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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

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INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FAR-EAST

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General Headquarters
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Plans and Estimates Branch

1 December 1949

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FAR EAST: SOVIET AND SATELLITE DISPOSITIONS

This estimate represents the latest currently available information on the general situation in the Far East, to include military, political, subversive, scientific, economic, and psychological factors of interest to the major units of the Far East Command. This estimate is primarily designed to give an over-all view of the general situation as it exists in this part of the world, the current capabilities of the Communist Forces in the Far East, and the most probable lines of action which may develop in the near future.

Current sources of information have been exploited to include FEC field unit reports, Department of the Army publications, and the intelligence compilations of Ground, Air, and Navy.

This study is the last most recent of a continuous series, viz:

Periodic Intelligence Summary: Situation Korea, 11 Jan 1946
Periodic Intelligence Summary: Situation Korea, 2 Apr 1946
Situation Korea-China-Manchuria, 22 Jan 1947
Situation Arctic-Southeast Siberia, 15 Mar 1947
Strength and Dispositions of Soviet Forces, 31 Jul 1947
Special Report, Sakhalin-Kurile Islands-Kamchatka-Chukhotsk, 15 May 1948
Strength and Dispositions of Soviet Forces, 15 Jan 1949
Estimate of the Situation China-Manchuria, 10 May 1949

For continuing information on the major factors covered in this estimate, see G-2, FEC "Daily Intelligence Summary."

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INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FAR EAST

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1 December 1949

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FAR EAST

MAPS: The World Map, National Geographic Society, Scale 1 to 40,000,000;
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, National Geographic Society, Scale: 1 to 9,000,000;
China, National Geographic Society, Scale: 1 to 7,000,000;
Japan and adjacent regions of Asia and the Pacific Ocean, National Geographic Society, Scale: 1 to 4,224,000.

I

MISSIONS *

A. Commander-in-Chief Far East exercises unified command over all forces allocated to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or other authority, and will carry out the following missions:

1. Maintain the security of the Far East Command, including the protection of sea and air communications.

2. Support United States policy within the scope of his command responsibility.

3. Support Pacific, Alaska**, and Strategic Air** commanders in their missions.

4. Upon request by United States Ambassador to Korea, provide for the safety of United States Nationals in Korea by evacuation.

5. Make plans and preparations within the resources assigned to him and prospectively available to him in case of a general emergency to:

a. Provide for the safety of United States Forces in Korea and China.

b. Oppose enemy advances.

c. Secure Japan, the Ryukyus, the Marianas and the Bonins.

d. Discharge United States military responsibilities in the Philippines.

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* These missions are the ones accepted by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, General Headquarters Far East Command.
** The above missions have been assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except those starred which are derived.

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II

ENEMY FORCES AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

A. ENEMY FORCES:

1. General:

a. See Annex 1, Ground Forces.

b. For the purpose of this estimate, enemy forces are assumed to be all organized bodies in the Far East, covert or overt, which, in the event of hostilities, would be expected to support the USSR and world communism, and which might exercise an impact on the situation in the Far East.

2. Ground:

a. See Annex 1, Ground Forces.

b. The Soviet Army is the largest and most effective ground force in the world. With a total strength of 2,500,000 (175 divisions), it is organized, equipped, and disposed for combat.

One-fifth of the Soviet Army is in the Far East. In this region there are 35 divisions - 10 new- and 15 old-type rifle divisions, 3 airborne, 5 mechanized and 2 tank divisions. These divisions compose thirteen corps, and six armies. (See Plate No. 1) Soviet ground forces are well equipped and their morale is excellent; training is continuous, vigorous, and realistic.

Logistically, the ground forces in the Soviet Far East are dependent upon the highly vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railroad, the only land link between the Urals and Siberia. To overcome this deficiency, the Soviets have resorted to stockpiling, and since production of her general industry has been maintained at near wartime capacity, it is believed that significant reserves of equipment have been accumulated in strategic locations throughout the Far East. There is a collateral effort to expand local Siberian industries to self-sufficiency coupled with the integration and rehabilitation of the economic-military potential of Manchuria and North Korea.

At present, the ground forces of the Soviet's Asiatic Satellites possess only slight significance in assessing the Soviet offensive capability in this theater.

Chinese Communist ground forces (see Plate No. 2) are currently estimated to number approximately 1,500,000 front-line troops. However, present operations against Nationalist forces, the economic deterioration of the country due to a prolonged war, and the lack of adequate logistics facilities impede the use of such forces by the USSR for any offensive action against a major power without a disproportionate expenditure of Soviet resources. Communist forces of Outer Mongolia are considered inconsequential.

North Korean ground forces, currently estimated to number approximately 60/64,000 military troops (including about 14/16,000 Chinese Communist forces) and 52,000 para-military personnel, could be used only for garrison or limited offensive operations, such as an offensive campaign in conjunction with USSR forces to overrun South Korea. (See Plate No. 2)

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

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

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

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

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In summary, the Soviet-Communist ground forces in the Far East, especially in defense of their native soil, are a powerful and effective force. The logistics dependency upon the highly vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railroad and upon Far East strategic stockpiles is their major weakness and is a definite "yardstick" by which to measure the total number of divisions that might be operationally employed in this area by the Soviets.

3. Air: (See Plate No. 3)

a. See Annex 2, Air Forces.

b. The Soviet air arm is composed of the Military Air Force, the Long Range Air Force, the Fighter Defense Force, the Naval Air Force, and the supporting Civil Air Fleet and Security (MVD) Air Force. The Soviet air arm is well organized and equipped to carry out the mission of furnishing close support to the ground forces, and great effort is being devoted to the development of jet fighters and a strategic air arm.

Of the estimated 17,000 aircraft in the Soviet armed forces, 4,200 are deployed in the Far East; this figure includes 3,180 combat types (2,030 fighters, 280 ground attack, 870 bombers) plus 1,020 miscellaneous aircraft. The presence of long-range bomber aircraft in the Far East cannot be established by confirmed reports, however, a few four-engine bombers of the PE-8 type have been reported by sources of low reliability. With the light bombers and fighters presently based in the Far East, the Soviets have the capability of mounting fighter-escorted bomber attacks against all remunerative targets on the Japanese home islands. Okinawa is beyond the range of Soviet aircraft now in the Far East when operating from present Soviet bases. Acquisition of bases in China or South Korea, or the arrival of B-29 bombers in the Soviet Far East, would place Okinawa within Soviet bomber range.

Several weaknesses exist in the Soviet air arm. It is deficient in specialized personnel and in the techniques of long-range navigation and of both night-flying and all-weather flying. The maintenance of air equipment is below USAF standards, and like the Soviet armies, the air forces depend largely on the Trans-Siberian Railroad for movement of supplies. The critical items in the Far East are aviation gasoline, spare parts, and aircraft engines. The Soviets are believed to have at least a year's supply of aviation petroleum or its equivalent stockpiled in the Far East, but the extent of stockpiling of spare parts and aircraft engines is not known.

Any airlift required by Soviet commanders in the Far East would have to be furnished by the Civil Air Fleet with its 3,000 major transports. Maximum capability of this transport fleet is to lift 34,000 fully equipped paratroopers with supporting arms for a range of 1,080 nautical miles. It is improbable, however, that any large number of these aircraft would be diverted to the Far East. Soviet satellites in the Far East have negligible air combat capabilities, however, they can contribute useful advanced ground facilities, thereby broadening the offensive capabilities of the Soviet air forces.

To sum up - the Soviet air arm in the Far East is strong in numbers, but limited by imperfect supply training and present types of aircraft (light-bombers only). It could deal a staggering blow to installations in Japan in the initial stages of hostilities, particularly if surprise could be achieved. By

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expansion of base facilities to China or South Korea, or by bringing B-29-type bombers to the Far East, the Soviet bombers could strike Okinawa and the Philippines.

4. Navy: (See Plate No. 4)

a. See Annex 4, Naval Forces.

b. The Soviet Navy in the Far East, as well as the Soviet Navy as a whole, is deficient in surface power, but possesses a relatively strong submarine arm and limited though dangerous mining capabilities. Soviet naval air power is weakened by the absence of aircraft carriers; amphibious power is weakened by the lack of suitable assault craft; and a shortage of naval auxiliaries would hinder any attempt to challenge command of the sea.

The more important types of Soviet vessels based in the Far East are tabulated below:

Heavy Cruisers	2
Light Cruisers	1
Destroyers	18
Destroyer Escorts	17
Submarines	78

Many of the Soviet vessels are obsolete by modern standards, and are incapable of successfully opposing United States or British vessels of similar types.

Although operational control of naval air units rests with fleet commanders, the Soviet Naval Air Force itself is a branch of the Soviet air arm, and in most cases, employs identical aircraft. These naval aircraft are practically all land-based due to shortage of aircraft tenders and absence of aircraft carriers. It is estimated that 40 of the total of 85 Naval Air Force regiments are assigned to the Pacific Fleets, with 1,450 of the total of 3,100 aircraft. At present, naval air units are believed to be an effective coastal complement to the Soviet Navy, but of little value in long-range naval operations.

It is anticipated that in the event of hostilities, the Soviet Navy in the Far East will be used primarily to defend vital water approaches and to attack shipping and lines of communication.

Soviet submarine and mining operations will constitute a definite threat which will be mitigated by reinforcement of present Anglo-American escort craft and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) craft in the Far East. Within the limitations imposed by land-based aircraft, the Soviet Navy can conduct limited surface operations in the Far East, and can provide support for ground attack forces requiring water-lift over short distances.

Expansion of naval bases and port facilities in the Far East has been given high priority, not only in the Maritime Province, but in Sakhalin and eastern Kamchatka as well. Developments have been based on a co-ordinated program for increase of commercial shipping coupled with adequate frontier defense. This program has added to the difficulties experienced by the Soviet Merchant Marine in meeting shipping requirements and, concurrently, has retarded naval vessel construction. Construction of merchant vessels is far behind schedule, expecially those necessary for relief of the critical tanker shortage. Although the Merchant Marine

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is under strict governmental control, which insures flexibility of movement, with few exceptions the characteristics of the vessels preclude their use as naval auxiliaries.

At the present time, the Soviet Far East Satellites have no significant naval capabilities. Assistance to the Soviet Navy would be limited mainly to the use of ports and harbors and minor base facilities.

In summary, Soviet Naval Forces in the Far East are primarily a defensive weapon, however, they are capable of conducting limited offensive operations, chiefly by means of submarine warfare. At the present time, a major amphibious assault is not within the capabilities of Soviet Far East Naval Forces, but transportation could be made available for the seizure of a near-by objective by waterborne forces provided an established port is captured intact.

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

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

PLATE NO. 3

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Slip Sheet
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Plate No. 3





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

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Slip Sheet
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Plate No. 4

NAVAL VESSEL STRENGTH OF THE USSR

Types	Entire USSR	Far East
Battleships	3	0
Cruisers	12	3
Destroyers	60	18
Destroyer Escorts ...	39	17
Submarines	281	78
Gunboats & Frigates .	283	48
Mine Craft	640	96
Subchasers	410	140
Motor Torpedo Boats .	470	160
Landing Craft	240	100
Fleet Auxiliaries ...	227	35
District Craft & Small Auxiliaries .	Numerous	Numerous
TOTAL	2,665 +	695 +

SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE

	Entire USSR		Far East*	
Types	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
Cargo	419	1,383,000	187	707,000
Cargo-Passenger	79	367,000	24	123,000
Tanker	30	124,000	11	42,000
Miscellaneous	16	59,000	--	--
TOTAL	544	1.933,000	222	872,000

60% of above vessels are more than 20 years old.
60% of above vessels are coal-burning.
30% of above vessels have speeds less than 10 knots.
92% of above vessels have speeds of 12 knots or less.

* In addition, 30 vessels totaling 100,000 tons are employed in the FAR EAST FISHING COMBINE.

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5. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND ATOMIC WARFARE - USSR

	Capability	Forces	Training	Doctrine	Munitions
a. Chemical	Large scale prosecution by conventional means (and possibly new ones).	Offensive and defensive elements in ground and air forces. Defense organization maintained since 1924.	Carried on an extensive scale throughout armed forces with advances in offensive and defensive techniques indicated. Public distribution of training material and propaganda continues.	Nature and effectiveness are appreciated by high command. Extensive use of air elements in offensive operations apparently is favored.	Dumps in forward areas and aircraft spray apparatus of four types reported by Germans during World War II. Soviets captured German technicians and stocks of munitions and intermediate chemicals. Quantity production, during World War II, was reported of the following. mustard gas nitrogen mustards Lewisite Adamsite phosgene phosgene oxime hydrogen cyanide chloractetophenone diphenylchlorarsine cyanogen chloride chloropicrin Possessors of at least one of new German "nerve gases."
b. Biological Warfare	Widespread operations by saboteurs - probable.	Organization, strength, location unknown.	Unknown.	Unknown. (Greatly improved sanitation and epediological control needed for defense.)	Research and development personnel and facilities are available. These were employed in middle and late 1930's, according to German General Staff records and Japanese reports.
c. Atomic Warfare	Unknown. USSR atomic explosion reported by U.S. as having taken place in August, 1949.	Unknown.	Unknown.	Unknown.	Unknown. (Atomic research and developmental work are apparently extensive and intensive; some success has been claimed.)

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COMPARISON OF COMMUNIST ELEMENT (approx) TO TOTAL POPULATION IN THE FAR EAST



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6. Subversive:

a. See Annex 4, Subversive Forces.

b. The Communist subversive potential in non-Communist countries in the Far East is based on the Communist Party, and on the recently repatriated prisoners of war who have been thoroughly indoctrinated in the tenets of communism. This potential is relatively small (see Plate No. 5), but subversive elements in the Far East are striving to strengthen their position and influence at all levels of society and constitute a real threat to non-Communist governments.

In Japan, the Communist Party (JCP) is estimated to have a strength of 150,000 members (covert and overt) and a total working element of 200/300,000, including active sympathizers. This strength is scattered throughout Japan, with critical concentrations located in or near large industrial centers. The morale, discipline, and efficiency of party members is considered to be high.

The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) is dependent financially on the contributions of Party sympathizers, on dues paid by members, on Soviet agencies in Japan, and, to a lesser extent, on smuggling activities. This system appears to provide sufficient funds for current limited operations, but it is not sufficient for aggressive operations which are anticipated in the event of hostilities.

The JCP training program for subversive elements includes instruction in low-order sabotage, espionage, dissemination of propaganda, and civil violence. It is believed, however, that courses in revolutionary theory and tactics are being taught by trained professional revolutionaries to a small, select group of JCP youths. In time of war, the tactics of the JCP probably will include labor disturbances, riots, espionage, sabotage of vital industry, and assassination of key anti-Communist leaders. (For a tabulation of potential sabotage targets, see Appendix A to Annex 4.)

The South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) is estimated to have a total working element of 50/75,000, scattered throughout southern Korea. The morale and efficiency of the SKLP are lower than that of the JCP, and the party organization of the SKLP is weaker.

For supplies, the SKLP depends largely on Communist elements in North Korea, Manchuria, and China. So far, such aid has provided sufficient equipment for sabotage activities, and has encouraged lawlessness throughout South Korea, however, it is unlikely that the subversive element in South Korea has acquired significant stocks of supplies. The easy availability of trained agents from North Korea has largely remedied deficiencies in training and leadership. Therefore, the subversive forces in South Korea would be formidable should they elect to operate at their maximum capability. This fact has been established by the record of civil disturbance, riots, attacks upon South Korean police, and defections in the armed forces.

In the Ryukyus the total strength of subversive elements is 1/5,000 members, which is not sufficient to challenge the civil and occupation authorities; they could carry out a campaign of important proportions only if heavily reinforced.

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In summary, the Communist subversive force in the Far East is built primarily around the Communist Party, and is wholly dedicated to the basic doctrine upon which the USSR is founded. This small but expanding group is prepared to use any means necessary to further the aims of the USSR and world communism, and, unless effectively curbed, might be able to interfere with the United States forces in the execution of their duties to protect American installations and interests in Japan and Korea.

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS:

1. Terrain, Weather, and Hydrography:

a. See Annex 5, Terrain, Weather, and Hydrography.

b. The topography of Sakhalin, southeastern Siberia, Manchuria, Korea, and northeast China is predominantly mountainous and hilly in character and, in general, impedes cross country movement. The major areas with topography favorable to ground operations are the rolling, hilly central lowlands of Manchuria, and the great delta plain of north China. Other lowland areas are interspersed with swamps, rice paddies, and marshes, which are impassable for vehicles except when deeply frozen. The climate of the region is characterized by long, cold, dry winters with severe cold in the interior areas of Manchuria and southeastern Siberia; summers range from mild to hot with a high degree of humidity, much rain, and considerable cloud cover and coastal fogs. Generally, the most favorable seasons for combined operations in the mountainous areas are the late summer and fall, and in the lowlands of Manchuria and northeast China, the fall and winter. (see Plate No. 6)

The hydrographical summary of the area is contained in the following tabulation.

	Yellow Sea	Sea of Japan	Sea of Okhotsk
Tidal Ranges	2.5 to 11 ft.	Less than 2 ft.	Usually exceed 2 ft.
Currents	Tidal - 1-4.5 knots. Non-tidal - weak and variable in direction.	*	**
Depths	Mostly under 50 fathoms.	Central depth 2000 fathoms.	Variable; central depth 800 fathoms.
Average Surface Water Temperatures	Summer - 75°F Winter - 40°F	Summer 45°F Winter 35°F	Variable
Ice Conditions	Ice is not a serious hindrance.	Ice forms along coast from Oct to May. Tartary Straits closed from Nov to June unless icebreakers are used. Ice not a hazard in open seas during any season.	Generally closed to shipping from Oct to June, except in central and southern Kuriles and some areas west of the Kuriles. La Perouse straits are sometimes closed by drift ice.

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TOPOGRAPHY
SOVIET FAR EAST
N.E. CHINA-KOREA

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	Yellow Sea	Sea of Japan	Sea of Okhotsk
Sonar Conditions.	Ranges 1000-2000 yards from Sept to March; less in summer.	Less than 1000 yds in summer.	Variable according to sea and swell conditions.
Mineability	Entire area could be mined.	Tsushima Straits, coastal shelf between Vladivostok and Korea, La Perouse Straits and Tartary Straits could be mined.	Mineability is dependent upon individual area characteristics.

* In the Japan Sea, the cold Liman Current flows southwestward along the mainland coast at 2 to 4 knots and the warm Tsushima Current flows northeastward along the Japan coast at 1/2 knot.
** In the Okhotsk Sea, a counterclockwise current feeds cold water from the Nagaevo area to Sakhalin, while the Japan Current brings warm water northeast through the Kuriles.

2. Economic:

a. See Annex 6, Economic Factors.

b. The economic-military potential of the USSR, (defined as the capability of a country to produce the weapons, equipment, and other supplies necessary to sustain its Armed Forces in combat), is only 24 per cent of that of the United States. Further, the Soviet Union will not approach the economic-military potential of the United States in the foreseeable future. (See Plate No. 7)

Although the USSR is basically strong in her natural resources position, there are critical shortages of several strategic raw materials, i.e., copper, natural rubber, tin, molybdenum, petroleum, tungsten, and industrial diamonds. Siberia and the Soviet Far East lag far behind the rest of the Soviet Union in the output of raw materials. (See Plate No. 8). The notable exception to this condition exists in the production of tin, in which the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia lead all other portions of the USSR. Also of significance to the Far East Command - the primary sources of tungsten and natural rubber, as well as the major sources of USSR tin imports, lie in southeast Asia, and, to a smaller extent, in China and Korea.

The growth of Soviet industrial plants has been exaggerated in Communist propaganda. Present industrial plant capacity is actually about one-quarter of that of the United States with marked deficiencies existing in production of transportation, equipment, refined petroleum, high octane gasoline, machine tools, precision instruments, and certain types of finished steel. These facts are pertinent to the industry of the Soviet Far East, a region which makes no heavy contribution to the over-all industrial system. Despite the relatively tremendous industrial advances made in this area during and immediately following World War II, the Soviet Far East today is not carrying its proportionate share of the USSR production load. (See Plates No. 9 and 10)

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

P.D.M. MAP NO. 37 22 DEC. 1947

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

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

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

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ECONOMIC MILITARY POTENTIAL



* LESS THAN ONE PERCENT.

PRODUCTIVE CAPABILITIES EXPRESSED AS WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES OF UNITED STATES. (U.S. = 100 %)

1947 1957

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The most assailable portion of the Soviet economy in the Far East is the transportation system. (See Plate No. 11) - a network composed of the Trans-Siberian Railroad with its spurs, supplemented by an inefficient system of roads and inland waterways. At the present time, the Trans-Siberian Railroad carries approximately 94 per cent of all traffic dispatched from European USSR to the Far East. Its disruption, a task facilitated by many vulnerable tunnels, bridges, and defiles, would isolate the Soviet Far East from the rest of the USSR. Even if operable, there is grave doubt if enough supplies can be moved over it to sustain large-scale air and ground operations. Categorically, the highways and the inland waterways system in the Far East is the poorest in the USSR; for the most part, the highways are sparse and unsurfaced, and the inland waterways are frozen over for three to ten months a year. Ocean shipping in the Far East is generally limited to local distribution to isolated mainland bases and to island installations and suffers more from the lack of proper harbor and port facilities than from the smallness of its numbers.

With the possible exception of Japan, the remainder of the Far East (less USSR) is economically a net liability. Japan is deficient in almost all the necessary raw materials, but does have the best industrial plant east of the Urals, with a capacity estimated to be approximately one-quarter of the entire Soviet productive capacity.

In summary, the economic factor in the Soviet Far East as well as the entire USSR, has serious weaknesses, and it is not likely to be materially improved in the near future. It is an economy which suffers from a shortage of skilled labor, a lack of processed raw materials, a deficiency of industrial plants, and a dependency upon an inadequate and highly vulnerable transportation system.

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Summary to Accompany Political Factors

The Soviet political factor is one of the major contributions to the strength of the USSR. Democratic in form, the government is actually a dictatorship of the minority. This minority, the Communist Party of the USSR, controls all functions of government through personnel occupying key positions in both government and party organizations. The entire purpose of the government is to achieve the Communist dream - establishment of a world Communist state under the leadership of the USSR. Important foundations of the national policy are:

a. The theory that capitalism contains contradictions which inevitably result in recurring class struggle and depressions, and eventually in revolution itself.

b. The belief that the world revolution (which must occur prior to the establishment of the World Communist State) cannot be accomplished through peaceful means.

c. The belief that one more catastrophic war, between capitalism and communism, is inevitable.

d. The concept that the USSR is the guiding force of the revolution and that the Communist parties throughout the world are junior auxiliaries, which may be sacrificed if the situation so dictates.

Foreign policy, defense policy, and all internal affairs are founded on these theories, and, until the final goal is achieved, will not change materially in direction, although the tactics by which the end is sought may vary. Furthermore, national policies are implemented under strong, capable, and aggressive leadership. Police state-type controls combined with excellent leadership on the national level result in the USSR being one of the most stable governments in the world today.

The governments of the other nations of the Far East are generally characterized by adolescense and lack of experience and posses varying degrees of stability. Japan and South Korea lack capable and experienced leaders and are dependent on the United States for support. This development of capable leaders is progressing with considerable rapidity in Japan.

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3. POLITICAL FACTORS (See Annex 7)

	USSR	North Korea	South Korea	Communist China
Type of Government	Democratic in form, but a highly centralized, autocratic, police state type of government in operation; ideally suited to employment of power politics and easy, rapid conversion to a war footing; a dictatorship of the minority.	Government closely modeled after that of USSR; puppet government controlled and directed by the USSR.	Democratic government in form with extremely powerful executive branch in fact; power of government centered in hands of President RHEE.	Initial stages of formation at present time. Mimics governmental organization of USSR in important details.
Political Parties	A one party state; Communist Party only legal party.	Several political parties in form; actually all political parties are controlled and directed by the Labor Party (Communist), which is the Chief party in the Democratic People's Front, a coalition.	There are numerous parties in South Korea, both rightist and leftist; controlling influence among rightist parties fluctuates considerably, however RHEE has commanded sufficient support in a "coalition" to keep power; South Korean Labor Party dominated by Communists, highly active but cannot gain control.	Although many political parties ostensibly are represented in Communist China, actually only one party, the Chinese Communist Party, exists; all policy decisions, directions, and other governmental functions are decided by this party.
Pressure Groups	No significant pressure groups.	No significant pressure groups.	No significant pressure groups.	Pressure groups are presently found in the cliques within the Communist Party and key military leaders; these pressure groups not considered a serious threat at present, but will influence the government to some extent. Resistance groups, composed largely of peasants, causing increasing concern in rear areas.
Ideology: Aims	Ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, that of all international Communists; aim is world revolution and establishment of world Communist state.	Ideology that of the Kremlin; same aims as those of USSR, with the immediate aim of consolidating all of Korea, under Communist (North Korean) rule.	Ideology not firm, highly nationalistic, anti-Communist and pro-U.S.; ideology of Communist elements same as that of North Korea; aim of government to establish South Korea as a stable republic, to prepare to meet North Korean threat and possibly to consolidate all of Korea under a democratic government.	Professed ideology is that of the Kremlin; immediate aim is to consolidate all of China under the Chinese Communist Party.
Foreign Policy	Based on ideology of Communist Party and advanced through power-political methods; radically and bitterly anti-Western in nature; aimed at weakening capitalist nations and strengthening USSR and her "satellites."	Evidenced largelythrough the USSR, anti-Western, highly anti-South Korean; friendly relations with Chinese Communists, Mongolians, and other Communist governments and factions in the Far East.	Aimed at cementing relations with U.S. and other Western Powers and all anti-Communist factions in the Far East; hope to acquire aid and build up self-protection by this; anti-Communist, anti-USSR, and highly anti-North Korean.	Not as yet firm; cordial relations with Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and other Communist governments and factions in the Far East and with the USSR; anti-Western attitude may of necessity be tempered because of desire for trade with the west. Recently recognized as legal government of China by USSR and her European satellites.
Defense Policy	Furthered through foreign policy; attention given to defense in depth (satellite or buffer states) and to undermining stability of potential enemies through fostering and supporting subversive movements in these countries.	Based on theory best defense is good offensive, security forces maintained out of proportion to defensive needs; foster subversive movements in potential enemy countries (South Korea) and conducts war nerves, using minor incidents and propaganda.	Intense efforts being made to build and maintain strong security forces to counter North Korean threat, obtain outside aid and support from anti-Communist nations.	Not as yet applicable.
National Leadership	Strong, capable, and aggressive on national level, but weak and with little initiative on lower levels; highly concentrated and centralized, inasmuch as almost all important leaders are Politburo members.	Leaders have little or no political experience; guided by Soviets; leadership on national level must be considered weak.	The encumbent president is a particularly strong, aggressive, and capable leader; however, this type of leadership is unusual in South Korea and national leadership as a whole can be considered no better than fair.	Strong, capable, and effective; probably some of the best leaders in the orient, many of which are Soviet-trained and educated.
Stability of Government	Excellent; rests largely on stability of Communist Party and on national leaders, who maintain sufficient armed forces and police to destroy any opposition.	Depends on Soviet support and guidance; with this help, stability must be considered good; without this help, stability is doubtful.	Fair; stability depends largely on one old man, President RHEE; also on amount of U.S. support; stability doubtful in face of armed invasion from North Korea.	Good; leadership and the controls available to this leadership insure continued stability in near future; future economic conditions and relations with USSR possibly may affect stability considerably.
Future Trends	General increase in political stability, accompanied by minor but significant disturbances in "satellite" countries; periods of extremely aggressive foreign policy followed by "peace overtures".	Increased efforts to undermine and overthrow South Korean government; efforts to achieve international recognition; stability will increase slowly as leaders gain experience and confidence.	Gradual gain in stability; increased efforts to secure outside support; continuation of anti-Communist policy and defense measures.	Closer cooperation with the USSR; anti-Western attitudes, which may be tempered slightly out of desire for trade; stability hinges on ability to solve economic problems; will seek further international recognition and membership in U.N.

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The Communist-led Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is also newly formed, and is considered thoroughly Soviet-oriented. The leaders of this government are considered among the most capable in the Far East, although they are lacking in experience in administrative affairs. The government must be classified as stable at the present time, however, continued stability depends largely on its ability to solve that serious economic problems which confront China.

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3. POLITICAL FACTORS (Continued)

	Nationalist China	Japan	Okinawa	Taiwan (Formosa)
Type of Government	Democratic government in form; actually an uncoordinated group of regional states, each of which has a degree of autonomy; government is corrupt and inefficient and is disintegrating rapidly.	Highly democratic in form and application; supervised by U.S. Occupation Forces, who are gradually decreasing control, allowing Japanese to depend on themselves.	A U.S. Military Government area; local advisors to U.S. government officials; termed civil administration rather than government.	Military dictatorship under Gen CHEN Cheng (Kuomintang Party), a loyal follower of CHIANG Kaishek.
Political Parties	One major party - the Kuomintang; all major national leaders belong to this party; many smaller more or less independent factions, but none have any significant following or power.	There are numerous political parties, of which only two or three are significant; power fluctuates frequently between the variou rightist parties; the Japan Communist Party is strong, but is not capable of gaining control.	Political parties only recently formed, are not stable or well organized; Okinawa is politically undeveloped; Communists as a party do not exist on the island, however, there are individual Communists.	The Kuomintang in the dominant political party on the island; there are numerous native "independence" movements, all of which are comparatively ineffective at present; the Chinese Communist Party following on the Island is increasing.
Pressure Groups	Many pressure groups in form of big business, religious groups, minority groups, and political factions; considerable influence on government usually detracting from its efficiency.	No significant pressure groups.	Small pressure groups are ineffectual at the present time.	Pressure groups are present in the form of native "independence" movements, but are negligible in effectiveness at present.
Ideology: Aims	Various ideologies; chief concern at present is to withstand Communists in hopes foreign aid, war, or a combination of events will salvage the situation for the Nationalists.	Ideology of the rightist groups is not well formed; aims are to secure removal of restrictions on the government, develop foreign trade, and to introduce foreign capital; ideology of Communists is that of the Soviet Communists.	Ideologies of various parties are not well defined; aims are conflicting, but generally are directed at securing independence for Okinawa, placing it under the U.S., Japan, or the United Nations.	Ideology of the government is that of Nationalist China; ideology or aim of native groups is to free Taiwan from Nationalist rule.
Foreign Policy	Weak and vacillating; generally aimed at securing foreign aid for tottering regime; tries to maintain international status as a major power, when in fact is not.	Not thoroughly developed at present, but more and more attention is given to this subject; foreign policy expected to be aimed at securing support of and close ties with Western Powers, especially the U.S. will probably be highly anti-Communist.	Not applicable.	Same as that of Nationalist China.
Defense Policy	Policy is to resist Communist advances in outlying areas in northwest, south and southwest, and Taiwan; this defense accompanied by efforts to obtain foreign aid and backing.	Sole means of defense lies in U.S. Occupation Forces present in Japan.	Not applicable.	Same as that of Nationalist China.
National Leadership	The capable leaders remaining in China are not as a rule in responsible positions; national leadership generally is inefficient and ineffective; highly divided and uncoordinated.	There are few capable leaders who are acceptable because of their part in World War II; leadership is developing rapidly, however, and will improve with time and experience; Japan Communist Party leadership is strong and capable.	Leadership is extremely poor and is practically non-existent.	Government leadership is the same as that of Nationalist China; native leadership is poor, scarce, and untrained.
Stability of Government	Very poor; unity of government is gone; disintegration into small, uncoordinated regional groups is probable.	Good; will increase with time and the development of capable leadership; depends heavily on the U.S.	Depends entirely on the U.S.	Same as that of Nationalist China; armed forces on Island contribute to stability at present time, however they conceivably could cause the downfall of this government.
Future Trends	Continued uncoordinated and ineffective resistance to Communist forces from isolated areas; further split into factions; continued efforts to secure aid from foreign countries; CHIANG Kai-shek will remain foremost figure in Nationalist China.	Increased self-reliance; leadership will improve with experience; stability will increase.	Extremely gradual political development, increase in Communist activities on the Island.	Native and Communist movements will increase and gather momentum; stability of government will decrease rapidly.

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4. PSYCHOLOGICAL (See Annex 8)

	SE Siberia (USSR)	China (Nationalist)	China (Communist)	North Korea	South Korea	Japan
Racial Characteristics	Siberia is a heterogeneous colony of many diverse ethnic groups cultures, and traditions where oppressive political controls and severe environment have contributed to the evolution of a stolid, rugged people who accept authoritarian control. They are accustomed to privation, regimentation, and ruthless punitive measures. Russian soldiers traditionally have been considered skilled, tenacious defensive fighters, but lacking initiative or willingness to accept responsibility.	Chinese are a passive and fatalistic people who calmly accept a primitive existence and resist changes in their accustomed pattern of living. They maintain strong family ties and have a propensity for secret cliques and societies. They are inured to privation and physical hardship, and face both life and death with the same stoicism. Chinese are generally considered good-humored, gregarious, intelligent, inquisitive, practical, and very patient. They are usually loyal to leaders who treat them considerately. Their patriotism is more regional than national as they concern themselves mostly with their own locality or family affairs. Chinese acumen in commercial undertakings is well known. "Face-saving", a typical Oriental trait, is a strong influence on the Chinese who prefer devious diplomatic maneuverings to direct action.		Koreans, unified by a common language, culture, and traditions, are considered strong nationalists, averse to regimentation, quick-tempered, emotional, individualistic, aggressive, and pugnacious, but generally responsive to strong leadership. South Koreans have less initiative, are more phlegmatic and docile than the North Koreans who are considered more ambitious and daring. In both political and religious movements, Koreans have shown themselves to be capable to self-discipline, devotion, and fortitude. Despite a reputation for laziness, they are capable of great exertion for a cause. Lacking individual initiative, Koreans are amenable to strong leadership, and are generally loyal followers.		Japan has a homogenous population with no important ethnic or religious minorities. The Japanese people are a docile, orderly, interdependent, and cooperative race. They are greatly influenced by customs and public opinion. Japanese are more progressive and display more industrial and organizational ability than other Orientals. Japanese soldiers traditionally have been stubborn, skilled fighters who feared failure more than death.
Psychological Strengths	Traditional native fortitude, tenacity, physical toughness and stamina; Effective centralized control of the people; Innate patriotism combined with inculcated pride in the regime; Amenability to imposed discipline; Implanted mistrust of foreigners; Indifference to loss of human life; Ideological appeal of Communism; Thorough propaganda indoctrination.	Innate anti-foreignism; Stoicism; Respect for seniors and authority; Fear of Communist domination.	Innate anti-foreignism; Stoicism; Respect for seniors and authority; Family solidarity;	Strong nationalistic spirit; Aversion for regimentation; Aggressiveness; Ideological appeal of communism.	Strong nationalistic spirit; Aversion for regimentation; Aggressiveness; Desire for democratic ideals.	Strong nationalistic spirit; Responsiveness to authority; High literacy rate; Strong military tradition; Traditional mistrust of USSR; Willingness to take orders and follow leaders.
Psychological Weaknesses	Disillusionment and embitterment resulting from ruthless oppression; Destruction of independent thinking caused by fear of severe reprisals; Dislike for the extreme concentration of power in the minority; Disappointment at postwar continuance of low living standards; Native nationalism of certain ethnic groups; Low level of self-discipline.	Indifference to national affairs; High illiteracy rate; Nepotism; "Face-saving" tactics.	Indifference to national affairs; High illiteracy rate; Nepotism; "Face-saving" tactics.	Quick-temper and jealous attitudes; High illiteracy rate; Lack of real national independence and unity; Resentment at Soviet exploitation of Korean resources, declining standard of living, and discriminatory political and economic policies; Lack of military tradition.	Quick-temper and jealous attitudes; High illiteracy rate; Lack of real national independence and unity; Lack of military tradition; Fear of Soviet domination.	Sensitivity to ridicule or criticism; Resort to "face-saving" expedients
Attitude toward United States	Anti-U.S. Soviet citizens are sated with propaganda which claims that U.S. is instigating a war of aggression with Russia as the intended victim, and that the Soviet system is superior in all fields of endeavor. It is believed that Soviet citizens have little doubt as to the righteousness of their cause.	Friendly to U.S. Primarily nationalistic with general anti-foreign sentiment.	Anti-U.S.	Anti-U.S.	Friendly to U.S. out of fear of USSR, accompanied by general anti-foreign sentiment.	Oriented toward U.S. to point of offering men and material aid to U.S. efforts.
Attitude toward USSR		Anti-Communist.	Pro-USSR.	Completely dominated by USSR.	Fearful of USSR domination with general anti-foreign sentiment.	Anti-Soviet and anti-Communist.
Psychological Vulnerability	Psychological penetration will be difficult because of effective security controls, fear of reprisals, and thorough propaganda indoctrination.	The Chinese will tend to resist interference, advice, and propaganda from outside sources. Because of the vast area, tremendous population, and the extended shoreline, close surveillance of the population and strict censorship of all information media will be difficult to maintain. The U.S. and the USSR will have capabilities of effecting psychological penetration of China.		Despite their general anti-foreign sentiment, Koreans will be strongly influenced by the ideologies, action, and propaganda of the U.S. and USSR who have been instrumental in the establishment of the two distinct Koreans governments.		Japanese amenability to U.S. Occupation coupled with their historic distrust of the USSR will be advantageous to the U.S. Japanese will resist Soviet propaganda efforts.

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Summary to Accompany Psychological Factors

The Soviet psychological factor is a strong asset in the war potential of the USSR. This judgment is based on the following summary of the psychological characteristics (divided into strengths and weaknesses) of the Soviet people:

Strengths: Traditional native fortitude, tenacity, physical toughness and stamina. Effective centralized control of the people, employing police forces, propaganda, and political and economic duress. Innate patriotism combined with inculcated pride in the present regime. Amenability to imposed discipline. Indifference to loss of human life. Implated mistrust of foreigners. Ideological appeal of communism.

Weaknesses: Disillusionment and embitterment among the people resulting from ruthless oppression and exploitation. Destruction of independent thinking and initiative caused by fear of severe punishment. Disappointment at the postwar continuance of low living conditions. Native nationalism of certain ethnic groups. Low level of self-discipline. Generally low level of education.

The strengths noted above are actual and current advantages to the USSR, while the weaknesses, in most cases, are latent rather than actural. While the weaknesses will continue to be a burden on the Kremlin's political, economic, and administrative controls, they probably would not have an early and decisive effect on the outcome of a Soviet military regime.

The psychology of the Soviet fighting man merits closer examination. As in all national armies, the Soviet soldier is a reflection of the national psychology of the USSR. This psychology produces a soldier who is tenacious in defense and resolute in attack to the point of bullheadedness and suicide. The Russian soldier is hardened to privation, hardship, punishment, and even death itself. He submits to the harshest discipline in the world, and, as a result, Russian commanders can make incredible demands on their men. Psychologically, the Soviet soldier has been used to privation for so many centuries that his logistical needs are far less than those required by other armies. He is a simple man, a primeval man, and, for this reason, he is most adept at the more primitive forms of human conflicts - close combat, night fighting,

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and heavy forest fighting.

Anti-foreignism, the matter of "face" and traditional loyalty to family are important psychological characteristics of the Chinese. Although the average Chinese is docile, good humored, and patient, he is quickly move to heights of emotion by proper stimulus, as borne out by food riots, anti-foreign demonstrations, and student riots which are common occurrences in Chinese history. The Chinese may be expected to resist foreign psychological penetration during periods of hostility.

The Koreans are characterized by a highly nationalistic spirit and aggressiveness, combined with quick temper and individualism. Presently divided into pro-USSR and pro-U.S. camps, they would be greatly influenced by the ideologies, actions, and propaganda of these two nations in event of hostilities.

The Japanese, probably the most progressive and capable of all the oriental peoples, have a strong nationalistic spirit. Generally docile and amenable to discipline, they are greatly influenced by tradition and by public opinion or "face." The Japanese are highly pro-U.S. and evidence hatred for the USSR and contempt for the Chinese. As a result, during periods of hostilities they probably would be greatly influenced by U.S. psychological efforts but would be comparatively unresponsive to similar efforts on the part of the USSR or China.

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III

ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Capability No. 1: TO LAUNCH AN AIR ATTACK AGAINST UNITED STATES GROUND, NAVAL, AND AIR INSTALLATIONS AND UNITS IN JAPAN AND NEIGHBORING WATERS, MOUNTING A POTENTIAL TOTAL OF 6,000 BOMBER SORTIES AND 21,000 GROUND ATTACK AND FIGHTER SORTIES OVER A THIRTY DAY PERIOD. PRIMARY EFFORT WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD DESTRUCTION OF UNITED STATES AIR POWER IN THE FAR EAST.

Capability No. 2: TO ATTACK UNITED STATES SEA-COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVAL FORCES BY SUBMARINE AND MINING OPERATIONS, OR COMBINATIONS THEREOF.

Capability No. 3: TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE OPERATIONS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND OKINAWA AGAINST ALLIED AIR, NAVAL, AND GROUND INSTALLATIONS (PARTICULARLY RADAR SITES), AGAINST VITAL ROADS AND RAILROADS, AND AGAINST MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS; IN ADDITION, CARRY OUT ASSASSINATION PLOTS AGAINST KEY PERSONNEL.

Capability No. 4: TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK AGAINST SOUTH KOREA EMPLOYING A MINIMUM OF FOUR KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY DIVISIONS, AND TWO SOVIET DIVISIONS PLUS FIVE SOVIET AIR REGIMENTS (100 planes) IN CLOSE SUPPORT.

Capability No. 5: TO LAUNCH A SEABORNE-AIRBORNE ATTACK AGAINST HOKKAIDO EMPLOYING ONE SOVIET AIRBORNE BRIGADE, TWO SEABORNE SOVIET RIFLE DIVISIONS, AND 12 AIR REGIMENTS (500 planes) IN CLOSE SUPPORT.

Capability No. 6: TO LAUNCH SMALL-SCALE DIVERSIONARY AIRBORNE ATTACKS AGAINST UNITED STATES INSTALLATIONS ON THE KANTO AND KANSEI PLAINS.

Capability No. 7: TO CONDUCT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND POSSIBLY, ATOMIC WARFARE. CHEMICAL WARFARE ATTACKS WOULD BE CONDUCTED PRIMARILY BY USE OF AIRCRAFT, WHILE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ATTACKS WOULD BE CONDUCTED PRIMARILY BY SOVIET CLANDESTINE AGENCIES.

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IV

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Capability No. 1 - TO LAUNCH AN AIR ATTACK AGAINST UNITED STATES GROUND, NAVAL, AND AIR INSTALLATIONS AND UNITS IN JAPAN AND ON NEIGHBORING ISLANDS, MOUNTING A POTENTIAL TOTAL OF 6,000 BOMBER SORTIES AND 21,000 GROUND ATTACK AND FIGHTER SORTIES OVER A THIRTY DAY PERIOD. PRIMARY EFFORT TO BE DIRECTED TOWARD DESTRUCTION OF UNITED STATES AIR POWER IN THE FAR EAST.

The Soviets, with a total of 3,180 combat aircraft in the Far East, are actually capable of flying a total of 35,000 fighter sorties, 4,800 ground attack sorties, and 12,000 light bomber sorties during the initial thirty days of hostilities. It is estimated, however, that 190 of these 3,180 planes will be employed against Alaska. Furthermore, the remunerative targets in Japan could be attacked only by bombers of the Tu-2 and Il-4 types escorted by fighters of Yak-5, Yak-9u, and Yak-9td, La-9, and La-11 types from present Soviet-controlled bases in the Toyohara, Vladivostok, Hamhung, and Dairen areas. These factors decrease the number of Soviet sorties against Japan to 6,000 bomber and 21,000 fighter sorties for the initial thirty day period. The combat radius of operations of the bombers and fighters listed above are between 550 and 575 nautical miles (see Plate No. 12), and targets in the Tokyo-Yokohama and Nagoya areas are at the extreme range of the attacking aircraft.

Although a heavy aerial attack over an extended period would be difficult for the Soviets to support logistically, they are credited with an effective air effort, at least for the first thirty days. It is estimated that FEC installations would be attacked in the following priority and that bomber and fighter action would effect the level of destruction indicated in the initial 30 days of hostilities:

Aircraft (in the air and on the ground)	50%
Air Bases (including maintenance and operating facilities, and FEAF POL storage)	50%
POL Storage (including all US Army and Japanese-operated storage facilities)	70%
Radar Installations	50%
Ports and Naval Facilities	50%
Storage Areas and Depots	50%
Transportation Cut-points	50%

Our retaliatory attacks against the Soviet transportation net probably would sever operating airfields from rear bases of supply, but the Soviet air forces could continue their initial operations by subsisting on local stockpiles.

The Japanese Communist Party can contribute to the success of the initial Soviet attacks by sabotaging the United States radar and early warning system, an effective measure by which the Soviets might gain surprise. Japanese Communist saboteurs working with parachuted Soviet saboteurs could accomplish limited sabotage against airfields, equipment, communications, and transportation facilities in Japan.

The influence of the topographic factor is confined to the effect of the weather on the Soviet air capability against Japan (see Plate No. 13). The climate, due to persistent conditions of low

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visibility, is not favorable to high or low altitude visual bombing operations - an important factor since the Soviets are limited almost wholly to visual bombing due to deficiencies in training and equipment. Weather conditions are most favorable for air attacks along the east coast of Japan during the winter months, and along the west coast during the summer months. However, the difference between the two regions is not so marked in summer as in winter, and cloudiness over all areas is relatively high. Weather conditions are adverse on Hokkaido throughout the year. Significantly, Soviet weather predictions are facilitated during the winter by the prevailing northwest flow of air.

Okinawa is beyond the combat radius of aircraft now in the Soviet Far East operating from current Soviet bases. However, if airfields in Korea, the Shanghai area, the coastal area of southeast China, or on Formosa were made available to the Soviets, Okinawa would be within range of the tactical bombers now assigned to the Soviet air forces in the Far East. Although there are sufficient facilities to support a Soviet air effort in all of these areas, there is no indication that the Soviet air arm or any other Soviet service is utilizing facilities in South Korea, the Shanghai, or southeast China areas, or on Formosa.

The following factors would deter the Soviet Union from utilizing large air bases in southern China: (a) transportation of the bulk of the required supplies is dependent on a single, extremely vulnerable Chinese railroad (possibly not now operable); (b) logistic support of air garrisons by sea would strain the already overtaxed Soviet maritime service, and would render Soviet ships vulnerable to United States air and naval attacks; (c) as the Chinese Communists could not defend their installations against United States air attacks, the Soviets would be forced to expend some of their own forces, deploying them along more than a thousand miles of communications; and (d) the entry of large numbers of Russians into China could arouse the traditional Chinese xenophobia and lead to trouble for the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. China might be a greater asset to the USSR if she furnished only labor, raw materials, and some industrial products to the Soviet war machine, than if she entered the war actively. The Chinese Communists could not hope to contend with the United States in the air or on the sea, and the USSR, at least initially, has no need for China's huge land armies.

One feasible solution to the problem of striking Okinawa by air, and one of which the Soviets are capable, is the introduction of Pe-8 and B-29 type bombers into the theater, to operate against Okinawa from present Soviet bases.

Capability No. 2 - TO ATTACK UNITED STATES SEA-COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVAL FORCES BY SUBMARINE AND MINING OPERATIONS OR COMBINATIONS THEREOF.

Plate No. 14 shows the maximum radius of action for the four types of Soviet submarines in the Far East. However, it is believed that the submarines will not normally operate at these maximum distances, but rather as shown on Plate No. 14. The 2 "S" type submarines, which carry 12 torpedoes, would be stationed to attack shipping at critical points, or would be assigned to operate against naval forces. The 11 "L-2" type submarines, which carry 18 torpedoes and 20 mines, would be stationed to attack shipping, or assigned naval forces, or employed in mining operations to supplement the weaker naval air-mining forces, as desired. The 37 "Shchuka" type submarines with 10 torpedoes would be assigned to

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an outer perimeter as offshore coastal patrol submarines, and would not be effective against United States shipping lanes in rear areas. The 28 "M" type submarines with 2 torpedoes would patrol along the Soviet coasts mainly as a defense force. Should the Soviets elect to employ all types of submarines in mining operations, the carrying capacity would be two mines in lieu of each torpedo. The total numbers of submarines are not representative of actual operational strength. For extended operations, about one-third would be on station. Others would be in transit, or in refit.

The Naval Air Force has only harassing mining capabilities. (See Plate No. 15). The IL-4 and TU-2 bombers, by operating at extreme radius with minimum load, probably could drop mines in the Tokyo Bay area from present bases (but with little effect).

Soviet naval surface units are capable of defending mainland coastal areas, with the aid of the Soviet air arm, and could support Soviet Army movements over short distances during the initial phase of hostilities. They are not capable of challenging command of the sea against United States and British forces operating with aircraft carriers. Nor could they sustain themselves for long periods of operation at sea as "task forces." The surface defensive mining forces are capable of mining approaches to important ports and harbors, where hydrographic conditions permit, and would be able to keep these approaches clear of mines during the initial phase of hostilities.

Capability No. 3 - TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE OPERATIONS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND OKINAWA AGAINST ALLIED AIR, NAVAL, AND GROUND INSTALLATIONS (PARTICULARLY RADAR SITES), AGAINST VITAL ROADS, RAILROADS, PORT FACILITIES, AND AGAINST MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS. IN ADDITION, TO CARRY OUT ASSASSINATION PLOTS AGAINST KEY PERSONNEL.

Present subversive activities in Japan are directed toward maintenance of a state of confusion in the Japanese economy, embarrassment of the Japanese government, prevention of the democratization and stabilization of Japan, and maintenance of a limited espionage coverage of the United States military forces. These missions are carried out primarily by members and sympathizers of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and have involved strikes, labor demonstrations, riots, minor sabotage, and agitation in the legislature.

In the event of hostilities, the subversive activities would be greatly increased. Most of the subversive forces would be engaged in generating civil disorders, and in sabotage and espionage activities. Important missions undoubtedly would be executed by selected members of the JCP under the supervision of professional Soviet saboteurs and espionage agents. Such activities are an integral part of the Soviet war strategy. The saboteurs and agents would be directed to accomplish the following objectives: (a) to disrupt public utilities, particularly transportation and communications, in an effort to impede the movement and control of United States forces, and to create confusion, disorder, and lawlessness among the civil population; (b) to destroy critical military installations such as early warning and radar sites, anti-aircraft equipment, and military signal facilities, in order to reduce United States defensive capabilities and to facilitate Soviet attacks; (c) to introduce biological agents to weaken the United States combat potential and increase the difficulties of the Occupation; (d) to embarrass the existing government, and cause the economic and political collapse of Japan; (e) to assassinate selected civil and military leaders, and create a period of indecision and inaction by United States forces.

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Potentially, subversive forces in Japan are estimated to number 200/300,000 persons. These include some 90,000 Japanese ex-prisoners of war, who recently have been repatriated, after thorough indoctrination in Communist ideology by the Soviets. This potentially hostile group is constantly under close surveillance and strict regulation, but these are only precautionary measures. The subversive element in Japan undoubtedly will continue to employ harassing tactics, and will strive to increase the influence of the Communist Party, but it is not likely that such actions will precipitate an internal revolution or engender a serious international incident in the immediate future.

South Korean Communist forces have the same capabilities as those in Japan, and when operating at maximum efficiency, they can carry out such activities on an increased scale. This increased capacity is based on the anticipation of greater ease in obtaining the necessary arms, ammunition, and explosives, on a rugged terrain of the country, and on the fact that the government does not have adequate communications and transport facilities to cope with widespread disorders. However, the existence of a well-organized and loyal army under capable leadership is an effective deterrent to Communist terrorism.

Communist activities are limited in Okinawa largely because of intensive surveillance by the Okinawa Civil Police, and the absence of strong leadership among the dispersed Communist elements. But the economic distress of the people of the Ryukyus, the extensive smuggling activities and the presence of repatriated ex-prisoners of war (after Soviet indoctrination) constitute potential dangers. The Ryukyus, because of their strategic location and of the United States forces there, may become a target (possibly a vulnerable one) of great importance to the Communists.

Capability No. 4 - TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK AGAINST SOUTH KOREA EMPLOYING A MINIMUM OF FOUR KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY DIVISIONS AND TWO SOVIET DIVISIONS, PLUS FIVE AIR REGIMENTS (100 PLANES) IN CLOSE SUPPORT.

The primary object of a joint Soviet-North Korean attack would be to gain South Korea as a base for future Soviet action, and to deny South Korea to the United States as a base. A successful Korean campaign would also furnish grist to the Communist propaganda mill. This campaign can be conducted without straining the resources of the Soviet Union, and is the only ground offensive in the Far East which would not require extensive water lift. Economically, there is little reason for the Soviets to seize South Korea, for the raw materials and sparsely scattered industrial plants there are not worth the necessary expenditure of effort and resources.

It is believed that the four Korean People's Army divisions now available, plus two Soviet rifle divisions and five Soviet ground attack regiments would be ample for the subjugation of the South Korean Army. The 100 Soviet aircraft, if assigned to the Korean campaign, would be sufficient to accomplish the aerial mission of closely supporting the ground forces, and would not impose a heavy logistic burden. Advanced fields at Pyongyang, Haeju, and Wonsan have sufficient facilities for the operation of these Soviet aircraft.

Soviet-North Korean forces would undoubtedly move on Seoul and Pusan as their primary terrain objectives in South Korea. Seoul is the capitol and largest city of South Korea, the hub

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

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

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PLATE NO.12

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of the Korean transportation net, and the industrial, governmental, military, and telecommunication center. Kimpo airport, the most important airfield in Korea, is located close to Seoul. The adverse psychological effect of Seoul's loss might so weaken South Korean resistance, as to permit an uninterrupted march on Pusan and bring the campaign to an early conclusion.

Pusan, the next terrain objective, is the second largest city in South Korea. Its strategic importance lies in its proximity to Japan; its excellent port and rail facilities; and its airfield, which is capable of handling B-17 and troop-carrier aircraft.

The routes to these critical areas are shown on Plate No. 16. Both routes to Seoul follow major roads and railroads, and both are capable of sustaining the traffic required for this capability. Both routes have several natural obstacles which, if defended, would be difficult to reduce. Any attempt to depart from these routes would result in an arduous campaign of mountain warfare, and vehicular movements off the roads are virtually impossible.

The Seoul-Pusan route follows a well-defined road and railroad, and passes through extremely rugged terrain, which, if defended, could hold up an attacking force for weeks. In this event, the reduction of Pusan might require a waterborne or airborne operation, though Soviet committments elsewhere would make such operations improbable.

A consideration of strategic areas and routes of advance indicates that the Soviet-North Korean initial concentration areas are likely to be as shown on Plate No. 16.

The topography of Korea places a premium on infantry troops trained in mountain warfare. Mechanized, motorized, and heavy armored troops are at a disadvantage in the rugged, broken terrain of the uplands, and in the flooded rice paddies predominating in the lowlands during a large part of the year. The best seasons for the conduct of operations are late fall and winter. The cold is not intense and the rice paddies are dry, permitting maximum mobility. Visibility for air and ground operations is at optimum. Snow is found only in isolated spots, and there is no danger of disastrous flash-floods which threaten in spring and summer.

In view of widespread civil disorders in the 1946-49 period, the subversive and guerrilla elements which would operate against the South Koreans cannot be discounted. Communist collaborators could aid the invasion by instigating general uprisings, thus dissipating the defense forces of the South Korean Army and police. They could destroy transportation and communication facilities, assassinate officials, and possibly even seize critical terrain features, pending the arrival of the Communist forces. A valid appraisal of South Korea's capacity to resist invasion must give great weight to the "fifth column" operating within the country.

The political and psychological factors in South Korea represent further elements of weakness. The people express little patriotic devotion to the Government and are not likely to resist the invasion if it achieves rapid initial success. The Government of South Korea recently has shown several elements of instability, and might collapse when confronted with a crisis. President Rhee, because of age and a dictatorial tendency, is not likely to furnish the high order of leadership required by such an emergency.

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Slip Sheet
to Accompany
Plate No. 13

AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS FAVORABLE FOR
HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBING OPERATIONS

	TARGET	WINTER	SPRING	SUMMER	AUTUMN	TOTAL
			0600 LCT			
1.	Ashigawa	6	11	8	7	32
2.	Sapporo	15	16	11	19	61
3.	Hakodate	15	18	13	22	68
4.	Aomori	7	19	14	22	82
5.	Ishinomaki	36	25	10	25	96
6.	Niigata	7	17	19	18	61
7.	Tokyo	45	23	12	23	103
8.	Yokohama	42	24	15	24	105
9.	Nagoya	29	23	15	18	85
10.	Osaka	32	25	21	24	102
11.	Kyoto	19	21	15	17	72
12.	Kobe	23	23	15	20	81
13.	Miyazu	8	17	17	13	55
14.	Hiroshima	24	25	16	24	89
15.	Hamada	10	18	17	19	64
16.	Fukuoka	14	15	16	18	63
17.	Nagasaki	19	19	14	24	76
18.	Kagoshima	22	17	12	23	74
			1800 LCT			
1.	Ashigawa	11	13	12	9	45
2.	Sapporo	19	15	12	21	67
3.	Hakodate	16	19	16	25	76
4.	Aomori	11	22	19	26	78
5.	Ishinomaki	46	28	13	31	118
6.	Niigata	8	16	23	21	68
7.	Tokyo	44	25	14	27	110
8.	Yokohama	44	26	18	28	116
9.	Nagoya	30	21	14	24	89
10.	Osaka	29	22	15	25	91
11.	Kyoto	0	0	16	0	16
12.	Kobe	14	0	31	0	45
13.	Miyazu	10	14	13	17	54
14.	Hiroshima	21	22	17	22	82
15.	Hamada	10	19	12	19	60
16.	Fukuoka	12	15	11	18	56
17.	Nagasaki	14	17	12	20	63
18.	Kagoshima	21	17	11	21	70

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Slip Sheet
to Accompany
Plate No. 13

AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS FAVORABLE FOR
LOW ALTITUDE BOMBING OPERATIONS

TARGET	WINTER	SPRING	SUMMER	AUTUMN	TOTAL
		0600 LCT			
1. Ashigawa	8	12	7	10	37
2. Sapporo	17	15	8	20	60
3. Hakodate	18	20	10	22	70
4. Aomori	17	43	37	42	139
5. Ishinomaki	48	48	26	42	164
6. Niigata	17	44	47	37	145
7. Tokyo	60	44	36	43	183
8. Yokohama	57	44	42	44	187
9. Nagoya	44	52	41	36	173
10. Osaka	41	41	42	35	157
11. Kyoto	30	39	36	34	139
12. Kobe	36	50	38	41	165
13. Miyazu	13	35	37	31	116
14. Hiroshima	35	46	38	40	159
15. Hamada	24	48	47	40	159
16. Fukuoka	24	46	42	41	153
17. Nagasaki	39	49	42	48	178
18. Kagoshima	30	44	38	44	156
		1800 LCT			
1. Ashigawa	11	13	12	9	45
2. Sapporo	19	15	12	21	67
3. Hakodate	16	19	16	25	76
4. Aomori	23	48	45	46	162
5. Ishinomaki	58	56	39	46	199
6. Niigata	19	45	55	40	159
7. Tokyo	59	52	55	46	212
8. Yokohama	58	52	55	47	212
9. Nagoya	48	48	44	44	184
10. Osaka	37	40	35	38	150
11. Kyoto		Insufficient Observations			
12. Kobe		Insufficient Observations			
13. Miyazu	15	38	41	27	121
14. Hiroshima	33	48	41	39	161
15. Hamada	23	46	46	39	154
16. Fukuoka	28	46	39	41	154
17. Nagasaki	32	54	48	45	179
18. Kagoshima	37	50	40	44	171

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

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TARGET WEATHER CONDITIONS

PDM MAP NO. 123 18 OCT. 1949

PLATE NO. 13

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

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

PDM MAP NO. 46 11 MARCH 48

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

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

MAP AREA	GENERAL DESCRIPTION	TOPOGRAPHY AND GROUND	EXISTING ROADS	WATER SUPPLY
I	BARRIER AREA	GENERALLY POOR	GENERALLY POOR	GENERALLY GOOD
I-A	CORRIDOR	GENERALLY POOR	FAIR TO POOR	GENERALLY GOOD
II	S.E. AREAS OF MTS. AND BROAD VALLIES	FAIR TO POOR	FAIR TO POOR	GENERALLY GOOD
III	COASTAL AREAS OF EASY MOVEMENT	GENERALLY FAIR, GOOD IN LIMITED AREAS	FAIR TO POOR	GENERALLY GOOD

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SOUTH KOREA
TERRAIN, TRANSPORTATION, STRATEGIC AREAS AND ROUTES OF APPROACH

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PLATE NO. 16

PDM MAP NO. 47 26 MARCH 1948

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No calculation of the time required to complete the conquest of South Korea would be trustworthy. Seoul could probably be taken in from four to seven days. The time-table for the subjugation of the remainder of South Korea depends on the resistance of the remnants of the South Korean Army, on the Soviet requirement for speed, on the season of the year in which the operation is undertaken, and on many other factors.

It is probable, even if the South Korean campaign were concluded speedily, that guerrilla warfare would necessitate the use of large Soviet Occupation forces. The Korean's traditionally vigorous resentment of governmental control would certainly be aggravated under a harsh Communist regime, and the wild, rugged terrain is well suited to guerrilla warfare.

Capability No. 5 - TO LAUNCH A SEABORNE-AIRBORNE ATTACK AGAINST HOKKAIDO, EMPLOYING ONE SOVIET AIRBORNE BRIGADE, TWO SOVIET SEABORNE RIFLE DIVISIONS AND 12 AIR REGIMENTS (500 AIRCRAFT) IN CLOSE SUPPORT.

The seizure of Hokkaido would allow the Soviets to extend their aircraft and submarine radius of operations, would deny the use of air and naval bases in Hokkaido to the United States; would effect a profound and adverse psychological reaction upon the Japanese people; and would force the Commander-in-Chief Far East to accept the loss of Hokkaido, or to attempt a costly counter-invasion.

Certain indications point to excessive Soviet interest in this area. Soviet espionage activity, as determined by the apprehension of Soviet agents, is concentrating on Hokkaido and Northern Honshu. Soviet agents have been dispatched to Sapporo, Otaru, Hakodate, Kushiro, Wakkanai, and Asahigawa in Hokkaido, and to Misawa, Sendai, and Aomori in Honshu. The general mission of these agents is to gather data on United States Order of Battle, on port and rail facilities, on the Japanese police, and on the reorganization of the Japanese Army.

The Soviets have adequate ground, air, and naval forces to implement this capability. An assault force built around two new-type rifle divisions closely supported by 500 aircraft seems ample to overcome the present United States garrison on Hokkaido, and is within the logistic and support capabilities of the Soviet Union in the Far East.

The Soviets must gain and maintain air superiority over Hokkaido, at least during the assault phase, in order to carry out a successful invasion of Hokkaido. The attainment and maintenance of air superiority has been detailed in the discussion of capability number 1.

The third essential for a successful campaign is adequate water-lift for the assault force of two divisions plus supporting troops, and for the eventual occupation force. The Soviets can meet this requirement.

If the Soviets elect to launch an over-water offensive from bases on the mainland, they could utilize vessels of the merchant fleet to supplement naval craft, and thus provide sufficent cargo and transport vessels to meet their assault and logistic needs. However, the concentration of equipment and supplies in ports would be necessary prior to such an operation. Liberty ships now on lend-lease from the United States would provide the

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best vessels for transporting the attacking forces. By committing one-third of the Liberties in the Far East (about 10 per cent of the total tonnage of the Soviet Far East merchant fleet), the logistic requirements for this water-lift could be met.

If the Soviets launch an amphibious assault on the beaches and ports of Hokkaido, with water-lift provided by small craft staged from Sakhalin, they could provide sufficient numbers of such craft for the transport of the troops with light equipment. The characteristics of small craft, however, would pose numerous problems in the transport of personnel and equipment, since they are predominantly fishing vessels and harbor craft and are unsuitable for use in unprotected waters.* For this reason, the Soviets would be forced to utilize merchant vessels for the transport of the heavy equipment required for a successful seaborne operation and subsequent land action.

The following water-lift units and capacities could be assigned for the operation:

Vessel Type	No.	Gross Tonnage	Initial Lift
Liberty	12	86,000 Tons	49,000 Tons
APD (ex-Jap DD & DE)	(Undetermined)	---	(small amount)
LCI (L)	20	---	1,500 Tons
LCT (6)	11	---	(small amount)
Tanker	1	7,745 Tons	(65,000 bbls.)
Small Craft	(Numerous)		
	Minimum total tonnage in initial lift:		50,500 Tons

The water-lift requirements of two new-type rifle-divisions would be about 100,000 tons for the 50,000 troops for the first 30 days. Assuming one ton per man on wheels and maximum turn-around time for the Liberty ships of 15 days from Vladivostok,** and 7 days from Sakhalin for the landing craft, APD's (small fast transports), and various types of small craft, 35 to 40 per cent of the weight requirements of the ground forces, for the first 30 days, could be put ashore in the first 15 days of the operation.

---

* The Soviet Union has contracted with Japanese shipbuilders for the delivery of 175 non-self-propelled wooden barges (already delivered) and 220 wooden tugs (nearly all delivered). The tugs have a maximum speed of approximately 8 knots, and can average 4 or 5 knots with light loads over calm water. The numbers of other, and possibly more suitable, small craft available to the Soviets in the Far East, are not known. Utilizing a fleet of small craft, the Soviets could seize small, undefended ports and harbors in Hokkaido, employing the method which they favored in World War II. The small craft contracted from Japan are:

Tugs	Horsepower	Barges	Capacity
200	50	75	50 Tons
20	115	75	25
		25	100
220		175	

** Major supply points for such an operation, regardless of the point of origin, undoubtedly will be on the mainland. Such an arrangement would not only eliminate added shipping requirements and activities for the establishment of land bases, but would also allow the most efficient use of existing stockpiles.

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

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

HOKKAIDO

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AVENUES OF APPROACH TO STRATEGIC AREAS AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

SCALE
0 10 20 30 40 50
MILES

ACIFIC
CEAN

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PLATE NO. 17

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PLATE NO. 17

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This includes enough of the weight requirements of the air forces to sustain the fighter regiments to be based on Hokkaido. The Liberty ships initially could be combat-loaded at the rate of 4,000 tons, and organizational-loaded thereafter with 6,000 to 8,000 tons per ship. The landing craft and APD's could be used for the transport of provisions, lightweight supplies, and troops. A tanker could be employed to furnish fuel for naval support craft, patrol craft, and small craft, especially those with diesel engines.

From a consideration of the characteristics of the Soviet vessels, it is obvious that the Soviets must capture sufficient ports in the area of operations to support their invasion. Soviet naval strength in the Far East does not include enough auxiliary attack cargo and attack transport vessels or assault landing craft to support a major amphibious operation; this is true regardless of whether such an operation be launched with small craft from Sakhalin or with merchant shipping from bases on the mainland. The use of merchant vessels in amphibious attack to supplement naval vessel strength would require that they be fitted for the handling of heavy assault boats laoded with heavy equipment. This modification of the merchant vessels would temporarily inactivate critical commercial shipping,and would be a clear indication of intended Soviet action in the Far East, and, for these reasons, would probably not be accomplished. Without such special arrangments, only light infantry units could be moved over a beach, and a port of sufficient capacity to handle heavy combat elements in assault would be necessary.

Ports which could be used in an invasion of Hokkaido (see Plate No. 17) are Otaru, Hakodate, Kushiro, Rumoe, Muroran, Tomakomai, and Wakkanai. However, Otaru is the most logical port for use in a fast-moving, airborne-seaborne operation of major proportions. It is easy to approach from Vladivostok and Sakhalin Island, and its proximity to the vital Ishikari Plain would permit clearance of equipment and supplies to the airfields and bivouac areas, and to the key city of Sapporo. Port facilities at Otaru are adequate for the requirements of the indicated invasion forces.

All the other ports listed above possess the disadvantage of location, and none has the port capacity needed for a major invasion. Wakkanai, Rumoe, Kushiro, and Hakodate are not in close proximity to the strategically important area of the Ishikari Plain and are separated from it by mountainous, easily defensible terrain. However, Wakkanai and Rumoe do offer the necessary harbor facilities, and the advantage of location to support an invasion by small craft staged on Sakhalin Island. Further, since Hakodate, Muroran, Tomakomai, and Kushiro are on the southern coast, an attempt to seize one or more of these ports would jeopardize the possibility of surprise, and would place the invading forces within easy striking range of the United States naval and air forces. It is not probable that invading forces would be staged from the Kuriles, because of limited base facilities and the necessarily greater logistic problems. Minor landings of a diversionary or deceptive nature may be made at any of the ports listed, but the port with the most favorable conditions for use by the Soviet main effort is Otaru.

The cargo-handling capacity of Otaru, where the Liberty ships would unload, is normally 6,000 tons of dry cargo for a 10-hour day. By operating three 8-hour shifts, the capacity could be increased to 12,000 tons per day; that would be more than sufficient to meet the requirements previously discussed. Stevedores could

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be procured locally, or could be brought in with the invasion forces. Blockage of the Otaru harbor by air attacks might affect the deployment of the lift-vessels as well as the number employed.

The port of Otaru would allow the Soviets to carry out an unloading schedule as follows: By H-hour + 24, 5,000 tons could be put ashore from landing craft, APD's and Liberty ships, 6,000 tons could be landed the second day, and by D + 6, the entire initial lift could be landed. The following schedule could be maintained:

Time	Ground Force Tonnage	Air Force Tonnage	Total Tonnage	Total Unloaded
D-day	4,000	1,000	5,000	5,000
D+1 to D+3	18,000	3,000	21,000	26,000
D+4 to D+6	14,500	10,000	24,500	50,500
INITIAL LIFT	36,500	14,000	50,500	50,500
D+ 7 to D+10	1,000	5,000	6,000	56,500
D+11 to D+15	1,000	5,000	6,000	62,500
D+16 to D+25	58,000	32,000	90,000	152,500
D+26 to D+30	6,000	--	6,000	158,500
1st 30 DAYS	102,500	56,000	158,500	158,500
D+31 to D+40	9,000	29,000	38,000	196,500
D+41 to D+55	9,000	30,000	39,000	235,500
D+56 to D+70	9,000	20,000	29,000	264,500
D+71 to D+90	8,000	12,000	20,000	284,500
1st 90 DAYS	137,500	147,000	284,500	284,500

Number of Liberty ships required:

Until D+30	12
D+31 to D+60	7
D+61 to D+75	5
D+76 to D+90	4
After D+90	3

With this shipping, a permanent garrison of Soviet forces could be maintained on Hokkaido to include one rifle division plus 3 anti-aircraft regiments, necessary ground service troops, 6 fighter aircraft regiments, 6 light bomber regiments, air force service personnel, and such naval forces as could be based in mobile units, possibly with tenders for the support of submarines.

If the Soviet main effort were made at or near Otaru, then some airborne elements would probably be necessary. The mission of such an airborne element would be to prevent the movement of United States ground forces from Camp Crawford to Otaru, and to prevent interference with the unloading operations of the Soviet assault forces. One airborne brigade would suffice.

The advantage of surprise to be gained by use of airborne forces is also significant. Sufficient airborne troops are available in the Soviet Far East, and it is believed that sufficient transport aircraft (about 300) could be assigned to this theater to lift the airborne brigade.

It would appear desirable for the Soviets to strike directly at Otaru and the United States forces in the Ishikari Plain in order to destroy the United States garrison, or expel it as soon as possible. The alternative - to land at a point distant from the strategic areas of Hokkaido, and fight a long, mountain campaign to Sapporo - would in the end be the more dangerous course of action.

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Any significant delay in the operations would permit the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, to reinforce the Hokkaido garrison, and would permit substantial reinforcement of United States naval strength by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, while the Soviet campaign was in a critical state. Moreover, a substantial delay would allow the United States air forces time to recover from the possibly stunning blow which probably would initiate hostilities. Further, a long, stoutly-contested ground campaign would require the support of increased Soviet water-lift over a long period. This factor strikes the Soviets vitally through the debilitating effect of diverting a large portion of already deficient merchant shipping to the assault.

There is always weather, hydrography, and topography to be considered. The necessity for favorable weather and terrain conditions makes it doubtful whether the Soviets would attempt an airborne-seaborne lodgment on Hokkaido between 15 November and 15 March or 1 April. Climatological conditions in Hokkaido during this period are extremely unfavorable. Air operations would be imparied for many days during the winter months by low visibility and icing conditions. Parachute and airborne operations would be jeopardized by high winds, snow, and poor visibility, which render low-altitude drop operations near mountainous areas extremely hazardous. Amphibious operations would be hindered by high winds and surf. Unloading operations in Otaru, or any other port would be unfavorably affected by high winds, sea-icing, and short hours of daylight. The impairment of unloading operations is the most dangerous of all these factors.

Surprise, as to the sites and times of assault by the airborne and seaborne forces, is essential. Each of these forces would be extremely vulnerable during the first phase of landing operations. If the airborne force were destroyed, the seaborne elements, as they attempted an unprotected-almost an administrative-landing, would be at the mercy of United States ground forces.

Surprise could be gained if the airborne elements approached the drop and landing zones just before dawn. The seaborne elements could approach under conditions of low visibility. Saboteurs, landed in Hokkaido by submarine, could render isolated United States radar and early warning systems inoperative; also, they might effectuate limited sabotage of transport, communications, and power facilities, perhaps seizing some of the key points, particularly between Otaru and Sapporo.

Summarizing the conditions, which appear essential for a successful Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, it must be concluded that the Soviets have sufficient forces currently available; they can establish and maintain air superiority over the area of operations; they can provide adequate water-lift for supply of the assault and occupation forces necessary for the operation; they can choose the time of attack in order to best utilize favorable terrain and weather conditions, and to gain necessary surprise. The only conditions which militate strongly against this Soviet capability are the requirements for bringing their forces ashore expeditiously in the face of possible United States ground forces, and for expelling United States Forces from Hokkaido with a minimum of delay. Both conditions hinge on the successful seizure of a port in or near the area of operations - a feasible operation, unless preliminary precautions are taken by United States forces to secure ports of entry which are so vital to invasion forces.

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Capability No. 6 - TO LAUNCH SMALL-SCALE DIVERSIONARY AIRBORNE ATTACKS AGAINST UNITED STATES INSTALLATIONS ON THE KANTO AND KANSEI PLAINS.

Though the possibility appears remote, the Soviets could initiate small airborne diversionary attacks against key installations on Honshu. These might be undertaken as a cover and a deceptive measure to create confusion as to Soviet strength and intentions, so as to forestall the prompt dispatch of United States reinforcements to Hokkaido, or some other threatened point. Such attacks would also assist indigenous saboteurs, and would effect some destruction of installations, particularly airfields.

Soviet air transports now in the Far East have sufficient range to drop paratroopers anywhere in Honshu, and at least two divisions of Soviet paratroopers are stationed in the Far East. Although the losses of aircraft and personnel would be high, some of the paratroopers might eventually be smuggled out by the Japanese Communist underground. It must be re-emphasized, that, although this action is within the physical capabilities of the Soviets, it is relatively unlikely in view of current distribution of our own forces.

The possibility of a large-scale amphibious-airborne offensive directed initially against Honshu was explored. It is believed that the present water-lift and air-lift capabilities available to the Soviets in the Far East would be logistically inadequate to support a joint force of sufficient size to conquer American forces now on Honshu.

The feasibility of effecting an amphibious-airborne landing on Okinawa was analyzed and discarded for the present due to the lack of port facilities in Okinawa, the lack of amphibious craft in Soviet hands, the overwhelming waterborne logistics requirements, and the fact that such an amphibious force would have to overcome elements of the United States Navy in a contest fought far from Soviet bases and at extreme range of presently based Russian air support. If the Soviets move large forces into the Shanghai area, then the invasion of Okinawa as now defended becomes a capability and will have to be reviewed.

Capability No. 7 - TO CONDUCT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND POSSIBLY, ATOMIC WARFARE. CHEMICAL WARFARE ATTACKS WOULD BE CONDUCTED PRIMARILY BY USE OF AIRCRAFT, WHILE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ATTACKS WOULD BE RELATIVELY SIMPLE FOR SOVIET CLANDESTINE AGENCIES.

The exact atomic capabilities of the USSR at this time are indeterminable, however, it must be conceded that she has some atomic capabilities, and the planes required to implement them. It is logical to assume then that any portion of the Far East Command within a radius of 1800 miles from present Soviet bases near Vladivostok could be attacked by atomic bombardment if the Soviets elected to do so.

The USSR is capable of launching a chemical warfare offensive. The Soviets have chemical munitions on hand, and have chemical warfare units in their forces. In addition, the raw materials and plants to produce chemical agents are available, and the Soviet Army and populace have both offensive and defensive equipment and have received chemical defensive training.

The possibility of Soviet initiation of gas warfare is given some credence by the extensive anti-gas potential she now maintains.

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The fear of reprisal attacks which will follow the initiation of chemical warfare by the USSR may be one reason for this broad program of chemical defense. The leaders of the Soviet Union would be deterred from using chemicals only by the thought of retaliation - particularly, retaliation by the United States with its long-range bomber superiority. If the Politburo becomes convinced, however, that the results accruing to the USSR from the use of gas warfare will justify the cost, then neither morality, nor the thought of the retaliatory death of thousands of their countrymen will prevent their recourse to chemical weapons.

It is emphasized that the Soviet Union is physically capable of launching an atomic, chemical, and biological warfare campaign. Whether they will choose to do so will be a choice made at the highest level. For this reason, it is impossible to assign any relative probability to this capability.

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ANNEX 1 – GROUND FORCES

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V

RELATIVE PROBABILITY OF ADOPTION

From the foregoing discussion of the courses of action open to the Soviets and her Far East Satellites, the relative probability of adoption is believed to be:

First:

Capability No. 1 - TO LAUNCH AN AIR ATTACK AGAINST UNITED STATES GROUND, NAVAL, AND AIR INSTALLATIONS AND UNITS IN JAPAN AND NEIGHBORING WATERS, MOUNTING A TOTAL OF 6,000 BOMBER SORTIES AND 21,000 GROUND-ATTACK AND FIGHTER SORTIES OVER A 30-DAY PERIOD (PRIMARY EFFORT WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD DESTRUCTION OF UNITED STATES AIR POWER IN THE FAR EAST) - concurrently with

Capability No. 2 - TO ATTACK UNITED STATES SEA-COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVAL FORCES BY SUBMARINE AND MINING OPERATIONS - concurrently with

Capability No. 3 - TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE OPERATIONS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND OKINAWA AGAINST ALLIED AIR, NAVAL, AND GROUND INSTALLATIONS (PARTICULARLY RADAR SITES), AGAINST VITAL ROADS AND RAILROADS, AND AGAINST MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TELE-COMMUNICATIONS: IN ADDITION, CARRY OUT ASSASSINATION PLOTS AGAINST KEY PERSONNEL - concurrently with

Capability No. 4 - TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK AGAINST SOUTH KOREA EMPLOYING A MINIMUM OF 4 KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY DIVISIONS AND 2 SOVIET DIVISIONS PLUS 5 SOVIET AIR REGIMENTS IN CLOSE SUPPORT.

Second:

Capability No. 5 - TO LAUNCH A SEABORNE-AIRBORNE ATTACK AGAINST HOKKAIDO EMPLOYING ONE SOVIET AIRBORNE BRIGADE, 2 SEABORNE SOVIET RIFLE DIVISIONS AND 12 AIR REGIMENTS IN CLOSE SUPPORT - concurrently with Capabilities 1 to 4 inclusive -

Third:

Capability No. 6 - TO LAUNCH SMALL-SCALE DIVERSIONARY AIRBORNE ATTACKS AGAINST UNITED STATES INSTALLATIONS ON THE KANTO AND KANSEI PLAINS - concurrently with Capabilities 1 to 5 above.

No relative probability can be assigned at this time for the adoption of Capability No. 7 - TO CONDUCT ATOMIC, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE.

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FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Plans and Estimates Branch

Annex 1
to
Intelligence Estimate Far East

GROUND FORCES

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Plans and Estimates Branch

15 November 1949

Annex 1
to
Intelligence Estimate Far East

GROUND FORCES

A. GENERAL:

1. Enemy Forces:

For the purpose of this estimate, enemy forces are considered to be all organized forces, covert or overt, who are controlled by and work for the USSR. Although it is recognized that forces may exist in nations who are not allied with the United States, such forces are at this time considered inconsequential unless allied with or likely to be allied with the Soviet Union. As these forces are primarily Soviet, reinforced by various satellite nations, and receive instructions from the Kremlin, a discussion on top control only as it affects the Soviet Armed Forces is deemed sufficient for complete understanding of the enemy forces.

2. Structure of the Armed Forces:

a. Composition:

The Soviet Armed Forces consist of military and semi-military troops: the military troops make up the Ground Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, and Rear Services; the semi-military troops include the militarized personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

b. Top Control: (See Plate No. 1-A)

Although Generalissimo Stalin resigned as Minister of Armed Forces on 3 March 1947, he clearly retains de facto command of the Armed Forces and is de jure Supreme Commander. He has little to do, however, with the administration of the Armed Forces and at the present time has minimized his command responsibilities by placing major operational control of the Armed Forces under two important executive departments of the Soviet Government, the Ministry of Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The Ministry of Armed Forces (Plate No. 2-A) contains an Armed Forces General Staff for over-all military coordination between services and separate staffs responsible for the administration of each of the major components of the military troops. Although these separate staffs are each headed by an Assistant Minister of Armed Forces and even to include military personailities who are designated as "Commanders-in-Chief", the command of the Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Naval Forces is still the sole responsibility of the Minister of Armed Forces with command responsibility stemming direct from the Minister to the commanders-in-the-field of the various Army Groups, military districts, and fleets. This Ministry of Armed Forces also contains a number of offices, or Main Administrations, which are responsible for the development of various as-

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

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TOP CONTROL
SOVIET ARMED FORCES

PLATE NO. I-A

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ORGANIZATION OF MINISTRY OF ARMED FORCES



PLATE NO.2-A

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pects of military policy throughout the components of the Armed Forces and can be compared generally to our Department of the Army special staff offices such as Signal, Judge Advocate, Adjutant General, Chemical, etc.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (Plate No. 3-A) is the controlling agency for the semi-military MVD (security) forces and exercises this function through four offices known as administrations. These administrations are designed to control each of the four main categories of semi-military MVD troops and are classified as the Border Troop Administration, Security Troop Administration, Interior Troop Administration, and Signal Troop Administration. Here again these separate offices are charged with operational functions while responsibility therefor rests solely with the Minister of Internal Affairs. Command responsibility stems from the Minister through the chiefs of the appropriate administrations to the units and regional MVD commanders.

B. USSR:

1. Organization:

a. Strategic Units:

Strategic grouping within the Soviet ground forces is by military district within the USSR and by army group in occupied areas.

(1) Military Districts: (See Plate No. 4-A)

Within the Soviet Union the ground forces are organized into 21 military districts, which may be compared generally to our continental army areas, and all ground forces within the military district fall under the command of the district commander. (Naval, Air, Airborne and MVD units within the District have varying degrees of tactical subordination to this commander regardless of their composition.) Command responsibility is delegated to the district commanders directly from the Minister of Armed Forces and in turn they are held accountable for two main functions: operational functions to include the employment of troops within the district to combat local insurrections; and designated mobilization and training functions. This latter function includes:

(a) Military training of headquarters, units and personnel within the district.

(b) Political indoctrination of personnel.

(c) Study of the possible enemy.

(d) Requisition or procurement and storage of current requirements of supplies and mobilization stocks.

(e) Preparation of mobilization plan and, in the case of border districts, operations plans, in accordance with directives of the Ministry of Armed Forces.

(f) Supervision of pre-military training.

(g) Supervision and support of defense preparation of civilian agencies.

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SECRET PLATE NO. 4-A

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ORGANIZATION OF MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS



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ORGANIZATION OF MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PLATE NO. 3-A

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(2) Army Groups: (See Plate No. 5-A)

Soviet troops serving in occupied areas are organized in the same tactical manner as are those troops serving within her borders; however, the army group, which commands elements of all three services, is the controlling headquarters and serves substantially the same purpose as the military district. Available information reveals that such groups would normally be an ad hoc grouping of three to five rifle armies, one or more mechanized armies, one or two air armies, and supporting arms and services. Areas of responsibility are determined wholly by terrain and logistical considerations.

b. Tactical Units:

Within the military districts and the army groups, the ground forces are organized into armies, corps, and divisions and are capable of operating either individually or as a part of a larger task force. Discussion of the major components of the ground force follows.

(1) Armies: (See Plate No. 6-A)

At the present time the reorganization of the Soviet armies is still in process, but available information indicates two types of future armies: the rifle army and the mechanized army. The rifle army may consist of two to five rifle corps and army artillery, while the mechanized army may contain possibly two tank and two mechanized divisions. Wartime rifle armies normally included three to four rifle corps, artillery, and service units.

(2) Corps: (See Plate No. 6-A)

Rifle corps presently being developed are composed of one mechanized and two rifle divisions with supporting artillery, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, engineer, and signal units. Some evidence has been found to indicate presence of airborne corps, but exact composition and structure is not known.

(3) Divisions: (See Plate Nos. 7-A and 8-A)

The division in the Soviet ground forces, as in our own forces, is the basic combat unit and may be divided; used singlely; or added to as required to perform any given mission. Presently available information lists the types of Soviet ground divisions as follows: tank, artillery, mechanized, rifle (old and new types), anti-aircraft and cavalry. In addition to the above units, there is some justification that an airborne division may be in existence, however, its exact composition and strength are unknown.

(4) Airborne Units: (See Plate No. 9-A)

The Soviet airborne force is controlled separately by use of a special airborne headquarters subordinated directly to the Ministry of Armed Forces and is charged with performance of all staff and administrative functions as pertains to airborne operations. It also makes the necessary assignment of airborne units for the performance of both tactical and strategic roles. Airborne units may be allotted direct to commanders of army groups and/or military districts or may be used directly under a commander of airborne troops for a specific mission. Tactically, airborne troops

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RIFLE ARMY

UNIT	O & EM	82mm MORTAR	120mm MORTAR	160mm MORTAR	37mm AAGUN	76mm GUNS	122mm HOW	AT GUNS	SP GUNS	TANKS
RIFLE CORPS *	34,850	244	90	24	58	84	96	24-85mm 104-57mm	36-76mm 32-100mm 42-152mm	242-MED 23-HVY
RIFLE DIV	11,000	81	18	12	18	24	36	12-85mm 36-57mm	18-76mm 16-100mm	52-MED
MECZ DIV	12,850	82	54		22	36	24	32-57mm	42-152mm	138-MED 23-HVY

* DOES NOT INCLUDE CORPS TROOPS

MECHANIZED ARMY

UNIT	O & EM	82mm MORTAR	120mm MORTAR	37mm AA GUN	57mm AT GUN	76mm GUN	122mm HOW	152mm GUN-HOW(SP)	MED TANK	HEAVY TANK
MECZ DIV	12,850	82	54	22	32	36	24	42	138	23
TANK DIV	10,300	52	42	22	28	12	12	21	205	44

TANK DIVISION

UNIT	O & EM	82mm MORTAR	120mm MORTAR	37mm AA GUN	57mm AT GUN	76mm GUN	122mm HOW	152mm GUN-HOW(SP)	MEDIUM TANK	HEAVY TANK
MED TK REGT	1,220	6			4				65	
HVY TK-SP GUN REGT	1,300			6				21		44
MTZ RIFLE REGT	1,736	30	6		12	12				
HOW BN	350						12			
MORT REGT	508		36							
AAA REGT	316			16						
RL BN	204									
RCN BN	500	4			4				10	

ARTILLERY DIVISION *

UNIT	O & EM	120mm MORTAR	76mm GUN	122mm HOW	152mm HOW	152mm GUN/HOW	REMARKS
MORT BRIG	1,700	108					1 TO A DIV
LT ARTY BRIG	2,000		72				1 TO A DIV
LT HOW BRIG	2,250			48	24		1 TO A DIV
MED GUN BRIG	2,100					24	1 TO A DIV

* TYPICAL DIV, MAY VARY AS TO NUMBER, TYPE, AND CALIBER OF COMPONENT UNITS

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AT GUNS	SP GUNS	TANKS	132mm RL	REMARKS
24-85mm 104-57mm	36-76mm 32-100mm 42-152mm	242-MED 23-HVY	12	2-5 TO AN ARMY
12-85mm 36-57mm	18-76mm 16-100mm	52-MED		2 TO A CORPS
32-57mm	42-152mm	138-MED 23-HVY	12	1 TO A CORPS

152mm GUN-HOW(SP)	MED TANK	HEAVY TANK	132mm RL	REMARKS
42	138	23	12	2 TO AN ARMY
21	205	44	12	2 TO AN ARMY

152mm GUN-HOW(SP)	MEDIUM TANK	HEAVY TANK	132mm RL	REMARKS
	65			3 TO A DIV
21		44		1 TO A DIV
				1 TO A DIV
				1 TO A DIV
				1 TO A DIV
				1 TO A DIV
			12	1 TO A DIV
	10			1 TO A DIV

MARKS
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ORGANIZATION AND PRINCIPLE WEAPONS OF SOVIET UNITS

PLATE NO. 6-A

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PLATE NO. 6A

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MECHANIZED DIVISION

UNIT	O & EM	82mm MORTAR	120mm MORTAR	37 mm AA GUN	57mm AT GUN	76mm GUN	122 mm HOW	152 mm GUN-HOW(SP)	MED TANK	HEAVY TANK
MECZ REGT	2,134	24	6		8	12			21	
M TK REGT	1,220	6			4				65	
HVY TK-SP GUN REGT	1,300			6				42		23
HOW REGT	670						24			
MORT REGT	508		36							
AAA REGT	316			16						
RCN BN	500	4							10	
RL BN	208									

NEW TYPE RIFLE DIVISION

UNIT	O & EM	82mm MORTAR	120mm MORTAR	160mm MORTAR	37 mm AA GUN	76mm GUN	122mm HOW	AT GUNS	SP GUNS	MED TANK
RIFLE REGT	2,100	27	6					12-57mm	6-76mm	
TK-SP GUN REGT	650								16-100mm	52
ARTY BRIG	1,900			12		24	36			
AAA BN	250				18					
AT BN	220							12-85mm		

OLD TYPE RIFLE DIVISION

UNIT	O & EM	7.62mm SAR, R, CBN	7.62mm SMG	7.62mm HV MG	7.62mm LMG	12.7 mm AA MG	14.5mm AT R	50 mm MORTAR	82 mm MORTAR	120 mm MORTAR
HQ & HQ CO	117	110	6		1					
RCN TROOP	74		68		6					
SIG CO	130	90	40							
ENG BN	164	149	15							
CWS CO	40	25	15							
DIV ARTY REGT	998	738	206		18		36			
AT BN, MTZ	233	172	43		6		18			
AA MG CO, MTZ	97	67	30			18				
REPL CO	100	75	25		5		2	2	2	
MED BN	90	90								
VET HOSP	11	11								
BKRY	63	63								
TRANS CO	80	80								
3 R REGTS	7422	3756	1950	486	135		162	54	81	21
TOTAL	9619	5426	2398	486	171	18	218	56	83	21

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m V	152 mm GUN-HOW(SP)	MED TANK	HEAVY TANK	132 mm RL	REMARKS
		21			3 TO A DIV
		65			1 TO A DIV
	42		23		1 TO A DIV
					1 TO A DIV
					1 TO A DIV
					1 TO A DIV
		10			1 TO A DIV
				12	1 TO A DIV

m V	AT GUNS	SP GUNS	MED TANK	REMARKS
	12-57 mm	6-76 mm		3 TO A DIV
		16-100mm	52	1 TO A DIV
				1 TO A DIV
				1 TO A DIV
	12-85mm			1 TO A DIV

m R	50 mm MORTAR	82 mm MORTAR	120 mm MORTAR	45 mm AT GUN	76 mm HOW	76mm GUN	122 mm HOW
						24	12
				12			
	2	2		2			
	54	81	21	36	12		
	56	83	21	50	12	24	12

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ORGANIZATION
AND
PRINCIPLE WEAPONS
OF SOVIET DIVISIONS

PLATE NO. 7-A

REPRO BY THE 64TH ENGR BASE TOPO BN

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

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TYPICAL SOVIET ARMY GROUP

PLATE NO. 5-A

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CAVALRY DIVISION

UNIT	O & EM	7.62MM SAR, R, CBN	7.62 MM SMG	7.62MM LMG	12.7 MM AA MG	7.62MM HV MG	14.5MM A.T.R.	82 MM MORTAR	120MM MORTAR	37 MM AA GUN
DIV HQ	120	105	12	3						
RCN SQD	110		110	9						
SIG HALE SQD	53	48	5							
ENG SQD	70	58	12	6						
AAAW BTRY MTZ	80	68	12	6						6
MORT-ARTY REGT (H DRAWN)	450	400	50	12			16		12	
SERVICES—										
CWS SQD	64	55	6	3						
AM COLM	143	125	14	4						
SUP COLM	48	48								
MED COLM	50	50								
VET HOSP	25	25								
3 CAV REGTS	3432	1959	1395	129	9	48	96	36		
TOTAL	4645	2941	1616	172	9	48	112	36	12	6

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY DIVISION

UNIT	O & EM	12.7mm AA MG	37 mm AA GUN	85 mm AA GUN	REMARKS
AAA REGT (LT)	500	16	24		2-3 TO A DIV
AAA REGT (HV)	620	16		16	1-2 TO A DIV

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.5MM A.T.R.	82 MM MORTAR	120 MM MORTAR	37 MM AA GUN	45 MM AT GUN	76 MM GUN+HOW
			6		
16		12			12
96	36			12	12
112	36	12	6	12	24

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ORGANIZATION
AND
PRINCIPLE WEAPONS
OF SOVIET DIVISIONS

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

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS	
76 mm INF HOWS	8
45 mm AT GUNS	16
37 mm AAA GUNS	4
120 mm MORTARS	4
82 mm MORTARS	24
50 mm MORTARS	36
12.7 mm AAA MG	24
7.62 mm HV MG	48
14.5 mm AT RIFLES	126
7.62 mm LMG	132
RIFLES & SUB MG	UNK.

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

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

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