

PHILOSOPHICAL AND OTHER ESSAYS

Part - 1

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**ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY & RELIGION,
HINDWADI, BELGAUM.**



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Part I

R. D. RANADE

Foreword by
Prof. N. G. Damle,

2013

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Dedicated
To
My Spiritual Teacher

Shri Sadguru Bhausahab Maharaj, Umadi





Appreciation of Gurudeo Ranade

By

Loknayak Madhav Shrihari *alias* Bapuji Aney,
Ex-Governor of Bihar.

ॐ

रामचंद्र-प्रशस्तिः

यो रानडेवंशललामभूतः ।
विद्वद्भैः पूजितपादपीठः ॥
आचारवानुच्चविचारदर्शी ।
तं रामचन्द्रं शिरसा नमामि ॥ १ ॥

संजातो जमखण्डिनाम्नि नगरे विद्यावतामग्रणीः ।
विद्यादानतपोरतोऽतिविमले गंगाऽसितासंगमे ॥
वेदग्रंथशिरःस्थितोपनिषदाम् कृत्वा च यो मंथनम् ।
तप्तेभ्योऽमृतमाददाति सततं संसारदावानलैः ॥ १ ॥

भक्तिज्ञानविरक्तिबोधसरिता यस्याननाम्निःसृता ।
शिष्यान्तःकरणं करोति विमलं चाध्यात्मतत्त्वास्पदम् ॥
योगारूढमतिः समस्तजगतो बंधुर्विलुप्तैषणः ।
तत्त्वज्ञानपरायणाय गुरवे रामाय तस्मै नमः ॥ ३ ॥

शके १८७८ ज्येष्ठ शुद्ध तृतीया
भानुवासरे
पुणे नगरे ३४२ सदाशिवोपनगरे
लक्ष्मीविलासस्थाने.

अणे इत्युपाह्वः श्रीहरिसूनुः
माधवशर्मा

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PREFACE

It is a matter of supreme gratification and joy to Shri Gurudeo Ranade Satkar Samiti that it has been able to bring out this volume entitled "Philosophical And Other Essays" and make a humble presentation of it to Gurudeo Ranade on the auspicious occasion of the Amrita Mahotsava (70th Birthday Celebration) which falls on the 3rd of July 1956. The volume comprises a few select essays and review-articles contributed by Gurudeo Ranade to different journals at different times. They deal with various subjects ranging from Philosophy of Change to Ideal Kingship, from Relativism to Philosophy of Fictions. Even a cursory glance at these philosophical and other essays will show to us, how encyclopædic is his learning, how profound is his philosophical insight, and how penetrating is his critical powers. They are sure to leave a deep impress on the minds of the readers because they are instinct with high moral purpose and are bound together by a common spiritual thread.

The publication of this volume has been one of the important items in the comprehensive programme chalked out by the Satkar Samiti, including the Unveiling of Gurudeo's Portrait, Presentation of Addresses and a Course of Spiritual Discourses. The Samiti is extremely indebted to Gurudeo Ranade for having allowed it to celebrate the Amrita Mahotsava and to bring out, in particular, this volume containing his earlier essays in book-form. The present volume will serve as an introduction to Gurudeo's more mature works which have been already published such as 'A Constructive Survey of the Upanishadic Philosophy' and 'The Pathway to God in Hindi Literature'.

The citizens of Jamkhandi regard it as a sacred duty to honour Gurudeo Ranade because he is born and educated at Jamkhandi and also initiated by his spiritual teacher, Shri Sadguru Bhausahab Maharaj of Umadi. His philosophical writings have earned for him a world-wide reputation. If he is great as a scholar, he is greater far as a mystic who has attained the heights of spiritual life. It is no exaggeration to say that the citizens of Jamkhandi feel that kind of love and reverence for him, which was felt by the inhabitants of Alandi

for Shri Dnyaneshwar, or by the inhabitants of Jamb for Shri Ramadas.

Jamkhandi has a high Paramarthic tradition. It is hallowed by the Samadhis of many a saint like Shri Kadasiddheshwar, Shri Sadanand and Shri Ajmirsahab. It was also one of the chief centres of Shri Sadguru Bhausahab Maharaj's spiritual activity. We all rejoice to find that Gurudeo Ranade has not only maintained the same noble tradition but has enriched it by his own example and teaching.

The Samiti owes a deep debt of gratitude to Prof. N. G. Damle of Fergusson College, for having readily consented to its request for seeing this volume through the Press and also writing a Foreword to it. The Samiti could not have thought of a better and worthier person than Prof. Damle to write an appreciative and learned foreword to this volume. His foreword reveals his profound study of Philosophy and a deep insight into mystical life, and shows that he is a worthy nephew of his great spiritual uncle.

The Samiti also acknowledges its debt of gratitude to Shri V. A. Patwardhan, the Manager of the Aryabhushan Press, for having taken all the trouble to see this volume through the Press with all possible care and promptness, and that too within a very short time. The Samiti also extends its thanks to Shri M. H. Nagpurkar, Shrimati Leela Gole, M. A. and Mr. V. P. Bokil, M. A., S. T. C. D. for having assisted, so willingly, Prof. Damle in preparing the copy of this volume for the press.

In conclusion, the Samiti devoutly prays the Almighty to grant Gurudeo Ranade a full life of a hundred years so that thousands of people may be spiritually benefitted.

Blessed is Gurudeo Bhausahab Maharaj of Umadi ; Blessed is Gurudeo Ranade and blessed be those who follow this peerless pair of Guru and Shishya in full faith and devotion.

W. T. APTE,

Chairman,

LILAVATIBAI PATWARDHAN,
Dowager Ranisahab of Jamkhandi.

President

Shri Gurudeo Ranade Satkar Samiti, Jamkhandi.




Birth
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
Shrimant Ramachandrarao Appasaheb Patwardhan
Ruler of Jamkhandi
who founded Parashuram Bhau High School, Jamkhandi in 1888.



House at Jamkhandi where Shri Gurudeo Ranade was born.



Parashuram Bhau High School, Jamkhandi.



Shrimant Lilavatidevi Patwardhan
Dowager Ranisaheb of Jamkhandi
President, Shri Gurudeo Ranade Satkar Samiti, Jamkhandi.

FOREWORD

Among the great in contemporary Indian Philosophy, like Shri. Aurobindo Ghosh and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Dr. R. D. Ranade holds a unique place of honour. Apart from their temperamental differences and differences in their spheres of work, they are the typical exponents of ancient Indian wisdom, as enriched and supported by the great truths that lie embedded in the philosophies and religions of the world, however variously they might have been presented. Their writings indicate a happy blending of the East and the West. If Shri. Aurobindo's philosophy may be described as Integral Idealism (Purna Yoga) and if Dr. Radhakrishnan, finds the true spirit of philosophy in the Philosophy of the spirit (Atma Darsana) it is Mysticism (Atma Sakshatkar-Self Realization) which is the quintessence of Prof. Ranade's philosophy of life. Mysticism has nothing to do with Magic or Miracle-mongering. It is not to be confused with Occultism. There is nothing 'misty' or mysterious about it; it is 'mystery unveiled'. Mysticism, according to Prof. Ranade, implies the direct, intuitive apprehension of God, the beatific vision of the Self. In short, it stands for the ideal of self-realization in which all philosophical speculation and moral endeavour find their culmination, in which all doubts are resolved and all knots of the heart are broken. When the Self is realized the mystic arrives at the "Unending End" of his spiritual pilgrimage and lives in blissful Eternity, while spreading the divine message for the upliftment of humanity.

Prof. Ranade's mystical philosophy of life has developed out of a strong original spiritual impulse awakened at the touch of his spiritual teacher, the Saint of Umadi, who blessed him so far back as in the year 1901 on Vaikuntha Chaturdashi (fourteenth day in the first half of the month of Kartika) at Jamkhandi. The same spiritual impulse which began appreciably to influence his life so far back as a little less than half a century has not only continued unabated but which, with the passage of time, has become stronger, being more firmly rooted and more fruitful having blossomed forth into more variegated flowers of mystical experience. Any one who has come into close contact

with him and observed his silent meditations and pondered over his musings and who has read his writings with 'a discerning eye' will bear out the truth of this statement.

In this connection, from among the more important publications of Prof. Ranade the following may be specially mentioned :

(1) A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy (1926), (2) Mysticism in Maharashtra (1933), (3) Pathway to God in Hindi Literature (1954), (4) Conception of Spiritual Life in Mahatma Gandhi and the Hindi Saints (1956). These volumes are a rich treasure-house of profound philosophical teachings, inspiring moral exhortations and sublime mystic experiences of the Upanishadic seers, saints of Maharashtra and Hindi Saints. They bear an eloquent testimony to his deep, patient and critical study of the original sources in Sanskrit, Marathi and Hindi. They are based on selections from these original sources which he has systematically arranged under appropriate headings. His treatment of this basic material is largely descriptive, but his description being interspersed with critical observations and constructive suggestions, as also with instructive comparisons shed a good deal of light on his own philosophical position. In these volumes Prof. Ranade has portrayed the lives and teachings of the great seers and saints as with the skill of an artist and with the rare sympathy and understanding of an ardent student enabling the reader to see, as through a veil which half reveals and half conceals his own philosophical views and mystical experiences.

Equally important from the standpoints of morality, metaphysics and mysticism are Prof. Ranade's forthcoming volumes, (almost ready in type-script for the press): (1) The Bhagavadgita as a Philosophy of God—realization—(Kinkhede Lectures, Nagpur University), (2) The Vedanta as the culmination of Indian Thought—(Basu Mallik Lectures, Calcutta University), and (3) Mysticism in Karnatak.—(Karnatak University).

A survey of all these works taken together will show that most of the important philosophical problems are discussed

therein, some very elaborately while others rather briefly but suggestively. I might venture to suggest that the time is now ripe for undertaking a comprehensive study of Prof. Ranade's philosophy on the background of his intellectual and spiritual biography for the benefit of the earnest students of philosophy and religion, and the spiritually inclined general public, in India and outside.

In the meanwhile, it is thought desirable that the important essays contributed by Prof. Ranade to different journals at different times should be brought together and published in book-form without delay. We heartily congratulate "Shri Gurudeo Ranade Satkar Samiti," with which Shrimant Leelavatidevi Patwardhan, Dowager Ranisaheb of Jamkhandi, has generously allowed her name to be associated as President, on its decision to undertake the publication of such a volume immediately, so that it may be presented to Gurudeo Ranade on the occasion of Amrita Mahotsava (the Seventieth Birthday celebrations) on the 3rd July 1956 at Jamkhandi. It is quite in the fitness of things that Jamkhandi should have taken the lead in this matter, since it was in Jamkhandi that he was born, and born twice, first in 1886, and again in 1901 when he was spiritually initiated. Further it was from The Parashuram Bhau High-School, Jamkhandi that he passed the Matriculation Examination (1902), winning the first Jagannath Shankarshett Scholarship.

If the people of Jamkhandi take pride in regarding Prof. Ranade as their philosopher, friend and guide, he in his turn entertains an equally warm feeling of attachment to that place, specially on account of his very happy spiritual associations with it.

Personally, I consider it an honour and a privilege to be invited by Shri. Gurudeo Ranade Satkar Samiti through its Chairman, Mr. W. T. Apte, M. A., LL. B. to see the proposed volume through the press and to contribute a Foreword to it. I have accepted the invitation because I regard it as a good opportunity for paying my humble tribute to my revered uncle and teacher, whose advice has stood me in good stead in every

sphere, particularly the spiritual, and whose life has served as a beacon-light to many an aspirant like myself in their voyage through the deeps and shoals of the sea of life to the haven of spiritual realization.

After a brilliant academic career, achieving first class distinction and consistently winning scholarships and prizes in Sanskrit in the University of Bombay, as a student of the Deccan College, 'Shri. Rambhau,' as he was popularly known then, was appointed as a Dakshina fellow in 1907, in the same college. But soon after, he was overtaken by a prolonged and serious illness which hampered his post-graduate studies and upset his plans of a prospective career. His physical breakdown and other difficulties gave a new turn to his life, which he put to the best possible advantage by practising intensive Sādhana with unfaltering devotion to and under the saving grace of his Teacher. Shri. Rambhau had his own convincing spiritual experiences of "unlit light and unstruck music of the Infinite". They were admittedly authentic, but his attitude being that of a critical rationalist, the problem before him was how to justify them in terms of philosophic thought. He, therefore, decided to devote special attention to the study of philosophy Western as well as Indian leaving aside other academic interests. In the field of Western philosophy he was at first attracted by Greek Philosophy. He was also profoundly influenced by the Advaitism of Shankaracharya, and felt particularly glad when he came to discover its reconciliation with Bhakti in his philosophy—a reconciliation which was either looked upon as a conundrum or rejected as an absurdity by many eminent Indian and Western thinkers. The ground was, thus, being gradually prepared for an exposition of his own views on important philosophical problems.

The present volume entitled "Philosophical and Other Essays" consists of some of the important articles and critical reviews written by Prof. Ranade many years ago from time to time for various journals. Even these early essays clearly indicate his vast learning and deep scholarship and they are marked by lucidity of exposition. The reader finds his comparative studies very instructive and his critical judgment

sound and reliable. Prof. Ranade has a definite point of view to set forth, which is essentially spiritual, and a careful reader will be glad to discover in them a deep undercurrent of his spiritual philosophy, which in its developed form is clearly manifested in his later works. But it is natural and beneficial "to wend one's way to the sea through a river".

To turn to the present volume, Prof. Ranade has made a thorough-going, critical study of Greek Philosophy. His research work in this field, based as it is on his knowledge of the original Greek sources, is embodied in the first four essays of the volume and is highly appreciated by authorities on Greek Philosophy. In the words of Shri. Aurobindo, a complete history of Greek Philosophy by "this perfect writer and scholar" would be "a priceless gain".

It may be of some interest to note here during what period of his life Prof. Ranade wrote these essays.

It was in 1912-13, when he had partially recovered his health, that he accepted the post of a lecturer in Sanskrit, in charge of Manuscripts Library in the Deccan College. Soon after, however, being inspired by the high ideal of service and sacrifice he decided to devote his life to the cause of higher education by joining the D. E. Society as Life-member and the Fergusson College as Professor of Philosophy. By this time he had achieved the highest academic distinction by standing first in the first class at the M. A. Examination of the University of Bombay with Philosophy as his optional subject winning the much coveted Chancellor's Gold medal. During the period of about ten years of his Professorship in the Fergusson College he contributed these articles on Greek Philosophy to different periodicals. Had he enjoyed good health and enough leisure he would have satisfied the expectations of Shri. Aurobindo about writing a complete History of Greek Philosophy.

In spite of his ill-health, however, and domestic calamities like the death of his mother and first wife, he continued his literary and spiritual pursuits without being seriously perturbed. Academically his life was successful being respected as a distinguished writer and a learned professor; spiritually, his

life was progressive being eventful and full of hope and joy on account of his varied religious experiences.

The philosophy of Herakleitos can be gathered from the fragments which are available from his original work. It is true that he has written aphorisms and his style is epigrammatic and cryptic, but that does not make him a mystic. Prof. Ranade refers Herakleitos to the scientific tradition and not to the mystical. Herakleitos attaches supreme importance to the dry light of reason and regards the dry soul as the wisest and the best. His ideas of perpetual change, reign of law, conservation of energy have a great scientific significance. In his theory of Ideas, Plato has synthesized the Herakleitean and the Eleatic concepts of Becoming and Being. This Platonic synthesis resembles the one implied in Shankaracharya's distinction between Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika orders of existence. Hegel later on, in his own way, transmuted Herakleitos' ideas of change and harmony of opposite tensions into his theory of development by contradiction. Herakleitos inveighs against the practice of wine-drinking, because it makes the soul moist. He attacks 'Image-worship' by saying that "He who prays to an image is chattering to a stone-wall" and also more vehemently attacks the practice of animal sacrifice performed with the desire of "purifying oneself through blood". Agreeing with Herakleitos Prof. Ranade observes that Relativism is restricted to the phenomenal sphere; it has no application to God. Lastly Herakleitos' saying "The kingdom belongs to a child" touches the heart of spiritual life. It anticipates one of the central teachings of Christianity. It also puts us in mind of a famous Upanishadic passage which says that a liberated man is in his soul 'Bālavat', even as if a child.

Prof. Ranade's essay on Aristotle's Criticism of the Eleatics may be regarded as a master-piece in critical philosophic literature. The essay not only gives us a critical insight into Eleatic philosophy but also exposes the defects in Aristotle's criticism of it.

Xenophanes was one of the earliest to formulate a definitely monotheistic doctrine. According to him there are no Gods

but 'only one God supreme among Gods and Men and not like the mortals in body and mind.' His satirical criticism of Anthropomorphism which pictures God as a human being with all his faults and foibles has become classic. He was not an abstract metaphysician but a great human. He stressed the value of humanistic studies and urged the importance of moral education. Prof. Ranade has a word of praise to offer to Xenophanes for his physico-theological argument, which Aristotle, curiously enough, failed to appreciate.

In the history of early Greek Philosophy, Parmenides stands out as a typical exponent of monistic Idealism for which Prof. Ranade has a very high regard. There is a striking resemblance between the views of Parmenides and Shankaracharya. Parmenidean identification of thought and Being is similar to Shankaracharya's identification of *Sat* and *Chit*. There is also correspondence between Parmenidean distinction of opinion and truth and Shankaracharya's distinction of the *Vyāvahārika* and the *Pāramārthika*. Influenced by Pythagorean doctrine that "All that is true and good is limited and finite", Parmenides, unlike Shankaracharya, characterized his Being as 'finite'. According to Prof. Ranade, those who like Burnet and Zeller find in the Parmenidean theory of Being a crass materialism are utterly mistaken. The mistake lies in their fallacious identification of analogy with fact. Being is only compared by Parmenides to a sphere and not identified with it.

Zeno is a great intellectual gymnast. His arguments are immeasurably subtle and profound. He used all his dialectic skill in silencing the partisans of plurality and motion, and in defending the Idealistic Monism of his master, Parmenides. Zeno's famous puzzles, such as, "It would be impossible for Achilles of swiftest foot to overtake a creeping tortoise, if it has just got a start ahead of him" and "The flying arrow must be regarded as at rest", cannot be finally solved unless we take the help of infinitesimal calculus and realize that motion is a spatio-temporal relation. It is neither a purely spatial, nor a purely temporal function.

The philosophy of Melissos like that of Spinoza is a culmination of the deductive method as applied to metaphysics.

He arrives at the conclusion that Being is one, homogenous incorporeal and immovable. Unlike Parmenides, however, he regards it as Infinite.

For practical wisdom expressed through such pithy sayings as "Know thyself" and "Love our neighbour as well as ourselves", Plato included Thales among the 'Seven Sages' of Greece. Aristotle regards him as the inaugurator of Philosophy of Nature, because he first raised the fundamental problem about the 'original stuff' and which he tried to answer in a scientific spirit. It is Water, he said, from which all things are born and into which they are finally resolved. Thales further believed that all things are filled with 'Gods' and 'good souls'. This, according to Prof. Ranade, is Pan-psychism. In Astronomy he is credited with having predicted a solar eclipse and in Geometry he found a method for determining the height of a pyramid.

The name of Protagoras, the celebrated Sophist, is closely associated with the Homo-Mensura doctrine, i. e. "Man is the measure of all things." Neither the generic interpretation given by Gomperz according to which, man-as-such is the measure of all things and not the individual man, nor the humanistic interpretation of F. C. S. Schiller who reads his own mind into the Protagorean dictum is satisfactory. The individualistic interpretation offered by Plato and Aristotle, on the whole, is convincing. Protagoras' doctrine, thus interpreted, inevitably leads to sensationalism and scepticism. Further, it should be remembered that the judgments of different people, e. g., those of the physician and the quack, are not equally valid. The most important criticism that Aristotle has passed upon Relativism is that it does not take any account of 'Differences of value', and that it has no adequate theory of Truth. Prof. Ranade entirely agrees with Aristotle in his view that "far from there being any question of Degrees of Truth and Error, there are only Degrees of Error. Truth is one but error infinite. "Truth is one, absolute and immutable, and that is in God."

This God-centred theory, as sharply distinguished from the cosmo-centric and the homo-centric, gives us the kernel

of Prof. Ranade's philosophy. It implies that everything lives and moves and has its being in God. The realization of such Divinity is the supreme goal of man's life. This great truth of God-realization dawned upon Prof. Ranade at a comparatively early stage in his life. It was in 1915 that he was invited to deliver a series of lectures on the Upanishads under the auspices of Sanskrit Academy in Bangalore. This gave him a welcome opportunity to make a thorough, critical study of the Upanishads. Such a study of the Upanishads helped him understand clearly the nature of this great truth, which may be described as God-realization or Self-realization—, its philosophical justification, means and methods for its attainment and the effects following therefrom. His lectures at Bangalore were fully developed later on into his monumental work, "A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy". This brought him great reputation all over India and abroad. Among the many eminent thinkers and scholars who were profoundly impressed by this masterly work of Prof. Ranade we might specially mention the name of the late Dr. Ganganath Jha of revered memory, who was then the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Allahabad. In the wake of this appreciation came his appointment as Professor of Philosophy in 1928 in the Allahabad University. For about eighteen years Prof. Ranade served the University with distinction in various capacities, as the Head of the Department of Philosophy, as the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, and also as Acting Vice-Chancellor for some time.

His stay at Allahabad, though it extended over more than eighteen years, was punctuated by his somewhat frequent visits to Nimbai where he has established his Ashrama and where his Gurubandhus and disciples meet for practising Sādhana and attending informal spiritual discourses. Nimbai is also the headquarters of 'Adhyatma Vidya Mandir' which is started under the kind patronage of His Highness Rajasaheb of Sangli, and of which he is the Director. He also occasionally used to visit the holy places like Inchgeri, Nimbargi for offering obeisance to the Samadhis of the saints of Nimbargi and Umadi. Allahabad has a special attraction to Prof. Ranade not merely because it is the place famous for Triveni Sangama, for the

confluence of Ganga, Yamuna and Sarasvati which is often compared by him with the confluence of Devotee, Name and God, but because it has considerably enlarged his intellectual horizon and immeasurably enriched his spiritual experiences. He practised intensive meditation daily for hours together, and almost without any break for many long years, at different and spiritually congenial places in Allahabad. He had before him Ramadasa's ideal of Urtamapurusha and the Gita-ideal of Sthitaprajna, implying a life of rhythm, of withdrawal into solitude for quiet meditation and return to active life for social service, and a life of detachment and dedication. In his Bungalow near the Draupadi Ghat at Allahabad, far removed from the bustle of the City's crowd, what glorious Sādhana he practised and how Blissfully in the Presence of his Teacher, nobody can describe. But a description of the varieties of such spiritual experiences as those of form, colour, light, sound and flavour, is found in the writings of the poet-saints referred to by Prof. Ranade in his work on 'Pathway to God in Hindi Literature' and his forthcoming volume on 'Karnatak Mysticism'.

In the two essays, included in this volume, entitled "A Philosophy of Spirit", and "Yājñavalkya and Philosophy of Fictions", written while he was at Allahabad, the reader will find some little glimpse of his ripe wisdom.

In his learned Presidential Address of Philosophical Congress held at Nagpur in 1937 Prof. Ranade has propounded his philosophy of spirit with reference to the recent scientific researches specially in the field of Physics, Biology and Neurology. In Physics, Sir James Jeans maintains that space and time are mental constructs and that there is one continuous stream of life running through the whole of Nature which permeates us all. This line of thought is in harmony with Idealism. One step forward from this Idealism will lead us to a Spiritualistic Absolutism, according to which spirit is immanent in the universe. Driesch from his biological experiments concludes that life is an autonomous principle which he calls the 'entelechy'. Driesch suggests that as far as human life is concerned it can be called 'psychoid'. Prof.

Ranade however prefers to call it, coining a new word for it, 'spiriton', which corresponds to the term 'Bindule' used by Jñanesvara and other mystics. Researches of Mr. Head in the field of Neurology lead him to conclude that 'Thalamus' is the seat of emotion which implies a significant fact, especially from the philosophic point of view, that the intellect controls emotion. The important lesson we learn from these neurological discoveries is the necessity and value of perfect harmony and cooperation between intellect and emotion, Jnana and Bhakti. Criticizing Bergson's doctrine of the two sources of morality and religion, Prof. Ranade holds that there is ultimately only one source, viz. Intuition. He also criticizes Bergson's E'lan as being a biological and not a spiritual principle. As far as Buddhistic philosophy is concerned, Prof. Ranade is of the opinion that the spiritual illumination of Buddha consists in an actual mystical experience and that his Anatta does not negate the reality of the self. The essay concludes with the observation that it is only when humanity recognizes the Spiritual Principle that peace and harmony in the world may be established.

For a proper understanding of Yājñavalkya's Philosophy of Fictions it is necessary to grasp clearly the two fundamental principles underlying his philosophy – The first is the impossibility of making the knower the object of knowledge, and the second, modification made by Yājñavalkya himself in his Absolutistic solipsism by granting some sort of reality to the objective existence for psychological purposes. It is also necessary to determine the correct meaning of the particle 'iva' occurring in the famous passage in the second chapter of the Brihadaranyakopanishad—यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति ।

A critical analysis and comparative study of "Yājñavalkya's Philosophy of Fictions" and Vaibinger's Philosophy of "As if" shows unmistakably how diametrically opposed they are to each other, inasmuch as Yājñavalkya's Fictionalism is based on the firm foundation of Atmanic experience, while that of Vaibinger lands us into mere sensationalism depriving, as it does, all scientific discoveries and assumptions and reducing them to mere 'ficta'.

In this gem of a short literary essay on the "Meditations on a Fire-fly", Prof. Ranade gives a very poetic description of the musings of a philosopher who lost himself into a reverie, while his attention was seized upon a fire-fly, that found its way into his room by chance. He feels that a fire-fly is a standing example of injustice of the world, because the world does not recognise its modesty and harmlessness. The fire-fly is the embodiment of unconscious virtue. If the fire-fly has light without, man has divine spark within!

"The Centre of the Universe" is one of Prof. Ranade's earliest essays written under the spiritual influence of Carlyle. The pluralistic conception of Spiritual Reality referred to therein forms the starting point of his philosophic thought. While once observing a cricket match on the play grounds of the Deccan College, a thought arising from his peculiar spiritual experience flashed across his mind, that the whole universe might be regarded as full of spirit! The universe, he felt, is but an Infinite Circle with its Centre Everywhere and Circumference Nowhere. To come to know the Centre of the Universe, its Presiding Element, is to solve the Problem of Problems.

Prof. Ranade has written a detailed review of Dr. Macnicol's book on 'Indian Theism' and Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar's monograph on Aśoka. In the first he has criticized Dr. Macnicol's views regarding the un-Indian character of Indian Theism, his biassed dislike of Advaitism and his contention about the impossibility of reconciling Advaitism with Bhakti. He however shows great appreciation of poet-saints of India and rightly refers to the importance of *Shabda* and *Guru* as Kabira's contribution to Indian Theism.

In this "Republic" Plato depicts a fine picture of a philosopher-king. Aśoka may, indeed, be regarded as such a philosopher-king. As an ideal king he ruled over his vast empire with one-pointed devotion to the welfare and happiness of all his subjects, in this and the next world. He made Buddhism the State-religion. But there was nothing dogmatic about his religious faith. Religious tolerance, on the other hand, is writ large in his Edicts. "True Religion" says he

“ consists in concourse or Samavāya : where there is no friendliness of feeling towards another there is no religion.” Had he been alive to-day he would have most enthusiastically supported the Panch-shila doctrine of peaceful co-existence among nations. He did not negate nationalism ; but he had a large cosmopolitan outlook which envisaged an equal opportunity for all humanity to realize the highest moral and religious ideal.

The last essay contains a very spirited defence of Indian Philosophy by Prof. Ranade against the unmerited attack on it by Lala Hardayal.

A bird's-eye-view of the essays in the present volume (Part I), like the one we have taken above, is enough to show Prof. Ranade's learning and insight as also the moral and spiritual tenor of his philosophy. It is hoped that Part II of Prof. Ranade's collected essays will be published in the near future.

What is attempted in this Foreword is only a short account of a few incidents in Prof. Ranade's life and some aspects of his philosophy and not a detailed biography nor a comprehensive statement of his philosophical teachings. This deficiency might be made good, we hope, by the publication, at an early date, of an independent volume on the “ Life and Teachings of Prof. R. D. Ranade ”.

However fragmentary our account of Prof. Ranade's philosophy might be, we cannot help making at least a passing reference to his views about the Pathway to God. It should be remembered that for God-realization, which means self-realization or Ātmajñāna, intellectual discipline and moral purity, however indispensable, are by themselves not enough. They only prepare the ground. For the attainment of God-realization, constant and one-pointed *meditation*, with unswerving faith and whole-hearted love and devotion, on the *Name of God*, as imparted by a *Spiritual Teacher* who has realized his identity with God, is necessary. But with all our knowledge and morality and meditation we shall not reach the heights and enjoy the fulness of spiritual experience unless we are blessed by God with His abounding *Grace*.

I am deeply obliged to Messrs. M. H. Nagpurkar, M. V. Marathe, V. P. Bokil, M. A., S. T. C. D., who have considerably lightened my work in seeing the present volume through the press by correcting the proofs. My special thanks are due to Prof. R. D. Vadekar, M. A., for all the trouble he has taken in carefully going through the Greek passages in the proofs and to Shrimati Leela D. Gole, M. A., for her help in writing the Foreword. The manager of the Aryabhusan Press also deserves thanks for efficiently and speedily carrying out the printing of the volume. As the volume had to be rushed through the press it is possible that a few misprints might have remained uncorrected.

Let me, in conclusion, hope and pray that the great work, which Shri. Gurudeo Ranade Satkar Samiti has already started with full faith and devotion and under the guidance of its Chairman Mr. W. T. Apte, M. A., LL. B., and the kind patronage of its President, Shrimant Leelavatidevi Patwardhan, may succeed in furthering the sacred cause of Paramartha, to which Gurudeo Ranade has dedicated his whole life.

"Suryodaya"
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N. G. DAMLE

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Philosophical and other Essays

Herakleitos

A Philosopher of War

If any apology is needed for the discussion at the present moment* of such an academic subject as the philosophy of Herakleitos, it seems to the present writer to consist in the fact that Herakleitos is pre-eminently a philosopher of war. Like Hobbes at a later date, Herakleitos found, wherever he looked, the reign of war and strife. War, said Herakleitos, is the Father of all, and King of all : *πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς*. He who wished to do away with the reign of strife in this world knew not what he said. Herakleitos thus blamed Homer for praying that strife might perish from among gods and men ; he said that Homer did not see that he was thus praying for the destruction of the universe, for, if his prayer was granted, it would happen that all things would pass away. The cessation of strife, in short, thus means the end of the world ; for, the world, said Herakleitos, is supported by strife. War, therefore, is the condition of nature, and as such we may identify strife and justice, said Herakleitos : *εἰδέναι δίκην ἔριν*. Lastly, not only is war, said Herakleitos, natural and just, but we may also say that it is the very spring of all things, and that all things come into being through strife : *γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔριν*.

Personality and style.

Such in a nutshell is the war-philosophy of that dark Ephesian philosopher, Herakleitos, who is said to

* This essay was first published in February, 1916.

have flourished in Asia Minor in the sixty-ninth Olympiad. The more exact dates of his life and death have been fixed in modern times to be 535 B. C. and 475 B. C. From the great perplexity of his writings, Herakleitos came to be surnamed the Obscure (ὁ σκοτεινός). Even the great Aristotle complained about the grammatical difficulties in Herakleitos' work. This work is said to have borne the customary title *περὶ φύσεως*. Even though we have not the whole work of Herakleitos before us we have sufficient fragments extant from that work to enable us to reconstruct Herakleitos' philosophy tolerably satisfactorily. Herakleitos wrote in aphorisms, which is the real reason of his occasional obscurity. To take one illustration out of many, it is impossible to make out what Herakleitos meant when he called gods mortals, and men immortals: *θεοὶ θνητοί, ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι*. Very often, however, Herakleitos' meaning is plain when we once understand the secret of his philosophy; but we must remember that his style is often antithetical: the name of the bow (*βίος*), he says, is life (*βίος*), but its work is death—*τοῦ βιοῦ ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος*.

Criticism of Predecessors.

Herakleitos has been called a weeping philosopher, as contrasted with Demokritos, who is called a laughing philosopher. The charge against Herakleitos is due to some traces of pessimism found in his writings. Man, says Herakleitos, is kindled and put out like a light in the night-time: *ἄνθρωπος, ὅπως ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φῶς, ἀπτεται ἀποσβέννυται*. Time, he says elsewhere, is like a child playing draughts; it "amuses itself with counters, and builds castles on the sea-shore for the sake of throwing them down again: construction and destruction, destruc-

tion and construction"—this is how the supreme principle acts (Gomperz: Greek Thinkers I. 64). Even though, therefore, we have some justification for calling Herakleitos a weeping philosopher, we have still more justification for calling him a philosopher who made other people weep. We know how he inveighed against all his predecessors, Homer and Hesiod, and Pythagoras, and Xenophanes, and the rest. About Homer, he said that he deserved to be turned out of the lists and whipped with lashes: τὸν Ὅμηρον ἀξιὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγῶνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι. Pythagoras, he said, made a wisdom of his own—much learning and bad art: Πυθαγόρης ἐποίησε ἑωυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην. About Hesiod, and Pythagoras, and Xenophanes, as a whole, he says that their much learning had not yet taught them understanding: "much learning teacheth not understanding, else it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes": πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐδὲν διδασκει. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδασκε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὐτὶς τε Ξενοφάνεα. It is worth while remembering that Herakleitos inveighs against Pythagoras in this strain, even though he was indebted to him for the idea of the lyre of which he made an important use in his system, as we shall see later on, and that he criticised Xenophanes in spite of Xenophanes' similar attitude towards Homer and Hesiod, who, in his opinion, "ascribed to the Gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace even among mortals—stealings and adulteries, and deceivings of one another." In the light of such severe criticisms it would be better to call Herakleitos a philosopher who did not himself weep, but made other people weep; an ὀχλολοΐδορος who railed at the people, a veritable fire-breathing philosopher like his later compeer—Nietzsche.

Was Herakleitos a Mystic ?

Herr Pfleiderer wishes us to look upon Herakleitos in the light of the idea of the mysteries : "im Lichte der Mysterien-idee." The opinion is entirely groundless. Herr Pfleiderer does not seem to have noticed the severe attack that Herakleitos made against all people who took part in mysteries. He calls them night-walkers, wizards, bacchanals, revellers, mystery—mongers—*νυκτιπόλοι, μάγοι, βάκχοι, λήναι, μύσται*—a worse terminology of abuse could scarcely be invented ; for what are called mysteries among men they celebrate in an unholy way : *τὰ γὰρ νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστήρια ἀνιερωστὶ μευῖνται.* In the light of such utterances of Herakleitos, it would be sheer madness to consider Herakleitos in any sense a mystic. Among the two traditions discussed by Mr. Cornford in his book "From Religion to Philosophy," we may safely refer Herakleitos to the scientific tradition, and not to the mystical tradition. The only claim of Herakleitos to a niche in the mystic shrine is his aphoristic, epigrammatic, and cryptic style. But mere aphorism is not mysticism, and we may safely regard Herakleitos as even an anti-mystic, remembering what importance Herakleitos attached to the dry light of reason: the dry soul, said Herakleitos, is wisest and best: *αὕη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη.*

Relation to Parmenides

We are now prepared to discuss the relation of Herakleitos to Parmenides. We have already seen above that Herakleitos refers to Xenophanes, while we can undoubtedly say that Parmenides refers to Herakleitos so that Herakleitos may be safely put down as having flourished *between* Xenophanes and Parmenides. Zeller,

however, flatly denies that Parmenides was acquainted with the doctrine of Herakleitos (Vol. II pp. 111-12). Zeller does not take into account the important reference in Parmenides, which unmistakably points to Herakleitos: " Undiscerning crowds ", says Parmenides, " in whose eyes it is and is not, the same and not the same, and who suppose *that all things follow to back-turning course* " : πάντων δὲ πάλιντροπος ἐστὶ κέλευθος. Here we may notice that Parmenides is using the very word, which, as we shall see later on, Herakleitos had used before him—πάλιντροπος—which makes it unmistakably clear that Herakleitos preceded Parmenides, and that, in spite of Zeller, Herakleitos' doctrine was definitely known to Parmenides. And if it is clear that Herakleitos preceded Parmenides, it is also clear that the doctrine of becoming preceded the doctrine of being, and Hegel's contention that the logical category of becoming must follow that of being is not historically justified. And this becomes an aspersion on one of Hegel's favourite ideas that the logical order of development corresponds to the historical, and that the categories of the Understanding are at the same time the categories of the Cosmos.

The Idea of Perpetual Change

One of the central points in the philosophy of Herakleitos is his idea of perpetual change, of a continuous flux. This was expressed by Plato and Aristotle in the celebrated expression πάντα ῥεῖ—all things flow. Herakleitos himself never used these words; but the expression summed up, according to Plato and Aristotle, the essential teaching of Herakleitos. Herakleitos however says himself that the Sun that rises up every morning is new every day; νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ ἥλιος. Hera-

Herakleitos also expressed his favourite idea of incessant change in that oft-quoted sentence of his: you cannot step twice into the same waters, for "other and yet other waters are ever flowing on": ἕτερα γὰρ καὶ ἕτερα ἐπιρρέει ὕδατα. This doctrine of the Master that it is impossible for us to step into the same rivers *twice* had its nemesis in the teaching of one of his disciples who held that it is impossible for us to step into the water *even once*, for as soon as we are placing our foot in it, the water has already run off. Then, again, Epicharmos made fun of Herakleitos' doctrine by putting the doctrine of perpetual flux in the mouth of a debtor. Why should the debtor pay his debts at all, seeing that the man who borrowed is not the same as the man who was going to pay? Anyhow, irrespective of such extravagances to which the doctrine was carried, we may say that Herakleitos broached for the first time an important scientific truth that nothing in this world is absolutely stationary, but that all things are perpetually changing, and that it is not the static aspect of things but the dynamic aspect that matters for science.

The Primary Substance: Fire

Herakleitos had now to find out a substance which would serve as basis for this process of incessant change. As Anaximenes had chosen Air as his φύσις because it had a greater capacity of change than the Water of Thales, so Herakleitos chose Fire as his φύσις because it was more changeable than the Air of Anaximenes. Volatility or the capacity to change seems to be the reason which led these philosophers to fix upon their primal substance. Fire, said Herakleitos, was the type of change; for look at fire, he said, the fuel is turning into smoke, from behind smoke are

emerging cinders, and the cinders are turning into ashes. The whole process is symbolic of change. Herakleitos expressed this darkly when he said in a cryptic style that the Thunderbolt steers the course of all things: τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰκίξει κερκυνός: that it was Fire, whether celestial or terrestrial did not matter, that directed the course of the Universe. He said, moreover, that the world had been made neither by gods nor by men; that it always was, and is, and would be a Fire Everlasting; κόσμον...οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε, ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰείζων.

The Interpretation of Fire

What Herakleitos exactly meant by fire (πῦρ) has been a bone of contention among historians of philosophy. This is, as we shall see presently, one of the crucial points of "interpretation" in Early Greek Philosophy. Lassalle would argue in Hegelian fashion, and say that "fire" is just the idea of becoming, which includes under it the notions of being and not-being. Teichmüller would argue that by "fire" Herakleitos meant the actual fire that burns and crackles on the hearth. Zeller would say that Herakleitos might have meant by "fire" warm matter in general (Vol. II. p. 24). Anyhow, it does not seem possible that Herakleitos might have meant by fire the "element" of its name, which was the sense in which Empedokles and Aristotle later understood it (Zeller, Vol. II p. 53). Herakleitos understood by Fire a kind of world-forming force, the λόγος, and he identified it in succession with Zeus and with Eternity. It was the supreme principle of the world, from which various forms of matter went forth, and to which they returned. Herakleitos has given us a very pregnant aphorism,

which tells us that the Way Up and the Way Down are one and the same: ὁδὸς ἀνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή; that from fire proceed air, and water, and earth in that order, which is the Way Down, and to fire they return in the reverse order, which is the Way Up.

The Problem of the One and the Many

Herakleitos is therefore a kind of monist, and Zeller goes to the length of calling his philosophy "the most outspoken Pantheism" (Vol. II. p. 46). And yet it must be remembered that Herakleitos does not deny true reality to the Many as his predecessor Anaximander had done: he reconciles the opposite claims of the One and the Many in the only way possible for him. He tells us how it is wise to accept that all things are One: ὁμολογέειν σοφὸν ἔστι, ἔν πάντα εἶναι; but the Many and the One are interdependent, and from all things arises the One and from the One all things: ἐκ πάντων ἔν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα. We must also remember that famous reference in Plato's "Sophist" to the reconciliation of the Many and the One by Herakleitos, and by Empedokles. Plato tells us: "Certain Ionian, and at a later date, certain Sicilian Muses remarked that reality is both many and one; for, say the more severe Muses, in its division it is *always* being brought together, while the softer Muses relax the requirement that it should be so, and say that the All is *alternately* one and many". By the severe Ionian Muses, Plato means Herakleitos, and by the soft Sicilian muses, he means Empedokles. And we incidentally gather Plato's opinion that Herakleitos held that Reality was One and Many simultaneously, and that Empedokles held that it was so only alternately.

We shall see very soon what use we can make of this statement.

The Idea of Exchange

But now if the One is Many, and the Many One to Herakleitos, what is the actual process by which this becomes so? Anaximander had said that contraries came out of his *ἄπειρον* by the process of "separation"; Anaximenes had said that it was by the processes of "rarefaction and condensation" that from air proceeded all things; Herakleitos now comes forward, and gives us the process by which the one becomes many, and the many one, in his important idea of Exchange (*ἀμοιβή*), which is a clever anticipation of the modern idea of Conservation of Energy. All things, says Herakleitos, are exchanged for fire, and fire for all things, even as wares are exchanged for gold, and gold for wares: *πυρὸς ἀνταμείβεται πάντα, καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων, ὥσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα, καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός.* Thus it comes about that fire is exchanged for air and water and earth, and air and water and earth are exchanged for fire, for we see that fire gives out smoke but receives fuel instead. Anyhow, there is no destruction of matter. Exchanges are always going on in the world, energy is conserved, "measures" are fixed. The Sun, says Herakleitos, will not overstep his measures; if he does, the Erinyes, the hand-maids of justice, will find him out; *ἢ λῆος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα. εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσι.* The process, then, by which the One passes into Many, and the Many into One, as well as that by which anything can pass into another, may be termed, says Herakleitos, *ἀμοιβή*; this will secure the fixity of measures, for the soul of it is justice. If we understand, thus, the two catchwords in the philosophy of Herak-

leitos, change and exchange, we may understand the whole of Herakleitos' philosophy.

Harmony of Opposite Tension

The one great problem that presents itself before any philosophy of change is how to account for the static appearance of the world. We have seen above that the law of the conservation of measures may be theoretically supposed to secure the appearance of stability. But even this is insufficient to explain the actual mode of working which produces the static appearance of the world. With a view, then, to explain the actual mode by which this result could be secured, Herakleitos gives us another very significant notion: the law of opposite tension. Philo tells us that Herakleitos boasted of a great discovery when he said that harmony was secured by opposite tension. At any given moment, said Herakleitos, even though they are constantly changing, each of the three forms of matter, Fire, Water, and Earth is made up of two equal portions; these equal portions are always being drawn in opposite directions; and it is this opposite tension which secures harmony. In short, what Herakleitos' doctrine about the static appearance of the world comes to is this, that there appears to be a stability in the world for the simple reason that, in the terminology of modern science, action and reaction are equal and opposite. The war which Herakleitos saw between things, he also saw inside things: out of strife everywhere proceeded the fairest harmony. Harmony, he said, lies in bending back, as, for example, of the bow and the lyre: *παλίντροπος ἄρμονίη, ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης*. "As the arrow is leaving the string, the harmony of the bow is secured by the opposite tension of the hands; and the sweet note of the

lyre is due to a similar tension and re-tension. Such is also the secret of the universe " (Campbell). Does not a painter, asks Herakleitos, produce his harmonious effects by the contrast of colours, and the musician by that of high and low notes? And if the law of opposition governs the sphere of art why should we not suppose that it has supreme power everywhere?

The Law of Relativism.

The idea of opposite tension also led Herakleitos to formulate for the first time the famous Law of Relativism, which later on influenced Sophistic teaching. Gomperz has said (Vol. I. p. 71) that Herakleitos in his Law of Relativism anticipates the modern conception of polarity. The Law of Relativism does away with differences of kind among things, and substitutes instead differences of degree. There is no absolute distinction between night and day, said Herakleitos, between life and death, between good and bad. Hesiod was wrong in saying in his " Theogony " that Day was the child of Night: he did not know that Night and Day are one: ' Ησίοδος... ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκε. ἔστι γὰρ ἓν. Then again, Herakleitos said that Life and Death, Youth and Old age, are the same: ταὐτ' εἰναίζων καὶ τεθνηκόος, καὶν ἐν καὶ γηραίον. Then, again, Herakleitos boldly preached that Good and Bad are one: ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ταύτου: this is veritably the supermoralism of his later analogue, Nietzsche, who wishes us to go beyond Good and Evil. Herakleitos illustrates his Law of Relativism by taking other illustrations. The sea, he says, is both purest and foulest water: θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρὸν καὶ μικρότατον. It is purest for fish, but foulest for men, thus pointing to the conclusion that there is no absolute nature of sea-water. Herakleitos also says that extremes meet, as we find that

the beginning and the end of the circle is the same : ξυγόν ἀρχῆ καὶ πέρας. Then he says that we step and do not step into the same rivers (this was how he was obliged to modify his original theory of perpetual change in the light of the law of Relativism) ; we are and we are not : ποταμοῖσι τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι ἐμβάινομεν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβίνομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμέν. It was such an antinomianism of Herakleitos which might have led Plato to give us the interesting puzzle in his Republic : “ A man and no man, seeing and not seeing a bird and no bird, sitting upon wood and no wood, struck and did not strike it with a stone and no stone ”.

Does the Law stop at God ?

If we ask Herakleitos whether his law of Relativism holds good in the case of God, he gives two different answers at two different places. Once he says that the law of Relativism holds good even about God : the First Principle, he says, is willing to be called Zeus, and unwilling to be called Zeus : λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς οὐνομα. But he says elsewhere that the law of Relativism stops at God, even though it holds good about men : to God, he says, all things are fair and good and just, but men hold some things unjust and some just : τῷ μὲν θεῷ κτλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ἀνθρώποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἀδίκια ὑπειλήφασιν, ἃ δὲ δίκαια. The conclusion at which Herakleitos arrives is that “ God is both day and night, war and peace, surfeit and hunger ; but He takes various shapes, just as fire, when it is mingled with spices, is named according to the savour of each ”. In short, says Herakleitos, every one gives Him the name he pleases : ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου.

Violation of the Law of Contradiction.

There is one important point which emerges from Herakleitos' doctrine of Relativism. If the law of

Relativism is right, it is equivalent to a flat denial of the law of Contradiction; and it was Aristotle who first noticed this, and who therefore ranked Herakleitos along with Anaxagoras and Protagoras among the chief violaters of the Law of Contradiction. If the Law of Relativism is right, Reality is both many and one, good and bad: this entirely violates the Law of Contradiction which tells us that A cannot be B and not-B at the same time. Zeller, however, argues against the authority of Aristotle (Vol. II. pp. 36-37), and asserts that Herakleitos did not deny the law of Contradiction. "Though Herakleitos asserts", says Zeller, "that opposite qualities can belong to the same subject, he does not say that they belong to it in the same respect: to assert, in other words, that opposites are found in the same subject is not to assert their identity. The former view alone can be deduced from the examples which Herakleitos brings forward, and he had no occasion to go farther, since his concern was not with speculative Logic but with Physics." To the mind of the present writer, Zeller is entirely ignoring the fact that Herakleitos supposed that Reality was Many and One simultaneously, that is, at the same time. Otherwise, the whole point of the distinction between the Ionian Muses and the Sicilian Muses which Plato drew in his "Sophist" would be entirely lost. Plato says, that, to Herakleitos, Reality was many and one simultaneously, and to Empedokles, alternately. If, then, Plato is right in maintaining this distinction between Herakleitos and Empedokles, it follows that Herakleitos did hold that Reality was Many and One at the same time, thus breaking the Law of Contradiction. It was no more than this simple fact which Aristotle wished to draw our attention to, when he

said that Herakleitos violated the Law of Contradiction. We see thus how Zeller's defence of Herakleitos falls to the ground.

Zeller on Conflagration.

If there is any one point more than another which has caused the greatest amount of divergence in the interpretation of Herakleitos, it is the question as to whether Herakleitos did or did not hold the theory of periodic conflagration (*ἐκπύρωσις*). The controversy between Zeller and Burnet on this point is very keen, Zeller asserting that Herakleitos did hold a theory of conflagration, Burnet saying that we have no evidence to ascribe the theory to Herakleitos. Zeller's arguments are, in short, these: (1) that Anaximander and Anaximenes had held a theory of conflagration even before Herakleitos; (2) that we have Aristotle's testimony that Herakleitos did believe in such a Conflagration; (3) that even those Stoics who were opposed to the doctrine of Conflagration say that Herakleitos held it; (4) that we have an utterance of Herakleitos himself to the effect that fire in its advance will judge and convict all things—*πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινέει καὶ καταληψεται*—thus proving that he believed in a universal Conflagration by fire; (5) and that even though the idea of Conflagration is inconsistent with another central idea of Herakleitos' system, namely, perpetual Change, Herakleitos unfortunately did not see this inconsistency, and allowed it to remain in his system.

Burnet on Conflagration.

Burnet, on the other hand, argues against ascribing the theory of Conflagration to Herakleitos. His argu-

ments are in short : (1) that the idea of Conflagration which reconciles all opposites, and that of Change which retains all opposites in a state of war, are mutually contradictory; (2) that Plato intends to say about Herakleitos in his " Sophist " that he maintained that the One was always Many, and the Many always One, which would give the lie direct to the theory of Conflagration ; (3) that the only clear statements about the fact that Herakleitos taught the doctrine of a general Conflagration are posterior to the rise of Stoicism ; (4) that the theory of measures, the metaphor of exchange, and the criticism of Homer's prayer that strife should cease, all go against it ; (5) that lastly, Herakleitos positively asserts that the world has been created neither by gods nor by men, but that it always was, and is, and shall be a fire everliving, a passage which we have already quoted : *κόσμον...ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰεὶζῶν.*

Conflagration and Change not contradictory.

The present writer thinks however that both Zeller and Burnet have gratuitously assumed that Conflagration and Change are mutually contradictory, and that if we once admit Conflagration we thereby deny the possibility of future Change. Now, Conflagration and Change are so far from being contradictory, that they are both of them equally essential for a right understanding of Herakleitos' position. Herakleitos did not suppose that when the world was overtaken by a Conflagration, there was for ever an end of it ; on the other hand, he seems to have held that at the time of the Conflagration, the world, as it takes the Way Up, so far from being reduced to nothing, is reduced to a Ball of Fire, because the measures must always be

conserved ; and that when a future periodic generation of the world takes place, it is by this Ball of Fire taking the Way Down that we get to the world once more. In fact, the Way Up and the Way Down themselves are an indication of the belief of Herakleitos in a periodic Conflagration, a point which neither Zeller nor Burnet has noticed ; and thus Conflagration, so far from being contradictory of Change, as both of them have gratuitously assumed, becomes the necessary condition of Change. And so, as we see, both Zeller and Burnet are and are not right, and are not wrong, if we may be allowed to speak in the strain of Herakleitos himself. At the time of the Conflagration, the world is reduced to a Ball of Fire, which contains in it the potentiality of change, and at the time of the Creation, the Ball of Fire emerges as the world once more. This is how, as Herakleitos said, Time is playing draughts like a child, building castles on the sea-shore for the purpose of throwing them down again. We may compare with this the whole of the poem of Sir Rabindranath Tagore "On the sea-shore"—where he speaks of "Children gathering pebbles to scatter them over again" (Gitanjali p. 55.)

Practical Wisdom : Psychology and Ethics.

We must now pass to another important point about Herakleitos—his great practical wisdom. Even the fragment of his work that is left to us teems with wise sayings which all of us might usefully fix in memory. Speaking about scientific effort, he says that Nature loves to hide—*φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ*; and if he had lived in Bacon's days, he would certainly have added that even though the greatness of Nature lies in concealing things, the greatness of Man consists in bringing

them out. Speaking about the soul, he says, how the soul is unlimited, how one cannot discover the limits of the soul: *ψυχῆς πείρατα οὐκ ἄν εξεύροιο*. He is again the first philosopher we know who asserts the fact of self-consciousness; true to the teaching of the Delphic Oracle, he tells us how he sought himself: *ἔδιξήσάμην ἑμεωυτόν*. Herakleitos again is the first definite champion of Rationalism: Reason is "common", he says, and yet most people live as though they had each an individual understanding: *τοῦ λόγου δ' ἔόντος ξυνοῦ ζῶουσι οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίην ἔχοντες φρόνησιν*. The sleeping, he says, drift each to his separate world; but "those that are awake have one common world": *τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι*. This is as much as to say that universal judgments become possible only from the standpoint of Reason, but Sense gives us each a separate judgment. In Ethics, he points out how it is delight to souls to become moist: *ψυχῆσι τέρψις ὑγρῆσι γενέσθαι*. He inveighs against the practice of wine-drinking: Hades and Dionysos, he says, are the same: *ὡτίς δὲ Ἄϊδης καὶ Δίονυσος*. We must, hence, not allow our souls to worship Dionysos, in other words, to become moist; it is the dry soul which is the wisest and best: *αὕη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*. He insists on the power of Justice in this world; he tells us how Justice shall overtake forgers of lies, and the witnesses to them: *δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδέων τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας*. He expatiates on the great value of character; our character, he tells us, is our guarding angel: *ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων*—a text which must have supplied Fletcher with a fruitful idea when he said:—

" Our acts our angels are, or good or ill,
Our fatal shadows that walk by us still."

Views about Society

The social views of Herakleitos are not less remarkable: he was a hard aristocrat who clamoured

against the many-headed monster—the people. “Fools,” he says, “they are like the deaf: they are absent when present.” The many, he adds, are bad, and the few are good: πολλοὶ κακοὶ, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί. One man would be ten thousand to him, he says, if he be best: εἰς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἕν ἄριστοισι ἦ. Even though he attacked democracy in this severe style, he did not forget the divine element in all human laws. Far from arguing like the later Sophists, that the human law, because it is a conventional law, deserves to be abandoned in favour of the law of nature, Herakleitos argued that the human law partakes of the law of nature, which is at the same time a divine law: “Fed are all human laws,” he says, “by one which is divine”: τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου. And yet he takes to pieces some of the Greek social institutions like sacrifice and image-worship, two chief pillars of the Greek Religion. About sacrifice, he says, that in it “people vainly try for purification by defiling themselves with blood, just as if one who had stepped into mud were to try to wash his feet clean with mud”; in other words, he says that there is no power for purification in a blood-defiled sacrifice. Lastly, he vociferously clamours against idol-worship, saying that “he who prays to an image is chattering to a stone-wall.”

Influence on Ancient Philosophers

Having thus seen the various sides of Herakleitos' philosophy, we are now prepared to estimate the influence that he exercised on the succeeding philosophers, (1) The most direct influence that Herakleitos exercised, and the earliest in point of time, was that on Protagoras. We have seen how Herakleitos preached a kind of Relativism which directly paved the way for

the *Homo Mensura* of Protagoras. We have Plato's authority for saying that the doctrine of Protagoras must be referred back to Herakleitos, as we may see from Plato's "Theaetetus". (2) Then again, by Aristotle's consent, we cannot understand Plato's philosophy, unless we suppose it to be a synthesis of Herakleitianism and Socratism, unless, in other words, we suppose that Plato adopted Herakleitos' flux for his phenomenal world, and the Socratic permanence for his Ideal world. Thus, it is clear how Plato himself was influenced by Herakleitos. (3) Thirdly, the influence which Herakleitos wielded on the Stoics is very remarkable. If the relativistic side of Herakleitos' philosophy connects him with the Sophists, the rationalistic side of his philosophy connects him with the Stoics. The implacable determinism of Herakleitos which he expressed when he said ἔστι γὰρ εἰμυρμένα πάντα...found its way in the Stoic system, along with another pregnant idea of Herakleitos, his insistence on Reason or Word which he called λόγος for the first time in the History of Philosophy. Men seem to know it not, he says, "even though all things come to pass in accordance with this Word": γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον. This combination of the ideas of Necessity and Reason, which at the same time is a kind of Justice, is the very bountiful legacy which Herakleitos left to the Stoics. But as soon as we have said that it was Herakleitos who first used the Word λόγος in a philosophical sense, we know what a large vista opens before us of the mighty influence of Herakleitos. We have said that the Stoics directly borrowed the λόγος doctrine from Herakleitos in the sense of the immanent Reason of the world. The only modification that the Stoics introduced in the conception was to suppose a kind of an original λόγος

σπερματικός, which in its turn was to produce a number of λόγοι σπερματικοί, the immanent Reason in the world to produce a number of lesser immanent reasons in men. Philo, the Jew, later adopted the term λόγος from his predecessors, Herakleitos and the Stoics, but he understood by it much more than the immanent principle of Reason. He understood it in the sense of "the divine dynamic, the energy and the self-revelation of God" (*Vide* Article "Logos" in En. Br. XIth Edition). Lastly, when St. John borrowed it from Philo and made use of it in his Fourth Gospel, he introduced a still more important modification in it by making it fully personal, by saying how the Word became Flesh, and by subordinating the aspect of λόγος as Reason to that of λόγος as Word, which hitherto had run into one another. Just as the word we speak is an expression of our spirit, so Christ was the Divine Word sent out by the Father as an expression of His spirit. This, in short, is the history of the word λόγος, which Herakleitos had the credit of having first invented, and philosophically used. (4) There is another aspect of the influence which Herakleitos wielded on Christianity, and this is a point, which, so far as the present writer is aware, has not yet been noticed by anybody. The very remarkable expression which Herakleitos uses παδὸς ἡ βασιλείη, "the kingdom belongs to the child," became later on one of the central teachings of Christianity, namely, in the doctrine of humility: "Except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (St. Matthew XVIII. 3).

Influence on Modern Philosophers

Coming to modern times, we find that Herakleitos' influence is no less remarkable. (1) Hegel was

very largely influenced by the theories of Herakleitos. Hegel expressly says how Becoming is the first chief category to reckon with in Logic, as Herakleitos is the first chief philosopher to reckon with in Philosophy. Hegel avails himself of the central idea of Change in Herakleitos, which he transmutes into a theory of Development ; he again avails himself of the idea of the harmony of opposite tension in Herakleitos, which he transmutes into his favourite logical device of thesis and antithesis to be subsumed under a higher synthesis. In short, the very keystone of his methodology Hegel owes to Herakleitos, and it consists, we may say, just in the idea of *development by contradiction*. (2) Then again, we know how Herakleitos influenced some modern reactionaries like Proudhon and Nietzsche. The revolutionary Proudhon, says Gornperz, (Vol. I. P. 77) was the exactest counterpart of the Ephesian : in their mental habits and their love of paradox, they were as like each other as two peas. While Nietzsche borrowed not merely Herakleitos' habit of retiring to mountain-fastnesses, but he borrowed his whole philosophy of war, and crowned these with the doctrine of Supermoralism —“ Beyond Good and Evil ”— of which he made an originally perverse use. (3) While Herakleitos' Philosophy of Change has been echoed in modern times from the halls of the Collége de France, and Herakleitos' teaching seems at last to have fallen on very fruitful soil. Bergson, as to Herakleitos, immobility is purely an appearance. Reality is ever in a flux, and we could hardly think of Becoming unless we set going a kind of cinematograph inside us, unless, “ if we are not abusing this kind of illustration, the cinematographical character of our knowledge of things is due to the kaleidoscopic character of our adaptation to them ” (*Creative Evolution*

p. 323). We see therefore that Bergson is largely indebted to Herakleitos in his idea of perpetual flux, but with this difference, that while to Herakleitos the flux is physical, to Bergson the flux is psychical.

General Survey

If we were now to survey Herakleitos' philosophy as a whole we might be astonished to see how many novel ideas Herakleitos contributed to Philosophy. In Science, a man who first noticed the absolutely dynamic aspect of the universe, who not merely asserted the reign of absolute Law, but who also imagined that the soul of Necessity was Justice, and who first anticipated as through a glass darkly two significant notions of modern science, namely, Conservation and Polarity; in Psychology, who first asserted the fact of Self-consciousness; in Epistemology, who first dared to proclaim a definite Rationalism by his stress on what he called the "Common"; in Morals, a scoffer at Dionysos and wine, and, in brief, the moisture of soul; in Politics, a railer at the people, in spite of the fact that he believed that all human laws rested on a divine foundation: Herakleitos stands out, like an ancient; Carlyle, "a bold, paradoxical, and solitary figure," the head and fount of two opposing streams of thought, Relativism and Rationalism, which between them have divided the whole philosophic world down to this day. "If we may echo his own cry", says Gomperz, "Herakleitos was and was not the bulwark of conservatism, he was and was not the champion of revolt." Herakleitos shines on the horizon of Greek Philosophy like a solitary star of the first magnitude, suffering no peer near his throne, forming no school of thought, and yet, in his self-isolation, exercising a potent influence on the whole course of Ancient and Modern Philosophy.

REFERENCES

1. Fragments of Herakleitos in Fairbanks' "*First Philosophers of Greece*" (pp. 24-56).
 2. Plato's *Theaetetus* 160 D., and *Cratylus* 401 D., both referring to Herakleitos' doctrine of Flux.
 3. Many references in Aristotle, principal of which are *Physics* I. 2. 185 b 19; *De Anima*, I. 2, 405 a25; *Metaphysics*, XII. 4, 1078 b 12, this last containing the famous reference to the Herakleitian element in Plato's Theory of Ideas.
 4. The standard treatment of Herakleitos in the three great Historians of Greek Philosophy—*Zeller* (Vol. II), *Gomperz* (Vol. I), and *Burnet* " Early Greek Philosophy " (pp. 143-191).
 5. A complete Bibliography would require the mention of such monographs as Schafer's *Die Philosophie des Heraklit*, Patrick's *Herakleitos on Nature*, and E. Pfeiderer's *Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus im Lichte der Mysterien-idee*, which last would ask us to look upon Herakleitos as a mystic.
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Aristotle's Criticism of the Eleatics.

1. *The General Character of Eleatic Philosophy.*—There has been a great deal of misunderstanding about the nature of Eleatic doctrine among historians of Greek Philosophy. Prof. Burnet interprets it as merely a materialistic or naturalistic doctrine. Zeller has said that the Eleatic doctrine is not to be understood “as a dialectical system, but as a system of natural philosophy.....Not the idea of knowing, but the concept of Being dominates the whole.”¹ Such a naturalistic interpretation, as we shall see in the course of this essay, is completely at variance with the spirit of Eleaticism as a whole, as well as with the testimony of Plato and Aristotle. We learn from Aristotle that the two chief points of difference between the Ionian monists and the Eleatic monists were, first, that the former regarded Being as in motion, while the latter regarded it as motionless; and secondly, that the two schools differed among themselves “in respect of the logical character of Being.”² As we shall see later on, the general tenor of Eleatic philosophy is metaphysical, and not physical as it is supposed to be by Burnet and Zeller, and that we have far more reason to agree with Plato and Aristotle than with Burnet and Zeller. We shall also see how the Eleatic Philosophy develops stage by stage through its four great representatives, Xenophanes the Theologian, Parmenides the Ontologist, Zeno the Dialectician, and Melissos the Philosophical Mystic.

1. Zeller I. 640-642.

2. Arist. *Meta.* 986 b 12. *Vide* Taylor, *Aristotle on his Predecessors*, p. 96.

1. Xenophanes.

2. *How far can Xenophanes be regarded as the founder of the Eleatic doctrine?*—Prof. Burnet has raised the question whether Xenophanes should be regarded as the founder of the Eleatic school. He comes to the conclusion that it is very unlikely that Xenophanes settled at Elea and founded a school there, though he grants that Xenophanes did write a poem of 2000 hexametres on the foundation of that city, and also that he might be supposed to have visited Elea and the surrounding places. His chief contention is that because no ancient writer says explicitly that Xenophanes ever lived at Elea, therefore he could not be regarded as the founder of a school in Elea.³ Now, we have evidence from Aristotle to suppose that Xenophanes had come in close touch with the inhabitants of Elea who asked him the question about Leukothea to be presently mentioned, as well as that Xenophanes knew the adjoining parts of the country very well. Aristotle tells us that Xenophanes had observed that the lava stream at Etna appeared recurrently at the interval of many years as well as that he knew that the volcanic fire on the Lepara islands off the North coast of Sicily, after having once ceased for sixteen years, appeared in the seventeenth.⁴ We see from this that Xenophanes must have known Elea and the surrounding country long enough, and rather intimately. The question of importance, however, for a History of Philosophy is not whether he founded a school at Elea, but whether he founded the Eleatic doctrine. Plato tells us that Xenophanes might be regarded as almost the first philosopher at the dawn of Greek Philosophy who

3. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 127.

4. Arist. *De Mirac. Oscult.* 38 ; 833 a 16.

said that the Many exist only in name, and that the One alone truly exists: "The Eleatics.....say that all things are many in name, but in nature one; this is their mythus which goes back to Xenophanes and is even older".⁵ We have to understand from this passage that the doctrine of the apparent reality of the Many and the absolute reality of the One, even though partly adumbrated by unknown philosophers before the day of Xenophanes, might yet be taken to be for the first time articulately formulated by Xenophanes. Aristotle also tells us that Xenophanes was the first partisan of the new conception of the One, and that Parmenides was regarded as having been his pupil⁶. From all this, it would not be amiss if we regarded Xenophanes as the founder of the Eleatic doctrine, especially as Aristotle hands over to us the tradition according to which Parmenides was regarded as the disciple of Xenophanes. We do not enter here into the question as to whether and how far Parmenides differed from Xenophanes, a question debated between Zeller and Jackson, and about which the latter remarks that while to Xenophanes the primary reality was God, to the latter it was Being: while both Xenophanes and Parmenides tried to reconcile the One and the Many from their respective points of view, "Xenophanes, in his theological system, recognised at once the unity of God and the plurality of things; so, Parmenides in his system of nature recognised the rational unity of the Ent and the phenomenal plurality of the Non-ent"⁷. We regard this as too subtle a distinction to make

5. Plato, *Sophist* 242 D.

6. Arist. *Meta.* i. 5.; 986 b 23.

7. Jackson, *Art. Parmenides*, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th edition, Vol. XX. p. 852.

between the doctrines of Xenophanes and Parmenides; while to ascribe to Xenophanes and Parmenides themselves a definite recognition of the distinction between the theological concept of God and the metaphysical concept of Being is something which passes beyond our comprehension. We cannot help remarking, however, that Xenophanes' way of thought must have led to that of Parmenides, as is abundantly clear from the way in which Xenophanes himself speaks of the "immovability" of Being, a characteristic of Being which is handed down from Xenophanes to Parmenides, and from Parmenides to Zeno and Melissos. Xenophanes himself speaks about his God as follows:—

αἰεὶ δ' ἐν ταύτῳ μίμνει κινούμενον οὐδέν,
οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθ' ἄνθρωποι μιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ⁸

which clearly implies that God must be regarded as always abiding in the same place, and as not moving it at all, a way of speaking about the primary reality which is so characteristic of the whole Eleatic school. It is evident from these considerations that Xenophanes might be credited with having had the honour of being the Founder of Eleatic doctrine.

3. *The injustice of Aristotle's criticism of Xenophanes.*— We cannot enter here into a detailed exposition of the thought of Xenophanes, as the title of our chapter forbids it. We shall look only at those points in his philosophy which have been regarded as worthy of criticism by Aristotle.

(1) Aristotle's first charge against Xenophanes is that his philosophy looks so "crude." He complains that Xenophanes "does not express his opinions in an

8. Fairbanks, *First Philosophers of Greece*, p. 66 fr. 4.

ordinary and natural way". He even regards that Xenophanes might be "dismissed from an investigation into metaphysics"⁹, as his doctrines seem to him to have no philosophical value. The reason why Aristotle regards Xenophanes as unworthy of consideration in a metaphysical treatise is that according to him Xenophanes "takes no trouble to inquire into the meaning of cause". Xenophanes naïvely asserts that the earth must be regarded as "rooted in infinity," and there is the end of the matter. Now this seems to Aristotle to be a naïve evasion of the problem of cause. To say that "there is no limit to the earth's extension underneath us"¹⁰ is to confess ignorance about the nature of cause. To Aristotle, the theory of four-fold causation is the type and norm, by reference to which any system of philosophy is to be evaluated. He finds in Xenophanes and the early Greek Philosophers generally a sad neglect of the problem of causation. The only cause that they take account of is the material cause: that is the burden of Aristotle's criticism. To us, Aristotle seems to be too much obsessed by his theory of four-fold causation. Whenever he has no other defect to find in any philosopher, he brings in his theory of causation, and criticises him for his want of knowledge of the true nature of the problem. Aristotle does not see that the problem of metaphysics is not identical with that of cause, but that it includes other considerations no less vital.

(2) It is especially from this point of view that Aristotle should have taken a more sympathetic view of Xenophanes. The value of Xenophanes consists in the impetus that he gave to moral reflection. All that

9. Arist. *Meta.* i. 5; 986 b.

10. Arist. *De Caelo*, ii. 13; 294 a 21.

Xenophanes did under this head escapes the consideration of Aristotle, who judges him merely from the point of view of abstract metaphysics. Xenophanes has a great importance for the student of the humanistic sciences even though he might not have helped the furtherance of a bloodless metaphysics. He was a pioneer of moral education, and might fitly be regarded as having given lessons to Plato and Aristotle themselves. It was Xenophanes who first inveighed against the poetic habit of ascribing to divinities the faults and foibles which belong to men alone. It was he who first initiated the quarrel between poetry and philosophy. To attribute to gods " things which might be considered disreputable among men.....stealings and adulteries and deceptions of one another " ¹¹ is to set a very bad lesson for moral instruction. Xenophanes in this way gave hints even to Plato, who might thus be regarded as having based his ideas of the moral instruction of the young on the inspiration which he received from Xenophanes. Aristotle himself concurs with Plato in this respect. Does he not himself say that a rigorous censorship¹² ought to be exercised over the stories to be imparted to children—stories which would in any way tend to place false models for imitation before the young? Aristotle is entirely blind to Xenophanes' importance for the humanities, when he criticises him from the point of view of pure philosophy. He fails to appreciate the " wisdom " of Xenophanes, when he calls him merely a " crude " philosopher. As a great satirist of his age, as the moral instructor of his nation, as an apostle of shrewd common sense,

11. Fairbanks, *First Philosophers of Greece*, p. 69 fr. 7.

12. *Vide* Plato's *Republic* Bk. III. 386 ff. and Aristotle's *Politics* VII. 17.

Xenophanes stands unequalled. He bewails that people do not prize wisdom as much as they prize physical strength. It is strange, he says, that a gymnast or a wrestler should come to be honoured more than even a philosopher. Would a city, he asks, be better governed for having more wrestlers than philosophers¹³? He expresses humility when he speaks of his having been permitted to have had only a faint glimpse of truth¹⁴. Finally, with a self-confidence engendered by higher vision he asserts that there has not been a man, nor will there be any, who knows distinctly what he says about the gods, and the nature of things¹⁵. Xenophanes certainly had a right to be treated more leniently by Aristotle for his humanistic importance.

(3) It is true that Aristotle seems to have some sympathy with Xenophanes for his attack on anthropomorphism as well as on the conception of a plurality of gods. He commends Xenophanes for having answered the inhabitants of Elea that "they need not sacrifice to Leukothea if they thought her human, and sing a dirge if they thought her divine¹⁶. He also seems to give some praise to Xenophanes for having said that those who assert that the gods are born are as impious as those who say that they die; for, in both cases the assertion amounts to this that the gods do not exist at all¹⁷. But it seems that Aristotle does not rise to the full stature of his appreciation of Xenophanes' remark that anthropomorphism must be

13. Fairbanks, *First Philosophers of Greece*. p. 73 fr. 19.

14. *Ibid* p. 71 fr. 16.

15. *Ibid* p. 71 fr. 14.

16. Arist. *Rhet.* ii. 23; 1400 b 5.

17. *Ibid* 1399 b 6.

regarded as on all fours with boviomorphism, eomor-
 phism, or hippomorphism¹⁸. Indeed it appears to us
 that the strain of Xenophanes' philosophy is even
 more monotheistic than that of Aristotle. Aristotle
 believed that the stars were divinities; Xenophanes,
 on the other hand, believed that there were no
 gods but God: "There is only one God, supreme
 among gods and men, and not like mortals in body or in
 mind."¹⁹ His God is the *ἓν καὶ πᾶν* the One and the
 All. These utterances have indeed given rise to a host
 of different interpretations. While some would regard
 him as a pantheist, others would call him a polytheist,
 still others as a polytheistic pantheist, and there are
 some who would for the same reasons regard him as
 even an atheist! To us, Xenophanes definitely appears
 to be a monotheist, and we also believe that it was
 impossible for Aristotle to appreciate the kind of
 monotheism which Xenophanes was preaching. The
 Jewish God may be a Judge, the Platonic God a
 Demiurge, the Christian God a Father, and Aristotle's
 God a Theoriser; but Xenophanes' God is an All-sentient
 God, "the whole of whom sees, the whole perceives,
 the whole hears, who without effort sets in motion all
 things by mind and thought."²⁰ Aristotle has no word
 of praise for the directive power of Xenophanes' God.
 He commends Anaxagoras for the directive power with
 which he credits his *Nous*, but he does not commend
 Xenophanes for having ascribed to God the same kind
 of directive power. Finally, Aristotle entirely misre-
 presents the whole situation when he calls Xenophanes
 merely a listless observer of the Heavens, who one day

18. Fairbanks, *First Philosophers of Greece*, p. 67 fr. 6.

19. *Ibid* p. 67 fr. 1.

20. *Ibid* p. 67 frs. 2-3.

looked to the skies and said that it was all God. Aristotle does not perceive the physico-theological strain of Xenophanes' musings. He is very unsympathetic to the physico-theological argument of others, even though he himself comes to posit a Prime Mover by observing the circular (!) motion of the heavens²¹—a peculiar variety of the physico-theological argument! The fact is that the physico-theological musings of Xenophanes could not be set at naught. Looking at the blue vault of the sky, observing how the stars are inwrought in the blue structure of the overhanging canopy, "contemplating the universe as a whole", who would not say in the spirit of that first physico-theologian, Xenophanes, that "the One is, namely God?"²².

II. Parmenides

4. *Aristotle's general sympathy with Parmenides.*—Parmenides finds more favour with Aristotle. Aristotle compliments Parmenides on having spoken with greater insight than any other Eleatic²³. He seems to be carried away by Parmenides' invulnerable argument even so far as to allow in one place that all things are one, that is, as much as to say, that monism is the only consistent position: "it is necessary to agree with the reasoning of Parmenides that all things are one."²⁴

5. *Aristotle's objections to the method of Parmenides.*—But even if the goal of speculation as we find it in Parmenides be so far right, Aristotle finds two serious defects in the logical method of Parmenides; first, that

21. *Arist. Meta.* xii. 6; 1072 a.

22. *Arist. Meta.* i. 5; 986 b 25.

23. *Arist. Meta.* i. 5; 986 b 28.

24. *Ibid* ii. 4; 1001 a 32.

Parmenides "makes mistakes of facts," "makes false assumptions", secondly, that he "reasons in a fallacious manner," "does not draw his conclusions correctly," "the course of his reasoning is not logical."²⁵ Thus Aristotle says that there are loop-holes in Parmenides' premises, as well as his conclusions: (i) In regard to the first point, we learn from Aristotle, that Parmenides makes the false assumption that Not-Being does not exist in addition to, and as superfluous of, Being²⁶, thus involving the absolute existence of Being alone, and that, therefore, "Being is to be spoken of absolutely."²⁷ Aristotle could not sympathise with this assumption of Parmenides, inasmuch as he himself believed in the separate existence of Not-Being, as constituting the womb and matrix of all indeterminate existence whatsoever. (ii) Aristotle's second objection is directed against what he regards as the false conclusions of Parmenides. Given the position that Being is to be spoken of absolutely, he makes Parmenides conclude, first, for example, that there is no difference between one white and another, so that all whites are one, and second, that the object which is white, and the predicate white, are identical²⁸, so that subject and predicate merge into each other. Aristotle says, in answer to these positions, in the first place, that there are many whites and not one, and in the second place, that white as a quality must be absolutely separated from the object which is white²⁹. We can understand clearly, by reference to Aristotle's doctrine of categories, why he should feel compelled to

25. Arist. *Phys.* i. 3; 186 a 4 ff.

26. Arist. *Meta.* i. 5; 986 b.

27. Arist. *Phys.* i. 3; 186 a.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

make a complete separation between substance and quality, while, on the other hand, we can also understand, by reference to Parmenides' monism, why the logic of his position would necessitate a coalescence of substance and quality. It would be beyond our province for the present to institute an inquiry into the justification of either the one position or the other.

6. *Parmenides' Identification of Thought and Being*—The merging together of substantial and adjectival existence has, for Parmenides, not merely a logical significance, but a metaphysical significance as well. As, from the logical point of view, Parmenides asserted the unity of subject and predicate, so from the metaphysical point of view, he asserts the unity of thought and being. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι said Parmenides. This very thought he reiterates in his Poem once more when he asserts τῶντ' ὁ δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκ' ἐστὶ νόημα: "thinking and that by reason of which thought exists are one and the same things"³⁰. Plato and Aristotle understood these expressions quite correctly as implying an identification of the real and the rational. Some modern critics, however, have despised this interpretation, and have found in Parmenides' philosophy a crass materialism. Burnet thinks it a mistake to call Parmenides the father of Idealism, on the contrary, he says that all materialism depends on his view of reality³¹. He asserts that it would be a Platonic anachronism to regard Parmenides as having made a distinction between appearance and reality³². We find Zeller also crediting

30. Fairbanks, *First Philosophers of Greece*, p. 90. l. 40, and p. 96. l. 94.

31. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 208.

32. *Ibid* p. 209 n. 2.

Parmenides with the idea of a mere globular form of ultimate being, "a fixed and homogeneous mass, symmetrically extended from its centre on all sides"³³. Zeller, however, admits a little further on that we would be justified in rejecting this description as metaphorical, only if we could otherwise find any indication that Parmenides conceived Being as incorporeal³⁴. It is just this incorporeality of Parmenides' Being which we hope to establish by reference to the ontological strain of Parmenides' thought as understood both by Plato and Aristotle; but before we proceed to the Platonic-Aristotelian interpretation, we shall first dismiss the materialistic interpretation of Parmenides by discovering the root-source of the fallacy.

7. *The Fallacy of the Materialistic Interpretation of Parmenides by Burnet and Zeller exposed.*—The fundamental mistake of Burnet and Zeller and other similar interpreters of Parmenides consists in their fallacious identification of an analogy with a fact. Shutting their eyes deliberately to the general tenor of Parmenides' Poem which is unmistakably ontological, these critics have pinned their hope on a single passage which is as follows :—

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πῆιρας πύμκτον, τετελεσμένον ἐστὶ
 πάντοθεν, εὐκίκλου σφίρης ἐκλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
 μεσσοθεν ἴσοπλῆς πάντη.

Now anybody who will take the trouble of interpreting this Greek passage will see immediately that Being is here "compared" to a sphere, and not "identified" with it. It must be remembered that

33. Zeller l. 589.

34. *Ibid.*

Parmenides here uses the word ἐνὸςλίγκιον which implies that he regards being as "resembling" a sphere. The root-source of the fallacious interpretation of Burnet and Zeller lies in the confounding of resemblance with identity. Being is like unto a sphere in point of its perfection all round, and in point of its subsistence in equality. There is neither rhyme nor reason in understanding an analogy to be a fact. When Homer compares Hector to a bold hound, we have not to understand that Hector was actually a hound. When he compares Pericles to a lordly bull, we have not to understand that he was actually a bull. The materialistic interpretation of Parmenides, based upon understanding the expression "like a sphere" to mean "spherical" is no less ridiculous. It is gross injustice to the spirit of Parmenides to pin one's interpretation of him on a single passage without looking to the tenor of the whole, and then to distort it in such a way as to make him ridiculous. Once the foundations of a materialistic interpretation are laid, Burnet has no difficulty in raising an equally materialistic edifice on it: the Being of Parmenides is "a finite, spherical, motionless, corporeal plenum"³⁵, and later Prof. Burnet adds the word "continuous"³⁷. If Parmenides regarded Being as *finite*, it was partly because he had not yet risen to the sublimer conception of Melissos who regarded Being as infinite, and partly because he was yet under the thralldom of the Pythagorean identification of finitude and goodness, for which reason even Aristotle praises Parmenides as an acute thinker³⁸. Then, again,

35 Fairbanks; *First Philosophers of Greece*, p. 96 ll. 102-104.

36 Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 208.

37 Burnet, *Thales to Plato*, p. 68.

38. Arist. *Phys.* iii. 6; 207 a 15.

we have seen that Being was *like a Sphere* in point of its perfection all round, as well as its subsistence in equality, and we have *no reason to dub it corporeal*. Being was evidently *motionless*, for whereunto could Being move? It was a plenum, not in the materialistic sense, but in the idealistic sense of *perfect*; it was in fact "the whole", the *ἐν καὶ πᾶν* of Xenophanes once more, so *pervading* that it left no gaps unfilled, for which reason also it was *continuous*. All the epithets which Burnet interprets materialistically, could also be interpreted in an idealistic sense. To crown all, the following excerpts from Parmenides' Poem would be eloquent enough to support our interpretation: "Being is without beginning, and is indestructible. It is universal, existing alone, immovable, and without end. Nor was it, nor will it be, since it now is.....Powerful necessity holds it in confining bonds.....Therefore, Divine Right does not permit Being to have any end. It is lacking in nothing; for, if it lacked anything it would lack everything" ³⁹.

8. *Adamson and Gomperz on Parmenides*.—Adamson and Gomperz have not been as unsympathetic to Parmenides as Zeller and Burnet. They agree more or less with the interpretation of Plato and Aristotle, though they do not rise to their full stature in giving an idealistic interpretation. Adamson understands Parmenides to have at least risen to the conception of the Non-corporeal, if not to that of the Incorporeal, that is, mental or psychical.⁴⁰ Gomperz interprets Parmenides' philosophy in a Spinozistic sense: "Was the universal Being of Parmenides merely matter, merely corporeal

39. Parmenides' *Poem* II. 59-89.

40. Adamson, *Development of Greek Philosophy*, p. 35.

and extended? This seems well-nigh incredible. The supposition is rather forced on us that for Parmenides, as Spinoza might have said, thought and extension were the two attributes of one substance, and the real was at once the thinking and the extended The Material Being of Parmenides was incontestably a Spiritual Being as well. It is universal matter and universal spirit at once" ⁴¹. We have, then, according to Gomperz, in Parmenides, an early adumbration of the Spinozistic philosophy. This is at least not an unfair interpretation. A Spinozism is much nearer an Ontologism than a crass Materialism.

9. *Plato and Aristotle on Parmenides.*—We can, however, lay the ghost of the materialistic interpretation finally to rest by reference to Plato and Aristotle, whose testimony is more valuable than that of others, because they were so much nearer Parmenides, and were less likely than others to misunderstand his doctrines. Aristotle's evidence is all the more important, because his leanings lay in the direction of naturalism, and not in the direction of ontologism. Aristotle gives a fair objective presentation of Parmenides, even though he himself would not subscribe to the unity of being and thought. Plato's testimony stands in a different category; he had a sympathy with the position of Parmenides, even though his Idealism was of a different kind. It is not without reason that Plato speaks of Parmenides as a person to be at once revered and feared. "I have a kind of reverence," he makes Socrates say in the *Theaetetus*, "not so much for Melissos and the others who say that all is one and at rest, as for the great leader himself,

41. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, 1. 179.

Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language he may be called ; him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him " 42. It follows that Plato must have taken trouble to at least understand the man whom he so much revered, and that therefore, his testimony may be regarded as having a peculiar value. According to Plato, Parmenides is the father of Ontologism. He tells us in the *Sophist* that Parmenides regarded Not-Being as unspeakable, inconceivable, irrational, meaning thereby that in order to exist, anything must be thought, conceived, and reasoned about⁴³, a statement which agrees so well with the assertion of Parmenides himself that the path of Not-Being must be regarded as "unspeakable and unthinkable", and must therefore be severely left aside, as it is not the path of truth :—

κέκριται δ' οὖν ὡσπερ ἀνάγκη,
την μὲν ἔαν ἀνόητον, ἀνώουμον. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὴς
ἐστὶν ὁδός.⁴⁴

It is very unfortunate that Prof. Burnet does not see that the identical meaning which he finds in the two questions—*Is it or is it not*, and *Can it be thought or not*,⁴⁵—lays the axe at the root of his materialistic interpretation, and supports the ontological meaning which Plato and Aristotle find in Parmenides. Aristotle very clearly recognises the conceptual character of Parmenides' philosophy. In his *Physics*, for example, Aristotle definitely lays down that the Parmenidean doctrine refers to concepts, and hence a discussion of

42. Plato, *Theaetetus*, 183 E. (Jowett's translation).

43. Plato, *Sophist* 238 C.

44. Parmenides' *Poem* II. 72-74.

45. Burnet, *Thales to Plato*, p. 67.;

that doctrine would be beyond the scope of physics proper⁴⁶. This very definite statement from the foremost scientific philosopher of ancient times is a clear indication of the fact that Parmenides' philosophy has only a conceptual or ontological meaning, and not a naturalistic or materialistic one. Then again, in explaining the nature of unity and plurality from the standpoint of Parmenides, Aristotle lays down that Parmenides regarded the world as a rational unity, while the plurality that one meets with in the world is to be regarded as merely sensible, and therefore, as only apparent: "of necessity he thinks that Being is one, and that there is nothing else.....and being compelled to account for phenomena, he assumes that things are one from the standpoint of reason, and many from the standpoint of sense."⁴⁷ The only meaning that we could assign to this statement about Parmenides is that according to him the essential nature of the world is to be regarded as rational, conceptual, ontological, which allows no scope for ultimate materialistic existence. There is no alternative except to find in Parmenides' identification of Thought and Being a vision of the later ontological argument, which has exercised a potent influence on the whole course of thought. We definitely agree with Prof. A. C. Fraser when he says that the later ontological argument was itself anticipated in the τὸ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι attributed to Parmenides.⁴⁸

10. *Parmenides and Shankaracharya*.—It is very significant that Herr Garbe, following a suggestion,

46. Arist. *Phys.* i cc. 2 f. (*Vide* Adamson p. 34 also).

47. Arist. *Meta.* i. 5. 986 b 32.

48. Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 223.

made originally by Gladisch, should have pointed out the extreme similarity between Greek Eleaticism and Indian Monism. It is noteworthy that Garbe finds in Eleatic philosophy a probable borrowing from the Idealistic Monism of ancient India⁴⁹. As has been shown, however, by the present writer in his "Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy", recently published, the analogies of Greek and Indian thought have to be explained on the theory of Parallelism, and not on the theory of an unproved and unprovable Inter-influence between Greece and India before the days of Alexander. It is only as a specimen of the Parallelism of Greek and Indian thought that we shall briefly notice in this place how Shankaracharya, who represents an ancient tradition of long duration, should have come to the very position of Parmenides. His philosophy of the one Absolute Existence which is Being and Thought, *Sat* and *Chit*, at the same time, his recognition of Not-Being, which is even a verbal equivalent of the word *Māyā*, as being conceptually antithetical to the idea of Being, and as essentially non-existent, his explanation of the plurality of the world which is only apparent, his distinction of the phenomenal and the noumenal, the *Vyāvahārika* and the *Pāramārthika*, which recalls to our mind the Parmenidean distinction of opinion and truth, *δόξα* and *ἀλήθεια*, would go a long way in enabling us to call Shankara the Indian Parmenides. But the most important point with which we are concerned here is the very curiously identical way in which both Parmenides and Shankara argue against the Logical Universal. Shankaracharya, as does Parmenides in the Platonic dialogue of that name,⁵⁰

49. Garbe, *Philosophy of Ancient India*, pp. 33 and 39.

50. Plato, *Parmenides* 131 A ff.

speaks against the Logical Universal in the following way. What is the relation, he asks, between the Universal and the Particular? Is the Universal wholly present in the Particular, or only partly? If it is wholly present, it is distributed in so many things, and so it is many; if it is partly present in the Particulars which are many, it is divisible. It thus comes about that the logical Universal is either many or divisible: in either case it is not one, which it ought to be by definition⁵¹. Students of Plato's *Parmenides* will notice here the extraordinary analogy of the two arguments. It is not possible either that Shankara borrowed it from Parmenides, or that Parmenides borrowed it from the ancient Indian tradition going so far back to the days of the Upanishads, to which Shankara belonged, and whose traditions he has preserved in his Commentary. We have mentioned the extreme similarity of the arguments in this place only in order to strengthen Gomperz's assertions that "if an idealistic interpretation of Parmenides be incredible on other grounds, the last traces of hesitation would be removed by the parallelism to Parmenides which we find in the Vedānta Philosophers of India"⁵²; for then, we could interpret the one philosophy in as idealistic a sense as the other.

III. Zeno

11. *Zeno, an intellectual Acrobat*—Of all the Eleatics, and in fact of all the early Greek philosophers, Zeno alone could be regarded as having made an approach to the art of intellectual gymnastic. Aristotle says that the early philosophers were only untrained boxers, who

51. Shankaracharya, *Brahmasutrabhāṣya*, II. 1. 18.

52. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* I. 179.

occasionally made a splendid hit, but Aristotle generally finds them lacking in the art of intellectual wrestling⁵³. In Zeno, for the first time, we have an intellectual acrobat. He seems to us to be like a porcupine, who darts his sharp-pointed spiny quills at every opponent who happens to come near. By his clever dialectic he sets the whole world of his opponents at naught in order to defend his Master's idealistic monism. Whether, as a champion of Unity, he attacks the Pythagoreans for their inveterate Pluralism, or whether, with a haughtiness to be matched only by that of the proud Hera-kleitos⁵⁴, he attacks his doctrine of incessant motion, the fact remains that he marshals his arguments so skilfully, that his opponents find themselves at their wits' end in resisting the attacks of Zeno. It is not without reason that the whole world has for more than 2000 years stood agape at the skilful performances of Zeno, and more than one eminent man has called Zeno's arguments "immeasurably subtle and profound."

12. *Was Zeno a mere Sceptic?*—Opinions differ as to whether Zeno should be regarded as having a positive object for his philosophy or only a negative one. We cannot be too sure as to whether Zeno influenced Protagoras: it seems according to Simplicius as if he did⁵⁵. Gomperz asserts, relying mainly on a misunderstanding of a passage in Plato⁵⁶, that Zeno did not remain a faithful acolyte of Parmenides in his later life, that he no doubt entered the field as an ardent believer in the doctrine of unity, but that he left it as a sceptic,

53. Arist. *Meta.* 985 a 15.

54. Diogenes Laertius Bk. (Life of Zeno).

55. Simplicius, *Phys.* 255 r.

56. Plato, *Parmenides* 128 E.

or rather as a nihilist. We thus find, that, according to Gomperz, there was in Zeno what he calls "a spontaneous decomposition of the Eleatic theory of Being" ⁵⁷. As against this view, we have the authority of Zeller, who tells us that Zeno must not be regarded as being merely a sceptic, but should rather be credited with having a positive end for his argumentation ⁵⁸. According to this view, we ought to regard Zeno as merely a henchman of Parmenides, who defended his Master's changeless Being with negative arguments. It is with this latter view that we may see that we have reason enough to agree.

13. *Plato on Zeno's Method.*—Plato tells us in the *Parmenides* that Zeno was regarded as the *alter ego* of Parmenides. That he was merely the comely catamite of Parmenides is only a disgraceful calumny ⁵⁹. But the fact remains that Zeno stood to Parmenides in the close relation of philosophical discipleship. Plato tells us that, in this relation, Zeno advanced no new theory of his own, but only fenced round the old theory of Parmenides. While Parmenides affirmed Unity, Zeno denied plurality, and Plato says that they deceived the world into believing that they were saying different things when they were saying the same. In an apologetic vein Zeno replies that he had no intention of deceiving the world; his only object was to defend the arguments of Parmenides against those who made fun of him; and he only paid back with interest the attacks of the partisans of plurality and motion ⁶⁰. Elsewhere,

57. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* I. 204.

58. Zeller I. 614.

59. Diogenes Laertius Bk IX (Life of Zeno).

60. Plato, *Parmenides*, 128 D.

Zeno is called by Plato the Eleatic Palamedes for the subtlety of his inventive genius⁶¹. With his power of invention, Zeno brought into existence his great hypothetical method. Prof. Burnet has exceedingly well brought out the nature and implications of this method. According to him, we must trace back the word *ὑπόθεσις* in Plato's *Parmenides* to the days of Zeno himself⁶². The essence of the hypothetical method consisted in provisionally assuming the truth of an opponent's conclusion, and then deducing from it, either one absurd or two contradictory conclusions: in fact it consisted in educing a *reductio ad absurdum*. According to Prof. Burnet, we must regard Plato himself to have been indebted to Zeno for the method of the *ὑπόθεσις* which he later made use of and incorporated in his *διαλεκτική*.

14. *Aristotle on Zeno's method*.—We are also told by Diogenes Laertius that Aristotle himself called Zeno the inventor of the Dialectic. In a translation of Diogenes Laertius, published by R. Bentley and T. Chapman, London, 1696, there occurs the following passage (p. 103): "In his *Sophist*, Plato calls Zeno, for the subtlety of his wit, the Elean Palamedes. Aristotle tells us that he was the first inventor of Logic." Now, this statement must be taken with caution and care. It is not in his *Sophist*, but in his *Phaedrus*, that Plato compares Zeno to Palamedes, as we have already seen above. Hence, Zeller and Burnet, following Ritter and Preller, take over the expression "in his *Sophist*" with the next sentence, and therefore understand that it was Aristotle who made the remark about Zeno in his *Sophist*⁶³. This raises a further question: what work of

61. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 261 B. D.

62. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 361 n. 4.

63. Zeller I. 613, and Burnet *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 361

Aristotle Diogenes Laertius had in view? In any case, we might trust Diogenes so far as to regard Aristotle as having called Zeno the inventor of the dialectic, as we might also trust him for having said that Plato called him the Eleatic Palamedes. That Zeno had a masterly dialectical mind, and that the problems which he set to the thinking world were "difficult of solution," Aristotle asserts more than once.⁶⁴ The interest however which Aristotle takes in Zeno is not primarily of the metaphysical kind. He never makes mention of Zeno in connection with Parmenides, as he does of Xenophanes and Melissos. Aristotle's interest in Zeno is of a logico-physical kind. By his dialectical way of argumentation, Zeno set the thinking world to frame the rules by which correct reasoning might be tested: while Aristotle duly recognises that the whole trend of Zeno's argument had a very important influence on the development of physical science.⁶⁵

15. *Zeno's Arguments against Motion.*—The arguments by which Zeno set the philosophers of Greece to scratch their heads are well-known: but the merciless logic and the profound insight into science with which Aristotle meets them are not equally known. We will go to consider in the next section the way in which Aristotle meets the arguments of Zeno; but before we do this, we shall take a brief résumé of Zeno's arguments against Motion as stated by Aristotle, in order that we might be better able to understand Aristotle's criticisms of them.

(1) In the first place, Zeno argued that it would be impossible for a moving body to reach any destination

64. Arist. *Topics* VIII. 8; *Sophistici Elenchi* 24.

65. Arist. *De Generatione* A. 8. 324 b 35 ff.

whatsoever : it would be impossible, for example, for a runner to reach the end of a race course ; because, before he traverses the whole distance, he must have traversed a half, and before he traverses the half, he must have traversed *its* half, and so on *ad infinitum*. It comes about, therefore, that it would be impossible for anybody to move at all.

(2) It would be impossible, said Zeno, for Achilles of swiftest foot to overtake a creeping tortoise, if it has just got a start ahead of him. When Achilles comes up to the point from which the tortoise started, it has already gone some distance ahead. Before Achilles makes up this distance, it has advanced still a little further, and so on *ad infinitum*. It comes about, therefore, that it is impossible for Achilles even to overtake the tortoise, not to speak of leaving it behind.

(3) The flying arrow, said Zeno, must be regarded as at rest. At any moment during its motion, it occupies a position which is equal to its own length ; and thus, at any moment, it must be regarded as stationary. A sum of restful positions could never constitute a motion.

(4) Finally, Zeno argued that if two equal bodies are moving with equal speed in opposite directions past another equal stationary body in the stadium, they will move past each other with double the speed and half the time that each of them would take in moving past the stationary body. It happens thus that half the time is equal to double the time.

16. *Aristotle's Criticisms of the Arguments against Motion.*—The acuteness with which Aristotle has attacked these arguments has not been noticed, though it is

well worthy of our admiration. In his criticism of Zeno's arguments Aristotle contributes three important ideas to the history of thought. They are concerned with the distinction between Relative and Absolute Motion, the Philosophy of the Infinite, and the Philosophy of the Continuum. We shall consider these in order.

(1) Aristotle finds it easy enough to dispose of the fallacy underlying the argument of the stadium by saying that it rests on a confusion between the concepts of relative and absolute motion: when we say "half the time", we are comparing the motion of the two moving bodies in respect of each other, that is, we are taking into account relative motion. When we say "double the time," we are considering the motion of a moving body past a stationary body, this is, we are speaking of absolute motion. "The fallacy lies in the fact that while Zeno postulates that bodies of equal size move forward with equal speed for an equal time, he compares the one with something in motion and the other with something at rest"⁶⁶. The two motions, and therefore the two times, cannot be equated with each other, and thus arises the fallacy of the confusion of relative and absolute motion. When we remember that there has been a great deal of controversy in the history of modern mathematical physics over the nature of absolute and relative space, time, and motion between the two camps of Newton and Leibnitz, the one definitely asserting the existence of these, and the other controverting the position,⁶⁷ we will be not a little surprised that Aristotle first moots the problem, and throws it as an apple of

66. Arist. *Phys.* 240 a 1-4.

67. Vide Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 489 ff.

discord amongst the contending schools of mathematicians.

(2) We have hitherto discussed the fallacy underlying the last argument of Zeno. We may now consider how in criticising Zeno's first three arguments, Aristotle makes a contribution to the Philosophy of the Infinite, and the Philosophy of the Continuum. And first, in regard to Aristotle's Philosophy of the Infinite. One of the most significant fallacies underlying the arguments of Zeno, says Aristotle, is the confusion of the infinite and the infinitesimal. "Both space and time can be called infinite in two ways: either absolutely as a continuous whole, or by division into the smallest parts. With infinites in point of quantity, it is not possible for anything to come in contact in a finite time; but it is possible in the case of the infinites reached by division"⁶⁸. Aristotle's point is that though it would be impossible to traverse an infinite space in a finite time, it would yet be possible to imagine that an infinitesimal space could be traversed in a finite time. On a consideration of the passage from Aristotle, which we have quoted, it may be seen that even though Aristotle is shrewd enough to make a distinction between the two meanings of the word Infinite, namely the infinite proper and the infinitesimal, his argument, that the infinites could not be brought into relation with infinites while the infinitesimals could, falls wide of the mark, and might be condoned in him in the absence of the discovery of the infinitesimal calculus in his day. Aristotle did not see that the infinitesimals have to do with the finites no more and no less than the very infinites themselves; the two stand absolutely on a par so far as their relation with the finites is concerned.

68. Arist. *Phys.* vi. 2; 233 a.

(3) The most important criticism, however, which Aristotle makes is directed against the assumption of discontinuity underlying the arguments of Zeno. It seems as if Aristotle regards this as a criticism of Zeno himself: "Both time and space are continuous, and the divisions of time and space are the same. Accordingly, Zeno's argument is erroneous that it is not possible to traverse infinite spaces, or come in contact with infinite spaces, successively in a finite time";⁶⁹ or again, "Zeno's reasoning is fallacious.....for time is not composed of present moments that are indivisible, nor indeed is any other quantity."⁷⁰ It must be remembered that this criticism applies not to Zeno himself, but to the Pythagorean idea of discontinuity, which, *pace* Prof. Adamson⁷¹, was the *ὑπόθεσις* of Zeno. We must also remember that Zeno only provisionally assumes the Pythagorean conception of discontinuity, proves that it is beset with difficulties, and finally implies that such a hypothesis must therefore be destroyed. Zeno wanted to uphold the continuity of Parmenides' Being, and was therefore obliged to prove the absurdity of the Pythagorean notion of discontinuity before he could successfully defend his Master's position. According to the Pythagorean view, space and time must be regarded as merely empirical syntheses of discrete positions and moments; as space consists of only present positions, the "heres," so time consists of only present moments, the "nows". Time and space are merely complexes of jerks; the moving finger writes—and stops—and then moves on; there are caravansaries in the course of space and time. It was

69. Arist. *Phys.* vi. 2; 233 a 21-23.

70. Arist. *Phys.* vi. 9; 239 b 5-9.

71. Adamson, *Development of Greek Philosophy*, p. 37.

such a view which Zeno wanted to prove absurd, and Aristotle would only join him in the affray. To Zeno, as to Aristotle, space could not be composed of serial locations, any more than time could be composed of present moments. Aristotle complains that the view he criticises depends on the false assumption that time is composed of present moments : *συμβάλει δὲ πρὸς τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον οὐκ ἐκ τῶν νῦν.*⁷² and what is true of time could be analogously asserted of space likewise. The Pythagorean idea of discontinuity of space and time was abhorrent to both Zeno and Aristotle; they both regarded their infinite divisibility as a mere chimera. It may thus be seen that Aristotle unconsciously agrees with Zeno : he defends his intention even though he criticises his hypothesis. If, however, Zeno stops with a negative proof of continuity implied in the disproof of the discontinuous, Aristotle goes beyond Zeno in supplying us with a positive definition of continuity, and thus manifests an insight into science which is wonderful : "A thing is continuous *συνεχές* when of any two successive parts, the limits at which they touch are *one and the same*, and are, as the word implies, held together."⁷³ Aristotle tells us how continuity implies more than mere contiguity. We may say without exaggeration that Aristotle has supplied all modern philosophies of the continuum with a solid basis to build upon. It will take us too long to discuss in this place the contribution to the philosophy of the continuous made by recent writers like Cantor, Dedekind, Canturat, Peano and others. We will only take a typical modern definition of the continuous, and see how much it owes

72. Arist. *Phys.* 239 b 31-32.

73. Arist. *Phys.* 227 a 10-13.

to the definition of Aristotle : " A series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts, which between them, comprise all the terms of the series, and when any term which so divides the series is itself a term of the series"⁷⁴. Aristotle's definition is even better, because it is still simpler, and we must credit Aristotle with the first and most complete definition of the continuous. If Logic sprang full-grown from the head of Aristotle, as Kant once said, we could also say that the idea of Continuity also sprang full-grown.

17. *Zeno's arguments against Multiplicity and Empty Space.*—We have hitherto considered Zeno's arguments against motion which have been mentioned and discussed by Aristotle himself. We shall now briefly consider the other arguments of Zeno which are preserved for us by Simplicius.

(1) Being, said Zeno, could not be a plurality, because, on this supposition, it could be shown to be at once finite and infinite. It is finite, because it consists only of as many units as there are ; it is infinite, because, on the hypothesis of plurality, we could always interpose an intermediate unit between any existing pair of units ; hence, says Zeno, the hypothesis we have assumed leads to two inter-contradictory conclusions, which fact destroys the original hypothesis.

(2) Then again, said Zeno, Being could not have any magnitude, for, if possible, let Being have a magnitude. On this supposition, a line which has got magnitude could be divided *ad infinitum* into an indefinite number of units. Each of these units must itself either have a magnitude or not. If it has, the line

74. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 171.

becomes infinitely large; if it has not, the line becomes infinitely small. Thus it comes about that the same line is both great and small, small enough not to have any magnitude, and great enough to be infinite: *μικρὰ μὲν ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μέγλα δὲ ὥστε ἀπειρα εἶναι.*⁷⁵

(3) Then follows the argument of the bushel of corn, involving the idea of plurality, but intended apparently to prove the invalidity of sense-perception. It was inconceivable, said Zeno, how a bushel of corn could make a noise, when one grain of corn, or a ten-thousandth part of a grain is not perceived to make a noise, even though it must be regarded as making one.

(4) Finally, Simplicius makes mention of Zeno's argument against the reality of empty space. If all Being exists⁷⁶ in space, space as Being must exist in a second space, and this in another, and so on *ad infinitum*; hence it follows that there is no such thing as space; *ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν τόπῳ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ' ἀπειρον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.*⁷⁶

18. *Aristotelian criticism of these arguments.*—Aristotle has not himself criticised these arguments formally in detail excepting the last one; but we might see that the principles underlying his criticism of the arguments against motion could easily be made applicable to the first three of these arguments also. We shall however first consider Aristotle's criticism of the last argument before we discuss the validity of the first three arguments from the Aristotelian point of view.

(1) According to Aristotle, the indefinite regress involved in the argument against the existence of space is not of an objectionable kind. It is not difficult, says

75. *Simpl. Phys.* 30 V 141, 1.

76. *Simpl. Phys.* 130 V 562, 4.

Aristotle, to solve Zeno's problem ; there is no reason why the first place should not be in something else...just as health exists in warm beings as a state, while warmth exists in a material body as an affection, and so on indefinitely : οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τόπον ...ὡσπερ ἡ μὲν υγίεια ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς ὡς ἕξις, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν ἐν σώματι ὡς πάθος.⁷⁷ It might seem at first sight as if this is merely a verbal argument addressed to Zeno, and as if it meets one infinite regress by another of the same kind. But, if we look deeper, we will find that Aristotle is here unconsciously making a distinction between two kinds of infinite regress, one of an objectionable kind, and the other absolutely harmless. Mr. Bertrand Russell has very cleverly pointed out that an infinite regress is objectionable, only when in a series of backward processes we never reach a proposition which has a definite meaning; on the other hand, a regress is absolutely harmless when we do⁷⁸. In the regress suggested by Zeno, the very meaning of the successive propositions is in question; on the other hand, in the regress suggested by Aristotle, the meaning of the propositions is quite definite. Hence we see that by recognising that not all infinite regresses are objectionable, Aristotle gives a very clever answer to the sophism of Zeno.

(2) The two arguments against plurality and magnitude were not formally refuted by Aristotle ; but, as we have seen, the principles underlying his criticism of the arguments against motion could be made applicable to these arguments also. The arguments against multiplicity as much as the arguments against motion are based upon a fundamental

77. Arist. *Phys.* 210 b 24-27.

78. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, pp. 348-9.

misunderstanding of the nature of the Infinite and the Continuous; with this difference only, that while in the case of the arguments against motion, we were concerned with Time, in the case of the arguments against multiplicity, we are concerned with Space. The arguments against motion are based on a defiance of the application of the concepts of the Infinite and the Continuous to Time; the arguments against multiplicity are based on a like defiance as extended to Space. If time is not made up of discrete moments, space is equally well not made up of discrete positions; the two are alike infinite and continuous, and they equally rebel against the kind of subjection to divisibility which Zeno's argument would impose upon them. It is very important to remember in this connection that the outcome of Zeno's argument was the formation of the concept of the geometrical point, which has merely an imaginary position and which must therefore be regarded as having no physical parts. How well does this anticipate Euclid's definition of a point as having merely an imaginary location, and having no physical parts! σημείον ἐστὶν οὐ μέρος οὐθεν⁷⁹. While it is important to remember that Zeno thus inspired Euclid in regard to the first principles of his science it is unfortunate that Aristotle did not catch the inspiration. As Euclid agreed with Zeno in regard to the definition of a point, Aristotle agreed with the Pythagoreans. We shall show elsewhere in an Essay on "Aristotle's Criticism of the Pythagoreans" how Aristotle develops the Pythagorean conception of a point as having an actual magnitude. As to how far Aristotle's doctrine of a point as having magnitude⁸⁰ is consistent with his other

79. Euclid's *Elements* (opening).

80. Arist. *Meta.* 992 a. 23.

doctrine of the continuity of space, it will be too much for us to enquire in detail in this place. We may say however that Aristotle seems to us to be a defaulter in this respect. We could understand the Pythagorean doctrine of the discontinuity of space as consistent with their other doctrine of a point as having magnitude; we could understand Zeno's doctrine of the continuity of space as entirely consistent with the doctrine of a point as having no magnitude, but we cannot understand how Aristotle could maintain the doctrine of continuity with Zeno, and the doctrine of a magnitudinous point with the Pythagoreans! The Pythagoreans were wrong, but consistent; Zeno was both right and consistent; but Aristotle was both right and wrong, and therefore inconsistent. For our present purposes, however, it is enough to understand that Aristotle was at one with Zeno in the doctrine of the "continuity" of space at least, and from that point of view it is easy enough to see, as in the case of the previous arguments, how the arguments against multiplicity could be answered.

(3) Zeno's argument of the bushel of corn is, like the above two arguments, based upon the antinomy inherent in the conception of multiplicity, and could therefore be answered from the same point of view. There are, however, in the argument of the bushel of corn two further considerations, which were not contemplated by Aristotle, but which we might briefly mention. In the first place, the argument introduces the idea of number, as the ideas of space and time were introduced in the previous arguments. Now, as students of the History of Thought know, the fundamental conception underlying the idea of number may be taken to be either time as with Kant,

or Space as with Bergson.⁸¹ We do not enter here into the question as to which of these views is more valid. Our point is that whether we understand number to be fundamentally spatial or whether we understand it to be temporal, the antinomy underlying its conception could be, from the Aristotelian standpoint, equally well disposed of as the antinomies underlying the conceptions of space and time. In the second place, we have to remember that the argument of the bushel of corn which was intended to invalidate the authority of sense-perception, could not be finally answered until we go to the psychology of consciousness. Students of Leibniz know that the problem which most seriously engaged his attention was exactly the problem of Zeno: "I am accustomed to use the example of the roaring of the sea with which one is assailed when near the shore. To hear this noise, as one does, one must hear the parts which compose its totality; that is, the noise of each wave,.....although this noise would not be noticed if its wave were alone. One must be affected a little by the movement of each wave,...however small it be; otherwise one would not hear that of a hundred thousand waves, for, of a hundred thousand zeroes one can never make a quantity"⁸². In fact, as Leibniz tells us, we have to take for granted the existence of "*petites perceptions*" before we could constitute out of them a total state of consciousness, the "*aperception*." The problem of Zeno is the same as the problem of Leibniz, and we cannot answer it unless we consider the nature of the subconscious, and the miraculous commingling of subconscious units to form a total state of consciousness.

81. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Transcendental Aesthetic); Bergson, *Time and Free-will*, pp. 78-85.

82. Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais*, Avant-propos.

19. *Zeno, Neo-Zenoism, and the Infinitesimal Calculus.*—(1) We have considered so far the general nature of Aristotle's criticism of Zeno's arguments. We have seen that Aristotle does not rise to an appreciation of the true nature of the Infinite, as the Infinitesimal Calculus had not yet been discovered; we have seen that he does not rise to the appreciation of the nature of the geometrical point as a dot in an ideal space without any physical magnitude; we have seen that he could not come to imagine the existence of *petites perceptions* in the absence of any light yet thrown on the nature of the sub-conscious. But the way in which he cleverly distinguishes between different kinds of infinite regress, some of which are objectionable and others harmless, the acute insight which he shows in making a distinction between relative and absolute motion and finally, his prophetic vision of the nature of the continuous in space and time, are sufficient for our purposes to enable us to regard him as a precocious scientific intellect, whose musings would put the pioneers of modern science to the blush. There are, however, one or two other considerations from the standpoint of modern science, to which we have to do justice before we finish our review of Aristotle's criticisms of Zeno.

(2) One such consideration is forced upon us almost immediately after the dazzling effect produced by Zeno's arguments has partially subsided. Granted that Zeno was acute enough to discover the nature of the continuous; granted also that he could discover the nature of the geometrical point as having merely an imaginary position; granted likewise that these are real contributions to the development of science; what can we say about his doctrine of absolutely motionless Being? Even supposing that the Whole is to Zeno a

mere static reality, could there be no immanent motion inside it, as Aristotle urged? Then again, is Reality a mere block-universe, which allows of no motion and no change? Trying to fly to the opposite pole from the Becoming of Herakleitos, Parmenides and Zeno are obliged to descend on the nude table-land of the Whole, desolate, breezeless, motionless, scorched under the glare of the midday sun. To Aristotle, such a conception of Reality was unimaginable. His principal complaint is that Parmenides and Zeno make no room for change in their static universe. Zeno might prove by a sleight-of-hand that motion is inconceivable; but experience forbids such a false view of the universe. Equally false is the explanation of motion which Plato and Aristotle have themselves to offer as due to the initiation of the soul; it is no less mythological and crude. Plato and Aristotle have played out their cards; Zeno remains unbeaten; the sophisms by which he proves the unreality of motion remain; what trump-card could modern Science show?

(3) The fact is that Zeno could not be finally answered until it comes to be definitely realised that motion is a spatio-temporal relation. It is neither a purely spatial, nor a purely temporal, function. It consists of a correlation between places and times. As Mr. Bertrand Russell cleverly points out, "there is motion when different times.....are correlated with different places; there is rest when different times...are all correlated with the same place.....Motion consists broadly in the correlation of different terms of t with different terms of s "⁸³. In his arguments against motion Zeno with his right hand shows the card s and then

83. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 473.

withdrawing his right hand, with his left shows the card t ; we must compel him to show the cards simultaneously. All the Sophisms of Zeno against motion, the flying arrow, the Achilles, and the rest, depend upon a promiscuous huddling up of δs and δt and the clever passing off of one for the other. To put the whole thing mathematically, motion must be understood as defined by the differential coefficient ds/dt ; it is neither mere δs nor mere δt ; it is a correlation of the two, different from either, and qualitatively new. It is this fact which has been urged upon us by the Neo—Heraklitean French Philosopher, Monsieur Bergson. Time and oft in his books has he urged that movement is indivisible: "Motionless in each point of its course, says Zeno, the arrow is motionless during all the time that it is moving! Yes, if we suppose that the arrow can never *be* in a point of its course.....To suppose that the moving body *is* at a point of its course is to cut the course in two by a snip of the scissors at this point, and to substitute two trajectories for the the single trajectory which we were first considering.....The other three arguments all consist in supposing that what is true of the line is true of the movement,.....which is regarded as decomposable and recomposable at will"⁸⁴. It may be easily shown that Zeno's arguments could be disposed of by giving to motion the things which are motion's.

(4) We must not forget, however, to take account of certain Neo-Zenoist tendencies of modern thought. As we have a rehabilitation of Herakleitos in Bergson, so we have a rehabilitation of Zeno in Mr. Bertrand

84. Bergson, *Creative Evolution* pp. 325-328. Also *Vide. Time and Free-will*, p. 113, and *Matter and Memory*, p. 250.

Russell. He preaches us a philosophy of what he is pleased to call "static change"⁸⁵. With an eloquence which comes out of intense appreciation, he expatiates on the capriciousness of posthumous fame: "One of the most notable victims of posterity's lack of judgment is the Eleatic Zeno. Having invented four arguments, all immeasurably subtle and profound, the grossness of subsequent philosophers pronounced him to be a mere ingenious juggler, and his arguments to be one and all sophisms. After two thousand years of continual refutation, these sophisms were reinstated, and made the foundation of a mathematical renaissance, by a German professor, who probably never dreamed of any connection between himself and Zeno. Weierstrass, by strictly banishing all infinitesimals, has at last shown that we live in an unchanging world, and that the arrow, at every moment of its flight, is truly at rest"⁸⁶. At rest indeed, and with a vengeance! For, does not Mr. Russell say that all such conceptions like velocity, acceleration and force, which may to the slightest extent imply the existence of a changing, moving world, are mere fruitful fictions⁸⁷ of the scientific imagination? Is not Mr. Russell a fit associate of Weierstrass in banishing the conception of the infinitesimal, and in urging that there exist "no infinitesimal differences at all?" For, are not infinitesimals "an attempt to extend to the *values* of a variable, the variability which belongs to it alone?" And finally, does not Mr. Russell justify the sophism that the flying arrow is always at rest, as being merely an illustration of a very widely applicable platitude that

85. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 350.

86. *Ibid*, p. 347.

87. *Ibid*, pp. 473, 482.

“ every possible value of a variable is constant ” ?⁸⁸ But the Nemesis of a static philosophy soon overtakes Mr. Russell. He bethinks himself that Zeno may probably have erred : he may have erred “ in inferring (if he did infer) that, because there is no change, therefore the world must be in the same state at one time as at another ”⁸⁹. And, to crown all, he is in the end compelled to reject the Achilles argument⁹⁰ and favour the Tristram Shandy even though both are equally ridiculous, forgetting all the while that the rejection of the Achilles takes the bottom off the philosophy of rest !

(5) The fact is that the Infinitesimal Calculus can not be so slightly treated, as has been done by Weierstrass and Russell. The Infinitesimal Calculus has come to stay, and mathematicians could ill afford to despise its rules. If the notions of infinity and continuity are to any extent valid,—and that they are valid must be recognised by every thinker—the Infinitesimal Calculus must hold its own in spite of the Casca like thrusts of Herr Weierstrass. Well might we say to Mr. Russell “ *Et tu, Brute ?* ” His attack on the Infinitesimals is the most unkindest cut of all. The Infinitesimal Calculus supplies us with the only possible answer to Zeno’s sophisms. On a review of the mathematical basis on which a majority of these arguments repose, it may be seen that they take the form of the mathematical question—How is it possible for an infinite number of infinitesimally small units to produce a finite whole in combination ? In fact, the question is—Is it

88. *Ibid*, p. 351.

89. *Ibid*, p. 347.

90. *Ibid*, p. 359.

possible that the expression $\infty \times 0$ may give us a finite result? Now, as modern Calculus would tell us, the

expression $\infty \times 0$ is of the form $\frac{0}{0} = \frac{\phi(x)}{\psi(x)}$, when

$x = a$ reduces both of these functions to 0. Supposing that the next higher value that we could assign to x is $a + h$, we have, according to Taylor's theorem

$$\frac{\phi(x)}{\psi(x)} = \frac{\phi(a) + h\phi'(a) + \frac{h^2}{2!}\phi''(a) + \dots + \frac{h^n}{n!}\phi^n(a) + \dots \text{ to } \infty}{\psi(a) + h\psi'(a) + \frac{h^2}{2!}\psi''(a) + \dots + \frac{h^n}{n!}\psi^n(a) + \dots \text{ to } \infty}$$

Now $\phi(a)$ and $\psi(a)$ are each of them zero by hypothesis.

The next succeeding value of $\frac{\phi(x)}{\psi(x)}$ would therefore

be $\frac{\phi'(a)}{\psi'(a)}$. Now, if $\phi'(a)$ and $\psi'(a)$ are zero again, the

next value of $\frac{\phi(x)}{\psi(x)}$ would be $\frac{\phi''(a)}{\psi''(a)}$ and so on, the

general type of evaluation of the original expression being $\frac{\phi^n(a)}{\psi^n(a)}$. Thus, it would be ultimately possible

to get a finite value for $\frac{\phi(x)}{\psi(x)}$ which would no longer

remain indeterminate. The only hope for us to lay to rest the ghost which Zeno has raised is to compel it to submit to the magical wand of the Infinitesimal Calculus.

IV. Melissos.

20. *Points of difference between Parmenides and Melissos.*—When Aristotle comes to speak of Melissos,

he brings Melissos' doctrine in close relation with that of Parmenides, and tells us where they agreed as well as where they differed. Melissos has for Aristotle a logico-metaphysical interest. We have seen already that Zeno was treated apart by Aristotle for his logico-physical significance. Zeno had applied the doctrine of his Master in such a way that he might be enabled to repel the attacks of the advocates of plurality and motion, and he thus contributed more to the history of science than to the history of metaphysics. Melissos, on the other hand, looks at the metaphysical doctrine of Parmenides *per se*, and carries it to its logical conclusion. Aristotle tells us that there were two important points of difference between Parmenides and Melissos. (i) The first consisted in that, while Parmenides' Being was limited, that of Melissos was infinite⁹¹. Aristotle even compliments Parmenides as an acute thinker for having said that Being was finite! As we have already seen, both Parmenides and Aristotle were too much under the spell of Pythagorism to rise to the conception of the infinity of Being as philosophically a sounder and more advanced conception. It is strange that even Aristotle could not extricate himself from the thralldom to finiteness, which is a dominant note of Greek thought: "Nothing is complete which has not an end; and an end is a limit; therefore, Parmenides was a more acute thinker than Melissos"⁹². (ii) The second point of difference between Parmenides and Melissos consisted, according to Aristotle, in this, that while Parmenides seemed to take hold of Unity according to reason, Melissos seemed to take hold of it according to matter: Παρμενείδης μὲν γὰρ ἔοικε τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον εἶδος ἀπτεσθαι, Μελισσος δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν

91. Arist, *Phys.* iii. 6; 207 a 16; also *Meta.* i. 5; 986 b 20.

92. Arist. *Phys.* iii. 6; 207 a 14.

ἄληθ. 93. What this cryptic assertion means, we shall immediately see ; but we may forewarn our readers that it does not mean that Melissos was a materialist.

21. *Burnet on the materialism of Melissos.*—It could be easily imagined that the authoritative statement of Aristotle that Melissos laid hold of Unity according to matter would be regarded as a god-send by all those interpreters of Eleaticism who would approach it with a pre-conceived notion of its materialistic tendencies. We thus find that Prof. Burnet sees in Melissos merely a materialism *redivivus*. Unmindful again of the general tenor of Melissos' thought, unmindful of the deliberate and definite statement of Melissos which we shall quote a little further that Being cannot have body, and therefore that it must be regarded as incorporeal, Burnet fathers upon Melissos a materialistic interpretation once more. The only justification which Prof. Burnet gives for this interpretation is a sublime *petitio principii*: "If our general view as to the character of Early Greek Philosophy is correct" 94, then we must disbelieve that Melissos regarded Being as incorporeal, and believe that he was a materialist! "Reality" to Melissos "is a single, homogeneous, corporeal plenum, stretching out to infinity in space, and going backwards and forwards to infinity in time" 95. Adamson points out cleverly as against this view that "material" to Aristotle does not mean "corporeal": "Matter with Aristotle is a much wider notion than corporeality; there is for him, for example, intelligible matter. The *logos* is the abstract notion, the complete representation of what is essential

93. Arist. *Meta.* i. 5; 986 b 18-20.

94. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 377.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 376.

to the thing. In regard to it, *hyle* is always involved, but only as a subordinate factor or element" ⁹⁶. We have to remember, further, that, in the explanation of the doctrines of the earlier philosophers, Aristotle often uses expressions which have significance only from the standpoint of his own philosophy; and it could be easily imagined that Aristotle uses the word "matter" in the above reference from his own standpoint. Moreover, if the statement from Aristotle above referred to would enable us, according to Burnet, to regard Melissos as a materialist, then the very same statement must enable us to regard Parmenides as a "rational" philosopher, which would give the lie direct to Burnet's interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy! There is no alternative except to understand Aristotle as implying, that while Parmenides may have looked at Unity from the abstract point of view, Melissos may have looked at it from the concrete.

22. *Melissos at the bar of formal logic*—The philosophy of Melissos calls forth very unsympathetic criticism from Aristotle. We shall consider in the next section what Aristotle has to say about the metaphysical philosophy of Melissos. We shall consider here the logical arguments which Aristotle brings against Melissos, and by which he tries to prove that the philosophical structure of Melissos is not in the logical plumb line.

(i) In the first place, Aristotle very severely criticises Melissos for the simple conversion of a universal affirmative proposition. Even if you allow that

96. Adamson, *Development of Greek Philosophy*, p. 35.

what is generated has beginning, it does not follow, as Melissos argues, that, what has a beginning is generated. It may be true, says Aristotle, that a man with fever is warm; but it does not follow that one who is warm has fever.⁹⁷

(ii) Secondly, Aristotle finds in Melissos a fallacious inference by added determinants. He tells us that Melissos believed that things which are generated from equals have the same size.⁹⁸

(iii) Aristotle discovers in Melissos a fallacy of inversion. From the proposition SaP, we could only infer as S'oP as the result of inversion; an S'eP is fallacious. From the proposition "Things which have come into being have a beginning", Melissos unjustifiably infers the proposition, "Things which have not come into being have no beginning".⁹⁹

(iv) Aristotle tells us further that, assuming the truth of the conclusion of the previous immediate inference, Melissos uses it with a minor premise in order to deduce a conclusion therefrom. He makes Melissos argue, that, because Things which have not come into being have no beginning, and Time is seen to have no beginning, therefore, that, Time does not come into being at all.¹⁰⁰ This evidently involves the fallacy of undistributed middle.

(v) Finally, when Melissos tries syllogistically to prove the infinity of Being, Aristotle finds in the argument the fallacy of Illicit Major. From the two

97. Arist. *Soph. Elen.* 5.

98. Arist. *Soph. Elen.* 6.

99. Arist. *Phys.* i. 3 ; 186 a.

100. *Ibid.*

premises—What is generated has a beginning, and The All is not generated,—he makes Melissos deduce that The All has no beginning, and that therefore it is infinite.¹⁰¹ We do not want to enter into the question whether the criticisms which Aristotle thus passes on Melissos are justifiable; we have no desire to exonerate Melissos from the attacks of Aristotle; but we cannot forbear remarking that the criticisms of Aristotle which we have noticed above are anything more than a mere verbal jugglery.

23. *Aristotle unsympathetic to the Metaphysics of Melissos.*—In regard to the metaphysical position of Melissos, we find that Aristotle is extremely unsympathetic. Melissos' metaphysic has been subjected to most undeserved criticisms by Aristotle. "The argument of Melissos," he says, "is all the more wearisome because it sets no problem; but granted one strange thing, others follow."¹⁰² Any kind of metaphysical monism, like that of Melissos, is to Aristotle nothing short of puerility. In regard to the static Being of Melissos, Aristotle asks, what does Melissos mean by saying that the whole is immovable? Granted that for the whole there is no transcendent or external motion; what nevertheless, asks Aristotle, would prevent us from saying that there could be an immanent or internal motion? Why should not the whole be moved even as a part of it, namely water, is moved in itself?¹⁰³ ἔπειτα διὰ τί ἀκίνητον; εἰ ἐν; ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μέρος ἐν ὄν, τοδὶ τὸ, ὕδωρ. κινεῖται ἐν τῷ, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ πᾶν; It cannot be said that the philosophy of Melissos is invulnerable, or that

101. Arist. *Soph. Elen.* 5.

102. Arist. *Phys.* i. 3; 186 a 8-10.

103. Arist. *Phys.* i. 3; 186 a 16-18.

Aristotle's criticism of the static, changeless, Being of Melissos is absolutely groundless; but our complaint is that Aristotle cannot put in even a single word of appreciation for Melissos. Aristotle had no eye of sympathy for the deductive method in philosophy. To him, from the empiristic point of view, the philosophy of Melissos was as absurd as Spinoza's would have been, had he lived to see the uprise of that philosophy. To us, the philosophy of Melissos, like the philosophy of Spinoza himself, seems to be a culmination of the deductive method as applied to metaphysics. Melissos applies this method so successfully that if we just grant the first premise of Melissos, we are carried irresistibly from one stage of the argument to another, until we reach the conclusion of the argument. The deductive method is thus made by Melissos to reveal to our gaze a whole panorama of metaphysical truths. Aristotle shuts his eyes deliberately, and would not see the vision.

24. *The Metaphysical Sorites of Melissos.*—In order to exemplify what we mean, let us briefly cast a glance at the main stages of Melissos' Metaphysical Sorites. Melissos starts by saying that we cannot conceive of the existence of Non-Being; it follows from this that Being is (fr. 1 a)¹⁰⁴. If it is, it is eternal! it ever was and ever shall be (fr. 1). It is thus without beginning and end, and therefore without limit (fr. 2), that is, infinite (fr. 3). If it is infinite, it must be one; for, if it were two, it could not be infinite, for then, the two would be bounded by each other (fr. 6). Since it is one, it is alike throughout; for, if it were unlike, it would be many, and not one (fr. 6 a). Moreover, if it is one, it

104. The fragments quoted follow the arrangement of Prof. Burnet in his *Early Greek Philosophy*, pp. 370-373.

cannot have body ; for if it had body, it would have parts, and would no longer be one (fr. 9). Also if it is one, nothing can be added to it, nor anything taken away from it. It cannot therefore suffer pain or grief ; for, a thing in grief could not be ever, nor would it be alike if it were in pain. It is not therefore changed by so much as a single hair in ten thousand years (fr. 7). It is thus complete, and therefore, it has no necessity to move, for, whereunto should it move if it is complete (fr. 7)? The One is thus an eternal, infinite, homogeneous, incorporeal, painless, unchangeable, complete, immovable Whole. It would be harder to conceive of a more irrefragable chain of philosophical truths, which follow by necessity on the assumption of a single premise. The general tenor of the reflections of Melissos seems to us to be definitely metaphysical ; but if Prof. Burnet chooses to call it materialistic, we cannot help the jaundice.

25. General Survey.—On a review of Aristotle's criticism of the Eleatics as a whole, we find that it was hard for him, with his empirical bias, to agree with the idealistic tenor of the Eleatic philosophy. It was the philosophy of the changeless one, which militated against his own doctrine of development, as embodied in the duality of Form and Matter. It was a philosophy which he supposed to have left no scope for the operation of the efficient and the final causes. It must be said to Aristotle's credit that he thoroughly understood the idealistic character of the Eleatic philosophy, though it must also be said that he failed to extend to it his sympathetic appreciation. He makes fun of Xenophanes for having been merely a listless observer of the heavens, and has no sympathy with the physico-theological strain of his

musings. The ontologism of Parmenides, with its identification of Being and Thought, was, for Aristotle, too hard a nut to crack. In spite of his own original contribution to the philosophy of the Continuous, he "fails to understand the historical significance of Zeno" ¹⁰⁵, implied in his disproof of the idea of the discontinuous. Melissos he calls merely a wearisome philosopher; he fails to appraise correctly the importance of the deductive method in philosophy, which Melissos was one of the earliest to formulate and to carry to perfection; he fails to sympathise with the painless, griefless, sentient being of Melissos which puts us in mind of Parmenides' perfect Being, which lacked nothing, for then, it would lack all; finally, he failed to perceive that this was merely a negative preparation for his more positive, ecstatic, theoretic God, whose utter transcendence serves to place him on no higher pedestal than would be assigned to the thoroughly immanent Eleatic God.

¹⁰⁵ Taylor, *Art. Continuity*, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics Vol. IV. p. 9.

Thales

Prediction of the Solar Eclipse.

The greatest achievement in the life of Thales, on which principally his fame as σοφός rests, may be said to be his prediction of the solar eclipse which put an end to the long-continued war between the Medes and the Lydians. Herodotus¹ informs us that the war between the Medes and the Lydians had lasted for five years; and that "during this period the Medes often defeated the Lydians, and often the Lydians defeated the Medes... ..In the sixth year, when they were carrying on the war with nearly equal success, on occasion of an engagement, it happened that in the heat of the battle, day was suddenly turned into night. This change of the day Thales, the Milesian, had foretold to the Ionians, *fixing beforehand this year as the very period* in which the change actually took place. The Lydians and the Medes, seeing night succeeding in the place of day, desisted from fighting, and both showed a great anxiety to make peace." *That* Thales predicted the eclipse, which be it remembered was also a solar eclipse, is beyond the shadow of a doubt; but *what* led him to foretell it is a mystery which must continue for all time to remain unsolved. We may hazard conjectures; but we cannot definitely state the reasons which may have led Thales, when astronomical knowledge was only in its infancy, to make such a bold prediction, which, on the authority of Herodotus, came out exactly true.

1. Herodotus i. 74.

How to Explain the Prediction ?

The dates that were long proposed for the solar eclipse which Thales predicted varied very considerably between 625 B. C. and 583 B. C., but thanks to the researches of astronomers, the date has been finally ascertained to be May 28, 585 B. C. It was a curious fact, indeed, that Thales should have predicted this eclipse at a time when the Earth was itself regarded as a flat disc and not as a sphere. The idea of the Earth being merely a flat disc runs through Thales, Anaximenes, and even Leukippos. The sphericity of the earth which Anaximander saw as through a glass darkly and which was later the discovery of Pythagoras and Parmenides was not even so much as imagined in the days of Thales. Aristotle tells us that he had taken pains to ascertain that the oldest² view of this kind was to be ascribed to Thales: "We have ascertained that the oldest statement of this character is the one accredited to Thales, the Milesian, to the effect that it rests on water floating like a piece of wood or something else of that sort." It seems *a priori* impossible that, holding such a view of the nature of the Earth, Thales should have nevertheless been able to foretell the eclipse, which could only be foretold on the assumption of the sphericity of the Earth. What Aetios tells us to be the views of Thales seem to us to be merely the latter-day explanations of these phenomena. In his *Placita*, for example, Aetios³ informs us that Thales regarded the Earth as "one and *spherical* in form." Not content with making this statement, Aetios finds no hesitation in giving us further statements of Thales'

2. *De Coelo* ii. 13.

3. *Placita* iii. 9-10.

doctrine which seem to be all pervaded by the fallacy of personal equation. For example, he tells us that "the eclipses of the sun take place when the moon passes across it in direct line, since the moon is earthy in character, and it seems to the eye to be laid on the disc of the sun (while) eclipses (of the moon) show that it comes into the shadow of the earth, the earth coming between the two heavenly bodies and blocking the light of the moon." ⁴ As Zeller ⁵ has pointed out, these statements are "so imperfectly guaranteed that they cannot be considered authentic". What then can be the explanation of the prediction of the eclipse ?

Filtration of Babylonian Empeiria.

If we just investigate the source from which we derive our knowledge of Thales' prediction of the eclipse, namely Herodotus' account of it, we shall see that Herodotus never says that Thales predicted that the eclipse would take place on *a particular day*. Herodotus is careful to mention, and the statement is of very great significance, that Thales only predicted "the year" during which, he said, the eclipse would occur. It would have been nothing short of a miracle if Thales could have predicted "the actual day" on which the eclipse was to take place, taking his stand, as he did, on the idea of the mere disc-like shape of the Earth. The prediction loses a good deal of its sensational character if we remember that it is not so hard to predict the year during which an eclipse would take place as to predict the veriest day on which it would

4. *Placita* ii. 24-29.

5. *His. of Gr. Phi.* I. 224.

occur. And when we look at the problem in this way, we can explain it by saying, not that the prediction was but a chance-hit, or again that it was based on scientific grounds, but that it was merely an empirical generalisation based upon certain previously observed facts. We have the testimony of Ptolemy, the great Egyptian geographer and astronomer, who tells us that the Chaldeans of Babylon made calculations of eclipses so far back as 721 B. C. . This the Babylonians were able to do in the light of the very faithful records, which they had kept from very early dates of all celestial phenomena like the eclipses. The Babylonians were thus able to erect empirical generalisations upon their recorded observations ; and just as they succeeded in formulating an empirical law of the precession of the equinoxes, so they were also able to formulate an empirical law of the periodicity of the eclipses. It was the knowledge of some such law as this, which must have filtered down to Thales⁶ through the medium of Egypt, where we have rather positive grounds to suppose. Thales had made a sojourn for receiving their wisdom⁷. That Thales had a great love for astronomy is evidenced by what Simplicius⁸ tells us about him that he left nothing behind him in writing except a work on "Nautical Astronomy", which is also corroborated by the tradition which has been handed down to us about Thales that he was an incorrigible star-gazer. When Bacon, in his *Advancement of Learning*, holds a certain philosopher to ridicule because he fell into waters as

6. Gow says : " He may have learnt from Egyptian or Chaldean register that a solar eclipse occurs at intervals of 18 years 11 days "—*History of Greek Mathematics* p. 139 n.

7. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* p. 44.

8. *Physics* 6 r. 23, 21.

he was looking at the stars, we must understand that the philosopher meant is no other than Thales himself. Plato⁹ in his *Theaetetus* mentions "the jest which the clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet". We read in Hippolytos to the same effect: "Thales was the first of the Greeks to devote himself to the study and investigation of the stars and was the originator of this branch of science; on one occasion, he was looking up at the heavens, and was just saying he was intent on studying what was overhead, when he fell into a well; whereupon a maid-servant named Thratta laughed at him and said: 'In his zeal for things in the sky he does not see what is at his feet.' "Whether this story is true or false, it unmistakably points out to us the love which Thales bore to Astronomy; and being an amateur astronomer, he would have been also interested in seeking a law of the periodicity of eclipses from Chaldo-Egyptian sources; while we have no doubt Thales himself must have been greatly astonished when the heavens blazed forth that phenomenon during the year of his prediction. On the whole, we think, Grote's estimate of the prediction is absolutely just. "It is pretended" he says, "that Thales was the first who predicted an eclipse of the sun, not indeed accurately, but with large limits of error as to the time of its occurrence....It is sufficient at present to contrast the father of Ionic Philosophy with the times preceding him, and to mark off the first commencement of scientific prediction among the Greeks,

9. *Theaetetus* 174 a.

however imperfect at the outset, as distinguished from the inspired dicta of prophets or oracles...which formed the habitual reliance of the Homeric man".¹⁰

Thales as Scientific Geometer.

That Thales was interested not merely in Astronomy but in Geometry also may be proved on the authority of Eudemos, the disciple of Aristotle, who has left us a first History of Mathematics down to his own day. On the authority of Eudemos and other writers, Dr. G. J. Allman¹¹ ascribes the following propositions to Thales. He says, for example, that it was Thales who first found out that when two straight lines cut each other, the opposite angles they enclose are equal to each other; that the angles at the base of any isosceles triangle are equal (*pons asinorum*); that two triangles are equal to each other when they have one side and the adjacent angles equal; that a circle is bisected by its diameter; and that the angle in a semicircle is always a right angle. Moreover, he tells us that Thales was able to find out a method for determining the height of a pyramid by measuring the length of its shadow and comparing it with a human shadow at the same moment; now as the human height was given, the height of the pyramid may also be said to be given. Plutarch gives an alternative illustration: "placing your staff at the extremity of the shadow of the pyramid you made by the impact of the sun's rays two triangles, and so showed that the pyramid was to the staff as its shadow to the staff's shadow."

10. *History of Greece* II. 115.

11. *Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid*, also *Art Thales* in *Ency. Brit.* XI.

This statement has led Gow¹² to suppose that Thales probably knew that the sides of equiangular triangles are proportional, and that he thus anticipated the VI. 4 of Euclid. All these geometrical rules Thales must undoubtedly have owed to the knowledge he acquired in his Egyptian sojourn, where geometry first saw the light of day. Burnet¹³ agrees that Thales may well have brought the rules of mensuration from Egypt to Greece, but he denies without sufficient warrant that Thales knew the *rationale* of these rules. If what Eudemos says about Thales is right, it is hard to see why we should not believe that Thales was a scientific geometer, so far as the knowledge of his day would allow. If Thales was a mere empirical astronomer, this would not deter us from saying that he was a scientific geometrician; and to deny to Thales a knowledge of the rules of mensuration because he had no knowledge of the rules of astronomy is scarcely justifiable. That Thales made practical use of his scientific knowledge is evidenced by what Plato¹⁴ says about him that he was "the author of a number of ingenious inventions bearing upon the useful arts or other practical matters... ..a man of wisdom in the active duties of life", as well as by what Herodotus¹⁵ tells us about him, that on one occasion when he was in the army of Kroesos and when the river was unfordable to the army, he diverted the course of the river in a semi-circular "moon-like" canal, and when the waters of the river were divided, the army could safely cross over it;

12. *History of Greek Mathematics* p. 141.

13. *Early Greek Philosophy* p. 46.

14. *Republic* X. 600 a.

15. *Herodotus* i. 75.

while we also know on the authority of Proclus¹⁶ that Thales invented a method of finding out the distances of ships at sea from a watch-tower. All these facts unmistakably point to the geometrical attainments of Thales.

Philosophy of Nature

Thales was not merely an astronomer and a geometer, he was also the inaugurator of a philosophy of nature in Greece. Aristotle¹⁷ calls him ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας, the founder of this sort of philosophy. It was Thales who first drew the attention of people to the cosmological, or rather the cosmogonical, problem. Hesiod had said in his *Theogony* that it was the earth which was the basis of the Cosmos; Thales went beyond Hesiod and gave the earth itself a substratum, α ποῶ στῶ. He made the earth float like a piece of wood on the surface of water. Aristotle¹⁸ tells us that Thales declared the earth as merely resting on water τὴν γῆν ἐφ' ὕδατος ἀπεφῆκατο εἶναι which statement doubtless lent colour to the view that he "thought of it a flat disc."¹⁹ There has been a great deal of discussion as to the reasons which may have led Thales to choose water as his primary substance. Windelband refers in this connection to the "practical experience of the sea-faring Ionians", as well as to their "contact with the Egyptians"; according to this kind of explanation, Thales may have been led to take water as his primary substance as he must have had his imagination filled with the experience of the limitless expanse of the Ocean and the huge

16. *Commentary on Euclid.*

17. *Meta.* i. 3.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Burnet, *Thales to Plato* p. 20.

inundations of the Nile. Wildelband,²⁰ moreover, agrees with Burnet in saying that an additional reason why Thales may have chosen water as his primary substance can be sought for in its great adaptability to change: "Thales declared it to be *water*, Anaximenes, *air*. To this choice they were probably determined only by the mobility, changeability, and apparent inner vitality of water and air", and he quotes Simplicius as his authority for the statement.²¹ Burnet²² does not quote Simplicius, but asserts on his own responsibility that water must have been chosen by Thales, because "of all the things we know, water seems to take the most various shapes. It is familiar to us in a solid, a liquid, and a vaporous form, and so Thales may well have thought that he saw the world-process from water, and back to water again, going on before his very eyes." Now this seems to us to be nothing short of an anachronism. Simplicius²³ in his *Scholium* does make the statement about the adaptability to change, not however about Thales, but about Anaximenes. We can understand why Anaximenes should have chosen Air as his primary substance on account of its extreme mobility and changeability, as Anaximenes had in his day come to a consciousness of the processes of rarefaction and condensation. But Thales had no idea of these processes, and to say that Thales chose water for its extreme mobility is to see the later doctrine in the earlier writer. In fact, all the explanations that one could give of the problem must prove more or less

20. *History of Philosophy* p. 27.

21. *History of Philosophy* p. 32.

22. *Early Greek Philosophy* p. 49.

23. *Scholium* Arist. 514 a 33.

conjectural,²⁴ but we must give an account of Aristotle's reasons, because he was the most likely to know about these matters.

Aristotle on Water-philosophy.

In a famous passage in his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle²⁵ says that it is likely that the view that water is the primary substance of things may be traced to even before the times of Thales, and if so, he says it seems to have been grounded upon two beliefs, first that the parents of creation were Okeanos and Tethys, and second that the gods themselves, swore by the name of Styx: "Some think that the ancients who lived long before the present generation, and first framed accounts of the gods...made Ocean and Tethys the parents of creation, and described the oath of the gods as being by water, which the poets themselves call Styx; for what is oldest is most honourable, and the most honourable thing is that by which one swears. It may perhaps be uncertain whether this opinion about nature is primitive and ancient, but Thales at any rate is said to have declared himself thus about the first cause." Aristotle is not sure as to whether this opinion is ancient, but he does definitely know that it was Thales who definitely promulgated this view. Then again Aristotle²⁶ does not definitely know what were the precise reasons which might have led Thales to adopt such a view, but he tells us, that, if he were to hazard an opinion (*ὑπόληψις*), the following seem to be the reasons which must have prevailed

24. Jackson Art. *Thales* Ency. Brit. XI.

25. *Meta.* i. 3, 983 b. 28 ff.

26. *Meta.* i. 3.

upon Thales. In the first place, Thales must have observed that the *seeds* of all things have a moist nature πάντων τὰ στερμακτα τὴν φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν; secondly, he must have observed that the *nourishment* of all things is moist πάντων ὄραν τὴν τροφήν ὑγρὰν οὔσαν; and lastly, he must have seen that *heat* itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν. These are the opinions which Aristotle advances as the probable grounds of Thales' choice.

Conception of Conservation.

The important point to notice, however, is that: the early Greek cosmologists, among whom Thales was the first, regarded their primary substance as not merely an ἀρχή but a veritable φύσις. Burnet²⁷ has done well to call the attention of students of Greek philosophy to this important point: it was far more than a mere *beginning* that the early cosmologists were looking for, it was the eternal *ground* of all things that they were seeking after. We have Aristotle's testimony²⁸ on this point: it is not merely "that from which all things *spring* which is the first principle of them," but rather "that of which all things *consist*, and from which they first *come to be*, and into which they are finally *resolved*—that is the element and the principle of things." For a rough definition of the first principle the following would suffice: τὸ δ' ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πάντων; but for a fuller definition, we must have some such statement as this: ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται πρῶτον, καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον.....τοῦτο στοιχείον καὶ ταύτην ἀρχὴν φασι εἶναι τῶν ὄντων. For the whole conception, we may compare the definition of the Absolute as proposed in

27. *Early Greek Philosophy* pp. 12-15.

28. *Meta.* i. 3.

one of the Upanishads. The Absolute is there cryptically defined as *tajjalān*, that from which things are born, into which they are resolved, and in which they live and have their being. It was such a conception as this which lay at the root of the idea of *φύσις* as entertained by the early Greek cosmologists. Aristotle²⁹ tells us definitely that these cosmologists were believers in a principle like that of conservation of mass: "The substance remaining, but(only) changing in its modifications...they think nothing is either generated or destroyed, since this sort of entity is always conserved, as we say Socrates neither comes to be absolutely when he comes to be beautiful or musical, nor ceases to be when he loses these characteristics, because the substratum, Socrates himself, remains. So they say nothing else comes to be or ceases to be ; for there must be some entity.....from which all other things come to be, it being conserved." In fact, according to Aristotle, these early Greek philosophers were already preaching a gospel of *Ex nihilo nihil*.

Recognition of the efficient cause.

But now, a still more important question arises. Did these early Greek philosophers, and especially Thales, regard their primary substance as their only cause, or did they also accord some recognition to another kind of cause? In fact the question is whether they were satisfied with a mere material cause, or whether they also recognised the cause efficient? We have been told on Aristotle's authority that none of the early Greek philosophers before the days of Anaxagoras ever recognised a second cause. Aristotle³⁰ himself tells us that "of the first philosophers, most thought that the principles

29. *Meta.* i. 3. 983 b. 12 ff.

30. *Meta.* i. 3. 983 b.—984 b.

which were of the nature of matter were the only principles of all things. ...From these facts one might think that the only cause is the so-called material cause ; but as men thus advanced, the very facts showed them the way, and joined in forcing them to investigate the subject...For at least the substratum itself does not make itself change ; e. g...the wood does not manufacture a bed and the bronze a statue, but something else is the cause of the change. And to seek this is to seek the second cause, as *we* should say,—that from which comes the beginning of movement. Now those, who at the very beginning set themselves to this kind of inquiry and said that the substratum was one, were not at all dissatisfied with themselves." Now according to this statement of Aristotle we should credit none of the early philosophers—Aristotle, however, it may be noticed, does not here mention Thales by name—with having entertained even a faint notion of the second or efficient cause. We might however set against this passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* another from his *De Anima*,³¹ where we are *expressly told by Aristotle himself* that according to what was related of Thales, he seemed to have regarded the soul as something endowed with the power of motion, if indeed, Aristotle is careful to remark, Thales said that the loadstone had a soul because it moved iron : ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς, ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι, κινητικόν τι τῆν ψυχὴν ὑπολαμβάνειν, εἶπερ τὴν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ.

This passage tells us unmistakingly that Thales on the authority of tradition may be credited with having introduced the conception of the soul, and also endowed the soul with the power of initiating movement. As

31. *De Anima* i. 2.

we understand the doctrine of Thales, the credit for having introduced these conceptions belongs to Thales: rather than to Anaxagoras. It was unfortunate that most of the immediate successors of Thales could not appreciate the very great step that Thales had taken, and so allowed themselves to rest content with the non-recognition of the efficient cause, until Anaxagoras came on the scene and rediscovered the conception of a psychical and efficient cause for which Aristotle gives him the credit that he fully deserves.

Did Thales believe in a World-Mind ?

Our conclusion is manifestly strengthened when we take into account another statement that has been credited to Thales by both Plato and Aristotle. According to Aristotle's *De Anima*, we ought not merely to ascribe the conception of a psychical and moving cause to Thales, but ought also to ascribe to him the further notion that all things are full of gods. Aristotle³² tells us that Thales may have derived this conception from the belief which some people entertain about the whole universe being filled with soul : *καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δὲ τινες αὐτὴν (Sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) μεμίχθαι φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θυλῆς ᾤθηται πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι.*

Aristotle does not tell us that Thales himself definitely believed in a unitary World-Soul; but he tells us that this belief in a World-Soul which was prevalent among some men may perhaps have led Thales to fill all things with souls. On the whole, according to Aristotle, it seems that instead of believing in one World-Soul, Thales believed in a number of souls pervading all things. Cicero seems to have misunder-

32. *De Anima* i. 5.

stood the doctrine of Thales, when, on the authority of some such passage as the one quoted from Aristotle, he ascribed to Thales a belief in a World-Mind who should fashion all things from water: "Thales...*aquam dixit esse initium rerum. Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret.*" In other words, Cicero's interpretation comes very near to the theory of Manu³³ who said that God created the world from primeval waters, or again to the doctrine of the Old Testament³⁴ that at the beginning of creation the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters and then created all the objects in the Universe. We must consider Thales innocent of such an idea of a Creator who fashioned all things from water. We must remember that Thales has even been accused of being an atheist and having lost his belief in the gods³⁵. Even though this statement may be exaggerated, it is no less an exaggeration to say in Cicero's style that Thales believed in a World-Mind who created the world from the *Weltstoff*—water. Cicero's interpretation is another case of the fallacy of personal equation, as it seems evident that Cicero is looking for the later Stoic ideas in the philosophy of Thales.

The Panpsychism of Thales.

However this may be, that Thales believed that all things were filled with "gods" or "good souls" is evident from Aristotle's testimony. This is also corroborated by a famous passage in the *Laws* of Plato,³⁶ where also the same expression is used. It is true Plato does not

33. *Manusmriti* I. 8: *apa eva sasarijatau tasu bijamavasrijat,*

34. *Genesis* I. 2.

35. Simplicius, *Phys.* 6 r.

36. *Laws* X. 898-899.

refer to Thales by name, but we may assure ourselves that Plato had *Thales* in view, because the same doctrine of πάντα πλήρη θεῶν has been definitely referred to Thales by Aristotle in his *De Anima*. This makes us understand the passage in Plato's *Laws* as referring to Thales himself, and we may also conclude that Plato in that passage has preserved to us the argument by which a philosopher like Thales could have supported his theory that all things were full of "gods," or as Plato translates the expression, of "good souls": "If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other stars, does she not carry round each individual of them? And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the sun ought by every man to be deemed a god.....And of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and months and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them, those souls are gods, whether they are living beings and reside in bodies and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the place and mode of their excellence;—and will any one who admits all this venture to deny that *all things are full of gods?*" In this passage, no doubt, Plato is advocating his own more full-fledged doctrine that the souls which inhabit the sun, the moon, and the stars are divine beings; but the expression πάντα πλήρη θεῶν enables us unmistakably to see in it a reference to the doctrine of Thales. We have already seen on Aristotle's testimony that Thales probably attributed a soul to the magnet; we may likewise rely on Diogenes Laertios' information that he attributed a soul to amber³⁷ also. Aetios³⁸ tells

37. Diogenes Laertios i. 24.

38. *Placita* v. 26.

us that Thales regarded that the plants themselves were endowed with souls: "Plants are living animals; this is evident from the fact that they wave their branches and keep them extended, and they yield to attack and relax them freely again, so that weights also draw them down." If we sum up these statements, we may see that Thales regarded not merely the world of plants as living beings, that is, as endowed with souls, but he also regarded even inorganic objects as already endowed with life. In fact, Thales saw soul everywhere. He seems to have made no distinction between life and soul, and if all existences were living, he thought they must also be supposed to have been inhabited by souls. In our opinion, to characterise Thales' philosophy as a mere hylozoism, as Zeller does, is an inadequate statement of the opinions of Thales: we must call Thales' view a veritable panpsychism. Burnet,³⁹ however, does not allow even the name "hylozoism" to be given to the philosophy of Thales; for he says that "to say that the magnet and amber are alive is to imply, if anything, that other things are not"; so that, according to Burnet, that Thales should select "magnet" and "amber" as the only two objects endowed with souls is tantamount to saying that he denied souls to all other objects. This, we think, entirely misrepresents the situation. We have seen on Plato's authority and on that of Aristotle that Thales believed that all things were full of gods; and that therefore if Thales chose "magnet" and "amber" in illustration of his theory, he chose them as objects *most suited* to illustrate his doctrine. According to Thales, we must suppose, magnet and amber were to be regarded as pre-

39. *Early Greek Philosophy* p. 52.

eminent specimens to prove the general contention that all things are full of gods. We must therefore maintain not merely that Thales advocated a hylozoism, but that he believed in a panpsychic view of the world; and that as he recognised a psychical cause, however dimly it might be, he already anticipated Anaxagoras in introducing the conception of an efficient cause endowed with the power of motion. Zeller allows that Thales advocated a hylozoism, but denies that he had any notion of a moving cause; and therefore, in our opinion, does not see the contradiction in maintaining a hylozoistic and yet a non-dynamic view of the world. Wherever there is life, there is motion; and if we attribute a hylozoistic view to Thales, we must *ipso facto* ascribe to him a belief in the moving cause. If as we shall see in the case of most of the immediate successors of Thales, they have no notion of a moving cause, (and Aristotle's statement in his *Metaphysics* must be made applicable to these philosophers only), we must also refrain from characterising their philosophy as generally hylozoistic. To admit a hylozoism and to deny a moving cause are contradictory statements which cannot be reconciled with one another. Finally, we cannot also say that Thales did not see the contradiction and allowed it to remain; for, on Plato's and Aristotle's testimony we know that Thales did recognise the soul which he *also* endowed with the power of motion.

The Apophthegms of Thales.

The last point to discuss in connection with the philosophy of Thales is his great practical wisdom, for which he was praised by Aristotle⁴⁰ as having been

40. *Politics* 1259 a. 8-10

the first man to show that "it was easy for philosophers to be rich if they only cared about it", and for which he was included by Plato among the seven Wise Men of Greece. According to Plato,⁴¹ the seven Sages were Thales, Solon, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobulus, Myson, and Chilon. All these sages were known for their great practical wisdom which they were supposed to have expressed in some famous apophthegms. They were each of them credited with one distinctive maxim, and some of these maxims, such as "Know thyself," "Nothing too much," "Know thy opportunity" were inscribed on Apollo's temple at Delphi. The maxim which was pre-eminently ascribed to Thales was the first of these Γυῶθι σεαυτόν which was later made by Socrates⁴² the keystone of practical life. There are other pithy sayings of Thales which are handed down to us by Stobaeus, Diogenes, Laertios, and other writers. According to these, Thales tells us in Christian spirit to love our neighbour as well as ourselves Ἀγάπα τὸν πλησίον; he tells us not to forget our friends whether present or absent Φίλων παρόντων καὶ ἀπόντων μεμνήσθαι (ἔφη); he advises us to look to the past which is certain and not to the future which is obscure Ἀσφαλὲς τὸ γεγόμενον, ἀσφές τὸ μέλλον; he asks us not to reproach the unsuccessful, because upon them sits the vengeance of the gods Κακοπραγούντα μὴ ὀνειδίξει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τούτους νέμεσις θεῶν κάθηται; he warns us to disbelieve even probabilities from our enemies and believe even improbabilities from our

41. *Protagoras* 343 a.

42. Cf. Socrates' statement in the *Phaedrus* 229 e: "I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why? I must first know *myself*, as the Delphian inscription says: to be curious about that which is not my concern while I am still in ignorance of myself would be ridiculous."

friends Δεῖ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς καὶ περὶ τῶν πιστῶν ἀπιστεῖν, τοῖς δὲ φίλους καὶ τὰ ἀπίστα πιστεῖειν; and finally, he vindicates his own sententious way of putting things by saying that a multitude of words is never any proof of a prudent mind οὐ τι τὰ πολλὰ γ' ἔπη φρονιμὴν ἀπεφῆνυτο δόξαν. These aphorisms have been handed down to us through a number of centuries, and they show us how even a water-philosopher could discourse on moral science. And while these aphorisms and this water-philosophy has remained, it is not improbable, if the story of his having fallen into a well is authentic, that the philosopher himself was absorbed in the substance from which he came, and if what a modern writer has said about it is true, the very city, Miletus, in which he lived and philosophised has been dissolved in a lake formed by the Meander, thus proving the eternal truth of Thales' assertion that all things come from water as they are finally re-absorbed in it.

Aristotle's Critique of Protagoreanism

“For it those who have seen most of what truth is possible for us.....if these have such opinions and express these views about the truth, is it not natural that beginners in philosophy should lose heart? For to seek the truth would be to follow flying game”.—*Aristotle: Metaphysica* 1900-18. 33-38.

1. *Aristotle, a friend of Plato.*—When we think of Aristotle, we think of him as merely an opponent of Plato's theory of Ideas; but it never occurs to us to think of him as a friend of Plato. Aristotle had much reason, from his own philosophic standpoint, to complain of Plato's theory; but we must never forget that Aristotle had once been a pupil of Plato, and therefore had imbibed from his master a hatred of relativism and scepticism. If ever Plato and Aristotle joined hands together, it was in the scathing criticism that they alike passed on the relativistic and sceptic train of thought initiated by Protagoras. They were at one in guessing the real import of the Protagorean way of thought; and whatever the feeling of awe that might have been produced in them by the venerable 'Orphidus-like' figure of Protagoras, they never thought that their intellects were so poor as to compel them merely to dance attendance on Protagoras, and like that band of his disciples "to follow where he listed, and to wheel round and always take their places behind him in perfect order"¹. They would not have understood the

1. Compare Plato's *Protagoras* 315 B.

modern interpretation of Protagoras, and could not have sympathised with the Neo-protagoreans if they had understood it; and they would have merely brushed aside all modern attempts to exalt the Protagorean dictum even above the Delphic 'know thyself'².

2. *The Importance of Aristotle's criticism.*—A study of Aristotle's criticism of Protagorean doctrine would be interesting, first because while we merely derive our Protagorean criticism from Plato we do not much know that Aristotle criticised Protagoras with equal severity, and with almost the same arguments as those of Plato, modifying these, however, only in those essential respects in which the Aristotelian doctrine went beyond Plato's. This would prove that even though Aristotle was opposed to Plato's doctrine of Ideas, he retained his Platonism when a common enemy threatened the Academy and the Lyceum alike, and that he even made an advance over Plato when he had dispensed with Protagoreanism with his Platonic weapons. Secondly, the acute criticism of Protagoras which Aristotle offered on his own account is so fresh and modern, his psychological analysis of the nature of sensation so profound, and his account of truth and error so unassailable, that the present writer considers it almost impious to allow the Aristotelian *Metaphysica* merely to gather dust on old book-shelves and fall a prey to worms and moths. The unmerited oblivion in which the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle has been allowed to remain is surely unworthy of an age which boasts without warrant that it has incorporated into its learning all the precious wisdom of the past.

2. Compare Schiller's *Studies in Humanism* p. 33.

3. *Genesis of Protagorean Doctrine.*—Plato has truly said that the real kernel of Protagoreanism is the “high argument in which all things are said to be relative,”³ a truth which Protagoras esoterically conveyed to his own disciples, but of which he only spoke in parables to the common herd of people. That Protagoras definitely preached a doctrine of relativism is well-known; but for that reason we must not be prepared to give him the credit, or the censure, for having invented it. Both Plato and Aristotle tell us that the Protagorean doctrine of relativism was in the first instance based on the Heracleitean doctrine of flux; while they also tell us that the genesis of the doctrine is to be carried back to still remoter times. Summon any early philosopher you like, says Plato, with the honorable exception of Parmenides, and you will find him preaching a doctrine of motion, and forthwith of relativity: “Summon all philosophers—Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles and the rest of them, one after another, and, with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry—Epicharmus, the prince of comedy, and Homer of tragedy; when the latter sings of ‘Ocean, whence sprang the gods and mother Tethys,’ does he not mean that all things are the offspring of flux and motion?”⁴ Plato does not exclude even Epicharmus the prince of comedy, and Homer the prince of tragedy. All according to him were equally culpable of having magnified the doctrine of motion beyond measure. Aristotle is at one with Plato in tracing the genesis of the Protagorean doctrine to the same

3. *Theaetetus* 152 D.

4. *Ibid* 152 E.

philosophers, but he does not exclude Parmenides from the list of the people who maintained a relativistic doctrine. Aristotle gives a good account of the history of the relativistic doctrine from pre-protagorean philosophers. Homer himself, says Aristotle, was guilty of relativism when he represented Hector, at the time that he lay unconscious from the blow he had received, as "thinking other thoughts," as if a man who was bereft of thoughts should yet be able to think, as if, in other words, an unconscious mind could at the same time be conscious.⁵ Empedocles when he said that people changed their knowledge with their condition,⁶ Parmenides when he expressed himself in the same way by saying that the mind of man is like unto a much-bent limb,⁷ Anaxagoras when he said that all is mixed in all and that things are for persons what they suppose them to be,⁸ and Democritus when he said that the void and the full exist alike in each part, and yet one of these is being and the other non-being,⁹ all these philosophers, says Aristotle, were merely preparing the way for the later full-fledged relativism of Protagoras.

4. *Critical Examination of Heraclitus*—More than any of these philosophers, however, by the common consent of Plato and Aristotle, we ought to recognise Heraclitus with his doctrine of flux as the sure precursor of Protagorean doctrine. Plato tells us in a famous passage in his *Theaetetus* that the Protagorean doctrine of relativism was merely an application of the Heraclitean

5. *Metaphysica* 1009 b. 30.

6. *Ibid* 1009 b. 18.

7. *Ibid* 1009 b. 22

8. *Ibid* 1009 a. 27, and 1009. b. 25.

9. *Ibid* 1009 a. 29.

doctrine of flux to sensation and perception, that, to take an illustration, "as sight is flowing from the eye, whiteness is proceeding from the object, and as the eye is fulfilled with sight and becomes a seeing eye, the object is fulfilled with whiteness and becomes a white thing," that in fact all sense experience is based in the first instance on motion both ways.¹⁰ We know how Plato criticised this Heracleitean doctrine by pointing out that, if the conception of flux were to be universalised, 'perception' itself would be in a state of flux, the flow of movement could never be sufficiently arrested to enable us to even say 'this' or 'that', and the only logical position in which a Heracleitean on his principles was bound to remain was a state of absolute speechlessness, and, if we were to generalise this, absolute insentience. Aristotle passes a three-fold criticism on this Heracleitean doctrine of flux. He tells us in the first place that the Heracleitean doctrine of flux met its nemesis in being blossomed into the extreme doctrine of Cratylus, who did not think it right to say anything but only moved his finger, and who rebuked his master for having said that it is impossible to step twice into the same river, for *he* thought that this could not be done even once, for, he said, in the very process of your stepping into the river, the waters have run off¹¹. The second criticism which Aristotle brings to bear on the Heracleitean doctrine of incessant change is that even though there is some real sense in the relativist's contention that the changing, *when* it is changing, does not exist, still this does not prove that behind change there is no substratum. Aristotle almost argues like Kant that it is only the permanent that could change

10. *Theaetetus* 156E.

11. *Metaphysica* 1010 a. 10-15.

and that it is only from a pre-existing thing that change or motion could take place; and he says in addition that the process of change could not go on *ad infinitum*, and that therefore there is no meaning in the idea of incessant change: "if a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it is generated, and this process cannot be *ad infinitum*"¹². The last criticism which Aristotle passes on the theory of flux is that its author has unduly extended the sphere of application of the idea of change from his immediate surroundings to the whole universe. Granted that what immediately surrounds us is always in process of destruction and generation—this is, be it remembered, not even a fraction of the whole—it would thus be juster to acquit this part of the world because of this. So that, says Aristotle, it is evident that there is something whose nature is changeless, and if we were given the only alternative between 'rest' and 'change' as predicates of the Cosmos, we had rather decide for 'rest' than for 'change'¹³. Thus does Aristotle take the Heracleitean bottom out of the Protagorean relativism.

5. *Plato and Aristotle on the Homo Mensura.*—This relativism of Protagoras had a classical expression in his dictum that "Man is the measure of all things." The *magnum opus* of Protagoras, the *'Αλήθεια* has not been preserved to us; but it seems from the way in which Plato gives us the Protagorean doctrine in the *Theaetetus* that he is reporting the very words of Protagoras.¹⁴ The great question that has arisen about

12. *Ibid* 1010 a. 20-22.

13. *Ibid* 1010 a. 28-36.

14. *Theaetetus* 152 A.

this dictum is—who is this ‘man’ about whom Protagoras is speaking? Is it the individual man or the man-as-such? In other words, are we to put an individualistic interpretation on the dictum, or a generic one? Plato and Aristotle without doubt put an individualistic interpretation on the dictum: things are to me what they appear to me, and to you what they appear to you: there is no essential nature of anything whatsoever which could be apprehended by all men alike. It was such an interpretation which aroused the feelings of Plato, and it was with this interpretation in view that he passed that supreme classic contumely upon Protagoras: “I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon.....is the measure of all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom, he was no better than a tadpole.”¹⁵ Aristotle seems evidently to ascribe the same kind of individualistic interpretation to Protagoras: “He said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply that that which seems to each man assuredly is. If this is so, it follows that the same thing both is and is not, and is bad and good.....and that which appears to each man is the measure.”¹⁶

6. *The interpretation of Burnet.*— In interpreting the above dictum Professor Burnet tells us that the word ‘measure’ has been used in an arithmetical sense. This cannot be doubted; but the interpretation which he forthwith proceeds to put on the dictum is not, we think, a natural interpretation. Professor Burnet

15. *Ibid* 161 C.

16. *Metaphysica* 1062 b 14–20.

understands the dictum to mean simply that "theories that set themselves in opposition to the commonsense of mankind may safely be ignored." "It is recorded", says Professor Burnet, "that Protagoras attacked mathematics, and in particular the doctrine that the tangent touches the circle at a point. There must, he urged, be a stretch for which the straight line and the circle are in contact (cf. Arist. Met. B, 2.998 a, 2.)..... The geometers tell us that the side and the diagonal of the square have no common measure, but in cases like that, man is the measure, that is, they are commensurable for all practical purposes."¹⁷ This interpretation seems to the present writer to be entirely unnatural and forced, and in addition seems to make the dictum entirely tame by depriving it of its individualistic sting. The word 'measure' may have been used in an arithmetical sense, but this does not prove that the whole dictum should be arithmetically or mathematically interpreted. It seems to the present writer that there would be far more justification in interpreting the dictum from the view-point of the relation in which Protagoras placed himself to his pupils. Aristotle himself tells us that "it was the practice of Protagoras, who, whenever he taught any subject, would tell his pupils to estimate the value of the knowledge in their own eyes, and would take just so much payment and no more".¹⁸ Aristotle tells us that Protagoras made each one of his pupils the measure of the benefit which he reaped from himself and asked him thereafter to commute the measure of his benefit into a proportional payment of fees. The Protagorean dictum that "man is the measure of things" may have

17. *Thales to Plato* p. 114.

18. *Ethica* 1164 a. 24-26.

taken its rise from this peculiar custom of Protagoras, instead of from the notion of mere 'mathematical' commensurability or incommensurability. This interpretation would also preserve the individualistic sting in the original dictum instead of making it merely a doctrine of tame commonsense.

7. *The generic interpretation of Gomperz.*—There are, however, two other interpretations of the Protagorean dictum which we must consider before we can proceed to the criticisms which Aristotle passed on Protagorean individualism. These are respectively the generic interpretation of Gomperz and the individualistico-collectivistic interpretation of Mr. F. C. S. Schiller. Gomperz feels himself compelled to hold a brief for Protagoras against the authority of Plato and Aristotle, and to educe out of the Protagorean dictum a meaning which seems to us as eccentric as it is wrong. He tells us that if we are to believe the account of the Neo-platonist Porphyry, we shall have to suppose that Protagoras directed his attack against the Eleatic doctrine of unity and with a view to the rehabilitation of the evidence of the senses, that the dictum cannot possess an ethical meaning and cannot be the shibboleth of any moral subjectivism, that the dictum should rather be regarded as a contribution to the theory of cognition, that even when so interpreted the dictum tells us that human nature or man-as-such is the measure of all things and not the individual man, that the grammar of the original dictum and the general consensus of philological authorities in the interpretation of the little Greek word $\omega\varsigma$ in the original dictum as meaning 'that' and not 'how' compels us to put a generic interpretation on the dictum, that when we consider that the dictum

occurred at the very beginning of the Protagoras was foolish enough to imply a complete jettison of the doctrine of objective reality, and finally that man is to be regarded as the measure not of the properties but of the existence of the objects, and that therefore the meaning of the dictum is that human nature is to be regarded as the standard for the existence of things and that therefore only what is real can be perceived by us and the unreal cannot be an object of our perception.¹⁹ In the opinion of the present writer, the very statement of this kind carries with it its refutation. Is it meant that Plato and Aristotle did not understand the original Greek which modern philological interpreters are supposed to understand? Is it meant that we in the twentieth century have far more facilities to interpret the original dictum when we know definitely that Plato and Aristotle were in possession of a tradition which would compel them to interpret the original dictum in none other than in an individual sense? Moreover, have we not here a complete agreement of Aristotle with Plato which is itself a great argument for the fact that the individual interpretation is the only correct interpretation? To accuse Plato and Aristotle of malice prepense is what we completely fail to understand; to doubt their knowledge of Greek seems to us to be preposterous nonsense. If Gomperz believes on his own account that it is the 'man-as-such' who is the measure of all things, we are in entire agreement with Gomperz; but if he finds the meaning in the Protagorean dictum, we think he is like the jaundiced man who sees all things yellow.

19. *Greek Thinkers* I. 450-453.

8. *Schiller's humanistic interpretation.*—Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, in our opinion, is equally guilty of putting rather too large an interpretation on the Protagorean dictum from his own 'humanistic' point of view. He confesses that the dictum would lose much of its sting if we consented to put only a generic interpretation on the original dictum. The primary interpretation of the dictum, says Mr. Schiller, must be the individualistic interpretation; but it is not the only interpretation. When Protagoras said "man is the measure of all things" he implied not merely that the individual man was the measure, but that humanity itself was equally the measure of all things. The 'humanism' (!) of Protagoras was wide enough, says Mr. Schiller, "to embrace both man and men, and it could include the former because it had included the latter." He tells us that it was Protagoras who first had an inkling of the great scientific perception that "reality is relative to our faculties." It was Protagoras' great achievement to recognise even the hallucinations and illusions, the whims and the idiosyncrasies as real, and "woe betide any thinker or manager of men who fancies that he can ignore them with impunity!" The marvellous speech of Protagoras in Plato's dialogue of that name is, according to Mr. Schiller, a final repudiation of the intellectualistic way of thought. Protagoras, according to him, gave the death-blow to that system of Greek Ethics, which was 'corrupted by intellectualism and enervated by aestheticism.' Protagoras did not put men and pigs and baboons on the same level, says Mr. Schiller, as Plato ridiculously said about Protagoras; he did recognise distinction of value. The only difference, however between Protagoreanism and Neo-protagoreanism is, that Protagoras did not regard the true and false as values

which were *cognate* with good and bad. Finally, the passage from the individual to the generic, from the subjective to the objective, side of the dictum should be regarded as having been effected by Protagoras in a perfectly valid and scientific manner by the recognition of the fact that an objective order comes to be established in society out of the mass of variable subjective judgments by the processes of selection and survival, and by the coercing and cajoling which society effects on those who are inclined to take divergent views in moral and aesthetic matters.²⁰ We need hardly say that 'humanism' is Mr. Schiller's idol of the den; but for that reason there would be no justification in interpreting the Protagorean dictum in the modern humanistic sense. The interpretation of the dictum is one thing, and Mr. Schiller's philosophic bias is quite another. This is not the place to consider the Humanism of Mr. Schiller, but we cannot forbear saying that the individualistico-collectivistic interpretation of the dictum is entirely forced and unnatural. Mr. Schiller himself recognises that Protagoras did not know the process of 'natural selection' which is necessary for the understanding of the dictum in the sense in which Mr. Schiller understands it. We give Mr. Schiller the credit for having boldly recognised the individualistic sense of the dictum; but we fail to follow him when he says that Protagoras recognised humanity as different from men. This is a distinction which Protagoras would not have understood, and could not have accepted if he had.

9. *Criticism*: 1. *Inadequacy of sensation for knowledge*—The only interpretation, therefore, of the original dictum which remains to us is the Platonic-Aristotelian

20. *Studies in Humanism* pp. 32-38.

individualistic interpretation, leading inevitably to sensationalism and scepticism. It is these two aspects of the Protagorean doctrine which Aristotle proceeds to criticise with his penetrating metaphysical insight. His criticism very often recalls the similar criticism of Plato, with the only difference that Aristotle combines with his metaphysical arguments of the shrewdness of his scientific knowledge. He tells us first, that Protagoras, like many of the early philosophers, was obliged to take the sensible alone as the real, because in the first place, like them, he understood sensation to be of the nature of a physical alteration, and in the second place, he supposed that sensation alone could constitute knowledge²¹. According to Aristotle there was a double fallacy in this argument. Sensation, as Aristotle has said elsewhere, is not to be understood as merely a physical change: it is according to him what in modern psychology would be called a psychical fact: it is what *he* calls a movement of the soul²². Then again, mere sensation according to Aristotle could not constitute knowledge. It is true that Aristotle does not say, like Plato in the *Theaetetus*, that to constitute knowledge the data of sense must be subjected to certain fundamental notions which Plato calls *κοινά*, and which in Kantian terminology may be called categories. Aristotle does not mention any of the *κοινά* which Plato mentions,—such as Being and Not-being, Identity and Difference, Odd and Even, Beauty and Deformity, Good and Evil—which are necessary for moulding sense-data into the form of knowledge²³, and yet, says Aristotle, sensation implies a

21. *Metaphysica* 1009 b. 12–15.

22. *De Somno* 454 a. 7.

23. *Vide* Stewart's *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* p. 66.

mover which is beyond it and prior to it²⁴. Thus in order to produce knowledge, the soul must function like the Platonic 'mind itself'²⁵ which Professor Stewart compares to the Kantian 'unity of apperception.' It is true that Aristotle does not say this in so many words, yet to him the thought was present that sensation could not constitute knowledge without the moulding activity of thought.

2. *Sensation not Imagination.* — The second argument which is urged by Aristotle against Protagorean sensationalism is almost the same as that of Plato in the *Theaetetus*. Plato argues that if the perception of one moment were equally true with the perception of another moment, there would be no difference between true and false perception, between the perception in a state of wakefulness and the perception in a state of hallucination, madness, or dream. We would then be obliged to say that madmen or dreamers have true perceptions when the former are only imagining that they are gods, and the latter that they are flying in their sleep, and that therefore objective certitude would be no-where.²⁶ Aristotle raises the same objection against Protagoras. What difference, he asks, would there be between sensation and imagination, if the reports of the one were no more valid than those of the other? If all perceptions are equally valid, dream-experience would be equally valid, and continuous, with waking experience, and a man in Lybia who dreams that he is in Athens must straightway walk towards the Odeion when he regains his wakefulness, and yet we do not

24. *Metaphysica* 1010 b. 36-37.

25. *Theaetetus* 185 D.

26. *Ibid* 158 A.

find that he does so; he does recognise the difference between the τὸ φαινόμενον and the τὸ ἀληθές, thus giving the lie direct to the Protagorean contention that all perceptions are equally valid²⁷.

3. *Dovetailing of sense-experiences necessary.*—Aristotle next proceeds to point out against Protagoras in Platonic fashion that the reports of the different senses are not to be regarded as equally valid in respect of what is foreign and in respect of what constitutes the proper province of each sense; for example, in the cases of colour, sight has authority and not taste, and in the cases of flavour, taste has authority and not sight. So far Aristotle argues like Plato. But he goes beyond Plato when he points out that the deliverance of another, and the different sense-experiences must be dovetailed into each other to constitute knowledge. Aristotle very cleverly points out that we may be said to 'see' in the full sense of the term only when the two disparate fields of monocular vision are welded together in a larger perspective by binocular vision;²⁸ while the classical example of the illusive disparity of the reports of sight and touch, when a pen is rolled between two fingers crossed over each other, stands, says Aristotle, as an absolute reason why, in the interest of truth, one sense-report must be corroborated by another.²⁹ These are illustrations which eminently show the scientific acumen of the Stagyrte.

4. *Percipients not all on the same level.*—The fourth argument of Aristotle is again substantially the

27. *Metaphysica* 1010 b. 10-12.

28. *Ibid* 1011 a. 28-29.

29. *Ibid* 1011 a. 33-34.

same as that which was urged by Plato in the *Theaetetus*. Aristotle says like Plato that the judgments of different people are not equally valid; the judgment of the physician and the opinion of the ignorant quack are not equally decisive in regard to a disease.³⁰ The vine-grower Plato had said, is a better judge of the vintage than the harp-player; in musical composition, the musician knows better than the training-master; the cook is a better judge of a preparation than a guest; while in legislation, one counsellor is better than another and not all laws are equally expedient. This proves beyond doubt that opinion does not constitute truth, for otherwise, an opinion about the future would have to correspond with facts.³¹ Not every man therefore is the measure of things according to Plato, but only the wise man; and God more than anybody else. Not without reason did Plato take resort in a theological mysticism when, finding the hopeless divergence of opinions among men, he said that *God* ought to be to us the measure of things, and not, as men commonly say, man: ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις, ὡς φασι, ἀνθρώπος.³² Aristotle, not being so much of a mystic, would have differed from Plato in this judgment; but he certainly would have agreed with Plato in supposing that all percipients are not on the same level.

5. *A crushing eristic refutation.*—The last argument which Aristotle urges against Protagorean relativism is a *tu quoque* argument. There are some opponents, says Aristotle, who need persuasion, but there are

30. *Ibid* 1010 b. 12-14.

31. *Theaetetus* 178 C. E.

32. *Laws* 716 C.

others who need compulsion ; so that the same method of discussion need not be used with all opponents.³³ Aristotle has hitherto argued with those who need a persuasive argument; but there might be others who want an irresistible argument. To such, says Aristotle, we can only answer, that if, as the relativist says, all things are relative, this very statement must itself be relative and can be no more false or true than any other statement. If again the relativist says that all things exist in relation to the percipient, this percipient himself must exist in relation to another percipient, and so on *ad infinitum*³⁴. Finally, if the relativist takes shelter behind the idea of particularity, we can point out to him the absurdity involved in his being obliged to pile up one particularity over another, so that what appears exists for *him* to whom it appears, and *when* and in the *sense* in which, and in the *way* in which it appears,³⁵ and what is perceived is perceived by a *part* of the sense-organ, and then by a *part of this part*, and so on *ad infinitum*. The relativist, argues Aristotle, had rather give up his uncomfortable position of particularities and capitulate before the onslaught of eristic.

6. *Offence against the Law of Contradiction* :—It was, however, the sceptical side of Protagorean doctrine, even more than the sensational, which drew from Aristotle original points of criticism. We have already quoted the passage where Aristotle tells us that from the individualistic interpretation of the Protagorean dictum it immediately follows “that the same thing both is and is not, and is bad and good,” which involves

33. *Metaphysica* 1009 a. 16-17.

34. *Ibid* 1011 b. 11-12.

35. *Ibid* 1011 a. 22-23.

in it a direct denial of the Law of Contradiction which to Aristotle was the most fundamental Law of Thought :

φύσει γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιωματικῶν αὐτῆ πάντων.³⁶

The Protagorean scepticism, therefore, offends in the first place against the Law of Contradiction which is the primary consideration of Philosophy, and which is by its very nature the starting-point for all the other Laws of Thought. If the Protagorean sceptic now argued that in order that the Law of Contradiction might be valid, it ought to be capable of demonstration, Aristotle would boldly answer that it is not all things that are capable of proof : we have to take certain truths for granted, and of such truths the Law of Contradiction is the most fundamental. Aristotle did not consider the Axioms as Postulates : those who try to prove the most indisputable of principles show merely want of education, and are no better than mere plants : ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ φυτῶ, τοιοῦτος ἢ τοιοῦτος ἤδη³⁷. "It is impossible" said Aristotle, "that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything : there would be an infinite regress, so that there would be no demonstration at all in this way".³⁸

7. *Absurdity of an amorphous monism.*—Another attack which Aristotle makes on the Protagorean sceptic is that he says that on the hypothesis of the sceptic there would be a denial of substance resulting in an amorphous monism. The Protagorean sceptic says that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be. Aristotle answers that this may be possible only by virtue of an ambiguity of expression, just as what we

36. *Ibid* 1005 b. 33–34.

37. *Ibid* 1006 a. 14–15.

38. *Ibid* 1006 a. 7–9.

call 'man' others may choose to call 'not-man'. But the point at issue is, says Aristotle, whether the same thing can at the same time be and not be not merely in name but in fact. The Protagorean sceptic is virtually denying that substance or essence ever exists. If Socrates could be musical and not-musical at the same time, this would be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing as the essential being of Socrates and this would offend the unsophisticated conscience. Moreover it would follow on such a supposition, that anything could be affirmed or denied about any other thing, and we would be reduced to the state of a chaotic unity, a sort of a black-night identity: the same thing will be a trireme, a wall, a man, or a God,³⁹ and we would be landed into the position of Anaxagoras who said that "all things are one." The consequence of this would be that no 'thing' could ever be said to exist at all: while speaking of 'being,' such philosophers would be really speaking about 'not-being'.⁴⁰

8. *Necessity of the recognition of difference of value.*—The most important criticism, however, which Aristotle passes on the relativistic sceptic is that he says that the sceptic does not recognise differences of worth among things. If opposite courses are equally welcome to our opponent, asks Aristotle, "why does he not walk early some morning into a well or over a precipice if one happens to be in his way? Why do we observe him guarding against this, evidently not thinking that falling in is alike good and not good? Evidently he judges one thing to be better and another worse."

39. *Ibid* 1007 b. 20 ; 1008 a. 23.

40. *Ibid* 1007 b. 28-29.

It is in this last remarkable sentence δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ὑπολαμβάνεται τὸ δ' οὐ βέλτιον⁴¹, that Aristotle shows an insight that is wonderful. It is the argument from differences of value among things which is the final answer to the relativistic sceptic who would say that to be or not to be is to him equally welcome. Aristotle does definitely say that there is a more or less in the nature of things : τὸ γε μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων.⁴² He who thinks that two and two make five is, according to Aristotle, less wrong than he who thinks that they make a thousand.⁴³ The absolute truth in such a case is that two and two make four. The nearer a thing is to the norm, the less of an error it would be. Thus it follows that while there is an Absolute Truth, there are various degrees of error. It would be wrong according to Aristotle to say that there are degrees of truth. In his very original theory of Truth, Aristotle would say that Truth is one but error infinite. This would in fact be necessitated by the metaphysical consideration that while, according to Aristotle, all the sublunary things are capable of motion and so are emblems of infinite error, the First Mover is himself unmoved and so is the emblem of Absolute Truth.

41. *Ibid* 1008 b 18-19.

42. *Ibid* 1008 b. 32-33.

43. *Ibid* 1008 b. 34-35.

A Philosophy of Spirit

An abstract* of the Presidential Address delivered at the
13th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress
held at Nagpur in Dec. 1937.

‘ Your Excellency, Mr. Vice-Chancellor, Rajasaheb of Aundh, Sir Radhakrishnan, Ladies and Gentlemen,—
The honour which has been bestowed upon me by the working committee of the Philosophical Congress is too much for me. I am a man humbly working in my own way. I am indeed very much indebted to the organisers of the Philosophical Congress for inviting me to preside at this XIIIth session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. The honour goes round, and I am a participant in that round for this year. It is only in that capacity that I stand before you to-day.

‘ You all know how times are fast changing in India. According to the advent of the new age, we shall have to take account of our own Indian philosophic thought, and to see the place which it might occupy in the national life of India. Before we can collate Western thought with Indian thought, we shall utilize the knowledge that has been given to us by the great researches in the various departments of philosophic thought in the West so as to support and broadcast the message which Indian philosophic thought gives to us, and through us to the world.

* I am much indebted to my friend and younger colleague, Prof. C. D. Deshmukh, of Morris College, Nagpur, for this brief abstract of my address, R. D. R.

‘It is only too true, as Sir Hari Singh Gour has just now told us, that philosophy is beset with difficulties, subtleties, obscurantisms, and so on. I do not deny that these things exist. But I beg to submit that the kernel of philosophy is not the difficulties or the obscurantisms, but a metaphysical and moral pith which constitutes the essence of all philosophy whatsoever.

‘I will, at the commencement, take a general survey of the recent discoveries in modern Physics, Biology, Neurology, and so forth, and explain how they all tend to prove that Spirit is the only reality, and how Western thought can be brought into harmony with the conclusions of the great Indian sages and philosophers.

‘I will first take up the contribution which has been made by Sir James Jeans to the development of modern Physics, because that will help very much an interpretation of philosophy in terms of spiritualistic idealism. I would particularly draw your attention to the presidential address to the British Association for the advancement of Science which he delivered in 1934, and I hope that as President of the Indian Science Congress to be held in Calcutta very shortly, he will give further support to the doctrines he enunciated in his earlier address. When Sir James Jeans addressed the British Association, he said that space and time were merely mental constructs, and he postulated a theory of these in terms of seven dimensions, as he said that two independently moving electrons required six dimensions of space, and one of time. Sir James then mentioned two parables, the particle-parable and the wave-parable, as the governing principles of all physical thought hitherto. Photons, protons, positrons, negatrons,

gravitrons—all these come under the first heading. If Sir James Jeans may be regarded as sympathetic to either of these theories, he may be supposed to sympathise with the second, namely the wave-parable, even though he thinks that that itself does not give us a final explanation of reality. Nature, he says, is thus nothing more than waves of our knowledge, or waves of imperfections of our knowledge. All this is in consonance with the spirit of philosophical idealism, which, he says, governs modern physical theories. The next question that he asks is, supposing Nature is only one's own knowledge, how is it that all of us perceive the same Sun, Moon, and Stars? And the answer that Sir James Jeans gives is, that this is so because there is *one* continuous stream of life which runs through the whole of Nature, and which permeates us all. This line of thought, he says, is in harmony with the spiritual idealism preached by philosophers from Plato to Berkeley. All this is good enough, and there is no very distant step from this theory of Idealism to a theory of Spirit which is immanent in the whole universe.

‘Coming to Biology, we find the researches of Driesch most interesting from the philosophical point of view. Roux had disbelieved in the autonomy of life on the basis of his experiment consisting in the destruction of one of the two cleavage-cells of a frog's egg immediately after the first cleavage had been completed, because, he said, in such cases the remaining cell develops only the left or the right side of the embryo. Driesch approaches the problem by a different method, based on his experiments on the sea-urchin's egg, where the remaining cleavage-cell develops not half of the embryo, but a complete embryo of half the size.

Driesch applies the method also at the four-cell stage, as well as to the blastula, which is a hollow sphere built up of about a thousand cells. He also applies the method in the case of the Ascidian *Clavellina*, whose branchial apparatus is the very type of an equipotential system. From his experiments, Driesch concludes that life is an autonomous principle, which he calls the "entelechy". Disarrange a part of a sea-urchin's egg, and it will tight itself. Injure a part, and the injury will be made good. Take only a fragment, and it will develop a complete embryo. All this points, he says, to the existence of the "entelechy," which, according to him, has no chemical basis, nor any location in space. It governs all vital processes such as assimilation, circulaion, reproduction, and so forth. Further, it cannot be divided or cut into pieces. Driesch suggests that in the case of the higher animals, and especially in man, it may be called a "psychoid". This principle, however, if we may be allowed to coin a new word for it, may be called a "spiritoid", or a "spiriton," corresponding to the "*Bindule*" used by Jnanesvara and other mystics.

'I want now to call your attention to certain contemporary researches in the field of Neurology, and particularly, to the researches of Mr. Head on the function of the "Thalamus", which has been proved to be the seat of emotions. By the application of the three methods of (1) the study of lesions, (2) the study of pathological cases, and (3) the extirpation method practised especially on higher animals, we arrive, says Head, at the conclusion that the Thalamus is the seat of the emotions. It has been for a long time admitted that the cortex is the seat of intellection. Now, cut below the cortex, and there is exaggerated emotion, e. g.,

excessive weeping, excessive hilarity, excessive sexuality, and so on. Again, cut below the Thalamus, and we find that there is mere automatism. Thus, says Mr. Head, the Thalamus may be regarded as the seat of emotions. The significance of the discovery of the function of the Thalamus for philosophy is that we clearly see how the intellect is meant to "control" the emotions, following the idea of the control of the higher over the lower in Sherrington and Hughlings-Jackson. But, at the same time, emotions are more internal; they are "āntarātara," that is to say, nearer reality. Thus neurological discoveries bring to light the problems concerning the conflict and co-operation, the inhibition and summation—to use Sherrington's phraseology—of intellect and emotion, or of *Jnana* and *Bhakti*. The ideal would be a perfect harmony and co-operation between intellect and emotion.

'We now come to a discussion of the significance of the analysis of moral and religious consciousness by Bergson in his recent work—"The Two Sources of Morality and Religion". According to Bergson, intellect and intuition are the two sources of moral and religious consciousness, and action is superior to contemplation. A contemplative, he says, is an arrest of Nature. Bergson's dimorphism, however, is ultimately unacceptable, because there are not two sources of morality and religion, but only one, viz., intuition, as may be seen most clearly by reference to his earlier works; and the exclusive stress laid on action ignores the temperamental differences among mystics. Bergson's *élan* again, is a biological principle, and not a spiritual principle. Ultimately, however, in the analysis of religious consciousness, the Christian in Bergson asserts himself, and

he says that true mystical experience is to be found not in Plato or Plotinus, in the Buddha or the Hindu sages, but in Paul and Augustine. Buddhism, he says, following the usual traditional interpretation, reels on the edge of Nothingness.

Among the existing historical religions, Buddhism is often supposed to be advocating the view that Nothingness is the only reality. I have continuously thought through the last quarter of a century, though I was not able hitherto to substantiate it by a detailed study of the Sources, that a great religion like Buddhism cannot be based upon the foundation of No-spirit. This line of thought has found remarkable corroboration in the contributions which Mrs. Rhys Davids has lately made to the interpretation of Buddhism during the last 8 or 10 years, entirely contradicting her original views about Buddhism, a result which has been highly approved of by such critical scholars as Prof. Keith. Buddhism has thus to be interpreted anew on the lines of Mrs. Rhys Davids, who says that the negative side was due to the development of Canonical Buddhism, which was separated from the original doctrines of the Buddha by a period of three long centuries. The question which confronts us in connection with the Buddha is whether his spiritual illumination consists only in (1) an uncommon insight of moral comprehension, or (2) a discovery of the law of causality, or (3) an actual mystical experience. If we just cast a glance at the Buddha's soliloquy immediately after his spiritual illumination, we shall see that he refers to the Soul, 'the Builder of the body, whom he has found out, but whose house' he has entirely demolished. This passage which occurs in the Dhammapada is really in Majjhima,

which is a fairly old collection, and may give us the words of the Buddha himself. "Gahakāraka ditthosi.....sabbā te phāsukā bhaggā" might really be the spiritual experience of the Buddha in the very manner in which Trīśaṅku in the Upanishads tells us what he felt when he had reached a mystical apprehension of reality. Then again in the Alagaddūpama-sutta, which is a very old record, we are told that in reply to a critic who had charged the Buddha as having been mistaken in denying the existence of the soul, Buddha said that what he meant by preaching a doctrine of No-soul or Anattā was that the body or the mind or the senses were not the Soul, but that it would be a sacrilege to deny the existence of a spiritual principle. Further, in the Mahāparinibbānaa-sutta we are told how there were two occasions of light or *nimbus* in the case of the Buddha, one at the time of his spiritual illumination, and the other at the time of his passing away. These facts point unmistakably to the Buddha's teaching about the reality of the Self, as well as to the mystical experience which the Buddha enjoyed.

'Coming to a so-called spiritual philosopher of the present day, Croce, we find that he believes in an ever-evolving ever-changing never-ending Absolute. And though he repudiates the Hegelian dialectic, his system could legitimately be described as a hybrid of Hegelism and Bergsonism. His intuition is nothing more than imagination, and his view that a philosophy of history and a history of philosophy are both impossible is falsified by the logic of the Sciences. Croce's is a bastard spiritualism; his *spirito* is nothing but mind or thought. Both Croce and Gentile decry religion, and elevate moralism and infinite progress; and

their doctrine of approximation, though true of the individual, is false about the whole. Croce's ever-evolving absolute is the very philosophical prototype of Mussolini's never-ending political ambition. Mussolini's Fascism, might well be regarded as rooted in Croce's philosophy of the never-ending Absolute.

As we look at history, we see that all politics is determined by the prevailing philosophy of a nation. It was Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot who paved the way for the French Revolution. It was Hegel, Nietzsche, and Treitschke who paved the way for the great World-War of 1914. It is the new philosophy of an ever-evolving Absolute which is responsible for modern Fascism, whose ambition is never-ending. As against these theories, we have a theory of politics based upon the principles of non-violence and truth, resuscitated by Mahatma Gandhi from our ancient lore. Non-violence and Truth are not new principles, but have been advocated from very ancient times. It is to be remembered, however, that our politics cannot succeed without a spiritual basis. When the teacher of Krishna told him to make *Ahimsā* and *Satyavachana* his initial mottoes, he said that they were merely the alms that he was to give. "Akshitamasi, Achyutamasi....."—Thou art the imperishable, Thou art the unchangeable—indicated *verily* the Spiritual Principle that governed all moral action whatsoever. Non-violence has been the basic principle of Christianity, Jainism, and Buddhism. It has also been preached by the Bhagavadgītā in many a context; but these have been made to repose there definitely on a spiritual foundation. Non-violence and Truth are merely the flower of which the root is Spirit. Let us beware that in our modern political ambitions

we do not follow the irreligious Soviet ideal. I entirely agree with His Excellency Sir Hyde Gowan that universal brotherhood should be the foundation of our politics during times to come. But this brotherhood, I submit, should and could repose only upon a spiritual basis. A study of the Philosophy of Religion would contribute greatly to the bringing together of all creeds and faiths and races. Hindus and Muslims, Nazis and Jews, Communists and Fascist could never be reconciled by any political or moral theories. It is only when all humanity comes to recognize the one Spiritual Principle which underlies all things, that we can bring about a harmony between different creeds, nations and races. Sir Radhakrishnan is such an ambassador of Indian Thought to Western Culture. One could wish that chairs of Philosophy of Religion, as at Oxford, were established at all the Universities in order that all humanity might meet in the Philosophy of Spirit. It is not by an appeal to the dogmas of the different faiths that we can bring together the warring sects. It is only by bringing them to a common consciousness of spiritual life that we can realize the end which we are striving for. The Philosopher's work is not done when he has realised within himself the peace of mind about which Mr. Joseph speaks, and to which His Excellency refers. His supreme business is to bring about peace and harmony in the Society, the State, and the World at large. From this point of view, it may be said, without exaggeration, that the future of the world rests with the Philosophers'.

Yājñavalkya and the Philosophy of Fictions

The propriety of the theme.

1. It is fortunate that the present writer should have found a topic, namely one dealing with the philosophy of Yājñavalkya, as a topic peculiarly fitted to go in the commemoration volume in honour of Dr. Ganganatha Jha. The life and work of Dr. Ganganatha Jha remind us of the sage Yājñavalkya at every stage like Yājñavalkya, Dr. Ganganatha Jha hails from Mithilā, and like Yājñavalkya, he is an Advaitin. Any one who might have read his recent lectures on Advaita philosophy delivered at Baroda might find how much justification there is in calling Dr. Jha a present-day representative of the philosophy of Yājñavalkya.

A short résumé of the philosophical teaching of Yājñavalkya.

2. It would not be improper here to go into a very short résumé of the philosophical teachings of this great ancient Maithila Philosopher, the philosopher of the Bṛihadāranyakopanishad, Yājñavalkya. For a full account of his personality and teachings, the reader may be referred to the present writer's "*Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*," pp. 19—21, and 55--59. In order, however, to understand the full significance of Yājñavalkya's philosophy of Fictions, which is the topic of the present essay and which has been scarcely dealt with in that volume, it would just be well to begin by noticing a few points of his philosophy to serve as a background for the picture of his fictionalistic philosophy.

We know how Yājñavalkya regards the Atman as both the ontological substratum of all existence, as well as the epistemological nucleus of all knowledge.¹ He is the *fons et origo* of all existence, and is also the source to whom all perceptions are to be referred. Another way of stating his ontological doctrine is his very characteristic theory of Emanations. This involves, that the only reality in the world belongs to the Ātman, everything else being merely derivative, and a fatuity (Ārta).² From the heights of his Advaitic philosophy, as has been pointed out in the “*Constructive Survey*,” Yājñavalkya is led even to regard Transmigration as unreal; for as the Soul is eternal, from what would it transmigrate, and to what?³ Also we know, how he regards consciousness itself, from the purely philosophic point of view, as a fleeting phenomenon.⁴ This however, does not prevent him from regarding the Ātman as *ῥήσασθαι ὁρῶντος* the eternal self spectator,⁵ the only reality in a world of phantoms.

Yājñavalkya's use of the word 'Iva' to enunciate a philosophy of Fiction.

3. The passage in which Yājñavalkya's philosophy of Fictions comes out particularly is the celebrated one from the second chapter of the Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 4th *Brāhmaṇa*, which runs as follows :—

यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति, तदितर इतरं पश्यति, तदितर इतरं शृणोति, तदितर इतरमभिवदति, तदितर इतरं मनुते, तदितर इतरं जानाति, यत्र वा अस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं जिघ्रेत्तत्केन

1. Bṛih. II. 4. 11.

2. Bṛih. III. 4. 2, and III. 5. 1.

3. Bṛih. II. 4. 13.

4. Bṛih. II. 4. 12.

5. Bṛih. IV. 3. 1—6.

कं पश्येत्तत्केन कं शृणुयात्तत्केन कमभिवदेत्तत्केन कं मन्वीत तत् केन
कं विजानीयात् । येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयाद्विज्ञातारमरे
केन विजानीयात् ॥ १४ ॥

Yājñavalkya is telling his wife Maitreyī that it is only where there is an as-it-were duality, that one is able to see another, to hear another, to smell another, to know another, but where, to the realiser, the whole world is the Ātman, by what and what could he perceive, by what and what could he think, by what and what could he hear? How could he know the Knower who knows all things? This passage has got an eschatological context no doubt, because Yājñavalkya is having a conversation with his wife Maitreyī in regard to departing consciousness, but it could as well be extended to the epistemological sphere. Just before this passage, Yājñavalkya had almost confounded Maitreyī by telling her that after death it seemed as if consciousness was itself lost. Maitreyī felt perplexed and asked him how this came to pass. Yājñavalkya hastily excused himself from answering the question by saying that sufficient unto the day was the wisdom thereof,⁶ and then, as if by a tangent, gave out his great fictionalistic doctrine which is couched in the passage above referred to. Yājñavalkya tells us that because all perception, audition, thought, imagination, and so forth, take place only when there is as-it-were an "other," in the absence of such an "other" such acts of perception and the rest would be impossible altogether. Hence, Yājñavalkya's philosophy requires that there must be an as-it-were, a semblant duality, before any psychological act like that of perception or thinking becomes possible.

6. Bṛih. II. 4. 13.

But experience shows that this "other" is of an unending and perishable character. Hence, we have to conclude that for the epistemological act, the duality presented must be only an as-it-were duality, and not a real duality at all : it is only as-if there was an "other," pitted against the "one." The object is a non-ent, if taken away from the subject ; it is only the One that exists. This is what we might call the nucleus of Yājñavalkya's philosophy of fictions.

Two further points worthy of notice.

4. In regard to the position thus reached there are two further points worthy of note. In the first place, the philosophy of fictions is connected with the impossibility of making the Knower the object of knowledge. He, who is the supreme knower of all things, how is it possible for him to be known? This is the first chief strand in Yājñavalkya's epistemological doctrine. Another is the modification which Yājñavalkya later⁷ introduces in the same Upanishad, wherein he relieves his original absolutistic solipsism by granting that when it is said that we do not know any other object, in fact, we know it and yet know it not. We see and see it not ; we hear and hear it not ; and so forth. Hence, the original philosophy of fictions which threw a doubt upon the existence of objective reality by making it only an appearance has later to be modified by the recognition that to objective existence some sort of reality may be granted for psychological purposes ; this is possible because, says Yājñavalkya, the instruments of perception, namely the organs of sense, do not cease to function. Hence, because, the energies of the senses remain in the

7. Bṛih IV. 3. 23-30.

act of perception, we must grant that there must be some sort of existence for psychological purposes ; but as the only real existence for all ontological purposes could be the Ātman, the external reality that we are talking about must be of the nature of a mere fiction or an appearance.

Different interpretations of the Yājñavalkyan dictum.

5. This is the outcome of understanding the full implication of the particle 'iva' in the passage of the Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad which is the main topic of the present essay. Let us see how the passage originally quoted is interpreted by the three great commentators on the Upaniṣad, Śaṅkara, Raṅga-rāmānuja, and Madhva. The passage has, as we have pointed out above, an eschatological context no doubt, as it comes immediately after the exclamation of Yājñavalkya to Maitreyī that there may be no consciousness after death. But it is not necessary to restrict it to the eschatological universe of discourse. The question of Ātman, according to Yājñavalkya, could be discussed not merely from an eschatological point of view, but even legitimately from an epistemological point of view. Śaṅkara recognises this and tells us that two states of knowledge could be conceivably imagined ; one the state of Vidyā, and the other the state of Avidyā. In the state of Vidyā there is absolutely no existent outside the Ātman ; but in the state of Avidyā we might suppose that there is a "heteros" apart from the perceiving subject. But this "heteros," says Śaṅkara, is only of a fictional character :—

यत्र यस्मिन्नविद्याकल्पिते कार्यकरणसंघातोपाधिजनिते विशेष-
त्मनि खिल्यभावे, हि यस्मात् द्वैतमिव परमार्थतोऽद्वैते ब्रह्मणि द्वैतमिव

भिन्नामिव वस्त्वन्तरमात्मन उपलक्ष्यते.....इतरो घ्राता इतरेण घ्राणे-
नेतरं घ्रातव्यं जिघ्रति तथा । सर्वं पूर्ववत् । इयमविद्यावद्वस्था । यत्र तु
ब्रह्मविद्ययाऽविद्या नाशमुपगमिता तत्र आत्मव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्याभावः ।
यत्र वा अस्य ब्रह्मविदः सर्वं नामरूपाद्यात्मन्येव प्रविलापितमात्मैव संवृत्तं,
यत्र एवमात्मैवाभूत्तत्र केन करणेन कं घ्रातव्यं को जिघ्रेत् ? तथा
पश्येद्विजानीयात् ।

Hence, S'āṅkara concludes that real knowledge is know-
ledge where the trinity of the perceived, the perceiver,
and the perception vanishes :—

तस्मात्परमार्थात्मैकत्वप्रत्यये क्रियाकारकफलप्रत्ययानुपपत्तिः ।
अतो विरोधाद् ब्रह्मविदः क्रियाणां तत्साधनानां चात्यन्तमेव निवृत्तिः ।
..... केनचित् कथंचित्कश्चित्कथंचिन्न जिघ्रेदेवेत्यर्थः ।

Ranga-rāmānuja agrees with S'āṅkara that the passage
need not be interpreted merely from an eschatological
point of view, but he tells us that the particle 'iva' may
be understood as implying the inconceivability of the
independence of external reality :—

एवं मुक्तौ देहात्मभ्रमनिवृत्तिमुक्त्वा स्वनिष्ठता भ्रमनिवृत्तिं प्रतिपाद-
यति । यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति । यत्र यस्यामवस्थार्यां
द्वैतमिव भवति स्वनिष्ठतया परमात्मनः पृथगिव भवति स्वतन्त्र इव भव-
तीति यावत् । स्वातन्त्रस्याप्रामाणिकत्वद्योतनार्थं इवशब्दः ।

He furthermore tells us that it is only when the indivi-
dual soul receives grace from the Paramātman that he
is able to know all things, or even the Paramātman
himself :—

येन परमात्मना प्रसन्नेनानुगृहीतः सर्वज्ञो भवति । परमात्म-
प्रसादमन्तरेण परमात्मा दुःखबोध इत्यर्थः ।

Madhva, on the other hand, restricts the passage to the
eschatological sphere, substitutes the concept of positive
dependence for Raṅga-rāmānuja's inconceivability of
independence, and tells us that it is impossible to know

God Hari, a personal Being, through whom the individual soul knows all things :—

इवशब्दः पारतन्त्र्यार्थः । । यत्र यदि मुक्तौ अस्य ज्ञानिनः स्वकरणादिकमात्मैवाभूत् । स्वव्यतिरेकेण किमपि नासीत् । तत्तर्हि केन करणेन किं जिघ्रेदित्यादि ध्येयं गन्धादिविषयभोगो न स्यादित्यर्थः । येनेश्वरेण इदं सर्वं जीवो विजानाति तं हरिं केन विजानीयात् तज्ज्ञानं च न स्यादित्यर्थः ।

We thus see from a review of the different expositions of the Yājñavalkyan dictum how the particle 'iva' has been interpreted in different senses by the three great commentators : by Śaṅkara, as implying a theory of semblance ; by Raṅga-rāmānuja, as designating the inconceivability of the independence of external reality ; and by Madhva, as implying the positive dependence of reality upon a personal being.

**A justification for a fictionalistic interpretation
from an altogether new quarter.**

6. A justification for the way in which Śaṅkara has tried to interpret the Yājñavalkyan dictum comes from an altogether unexpected quarter, the philologico-philosophical. Vaihinger, an acute German philosopher, pointed out some years ago that exactly analogical expressions were used to designate the fictitious character of reality in the four chief European languages. We have, for example, the *quasi* in Latin, *comme si* in French, 'ὡς' *et* in Greek, and *als ob* in German, from which last, Vaihinger christens his philosophy. It is unfortunate that Vaihinger did not know the use of the particle 'iva' in Sanskrit exactly on the same lines as the above usages. It would have been a matter of great interest to Vaihinger to note in the passage of Yājñavalkya, which we have above quoted, that the

particle ' *iva* ' is used exactly in the same sense in which *als ob* is used in German. As we shall see a little later, by reference to certain passages from Kant, as well as to Vaihinger's philosophy of fictions, there is no escape from or no alternative to, interpreting Yājñavalkya's dictum in a like fictional manner.

**The inspiration to Vaihinger's fictionalism
in the philosophy of Kant.**

7. In his work "*Die Philosophie des Als Ob*," which was first penned in 1876, but which for various reasons, could not see the light of day till some years later, Vaihinger, while illustrating his philosophy of fictions, draws upon the various works of Kant to show how he first received the inspiration for his fictionalism from Kant. Kant to Vaihinger was a great luminous orb, at which he could light his own philosophical torch. By reference to the different works of Kant, Vaihinger points out that the only real interpretation of Kant is a fictional interpretation. It is neither an idealistic, nor a rational, nor an empirical, nor a properly critical interpretation, which, according to him, would give the real explanation of the philosophy of Kant. This, according to him, must be explained only from the fictional point of view. Kant's belief in the dual world of *noumena* and *phenomena* supplies us with the basis wherein to seek the roots of the fictionalistic philosophy. When Kant tells us that we must suppose "as if" there is a Creative Reason in the world,⁸ when he tells us that the will must be regarded "as if" free even though we cannot say anything about it from the phenomenal point of

8. Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* p. 91.

9. Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* p. 280.

view,¹⁰ when he says that each man should behave "as if" he were a member of the kingdom of ends, a kingdom which represents the idea of a complete totality of ends combined in a system,¹¹ when he says that we should regard the Moral Law as sacred "as if" it were a Divine Commandment,¹² when, finally, in the Critique of Judgment he tells us that we must suppose "as if" there was a Perceptive Intelligence for which there would exist no contingency for adapting particular laws of nature to the understanding,¹³ we see how Vaihinger wants to stress the purely fictionalistic trend running throughout the Critiques of Kant. It was this philosophy, he tells us, which was his primary inspiration for fictionalism. We may see likewise how Yājñavalkya's philosophy of 'iva' exactly corresponds with such a fictionalistic interpretation. Though there is no actual "heteros," we have heard Yājñavalkya tell us that we must suppose "as if" there was one for the different processes of perception; how, in fact, the Ātman is to be regarded as the sole reality, while all other things are merely "ficta."

The Nature and Illustrations of Fiction.

8. The question arises what is the nature of these fictions? Vaihinger has taken great pains to discriminate the nature of these fictions. He tells us that a fiction is a conscious and unreal assumption¹⁴ made for

10. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, quoted in Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* p. 289.

11. Watson, *Selections from Kant*, p. 248.

12. Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* p. 312.

13. Watson, *Selections from Kant*, p. 339.

14. Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* Autobiographical Introduction, p. xlii.

practical purposes. It differs from a hypothesis,¹⁵ inasmuch as a hypothesis can be verified, but a fiction can never be verified. Hence, even though a fiction is a conscious assumption like a hypothesis, it is unreal because it cannot be verified, while a hypothesis may be real because it is capable of verification. All scientific discoveries are made of hypotheses; but fictions do not enable us to make discoveries. All the human sciences are replete with illustrations of such fictions. Mathematics, Physics, Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics, Religion, in fact, all sciences are infected with ficta.¹⁶ All the sciences take certain unreal assumptions for granted, and weave their superstructures thereon. The nature of the sciences themselves is as fictitious as the assumptions which they make. Vaihinger points out how the concept of a point in mathematics and of an atom in physics is a fiction: there is nothing in reality to correspond either to a point or to an atom. Concepts and judgments, individuals and universals, are equally fictitious. The syllogism of Logic is evidently a fiction. Matter and Mind are fictions. The monad, which is so much talked about in philosophy, is of a fictitious character. The Divine Right of Kings is a fiction. The War of All against All, upon which Hobbes dilated, is also fictitious. The Absolute, which is regarded as the highest notion of philosophy, is of the nature of fiction. Value and End are fictions likewise. Infinites and infinitesimals equally share in the nature of fiction. All averages, all types, all symbols are fictitious in character. All categories, all concepts like Duty and God, are equally well fictions. Thus, says

15. Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* Autobiographical Introduction, p. xlii.

16. Robinson, *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 588.

Vaihinger, all Logics and Epistemologies, all Metaphysics and Ethics, all Mathematics, and Physics, in fact, all sciences are infected with ficta. These are conscious errors made only for "practical" purposes. In the latter point he agrees with Pragmatism,¹⁷ but he differs from Pragmatism in his conception of Double Truth,¹⁸ about which presently.

**The relation of Fictionalism with Sensationalism
and Ātmanism.**

9. It is needless to say that if Yājñavalkya had lived in these days, he would have given us the very expressions which Vaihinger has used as illustrations of the philosophy of fiction from the various sciences. Yājñavalkya concerned himself only with the subject-object relation in the various psychological processes, and told us that the subject alone was real while the object was of a fictitious character. There is, however, one important difference between the fictionalism of Vaihinger and the fictionalism of Yājñavalkya. While Vaihinger's fictionalism is sensationalistic,¹⁹ Yājñavalkya's fictionalism is Ātmanic. When Vaihinger was asked as to what remained when all his facts became fictions, and when the challenge was thrown at him that all ficta thus become facts *optimi juris*,²⁰ Vaihinger retorted by saying that there were two entities about the reality of which we might say we were certain, namely, the flux of

17. Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As if,'* Preface to the English Edition, p. viii.

18. Robinson, *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 595.

19. Robinson, *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 590.

20. F. C. S. Schiller, *Mind N. S.*, Vol. XXI, pp. 99-100.

sensations, and the laws of identity and contradiction.²¹ Now, every psychologist tells us that a bare sensation²² is a mere fiction. What, then, would prevent us from saying, when Vaihinger tells us that the "flux" of "sensations" is the ultimate reality, that he is dealing with a double instead of a single fiction? The "change" as well as the "sensations" are fictions, and hence the flux of sensations must be a double fiction. This is not so with Yājñavalkya's Ātmanic experience, where the eternal Knower is the *fons et origo* of existence, as of all experience. Thus, even though Vaihinger posits a double truth like Yājñavalkya, there is an important difference between the two. Vaihinger's double truth consists, as he elsewhere inconsistently puts it, of the world of matter and the world of consciousness.²³ It is this very conception of "double truth" in Vaihinger which the Pragmatists were concerned to refute. The Pragmatists only say that truth is successful error, and error is unsuccessful truth. Thus all truths, according to them, are some kind of error and all errors some kind of truth. To Vaihinger, there is a double reality. To Yājñavalkya, on the other hand reality consists of a lower and a higher kind, the lower being the world of human experience, and the higher, the world of Ātmanic experience. This double truth of human and Ātmanic experience, of Avidyā and Vidyā, corresponds closely to the phenomenal and the noumenal of Kant. Kant has thus far greater linkage with Yājñavalkya in the matter of this doctrine of double truth

21. F. C. S. Schiller, *Mind* N. S., Vol. XXI, p. 96.

22. Cf., e. g., James, *Text-book of Psychology*, p. 13.

23. Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* Autobiographical Introduction, p. xliv.

24. Schiller, *Mind* N. S., Vol. XXI, p. 103.

than Vaihinger can ever have. Vaihinger's fictionalism: is sensationalism gone mad and become inconsistent, while Yājñavalkya's fictionalism is based upon the rock of Ātmanic experience. Both are fictionalisms no doubt, but the one is a sensationalistic fictionalism, while the other is an Ātmanic one. There is as little similarity and as much difference between the fictionalism of Vaihinger and the fictionalism of Yājñavalkya as between Dog and God, the same alphabets no doubt, but the one an absolute anti-type of the other.

Meditations on a Fire-fly.

Our Philosopher was a man given to musing. It was his habit to draw morals from the meanest things he saw. In fact, nothing in nature was mean or slight to him. He found "tongues in trees, books in running brooks, sermons in stones, and good in everything." He moralised like Jaques, though cynicism was not his profession; and he meditated like Swift, though Satire was not his weapon. He could, like the one, moralise on a deer "weeping on the banks of a stream and dropping tears into it, thus adding to that which hath already much"; he could, like the other, make a philosophical dissertation on meanest subjects like a Broomstick. He clothed the slightest things in nature in philosophic thought, and whatever he touched turned to gold.

Our Philosopher was given to nightly wanderings for the observation of silent nature, and as he was once returning to his lodgings, two or three fire-flies crossed his way. "O, these brilliant creatures of light" said he, "would that I could have them and reflect upon them!" But as the night was dark, it was impossible for him to have them: he could only see the specks of light, and could neither see the form nor the size of them. Moreover, it was not his practice to go in direct pursuit of such creatures, as he was not a man of science. So he left it to time to bring one such creature at close quarters to himself. Fortunately, a fire-fly presented itself to him in a few days, having found its way into his room, and not being able to find its way out. Now that an opportunity had presented itself, the philosopher seized upon it and was lost in reverie

while looking at the fire-fly with the help of the candle. The fire-fly kept on moving hither and thither, sometimes settling on his very garments, and sometimes receding. He continued musing over it, until at last he partially came out of the reverie, as we shall see, at its disappearance.

“What a standing example are you” he said, “of the injustice of the world!” The poets of all countries have conspired together to belittle your greatness! For, do not the Indian poets represent you as going forward to proudly outshine the sun? Does not even Shakespeare condemn you for your vanity?

Like a glow-worm in the night,
The which hath fire in darkness, *none* in light.

The fact is that poets are jealous of the divine spark within you, supposing that it may rival their own lustre. You really twinkle like a little blue star, and surpass it by means of your *visible motion*. You relieve the darkness round yourself wherever you go. There is no need to kindle your flame. You are self-luminous, and shine by your own native light. May you not, therefore, on that account, be considered to surpass all those luminaries which shine by borrowed light? What vanity it is to compare your light to that of the sun! The two are not of the same *kind*: You are a living creature, while the sun consists of lifeless matter. You are perhaps the only luminous living being. What folly then to compare the intensity of your light to that of the Sun! Is this not one more instance of the envious, and therefore, odious comparisons? Why, for the matter of that, we might compare an ant to a moun-

tain, and condemn the former for not being adamantine enough! Instead of condemning you for want of light under the midday sun, the poets ought to have drawn the inference of the inconstancy of fortune; for while you shine gloriously by night, all your glory fades away in the trials of day-light!

What injustice, again, is shown by the world in not recognising your modesty and harmlessness! For you appear beautiful like a wasp, and are useful like a bee, but have not got the sting of either. For, have you not got the good features, and the symmetrical form of the wasp? And do you not put forth a native light, as the bee gives out honey? And are you not free from the venomous sting of either? O, that thy unassuming greatness should be so despised! You have not got even the element of heat, which exists in all light; for is it not true that you shine, but do not burn? Not like the nucleus of a comet, which shines and yet threatens, nor like the fire-spark which illumines and yet burns, you glide on your way, spreading light calmly and silently, and adorning whatever you light upon.

Moreover, you give the lie direct to the contention of certain philosophers that there is nothing like a natural gift; that by art, everything is possible; that genius is merely the capacity of taking infinite pains. For do you not show by your very twinkling, by that supreme gift which God has vested in you, that you are naturally superior to other little beings in this creation? Does the ordinary fly twinkle like You? Does the ant or gnat attract the attention of the on-looker by its superior radiance? The fact is that you are appointed from above to shine with superior brilliance. You show, therefore, that there is a funda-

mental distinction between natural gifts. Though Art might try to a certain extent to imitate Nature, it is for ever impossible that Art should have an equal power with Nature. The gnat might try till Doomsday, and it would not be able to clothe itself in radiance !

And at the same time that you have got this supreme gift from Nature, you are the more to be admired because you are unconscious of your powers. You would have grown proud, and perhaps venomous, had you known that there was this greatness in yourself. For, does not your light shine from behind, and not from before ? It is good that you move on, without the consciousness that you are leaving a flash of blue light behind. And in this, are you not the very model of unconscious virtue ? And do not philosophers tell us to grow virtuous, without having attained the consciousness of virtue ? And the fact that you are unconsciously great and, therefore, modest has often made you a butt of attack. For, do not ignorant children catch hold of you at night, considering that you are a jewel or a star, and confine you in their toy-box ? And are they not disillusioned in the morning to find that all your lustre has departed, and that you are no more a jewel than a piece of charcoal is diamond ? And then they throw you away ; but still you continue to be great, for though your light may be suppressed by day, it is not yet extinguished. You hold the light, as surely as the stars *shine* by day-light. It is true that in either case the light is not seen ; but it *is* there."

As our Philosopher had reached this stage of his speculations, it somehow happened that the fire-fly vani-

shed out of sight. Then the philosopher began to search for it with candle and without candle, but to no avail. He could not, with all his efforts, find where the fly had departed. "Fear not, O Fire-fly," he said, "fear not to show thyself to me! I am not a biologist: I am a philosopher. Do not fear that I will put thee in a bottle of spirit, and thus take the life out of a creature like myself! For, are we not both among the creation of God? Does not the same law, and the same element, influence and pervade us both? What iniquity then to kill life for the glories of science? Show thyself to me but once, and I shall see how I can identify myself with thee. But I see it nowhere! Where is it gone? If it is somewhere in the room, its light, like genius, must of itself be out. It is impossible to conceal musk! How, then, canst thou conceal thyself?"

But alas! What do I find here? Is it the carcass of the fly which inspired me with so much thought? Must my grave musing be definitely melancholy now? Is all thy greatness and thy lustre sunk to this little measure? Thy light hath ceased to exist, both from without and within! Thou canst not attract thy female any more by thy flashes of light; nor canst thou stupefy thy enemies by a sudden; blindness! Must I be forced to the inevitable conclusion that all greatness must sometimes shrink to a poor measure in the claws of Destruction! Vanity of vanities, all is vanity! Greatness does not exist but in name? Everything plays its part in its time, and is soon lost in the womb of annihilation! I must thank thee, Oh poor Fire-fly, that thou hast reminded me of mankind. For, what is man but an 'igneous worm' like thyself? We

are 'igneous', because we have the light within, as thou seemest to have the light without. We have the divine spark within us, as thou hast the phosphoric spark without. Our light however is permanent; thy light is transitory. We both agree in being worms; for, what are both of us but the tiniest parts of the boundless creation? In fact, thou hast reminded me that man is an igneous worm like thyself, and thou art, therefore, the very emblem of mankind!"

The Centre of the Universe

Our Professor was generally supposed to be an eccentric man. Careless in his dress, unmindful of the manners which the fashion of his time imposed on him, indifferent to his equals, and heedless of those who posed themselves as his superiors, he nevertheless manifested his precious soul to those fortunate few, who, after a long apprenticeship, had come to win his confidence. To those who judged him from what he seemed to be he appeared more or less a lunatic; and they were encouraged in this belief by the doctrine of our professor that "all Greatness is Lunacy." Our Professor steadily maintained that all great men must be lunatics, and that it was these lunatics who were the salts of the earth. Our Professor was thus known by the humorous title of the "Apostle of Lunacy."

The present writer was one of the fortunate few who had won his confidence, though it must be admitted that he only brought up the rear among them. Long would he listen, and with an ever-increasing interest, to what his master would impart to him. He has seen his master pouring out his soul in those fits of fantasy when, like a lunatic, he seemed to be "of imagination all compact." The teachings of the Professor were never given regularly; for, regularity was not a word to be found in his dictionary. If he was regular in anything, it was only in his irregularity. "Why bind ourselves by the fetters of Time and Space," he used to exclaim, "let us succumb to their power if they at all force us, but what is the use of courting voluntary imprisonment?" Rolling in a fine frenzy, the eye of

our Professor glanced from Heaven to Earth, from Earth to Heaven. In the search-light of his criticism, not the smallest or the darkest cranny of the Universe remained unilluminated.

The present writer has been fortunate enough to hear his master on several topics, and his great wish has been that the precious thoughts of his master should not die out. He must make an apology to his master for having published his thoughts against his will ; for, it must be remembered, that the Professor, following the bent of his eccentricity, is very averse to having his thoughts published. If, in doing so, the present writer has disobeyed the Professor, let it not be forgotten that the consideration of the spread of Truth has weighed with him more than that of disobedience. And it is with the animation of this thought, that he strings in the following pages his master's reflections on the Centre of the Universe.

One day while my master was in a pensive mood, with his mind focussed on a transcendental thought, I happened to sit at his feet, expecting every moment that his long and deep meditation might bring forth something worth hearing, when he suddenly began to think aloud in the following strain : " The Centre of the Universe : Will not a discussion of this Centre lead to important truths ? Is not the Centre of anything supposed to have peculiar properties ? And are not people tempted to find out the Centre of anything, even when there is none ? The fact is that people want to find unity in diversity, and order in chaos. Are they not hopelessly tempted by their " idol " of regularity ? As in geometry, they know that a circle has got a

centre, as in geography they assume that there is a centre of the Earth, as in astronomy they look upon the Sun as the centre of the planetary system, so do they try to find the Centre of the Universe. As in the former cases, they give the centre a definite position in space, even so do they consider that the Centre of the *Universe* is restricted by space. And herein they are mistaken. The Centre of the Universe is either No-where or Everywhere.

“ You will now ask me what is my own philosophy of the Centre of the Universe. The old Archimedes said that if he could get a fulcrum for the Earth he could lift its whole weight with the least effort. I say, in a similar style, that if we can come to know the Centre of the Universe we shall have solved the Problem of Problems! The questions that can be asked about this centre, are the ‘where’ and the ‘what’, and the ‘where’ determines the ‘what’. *Where* is the Centre of the Universe ?

“ I summarily answer Everywhere. Man is but a speck when compared to the Earth, the Earth is but a speck when compared to the Solar system, and the Solar system vanishes before the Universe! How ridiculous would it then be to suppose that the centre of this infinite Universe is restricted to any place! Men had rather die with shame than entertain such a foolish idea! Where then is the centre of the Universe? Everywhere! Every particle of this infinite universe is its centre! Every particle of water, every particle of wind, every particle of matter is its centre, or, we had better say, hides its centre. The centre is rather *in* the particles, than the particles themselves! The particles may perish, but the centre

does not ! It is indestructible, imperishable; without end, and without beginning ! Weapons cannot pierce it, fire cannot burn it ! In Geometry, they speak of the centre of a circle as the *one* single point from which the distances to the circumference are all *equal*. And is this not true of the centre of the Universe, namely, its Presiding Element, that it is only *one*, and equally near to all ? Again, they endow the centre of the Earth with the power of attracting everything on its surface—with the power of Gravitation. How far, then, would this be true of the centre of the *Universe* ? How powerful would the Gravitation of *this* centre be ? Conception fails to make an estimate of the Force with which all creation gravitates towards the Presiding Element ! The Presiding Element is Everywhere ! The Universe is but an Infinite Circle, with its Centre Everywhere, and circumference Nowhere ! ”

Indian Theism*

(From the Vedic to the Mahomedan Period).

We have great pleasure in recommending to the notice of our readers a book on Indian Theism written by the Rev. N. Macnicol of Poona. It is the first of a series of books, called "The Religious Quest of India" which is being published under the general editorship of Doctors Farquhar and Griswold. Dr. Farquhar is already known to the public by his noteworthy little manual "A Primer of Hinduism" as well as his "Crown of Hinduism", both published by the Oxford University Press. As readers of Indian literature know, he is the author of a book recently published by Macmillan and Co., and entitled "Modern Religious Movements of India", which in our opinion is a disappointing work. Dr. Griswold has undertaken a book on "The Religion of the Rigveda", in the present series. Dr. Macnicol's book is certainly abler than the second book in the series "The Heart of Jainism" by Mrs. Stevenson, and we doubt whether any other books promised in the series will come up to the high level attained by Dr. Macnicol. The author well deserves the D. Litt., which the University of Glasgow has conferred on him for writing the book under review. So far as we know, Dr. Macnicol's book could be reasonably compared in point of ability with only one other book which has been recently written by an Indian Missionary,—Rev. Mr. Howell's "Soul of India." No other books recently produced by Indian

*By Dr. N. Macnicol, M. A., D. Litt., pp. XVI 292, 6s. net, Oxford University Press.

missionaries have attained the high level reached in these books. Dr. Macnicol in his "Indian Theism" covers almost the same ground as does Sir R. G. Bhandarkar in his "Vaishnavism and Saivism", but with this difference, that while in Macnicol the treatment is more or less philosophical, in Bhandarkar the treatment is more or less antiquarian. Dr. Macnicol is to be congratulated the more as he wrote his book before that of Sir R. G. Bhandarkar saw the light of day. His purpose is to cover the ground from the Vedic period to the Mahomedan period (but the latter has been transcended as he discusses many *post*-Mahomedan Saints). We hope Dr. Macnicol will soon give us his reflections on Modern Indian Theism as represented in the activities of the Brahmo Samaj, Prarthana Samaj and other religious societies. We assure him that his remarks would be well worth considering.

The book opens with an excellent chapter on the Theism of the Rigveda. The author tells us how Varuna was regarded as the moral governor of the world, and how in those days so much stress was laid on the conception of the Rita, the moral law in the Universe. Varuna is looked upon as a fully personal god, who is endowed with all the highest moral qualities, being himself the moral governor of the world: "The great guardian among the gods sees as if from anear..... If two sit together and scheme, king Varuna is there as the third and knows it.....Whoso should flee beyond the heavens far away would yet not be free from king Varuna.....Numbered of him are the winkings of men's eyes" (p. 12). We entirely agree with Dr. Macnicol when he dwells on the moral grandeur of the god, but we differ from him when he says (p. 191) that the

Theism of the Rigveda is not properly an Indian Theism at all, but that it possesses elements which are possibly Semitic. Whatever is good is, according to Dr. Macnicol, un-Indian: this is the attitude which the author, in spite of his ability, unfortunately assumes throughout the book.

When the author comes to treat of the Upanishads, one is surprised to find how much he has misunderstood the doctrine of the Upanishads. This comes from his not having digested the philosophy of the Upanishads. He speaks of the 'abstractions' of the Upanishads and calls the Upanishadic philosophy a mere Gnosticism: "When the too opaque moral integuments are stripped off, God is intellectually apprehended.....by the Upanishad seekers—a being so rarefied and so transparent that he must, as they conceive, be the final and absolute one" (p. 194). This and the other opinions on the Upanishads which he holds are due to the absolute want of an accurate exposition of the Upanishadic doctrines which, *pace* Max Müller, and *pace* Deussen, has hitherto prevailed, and it is no wonder if Dr. Macnicol is misinformed about them by his knowledge of that inferior work on the Upanishads by Gough. This last book no doubt has a good literary style but it is absolutely a misrepresentation.

There is a chapter on Theism within Buddhism, which we consider to be nothing short of a misnomer. Buddhism, except possibly in the Mahayana form, is an Ethicism, and not a Theism at all. The characteristic marks of a Theism according to Dr. Macnicol are that it must be centred round a personal god, and that it must be devoid of the rigour of the law of *karma*. Now there is no personal god recognised in Buddhism. Buddha.

alone fills the place of this personal god. And moreover, if, as according to Mrs. Rhys Davids, there is no 'soul' recognised in Buddhism, freedom becomes a misnomer, and in its stead we meet with the rigorous law of *karma*. The only justification for recognising a Theism within Buddhism is that the Buddha very often placed himself in a relation to his monks which was bound to "develop itself into a full-orbed worship with a service of love" (p. 71). But this could scarcely justify Dr. Macnicol in bringing out elaborately the Theism of Buddhism. Buddhism is what the author himself calls (p. 67) a pragmatic agnosticism; it does not care for a metaphysic or a theology; its sole concern is the path towards the avoidance of misery: "I have not elucidated, says the Blessed One, that the world is eternal, or.....is not eternal, that it is finite, or that it is infinite.....And why have I not elucidated this? Because this profits not.....the fundamentals of religion.....Misery have I elucidated, the origin of misery, the cessation of misery have I elucidated.....because this does profit" (p. 67).

Dr. Macnicol shows a great understanding of the difficult points in the philosophies of Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhva. As is usual to represent the philosophy of Sankara, Dr. Macnicol talks (p. 98) of the impossibility of theism finding a "place in a system of such absolute and unflinching monism.....which makes self-consciousness an illusion, and to the sole existent Being denies all attributes whatever." But he finds it possible to speak on the very next page (p. 99) about the *apara vidya* of Sankara as opening "the door as it was intended no doubt to do, not only to theistic religion but to every form of superstition and idolatry." About the philosophy of Ramanuja he reiterates a curious statement

that the Sri or Lakshmi, the wife of Vishnu, merely symbolises the activity of the supreme spirit and thus that it corresponds to Jesus Christ (p. 109). About the philosophy of Madhva, the author rightly points out that Madhva recognised a mediator between God and man, whom he called Vayu, that he held the doctrine of grace, and that he entertained the conception of an eternal hell for one class of human beings—all which later pointed to the theory which was foisted on the philosophy of Madhva that it was indebted for these points to Christian Philosophy.

The author then goes on to discuss the theism embodied in the devotional writings of the Saints of India. Dr. Macnicol has done real service to the cause of the interpretation of these saint-poets to the western mind. He tells us how the “ worship of the impersonal laid no hold ” of the heart of Tulsi Dasa, and how his Rama-charita-Manasa has made “ familiar to every peasant the doctrines of *bhakti* and of the love and grace of God ” (p. 116). The author patronisingly says about Tukaram (p. 279) that he is “ a remarkable instance of a *mens naturaliter Christiana*.” And about Chaitanya, he says that his rapture was so fervent, and his desire so intense “ to be to Krishna, as Radha was to her divine lover that we can believe that he was sometimes heard to murmur ‘ I am He ’,” even though this kind of devotion “ which set before itself as its highest attainment *Madhurya*.....could hardly fail to have disastrous effects ” (p. 132). The custom of *jus primae noctis* for which he condemns the followers of Vallabha as a whole (p. 128) may perhaps be laid at the door of some immoral Maharajas among them, and is no mark of the system. Such customs are to be condemned in whatever religion they may be found

and the Maharajas of the Vallabha Sampradaya are to be condemned only as much as any immoral priests within the pale of Christianity itself.

When he comes to the chapter on Kabir and Nanak Dr. Macnicol very cleverly points out that with these Saints a new element enters into Indian Theism by the advent of Mahomedan influence. "The languor of the Hindu atmosphere is replaced by a new stringency, a new vigour,.....and a more decidedly ethical outlook. It is evident again and again, as we read...that new blood has flowed into Hinduism...which had been growing more and more anaemic" (p. 135). Dr. Macnicol says that Kabir contributed two things to Indian Theism: the doctrine of *Sabda* and the doctrine of the *Guru*. "Sabda is...the mysterious utterance of speech that conveys knowledge of the unknown and makes wise unto salvation... 'Kabir says, I am a lover of the word which has shown me the unseen (God)'" (p. 140). "How far this doctrine", says Dr. Macnicol, "may have been influenced by the teaching in the Gospel of St. John of the divine *Logos* or word,.....it is not possible to discuss... In any case the thought in Kabir's mind... is fundamentally akin to that of the Gospel and is far nearer to it, because more simply religious, than the *Logos* doctrines of Heracleitos or Philo" (p. 141). We, on the other hand, merely note the comparison, and fail to see any actual influence whatever. The Mahaprasada which consists in eating "betel leaves upon which has been written the secret name of God" (p. 143), even though it is so similar to the sacrament of the Lord's supper, is to be explained merely as being due to the universal notion that this kind of 'prasada' is one of the ways of assimilating divine spirit, as recognised by Dr. Macnicol himself (p. 143).

We fail to follow Dr. Barnett, whose opinion Dr. Macnicol merely reiterates in his chapter on Siva Bhakti, that it is to Kashmir Saivism that we must trace the origin of South Indian Saivism. The influence has not been proven and we cannot understand Dr. L. D. Barnett's statement in *Le Museon* that those theological ideas of the north "following the natural geographical route, filtered down southwards" till they reached Kanara. This is simply a statement without reasons. Why should we not credit the South Indian Saints with having started an independent Sivaite theology in the South? What, *a priori*, could prevent them from doing so, if we just remember that Siva Bhakti has its origins in the Svetasvatara Upanishad, from which both Kashmir Saivism and South Indian Saivism might be mere offshoots? It is sullyng the originality of such Saints as Mannikka Vasgar to say that they merely re-echoed the ideas of the north.—Mannikka-Vasgar, who according to Dr. Barnett himself, is responsible for having "produced a richer devotional literature.....more instinct with brilliance of imagination, fervour of feeling, and grace of expression than any other cult in the world (p. 171), and "from whose time," says Dr. Pope, "dates the foundation of that vast multitude of Saiva shrines which constitute a peculiar feature of the Tamil country " (p. 172).

Dr. Macnicol proceeds to discuss the Sakta sect, which, he says, is "a parallel morbid growth on the side of Saivism to the *madhurya* of erotic Vaishnavism " (p. 180). The five Makaras, *madya* wine, *Mamsa* flesh, *matsya* fish, *mudra* gesticulation, and *maithuna* sexual indulgence—things which have most of all caused man's ruin—are to be made the very means of his salvation.

(p. 186). We think the author is justified when he says that Tantrism rests on the principle that of all the illusions—and everything is illusion—the illusion called woman is the most sublime and the most necessary to salvation (p. 186), and further that “ throughout its symbolism and pseudo-philosophisings there lies at the basis of the whole system.....the conception of the sexual relationship as the ultimate explanation of the universe ” (p. 189).

We must confess to a sense of disappointment when in parts II and III of his book, Dr. Macnicol is obliged to traverse the same ground which he has covered in Part I, so that we find much repetition in the later parts of his work. In addition, he has here felt himself free to indulge in the usual depreciations which are unfortunately too often characteristic of the missionary in India. What on earth the “ depressing and enervating influence of a tropical and too fertile land ” (p. 193) has got to do with “ the Pantheism and pessimism, the moral weakness and intellectual subtlety ” of India, one can never so much as imagine. The idea is a fertile production of the author’s melancholy brain. He speaks of India presenting a strange paradox—“ a people intensely religious and yet so half-hearted in their religion ” (p. 237). The general level-headedness which Dr. Macnicol manifests in the rest of his work plays him false towards the end of his treatise, and we see that he has to obey the behests of the General Editors in undervaluing Indian Religion. The dispassionate truth-speaker in him becomes towards the end an obstinate partisan, and he comes to talk about Hinduism (p. 251) as “ an emotionally, irradiated mental void ”. There is no ideal of moral goodness (p. 251) which he can anywhere find in Indian religions. The honour and

loyalty among Indian Theisms he compares to the honour and loyalty which one finds among thieves (p. 252). And he speaks of the Indian religion as an " ineffectual religion, as was said of Namadeva in his earlier days by a wise potter, that it is *kaccha*, it is half-baked—like Namadeva, it has not yet found its *guru*.... With scarcely an exception, their Theisms, fair dreams of man's unguided hopes, have fallen from their high places to depths as deep as Tophet.... Or again, Indian Theism is a carnival of emotion, its worshipper no longer as ship lying helpless on a painted ocean of the intellect, but driven headlong by what are only too apt to be blasts from hell " (pp. 264-266). These are words which do not come from the higher self in Macnicol, and we refrain from considering them seriously. It is only when he would philosophise, and not merely soil his pages with abuse, that one can think it worth while to read him seriously.

The Ideal of Kingship*

1. We talk in these days of democracy, or socialism, of equality, even of Bolshevism. Scientific inventions, and the liberalisation of human intellect have generally put all men on the same level, and it would seem difficult to talk in these days of Kingship. A real veritable Kingship, where the King is not a mere automaton as in certain present constitutions, but where he really rules and rules benevolently, is what surpasses our imagination at the present day, and yet this was verily the state of things in those old days when King Asoka ruled. Benevolent Tyranny, using the word in the Greek and not in the modern sense, has been held up as the ideal form of Government by certain writers, and if the aim of a King could be conceived as the entire abnegation of his own self and one-pointed devotion to the cause of his subjects, such a King was to be found in the personality of the great pre-Christian Indian Monarch, Asoka, the grandson of Chandragupta.

2. A very able monograph on Asoka has recently seen the light of day, and we cannot thank too much Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar for his able re-construction of Asoka's life and activities through a study of the Rock and Pillar Edicts left by the great Emperor. The one compelling aim of the writer is to try to educe a faithful account of Asoka not from any mythological biographies of him that may have been left to us, but from the actual inscriptions on Rocks and Pillars that the great

* A Review of As'oka by D. R. Bhandarkar, M.A., Professor of Ancient Indian History and Culture, University of Calcutta, 1925, pp. xviii + 346.

Emperor caused to be carved. This method of re-construction of Asoka's life was indicated some years ago by M. Senart, and Prof. Bhandarkar has followed the clue, and ably re-constructed Asoka's life from those inscriptions. By a very fruitful study extending over a large number of years as Professor of Ancient Indian History in the University of Calcutta, Prof. Bhandarkar has produced a work which may easily be seen to do credit both to himself, and to the University which has undertaken its publication.

3. In his first Chapter, Prof. Bhandarkar discusses the meaning of the terms "Piyadasi" and "Devanam Priya" which are to be almost invariably found in the inscriptions he is considering. When James Prinsep first deciphered these inscriptions about seventy-five years ago, he was, as Prof. Bhandarkar points out, greatly puzzled by the name Priyadarsin. He did not know "who this Priyadarsin was, to what dynasty he belonged, and in what age he flourished". It was Mr. Turnour, of the Ceylon Civil Service, who was later successful in identifying Priyadarsi with Asoka. That Priyadarsi was a title given to both Asoka and his grand-father Chandragupta is evident from the Sinhalese Chronicles. It is necessary thus to understand Priyadarsi as a Biruda, or royal appellation, of grand-son and grand-father alike. Then, again, "Devanam Priya" was also a title given to kings before the Christian era, which told the subjects of the kings that the kings ruled over them as by Divine Right. Hence, the two expressions Priyadarsi and Devanam Priya which occur in the Asokan inscriptions tell us that Asoka ruled as if by Divine right, and was one who saw Good everywhere.

4. As regards the private life deducible from Asoka's inscriptions, from one Pillar Edict we know that Asoka had certain women other than his queens, and that his Avarodhana was not all in Pataliputra, but that some of its members stayed in the mofussil. It does not seem improbable, however, that Asoka, king as he was, had some left-handed wives. We also gather from the inscriptions that it was customary with Asoka to kill two peacocks, and one deer every day for his curry. But Asoka tells us that even though he liked the peacocks more than the deer, he is sorry that he should have been compelled to kill any animals at all, and he therefore orders that no animals shall be killed thenceforth for his table.

5. As regards the regal life of Asoka to be gathered from his inscriptions, we know how Asoka substituted his Dharma-yatras for the Viharayatras of former kings, viz., while former kings went out merely for the sake of sport, Asoka went on his tours for the administration of justice. We know, however, that Asoka adopted the practice of undertaking Dharmayatras in the tenth year of his reign, when he visited the "Sambodhi", or the place where the Buddha obtained enlightenment. Nor was Asoka entirely blind to the efficacy of the celebrations of certain public functions which might provide amusement for his people. In this connection, we are told that Asoka had ordered that certain Samajas be performed in order that they might please the palate or the eye or the ear of the people. Thus while he must have feasted the populace, he must have also held dancing and wrestling meetings, as well as provided music for his people. When Asoka gave up meat-eating himself, he must also have forbidden the Samajas,

where animals were slain to serve as meat for the public table. But it seems also that there was nothing in other kinds of Samajas for him to object to, and that he continued them in order that there might be amusement for his people.

6. By a very critical survey in the various Rock and Pillar inscriptions of the mention of territories that had come under the suzerainty of King Asoka, we may come to the conclusion that the extent of Asoka's dominions included "the whole of India except the southern extremity of the Peninsula, held by the Chola, Pandya, Satiyaputra and Keralputra kings" (p. 45). Asoka ruled over the whole of this empire in a benign spirit, as he tells us himself in one of his edicts: "All men are my children, and just as I desire for my children that they may obtain every kind of welfare and happiness both in this and next world, so I desire for all men". Asoka regarded himself as simply a Paterfamilias of the great human family. He specifically insisted upon justice being done to every one of his subjects. Those who were deputed to look after the Districts, namely the Nagarvyavaharikas, were warned by King Asoka to guard themselves against "envy, lack of perseverance, harshness, impatience, idleness, and sense of weariness". If they did not rule their territories well, they were threatened that a Mahamatra would be sent every five years to see that the administration of justice was carried out in the proper way. A Mahamatra was a touring Supervisor of Justice, who saw that justice was being administered in every one of the territories under his jurisdiction. The Dharmamahamatras were Asoka's own creation, and he appointed them for the first time in the 13th year of his reign.

“The welfare of the whole world is an esteemed duty with me”, says King Asoka, “and the root of it is exertion and despatch of business. I can therefore never be satisfied too much with my exertion, or despatch of my business in the matter of administration”; and, Asoka tells us that “he caused this document of Dhamma to be engraved in order that it may endure for a long time and that his sons and grandsons may similarly exert themselves for the welfare of the whole world”. Such was the very high ideal which Asoka had set for himself as the King of Men.

7: Asoka claims to be not merely the temporal head of his kingdom, but also the spiritual head. Had it not been for the great impetus which Asoka gave to Buddhism, it would never have thrived as it did. It is therefore wonderful to find that certain scholars who began to decipher the Inscriptions first should have doubted the Buddhist faith of Asoka. H. H. Wilson for example, ventured to dispute his Buddhistic faith, and Edward Thomas held that Asoka was a Jain first and became a Buddhist afterwards. The question as to whether Asoka was a Buddhist or not is now settled once for all by the very important Bhabru edict discovered in the ruins of an old monastery at Bairat in the northern part of the Jaipur State. There Asoka definitely refers to certain Dhamma Pariyayas or Buddhist canonical texts, which, it was his earnest wish, should be studied by monks and nuns, as well as lay gentleman and gentlewomen. At the opening of the Edict, Asoka definitely expresses his reverence for Buddha, Dhamma, and Samgha exactly in the well-known trinitary formula of Buddhism. This Edict sets to rest all doubts as to whether Asoka was a Buddhist. But the question arises at what time he

became a follower of Buddhism. In Rock Edict VIII, Asoka tells us that he repaired to the "Sambodhi" in the 10th year of his reign. Here, the word "Sambodhi" has been interpreted by scholars as meaning supreme knowledge or illumination: but, Prof. Bhandarkar points out that it were more in the fitness of things to regard it as the place where Buddha obtained enlightenment. Then the text would mean that Asoka repaired to the place of Buddha's illumination in the 10th year of his reign, and from other references, it would seem that he had become a Buddhist a year or two earlier.

8. Asoka was, however, enraptured not by the formalistic or ritualistic aspects of Buddhism, but by its soul-moving power. The "Ariya Vamsa" for example, to which Asoka refers in the Bhabru edict, holds up for the moral guidance of people an ideal of life, which consists in contentment with simple raiment, plain food, an humble habitation, and a life of meditation. The "virtues" which have been mentioned in other Edicts by Asoka as constituting Dhamma are: *Sadhave* good, *Apasinave* absence of defilement, *Daya* mercy, *Dane* liberality, *Sache* truth, *Sochaye* purity, *Madave* gentleness; and the "duties" which Asoka regards as incumbent upon everybody are non-slaughter, non-injury, obedience to mother, attendance to elders, and reverence to teachers—a list very closely approximate to the list of virtues in the Taittiriya Upanishad. These virtues and these duties constitute Asoka's message to the world for all climes and ages. But one very specific virtue to which Asoka refers as from the Majjhimanikaya in the Bhabru edict is the virtue,— "Pachavekkhana," self-examination or introspection. "It is difficult", says Asoka, "for a person to conduct self-examination, and

see through the evil he has committed. But unless one does it, one cannot purge the evils inherent to the body, speech and mind". Hence he insisted upon self-examination as the supreme virtue, and as the *sine qua non* of spiritual progress.

9. Asoka's conception of the Summum Bonum was not the conception of the Buddhist philosopher, but that of the Buddhist layman. If one were to ask Asoka what was to be obtained by practising virtue, Asoka would reply "Svarga" or Heaven. Asoka makes no mention of either Nirvana or Ashtangika Marga in his Edicts. Instead, he speaks of Svarga and holds it up as a reward for Dhamma in the next life. This was just the view of Buddha, as may be gathered from the Majjhimanikaya, when he said that a pious house-holder was born as a god in one of the Heavens. Asoka showed to his subjects various spectacles, such as the Vimanas, Hastins, and Agniskandhas. A work in Pali literature called "Vimanavatthu" makes clear in what sense these terms are to be understood. The Vimana was a column-supported palace, a veritable centre of bliss, which was to be obtained by the pious layman. The Hastin was a well-caparisoned white horse, which was to be in his possession. Agniskandha or Jyotihskandha was the white lustre emitted by the man who rose to the position of a god in the Heavens. By showing these spectacles to his subjects, Asoka taught them to practise virtue, for, in that way, they would come to enjoy celestial palaces, and celestial elephants, and emit celestial lustre. We see thus that Asoka's Edicts are deficient in holding up the ideal of Nirvana before the followers of Dhamma.

10. There is, however, one most important side to the religious teachings of Asoka which must never be lost sight of. His was a most tolerant mind, almost tolerant to an extreme. There is a famous Edict, the so-called 12th Rock Edict, which must be transcribed here for the sake of showing how broad-minded King Asoka was. The Edict runs "King Priyadarśin, Beloved of the gods, honours men of all sects.....with gifts and honour. But the Beloved of the gods does not think so much of gifts and honours, as that there should be a growth of the Essential among all sects. The growth of the Essential is however of various kinds. But the root of it is restraint of speech. There ought not to be any honour to one's own sect or condemnation of another without any occasion.....On the contrary, others' sects should be honoured on this and that occasion. By doing so, one exalts one's own sect and does service to another's sect. For one who does honour to one's own sect and condemns another's sect, in reality, by doing so, severely injures his own sect. Concourse is therefore commendable, in order that people may hear and desire to hear one another's Dhamma. For, this is the desire of the Beloved of the gods that all sects shall become Bahusruta, or well-informed". These lines must be engraved on their hearts by all religious enthusiasts, who, without understanding the meaning of religion, try to exalt their own sect at the expense of another. True religion, as Asoka tells us, consist in Concourse or Samavaya : where there is no friendliness of feeling towards another there is no religion.

11. As regards the dissemination of Buddhism and the missionary activities of King Asoka, we gather from his Edicts that he had sent missionaries not only over the

whole of India and Ceylon, but also to the five surrounding independent kingdoms governed by Greek kings, viz., Syria, Egypt, Macedonia, Epirus and Cyrene. This has been regarded by Prof. Rhys Davids as merely a royal rhodomontade. Prof. Bhandarkar, however, is of opinion that this must not be so construed, and that the Buddhist influence is visible not only in early Christianity but also in the Jewish sects of the Essenes and the Therapeutae. He is of opinion that the confessions, the fasting, the celibacy and even the rosaries of Catholic Christians must be traced to the influence of Buddhism. They are not simply coincidence as he tells us: "If such coincidence could be accounted for by a reference to the tendency of our common humanity, let analogous cases be produced. If they are to be set down as merely accidental, let similar cases be brought from the chapter of accidents". Hence he opines there cannot be the slightest doubt that Buddhism had spread to Western Asia and affected early Christianity, as it had also affected the Jewish monastic order of the Essenes living on the shores of the Dead Sea, as well as the pre-Christian Jewish order of the Therapeutae, residing in the neighbourhood of Alexandria.

12. Religion goes hand in hand with the spread of art and so did it happen in the case of Asoka. He studded various parts of India and Afghanistan with religious edifices, such as the Stupas, monasteries, and caves even so far back as the third Century B. C. It must be noted, however, that there was hardly any stone building before the days of Asoka, and that India is indebted to Asoka for the first time for the use of stone for architect.

tural purposes. The question arises—Was Asoka's architecture an exotic, or of purely Indian origin? It cannot be doubted that the impulse to the conversion of wooden architecture into stone came from Assyria through Persia. A rival view would hold that the Asokan column is entirely a Perso-Hellenic affair. This we may regard to be a merely gratuitous assumption. For why is it, we may ask, that we do not find specimens of the Asokan column in Bactria, or in the neighbouring regions? That the Indians copied from the Assyrians cannot be doubted. The Assyrians are undoubtedly the same as the Asuras mentioned in Vedic literature, with whom the Indian Aryans were constantly warring. They seem to have been great builders; and it is not impossible that they should have influenced Indian architecture, though a number of years previously to Asoka's time. We have evidence to say that Maya, an Asur, had built a huge hall for Yudhishtira, and there is no reason why we should not say that Indian architecture was influenced by Assyrian architecture: instead of Bactrian.

13. The last problem we may discuss is the place of Asoka in history. Here we may draw various parallels, and see how the position of Asoka as a combined king and prophet is unique in the annals of history. Like Constantine, Asoka patronised religion by making munificent endowments towards its dissemination; but while Constantine leaned to toleration for political purposes, Asoka was tolerant on humanitarian grounds. The Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius was no doubt Asoka's equal in the nobility of private life, and as regards

mental culture may have been even a little superior ; but he was deficient so far as sublimity of ideal was concerned, and the unflagging energy for the sake of dissemination of religion. King Akbar alone approaches Asoka in that respect. We know how he took delight in "presiding over the debates of the Sufi, the Sunnite, the Shi'ite, the Brahmana, the Jain, the Buddhist, the Christian, the Jew, and the Zoroastrian". His object was "to cull from every sect whatever Reason approved of ; perchance in this way that lock whose key has been lost may be opened". But Akbar was not tolerant all round. When a sect called the Ilahis sprang up, Akbar deported its adherents to Sind and Afghanistan. Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon may have been greater warriors and even greater administrators than Asoka, but we may well quote H. G. Wells to prove that they were much lesser as men. As the power of Alexander increased, his arrogance and violence knew no bounds. Caesar had no vision in him and his frolicking with the Egyptian Siren Cleopatra, although he was fifty-four, points out that he was simply a gross elderly sensualist. Napoleon had no touch of humanitarianism in him. Had he been accessible to any disinterested ambition, he might have done work for mankind which would have made him the very sun of history. But Napoleon entirely lacked imagination: "he could do no more than strut upon the crest of the great mountain of his opportunity like a cockerel on a dung-hill". St. Paul may be compared to Asoka so far as his religious enthusiasm was concerned ; but he was not a king. Asoka occupies a unique position as an ideal ruler and prophet. He first engaged himself in Vijaya

or territorial conquest ; but when his Empire was gained, he gave himself over to Dhamma-Vijaya or conquest through religion. The sound of the drum was to him no longer a signal for war, but a signal for religion. The idea of war he now came to abhor ; he impressed upon his sons and grandsons the necessity of replacing Vijaya by Dhamma-Vijaya. He did not negate nationalism ; but he had a large cosmopolitan heart which saw for all humanity an equal opportunity for the realisation of the highest moral and religious ideal.

A Vindication of Indian Philosophy

No one who has taken the trouble to observe the course of events and opinions in India during the last six or seven years, can have failed to notice that there have been two opposite, almost antagonistic, streams of thought in what might be called New India itself: one, the spiritual, the other, the materialistic; the first bordering on the superstitious; the other culminating in intellectual nihilism. There are healthy elements in both these activities: but the superstructure in either case has been most inartistically raised. If a true temple to "national activity" is to be reared, we must demolish the uncouth structures, and raise out of their materials a building, both artistic and solid, calculated to attract the attention of our contemporaries by its artistic skill, and to go down to posterity on account of its long-enduring elements.

We propose in this article to restrict our attention to the latter part of the scheme—the exposition of the defeats in the materialistic construction of Indian activities. From times immemorial, in this ancient land of ours, there have not been wanting men, who have poured out all their vehemence on the philosophical and spiritual activities of India. Brihaspati, the founder of the Charvaka school, made it a point to attack everything in Indian philosophy and practice, equally whether it was good or bad. And we owe a debt of gratitude to him, since he showed us where our defects lay. He showed us the absurdity of counting the forms of religion as everything, and the spirit as nothing. The great Buddha showed us the vulnerable points of our sacri-

ficial system, and it was owing to him that our sacrifices became more humane. In modern times also, a wave of materialism is spreading side by side with the wave of spirituality, and if we want our spiritual activity to be really healthy, we must learn its defects from the avowed materialists. And because we are unable to do justice to the writings of all such in the course of a short article, we may select Mr. Har Dayal as a typical instance of men who have rebelled against spiritual activities.

And when I say "rebelled", I use the word intentionally. I would request my readers first to go over Prof. Har Dayal's Article on the 'Wealth of the Nation' in the July (1912) number of the Modern Review; and then to compare the sentiments expressed in that article with those expressed in the July (1911) number of the same magazine in an article on "India in America"; and then also to read the article on "Indian Philosophy and Art in the West" by the same writer in the same magazine of April 1912. It would really be a great lesson to the readers of these articles to observe how a man can entirely change round within the course of twelve short months! The Har Dayal of July 1912 seems to be scarcely the Har Dayal of July 1911! I propose briefly to analyse his psychological development and then to make such remarks of my own as would show what I feel about the subject.

And I would scarcely have undertaken the project, if Mr. Har Dayal had been a reviler like other revilers of the Upanishads and Indian spirituality. The very fact that he is quite unlike them prompts me to break a lance with the American professor. He has travelled far and wide, and has tasted of the intoxicating drink of

Western Civilisation. He has been all over Europe, he has been in America, and has observed their various institutions. He therefore speaks from personal experience and actual contact. In his own words, "he has seen the silver lining," which is not visible to so many of us, who are spending their lives in India. In the second place, he has a wonderful command over English prose: he seems to be a master of antithesis, and like all other masters of antithesis, he often contradicts himself. Thirdly, he is a man deeply read in English and also in Indian philosophy: and he knows the merits and defects of either. Fourthly, because he holds with me that the enduring wealth of a nation consists "in the intellect and the character of its men and women," and no other economist would allow this. Fifthly, because his writings are read all over India by the rising generation with extreme avidity: and I do not consider that the sentiments he has expressed in his article on the "Wealth of the Nation" should be allowed to fall in the hands of the youth of India, without at the same time giving an equal opportunity to an opposite opinion to meet the very readers, upon whose minds his articles have made a deep impression. And lastly, because the souls of the ancient seers of India, whom he has treated with scant courtesy, and indeed has not failed to attack without provocation, call upon a young Indian, who knows what to prize most in their teachings, to take up their cause and fight for honour, if not also for duty.

In the latest issue of the Modern Review of August, 1912, I see a note by Mr. H. V. Divatia, who quarrels with Prof. Har Dayal, simply because he has condemned all philosophy and all metaphysics, which he does not want him to do. But is there no champion of

Indian philosophy forth-coming? Is there none to convince Mr. Har Dayal that there are points in Indian Philosophy, which are of perennial interest, and which will sway the minds of all thinkers in all ages and countries? And reader, will you believe me if I say that such a champion is Mr. Har Dayal Himself? Har Dayal against Har Dayal—a sight for the Gods to look on!

Let us see what the writer says in different issues of the *Modern Review*, first on 'philosophy' itself. In the July number of 1912, he has spared no word in his vocabulary to denounce Indian Philosophy. The "barren metaphysics" of India has "elevated sophistry to the rank of an art"! Indian Philosophy is nothing but "fantastic word towers for solid piles of thought-masonry. India is playing with the toys of childhood in mature age." He speaks of the intolerable twaddle of the *Shastras*, and denounces contemptuously the so-called "ineffable joys of trance or *Samadhi*". He plays with the text of the *Upanishads* "that by knowing which everything is known," like a child playing with fire. He supposes that the *Upanishads* are a bundle of "absurd conceits, quaint fancies, chaotic speculations;" and that a liking for them, which scholars like Paul Deussen conceive, is nothing but a "mania for what is effete and antiquated." He compares the six systems of philosophy, which Max Muller unfortunately chose as prominent and not the only ones, to a desert, and the *Vedas* to the Dead Sea!

We might retort to all this with the very epithet which he has bestowed on the *Upanishads*,—"verbal jugglery." For let us see what the same writer says elsewhere: "Now of all the treasures of Hindu history,

one of the most precious is our philosophy," (p. 420 : April, 1912). Is that really so ! " All European scholars know that India is rich in metaphysics." " India can lay Europe under a deep debt of gratitude by introducing her philosophy as a subject of study in Western Universities " (p. 421 : April, 1912). " Our philosophy deservedly ranks very high in the estimation of thinkers... Our philosophy takes the Western mind captive on account of its variety, its boldness, its thoroughness, and its clearness. " (p. 422 : April, 1912). Can anything be more conclusive proof of how even great men can turn black into white ! But let us proceed further. " I see that those old thinkers perhaps exhausted the possibilities of human thought in the field of pure metaphysics " (p. 422 : April, 1912). " India can offer to the world two things, which are sufficient to pay for everything that she receives—her systems of philosophy, and her ideal of a religious life Wisdom and Virtue in exchange for the secrets of manufacture and mechanical science—it is too generous an offer ! " (p. 11 : July, 1911). But reader, these are his opinions of July 1911, and not of July 1912 ! Can you conceive of a more thorough-going change ?

I might multiply instances : but I fear I might thereby tire out the patience of the reader. I suppose I have shown how the writer has abnormally developed in his contempt of Indian Philosophy on account, perhaps, of his American influence. I could understand a man who asserted that Indian Philosophy was not worth studying at all ; but I cannot understand a person who, in one breath, raises it to the skies, and in another consigns it to perdition,—and all this perhaps to secure antithesis and beauty of language, but at the pitiable sacrifice of truth. Who would deny that there is

wordiness in our philosophy ! But who would say that there is none in any of the European philosophers ? A student of comparative philosophy must know that philosophy can always reach a certain limit—thus far and no further : Just consider a philosopher, whom Mr. Har Dayal asks us to study, who says that “ if there is no god, it would be necessary to invent him ”, and a poor peasant, an illiterate, uncouth, rustic fellow, of the type of those peasants whom Christ, for example, preached to, who in the innocence of his ignorance, and in the strength of his faith, supposes and knows that God exists. How many of the so-called European ‘ philosophers ’, pray, had realised God, supposing that such realisation is possible ; and if they had not, and if they spoke merely from intellectual conceptions, how very inferior must they be to a poor Nicodemus, or to poor Chokha Mela, who, in the degradation of his caste, yet held communion with God ? But I fear we are treading sacred ground, and no quarrel can be possible on this stand-point with our American Professor.

I agree with him in so far that he considers much of our Indian philosophy to be wordy : but I also hold that all philosophy is wordy. What can a layman make of the ‘ substance ’, ‘ attributes ’, ‘ modes ’ of Spinoza’s philosophy ? What is Hegel’s philosophy to a non-philosopher but an array of words ? There were people, who, before the time of Har Dayal, have called philosophy by the very name with which he chooses to call it : a mere net-work of words, a great desert ! Again, the form which has been given to our philosophical treatises by the introduction of imaginary objections and feigned answers, exactly corresponds to the form of the mediaeval philosophy of the schoolmen : the same

imaginary objections, the same subtlety of argument, the same cobwebs of discussion. But when this is said, let the enemy make the best of it. In and behind these tiresome discussions, there is a pith and a marrow which is the heart of philosophy. It is this inner pith which must find expression in different forms, according to the times for which it is meant. Thus it would be most uncharitable to condemn Indian philosophy, as it would be equally uncharitable to condemn the schoolmen. The forms in which they are expressed are forced upon them according to the necessity of the times. It is always upon the past that we must build up the present, and those who despise their ancestors will themselves be despised by their posterity. "We speak of the errors of the past", says James Anthony Froude: "We, with this glorious present which is opening on us, we shall never enter on it till we have learnt to see in that past not error but instalment of truth, hard-fought-for truth, wrung out with painful and heroic effort. The promised land is smiling before us, but we may not pass over into the possession of it, while the bones of our fathers, who laboured through the wilderness, lie bleaching on the sands, or a prey to unclean birds. We must gather relics, and bury them, and sum up their labours, and inscribe the record of their actions on their tombs as an honourable epitaph".

I would take the liberty of impressing the truth of this most deserving passage on the attention of the writer. And yet, for considerations not of prudence but of justice, I may bring home to his mind the great truth which has been evolved through the entire course of the Upanishads, which he hastily calls "absurd con-

ceits, quaint fancies, chaotic speculations". Much sooner, and with greater justice, may we call the Greek Philosophers a set of fools, because they explained the Universe on the theories of Fire, Air, Water, or Earth. It is on account of the very fact that the Rishis differed from one another in their speculations, and also formed some conceptions about the origin of the Universe, which were certainly better than none, that they deserve the respect and attention of every dispassionate thinker, who does not judge of the past times by the canons of the present, and who sees the thread of an evolving idea through the entire course of the so-called "chaotic speculations". To quote J. A. Froude again: "Ptolemy was not perfect, but Newton had been a fool if he had scoffed at Ptolemy. Newton could not have been without Ptolemy; nor Ptolemy without the Chaldees". And however different might be the ideas of the Rishis themselves, yet they gradually evolved out of their speculations this great truth of truths: that there is an Atman, and that He can be realised: that this Atman is God: that the Universe, like the human body, is a covering of this Atman, and is, in fact, the Atman himself.

Upon this great truth stands or falls the whole philosophy of India. However different might be the different moulds in which this great truth is put, this is the great motor idea of all orthodox Indian philosophy. There might be systems which, like Buddhism, maintain the theory of No-Soul. When Ananda asks the Buddha what was meant by the phrase "the world is empty". Buddha answers "that it is empty, Ananda, of a self, or of anything of the nature of a self" (See Mrs. Rhys Davids' Buddhism, Home University Library, p. 52).

I agree with Mr. Har Dayal when he maintains that in a discussion of Indian systems of philosophy, we must include all those 16 systems of philosophy which are given in the Sarva Darsana Samgraha, and even more, and not the Six systems only as Max Muller has done. I suppose that the time is coming when, as anticipated by the late Max Muller, a new class of Sanskrit scholars is coming into being, who, after their study of European philosophy, are devoting their attention to their own native systems in order to place Sankara or Ramanuja or Kapila by the side of the great philosophers of Ancient and Modern Europe. It is time that Sanskrit should come to be known to European Scholars on account of its rich treasures of philosophy, than merely by its philological, antiquarian, or anthropological interest. It is time that the resemblances between Neo-Platonism and Yoga; between the philosophies of Spinoza and Berkeley and Sankaracharya, between Kant's idea of Duty and that of the Bhagavadgita, between the claims of both Tukaram and the Christ as their being the Sons or the Deputies of God, or even God himself, and other similar problems should be brought to light and discussed. It is only when, as I said, the pith of our philosophy is exhibited in modern garb that the world will come to know of the worth of Indian philosophy. Then, and not till then, will critics like Mr. Har Dayal see the intrinsic worth of a seemingly lifeless, soul-less philosophy.

So much with regard to purely philosophical matters. Coming, more or less, to persons, who were the main cause of the spread of Indian ideas in America, I mean, Vivekananda and Ramatirtha, and one far greater than either of them, Ramkrishna Paramahansa, the veiled

attacks which Mr. Har Dayal has made against all three, mentioning everything about them except their names, will be apparent on the first reading to every one who has made even a partial study of the movement they set on foot. The attacks which he has made in the number of July 1912 are wonderful, because they are veiled; but still more wonderful is the way in which he has, in former issues, stated the very opposite of them. "Contemplation in isolation," says the writer in July 1912, "is one favourite method of spending time adopted by India's sons.....They fall into the vacuous abyss of contemplation and inaction. They have established monasteries in remote nooks in the mountains in order to realise the Brahman. They practise all sorts of mysterious postures and other funny devices of a crude mysticism. All their stock and store consists in the Vedanta Sutras, the Upanishads, and the sonorous monosyllable Om. This last word seems to do duty for all history and science. Whenever a saint has nothing to think about, he takes refuge in Om.....How strange it is that a capacity for swooning away should be considered the mark of wisdom! It is very easy to lose consciousness if one has strong emotions, and a feeble intellect! That is why ladies faint so often on the slightest provocation.....No wonder that books and laboratories are despised, for no knowledge is needed to make one swoon away at intervals." This is the most suggestive passage that ever was penned. He refers to the Mayavati-Ashram, to Vivekananda, to Ramtirtha, with whom "Om" seemed to do duty for all Science, and to Ramkrishna Paramahansa, who is reported by M., his disciple, to have swooned away at frequent intervals. The whole army of modern saints have been brought to the guillotine!

As I said, let us turn to the author's former writings and see how very glaring are contradictions of which he is guilty. He contemptuously refers in the above passage to the contemplation in isolation, which brings on inaction. But here is what he said in the issue of July 1911 : Wherever he wandered in the continent of Europe, " I have always turned towards the dream of my love, that sacred tapovan and cradle of Hindu spirituality, where all Hindu aspirants from Kapila to Swami Ramtirtha, have gone to get wisdom and insight by communing with Nature and their own hearts—a veritable training ground for the spiritual grants of India; but here in the West, it is all noise and show and conventionality." Forsooth, he longs for the solitude of the ' tapovan ' then ! He admits that in solitude, one can commune with Nature and one's heart ! He admits that Ramtirtha repaired to the Himalayas to gather virtue ! He admits in the words of Milton that solitude is the nurse of Virtue, where Virtue plumes her feathers which were " all-too ruffled in the bustle of active life" ! Yet another extract ! " As well tame a tiger or bind the wind as get an American to retire to the mountains for meditation ! He cannot understand that the hidden sources of all true life lie far away from the Senate, the market-place, the theatre, the stock-exchange and the Church." (July 1911). We may, therefore, be justified in throwing back upon this Shylock, false contradicting, overassuming wrangler the very words which he threw at the innocent Bassanios " These be thy gods, Oh Israel ! "

Let us, moreover, look to other passages in the issue of July, 1911, wherein he is voluntarily praising Vivekananda and Ramkrishna and Ramtirtha, whom he

is condemning in the issue of July, 1912: The beneficial effects of his (i. e. Vivekananda's) preaching are visible on every side, America is always on the alert for a lesson in religion from a Hindu" (p. 6. July, 1911). Again, he respectfully makes mention of "full-size portraits of Paramhansa Ramkrishna and Swami Vivekananda, executed by loving American disciples" (p. 7, July 1911). And last and the most positive: "Ramtirtha was the greatest Hindu who ever came to America, a real saint and sage, whose life mirrored the highest principles of Hindu spirituality, as his soul reflected the love of the "Universal Spirit", whom he tried to realise" (p. 9. July, 1911).

What would readers say of this writer, who blows hot and cold with the same breath? Did he ever form beforehand an accurate conception of what he was going to say? If he has 'evolved', it is a terrible evolution indeed! At any rate, he is an object-lesson in abnormal psychological development, which, in this case, has taken place at an almost electric speed!

Two more points to be cleared up before we finish the review of Prof. Har Dayal's articles. He talks about the "Yoga-craze" and the "Bhakti-mania" as being the powerful sources of the wastage of moral power in India. What does he mean by the Yoga? If he means by the term Yoga "Hatha-Yoga" as it is ordinarily understood I agree with him. But if he means by the Yoga the Yoga as it is taught in the Bhagavadgita, I beg the liberty of entirely dissenting from him. Indeed Yoga and Bhakti, Philosophy and Religion, Karma and Jnana are so intensely connected with each other, that by separating the one from the other, you make both impotent. I dissent from Prof. Har Dayal and the late

Mr. Max Muller when they say that philosophy and religion must be rigidly excluded from each other. I believe that philosophy without religion is like form without spirit : and that religion without philosophy is like spirit which cannot work without a form. It is in the supreme combination of form and spirit, of philosophy and religion, that the true salvation of a nation consists. Similarly with regard to Yoga and Bhakti : Yoga is the form, Bhakti is the spirit. For, says Lord Sri Krishna :—

“ Of all the Yogins, I suppose he is the most intent upon me, who, with his heart fixed on me, worships me with faith”. Yoga, in my opinion, may be defined according to its derivation as a positive, persistent and final determination to seek out the truth--of whatever kind it may be. Such a determination necessarily requires solitude in the initial stages, in order that the virtues necessary for an active life may be gathered in the secrets of retirement. Such a solitude is the fountain-head of energy and strength, virtue and joy. Activity to be productive, must be fed by retired thought. The history of all religions confirms it. The great Buddha retired to solitude, and it was in solitude that he received his illumination. The Lord to escape company. The late Mikado of Japan was a proverbial recluse; and yet, wonders the Times of India, he was the backbone of all the activities of his nation. Solitude is not, as Prof. Har Dayal says, meant for inaction : on the contrary, it is the nurse of supreme action. The true Yoga must admittedly be the Yoga of service : the Karma-yoga : but the human faculties require to be fed in solitude, and in a transcendental and most fruitful ‘inaction’ ! “ As oft as I have been among men,” says Seneca, “ I

returned home less a man than I was before". And in order that this should not be the case, one must needs have recourse to solitude and contemplation.

Moreover, is it not wonderful to find how people come to opposite conclusions from the same premises? We find Mr. Har Dayal condemning the people of India, because their Vedanta leads them to inaction. "They become altogether useless for any purpose that one may appreciate". Contrast with this the remarks of another hot-headed, hasty, generaliser—I mean Mr. Ramsay Macdonald: "It (i. e., the Gita) is the gospel of action, of action stern and terrible done by the body and the passions, whilst the possessing soul is at rest in the presence of the eternal.....Bathed in this ocean of self-surrender, and ever filled with the music of the Divine Voice, the Indian's heart beats with ecstasy, and then goes forth to do his work. There is no limb of the vernacular press.....so dangerous, so seditious, as the song of the blessed one" (The Awakening of India: Popular Edition: p. 120). Can anything be more absurd, more glaring, more misconceived than these hasty, immature remarks of a raw labourite? Yet, as Aristotle says, the truth lies between the two extremes and I would recommend Prof. Har Dayal as well as Mr. Ramsay Macdonald to read the remarks of his adversary in order to become more level-headed, and more like a man! Let them not father their own ideas upon the text which they see!

I now come to another important discussion: Mr. Har Dayal's contemptuous treatment of the Bhaktas. "For one Chaitanya", says he, "it (i. e. Bhakti) gives us a thousand sentimental, weak-minded irresolute devotees, who are good for nothing in any practical

work for righteousness....It gives them a factitious object of devotion instead of teaching them that every suffering child is Krishna, and every sorrowful brother-man is Rama. They worship the stars and suns, but they forget their brother-man....try to think and look in words : others try to weep and dance. And all the while, ignorance, poverty and disease march triumphant through the land". Yet another extract : "Teach the people that the old gods are dead. What is there at Benares but hideous temples, fat bulls and fat priests? What is there at Puri but Cholera and waves idly breaking on the beach?" Now, pray, why does he wax so eloquent? What level-headed man would believe that god is only in Benares and nowhere else? Have not saints like Tukaram said centuries ago

" wherever you go, you find stones and water :
but god is with good " ;

" verily, verily, the good people are the gods :
the images are a mere pretext ? "

Where, then, was the necessity of such an eloquent discourse from Prof. Har Dayal? People have known even before the times of this writer where god was to be found. When he talks of the " funny devices of a crude mysticism " and the uselessness of pilgrimage, he is, like Ixion, merely embracing clouds : hence, the dire brood of his centaur-like ideas, fitting in our midst.

" For one Chaitanya, " he admits, we have a host of irresolute devotees. But, reader, mark the words for one Chaitanya. He does acknowledge that Chaitanya was a great man ! But when has history shown that great men have sprung up in myriads? A great man arises

out of countless mediocrities, and so is the case even here. When there is a Chaitanya or a Tukaram, a Sankara or a Christ, thousands of inferior persons must prepare the ground for him ! Again, he asks us to love every suffering child as Krishna, and every sorrowful brotherman as Rama ! Has he not borrowed this expression from Ramtritha whom he himself condemns ; for does not Pamtritha talk of the "Starving Narayanas" ? Moreover, would we ever deny that Bhakti includes the "love of humanity" ? Does not Tukaram implore God to lead him through the service of his feet to the service of mankind ?

"Give me the service of Thy feet and the worship of humanity, irrespective of the pride of caste or colour."

Moreover, is it not wonderful to find that this same writer should have admitted that "Voltaire, Rousseau, Marx (the modern Rishi !); Darwin, Lavoisier, Cuvier, Laplace, and Caxton were not personally as noble and pure as St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Xavier" ? (p. 49 July 1912). If personal purity does count for anything, and if social regeneration must come through personal development, then the philosophers he idolises were certainly below the mark ! Moreover, is it not an irony of fortune that the same writer who condemns the pilgrimages, and the Ganges, should himself fall a victim to the popular idea : "Time, the mighty architect, the healer of all wounds, and the avenger of all wrongs, will lead our efforts to final success after our ashes are mingled with the eternal waters of the holy Ganga" (p. 11, July 1911). He considers the Ganges as holy, then ! and its waters as eternal ! Can anything be more superstitious ? Yet, these are the weaknesses of great minds !

But I will not merely construe texts: I must say what I feel on the point on my own account. I believe that Bhakti does not consist in religious ceremonials, in pilgrimages, and in formal idol-worships: it consists in love to God, and through this, in love to man. We can never love man so well as when we know that he partakes of the same divine nature which is in us. Love to humanity must be based on Love to God: if it is not, it is bound to have a shaky foundation. It is the Love which we bear to God that inspires us with Love to man: and those who love man otherwise love him accidentally and not essentially. People like Har Dayal might indulge in literary studies in such a way as to stunt their moral powers: God may seem distant and far away. Perhaps also they might be sinless, and might not have a new desire for righteousness! But all men who have sinned—and let he, who is sinless, contradict this—and those who have come to have an earnest desire for righteousness, wish from the bottom of their hearts to come nearer God. So too can a sense of eternity, the pangs of sorrow, the bitings of conscience, the vanity of human wishes or a keen social enthusiasm bring man nearer God. It is in such a state of mind that he begins to love God as his only guide and helper, and it is in such a state that the whole moral world opens up before him. If he does not care for the vanities of the world, he might be excused: he cares for the immense gains of moral life. Those critics, therefore, who would assault an innocent Bhakta, must not shut their eyes to this all-important side of man's activities—moral development. It is no use carping at a man simply because he has chosen to devote himself to moral advancement, which, he considers, must necessarily come through a love to God. It is here that personal purity matters a great

deal : and it is here that the philosophers, like those whom Har Dayal has mentioned, are weighed in the balance and found wanting !

We have hitherto expressed our opinions on the manner in which Prof. Har Dayal has inveighed against Indian philosophy, Yoga, and Bhakti, and have, we believe, tried to show that there is another side to the question. Indeed, I must not be supposed to hold that India must be flooded with philosophers, Yogis, and Bhaktas : far from it. Prof. Har Dayal, on the other hand, wants to fill our nation with scientists and economists. "To the preacher", says Prof. Har Dayal in another place, "the world is full of sinners! to the cobbler, it is full of shoes" : we might add in a similar style that to Prof. Har Dayal, it is full of 'economists'. I am a firm believer in the manifold activities of a nation, supplementing, instead of contradicting one another. I hold that when a nation rises, it rises from all points of view. The history of England at the time of Elizabeth, or the history of Maharashtra at the time of Shivaji, amply bears out the fact that when a nation rises, it attempts all enterprises. We must have scientists as well as philosophers ; men who go in for action, and men who sit down to contemplate ; people who devote themselves to social regeneration as well as those who care for personal development. As Prof. Har Dayal has himself said elsewhere : "I need not impose my dream on all. Moral energy takes myriad forms in its manifestation You may as well find fault with the rose for not being a violet, or quarrel with the cuckoo, because she is not a nightingale. Art, Literature, Science, Politics, War, Exploration, Religion—each one of these appeals to some one, and he begins to love it with his

whole heart and soul. Let us not be narrow and one-sided in our judgments" (p. 10, July 1911). If he had just remembered this when he penned his article of July 1912, I would not have felt it necessary to make this long vindication.

And then, it is also wonderful to find—it is perhaps a sign of the times—that while scientists like Sir Oliver Lodge are speaking in favour of religion, philosophers like Prof. Har Dayal should have felt it necessary to take a brief for science and economics. I am not one of those who would condemn science for the sake of religion. I hold that there is a perfect reconciliation between the discoveries of science and the truths of religion. Science merely deals with the works of God. It supplements, instead of supplanting, religion. But I would not have the mere scientific or the mere economic spirit prevail. Let not an age of pure scientists, pure economists and pure calculators prevail and let not the glory of India be extinguished for ever. Religion asks from you merely the consent of the heart, a mere touch of the love of God. I do not understand how this can come in the way of pure activity. It would, as I said, serve only to strengthen activity, and not to weaken it. This is the only secure platform upon which the building of India's activities can be raised. Take it away, and the building will tumble down in no time. Substitute another foundation, and you will find that the building will be raised on mere stubble. We do not want India to imitate either France or America; France, with its falling birth-rate, its frivolous immoral capital, its denuded farms and dying commerce; America, sordid and soul-less, immersed in money-making, a slave of Mammon, and forced to mimic the culture of the very

country against which it revolted. And yet if Mr. Har Dayal has his way, his ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity would lead merely to national death. The French Revolution which he glorifies—is not this Revolution responsible for modern Anarchism and Nihilism? It is time that India should cease to be polluted by merely the worse elements of Western civilisation. Does not Prof. Har Dayal himself pathetically describe the lot of the woman in the West? Has not the suffragette movement served simply to make men of European women, by taking away all their elegant graces and social virtues? Does it not seem that “almost a new sex is on the make like the feminine neuter of Ants and Bees—not adapted for childbearing” and yet with a pretended power for social service? And what is it due to but to the spirit of “liberty, social equality, rationalism, and fraternity” which he glorifies? (p. 46, July 1912). If India must rise, she will rise in a most peculiar way, not hitherto known to all History. She will combine the virtues of the West and the East, and will rise superior to both. If the West and the East are to meet, they will meet in India, and not in Europe. What a glorious prospect lies before India! I see India flinging away superstition, sloth and intellectual inertia. I see her taking up the scientific spirit, and the energy of Europe. I see her assimilating the excellences of both the East and the West, and rising in the scale of modern nations, preserving all the while the integrity and the pristine purity of her spiritual self!

On reading Professor R. D. Ranade's articles on Greek Philosophy, Sri Aurobindo Ghosh wrote: "The perfect writer and scholar possesses in superlative degree the rare gift of easy and yet adequate exposition and leaves us charmed....enlightened and satisfied. A complete history of Greek Philosophy by this perfect writer and scholar would be a priceless gain".

Principal Francis William Bain told his student Prof. R. D. Ranade: "In India there are not even five or ten persons who can understand your pamphlets on Greek philosophers". While returning to England after his retirement in 1919, Principal Bain left all his library in India, but took with him all the essays on Greek philosophy by Ranade.

In his Presidential address on 'A Philosophy of spirit delivered at the 13th Philosophical Congress held at Nagpur in Dec. 1937 Prof. R. D. Ranade coined a new word spiritoid/spiriton.

Regarding the bright future of India Prof. R. D. Ranade observes:".....What a glorious prospect lies before India! I see India flinging away superstition, sloth and intellectual inertia. I see her taking up the scientific spirit, and the energy of Europe. I see her assimilating the excellences of both the East and the West, and rising in the scale of modern nations, preserving all the while the integrity and the pristine purity of her spiritual self!"