockholm (as far as I know until the end of the war).

The military attache and the Naval attache also regarded themselves as superior to OSHIMA because they did not refrain from criticism of National Socialism and the German Government. Far beyond their real scope as attaches of the armed forces, they also reported to TOKIO through their own channels and with their own codes about purely political matters which they observed in Germany in terms quite different from Oshima's reports.

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Thus we knew comparatively early that not much attention was given to OSHIMA's reports in Tokio but rather to reports from the attaches and SAKUMA as far as German affairs were concerned. On the questions of the larger European political issues (on which nominally the Berlin Ambassador was also supposed to report) the Japanese Ambassador in Madrid, SUMA - well known to me as a politician with a very strong leaning towards America - was consulted. Therefore OSHIMA was really little respected in the Ministry, on whose orders he was active in Berlin, and was hardly taken seriously. That he remained in Berlin all the same and was not replaced even during the most critical period of the German-Japanese relations was due entirely to the key position which the Japanese military party occupied within the entire political structure of Japan since the signing of the Tripartite Pact, and about which I made some very interesting discoveries when I was in Japan in 1940 on a mission for the German Foreign Office. This was due, not least, to a series of conversations which I had with OSHIMA who was then in Tokio (since he had been removed from his Berlin post, for a time, shelved and replaced by KURUSU). To the leading military Party, and to Tojo in particular, it was unimportant whether OSHIMA was up to the standard that was normally expected of a highly qualified professional diplomat or not. They merely considered that OSHIMA was the best man to safe-guard German-Japanese collaboration and thus guarantee that Japan could rely on the most thorough use of the German war potentials for their own war plans. By maintaining OSHIMA, the military party indulged in the same practice as in other cases - a particularly instructive one being in Manchuria, where the post of the Japanese Ambassador, which was a fictitious one anyway, was held by the O/C of the Kwantung Army. Possibly they might have regarded it as a loss of prestige if they had had to withdraw OSHIMA and give his post to a foreign office man. Besides, as I realised in 1940, they were perfectly aware that not only the Japanese foreign minister SHIGEMITSU but also the leading clique of senior officials employed in the Gaimusho, regarded this uncompromisingly pro-German line of Japanese foreign policy with the greatest scepticism. Therefore no personality chosen from these circles could have given the same guarantee of unconditional collaboration with Germany as OSHIMA did. At any rate the military Party was perfectly aware of OSHIMA's inefficiency. They had been told something of that kind even by non from their own Camp, in fact by the Naval Attaché in Berlin, Admiral KOJIMA. Nevertheless they stubbornly maintained OSHIMA. This cannot only have been due to the fact that Tojo and OSHIMA were fellow graduates at the same Cadet school and the Military Academy and therefore friends, but also because OSHIMA appeared, to the military party, to be the safest man to safeguard German-Japanese relations and exploit them in the interest of Japan.

OSHIMA, as already intimated, had a number of opponents who not only disliked him personally but whose independent reports to Tokio entirely differed to his own. The chief of these were the above mentioned special emissary, SAKUMA, who is probably still in Stockholm. Moreover the naval Attaché, KOJIMA, who was probably the most brilliant man in the Japanese mission in Berlin, and who in spite of all his loyalty towards OSHIMA differed entirely in his opinion regarding Germany's position. There was also the first Botschaftsrat Kawahara, who associated particularly closely with me during the last weeks before the collapse (when OSHIMA had already been evacuated to Bad Gastein with the larger part of his Embassy) because he seemed to think that I might be able to put him in direct contact with the Reich Foreign Minister, JODL or KEITEL. The military Attaché General KOMATSU, however, cannot be regarded as one of OSHIMA's opponents. His line was the same as OSHIMA's. He was not very versatile or experienced in politics, and thus did not appreciate the dangerous deterioration of the position as it became apparent since the summer of 1943. A definite opponent of OSHIMA's, however, was the already mentioned Japanese Ambassador in Madrid - SUMA. During confidential conversations with Japanese diplomats with whom I was acquainted, I learned that SUMA had orders to approach Sir Samuel Hoare in Madrid in a most careful manner (either himself or by some intermediary) in order to sound him as to possible English re-actions to a possible Japanese withdrawal from the Tripartite Pact. This was on the orders of Shigemitsu and without the knowledge of the Military Party. In addition, SUMA had orders to compile Sitreps about the general European situation which, it is certain, were taken far more seriously in the Gaimusho than OSHIMA's reports. Finally, among OSHIMA's opponents, there was SATO, Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, who did not only harbour the usual resentment of the professional diplomat against an military "outsider" but moreover knew OSHIMA as one of the most fanatical enemies of the Bolshevist regime, who had 3/...

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pleaded for Japan's entry into the war against the Soviet Union up to the middle of 1943, together with the extremist wing of the Military Party (primarily the Officers of the Kwantung Army) - a project against which SATO kept warning continually and emphatically, as I was told by KAWAHARA. Incidentally after the spring of 1944 OSHIMA became a fervent advocate of a German-Russian "rapprochement". This was due, as I found out through private conversations, not only to definite concrete orders sent him by his Ministry, but also to the belief that Bolshevism had remarkably changed since the alteration of the constitution of the Soviet Union in February 1942, and had, therefore, become merely a kind of state socialism on an extremely national basis. This seemed worth consideration for Japan herself, provided the Tenno system and the privileged position of the army within the Japanese Government were maintained. The following illustration will show how much OSHIMA's attitude had changed on this point.

At the beginning of this year, OSHIMA visited NAUMANN, the Secretary of State in the Ministry of Propaganda and explained to him at length why he was advocating the necessity for a German-Russian "rapprochement". NAUMANN made a copy of this conversation which I saw accidentally. It quoted OSHIMA as having said the following: "If I (OSHIMA) now advocate a German-Soviet "rapprochement" without reservation, I have got a particular claim to be heard because in the whole of Japan there is no more radical enemy of Bolshevism than myself, having once participated in the preparation for an attempt against Stalin". OSHIMA was quite aware that this turn of events would be indicated to the Fuhrer by NAUMANN. He himself had asked NAUMANN to inform Himmler about the conversation and also if possible to arrange an interview with Himmler. As far as I know, however, this interview never materialised.

It may also be mentioned that the circle of Japanese journalists who were active in Berlin did not have an high opinion of OSHIMA either. They all, without exception, regarded OSHIMA as an uncritical hanger-on of the German Government, or, as they occasionally remarked, as a "victim of propaganda". Most of them were also active for Japanese Intelligence and did not refrain from giving their opinions in their reports to that effect.

Thus one can gain a general picture of OSHIMA's personality, which was as follows:

OSHIMA was primarily an officer and not a diplomat. He lacked understanding of the finer and more intricate trends of political development. He saw everything only in rough and simplified outlines, as presented by propaganda and particularly by HITLER's suggestive manner. Therefore he arrived at the most exaggerated and extraordinary appreciations of the current state of affairs and believed the most optimistic predictions for the future provided they were issued or approved by HITLER. Thus he came to be regarded by his own superiors, the Gaimusho, as an unreliable chief of the mission, who would have been recalled long time ago, if he had not been kept in Office by the Military Party which was unsensitive and uninterested in matters of Foreign Policy and not very interested.

As an individual OSHIMA was a pleasant person, with a genuine respect for German culture (as his father had also been). He spoke excellent German, and was a pleasant companion who during late hours behaved very unconstrainedly under the influence of alcohol - which he greatly liked - behaviour not usual amongst diplomats. In such moments he became far more talkative than is customary among diplomats. There is no doubt that the military flavour of official and private life in Germany and particularly in Berlin contributed considerably to the fact that he enjoyed his assignment so much.

During April OSHIMA moved with the bigger part of the Embassy to Bad Gastein. Finally his wife also moved there. There he was specially looked after by the Reichsstatthalter of Salzburg - Dr. SCHEERL, whose close friend he had been for years. It appears that OSHIMA was captured by American troops while he was trying to move west from Bad Gastein - presumably in the direction of Switzerland.

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2. KAWAHARA.

KAWAHARA was the first Botschaftsrat under OSHEW. As he was a professional diplomat he stood in slight opposition to OSHEW from the very beginning. However, he was disciplined enough not to let antagonism interfere with his routine office collaboration with OSHEW. But, as he told me, there were often very strong differences of opinion between them. As a rule, these concerned the compilation of the reports for Tokio whose final journalistic touches were put in by KAWAHARA. To every report compiled by OSHEW, KAWAHARA usually added a few touches of his own in order to somewhat damp OSHEW's optimism which was in disagreement with his own opinion. Whenever OSHEW noticed this he got very annoyed.

Contrary to most other Japanese working in the Western Countries, KAWAHARA remained completely "unwesternised". He regarded himself always very much as an Asiatic, and never disguised his disparagement of anything western. He favoured the policy of complete "rapprochement" between Japan and the Soviet Union and it seemed to him that Japan could easily give up Manchuria and Korea in order to achieve this aim. He is full of resentment against the United States. Together with a larger circle of higher officials of the Foreign Office in Tokio he believes in the possibility of an enduring general settlement of Sino-Chinese relations on the basis of a very close economic co-operation between Japan, the Soviet Union and China. He has frequently mentioned to me a so-called "Asin-pact" which was supposed to have been the subject of negotiations in Autumn 1944 between Japanese, Chungking-Chinese and Soviet emissaries. No confirmation of this report was obtainable. However the same rumour was repeatedly circulated by members of the Nanking Chinese and the Manchurian Embassy in Berlin.

While KAWAHARA was working in Berlin under OSHEW, he was completely overshadowed by him, though he was first Botschaftsrat and therefore next senior official after OSHEW. He was completely eclipsed by OSHEW who was always after publicity. Therefore he was literally relieved when OSHEW evacuated himself to Bad Gastein. Thus he became the chief of the remainder of the Berlin Embassy and tried by all means to play some part, at least, during the last phase of the war, by pulling all possible strings in order to get personal contact with Ribbentrop, Himmler, Schollenburg and the OKW. During these occasions he tried by all means at his disposal to make the Germans consider a special peace-offer to the Soviet Union. He pretended that he knew from a very secret and also very reliable source that the Soviet Union was still ready for negotiations with the Reich in March 1945. When I asked him whether he was in touch with Sato in Moscow regarding these matters, he answered in the negative. However, I know that KAWAHARA knew about the existence of a line of communication via Switzerland to Moscow, controlled by Naval Attaché, Admiral KOJIMA and therefore it is possible that KAWAHARA received his special information from Moscow through this source.

KAWAHARA stayed in Berlin until the end of April and is then supposed to have escaped somewhere north. I do not know whether he got as far as Sweden. Ideologically he stands close to the previous special emissary in Berlin, SAKUMA, who is now in Stockholm, and therefore it may be assumed that he would try to get in touch with him. Should KAWAHARA be used again in diplomatic service, after his return to Japan, he will be employed somewhere in Asia, so he assured me. In this case other western countries represented in Eastern Asia can be certain to meet in KAWAHARA a resolved enemy of all Western influences. He will use his position to harm Western interests in all circumstances in spite of being outwardly correct in his behaviour.

3. UCHIDA.

UCHIDA was first Botschaftsekretär (Embassy Secretary) and at the same time a kind of private secretary to OSHEW and also the "collecting point" for the intelligence communications controlled by OSHEW. UCHIDA was the only member of the Embassy staff who went with OSHEW through "thick and thin", and regarded OSHEW's views as absolutely sacred. I have always doubted whether UCHIDA did this out of honest conviction. He was much too cunning and too careful for that. Presumably he had his career at the back of his mind. Anyhow he was outwardly always a thorough-going adherent and defender of OSHEW towards the other members of the Embassy staff and the members of the Japanese Colony in Berlin.

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Anyhow there was one point in which UCHIDA agreed with OSHIMA out of honest conviction; this was regarding Japanese-Soviet relationship. UCHIDA was definitely "Russophile", but not because of any positive disposition towards communism - as in the case of many other Japanese. On the contrary UCHIDA liked a rather feudal and American style of living on a grand scale. His leaning towards Russia is simply explained - because he believes that Japanese-Russian solidarity constitutes the "key to future Japanese existence". Though normally he had himself excellently under control, he got violently excited during conversations on this subject and severely criticised the Reich Government, which according to his opinion had gambled away its biggest chance by refusing Japanese proposals regarding German-Soviet "rapprochement". Under the influence of alcohol UCHIDA became occasionally somewhat pointed in his criticism of German policy. He said once cynically that Japanese interest in a German-Russian agreement was not so much prompted by the desire to create a unified and practically unassailable continental block from the Pacific to the Atlantic but rather by the idea that Germany would be able to throw their entire war potential in the fight against England and America if this agreement were reached. That and nothing else was Japan's interest.

It seems remarkable that UCHIDA repeatedly told me that his opinion regarding Japanese-Russian relations was shared by all the younger Japanese diplomats. There was no-one amongst the young diplomats of his own age - UCHIDA might be about 35 years old - who was not convinced of the necessity for a close Japanese-Russian co-operation and who did not regard the achievement of a close enduring and friendly relationship as a matter of life and death. The orientation of Japan towards the west was definitely finished. Japan was going to confine her political and economic interests to Greater Asia entirely, in agreement with the Soviet Union - and against the United States.

USHIDA went with OSHIMA to Bad Gastein but has most likely fallen into American hands along with OSHIMA. If there should be however, any use for USHIDA in the diplomatic service he will probably turn up in a bigger place, possibly the United States or England.

Among the younger diplomats, USHIDA is definitely one of the most able and experienced ones, very gifted, very versatile and with a thorough general knowledge, pleasant in his outward appearance and very Western in his way of living and behaviour.

4. DR. OGA.

OGA was press attaché; he was also in charge of one of the branches of the cultural Department of the Embassy. He was used a lot by OSHIMA to procure information from the higher circles of Berlin Society.

OGA also belonged to OSHIMA's adherents; at any rate within the Japanese Colony he always took OSHIMA's side. However, he did not share OSHIMA's optimism regarding the war situation. He predicted the collapse fairly early on and, like USHIDA, he was one of the adherents of a definite pro-Russian policy, but the roots of his "Russophile" attitude went deeper than they did with USHIDA. OGA's career was not a normal diplomatic one. He was a journalist for a long time and a student of philosophy before that. He gives the impression, not uncommon with Japanese intellectuals, that he might always change over to some anarchistic camp. During discussions about Bolshevism he showed an extraordinary knowledge of all questions of orthodox Marxism and Leninism, and in those discussions his great admiration of those ideas was evident. OGA, who speaks German almost as well as his mother tongue, was very pleasant in his dealings with German personalities and Authorities, giving the impression that he was almost a National Socialist himself. It can hardly be expected that OGA will continue a diplomatic career.

He only got started in Berlin in the first place because no ordinary officials could be procured from Tokio owing to difficulties of transport. OGA himself has little desire to remain a diplomat. He is more interested in Secret Service work, which will probably be his main interest in the future. He told me that he hoped to operate in Middle and South-Eastern Europe. Incidentally I am of the opinion that OGA is one of the few Japanese who under

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certain circumstances might be prepared to work for a Foreign Intelligence Service. There is no doubt as to his ability and usefulness in this direction.

5. KOJIMA.

Admiral KOJIMA was Naval Attache. In certain respects he was the most remarkable personality within the whole Embassy, a man with a cultured and refined way of life, and a knowledge far above the limits of his military education, but at the same time a "full-blooded" politician, with a remarkable vision and quite broad-minded, thus over-shadowing OSHIMA generally. His point of view on questions of foreign policy was remarkable. It sprang from the following fundamental idea:

Japan must either be a Naval power or she will not be a power worth mentioning. It is inconceivable that she can ever achieve sufficiently dominating position on the Asiatic Continent, without being a first class Naval Power at the same time. This, however, implies an unavoidable and yearly increasing antagonism with the United States. This antagonism will one day be brought to a head. It is unavoidable and the navy has been preparing for it. The other side of this naval policy, however, is the necessity to cultivate closest co-operation with the Soviet Union. It is essential for Japan to have a friendly Russia in her rear if her policy in the Pacific is to be efficient and without risk. Therefore the Navy supports the idea of an agreement with Russia 100% even if it means losing Manchuria and Korea. At the same time the Navy was convinced of the necessity for a thorough overhauling of German-Russian relations and was passionately backing such plans. KOJIMA despised Bolshevism vehemently from the bottom of his heart. He was no Army Officer (here KOJIMA referred to the State-Socialist aspirations of large circles of the Officer's Corps of the Japanese Army, in particular the younger groups of this Corps). However, he saw in a Japanese-Russian agreement the only guarantee for a comparatively secure Japanese future. Here was a unique and never recurring chance for German Foreign policy to use Japan as an intermediary to reach settlement between Germany and the Soviet Union. In this connection KOJIMA stated repeatedly that on the German side no belief should be harboured that Japan might possibly try to sound the Russians through the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, SATO. (Here he alluded to the fact which was well known to us, that SATO was a pronounced opponent of the Reich who might possibly sabotage any serious German approaches). For such a delicate mission Japanese policy had quite different channels and personnel at their disposal of whose reliability Germany need not doubt. KOJIMA never revealed who were the personalities in question, but, I have reason to believe that he had in mind the previous Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA, whom I knew well during the years 1932-5, and who I know not only agrees with the Navy's attitude as to the need for close collaboration between Japan and the Soviet Union, but also has a definite leaning towards Germany. Moreover he played with the idea of a German-Russian-Japanese axis since the middle of the Thirties, a plan which he had obviously weighed up very thoroughly and studied as regards its historical precedents. He also told me once that Grand Admiral TIRPITZ had already entertained the same ideas and had approached the then German (Kaiserliche) Government. This definitely corresponds with the facts, as I was told, on enquiry by TIRPITZ' son-in-law, the late German Ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von HASSEL. During the time of his activities in Berlin, it was KOJIMA's greatest desire to interest the German leading Authorities in the idea of establishing a common, combined German-Japanese general staff. According to his own arguments he had something in mind similar to the British Empire General Staff, or the combination of the British and American General Staffs. This he expected to result in a far more efficient co-ordination of the German-Japanese war effort. He repeatedly stated that there existed no collaboration worth mentioning between the German and the Japanese Army and Naval Staffs and thus great chances offered by the common war effort were left unexploited. KOJIMA blamed the Germans entirely for this lack of collaboration, especially Goering whom he said would completely sabotage all Japanese attempts for a closer strategic co-ordination because of personal antipathy towards anything Japanese. KOJIMA often said bitterly that GOERING liked to refer to

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the Japanese as the "Yellow Apes" and he knew dozens of examples how GOERING and responsible men of the general staff of the Luftwaffe despised the Japanese and did not refrain from airing their low opinion of them. He tried further to approach Hitler direct with this idea of a Common General Staff, and to achieve this, he tried via the Foreign Office and the Führer's Headquarters to obtain an interview with Hitler. This interview never materialized as neither Ribbentrop, Jodl nor Keitel were prepared to persuade the Führer to receive KOJIMA. KOJIMA himself moreover suspected that Ambassador OSHIMA made representations to the Foreign Office and maybe also to the OKW, with the aim of preventing this interview with the Führer, as he wanted to "reserve" direct contact with Hitler for himself. Moreover he was convinced that Goering fostered animosity against the Japanese within the Führer's Headquarters. Incidentally he explained the anti-Japanese attitude of Goering and his General Staff by the influence exerted by German Instructional Officers who were formerly with Tschiangkai-shek. These officers were definite supporters of Chungking China.

A special role as KOJIMA's confidant was played by the Marinobaurat in the Office of the Naval Attaché, SAKAI.

6. SAKAI.

SAKAI had already been in Berlin for 15 years and during this time had mainly been concerned with transactions between the Japanese Government and German export firms. He dealt with license negotiations with the big German Armaments firms. He was well known in German industrial circles and he was generally known there as a crook, with whom any deal could be arranged as long as he himself got a proper share. As regards intelligence information he was probably of great use to the Japanese Intelligence Service, since there was no other Japanese in Germany who had such close contacts with German industry and who was therefore so suited to industrial espionage.

More important than the part he played as an industrial expert was his running of one of KOJIMA's Intelligence channels to Moscow which went via Berne. KOJIMA mentioned this line only very seldom and then only very vaguely, but each time with every indication that it was a most important connection. Nobody in the Embassy knew anything about this line except SAKAI. An account of this line can presumably only be got from Berne itself and there most likely through the attaché IMAI. Previous to his stay in Berlin IMAI had been in Russia. He is a communist sympathizer, speaks perfect Russian and was greatly respected by KOJIMA. Therefore it can be assumed that he was informed as to the identity of the intermediaries in Switzerland who were part of the link in the line to Moscow. Incidentally SAKAI did not go to Bad Gastein towards the end of the war. At first he remained with the Officers of the Office of the Naval Attaché in Berlin and then disappeared out of my sight during the middle of April. Possibly he was among that group of Japanese Officers who escaped to Sweden in a sailing boat during the last days before the collapse.

(Sgnd) Wilhelm Classen.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION OF THE FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT
OF THE OKW AND RSHA

1. Abwehrstelle Shanghai.

A special report has already been made about this branch. Supplementary details are as follows:-

Information coming from Shanghai was first of all evaluated by the Japanese Group (Japangruppe) in the Amt. Mil. of the RSHA-Oberstleutnant (Lt/Col) OHLETZ, Major BAECHTLE and Hauptmann PLAGE. To this Group also belonged a Fahnenjunker Feldwebel by the name of BRENNSCHEIDT who had a far greater expert knowledge of the subject than all the other members of the Group, as he had been a merchant in China for a long time and thus was able to gain his experience on the spot.

After having been dealt with by this Group of the Amt Mil of the RSHA the Shanghai reports were distributed to the various interested Agencies.

2. Intelligence Informants in Germany:

- (i) Admiral Richard FOERSTER, Berlin President of the German-Japanese Society. FOERSTER had friendly relations with OSHIMA and also with most of the leading members of the Embassy Staff. He never made written reports about his conversations with the Japanese; however, from time to time he was visited by representatives of all Agencies who were interested in Japanese questions and he willingly passed on information about anything he might have learned from the Japanese. He met Ambassador OSHIMA comparatively frequently and got to know from him details about OSHIMA's visits to the Führer's Headquarters. The value of Intelligence information derived from FOERSTER was not very high.
- (ii) Assessor TROEMEL. TROEMEL was general secretary of the German-Japanese Society in BERLIN and thus came frequently into contact with members of the Japanese Embassy and the Japanese colony. He was particularly well informed about the feeling of the younger members of the Embassy and the Japanese journalists. He himself was more or less disinterested politically and therefore did not deliberately collect information, nor was he acquainted with the complicated details of the political conditions in Eastern Asia. His information was therefore of no decisive value.
- (iii) Herr ZANDER. ZANDER originally was a book-seller and Publisher; besides this he was privately used by OSHIMA for writing the German text of the letters which OSHIMA sent out as answers to invitations, thanks for gifts, etc. Thus ZANDER came into close contact with OSHIMA and naturally used this opportunity to start political conversations. Not much useful information was gained from these conversations, anyhow not enough for somebody who was not acquainted with the political situation in East Asia. The Abwehr and RSHA regarded ZANDER as a "V-Mann" however, not within the East Asia Department but within Amt VI A, which dealt as far as I know with internal German administrative affairs. Thus I, too, got to know him superficially. He lived in BERLIN - Nikolassee, I do not know the street. It seems that ZANDER was also ordered by some agency to keep in close contact with Swiss journalists living in BERLIN, and I presume that this order represented his main activity as a "V-Mann". Any Eastern Asiatic information he produced from his contact with OSHIMA was neither substantial nor new.

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- (iv) Dr. DONAT. DONAT was professor of "Japanology" at the Auslandswissenschaftlichen (foreign-scientific) faculty of Berlin University. This faculty was regarded amongst the professors of the university as a more or less disguised research Branch of the SD. Therefore DONAT was also closely collaborating with the RSHA, which also provided him with a special "East Asia Institute" where DONAT employed a number of Far Eastern Experts as assistants on the study of scientific subjects which seemed worth while evaluating because of their Intelligence Interest. DONAT also used some foreigners there, amongst them a Dutch specialist for Dutch East India questions and also a Russian-Mongolian expert. The names of these men I cannot remember now without the help of my notes. DONAT himself also participated in the evaluation of Intelligence subjects. Besides that he cultivated social contacts with all members of Eastern Asiatic Nations who were represented in BERLIN, in particular with Indo-Chinese students who had come to BERLIN from FRANCE. At first his Institute was situated in the Oranienburger Strasse where it was bombed out last Autumn. From there it moved to Marienbad in BOHEMIA where it remained, as far as I know, till the end of the war. I do not know what heppened to the members of the Institute nor to DONAT himself. Presumably they fell into American hands.
- (v) Herr NAKANISHI. NAKANISHI is a Japanese, married to a German woman, who before the war owned a prosperous business in Eastern Asiatic curios and antiques and who since the beginning of the war did all sorts of odd jobs for the Embassy. As he was married to a German, the Japanese treated him somewhat distantly which in turn resulted in a slightly sensitive attitude towards his own countrymen. This made him particularly useful as an informant. NAKANISHI, who had also worked for a time as a journalist, is a clever, versatile, somewhat enigmatic person thoroughly versed in the more obscure questions of Eastern Asiatic policy. He has an abounding knowledge of leading Japanese political personalities and was, therefore, able to enlarge on information from Eastern Asia because of his knowledge of the personalities involved. His contact with the Berlin Embassy was really close, as the Embassy used him very frequently for difficult jobs (such as dealing with German Authorities who were responsible for providing accommodation for displaced or bombed out Japanese (particularly during the later days). However, those members of the Embassy, who might have been able to give internal Intelligence information remained always rather reserved in their attitude, for the reason given above. NAKANISHI, however, got more information from Japanese journalists living in BERLIN, a number of whom also had strained relations with the Embassy, although for different reasons. NAKANISHI's last residence was in BERLIN - GRÜNEWALD, Trabenerstrasse 53 or 63.
- (vi) "V" Person "TOJA". TOJA was a cover name for a woman whose real name I cannot remember without the help of my notes. She was registered as a "V" woman by a city office of the Abwehr in BERLIN. Outwardly she was supposed to be a scientific collaborator of the Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Instituts der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, where she perhaps really was employed in some cover job. TOJA mainly dealt with Japanese journalists and with less important people of the Embassy and she was untiring in producing terribly long-winded accounts about her conversations in these circles. Her reports were always of no great value and dealt mainly with the private lives of the Japanese concerned and were therefore mostly "gossip". I do not know whether TOJA got paid by the Abwehr for

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her collaboration. Judging by the amount of material produced by her, she must have been busy with it all day, so it can be assumed that her activities for the Abwehr office were of a whole time nature.

(vii) "V" man "BORIS". This "V" man belonged to referat ROLAND of the Abwehrstelle in HAMBURG. All I have been able to discover about him through a third party was that he was a White Russian who had excellent connections with the Manchurian Embassy in BERLIN and who had occasional access to the Japanese Embassy. As a rule he dealt with the main lines of Japanese Far Eastern Policy. His appreciations showed a good knowledge of the subject and always contained new views and ideas. However, BORIS always refused to disclose his sources. It seems that BORIS was particularly well suited for spying on various Agencies. Any further particulars about his present whereabouts can only be obtained via Referat ROLAND of the HAMBURG Abwehr.

(ix) Dr. Otto RICHTER. RICHTER is GESCHAFTSFÜHRER of the Ostasiatische Verein in HAMBURG, and had, as such, close connections with Far Eastern merchants in HAMBURG. He was also editor of the Ostasiatische Rundschau, and was thus compelled to keep himself informed about all important current developments in Eastern Asiatic policy. As regard Intelligence information, he was mainly required to report on all economic questions connected with Eastern Asia and he was competent in this subject. Until the end of the war he was in contact, by code, with German Commercial Firms in Japan and Nanking China and passed any information gathered from this source to all interested Agencies. Any further information about this personality would have to be obtained from the Japanreferat of the HAMBURG Abwehr (if there was such a referat) or otherwise from the Vertreter (Agent) of Amt VI of the RSHA in HAMBURG, Hauptsturmführer Steinert.

3. OKW Abhoerdienst (monitoring service) and CHI Department. Material produced by this Branch was, at times, quite informative. However, foreign broadcasts which were listened to by the monitoring service were not really useful for Intelligence requirements and besides they were surpassed by the rival monitoring service of the Foreign Office ("Seehaus") which was even more extensive. However, the translations of foreign telegrams and broadcasts produced by the de-cyphering Department were occasionally extremely valuable. The decyphering Department had some very experienced decyphering experts who had succeeded in decyphering the codes of Foreign Agencies in a remarkable number of cases. Thus they knew there:- The code used by the Turkish Ambassador in Chungking to communicate with Ankara and the code used by the Swiss Ambassador in Chungking to communicate with Berne. Therefore the reports of both Ambassadors reached interested Agencies in Berlin at the same time as they arrived in Ankara or Berne. The contents of these reports were always very interesting. They always dealt with the relations between Chungking and Moscow, Chungking and Tokio and occasionally Tokio and Moscow, as seen from the Chungking point of view. In addition to the information already obtained on these subjects, these reports were of great complementary value.

4. STÄHMER. Reports by the Foreign Office. As a rule these reports were only meant for strictly confidential use by the Foreign Office but the more important of them were regularly passed to the Secret Service by the Chief of the Eastern Asiatic Department of the Foreign Office, Legationsrat Dr. K.O. BRAUN. BRAUN was very violently opposed to RIBBENTROP, and frequently intended to leave the diplomatic service as a protest against RIBBENTROP's Eastern Asiatic policy and to dedicate himself completely and as a whole time job to Secret Service Work. BRAUN is extremely well versed in Eastern Asiatic affairs and has very good connections with leading Japanese circles. He had the full confidence of all the members of all Eastern Asiatic missions accredited to BERLIN. He speaks good Japanese and also has all the good qualities needed for any kind of Secret Service Work. Although he is as far as I know, an old Party member since the beginning of the Thirties, he has, owing to the developments of recent years and in particular under the influence of RIBBENTROP's personality, completely drifted away from National Socialism. BRAUN was not only valuable from the

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Intelligence point of view, because he made accessible the Stahmer reports which were jealously guarded by the Foreign Office, but also because of the great confidence he enjoyed with the members of the Japanese Embassy from whom he extracted more information than any other German in BERLIN. The Japanese poured out their hearts to him unreservedly and burdened him with all their worries regarding the lack of co-operation by the German Authorities. Thus they passed on to him information from Tokio which judging from its nature might possibly have been passed on to the German Foreign Minister, if he had only been willing to listen to the Japanese and take them seriously. Towards the end of the war, BRAUN was sent to Bad Gastein where he had to look after the Japanese Embassy in his capacity as Ostasienreferent, therefore he also is likely to have fallen into American hands, but I think it very probable that the Americans, who are very interested in questions regarding Far Eastern Policy, will use him as an expert on these matters.

5. Portuguese State Police. There were occasionally reports via a Branch of the RSHA in Lisbon which also contained meagre Intelligence details regarding Far Eastern Questions. This material was supposed to have been supplied by an Agency of the Portuguese Police - I do not know whether this was an officially agree-upon exchange of material or whether other channels were used. Anyhow, the reports indicated that the Portuguese Police employed a V-woman who was also occasionally planted on the Japanese Ambassador in LISBON, whom she led on to make political statements. This V-woman was a German by birth, whose name and alias I cannot recollect without the help of my notes. However, I remember one note, according to which this woman had contact with an Officer of the British Secret Service whose name must have been Col. Stribbling or Stirling or something to that effect and from whom she also got some remuneration. This was done with the knowledge of the Portuguese Police. Whatever information the woman extracted from the Japanese Ambassador it was not very much; it was only concerned in a very limited way with questions of current policy. No high value was attached to news from this source.

6. WLASSOW - Officers. The Wlassow Army contained some good experts on Far Eastern Affairs; in particular WLASSOW himself was well versed in all questions affecting Far Eastern Policy; and ever since his activity as advisor to Chiang Kai Shek, he has kept himself currently well informed about these matters. A systematic evaluation of his knowledge for Intelligence purposes has never taken place as far as I know, and my acquaintance with him only came about accidentally while I was attached to the OKW.

However, one of his staff Officers was used by an Agency of the RSHA against the private Secretary of Ambassador OSHIMA with whom he had intimate relations. She passed to him a series of reports from the Embassy, some of which I have seen. They were of no great value.

7. Personal contacts with members of the Japanese Embassy. However the most productive Intelligence information was produced by close personal contact with members of the Japanese-Manchurian-Chinese and Thailand Embassies. There the Secret Service had good connections at its disposal. I myself had the best relations with the civilian members of the Japanese Embassy as well as with the attaches of the Armed forces. Other Verbindungsleute (Intermediaries) to these circles and to the Manchurian, Chinese and Thailand Embassies were:

(a) Herr Joern LEO. (LEO is the sur-name). Lived in Japan for 15 years and therefore has very good connections with the Japanese. For several years LEO was Referent in the Far Eastern Department of Amt VI of the RSHA.

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(b) Dr. Harald Kirfel. A young Japanologist and Sinologist, who though he had not yet been to Eastern Asia had an expert knowledge regarding Far Eastern Affairs. Originally he was active in a Dolmetscherlehrkompanie (Interpreter Instruction Company) of the OKH and like myself he was posted from the OKW to the RSHA in Autumn last year. He was in Bad Gastein at the end.

(c) Dr. KONAT }
(d) Dr. BRAUN } See above.

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

CONFIDENTIAL

Tokyo, Japan, April 3, 1946

DC/A

No. 343

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 15 1946
DIVISION OF FOREIGN
REPORTING SERVICES

SUBJECT: Political Parties in Japan: Developments During
The Week Ending March 30, 1946

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APR 12 11 43 AM '46
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Office's despatch No. 334, March 27, 1946, and previous, transmitting weekly reports on political parties in Japan, and to transmit copy of this Office's latest report "Political Parties in Japan: Developments During the Week Ending March 30, 1946".

Respectfully yours,

Max W. Bishop

Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer

Enclosure:

Copy of report
dated April 2, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department

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Enclosure to despatch No. 343 dated April 3, 1946, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Political Parties in Japan: Developments During the Week Ending March 30, 1946."

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, April 2, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING
THE WEEK ENDING MARCH 30, 1946

Summary. Within their capabilities, the various political parties and their candidates are making an effort to arouse the interest and enthusiasm of the electorate in their respective platforms. Despite limitations brought on by shortages of materials, difficulties of travel and communications, and regulations concerning posters, the tempo of the campaign is increasing in the cities, towns, and villages of Japan. A feeling of pessimism over the lack of public interest in the election nevertheless pervades various circles. Reasons for this apparent failure on the part of the people to respond to the freedoms of discussion, congregation, and voting power may be attributed to the hardships and inconveniences of daily life, lack of confidence in the parties, leadership, and candidates, fatalism of the Japanese masses, low levels of political education and experience of the people, and to some extent, the ineptness of the parties in arousing public enthusiasm. Taken in combination, these various factors suggest that abstention of voters in the coming election will be high, a result which would be unfortunate and might give rise to an implication that the initial test of democracy in Japan has failed. The Government is aware of this danger. If the new Diet is to represent the choice of the Japanese people as a whole, abstention from voting must be kept to a minimum. To combat this disinterestedness, it may perhaps be desirable for SCAP, through suitable channels and means, to emphasize the importance of the political responsibilities which the people have to assume under these new freedoms and which must be discharged in the election and in the new Diet. Somewhat in keeping with the practice of political parties in other countries, when dealing with such specific problems as inflation, Governmental finance, unemployment, and the food shortage, the programs of the major parties are made up of generalities. In some instances, however, Japanese parties have exceeded practices elsewhere in showing an inclination to juggle inconsistencies, to ignore objectivity, and to confuse or dismiss fundamental issues with political "mumbo-jumbo". As of March 31, a total of 2,787 candidates were running in the campaign. End of Summary.

The Election Campaign

With the election campaign now entering into its final phase, the various political parties and their candidates are making an effort, within their capabilities, to arouse the

interest

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interest and enthusiasm of the electorate in their respective platforms. The pattern of campaigning in Japan is tame by comparison with similar activities in the United States, because of the limitations under present conditions imposed on the parties in Japan by shortages of materials, difficulties and expense of travel and communications, and the detailed regulations concerning permissible sizes of posters and advertising matter. There are, nevertheless, an increasing number of posters bearing the names of candidates and campaign slogans making their appearance throughout the cities, towns, and villages of Japan—evidence that the candidates and **their** supporters are busily engaged in furthering their causes. Less obvious, but probably more efficacious in gathering adherents, are the speaking tours conducted in the provinces by candidates who thereby hope to popularize themselves with their constituents. Tours of this nature are usually arranged by a committee which fixes a rigid schedule of appearances throughout the prefecture, it being not unusual for a candidate to attend as many as fifty "meetings" over a period of five or six days. In addition, the candidate attends the customary private entertainments, such as lunches and dinners, which afford ample opportunity for back-stage discussion of campaign problems and strategy.

Despite the activities of the candidates and their supporters, however, a feeling of pessimism over the lack of public interest in the election campaign appears to pervade Government circles, politicians, and many thoughtful Japanese. Lack of enthusiasm for the election among the general populace, particularly in the large cities, is such that the Home and Education Ministries are making an effort to stimulate greater interest, but as yet with little or no success, and with undetermined effect on the total vote to be cast.

In searching for underlying reasons for the apparent failure of the Japanese to respond to their newly-found freedoms of discussion, congregation, and voting power, the hardships and inconveniences of daily life, including difficulties of travel and communications, are the chief factors which detract from political activity and interest. Contributory causes, powerful but less obvious, are (a) a general lack of confidence in the parties, leadership, and candidates; (b) the deep-seated fatalism inherently characteristic of the Japanese masses, accustomed to follow but not to lead; (c) the low levels of political education and experience of the people as a whole; and (3) to some extent, the ineptness of the parties in arousing public enthusiasm for their respective principles.

Candidates and the Diet

In evaluating the standing and character of the numerous candidates, even well-informed Japanese observers are all too apt to dismiss the subject with over-simplifications such as "all candidates are of low caliber", "all politicians are venal", or "all candidates are merely new faces masking for old." This attitude of resignation is difficult to combat, in view of the

suspicious